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crs_R45034

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Political Background1 Haiti was without an elected president from February 2016 until February 2017. Haiti inaugurated Jovenel Moïse as president on February 7, 2017, marking a return to constitutional order. Moïse arrived under the shadow of an ongoing Haitian government investigation into his possible involvement in money laundering and irregular loan arrangements, which Moïse denies. The United Nations ended its 13-year-long United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in October 2017. Economic Background4 Plagued by chronic political instability and frequent natural disasters, Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and one of the poorest countries in the world. Haiti's poverty is massive and deep. Almost 60% of the population lives under the national poverty line of $2.41 per day. A two-year drought, compounded by Hurricane Matthew, has largely destroyed Haiti's food supply, creating a humanitarian disaster. Nonetheless, according to the State Department, Haiti has made the transition from a postdisaster era to one of reconstruction and long-term development. Missions, Haitian Police, and Revival of the Haitian Army MINUSTAH, which was in Haiti for 13 years, was established to help restore and maintain order after the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's government in 2004. Many Haitians and other observers criticized MINUSTAH for its role in introducing cholera to Haiti, and for allegations of sexual abuse by some of its forces. In August 2016, after years of criticism and demands that the U.N. take full responsibility for introducing the disease to Haiti, then-U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon said that the U.N. had a "moral responsibility" to the epidemic's victims and announced a new program to support them, although the U.N. continues to claim diplomatic immunity. The U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) is to focus on rule of law, development of the Haitian National Police (HNP) force, and human rights, "to support the Government of Haiti in consolidating the stabilization gains and ensuring their sustainability." Concerns over Haitians and People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic Relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which share the island of Hispaniola (see Figure 1 ), have been strained throughout their history. Policy priorities include support for economic growth and poverty reduction, including through bilateral trade and investment to promote job creation; improved health care and food security; promoting respect for human rights; strengthening democratic institutions; and strengthening the HNP so that the country can provide its own security and work more effectively with U.S. agencies to combat international crime. U.S. Assistance18 Because Haiti is the poorest country in the hemisphere, and because of its proximity to the United States, Haiti has received high levels of U.S. assistance for many years. The Trump Administration's request for FY2018 aid to Haiti totals $157.5 million, almost a 30% reduction from the FY2017 request of $218 million. Criminal gangs in Haiti are involved in international drug trafficking. Temporary Protected Status Following the 2010 earthquake, the United States granted TPS for 18 months to Haitians living in the United States at the time of the disaster. Human Rights According to the State Department's most recent Human Rights Report, Haiti's "most serious impediments to human rights involved weak democratic governance in the country worsened by the lack of an elected and functioning government; insufficient respect for the rule of law, exacerbated by a deficient judicial system; and chronic widespread corruption." On November 10, the Haitian Senate's Special Commission of Investigation issued a 656-page report detailing alleged embezzlement and fraud by current and former Haitian officials managing $2 billion in loans from Venezuela's PetroCaribe discounted oil program. The commission accuses 15 former government officials, including two former prime ministers, and the current president's chief of staff of corruption and poor management.

Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic; Haiti occupies the western third of the island. Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. Although significant progress has been made in improving governance, democratic institutions remain weak. Poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide. In proximity to the United States, and with a chronically unstable political environment and fragile economy, Haiti has been an ongoing policy issue for the United States. Many in the U.S. Congress view the stability of the nation with great concern and have evidenced a commitment to improving conditions there. Haiti returned to constitutional order in February 2017, with the inauguration of President Jovenel Moïse, after almost a year without an elected president because of political gridlock and delayed elections. Hopes for a more functional and transparent government are tempered by the political newcomer's lack of experience and ongoing investigations into Moïse's possible involvement in money laundering and irregular loan arrangements, which the president denies. Widespread corruption has been an impediment to good governance and respect for human rights throughout much of Haiti's history. The Haitian Senate's Special Commission of Investigation released a report in November alleging embezzlement and fraud by current and former Haitian officials managing $2 billion in loans from Venezuela's PetroCaribe discounted oil program. The commission accuses 15 former government officials, including two former prime ministers, and President Moïse's chief of staff of corruption and poor management. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Its poverty is massive and deep, exacerbated by chronic political instability and frequent natural disasters. Almost 60% of the country's 10 million people live in poverty, and almost a quarter of them live in extreme poverty. Haiti is still recovering from the devastating earthquake in 2010, as well as Hurricane Matthew, which hit the island in 2016. The latter worsened a process begun by a two-year drought, destroying Haiti's food supply and creating a humanitarian disaster. In addition, Haiti continues to struggle against a cholera epidemic inadvertently introduced by United Nations peacekeepers the same year as the earthquake. Nonetheless, according to the State Department, Haiti is transitioning from a postdisaster era to one of reconstruction and long-term development. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was in Haiti to help restore order from 2004 until October 2017. The mission helped facilitate elections, combated gangs and drug trafficking with the Haitian National Police, and responded to natural disasters. MINUSTAH was criticized because of sexual abuse by some of its forces and scientific findings that its troops introduced cholera to the country. The U.N. maintains it has diplomatic immunity, but after years of international pressure said that it had a "moral responsibility" to the epidemic's victims. The U.N. announced a new $400 million plan to fight cholera in Haiti, and its intention to support cholera victims; neither program has been fully funded or implemented. MINUSTAH has been succeeded by a smaller mission, the U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), which is to focus on rule of law, development of the Haitian National Police force, and human rights. The Haitian National Police now have primary responsibility for domestic security. Haiti was a key foreign assistance priority for the Obama Administration in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the State Department, the main priorities for current U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic institutions and foster sustainable development. Other policy priorities include support for economic growth and poverty reduction, including through bilateral trade and investment to promote job creation; improved health care and food security; promoting respect for human rights; and strengthening the Haitian National Police. The Trump Administration's proposed FY2018 budget of $156 million for aid to Haiti was a 30% reduction from the FY2017 request. The Administration has also announced that Temporary Protected Status for Haitians is to be terminated as of July 22, 2019.

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Introduction The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. FEMA has established the Public Assistance (PA) Grant Program by combining the authority of multiple sections of the Stafford Act. Between FY2000-FY2013, the PA Program has provided $52.6 billion in grant assistance to help communities pay for an array of eligible response and recovery activities, including debris removal, emergency protective measures, and the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain private nonprofit (PNP) organizations. The authorities of the PA Program were most recently significantly amended by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (Division B of P.L. The report concludes with discussion of several policy issues that Congress may wish to consider when evaluating the PA Program in the future, including considerations of significant prospective changes to the PA Program and the role of the PA Program in the context of other federal agency disaster assistance authorities. Key Elements of the PA Program This section of the report describes key elements of the PA Program, such as major eligibility considerations, the types of grant assistance provided, and the methods for disbursing grant funding. Eligible Applicants In order to be eligible for PA grants, an applicant's respective state or tribal government must first receive a major or emergency disaster declaration from the President through Stafford Act procedures. More limited emergency work assistance is also provided for areas receiving Fire Management Assistance Grants (FMAGs). So long as it is in the public interest, FEMA provides grant assistance to communities for both the actual removal of the debris and the management of the process writ large, as authorized by Section 403(a)(3)(A) and Section 407 of the Stafford Act. Examples of eligible activities include the establishment of temporary shelters and community service facilities, critical power generation, demolition of unsafe buildings, operation of emergency communications systems, and more. This policy guidance explains the conditions by which FEMA will approve assistance for hazard mitigation measures (with examples provided). If facility owners fail to obtain and maintain insurance as required by FEMA, the facility is ineligible for permanent work assistance in a future disaster of the same hazard type (this restriction does not apply to emergency work assistance). The PA Program has a minimum federal cost-share of 75%, meaning that the maximum a grantee is responsible for is 25% of the total eligible amount of grant assistance, for both emergency and permanent work. FEMA will either award grants based on the estimated federal share of the total eligible cost for the project, or it will award grants on the federal share of actual eligible costs evidenced through documentation by the applicant/grantee. The actual cost basis method reimburses the applicant for eligible expenses only as actual costs are documented by the applicant. Estimated Cost Basis Under current practice, FEMA issues grants based on the estimated federal share of eligible costs for PA projects when: The project is eligible for simplified procedures as authorized in Section 422 of the Stafford Act (a "small project" in FEMA terminology); An applicant has decided to receive an in-lieu contribution through Section 406(c) of the Stafford Act (an "alternate project" in FEMA terminology); Certain projects that include significant improvements for the facility (an "improved project" in FEMA terminology); or An applicant chooses to use the alternative procedure for a permeant work, large project grant to be based on a fixed estimate. For the period FY2000-FY2013, $6.6 billion was obligated by FEMA to PNPs, with the highest spending in FY2005 ($2.0 billion) and FY2013 ($1.4 billion). Inclusion of these costs may increase the amount of general hazard mitigation assistance provided by the PA Program considerably if accounted for in other analysis. Consistent with past precedents, Congress may review current FEMA policies and procedures for the PA Program, and, when desired, override the policies through further clarification in law or submit formal legislative recommendations on policies in committee or conference report language. As described earlier in this report, FEMA created the Public Assistance Alternative Procedures (PAAP) Pilot Program to implement these alternative procedures. P.L. Since then, namely in the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and in the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988, permanent work assistance has expanded to include certain PNPs with similar reasoning. Privately Owned Facilities Under past and current law, private entities, such as owners of private infrastructure facilities and individual homeowners, are excluded from PA Program assistance for both emergency work and permanent work. To do so, Congress could consider several options, including, but not limited to, Requiring the President or FEMA to issue further regulations on the circumstances that Stafford Act authorities will provide assistance in the presence of more specific federal authorities, to possibly include revision of FEMA's regulation for permanent work on the matter; Requesting a formal opinion from the Comptroller General on FEMA's legal interpretation of augmentations of appropriations law to determine if Stafford Act authorities can be used to provide assistance when another federal agency with more specific authority does not have sufficient appropriations to fund an activity; Giving further direction through law or report language to the executive branch regarding the conditions it should to defer to more specific authorities in lieu of the more broadly scoped Stafford Act, perhaps in the form of a delivery sequence outlining the order of precedence of federal programs for assistance; and Revising the Stafford Act to explicitly identify whether Stafford Act authorities may or may not provide assistance in substitution, or at grantee preference, for more specific federal disaster assistance authorities. The main report discusses the notable changes made to the PA Program by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 ( P.L. 113-2 , SRIA).

The Public Assistance Grant Program (PA Program) is administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and combines the authorities of multiple sections of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended, the Stafford Act). The PA Program is only available for states and communities that have received a major or emergency disaster declaration through the Stafford Act (and in a more limited fashion, Fire Management Assistance Grants). The PA Program provides grant assistance for eligible purposes, including Emergency work, as authorized by Sections 403, 407, and 502 of the Stafford Act, which provide for the removal of debris and emergency protective measures, such as the establishment of temporary shelters and emergency power generation. Permanent work, as authorized by Section 406, which provides for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain private nonprofit organizations (PNPs). PNPs are generally eligible for permanent work assistance if they provide a governmental type of service, though PNPs not providing a "critical" service must first apply to the Small Business Administration for loan assistance for facility projects. At its discretion, FEMA may provide assistance for hazard mitigation measures that are not required by applicable codes and standards. As a condition of PA assistance, applicants must obtain and maintain insurance on their facilities for similar future disasters. Management costs, as authorized by Section 324, which reimburses some of the applicant's administrative expenses incurred managing the totality of the PA Program's projects and grants. FEMA will either award PA grants based on the estimated federal share of the total eligible cost of the project or award grants on the federal share of actual eligible costs evidenced through documentation from the applicant/grantee. The federal government provides a minimum of 75% of the cost of eligible assistance, and this cost-share can rise if certain criteria are met. The PA Program is appropriated for in the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). Between FY2000 and FY2013, PA accounted for approximately 47% of all federal spending from the DRF. During this period, the PA Program provided approximately $21.2 billion in federal grants for emergency work assistance, $30.2 billion in permanent work assistance, and $1.2 billion in management assistance. Approximately $6.6 billion of these grant amounts was provided to PNPs for both emergency and permanent work. The PA Program authorities were most recently significantly amended by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (Division B of P.L. 113-2, SRIA). SRIA established "alternative procedures" for PA Program assistance, which has allowed FEMA to implement a Public Assistance Alternative Procedures (PAAP) Pilot Program. These procedures revise a number of elements of the PA Program, such as allowing grants for large, permanent work projects (facility restoration projects over $120,000) to be based on fixed estimates, as opposed to actual cost basis; and increasing the federal share of eligible costs when debris is removed more quickly by applicants. Given the importance of PA Program assistance to communities recovering from disasters, and the amount of federal dollars spent on the assistance, Congress may consider several policy issues related to the PA Program. For example, Congress may consider Reviewing current FEMA policies implementing the authorizing statute and, when desired, codifying or overriding the policies through further clarification in law; Evaluating major forthcoming changes to the PA Program authorized by SRIA and an earlier law, the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-390); Weighing options for decreasing the improper use of PA assistance by applicants, perhaps by revising the conditions of management cost assistance or improving the collection of data in the PA Program; Expanding or restricting the eligibility of the PA Program, possibly to exclude certain PNPs from assistance or to grant assistance to privately owned facilities; Deciding if and how the PA Program should provide hazard mitigation assistance on facility restoration projects; and Defining the role of PA Program as it potentially overlaps with the disaster assistance authorities of other federal agencies.

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Program "delivery" generally refers to selling and servicing policies. Delivery subsidies are not based on actual delivery expenses. They are paid as a separate government subsidy to AIPs. The SRA sets their amounts as follows: A&O: for delivery of buy-up coverage (lower deductibles), equals between 12% and 21.9% of premium, depending on policy type. CAT LAE: for delivery of catastrophic level coverage (higher deductibles), is fixed at 6% of premium. A&O Cup and Cap The 2011 SRA and subsequent SRAs established a minimum (cup) of approximately $1.0 billion and a maximum (cap) of approximately $1.3 billion per year for A&O subsidies—subject to an adjustment for inflation from 2011 to 2015—to help stabilize A&O amounts. Delivery Subsidy Outlays From 2007 to 2016, annual delivery subsidies (A&O and CAT LAE combined) averaged about $1.5 billion and represented about 15% of total premium ( Figure 3 ). Since the A&O cup and cap first went into effect in 2011, the total amount spent on delivery subsidies (A&O and CAT LAE combined) has exceeded the A&O cap every year ( Figure 3 ), reflecting policies, coverages, and SnapBack that are not subject to the A&O cup and cap ( Table 2 ). AIP Reporting of Actual Expenses Limited data is available on the actual expenses of AIPs. RMA requires AIPs to report actual expenses, but RMA does not publish the reported expense data. CRS is aware of three publicly available sources for information on AIP expenses: (1) annual statements from state departments of insurance, (2) Form 10-K and other reports submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by AIPs that are owned by publicly traded companies, and (3) AIP survey data used in studies sponsored by the crop insurance industry. Policy Issues Delivery subsidies accounted for $14.8 billion (20%) of government spending on the federal crop insurance program during the crop years 2007-2016. The amount of these subsidies is based not on actual expenses incurred by AIPs but on percentages of premium set in the SRA that vary by policy type and coverage level. The available data on actual delivery expenses is not easily matched with A&O delivery subsidies and leaves unanswered the question of whether current subsidies are deficient, sufficient, or excessive.

In the federal crop insurance program, "delivery" generally refers to marketing policies, processing applications, collecting premiums, and adjusting claims. Delivery subsidies accounted for $14.8 billion (20%) of federal spending on crop insurance during crop years 2007 through 2016. The amount of delivery subsidies is not based on actual expenses incurred by Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs) but is instead based on percentages of premium that are established in the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA). The percentages vary by policy type and coverage level. Delivery subsidies are not taken from total premium. They are paid as a separate government subsidy to AIPs. The SRA sets their amounts as follows: Administrative and Operating (A&O) subsidy, for delivery of buy-up coverage (lower deductibles), equals between 12% and 21.9% of premium, depending on policy type. Catastrophic Loss Adjustment Expense (CAT LAE), for delivery of catastrophic level coverage (higher deductibles), is fixed at 6% of premium. From 2007 to 2016, total annual delivery costs (A&O and CAT LAE combined) averaged about $1.5 billion in current dollars and represented about 15% of total premium. The 2011 SRA and subsequent SRAs established a minimum (cup) of approximately $1.0 billion and a maximum (cap) of approximately $1.3 billion per year for A&O subsidies—subject to an adjustment for inflation from 2011 to 2015—to help stabilize A&O amounts. Since the A&O cup and cap first went into effect in 2011, the total amount spent on delivery subsidies (A&O and CAT LAE combined) has exceeded the A&O cap every year. Limited data is available on the actual expenses of AIPs. The Risk Management Agency (RMA) requires AIPs to report actual expenses as SRA exhibits but does not publish the reported expense data. CRS is aware of three publicly available sources for information on AIP expenses: (1) annual statements from state departments of insurance, (2) Form 10-K and other reports submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by AIPs that are owned by publicly traded companies, and (3) AIP survey data used in studies sponsored by the crop insurance industry. The available data on actual delivery expenses is not easily matched with A&O delivery subsidies and leaves unanswered the question of whether current subsidies are deficient, sufficient, or excessive relative to the actual delivery costs of AIPs.

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Introduction As Congress weighs comprehensive immigration reform legislation that would likely include strengthened enforcement measures, a significant expansion of guest workers, and perhaps include increased levels of permanent immigration, some question whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can handle the increased immigration workload. In response to growing concerns that the immigration responsibilities and other important duties of DHS were not functioning effectively, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff announced the Second Stage Review (2SR) to base work on priorities driven by risk. Currently, three agencies in DHS have important immigration functions: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. In 2004, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that many of the management problems that plagued the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) have carried over to the three DHS immigration agencies. This report focuses on the management and administration element. 5005 ); place all of INS in DHS in its own Directorate of Immigration Affairs, which would have two separate bureaus for the enforcement and service functions, with border inspections as a stand-alone and dual-function entity within the Directorate of Immigration Affairs (Senate substitute); or, place INS's enforcement functions in the DHS Bureau of Border Security and INS's service functions in the DHS Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (House-passed H.R. In seven of the eight workload measures analyzed above, the immigration workload has declined since 2001. Only the removal of aliens has surpassed levels prior to the reorganization of the immigration functions. While several key workload trends are inching upward—notably, border apprehensions and immigration adjudications—other workload trends have declined or remained flat. The Assistant Secretary of ICE, the Commissioner of CBP, and the Director of USCIS all serve on a parity under the Secretary of DHS. Of these, only the Director of USCIS has responsibilities that are exclusively immigration. While the Secretary of DHS is the lead cabinet officer on immigration issues, he shares substantial immigration policymaking roles with the Attorney General, who oversees the EOIR immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the Secretary of State, who oversees the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Thus far, independent assessments of the functioning of immigration in DHS have centered on problems rather than successes. Indeed, the GAO has concluded that many of the management problems that plagued the former INS remain with the DHS organizational structure. The underlying question remains whether a sufficient length of time has elapsed to assess DHS's efficacy in managing immigration policy.

As Congress weighs comprehensive immigration reform legislation that would likely include additional border and interior enforcement, a significant expansion of guest workers, and perhaps include increased levels of permanent immigration, some question whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can handle the increased immigration workload. There are concerns that the immigration responsibilities in the DHS are not functioning effectively. DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff announced a "Second Stage Review" (2SR) in 2005 that includes strengthening border security and interior enforcement and reforming immigration processes as major agenda items. Currently, three agencies in DHS have important immigration functions: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The immigration functions are dispersed across three agencies within DHS. The Assistant Secretary of ICE, the Commissioner of CBP, and the Director of USCIS all serve with the same rank directly under the DHS Secretary. Of these, only the Director of USCIS has responsibilities that are exclusively immigration. While the DHS Secretary is the lead cabinet officer on immigration issues, he shares substantial immigration policymaking roles with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State. Some now argue the disaggregation of the government's immigration responsibilities across several agencies has weakened immigration as a policy priority and has made it much more difficult for the executive branch to develop a comprehensive immigration reform and border security strategy. Others maintain that the current organizational structure sharpens the focus on the key, yet disparate, immigration functions and is optimal from a homeland security perspective. In seven of the eight workload measures analyzed over the past decade in this report, the immigration workload has declined in recent years. Only removals of aliens has surpassed levels prior to the restructuring of immigration responsibilities. While several key workload trends—notably, border apprehensions and immigration adjudications—are inching upward, the workload trends in asylum, inspections, naturalization, criminal prosecutions, and work site enforcement have declined or remained flat. Thus far, independent assessments of the functioning of immigration in DHS have centered on problems rather than successes. Indeed, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has concluded that many of the management problems that existed before the restructuring of the federal immigration functions still remain. An underlying question is whether a sufficient length of time has elapsed to assess DHS's efficacy in managing immigration policy. This report does not track legislation and will not be regularly updated.

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Introduction Economic indicators confirm that the economy went into a recession at the close of 2007. Although some economic indicators suggest that growth has resumed, unemployment remains high and is projected to remain so for some time. Historically, international migration ebbs during economic crises (e.g., immigration to the United States was at its lowest levels during the Great Depression). While preliminary statistical trends hint at a slowing of migration pressures, it remains unclear how the economic recession of the past two years affected immigration. Addressing these contentious policy reforms against the backdrop of economic crisis sharpens the social and business cleavages and narrows the range of options. Even as U.S. unemployment remains at a historically high level, some employers maintain that they continue to need the "best and the brightest" workers, regardless of their country of birth, to remain competitive in a worldwide market and to keep their firms in the United States. While support for increasing employment-based immigration may be dampened by the high levels of unemployment, proponents argue that the ability to hire foreign workers is an essential ingredient for economic growth. Those opposing increases in foreign workers assert that such expansions—particularly during a period of high unemployment—would have a deleterious effect on salaries, compensation, and working conditions of U.S. workers. Others question whether the United States should continue to issue foreign worker visas (particularly temporary visas) at this time and suggest that a moratorium on such visas might be prudent. The foreign labor certification program in the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) is responsible for ensuring that foreign workers do not displace or adversely affect working conditions of U.S. workers. The INA specifically states Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that—(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed. Despite the dip to 126,874 employment-based LPRs in FY2009, the first preference extraordinary category rose slightly. In FY2009, there were 1.1 million temporary employment-based visas issued, down from a high of 1.3 million in FY2007. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (also known as H.R. 111-5 ) requires companies receiving Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funding to comply with the more rigorous labor market rules. Specifically, §1611 of P.L. This issue was addressed in §524 of division D of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ). Additional Fees on Firms with Majority H-1B and L Workers Concern that certain multinational firms are hiring foreign professional workers on H-1B and L visas to work as temporary contractors at salaries that undercut salaries of comparable U.S. workers is cited as one of the reasons Congress has imposed an additional fee on companies who have more than 50% of their employees on H-1B or L visas. 6080 , P.L.

Economic indicators confirm that the U.S. economy sunk into a recession in December 2007. Although some economic indicators suggest that growth has resumed, unemployment remains high and is projected to remain so for some time. Historically, international migration ebbs during economic crises; for example, immigration to the United States was at its lowest levels during the Great Depression. While preliminary statistical trends hint at a slowing of migration pressures, it remains unclear how the economic recession of the past two years has affected immigration. Addressing these contentious policy reforms against the backdrop of economic crisis sharpens the social and business cleavages and narrows the range of options. Some employers maintain that they continue to need the "best and the brightest" workers, regardless of their country of birth, to remain competitive in a worldwide market and to keep their firms in the United States. While support for increasing employment-based immigration may be dampened by the high levels of unemployment, proponents argue that the ability to hire foreign workers is an essential ingredient for economic growth. Those opposing increases in foreign workers assert that such expansions—particularly during a period of high unemployment—would have a deleterious effect on salaries, compensation, and working conditions of U.S. workers. Others question whether the United States should continue to issue foreign worker visas (particularly temporary visas) during a period of high unemployment and suggest that a moratorium on such visas might be prudent. The number of foreign workers entering the United States legally has notably increased over the past decade. The number of employment-based legal permanent residents (LPRs) grew from under 100,000 in FY1994 to over 250,000 in FY2005, and dipped to 126,874 in 2009. The number of visas issued to employment-based temporary nonimmigrants rose from just under 600,000 in FY1994 to approximately 1.3 million in FY2007. In FY2009, the number of visas issued to employment-based temporary nonimmigrants dropped slightly to 1.1 million. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) bars the admission of any alien who seeks to enter the U.S. to perform skilled or unskilled labor, unless it is determined that (1) there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available; and (2) the employment of the alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed workers in the United States. The foreign labor certification program in the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) is responsible for ensuring that foreign workers do not displace or adversely affect working conditions of U.S. workers. The 111th Congress has addressed one element of the labor market test for foreign workers issue in §1611 of P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which requires companies receiving Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funding to comply with the more rigorous labor market rules of H-1B dependent companies if they hire foreign workers on H-1B visas. Also, §524 of division D of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) authorized the Department of Labor to use its share of the H-1B, H-2B, and L Fraud Prevention and Detection fees to conduct wage and hour enforcement of industries more likely to employ any type of nonimmigrants (not just H-1B, H-2B or L visaholders). Finally, P.L. 111-230 (H.R. 6080) authorized additional fees on firms who have more than 50% of their employees on H-1B or L visas. This report does not track legislation and will be updated if policies are revised.

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The "grassroots" lobbying disclosure provisions for registered professional lobbyists, and for commercial direct mail or public relations firms on behalf of outside clients ("grass roots lobbying firms"), which had been originally included in S. 1 , 110 th Congress, were struck from the Senate bill by a floor amendment, and the lobby reform legislation, the "Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007" ( P.L. 110-81 , 121 Stat. The question and issue of whether paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying should, at some point, be required to be publicly disclosed as part of a transparency and "open government" scheme, where the paid influences and pressures upon Members of Congress may be analyzed and reviewed by the electorate, continues to be of some import to certain government reform groups and persons both inside and outside of Congress. However, it has been noted as a general principle that although First Amendment rights "are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute"; and the federal courts have increasingly upheld statutory regulation in the area of lobbying and campaign disclosures against facial challenges when, on balance, the governmental interest asserted in the regulation is significant, when possible limitations on First Amendment rights are only indirect (as in disclosure statutes), and where the statute in question is drawn with sufficient precision so as to promote and be relevant to the interests asserted as the statute's justification. The Government's asserted interests in preserving the integrity of fundamental governmental processes, such as the legislative process, and protecting such proceedings from corruption and undue influences from those who are paid specifically to influence them has been long recognized as a significant, important and compelling governmental interest. upheld the constitutionality of that Act. Judicial Decisions and State Grassroots Lobbying Disclosure The clear trend in federal case law concerning constitutional challenges to lobbying statutes in the states has been to uphold against facial challenges provisions of state law which require the disclosure of "indirect" lobbying campaigns which involve "grassroots" lobbying of the nature generally covered in the legislative proposals discussed. Additionally, the courts have seemed to recognize the growth of importance of such "grassroots" lobbying efforts in the legislative process, and the increased need for legislators and others to be able to identify and assess the pressures on legislators being stimulated (and financed) by interest groups by such methods. Under the analysis applied in these cases, it would appear that a federal statute which requires only disclosure and reporting, and does not prohibit any activity, and which reaches only those who are compensated to engage in a certain amount of the covered activity (leaving volunteer organizations, volunteers, and individuals who engage in such activities on their own accord out of the coverage and sweep of the provisions), would appear to fit within those types of provisions which have been upheld in judicial decisions when the statute is drafted in such a manner so as not to be susceptible to an overly broad sweep bringing in groups, organizations and other citizens who do no more than advocate, analyze and discuss public policy issues and/or legislation. Even with the probability of such a crafted disclosure statute withstanding a facial challenge, the law could still at some point be subject to an "as applied" challenge if a particular group or organization could show a reasonable probability that the disclosures required would result in harassment or reprisals against it or its member or contributors.

The disclosure by professional lobbyists and commercial lobbying firms of expenditures or payments for "grassroots" lobbying campaigns continues to be an issue of importance to reformers both inside and outside of Congress. Legislative proposals, such as S. 1, 110th Congress and H.R. 4682, 109th Congress, had originally sought to extend public reporting requirements for some paid activities intended to stimulate "grassroots" lobbying. The lobbying and ethics reform legislation eventually enacted into law in 2007, the "Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007" (P.L. 110-81,121 Stat. 735 [S. 1, 110th Congress]) did not, however, include "grassroots" lobbying disclosure requirements. As to the constitutionality of requiring such disclosures, it should be noted that the activities involved in "lobbying," including the stimulation of "grassroots" lobbying, clearly implicate and involve freedoms protected by the First Amendment, including speech, associational rights, and the right to petition the government. The courts have long found, however, that some burden on these fundamental rights may be tolerated when a law promotes significant governmental interests, when the burdens on such activities are, at the most, indirect (such as in disclosure laws), and when the statute is drawn with enough precision so that a correlation exists between the information required to be disclosed and the achievement of the interests asserted as the law's justification. Under such standards, the courts have upheld against facial First Amendment challenges required disclosures in the areas of lobbying activities and campaign financing to promote the interests of preventing corruption and limiting the undue influences of monied and powerful interests, as well as preventing merely the "appearance" of such influence, in basic governmental and democratic processes. The apparent trend in more recent judicial decisions seems to allow the legislatures some leeway in determining which activities are relevant to the goals of preserving the integrity of, for example, their own legislative process, and so to include also in required disclosures some activities that are more on the periphery and not necessarily themselves directly involved in such process, but are intended to result in direct contacts and to significantly influence a legislator. In both state and federal courts, state provisions that reach "indirect" or "grassroots" lobbying have increasingly been upheld against facial constitutional challenges. Courts have recognized the growth of importance of these efforts in the legislative process, and the increased need for legislators and others to be able to identify and assess pressures on legislators. Under the analysis applied in these cases, it would appear that a federal statute that requires only disclosure and reporting, and does not prohibit activity, and that reaches only those who are compensated to engage in a certain amount of the covered activity, would appear to fit within those types of provisions upheld in past cases when the statute is narrowly drafted to exclude groups, organizations, and citizens who do no more than advocate, analyze, and discuss public policy. Even with the probability of such a crafted statute withstanding a "facial" challenge, the law might still be subject to an "as applied" challenge if a particular group could show a reasonable probability that the disclosures required would result in harassment or reprisals against members.

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When results were announced on May 13, nearly all observers and participants -- includingPrime Minister Atal Vajpayee -- were surprised by the upset defeat of the NDA, and by asimultaneous resurgence of the Congress Party led by Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born widow offormer Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, which had forged strategic and unprecedented alliances withpowerful regional parties. On May 18, Gandhi stunned her supporters by declining the position ofprime minister in a new United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government, insteadnominating her party lieutenant, Oxford-educated economist Manmohan Singh, for the job. AsFinance Minister from 1991-1996, Singh was the architect of major Indian economic reform andliberalization efforts. On May 22, the widely-esteemed Sikh became India's first-ever non-HinduPrime Minister. Early alarm was sounded that the influence ofcommunists in New Delhi might derail India's economic reform efforts, however, Indian industrialleaders have sought to assure foreign investors that Left Front members are not "Cuba-stylecommunists," but can be expected to support the UPA reform agenda. (18) Economic, Foreign, and Security Policy Prime Minister Singh has insisted that development will be a central priority of the UPAgovernment, with reforms aimed at reducing poverty and increasing employment. (23) India-U.S. Relations It is as yet unclear how, if at all, the Congress-led government might differ from itspredecessor in terms of relations with the United States.

U.S. relations with India depend largely on India's political leadership. India's 2004 nationalelections ended governance by the center-right coalition headed by Prime Minister Atal BihariVajpayee and brought in a new center-left coalition led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Following the upset victory for the historically-dominant Indian National Congress Party led bySonia Gandhi, Gandhi declined the post of Prime Minister in the new left-leaning United ProgressiveAlliance (UPA) coalition government, instead nominating her party lieutenant, Oxford-educatedeconomist Manmohan Singh, for the job. As Finance Minister from 1991-1996, Singh was thearchitect of major Indian economic reform and liberalization efforts. On May 22, thewidely-esteemed Sikh became India's first-ever non-Hindu Prime Minister. The defeated BharatiyaJanata Party now sits in opposition at the national level, led in Parliament by former Deputy PrimeMinister Lal Advani. A coalition of communist parties supports the UPA, but New Delhi'seconomic, foreign, and security policies are not expected to be significantly altered. The newgovernment has vowed to continue close and positive engagement with the United States in all areas. This report, which will not be updated, provides an overview of the elections, key parties, and U.S.policy interests.

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But on two issues there is little, if any, disagreement: (1) the impact of technological innovation on economic growth in the long run and (2) the proper role of government in the development and commercial uses of new technologies. As a remedy for this failure, most economists recommend the adoption of public policies aimed at boosting or supplementing private investment in R&D. Federal tax law offers two such incentives: (1) an expensing allowance for qualified research expenditures (QREs) under Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and (2) a non-refundable tax credit for QREs above a base amount under IRC Section 41—also known as the research and experimentation (R&E) tax credit, the research tax credit, the R&D tax credit, or the credit for increasing research activities. This report examines the current status of the R&E tax credit, describes its legislative history, and discusses some of the key policy issues raised by the current credit. But it actually has four discrete components: a regular research credit, an alternative simplified credit (ASC), a basic research credit, and a credit for energy research. Regular Research Credit The regular research tax credit was extended 16 times before the PATH Act permanently extended it. There is evidence that business R&D investment is responsive to reductions in its after-tax cost. The base amount for the regular credit is supposed to approximate how much a firm would spend on qualified research in the absence of the credit. 3. 4. After years of being a temporary provision, the 114 th Congress permanently extended the credits, starting with the 2015 tax year, through the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act, P.L. 114-113 ). As a result, analysts have relied on two other measures of effectiveness: (1) the amount of business R&D investment in a given year that can be attributed to the research credit and (2) the added R&D induced by one dollar of the credit. Uneven and Inadequate Incentive Effects A tax subsidy's incentive effect refers to the magnitude of the benefit it offers eligible taxpayers. Critics contend that the credit's lack of refundability can pose a special problem for small young firms that invest heavily in R&D relative to their income. Ambiguity and Uncertainty in the Definition of Qualified Research and QREs Some critics maintain that another reason the current research tax credit's incentive effect is not as robust as it could or should be lies in the many disputes in each tax year between the IRS and companies claiming the credit over the definition of qualified research and the expenditures that qualify for the credit. They departed in some significant ways from previous guidance.

Technological innovation is a primary engine of long-term economic growth, and research and development (R&D) serves as the lifeblood of innovation. The federal government encourages private investment in R&D in several ways, including a tax credit for increases in spending on qualified research above a base amount. This report describes the current status of the credit, summarizes its legislative history, and discusses policy issues it raises. The research tax credit (also known as the research and experimentation (or R&E) tax credit) was permanently extended in 2015. Since its enactment in mid-1981, the credit was temporarily extended 16 times and significantly modified 5 times. While the credit is often thought of as a single credit, it actually consists of four discrete credits: (1) a regular credit, (2) an alternative simplified credit (ASC), (3) a university basic research credit, and (4) an energy research credit. A taxpayer may claim one of the first two and each of the other two, provided it meets the requirements for each. In essence, the research credit endeavors to boost business investment in basic and applied research by reducing the after-tax cost of undertaking qualified research above a base amount, which approximates the amount a company would invest in R&D in the absence of the credit. As a result, the credit's effectiveness hinges, in part, on the sensitivity of the demand for this research to decreases in its cost. It is unclear from existing studies exactly how sensitive that demand is. While most analysts endorse the use of tax incentives to generate ever-higher levels of business R&D investment, some have some reservations about the design of the current credit. Critics contend that it is not as effective as it could or should be, given the economic benefits of technological innovation. The limits on the credit's effectiveness, in their view, include uneven and inadequate incentive effects, a lack of refundability, and an ambiguous definition of qualified research that fosters disputes between the Internal Revenue Service and companies over the legitimacy of claims for the credit. The 114th Congress permanently extended the research tax credit by passing the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act, P.L. 114-113). The act also allowed certain small firms to apply up to $250,000 of any credit they may claim against their payroll taxes in a tax year.

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Brief History of Federal Campaign Finance Law The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) is the most recently enacted federal law regulating money in the political sphere. McConnell v. FEC The following section of this report provides an overview of the lower court litigation and an analysis of the Supreme Court's major holdings in McConnell v. FEC. A. 107-155 . B. U.S. Supreme Court Opinion The Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v. FEC, issued on December 10, 2003, is its most comprehensive campaign finance ruling since Buckley v. Valeo in 1976. 4. 5. Prohibition on Campaign Contributions by Minors Age 17 and Under Invalidated By a unanimous vote, the Court invalidated section 318 of BCRA, which prohibited individuals age 17 or younger from making contributions to candidates and political parties. Most notably, the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on the raising and spending of previously unregulated political party soft money and a prohibition on corporations and labor unions using treasury funds to finance "electioneering communications," requiring that such ads may only be paid for with corporate and labor union political action committee (PAC) funds. A.

In its most comprehensive campaign finance ruling since Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, on December 10, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld against facial constitutional challenges key portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), P.L. 107-155, also known as the McCain-Feingold or Shays-Meehan campaign finance reform law. In McConnell v. FEC, a 5 to 4 majority of the Court upheld restrictions on the raising and spending of previously unregulated political party soft money and a prohibition on corporations and labor unions using treasury funds to finance "electioneering communications," requiring that such ads may only be paid for with corporate and labor union political action committee (PAC) funds. The Court invalidated BCRA's requirement that parties choose between making independent expenditures or coordinated expenditures on behalf of a candidate and its prohibition on minors age 17 and under making campaign contributions. This report provides an analysis of the Supreme Court's major holdings in McConnell v. FEC, including a discussion of the developments leading to the enactment of BCRA, the 1976 seminal campaign finance decision, Buckley v. Valeo, and implications for future cases.

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Introduction The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA; P.L. 113-28 ), which succeeded the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 ( P.L. 105-220 ), is the primary federal legislation that supports workforce development. WIOA was e nacted to bring about increased coordination and alignment among federal workforce development and related programs. Most of its provisions went into effect on July 1, 2015. WIOA includes five titles: Title I—Workforce Development Activities—authorizes job training and related services to unemployed or underemployed individuals and establishes the governance and performance accountability system for WIOA; Title II—Adult Education and Literacy—authorizes education services to assist adults in improving their basic skills, completing secondary education, and transitioning to postsecondary education; Title III—Amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act—amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 to integrate the U.S. Employment Service (ES) into the One-Stop system authorized by WIOA; Title IV—Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973—authorizes employment-related vocational rehabilitation services to individuals with disabilities, to integrate vocational rehabilitation into the One-Stop system; and Title V—General Provisions—specifies transition provisions from WIA to WIOA. Workforce development programs provide a combination of education and training services to prepare individuals for work and to help them improve their prospects in the labor market. This report focuses on the workforce development activities that the federal government supports through WIOA, which are designed to increase the employment and earnings of workers. This includes activities such as job search assistance, career counseling, occupational skills training, classroom training, or on-the-job training. Title III amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, which authorizes the Employment Service (ES), to make the ES an integral part of the One-Stop system amended by WIOA. Title I programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), primarily through its Employment and Training Administration (ETA). WIOA authorizes appropriations for WIOA programs from FY2015 through FY2020. This section of the report provides details of the WIOA Title I state formula grant program's structure, services supported, allotment formulas, and performance accountability provisions. In addition, it provides a program overview for national grant programs. This system is supposed to provide employment and training services that are responsive to the demands of local area employers. Under the state formula grant portion of WIOA, which accounts for nearly 60% of total WIOA Title I funding, the majority of funds are allocated to local WDBs (after initial allotment from ETA to the states) that are authorized to determine the mix of service provision, eligible providers, and types of training programs, among other decisions. The WIOA system provides central points of service through its system of One-Stop centers . Local WDB Functions The local WDB performs multiple functions in carrying out the programs and services authorized under WIOA, including the following: development of a local plan for workforce investment activities; analysis of regional labor market conditions, including needed knowledge and skills for the regional economy; engagement of regional employers to promote business participation on the WDB and to coordinate workforce activities with needs of employers; development and implementation of career pathways; identification and promotion of proven and promising workforce development strategies; development of strategies to use technology to increase accessibility and effectiveness of the local workforce system; oversight of all programs for youth, adult, and dislocated workers; negotiation of local performance measures with the governor; selection of One-Stop operators and eligible providers of training; coordination of WIOA workforce development activities with local education providers; development of a budget and administration of funding to service providers; assistance in development of a statewide employment statistics system; and assessment of accessibility for disabled individuals at all local One-Stop centers. Unified State Plans, which were optional under WIA, must outline the workforce strategies for the six core WIOA programs—adult, dislocated worker, and youth programs (Title I of WIOA), the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA; Title II of WIOA), the Employment Service program (amended by Title III of WIOA), and the Vocational Rehabilitation State Grant Program (amended by Title IV of WIOA). The workforce development system designed by WIOA is premised on universal access, such that an adult age 18 or older does not need to meet any qualifying characteristics in order to receive career services.

The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA; P.L. 113-128), which succeeded the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-220) as the primary federal workforce development legislation, was enacted in July 2014 to bring about increased coordination among federal workforce development and related programs. Most of WIOA's provisions went into effect July 1, 2015. WIOA authorizes appropriations for each of FY2015 through FY2020 to carry out the programs and activities authorized in the legislation. Workforce development programs provide a combination of education and training services to prepare individuals for work and to help them improve their prospects in the labor market. They may include activities such as job search assistance, career counseling, occupational skill training, classroom training, or on-the-job training. The federal government provides workforce development activities through WIOA's programs and other programs designed to increase the employment and earnings of workers. WIOA includes five titles: Workforce Development Activities (Title I), Adult Education and Literacy (Title II), Amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act (Title III), Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Title IV), and General Provisions (Title V). Title I, whose programs are primarily administered through the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), includes three state formula grant programs, multiple national programs, and Job Corps. Title II, whose programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), includes a state formula grant program and National Leadership activities. Title III amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, which authorizes the Employment Service (ES). Title IV amends the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which authorizes vocational rehabilitation services to individuals with disabilities. Title V includes provisions for the administration of WIOA. The WIOA system provides central points of service via its system of around 3,000 One-Stop centers nationwide, through which state and local WIOA employment and training activities are provided and certain partner programs must be coordinated. This system is supposed to provide employment and training services that are responsive to the demands of local area employers. Administration of the One-Stop system occurs through Workforce Development Boards (WDBs), a majority of whose members must be representatives of business and which are authorized to determine the mix of service provision, eligible providers, and types of training programs, among other decisions. WIOA provides universal access (i.e., an adult age 18 or older does not need to meet any qualifying characteristics) to its career services, including a priority of service for low-income adults. WIOA also requires Unified State Plans (USPs) that outline the workforce strategies for the six core WIOA programs—adult, dislocated worker, and youth programs (Title I of WIOA), the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA; Title II of WIOA), the Employment Service program (amended by Title III of WIOA), and the Vocational Rehabilitation State Grant Program (amended by Title IV of WIOA). Finally, WIOA adopts the same six "primary indicators of performance" across most of the programs authorized in the law. This report provides details of WIOA Title I state formula program structure, services, allotment formulas, and performance accountability. In addition, it provides a program overview for national grant programs. It also offers a brief overview of the Employment Service (ES), which is authorized by separate legislation but is an integral part of the One-Stop system created by WIOA.

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Introduction The Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (Title VI, P.L. 106-541 ) authorized involvement of federal agencies in projects to restore the Everglades; these projects are coordinated under a planning framework—the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP or the plan). During the dry season, the current water regime in South Florida is unable to sufficiently supply freshwater to meet both natural system needs and urban and agricultural demand. The altered water regime combined with urban and agricultural development have reduced the Everglades to half its original size. Achieving these goals for South Florida is estimated at nearly $20 billion, of which $10.9 billion would be spent under CERP. It also authorized $700 million in federal funds for an initial set of CERP projects. WRDA 2007 ( P.L. 110-114 ) authorized a second set of activities, including the Indian River Lagoon (IRL) and Picayune Strand restoration projects; CERP activities in the legislation represented roughly $2.0 billion in authorizations (not counting $240 million in related deauthorizations also included in the legislation). Title VI of WRDA 2000 established that construction as well as operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of CERP projects would be equally shared by Floridian stakeholders and the federal government. CERP authorization was achieved after years of delicate negotiations among federal, state, local, and tribal stakeholders. Other issues include effectiveness of restoration efforts and uncertainties in technologies.

The Everglades, a unique network of subtropical wetlands in Florida, is half its original size. Many factors contributed to its decline, including flood control projects and agricultural and urban development. Federal, state, tribal, and local agencies collaborated to develop a Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP, or the plan). CERP aims to increase storage of wet season waters to augment the supplies during the dry season for both the natural system and urban and agricultural users. The plan consists of more than 60 projects estimated to take more than 30 years and $10.9 billion to complete. The Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 2000 (P.L. 106-541) approved the CERP framework and authorized a first set of projects at $1.4 billion. WRDA 2000 established how CERP costs would be split; the federal government would pay half of construction and operation, and an array of state, tribal, and local agencies the other half. WRDA 2007 (P.L. 110-114) authorized a second set of CERP activities ($2.0 billion). CERP implementation issues include project priorities and funding; timeliness and effectiveness of restoration efforts (e.g., the impacts of delays in the Modified Water Deliveries project); mitigation of excess phosphorous; and technological uncertainties. This report summarizes CERP and its implementation.

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Background Radio frequency spectrum is managed primarily by regulations that set rules, for example, for permissible uses, certification of devices, requirements for public safety, and the acquisition of licenses. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is responsible for overseeing licensed and unlicensed spectrum used for commercial purposes and by state and local agencies, including first responders, as well as most other radio frequencies not assigned for federal use. Although Congress has a legislative role in spectrum management, the FCC routinely takes on the responsibility of making decisions about the assignment of spectrum for different uses and sets the rules for auctions of spectrum licenses. Today's technology can only operate on certain frequencies; commercially viable frequencies are a valuable commodity. Auctions are a market-driven solution to assigning licenses to use specific frequencies and are a recent innovation in spectrum management and policy. Several lucrative auctions have added billions to the federal treasury, applied to general revenue. Creation of two important trust funds—the Spectrum Relocation Fund and the Digital Television and Public Safety Fund—required new language and amendments to existing law to permit some auction revenues to be applied directly to specific programs through trusts. The FCC's plan for the amount of spectrum per license, the number of licenses, and the conditions for use of the designated spectrum is developed for each new wireless service. Auctions of Spectrum Used for Television Broadcasting The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 required the FCC to conduct auctions for 78 MHz of the analog television spectrum planned to be reclaimed from television broadcasters at the completion of the transition to digital television and to allocate 24 MHz for public safety services. Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act This act created the Spectrum Relocation Fund to provide a mechanism whereby federal agencies can recover the costs of moving from one spectrum band to another. This fund could provide a means to make it possible for federal agencies to recover relocation costs directly from auction proceeds when they are required to vacate spectrum slated for commercial auction. In effect, successful commercial bidders would be covering the costs of relocation. Deficit Reduction Act The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. The act set a definite date of February 17, 2009 for the release of spectrum at 700 MHz currently held by broadcasters. 108-458 ) dealt with spectrum policy. Provisions in the auction rules, however, provided for a new, interoperable communications network for public safety users to be shared with commercial users. A national license for 10 MHz, designated as Upper Block D, was put up for auction under service rules that required working with a Public Safety Licensee to build and manage a shared network. These licenses are referred to as the C Block. Auction Results The auction grossed $19,592,420,000. The D Block received a single bid of $472,042,000, well below the minimum price of $1.3 billion the FCC established for that license. In an Order adopted and released on March 20, 2008, the FCC directed the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau not to proceed with the re-auction of the D Block because it is "in the public interest to provide additional time to consider all options...." The FCC therefore has begun a review of its rules regarding licensing, structuring a partnership, setting service requirements, and other rules and obligations established prior to the commencement of Auction 73.

Radio frequency spectrum policy issues before Congress are characterized by economic, technological and regulatory complexity. Of particular interest to policy makers are the allocation of spectrum for specific types of use (such as TV broadcasting, radio, advanced wireless services, or unlicensed) and the assignment of licenses for exclusive or shared use of specific frequencies. Today, most frequencies allocated for commercial uses are assigned through auctions, with licenses going to the highest bidder. Another important allocation of spectrum is for unlicensed use. Both commercial and non-commercial entities use unlicensed spectrum to meet a wide variety of monitoring and communications needs. Suppliers of wireless devices must meet requirements for certification to operate on frequency bands designated for unlicensed use. Examples of unlicensed use include garage door openers and Wi-Fi communications. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates licensed and unlicensed spectrum not allocated for federal use, is responsible for auctioning spectrum licenses, and can also use its authority to redistribute licenses. Proceeds from spectrum license sales are presently attributed to general revenue in the U.S. Budget. In the 108 th Congress, however, a precedent was established with the creation of a Spectrum Relocation Fund to hold proceeds from the auction of specified radio frequencies allocated to federal use; federal agencies vacating spectrum to be auctioned for commercial use are being compensated from the fund for costs of relocation. In the 109 th Congress, the Deficit Reduction Act ( P.L. 109-171 ) included provisions that placed certain auction proceeds in a Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund. The fund is being mainly used to assist the transition from analog television broadcasting to digital broadcasting, and for contributions to programs for public safety. Over $7 billion of the auction proceeds were applied to deficit reduction. The funding came from the auction of spectrum (at 700 MHz) currently used for analog television broadcasting, to be vacated by February 17, 2009. The auction, Auction 73, concluded on March 18,2008; it grossed $19,592,420,000. The rules for Auction 73 introduced two new business models for spectrum management and assignment that represented departures from past policy. One model designated a block of spectrum licenses for a network that could be managed to accept any suitable wireless device or software application, referred to as open access. The other model would require a shared network to accommodate both public safety and commercial users in a partnership. A national license, referred to as the D Block, was put up for auction, as part of Auction 73, with a reserve price of $1.3 billion. The winning bidder would have been required to assume the cost and responsibility of building the network using D Block spectrum and adjacent spectrum assigned to public safety. The sole bid for the D Block was below the reserve price and consequently the D Block will be re-auctioned. The prospects for this new auction have triggered a debate about the nature of competition in the wireless industry and the need for a nationwide public safety network that may be resolved by Congress through legislation.

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Introduction The federal government relies heavily on contractors to supply it with goods and services. Each year, fraud by these contractors potentially costs the government billions of dollars. Detecting, prosecuting, and deterring contractor fraud poses a challenge to federal agencies, which often possess limited resources. Since that time, Congress has enacted several statutes that allow the federal government—and in some instances, private parties—to recover damages, civil penalties, or forfeitures for false or fraudulent claims for payment and other misconduct. The government has also recovered large civil penalties and forfeitures from contractors who submit fraudulent claims for payment as part of the contract disputes process, including in a recent case in which the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' (COFC's) assessment of a $50.6 million civil penalty against a contractor under the Contract Disputes Act's (CDA's) anti-fraud provision and rendered judgment of forfeiture of a $13.3 million contractor claim under the Forfeiture of Fraudulent Claims Act (FFCA). In addition to the significant damage awards that plaintiffs may recover under some of these statutes, courts may find a contractor civilly liable under these laws for conduct that may not amount to fraud under traditional common law definitions. Congress has an interest in the scope of federal civil fraud remedy statutes. In order to be effective, these statutes must be broad enough to punish and deter fraud that often evades detection, wastes taxpayer funds, and negatively impacts government programs. On the other hand, if courts interpret a fraud statute so broadly that it imposes civil liability on contractors for minor regulatory violations or ordinary breaches of contract—possibly resulting in a contractor having insufficient notice as to which actions will result in liability —contractors may decline to compete for government contracts. This could lead to higher prices for the government. Under the implied false certification and fraud in the inducement theories, claims for payment that are not explicitly false may become false by implication because of a party's actions or omissions prior to contract formation or during contract performance. Some courts have expressed concerns that, under these theories, a defendant could become liable for ordinary breaches of contract or minor regulatory violations. The FCA authorizes the Attorney General, as well as certain private parties that sue on behalf of the United States under the act's qui tam provisions (known as "relators"), to bring a civil action against an alleged violator of the act. The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Daewoo Engineering Co., Ltd. v. United States demonstrates that the CDA's anti-fraud provision may result in a significant civil penalty for a contractor when it submits a fraudulent claim to the government during a contract dispute in order to extract a settlement. Anti-Fraud Provision The CDA contains an anti-fraud remedy primarily because of concerns that contractors would submit inflated claims during contract disputes as a "negotiating tactic," leading the government to settle these claims instead of using its limited resources to evaluate them on the merits. For example, courts disagree about whether fraud sufficient for forfeiture may involve fraud in connection with the execution or performance of the contract in addition to fraud related to submission of a claim. Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act (PFCRA) provides an administrative process under which certain federal agencies may obtain civil remedies and assessments from "persons" who knowingly make false, fraudulent, or fictitious claims or statements to the agencies. The act's legislative history suggests that Congress intended the PFCRA to remedy the "small-dollar cases" of fraud that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had declined to pursue in court because of litigation costs. Other recent regulatory and judicial developments may also affect contractors' potential exposure to civil liability and damages under the FCA.

