Datasets:

learn3r

/

gov_report_memsum_oracle

like 0

crs_R40889

crs_R40889_0

Policy Context Health care reform legislation raises a significant set of complex issues, and among the thornier for policy makers are the noncitizen eligibility and verification issues. That the treatment of foreign nationals complicates health care reform legislation is not surprising given that reform of immigration policy poses its own constellation of controversial policy options. This report focuses on this nexus of immigration law and health care reform in the major health care reform bills that have received committee or floor action. These are the America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 ( H.R. 3200 ), as reported by the House Committees on Energy and Commerce, Ways and Means, and Education and Labor on October 14, 2009, and folded into the Affordable Health Care for America Act ( H.R. 3962 ), which passed on November 7, 2009; the Affordable Health Choices Act ( S. 1679 ), as reported by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) on September 17, 2009; the America's Healthy Future Act ( S. 1796 ), as reported by the Senate Committee on Finance on October 19, 2009; and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( H.R. 3590 as amended), which passed the Senate on December 24, 2009. They are mandated to purchase health insurance, are eligible to purchase insurance through the exchange, and are eligible for the premium and cost-sharing subsidies if they meet the other eligibility requirements. This consistency of treatment holds regardless of when they entered the United States or whether they came initially as refugees or asylees. The treatment of unauthorized aliens varies across bills and across the three elements. 3590 and the Senate Finance bill expressly exempt unauthorized aliens from the mandate to have health coverage and bar them from the health insurance exchange. The proposed policies toward nonimmigrants (those admitted temporarily for a limited purposes, such as students, visitors, or temporary workers) are more nuanced, in large part because some classes of nonimmigrants reside legally in the United States for extended periods of time, some are employed and taxed as a result of those earnings, and some are on a track to become LPRs. H.R. The Senate-passed H.R. Unauthorized aliens would not be eligible for the premium and cost-sharing credit in any of the major bills. The Senate-passed H.R. The Senate-passed H.R. Eligibility for Existing Federal Means-Tested Health Care Coverage in Major Health Care Reform Bills None of the major health care reform bills would alter the noncitizen eligibility laws pertaining to Medicaid or CHIP. Obligations and Eligibility for Existing Federal Tax Provisions in Major Health Care Reform Bills None of the major health care reform bills would alter the laws that authorized the employment of noncitizens, nor would the bills revise the Internal Revenue Code's definitions of resident or nonresident aliens. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) maintains various databases that record the immigration and citizenship status of foreign nationals in the United States. 3590 and S. 1796 would use three pieces of personal data to verify citizenship and immigration status. The Social Security Administration (SSA) would verify the name, social security number, and date of birth of the individual. 3962 would expressly require the Health Choices Commissioner to verify citizenship and immigration status. 3962 references §1137(d) of the SSA, which is the statutory authority for the SAVE system.

Health care reform legislation raises a significant set of complex issues, and among the thornier for policy makers are the noncitizen eligibility and verification issues. That the treatment of foreign nationals complicates health care reform legislation is not surprising given that reform of immigration policy poses its own constellation of controversial policy options. This report focuses on this nexus of immigration law and health care reform in the major health care reform bills that are receiving action. These are the America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 (H.R. 3200), as reported by the House Committees on Energy and Commerce, Ways and Means, and Education and Labor on October 14, 2009, and folded into the Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962), which passed on November 7, 2009; the Affordable Health Choices Act (S. 1679), as reported by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) on September 17, 2009; the America's Healthy Future Act (S. 1796), as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Finance on October 13, 2009; and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590 as amended), which passed the Senate on December 24, 2009. Legal permanent residents (LPRs) are treated similarly to U.S. citizens under all the major health care reform bills. They are mandated to obtain health insurance, are eligible to purchase insurance through the exchange, and are eligible for the premium and cost-sharing subsidies if they meet the other eligibility requirements. This consistency of treatment holds regardless of when they entered the United States or whether they came initially as refugees or asylees. The proposed policies toward nonimmigrants (i.e., those in the United States temporarily, such as students and temporary workers) are more nuanced in large part because some classes of nonimmigrants reside legally in the United States for extended periods of time, some are employed and taxed as a result of those earnings, and some are on a track to become LPRs. The treatment of unauthorized aliens varies across bills and across the three elements (the individual mandate, eligibility for the exchange, and eligibility for subsidies). Unauthorized aliens would not be eligible for the premium and cost-sharing credits in any of the bills. The Senate-passed H.R. 3590 and the Senate Finance bill expressly exempt them from the mandate to have health coverage and bar them from the health insurance exchange. Another aspect of the legislation germane to the issue of noncitizens is the immigration and citizenship verification provisions of the bills. Under Senate-passed H.R. 3590, three pieces of personal data would be used to verify citizenship and immigration status. The Social Security Administration would verify the name, social security number, and date of birth of the individual, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would verify an individual's immigration status. While the Senate-passed H.R. 3590 has requirements similar to and compatible with the DHS Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system established by §1137(d) of the Social Security Act (SSA), H.R. 3962 would expressly build on the statutory authority of the SAVE system to verify citizenship and immigration status. None of the major health care reform bills would alter the noncitizen eligibility laws pertaining to Medicaid or CHIP. Moreover, none of the major health care reform bills would alter the Internal Revenue Code on the definitions of resident or nonresident aliens.

crs_R40092

crs_R40092_0

Issue Overview Current Diplomacy Following leadership changes in the United States and Israel in early 2009 and the Israel-Hamas Gaza conflict in December 2008-January 2009, the inconclusive final-status peace negotiations that took place between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the final year of the Bush Administration have not resumed. Nevertheless, President Barack Obama showed his commitment to a negotiated "two-state solution" just days after his January 2009 inauguration by appointing former Senator George Mitchell—who was successful as a mediator in the Northern Ireland conflict for the Clinton Administration in the 1990s—as his Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. In September 2009, Obama convened a trilateral meeting with Netanyahu and Abbas in New York and addressed the annual opening session of the United Nations General Assembly. He indicated that negotiations should not be delayed further, despite the lack of resolution on preliminary issues: Simply put, it is past time to talk about starting negotiations. The Two-State Debate in Context It has now been 16 years since Israel and the PLO agreed to the 1993 Oslo Accord. Yet, differences between the sides over core issues, such as borders, security, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, refugees, and water rights, have not been overcome, despite the third-party involvement of various international actors—the United States, in particular. Yet there are a number of key actors and observers expressing doubts that the very concept of a negotiated two-state solution can survive a process in which negotiations are put on hold and resumed an indefinite number of times without finality. These doubts have been exacerbated by geopolitical changes and by realities on the ground—including demographics, violence, Palestinian factionalism, Israeli settlements, and other impediments to Palestinian movement and territorial contiguity—that sustain tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. Decreased hope in the viability of a two-state solution has led to a willingness among some policymakers and analysts to consider different pathways to get there—such as Palestinian statehood prior to a final-status agreement or a "borders first" deal. It also has led to openness among some Israelis and Palestinians to alternative solutions that are contrary to declared U.S. policy. These alternatives, each of which is the subject of considerable debate among and between Israelis and Palestinians, include a so-called "one-state solution," a "Jordanian" or "regional" option, or other, non-negotiated outcomes. Continued failure to reach a two-state solution, combined with lack of consensus on any of the alternatives, may also mean that the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza could continue indefinitely. After then outlining possible alternatives to a two-state solution, the report analyzes the policy challenges facing a U.S. approach to promoting a two-state solution—including implications for Congress—on matters such as foreign aid, security assistance, Israeli settlements, and the treatment of the militant Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, or "FTO"). U.S. Policy Debate Over the U.S.