Because the federal government relies heavily on contractors to supply it with goods and services, fraud by these contractors potentially costs the government billions of dollars annually. Detecting, prosecuting, and deterring contractor fraud poses a challenge to federal agencies, which often possess limited resources. To combat contractor fraud, Congress has enacted several statutes that allow the federal government—and in some instances, private parties—to recover damages, civil penalties, or forfeitures against parties that make false or fraudulent claims for payment or engage in other misconduct. These statutes may impose civil liability for conduct that does not amount to fraud under traditional common law definitions and potentially allow for significant recoveries. Generally, the False Claims Act (FCA) authorizes the Attorney General, as well as certain private parties, to bring a civil action against "any person" who makes a false claim for payment from the government. Recently, some courts have held that claims for payment that are not explicitly false may become false by implication because of a party's actions or omissions prior to contract formation or during contract performance. However, some of these same courts have expressed concerns that such theories could lead to liability for ordinary breaches of contract or insignificant regulatory violations, and have thus imposed limitations on their use by the government or private parties that sue on behalf of the government. Other recent regulatory and judicial developments may also affect contractors' potential exposure to civil liability and damages under the FCA. The Contract Disputes Act (CDA) sets forth procedures for the resolution of claims and disputes involving certain contracts awarded by executive agencies. The CDA contains an anti-fraud remedy because of concerns that contractors would submit inflated claims during contract disputes as a "negotiating tactic," leading the government to settle these claims instead of using its limited resources to evaluate them on the merits. The Federal Circuit's notable decision in Daewoo Engineering Co., Ltd. v. United States demonstrates that the CDA's anti-fraud provision may result in a significant civil penalty for a contractor that submits a fraudulent claim to the government in an effort to extract a settlement offer. Under the Forfeiture of Fraudulent Claims Act (FFCA), a contractor that brings a fraudulent contract claim against the government in the Court of Federal Claims (COFC) may have to forfeit all of its claims under the contract. Courts disagree over whether fraud sufficient for forfeiture may relate to the execution or performance of the contract in addition to submission of a claim. The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act (PFCRA) provides an administrative process under which certain federal agencies may impose civil remedies or assessments on "persons" who knowingly make false, fraudulent, or fictitious claims or statements to the agencies in "small-dollar cases" of fraud that the Department of Justice (DOJ) declines to pursue in court. Few federal agencies use the PFCRA, leading some to recommend that, among other things, Congress raise the act's jurisdictional cap and civil penalty limit; allow agencies to retain recovered funds; and simplify the act's procedural requirements. Congress is perennially interested in the scope of federal civil fraud remedy statutes. In order to be effective, these statutes must be broad enough to punish and deter fraud that often evades detection, wastes taxpayer funds, and negatively impacts government programs. On the other hand, if courts interpret a fraud statute so broadly that it imposes civil liability on contractors for minor regulatory violations or ordinary breaches of contract, contractors may decline to compete for government contracts, potentially leading to higher prices for the government.

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To assist individuals, families, and employers in obtaining health coverage, the 111 th Congress passed major health reform legislation, which contains provisions that directly affect self-insured plans. Private health insurance can be provided to groups of people that are drawn together by an employer or other organization, such as a trade union. Such groups are generally formed for some purpose other than obtaining insurance, like employment. When insurance is provided to a group, it is referred to as "group coverage" or "group insurance." Fully Insured Health Plans A common distinction made between private health coverage offered to groups is how such coverage is funded. That is, the plan sponsor may either purchase group health insurance from a state-licensed insurance carrier, or fund the health benefits directly. The former refers to fully insured plans; the latter, self-insured plans. Self-insurance refers to coverage that is provided by the organization seeking coverage for its members (e.g., an employer offering health benefits to his employees). Such organizations set aside funds and pay for health benefits directly. (Enrollees may still be charged a premium.) Under self-insurance, the organization itself bears the risk for covering medical expenses. Because self-insured plans are not purchased from a carrier licensed by the state, they are exempt from state requirements and subject only to federal statutes and regulation. With fully insured plans, the insurance carrier charges the plan sponsor a fee for providing coverage for the benefits specified in the insurance contract. The fee typically is in the form of a monthly premium. (In turn, the sponsor may decide that each person or family who wishes to enroll must pay part of the premium cost.) Under the fully insured scenario, the private insurer bears the insurance risk; that is, the insurer is responsible for covering the applicable costs associated with covered benefits. Insurance purchased from a state-licensed insurer is subject to both federal and state rules. Data Related to Self-Insured Plans A majority of individuals with private health insurance coverage are enrolled in self-insured plans. In 2008, 55% of private-sector enrollees were in such plans. This proportion differs when comparing small firms (less than 50 workers) and large firms (50 or more workers). In 2008, of the private-sector workers who were employed at small firms with health coverage, 12% were enrolled in self-insured health plans. In contrast, of private-sector workers employed at large firms, 65% were enrolled in self-insured plans. Consistent with these findings is the share of private-sector firms that offer at least one self-insured plan. In 2008, while 34% of all private-sector firms that offered insurance had at least one self-insured plan, only 13% of small firms had such a plan, compared with 63% of large firms. Health Reform The 111 th Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA," P.L. On March 30, 2010, PPACA was amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 ("Reconciliation," P.L. 111-152 ). PPACA imposes new requirements on individuals, employers, and health plans; restructures the private health insurance market; sets minimum standards for health coverage; and provides financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. Among the provisions in PPACA are ones that would have a major impact on private health insurance coverage, including self-insured plans.

Private health insurance can be provided to groups of people that are drawn together by an employer or other organization. Such groups are generally formed for some purpose other than obtaining insurance, like employment. When insurance is provided to a group, it is referred to as "group coverage" or "group insurance." A common distinction made between private health coverage offered to groups is how such coverage is funded. That is, the plan sponsor may either purchase group health insurance from a state-licensed insurance carrier, or fund the health benefits directly. The former refers to fully insured plans; the latter, self-insured plans. Self-insurance refers to coverage that is provided by the organization seeking coverage for its members. Such organizations set aside funds and pay for health benefits directly. (Enrollees may still be charged a premium.) Under self-insurance, the organization itself bears the risk for covering medical expenses. Because self-insured plans are not purchased from an insurance carrier licensed by the state, they are exempt from state requirements and subject only to federal regulation. With fully insured plans, the insurance carrier charges the plan sponsor a fee for providing coverage for the benefits specified in the insurance contract. The fee typically is in the form of a monthly premium. (In turn, the sponsor may decide that each person or family who wishes to enroll must pay part of the premium cost.) Under the fully insured scenario, the private insurer bears the insurance risk; that is, the insurer is responsible for covering the applicable costs associated with covered benefits. Insurance purchased from a state-licensed insurer is subject to both federal and state regulation. A majority of individuals with private health insurance coverage are enrolled in self-insured plans. In 2008, 55% of private-sector enrollees were in such plans. This proportion differs when comparing small firms and large firms. In 2008, of the private-sector workers who were employed at small firms with health coverage, 12% were enrolled in self-insured health plans. In contrast, of private-sector workers employed at large firms, 65% were enrolled in self-insured plans. Consistent with these findings is the share of private-sector firms that offer at least one self-insured plan. In 2008, while 34% of all private-sector firms that offered insurance had at least one self-insured plan, only 13% of small firms had such a plan, compared with 63% of large firms. To assist individuals, families, and employers in obtaining health coverage, the 111th Congress passed major health reform legislation. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, PPACA) was signed into law on March 23, 2010, and later amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152). PPACA imposes new requirements on individuals, employers, and health plans; restructures the private health insurance market; sets minimum standards for health coverage; and provides financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. Among the provisions in PPACA are ones that would have a major impact on private health insurance coverage, including self-insured plans.

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Introduction There has been increased concern over the size and sustainability of the United States' recent deficits and the country's long-run budget outlook. This concern has brought the issues of the federal government's revenue needs and fundamental reform of the tax system to the forefront of congressional debates. One place Congress may turn to address these issues is the set of tax benefits for homeowners. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) has estimated that the cost to the federal government in terms of foregone revenue from these benefits will be approximately $136.3 billion annually between 2014 and 2017. Economists have identified the set of tax benefits for homeowners as one area in which reform may improve economic efficiency. This report focuses on the two largest federal tax benefits available to homeowners—the mortgage interest deduction and the deduction for state and local property taxes. The goals of this report are five-fold: (1) briefly summarize the trends in homeownership; (2) provide an overview of what tax benefits are available; (3) analyze the rationales commonly provided for offering such benefits; (4) analyze the effect of the mortgage interest deduction and property tax deduction on the homeownership rate, housing consumption, and the economy; and (5) present policy options. These long-term trends in homeownership behavior may be overshadowed by more recent trends in foreclosures. These tax benefits and their associated budget impacts are listed in Table 1 . The three most expensive tax incentives in the JCT's estimate are the mortgage interest deduction ($77.3 billion annually), the itemized state and local property tax deduction ($31.5 billion annually), and the exclusion of capital gains on the sale of a principal residence ($26.5 billion annually). First, a high homeownership rates may bestow certain benefits to society as a whole such as higher property values, lower crime, and higher civic participation, among others. Second, homeownership may promote a more even distribution of income and wealth, as well as establish greater individual financial security. And lastly, homeownership may have a positive effect on living conditions, which can lead to a healthier population. Positive Externalities Tax benefits for homeowners are most often rationalized on the basis that homeownership generates positive externalities. Economic Analysis of Current Tax Benefits for Homeowners While some policy makers may or may not want to promote homeownership based on the reasons just discussed, a separate issue that arises is—what are the effects of the mortgage interest deduction and property tax deduction? Household income has also been found to influence the home-buying decision, although its effect on the decision to become a homeowner is smaller than the ability to finance a down payment. Providing preferential tax treatment for homeowners can improve the long-run performance of the economy by encouraging capital and labor to flow to the higher return producing housing sector. Similarly, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp recently released a comprehensive tax reform draft that proposes limiting the size of mortgages eligible for the deduction. In 2005, President George W. Bush's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (Tax Reform Panel) also proposed replacing the mortgage interest deduction with a credit. A similar option was presented by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 2009.

Concern has increased over the size and sustainability of the United States' recent budget deficits and the country's long-run budget outlook. This concern has brought the issues of the government's revenue needs and fundamental tax reform to the forefront of congressional debates. Congress may choose to address these issues by reforming the set of tax benefits for homeowners. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, federally provided tax benefits for homeowners will cost approximately $136.3 billion annually between 2014 and 2017. Reducing, modifying, or eliminating all or some of the current tax benefits for homeowners could raise a substantial amount of revenue, while simultaneously simplifying the tax code, increasing equity among taxpayers, and promoting economic efficiency. This report focuses on the two largest federal tax benefits available to homeowners—the mortgage interest deduction and the deduction for state and local property taxes. While other tax benefits for homeowners exist, these two particular benefits are the most expensive in terms of forgone revenue to the federal government. Between 2014 and 2017 the mortgage interest deduction and property tax deduction are estimated to cost around $77.3 billion and $31.5 billion annually. Congress may therefore consider modifying these two tax benefits to raise revenue. The mortgage interest deduction and property tax deduction are also the two tax benefits proponents most often argue promote homeownership. Economists, however, have questioned this claim. The analysis presented in this report is structured along two dimensions. First, the analysis focuses on the rationales commonly offered for providing tax benefits for homeowners, mainly that homeownership (1) bestows certain benefits on society as a whole such as higher property values, lower crime, higher civic participation, among others; (2) is a means of promoting a more even distribution of income and wealth; and (3) has a positive effect on living conditions, which can lead to a healthier population. Although these benefits may exist, the analysis presented in this report highlights the difficulties that economists have encountered in attempting to establish their existence or magnitude. The analysis then turns to examining the effect that the mortgage interest deduction and state and local property tax deduction have on the homeownership rate, housing consumption, and the economy. The analysis in this report suggests that these tax incentives may have a larger effect on the size of homes purchased than on the decision to become a homeowner. The possibility that attempting to promote homeownership via the tax code may distort the allocation of capital and labor, which could hinder the performance of the economy in the short-run and long-run, is also raised. In the process of conducting the analysis, this report briefly summarizes the historical trends in homeownership and the more recent trends in foreclosures. The report concludes with policy options that Congress may find useful as it moves forward, including proposals made by House Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp, President Obama's Fiscal Commission, President George W. Bush's Tax Reform Panel, and the Congressional Budget Office.

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Introduction The Antiquities Act of 1906 authorizes the President to proclaim national monuments on federal lands that contain "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest." Various issues regarding presidentially created monuments have generated controversy, lawsuits, statutory changes, and legislative proposals to limit the President's authority. Concerns have centered on the extent of the President's authority to establish and modify monuments, the size of the areas, the types of protected resources and the level of threats to the areas, the inclusion of nonfederal lands within monument boundaries, and the selection of the managing agency. Still another focus is the manner in which the monuments were created. Most monument advocates favor the Antiquities Act in its present form. They believe that the act serves an important purpose in preserving resources for future generations. To give one historical example, displeasure with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's proclaiming of the Jackson Hole National Monument in Wyoming in 1943 (which became Grand Teton National Park) prompted litigation on the extent of presidential authority under the Antiquities Act, and led to a 1950 law prohibiting future establishment of national monuments in Wyoming unless Congress made the designation. President Obama issued 34 monument proclamations, including designation of 29 new monuments and enlargement of 5 existing monuments. Presidents have changed the terms and conditions of monument proclamations, although relatively infrequently. Congress has authority to create, modify, and abolish national monuments on federal lands, and has done so on numerous occasions under its constitutional authority to enact legislation regarding federal lands. Monument Size In establishing a national monument, the President is required by the Antiquities Act to reserve "the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected." Some monument advocates support more restrictions on development. Brief information on each monument proclamation by President Trump is contained in Appendix C . Overview of Legislative Activity Given the recurring controversies over presidential establishment and modification of national monuments, recent Congresses have evaluated whether to abolish, limit, or retain unchanged the President's authority to proclaim monuments under the Antiquities Act. Among the monument measures considered during recent Congresses were bills to impose restrictions on presidential authority, including to: limit the size or duration of withdrawals; prohibit or restrict withdrawals in particular states or other locations (e.g., the exclusive economic zone); narrow the types of resources that could be protected; ban the inclusion of nonfederal land within monument boundaries; encourage public participation in the monument designation process; revoke the President's authority to designate monuments or require congressional and/or state approval of some or all monument designations; and promote presidential creation of monuments in accordance with certain federal land management laws and environmental laws. Some of these supporters have introduced legislation to bar the President from reducing or abolishing national monuments.

The Antiquities Act of 1906 (54 U.S.C. §§320301-320303) authorizes the President to proclaim national monuments on federal lands that contain historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, or other objects of historic or scientific interest. The President is to reserve "the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected." The act was designed to protect federal lands and resources quickly. Presidents have proclaimed a total of 158 monuments, and also have enlarged, diminished, and changed the terms of monuments previously proclaimed by Presidents. Congress has modified many of these proclamations and has abolished some monuments. Congress also has created monuments under its own authority. Presidential establishment of monuments sometimes has been contentious—for example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's creation of the Jackson Hole National Monument in Wyoming (1943) and President Clinton's establishment of 19 monuments and expansion of 3 others (1996-2001). Debate over the President's authority to establish and modify national monuments has continued in light of more recent presidential action, namely President Obama's designation of 29 new monuments and enlargement of 5 others, and President Trump's designation of 1 monument and reduction and modification of the terms of 2 others. Various issues regarding presidentially designated monuments have generated controversy, lawsuits, statutory changes, and legislative proposals to limit the President's authority. Some concerns have centered on the extent of the President's authority to establish and modify monuments, the size of the areas, the types of protected resources and the level of threats to these resources, the inclusion of nonfederal lands within monument boundaries, the selection of the managing agency, restrictions on land uses that may result, and the manner in which the monuments were created. Most monument advocates favor the Antiquities Act in its present form. They believe that the act serves an important purpose in preserving resources for future generations and that the President needs continued authority to act promptly to protect valuable resources on federal lands from potential threats. They assert that the public has supported and courts have upheld designations by the President and that many past presidential designations that initially were controversial have come to be supported. Given the recurring controversies over presidential monument proclamations, Congress has evaluated whether to abolish, limit, or retain unchanged the President's authority under the Antiquities Act. During recent Congresses, measures were considered to impose restrictions on presidential authority, including to limit the designation of monuments in particular locations and promote presidential creation of monuments in accordance with certain federal land management, public participation, and environmental laws. Other measures sought to change land uses within monuments or alter monument boundaries. Among other bills, some proposals would have barred the President from reducing or abolishing national monuments or increased funds for presidentially proclaimed monuments.

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Most Recent Developments On December 19 the House, and on December 18, the Senate, approved an omnibus FY2008 appropriations bill, H.R. The President signed the bill into law, P.L. 110-161 , on December 26. The bill includes a Senate amendment to provide $70 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for the Department of Defense for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The Defense Department now projects that the funding provided in the bill will sustain Army military personnel accounts until about the middle of June and Army operation and maintenance accounts until about the end of June or early July at planned rates of obligation. How Long Regular FY2008 Defense Appropriations Will Last Until supplemental appropriations for FY2008 were enacted, the Department of Defense was financing both day-to-day peacetime operations of U.S. military forces and overseas military operations in Iraq and elsewhere with funds appropriated in the regular FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. The measure provided $460 billion for the Defense Department to cover the costs of baseline, non-war-related programs in FY2008. At a press conference on November 15, Secretary of Defense Gates warned that the Army would be out of money by the beginning of February, and the Marine Corps some time in March, and he announced that preliminary steps needed to shut down Army operations, and not merely to slow down spending, would begin almost immediately. "The least undesirable" option, he said, would be to "cease operations at all Army bases by mid-February next year." This would result, he said, in furloughs of 100,000 civilian and another 100,000 contractor personnel. 110-116 , provided $27.4 billion in O&M for the Army and $4.8 billion for the Marine Corps. The requested transfer of $4.1 billion to the Army, would extend the time the Army can operate for another two to three weeks, or until the end of February. Alternatives for Extending Operations Longer In the absence of FY2008 supplemental appropriations, the Defense Department would have been be able to extend Army and Marine Corps operations for an additional month or so, either by transferring additional amounts to O&M accounts or by slowing the pace at which the services are obligating funds. Alternatives for extending Army and Marine Corps operations include – Transfer limited additional amounts that may be available from cash balances in working capital funds; Slow the pace of Army and Marine Corps obligations of funds, in part by taking steps the Army had earlier considered in April 2007 and in part by delaying depot maintenance funding; Invoke the Feed and Forage Act, which permits obligations of funds in advance of appropriations, and for which there are extensive precedents in the past 40 years; and finally, Consider using standing authorities for which there do not appear to be precedents to limit Army and Marine Corps costs, such as the authority in 10 USC 165 to assign support operations to other services. While waiting for Congress to act, however, the Defense Department would have little, if any, remaining transfer authority. Defense Department officials said that cuts such as those planned last spring were not sufficient in the present circumstances because of greater uncertainty about supplemental funding. The FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act provided $32.2 billion for Air Force O&M and $33.1 billion for Navy O&M. The Defense Department might have been able to extend military operations further by transferring limited additional amounts to the Army and Marine Corps and by slowing down operations, but each alternative has some disadvantages. Some of these measures, however, may disrupt day-to-day Army operations. It would appear, however, to undermine congressional controls on the use of funds.

On December 18, 2007, the Senate, and on December 19, the House, approved a consolidated FY2008 appropriations bill, H.R. 2764, that includes $70 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for the Department of Defense for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The President signed the bill into law on December 26. Congress's agreement to provide $70 billion for overseas military operations resolved a dispute over war funding that had led the Defense Department to announce plans to shut down all but essential Army and Marine Corps operations early in 2008. In the absence of supplemental appropriations, officials warned that money for Army operations would run out by the end of February and for the Marine Corps in March, even after a transfer of $4.1 billion to the Army. On November 15, 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates said that the Defense Department would "cease operations at all Army bases by mid-February next year," which would result in furloughs of 100,000 civilian and another 100,000 contractor personnel. The consolidated appropriations bill averted the need for such steps. It provided $35.2 billion for Army and $4.0 billion for Marine Corps operation and maintenance accounts. These amounts are in addition to $27.4 billion for the Army and $4.8 billion for the Marine Corps in the regular FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-116). The supplemental funding, added to regular appropriations, provided enough money to sustain Army operations until the end of June or early July, 2008, and Marine Corps operations until the end of August at planned rates of obligation. While Congress's agreement to provide funds resolves the debate for the present, it did not settle the underlying controversy. A recurring issue for Congress has been how much flexibility the Defense Department has to delay, if not to avoid entirely, shutting down operations when Congress does not provide full-year defense appropriations. In the absence of supplemental appropriations, the Defense Department relied on funds in the regular FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act to finance both day-to-day peacetime activities and war-related operations abroad. CRS calculated that these funds would be exhausted by February for the Army and by early April for the Marine Corps, which is about what the Defense Department projected. DOD's proposed transfer of $4.1 billion to the Army would have extend its operations for another two to three weeks. Without supplemental appropriations, the Defense Department could have extended operations for about another month by transferring limited additional amounts to the Army and Marine Corps and by slowing down spending through measures such as those the Army began to implement in April 2007. Such measures would reduce remaining financial flexibility and might disrupt day-to-day operations. The Defense Department might have been able to sustain operations longer by invoking the Feed and Forage Act or by using novel, unprecedented measures, such as assigning the Navy and Air Force to pay costs of Army support operations abroad. Such measures might weaken congressional war powers and erode congressional controls on the use of funds. This report will not be updated.

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In January 2008, for example, the President announced he would veto future appropriations bills that did not cut the number and funding of Administration-defined and -identified earmarks by half, relative to FY2008. The President also issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13457, which directed that agencies "should not" fund non-statutory earmarks, except under some conditions. OMB subsequently directed agencies on how to implement the E.O. after enactment of FY2009 continuing and regular appropriations. These are the latest in a series of developments that began in early 2007, when the President made proposals regarding earmarks originated by Congress, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a series of memoranda and took corresponding actions to implement the President's policy. This report provides an analysis of Bush Administration policy regarding congressionally originated earmarks, focusing primarily on the veto threat and E.O., and related issues for Congress. As noted earlier, specific definitions for the term earmark (and related terms, like congressional earmark , congressional directive , presidential earmark , administration earmark , executive branch earmark , and directed spending ) vary considerably and are controversial. Nevertheless, all of the terms relate to the use of discretion to allocate particularized benefits—subsets of funding or other resources or benefits—through law, non-statutory direction (e.g., report language, which is not legally binding), or administrative action (e.g., making a budget proposal or awarding a contract or grant) to one or more specific purposes, entities, or geographic areas. Practices like earmarking have been used for decades, if not centuries, to make decisions regarding the allocation of public resources, but concerns also have been expressed. At the same time, Congress, its Members, and Presidents have asserted the prerogatives of their respective constitutional and statutory authorities and pursued their budget policy preferences. Definitions in the 110th Congress During the 110 th Congress, the House, Senate, and Bush Administration have defined terms like congressional earmark , congressionally directed spending item , and earmark , and provided some direction for how congressionally originated earmarks, according to these definitions, are to be handled in the budget process. 13457 In various forums during January and February 2007, the President proposed that congressionally originated earmarks should be cut by at least 50% in number and funding in FY2008 appropriations, relative to FY2005, and no longer included in non-statutory report language. Analysis of E.O. 13457. The policy, therefore, may raise several general and specific issues for Congress, including the following: What are the appropriate budgetary roles and responsibilities for Congress, the President, agencies, and the public in the U.S. political system? What are the implications for Congress of the OMB "Earmarks" website and database of congressionally originated earmarks? Defining, Identifying, and Overseeing Earmarks Debates over earmark definitions and transparency have taken place for some time, but no generally accepted definitions of earmark-related terms appear to have been established. Executive Order 13457 E.O.

During the 110th Congress, the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the George W. Bush Administration have defined terms like congressional earmark, congressionally directed spending item, and earmark, and have provided some direction for how congressionally originated earmarks, according to these definitions, are to be handled. This report focuses on Bush Administration policy regarding earmarks originated by Congress and related issues. Specific definitions for the term earmark (and related terms, like congressional earmark, presidential earmark, and others) vary considerably and are controversial. Nevertheless, all of the terms relate to the use of discretion to allocate particularized benefits to one or more specific purposes, entities, or geographic areas. Some earmarks have the force of law, and others do not. Practices like earmarking have been used for decades, if not centuries, to make decisions regarding the allocation of public resources, but concerns also have been expressed. At the same time, Congress, its Members, and Presidents have asserted the prerogatives of their constitutional and statutory authorities and pursued their budget policy preferences. In January 2008, the President announced he would veto future appropriations bills that did not cut the number and funding of Administration-defined earmarks by half, relative to FY2008. The President also issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13457, which directed that agencies "should not" fund non-statutory earmarks, except under some conditions. OMB subsequently directed agencies on how to implement the E.O. after enactment of FY2009 continuing and regular appropriations. These are the latest in a series of developments that began in January 2007, when the President proposed that Congress should (1) cut the number and funding of congressionally originated earmarks by at least half for FY2008 appropriations, relative to FY2005, and (2) place them only in statutory text, not report language. In January 2007, the Administration issued its own definition of earmark, whose language (and perhaps meaning) evolved over time in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memoranda. A final definition appears to have been established in E.O. 13457, but its meaning probably is informed by the evolution and contents of previously articulated definitions. Later, OMB established an "Earmarks" website, containing a database of Administration-identified earmarks, to track congressional action. Potential related issues for Congress involve, generally, roles and responsibilities for Congress, the President, agencies, and the public in the U.S. political system; defining, identifying, and overseeing earmarks; the executive order; the "Earmarks" website and database; and potential representational consequences. This report emphasizes analysis of E.O. 13457. For a legal analysis of E.O. 13457, see CRS Report RL34373, Earmarks Executive Order: Legal Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as warranted and at the conclusion of the George W. Bush Administration.

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Overview of the By-Elections The Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma) held parliamentary by-elections on April 1, 2012. Depending on the conduct of the election, the official election results, and the treatment of the newly elected members of parliament, U.S. policy toward Burma may undergo a major shift, possibly including the waiver or removal of some of the current U.S. sanctions. Other nations and the European Union (EU) are reportedly also considering removing sanctions or restrictions on Burma depending on their assessments of the by-elections. The by-elections originally were to fill 48 vacant seats in Burma's various parliaments. However, on March 23, 2012, the Union Election Commission (UEC) postponed voting for three People's Assembly seats in the Kachin State for security reasons. The by-elections are largely considered significant because of the participation of the NLD, and its Chair Aung San Suu Kyi, who is viewed both domestically and internationally as the leader of Burma's democracy movement. According to the official results released by the UEC, the NLD won all 37 seats in the People's Assembly, 4 seats in the National Assembly, and both of the seats in the regional assemblies. As a result of the by-elections, the pro-military parties—the USDP and the National Unity Party (NUP)—and the military control 77.5% of the seats in the People's Assembly, 82.6% of the seats in the National Assembly, and 79.2% of the seats in the combined Union Parliament. Who's Ran—and Who Did Not Run A total of 17 political parties registered the minimum number of three candidates running for office in the by-elections including the pro-democracy NLD and the pro-military USDP (see textbox ). NLD rallies at which Aung San Suu Kyi spoke routinely drew over 10,000 people, making it desirable to use the stadia. Other nations also were allowed to send election monitors. However, at the same time reports of the invitation of international observers from ASEAN, the EU, the United Nations, and the United States appeared in the press, an election monitor for the Bangkok-based Asian Network for Free Elections was deported by the Union Government. Aung San Suu Kyi was among the NLD winners; she will be a member of the People's Assembly for the Yangon (Rangoon) Region. U.S. The Obama Administration has signaled that it would consider modifying or waiving some of the existing sanctions on Burma if it determines that the elections were sufficiently free and fair to warrant such a response. The Obama Administration's response to the by-elections may also be influenced by how other countries and the EU react to the election results. Other Developments in Burma While the parliamentary by-elections are drawing much of the attention in Burma, important developments have occurred with respect to other major issues of concern for the United States, particularly the continued detention of political prisoners, the Tatmadaw's continued attacks on ethnic militias, and the continued human rights violations of civilians in conflict areas. However, hundreds of political prisoners remain in detention. The continued fighting in Burma has resulted in ten of thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) and thousands of new refugees fleeing into China and Thailand. They also provide Congress with more evidence by which to assess the present situation in Burma and to possibly re-examine current U.S. policy. In addition, Congress may be asked by the Obama Administration to alter or amend one or more of the existing laws governing U.S. sanctions on Burma, depending on the outcome of the parliamentary by-elections. In many cases, the President has the authority to temporarily or permanently waive existing sanctions.

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma) held parliamentary by-elections on April 1, 2012. According to the official results announced by Union Election Commission (UEC), the National League for Democracy (NLD) won all but two of the 45 seats, including NLD Chair Aung San Suu Kyi winning a seat in the lower house of Burma's national parliament. Depending its assessment of the conduct of the election and the official election results, the Obama Administration may seek to alter policy towards Burma, possibly including the waiver or removal of some current sanctions. Such a shift may require congressional action, or may be done using executive authority granted by existing laws. The by-elections originally were to fill 46 vacant seats in Burma's national parliament (out of a total of 664 seats) and 2 seats in local parliaments. On March 23, the UEC postponed voting for three seats from the Kachin State for security reasons. A total of 17 political parties ran candidates in the by-elections, including the NLD and the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). The by-elections are viewed as significant primarily because of the decision by the NLD to compete for the vacant seats. The NLD and others allege that some Burmese officials and the USDP took steps to disrupt the NLD's campaign and possibly win the by-elections by fraudulent means. Despite these problems, events at which Aung San Suu Kyi spoke routinely drew tens of thousands of people. In response to international pressure, the Union Government invited the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU), the United Nations, the United States, and other nations to send election observers. Although largely free and fair by-elections would be a significant development, the current political situation in Burma remains a source of serious concern for U.S. policy makers. Hundreds of political prisoners remain in detention. Despite ceasefire talks, fighting between the Burmese military and various ethnic militias continues, resulting in a new flow of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees into nearby countries. Reports of severe human rights abuses by the Burmese military against civilians in conflict areas regularly appear in the international press. The response of the Obama Administration to Burma's by-elections will depend on the conduct of the campaign, the balloting process, the veracity of the official election results, and possibly on how the winners of the elections are treated once they become members of Burma's parliaments. In addition, the assessments of opposition parties (particularly the NLD and its chairperson, Aung San Suu Kyi), other nations and the EU to the by-elections may influence the U.S. response. Under current law, President Barack Obama has the authority to waive many—but not all—of the existing sanctions on Burma, and he may choose to exercise that authority following the by-elections. Alternatively, the White House may ask Congress to consider legislation removing or altering some the existing sanctions. For its own part, Congress may decide to re-examine U.S. policy toward Burma and make whatever changes it deems appropriate. For additional information on Burma, see CRS Report R41971, U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress; CRS Report R41336, U.S. Sanctions on Burma; and CRS Report R42363, Burma's Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions. The report will be updated following the announcement of the official results of the by-elections, and as circumstances warrant.

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Introduction Civil society organizations (CSOs), which are often viewed as an important component of sustainable democracy, are confronting growing limitations on their ability to operate around the world. This phenomenon is referred to by researchers and advocates as "closing space" for civil society work. Many experts assess that the closing space trend is likely to continue, which could also impact broader U.S. engagement on democracy promotion or the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression and, in some cases, even conflict with U.S. efforts to promote, development, and security. Congress has taken action to support civil society through a range of activities, including legislation, and may choose to further consider legislation, oversight activities—such as reporting, hearings, or direct engagement—and U.S. funding to respond to growing limitations on civil society around the world. From restrictions on the types of funding they are allowed to receive to draconian registration requirements, the measures targeting nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups are putting ever greater pressure on the entire civil society sector. The restrictions are most commonly imposed by governments seeking to limit the influence of nongovernmental actors. The United States has long supported civil society abroad, though the implications of this support sometimes vary in practice. It is the largest financial supporter of civil society in the world, according to a recent White House fact sheet, with more than $3.2 billion invested to strengthen civil society since 2010 through training, technical assistance, and direct funding for programs. In the face of the rapid geographic and substantive expansion of measures designed to close civil society space, the Obama Administration launched the Stand with Civil Society initiative in 2013 to bolster U.S. support for civil society abroad. The effort saw Presidential attention through speeches and a Presidential Memorandum. While advocates generally praise the Administration for raising the profile of the closing space issue, there is less consensus on whether the Administration's actions have fully matched its rhetoric, or on whether the policies and structures put into place under the initiative are sustainable. Congress at times has treated the promotion of vibrant civil societies abroad as a key element of U.S. foreign policy. Some experts and advocates warn that, even in already restrictive environments, civil society actors could face new or additional repressive action, particularly when civil society engages in politically charged or sensitive issues. These security concerns may affect the ability of donors—including the United States government, private donors, foundations, and international allies—to s afely work with CSOs abroad. Stand with Civil Society Initiative In September 2013, the President launched the Stand with Civil Society initiative—a global call to action to support, defend, and sustain civil society. While experts generally agree that the United States has demonstrated leadership in understanding and framing the problem of closing space, the policy response has been complicated by a number of factors, including various competing interests in the policy process, such as balancing support for civil society with U.S. willingness to confront important bilateral partners, possible impacts on other programs or objectives, and the availability of suitable tools or sufficient leverage. While many such provisions are country- or issue-specific, others are global in scope.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) around the world are confronting ever stricter limitations on their ability to operate, a phenomenon often referred to "closing space" for civil society work. From restrictions on the types of funding they are allowed to receive to draconian registration requirements, the measures targeting CSOs are increasingly putting pressure on the entire civil society sector in certain countries. These restrictions are most commonly imposed by governments seeking to limit the influence of nongovernmental actors, though restrictions are also being imposed by a broad range of governments, including democratic allies. Increasing awareness of this phenomenon has elevated concerns among civil society advocates and some policymakers, including in Congress. Congress has also shaped U.S. policy toward civil society through funding, legislation, hearings, and oversight activities. Many experts assess that the closure of civil society space is likely to continue. Some experts and advocates warn that, even in already restrictive environments, civil society actors could face new or additional repressive action, particularly when civil society engages in politically charged or sensitive issues. This will likely impact the ability of donors'—including the United States government, private donors, foundations, and international partners—to work with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) abroad. Closing space for civil society could also impact broader U.S. engagement on the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression. The United States has long supported civil society abroad, which is often viewed as an important component of sustainable democracy and economic growth. The United States is the largest financial supporter of civil society in the world, according to a recent White House fact sheet, with more than $3.2 billion invested to strengthen civil society since 2010. Civil society groups are also in many cases the implementers of U.S. foreign assistance programs. Many experts view the results of the United States' efforts to support civil society as mixed. In the face of the rapid geographic and substantive expansion of measures designed to close civil society space, the Obama Administration is credited for launching the Stand with Civil Society initiative in 2013, a global call to action to support, defend, and sustain civil society. This effort saw Presidential attention to the effort through speeches and a Presidential Memorandum. The Administration has also devoted specific funding and programmatic responses to address the closing space phenomenon. While advocates generally praise the Administration for raising the profile of the closing space issue, some experts question whether the Administration's actions have fully matched its rhetoric, or whether the policies and structures put into place under the initiative are sustainable. Policy responses to the problem of closing space are complicated by a number of factors, including various competing interests in the policy process, such as balancing support for civil society with U.S. willingness to confront important bilateral partners, possible impacts on other programs or objectives, and the availability of suitable tools or sufficient leverage. Congress has at times treated the promotion of vibrant civil societies abroad as a key element of U.S. foreign policy and has taken action to support civil society through a range of activities, including legislation. While many such provisions are country- or issue-specific, others are global in scope. Congress may choose to further consider legislation, oversight activities—such as reporting, hearings, or direct engagement—and U.S. funding on this issue.

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MAP-21: Overview Surface transportation authorization acts authorize spending on federal highway and public transportation programs, surface transportation safety and research, and some rail programs. The most recent multi-year authorization for federal surface transportation programs, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ), reauthorizes federal surface transportation programs and activities through September 30, 2014. MAP-21 authorizes roughly $105 billion for FY2013 and FY2014 combined. It also extended FY2012 surface transportation authorizations to the end of the fiscal year, raising the act's total authorization to approximately $118 billion. The highway trust fund (HTF) has provided most of the funding for surface transportation authorization bills since its creation in 1956. The HTF is supported mostly from taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel, but a sluggish economy and improvements in vehicle fuel efficiency have reduced fuels tax revenues below projections. In the end, Congress chose to transfer money from the general fund to the HTF to fund a two-year authorization. Congress also made major changes in the structure and formula of the highway and transit programs. The number of highway programs was reduced by roughly two-thirds. The number of discretionary programs, formerly under the control of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), has been reduced. Instead, MAP-21 sets each state's share in the initial distribution for FY2013 and FY2014 based on the apportionment it received in FY2012, adjusted in FY2014 to assure that each state receives 95% or more of its highway tax contribution to the HTF. The act provides for a major expansion of the Transportation Infrastructure Financing and Innovation Act (TIFIA) and some modest changes in federal tolling provisions. MAP-21 also seeks to accelerate transportation project delivery by altering the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance process and other environmental reviews. The finance provisions of MAP-21 met the need, providing general fund transfers of $6.2 billion and $12.6 billion for FY2013 and FY2014 respectively. Federal-Aid Highways MAP-21's highway and research titles authorize $81.99 billion over two years, $40.96 billion for FY2013 and $41.03 billion for FY2014 (see Table 1 ). MAP-21 creates the Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program that, like the Appalachian Development Public Transportation Assistance Program, mirrors an existing highway program.

On July 6, 2012, President Barack Obama signed the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141). The act authorized spending on federal highway and public transportation programs, surface transportation safety and research, and some rail programs and activities through September 30, 2014. MAP-21 authorized roughly $105 billion for FY2013 and FY2014 combined. It also extended FY2012 surface transportation authorizations to the end of the fiscal year, raising the total authorization to approximately $118 billion. Most of the funding for surface transportation bills has been drawn from the highway trust fund (HTF) since its creation in 1956, but the HTF, which receives revenue mainly from federal motor fuel taxes, has, due to a sluggish economy and improvements in fuel efficiency, received revenue substantially below projections. For the past several years, HTF revenue has been insufficient to finance the government's surface transportation programs, leading Congress to delay reauthorization for 33 months following expiration of the last multi-year reauthorization. Although Congress was unable to agree on a long-term solution to the HTF revenue issue, MAP-21 did provide for the transfer of sufficient general fund revenues to the HTF to fund a two-year bill. MAP-21 made major changes in the programmatic structure for both highways and public transportation and included initiatives intended to increase program efficiency through performance-based planning and the streamlining of project development. Among its major provisions, MAP-21 included: for the federal-aid highway program, research, and education, authorizations for FY2013 of $40.96 billion and for FY2014 of $41.03 billion; for public transportation, authorizations for FY2013 of $10.58 billion and for FY2014 of $10.7 billion; for the Transportation Infrastructure Financing and Innovation Act (TIFIA), which provides credit assistance for surface transportation projects, a significant expansion that could provide credit support of up to $6.9 billion for FY2013 and $9.2 billion for FY2014; major program restructuring, which reduced the number of highway programs by two-thirds and consolidated public transportation programs as well; more distribution of funding via apportionment to the states and less discretionary funding via the Department of Transportation (DOT) to individual projects; no project earmarks; no equity program, instead basing the distribution of highway funding on the FY2012 distribution such that each state will likely receive as much federal highway funding as its highway users paid to the highway account of the HTF; and changes in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance process intended to accelerate project delivery.

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Its annual spending on facility energy has averaged over $3.4 billion recently. In the early 1970s, Congress began mandating reductions in energy consumed by federal agencies, primarily by improving the efficiency of buildings and facilities, and by reducing fossil fuel use. Recent legislation and Executive Orders establish further energy reduction goals. President-elect Obama's recently publicized economic recovery plans include improvements in public building energy efficiency. This report reviews the energy conservation provisions in past and recent legislation applicable to DOD, Executive Orders that apply to all federal facilities and operations, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directives and instructions to the military departments and agencies. Annual defense appropriations that fund energy conservation measures along with DOD energy conservation investments are also summarized. Defense Energy Efficiency Improvements Despite reductions in energy consumption, annual energy spending increased up through FY2006 and would likely have been higher without investment in energy efficiency improvements. Over the last decade, Congress has appropriated $443 million in DOD energy conservation projects, DOD investment in energy conservation adds another $250 million, and the value of Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) exceeds $2.8 billion. Legislation

In the early 1970s, Congress began mandating reductions in energy consumed by federal agencies; primarily by improving building efficiency, and reducing fossil fuel use. Early legislation mandated a 10% reduction in federal building energy and a recent Executive Order mandates a 30% further reduction by 2015. President-elect Obama has included the goal of improving public building energy efficiency in his administration's economic recovery plan. This report reviews energy conservation legislation and Executive Orders that apply to the Department of Defense, directives and instructions to the military departments and agencies on implementing the legislation and orders, Defense spending on facility energy over the last decade, annual Defense appropriations that fund energy-conservation improvements, and Defense energy conservation investments. In FY2007, Defense spending on energy to operate its facilities reached almost $3.5 billion. In the last decade, Congress has appropriated $443 million in Defense energy conservation projects, and the value of contracts to install energy savings improvements has exceeded $2.8 billion. While the Defense Department has reduced its energy consumption, its energy spending increased due to higher energy prices. Congress continues to look at furthering energy efficiency improvements in aging Defense facilities and buildings as a means to rein in energy consumption and spending.

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T his report answers several common questions about the regulation of social media accounts in the House of Representatives. Recently, the number of Member offices adopting social media as an official communications tool has increased. With the increased use of social media accounts for official representational duties, the House has adopted policies and regulations regarding the creation, content, and use of third-party social media services, such as Facebook, Twitter, Vine, YouTube, Instagram, and Flickr. How does the House define social media? How are social media accounts regulated in the House? What makes a social media account an official resource? Can Members use official funds for social media? Is some content prohibited on official social media accounts? Do the mass communications regulations apply to social media?

Recently, the number of Member offices adopting social media as an official communications tool has increased. With the increased use of social media accounts for official representational duties, the House has adopted policies and regulations regarding the creation, content, and use of third-party social media services. This report answers several questions about the regulation of social media accounts in the House of Representatives. How does the House define social media? How are social media accounts regulated in the House? What makes a social media account an official resource? Can Members use official funds for social media? Is some content prohibited on official social media accounts? Do the mass communications regulations apply to social media?

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The nuclear power industry and its supporters have proposed that Congress take action to prevent the shutdown of currently operating U.S. reactors before the expiration of their operating license. Supporters contend that nuclear power should be valued as a domestic source of highly reliable, low-carbon electricity. However, opponents contend that nuclear power suffers from too many drawbacks (e.g., safety risks) and that federal incentives should focus instead on renewable energy and efficiency. Generally, U.S. nuclear plants are located in one of two market types: (1) competitive—where the value of electricity fluctuates based on supply-side price offers that are generally a function of fuel (e.g., natural gas) costs and demand-side price bids, and (2) cost-of-service—where the value of electricity is set at a rate based on regulator-approved costs, operating expenses, and a reasonable investment return. Unlike cost-of-service market areas—where generators have electricity price rates that are approved and periodically revised by a state utility commission—competitive power markets are subject to electricity price volatility that results from supply and demand fundamentals as well as fuel (e.g., natural gas and coal) costs for the marginal price-setting generators. Six reactors have permanently shut down during the past five years; 10 reactors—at eight plant sites—have announced, since 2010, their intent to close—nine in the past two years (see Figure 1 ); and 10 have been identified by consultants and ratings agencies as "at-risk" of closing prior to the expiration of their operating licenses. To date, CRS has not been able to locate or aggregate a comprehensive data set that would allow for a plant-by-plant analysis that accurately reflects all financial variables. Nuclear power plants annually provide about 20% of total U.S. electricity generation, most recently 19.5% in 2015. Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) Some nuclear power plants that operate in competitive power markets have separate power purchase agreements (PPAs) outside the RTO market that provide a specified value for electricity generation. However, the combination of capacity payments and electricity sales is estimated—assuming constant production costs at 2015 levels—to be less than production costs in 2016, not considering any capital expenditures. The Illinois legislature passed S.B. 2814 on December 1, 2016, which includes a Zero Emissions Credit (ZEC) incentive program for existing nuclear plants in the state. This may result in continued operations of the Quad Cities nuclear plant. Plant-Level Analysis of Electricity Sales Revenue and Fuel and O&M Costs Plant-specific cost and price information available to CRS for 33 nuclear power plants that operate in competitive power markets was used to assess whether electricity revenue did, or is expected to, exceed 2015 fuel and O&M costs for each plant for the years 2015 to 2019. Each nuclear power facility is subject to a unique set of cost, price, and financial performance variables. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz has reportedly indicated that the federal government has limited existing authority to provide financial support for operating nuclear power plants and that doing so is currently a state issue. A range of policy options are available to Congress, should it choose to act, that could potentially provide some degree of financial support for operating U.S. nuclear power plants. However, no federal tax incentives are available for existing nuclear power plants. Carbon Price Because of the low-carbon attributes of nuclear-generated electricity, a price on carbon emissions could potentially benefit existing nuclear power plants if the carbon price were reflected in wholesale electricity prices. Both revenue and cost data used to perform this analysis are at the plant level, with revenues represented by the nodal electricity price paid to each power plant and plant-level fuel and O&M cost information as reported by third-party sources.

Some of the 60 operating nuclear power plants (comprising 99 nuclear reactors) in the United States have experienced financial stress in recent years due to a combination of low wholesale electricity prices and escalating costs. Six nuclear reactors have permanently shut down during the past five years, and 19 others have announced their intention to close or have been identified as "at-risk" of closure by financial consultants and ratings agencies. Generally, U.S. nuclear plants are located in one of two market areas: (1) competitive—where the value of electricity fluctuates based on supply-side price offers that are generally a function of fuel (e.g., natural gas) costs and demand-side price bids, and (2) cost-of-service—where the value of electricity is set at a rate based on regulator-approved costs, operating expenses, and a reasonable investment return. Most of the U.S. plants considered vulnerable to shut down before expiration of their operating licenses are "merchant plants" that sell all or most of their power into competitive wholesale power markets. The price paid to merchant plants for electric power varies by location and is influenced by the price-setting fuel (usually natural gas and coal), transmission congestion, and other factors. Wholesale electricity prices in certain locations have fallen and electricity sales revenue may be below the fuel and operating and maintenance (O&M) costs of some plants, not considering capital expenditures that may also be incurred. CRS analysis of third-party data indicates that 19 of 33 power plants operating in competitive power markets may incur fuel and O&M costs that exceed electricity revenues for each plant in 2016. However, this number declines to seven in 2017 due to rising forward electricity prices as reported by Bloomberg. While merchant generators do have other revenue sources (i.e., capacity payments where available, power purchase agreements, and hedging positions) and additional costs (e.g., capital), CRS was not able to locate plant-specific information about these revenues and costs that would allow for a holistic financial assessment at the plant level. The nuclear power industry and its supporters have proposed that Congress take action to prevent currently operating U.S. reactors from shutting down before their licenses expire. Supporters contend that nuclear power should be valued as a domestic source of highly reliable, low-carbon electricity. However, opponents contend that nuclear power suffers from too many drawbacks and that federal incentives should focus instead on renewable energy and efficiency. Nuclear power plants annually provide about 20% of total U.S. electricity generation. To date, all of the policy action related to financial support for existing nuclear plants has been at the state level. New York has implemented a Clean Energy Standard (CES) that includes payments to qualified nuclear power plants in the state starting at approximately $17 per megawatt-hour in 2017. The CES has been challenged on legal grounds. A similar program was recently approved by the Illinois legislature, and Ohio has also considered nuclear support. Since each nuclear power plant is subject to a unique combination of financial variables, federal-level incentives are challenged because some nuclear plants are expected to continue operating without federal financial support. Should Congress choose to debate financial incentives for existing nuclear plants, several options may be considered. Tax incentives based on capital investment or electricity production could potentially provide financial support for existing nuclear plants. Establishing a carbon price—carbon tax, cap-and-trade, emissions regulations—could also provide some financial assistance to nuclear power, depending on how a carbon price mechanism was designed and implemented. Finally, Congress could authorize and require the federal government to enter into power purchase agreements with nuclear power plants that would provide a guaranteed price for nuclear-generated electricity. Additionally, the nuclear industry has been advocating that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) institute changes to electricity price formation in competitive power markets.

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Congress has also required that certain information about campaigns' financial transactions be made public. The most notable recent statutory changes occurred in 2014, when Congress eliminated public financing for presidential nominating conventions and increased limits for some contributions to political parties. The 2010 Citizens United ruling spurred substantial legislative action during the 111 th Congress and continued interest during subsequent Congresses. In another 2010 decision, SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that contributions to political action committees (PACs) that make only independent expenditures cannot be limited—a development that led to formation of "super PACs." This report will be updated occasionally as events warrant. Nonetheless, major changes in campaign finance law have been rare. A generation passed between the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and BCRA, the two most prominent campaign finance statutes of the past 50 years. After Congress enacted BCRA, momentum on federal campaign finance policy issues arguably shifted to the FEC and the courts. What Has Changed Unlimited Corporate and Union Spending on Independent Expenditures and Electioneering Communications In January 2010, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission . Aggregate Caps on Individual Campaign Contributions On April 2, 2014, the Supreme Court invalidated aggregate contribution limits in McCutcheon v. FEC . Specifically, the FY2015 omnibus appropriations law, P.L. 113-235 , increased contribution limits to national political party committees. Most relevant for federal campaign finance policy, P.L. 113-94 , enacted in April 2014, terminated public financing for presidential nominating conventions. H.R. 115-244 ) amends FECA to change the place of filing for Senate campaign finance reports from the Secretary of the Senate to the FEC. As noted elsewhere in this report, in December 2014, Congress enacted legislation, which President Obama signed ( P.L. Congress also held related oversight hearings. 133 reported favorably. The bill would terminate the presidential public financing program. The 114 th Congress enacted no major changes to campaign finance law. Some Members of Congress and Federal Election Commissioners have raised questions about whether prohibited foreign funds could have influenced recent elections, whether additional legislative or regulatory safeguards are necessary to protect future elections, or both. 115-141 ). Regulation and Enforcement by the FEC or Through Other Areas of Policy and Law In recent Congresses, FEC enforcement and transparency issues attracted attention in Congress and beyond. In addition, in the House, the Committee on House Administration continued to request documents from the agency about its enforcement practices. Through recent appropriations bills, including those enacted during the 115 th Congress, Congress also prohibited requiring additional contractor disclosure. Post- Citizens United legislative activity among those who favor additional disclosure has generally emphasized the DISCLOSE Act, but, as noted elsewhere in this report, some have also proposed reporting particular kinds of spending to agencies such as the IRS or the SEC. That provision, however, was not included in the FY2016 consolidated appropriations law ( P.L. Conclusion Some elements of federal campaign finance policy have substantially changed in recent years; others have remained unchanged. BCRA's soft-money ban and some other provisions remain in effect; but Citizens United , SpeechNow , and other litigation since BCRA have reversed major elements of modern campaign finance law. Although some of the specifics are new, these themes discussed throughout this report have been present in campaign finance policy for decades.