Following leadership changes in the United States and Israel in early 2009 and the Israel-Hamas Gaza conflict in December 2008-January 2009, the inconclusive final-status peace negotiations that took place between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the final year of the Bush Administration have not resumed. Nevertheless, President Barack Obama showed his commitment to a negotiated "two-state solution" just days after his January 2009 inauguration by appointing former Senator George Mitchell as his Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. In September 2009, Obama convened a trilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas in New York and addressed the annual opening session of the United Nations General Assembly. He indicated that final-status negotiations should not be delayed further, despite the lack of resolution on preliminary issues such as the possible freeze of Israeli settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem or the possible gradual normalization of ties between Israel and certain Arab states. It has now been 16 years since Israel and the PLO agreed to the 1993 Oslo Accord. Yet, differences between the sides over core issues, such as borders, security, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, refugees, and water rights, have not been overcome, despite the third-party involvement of various international actors—the United States, in particular. Previously when talks have faltered, the parties eventually returned to the negotiating table. Yet there are a number of key actors and observers expressing doubts that the very concept of a negotiated two-state solution can survive a process in which negotiations are put on hold and resumed an indefinite number of times without finality. These doubts have been exacerbated by geopolitical changes and by realities on the ground—including demographics, violence, Palestinian factionalism, Israeli settlements, and other impediments to Palestinian movement and territorial contiguity—that sustain tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. Decreased hope in the viability of a two-state solution has led to a willingness among some policymakers and analysts to consider different pathways to get there—such as Palestinian statehood prior to a final-status agreement or a "borders first" deal. It also has led to openness among some Israelis and Palestinians to alternative solutions that are contrary to declared U.S. policy. These alternatives, each of which is the subject of considerable debate among and between Israelis and Palestinians, include a so-called "one-state solution," a "Jordanian" or "regional" option, or other, non-negotiated outcomes. Continued failure to reach a two-state solution, combined with lack of consensus on any of the alternatives, may also mean that the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza could continue indefinitely. Debate continues over the proper U.S. approach to the peace process. Congress faces significant policy challenges both with its oversight of the Obama Administration's formulation and implementation of policy; and on matters such as foreign aid, security assistance, Israeli settlements, the role of Arab states, and the treatment of the militant Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). For more information on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and peace process, see CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed].

crs_RL33719

crs_RL33719_0

Introduction Over the past couple of decades, the courts and Congress have been grappling with tobacco-related issues, among them, the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) authority to regulate tobacco under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA); the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that resulted from lawsuits by states' attorneys general against tobacco companies; federal, private party, and foreign lawsuits against tobacco companies; limits on tobacco advertising; and restrictions on selling and distributing tobacco to minors. This report concerns all of the above issues except the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco products, which is covered in a separate CRS report. State Suits and the Master Settlement Agreement Beginning in 1994, 41 states and Puerto Rico began filing lawsuits against tobacco companies for reimbursement of tobacco-related medical expenses, particularly Medicaid expenditures. In November 1998, attorneys general from 46 states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories signed the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the major tobacco companies. The MSA did not settle individual, union, private health care, or class action suits. The Federal Lawsuit The federal lawsuit against major tobacco companies and industry trade groups began under the Clinton Administration in 1999 as a way for the U.S. government to recover tobacco-related medical costs paid by federal health care programs. The Department of Justice (DOJ) was seeking: (1) restitution for money paid by the federal government's health care programs for treatment and care of persons with tobacco-related diseases; (2) a disgorgement of the profits that the tobacco industry allegedly earned by violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); and (3) orders preventing fraud and future violations of the law, such as racketeering or making false, deceptive, or misleading statements about cigarettes; as well as orders that the defendants take certain actions, such as issuing corrective statements, disclosing research, and funding smoking cessation programs. The district court also enjoined the defendants from using descriptors such as low-tar, light, mild, and natural on their cigarette packaging and advertisements; ordered the defendants to place "onserts" or stickers with corrective statements on their packaging and to issue statements in newspapers and on television and retail displays; and extended the length of time that tobacco companies must make documents produced in litigation available to the public, a requirement that originated in the MSA. Then, in 1992, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , the U.S. Supreme Court made it more feasible for smokers to recover. Tobacco Advertising: Federal Regulations, MSA Restrictions, and Local Ordinances67 The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) limits advertising of tobacco products. The Court upheld restrictions banning self-service displays and requiring customers to have contact with a sales person before handling or purchasing tobacco products. Restrictions on Selling and Distributing to Minors All 50 states ban tobacco sales to individuals under age 18, and federal law plays a role in this restriction.

Over the past couple of decades, the courts and Congress have been grappling with tobacco-related issues, among them, the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) authority to regulate certain tobacco products under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA); the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that resulted from lawsuits brought by states' attorneys general against tobacco companies; federal, private party, and foreign lawsuits against tobacco companies; limits on tobacco advertising; restrictions on selling and distributing tobacco to minors; and the Federal Trade Commission's rescission of its 1966 guidance document relating to tar and nicotine yields in cigarettes. This report addresses the above issues, with the exception of the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco products. For information on that topic see CRS Report R41304, FDA Final Rule Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. In the 1990s, states' attorneys general brought lawsuits for reimbursement of their states' tobacco-related medical expenses. They reached a settlement with tobacco companies in 1997, but the settlement did not garner the congressional approval needed for implementation. In 1998, 46 states, the District of Columbia, five U.S. territories, and the tobacco industry signed the MSA, worth $206 billion over 26 years. In 1999, the Clinton Administration filed a lawsuit against major tobacco companies and industry trade groups to recoup federal tobacco-related medical costs. In 2006, a federal district court held that the tobacco companies violated two provisions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) by, among other things, making false statements about the health effects of smoking. Among other remedies, the court ordered them to remove descriptors such as light, low-tar, natural, mild, and ultra light from their packaging. In 2012, the court ordered them to issue factual statements to counter the false statements that were part of the RICO verdict. Since the U.S. Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., individual and class action lawsuits have been brought against tobacco companies under theories such as fraudulent representation, conspiracy, breach of express warranty, and failure to warn. The private party suit section of this report discusses selected state class actions. Suits brought in federal courts by foreign governments for medical care costs resulting from tobacco-related illnesses have not been successful. Tobacco advertising is restricted at the federal, state, and local levels. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA), state laws, the MSA, and local ordinances limit tobacco advertising in ways such as prohibiting radio and television advertisements, compelling the use of health warning labels, limiting the use of terms that imply decreased health risks, banning the use of cartoons, and requiring individuals to have contact with a sales person before purchasing tobacco products. Additionally, federal law plays a role in enforcing laws that prohibit tobacco sales and marketing to minors.

crs_R44605

crs_R44605_0

Introduction United States-China relations, since 196 9, when the process of normalization began under President Richard M. Nixon, have advanced to a point that relatively few restrictions affecting trade remain. This report summarizes the United States' economic sanctions on China, including limits on U.S. foreign assistance and State Department programs; limits on U.S. support for China's requests for funding in the international financial institutions; prohibitions on the exportation of defense articles and defense services to China; prohibitions on the importation of munitions and ammunition from China; limits on exports to China of goods and services controlled for national security or foreign policy reasons, including a prohibition on exports to specific Chinese entities of goods that have a military end-use; limits on import/export and procurement contracts for specific Chinese entities found to be engaged in weapons proliferation activities; and restrictions on access to U.S.-based assets and ability to enter into transactions with U.S. persons, imposed on specific Chinese persons for reasons ranging from weapons proliferation, illicit narcotics trafficking, international terrorism, and engagement with others against which the United States imposes sanctions (i.e., entities in Iran, Russia, North Korea, Belarus).

United States-China relations, since 1969, when the process of normalization began under President Richard M. Nixon, have advanced to a point that relatively few restrictions affecting trade remain. This report summarizes the United States' economic sanctions on China. The United States, in its relationship with China, limits U.S. foreign assistance and State Department programs; limits U.S. support for China's requests for funding in the international banks; prohibits the exportation of defense articles and defense services to China; prohibits the importation of munitions and ammunition from China; limits exports to China of goods and services controlled for national security or foreign policy reasons, including prohibiting exports to specific Chinese entities of goods that have a military end-use; limits import/export and procurement contracts for specific Chinese entities found to be engaged in weapons proliferation activities; and restricts access to U.S.-based assets and the ability to enter into transactions with U.S. persons, imposed on specific Chinese persons for reasons ranging from weapons proliferation, illicit narcotics trafficking, international terrorism, and engagement with others against which the United States imposes sanctions (i.e., entities in Iran, Russia, North Korea, Belarus). Policymakers recognize the influence and impact of China's growing economy and role in international markets, military modernization, increasingly outward-looking investment in other regions, activities in the South China Sea, and often contrarian position in the United Nations Security Council. These factors challenge legislators and the executive branch alike in their efforts to shape and implement the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.