Major changes have occurred in campaign finance policy since 2002, when Congress substantially amended campaign finance law via the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). The Supreme Court's 2010 ruling in Citizens United and a related lower-court decision, SpeechNow.org v. FEC, arguably represent the most fundamental changes to campaign finance law in decades. Citizens United lifted a previous ban on corporate (and union) independent expenditures advocating election or defeat of candidates. SpeechNow permitted unlimited contributions supporting such expenditures and facilitated the advent of super PACs. Although campaign finance policy remains the subject of intense debate and public interest, there have been few recent major legislative or regulatory changes. In activity related to campaign finance policy, provisions in recent appropriations laws have prohibited some additional reporting requirements surrounding contributions and expenditures. Enacted 115th Congress legislation containing these provisions includes FY2018 consolidated appropriations law P.L. 115-141. Also through the appropriations process, the 115th Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 115-244) amending the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) to require electronic filing of Senate campaign finance reports. The above actions notwithstanding, the 115th Congress has not enacted major changes to campaign finance law, and there have been no major regulatory changes during the same period. The Committee on House Administration ordered reported a bill (H.R. 133) that would terminate the Presidential Election Campaign Fund. In addition, in some congressional legislative hearings, some Members of Congress have raised questions about whether prohibited foreign funds could have influenced the 2016 and 2018 elections, and required the FEC to issue a report on its enforcement of the FECA ban on such funds. Post-Citizens United, debate over disclosure and deregulation have been recurring themes in Congress and beyond. Legislation to require additional information about the flow of money among various donors, the DISCLOSE Act, passed the House during the 111th Congress and was reintroduced during subsequent Congresses. Congress also has considered alternatives, which include some elements of DISCLOSE, or proposals that would require additional disclosure from certain 501(c) groups. The debate over whether or how additional disclosure is needed has also extended to the Federal Election Commission—and congressional oversight of the agency—and the courts. During the same period, statutory and judicial changes eased some contribution limits and affected the presidential public financing program. Most consequentially, the Supreme Court invalidated aggregate contribution limits in April 2014 (McCutcheon v. FEC). Also in 2014, Congress and President Obama terminated public funding for presidential nominating conventions (P.L. 113-94). Congress responded to these events by including language in the FY2015 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 113-235) that increased limits for some contributions to political party committees, including for conventions. This report considers these and other developments in campaign finance policy and comments on areas of potential conflict and consensus. This report emphasizes issues that have been most prominent in recent Congresses. It also discusses major elements of campaign finance policy. This report will be updated occasionally to reflect major developments.

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First, some U.S. banks interested in competing in China's domestic market think that Chinese banks are provided an unfair advantage under the current regulatory regime, and that China has not fulfilled its obligations under its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession agreement to open its financial market to foreign competition. China's Banking Sector Prior to the beginning of China's economic reforms in 1978, the Chinese banking system was largely government-owned and isolated from the global economy. For four of the five equitized banks the majority of the shares are non-tradable shares held by the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), or other government entities, raising questions about their degree of separation from government control (see Table 1 ). Local Banks The category of local banks includes a variety of financial institutions. The PBOC and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) effectively oversee the operations of all banking institutions in China. Although China has made apparent efforts to comply with its WTO obligations, several U.S. banks maintain that China's laws and regulations, and the manner in which they have been enforced, have created barriers to entry for U.S. banks. However, the central government was unwilling to fully relinquish control over the equitized banks. Although China's central and local governments continue to wield significant influence over the operations of China's banks, these commentators say, they are no longer simply extensions of the government. Unresolved NPLs of the past, newly emerging NPLs associated with a recent sharp rise in local government debt, and hidden exposure to underground banking have increased the likelihood that China's banks may experience a rise in NPLs and, in some cases, edge towards insolvency. Local Government Funding Platforms as a Possible Source of Non-Performing Loans A second source of possible financial troubles for China's banks emerged out of the combined effects of China's post-global financial crisis stimulus program, flaws in local government financing, and the credit decisions of the banks. The Wenzhou financial crisis exposed a previously unseen and underappreciated vulnerability in China's banking system. In addition, the CBRC conducted a stress test study of China's banks to determine if they could withstand a sharp decline in property values. Allegations of Subsidized Loans The media and reports about China's banking system are replete with allegations that Chinese banks provide subsidized loans to preferred companies—usually state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—as part of a central government strategy to make Chinese companies more domestically or globally competitive. The Historical Evidence The claims that the Chinese government is directing Chinese banks to provide preferential loans to selected enterprises generally relies on two types of financial evidence: 1. that the selected enterprises are being provided a disproportional share of loans or credit; and 2. that the terms of the loans being provided to the selected enterprises are based on preferential treatment, usually in the form of lower interest rates. Congress could consider various options with respect to evaluating and responding to allegations of inappropriate bank subsidies in China. If implemented, Wen's proposed reforms may provide an opportunity for U.S. banks and other financial service providers to enter China's financial market. The extent to which the 112 th Congress may choose to play a role in this issue remains to be seen.

China's banking system has been gradually transformed from a centralized, government-owned and government-controlled provider of loans into an increasingly competitive market in which different types of banks, including several U.S. banks, strive to provide a variety of financial services. Only three banks in China remain fully government-owned; most banks have been transformed into mixed ownership entities in which the central or local government may or may not be a major equity holder in the bank. The main goal of China's financial reforms has been to make its banks more commercially driven in their operations. However, China's central government continues to wield significant influence over the operations of many Chinese banks, primarily through the activities of the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). In addition, local government officials often attempt to influence the operations of Chinese banks. Despite the financial reforms, allegations of various forms of unfair or inappropriate competition have been leveled against China's current banking system. Some observers maintain that China's banks remain under government control, and that the government is using the banks to provide inappropriate subsidies and assistance to selected Chinese companies. Others claim that Chinese banks are being afforded preferential treatment by the Chinese government, giving them an unfair competitive advantage over foreign banks trying to enter China's financial markets. While some question what they characterize as unfair competition in China's banking sector, others are concerned that many of China's banks may be insolvent and that China may experience a financial crisis. According to these commentators, efforts to resolve a serious accumulation of non-performing loans (NPLs) only disguised the problem. In addition, China's NPL situation may have been worsened by its November 2008 stimulus program and the emergence of "local government funding platforms" that generated an estimated $1.7 trillion in local government debt. A financial crisis in the city of Wenzhou revealed the previously underappreciated risk associated with China's "underground" banking activities. Some analysts fear that a sharp decline in China's property values could precipitate a financial crisis that could effect the U.S. economy. China's banking system raises two key issues that may be of interest to Congress. First, Congress may choose to examine allegations of inappropriate bank subsidies to major Chinese companies, particularly state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Second, under its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession agreement, China was to open its domestic financial markets to foreign banks. Congress may consider reviewing China's compliance with the WTO agreement and press the Obama Administration to raise the issue with the Chinese government. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

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The National Weather Service (NWS) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) sends alerts through NOAA Weather Radio (NWR), now expanded to include warnings for all hazards. National Continuity Programs The National Continuity Programs (NCP) Directorate, within the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), has responsibility for IPAWS. Redundancy in the dissemination network. In addition, NCP is developing a strategic plan for IPAWS that will align federal goals with the needs of state, local, tribal, and territorial officials. The initial stages of the program are projected to be realized on schedule, according to comments by Mr. Penn and Antwane V. Johnson, Division Director/PM, DHS/FEMA, IPAWS, at a June 2010 meeting sponsored by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Commercial Mobile Alerts In response to a requirement in the Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act, or WARN Act, as signed into law (Title VI of P.L. 109 - 347 ), the FCC worked with commercial mobile service providers to create a Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS) that would be able to relay alerts through cell phones. The gateway for CMAS is being developed as part of IPAWS. FEMA and the FCC have committed to a timetable for development of IPAWS and CMAS that is intended to deliver mobile alert messages to consumers by April 7, 2012. Through most of its existence, the alert system was known as the Emergency Broadcast System. Digital Emergency Alert System The FCC has promulgated new rules to include digital media carriage of EAS messages, the Digital Emergency Alert System (DEAS). The purpose of the document was to "develop a national vision and goals" for improving all-hazard warning systems at the federal, state, and local levels. Executive Order: Public Alert and Warning System On June 26, 2006, President George W. Bush issued an executive order stating that U.S. policy is "to have an effective, reliable, integrated, flexible, and comprehensive system to alert and warn the American people." This committee, within a year of formation, was charged with providing the FCC with recommendations on technical requirements, standards, regulation and other matters needed to support the transmittal of emergency alerts by commercial mobile service providers to their subscribers. The digital broadcasting capacity of public television stations is to be used to "enable the distribution of geographically targeted alerts by commercial mobile service providers," based on recommendations from the committee. The CMSAAC recommended that a federal agency act as an aggregator in accepting, verifying, and routing messages. The Future of IPAWS In the long term, IPAWS should be able to accept any legitimate alert or action announcement, verify it, and relay it to a wide variety of devices.

The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is built on a structure conceived in the 1950s when over-the-air broadcasting was the best-available technology for widely disseminating emergency alerts. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) jointly administers EAS with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in cooperation with the National Weather Service (NWS), an organization within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The NOAA/NWS weather radio system has been upgraded to include an all-hazard warning capability. Measures to improve the NOAA network and a new Digital Emergency Alert System (DEAS) are ongoing. DEAS benefits from the additional capacity that digital technology provides for message transmission. In addition, FEMA is developing the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) to meet requirements for an alert system as specified by an executive order issued by President George W. Bush. When completed, IPAWS should be able to accept any legitimate alert or action announcement, verify it, and relay it to a wide variety of communications devices. Legislation was passed at the end of the 109th Congress (Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act, or WARN Act, as signed into law as Title VI of P.L. 109-347) to assure funding to public television stations to install digital equipment to handle alerts. The law also required the establishment of a committee to provide the FCC with recommendations regarding the transmittal of emergency alerts by commercial mobile service providers to their subscribers. Committee recommendations provided the structure for a Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS), regulated by the FCC. Under the timetable agreed to by the FCC and FEMA, CMAS is scheduled to become operational by April 7, 2012. The federal agency responsible for completing critical work on CMAS, DEAS, and IPAWS is FEMA's National Continuity Program Directorate. IPAWS began as a federal program that would be available for state and local alerts. Its mission was then redefined to apply only for federal messages, placing the program at odds with the broader goals of DEAS and the broadcasters that transmit alerts. According to testimony in September 2009 before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, IPAWS will once more be developed as a comprehensive system to support the broader goal of combining federal participation with state, local, and tribal emergency management practices. Indecision and shifting goals in the past have, however, contributed to a lack of progress and significant delays in implementing IPAWS and related programs. IPAWS is incorporating leading-edge technologies for Internet Protocol (IP) enabled communications. Its deployment going forward will likely face challenges such as standards development, user acceptance, system management, and infrastructure funding.

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Consequently, the Courtheld that a state could not be liable for damages under the ADEA. of Community and Economic Development Judge Alito wrote the opinion for a unanimous court in the case of Chittister v. Departmentof Community and Economic Development , (20) which also considered if Congress had validly abrogated states'Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. Judge Alito found, however, that there did not appear to be similar findings concerningthe existence of intentional discrimination by employers against women in the provision of personalsick leave practices. (43) In Lopez , theCourt held that, because the act neither regulated a commercial activity nor contained a requirementthat the possession be connected to interstate commerce, the act exceeded the authority of Congressunder the Commerce Clause. §922(o), which states that "it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun"unless one of two exceptions applied. (59) Finally, Judge Alito undertook an analysis of the statute under the "substantial effects" prongof the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In general, it appears that Judge Alito's opinion in the Chittister case was consistentwith Supreme Court precedent at the time. Although Judge Alito has been criticized because hisopinion did not anticipate the result in the subsequent case of Nevada Department of HumanResources v Hibbs , the Hibbs case actually addressed a separate provision of the FMLA. The Chittister case is arguably distinguishable from the Hibbs case, a conclusion which has been reachedby other federal circuits. Judge Alito's dissent in the Rybar case, however, seems to have anticipated a more expansiveapplication of the Lopez and Morrison decisions than was adopted by most other circuits at the time. Further, his reasoning in Rybar may have been largely repudiated in the subsequent Supreme Courtcase of Gonzales v. Raich . Consequently, it would appear that Judge Alito's dissent was an argumentfor a more limited interpretation of the Commerce Clause than is consistent with current case law.

During his 15 years as a federal appellate judge on the Third Circuit, Judge Samuel Alito haswritten several opinions related to federalism. Two of these cases appear to be of particularsignificance. In Chittister v. Department of Community and Economic Development , Judge Alitoauthored a unanimous opinion which held that an individual could not sue a state under the FamilyMedical Leave Act (FMLA). This opinion addressed an issue which has been controversial in recentyears -- the parameters of the 11th Amendment and Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. The decisionheld that a provision of the Family Medical Leave Act which mandates the provision of sick leavefor employees with serious health conditions could not be enforced by employees against statesagencies or instrumentalities. In United States v. Rybar , Judge Alito authored a dissent to a decision that upheld a lawproviding that "it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun" as withinthe authority of the Congress under the Commerce Clause. Judge Alito, noting that the statute lackedboth a requirement for a specific connection to interstate commerce and findings that the purelyintrastate possession of machine guns had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, would havestruck the law down. In general, it appears that Judge Alito's opinion in the Chittister case was consistent withSupreme Court precedent at the time. Although Judge Alito has been criticized because his opiniondid not anticipate the result in the subsequent case of Nevada Department of Human Resources v.Hibbs , the Hibbs case actually addressed a separate provision of the FMLA. The Chittister case isarguably distinguishable from the Hibbs case, a conclusion which has been reached by other federalcircuits. Judge Alito's dissent in the Rybar case, however, seems to have anticipated a more expansiveapplication of the Supreme Court decisions in Lopez and Morrison than was being utilized by mostother circuits at the time. Further, his reasoning in Rybar may have been repudiated by the SupremeCourt in Gonzales v. Raich . Consequently, it would appear that Judge Alito's dissent was anargument for a more limited interpretation of the Commerce Clause than is consistent with currentcase law.

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Introduction1 NATO's mission in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) , is seen as a test of the allies' military capabilities and their political will to undertake a complex mission in a distant land and to sustain that commitment. Since the Washington NATO Summit in 1999, the allies have sought to create a "new" NATO, capable of operating beyond the European theater to combat emerging threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). NATO's effort in Afghanistan is the alliance's first "out-of-area" mission beyond Europe. The purpose of the mission is the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Stabilization and reconstruction must take place while combat operations, continue. The Karzai government in Afghanistan has also come under both domestic and international criticism due to rampant corruption and an inability to improve security and overall living conditions for its citizens. A Test of U.S. The elections were also seen as a message to the Taliban that the people of Afghanistan supported the effort to stabilize the country and end the conflict. On December 1, 2009, President Obama announced that after a lengthy review of the Afghan conflict, he had decided to send an additional 30,000 U.S. military forces to Afghanistan beginning in early 2010. In the initial two stages of ISAF's mission, key issues focused on use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to stabilize and rebuild the country; overcoming caveats placed by individual allies on the use of their forces; and managing the counter-narcotics effort. Beginning in 2008, in reaction to increased operations by the Taliban, NATO forces increased the number of offensive operations they undertook. One of the provisions in the report emphasized "that a major strengthening of political will and commitment is necessary, and that this should be followed up not only by a willingness to provide additional combat troops in the most difficult areas, unrestricted by national caveats ..." Provincial Reconstruction Teams Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are civilian-military units of varying sizes designed to extend the authority of the central government into the countryside, provide security, and undertake projects (such as infrastructure development and the delivery of basic services) to boost the Afghan economy. Mr. Costa suggested that Afghan Army and Police efforts in the counter-narcotics strategy had largely been ineffective and that ISAF should consider expanding its support of the Afghanistan government's counter-drug effort by including the destruction of opium labs and the interdiction of drug distribution networks as part of the ISAF mission. NATO's North Atlantic Council provides political direction for the mission. Although the allies had agreed on ISAF's mission, they differed on how to accomplish it. Canadian forces continue to deploy with U.S. and British forces in OEF combat operations against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. Former Deputy Commander in Afghanistan, a now U.S. Although President Obama's spring trip to Europe succeeded in renewing, at least temporarily, support for the Afghanistan mission among the Alliance's leadership, the lack of public support for continued involvement in ISAF in some allied countries will continue to complicate attempts by the U.S. Administration to successfully implement the new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in the long run. On the other hand, the growing level of violence carried out by what some perceive to be a resurgent Taliban, reinforced by the a growing number of al Qaeda and other foreign fighters, and the perception that the Afghan government has not made tangible progress in extending its authority, has lead to some wavering among the allies with respect to a long term commitment to remain in Afghanistan.

The mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan is seen by many as a test of the alliance's political will and military capabilities. Since the Washington Summit in 1999, the allies have sought to create a "new" NATO, capable of operating beyond the European theater to combat emerging threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Afghanistan is NATO's first "out-of-area" mission beyond Europe. The purpose of the mission is the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The mission has proven difficult, an "industrial-strength" insurgency according to General David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, because it must take place while combat operations against Taliban insurgents continue. The situation in Afghanistan has seen a rise in the overall level of violence due to increased Taliban military operations, an increase in terrorist-related activities, and recent major offensive operations conducted by the allies. U.N. Security Council resolutions govern NATO's responsibilities in Afghanistan. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) faces formidable obstacles: shoring up a weak government in Kabul; using military capabilities in a distant country with rugged terrain; and rebuilding a country devastated by war and troubled by a resilient narcotics trade. NATO's mission statement lays out the essential elements of the task of stabilizing and rebuilding the country: train the Afghan army, police, and judiciary; support the government in counter-narcotics efforts; develop a market infrastructure; and suppress the Taliban. Between 2001 and 2006, ISAF proceeded in four stages to extend its area of responsibility over the whole of Afghanistan. Although the allies agree on ISAF's mission, they have differed on how to accomplish it. Some allies continue to restrict their forces from engaging in counter-insurgency operations and have placed operational restrictions on their troops. The principal mechanism to rebuild Afghanistan are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) composed of military and civilian officials and charged with extending the reach of the Afghan government by improving governance and rebuilding the economy. The counter-narcotics efforts involving the destruction of poppy fields and drug facilities seems to be making some head way although drugs are still a major source of funds for the insurgents. Finally, continued turmoil in parts of Pakistan has complicated the effort to prevent the Taliban from infiltrating Afghanistan. Most observers suggest that ISAF's efforts to stabilize Afghanistan will require a long-term commitment from the allies. The Obama Administration has made the conflict a policy priority. On December 1, 2009, President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan including the decision to commit an additional 30,000 U.S. military forces to address the conflict. The plan also considers the idea of reducing the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan beginning in 2011 if conditions on the ground warrant. The 111th Congress continues to support the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan despite some rising opposition influenced in part by a growing negative public opinion in the United States towards the war and the added cost of the expanded war. The Congress has also demanded more integration and cooperation among all parties involved in the stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

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Introduction Family and work structure most Americans' lives. Work provides the principal means by which most families support themselves, and public policies directed at low-income families with children have generally attempted to encourage and support work. Family structure also has become a focus of public policy since an increasing number of children live with a single parent, and poverty rates for such children are much higher than for those in married-couple families. Families with children, regardless of marital status, are at risk of poverty; child poverty rates are higher than those for the aged or nonaged adults. In 2004, an estimated 13% of all parents worked at a wage rate that would have produced below-poverty income (for a family of three) even if they worked full-time, all year; an estimated 45% of all parents worked at a wage rate that would have produced incomes of less than 200% of poverty. Many single-parent families, having only one earner, have earnings that leave the family either poor or near poor. Though the likelihood that a family with children will be poor is much greater for those headed by a single mother than those headed by a married couple, married couples with children account for a nontrivial share of poor and low-income families with children. Parents' Work and Family Income Status Earnings are the primary means by which most parents support their families. Parents' Wages and Educational Attainment As is commonly known, wage rates tend to be higher for workers with higher levels of educational attainment. Figure 5 shows that while 3 out of 10 working parents with less than a high school diploma would have full-time full-year earnings too low to support a three-person family above the poverty level, only about 1-in-6 parents with a high school diploma, and about 1-in-20 parents with a bachelor's degree, have wages too low to support a benchmark family above poverty. Thus, though the table shows no occupation employing more than 500,000 parents with an hourly wage that would produce an annual income below the poverty level for the benchmark family of three (at full-year, full-time work), some parents in the occupations shown on this table did earn less than poverty-level wages. Weeks Worked and Work Schedules by Family Type Most families with children (92%) had one parent who worked at some point in 2004. Among those families who were near-poor (incomes above poverty but below 125% of the poverty line) based on the parents' earnings, 83% had a parent who worked full-time all year, and among families with earnings between 150% and 200% of poverty, the percentage with a full-time full-year worker rose to 90%. Whether one or both parents are fully engaged in the workforce affects the economic status of families with children headed by a married couple. Given that wage rates of many parents' jobs would leave a family in low-income status, it often takes two parents working for a family's earnings to attain a modest income level, above the low-income threshold of 200% of poverty used in this report. Rates of poverty and low income for single-parent families are higher than in married-couple families. Based on the earnings of both parents, 27% of married-couple families with children are low-income; however, based solely on the earnings of the family's principal earner, 39% of such families would be low-income.

Family and work structure most Americans' lives. Work provides the principal means by which most families support themselves, and public policies directed at low-income families with children have generally attempted to encourage and support work. Family structure also has been a focus of public policy because an increasing number of children live with a single parent, and poverty rates for such children are much higher than for those in married-couple families. Families with children, regardless of marital status, are at greater risk of poverty, with child poverty rates higher than those for either nonaged or aged adults. Based on nuclear family income in 2004, 17.1% of families with children had total incomes below the poverty line; 21.5% had incomes of less than 125% of the poverty line (poor or near-poor); and 34% had incomes of less than 200% of poverty (low-income). Most low-income families had a parent who worked during the year. Many parents work at jobs that produce low incomes for their families. In 2004, 13% of parents worked at a wage rate that would have produced below-poverty income for a family of three, and 45% of parents worked at a wage rate that would have produced incomes below 200% of the poverty level, even assuming full-year, full-time work—a level designated as low-income in this report. Thus, families with children headed by a single parent—with only one potential earner—are more likely to be poor than those headed by a married couple. However, married couples with children and one working parent sometimes struggle to attain even a modest income above 200% of poverty; it often takes both parents working for a family to exceed low-income levels. Moreover, for many families, if one parent's earnings are lost, the economic status of many married-couple families would suffer. Parents' characteristics (e.g., education and work experience) and the occupations in which they are employed affect wage rates, and therefore the possibility that a family is poor or low-income. Those with lower levels of educational attainment are more likely to earn low wages and be in low-income families. We estimate that 17% of working parents with just a high school diploma earn wages that are too low to support a family of three at the poverty line—assuming full-time, full-year work—and 60% would be unable to support such a family at twice that level. Among working parents with a bachelor's degree, only about 6% earn wages too low to support a family of three at the poverty line, but 24% lack the earnings capacity to support such a family at twice the poverty line. Additionally, younger parents typically earn less than older parents, who have had more time to accumulate work experience. This puts the families of young parents, who tend to have young children, particularly at risk for poverty and low income. Annual earnings and economic status also depend on number of hours worked per week and the number of weeks worked during the year. In married-couple families, strong attachment to the workforce of both parents is associated with higher income levels. However, among poor married-couple families, only half of all poor families had one earner working full-time all year. This report will not be updated.

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Observers point to several major challenges that the Intelligence Community will likely encounter in supporting the counter terrorist effort. Signals intelligence and imagery satellites have their uses in the counterterrorism mission,but intelligence to counter terrorism depends more on human intelligence (humint) such as spies and informers. Policies and statutes are being modified to facilitate a closer relationship between the two sets of agencies, but closercooperation has raised difficult questionsabout using intelligence agencies in the U.S. and about collecting information regarding U.S. persons. The primary role for Congress will be to decide appropriatelevels of budgetary resources and to oversee Intelligence Community efforts to ensure that resources are wellmanaged and that the nation's intelligence needs aremet. In February 2001, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet, in prepared testimony beforethe Senate Intelligence Committee, stated: "thethreat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving. Furthermore, "[Osama] bin Ladin and his globalnetwork of lieutenants and associates remain the most immediate and serious threat." The September 11, 2001 attacks were successful, but other terrorist plans havebeen thwarted although few details have been revealed. Inevitably there has been public discussion of the question of whether September 11 was an "intelligence failure." (8) A joint investigation by the House andSenate intelligence committees was undertaken in 2002 by a Joint Inquiry Staff. 107-306 ) Congress also established an independent commission toreview the review the evidence developed bygovernment agencies surrounding the 9/11 attacks. (20) A central issue for Congress is the extent to which it and the public are prepared to accept the inherent risks involved in maintaining many agents with connectionsto terrorist groups. Statutory law (21) requires thatcongressional intelligence committees be kept aware of all intelligence activities; unlike the situation in the earlyCold War years when some intelligence efforts were designed to be "deniable," it will be difficult for the U.S.Government to avoid responsibility for majormistakes or ill-conceived efforts of intelligence agencies. Intelligence-Law Enforcement Cooperation In the past, the Intelligence Community focused on threats from the military forces of hostile countries and inlarge measure left terrorism to law enforcementagencies, especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). A recurring concern reflected in reports about the activities of those involved in the September 11 attacks has been the perception that information about possibleterrorist involvement of individuals may not be available to immigration and law enforcement officials whoencounter the individuals. Intelligence Support to Counterterrorist Military Operations The campaign against Afghan-based terrorists and the Iraq war of 2003 (which was characterized as related tothe war on terrorism) graphically demonstrated theimportance of changes in intelligence support to military operations since the end of the Cold War. Ensuring that data collected from amyriad of sensors is available within essential time constraints will require coordination of programs some of whichare managed by DOD and others by CIA. They argue that even as Al Qaeda and otherterrorist organizations are being dealt with,traditional geopolitical concerns remain.

For well over a decade international terrorism has been a major concern of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Collection assets of all kinds have long been focusedon Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Intensive analytical expertise has been devoted to determining such groups'memberships, locations, and plans. Intelligence agencies had been acutely aware of the danger for years. In February 2001, Director of CentralIntelligence (DCI) George Tenet publicly testified toCongress that "the threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving." Furthermore, "[Osama] binLadin and his global network of lieutenants andassociates remain the most immediate and serious threat." Nevertheless, the Intelligence Community gave no specific warning of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Although all observers grant that terrorist groups are verydifficult targets and that undetected movements of small numbers of their members in an open society cannotrealistically be prevented, serious questions remain. An extensive investigation by the two intelligence committees of the September 11 attacks was undertaken in 2002. Although the final report is not yet public, thecommittee members found that the Intelligence Community, prior to 9/11, was neither well organized nor equippedto meet the challenge posed by globalterrorists focused on targets within the U.S. A separate independent commission was established in early 2003 totake another look at the events precedingSeptember 11. Counterterrorism is highly dependent upon human intelligence (humint), the use of agents to acquire information (and, in certain circumstances, to carry outcovert actions). Humint is one of the least expensive intelligence disciplines, but it can be the most difficult andis undoubtedly the most dangerous forpractitioners. Mistakes can be fatal, embarrass the whole country, and undermine important policy goals. Congressmakes decisions regarding the extent towhich the importance of humint outweighs the inherent risks. Countering terrorism requires close cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies; some terrorists will need to be brought to justice in courts,but others are dealt with by military forces or covert actions. In recent years, important steps have been taken toencourage closer cooperation between the twocommunities, but some believe terrorist acts may have been facilitated by continuing poor information exchangesbetween intelligence and law enforcementagencies and by blurred lines of organizational responsibility. Congress will oversee the implementation of theevolving relationship that affects importantprinciples of law and administration, and may choose to modify the roles and missions of intelligence and lawenforcement agencies. Military operations to counter terrorism are dependent on the availability of precise, real-time intelligence to support bombing campaigns using precision guidedmunitions. The linkage between sensor and "shooters" will be crucial as will access to global geospatial databases. As defense transformation progresses,Congress will also oversee the development of increased intelligence support to military operations including,especially, counterterrorist missions.

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Financial Challenges Facing the U.S. Since the passage of the PRA, the USPS has generated nearly all of its funding—about $69 billion in FY2015 according to the USPS's most recent financial report—by charging users of the mail for the costs of the services it provides. Between FY2007 and FY2015, the USPS accumulated $56.8 billion in financial losses, including a net loss of $5.1 billion in FY2015. In its 2010 exigent request, the USPS sought to increase rates on its market dominant products by approximately 5.6% due to poor economic conditions and decreased mail volume. Expenses from Operations To address its financial challenges, the USPS has made several operational adjustments intended to align its revenue, mail volume, and operating expenses, including changes to its workforce (e.g., increased use of non-career employees); consolidation of delivery routes and reductions in number of delivery facilities; reductions to retail office hours; and realignment of its mail processing and distribution network. The current labor and employment challenges of the USPS are discussed in greater detail in the " Current Issues Facing the USPS Workforce " section of this report. The USPS attributes the increased costs to "contractually obligated salary escalations and additional work hours associated in part with the growth in the more labor-intensive Shipping and Packages business." Additionally, the USPS reached its statutory debt limit of $15 billion in FY2012 and as a result the USPS has no remaining flexibility to finance operations or respond to market changes through borrowing without further action from Congress. Prefunding Requirement for Retiree Health Benefits64 The PAEA requires the USPS to prefund its retiree health benefits. To accomplish this task, the PAEA established a prefunding schedule beginning in FY2007. In total, through FY2015 the USPS has contributed $20.9 billion to the RHBF and has defaulted on payments totaling $28.1 billion. Postal Service's Current Strategies and Initiatives This section provides information on the U.S. Below is a selected list of the proposals contained in the USPS Business Plan : continued consolidation of mail processing facilities (known as the Network Rationalization Initiative); full implementation of revised postal service delivery standards; adjustments to staffing and the means of providing products and services at retail locations, including increases in "self-service" kiosks and reduced hours at selected retail locations; a shift to centralized and curbside mail delivery for both business and residential customers, where appropriate; an expanded scope of products and services offered at retail locations; and a move to five-day delivery of mail while maintaining six-day delivery of packages. Further, legislation introduced in the 114 th Congress, such as S. 2051 , Improving Postal Operations, Service, and Transparency Act of 2015 (iPOST Act), and H.R. 5714 , Postal Service Reform Act of 2016 , includes provisions that would allow the USPS to offer a range of nonpostal products and services that are currently prohibited under the PAEA. This approach would provide limited growth opportunities, but would also incur relatively low implementation costs and is permissible under current statutory authority.

This report provides background information on the responsibilities, financial challenges, and workforce issues facing the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). Additionally, it covers the current strategies and initiatives under development by the USPS and discusses further options for postal reforms. In FY2015, the USPS marked its ninth consecutive year of financial losses with a net loss of $5.1 billion. In addition, the USPS has reached its statutory debt limit of $15 billion. In recent years, the USPS has experienced growth in the package and shipping part of its business (known as Competitive Products). The USPS, however, has experienced sharp declines in both volume and revenue of its Market Dominant Products (e.g., First Class single-piece mail). The USPS has struggled in recent years to fulfill its statutory obligation to prefund its health benefits liability for future postal retirees. Under a prefunding schedule established by the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, the USPS has made $20.9 billion in contributions since FY2007 but defaulted on its remaining $28.1 billion in payments. In its most recent financial statement, the USPS requested reforms that would integrate postal employee healthcare options with Medicare, thereby reducing costs and making the prefunding liability expense more manageable. Such reforms would require statutory authorization from Congress. This report also covers several issues facing the USPS workforce. In recent years, initiatives designed to restructure the USPS retail and mail processing networks allowed the USPS to implement several workforce reduction strategies that helped cut costs. In FY2015, however, workforce costs increased. According to the USPS, this reversal was due to contract obligations and work hours associated with the growth in its labor-intensive package and shipping business. Additional postal initiatives and reform options discussed in this report include (1) changes to postal delivery standards, (2) consolidation of mail processing facilities, (3) closure of retail post offices, (4) five-day delivery, (5) updates to the postal fleet, (6) nonpostal products and services; and (7) postal banking. Appendix B of this report includes a table of House and Senate postal reform legislation introduced in the 113th and 114th Congresses, such as S. 2051, Improving Postal Operations, Service, and Transparency Act of 2015 (iPOST Act), and H.R. 5714, Postal Service Reform Act of 2016. For each bill, the table in Appendix B provides the bill number, title, sponsor, the committee(s) to which the bill was referred, a list of selected issues the bill covers, and the last major action (e.g., referral to committee, markup held).

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FEDVIP Basics The Federal Employee Dental and Vision Benefits Enhancement Act of 2004 was enacted on December 23, 2004, requiring the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to establish arrangements under which supplemental dental and vision benefits are available to federal employees, Members of Congress, annuitants, and dependents. OPM established the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP), with coverage first available on December 31, 2006. Enrollees are responsible for 100% of the premiums, and OPM does not review disputed claims. Individuals may choose a self-only, self +1, or a family plan. However, any coverage for dental and/or vision services provided under the individual's FEHB plan is the primary source of coverage, and the FEDVIP supplemental dental and vision plans pay secondary. Additionally, active workers (not annuitants) may still contribute to a Flexible Spending Account (FSA) to cover any qualified unmet medical expenses, such as dental copayments or deductibles.

The Federal Employee Dental and Vision Benefits Enhancement Act of 2004 was enacted on December 23, 2004 ( P.L. 108-496 ), directing the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to establish a supplemental dental and vision benefits program. OPM created the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP), with coverage first available on December 31, 2006. Enrollees are responsible for 100% of premiums and may choose a self-only, self + 1, or family plan. Coverage for dental and/or vision services provided through Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) plans is the primary source of coverage, and the supplemental dental and vision plan is secondary. Employees may still contribute to a Flexible Spending Account (FSA) to cover any qualified unmet medical expenses.

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(3) The 1997 economic crisis (which began in Thailand and quickly spread to Indonesia and several other East Asian economies), (4) resulted in a sharp depreciationof Indonesia's currency (the rupiah), (5) large-scalecapital flight, high inflation, widespread corporate bankruptcies (caused in part by large short-term debt ofmany companies and corrupt business practices), and a near collapse of the banking system. (6) In 1998, real GDP plunged by 13.2%; exports andimports fell by 8.6% and 34.5%, respectively, and living standards (per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity basis) droppedby nearly 13% (see Table 1 ). In addition, the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Indonesia dropped each year from 1997-2002. (9) However, Indonesia faces a number of challenges that threaten to undermine long-termgrowth prospects. The bombings have had a chilling effect on Indonesia's tourism industry and raisedmajor concerns over the safety of foreigntourists and businesspeople in Indonesia.

Indonesia's economy continues to struggle against the lasting effects of the 1997-1998Asian financial crisis and thepolitical instability that resulted. Indonesia was one of the hardest hit economies in Asia; real GDP fell by 13.2 %in 1998. Indonesian-U.S. commercial tieswere sharply diminished as well, caused in part by declining Indonesia living standards and a loss of foreign investorconfidence in Indonesia (due largely topolitical instability). The Indonesian economy has improved over the past few years, however, recent activities ofterrorist elements in Indonesia and the rise ofseparatist movements threaten to undermine further an already fragile economy. This report will be updated asevents warrant.

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Introduction1 The Reading First program was authorized as part of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA). The NCLBA was signed into law on January 8, 2002, and will expire at the end of FY2008 (including the automatic General Education Provisions Act one-year extension). It is expected that the 110 th Congress will consider legislation to extend the authorization of the ESEA as amended by the NCLBA. Reading First was drafted with the intent of incorporating scientifically based research on what works in teaching reading to improve and expand K-3 reading programs to address concerns about student reading achievement and to reach children at younger ages. By the end of October 2003, all states and the District of Columbia had received their FY2002 and FY2003 Reading First awards. Implementation Issues Information from ED's April 2007 report on state performance data, a 2007 Center on Education Policy report, Reading First: Locally Appreciated, Nationally Troubled , and a 2007 GAO report have all provided relatively positive information about states and local school districts opinions of the impact of Reading First on student achievement. However, state assessment measures and cut-off scores for determining reading proficiency vary from state to state, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions on Reading First's performance from these data. Office of the Inspector General Audits Three groups representing different reading programs filed separate complaints with ED's OIG, asking that the Reading First program be investigated. In addition, several audits of state Reading First programs have been issued, and audits have been conducted on ED's administration of the Reading First program and on the RMC Research Corporation's Reading First Contract. These three reports essentially validated many of the concerns that had been raised in complaints filed with the OIG. OIG Final Inspection Report: The Reading First Program's Grant Application Process The OIG report on the Reading First application process was highly critical of ED's implementation of the Reading First program. OIG Final Audit Report: The Department's Administration of Selected Aspects of the Reading First Program This audit focused on ED's administration of several aspects of the Reading First program: the Reading First Leadership Academies (RLAs) held in January and February of 2002; the Reading First website; ED's April 2007 Guidance for the Reading First Program ; and ED's monitoring of conflicts of interest in its technical assistance contracts.

The Reading First program was authorized as part of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA). The NCLBA was signed into law on January 8, 2002, and will expire at the end of FY2008 (including the automatic General Education Provisions Act one-year extension). It is expected that the 110th Congress will consider legislation to reauthorize the ESEA. Reading First was drafted with the intent of incorporating scientifically based reading research (SBRR) on what works in teaching reading to improve and expand K-3 reading programs to address concerns about student reading achievement and to reach children at younger ages. By the end of October 2003, all states and the District of Columbia had received their FY2002 and FY2003 Reading First awards. Information from the U.S. Department of Education's (ED) April 2007 report on state performance data; a February 2007 Government Accountability Office report, and a 2007 Center on Education Policy report, Reading First: Locally Appreciated, Nationally Troubled, have all provided relatively positive information about states' and local school district's opinions of the impact of Reading First on student achievement. However, state assessment measures and cut-off scores for determining reading proficiency vary from state to state, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions on Reading First's performance from these data. There have, however, been criticisms of the program that centered on the perceived "overprescriptiveness" of the program as it has been administered, perceptions of insufficient transparency regarding ED's requirements of states, and allegations of conflicts of interest between consultants to the program and commercial reading and assessment companies. Controversies have also arisen regarding the application of the SBRR requirements in the NCLBA to the Reading First program. Three groups representing different reading programs filed separate complaints with ED's Office of Inspector General (OIG), asking that the program be investigated. In September of 2006, the OIG issued a report on Reading First's grant application process. Subsequent OIG audit reports were issued on ED's administration of selected aspects of the program, on the RMC Research Corporation's Reading First contracts, and on several states' administration of the program. The OIG reports were highly critical of ED's implementation of the Reading First program, and essentially validated many of the concerns that had been raised in complaints filed with the OIG. In response to the controversy surrounding Reading First, the program's funding was cut from $1 billion in FY2007 to $393 million in FY2008. The Administration has requested that the program's funding be restored to $1 billion for FY2009. This report will be updated periodically.

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T he partnership parks of the National Park System are those units that the National Park Service (NPS) owns and/or manages along with one or more partners in the federal, tribal, state, local, or private sectors. This report responds to ongoing congressional interest in partnership parks, as Congress seeks to leverage limited financial resources for park management, to respond to concerns about federal land acquisition, and to create park units in "lived-in" landscapes, where natural and historical attractions are mixed with homes and businesses. Management and Ownership of Partnership Parks The partnership parks vary in their physical characteristics and legislative histories, but in each, NPS collaborates with outside entities to manage the land, significant portions of which may be owned by the partnering entity. Issues for Partnership Parks When considering NPS management partnerships, Congress faces a number of issues. How should financial responsibilities be shared between NPS and its partners? What administrative benefits and challenges might the partnership bring? More broadly, do partnership parks further the mission of the National Park Service, or does extending the agency's reach through partnerships weaken its focus on its core priorities? Inclusion in the National Park System In considering proposals to establish partnership areas, a basic question for Congress is whether the area should become a unit of the National Park System or whether some other arrangement (perhaps with less federal involvement) is more appropriate. On the other hand, some in Congress are reluctant to add new units to the system, contending that the federal government's land holdings are already too large and that budgetary resources would be better used to address problems in existing parks. Allocation of Financial Responsibilities Both NPS and its partners may face constrained financial resources for management of a partnership park. In other cases, the establishing legislation does include specific funding directions, such as requiring a 50/50 cost share between the federal government and nonfederal partners. Members of Congress and other observers have expressed both views. Some in Congress contend that partnership management has served as an incentive to add new units to the National Park System that do not necessarily warrant federal protection or investment.

In recent decades, it has become more common for the National Park Service (NPS) to own and manage units of the National Park System in partnership with others in the federal, tribal, state, local, or private sectors. Such units of the park system are often called partnership parks. Congressional interest in partnership parks has grown, especially as Congress seeks ways to leverage limited financial resources for park management. Congress generally specifies the shared management arrangements for partnership parks in the establishing legislation for each park. The arrangements may aim to save costs for both NPS and nonfederal stakeholders, combining investments so that neither partner carries the entire burden for park administration. Partnerships may also address concerns of Members of Congress and others about federal land acquisition by allowing nonfederal partners to own significant portions of a park unit, and they may address concerns about local input into decisionmaking. Partnership parks span a range of physical settings, including "lived-in" landscapes, where natural and historical attractions are mixed with homes and businesses. When considering NPS management partnerships, Congress faces both specific questions about the suitability and effectiveness of partnerships in particular units and larger questions about the role of these parks in the system as a whole. For specific areas, how much federal involvement is warranted, and how should financial responsibilities be shared between NPS and its partners? What concerns might arise around federal land ownership? What administrative benefits and challenges would NPS and its partners face in a given unit? More broadly, does partnership management help NPS fulfill its statutory mission to preserve valued natural and historic resources and provide for their enjoyment by the public, or does it too broadly diversify the agency's portfolio, compromising its ability to focus on core priorities? To the extent that partnerships enable or require new units to be protected as part of the National Park System, is this desirable? Some in Congress are reluctant to add units to the system, contending that the system is already too large and that NPS's budgetary resources would be better used to address concerns in existing parks, including a substantial maintenance backlog. Others see partnership parks as an opportunity to protect valuable resources that would not be feasible for NPS or its outside partners to administer alone.

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Indeed, as Secretary Chertoff explained, 2SR involved the evaluation of a variety of operational and policy issues, and among those was "the DHS organizational structure, to make sure that our organization is best aligned to support our mission." However, no report on the 2SR process and proposed reforms was issued. This report focuses primarily on the conclusions and proposals resulting from 2SR pertaining to organization and managerial lines of authority matters. Background DHS was mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The creation of DHS resulted in a reorganization of the executive branch on a scale not experienced since the establishment of the Department of Defense (DOD) half a century earlier. Originally denominated the National Military Establishment at birth in 1947, DOD was given its current name and underwent the first of what would be a series of structural modifications through statutory amendments in 1949. A similarly complex organization, DHS was the product of legislative compromises, and it was anticipated that congressional overseers, as well as department officials, would monitor the management and operations of DHS with a view to adjusting its structure as conditions warranted. In this regard, Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to reorganize functions and organizational units within DHS, subject to specified limits. In late January 2003, as components of DHS were being transferred to the department's operational control, President George W. Bush modified his original reorganization plan for DHS to reconfigure the functions of certain border security agencies into two new components—the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement—within the department's Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS). In one of his first actions as Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge's successor, Michael Chertoff, on March 2, 2005, the day before he was sworn in as Secretary, announced in testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security that he was "initiating a comprehensive review of the Department's organization, operations, and policies." This effort, he said, would begin "within days." 1. Since March 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been conducting an internal review of its policies, operations and organizational structure, known as the "Second Stage Review." 4009 ). Legislation H.R. The proposal would implement some aspects of Secretary Chertoff's plan for reorganizing DHS as a result of his 2SR initiative, but also contains provisions that are contrary to that plan.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The creation of DHS resulted in a reorganization of the executive branch on a scale not experienced since the establishment of the Department of Defense (DOD) half a century ago. Originally denominated the National Military Establishment at birth in 1947, DOD was given its current name and underwent the first of what would be a series of structural modifications through statutory amendments in 1949. A similarly complex organization, DHS was the product of legislative compromises, and it was anticipated that congressional overseers, as well as department officials, would monitor the management and operations of DHS with a view to adjusting its structure as conditions warranted. In this regard, Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to reorganize functions and organizational units within DHS, subject to specified limits. In late January 2003, as components of DHS were being transferred to the department's operational control, President George W. Bush modified his original reorganization plan for DHS to reconfigure the functions of certain border security agencies into two new components—the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement—within the department's Border and Transportation Security Directorate. In one of his first actions as Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge's successor, Michael Chertoff, on March 2, 2005, the day before he was sworn in as Secretary, announced in testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security that he was "initiating a comprehensive review of the Department's organization, operations, and policies." This effort, he said, would begin "within days." The results of that undertaking, which came to be known as the Second Stage Review or 2SR, were made public in mid-July. As Secretary Chertoff explained, 2SR involved the evaluation of a variety of operational and policy issues, and among those was "the DHS organizational structure, to make sure that our organization is best aligned to support our mission." However, no report on the 2SR process and reforms was issued. This report focuses primarily on the conclusions and proposals resulting from 2SR pertaining to organization and managerial lines of authority matters (H.R. 4009; S. 1866). Initial issues concerned the means for realizing the proposed 2SR reorganization; the efficiencies and effectiveness that would result with the proposed flatter, but more sprawling, restructuring; and how new leadership positions would be established, filled, compensated, and situated in the DHS hierarchy. Some aspects of these issues lingered for a while after the implementation of the 2SR plan on October 1, 2005. Approximately one year later, however, it appeared that Secretary Chertoff, exercising his reorganization authority, had largely realized his planned 2SR restructuring, although some legislative changes in this regard awaited finalization. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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This report provides an overview of major budget estimates and projections for the FY2011 federal budget cycle. The report presents and compares budget projections calculated by the Obama Administration's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). In addition, the report discusses selected major budgetary issues. Overview of the FY2011 Budget Cycle The congressional budget process, which includes the annual budget resolution and appropriations bills, usually begins once the Administration submits its budget to Congress. Economic Conditions Present Continuing Budget Challenges The economy continues to post major challenges to policymakers shaping the FY2011 federal budget. The economic recession, which many economists consider the most severe American recession since the Great Depression, has strongly affected budget estimates and projections. While the economy is showing some signs of recovery, the national unemployment rate, which was 9.5% in July 2010, is projected to decline slowly. Federal spending tied to means-tested social programs has risen due to elevated levels of unemployment, while federal revenues are projected to fall as individuals' incomes drop and corporate profits sink. Federal deficits, however, will likely be high relative to historic norms in FY2011, according to OMB and CBO projections. The Administration featured policy initiatives targeted at speeding up economic recovery, reducing the unemployment rate, enacting health insurance reform, overhauling financial regulation, and stabilizing housing markets and the automobile industry. The Mid Session Review was released on July 23, 2010. On April 22, the Senate Budget Committee passed its FY2011 budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. On July 1, 2010, the House, by adopting H.Res. 1500 , was considered to have agreed to a "deeming" resolution ( H.Res. Federal revenues fell 17% between FY2007 and FY2009. Discretionary spending over the next several fiscal years is projected to decrease in inflation-adjusted terms. The Obama Administration has called for a three-year freeze on non-security discretionary spending. Table 7 summarizes Administration and CBO projections of total federal deficits. Federal debt held by the public rose sharply from 40.8% of GDP at the end of FY2008 to 53.0% at the end of FY2010. In particular, changes in the expected path of the U.S. economy would affect future revisions of CBO baseline estimates of federal outlays and revenues. For instance, the U.S. economy contracted at an annualized real rate of 6.8% in the last quarter of 2008 and 4.9% in the first quarter of 2009, according to Commerce Department estimates, a sharper decline than many economists had expected. According to Commerce Department estimates, the economy grew at an annualized real rate of 3.7% in the first quarter of 2010 and only 1.6% in the second quarter. Unemployment rates have remained at high levels, with the national unemployment rate standing at 9.5% in July 2010.

This report provides an overview of major budget estimates and projections for the FY2011 federal budget cycle. The report presents and compares budget projections calculated by the Obama Administration's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). In addition, the report discusses major budgetary issues. The congressional budget process usually begins once the Administration submits its budget to Congress. The Senate Budget Committee passed a version of a budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 60) in April, and the House adopted a deeming resolution (H.Res. 1500; H.Res. 1493) in July. The current economic climate continues to pose major challenges to policymakers shaping the FY2011 federal budget. Although the economy has shown some signs of recovery from an economic recession that many economists consider the most severe since the Great Depression, unemployment remains at high levels. While the U.S. economy grew at an annual rate of 5.0% in the last quarter of 2009 in inflation-adjusted terms, after falling sharply in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, annualized growth was 3.7% in the first quarter of 2010 and 1.6% in the second quarter. The national unemployment rate stood at 9.5% in July 2010 and is projected to decline slowly. Weakness in residential and commercial real estate, high household debt levels, and fiscal challenges facing state and local governments may contribute to a long and slow economic recovery. The recession and the prospect of a slow recovery have strongly affected budget estimates and projections. OMB issued updated budget projections in July 2010, and CBO issued a budget baseline update in August 2010. Federal spending tied to means-tested social programs has risen due to rising unemployment, while federal revenues are falling as individuals' incomes drop and corporate profits sink. Federal revenues fell 17% between FY2007 and FY2009. Estimated costs of federal interventions in financial markets have fallen since late 2008 and early 2009, although fiscal risks associated with mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain. Federal deficits, according to OMB and CBO projections, will likely remain high relative to historic norms over the next few years. Long-run fiscal challenges have received renewed attention as the ratio of federal debt held by the public to GDP, which compares the accumulation of federal debt (excluding intragovernmental debt) to the size of the economy as a whole, reached 53% at the end of FY2009 and, according to OMB and CBO estimates, will exceed 60% at the end of FY2010 The Obama Administration released its FY2011 budget proposals on February 1, 2010. The Administration featured policy initiatives targeted at speeding up economic recovery, reducing the unemployment rate, implementing health insurance reform, overhauling financial regulation, and stabilizing housing markets and the automobile industry. The Administration also proposed a three-year freeze in non-security discretionary spending, which currently comprises about 15% of total federal outlays. The Administration's Mid Session Review, released on July 23, 2010, estimated that FY2010 revenues would be $33 billion lower, outlays would be $118 billion lower, and deficits would be $84 billion lower than estimates issued in February. CBO issued updated estimates on August 19, 2010. This report will be updated as warranted.

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For immigrants, there is one investor visa category, the EB-5 visa, which is the fifth employment preference immigrant visa category. The category provides individual foreign national investors and their derivatives lawful permanent residence (LPR) in the United States when they invest a specified amount of capital in a new commercial enterprise that creates at least 10 jobs. In general, individuals receiving EB-5 visas are granted a conditional residence status. After approximately two years they must apply to remove the conditionality from their residency status. If they have met the visa requirements (i.e., invested and sustained the required money and created the required jobs), the foreign national receives full LPR status. If the foreign national investor has not met the requirements or does not apply to have the conditional status removed, his or her conditional LPR status is terminated, and, generally, the foreign national is required to leave the United States, or will be placed in removal proceedings. Some Members of Congress contended during discussions around the creation of the visa that potential immigrants would be "buying their way in" to the United States. In 1992, Congress created the Regional Center Program, an additional pathway for foreign national investors to obtain an EB-5 visa. Unlike the EB-5 visa category, which does not expire, the Regional Center Program is temporary and is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2016. For each fiscal year, approximately 7.1% (roughly 10,000) of the total employment-based visas (140,000) are available for EB-5 investors and their derivatives, of which 3,000 are reserved for entrepreneurs investing in "targeted employment areas" (TEA), and 3,000 are reserved for those participating in the Regional Center Program. Questions include whether the Regional Center Program should be extended or made permanent, and if so should it be modified, or should it be allowed to expire. Some have also raised concerns about fraud in the program, including possible national security concerns. Other issues that have been raised include the capacity of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS, part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) to handle the complexity of regional center designations and EB-5 petition adjudications, the need for more data collection, the measurement of the visa's economic impacts, and state determinations of targeted employment areas. Currently, there are two different pathways for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status through the EB-5 visa category, the standard visa and the Regional Center Program. 1. Since its creation, the program has been reauthorized several times and is set to expire on September 30, 2016. Regional centers are defined as "any economic unit, public or private, which is involved with the promotion of economic growth, including increased export sales, improved regional productivity, job creation, and increased domestic capital investment." More simply, the term "regional center" refers to an entity (often a limited partnership or a limited liability corporation) where investment from multiple foreign nationals can be pooled to fund a broad range of projects within a specific geographic area. Certain state (e.g., Hawaii) and local governments have also established their own regional centers. In FY2006, investments in regional centers in a TEA were responsible for approximately 12% of the visas used; by FY2014 they represented 97% of the visas used. Individuals who are admitted to the United States on the basis of EB-5 visas are granted a conditional resident status. USCIS will issue a notice-to-appear (NTA) to foreign nationals who do not apply to have the conditional status removed or who are denied adjustment to full LPR status. China ranks at the top of investor visa recipient countries, with its citizens accounting for approximately 84% (8,156) of all EB-5 visas granted in FY2015. The EB-5 visa category was created as a way to increase investment and job creation in the U.S. economy. USCIS has also reported its estimates of the visa's creation of investment and jobs. Application and Petition Processing An on-going issue within the EB-5 program is the processing times for EB-5 applications (both for the regional center designation and the petitions for foreign national investors), and the impact of these potential delays on the investors and project developers. EB-5 stakeholders have also stated that USCIS needs to adjudicate EB-5 and regional center applications in a more predictable manner, noting that the EB-5 program faces competition from other countries with more predictable and speedy immigrant investor program. USCIS Expertise In drawing attention to some of the issues with the EB-5 visa, some have called into question whether USCIS is the right agency to manage the visa classification or whether USCIS should be required to consult or partner with other agencies regarding its EB-5 responsibilities. Some lawmakers were aware while creating the EB-5 program that the INS did not have all the expertise needed to implement the visa category and recommended the agency work with other agencies that have the necessary skills. In 2013, a DHS OIG report stated that "USCIS is unable to demonstrate the benefits of foreign investment into the U.S. economy." Fraud and Security Risks In comparison to other immigration visas, GAO found that EB-5 faces the risk of fraud in three unique respects that stem from its investment components. Second, the potential for large financial gains through the EB-5 visa may motivate regional center operators and intermediaries to take advantage of foreign investors. Lastly, the EB-5 visa classification is susceptible to the appearance of favoritism and special access. Addressing these could assist in its assessment and detection of fraud. For instance, USCIS' deference to states' determinations of the boundaries for high unemployment TEAs has allowed for variation across states in how they designate such an area. Some believe that this practice can accommodate commuting patterns and provide states with the choice as to what area fits their economic needs. The pending expiration of the program renewed attention on it and legislation has been introduced in the 114 th Congress related to the EB-5 visa category. In addition, H.R. 3370 would create an EB-5 fund to administer and operate the program.

The immigrant investor visa was created in 1990 to benefit the U.S. economy through employment creation and an influx of foreign capital into the United States. The visa is also referred to as the EB-5 visa because it is the fifth employment preference immigrant visa category. The EB-5 visa provides lawful permanent residence (i.e., LPR status) to foreign nationals who invest a specified amount of capital in a new commercial enterprise in the United States and create at least 10 jobs. The foreign nationals must invest $1,000,000, or $500,000 if they invest in a rural area or an area with high unemployment (referred to as targeted employment areas or TEAs). There are approximately 10,000 visas available annually for foreign national investors and their family members (7.1% of the worldwide employment-based visas are allotted to immigrant investors and their derivatives). In FY2015, there were 9,764 EB-5 visas used, with 93% going to investors from Asia. More specifically, 84% were granted to investors from China and 3% were granted to those from Vietnam. In general, an individual receiving an EB-5 visa is granted conditional residence status. After approximately two years the foreign national must apply to remove the conditionality (i.e., convert to full-LPR status). If the foreign national has met the visa requirements (i.e., invested and sustained the required money and created the required jobs), the foreign national receives full LPR status. If the foreign national investor has not met the requirements or does not apply to have the conditional status removed, his or her conditional LPR status is terminated, and, generally, the foreign national is required to leave the United States, or will be placed in removal proceedings. In 1992, Congress established the Regional Center (Pilot) Program, which created an additional pathway to LPR status through the EB-5 visa category. Regional centers are "any economic unit, public or private, which [are] involved with the promotion of economic growth, including increased export sales, improved regional productivity, job creation, and increased domestic capital investment." The program allows foreign national investors to pool their investment in a regional center to fund a broad range of projects within a specific geographic area. The investment requirement for regional center investors is the same as for standard EB-5 investors. As the use of EB-5 visas has grown, so has the use of the Regional Center Program. In FY2014, 97% of all EB-5 visas were issued based on investments in regional centers. Unlike the standard EB-5 visa category, which does not expire, the Regional Center Program is set to expire on September 30, 2016. Different policy issues surrounding the EB-5 visa have been debated. Proponents of the EB-5 visa contend that providing visas to foreign investors benefits the U.S. economy, in light of the potential economic growth and job creation it can create. Others argue that the EB-5 visa allows wealthy individuals to buy their way into the United States. In addition, some EB-5 stakeholders have voiced concerns over the delays in processing EB-5 applications and possible effects on investors and time sensitive projects. Furthermore, some have questioned whether U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) has the expertise to administer the EB-5 program, given its embedded business components. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector General (DHS OIG) has recommended that USCIS work with other federal agencies that do have such expertise, while USCIS has reported that it has taken steps internally to address this issue. USCIS has also struggled to measure the efficacy of the EB-5 category (e.g., its economic impact). USCIS methodology for reporting investments and jobs created has been called into question by both the DHS OIG and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Furthermore, some have highlighted possible fraud and threats to national security that the visa category presents. In comparison to other immigrant visas, the EB-5 visa faces additional risks of fraud that stem from its investment components. Such risks are associated with the difficulty in verifying that investors' funds are obtained lawfully and the visa's potential for large monetary gains, which could motivate individuals to take advantage of investors and can make the visa susceptible to the appearance of favoritism. USCIS has reported improvements in its fraud detection but also feels certain statutory limitations have restricted what it can do. Additionally, GAO believes that improved data collection by USCIS could assist in detecting fraud and keeping visa holders and regional centers accountable. Lastly, the authority of states to designate TEAs has raised concerns. Some have pointed to the inconsistency in TEA designation practices across states and how it could allow for possible gerrymandering (i.e., all development occurs in an area that by itself would not be considered a TEA). Others contend that the current regulations allow states to determine what area fits their economic needs and allow for the accommodation of commuting patterns. In addition to the issues discussed above, Congress may consider whether the Regional Center Program should be allowed to expire, be reauthorized, or made permanent, given its expiration on September 30, 2016. In addition, Congress may consider whether any modifications should be made to the EB-5 visa category or the Regional Center Program. Legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress that would, among other provisions, amend the program to try to address concerns about fraud, and change the manner in which TEAs are determined. Other bills would create an EB-5-like visa category for foreign national entrepreneurs who do not have their own capital but have received capital from qualified sources, such as venture capitalists.

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Introduction There is a broad-based consensus that the U.S. immigration system is broken. This consensus erodes, however, as soon as the options to reform the U.S. immigration system are debated. Substantial efforts to comprehensively reform immigration law failed in the 109 th and 110 th Congresses, prompting some to characterize the issue as a "zero-sum game" or a "third rail." The number of foreign-born people residing in the United States is at the highest level in U.S. history and has reached a proportion of the U.S. population—12.5%—not seen since the early 20 th century. Of the 38 million foreign-born residents in the United States, approximately 16.4 million are naturalized citizens. The remaining 21.6 million foreign-born residents are noncitizens. According to the latest estimates by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), about 10.8 million of the 21.6 million noncitizens were unauthorized aliens living in the United States in January 2010, down from a peak of 11.8 million in January 2007. Some observers and policy experts maintain that the presence of millions of unauthorized residents is evidence of inadequacies in the legal immigration system as well as failures of immigration control policies and practices. Whether and how the 112 th Congress will address immigration reform in the midst of historically high levels of unemployment and budgetary constrictions is difficult to project. Current circumstances may sharpen the social and business cleavages as well as narrow the range of options. Nonetheless, selected immigration issues are likely to be a major concern for the 112 th Congress, even if legislative action on such contentious issues appears daunting. Border and Visa Security The Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) each play key roles in administering the law and policies on the admission of aliens. arises in this debate.

There is a broad-based consensus that the U.S. immigration system is broken. This consensus erodes, however, as soon as the options to reform the U.S. immigration system are debated. Substantial efforts to comprehensively reform immigration law failed in the 109th and 110th Congresses. Whether and how the 112th Congress will address immigration reform in the midst of historically high levels of unemployment and budgetary constrictions is difficult to project. The number of foreign-born people residing in the United States is at the highest level in U.S. history and has reached a proportion of the U.S. population—12.5%—not seen since the early 20th century. Of the 38 million foreign-born residents in the United States, approximately 16.4 million are naturalized citizens. The remaining 21.6 million foreign-born residents are noncitizens. According to the latest estimates by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), about 10.8 million of the 21.6 million noncitizens were unauthorized aliens living in the United States in January 2010, down from a peak of 11.8 million in January 2007. Some observers and policy experts maintain that the presence of millions of unauthorized residents is evidence of inadequacies in the legal immigration system as well as failures of immigration control policies and practices. This report synthesizes immigration issues as a multi-tiered debate. It breaks down the U.S. immigration law and policy into key elements: border control and visa security; legal immigration; documentation and verification; interior immigration enforcement; integration, status, and benefits; and refugees and other humanitarian populations. It delineates the debate in the 112th Congress for a range of issues, including border security, criminal aliens, worksite enforcement, employment eligibility verification, permanent admissions, temporary workers, legalization, noncitizen eligibility for federal benefits, birthright citizenship, and the role of state and local law enforcement in enforcing immigration laws. Current circumstances may sharpen the social and business cleavages as well as narrow the range of options. Nonetheless, selected immigration issues are likely to be a major concern for the 112th Congress, even if legislative action on such contentious issues appears daunting. For a discussion of legislative action on immigration issues, see CRS Report R42036, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 112th Congress.

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Canada and Mexico resumed importing some U.S. beef in 2004. (See sections on Korea, Japan, and Canada, below.) U.S. Beef Exports to Korea Korea has been the last of the four major foreign markets to accept U.S. beef. In Congress In the 110 th Congress, U.S. access to Korea's beef market has become a key issue in the debate over implementation of the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement (FTA). U.S.

The 110 th Congress has been monitoring U.S. efforts to regain foreign markets that banned U.S. beef when a Canadian-born cow in Washington state tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in December 2003. The four major U.S. beef export markets, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Korea, are again open to U.S. products. However, resumption of beef trade with Japan and Korea has not gone smoothly. For example, Korea briefly readmitted but then suspended U.S. beef imports. Now, Korea's delays in implementing an April 2008 agreement to end its ban are a key issue in congressional consideration of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

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The SCRA protects servicemembers bytemporarily suspending certain judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that mayadversely affect their civil rights during their military service. The Act defines "Secretary concerned" with respect to a member of the armed forces as having the meaning in 10 U.S.C. This section requires military authorities to provide servicemembers with written information of their rights and benefits under the SCRA. The coverage ends in the event the ordersto active duty are revoked. They serve to suspend civil liabilities of military personnel and preserve causes ofaction either for or against them. Protection against default judgments. Thissection is inapplicable to section 301 (protection from eviction or distress). Maximum rate of interest. Evictions and distress. At least one court had interpreted the wording of the SSCRA, which statesan action is forbidden "unless upon an order previously granted by the court" to mean that the ordermust have been issued prior to the servicemember's entry into active duty. Cancellation of residential or motor vehicle lease. This section allows military persons who live in rental property to terminate leases they entered into prior to a period of active service. To be covered by the Act, the policymust be for a whole, endowment, universal, or term life insurance (other than group term lifeinsurance), or benefit similar to life insurance that comes from membership in any fraternal orbeneficial association and has to satisfy all of the following conditions: (1) the policy does not include a provision limiting the amount of insurance coverage based on the insured's military service; (2) the policy does not require the insured to pay higher premiums if he or she is in military service; (3) the policy does not include a provision that limits or restricts coverage if the insured person engages in any activity required by military service; and (4) the policy has to be "in force" (premiums have to be paid on time before any benefit guaranteed by these sections of the law can be claimed) for at least 180 days beforethe insured enters military service. Insurance rights and protections. V. Taxes and Public Lands The fifth broad category of provisions of the SCRA provides protection for certain rightsregarding public lands and protects servicemembers from having to pay certain taxes to multiplejurisdictions. Desert-land entries. Property used for business is not exempt from taxation. 101(6)). Anticipatory relief. Courts may grant the following relief: (1) if the obligation involves payments of installments for the purchase of real estate (like a mortgage), the court can stay enforcement of the obligation by adding a period oftime no greater than the period of military service to the remaining life of the contract,subject to the payment of the balance of principal and accumulated interest that remainsunpaid at the termination of the applicant's military service, in equal installments over theduration of the extended life of the contract; and (2) for any other type of obligation, liability, tax, or assessment, the court can stay enforcement for a period of time equal to the petitioner's period of military service,subject to payment of the balance of principal due plus accumulated interest in equalinstallments over the duration of the stay. The servicemember must resume makingregular payments on the debt after leaving active duty, in addition to the payments to make up forthe smaller payments he or she made while on active duty. Professional liability insurance. , malpractice) insurance policy, maysuspend payment of premiums on their liability insurance while they serve on active duty withoutlosing any coverage. Reinstatement of health insurance.

Recognizing the special burdens that members of the military may encounter in trying to meet their financial obligations while serving their country, Congress passed the Soldiers' and Sailors'Civil Relief Act of 1940 (SSCRA). This law has been amended from time to time, ordinarily inresponse to military operations that require the activation of the Reserves. P.L. 108-189 , the"Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)," was enacted on December 19, 2003 and overhauls theSSCRA. This report summarizes the rights granted to persons serving on active duty in the U.S.Armed Forces under the newly enacted SCRA. SCRA is a comprehensive rewrite of the SSCRA which clarifies language that has been subject to differing interpretations by courts, and modifies or expands certain benefits. The SCRA providesprotections for servicemembers in the event that their military service impedes their ability to meetfinancial obligations incurred before their entry into active military service. The SCRA does notrequire forgiving any debts or the extinguishment of contractual obligations on behalf ofservicemembers who have been called up for active duty, nor does it provide absolute immunityfrom civil lawsuits. Instead, it suspends claims against servicemembers and protects them fromdefault judgments. The SCRA also protects military members and their families from eviction,protects against cancellation of life insurance policies or non-reinstatement of health insurancepolicies, allows some professionals to suspend malpractice or liability insurance while on activeduty, and protects from taxation in multiple jurisdictions as well as forced property sales to payoverdue taxes. The SCRA provides for a cap on interest at an annual rate of 6% on debts incurred prior to a person's entry into active duty military service, sets forth procedures for requesting such a reduction,and clarifies that the balance of interest for the servicemember's period of military service is to beforgiven by the lender. Other measures protect military families from being evicted from rentalproperty or from mortgaged property, from cancellation of life insurance, from taxation in multiplejurisdictions and from foreclosure of property to pay taxes that are due, and from losing certain rightsto public land. It raises the amount of the rent that qualifies for protection from eviction, allowsservicemembers on active duty to terminate housing leases, and allows some servicemembers toterminate automobile leases.

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Introduction The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) was enacted in 1998 and replaced the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) as the federal government's primary employment and job training legislation. Title I of WIA—Workforce Investment Systems—authorizes job training and related services to unemployed or underemployed individuals. Funds authorized under Title I, Subtitle B of WIA ("Statewide and Local Workforce Investment Systems") are allocated to states by formula and are used for workforce development activities. The dislocated worker program is the largest of the three Title I grant programs and is intended to provide funding for employment and training activities for a specific group of unemployed individuals—dislocated workers. Third, in addition to concerns about the dislocated worker program formula leading to significant volatility and concerns about a mismatch between changes in unemployment and changes in funding, a fundamental misalignment between the formula factors and the intended population of the formula has also come under some scrutiny. This report addresses issues related to the dislocated worker program allocation formula by examining the extent to which problems may exist in the current formula regarding alignment of the formula factors with the program aims and volatility in year-to-year allocations; examining how aspects of the current formula's design may contribute to misalignment and volatility; and analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of alternative design options that may have the potential of improving alignment and reducing year-to-year volatility in state grant levels. There are three state formula grant programs in Title I: adult, dislocated worker, and youth. Thus the measures used for allocating funds in the current dislocated worker formula are likely to include but do not focus on the population of dislocated workers targeted by WIA. How Volatile Are Annual State Funding Allocations? Indexation in the Dislocated Worker Formula Although the current WIA dislocated worker formula, which uses a formula feature of fixed indexation of 4.5% to define excess unemployment, is intended to target funding on states with high or increasing unemployment (which, as discussed previously, is not strictly aligned with the dislocated worker population as defined by WIA), the use of a fixed point of reference yields results that do not always achieve this goal or results in funding decreases in times of unemployment increases. Conclusion The analysis in this report supports four conclusions. First, the current factors used in the WIA state grant formula for dislocated workers are not fully aligned with the target population. Fourth, there are several alternative factors available to measure the dislocated worker population.

The Workforce Investment Act (WIA), enacted in 1998, is the federal government's primary employment and job training legislation. Title I of WIA—Workforce Investment Systems—authorizes job training and related services to unemployed or underemployed individuals. Funds authorized under Title I, Subtitle B of WIA are allocated to states by formula and are used for workforce development activities. This report analyzes the current allocation formula for one of the three Title I formula grant programs—the dislocated worker program, which is the largest of the three Title I grant programs with annual funding of about $1.2 billion. The dislocated worker program is intended to fund employment and training activities for a specific group of unemployed individuals—dislocated workers. Dislocated workers are distinguished from the general category of adult unemployed individuals for purposes of funding allocations and are defined in WIA by specific criteria such as being part of a mass layoff. Interest in the dislocated worker program's allocation formula has increased recently because some high unemployment states have lost substantial funds under this program in recent years and there has been significant volatility in year-to-year state funding allocations under this particular funding stream. This report examines the funding formula and explores the pros and cons of alternative allocation procedures. The analysis in this report leads to three conclusions: First, the current dislocated worker formula does not align fully with the WIA-defined population of dislocated workers. The factors used for allocating funds in the formula may include but do not focus on the targeted population of dislocated workers. Second, as currently configured, the dislocated worker formula results in volatile changes in state allocations from one year to the next. While some volatility in allocations may be desirable so that funds go to the areas of greatest temporal need, the mechanics of the current formula tend to exaggerate the underlying volatility of the factors and lead to large annual changes in the intensity of funding (i.e., funding dollars per funding factor). Third, there are several alternatives to the current factors in the dislocated worker formula and several alternative formula features that may potentially offer better alignment with the target population and reduced volatility. In addition, there are options available to mitigate the large swings in specific state annual allocations under the dislocated worker formula.

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Prior to passage of SAFETEA, the most recent authorization was the Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-21, P.L. After October 1, 2003 all federal surface transportation programs continued to operate on the basis of 11 short term extension acts. The Conference Committee, Congressional Leadership, especially in the House, and the Administration were unable to reach agreement about total program funding for the next reauthorization period. This was largely because some Members of Congress backed a level of project funding larger than the Bush Administration was willing to support. At the end of the day, SAFETEA provides quite a bit of additional money, $286.4 billion in guaranteed spending authority, for the six-year period FY2004-FY2009. A direct comparison between the two bills, however, is difficult for a number of reasons that are beyond the scope this report. Part of the problem was that a bill that simply reduced the shares of donee states to increase the shares of donor states would have had difficulty overcoming a filibuster by donee states in the Senate. Providing equity in this way has been very expensive in dollar terms, the minimum guarantee program under TEA21, in fact, became the largest highway program. In the end, the constraints of limited funding availability and the practical politics of getting the surface transportation legislation through both houses of Congress, resulted in a modest and gradual increase in the guaranteed rate-of-return to the states. The same remains true in SAFETEA. This bonding provision may be the most important tolling provision in SAFETEA. For starters, SAFETEA contains at least 5,092 separate earmarks for congressional high priority projects (HPPs) with a value of over $14.8 billion (there are several additional blank, but nonetheless numbered earmarks in the conference report). In P.L. Other provisions in the act include a requirement that all federal agencies in the National Capital Region offer their employees a transit pass as a transportation fringe benefit (Section 3049); a provision making the alternatives analysis required as part of the New Starts program eligible for FTA grants (Section 3037), with 18 such studies earmarked for FY2006-FY2007; and earmarks for the Bus and Bus Facilities Program for FY2006-FY2009 (in TEA-21, there were no earmarks for that program for the last three years of the authorization period, leaving the earmarking during those years to the appropriations committees). Following are key SAFETEA provisions related to streamlining that change existing statutory or regulatory requirements: The establishment of a new entity in the NEPA process, referred to as a "participating agency," that includes those that intend to submit comments on NEPA documentation in addition to those that meet the definition of a cooperating agency; The establishment of procedures to be followed by lead and participating agencies for the collaborative development of the project's statement of purpose and need and project alternatives, including the establishment of deadlines on comments; The establishment of a 180-day statute of limitation on judicial claims on final agency actions related to environmental requirements; Authorization to allow the use of transportation funds to help agencies required to expedite the environmental review process; The establishment of a dispute resolution process when agencies disagree on elements of the environmental review process; Authorization to allow states to determine whether certain classes of projects may be processed as categorical exclusions; and Authorization to allow the establishment of state pilot programs to allow participating states to assume certain federal responsibilities regarding compliance with environmental laws. These limitations are among the issues of concern.

On August 10, 2005, President Bush signed the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act—A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU or SAFETEA) (P.L. 109-59). This act reauthorizes federal surface transportation programs through the end of FY2009. The reauthorization was long overdue, given that the previous long term authorization, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) (P.L. 105-206) expired on September 30, 2003. The reauthorization debate was primarily characterized by two interrelated issues, money and how that money would be distributed among the states. The 108th Congress came close to a bill with a surface transportation Conference Committee in place. In the end, however, conferees were unable to reach agreement either among themselves or with the Bush Administration as to how large the six-year reauthorization package would be in dollar terms. The Conference was also unable to agree on a solution to the long standing donor-donee state funding distribution question, with donor states insisting on a 95% return on fuel tax revenues and donee states insisting that increased funding for donor states not come at their expense. In the 109th Congress, the same issues threatened to undermine a Conference Committee that began meeting in June 2005. This time, however, all parties found ways in which to compromise. Most importantly, the Administration allowed total funding in the bill to rise to $286.4 billion for the six-year authorization period (in actuality the act provides $244.1 billion for the five years remaining before FY2009). This increase allowed the conferees to ultimately guarantee all states an eventual 92% rate of return, an improvement on the existing 90.5% rate, while at the same time holding 27 states harmless (meaning they will not receive less actual money than they have in the past). With these key compromises in place many of the objections to the bill disappeared and the conference report was agreed to on July 29, 2005. In addition to money issues, the act addressed a number of other issues. These included the creation of a new consolidated safety program, enhanced environmental streamlining regulations, changes in clean air conformity regulations, funding for transit new starts, expanded reliance on innovative financing and tolls, and spending on congressional high priority projects (earmarks). This report will be updated as warranted by congressional actions.

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Introduction The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a regional free trade agreement (FTA) among 12 Pacific-facing nations—Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam—that was concluded in October 2015. The TPP agreement is pending congressional approval, which is required for it to enter into force. TPP seeks to liberalize trade across a vast range of goods and services, including agricultural products. TPP countries already loom large in U.S. farm and food trade: Between 2011 and 2015, U.S. agricultural exports to these countries averaged $63.5 billion, or 42% of total exports, while TPP countries were the source for $60.9 billion in U.S. agricultural imports, amounting to about 47% of the U.S. total. This is followed by a partial snapshot of some of the higher-profile changes in market access for agricultural products in the agreement, a summary of selected provisions beyond market access that are of particular interest to stakeholders in food and agriculture, a brief overview of industry reactions to the agreement, and a review of what actions need to occur for the agreement to enter into force for the United States. With a combined population of roughly 250 million, these three countries likely offer the greatest potential for boosting U.S. farm and food exports via lower tariffs, or expanded tariff rate quotas (TRQs). At the same time, preferential access that U.S. food and agricultural interests have to markets in Canada and Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would become available to a wider group of potential competitors over time as tariffs are lowered within the TPP zone. Also significant is that potential key export expansion opportunities for U.S. food and agricultural interests, such as beef and pork to Japan and dairy products to Japan, Canada, and Vietnam, generally are to be phased in over a period of years, if not decades. As an example, Australia already enjoys preferential tariffs rates on its beef exports to Japan compared with the tariff rates imposed on U.S. beef. TPP would place U.S. beef on an even footing with Australian product in Japan. It concluded that TPP would boost U.S. farm income by $4.4 billion per year once it is fully implemented compared with a second scenario it modeled under which the United States does not implement TPP and the 11 remaining signatories ratify an equivalent agreement. Under the TPP agreement, Japan would drop its current tariff on fresh, chilled, and frozen beef from 38.5% to 27.5% in year one, with subsequent annual reductions to 9% by year 16. Japan also would establish a new duty-free, country-specific quota (CSQ) exclusively for U.S. wheat of 114,000 metric tons (equal to about 0.5% of U.S. wheat exports in the 2014/2015 marketing year), which would be increased to 150,000 tons in seven years and which also would be subject to the same progressively lower markup price. It also would create new duty-free CSQs for imports of U.S. unroasted and roasted malt. Sugar : The United States would expand access to its market for sugar incrementally by establishing new TRQs for sugar and sugar-containing products totaling 86,300 tons annually. Japan would provide new TRQs that would expand access to its market for sugar and sweetener-related processed products on a duty-free, or preferential-tariff-rate basis, including chewing gum, chocolates and products containing chocolate, confectionery goods and other such products, and would eliminate tariffs on various sweetener products over time. In its report on the likely effects of the TPP agreement on the U.S. economy and specific sectors, including agriculture, ITC specifically cites new provisions in the areas of sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT), and biotechnology as being among the beneficial elements in the agreement for U.S. agriculture. Among the non-tariff measures the TPP seeks to address are sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), which consist of actions that address issues of food safety, plant pests, and animal diseases. Export Disciplines On the topic of agricultural export programs, signatories to the agreement commit to eliminate the use of export subsidies, a type of incentive the United States does not employ in any case. In essence, the agreement establishes parameters for labeling and certification of products, including what information is permitted on the label and terms that may not be excluded, such as "chateau," "reserve," and others, while seeking to preserve the ability of government regulators to protect consumers. It also objected to the product-specific exception to recourse to dispute settlement that can be applied to tobacco products. Selected Agricultural and Food-Related Groups Opposed to TPP Groups that have expressed opposition to TPP include the Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Association, the National Farmers Union, R-CALF USA, the U.S. Rice Producers Association, and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union International (UFCW).

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a regional free trade agreement (FTA), which the United States concluded with 11 other Pacific-facing nations in October 2015: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Approval by Congress (through implementing legislation) is required before TPP can enter into force. If the 12 TPP countries ratify the deal, TPP would materially increase the overseas markets to which U.S. agricultural products would have preferential access. Exports account for around one-fifth of U.S. farm production, providing material support to commodity prices and farm income. For U.S. agriculture and food industry interests, much of the potential benefit from TPP lies in improving access to TPP markets by eliminating or lowering tariffs, and also increasing the quantity of products that may be imported on preferential terms under tariff rate quotas (TRQs). TRQs allow imports of a given product to enter duty-free, or at a reduced rate, within the quota amount. Quantities in excess of the quota are subject to higher duties that can be prohibitive. The opportunity to increase sales of farm and food products is expected to be greatest in the five TPP countries with which the United States has not concluded FTAs, particularly Japan and Vietnam. For example, the TPP agreement would substantially lower the tariff that Japan applies to U.S. fresh, chilled, and frozen beef cuts—from 38.5% currently to 27.5%—when the agreement enters into force, with further reductions down to 9% over 15 years. Significantly, this would place U.S. beef on par with the tariff treatment for Australian beef, which is the major competitor of U.S. beef in Japan and which currently enjoys a tariff preference under an FTA with Japan. Japan also would create new TRQs for U.S. wheat and rice, among other farm products, thereby expanding U.S. export opportunities across a number of product categories. The U.S. International Trade Commission has concluded that TPP would provide significant benefits to U.S. agriculture. The corollary to the potential for greater export opportunities for U.S. farm products under TPP is that the United States would lower and eliminate tariffs on many agricultural product imports—such as tree nuts, peanuts, cotton, various fruits, tobacco, and wine, among others. The United States also would provide limited additional duty-free access to farm imports via new TRQs for dairy products and for sugar and sugar-containing products. U.S. farm products, such as beef, that enjoy preferential access to Canada and Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would relinquish that advantage as tariffs are lowered over time for TPP partners. While tariff rate reductions and TRQs have long been a staple of trade liberalization efforts, TPP also seeks to address several non-tariff measures that can impede trade in food and agricultural products. Among these are sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), which concern actions by governments to assure food safety and guard against plant pests and animal diseases. TPP seeks to curb the use of SPS measures as impediments to trade and provides procedures for resolving disputes that arise, including recourse to dispute settlement. TPP also aims to minimize disruptions to trade in products of agricultural biotechnology and to bring greater coordination to the use of geographic indications, which involve exclusive naming rights for distinctive products from specific geographic locations. TPP commits countries to eliminate the use of export subsidies for agricultural products, which the United States does not employ, and seeks to reduce technical barriers to trade in wine and spirits by creating common definitions of these products and by establishing parameters for labeling and certification. As of August 2016, numerous major farm and food trade organizations had endorsed the TPP agreement, but support within the farm and food sector has not been universal. The National Farmers Union, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, and organizations representing tobacco leaf growers are among those groups that have expressed opposition to the agreement.

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Policymakers at all levels of government are debating a wide range of options for addressing the nation's faltering economic conditions. This report discusses policy issues associated with using infrastructure as a mechanism to benefit economic recovery. During the recent recession, policymakers took a number of monetary and fiscal policy actions to stimulate the economy. On the fiscal policy side, Congress enacted several measures in 2009 and 2010 that were intended to increase demand for goods and services through increases in federal spending and reduction in taxes. The largest of these was the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. Nevertheless, there is widespread desire to accelerate job creation and economic recovery, although consensus on how to do so is not apparent. Defining Infrastructure in Today's Context Most people probably think about roads, airports, or water supply when they refer to infrastructure, having in mind the types of systems or facilities that are publicly provided and are important to the productive capacity of the nation's economy. Today, many policymakers and stakeholder groups define the term broadly to include facilities and categories that vary considerably in the degree of historic federal investment in building or rebuilding physical structures (e.g., highways compared with public schools) and systems that have a long history of combined public and private ownership (water resource projects as well as electric transmission systems, some of which are federally owned, for example). Infrastructure and the Economy Academics, economists, and policymakers debate two key issues concerning the contribution of infrastructure investment to the economy. One is the issue of the effects of infrastructure spending and investment on productivity and growth. The second related issue is the role of infrastructure spending, including short-term job creation, as a countercyclical tool to support economic recovery. Infrastructure investment, they argued, can be an important source of stimulating labor demand when the labor market is underutilized, and enhancing U.S. productivity through long-neglected investments in roads, bridges, water systems, ports, etc. When Congress has considered raising spending on infrastructure or other federally funded activities to help stimulate a flagging economy, a commonly asked question is "how many jobs will be created?" Thus, the overriding question in debating infrastructure spending as part of a job creation package is, what will the increased spending buy? Two important considerations regarding any such proposal are, will the proposal produce short-term or long-term benefit, and will it produce a significant amount of incentive for the economy, relative to its budgetary cost. Some analysts are cautious about the effectiveness of infrastructure spending in this regard because of one key issue: timing. The timing of fiscal stimulus is critical. By definition, the goal of stimulus spending is to get money into the economy swiftly. But that objective conflicts with the reality of building infrastructure projects that typically are multiyear efforts with slow initial spendout. First, to the extent that recovery from a lengthy recession is slow—as it is now—projects with extended timeframes can still contribute to recovery. Setting Priorities and Determining Funding Needs Traditionally, setting priorities for infrastructure spending is based on a combination of factors. However, assessing "need" is complicated by differences in purpose, criteria, and timing, among other issues. A further complication arises in the context of evaluating job creation plans—whether infrastructure funds are targeted to true need, and whether "need" is defined by engineering assessments and established distribution methods, or by economic measures such as unemployment or the effectiveness of programs to pull in or leverage private capital.

During the recent recession, policymakers took a number of monetary and fiscal policy actions to stimulate the economy. Notably, Congress enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) that provided increases in federal spending and reduction in taxes in order to increase demand for goods and services. However, as the economy is only slowly emerging from the recession, interest in using federal government spending to boost U.S. economic recovery has again intensified. There is widespread desire to accelerate job creation and economic recovery, although consensus on how to do so is not apparent. Policymakers at all levels of government are debating a range of options to address these problems. This report is an overview of policy issues associated with one approach that also was included in ARRA: using accelerated investments in the nation's public infrastructure as a mechanism to benefit economic recovery. When most people think about infrastructure, they probably have in mind systems that are publicly provided and are important to the productive capacity of the nation's economy. Today, policymakers define the term more broadly to include both publicly and privately owned systems and facilities and categories that vary considerably in the degree of historic federal investment in building or rebuilding physical structures. Academics, economists, and policymakers debate two issues concerning the contribution of infrastructure investment to the economy. One issue is the effects of infrastructure investment on productivity and growth. The second related issue is the role of infrastructure spending, which is typically a long-term activity, as a short-term mechanism to invigorate a sluggish economy. Research conducted over time has resulted in a general consensus that there can be positive returns on productivity of investing in infrastructure. Many experts now argue that infrastructure spending could be an important source of stimulating labor demand and enhancing U.S. productivity through investments in roads, bridges, water systems, etc. Still, some analysts are cautious about the effectiveness of this type of fiscal stimulus because of one key issue: timing. By definition, the goal of stimulus spending is to get money into the economy swiftly, but infrastructure spending is different. The reality is that large infrastructure projects typically are multiyear efforts with slow initial spendout that continues over a period of time. Spending advocates contend that to the extent that recovery from a lengthy recession is slow—as it is now—projects with extended timeframes can still contribute to the economy's recovery. A key question in debating infrastructure as part of job creation to aid economic recovery is, what will the increased spending buy? Two important considerations are, will it produce short-term or long-term benefit, and will it produce a significant economic boost, relative to its budgetary cost. A commonly asked question is, how many jobs will be created? Setting priorities for infrastructure spending is based on a combination of factors, often including estimates of funding needs. Determining "need" is complicated by differences in purpose, criteria, and timing. In the context of evaluating job creation plans, a further complication is whether funds are targeted to true need, and whether "need" is defined by engineering assessments, by economic measures such as unemployment, or a program's effectiveness in leveraging private capital.

crs_RL32944

crs_RL32944_0

Introduction Many retirees depend on their former employer for retirement health insurance, either as their sole source of coverage for those under age 65 or as a supplement to their Medicare coverage once they reach 65. With the retirement of the baby boom generation looming ahead, employers offering coverage to their retired workers will face a huge future financial commitment. Some employers have already reduced or eliminated their commitment to insure their retirees. Further, among employers who provide health insurance for current retirees, their current workers are less likely to be guaranteed these benefits upon retirement. Employer-sponsored retiree health insurance benefits are eroding as employers attempt to control their costs by tightening eligibility requirements and shifting costs to retirees through increased premium contributions, deductibles, and co-payment amounts. Role of the Law and Courts An important characteristic of employer-sponsored health insurance, for both retirees and current employees, is that employers are not required to offer health insurance. There are few protections to prevent employers from cutting or eliminating benefits, unless the employer has made a specific promise to maintain the benefits or has a contractual agreement with either the employee or a labor group. This presents an interesting dilemma for the provision of retiree health benefits. Policy Options There are a wide variety of policy options that endeavor to make retiree coverage more available or affordable, or even to require that employers maintain coverage. However, when considering any option, it is also essential to consider the relationship between retirees' health insurance and insurance for current workers. Special treatment for retirees, compared to current workers could lead to inequitable outcomes. Thus any statutory requirement to provide retiree health insurance coverage should be examined in the broader context of all employer-sponsored coverage. Unlike defined benefit pensions that offer some protections for employees of companies in bankruptcy through the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation, there are no similar protections for retiree health.

Many retirees depend on their former employer for retirement health insurance, either as their sole source of coverage for those under age 65 or as a supplement to their Medicare coverage once they reach 65. However, the future of these benefits is uncertain. With the retirement of the baby boom generation looming ahead, employers offering coverage to their retired workers will face a huge future financial commitment. For this reason, many employers are re-examining their commitment to providing retiree health benefits. Some employers have already reduced or eliminated health insurance coverage for their retirees. Further, among employers who provide health insurance for current retirees, their current workers are less likely to be guaranteed these benefits upon retirement. An important feature of employer-sponsored health insurance, for retirees and current employees, is that it is voluntary—employers are not required to offer health insurance. Additionally, there are few protections to prevent employers from cutting or eliminating benefits, unless the employer has made a specific promise to maintain the benefits or has a contractual agreement with either the employee or a labor group. As a result, even among retirees who currently have employer-sponsored retiree health insurance, benefits are eroding as employers shift costs to retirees by increasing premiums, copayments or deductibles. For companies in bankruptcy, retiree health benefits are particularly vulnerable. Unlike defined benefit pensions that offer some protections for employees of companies in bankruptcy through the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation, there are no similar protections for retiree health benefits. There are a wide variety of policy options currently being discussed that endeavor to make retiree coverage more available or affordable, or even to require that employers maintain coverage. However, when considering any option, it is also essential to consider the relationship between retirees' health insurance and insurance for current workers. The concept of special treatment aimed solely at protecting the retiree population, without an equivalent treatment for current workers, could lead to inequitable outcomes. Thus, any statutory requirement providing retirees with health insurance coverage should be examined in the broader context of all employer-sponsored coverage. This report will be updated to reflect legislative activity.

crs_R43776

crs_R43776_0

Introduction Congress uses an annual appropriations process to provide discretionary spending for federal government agencies. The timetable currently associated with this process requires the enactment of these regular appropriations bills prior to the beginning of the fiscal year (October 1). If regular appropriations are not enacted by that deadline, one or more continuing resolutions (CRs) may be enacted to provide funds until all regular appropriations bills are completed or the fiscal year ends. First, the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 ( P.L. In the 113 th Congress, the House Appropriations Committee reported 11 of the 12 regular appropriations bills, and the House passed seven of these. During that same Congress, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported eight of the regular bills. 113-203 , respectively). On December 16, 2014, regular appropriations for 11 out of the 12 regular appropriations bills were enacted as part of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (Divisions A-K of ( P.L. 113-235 ); the FY2015 Consolidated Act). 113-235 to extend temporary funding for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through February 27, 2015. Discretionary Spending Budget Enforcement The framework for budget enforcement of discretionary spending under the congressional budget process has both statutory and procedural elements. The statutory elements are the discretionary spending limits derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ). The procedural elements are primarily associated with the budget resolution and limit both total discretionary spending and spending under the jurisdiction of each appropriations subcommittee. The limits for FY2015 discretionary spending are $521.272 billion for defense spending and $492.356 billion for nondefense spending. As of the date of this report, Congress has not adopted a FY2015 budget resolution. The Senate did not consider a budget resolution for FY2015. Both the House and Senate have used an alternative mechanism for FY2015 procedural budget enforcement that was enacted as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act. Based upon the budget enforcement provided via this alternative mechanism, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees each reported 302(b) suballocations to their subcommittees prior to floor consideration of the FY2015 regular appropriations bills. The FY2015 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act was considered and enacted during the first months of the 114 th Congress, on March 4, 2015 ( H.R. Of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2015, only one was not reported to the House. Status of Statutory Discretionary Budget Enforcement Prior to the Beginning of the Fiscal Year OMB projected the budgetary levels of the Senate regular appropriations bills on August 20, 2014. The bill was signed into law on March 4, 2015. Continuing Resolutions Because none of the FY2015 regular appropriations bills was to be enacted by the beginning of the fiscal year, a CR ( H.J.Res. 124 ; P.L. 113-164 ) was enacted on September 19, 2014. This CR generally extended funding at last year's levels, with a small across-the-board reduction and certain enumerated exceptions, through December 11, 2014. Two additional CRs were enacted to extend temporary funding for all 12 regular appropriations bills through December 13 and December 17 ( P.L. 113-202 and P.L. A fourth CR was enacted as part of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act to extend temporary funding for DHS through February 27, 2015 (Division L, H.R. 33 ; P.L. 114-3 ), after another CR ( H.J.Res. 35 ) was defeated on the House floor. 83 to complete the annual appropriations process for 11 out of the 12 regular appropriations bills, it became evident that additional time would be needed. 83, P.L.

The congressional appropriations process, which provides discretionary spending for federal government agencies, assumes the annual enactment of 12 regular appropriations bills prior to the beginning of the fiscal year (October 1). One or more continuing resolutions (CRs) may be enacted if all regular appropriations bills are not completed by that time. This report provides information on the budget enforcement framework for the consideration of FY2015 appropriations measures, the status of the FY2015 regular appropriations bills as of the beginning of the fiscal year, and the enactment of FY2015 continuing appropriations. Budget enforcement for discretionary spending under the congressional budget process has two primary sources. The first is the discretionary spending limits that are derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). The FY2015 levels for those limits are about $521.3 billion for defense spending and $492.4 billion for nondefense spending. The second source is the limits associated with the budget resolution on both total discretionary spending and spending under the jurisdiction of each of the appropriations subcommittees. However, Congress has not adopted a FY2015 budget resolution and has instead used an alternative mechanism for budget enforcement that was enacted as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-67). On the basis of this mechanism, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees received the total allocation for spending under their jurisdictions, and each reported 302(b) suballocations to its subcommittees prior to floor consideration of the FY2015 regular appropriations bills. In the course of the FY2015 appropriations process that occurred during the 113th Congress, the House Appropriations Committee reported all but one of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2015. The House separately considered eight regular appropriations bills on the floor and passed seven of them. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported eight of the 12 regular appropriations bills. Although the Senate began floor consideration of one of these bills, it did not complete it. The Senate did not separately consider any other regular FY2015 appropriations bills prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. Because none of the FY2015 regular appropriations bills were to be enacted by the beginning of the fiscal year, a CR (H.J.Res. 124; P.L. 113-164) was enacted on September 19, 2014. This CR generally extended funding at last year's levels, with a small across-the-board reduction and certain enumerated exceptions, through December 11, 2014. Two additional CRs extended temporary funding for all 12 regular appropriations bills through December 13 and December 17 (P.L. 113-202 and P.L. 113-203, respectively). The regular appropriations process for 11 of the 12 regular appropriations bills was concluded on December 16, 2014, when the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), Divisions A-K) was enacted. A fourth CR was enacted as Division L of P.L. 113-235 to extend temporary funding for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) only through February 27, 2015. On February 27, a fifth CR (H.R. 33; P.L. 114-3) was enacted to extend temporary funding for DHS through March 6, 2015, after another CR (H.J.Res. 35) was defeated on the House floor. On March 4, 2015, the FY2015 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act was signed into law (H.R. 240). This report will be updated during the FY2015 appropriations process as developments warrant. For information on the current status of FY2015 appropriations measures, see the CRS Appropriations Status Table: FY2015, at http://www.crs.gov/Pages/AppropriationsStatusTable.aspx.

crs_RL33800

crs_RL33800_0

Introduction Although much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established 30-plus years ago to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to "point" source discharges of metals and organic and inorganic toxic substances from factories and sewage treatment plants. However, there is less agreement about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required. Several key water quality issues exist: evaluating actions to implement existing provisions of the law, assessing whether additional steps are necessary to achieve overall goals of the act that have not yet been attained, ensuring that progress made to date is not lost through diminished attention to water quality needs, and defining the appropriate federal role in guiding and paying for clean water infrastructure and other activities. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the act have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. These factors partly explain why Congress has recently favored focusing legislative attention on narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, rather than taking up comprehensive proposals. A number of other issues of interest included implementation of current programs to manage stormwater discharges and nonpoint sources of pollution, as these are major contributors to water quality impairments across the country; implementation of rules governing discharges of wastes from large animal feeding operations; and implications of a number of court rulings concerning the scope of the act's discharge permit requirements. The act's program of financial aid for municipal wastewater treatment plant construction is a key contributor to that effort. At issue has been what the federal role should be in assisting states and cities, especially in view of such high projected funding needs. Thus, SRF issues have been prominent on the Clean Water Act reauthorization agenda in recent Congresses. H.R. In the 109 th Congress, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved S. 1400 , the Water Infrastructure Financing Act, in July 2005 ( S.Rept. This bill, H.R. H.R. Regulatory Protection of Wetlands How best to protect the nation's remaining wetlands and regulate activities taking place in wetlands has become one of the most contentious environmental policy issues, especially in the context of the CWA, which contains a key wetlands regulatory tool, the permit program in Section 404. The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee held hearings on H.R. 569 ).

Although much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established more than 35 years ago in the Clean Water Act (CWA) to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to toxic substances discharged from factories and sewage treatment plants. There is little agreement among stakeholders about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required to address the nation's remaining water pollution problems. Several key water quality issues exist: evaluating actions to implement existing provisions of the law, assessing whether additional steps are necessary to achieve overall goals of the act that have not yet been attained, ensuring that progress made to date is not lost through diminished attention to water quality needs, and defining the appropriate federal role in guiding and paying for clean water infrastructure and other activities. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the CWA have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. Congress has instead focused legislative attention on enacting narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, but not any comprehensive proposals. For several years, the most prominent legislative water quality issue has concerned financial assistance for municipal wastewater treatment projects, and it has been in focus in the 110th Congress, as well: the House passed three bills dealing with wastewater infrastructure financing (H.R. 720, H.R. 700, and H.R. 569), and the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved another, S. 3500. At issue is how the federal government will assist states and cities in meeting needs to rebuild, repair, and upgrade wastewater treatment plants, especially in light of capital costs that are projected to be as much as $390 billion. Also of interest have been programs that regulate activities in wetlands, especially CWA Section 404, which has been criticized by landowners for intruding on private land-use decisions and imposing excessive economic burdens. Environmentalists view these programs as essential for maintaining the health of wetland ecosystems, and they are concerned about court rulings that narrowed regulatory protection of wetlands and about related administrative actions. Many stakeholders desire clarification of the act's regulatory jurisdiction, but they differ on what solutions are appropriate. In the 110th Congress, committees held hearings on legislation that seeks to provide that clarification (H.R. 2421, S. 1870). Other issues discussed in this report that also have been of interest in Congress include implementation of current programs to manage stormwater discharges and nonpoint sources of pollution, as these are major contributors to water quality impairments across the country; implementation of rules governing discharges of wastes from large animal feeding operations; and implications of court rulings for the scope of the act's discharge permit requirements.

crs_RL32397

crs_RL32397_0

In addition to its many other responsibilities, OIRA currently reviews the substance of between 500 and 700 significant proposed and final rules each year before agencies publish them in the Federal Register , and can clear the rules with or without change, return them to the agencies for reconsideration, or encourage the agencies to withdraw the rules. The office was created by Congress and has a number of specific statutory responsibilities, but it also helps ensure that agencies' rules reflect the President's policies and priorities. Much of that discussion is drawn from a September 2003 report on OIRA by the General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government Accountability Office). This pre-publication review process made OIRA's regulatory reviews under Executive Order 12291 qualitatively different than its predecessors. In contrast to the broad scope of review under Executive Order 12291, the new order limited OIRA reviews to actions identified by the rulemaking agency or OIRA as "significant" regulatory actions, which are defined in section 2(f) of the order as the following: "Any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may (1) have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; (3) materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in the Executive order." OIRA's Formal Review Process As Figure 2 shows, OIRA reviews agencies' draft rules at both the proposed and final stages of rulemaking. The withdrawn rules reflect actions taken at the start of the George W. Bush Administration pursuant to a memorandum issued by Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card, which generally directed Cabinet departments and independent agencies to (1) not send proposed or final rules to the Office of the Federal Register, (2) withdraw from the Office rules that had not yet been published in the Federal Register , and (3) postpone for 60 days the effective date of rules that had been published but had not yet taken effect. For those economically significant rules, OIRA desk officers are to review the economic analyses using the office's guidance on how to prepare regulatory analyses under the executive order. If OIRA suggested a change to a rule before it was formally submitted to OIRA (e.g., during informal review), GAO's analysis would not reflect those changes. GAO's April 2009 Report In April 2009, GAO again reported that OIRA's reviews often resulted in changes to draft rules. Changes in OIRA's Policies and Practices During the George W. Bush Administration The formal process by which OIRA reviews agencies' draft rules has changed little since Executive Order 12866 was issued in 1993. Executive Order 12866 attempted to address some of those concerns, requiring (among other things) that agencies disclose after the publication of a rule the changes made to the rule during OIRA's review and the changes made at the suggestion or recommendation of OIRA. Executive Order 13563 On January 18, 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13563 on "Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review." The OMB director has delegated these responsibilities to OIRA. Proposals for changes to OIRA's authority and responsibilities have focused on such issues as (1) providing a statutory underpinning for regulatory reviews, (2) increasing or decreasing the office's funding and staffing, (3) including independent agencies' rules under the office's regulatory review function, and (4) improving the transparency of OIRA's regulatory review processes. Among other things, the office would be required to "provide to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, information that will assist the committee in the discharge of all matters within its jurisdiction, including information with respect to its jurisdiction over authorization and oversight of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget."

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Executive Order 12291, issued by President Reagan in 1981, gave OIRA the responsibility to review the substance of agencies' regulatory actions before publication in the Federal Register. The office's regulatory review role was initially highly controversial, and it has been criticized at different times as being both too active and too passive regarding agencies' rules. Although OIRA has a number of specific statutory responsibilities (e.g., paperwork review and regulatory accounting), as a component of OMB it is part of the Executive Office of the President, and helps ensure that covered agencies' rules reflect the President's policies and priorities. OIRA's current regulatory review responsibilities are detailed in Executive Order 12866, which was issued by President Clinton in 1993. The office reviews significant draft rules from agencies (other than independent regulatory agencies) at both the proposed and final rulemaking stages, and also informally reviews certain rules before they are formally submitted. For rules that are "economically significant" (most commonly defined as those having a $100 million impact on the economy), OIRA also reviews the economic analyses. Since 1994, OIRA has reviewed between 500 and 700 significant proposed and final rules each year, and can clear the rules with or without changes, return the rules to the agencies for reconsideration, or encourage the agencies to withdraw them. The executive order also requires OIRA or the rulemaking agencies to disclose certain elements of the review process to the public, including the changes made at OIRA's recommendation. A September 2003 report by the General Accounting Office indicated that OIRA had a significant effect on more than a third of the 85 rules in the study, but OIRA's most common effect was to suggest changes to explanatory language in the preambles to the rules. At the start of the George W. Bush Administration, OIRA made a number of changes to its review process, including increased use of return letters, added emphasis on economic analysis to support the rules, and improvements in the transparency of the office's review process. Overall, in contrast to the "counselor" role it played during the Clinton Administration, OIRA appeared to have returned to the "gatekeeper" role that it had during its first 12 years of existence. An April 2009 report by GAO again noted changes made to rules at OIRA's suggestion. Possible legislative issues involving OIRA include codification of the office's review function and principles, increasing or decreasing the office's funding and staffing, adding review of rules from independent regulatory agencies, and improvements in the transparency of OIRA's review process. In January 2009, President Obama requested recommendations from the Director of OMB for possible changes to Executive Order 12866. In January 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13563, which reaffirmed many of the principles in Executive Order 12866, but did not change OIRA's responsibilities. This report will be updated if there are changes in OIRA's regulatory review responsibilities. For information, see CRS Report RL33862, Changes to the OMB Regulatory Review Process by Executive Order 13422, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL32240, The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32356, Federal Regulatory Reform: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed].

crs_R43737

crs_R43737_0

Introduction The number of children coming to the United States who are not accompanied by a parent or legal guardian is raising a host of policy questions. While much of the congressional interest initially focused directly on immigration policy, the implications for other areas, including education, are now arising as well. Under federal law, states and LEAs are required to provide all children with equal access to a public elementary and secondary education, regardless of their immigration status. Upon arrival in the United States, unaccompanied alien children generally are initially served through programs operated by the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). While in these programs, children are provided with basic education services and activities and are not enrolled in local school systems. However, once an unaccompanied alien child is released to an appropriate sponsor (e.g., parent, other family member, or other adult), the child has the right to enroll in a local school, just like any other child living in that area, even while awaiting immigration proceedings. Rather, the first part of this report includes a discussion of three federal elementary and secondary education programs administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED): (1) Title I-A Grants to Local Educational Agencies (LEAs) authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), (2) English Language Acquisition Grants (Title III-A) authorized by the ESEA, and (3) Part B Grants to States authorized by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) with an emphasis on how these programs could currently serve unaccompanied alien children or possibly be modified to increase support for these children. The next section of the report provides an overview of the Refugee School Impact Aid program administered by ORR, which funds activities aimed at the effective integration and education of refugee children. Other Potentially Relevant Federal Education Programs that Are No Longer Funded In addition to the current federal education programs that may be useful in assisting LEAs in meeting the needs of recent immigrant students, there are other federal education programs administered by ED that are no longer funded that either focused on immigrant students (Emergency Immigrant Education Act) or have been used in the past to assist schools and LEAs experiencing an unexpected influx of students in elementary and secondary school (Temporary Emergency Impact Aid for Displaced Students). Limited Data on Placement of Unaccompanied Alien Children One of the principal challenges of providing funds to LEAs that are absorbing newly arriving unaccompanied children is the lack of local area data. The best available data from the ORR are county-level totals that do not indicate the age of the child.