crs_R41634

crs_R41634_0

Introduction Both the House and Senate have internal rules encouraging the separation of money and policy decisions. Limitations within appropriations measures are provisions that negatively restrict the amount, purpose, or availability of funds without changing existing law. The effect of these provisions is to limit the actions for which funds may be used through the capping or outright denial of funds for specific purposes. Proper limitations are distinct from legislative provisions because they do not have the effect of either making new law or changing existing law. The distinction between legislative provisions and funding limitations has been developed and refined over time based on various rulings that establish what types of provisions are allowable. Limitations and the Floor Process The rules of the House and Senate with respect to limitations are enforced during floor consideration of general appropriations measures. Forms of Limitations and Previous Purposes37 There are two forms in which limitations are regularly proposed. The first form places a total ban on the use of funds for a certain purpose by stipulating that none of the funds in the account or bill can be used for such purpose. The second form, sometimes referred to as a "not to exceed" limitation, provides that the use of funds is not to exceed a specific amount or percentage of total funds. Limitations have been previously allowed that prohibit funding for specific activities, a class of recipients, and earmarks. Limitations as Funding Prohibitions Limitations that prohibit federal funding for certain activities and restrict the types of recipients that can be eligible to receive federal government funds have previously been allowed under House and Senate rules. These types of limitations have been used to cap funds for certain accounts, items, activities, titles, or agencies or to place ceilings on total expenditures. Transfer Authority "Not to exceed" limitations have also been used to restrict transfer authority. Distinguishing Between Limitations and Legislative Provisions The precedents of the House and Senate distinguish between the limitations and legislative provisions based upon both structure and substance. In addition, whether or not the recipient of the funds can be considered "federal" and, in the House, if the subject matter of the limitation involves taxes or tariffs, are also factors that can have an impact on its admissibility. Provided further , That none of the funds appropriated in this paragraph and made available on October 1, 1980 shall be used to pay trade readjustment benefits under part I of subchapter B of chapter 2 of Title I of the Trade Act of 1974 for any week to any individual who is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits for such week; Provided further , That none of the funds appropriated in this paragraph and made available on October 1, 1980 shall be used to pay trade readjustment benefits under part I of subchapter B of chapter 2 of title II of the Trade Act of 1974 to any individual in an amount for any week in excess of the weekly unemployment insurance benefits which he received or which he would have received if he applied for such insurance… The point of order was overruled because the determinations that would need to be made by the agency to comply with this provision would be the same as those required by existing law. A limitation also cannot subject funds to a contingency that would require an official or agency to perform new duties not mandated in current law. Burden of Proof When a point of order is raised against a limitation provision contained within an appropriations bill or amendment, the burden of proof is on its proponent to demonstrate that it is a valid limitation that does not effectively change agency discretion or impose new duties in order for it to be allowed.