The number of children coming to the United States who are not accompanied by a parent or legal guardian is raising a host of policy questions. While much of the congressional interest initially focused directly on immigration policy, the implications for other areas, including education, are now arising as well. Under federal law, states and LEAs are required to provide all children with equal access to a public elementary and secondary education, regardless of their immigration status. Upon arrival in the United States, unaccompanied alien children generally are served initially through programs operated by the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). While in these programs, children are provided with basic education services and activities and are not enrolled in local school systems. However, once an unaccompanied alien child is released to an appropriate sponsor (e.g., parent, other family member, or other adult), the child has the right to enroll in a local school, just like any other child living in that area, even while awaiting immigration proceedings. While several federal education programs administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) provide funds that may be used by schools, local educational agencies (LEAs), and states to serve unaccompanied alien children, this report focuses on three ED programs that may be particularly helpful in providing support for these children: (1) Title I-A Grants to Local Educational Agencies (LEAs) authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), (2) English Language Acquisition Grants (Title III-A) authorized by the ESEA, and (3) Part B Grants to States authorized by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). In addition to current federal education programs that may be useful in assisting local education systems in meeting the needs of recent immigrant students, there are other federal education programs previously administered by ED that are no longer funded that either focused on immigrant students (Emergency Immigrant Education Act) or have been used in the past to assist schools and LEAs experiencing an unexpected influx of students in elementary and secondary school (Temporary Emergency Impact Aid for Displaced Students). In addition to these ED programs, ORR administers the Refugee School Impact Aid program administered by ORR, which funds activities aimed at the effective integration and education of refugee children. One of the principal challenges of providing federal funds to LEAs and schools that are absorbing newly arriving unaccompanied children is the lack of local area data. The best available data from ORR are county-level totals that do not indicate the age of the child. A discussion of these data and their limitations is included at the end of this report.

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Introduction and Background Challenges to Russia's democratic development have long been of concern to Congress as it has considered the course of U.S.-Russia cooperation. The Obama Administration has been critical of the apparently flawed Russian presidential election which took place on March 4, 2012, but has called for continued engagement with Russia and newly elected President Vladimir Putin on issues of mutual strategic concern. Some in Congress also have criticized the conduct of the election, but have endorsed continued engagement, while others have called for stepping back and reevaluating the Administration's engagement policy. Congress may consider the implications of another Putin presidency, lagging democratization, and human rights abuses in Russia as it debates possible future foreign assistance and trade legislation and other aspects of U.S.-Russia relations. The Campaign Five candidates were able to register for the March 4, 2012, presidential election. Four of the five candidates—Putin, Gennadiy Zyuganov, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and Sergey Mironov—were nominated by parties with seats in the Duma. Two out of the three—regional governor Dmitriy Mezentsev and opposition Yabloko Party head Grigoriy Yavlinskiy—were disqualified by the CEC on the grounds that over 5% of their signatures were invalid. Many observers argued that he was eliminated because he would have been the only bona fide opposition candidate on the ballot. Of the registered candidates, all but Prokhorov had run in previous presidential elections and lost badly. According to the final report of the CEC, Putin won 63.6% of 71.8 million votes cast, somewhat less than the 71.3% he had received in his last presidential election in 2004. In their preliminary report, the 262 monitors led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that the election was well organized but that there were several problems. Although the report did not state outright that the election was "not free and fair," some of the monitors at a press conference stated that they had not viewed it as free and fair. According to the report, Prime Minister Putin received an advantage in media coverage, and authorities mobilized local officials and resources to garner support for Putin. On election day, the OSCE monitors assessed voting positively overall in the over 1,000 polling places they visited, but witnessed irregularities in vote-counting in nearly one-third of the 98 polling stations visited and in about 15% of 72 higher-level territorial electoral commissions. Protest Rallies The initial protests after Putin's election by those who view the electoral process as tainted appeared smaller in size and number than after the Duma election. Authorities approved a protest rally in Pushkin Square in central Moscow on March 5, along with Putin victory rallies elsewhere in the city. After some of the protesters allegedly did not disperse after the time for the rally had elapsed, police forcibly intervened and reportedly detained up to 250 demonstrators, including activists Alexey Navalny, Sergey Udaltsov, and Ilya Yashin, who later were released.

Challenges to Russia's democratic development have long been of concern to Congress as it has considered the course of U.S.-Russia cooperation. The Obama Administration has been critical of the apparently flawed Russian presidential election which took place on March 4, 2012, but has called for continued engagement with Russia and newly elected President Vladimir Putin on issues of mutual strategic concern. Some in Congress also have criticized the conduct of the election, but have endorsed continued engagement, while others have called for stepping back and reevaluating the Administration's engagement policy. Congress may consider the implications of another Putin presidency, lagging democratization, and human rights abuses in Russia as it debates possible future foreign assistance and trade legislation and other aspects of U.S.-Russia relations. Five candidates were able to register for the March 4, 2012, presidential election. Of these, Prime Minister Putin had announced in September 2011 that he intended to switch positions with current President Dmitriy Medvedev, and return to the presidency for a third term. Three of the other four candidates—Communist Party head Gennadiy Zyuganov, Liberal Democratic Party head Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and A Just Russia Party head Sergey Mironov—were nominated by parties with seats in the Duma. The remaining candidate, businessman Mikhail Prokhorov, was self-nominated and was required to gather 2 million signatures to register. Other prospective candidates dropped out or were disqualified on technical grounds by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). Opposition Yabloko Party head Grigoriy Yavlinskiy was disqualified by the CEC on the grounds that over 5% of the signatures he gathered were invalid. Many critics argued that he was eliminated because he would have been the only bona fide opposition candidate on the ballot. Of the registered candidates running against Putin, all but Prokhorov had run in previous presidential elections and lost badly. According to the final report of the CEC, Putin won 63.6% of 71.8 million votes cast, somewhat less than the 71.3% he had received in his last presidential election in 2004. In their preliminary report, monitors led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that the election was well organized but that there were several problems. Although the report did not state outright that the election was "not free and fair," some of the monitors at a press conference stated that they had not viewed it as free and fair. According to the report, Prime Minister Putin received an advantage in media coverage, and authorities mobilized local officials and resources to garner support for Putin. The OSCE monitors witnessed irregularities in vote-counting in nearly one-third of the 98 polling stations visited and in about 15% of 72 higher-level territorial electoral commissions. The initial protests after Putin's election by those who view the electoral process as tainted appeared smaller in size and number than after the Duma election. Authorities approved a protest rally in Pushkin Square in central Moscow on March 5, along with Putin victory rallies elsewhere in the city. After some of the protesters allegedly did not disperse after the time for the rally had elapsed, police forcibly intervened and reportedly detained up to 250 demonstrators, including activist Alexey Navalny, who later was released.

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Some open access repositories archive only citations for articles or other materials; some archive both citations and full text materials; some allow free downloading and some do not. Opponents of open access publishing (primarily traditional publishers and major scientific associations) cite such issues as the doubtful permanence of electronic archives, questions of copyright ownership and reductions to traditional publishers' profits, costs to researchers who have to pay to have their manuscripts published in open access journals, the possibly dubious quality of articles published, questions about peer review processing and quality, perceptions of the academic community and the academic reward system which appear to give more status to articles published in traditional, subscriber-pays journals, and so forth. Policies For Paying Publication Costs in Relation to the Future of Open Access Publishing Among the issues related to "author pays," and possibly to the future of open access journals, is whether the federal government will continue to allow some research grant funding to be used to pay charges levied on authors or institutions for the costs of publishing articles resulting from federally funded research. After that, non-subscribers have free online access only to original research articles that were published in the hard-copy journal. As will be discussed below, a mixed model is used in the case of NIH's Public Access Policy , which asks authors to voluntarily submit to PubMed Central (PMC) the peer reviewed version of a manuscript accepted for publication in a journal. The language, reported to have been authored by Representative Ernest J. Istook, Jr., "recommended" that NIH permit open access to NIH-funded research by "requiring" researchers to deposit peer reviewed articles accepted for publication and associated supplemental materials in NIH's PubMed Central , an free access repository information system, within six months after publication of the article in a scientific journal. They are supposed to be posted and made available for public viewing after the embargo period, or sooner if the publisher agrees, but within 12 months. The report endorsed NIH's objectives in establishing the "Public Access Policy" and included language requiring NIH to develop an "aggressive" outreach program to ensure full participation by grantees in volunteering to submit their journal manuscripts to the NIH archive. 109-149 ). The Senate passed H.R. It requires all federal departments and agencies that invest $100 million or more annually in research to develop a public access policy that requires all final manuscripts or articles that result from federal funding to be posted in a free publicly accessible archive as soon as possible but no later than six months after publication. Issues Relating to Federal Open Access Archives and Publishing In addition to NIH's Public Access policy and PMC , other federal agencies have engaged in open access activities. 3010 ). But they both expressed concern about duplication of effort with the private sector and urged NIH to work with private sector publishers to avoid unnecessary duplication. In November 2004 the U.K. government (the Department of Trade and Industry) rejected the proposal, maintaining there is no indication that access to scientific journals is impeded under current publishing methods, and that according to the government, "the true costs of open-access publishing are still not clear ..." and "it is 'not obvious ... that the 'author pays' business model would give better value for money than the current one...." In June 2005, the United Kingdom Research Councils (RCUK), the main British supporter of publicly funded research, "which distribute[s] most government science funding," issued for comment a draft policy which mandates researchers it funds to archive their journal articles and conference papers "in a free public archive 'at the earliest opportunity, wherever possible at or around the time of publication.'" Assessment of proposals for governmental citation archives to link to publisher's websites to read published articles, as opposed to posting articles on a free access government system.

Controversies about open access publishing and archiving confront issues of copyright and governmental competition with the private sector. Traditional publishers typically charge readers subscriber fees to fund the costs of publishing and distributing hard-copy and/or online journals. In contrast, most open access systems charge authors publication fees and give readers free online access to the full text of articles. Supporters of the open access "movement" object to the rising costs of journal subscriptions; share peer reviewers' reluctance to do free reviews for journals rapidly escalating in price; and believe that scientific collaboration, advancement, and utilization will be hastened by free access to information. Traditional subscriber-pays commercial publishers and some scholarly associations object to most open access publishing because it may weaken the publishing industry and erode profits. Critics seek to limit free government-run repositories only to articles and citations from federally sponsored research; others oppose fees in the thousands of dollars charged to authors to pay the costs of publishing articles or view as unreliable foundation donations that sustain some open access activities. In response to congressional action in 2004 and 2005, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) implemented a policy that requires authors it funds to voluntarily submit copies of their manuscripts to NIH's free access electronic database, PubMed Central (PMC), as soon as possible after a journal accepts the article for publication, but within 12 months. The policy allows a publisher-imposed embargo, or delay, before allowing free public access to the manuscript. Many publishers oppose this policy and there is only about a 4% compliance rate by grantees. In September 2006, NIH publicized procedures to permit publishers to post manuscripts or articles directly to PMC and to give NIH free access to some articles for the embargo period. In the 109th Congress, report language on H.R. 3010, signed as P.L. 109-149, endorsed NIH's policy to post peer-reviewed manuscripts and mandated NIH to develop its open access repository, PubChem, and to avoid duplication with private efforts. H.R. 5647 would have mandated NIH-funded researchers to submit final manuscripts to PMC; S. 2104 would have required submission within six months. S. 2695, the Federal Research Public Access Act (FRPAA), would have required federal agencies with research funding exceeding $100 million annually to require all their federally funded researchers to deposit final manuscripts in a publicly accessible archive within six months of acceptance by a publisher. During the 110th Congress, issues likely to generate controversy could include the FRPAA, which may be reintroduced; modification of NIH's Public Access policy to require the government to link to the original journal's website to read articles; monitoring the added costs of expanding PubMed Central; determining if other agencies will use governmental nonexclusive licensing to allow access to commercially published journal articles, regardless of copyright ownership; assessing the quality of science published in open access journals; and evaluating the economic impacts of open access publishing on traditional publishing. This report will be updated as needed.

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106-113 ) , and the most recent law, the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act (SHVERA). SHVERA was passed as Division J of Title IX of the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. 4818 , P.L. 108-447 ) in December 2004. Under the law, only unserved households are eligible to receive distant network television signals via satellite. Broadcasters filed suit against those satellite television companies. In areas where local-into-local service was available, some had to choose between distant network signals or local-into-local.

In 2004, Congress passed the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act, SHVERA, as part of the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447). Among its many provisions, the law modified subscriber eligibility for distant and local analog broadcast network television signals. Some satellite television subscribers had to choose between either local or distant broadcast network signals instead of receiving both. This report explains the provisions in SHVERA, and outlines subsequent court decisions involving direct broadcast satellite providers, including EchoStar Communications. It will be updated as necessary.

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Political Background Since the 1980s, Guatemala has been consolidating its transition from a centuries-long traditionof mostly autocratic rule toward representative government. A democratic constitution was adoptedin 1985, and a democratically-elected civilian government inaugurated in 1986. Eighteen years later,democratic institutions remain fragile. Guatemala ended its 36-yearcivil war in 1996, with the signing of the Peace Accords between the government and theGuatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG),a group created in 1982 from the merger of four left-wing guerrilla groups. The accords not only ended the civil conflict, but constituted a blueprint for profound political, economic, and social change to address the conflict's root causes. Embracing 10 other agreementssigned from 1994 to 1996, the accords call for a one-third reduction in the size and budget of themilitary; major investments in health, education, and other basic services to reach the rural andindigenous poor; and the full participation of the indigenous population in local and national decisionmaking. The accords also outline a profound restructuring of stateinstitutions, especially of the military, police, and judicial system, with the goal of endinggovernment security forces' impunity from prosecution and consolidating the rule of law. Former President Alfonso Portillo, of the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), whose four-year term just expired, took office in January 2000 following elections generally regarded asfree and fair. Oscar Berger (pronounced ber-SHAY), of the Great National Alliance (Gran Alianza Nacional, GANA), a recently formed and fractious coalition of center-right parties, was inaugurated Presidenton January 14, 2004. Rios Montt, age 77, took power through a coup and was military dictator from1982-1983, while the army carried out a counter-insurgency campaign resulting in what theGuatemalan Truth Commission has now characterized as genocide of the Mayan population. This remains the case today. The 36-year civil war generated social and economic costs. On the positive side, observers pointout that the armed conflict is definitively ended; and the state policy of human rights abuses duringthat conflict has been terminated. Histop advisor on security policy is retired General Otto Perez, who signed the Peace Accords on behalfof the army. Current Human Rights Conditions The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the U.S. Department of State all have expressed concern that governmentactions have not matched its repeated pledges, and that the government of Guatemala has taken onlylimited steps to improve respect for human rights within the country. Demilitarization and the Strengthening of Civilian Power. Continued Gross Violations of Human Rights by Security Forces. U.S. assistance to Guatemala hasdeclined by over a third in the past three years, from almost $60 million in FY2002, to $38 millionrequested for FY2005. In the conference report for the FY2004 omnibus appropriations bill ( H.Rept. President Berger has made improving governanceand attacking corruption priorities. P.L. 108-199 ( H.R. agencies to set forth a written plan for the review of any relevant information they had regardingthose cases for possible release to the victims' families and directs the Attorney General to provideto the Committees on Appropriations, within 60 days of the bill's enactment, copies of the writtenplans and descriptions of the progress made in implementing them; (3) the conference agreementdoes not include the Senate section requiring the Administration to report on the status of its strategyto address the international coffee crisis, but Congress notes its concern about the report's delay andthat it expects it to be released in the near future. H.R. S.Res.

Since the 1980s, Guatemala has been consolidating its transition from a centuries-long tradition of mostly autocratic rule toward representative government. A democratic constitution was adoptedin 1985, and a democratically-elected government was inaugurated in 1986. Democratic institutionsremain fragile. A 36-year civil war ended in 1996 with the signing of the Peace Accords betweenthe government and the left-wing guerrilla movement. The accords not only ended the civil conflict,but constituted a blueprint for profound political, economic, and social change to address theconflict's root causes. They outline a profound restructuring of state institutions, with the goals ofending government security forces' impunity from prosecution, consolidating the rule of law;shifting government funding away from the military and into health, education, and other basicservices to reach the rural and indigenous poor; and the full participation of the indigenouspopulation in local and national decision making processes. From1997-2003, U.S. assistance toGuatemala focused on support of the peace process. Aid has declined from about $60 million inFY2002 to $38 million requested for FY2005. In the conference report for the FY2004 omnibusappropriations bill ( H.Rept. 108-401 ), Congress criticized the Administration's strategy of reducingstaffing and funding for Guatemala. Current conditions on aid are in P.L. 108-199 ; proposedlegislation related to Guatemala includes H.R. 1300 ; H.R. 2534 ; and S.Res. 289 . Former Guatemala City mayor Oscar Berger of the center-right coalition Great National Alliance was elected president with 54% of the vote and inaugurated on January 14, 2004, for afour-year term. Since taking office, he has pursued corruption charges against his predecessor,Alfonso Portillo, of the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), and other former FRG officials. Berger has also proposed military reforms including cutting troops by a third, slashing defensespending, and modernizing defense policy. His proposed economic reforms include new income taxrates and a temporary tax to fund programs related to the peace process. Despite his decisive loss in the first round presidential elections, retired General Efrain Rios Montt remains a divisive force. Berger's top defense official, General Otto Perez, resigned in Mayto protest negotiations between Berger officials and the FRG, of which Rios Montt is still leader. Rios Montt was military dictator from 1982-1983, while the army carried out a counter-insurgencycampaign resulting in what is now characterized as genocide of the Mayan population. Regarding respect for human rights, Guatemala has made enormous strides, but significant problems remain. The armed conflict is definitively ended, and the state policy of human rightsabuses has been ended. On the other hand, strengthening of civilian power over military forces isslow, and security forces reportedly continue to commit gross violations of human rights withimpunity. The U.N., the OAS, and the United States have all expressed concern that human rightsviolations have increased over the past several years, and that past Guatemalan governments havetaken insufficient steps to curb them or to implement the Peace Accords. This report may be updatedas events warrant.

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Most Recent Developments On May 25, 2006, the House passed H.R. On March 16, 2006, the Senate passed the FY2007 budgetresolution ( S.Con.Res. Moreover, if Congress opens federal lands in ANWR to development, current law would alsoopen Native lands. The conflict between high oil potential and nearly pristine nature in the Refuge creates adilemma: should Congress open the area for energy development or should the area's ecosystemcontinue to be protected from development, perhaps permanently? Actions in the 109th Congress, First Session. Asexplained below, the ANWR debate has taken two basic routes in the 109th Congress: (a)reconciliation bills ( S. 1932 and H.R. 18 ) passed by the Senate Budget Committee includedinstructions to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources to "report changes in lawswithin its jurisdiction sufficient to reduce outlays by $33,000,000 in FY2006, and $2,658,000,000for the period of fiscal years 2006 through 2010." This resolution assumed that the committee wouldreport legislation to open ANWR to development, and that leasing would generate $2.5 billion inrevenues for the federal government over five years. In the end, the conference report ( H.Rept. ANWR in the Defense Appropriations Bill. The Senate' bill contained no ANWR provisions. The ANWR title was omittedin the final measure ( P.L. Actions in the 109th Congress, Second Session. Oil. But the amount that would be economically recoverable depends on the price of oil, andcrude oil prices have increased substantially in the last two years, bringing about $70/bbl in thefutures market in late June 2006. Reducing the footprints of development has been a major goal of development. A follow-up memo (10) on caribou by one of the assessment's authors to the Director ofUSGS clarified that if development were restricted to the western portion of the refuge (an optionthat was being considered by the Administration), the Porcupine Caribou Herd (PCH) would not beaffected during the early calving period, since the herd is not normally found in the area at that time. Revenue Disposition. A court in Alaska v. United States (35Fed. The Trans Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act ( P.L. )specified that oil shipped through it could be exported, but only under restrictive conditions. 5429 (§8(a)(3))would also limit the scope of review by stating that review of a secretarial decision, includingenvironmental analyses, would be limited to whether the Secretary complied with the terms of theANWR subtitle, that it would be based on the administrative record, and that the Secretary's analysisof environmental effects is "presumed to be correct unless shown otherwise by clear and convincingevidence to the contrary." Under ANILCA and the 1983 Agreement, development of the surface and subsurfaceholdings of Native corporations in the Refuge is precluded as long as oil and gas development is notallowed on the federal lands in the Refuge. 109-148 ( H.R. 2863 ) Provides for Defense appropriations. House approved conference report ( H.Rept. Overview of the 1991 ArcticNational Wildlife Refuge Recoverable Petroleum Resource Update . U.S. General Accounting Office. U.S. National Energy Policy Development Group. May,2001.

One part of the energy debate is whether to approve energy development in the ArcticNational Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in northeastern Alaska, and if so, under what conditions, orwhether to continue to prohibit development to protect the area's biological, recreational, andsubsistence values. ANWR is rich in fauna, flora, and oil potential. Its development has beendebated for over 40 years, but sharp increases in energy prices from late 2000 to early 2001, terroristattacks, more price increases in 2004-2006, and energy infrastructure damage from hurricanes haveintensified debate. Few onshore U.S. areas stir as much industry interest as ANWR. At the sametime, few areas are considered more worthy of protection in the eyes of conservation and someNative groups. Current law prohibits oil and gas leasing in the Refuge. In the first session of the 109th Congress, development advocates added ANWR developmentto the conference report for the Defense appropriations bill ( H.R. 2863 ). The Housepassed the conference report with the ANWR provision, but the ANWR title was removed from thebill ( P.L. 109-148 ) after failure of a cloture motion in the Senate. In the second session, on March 16, 2006, the Senate passed S.Con.Res. 83 , theFY2007 budget resolution. Its sole reconciliation instruction was to the Senate Committee onEnergy and Natural Resources, and it assumed revenues from leasing in ANWR. On May 25, 2006,the House passed the American-Made Energy and Good Jobs Act ( H.R. 5429 ), whichwould open ANWR to development. Development advocates argue that ANWR oil would reduce U.S. energy markets' exposureto Middle East crises; lower oil prices; extend the economic life of the Trans Alaska Pipeline; andcreate jobs in Alaska and elsewhere in the United States. They maintain that ANWR oil could bedeveloped with minimal environmental harm, and that the footprint of development could be limitedto a total of 2,000 acres. Opponents argue that intrusion on such a remarkable ecosystem cannot bejustified on any terms; that economically recoverable oil found (if any) would provide little energysecurity and could be replaced by cost-effective alternatives, including conservation; and that jobclaims are exaggerated. They maintain that development's footprints would have a greater impactthan is implied by a limit on total acreage. They also argue that limits on footprints have not beenworded to apply to extensive Native lands in the Refuge, which could be developed if the Refugewere opened. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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The Reconciliation Process The purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to bring existing spending, revenue, and debt-limit laws into compliance with current fiscal priorities established in the annual budget resolution. When Congress adopts a budget resolution, it is agreeing upon budgetary goals for the upcoming fiscal year. In some cases, for these goals to be achieved, Congress must pass legislation that alters current revenue, direct spending, or debt-limit laws. Overview of the Reconciliation Process Budget reconciliation is an optional, congressional process that consists of several different stages ( Figure 1 ). The first stage in the reconciliation process is the adoption of the budget resolution. If Congress intends to utilize the reconciliation process, reconciliation directives (also referred to as reconciliation instructions) must be included in the annual budget resolution. These directives detail which committee(s) should report reconciliation legislation, the date by which the committee(s) should report, the dollar amount of budgetary change to be achieved in the reconciliation legislation, and the time period over which the impact of the budgetary change should be measured. They might also include language regarding the type of budgetary change that should be reported as well as other procedural provisions, contingencies, and programmatic direction. Each chamber, however, has methods it can employ to allow it to move forward with reconciliation legislation and include legislative language that falls within the non-reporting committee's jurisdiction to satisfy the committee's directive. As explained above, there is no procedural mechanism for requiring a committee to report reconciliation legislation on time, or at all. These methods vary by chamber.

The purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to bring existing spending, revenue, and debt-limit laws into compliance with current fiscal priorities established in the annual budget resolution. When Congress adopts a budget resolution, it is agreeing upon its budgetary goals for the upcoming fiscal year. In some cases, for these goals to be achieved, Congress must pass legislation that alters current revenue, direct spending, or debt-limit laws. Reconciliation instructions are the means by which Congress can establish the roles that specific committees will play in achieving these goals. Budget reconciliation is an optional, congressional process that consists of several different stages. The first stage in the reconciliation process is the adoption of the budget resolution. If Congress intends to utilize the reconciliation process to achieve its budgetary goals, reconciliation directives (also referred to as reconciliation instructions) must be included in the annual budget resolution. To achieve the budgetary goals set forth in the budget resolution, reconciliation directives designate which committee(s) should report reconciliation legislation, the date by which the committee(s) should report, the dollar amount of budgetary change to be achieved in the reconciliation legislation, and the time period over which the impact of the budgetary change should be measured. They might also include language identifying the type of budgetary change that should be reported as well as other procedural provisions, contingencies, and programmatic direction. This report discusses these various components of reconciliation instructions. There is no procedural mechanism for requiring a committee to report reconciliation legislation on time, or at all. Each chamber, however, has methods that it can employ to allow it to move forward with reconciliation legislation and to include legislative language that falls within the non-reporting committee's jurisdiction, in the event that a committee has not reported. These methods vary by chamber.

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This includes oversight of IBWC's actions to manage the Colorado River's water and infrastructure to improve water availability during drought and to restore and protect riverine ecosystems. On multiple occasions since 1994, Mexico has not met its Rio Grande water delivery obligations to the United States within the five-year period prescribed by the 1944 Water Treaty. Since 2014, Congress has directed the U.S. Department of State to report annually on Mexico's deliveries and on efforts to improve Mexico's treaty compliance. In the 1944 Water Treaty, the United States and Mexico allocated water in the Rio Grande basin below Fort Quitman, TX, and in the Colorado River basin; they also authorized the IBC to oversee U.S.-Mexico water-allocation treaties, renaming it the IBWC. The Minute Process The 1944 Water Treaty authorizes the IBWC to develop rules and to issue proposed decisions, called minutes , regarding matters related to the treaty's execution and interpretation. Water Delivery Requirements Established in the 1944 Water Treaty The 1944 Water Treaty defines the basic water-distribution arrangements between the United States and Mexico as For the Colorado River basin, the United States provides Mexico with 1.5 million AF of water annually. Key elements of the agreement included the following: extending provisions of Minute 318 (Cooperative Measures to Address the Continued Effects of the April 2010 Earthquake in the Mexicali Valley, Baja California) to allow Mexico to defer delivery of its Colorado River water allocation while the country repairs earthquake-damaged infrastructure; delivering additional water (i.e., above the 1.5 million AF annual delivery required by the 1944 Water Treaty) to Mexico when water levels are high in Lake Mead; reducing deliveries to Mexico during water shortage conditions in the Colorado River basin (i.e., Mexico's annual water deliveries would be reduced if Lake Mead elevations indicated shortage conditions, similar to reduction by the U.S. lower basin states); creating a mechanism by which U.S. water deliveries to Mexico could be held in U.S. reservoirs for subsequent delivery; continuing to address salinity concerns per Minute 242; and implementing a pilot program of jointly funded water efficiency and conservation projects in Mexico. Rio Grande Basin Water sharing in two portions of the binational Rio Grande basin has distinct characteristics. In the first year of the cycle, Mexico fell 15% below its water-delivery obligations under the 1944 Water Treaty. IBWC indicates that Mexico delivered to the United States less than 350,000 AF in the third year of the cycle. However, Mexico's higher deliveries in the second year resulted in cumulative deliveries for the first three years of the cycle being almost 98% of the three-year delivery target of 1.05 million AF. As part of its broader effort to improve the reliability in Mexico's water deliveries, the IBWC is developing a binational model for water management in the Rio Grande. The IBWC accounts for Mexico's deliveries to the United States pursuant to the 1944 Water Treaty largely by aggregating deliveries (i.e., 1.75 million AF) over a five-year cycle, with an annual average delivery target of 350,000 AF. To date, Congress has been involved in binational water-sharing issues primarily through oversight. For Congress, binational Colorado River oversight topics may encompass Minute 323 implementation and operations and deliveries during shortage conditions. It required that the Secretary of State report to the Committees on Appropriations on the following water delivery and accounting issues: Not later than 45 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Commissioner for the United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), shall report to the Committees on Appropriations on the efforts to work with the Mexico Section of the IBWC and the Government of Mexico to establish mechanisms to improve the transparency of data on, and predictability of, the water deliveries from Mexico to the United States to meet annual water apportionments to the Rio Grande, in accordance with the 1944 Treaty between the United States and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, and on actions taken to minimize or eliminate the water deficits owed to the United States in the current 5-year cycle by the end of such cycle: Provided, That such report shall include a projection of the balance of the water delivery deficit at the end of the current 5-year cycle, as well as the estimated impact to the United States of a negative delivery balance.

The United States and Mexico share the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande. A bilateral water treaty from 1944 (the 1944 Water Treaty) and other binational agreements guide how the two governments share the flows of these rivers. The binational International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) administers these agreements. Since 1944, the IBWC has been the principal venue for addressing river-related disputes between the United States and Mexico. The 1944 Water Treaty authorizes the IBWC to develop rules and to issue proposed decisions, called minutes, regarding matters related to the treaty's execution and interpretation. Water Delivery Requirements Established in Binational Agreements. The United States' and Mexico's water-delivery obligations derive from multiple treaty sources and vary depending on the body of water. Under the 1944 Water Treaty, the United States is required to provide Mexico with 1.5 million acre-feet (AF) of Colorado River water annually. The 1944 Water Treaty also addresses the nations' respective rights to waters of the Rio Grande downstream of Fort Quitman, TX. It requires Mexico to deliver to the United States an annual minimum of 350,000 AF of water, measured in five-year cycles (i.e., 1.75 million AF over five years). For waters of the Rio Grande upstream of Fort Quitman, a 1906 bilateral convention requires the United States annually to deliver 60,000 AF of water to Mexico. Developments in the Colorado River Basin. The United States continues to meet its Colorado River annual delivery requirements to Mexico pursuant to the 1944 Water Treaty. At the forefront of recent IBWC actions on the Colorado River are efforts to cooperatively manage the Colorado River's water and infrastructure to improve water availability during drought and to restore and protect riverine ecosystems. Minute 323 is a set of binational measures in the Colorado River basin that provides for binational cooperative basin water management, including environmental flows to restore riverine habitat. Minute 323 also provides for Mexico to share in cutbacks during shortage conditions in the U.S. portion of the basin. Additionally, Minute 323 designates a "Mexican Water Reserve" through which Mexico can delay its water deliveries from the United States and store its delayed deliveries upstream at Lake Mead, thereby increasing the lake's elevation. Lake Mead elevation is the baseline used for determining shortage conditions and associated water delivery cutbacks for the lower Colorado River basin states of Arizona, California, and Nevada. Recent congressional attention to the Colorado River basin has related largely to oversight of Minute 323 implementation and water management during potential shortage conditions. Developments in the Rio Grande Basin. On multiple occasions since 1994, Mexico has not met its Rio Grande delivery obligations within the five-year cycle established by the 1944 Water Treaty. For example, Mexico fell 15% below its water-delivery obligations under the 1944 Water Treaty for the five-year cycle from 2010 to 2015. Mexico addressed its deficit by early 2016. The October 2015 to October 2020 cycle is under way. Mexico offset its below-target deliveries for the first year of this cycle with additional deliveries in the second year. IBWC indicates that Mexico delivered less than its 350,000 AF in the third year of the cycle; however, higher deliveries in the second year resulted in Mexico's deliveries being almost at 98% of the three-year cumulative delivery target of 1.05 million AF. Some U.S. stakeholders promote the adoption of mechanisms to achieve a water-delivery regime by Mexico that provides more reliability and benefit for U.S. interests in Texas. The IBWC is developing a binational model for water management in the Rio Grande, as part of its broader effort to improve reliability in Mexico's water deliveries. Congress has been involved in the recent Rio Grande water-sharing issues through oversight. Congress requires the U.S. Department of State to report annually on Mexico's deliveries and on efforts to improve Mexico's treaty compliance.

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The U.S. Constitution allocates primary responsibility for such agreements to the executive branch, but Congress also plays an essential role. First, in order for a treaty (but not an executive agreement) to become binding upon the United States, the Senate must provide its advice and consent to treaty ratification by a two-thirds majority. Secondly, Congress may authorize executive agreements. Thirdly, the provisions of many treaties and executive agreements may require implementing legislation in order to be judicial enforceable in U.S. courts. The effects of customary international law upon the United States are more ambiguous and difficult to decipher. In some cases, the United States makes "political commitments" with foreign States, also called "soft law" pacts. Although these pacts do not modify existing legal authorities or obligations, which remain controlling under both U.S. domestic and international law, such commitments may nonetheless carry significant moral and political weight. . . specifically providing for such commitment." Unlike in the case of legally binding international agreements, there is no statutory requirement that the executive branch notify Congress of every nonlegal agreement it enters on behalf of the United States. Effects of International Agreements on U.S. Law The effects that international legal agreements entered into by the United States have upon U.S. domestic law are dependent upon the nature of the agreement; namely, whether the agreement (or a provision within an agreement) is self-executing or non-self-executing, and possibly whether the commitment was made pursuant to a treaty or an executive agreement. For domestic purposes, a ratified, self-executing treaty is the law of the land equal to federal law and superior to U.S. state law, but inferior to the Constitution. A self-executing executive agreement is likely superior to U.S. state law, but sole executive agreements may be inferior to conflicting federal law in certain circumstances (congressional-executive agreements or executive agreements pursuant to treaties are equivalent to federal law), and all executive agreements are inferior to the Constitution. When a federal statute does conflict with customary international law, lower courts consistently have concluded that the statute prevails. Statutory Incorporation of Customary International and the Alien Tort Statute Customary international law plays a direct role in the U.S. legal system when Congress incorporates it into federal law via legislation. Some statutes expressly reference customary international law, and thereby permit courts to interpret its requirements and contours. The ATS originated as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and establishes federal court jurisdiction over tort claims brought by aliens for violations of either a treaty of the United States or "the law of nations." Conclusion Although the United States has long understood international legal commitments to be binding both internationally and domestically, the relationship between international law and the U.S. legal system implicates complex legal dynamics. And the Supreme Court has held that only self-executing international agreements have the status of judicially enforceable domestic law. But other issues concerning the status of international law in the U.S. legal system have never been fully resolved. Because the legislative branch possesses significant powers to shape and define the United States' international obligations, Congress is likely to continue to play a critical role in dictating the outcome of these debates in the future.

International law is derived from two primary sources—international agreements and customary practice. Under the U.S. legal system, international agreements can be entered into by means of a treaty or an executive agreement. The Constitution allocates primary responsibility for entering into such agreements to the executive branch, but Congress also plays an essential role. First, in order for a treaty (but not an executive agreement) to become binding upon the United States, the Senate must provide its advice and consent to treaty ratification by a two-thirds majority. Secondly, Congress may authorize congressional-executive agreements. Thirdly, many treaties and executive agreements are not self-executing, meaning that implementing legislation is required to render the agreement's provisions judicially enforceable in the United States. The status of an international agreement within the United States depends on a variety of factors. Self-executing treaties have a status equal to federal statute, superior to U.S. state law, and inferior to the Constitution. Depending upon the nature of executive agreements, they may or may not have a status equal to federal statute. In any case, self-executing executive agreements have a status that is superior to U.S. state law and inferior to the Constitution. Courts generally have understood treaties and executive agreements that are not self-executing generally to have limited status domestically; rather, the legislation or regulations implementing these agreements are controlling. In addition to legally binding agreements, the executive branch also regularly makes nonlegal agreements (sometimes described as "political agreements") with foreign entities. The formality, specificity, and intended duration of such commitments may vary considerably, but they do not modify existing legal authorities or obligations, which remain controlling under both U.S. domestic and international law. Nonetheless, such commitments may carry significant moral and political weight for the United States and other parties. Unlike in the case of legal agreements, current federal law does not provide any general applicable requirements that the executive branch notify Congress when it enters a political agreement on behalf of the United States. The effects of the second source of international law, customary international practice, upon the United States are more ambiguous. While there is some Supreme Court jurisprudence finding that customary international law is "part of" U.S. law, domestic statutes that conflict with customary rules remain controlling, and scholars debate whether the Supreme Court's international law jurisprudence still applies in the modern era. Some domestic U.S. statutes directly incorporate customary international law, and therefore invite courts to interpret and apply customary international law in the domestic legal system. The Alien Tort Statute, for example, which establishes federal court jurisdiction over certain tort claims brought by aliens for violations of "the law of nations." Although the United States has long understood international legal commitments to be binding both internationally and domestically, the relationship between international law and the U.S. legal system implicates complex legal dynamics. Because the legislative branch possesses important powers to shape and define the United States' international obligations, Congress is likely to continue to play a critical role in shaping the role of international law in the U.S. legal system in the future.

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Introduction On August 5, 2004, the United States entered into the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic (hereafter the CAFTA-DR countries). 109-53 ). CAFTA-DR entered into force with El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala by July 1, 2006, the Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007, and Costa Rica on January 1, 2009. This report follows up on congressional interest by providing an analysis of the trends in trade and investment since CAFTA-DR entered into force six years ago. Background and Rationale for CAFTA-DR Historically, the United States has entered into free trade agreements (FTAs) and unilateral trade preference programs with developing countries in the pursuit of both economic and foreign policy goals. In 1983, the U.S. Congress passed the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI—formally the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act— P.L. CAFTA-DR builds on this precedent, but makes preferential access comprehensive, reciprocal, and permanent while also enhancing rules and other disciplines on trade. Equally important for the United States were enhanced rules covering multiple disciplines including trade in services, intellectual property rights, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, investment, government procurement, labor, and environment, among others. CAFTA-DR Trade Rules Market access is at the center of free trade agreements and refers to provisions that govern barriers to trade such as tariffs and quotas. It is a starting point for raising questions over the possible effects of CAFTA-DR. CAFTA-DR Direction of Trade There have been three major changes in the direction of CAFTA-DR trade over the last decade, including the period of time the agreement has been in force: first, although the United States remains the CAFTA-DR countries' dominant trade partner, U.S. trade has fallen relative to other countries; second, trade with China and Mexico has increased; and third, intra-Central America trade and integration has increased and deepened. In addition, analysis of the technology content of CAFTA-DR country exports suggests that the agreement supports the trend of the United States being the largest market for technology-enhanced exports, ranging from low-technology apparel to high-technology medical equipment and integrated circuits. Also, because a large portion of CAFTA-DR exports entered the United States duty free prior to implementation of the agreement, the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) model predicted that the marginal trade effects of the accord would be a relatively larger increase in U.S. exports, as appears to be the case, so far. Textiles and Apparel From 2000 to 2011, aggregate U.S. exports of apparel, yarns, and fabrics declined from 33.4% to 12.4% of total U.S. exports to the CAFTA-DR countries. It has shifted to other higher value-added goods. The Dominican Republic has seen little agricultural export growth except for sugar and tobacco, and Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras have seen slight increases in fruit, fish, and specialized coffee exports, demonstrating some shift in production to nontraditional exports. A non-exhaustive list includes support for private sector investment, infrastructure, education, and good governance, including an efficient and predictable regulatory framework. Differences in growth of exports and FDI seem to correlate closely with similar trends in these variables. The data suggest that CAFTA-DR has supported a long-term trend in the region toward trade and investment liberalization, encouraging diversification into higher value-added, and in some cases, technology-enhanced goods. U.S. exports have grown, with gains in agriculture and more modest growth in manufactured goods. Deteriorating security and governance capabilities in some countries further complicate the trade and investment environment.

On August 5, 2004, the United States entered into the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Congress passed the implementing bill on July 28, 2005 (P.L. 109-53) and CAFTA-DR entered into force with El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala by July 1, 2006, the Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007, and Costa Rica on January 1, 2009. This permanent, comprehensive, and reciprocal trade agreement eliminates tariff and non-tariff barriers to two-way trade, building on unilateral trade preferences begun under the 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). It enhances rules and other standards for services, intellectual property rights, government procurement, and investment, and other disciplines. It also reinforces Congress's historical support for trade as a foundation of broader foreign economic, political, and security policies in the region. This report supports congressional interest with an analysis of the trade and investment trends since CAFTA-DR entered into force. CAFTA-DR reinforces trade and investment trends that have been emerging at least over the past decade. The United States remains the region's dominant trade partner, but its share of total trade has begun to decline. Intra-Central America trade and trade with China have seen the largest growth. Still, the United States (1) has vibrant trade in intermediate goods reflecting increasingly integrated production with the region; (2) provides the largest portion of foreign direct investment to the region; and, (3) remains the largest market for high-technology content exports. Because U.S. tariffs were already relatively low, the United States International Trade Commission model predicted that U.S. exports would rise slightly faster than imports, which so far has been the case. One important indicator is the change in composition of trade. The United States has seen strong growth in exports of mineral fuels, machinery, cereals, yarns, and fabrics. Historically, the CAFTA-DR region has exported agricultural products and later apparel and other assembled goods to the United States. For over the past decade, more sophisticated and higher-value exports have grown, including specialized machinery goods (e.g., small aviation motors), electrical goods (e.g., integrated circuits), and medical equipment, while exports of light manufactures such as apparel have stagnated, or in some cases, declined. Agricultural trade has increased moderately and remains a combination of traditional exports (e.g., coffee and bananas) with little growth in higher value nontraditional goods (e.g., pineapple and sweet peppers). These aggregate trends, however, mask important country differences. As examples of moving up the value chain, Costa Rica has increased nontraditional production in both its manufacturing and agricultural sectors, and so has experienced the largest growth in exports. Similarly, Nicaragua has begun to enter the assembly manufacturing sector and so experienced the second highest rate of trade growth. The other four countries have seen their exports stagnate or decline for multiple reasons, including dependence on the highly competitive apparel trade, lower levels of investment, public security problems, and broader governance and policy concerns. CAFTA-DR reinforces the idea that growth in trade correlates closely with policies that promote economic stability, private investment in production, public investment in education, infrastructure, logistics, and good governance in general. Countries with worsening security and governance problems face additional problems in benefitting from CAFTA-DR. It is also important to promote productivity in part by avoiding delays in making necessary adjustments to trade liberalization, focusing public and private resources on trade facilitation, developing strategies for trade diversification, and examining CAFTA-DR trade rules (especially for textiles and apparel) that have perhaps inadvertently hindered trade growth expected from the accord.

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In recent years, there has been some congressional support for a mandatory reduction program. In the absence of action by the federal government to establish a national program that directly addresses GHG emissions, a number of states (and local governments, whose activities are not covered in this report ) have taken action in this arena. Some states view their GHG policies as economic opportunities. Mandatory Programs to Reduce Greenhouse Gases Mandatory programs to require GHG reductions represent the most aggressive end of the state action spectrum. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative One of the more significant climate change developments at the state level is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI, pronounced "Reggie"). Although RGGI is one of the more aggressive state programs addressing climate change, the program has received some criticism and may face upcoming challenges. For example, if a RGGI state lowers its emissions by importing more power from a non-RGGI state, the emissions reductions in the RGGI state may be offset by an emission increase in the exporting state. Western Climate Initiative Seven U.S. states and four Canadian provinces are participating in the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). The states and provinces set a regional, economy-wide target to reduce GHG emissions to15% below 2005 levels by 2020. The recommendations include a cap-and-trade system that would cover emissions from electricity generation and large industrial and commercial sources in 2012. In addition, states are working on other mechanisms that would require GHG emission reductions. The electricity-generating sector is often considered a primary candidate for emission reduction, because in most states electric power plants account for the highest percentage of carbon dioxide emissions. The LCFS aims to reduce the carbon intensity of California's transportation fuels by 10% by 2020. In May 2007, 30 states formed the Climate Registry, which aims to establish a standard system for GHG emissions reporting. Almost half (23) of the states have joined one of the three regional emission (all GHGs or just carbon dioxide) reduction programs: the Midwest Accord, WCI, and RGGI. With this range of state activity, it is difficult to predict the precise consequences of state-led climate change actions. For automotive manufacturers, the California motor vehicle regulations—which at least 16 states have indicated they plan to implement if EPA approves the waiver (discussed above)—will likely have the effect of dividing the market, potentially requiring the manufacture of a different class of cars to meet the new standards (scheduled to apply in 2009). Patchwork of Regulations One concern shared by many observers, particularly industry stakeholders, is that state climate change programs (in lieu of a federal program) will create a patchwork of regulations across the nation. The possibility of legal challenges creates considerable uncertainty regarding the future of state climate change actions, particularly the more aggressive programs.

In the absence of a federal climate change program, a number of states have taken actions that directly address greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. States' efforts cover a wide range of policies. Although much of the early activity was largely symbolic, the more recent state actions have been more aggressive. Twenty-three states have joined one of the three regional partnerships that would require GHG (or just carbon dioxide) emission reductions. Set to take effect in 2009, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a partnership of 10 Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states that creates a cap-and-trade system aimed at limiting carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. Seven western states (and four Canadian provinces) have formed the Western Climate Initiative, which set an economy-wide GHG emissions target of 15% below 2005 levels by 2020. In addition, six states (and one Canadian province) signed the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, which aims to establish a multi-sector, GHG cap-and-trade program in the Midwest. The latter two programs are still in the early development stages; RGGI is on schedule for 2009, and participating states have already held one emission allowance auction. California has addressed GHG emissions on several fronts. To complement its statewide emissions reduction regime, California established GHG performance standards that would effectively limit the use of coal-generated electricity in California. In 2004, California issued regulations to reduce greenhouse gases from motor vehicles. At least 16 other states have indicated they intend to follow California's new vehicle requirements. In addition, the state has also taken action to reduce the carbon intensity in its transportation fuels. Predicting the precise consequences of the state-led climate change actions is difficult. Some actions, particularly the mandatory emission reductions, may create economic effects, especially in the automotive manufacturing and electricity-generating sectors. Industry stakeholders are especially concerned that the states will create a patchwork of climate change regulations across the nation. This prospect is causing some industry leaders to call for a federal climate change program. If Congress seeks to establish a federal program, the experiences and lessons learned in the states may be instructive. Although some states are taking aggressive action, their possible emission reductions may be offset by increased emissions in states without mandatory reduction requirements. This is perhaps the central limitation of state climate change programs in actually affecting total greenhouse gas emissions. Legal challenges represent another obstacle for state programs, particularly for the more aggressive, mandatory programs.

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In response to the experience of the embargo, Congress authorized the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA, P.L. 94-163 ) to help prevent a repetition of the economic dislocation caused by the Arab oil embargo. The program is managed by the Department of Energy (DOE). Physically, the SPR comprises five underground storage facilities, hollowed out from naturally occurring salt domes, located in Texas and Louisiana. By the end of 2009, was virtually filled to its capacity at 726 million barrels of crude oil. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) requires, "as expeditiously as practicable," expansion of the SPR to its authorized maximum of 1 billion barrels. The FY2010 budget, at $229 million, includes $43.5 million for purchase of a cavern at Bayou Choctaw to replace a cavern posing environmental risks, as well as $25 million for expansion activities. The conferees accepted language in the Senate version of the bill that prohibits SPR appropriations expended to anyone engaged in providing refined products to Iran or contributing in any way to expansion of refining capacity in Iran. 94-163 ) authorized drawdown of the Reserve upon a finding by the President that there is a "severe energy supply interruption." Congress enacted additional drawdown authority in 1990 (Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments of 1990, P.L. § 6241(h), has allowed the President to use the SPR for a short period without having to declare the existence of a "severe energy supply interruption" or the need to meet obligations of the United States under the international energy program. The American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009 ( S. 1462 ) would require that the SPR include 30 million barrels of refined product (distinct from the 2 million barrels of home heating oil held in the Northeast Heating Oil Reserve); would transfer authority for a drawdown from the President to the Secretary of Energy; and would amend the drawdown authority to permit drawdown and sale in the event of a "severe energy market supply interruption" that has caused, or is expected to cause "a severe increase" in prices. This language is a significant departure from existing authorities which predicate drawdown disruptions in supply, and discourages use of the SPR to address high prices, per se. 110-232 ) enacted in May 2008 forbade DOE from initiating any new activities to acquire royalty-in-kind (RIK) oil for the SPR during the balance of 2008. The sharp decline in crude oil prices since spiking to $147/barrel in the summer of 2008 has spurred interest in resuming fill of the SPR. On January 2, 2009, the Bush Administration announced plans to purchase oil for the SPR, and to reschedule deferred deliveries. There are four components in the resumption of fill: (1) a purchase announced on January 16, 2009, of nearly 10.7 million barrels to replace oil that was sold after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005; (2) the return of roughly 5.4 million barrels of oil borrowed by refiners after Hurricane Gustav in 2008; (3) delivery of roughly 2.2 million barrels of RIK oil that had been deferred; and (4) resumption of RIK fill in May 2009 at a volume of 26,000 barrels per day, totaling over 6.1 million barrels to be delivered over a period from May 2009 to January 2010. These activities are intended to fill the SPR to its current capacity of 727 million barrels by early 2010. As has been noted, a site in Richton, MS, has been evaluated as a possible site for expansion of the SPR. 776 , P.L. The FY2001 Interior Appropriations Act ( P.L. 106-291 ) provided $8 million for the Northeast Heating Oil Reserve (NHOR).

Congress authorized the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA, P.L. 94-163) to help prevent a repetition of the economic dislocation caused by the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo. The program is managed by the Department of Energy (DOE). The capacity of the SPR is 727 million barrels, and by the end of 2009, was virtually filled to its capacity at 726 million barrels of crude oil. In addition, a Northeast Heating Oil Reserve (NHOR) holds 2 million barrels of heating oil in above-ground storage. The SPR comprises five underground storage facilities, hollowed out from naturally occurring salt domes in Texas and Louisiana. EPCA authorized drawdown of the Reserve upon a finding by the President that there is a "severe energy supply interruption." Congress enacted additional authority in 1990 (Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments of 1990, P.L. 101-383), to permit use of the SPR for short periods to resolve supply interruptions stemming from situations internal to the United States. The meaning of a "severe energy supply interruption" has been controversial. EPCA intended use of the SPR only to ameliorate discernible physical shortages of crude oil. However, the American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009 (S. 1462), reported in the Senate, would require that the SPR include 30 million barrels of refined product; would transfer authority for a drawdown from the President to the Secretary of Energy; and would amend the drawdown authority to permit drawdown and sale in the event of a "severe energy market supply interruption" that has caused, or is expected to cause, "a severe increase" in prices. This language is a significant departure from existing authorities which predicate drawdown disruptions in supply, and discourages use of the SPR to address high prices, per se. Beginning in 2000, additions to the SPR were made with royalty-in-kind (RIK) oil acquired by the Department of Energy in lieu of cash royalties paid on production from federal offshore leases. In May 2008, Congress passed legislation (P.L. 110-232) ordering DOE to suspend RIK fill for the balance of the calendar year unless the price of crude oil dropped below $75/barrel. However, the sharp decline in crude oil prices since spiking to $147/barrel in the summer of 2008 brought about a resumption of fill of the SPR. On January 2, 2009, the Bush Administration announced plans that included the purchase of nearly 10.7 million barrels for the SPR to replace oil that was sold after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. In May 2009, RIK fill was resumed at an average volume of 26,000 barrels per day, totaling over 6.1 million barrels to be delivered by January 2010. These activities have brought the SPR essentially to capacity. The government has not purchased oil for the SPR since 1994. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) required expansion of the SPR to its authorized maximum of 1 billion barrels. Congress approved $205 million for FY2009, including $31.5 million to continue expansion activities. A site in Richton, MS, has been evaluated as a possible location for an additional 160 million barrels of capacity. Although expansion activity appears to have been set aside, the FY2010 budget enacted in the FY2010 Energy and Water Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-85), which provides $243.8 million for the entire SPR program, includes $25 million for expansion activities and $43.5 million for purchase of a cavern at Bayou Choctaw to replace a cavern posing environmental risks. An amendment agreed to in the Senate, and included in the final bill, prohibits SPR appropriations expended to anyone engaged in providing refined product to Iran, or assisting Iran in developing additional internal capacity to refine oil.

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As the strength of product demand began to weaken in the latter stages of the year, responding to high petroleum product prices as well as a possible slow down of economic growth, refinery margins began to narrow, suggesting that the companies were less able to pass through the increased cost of crude oil to consumers. This report analyzes the industry's profit performance in 2007. Integrated Oil Company Profits Integrated oil companies operate in both the upstream (exploration and production) and the downstream (refining and marketing) segments of the industry. Revenue growth among the integrated oil companies in 2007 was driven by increases in the price of crude oil, especially in the last two quarters of the year. Even though five of the nine companies experienced a decline in oil production, and one of the nine experienced a decline in natural gas production, as shown in Table 2 , their revenues increased on average by 7.1% in 2007. Their net incomes, however, were approximately 15% of the net incomes of the integrated companies. Independent Refiners and Marketers Valero is the leading firm among the group of independent refiners and marketers. The difference was that these companies produce no crude oil and therefore were not positioned to take advantage of the increases in the price of crude oil during the second half of 2007. Not only was the cost of crude oil rising for the independent refiners, but relatively weaker demand conditions made it harder for the firms to quickly pass cost increases on to consumers. 2008 Profit Outlook Crude oil prices spot prices reached $110 per barrel in the first quarter of 2008. Should the price of crude oil remain at, or above, $100 per barrel for large portions of the year, the profits of oil producing firms should be high. These lower quality crude oils are more readily available than high quality oils and sell at a price discount relative to the reference oils, West Texas Intermediate, for example. Conclusion The oil industry, in general, continued to generate high profits, as it has since 2004. While demand growth, political uncertainty, the weak U.S. dollar, tight spare capacity, and other factors make it likely that the price of crude oil will remain high in 2008, the weakening U.S. economy, coupled with the demand reducing effects of higher prices, may make it more difficult to raise petroleum product prices.

Increases in the price of crude oil that began in 2004 pushed the spot price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI), a key oil in determining market prices, to nearly $100 per barrel in the third quarter of 2007. Tight market conditions persisted through the remainder of 2007, with demand growth in China, India, and other parts of the developing world continuing. Uncertain supply related to political unrest in Nigeria, Venezuela, Iraq, and other places continued to threaten the market and contribute to a psychology that pushed up prices. The decline of the value of the U.S. dollar on world currency markets, as well as the investment strategies of financial firms on the oil futures markets, has also been identified by some as factors in the high price of oil. The profits of the five major integrated oil companies remained high in 2007, as they generally accounted for approximately 75% of both revenues and net incomes. For this group of firms, oil production led the way as the most profitable segment of the market, even though oil and gas production growth was not strong. The refining segment of the market performed relatively poorly. Independent oil and natural gas producers are small relative to the integrated oil companies, and their financial performance was weaker, with more than half of the firms reporting declines in net income. Independent refiners and marketers also experienced a difficult year that was reflected in profits in 2007. The combination of high crude oil prices that raised their costs and the inability to quickly pass cost increases on to consumers lowered refining margins, resulting in generally declining profits. The potential volatility of the world oil and financial markets, coupled with the weakness of the U.S. and other economies, makes any profit forecast for 2008 highly speculative. While continued high oil prices are likely—the price of oil reached $110 per barrel in the first quarter of 2008—the ability of the industry to pass those prices on to consumers of gasoline and other products during 2008 is uncertain due to possibly weakening demand.

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Introduction The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible workers earning relatively low wages. Because the credit is refundable, an EITC recipient need not owe taxes to receive the benefit. Hence, many working poor (especially those with children) who have little or no tax liability receive financial assistance from this tax provision. Studies indicate that EITC errors (both unintentional and intentional) result in a relatively high proportion of EITC payments being issued incorrectly. The Department of the Treasury's Agency Financial Report (AFR) for fiscal year (FY) 2017 estimates that in FY2017 between 21.9% and 25.8% of EITC payments—between $14.9 billion and $17.6 billion—were issued improperly. This study found that the majority of taxpayers who overclaim the EITC are ultimately ineligible for the credit, rather than eligible for a smaller credit. (While the study was released in 2014, it is also referred to as the 2006-2008 EITC Compliance Study in this report, because it examined tax returns between 2006 through 2008.) This report examines findings from the 2014 IRS study. Next, the report provides an overview of the major factors leading to EITC noncompliance identified in the 2014 study on this issue, as well as challenges the IRS may face in their efforts to reduce each type of error. In other words, recovered amounts of the credit are subtracted from erroneous claims of the credit to calculate improper payments. This study concluded that there were three major reasons for errors among claimants: EITC claimants claimed children who were not their qualifying children for the credit; EITC claimants misreported their income; and EITC claimants used an incorrect filing status when claiming the credit. Unlike previous studies (which did not examine error among paid preparers), this study also found that among paid tax preparers, unenrolled preparers were the most common type of preparers of tax returns which include the EITC. In addition, unenrolled preparers were found to be most prone to error when claiming the credit. Second, the child must share a residence with the tax filer for more than half the year in the United States. Study Results The 2006-2008 EITC Compliance Study found that in terms of dollar amounts of overclaims, errors in claiming the qualifying child were the largest source of EITC overclaims. Of the 13% of children claimed in error, the most frequent type of qualifying child error was the failure of the tax filer's qualifying child to meet the residency requirement. Incorrectly reporting income (sometimes referred to as "income misreporting") was the most common source of error identified in the 2006-2008 EITC Compliance Study. In contrast, tax filers whose income is above the phase-out threshold amount may receive a larger credit if they underreport their income. Filing Status Errors The EITC can be claimed by taxpayers filing their tax return as married filing jointly, head of household, or single. EITC recipients may use paid preparers for a number of reasons, including the belief that having their tax return prepared by a paid preparer will result in a larger tax refund and fewer errors, the belief that refunds are received faster when the return is prepared by a paid preparer, language differences or taxpayer literacy problems, the IRS's close review of EITC returns or the belief that using a paid preparer will reduce the chance of audit, less effort (work) by the tax filer, and the incorrect belief that the paid preparer (and not the taxpayer) will pay any penalty associated with an error. An EITC overclaim is "the difference between the EITC amount claimed by the taxpayer on his or her return and the amount the taxpayer should have claimed." This allows the IRS to determine the factors that lead tax filers to claim the credit incorrectly.

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible workers earning relatively low wages. Since the credit is refundable, an EITC recipient need not owe taxes to receive the benefit. Hence, many low-income workers, especially those with children, can receive significant financial assistance from this tax provision. Studies indicate that a relatively high proportion of EITC payments are issued incorrectly. The Treasury Department estimates that in FY2017 between 21.9% and 25.8% of EITC payments—between $14.9 billion and $17.6 billion—were issued improperly. These improper payments can be overpayments or underpayments. The IRS's most recent study (released in 2014) of the factors that lead to EITC overclaims—the difference between the amount of EITC claimed by the taxpayer on his or her return and the amount the taxpayer should have claimed—concluded that there were three major reasons that tax filers claimed the wrong amount of the credit: Qualifying child errors: Some EITC claimants claimed children who were not qualifying children for the credit. The most frequent type of qualifying child error was the failure of the tax filer's qualifying child to meet the credit's residency requirement whereby the claimed child must live with the tax filer for over half the year in the United States. This was the largest error in terms of dollars of EITC overclaims. Income reporting errors: Some EITC claimants misreported their incomes. For example, tax filers whose income was above the phase-out threshold amount would receive a larger credit if they underreported their income. This was the most common error in terms of its frequency among tax returns which included an EITC claim and also included an overclaim. Filing status errors: Some EITC claimants used the incorrect filing status when claiming the credit. Specifically, married couples were filing as unmarried (as single or head of household) to receive a larger credit. This IRS study—also referred to as the 2006-2008 EITC Compliance Study in this report, because it examined tax returns between 2006 through 2008—found largely the same results as a previous IRS study on overclaims, released in 1999. The 2014 study also found that the majority of taxpayers who overclaim the EITC are ultimately ineligible for the credit, rather than eligible for a smaller credit. The 2014 study did not estimate the proportion of errors which were intentional (i.e., fraud) versus "honest mistakes" made while attempting to comply with EITC rules Unlike previous studies, the 2014 study also examined different types of paid tax preparers who prepared tax returns which included EITC claims (these tax returns are sometimes referred to as "EITC returns"). The study found that among paid tax preparers, unenrolled preparers were both the most common type of tax preparers of EITC returns and among the most prone to erroneous claims of the credit. Unenrolled tax preparers generally do not pass the same testing requirements as enrolled preparers (e.g., attorneys and CPAs) and in contrast to enrolled tax preparers are limited in how they can represent their clients before the IRS. This report summarizes findings from the 2014 IRS study detailing the factors that can lead to erroneous claims of the credit, and describes the challenges the IRS may face in their efforts to reduce each type of error. It also examines the role of paid tax preparers on EITC error.

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RS21664 -- The WTO Cancún Ministerial November 6, 2003 Background The new round of trade negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), was launched at the 4th WTO Ministerial at Doha, Qatar in November 2001. Negotiations proceeded at a slow pace. In the end, the Singapore issues broke up the talks before agriculture issues were evenformally discussed. Reaction. Subsequent to the collapse of the talks, U.S. and EU negotiators criticized both the substance andtactics of the G-20+ group. (4) The European Union has undertaken a review of its policy towards the WTO and multilateral trade negotiations. It has beenendorsed by leaders of the Asia-PacificEconomic Cooperation (APEC) nations, including the United States, Canada and Japan. African countries refused to negotiate on this basis. Industrial Market Access.

The Cancún Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization(WTO)broke up without reaching agreementon the course of future multilateral trade negotiations. Negotiations on the Doha Development Agenda haveproceeded at a slow pace since the launch of thenew round in November 2001. The immediate cause of the collapse of talks was disagreement over launchingnegotiations on the Singapore issues, butagriculture and industrial market access issues were also sources of contention. Reaction from the United States hasbeen to focus on regional and bilateraltalks, while the European Union has undertaken a policy review of its position towards the WTO. The talks werecharacterized by the emergence of the G-20+group of developing nations that sought deep cuts in developed country agricultural subsidies. This report will notbe updated.

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Background Insurance companies constitute a major segment of the U.S. financial services industry. The industry is often separated into two parts: life and health insurance companies , which also often offer annuity products, and property and casualty insurance companies , which include most other lines of insurance, such as homeowners insurance, automobile insurance, and various commercial lines of insurance purchased by businesses. Different lines of insurance present different characteristics and risks. Life insurance typically is a longer-term proposition with contracts stretching over decades and insurance risks that are relatively well defined in actuarial tables. Property and casualty insurances typically are shorter-term propositions with six-month or one-year contracts and have greater exposure to catastrophic risks. Insurance companies, unlike banks and securities firms, have been chartered and regulated solely by the states for the past 150 years. The states have also developed a coordinated system for insurer resolution, including guaranty funds designed to protect policyholders in the event of insurer insolvency. The two large legislative overhauls of financial regulation in the past two decades, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), expanded the federal role in insurance, but states continued as the primary regulators of insurance following these acts. The Dodd-Frank Act altered the post-GLBA regulatory structure, but left the basic functional regulatory paradigm largely the same. The act gave enhanced systemic risk regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve and to a newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), including some oversight authority over insurers. The Dodd-Frank Act also included measures affecting the states' oversight of surplus lines insurance and reinsurance and created a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Department of the Treasury. Following the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and Dodd-Frank, international insurance issues have been of greater interest to Congress. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) named several U.S. insurers as global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs), and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) has been developing a multifaceted set of regulatory standards to apply to G-SIIs and other internationally active insurers. The United States and the European Union (EU) negotiated a covered agreement addressing a long-standing dispute over reinsurance collateral as well as questions about how U.S. insurers would be treated under the EU's new "Solvency II" regulatory regime. Legislation in the 115th Congress Possible insurance regulatory issues before the 115 th Congress include overseeing the implementation of, and possible amendments to, the Dodd-Frank Act, including specific legislation, such as P.L. 115-61 , H.R. 10 , H.R. 115-174 , S. 1360 , and H.R. 3762 / H.R. 4537 / S. 488 . P.L. P.L. Section 211 of P.L. International Insurance Standards Act (H.R. 5059 . Committee-Reported Legislation Business of Insurance Regulatory Reform Act (H.R. 3861) H.R. 4483) H.R. 4885) H.R. 5502) H.R. 5666/S.

Insurance companies constitute a major segment of the U.S. financial services industry. The insurance industry is often separated into two parts: (1) life and health insurance companies, which also often offer annuity products, and (2) property and casualty insurance companies, which include most other lines of insurance, such as homeowners insurance, automobile insurance, and various commercial lines of insurance purchased by businesses. Different lines of insurance present different characteristics and risks. Life insurance typically is a longer-term proposition with contracts stretching over decades and insurance risks that are relatively well defined in actuarial tables. Property and casualty insurances typically are shorter-term propositions with six-month or one-year contracts and have greater exposure to catastrophic risks. Since 1868, the individual states have been the primary regulators of insurance with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) acting to coordinate state actions and collect national data. In accordance with the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act, the states have operated as the primary insurance regulators with congressional blessing, but they have also been subject to periodic congressional scrutiny. Immediately prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, congressional attention on insurance regulation focused on the inefficiencies in the state regulatory system. A major catalyst was the aftermath of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA; P.L. 106-102), which overhauled the regulatory structure for banks and securities firms, but left the insurance sector largely untouched. The 2007-2009 financial crisis refocused the debate surrounding insurance regulatory reform. Unlike many financial crises in the past, insurers played a large role in this crisis. In particular, the failure of the insurer American International Group (AIG) spotlighted sources of systemic risk that had gone unrecognized. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank; P.L. 111-203), enacted following the crisis, gave enhanced systemic risk regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve and to a newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The Dodd-Frank Act also included measures affecting the states' oversight of surplus lines insurance and reinsurance and created a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Department of the Treasury. Following the financial crisis and Dodd-Frank, international insurance issues have been of greater interest to Congress. In particular, the development of various regulatory standards by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) has been the subject of both hearings and legislation. In addition, using Dodd-Frank authorities, the United States negotiated a covered agreement with the European Union (EU) addressing a long-standing dispute over reinsurance collateral as well as questions about how U.S. insurers would be treated under the EU's new "Solvency II" regulatory regime. A variety of legislation addressing insurance regulatory issues has been introduced in the 115th Congress with one bill enacted. Issues recurring in multiple bills include amendments to the Dodd-Frank Act provisions on FIO and FSOC (P.L. 115-61; H.R. 10; H.R. 3861; H.R. 4483; H.R. 5666/S. 3177) and international insurance standard negotiations (P.L. 115-174/S. 2155; S. 1360; H.R. 3762; H.R. 4537/S. 488). Individual legislation has been introduced on other topics, including licensing of insurance claims adjusters (H.R. 3363), discrimination in automobile insurance (H.R. 4885; H.R. 5502), and Federal Reserve oversight of insurers (H.R. 5059).

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The fact that all of the MDBs were requesting capital increases presented an opportunity for the Obama Administration and Congress to collectively evaluate U.S. participation and leadership in the MDBs, debate whether the MDBs are using their existing capital effectively, and decide whether to participate in any or all of the capital increases, and if so, whether to seek additional reforms. Key issues regarding the MDBs include: the comparative effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral aid, and the responsibilities of the MDBs to assess and pursue effectiveness; the scope of MDB activity, and whether that scope serves U.S. national security, economic, and foreign policy interests; MDB lending to emerging economic powers, and whether lending to China and other dynamic economies should continue to be encouraged; the increasing role of emerging economic powers at the MDBs, and its implications for U.S. influence and role; MDB-funded procurement, and potential U.S. export and commercial opportunities; and anti-corruption efforts, and the responsibility of the MDBs to promote development in poor countries prone to corruption while safeguarding MDB resources and ensuring an open and fair bidding process for MDB procurement. Background What Are the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)?2 For the purposes of this report, the term "Multilateral Development Bank," or "MDB," refers to the World Bank Group (including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), as well as several other facilities), and four regional development banks: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). MDB General Capital Increase Requests An across-the-board increase in all members' shares of MDB capital, increasing the amount the MDB can lend through its non-concessional window, is called a general capital increase (GCI). Collectively, these capital increases are worth around $348 billion. This was the first time that capital increases for so many MDBs were considered by Congress at the same time. Comparative Effectiveness of Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Compared to other advanced economies, the United States provides a smaller percentage of its development assistance through multilateral organizations, such as the MDBs, than other countries. For example, the United States designated a portion of U.S. By contrast, some analysts argue that the United States cedes control over its aid programs when a multilateral approach is used. In addition to expanding the range of projects for which the banks lend, the MDBs are increasingly providing greater amounts of funding in the form of policy loans (i.e., budget support) compared to project loans. Role of Emerging Economic Powers Members may consider the necessity of capital increases that would support higher levels of lending to emerging market countries such as Brazil, China, and India, who have access to international capital markets and large foreign exchange reserves. In addition to their borrowing, many of these emerging economies are increasing their shares and leadership roles in the institutions, as a result of recent G-20 agreements. U.S. Bidding on MDB-Funded Contracts The MDBs provide opportunities for U.S. firms by funding projects in developing countries in a range of sectors. Several of these positions are unfilled. The anti-corruption measures at the MDBs are relatively recent.

For the first time in the history of the institutions, each of the major Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are simultaneously seeking increases in their capital bases to fund the continued expansion of their development lending programs. The requests come after several years of increased lending by the banks. If the increases are fully funded, the resources of the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Asian Development Bank (AsDB), and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) would increase by between 31% and 200%. Collectively, the requested capital increases are worth around $348 billion. U.S. authorization to participate in the GCIs was provided in the FY2011 and FY2012 budget measures. Key issues regarding U.S. participation in the GCIs include: Comparative effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral aid. Compared to other advanced economies, the United States provides a smaller proportion of development assistance through multilateral organizations, such as the MDBs, than other countries. Is multilateral assistance more effective, and if so, should greater amounts of U.S. foreign aid be channeled through the MDBs by supporting the capital increases? Scope of MDB activity. The MDBs have expanded the range of activities that they engage in to include issues such as climate change and food security. Members may wish to evaluate whether the benefits of MDB engagement on these issues outweigh potential costs. Some argue that a consequence of working through the MDBs is duplication of efforts across a range of multilateral institutions, which can be costly and inefficient. Others argue that this approach leverages resources and provides common approaches. Role of emerging economic powers. Many rapidly growing economies, including Brazil, China, and India, among others, borrow from the MDBs despite having access to international capital markets and substantial holdings of foreign exchange reserves. Supporting capital increases at the MDBs would allow higher rates of lending to these quickly growing economies. Members may assess whether the development-impact of increased MDB lending to credit-worthy countries outweighs any potential crowding-out effect. At the same time, these countries are increasing their shares and leadership roles in the institutions, with important implications for the United States. U.S. bidding for MDB-funded projects. Firms located in large emerging economies are winning a larger share of MDB procurement projects. Are U.S. firms competing effectively for MDB projects? If not, since the general capital increases (GCIs) would increase the amount of MDB projects, are policy options available to better position U.S. firms to capture a larger share of MDB projects, creating additional jobs for U.S. workers? Anti-corruption policies. The MDBs have different approaches to anti-corruption measures. In procurement, for example, these range from international best practices to country-based approaches, which, some analysts argue, may increase the risk of monies being diverted for corrupt purposes. Congressional legislation on capital increases may be seen as a potential opportunity for seeking further reform.

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Congress plays a role in promoting a stable and prosperous world economy. But this evidence does not prove that economic theory is wrong. If a government wishes to alter a floating exchange rate or maintain a fixed exchange rate, it may do so by altering monetary policy but only if it is willing to abandon other macroeconomic goals such as providing stable economic growth, preventing recessions, and maintaining a moderate, stable inflation rate. In a floating exchange rate regime, the exchange rate is a price freely determined in the market by supply and demand. How valuable the macroeconomic adjustment mechanism that floating exchange rates provide depends on the economic independence of the country. "Hard pegs," currency boards and currency unions, are considered first because they are the most stark example of a fixed exchange rate arrangement. This can be done through a currency board or a currency union. A currency board is a monetary arrangement where a country keeps its own currency, but the central bank cedes all of its power to alter interest rates, and monetary policy is tied to the policy of a foreign country. Argentina had a similar arrangement which it abandoned in 2002, during its economic crisis. Greater trade is widely seen to be an engine of growth, particularly among developing countries. For developing countries, these investment gains can be quite large. On the other hand, international capital flows can change rapidly in ways that can be destabilizing to developing countries, as will be discussed below. Whenever a country's inflation rate gets extremely high, it is a reflection of its fiscal policy. Fixed Exchange Rates In a traditional fixed exchange rate regime, the government has agreed to buy or sell any amount of currency at a predetermined rate. As a result, countries with fixed exchange rates have limited freedom to use monetary and fiscal policy to pursue domestic goals without causing their exchange rate to become unsustainable. Economic Advantages of a Fixed Exchange Rate As with a hard peg, a fixed exchange rate has the advantage of promoting international trade and investment by eliminating exchange rate risk. As with a hard peg, the drawback of a fixed exchange rate compared to floating exchange rates is that the government has less scope to use monetary and fiscal policy to promote domestic economic stability. The scope for the pursuit of domestic goals is greater for countries that fix their exchange rate to a basket of currencies—unlike a hard peg, the country is no longer placed at the mercy of the unique and idiosyncratic policies and shocks of any one foreign country. Political Advantages of a Fixed Exchange Rate In previous decades, it was believed that developing countries with a profligate past could bolster a new commitment to macroeconomic credibility through the use of a fixed exchange rate for two reasons. In this view, while "soft pegs" may have been successful in the past, any attempt by a country open to international capital to maintain a soft peg today is likely to end in an exchange rate crisis, as happened to Mexico, the countries of Southeast Asia, Brazil, and Turkey. The previous discussion summarizes the textbook advantages and disadvantages of different exchange rate regimes. And that is the key reason why floating exchange rates are not prone to financial and economic crises. In making this argument, currency board proponents are only focusing on the political advantage to a currency board—it makes profligate fiscal and monetary policy impossible. How Interdependent Are International Economies? But a closer look at Canada suggests that a successful floating exchange rate may not be incompatible even with a country as closely interdependent with its neighbor as Canada is with the United States.

Congress is generally interested in promoting a stable and prosperous world economy. Stable currency exchange rate regimes are a key component to stable economic growth. This report explains the difference between fixed exchange rates, floating exchange rates, and currency boards/unions, and outlines the advantages and disadvantages of each. Floating exchange rate regimes are market determined; values fluctuate with market conditions. In fixed exchange rate regimes, the central bank is dedicated to using monetary policy to maintain the exchange rate at a predetermined price. In theory, under such an arrangement, a central bank would be unable to use monetary policy to promote any other goal; in practice, there is limited leeway to pursue other goals without disrupting the exchange rate. Currency boards and currency unions, or "hard pegs," are extreme examples of a fixed exchange rate regime where the central bank is truly stripped of all its capabilities other than converting any amount of domestic currency to a foreign currency at a predetermined price. The main economic advantages of floating exchange rates are that they leave the monetary and fiscal authorities free to pursue internal goals—such as full employment, stable growth, and price stability—and exchange rate adjustment often works as an automatic stabilizer to promote those goals. The main economic advantage of fixed exchange rates is that they promote international trade and investment, which can be an important source of growth in the long run, particularly for developing countries. The merits of floating compared to fixed exchange rates for any given country depends on how interdependent that country is with its neighbors. If a country's economy is highly reliant on its neighbors for trade and investment and experiences economic shocks similar to its neighbors', there is little benefit to monetary and fiscal independence, and the country is better off with a fixed exchange rate. If a country experiences unique economic shocks and is economically independent of its neighbors, a floating exchange rate can be a valuable way to promote macroeconomic stability. A political advantage of a currency board or currency union in a country with a profligate past is that it "ties the hands" of the monetary and fiscal authorities, making it harder to finance budget deficits by printing money. Recent experience with economic crisis in Mexico, East Asia, Russia, Brazil, and Turkey suggests that fixed exchange rates can be prone to currency crises that can spill over into wider economic crises. This is a factor not considered in the earlier exchange rate literature, in part because international capital mobility plays a greater role today than it did in the past. These experiences suggest that unless a country has substantial economic interdependence with a neighbor to which it can fix its exchange rate, floating exchange rates may be a better way to promote macroeconomic stability, provided the country is willing to use its monetary and fiscal policy in a disciplined fashion. The collapse of Argentina's currency board in 2002 suggests that such arrangements do not get around the problems with fixed exchange rates, as their proponents claimed. This report does not track legislation and will be updated as events warrant.

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Amidst controversy regarding U.S. treatment of enemy combatants and terrorist suspects detained in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations, Congress approved additional guidelines concerning the treatment of persons in U.S. custody and control via the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which was enacted pursuant to both the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109 - 148 ), and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 ( P.L. 109 - 163 ). Among other things, the DTA contains provisions that (1) require Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to employ United States Army Field Manual guidelines while interrogating detainees, and (2) prohibit the "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment of persons under the detention, custody, or control of the United States Government." These provisions, added to the defense appropriations and authorization bills via amendments introduced by Senator John McCain, have popularly been referred to as the "McCain Amendment." As subsequently modified, the DTA also provides legal protections and assistance to U.S. personnel engaged in the authorized interrogation of a terrorist suspect. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA, P.L. Post-DTA Developments Concerning the Interrogation and Treatment of Detainees In the years following the enactment of the DTA, the standards governing the interrogation and treatment of detainees have been further modified by executive, legislative, and judicial action. Most recently, President Barack Obama has issued an Executive Order which generally requires all U.S. agencies conducting interrogations of persons during armed conflicts to comply with Army Field Manual requirements. Effects of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the MCA In the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , the Supreme Court rejected the Bush Administration's long-standing position that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions was inapplicable to the present armed conflict with Al Qaeda. Several bills introduced in response to the Hamdan decision contained provisions that referenced the DTA. The DTA may have implications for the prosecution of U.S. agents for conduct involving the treatment or interrogation of wartime detainees. The version of H.R. 2082 reported out of conference was passed by the House on December 13, 2007, and the Senate on February 13, 2008, but was subsequently vetoed by President Bush on March 8, 2008. 4156 , the Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment Appropriations Act, 2008, which was passed by the House on November 14, 2007, would have generally barred all federal agencies, including the CIA, from using any treatment or interrogation tactic that is not authorized or listed by the Army Field Manual. Similar proposals have also been introduced in the 111 th Congress. It remains to be seen whether President Obama's Executive Order on detainee treatment or the findings of the Special Interagency Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies will affect congressional interest in passing further legislation affecting U.S. interrogation policy. H.R.

U.S. treatment of enemy combatants and terrorist suspects captured in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations has been a subject of long-standing debate, including whether such treatment complies with U.S. statutes and treaties such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT). In response to this controversy, Congress approved additional guidelines concerning the treatment of detainees via the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which was enacted pursuant to both the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-148, Title X), and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163, Title XIV). Among other things, the DTA contains provisions that (1) require Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to employ United States Army Field Manual guidelines while interrogating detainees, and (2) prohibit the "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment of persons under the detention, custody, or control of the United States Government." These provisions of the DTA, which were first introduced by Senator John McCain, have popularly been referred to as the "McCain Amendment." This report discusses provisions of the DTA concerning standards for the interrogation and treatment of detainees. This report discusses the application of the DTA by the DOD in the updated 2006 version of the Army Field Manual, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. In addition, the report discusses the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) (P.L. 109-366), which contains provisions that reference or amend the DTA. It also addresses the Executive Order issued by President Barack Obama that generally instructs all U.S. agencies to comply with Army Field Manual requirements when interrogating persons captured in an armed conflict. The report also discusses the recommendations made by the Special Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer established by the Executive Order, and the DTA's relevance in the event of the prosecution of U.S. personnel for authorized interrogation or detention activities. For discussion of the provisions in the DTA that limit judicial review of challenges to U.S. detention policy, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. Several legislative proposals were introduced during the 110th Congress that referenced or modified the DTA's requirements relating to the treatment and interrogation of detainees, including H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, which was vetoed by President Bush on March 8, 2008, and House-passed H.R. 4156, the Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment Appropriations Act, 2008. Both bills would have barred the CIA and other intelligence agencies from employing any interrogation tactic that is not authorized by the Army Field Manual. Similar proposals have been introduced in the 111th Congress. It remains to be seen whether President Obama's recent Executive Order on detainee treatment will affect congressional interest in passing further legislation affecting U.S. interrogation policy.

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Introduction Funding for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), including the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), is provided in the annual Energy and Water Development (E&W) Appropriations bill. EERE supports renewable energy and end-use energy efficiency technology research, development, and implementation. President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request to Congress on May 23, 2017. The budget requests $28.2 billion for DOE, a decrease of nearly $3 billion, or 9.5%, from the FY2017 enacted level. This report discusses the FY2018 EERE budget request and the proposed EERE funding levels and priorities in the related E&W appropriations bills. The office collaborates with industry, academia, national laboratories, and others to develop technology-specific road maps and then focuses funding on early stage research and development (R&D), technology validation and risk-reduction activities, and the reduction of barriers to the adoption of market-ready new technologies. EERE also manages a portfolio of research and development programs that support state and local governments, tribes, and schools. FY2015-FY2017 Appropriations EERE funding is provided from the annual E&W appropriations bill. According to the budget request, funding for EERE would focus on "early-stage R&D, where the Federal role is critically important, and reflects an increased reliance on the private sector to fund later-stage research, development, and commercialization of energy technologies." For FY2018, the bulk of the EERE request would be split among three areas: about 29% for sustainable transportation programs, 25% for energy efficiency programs, and 21% for renewable energy programs. The budget request specifies two EERE program eliminations: the Weatherization Assistance Program and the State Energy Program, which received FY2017 appropriations of $225 million and $50.0 million, respectively. The request would reduce EERE funded full-time equivalents (FTE) by approximately 30%. Energy Efficiency The Administration's request for the Office of Energy Efficiency is $159.5 million for FY2018, $602 million (79%) less than the FY2017 enacted level of $762 million). The bill would provide funding for EERE of $1.1 billion—$1.0 billion below FY2017 and $449 million above the Administration request ( H.R. 3266 was incorporated as Division D of H.R. 3219 , the Defense, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, Legislative Branch, and Energy and Water Development National Security Appropriations Act, 2018 (also referred to as the Make America Secure Appropriations Act, 2018). The House passed H.R. 3219 on July 27, 2017. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the FY2018 Energy and Water Appropriations bill, S. 1609 , on July 20, 2017. S. 1609 would provide $1.9 billion for EERE—$153 million below the FY2017 level and $1.3 billion above the Administration request ( S.Rept. 115-132 ). The President signed P.L. 115-56 , Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 and Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2017 on September 8, 2017, providing appropriations at the FY2017 level through December 8, 2017. Concerns may include not only the level of EERE appropriations for FY2018, but also which activities EERE should support. For S. 1609 , the funding levels for specific offices and programs are those that are in S.Rept. Proposed Shift to Early-Stage Research and Development According to the budget request, funding for EERE would focus on "early-stage R&D," and would result in a decrease of nearly 70% for EERE programs. The two appropriation bills before Congress— H.R. According to H.Rept. 115-230 , the report accompanying H.R. For advanced manufacturing, H.R.

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) administers renewable energy and end-use energy efficiency technology programs in research, development, and implementation. EERE works with industry, academia, national laboratories, and others to support research and development (R&D). EERE also works with state and local governments to assist in technology implementation and deployment. EERE supports nearly a dozen offices and programs including vehicle technologies, solar energy, advanced manufacturing, and weatherization and intergovernmental programs, among others. Funding for EERE is provided in the annual Energy and Water Development (E&W) Appropriations bill. At issue for the 115th Congress is the level of EERE appropriations and which activities EERE should support, including whether to continue support for specific initiatives and programs. On May 23, 2017, the Trump Administration submitted the budget proposal for FY2018. The FY2018 budget request for DOE is $28.2 billion of which about 2% is for EERE. The budget request for EERE is $636.1 million, a decrease of $1.5 billion, or nearly 70%, from the FY2017 enacted level of approximately $2.1 billion. The proposed reduction, if enacted, would affect all offices within EERE. For FY2018, the bulk of the EERE request is allocated to three areas: 25% for energy efficiency programs, 21% for renewable energy programs, and about 29% for sustainable transportation programs. The request estimates that two-thirds of the current portfolio of 2,500 multi-year projects (e.g., early-stage R&D projects) would remain active in FY2018. DOE anticipates that eliminating one-third of these projects would result in a reduction of approximately 30% in EERE-funded full-time equivalent staff. The President's request would include two specific program eliminations: the Weatherization Assistance Program and the State Energy Program, which received FY2017 appropriations of $225.0 million and $50.0 million, respectively. The President's request for EERE emphasizes early-stage R&D, limited validation testing and simulation to inform R&D, and analysis to support regulatory activities. The DOE budget justification states that funding for EERE would focus on "early-stage R&D, where the Federal role is critically important, and reflects an increased reliance on the private sector to fund later-stage research, development, and commercialization of energy technologies." There are several bills before Congress that recommend FY2018 appropriations for EERE. The bills contain EERE funding levels that are below the FY2017 enacted level, but higher than the President's budget request. The House passed H.R. 3219, the Defense, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, Legislative Branch, and Energy and Water Development National Security Appropriations Act, 2018, on July 27, 2017. Division D of H.R. 3219—which contains the E&W appropriations—provides funding of $1.1 billion for EERE, $1.0 billion below the FY2017 enacted level and $449 million above the request. Floor amendments to H.R. 3219 reduced funding for EERE in H.R. 3219 by $18.4 million from H.R. 3266, the House Appropriations Committee version of the FY2018 E&W appropriations bill. H.R. 3266 would provide funding of $1.1 billion to EERE—$986 million below the FY2017 enacted level and $468 million above the request (H.Rept. 115-230). The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 1609, the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2018, on July 20, 2017. S. 1609 would appropriate $1.9 billion to EERE—$153 million below the FY2017 enacted level and $1.3 billion above the request (S.Rept. 115-132). The President signed P.L. 115-56, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 and Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2017 on September 8, 2017, providing FY2018 funding at the FY2017 appropriations level through December 8, 2017.

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The Project BioShield Act To encourage the development of new CBRN countermeasures, President Bush proposed Project BioShield in his 2003 State of the Union address. This act has three main provisions. It provides the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) expedited procedures for CBRN terrorism-related spending, including procuring products, hiring experts, and awarding research grants. All these awards supported research on medical countermeasures to be used following radiation exposure. The Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act ( P.L. HHS used some of these authorities when structuring each of the Project BioShield contracts discussed below (" Acquisitions "). The second report determined that HHS has used Project BioShield to support development and procurement of CBRN medical countermeasures. Instead, it authorized the appropriation of up to a total of $5.593 billion for countermeasures procurement from FY2004 through FY2013. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 ( P.L. 108-90 specified that $3.418 billion was available for obligation for FY2004 to FY2008. The Project BioShield Act specified that these funds are only for the procurement of CBRN countermeasures using the Project BioShield authorities and may not be used for other purposes, such as for grants to support countermeasure development or program administration. Congress removed $25 million from this account through rescissions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 ( P.L. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. The Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 ( H.R. 3293 ) would make this transfer. Future targets for Project BioShield procurement include countermeasures against anthrax, viral hemorrhagic fevers, and radiation. In response to perceived problems with Project BioShield countermeasure procurement, the 109 th Congress created the Biodefense Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in HHS through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act ( P.L. 109-417 ). Policy Issues The 111 th Congress faces several BioShield-related policy issues. These include: whether to grant the President's request to transfer the account from DHS to HHS; the diversion of BioShield funds for other purposes; how to replace stockpiled countermeasures as they expire; and whether this program has sufficiently encouraged the development of broad spectrum countermeasures. Transfer of Account to HHS In the FY2010 budget request, President Obama has proposed transferring the entirety of the Project BioShield special reserve fund from DHS to HHS. Subsequent Congresses have removed approximately 8% of the advance appropriation through rescissions and transfers to other accounts. 3293 would transfer the requested $305 million to BARDA and $500 million to NIAID to support basic research. Transfer for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness In FY2009, Congress transferred $137 million from the Project BioShield special reserve fund to HHS for pandemic influenza preparedness and response.

Many potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism agents lack available countermeasures. In 2003, President Bush proposed Project BioShield to address this need. The Project BioShield Act became law in July 2004 (P.L. 108-276). This law has three main provisions: (1) relaxing regulatory requirements for some CBRN terrorism-related spending, including hiring and awarding research grants; (2) guaranteeing a federal government market for new CBRN medical countermeasures; and (3) permitting emergency use of unapproved countermeasures. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has used each of these authorities. The HHS used expedited review authorities to approve grants relating to developing treatments for radiation exposure and used the authority to guarantee a government market to obligate approximately $2 billion to acquire countermeasures against anthrax, botulism, radiation, and smallpox. The HHS has also employed the emergency use authority several times, including allowing young children with H1N1 "swine" influenza to receive specific antiviral drugs. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90) advance-appropriated $5.593 billion for FY2004 to FY2013 for Project BioShield. Subsequent Congresses have removed approximately 8% of the advance appropriation through rescissions and transfers to other accounts. In FY2004 and FY2005, Congress removed a total of approximately $25 million through rescissions. In the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), Congress transferred $412 million to other programs supporting countermeasure advanced research and development and pandemic influenza preparedness and response. For FY2010, President Obama has proposed transferring an additional $305 million to support countermeasure advanced research and development and transferring the account from DHS to HHS. The Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3293) would make both these requested transfers. This legislation would also make a transfer that was not in the President's request: $500 million out of the Project BioShield account to support basic research in HHS. Since passing the Project BioShield Act, subsequent Congresses have considered additional measures to further encourage countermeasure development. The 109th Congress passed the Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417) which created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in HHS. Amongst other duties, this office oversees all of HHS' Project BioShield activities. The Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act also modified the Project BioShield procurement process. Questions remain regarding whether these changes have sufficiently improved countermeasure development and procurement. The 111th Congress faces several challenging policy issues. Primary among them is assessing whether Project BioShield is successfully encouraging medical countermeasure development. A second issue is whether to allow additional diversions of the Project BioShield advance appropriation, a key element of the government's market guarantee, to support other activities. A third is whether to broaden Project BioShield's mandate beyond CBRN countermeasures in the face of other threats such as pandemic influenza.

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False Claims Act The federal False Claims Act (FCA), codified at 31 U.S.C. Under three key provisions of the FCA, civil liability may be imposed on any person that (1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval [31 U.S.C. Overview of the Allison Engine Decision In Allison Engine Co. v. U.S. ex. rel. While the Court held that a false claim does not have to be presented to the government under §§ 3729(a)(2) and (a)(3), the Court found that under § 3729(a)(2), a plaintiff "must prove that the defendant intended that the false record or statement be material to the Government's decision to pay or approve the false claim." Some commentators have suggested that Allison Engine could make it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring an FCA claim against health care entities. These bills include the False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009 ( S. 458 ), introduced by Senator Grassley, and the False Claims Act Correction Act of 2009 ( H.R. In addition, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 ( S. 386 , as reported in the Senate), which was introduced by Senator Leahy and Senator Grassley to enhance federal enforcement capabilities to counteract mortgage fraud, securities fraud, and fraud with respect to federal financial assistance, would also amend the FCA to "clarify that the False Claims Act was intended to extend to any false or fraudulent claim for government money or property, whether or not the claim is presented to a government official or employee … and whether or not the defendant specifically intended to defraud the U.S. 1788 , and S. 386 (which all contain similar, but not identical, provisions) could potentially limit the application of Allison Engine .

The False Claims Act (FCA), an important tool for combating fraud against the U.S. government, generally provides that a person who knowingly submits, or causes to be submitted, a false or fraudulent claim for payment to the U.S. government may be subject to civil penalties and damages. Recently, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the FCA in Allison Engine v. United States ex rel. Sanders, in which a former employee of a subcontractor brought an action against other subcontractors who had allegedly submitted a false claim to the prime contractor on a U.S. defense contract. The Court struck down the FCA claim against the subcontractors, holding that a demonstration that a false claim was paid for with government funds, without more, does not establish liability under 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(2) and (a)(3). Under these sections, the Court found that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended to defraud the government (and not just a recipient of government funds) when it submitted or agreed to make use of the false claim. Given that the FCA is frequently invoked in the health care context, it has been questioned how this decision could affect these cases. This report provides an overview of the FCA and the Allison Engine decision, analyzes how this decision could affect certain FCA health care claims, and discusses proposed legislation that would amend the False Claims Act (i.e., the False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009 (S. 458), the False Claims Act Correction Act of 2009 (H.R. 1788), and the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (S. 386)), which could limit the application of the Allison Engine decision.

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Introduction The New Starts program provides federal funds to public transportation agencies on a largely competitive basis for the construction of new fixed guideway transit systems and the expansion of existing systems (49 U.S.C. It should be noted that public transportation, as defined in federal law, does not include transportation by school bus, intercity bus, or intercity passenger rail (Amtrak). Most New Starts funding has been provided to transit rail systems for subway/elevated rail (heavy rail), light rail, or commuter rail projects. The New Starts program is one element of the federal public transportation program that is administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) within the Department of Transportation. In July 2012, the New Starts program was reauthorized through FY2014 as part of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ). The program underwent several significant changes in MAP-21. Unlike FTA's other major programs, funding for New Starts comes from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury, not the mass transit account of the highway trust fund. Moreover, the New Starts program provides discretionary funding whereas the other major programs provide funding by formula. Prior to the passage of MAP-21, bus program funding was discretionary, but heavily earmarked. New Starts program funds now may be used for substantial investments in existing fixed guideway lines that increase the capacity of a corridor by at least 10%. These types of projects are termed "core capacity improvement projects." MAP-21 also authorizes the evaluation and funding of a program of interrelated projects. MAP-21 simplifies the New Starts process by reducing the number of major stages from four to three. The new stages are termed project development, engineering, and construction. The bill eliminates the duplicative alternatives analysis previously required to be conducted separately from the alternatives analysis required by NEPA. MAP-21 also provides authority to advance projects more quickly using special warrants for projects of which the federal share is $100 million or less or 50% or less of the total project cost. Unlike SAFETEA, which reserved $200 million of the overall program authorization for Small Starts, MAP-21 does not reserve funds for Small Starts projects in FY2013 and FY2014. Cost-effectiveness as measured by cost per rider . This change, along with changes to the cost effectiveness measure required by law, will likely improve the rating of projects that generally provide shorter trips, such as streetcars.

The New Starts program is a discretionary funding program for the construction of new fixed-guideway public transportation systems and the expansion of existing systems. Eligible projects include transit rail, including subway/elevated rail (heavy rail), light rail, and commuter rail, as well as bus rapid transit (BRT) and ferries. Public transportation, as defined in federal law, does not include transportation by school bus, intercity bus, or intercity passenger rail (Amtrak). The New Starts program is one element of the federal public transportation program that is administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) within the Department of Transportation. In July 2012, the New Starts program was reauthorized through FY2014 as part of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141). Funding is authorized at $1.9 billion for FY2013 and FY2014, or about 18% of the overall federal public transportation program budget. Unlike FTA's other major programs, funding for the New Starts program comes from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury, not the mass transit account of the highway trust fund. Moreover, the New Starts program provides discretionary funding whereas the other major programs provide funding by formula. The program underwent several significant changes in MAP-21: Funding can now be used for substantial investments in existing fixed guideway lines that increase the capacity of a corridor by at least 10%, termed "core capacity improvement projects." MAP-21 also authorizes the evaluation and funding of a program of interrelated projects. MAP-21 retains the definition of Small Starts projects as those costing less than $250 million and seeking $75 million or less in federal funding. But MAP-21 does not specifically reserve funding for Small Starts projects as was the case in prior law. MAP-21 simplifies the New Starts process by reducing the number of major stages from four to three. The new stages are termed project development, engineering, and construction. MAP-21 eliminates the alternatives analysis that is separate from the alternatives analysis required by National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). MAP-21 provides FTA with authority to advance projects more quickly in certain circumstances. A recent focus of both Administration and congressional concern has been the rating scheme by which projects are evaluated, particularly the notion of cost effectiveness. Among other things, MAP-21 changes the definition of cost effectiveness from incremental travel time saved to cost per rider. This would likely improve the rating of projects that generally provide shorter trips, such as streetcars.

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The combined efforts of the food industry and the regulatory agencies often are credited with making the U.S. food supply among the safest in the world. The Agencies and Their Roles Numerous federal, state, and local agencies share responsibilities for regulating the safety of the U.S. food supply. Federal responsibility for food safety rests primarily with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), which is part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) regulates most meat and poultry and some egg and fish products. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified as many as 15 federal agencies, including FDA and FSIS, as collectively administering at least 30 laws related to food safety. State and local food safety authorities collaborate with federal agencies for inspection and other food safety functions, and they regulate retail food establishments. This organizational complexity, and trends in U.S. food markets—for example, increasing imports as a share of U.S. food consumption and increasing consumption of fresh, often unprocessed, foods—pose ongoing challenges to ensuring food safety. Over the years, GAO has published a series of reports highlighting how food safety oversight in the United States is fragmented and recommending broad restructuring of the nation's food safety system. Similar observations are noted in a series of food safety studies by the National Research Council (NRC) and Institute of Medicine (IOM). The NRC/IOM studies further recommend that the core federal food safety responsibilities should reside within a single entity/agency; have a unified administrative structure, clear mandate, and dedicated budget; and maintain full responsibility for oversight of the entire U.S. food supply. The FDA is responsible for ensuring that all domestic and imported food products—except for most meats and poultry—are safe, nutritious, wholesome, and accurately labeled. FDA also has oversight of all seafood and shellfish products, and most fish products (except for catfish). FDA shares some responsibility for the safety of eggs with FSIS. In addition, the 111 th Congress passed comprehensive food safety legislation with the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, P.L. FSMA did not directly address meat and poultry products under USDA's jurisdiction. FSMA was the largest expansion of FDA's food safety authorities since the 1930s.

Numerous federal, state, and local agencies share responsibilities for regulating the safety of the U.S. food supply. Federal responsibility for food safety rests primarily with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). FDA, an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for ensuring the safety of all domestic and imported food products (except for most meats and poultry). FDA also has oversight of all seafood, fish, and shellfish products. USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) regulates most meat and poultry and some egg products. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified as many as 15 federal agencies, including FDA and FSIS, as collectively administering at least 30 laws related to food safety. State and local food safety authorities collaborate with federal agencies for inspection and other food safety functions, and they regulate retail food establishments. The combined efforts of the food industry and government regulatory agencies often are credited with making the U.S. food supply among the safest in the world. However, critics view this system as lacking the organization, regulatory tools, and resources to adequately combat foodborne illness—as evidenced by a series of widely publicized food safety problems, including concerns about adulterated food and food ingredient imports, and illnesses linked to various types of fresh produce, to peanut products, and to some meat and poultry products. Some critics also note that the organizational complexity of the U.S. food safety system as well as trends in U.S. food markets—for example, increasing imports as a share of U.S. food consumptions and increasing consumption of fresh, often unprocessed, foods—pose ongoing challenges to ensuring food safety. Over the years, GAO has published a series of reports highlighting how food safety oversight in the United States is fragmented and recommending broad restructuring of the nation's food safety system. Similar observations are noted in a series of food safety studies by the National Research Council (NRC) and the Institute of Medicine (IOM) that recommend that the core federal food safety responsibilities should reside within a single entity/agency, with a unified administrative structure, a clear mandate, a dedicated budget, and full responsibility for oversight of the entire U.S. food supply. The 111th Congress passed comprehensive food safety legislation with the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, P.L. 111-353). FSMA is the largest expansion of FDA's food safety authorities since the 1930s. Although numerous agencies share responsibility for regulating food safety, FSMA focused on foods regulated by FDA, amended FDA's existing structure and authorities, and did not directly address meat and poultry products under USDA's jurisdiction. Beyond these changes, some in Congress continue to push for additional policy reforms to address other perceived concerns about the safety of the U.S. food supply.

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The American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry (AAPD) recommends that every child be seen by a dentist following the eruption of the first tooth, but not later than 12 months of age. All other children should have additional periodic dental exams every six months (i.e., twice a year). One goal of the Healthy People 2010 initiative, a federal effort to increase quality and years of healthy life and eliminate health disparities, is that at least 66% of low-income children receive a preventive dental visit each year. In addition, care that is necessary to correct or ameliorate identified problems must also be provided, including services that states do not otherwise cover in their Medicaid programs. Emerging Models for Dental Care for Medicaid Children Many states recognize that dental care is underutilized across most Medicaid sub-populations. States may need to address such issues if they wish to expand access to dental care under Medicaid for children and other sub-groups.

According to guidelines published by the American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry, all youth should see a dentist for routine dental screening and preventive care twice a year. Dental care is a mandatory benefit for most Medicaid eligibles under the age of 21, however, nationwide, the majority of low-income children enrolled in Medicaid do not receive any dental services in a given year. There are many beneficiary and provider-related issues that contribute to inadequate access to and delivery of dental care. To address this problem, some states have undertaken new Medicaid initiatives to attract and retain dental providers that may serve as models for other state Medicaid programs.

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The House of Representatives Apportionment Formula: An Analysis of Proposals for Change and Their Impact on States1 Introduction As a basis for understanding the reallocation of Representatives among the states based on the 2010 Census, it may prove helpful to examine the current House of Representatives apportionment formula. In addition, some members of the statistical community have, in the recent past, urged Congress to consider changing the current apportionment formula. Consequently, an examination of other methods that could be used to apportion the seats in the House of Representatives may contribute to a deeper understanding of the apportionment process. One, the Hamilton-Vinton method, involves ranking fractional remainders. One solution to this problem of too few or too many seats would be to divide each state's population by the national "ideal" size district, but instead of rounding at the .5 point, allot each state initially the whole number of seats in its quota (except that states entitled to less than one seat would receive one regardless because of constitutional requirements). Next, rank the fractional remainders of the quotas in order from largest to smallest. If the number of Representatives assigned using the whole numbers is less than the House total, rank the fractional remainders of the states' quotas and award seats in rank order from highest to lowest until the House size is reached. In the Adams, Webster, and Jefferson methods, the rounding points used are the same for a state of any size. In the Dean and Hill methods, on the other hand, the rounding point varies with the number of seats assigned to the state; it rises as the state's population increases. These differences among the rounding methods are illustrated in Figure 1 . Hill: Rounding at the Geometric Mean The only operational difference between a Webster and a Hill apportionment (equal proportions—the method in use since 1941), is where the rounding occurs. The Dean method (which has never been used) can be defined in the following manner for a 435-seat House: Dean Find a number so that when it is divided into each state's population and resulting quotients are rounded at the harmonic mean, the total number of seats will sum to 435. (In all cases where a state would be entitled to less than one seat, it receives one anyway because of the constitutional requirement.) Each apportionment method discussed in this report has a "rational" basis, and for each, there is at least one test according to which it is the most equitable. The question of how the concept of fairness can best be defined, in the context of evaluating an apportionment formula, remains open. Some rounding methods are better than others in this respect. Which of the mathematical tests discussed in this report best approximates the constitutional requirement that Representatives be apportioned among the states according to their respective number is, arguably, a matter of judgment—rather than an indisputable mathematical test.

As a basis for understanding the reallocation of Representatives among the states based on the 2010 Census, it may prove helpful to examine the current House of Representatives apportionment formula. In addition, some members of the statistical community have, in the recent past, urged Congress to consider changing the current apportionment formula. Consequently, an examination of other methods that could be used to apportion the seats in the House of Representatives may contribute to a deeper understanding of the apportionment process. Seats in the House of Representatives are allocated by a formula known as the method of equal proportions or the "Hill" method. If Congress decided to change it, there are at least five alternatives it might consider. Four of these are based on rounding fractions and one, on ranking fractions. The current apportionment system (codified in 2 U.S.C. 2a) also is based on rounding fractions. The Hamilton-Vinton method, used to apportion the House of Representatives from 1851-1901, is based on ranking fractions. First, the total population of the 50 states is divided by 435 (the House size) in order to find the national "ideal sized" district. Next, this number is divided into each state's population, producing the state's "quota" of seats. Each state is then awarded the whole number in its quota (but at least one). If fewer than 435 seats have been assigned by this process, the fractional remainders of the 50 states are rank-ordered from largest to smallest, and seats are assigned in this manner until 435 are allocated. The rounding methods, including the Hill method currently in use, allocate seats among the states differently, but operationally the methods only differ by where rounding occurs in seat assignments. Three of these methods—Adams, Webster, and Jefferson—have fixed rounding points. Two others—Dean and Hill—use varying rounding points that rise as the number of seats assigned to a state grows larger. The methods can be defined in the same way (after substituting the appropriate rounding principle in parentheses). The rounding point for Adams is (up for all fractions); for Dean (at the harmonic mean); for Hill (at the geometric mean); for Webster (at the arithmetic mean, which is 0.5 for successive numbers); and for Jefferson (down for all fractions). Substitute these phrases in the general definition below for the rounding methods: Find a number so that when it is divided into each state's population and resulting quotients are rounded (substitute appropriate phrase), the total number of seats will sum to 435. (In all cases where a state would be entitled to less than one seat, it receives one anyway because of the constitutional requirement.) Fundamental to choosing an apportionment method is a determination of fairness. Each apportionment method discussed in this report has a "rational" basis, and for each, there is at least one test according to which it is the most equitable. The question of how the concept of fairness can best be defined, in the context of evaluating an apportionment formula, remains open. Which of the mathematical tests discussed in this report best approximates the constitutional requirement that Representatives be apportioned among the states according to their respective numbers is, arguably, a matter of judgment, rather than an indisputable mathematical test.

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Overview Civilians in Africa's conflict zones—particularly women and children, but also men—are often vulnerable to sexual violence, including rape, sexual assault, mutilation, forced prostitution, sexual slavery, and other abuses. Some incidences appear to be opportunistic, the product of a larger breakdown in the rule of law and social order that may occur amid conflict. In other cases, sexual violence has also been employed by combatant groups as a strategic tool. Such acts have been particularly prevalent in eastern DRC, where security forces, rebel organizations, militias, and other armed groups have inflicted sexual violence upon the civilian population on a massive scale. Congressional Activities In recent years, Congress has demonstrated an interest in drawing attention to sexual violence in conflict zones, including through legislation, hearings, and other activities. In addition, several pieces of draft legislation were introduced during the 111 th Congress on the overlapping issues of international violence against women and sexual violence in conflict zones. These include H.Res. 1676 (Carnahan); H.R. 5121 (Clarke); S. 2982 (Kerry); H.R. 4594 (Delahunt); H.Res. 931 (Carson); and H.J.Res. 10 (Jackson-Lee). At least one piece of related draft legislation has been introduced during the 112 th Congress: on January 7, 2011, H.J.Res. 12 (Jackson Lee), on international gender-based violence, was introduced in the House. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. 111-203 , July 21, 2010) includes an provision on "conflict minerals" that references reported links between illicit mining activities and high levels of sexual and gender-based violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Among other provisions, it also requires the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to develop and submit to Congress a strategy "to address the linkages between human rights abuses, armed groups, mining of conflict minerals, and commercial products," and requires the U.S. Comptroller General to submit to Congress a report that includes "an assessment of the rate of sexual- and gender-based violence in war-torn areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and adjoining countries." Survivors of sexual violence are often shunned by spouses, their families, and their communities, as are the children born to women who have been raped. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Melanne Verveer, the Obama Administration's Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues, have spearheaded the Administration's public efforts through multiple statements, official travel, writings, and actions at the United Nations. Global AIDS Coordinator; and the Office of Global Women's Issues (GWI). Other departments that support programs include the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Justice (DOJ). U.S. Policy Responses The State Department characterizes DRC as a "priority focus" for U.S. efforts to prevent and respond to violence against women and girls. Outlook and Issues for Congress Many observers have praised the Obama Administration for its attention to the issue of sexual violence in African conflicts. The U.S. response to sexual violence in African conflicts tends to be fragmented among many different agencies and implementers, often with reportedly little collaboration, cooperation, or coordination in design or implementation.

Civilians in Africa's conflict zones—particularly women and children, but also men—are often vulnerable to sexual violence, including rape, assault, mutilation, and sexual slavery. This violence is carried out by a range of actors, including government security forces, rebel groups, militias, and criminal organizations. Some abuses appear to be opportunistic, the product of a larger breakdown in the rule of law and social order that may occur amid conflict. In other cases, attacks appear to be carried out systematically by combatants as a strategic tool to intimidate and humiliate civilian populations. While such abuses are by no means limited to Africa, weak institutions in many African states can mean that victims have little redress. In addition to health and psychological consequences, survivors are also often shunned by their families and communities. Within Africa, the issue of sexual violence in conflict has been particularly prevalent in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where security forces, rebel organizations, militias, and other armed groups have inflicted sexual violence upon the civilian population on a massive scale. This report provides a detailed case study of DRC and an overview of the U.S. strategy to counter sexual violence there. The issue of sexual violence in conflict is complex, with implications for international programs and policies related to health, humanitarian relief, global women's issues, the justice sector, the security sector, and multilateral activities. Multiple U.S. government agencies and implementing partners contribute to efforts to prevent and respond to sexual violence in African conflicts, including the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense, among others. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Melanne Verveer, the Obama Administration's Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues, have taken the lead on the Administration's initiative to address the issue and have focused attention through speeches, official travel, public remarks, writings, and actions at the United Nations. Still, concerns remain among some analysts that programmatic responses to the issue have lacked coordination between donors and among implementers. Potential issues for Congress include the authorization and appropriation of targeted assistance programs and oversight of Administration policies and participation in multilateral activities. The 111th Congress repeatedly expressed interest in bringing attention to the issue of sexual violence in African conflicts and support for programs to address it through legislation, hearings, and other congressional actions. Related legislation introduced during the 111th Congress included H.Res. 1676 (Carnahan); H.R. 5121 (Clarke); S. 2982 (Kerry); H.R. 4594 (Delahunt); H.Res. 931 (Carson); and H.J.Res. 10 (Jackson-Lee). The "conflict minerals" amendment to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173, passed into law on July 21, 2010, as P.L. 111-203), which is expected to lead to new regulations for U.S. companies that rely on certain minerals mined in central Africa, references reported links between illicit mining activities and high levels of sexual and gender-based violence in DRC. On January 7, 2011, H.J.Res. 12 (Jackson Lee), on international gender-based violence, was introduced in the House. For further background, see CRS Report RL34438, International Violence Against Women: U.S. Response and Policy Issues, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

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This apparent disconnect between expected import needs and the desire to export crude oil can be explained when considering crude oil prices can be influenced by the following: (1) the geographical location of LTO production, (2) the type/quality (i.e., light, sweet) of crude oil being produced, (3) the types of crude oil that some U.S. refineries are currently configured to optimally refine, (4) the petroleum products that are derived from different types of crude oil, and (5) transportation and infrastructure challenges associated with moving certain types of crude oil to demand centers. Members of Congress have taken various positions regarding crude oil exports, including (1) calling for the Administration to lift export restrictions, (2) maintaining existing restrictions, (3) opposing attempts to lift restrictions through the World Trade Organization, and (4) proposing bills to eliminate crude oil export restrictions (see section below titled "Legislative Action"). Background Current crude oil export restrictions date back to the 1970s, during an era of U.S. oil price controls that motivated producers to export and sell crude oil at unregulated world prices. In 1973, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) imposed a total embargo of crude oil delivered to the United States. Prior to the advent of advanced drilling and extraction technologies, many U.S. refiners in the Midwest and Gulf Coast invested in equipment to process heavy crudes from Canada and Latin America. However, as LTO volumes increase, oil producers are bracing for continuing price discounts that may result from a structural oversupply of light crudes in certain regions. Legal and Regulatory Context The export of domestically produced crude oil has been significantly restricted since the 1970s by an array of federal laws and regulations, in particular the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA) and the resultant Short Supply Control Regulations adopted and administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The Energy Policy and Conservation Act EPCA directs the President to "promulgate a rule prohibiting the export of crude oil and natural gas produced in the United States, except that the President may ... exempt from such prohibition such crude oil or natural gas exports which he determines to be consistent with the national interest and the purposes of this chapter." The regulations provide that BIS will issue licenses for certain crude oil exports that fall under one of the listed exemptions, including (1) exports from Alaska's Cook Inlet; (2) exports to Canada for consumption or use therein; (3) exports in connection with refining or exchange of Strategic Petroleum Reserve oil; (4) exports of heavy California crude oil up to an average volume not to exceed 25,000 barrels per day; (5) exports that are consistent with certain international agreements; (6) exports that are consistent with findings made by the President under certain statutes (see section below titled " Other Relevant Federal Statutes "); and (7) exports of foreign origin crude oil where, based on satisfactory written documentation, the exporter can demonstrate that the oil is not of U.S. origin and has not been commingled with oil of U.S. origin. However, some refiners are concerned that regional crude oil acquisition price discounts may narrow if exports are expanded. Rather, the industry is dynamic and is constantly changing. Furthermore, crude oil export regulations are open to interpretation, and it is likely that oil producers will seek more export opportunities that might be allowed under the existing regulatory framework (see Appendix C ). Inconsistencies in the crude oil definition (see "Condensate" text box above) as well as a lack of clearly defined terms (i.e., topped crude oil and unfinished oils) may be an opportunity for producers to seek to determine the minimum amount of processing necessary that would result in an exportable product. The President has some powers to exempt certain crude oil exports if doing so is determined to be in the national interest. There are a number of other options for modifying existing restrictions that might be considered. Congress may choose to study and analyze various considerations associated with efforts to modify crude export restrictions. Legislative Action During the 113 th Congress, several bills were proposed that would eliminate current crude oil export restrictions. Following is a list of four bills that were proposed in the 113 th Congress: H.R.

During an era of oil price controls and following the 1973 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries oil embargo, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA), which directs the President "to promulgate a rule prohibiting the export of crude oil" produced in the United States. Crude oil export restrictions are codified in the Export Administration Regulations administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)—a Commerce Department agency. Generally, U.S. crude oil exports are prohibited, although there are a number of exemptions and circumstances under which crude oil exports are allowed. The President has authority to allow certain crude oil exports if an exemption is determined to be in the national interest. In 2009, a decades-long U.S. oil production decline was reversed due to the application of advanced drilling and extraction technologies to produce tight oil, generally light/sweet crude primarily located in Texas and North Dakota. Limited demand for tight oil and condensate being produced in the Texas/Gulf Coast region may result because certain refiners in that region are currently configured to process heavier crudes. As a result, oil producers and industry analysts are projecting an oversupply of light oil, which could lead to price discounts and lower production should export restrictions remain. However, the industry is dynamic, and refiners can modify operating configurations and add equipment in order to accommodate more light crude volumes. Price discounts may be needed to motivate such changes. The effect on domestic gasoline prices is a major consideration, among several, associated with allowing crude oil exports. Commercial studies and federal government analysis suggests that gasoline prices are correlated to international crude oil prices—since gasoline and other petroleum products can be exported without restriction—and U.S. gasoline prices could possibly decrease if crude oil exports were allowed. However, the projected decreases—assuming ~$100 per barrel crude oil prices—are relatively small and range from $0.02 to $0.12 per gallon. Congress may choose to consider crude oil export policy options that could range from maintaining existing restrictions to eliminating the prohibition on crude oil exports. During the 113th Congress, four bills were introduced that would have eliminated crude oil export restrictions: H.R. 4286, H.R. 4349, S. 2170, and H.R. 5814. Some Members of Congress have expressed the desire to maintain crude oil restrictions. However, maintaining restrictions might not prevent more crude-oil-like material from being exported, because varying interpretations of existing regulations may allow for more exports. The crude oil definition in the export regulations is open to interpretation and has many undefined terms that the industry may explore with the objective of determining the minimum amount of crude oil processing necessary that would result in an exportable product. It is not clear how broadly or narrowly BIS might interpret existing laws and regulations. Finally, Congress may choose to explore other options between eliminating and maintaining restrictions. Examples may include allowing exports of lease condensate—an ultralight hydrocarbon that is typically produced with natural gas—allowing unrestricted exports to Mexico since exports to Canada are not restricted, allowing a certain type of crude (i.e., light/sweet) from a certain location (i.e., Texas) to be exported—much like the California heavy crude oil export exemption—or allowing crude oil exports for a limited time period since U.S. oil production growth is uncertain and may, according to the Energy Information Administration, peak in 2020. The President has the authority to make national interest determinations that would allow for more crude oil exports.

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Continuing Resolution Congress has passed a series of continuing resolutions (CRs) to fund government programs since FY2011 began on October 1, 2010. 1 , respectively, to fund the government for the remainder of FY2011. Ensuing negotiations between the Administration and House and Senate leaders resulted in an agreement that was introduced in the House on April 11 as H.R. 1473 . 112-10 , approved by the House and Senate on April 14 and signed by the President on April 15. 111-212 ) the FY2010 supplemental, which provides about $6.1 billion to the Department of State and Foreign Operations funding, largely for State Department operations and foreign aid to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Haiti. House Legislation On June 30, the House State-Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee marked up and approved, by voice vote, a draft FY2011 funding bill. Senate Legislation On July 27, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up and approved a FY2011 State-Foreign Operations funding bill, S. 3676 . State-Foreign Operations Overview The State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill funds most programs and activities within the international affairs budget account, known as Function 150, including foreign economic and military assistance, contributions to international organizations and multilateral financial institutions, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) operations, public diplomacy, and international broadcasting programs. However, the bill does not align perfectly with the international affairs budget. Less clear, however, is the appropriate designation for $1.8 billion included in an FY2009 supplemental appropriations measure that House and Senate appropriators considered forward funding of priorities identified in the FY2010 request, but which were not clearly designated as FY2010 funds in the enacting legislation and accompanying report. For example, the FY2011 request was slightly less than the FY2010 total if the FY2010 supplemental and forward funding are included in the FY2010 column, but represented a 16% increase if the supplemental funds are excluded and the forward funding is counted in FY2009 rather than FY2010. FY2011 Budget Request On February 1, 2010, the Obama Administration sent its FY2011 international affairs (Function 150 account) budget request to Congress, corresponding to a total of $56.81 billion requested for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs. For a full listing of funds requested for State, Foreign Operations and Related Agency accounts, see Appendix C and Appendix D . FY2011 Budget Request: State Department and Related Programs14 The Administration's FY2011 budget request for the Department of State, international broadcasting, and related programs was $17.41 billion, a 1.2% decrease from the FY2010-enacted level of $17.62 billion, including the mandatory Foreign Service Retirement Fund and $1.52 billion in supplemental funds. Contributions to several foundations supported by the bill would have been reduced from FY2010 levels as well. (See Appendix D for Foreign Operations accounts and funding levels.) The Administration requested $1.48 billion for USAID Operating Expenses for FY2011, a 6% increase over the enacted FY2010 level. Global Health The Administration requested $8.5 billion in the Global Health and Child Survival account for Global Health Initiative (GHI) activities in FY2011. This amount did not include P.L.

The annual State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill has been the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. international affairs budget and influences executive branch foreign policy making in recent years, as Congress has not regularly considered these issues through a complete authorization process for State Department diplomatic activities since 2003 and for foreign aid programs since 1985. Funding for Foreign Operations and State Department/Broadcasting programs has been steadily rising since FY2002, after a period of decline in the 1980s and 1990s. Ongoing assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as large new global health programs and rapidly increasing assistance to Pakistan, has kept the international affairs budget at historically high levels in recent years. The change of Administration in 2009 did not disrupt this trend. However, increasing concern about the federal budget deficit and accountability for funds already provided has halted this growth in FY2011. On February 1, 2010, President Obama submitted a budget proposal for FY2011 that requested $58.68 billion for the international affairs budget, a 3% increase over the enacted FY2010 funding level, including supplementals. If $1.8 billion in "forward funding" of FY2010 priorities appropriated in FY2009 supplemental legislation is counted toward FY2010 rather than FY2009 totals, as it was by the Administration, and the enacted FY2010 supplemental is factored in, the FY2011 request would represent a slight decrease from FY2010-enacted levels. This report focuses only on the $56.82 billion requested for programs and activities funded through the State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill, which excludes some portions of the International Affairs request and includes funding for certain commissions requested as part of other budget functions. The Administration requested significant increases for Global Health and Child Survival, Development Assistance, technical assistance and debt restructuring through the Treasury Department, Foreign Military Financing, and various multilateral environmental accounts. Programs for which the Administration recommended significantly reduced funding, compared with enacted FY2010 levels, are contributions to international organizations, commissions and foundations, and peacekeeping operations. The House State-Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee approved a draft FY2011 bill on June 30, which totaled $52.81 billion. On the Senate side, the full Appropriations Committee marked up and approved its FY2011 State-Foreign Operations bill, S. 3676, on July 27, totaling $54.22 billion. Neither bill progressed further, however, and State Department and Foreign Operations activities, along with all federal programs, have been funded since October 1, 2010, through a series of continuing resolutions. On April 14, 2011, the House and Senate approved H.R. 1473, legislation embodying an agreement between the Administration and House and Senate leaders to fund the government for the remainder of FY2011. Signed into law on April 15, 2011, H.R. 1473 (P.L. 112-10) funds State and Foreign Operations accounts at $48.98 billion. This report analyzes the FY2011 request, recent-year funding trends, and congressional action related to FY2011 State-Foreign Operations legislation.

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Introduction The importance of early learning for children's healthy development and positive outcomes in school and the workforce has become a subject of increasing interest to the public, Members of Congress, and the Adm inistration. During recent congresses many bills have been introduced that would provide funding to states aiming to facilitate improvements in the quality of, and access to, early childhood education (ECE) programs. Report Roadmap This report focuses on two recent early childhood initiatives proposed by the Obama Administration and funded between FY2011 and FY2016: Race to the Top-Early Learning Challenge (RTT-ELC) grants and Preschool Development Grants (PDG). While funding for these programs is appropriated to the U.S. Department of Education (ED), these programs are jointly administered by ED and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This report provides background and information on both the RTT-ELC and PDG programs, and on the states that have received a grant from one or both of these programs. Readers should note that the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ) established a standalone authorization for a new PDG program beginning in FY2017. A full discussion of the new PDG program is beyond the scope of this report. However, some limited information on the newly authorized PDG program, as compared to the current PDG program, is provided in Appendix C . Early Learning Challenge Grants Program Goals The overarching goal of the RTT-ELC program was to help states build comprehensive statewide systems that improve early learning programs, and increase access to high-quality ECE programs for high-need children. 2. 3. FY2013 funding included supplements to six states in addition to six new awards. ED and HHS ultimately reserved $200 million for RTT-ELC funding, which was awarded to five states in two blocks. ED reserved $370 million for RTT-ELC. The program is intended to support state and local efforts to build, develop and expand high quality preschool programs. In its FY2016 budget request, the Administration states that the PDG program will lay the groundwork to help ensure that states are ready to participate in the Administration's proposed Preschool for All program—which would make high-quality preschool programs available for all four-year-olds from low- and moderate-income families. Funding In the FY2014 President's Budget, the Obama Administration requested $750 million in discretionary funding for the new PDG program, as well as $75 billion (over 10 years) in mandatory funding for a Preschool for All program that would provide high-quality public preschool to all low- and moderate-income three- and four-year-olds. The Administration subsequently requested $500 million in discretionary funding for PDG in FY2015 and $750 million in FY2016. FY2015 and FY2016 funding allowed existing grantees to receive a continuation award but was not sufficient to fund new grantees. On December 10, 2014, ED and HHS announced that 18 of the 36 states and outlying areas that applied for a PDG grant would receive FY2014 funding. As has been noted, PDG-Development Grants are designed for states with fewer than 10% of their four-year-olds in state-funded preschool that have not received a RTT-ELC grant. PDG-Preschool Expansion Grants are designed for states that already serve 10% or more of their four-year-olds in state-funded preschools or received a RTT-ELC grant.

The importance of children's early learning experiences to their development and later success in school and the workforce has become a subject of increasing interest to the public, Members of Congress, and the Administration. During recent congresses many bills have been introduced that would provide funding to states aiming to facilitate improvements in the quality of, and access to, early childhood education (ECE) programs. This report focuses on two early childhood initiatives—Race to the Top-Early Learning Challenge (RTT-ELC) grants for FY2011-FY2013 and Preschool Development Grants (PDG) for FY2014-FY2016. Both programs have been administered jointly by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In addition to background and information on these programs, the report provides data on states that received grants under one or both of these programs. Through the RTT-ELC program, ED and HHS awarded three rounds of RTT-ELC grants in December 2011 ($500 million), 2012 ($133 million), and 2013 ($370 million). Nine states received RTT-ELC grants in 2011 (Phase 1), five states in 2012 (Phase 2), and six states in 2013 (Phase 3). These grants were broadly focused on building comprehensive statewide systems to support high-quality preschool, as well as increasing access to preschool for high-need children. The Obama Administration's proposed PDG program was intended to build on the RTT-ELC grants program to accomplish similar goals. For FY2014-FY2016, the PDG program focused specifically on expanding access to high-quality preschool for four-year-olds from low-income families. The Administration requested $750 million in FY2014 and FY2016, and $500 million in FY2015 for the PDG program; the program received $250 million in each of the three years. According to the Administration's FY2016 budget request to Congress, higher funding for the PDG program would help lay the groundwork for the Administration's larger Preschool for All initiative—which was intended to provide high-quality preschool to all low- and moderate-income children. Separately, the Every Student Succeeds Act (P.L. 114-95), enacted in December 2015, established a standalone authorization for a new PDG program. This new program has not yet been funded; FY2017 is the first year for which funding is authorized. This report is focused on the initial programs, as administered through FY2016. The new PDG program is generally beyond the scope of this report, though some additional information on it can be found in Appendix C. On December 10, 2014, ED and HHS awarded PDG grants to 18 states from FY2014 funding. FY2015 and FY2016 funding allowed existing grantees to receive continuation awards but did not fund any new grantees. PGD grants were divided into two separate funding streams. States with fewer than 10% of their four-year-olds in state-funded preschool that had not received an RTT-ELC grant were eligible for PDG-Preschool Development Grants. Five states received these grants. States with more than 10% of their four-year-olds in state-funded preschool or that had received an RTT-ELC grant were eligible to apply for PDG-Preschool Expansion Grants. Thirteen states received these grants.

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Over the last two decades, however, interest in developing federal policies that focus on student outcomes has increased. Perhaps most prominently, the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110 ), which amended and reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), marked a dramatic expansion of the federal government's role in supporting standards-based instruction and test-based accountability, thereby increasing the federal government's involvement in decisions that directly affect teaching and learning. This includes a discussion of the Race to the Top (RTT) State Grants, Race to the Top (RTT) Assessment Grants, and the ESEA flexibility package currently being offered to states by the Administration. States are not required to have their content or performance standards approved or certified by the federal government in order to receive funding under the ESEA. Relevant prohibitions appear in the ESEA and in the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA). As of August 2014, 43 states, the District of Columbia, 4 outlying areas, and the Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) had adopted the Common Core State Standards. This total does not include Indiana and Oklahoma, who recently became the first states to adopt and subsequently discontinue use of the Common Core State Standards. South Carolina has indicated that the Common Core State Standards will be fully implemented for the 2014-2015 school year but will be replaced by "new, high-level College and Career Ready standards" in the 2015-2016 school year. However, it should be noted (and is discussed in the next part of the report) that some states that did not win RTT state grants may have opted to continue with the adoption and implementation of the Common Core State Standards in response to requirements associated with receiving the ESEA flexibility package being offered to states by the Administration. It is possible that states may have been able to use federal funds provided for State Assessment Grants under Title VI-A of the ESEA to support the joint development of these assessments. Issues Related to the Implementation of Common Core State Standards and Aligned Assessments This section examines some of the issues that have been raised in relation to the Common Core State Standards. States that Initially Agree to Use the Common Core State Standards and Subsequently Drop Them While 43 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Common Core State Standards, there are debates occurring in some states regarding continued state adoption or implementation of the Common Core State Standards. In general, if a state agrees to adopt and implement the Common Core State Standards and subsequently decides not to use these standards, the consequences of this action will differ depending on whether the state received a RTT grant based on an application that included the use of the Common Core State Standards, had an application approved for the ESEA flexibility package that included use of the Common Core State Standards, or has opted to use the Common Core State Standards only to meet the requirements of ESEA Title I-A. More generally, if a state chooses to adopt and implement the Common Core State Standards as its state standards to meet the reading and mathematics standards requirements included in ESEA Title I-A and the state later opts to change its standards, the state would need to adopt and implement a new set of state standards to meet the requirements of Title I-A. Similarly, the American Association of School Administrators, the National Association of Elementary School Principals, the National Association of Secondary School Principals, and the National School Boards Association also expressed their support for the Common Core State Standards, but argued that schools have not had sufficient time to prepare teachers to incorporate the Common Core State Standards and aligned assessments into their teaching and that principals lack the preparation to lead efforts to implement the Common Core State Standards and aligned assessments, including being able to evaluate teachers' use of the new standards and determining the best professional development to support their teachers in implementing the standards. 2.

Over the last two decades, there has been interest in developing federal policies that focus on student outcomes in elementary and secondary education. Perhaps most prominently, the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110), which amended and reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), marked a dramatic expansion of the federal government's role in supporting standards-based instruction and test-based accountability, thereby increasing the federal government's involvement in decisions that directly affect teaching and learning. Under the ESEA, states are required to have standards in reading and mathematics for specified grade levels in order to receive funding under Title I-A of the ESEA. In response to this requirement, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have adopted and implemented standards that meet the requirements of the ESEA. Since the ESEA was last comprehensively reauthorized by NCLB, three major changes have taken place that have possibly played a role in the selection of reading and mathematics standards by states: (1) the development and release of the Common Core State Standards; (2) the Race to the Top (RTT) State Grant competition and RTT Assessment Grants competition; and (3) the ESEA flexibility package provided by ED to states with approved applications. As of August 2014, 43 states, the District of Columbia, 4 outlying areas, and the Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) had at some point adopted the Common Core State Standards. Indiana and Oklahoma recently became the first states to adopt and subsequently discontinue use of the Common Core State Standards. South Carolina has indicated that the Common Core State Standards will be fully implemented for the 2014-2015 school year but will be replaced by new standards in the 2015-2016 school year. This report examines each of the aforementioned changes and discusses how they are interrelated. More specifically, it provides (1) background information on current law, (2) a discussion of the development of the Common Core State Standards and state adoption of the standards, (3) an analysis of the RTT State Grant competition and how the structure of the grant application process may have incentivized state adoption of the Common Core State Standards, (4) an examination of the RTT Assessment Grants competition and the federal funds provided to support the development of assessments aligned with the Common Core State Standards, and (5) an analysis of the ESEA flexibility package and how the conditions that states had to meet to receive waivers of ESEA accountability provisions may have incentivized state implementation of the Common Core State Standards. This report also examines prohibitions in the ESEA and the General Education Provisions Act related to standards, assessments, and curriculum. Additionally, it includes a brief discussion of the relationship between teacher and school leader evaluation systems that are being developed by states and the Common Core State Standards. Finally, the report examines issues that have arisen in relation to the Common Core State Standards, including the following: whether states were incentivized by the Administration to adopt and implement the Common Core State Standards; whether state adoption and implementation of the Common Core State Standards could result in a national assessment and national standards; whether state adoption and implementation of the Common Core State Standards could lead to the development of a national curriculum; possible issues that may need to be addressed if a state chooses to discontinue its use of the Common Core State Standards; possible issues related to teacher evaluation and the Common Core State Standards; possible technology issues related to implementation of the Common Core State Standards; and possible issues related to the long-term maintenance of the Common Core State Standards.

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Title X Program Administration and Grants The federal government provides grants for family planning services through the Family Planning Program, Title X of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§300 to 300a-6). Enacted in 1970, it is the only dom estic federal program devoted solely to family planning and related preventive health services. Administration Title X is administered by the Office of Population Affairs (OPA) under the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Authorization of appropriations expired at the end of FY1985, but the program has continued to be funded through appropriations bills for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS-Education). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ) provided $286.479 million for Title X in FY2017, the same as the FY2016 enacted level. The President's FY2018 budget request includes $286.479 million for Title X, the same as the FY2017 enacted level. The House-reported FY2018 Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations bill, H.R. The House Rules Committee has announced that H.R. 3354 , the Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act, 2018, would be the legislative vehicle for several FY2018 appropriations bills, including the House Labor-HHS-Education appropriations bill. 3354 , as posted on the House Rules Committee website on August 16, 2017, would provide no funding for the Title X program in FY2018. As of this writing, an FY2018 Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations bill has not been introduced in the Senate. The FY2017 act continued previous years' requirements that Title X funds not be spent on abortions, among other requirements (see text box "Requirements on the Use of Title X Funds in P.L. H.R. 3358 would provide no funding for the Title X program in FY2018. It would have added the following language to Title X Family Planning Services grant program regulations: No recipient making subawards for the provision of services as part of its Title X project may prohibit an entity from participating for reasons other than its ability to provide Title X services. On April 13, 2017, the President signed P.L. 115-23 nullified the rule under the Congressional Review Act. Abortion and Title X The law prohibits the use of Title X funds in programs where abortion is a method of family planning. On July 3, 2000, OPA released a final rule with respect to abortion services in family planning projects. According to OPA, family planning projects that receive Title X funds are closely monitored to ensure that federal funds are used appropriately and that funds are not used for prohibited activities such as abortion. The prohibition on abortion does not apply to all the activities of a Title X grantee, but only to activities that are part of the Title X project. The grantee's abortion activities must be "separate and distinct" from the Title X project activities. Although minors are to receive confidential services, Title X providers are not exempt from state notification and reporting laws on child abuse, child molestation, sexual abuse, rape, or incest.

The federal government provides grants for family planning services through the Family Planning Program, Title X of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§300 to 300a-6). Enacted in 1970, it is the only domestic federal program devoted solely to family planning and related preventive health services. In 2015, Title X-funded clinics served 4.0 million clients. Title X is administered through the Office of Population Affairs (OPA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Although the authorization of appropriations for Title X ended with FY1985, funding for the program has continued through appropriations bills for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS-Education). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) provided $286.5 million for Title X, the same as the FY2016 level. The FY2017 act continued previous years' requirements that Title X funds not be spent on abortions, that all pregnancy counseling be nondirective, and that funds not be spent on promoting or opposing any legislative proposal or candidate for public office. Grantees continued to be required to certify that they encourage "family participation" when minors seek family planning services and to certify that they counsel minors on how to resist attempted coercion into sexual activity. The appropriations law also clarified that family planning providers are not exempt from state notification and reporting laws on child abuse, child molestation, sexual abuse, rape, or incest. The President's FY2018 budget request includes $286.5 million for Title X, the same as the FY2017 enacted level. The House-reported FY2018 Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations bill, H.R. 3358, would provide no funding for the Title X program in FY2018. The House Rules Committee has announced that H.R. 3354, the Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act, 2018, would be the legislative vehicle for several FY2018 appropriations bills, including the House Labor-HHS-Education appropriations bill. H.R. 3354, as posted on the House Rules Committee website on August 16, 2017, would provide no funding for the Title X program in FY2018. As of this writing, an FY2018 Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations bill has not been introduced in the Senate. In December 2016, OPA released a final rule to limit the criteria Title X grantees could use to restrict subawards: "No recipient making subawards for the provision of services as part of its Title X project may prohibit an entity from participating for reasons other than its ability to provide Title X services." On April 13, 2017, the President signed P.L. 115-23, which nullified the rule under the Congressional Review Act. Federal law (42 U.S.C. §300a-6) prohibits the use of Title X funds in programs where abortion is a method of family planning. According to OPA, family planning projects that receive Title X funds are closely monitored to ensure that federal funds are used appropriately and that funds are not used for prohibited activities such as abortion. The prohibition on abortion does not apply to all the activities of a Title X grantee, but only to activities that are part of the Title X project. A grantee's abortion activities must be "separate and distinct" from the Title X project activities.

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Thus, there is one regulatory regime for carriers providing voice telephone service and another regime for cable television providers. Information services are not subject to either regulatory regime. The subsequent deployment of digital broadband technologies in telephone and cable networks has resulted in these networks providing services that compete with one another, but that sometimes are subject to different regulatory requirements. Voice and video services can now be provided using Internet protocol and thus might be classified as unregulated information services, but these services compete directly with regulated traditional voice and video services. There is consensus that the current statutory framework is not effective in the current market environment, but not on how to reform that framework. That debate focuses on how to foster investment, innovation and competition in both the physical broadband network and in the applications that ride over that network while also meeting the many non - economic objectives of U.S. telecommunications policy : universal service, homeland security, public safety, diversity of voices, localism, consumer protection, etc. Digital technologies are being deployed in and carried over wireline, cable, and wireless networks that are increasingly capable of providing voice, data, and video services over a single broadband platform. Given the distinct, service-specific networks then in use, the 1996 Act created distinct vertical regulatory "silos" that equated specific services with specific network technologies. The physical network providers (local exchange carriers and cable system operators) argue that they will be discouraged from undertaking costly and risky broadband network build-outs and upgrades if their networks are subject to open access and/or non-discrimination requirements that might limit their ability to exploit vertical integration efficiencies or to maximize the return on (or even fully recoup) their investments. On the other hand, the independent applications providers argue that in order for them to best meet the needs of end users and offer innovative services in competition with the vertically integrated network providers and, in some cases, services not offered at all by network providers. Background: The 1996 Act In 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act, the first major rewrite of our nation's telecommunications law since the enactment of the 1934 Communications Act. The general objective of the 1996 Act was to open up markets to competition by removing unnecessary regulatory barriers to entry. The market convergence currently underway will not result in a multitude of broadband networks because the underlying cost structure for such networks (the huge sunk up-front fixed costs that can only be recovered if the company can exploit significant economies of scale and scope) will only support a limited number of networks. Approaches to Regulating Access to Broadband Networks There are four general approaches to the regulation of broadband network providers vis-a-vis independent applications providers: structural regulation, such as open access; ex ante non-discrimination rules; ex post adjudication of abuses of market power, as they arise, on a case-by-case basis; and reliance on antitrust (and unfair methods of competition) law and non-mandatory principles as the basis for self-regulation. The debate about how best to allocate spectrum, however, is beyond the scope of this report. Those provisions were intended to foster intramodal competition with the understanding that new entrants could not instantaneously build out ubiquitous networks like those of the incumbent monopolies.

In 1996, Congress enacted comprehensive reform of the nation's statutory and regulatory framework for telecommunications by passing the Telecommunications Act, which substantially amended the 1934 Communications Act. The general objective of the 1996 Act was to open up markets to competition by removing unnecessary regulatory barriers to entry. At that time, the industry was characterized by service-specific networks that did not compete with one another: circuit-switched networks provided telephone service and coaxial cable networks provided cable service. The act created distinct regulatory regimes for these service-specific telephone networks and cable networks that included provisions intended to foster competition from new entrants that used network architectures and technologies similar to those of the incumbents. This "intramodal" competition has proved very limited. But the deployment of digital technologies in these previously distinct networks has led to market convergence and "intermodal" competition, as telephone, cable, and even wireless networks increasingly are able to offer voice, data, and video services over a single broadband platform. However, because of the distinct regulatory regimes in the act, services that are provided by different network technologies, but compete with one another, often receive different regulatory treatment. Also, the act created a classification, "information services," that was not subject to either telephone or cable regulation. Today, some voice and video services that are provided using Internet protocol technology may be classified as information services and therefore not subject to traditional voice or video regulation. There is consensus that the current statutory framework is not effective in the current market environment, but not on how to modify it. The debate focuses on how to foster investment, innovation, and competition in both the physical broadband network and in the applications that ride over that network while also meeting the many non-economic objectives of U.S. telecommunications policy: universal service, homeland security, public safety, diversity of voices, localism, consumer protection, etc. Given the underlying cost structure of broadband networks—huge sunk up-front fixed costs—the marketplace will likely support only a limited number of such networks. Today, the market is largely a duopoly: the telephone company network and the cable company network. The physical network providers argue that they will be discouraged from undertaking costly and risky build-outs if their networks are subject to open access and/or non-discrimination requirements. On the other hand, independent applications providers argue that in order for them to best meet the needs of end users and offer innovative services they must have nondiscriminatory access to the physical network. There is much debate over the advantages and disadvantages of structural regulation (such as open access), ex ante non-discrimination rules (such as mandatory network neutrality requirements), ex post adjudication of abuses of market power on a case-by-case basis, and reliance on non-mandatory principles. There is general agreement that there would be great consumer benefits from entry by a wireless broadband network to compete with the telephone and cable networks. There also is debate about how to modify the universal service program and intercarrier compensation rules in light of the major market changes. This report will be updated as warranted.

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Introduction and Background In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, Congress continues to debate how much of the outer continental shelf (OCS) should be available for oil and gas development. On December 1, 2010, the Obama Administration announced its Revised Program (RP) for the remainder of the 2007-2012 OCS Leasing Program. Among other components, the RP eliminates five Alaskan lease sales (sales 209, 212, 214, 217, and 221) that had been contemplated in the current lease program. Lease sale 219 in the Cook Inlet (scheduled to be held in 2011) was cancelled because of a lack of industry interest. Further, the Obama Administration, under executive authority, withdrew the North Aleutian Basin Planning Area from oil and gas leasing activity until June 30, 2017. Public hearings began in 2010 on the scope of the 2012-2017 OCS oil and gas leasing program, but three planning areas in Alaska (Cook Inlet, Chukchi, and Beaufort Sea) are being scoped as well. On November 8, 2011, the Administration announced its second draft proposed oil and gas leasing program for 2012-2017, which excludes all three Atlantic and all four Pacific Coast planning areas at least through 2017. On December 14, 2011, the Obama Administration held lease sale 218 in the Western Gulf of Mexico, the first sale since the oil spill. A combined lease sale in the Central Gulf of Mexico (sale 216 and 222) is scheduled for June 20, 2012, the final sale of the 2007-2012 leasing program. Congress and the Administration are likely to give careful consideration to which parts of the OCS to keep open and which to protect through leasing moratoria. Most recently, legislation introduced in the House—the Energy Security and Transportation Jobs Act ( H.R. 3410 ) on November 14, 2011—combines some of the language from bills passed earlier by the House ( H.R. 1230 and H.R. 1231 , discussed below) and incorporates this proposal into H.R. 7 , the American Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act of 2012, as Title XVII – Subtitle B. Subtitle B of this act would require BOEM to offer lease sales in the most prospective areas in each of the OCS Planning Areas for the 2012-2017 5-Year Leasing Program specifically, areas that contain more than 2.5 billion barrels of oil or more than 7.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. H.R. Another bill ( H.R. The House passed H.R. A characteristic of the U.S. oil market, as well as the world oil market, is that the access to supply tends to be sequential. Normally, the first source of oil used by a nation is domestic production, if available. The development of the offshore areas would be unlikely to eliminate U.S. dependence on foreign energy sources, and may not even reduce it. Resource Estimation and Technological Change Estimation Techniques in the OCS Exploration and production proceed in stages during which increasing data provide increasing certainty about volumes of oil and gas present. Analysis of Estimates The assessments of UTRR on the U.S. OCS by the BOEM provide estimates whose statistical certainty varies by region, because the availability of geologic data varies widely by region. Nine lease sales have occurred to date. Resources . Undiscovered technically recoverable resources (UTRR) .

Access to potential oil and gas resources under the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) continues to be controversial. Moratoria on leasing and development in certain areas were largely eliminated in 2008 and 2009, although a few areas remain legislatively off limits to leasing. The 112th Congress may be unlikely to reinstate broad leasing moratoria, but some Members have expressed interest in protecting areas (e.g., the Georges Bank or Northern California) or establishing protective coastal buffers. Pressure to expand oil and gas supplies and protect coastal environments and communities will likely lead Congress and the Administration to consider carefully which areas to keep open to leasing and which to protect from development. The oil spill that occurred on April 20, 2010, in the Gulf of Mexico brought increased attention to offshore drilling risks. Consideration of offshore development for any purpose has raised concerns over the protection of the marine and coastal environment. On December 1, 2010, the Obama Administration announced its Revised Program (RP) for the remainder of the 2007-2012 OCS Leasing Program. Among other components, the RP eliminates five Alaskan lease sales (sales 209, 212, 214, 217, and 221) that had been contemplated in the current lease program. Lease sale 219 in the Cook Inlet (scheduled to be held in 2011) was cancelled because of a lack of industry interest. Further, the Obama Administration, under executive authority, withdrew the North Aleutian Basin Planning Area from oil and gas leasing activity until June 30, 2017. Public hearings began in 2010 on the scope of the 2012-2017 OCS oil and gas leasing program, but three planning areas in Alaska (Cook Inlet, Chukchi, and Beaufort Sea) are being scoped as well. On November 8, 2011, the Administration announced its second draft proposed oil and gas leasing program for 2012-2017, which excludes all three Atlantic and all four Pacific Coast planning areas at least through 2017. On December 14, 2011, the Obama Administration held lease sale 218 in the Western Gulf of Mexico, the first sale since the oil spill. A combined lease sale in the Central Gulf of Mexico (sale 216 and 222) is scheduled for June 20, 2012, the final sale of the 2007-2012 leasing program. Three bills that were passed in the House in May 2011 would address permitting efficiencies (H.R. 1229), enforce certain lease sales in the current five-year planning period (H.R. 1230) and require lease sales in the "most promising" OCS Planning Areas during the 2012-2017 Lease Program (H.R. 1231). Most recently, legislation introduced in the House—the Energy Security and Transportation Jobs Act (H.R. 3410) on November 14, 2011—combines some of the language from bills passed earlier by the House (H.R. 1230 and H.R. 1231, discussed below) and incorporates this proposal into H.R. 7, the American Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act of 2012, as Title XVII – Subtitle B. Exploration and production proceed in stages during which increasing data provide increasing certainty about volumes of oil and gas present. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) conducts assessments of undiscovered technically recoverable resources (UTRR) on the U.S. OCS. The statistical certainty of these assessment estimates varies by region because the availability of geologic data varies widely by region. One characteristic of the U.S. oil market, as well as of world oil markets, is that the access to supply tends to be sequential. Normally, the first source of oil used by a nation is domestic production, if available. The ultimate impact of oil and gas development in offshore areas will depend on oil and gas prices, volumes of resources actually discovered, infrastructure development, and restrictions placed on development, all of which currently carry significant uncertainties.

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Congressional recognition that the patent system plays a role in supporting U.S. innovation led to the September 16, 2011, enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), P.L. 112-29 . Among many other amendments to the Patent Act of 1952 (the "Patent Act"), the AIA required the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to "conduct a study on effective ways to provide independent, confirming genetic diagnostic test activity where gene patents and exclusive licensing for primary genetic diagnostic tests exist." The 2012 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. addressed both diagnostic tests and the concept of patentable subject matter. Some observers believe that Mayo v. Prometheus will significantly impact research into biotechnology and personalized medicine in the United States. The Myriad Litigation Following the Supreme Court's opinion in Mayo v. Prometheus , considerable attention has been placed upon another well-publicized litigation, Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office . More commonly known as Myriad —after the name of the patent holder—this litigation may determine whether patents may appropriately issue on isolated deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecules that encode sequences identical to human genes. If Congress believes that the current circumstances with respect to patentable subject matter are satisfactory, then no action need be taken. Should Congress choose to take action, however, a number of options exist. One possibility is an amendment to Section 101 of the Patent Act stipulating that certain subject matter is or is not patentable. Another option is to allow patents on particular inventions to issue, but to limit the remedies available to proprietors of such patents. Some have welcomed judicial decisions that narrow the scope of patentable subject matter, asserting that these patents are harmful to healthcare and medical research. On the other hand, some believe that patents in these fields provide powerful incentives for innovation and public disclosure of new technologies.

The recent enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), P.L. 112-29, suggests congressional interest in patents on diagnostic methods. In particular, Section 27 of the AIA required the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to conduct a study on the patenting of genetic diagnostic tests. The 2012 decision of the Supreme Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. also addressed these sorts of patents. The Court's decision arguably placed severe limitations on the ability of inventors to obtain diagnostic method patents. Some observers have welcomed Mayo v. Prometheus, asserting that patents on diagnostic methods are harmful to healthcare and medical research. On the other hand, detractors of the opinion state that patents provide powerful incentives for innovation and public disclosure of new technologies. They believe that the Supreme Court's decision will negatively impact medical research in the areas of biotechnology and personalized medicine. The holding in Mayo v. Prometheus may impact another well-publicized litigation, Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. More commonly known as Myriad—after the name of the patent holder—this litigation may determine whether patents may appropriately issue on human genes. Congressional policymakers may contend that current circumstances with respect to patentable subject matter are satisfactory and therefore may advocate that no further legislative action need be taken. Should Congress choose to take action, however, a number of options exist. One possibility is an amendment to the Patent Act stipulating that certain subject matter is or is not patentable. Another is to allow patents on particular inventions to issue, but to limit the remedies available to proprietors of such patents.

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Introduction On May 6, 2007, French voters chose the Gaullist Nicolas Sarkozy to be President of France. Sarkozy represents a younger generation of leaders at a time when a majority of the French public believes their country is in decline, in part due to enduring low economic growth and high unemployment, in part to an apparent diminishing influence in guiding the course of the European Union (EU). The second round of the presidential elections saw a near-record turnout of 84.9% in a campaign that was closely watched by voters. Since 1981, France has had only two presidents, the Socialist François Mitterrand and the Gaullist Jacques Chirac, each a formidable political figure who dominated his respective party. The Gaullist Party and the Socialist Party nominated their candidates from within the party structures. Although supportive of the European Union, he is less wedded to it than earlier and older post-war French leaders. Foreign Policy Sarkozy presents himself as a friend of the United States who will nonetheless not be slavish to U.S. foreign policy objectives. He expressed his admiration for American culture, openness, and entrepreneurship. He views Iran as the greatest danger to French interests and a highly destabilizing influence in the Middle East. Domestic Issues Royal also addressed the issue of immigration and integration of Muslims into French society. Royal had a tough message meant to bring greater order and discipline to the public school system. This suggestion brought criticism from elements of the Socialist Party, but appealed to parts of the center and right on the political spectrum. Royal was sharply critical of Bush Administration foreign policy. Royal introduced a new, more direct style of politics to France in her campaign of "participatory democracy." As noted above, the UMP in fact lost seats in the legislative elections. Implications for the United States The essence of the U.S.-French relationship is unlikely to change substantively under Sarkozy's presidency. Some U.S. officials believe that Sarkozy will be more "practical" in discussing the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with the United States; they believe that President Chirac has impeded cooperation between NATO and the EU by insisting that the United States, rather than NATO, engage in discussions over strategic issues with the Union, and by pressing for an "EU caucus" in NATO, where EU member states would present a united position on selected issues to the United States and NATO governments not in the Union. Just as some U.S. officials believe that President Chirac has been an impediment to improved relations, many observers in France, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and highly politicized criticism of France emanating from parts of the U.S. government and media, believe that only the end of the Bush Administration will lead to a moment when the political atmosphere between the two countries can improve. Sarkozy, as Interior Minister, was intimately involved in this cooperative effort. France also plays a role in the EU stabilization mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the NATO mission in Kosovo.

On May 6, 2007, the Gaullist Nicolas Sarkozy defeated the Socialist candidate Ségolène Royal in the second round of the French elections to become President of France. He will serve a five-year term. His party lost seats but maintained a solid majority in subsequent legislative elections. Since 1981, France has had only two presidents. There is a sense of malaise in the country, in part due to high unemployment and slow economic growth. Sarkozy represents a younger generation of leaders. Sarkozy casts himself as a tough-minded former Interior Minister. His campaign built on his reputation as hard on illegal immigration and insistent on greater efforts by the country's large Muslim community to better integrate itself into French life. Royal pursued a campaign meant to place her directly in touch with French voters. In doing so, she circumvented some of the steps normally necessary to gain the Socialist Party nomination. This campaign strategy put her at odds with some of the Party elders. She gambled that her campaign of "participatory democracy" would appeal to a range of voters beyond the Socialist Party. In the end, she failed to deliver a clear message to French voters and to unite her own party. Foreign policy played a secondary role in the elections. Sarkozy and Royal stressed the growing danger of Iran. Both candidates supported French participation in U.N., NATO, and EU security and stabilization missions, but there were disagreements with the United States over some elements of NATO's mission and future. Both candidates supported the EU, but neither brought to EU issues the passion of previous post-war French leaders. Sarkozy presents himself as a friend of the United States and an admirer of American culture but added that France under his leadership would assert its usual independence. Royal was sharply critical of the Bush Administration and contended that U.S. "unilateralism" in recent years has damaged bilateral relations and increased instability in the Middle East. It is possible that Sarkozy will pursue a practical and non-ideological posture towards the United States. He is unlikely to alter the U.S.-French relationship in a stark manner. Cooperation over counterterrorism measures, multinational operations in Lebanon, the Balkans, and Afghanistan, and good trade relations are likely to continue. This report will be updated to reflect the outcome of the presidential and legislative elections. See also CRS Report RL32464, France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

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Introduction Al Qaeda leaders and affiliates have conducted sophisticated public relations and media campaigns since the mid-1990s using a series of faxed statements, audio recordings, video appearances, and Internet postings. Terrorism analysts believe that these campaigns have been designed to elicit psychological reactions and communicate complex political messages to a global audience as well as to specific sub-populations in the Islamic world, the United States, Europe, and Asia. Some officials and analysts believe that Al Qaeda's messages contain signals that inform and instruct operatives to prepare for and carry out new attacks. Bin Laden has referred to his public statements as important primary sources for parties seeking to understand Al Qaeda's ideology and political demands. Global counterterrorism operations in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks appear to have limited Bin Laden's ability to provide command and control leadership to Al Qaeda operatives and affiliated groups. Al Qaeda Post-9/11 Osama Bin Laden's longstanding threats to strike the United States came to fruition on September 11, 2001, and Bin Laden and others subsequently issued several statements confirming Al Qaeda's responsibility for the attacks on New York and Washington. Both Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al Zawahiri have criticized the population and governments of the Islamic world for failing to answer their calls to arms and for cooperating with the United States and its allies. In January 2006 Bin Laden stated that Al Qaeda "does not object to a long-term truce" with the United States "on the basis of fair conditions," but it is unlikely that he could guarantee a total cessation of hostilities or that other Al Qaeda figures would abandon strategic priorities that include long-term confrontation with the United States and its allies. In the second tape, released on December 27, 2004, Bin Laden underscored Al Qaeda's interest in Iraq and support for the ongoing insurgency. Bin Laden's January 2006 message implied that Al Qaeda operatives had infiltrated the United States and were preparing to strike. Iraq and Al Qaeda's Regional Ambitions Abu Musab al Zarqawi and Al Qaeda military leader Sayf al Adl have referred to the current situation in Iraq as an opportunity for the global jihadist movement to take advantage of insecurity in the heart of the Arab world and to spread into neighboring areas. Political Goals and Perspectives on Reform The Three Foundations The operations of Al Qaeda affiliates continue to be complemented by centrally-planned ideological outreach activities. Other Al Qaeda figures have alluded to the desirability of attacks on and eventual conflict with Israel. Implications and Conclusion Statements from Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, the late Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, Sayf al Adl, and Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq display the uncompromising commitment of Al Qaeda's leaders and operational affiliates to a consistent ideological agenda focused on two sequential goals: the expulsion of foreign forces and influences from Islamic societies and, ultimately, the creation of an Islamic state ruled by sharia law.

Al Qaeda leaders and affiliates have conducted sophisticated public relations and media campaigns since the mid-1990s. Terrorism analysts believe that these campaigns have been designed to elicit psychological reactions and communicate complex political messages to a global audience as well as to specific sub-populations in the Islamic world, the United States, Europe, and Asia. Some officials and analysts believe that Al Qaeda's messages contain signals that inform and instruct operatives to prepare for and carry out new attacks. Bin Laden and other leading Al Qaeda figures have referred to their public statements as important primary sources for parties seeking to understand Al Qaeda's ideology and political demands. Global counterterrorism operations since 2001 appear to have limited Bin Laden's ability to provide command and control leadership to Al Qaeda operatives and affiliated groups. Other Al Qaeda leaders and affiliates continue to release statements that encourage and provide guidance for terrorist operations. Iraq has become a focal point for jihadist rhetoric, underscoring Al Qaeda leaders' interest in Iraq and support for the ongoing insurgency. Statements released by Osama Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al Zawahiri since late 2004 have rekindled public debate in Europe and the United States surrounding Al Qaeda's ideology, motives, and future plans for attacks. Statements released following the July 2005 Al Qaeda-linked suicide bombing attacks on the London transit system have characterized those attacks and Al Qaeda's ongoing terrorist campaign as a response to British and American military operations in Iraq. In January 2006, Bin Laden stated that Al Qaeda "does not object to a long-term truce" with the United States "on the basis of fair conditions" but alluded to nearly complete preparations to carry out attacks inside the United States. The ideological content and political tone of recent Al Qaeda statements have led some terrorism analysts to speculate that the messages may signal an on effort by Al Qaeda founders to reaffirm their leadership roles and the role of the Al Qaeda organization as the vanguard of an emerging, loosely organized international jihadist movement. Others have argued that the presently limited operational capabilities of Al Qaeda's founders have inspired them to focus on ideological outreach activities and efforts to influence public opinion in the United States and Europe. Many observers believe that the group's primary goal remains to inspire, plan, and carry out attacks against the United States and its allies around the world, with particular emphasis on targeting economic and energy infrastructure and fomenting unrest in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf states, and countries neighboring Israel. This report reviews Al Qaeda's use of public statements from the mid-1990s to the present and analyzes the evolving ideological and political content of those statements. The report focuses primarily on statements made by Osama Bin Laden, but also considers: statements made by Ayman al Zawahiri, the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi, Iraq-based Al Qaeda affiliates, and Al Qaeda military leader Sayf al Adl. The report will be updated periodically. For background on Al Qaeda, see CRS Report RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by [author name scrubbed].

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O n March 16, 2016, President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court created by the unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February. Judge Garland was appointed to the D.C. Circuit by President Clinton in 1997, and is currently its chief judge, an administrative position that rotates among the active judges on the circuit. Prior to his appointment to the bench, Judge Garland served in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), where he notably oversaw the prosecution of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing case, as well as other cases. It remains to be seen whether or how the Senate might proceed in considering Judge Garland's nomination; however, his nomination generally remains effective until it is withdrawn or this term of Congress ends, whichever occurs first. This report provides an overview of Judge Garland's jurisprudence and discusses what the impact on the Supreme Court might be if he, or a judge of a similar judicial philosophy, were to be confirmed to succeed Justice Scalia. The report focuses on those areas of law where Justice Scalia can be seen to have influenced the High Court's approach to particular issues, or served as a fifth and deciding vote on the Court, with a view toward how Judge Garland might approach that same issue if he were to be confirmed. The report begins with his views on two cross-cutting issues—the role of the judiciary and statutory interpretation. It then addresses 14 separate areas of law, which are arranged in alphabetical order from "administrative law" to "takings." The report discusses numerous cases and votes involving Judge Garland. A separate report, CRS Report R44484, Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions Authored by Judge Merrick Garland , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], lists all opinions authored by Judge Garland during his tenure on the D.C. Other CRS products discuss various issues related to the vacancy on the Court. For an overview of available products, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1526, Vacancy on the Supreme Court: CRS Products , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Circuit where Judge Garland serves. Judge Garland and the D.C.

On March 16, 2016, President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court created by the unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February. Judge Garland was appointed to the D.C. Circuit by President Clinton in 1997, and is currently its chief judge, an administrative position that rotates among the active judges on the circuit. Prior to his appointment to the bench, Judge Garland served in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, where he notably oversaw the prosecution of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing case, as well as other cases. It remains to be seen whether or how the Senate might proceed in considering Judge Garland's nomination; however, the nomination generally remains effective until it is withdrawn or this term of Congress ends, whichever occurs first. This report provides an overview of Judge Garland's jurisprudence and discusses what the impact on the Court might be if he, or a judge of a similar judicial approach, were to be confirmed to succeed Justice Scalia. In particular, the report focuses upon those areas of law where Justice Scalia can be seen to have influenced the High Court's approach to certain issues, or served as a fifth and deciding vote on the Court, with a view toward how Judge Garland might approach those same issues if he were to be confirmed. The report begins with his views on two overarching issues—the role of the judiciary and statutory interpretation. It then addresses 14 separate areas of law, which are arranged in alphabetical order from "administrative law" to "takings." The report includes one table which notes the cases where the Supreme Court has reviewed majority opinions written or joined by Judge Garland. Another table, in the appendix to the report, identifies Judge Garland's colleagues on the D.C. Circuit and lists notable cases involving Judge Garland and that colleague. A separate report, CRS Report R44484, Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions Authored by Judge Merrick Garland, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], lists all opinions authored by Judge Garland during his tenure on the D.C. Circuit. Other CRS products discuss various issues related to the vacancy on the Supreme Court. For an overview of available products, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1526, Vacancy on the Supreme Court: CRS Products, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

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A second concern is cost and spending. Costs are a particular source of anxiety for families that are planning for retirement or where someone is seriously ill. National health care spending now likely exceeds $2.5 trillion, more than 17% of the gross domestic product (GDP). The three concerns raise significant challenges. For one thing, each is more complex than might first appear, which makes it difficult to find solutions, or at least simple or uniform solutions. Second, solutions to the three concerns may conflict with one another. Under many scenarios, for example, providing coverage to the 45 million uninsured would likely drive up costs (as more people seek care) and expand public budgets (since public subsidies would be required to help them get insurance). Other challenges involve significant stakeholder interests that reform might threaten, including those of insurers, hospitals and other health care facilities, and doctors and other providers, many of whom have substantial investments in present arrangements. In addition, if debates over the Clinton plan are still a guide, some people may be uneasy about moving from an imperfect but known system to something that is potentially better but untried. It focuses on the three predominant concerns just mentioned—coverage, cost and spending, and quality—and some of the legislative issues within which they likely will be debated, including the scope of reform (particularly whether Medicare and Medicaid should be included); the choice between public and private coverage; whether employment-based insurance should be strengthened, weakened, or left alone; and what role states might play. The report does not attempt to identify, let alone discuss, all the relevant concerns about health care in the United States, even though others may also be important and will likely contribute to the complexity of the reform debate. The report may be updated to include other health care reform issues as the debate in Congress unfolds. The number indicates that more than 45 million people are likely to be uninsured over a short time period, even if many have coverage at some point. Coverage is not the same as access, and it is possible to have one without the other. Having coverage also does not ensure that one can pay for care. Quality Despite spending more on health care than other industrialized countries, the United States scores only average or somewhat worse on many quality of care indicators. As Congress considers what to do about health care quality, a number of issues have arisen, including the following: whether quality improvements should be pursued for their own sake, regardless of whether they promise to save money, whether it is possible to improve the quality of care without reorganizing and restructuring health care delivery systems, whether preventive care should have a significant role in improving quality, relative to acute or chronic care services, whether the evidence-base is adequate for guiding quality improvement efforts, or whether the way research is organized, financed, and carried out needs to be changed, and whether employers and other entities that are not health care providers can play a role in improving health outcomes. ( H.R. The Cost of Reform The cost of reform and how to pay for it have become important issues in the current debate. Congressional Proposals The committees of jurisdiction for health care have prepared comprehensive reform proposals. The Senate HELP Committee approved a measure on July 15 (Affordable Health Choices Act), whereas the Senate Finance Committee has not yet released a proposal, though earlier it provided a range of policy options and many of its debates have been publicized. 3200 , a coordinated measure by three House committees (Education and Labor, Ways and Means, and Energy and Commerce), was approved by the first two committees with some variations on July 17 and by Energy and Commerce on July 31.

Health care reform is a major issue in the 111th Congress, driven by growing concern about millions of people without insurance coverage, continual increases in cost and spending, and quality shortcomings. Commonly cited figures indicate that more than 45 million people have no insurance, which can limit their access to care and ability to pay for the care they receive. Costs are rising for nearly everyone, and the country now likely spends over $2.5 trillion, more than 17% of gross domestic product (GDP), on health care services and products, far more than other industrialized countries. For all this spending, the country scores but average or somewhat worse on many indicators of health care quality, and many may not get appropriate standards of care. These concerns raise significant challenges. Each is more complex than might first appear, which increases the difficulty of finding solutions. For example, by one statistical measure, far more than 45 million people face the risk of being uninsured for short time periods, yet by another, substantially fewer have no insurance for long periods. Insurance coverage and access to health care are not the same, and it is possible to have one without the other. Having coverage does not ensure that one can pay for care, nor does it always shield one from significant financial loss in the case of serious illness. Similarly, high levels of spending may be partly attributable to the country's wealth, while rising costs, though difficult for many, may primarily mean that less money is available for other things. Solutions to these concerns may conflict with one another. For example, expanding coverage to most of the uninsured would likely drive up costs (as more people seek care) and expand public budgets (since additional public subsidies would be required). Cutting costs may threaten initiatives to improve quality. Other challenges include addressing the interests of stakeholders that have substantial investments in present arrangements and the unease some people have about moving from an imperfect but known system to something that is potentially better but untried. How much reform might cost and how to pay for it is also an issue. Health care reform proposals rekindle debate over perennial issues in American health care policy. These include whether insurance should be public or private; whether employment-based insurance should be strengthened, weakened, or left alone; what role states might play; and whether Medicaid should be folded into new insurance arrangements. Whether changes to Medicare should occur at the same time is also being considered. Concerns about coverage, cost and spending, and quality are likely to be addressed within the context of these issues. The committees of jurisdiction for health care have prepared comprehensive reform proposals. The Senate HELP Committee approved a measure on July 15 (Affordable Health Choices Act), whereas H.R. 3200, a coordinated measure by three House committees (Education and Labor, Ways and Means, and Energy and Commerce), was approved by the first two committees with some variations on July 17 and by Energy and Commerce on July 31. The Senate Finance Committee has no draft available to the public, though it has released policy option documents and many of its debates have been publicized. More than a dozen other comprehensive bills have also been introduced. This report does not discuss or even try to identify all of the concerns about health care in the United States that are prompting calls for reform. Other concerns may also be important, at least to some, and will likely contribute to the complexity of the reform debate. The report may be updated to include other health care reform issues as the debate in Congress unfolds.

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An array of budget process reform proposals are put forth each year seeking to refine or modify the existing constitutional requirements, laws, and rules that make up the federal budget process. Budget Process Reform Actions in 2012 The following section identifies, tracks, and explains current budget process reform proposals reported from committee, or considered on the floor during 2012. The proposals are organized into categories related to the existing budget process. When appropriate, a brief description of the current process is provided. H.R. H.R. H.R. The change to the baseline included in H.R. 3582 , the Pro-Growth Budgeting Act of 2011, was reported by the House Budget Committee on January 30. 3578 . Budget and Accounting Transparency Act24 H.R. 3581 .

An array of budget process reform proposals are put forth each year seeking to refine or modify the existing constitutional requirements, laws, and rules that make up the federal budget process. This report identifies, tracks, and explains current budget process reform proposals reported from committee or considered on the floor during 2012. The proposals are organized into categories related to the existing budget process. When appropriate, a brief description of the current process is provided. Measures included in this report are H.R. 3575, the Legally Binding Budget Act of 2011; H.R. 3521, the Expedited Legislative Line-Item Veto and Rescission Act of 2011; H.R. 3578, the Baseline Reform Act of 2012; H.R. 3582, the Pro-Growth Budgeting Act of 2011; and H.R. 3581, the Budget and Accounting Transparency Act of 2011.

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Introduction Quality gaps in the care delivered by the U.S health care system result in preventable mortality and morbidity and contribute costs to the system. Although no single definition of high-quality health care has been agreed upon, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) provided a framework for considering the quality of care, based on six domains: (1) effective, (2) efficient, (3) equitable, (4) patient-centered, (5) safe, and (6) timely. Many efforts that aim to improve the quality of care focus on increasing health care providers' accountability for the care they provide. Many payment incentive and public reporting policies rely on quality measurement. Ongoing congressional interest in enhancing the quality of health care is likely given the federal role in the delivery and financing of health care through, for example, Medicare, Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), and the Indian Health Service (IHS). These include, among others (1) the availability of a comprehensive set of quality measures, (2) the strength of the evidence base supporting the measures, (3) the National Quality Forum (NQF)-endorsement status of the measures, and (4) the relative mix of different measure types. The ability to directly compare the performance of providers is an essential component of many payment incentive and public reporting policies that aim to enhance provider accountability; at a basic level, the creation of incentives to improve quality relies on being able to make distinctions between providers. Payment Incentives for Quality Emphasis has been placed on changing the way health care is paid for, away from a system where payment is simply a transaction based on the unit of care provided, to one where higher-quality, lower-cost care is preferentially rewarded. This policy approach, representing a shift from volume-based or fee-for-service (FFS) payment to value-based payment, is often referred to as value-based purchasing or value-driven health care. Such efforts may modify payment through payment incentives. The Role of Medicare At the federal level, the Medicare program provides policymakers the opportunity to implement value-based purchasing approaches and other payment modifications. Given this uncertainty with respect to the impact on health care cost and quality, payment incentives implemented in the Medicare program may provide valuable data that private insurers and others may use when considering implementing these approaches. Public Reporting of Performance Information Policymakers have undertaken efforts to enhance provider accountability through the public reporting of performance information; these efforts have generally occurred in concert with policies that modify payment to incentivize higher quality. The impact of public reporting on both consumer decision making, as well as quality improvement efforts by providers, is unclear. The Theory Underlying Public Reporting Theoretically, making information on provider performance public serves to correct an existing information asymmetry; that is, an imbalance in information between the provider and user of a service, in this case, health care services. Characteristics of the performance information itself that influence its use by consumers include, among others (1) awareness of the information, (2) relevance of the information, and (3) usability of the information (e.g., its presentation). Consumer decision making in health care is also known to be influenced by a number of factors unrelated to performance information. Studies suggest that consumers are generally not making use of performance information in their health care decisions.

Quality gaps in the care delivered by the U.S health care system result in preventable mortality and morbidity and contribute costs to the system, with multiple indicators showing that quality of care could be improved. Although no single definition of high-quality health care has been agreed upon, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) provided a framework for considering the quality of care, based on six domains: (1) effective, (2) efficient, (3) equitable, (4) patient-centered, (5) safe, and (6) timely. Ongoing congressional interest in enhancing the quality of health care is likely given the federal role in the delivery and financing of health care through, for example, the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Many efforts that aim to improve the quality of care focus on increasing health care providers' accountability for the care they provide. These efforts include, among others, the modification of payment through incentives and the public reporting of performance information. Many payment incentives and public reporting policies rely on quality measurement, and numerous issues arise when considering the use of quality measures in these policies. These include, among others (1) the availability of a comprehensive set of quality measures, (2) the strength of the evidence base supporting the measures, and (3) the relative mix of different measure types. The ability to directly compare the performance of providers is an essential component of many payment incentive and public reporting policies, and quality measurement allows for the generation of this comparative provider-specific performance information. Emphasis has been placed on changing the way health care is paid for, away from a system where payment is simply a transaction based on the unit of care provided, to one where higher-quality, lower-cost care is preferentially rewarded. This policy approach is often referred to as value-based purchasing or value-driven health care, and such efforts may include payment incentives in the form of adjustments, performance-based payments, or fees. At the federal level, the Medicare program provides policymakers the opportunity to implement value-based purchasing approaches and other payment modifications; payment incentive policies implemented in the Medicare program may provide valuable data that private insurers and others may use when considering implementing these approaches. Policymakers have undertaken efforts to enhance provider accountability through the public reporting of performance information; these efforts have generally occurred in concert with policies that modify payment to improve quality. Theoretically, making provider performance information public serves to correct an existing information asymmetry; that is, an imbalance in information between the provider and user of a service, in this case, health care services. Consumer decision making in health care is influenced by a number of factors, including, among others (1) awareness of the information, (2) relevance of the information, and (3) usability of the information. Other factors unrelated to the performance information itself may also affect consumer use of this information (e.g., location of hospital). The impact of public reporting on both consumer decision making, as well as quality improvement efforts by providers, is unclear, although evidence suggests that consumers do not use performance information very often in their decision making.

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Introduction On January 19, 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone. Final standards were expected to be issued by the end of August 2010, but EPA has delayed promulgation, first to October, then to December, and now to July 2011. Primary NAAQS are standards, "the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the [EPA] Administrator ... are requisite to protect the public health," with "an adequate margin of safety." Depending on the severity of the pollution, ozone nonattainment areas have anywhere from 3 to 20 years to actually attain the standard. Thus, establishment or revision of a NAAQS sets in motion a long and complicated implementation process that has far-reaching impacts for public health, for sources of pollution in numerous economic sectors, and for states and local governments. The Ozone Standard The ozone standard affects a larger percentage of the population than any of the other NAAQS. As of September 2010, 39% of the U.S. population lived in areas designated nonattainment under the 1997 standard for ozone, 119 million people in all. Since the standard has been strengthened as a result of a review completed in 2008 and the Administrator is now proposing a further strengthening, more areas will be affected, and those already considered nonattainment may have to impose more stringent emission controls. The Primary Standard The primary (health-based) standard promulgated in 1997 was set at 0.08 parts per million (ppm), averaged over an 8-hour period. The panel unanimously recommended a range of 0.060 to 0.070 ppm (60 to 70 parts per billion) for the primary 8-hour standard. At 0.070 ppm, 515 counties (76% of those with monitors) exceeded the standard. Given the trend toward cleaner air in recent years, and regulations on both mobile and stationary sources that have taken effect in the intervening years, the agency expects the number of counties exceeding the standard to be less than indicated by these projections. (For a discussion, see archived CRS Report RL34057, Ozone Air Quality Standards: EPA's March 2008 Revision .) As shown in Figure 4 , nonattainment with the proposed secondary standard could be widespread: based on the latest available (2006-2008) data at the time of proposal, 196 counties would be nonattainment if the secondary standard were set at 15 ppm-hours, and 579 counties (86% of all counties with monitors) would be nonattainment under a 7 ppm-hours standard. Most stationary and mobile sources are considered to be contributors to ozone pollution. Issues The major issues raised by the proposed standards concern whether the Administrator has made appropriate choices (i.e., whether her choices for the primary and secondary standards are backed by the scientific studies). This mismatch could support a case for stronger federal controls on the sources of ozone precursors or a reexamination of the attainment deadlines. Another issue arises from a close inspection of EPA's maps: whether the current monitoring network is adequate to detect violations of a more stringent standard. Only 675 of the nation's 3,000 counties have ozone monitors in place. With as many as 650 of them (96%) showing violations of the most stringent proposed standard, using current data, how confident is the agency that the 2,350 counties without monitors would all be in attainment? That proposal would require that each state operate at least three ozone monitors in non-urban areas.

On December 8, 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced that it will delay issuing revised ambient air quality standards for ozone until July 2011 so that it can consider further recommendations from an independent panel of scientific advisers. The agency proposed changes to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone on January 19, 2010, with an expected promulgation date of August 2010. The December announcement marks the third time that the agency has postponed issuing the revised standards. NAAQS are standards for outdoor (ambient) air that are intended to protect public health and welfare from harmful concentrations of pollution. By changing the standard, EPA would be concluding that protecting public health and welfare requires lower concentrations of ozone pollution than it previously judged to be safe. Under the January 2010 proposed standards, as many as 96% of the counties that currently monitor ozone might need to take action to reduce emissions. The proposal would also, for the first time, set a separate standard for public welfare, the principal effect of which would be to call attention to the negative effects of ozone on forests and agricultural productivity. The ozone standard affects a large percentage of the population: as of September 2010, 119 million people (nearly 40% of the U.S. population) lived in areas classified "nonattainment" for the primary ozone NAAQS. As a result of the standard's strengthening, more areas would likely be affected, and those already considered nonattainment may have to impose more stringent emission controls. The proposed revision would lower the primary (health-based) standard from 0.075 parts per million—75 parts per billion (ppb)—averaged over 8 hours to somewhere in the range of 70 to 60 ppb averaged over the same time. Using the most recent three years of monitoring data, 515 counties (76% of all counties with ozone monitors) would violate the new standard at 70 ppb; 650 counties (96% of those with monitors) would be in nonattainment if the standard is set at 60 ppb. By comparison, only 85 counties have monitors showing exceedance of the currently implemented 1997 standard. (The counties that might exceed the proposed standard are shown in Figure 3 of this report.) The proposed standards, now expected to be finalized in July 2011, will set in motion a long and complicated implementation process that has far-reaching impacts. The first step, designation of nonattainment areas, is expected to take place within a year of the new standards' promulgation; the areas so designated would then have 3 to 20 years to reach attainment. The proposed standards raise a number of issues, including whether they should lead to stronger federal controls on the sources that contribute to ozone pollution. Current federal standards for cars, trucks, nonroad vehicles and engines, power plants, and other stationary pollution sources are not strong enough to bring many areas into attainment, thus requiring local pollution control measures in many cases. EPA, the states, and Congress may also wish to consider whether the current monitoring network is adequate to detect violations of a more stringent standard. Only 675 of the nation's 3,000 counties have ozone monitors in place. This report discusses the standard-setting process, the specifics of the new standard, and issues raised by the Administrator's choice; and it describes the steps that will follow EPA's promulgation.

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Introduction Federal water projects operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) may be operated for a variety of authorized purposes, which are identified by Congress at the time each project is authorized. Additionally, the Corps and Reclamation have general authority under the Water Supply Act of 1958 (WSA) to include water storage for municipal and industrial (M&I) use as a project purpose for new and existing projects. The WSA requires congressional approval of water storage if water supply storage would seriously affect the original project purposes or involve a major operational change for the project. This ambiguity has become a particular issue when severe drought raises the competition for water supply, and is an especially contentious issue in eastern riparian states where all users are affected by any drought. Increasing pressures on the quantity and quality of available water supplies are raising interest in—and concern about—changing operations at federal facilities to meet M&I demands. The tradeoffs inherent in such reallocations may garner controversy because a shift from a currently authorized purpose (e.g., hydropower, navigation, flood control) to M&I use changes the types of benefits produced by a dam and the stakeholders served. This issue is also at the center of litigation related to the Corps' operation of Lake Lanier in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (ACF). Two federal appellate courts have examined questions related to water allocation at Lake Lanier, and each reached a different result. First, the issue was the subject of a 2008 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Southeastern Federal Power Customers v. Geren . Then, in 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11 th Circuit considered consolidated cases challenging related issues ( In re Tri-State Water Rights Litigation). Using the context of the Corps' reallocation of water in Lake Lanier, this report specifically analyzes the reallocation issues under the WSA, including the various legal challenges to the Corps' actions and outcomes of the litigation. It also analyzes data regarding the Corps' reallocations under the WSA in various projects and legislative options for Congress. Although the WSA provides authority to Reclamation as well, the application of the WSA to Reclamation is beyond the scope of the report. General Authority for M&I Water Supply In addition to project-specific authority for M&I water supply, Congress has enacted some generally applicable legislation that authorizes the Corps to provide water supply for M&I use at any of its facilities. Significantly, however, Congress did not define "seriously affect" or "major structural or operational changes" under the WSA. In 1977, the Corps adopted as part of its manual the following provision for guiding when a reallocation was to be considered insignificant, thus not requiring congressional approval: Modifications of reservoir projects to allocate all or part of the storage serving any authorized purpose from such purpose to storage serving domestic, municipal, or industrial water supply purposes are considered insignificant if the total reallocation of storage that may be made for such water supply uses in the modified project is not greater than 15 per centum of total storage capacity allocated to all authorized purposes or 50,000 acre feet, whichever is less. Citing these examples of the Corps' recognition of the limits on its discretion under the WSA, the D.C. Circuit's decision, finding that water supply was not an authorized purpose and that the Corps' actions constituted a major operational change.

Pursuant to congressional authorization, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the agencies with primary responsibility for federal water resources management, operate water projects for specified purposes. In the case of Corps dams and their related reservoirs, Congress generally has limited the use of such projects for municipal and industrial (M&I) water supply, but growing M&I demands have raised interest in—and concern about—changing current law and reservoir operations to give Corps facilities a greater role in M&I water storage. Reallocation of storage from a currently authorized purpose to M&I use would change the types of benefits produced by a facility and the stakeholders served, which has led to controversy over project operations at some federal projects. The Corps and Reclamation, therefore, may be authorized to operate federal water projects for M&I use under the project-specific authorization statutes. Alternatively, the generally applicable Water Supply Act of 1958 (WSA) authorizes the Corps and Reclamation to include water storage for municipal and industrial use as a project purpose for new and existing projects. The WSA requires congressional approval if adding water supply storage would seriously affect the original project purposes or involve a major operational change for the project. However, the WSA does not define the extent to which the change in water supply storage must affect existing purposes or what constitutes a major operational change. This ambiguity has become a particular issue when severe drought raises the competition for water supply, and is an especially contentious issue in eastern riparian states where all users are affected by any drought. Because of such water shortages in some riparian basins with Corps projects, the Corps' reallocation of water storage at its discretion has been of particular interest. This issue is at the center of ongoing litigation related to the Corps' activities in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (ACF). The scope of the Corps' authority under the WSA was the subject of a 2008 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (Southeastern Federal Power Customers v. Geren), as well as a 2011 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit (In re Tri-State Water Rights Litigation). The D.C. and 11th Circuits reached different results, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined a petition for its review of the issue in 2012. These cases each addressed a tri-state water dispute involving Lake Lanier, a Corps water project in the ACF basin, which includes parts of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Using the Corps' reallocations of water storage for M&I use at Lake Lanier as an example, this report analyzes the legal and policy issues associated with reallocation under the WSA. Specifically, it examines Corps authority under the WSA, including limitations on modifications that constitute major operational changes. The report details data and examples regarding the Corps' reallocations under the WSA. It also analyzes various legal challenges of water supply storage at Lake Lanier, including courts' identification of congressionally authorized purposes, and discusses results of the litigation and options for Congress. Although the WSA provides authority to Reclamation as well, the application of the WSA to Reclamation is beyond the scope of the report.

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A ccording to press reports, the Trump Administration may reestablish the National Space Council, a coordinating body in the Executive Office of the President that was last active in 1993. This report summarizes the history and statutory status of the National Space Council, its predecessor the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and other White House bodies that have been responsible for coordinating space policy. In April 1989, President Bush issued an executive order establishing the council "in order to provide a coordinated process for developing a national space policy and strategy and for monitoring its implementation." The executive order stated that the council would be chaired by the Vice President (Dan Quayle) and would include the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, and Transportation, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the President's Chief of Staff, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The NASC was initially chaired by the President. It was a smaller group than its successor, the National Space Council. Chief among these are the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Security Council, and the National Science and Technology Council. In practice, the Administration found that a strengthened interagency process, led by the National Security Council and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, met the intent of President Obama's promise and achieved the goals he described during his campaign. Issues for Congressional Consideration Because the original statutory authority for the National Space Council remains in effect, congressional action would not be necessary for its reestablishment. Congress could choose to play a role, however, either by amending the existing authority or by conducting oversight. Among the topics Congress might wish to consider are the goals of the council; who would chair it; whether it should have an advisory committee; and whether any aspects of the existing statutory authority require changes. In the case of space policy, the National Space Council and its predecessor, the National Aeronautics and Space Council, were sometimes seen as effective and sometimes not.

According to press reports, the Trump Administration may reestablish the National Space Council, a coordinating body in the Executive Office of the President that was last active in 1993. The National Space Council was established in 1989 "to provide a coordinated process for developing a national space policy and strategy and for monitoring its implementation." It was chaired by the Vice President and included the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, and Transportation, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the President's Chief of Staff, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The National Space Council was active in overseeing policy and management for the civil space program, but less active in the national security space arena. Its statutory authority has never been repealed. A predecessor, the National Aeronautics and Space Council, existed from 1958 to 1973. It consisted of a similar but smaller group of senior federal officials, initially joined by three non-federal members and chaired by the President. In 1961, the non-federal members were dropped and the Vice President took over as chair. The National Aeronautics and Space Council was briefly influential in the early 1960s, but most Administrations relied more on other sources of space policy advice. Other bodies in the Executive Office of the President that have space policy coordination responsibilities include the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Security Council, and the National Science and Technology Council. In 2008, the incoming Obama Administration also planned to reestablish the National Space Council, but that plan was not implemented. The Administration concluded that a strengthened interagency process led by the National Security Council and the Office of Science and Technology Policy would meet its goals. Because the original statutory authority for the National Space Council remains in effect, congressional action would not be necessary for its reestablishment. Congress could choose to play a role, however, either by amending the existing authority or by conducting oversight. Among the topics Congress might wish to consider are the goals of the council, who should chair it, and whether it should have an advisory committee.

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Introduction Historically, the U.S. government has played an active role in promoting U.S. exports of goods and services by administering various forms of export assistance through federal government agencies. In 2010, President Obama introduced a National Export Initiative (NEI), a strategy for doubling U.S. exports to $3.14 trillion in 2015, to generate and support U.S. jobs. Congress has had a long-standing interest in the effectiveness and efficiency of federal export promotion activities and their role in generating economic growth and jobs. Congress may exercise export promotion authority in a number of ways, including through oversight, authorization, and funding of federal export promotion programs. U.S. The five key components of the NEI are to (1) improve advocacy and trade promotion efforts on behalf of U.S. exporters; (2) increase access to export financing; (3) reinforce efforts to remove barriers to trade, such as through free trade agreements (FTAs); (4) enforce trade rules; and (5) pursue policies to promote strong, sustainable, and balanced growth at the global level. Global economic factors. Determining the Goals of Export Promotion Although the main goal of export promotion policy generally is to increase U.S. exports, supporters of such policies often have other goals as well. From an economic perspective, much of the debate over export promotion involves whether some market failure actually has occurred, and whether government intervention can produce net benefits for the economy as a whole. Opponents of export promotion programs dispute that significant market failures have occurred, and warn that government intervention may interfere with the efficient operation of the market. Another aspect to the economic debate about export promotion is the existence of foreign countries' export promotion programs. Supporters of government export promotion often argue that such policies are needed to offset the effects of similar programs used by foreign governments. Effectiveness of Export Promotion Activities Congressional debate on the effectiveness of U.S. export promotion efforts has grown with the introduction of the NEI. Many argue that providing export assistance to U.S. firms would be of limited help if such firms faced significant tariff and non-tariff trade barriers and poor protection of intellectual property rights overseas. Thus, it is argued that efforts to ensure foreign compliance with existing trade agreements and the negotiation of new FTAs should be part of a strategy to boost U.S. exports. Others argue that more can be done to address U.S. barriers to exports, such as U.S. export controls on dual-use products, which some contend may be too restrictive and may put U.S. exporters at a disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign competitors. Finally, many argue that the United States should make a greater effort to induce countries that are heavily dependent on exports to implement policies that increase domestic consumption. They contend that countries with high savings and relatively low consumption should put more efforts into increasing private consumption as an engine for future economic growth. Reorganization of Federal Agencies Involved in Export Promotion The introduction of the NEI has drawn greater attention to whether the trade policy structure of the federal government is suited to boosting U.S. exports and supporting U.S. jobs effectively and efficiently. 2987 (Berman) would require the TPCC to review the proposed annual budget of each federal agency before it is submitted to the OMB and the President when assessing the federal export promotion and financing budget; require the government-wide strategic plan for federal trade promotion efforts developed by the TPCC to take into account recommendations from a representative number of U.S. exporters, including SMEs and U.S. workers; direct the President to issue an executive order and regulations necessary to provide the TPCC with the authority to carry out its duties and to implement the strategic plan; require the Secretary of Commerce to conduct an assessment once every five years on overseas markets with the greatest potential for increasing U.S. exports and to redeploy the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service based on the assessment; and to amend the Foreign Service Act of 1980 to require each chief of mission to develop a plan for effective diplomacy to remove or reduce obstacles to U.S. exports.

For many years, the U.S. government has played an active role in promoting U.S. commercial exports of goods and services by administering various forms of export assistance through federal government agencies. Congress has had a long-standing interest in the effectiveness and efficiency of federal export promotion activities and may exercise export promotion authority in a number of ways, including through oversight, authorization, and funding roles. The recent global economic downturn has renewed congressional interest in U.S. government efforts to expand U.S. exports levels. In addition, in 2010, President Obama introduced a National Export Initiative (NEI), a strategy for doubling U.S. exports by 2015 to generate U.S. jobs. The NEI's key components are to (1) improve advocacy and trade promotion efforts on behalf of U.S. exporters; (2) increase access to export financing; (3) reinforce efforts to remove barriers to trade, such as through free trade agreements (FTAs); (4) enforce trade rules; and (5) pursue policies to promote strong, sustainable, and balanced global economic growth. The NEI also contains a focus on expanding specific U.S. exports, such as exports from small businesses. The growing interest in federal export promotion raises a number of issues for the 112th Congress. One debate involves export promotion definitions. Based on varying views, activities that constitute export promotion can range from direct forms of export assistance (such as commercial advocacy or export financing) to broader forms (such as negotiating FTAs). Although the main goal of export promotion policy generally is to boost U.S. exports, policymakers may use export promotion to advance other goals, such as macroeconomic, economic sector-specific, or international trade policy goals, and may differ on how to prioritize such goals. From an economic perspective, much of the debate over export promotion involves whether some market failure actually has occurred, and whether government intervention can produce net benefits for the economy as a whole. Opponents of export promotion programs dispute that significant market failures have occurred, and warn that government intervention may interfere with efficient operation of the market. Although export promotion might increase the ability of certain U.S. firms to export, a combination of macroeconomic and other factors may determine the overall level of U.S. exports. Another aspect to the economic debate is the existence of foreign countries' export promotion programs. Supporters of export promotion often argue that such policies are needed to offset the effects of similar programs used by foreign governments. Congressional debate on the effectiveness of U.S. export promotion has grown with the introduction of the NEI. Many argue that providing export assistance to U.S. firms would be of limited help if such firms faced significant tariff and non-tariff trade barriers and poor protection of intellectual property rights overseas. Thus, it is argued that efforts to ensure foreign compliance with existing trade agreements and the negotiation of new FTAs should be part of a strategy to boost U.S. exports. Others argue that more can be done to address U.S. barriers to exports, such as U.S. export controls on dual-use products, which some contend may be too restrictive and may put U.S. exporters at a disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign competitors. Finally, many argue that greater efforts should be made to induce countries with high savings and relatively low consumption and that are heavily dependent on exporting for their economic growth to implement policies that would make private consumption the engine of future economic growth, which would enhance their demand for U.S. goods and services. The NEI also has drawn greater attention to whether the trade policy structure and organization of the federal government is suited to boosting U.S. exports and supporting U.S. jobs effectively and efficiently.

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Biopower comprised approximately 1.6% of total U.S. electricity generation in 2014. When accounting solely for renewable energy sources, biopower constituted close to 12% of U.S. renewable electricity generation in 2014. Congress may debate the future role for biopower in the U.S. electricity portfolio, and as such it may consider whether biopower requires new national policies or incentives to further encourage its use or if its use should be diminished. Like other power sources, biopower has its advantages and disadvantages. With sufficient feedstock supplies, among other things, a biopower plant can provide firm power for baseload needs. Further, it is not clear if biomass supplies exist at a level that is palatable to the biomass-producing communities, the electricity industry, and the environmental community. These issues contribute to uncertainty about the biopower market. Wood Pellets Interest in one particular type of woody biomass feedstock—wood pellets—has increased over the last few years, mainly due to international demand for this commodity. There are concerns about the sustainability and environmental impact of an expanding wood pellet market. For instance, some environmental groups argue that increased wood pellet production will destroy ecosystems and incentivize conversion of natural forests to plantations, among other things. Moreover, possible energy and environmental policy changes (e.g., any new energy bill, the Environmental Protection Agency's [EPA's] Clean Power Plan [CPP], state renewable portfolio standards) could impact wood pellet production and export. Federal Support The federal government supports biopower with multiple initiatives including tax incentives, grant programs, research and development efforts, and more. Federal tax credits in lieu of a portion of the traditional bond interest result in a lower effective interest rate for the borrower. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reports the bonds can be used to produce electricity from renewable energy sources, among other things. The CPP establishes regulations that would reduce carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric power plants. States are required to devise a plan that allows them to reach a state-specific CO 2 emission reduction goal by 2030. States have various options to reach this goal—including with the use of renewable energy (e.g., biopower)—based on guidance provided by the EPA. Given implementation of certain environmental standards for biomass feedstock cultivation and biopower plants, some in the environmental community might support certain forms of biopower, especially if there is monitoring of land-use, biodiversity, and GHG emission reduction impacts. However, various organizations have expressed opposition to biopower. A sustainable supply of biomass feedstocks would be necessary for biopower growth. Some have argued that regulatory uncertainty has contributed to the reluctance to develop biopower (e.g., EPA's CPP). In addition, there is no federal mandate requiring the production of biopower, although 29 states have implemented state renewable portfolio standards that include biopower. For example, grants may be rendered to an entity conducting research on advanced biomass gasification and combustion to produce electricity (§307(d)(2)(e)); related research in advanced turbine and stationary fuel cell technology for production of electricity from biomass (§307(d)(2)(f)); biomass gasification and combustion to produce electricity (§307(d)(3)(A)(v)); and any research and development in technologies or processes determined by the Secretaries, acting through their respective points of contact and in consultation with the Biomass Research and Development Board (§307(d)(4)).

Biopower—a form of renewable energy—is the generation of electric power from biomass feedstocks. In 2014, Biopower comprised about 1.6% of total U.S. electricity generation and accounted for close to 12% of U.S. renewable electricity generation. Its advantages include a potential for baseload power production, greenhouse gas emission reduction, and use of renewable biomass feedstock, among other things. Its disadvantages include uncertain sustainable feedstock supply and infrastructure concerns, among other things. Recent developments have prompted renewed interest in biopower. For instance, some stakeholders are concerned about the treatment of biopower by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the Clean Power Plan (CPP). The CPP—which was granted a stay by the Supreme Court on February 9, 2016—establishes regulations that would reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric power plants. . States are required to reach a state-specific emission reduction goal by 2030 using various options—including biopower—based on guidance provided by EPA. EPA has struggled with accounting for greenhouse gas emissions from bioenergy for various reasons, and it is not clear if this struggle will continue throughout the implementation of the CPP. Further, international demand for wood pellets—primarily to satisfy European Union renewable energy mandates—has increased significantly. This development has prompted environmental organizations and others to express concern about the harvest of increasing amounts of biomass and about possible increases in greenhouse gas emissions from the combustion of wood pellets to produce energy. By contrast, some in the forestry industry and the wood pellet industry argue that the international demand presents another market opportunity, that measures are in place to ensure a sustainable biomass feedstock supply, and that biopower can result in lower greenhouse gas emissions. The future contribution of biopower to the U.S. electricity portfolio is uncertain. Challenges to biopower production include regulatory uncertainty (e.g., EPA's CPP), market fluctuation (e.g., natural gas prices), conversion technology development, and tax uncertainty (e.g., extension or termination of renewable energy tax credits), among other issues. Some argue that a comprehensive energy policy focused on renewables could boost biopower production efforts, especially if the policy includes a renewable portfolio standard—a mandate that requires increased production of energy from renewable sources. There is no federal renewable portfolio standard, and the last Congress to robustly debate the issue was the 111th Congress. However, 29 states have established renewable portfolio standards, which vary dramatically from state to state. Current federal support for biopower exists in the form of loans, tax incentives, grant programs, and more.

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Congress periodically establishes agricultural and food policy in an omnibus farm bill. The most recent omnibus farm bill is the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-246 , the 2008 farm bill), and many of its provisions expire in 2012. Most of these statutes were enacted decades ago and are no longer compatible with current national economic objectives, global trading rules, and federal budgetary or regulatory policies. Traditionally, the primary focus of every omnibus farm bill has been farm commodity price and income support policy—namely, the methods and levels of support that the federal government provides to agricultural producers. The omnibus nature of the farm bill creates a broad coalition of support among sometimes conflicting interests for policies that, individually, might not survive the legislative process. Proponents of the current approach to farm commodity support want a stronger safety net, with many focusing on enhancements to risk management tools. Opponents of the status quo often cite cost and budget concerns. Some point to other competing policy priorities, including equitability concerns across the farm sector, and call for enhanced support for small and medium-sized farms, specialty crops, organic agriculture, local and regional food systems, healthy and nutritious foods, research, conservation, and rural development, among other topics. Mandatory spending in the farm bill is primarily authorized for the farm commodity programs, crop insurance, nutrition assistance programs, and some conservation and trade programs. The budget situation is more difficult and uncertain this year than for past farm bills because of the attention to the federal debt. How much of the above baseline can be used to write a farm bill and how much will remain for 2013 and beyond is unknown, given the uncertainty about deficit reduction that is beyond the control of the agriculture committees and may not be resolved for months. Several high-profile congressional and administration proposals for deficit reduction are specifically targeting agricultural programs with mandatory funding. The budget picture is further clouded by other factors. (See " Farm Economy and International Environment ," above.) However, direct payments are estimated to be $49.6 billion over the 10-year period. Many farm safety net proposals have called for combining common elements of commodity programs, disaster programs, and crop insurance. Most conservation supporters saw this as a victory for conservation. Most farm bill program authority expires at the end of FY2012. The current financial climate has caused direct payments under the farm commodity support programs to come under considerable scrutiny. Key biofuels-related provisions in the enacted 2008 farm bill included: expansion of the Biobased Markets Program (to encourage federal procurement of biobased products) and the federal Bioproducts Certification Program; additional support for biorefinery development in the Biorefinery Assistance Program (BAP), which provides grants and loan guarantees for construction and retrofitting of biorefineries for the production of advanced biofuels; restructuring of the Repowering Assistance Program (RAP) to focus on converting fossil fuel-burning plants to retrofit to biomass or some other renewable fuel source for processing energy; a new Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels (BPAB) to provide grants and loan guarantees for advanced biofuels (especially cellulosic) production; extension of the Biodiesel Fuel Education Program to award competitive grants for an education program to promote the use and understanding of biodiesel; a new Rural Energy for America Program (REAP) to provide grants, loans, and loan guarantees in support of rural energy efficiency and self-sufficiency and biofuels marketing infrastructure; reauthorization of the Biomass Research and Development Initiative (BRDI) to support renewable energy research programs within USDA and the Department of Energy (DOE); a new program—the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP)—to provide financial assistance to producers for growing and marketing biomass crops and for developing conversion facilities; and reauthorization of Sun Grant Initiative programs that coordinate research on advanced biofuels at land-grant universities and federally funded laboratories. Four of the past five farm bills have contained separate forestry titles.

Congress periodically establishes agricultural and food policy in an omnibus farm bill. The 112th Congress faces reauthorization of the current five-year farm bill (the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246) because many of its provisions expire in 2012. The 2008 law contained 15 titles covering farm commodity support, horticulture, livestock, conservation, nutrition assistance, international food aid, trade, agricultural research, farm credit, rural development, bioenergy, and forestry, among others. The breadth of farm bills has steadily grown in recent decades to include new and expanding food and agricultural interests. The omnibus nature of the bill can create broad coalitions of support among sometimes conflicting interests for policies that individually might not survive the legislative process. This breadth also can stir fierce competition for available funds, particularly among producers of different commodities, or between those who have differing priorities for farm subsidies, conservation, nutrition, or other programs. One of the principal drivers of the farm bill debate will be the federal budget, which is more uncertain and difficult to predict than for past farm bills because of the congressional attention to deficit reduction. According to Congressional Budget Office estimates, if ongoing programs were to continue under current law, mandatory farm bill spending would be $994 billion over 10 years, with domestic nutrition assistance accounting for more than three-fourths of the total and the rest primarily for the farm safety net (commodity support and crop insurance) and conservation. How much of this baseline can be used to write a farm bill is unknown, given the uncertainty about deficit reduction that is beyond the control of the authorizing committees and may not be resolved for months. Several high-profile congressional and Administration proposals for deficit reduction are specifically targeting agricultural programs with mandatory funding, and the possibility of budget sequestration early next year further clouds the budget picture. Also, disaster assistance, most bioenergy programs, and some conservation programs expire without any baseline beyond their expiration date. Traditionally, the primary focus of omnibus farm bills has been farm commodity price and income support policy—namely, the methods and levels of support that the federal government provides to agricultural producers. The 2008 farm bill combined counter-cyclical support with direct payments available primarily to growers of grains, cotton, and peanuts, regardless of farm commodity market prices. Proponents of the current approach to farm commodity support want a stronger safety net, with many focusing on enhancements to risk management tools such as crop insurance as a substitute for direct payments. Some opponents of the status quo cite the thriving farm economy as a reason for reducing federal support. Others point to competing policy priorities, including equitability concerns across the farm sector, and call for enhanced support for small and medium-sized farms, specialty crops, organic agriculture, local and regional food systems, healthy and nutritious foods, research, conservation, and rural development, among others. Leaders of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees anticipate having a new farm bill completed before the end of this session. If the current law expires without a new authorization or a temporary extension, it automatically would be replaced with permanent statutes for farm commodity support, which are not fully compatible with current national economic objectives, global trading rules, and federal budgetary or regulatory policies.

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T his report provides resources to help congressional staff respond to constituents' frequently asked questions (FAQs) about the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended). The report lists selected resources regarding consumers, employers, and other stakeholders, with a focus on federal sources. It also lists Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports that summarize the ACA's provisions. This list is not a comprehensive directory of all resources on the ACA but rather is intended to address some questions that may arise frequently. Constituents with health insurance questions and problems may contact state insurance departments for assistance. It has questions and answers on health insurance under ACA, including options for obtaining coverage. CRS Report 98-446, Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies The CRS report lists congressional liaison offices at federal agencies, including those that work on ACA issues, such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); HHS's Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, which administers the ACA's private health insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid provisions; the IRS, which administers the ACA's revenue (tax) provisions; the Department of Labor, which administers ACA provisions related to employer-sponsored coverage; and the Congressional Budget Office. Basic Consumer Sources Health Care (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/ Consumer information on obtaining coverage from the ACA exchanges (marketplaces) and using health coverage to get health care. It also lists selected data sources for private health insurance coverage estimates. Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program Individuals can enroll in Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) any time of the year. Taxes See also " The Individual Mandate " and " Subsidies ." The list includes examples of bills to repeal or amend the ACA. Statistics on Insurance Coverage See also " Exchange Statistics " and " Statistics ." Legal and Regulatory Issues See also " Women's Health Care ."

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) had numerous provisions affecting private health insurance and public health coverage programs. This report provides resources to help congressional staff respond to constituents' frequently asked questions (FAQs) about the ACA. It lists selected resources regarding consumers, employers, and other stakeholders, with a focus on federal sources. It also lists Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports that summarize the ACA's provisions. This report begins with links to contacts for constituents' specific questions on insurance coverage (such as state insurance departments and the U.S. Department of Labor's consumer hotline for questions on employer-based coverage) and contacts for questions about HealthCare.gov and ACA tax provisions. It also lists sources for congressional staff to contact federal agencies with ACA questions. The report then provides basic consumer sources, including a glossary of health coverage terms and sources for obtaining the law's full text. The next sections focus on the individual mandate, private health insurance, exchanges, and employer-sponsored coverage. These are followed by information on public health care programs, such as Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and Medicare. The report also provides sources on the ACA's provisions on specific populations: women's health care, Indian health care, veterans' and military health care, and the treatment of noncitizens under the ACA. These are followed by sources on behavioral health (mental health and substance use disorders); public health, workforce, and quality; and state innovation waivers. Finally, the report lists sources on taxes, congressional efforts to repeal or amend the ACA, ACA agency audits and investigations, cost estimates and spending, insurance coverage statistics, and legal and regulatory issues. This list is not a comprehensive directory of all resources on the ACA but rather is intended to address some questions that may arise frequently.

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On April 4, 2012, the STOCK Act (Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012) was signed into law. Secondly, the law requires the establishment of an electronic filing system for certain financial disclosure reports that must be filed by legislative and executive branch officials under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, and requires that the public reports of personal financial information filed by Members of and candidates to Congress, the President, the Vice President, and presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed officials at levels I (cabinet positions) and level II of the Executive Schedule are to be available to be publicly accessed on the Internet in a searchable and sortable format. Insider Trading The provisions of the new law expressly affirm that there exists no exemption for Members of Congress, congressional employees, or for other federal officers or employees from the "insider trading" prohibitions in federal securities law and regulation. In addition to affirming that the insider trading restrictions of securities law and regulation apply to Members of Congress and to other federal officials, the STOCK Act further affirms expressly that each officer and employee of the legislative branch, each executive branch official, and each judicial officer and employee owes a duty of trust and confidence to the United States and the citizens of the United States with respect to material, nonpublic information derived from such person's public employment. The STOCK Act requires, as of July 3, 2012, the public reporting of covered transactions exceeding $1,000 in many of these income-producing assets to be made within 30 days of receiving notice of the transaction, but not later than 45 days after the transaction, from all federal officers and employees in the legislative and executive branches who are required to file public financial disclosure reports under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended. Such transactions in income producing real property, or in such holdings as mutual funds, must still, however, be reported on the annual financial disclosure reports of the official. Internet Posting of Disclosure Reports; Electronic Reporting The STOCK Act as originally adopted had required the posting on the respective official websites of the House and Senate the annual financial disclosure reports, as well as the new prompt reporting disclosures of financial transactions, made in 2012 by Members, officers of the House or Senate, candidates to Congress, and employees of the entire legislative branch who are required to file public financial disclosure reports under the Ethics in Government Act. In response to such concerns and judicial actions, Congress had delayed the implementation of the requirement for Internet posting of personal financial data for most federal officials until the potential impact of these new Internet disclosures may be studied by the National Academy of Public Administration [NAPA]. However, for all other officers and employees in the legislative and executive branches of government who must file public reports with their agencies, these reports will no longer be required to be posted on the Internet.

The STOCK Act (Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012) was signed into law on April 4, 2012. It affirms and makes explicit the fact that there is no exemption from the "insider trading" laws and regulations for Members of Congress, congressional employees, or any federal officials. The law also expressly affirms that all federal officials have a "duty" of trust and confidentiality with respect to nonpublic, material information which they may receive in the course of their official duties, and a duty not to use such information to make a private profit. The STOCK Act, as part of the law's regulation of securities transactions by public officials, now requires expedited, periodic public disclosure of covered "financial transactions" by all officials in the executive and legislative branches of the federal government who are covered by the public reporting provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended. The act thus works to require not only annual public reporting of such transactions (which reporting has been required since 1978), but also now requires public reporting within 30 days of receipt of a notice of a covered financial transaction (but in no event more than 45 days after such transaction). These periodic reports are filed with reference to any financial transactions of $1,000 or more in securities, but are not required for transactions in mutual funds or income-producing real property. The act as originally adopted had required all public financial disclosure statements filed under the Ethics in Government Act in the legislative and executive branches to eventually be made in electronic form, and to be posted on the Internet where they may be publicly searched, sorted, and, if a log-in protocol is followed, downloaded from official government websites. Because of safety concerns, privacy threats, and the possibility of malicious use of such data, federal executives and employees complained about the Internet posting of their detailed financial information, and filed suit to stop the requirement to post such information on the Internet. Congress responded by amending the Stock Act to delay the Internet posting requirements of the public personal financial disclosure reports until a study could be made on the potential impact of having such personal financial information available on the Internet. Legislation (S. 716, 113th Congress) was signed into law on April 15, 2013 (P.L. 113-7, 127 Stat. 438) which permanently rescinds the requirement for Internet posting for most covered employees in the legislative and executive branches of the United States Government. However, the requirement for Internet posting of the financial disclosure reports and all financial information filed by Members of Congress, the President and Vice President, candidates for Congress, and federal officials appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in positions on the Executive Schedule at Levels I (cabinet level) and II, remains in effect, and such information and reports are still required to be posted on the Internet.

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This report highlights those personnel-related issues that seem to generate the most intense constituent interest, and tracks their status in the FY2008 House and Senate versions of the NDAA. The House bill, H.R. 1585 and inserting the text of S. 1547 as amended by the Senate. The entries under " H.R. 1585 House-passed Version" and " H.R. On December 6, 2007, the conference report ( H.Rept. 110-477 ) was filed. Objecting to language in the bill regarding a possible freeze on Iraqi assets held in U.S. banks, the President vetoed it on December 28, 2007. 4986 . 110-181 , 122 Stat. Each presentation in this report offers the background on a given issue, compares House and Senate language on the issue, discusses the proposed and enacted language, identifies other relevant CRS products, and designates a CRS issue expert. Note: some issues were addressed in last year's National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report RL33571, The FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues , concerning that legislation. Those issues that were previously considered in CRS Report RL33571 are designated with a " * " in the relevant section titles of this report. Continuation/Modification of Authority for Members of the Armed Forces to Designate a Recipient for a Portion of the Death Gratuity Background: The Death Gratuity is one of a number of benefits available to the survivors of military personnel. H.R. H.R. This is report language and is not contained in the law itself. *Military Pay Raise Background: Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with end strength increases and recruiting challenges, continue to highlight the military pay issue. Although there had been a provision relating to the issue in the Senate version of the defense authorization bill for FY2007, no language was included in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L.

Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of what the Bush Administration terms the Global War on Terror, along with the emerging operational role of the Reserve Components, have further heightened interest and support for a wide range of military personnel policies and issues. CRS selected a number of issues addressed by Congress as it considered the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1585/S. 1547/H.R. 4986). In each case, a brief synopsis is provided that includes background information, a comparison of the House-passed, Senate-passed, and public law provisions, and a brief discussion of the issue. This update reflects the actions taken on the various House and Senate provisions in H.Rept. 110-477, the conference report to accompany H.R. 1585, which was filed on December 6, 2007. Note: due to objections by the Administration to language that might have led to a freeze on Iraqi assets in U.S. banks contained in H.R. 1585, President Bush vetoed the bill. The bill was reconsidered by the House and Senate, and reissued (without the Iraqi language) as H.R. 4986. H.R. 4986 became P.L. 110-181. Where appropriate, other CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided. Note: some issues were addressed in last year's National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report RL33571, The FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues, concerning that legislation. Those issues that were previously considered in CRS Report RL33571 are designated with a "*" in the relevant section titles of this report. This report focuses exclusively on the annual defense authorization process. It does not include appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices or any discussion of separately introduced legislation. Updates to this report are not anticipated.