Both the House and Senate have internal rules encouraging the separation of money and policy decisions. These rules bar legislative provisions from being included in general appropriations measures under most circumstances. Limitations within appropriations measures are provisions that negatively restrict the amount, purpose, or availability of funds without changing existing law. The effect of these provisions is to limit the actions for which funds may be used through the capping or outright denial of funds. Limitations are distinct from legislative provisions, which have the effect of either making new law or changing existing law. This distinction has been developed and refined over time based on various rulings establishing what type of language is allowable. The procedural contexts within the House and Senate for the consideration of limitations on the floor differ in three significant ways. First, although legislative provisions are generally not allowed under the rules of the House, the rules of the Senate do allow exceptions under some circumstances. Second, House Rule XXI designates a particular process for the consideration of limitation amendments, but the Senate has no specific procedures relating to such provisions. Third, although House Rule XXII bans legislative language within conference reports, Senate rules contain no such prohibition. There are two forms in which limitations regularly occur. The first form places a total ban on the use of funds by stipulating that none of the funds in the account or bill can be used for a certain purpose. The second form, sometimes referred to as a "not to exceed" limitation, provides that the use of funds is not to exceed a specific amount or percentage of total funds for a certain account, item, activity, agency, or bill but does not change existing law. Limitations that prohibit the use of funds for certain purposes have been used to prevent federal funding for specific activities, a class of recipients, or to prohibit funding for earmarks. "Not to exceed" limitations have been used to establish funding ceilings for certain activities or total funding amounts. Both types of limitations also have been used to restrict the availability of funds for transfer. Limitations and legislative provisions are distinguished both by structure and substance. With respect to structure, a limitation must be phrased as a negative funding prohibition. For substance, a limitation must not effectively waive current law, alter agency discretion, impose new duties upon the official or agency, or provide funding based upon a contingency. Additionally, whether the recipient of the funds can be considered "federal" and, in the House, if the subject matter of the limitation involves taxes or tariffs, can determine the admissibility of this type of provision. When a limitation provision has been the subject of a point of order, the burden of proof is on its proponent to demonstrate that the restrictions exist within current law or that the new provision does not effectively change agency discretion or impose new duties.

crs_R44025

crs_R44025_0

Authority for mandatory reporting was set to expire on September 30, 2015. In September 2015, the Senate amended the House-passed bill, and Congress reauthorized LMR until September 30, 2020, in the enacted Agriculture Reauthorizations Act of 2015 ( P.L. Background Before livestock mandatory price reporting was enacted by Congress in 1999, the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) collected livestock and meat price and related market information from meat packers on a voluntary basis under the authority of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 (7 U.S.C. §1621 et seq.). Fewer animals were sold through negotiated (cash; or "spot") sales, and more frequently sold under alternative marketing arrangements (e.g., formula sales based on a negotiated price established in the future) with prices not publicly disclosed or reported. Some livestock producers, believing such arrangements made it difficult or impossible for them to determine "fair" market prices for livestock going to slaughter, called for mandatory price reporting for packers and others who process and market meat. Legislative and Rulemaking History The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 (LMR, P.L. 106-78 , Title IX; 7 U.S.C. The law mandated price reporting for live cattle, boxed beef, and live swine and allowed USDA to establish mandatory price reporting for lamb sales. USDA issued a final rule on December 1, 2000. On April 28, 2015, the Mandatory Price Reporting Act of 2015 ( H.R. 2051 , the Agriculture Reauthorizations Act of 2015, included provisions to reauthorize Mandatory Price Reporting, the U.S. 114-54 ) was signed into law on September 30, 2015. In addition, the act makes several changes to swine reporting, revises definitions in lamb reporting, and requires USDA to conduct a study on LMR ahead of the next reauthorization. The Senate-amended version included most of the House-passed provisions. However, the section of the House-passed bill that granted emergency authority to USDA to continue price reporting in the event of a government shutdown because of a lapse in appropriations, which was widely supported by the cattle, swine, and lamb industries, was not included in the enacted law. Lastly, the act requires that next-day reports include transaction prices that were concluded after the previous day's reporting deadlines. However, like past reauthorizations, livestock industry stakeholders suggested changes that were intended to improve mandatory reporting and to address issues that emerged since the last reauthorization. Although the House-passed version ( H.R.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) collected livestock and meat price and related market information from meat packers on a voluntary basis under the authority of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 (7 U.S.C. §1621 et seq.). However, as the livestock industry became increasingly concentrated in the 1990s, fewer animals were sold through negotiated (cash; or "spot") purchases and more frequently sold under alternative marketing arrangements that were not publicly disclosed under voluntary reporting. Some livestock producers, believing such arrangements made it difficult or impossible for them to determine "fair" market prices for livestock going to slaughter, called for mandatory price reporting for packers and others who process and market meat. In response, Congress passed the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-78, Title IX; LMR). The law mandated price reporting for live cattle, boxed beef, and live swine and allowed USDA to establish mandatory price reporting for lamb sales. USDA issued a final rule in December 2000 that went into effect in April 2001. The final rule included mandatory reporting for lamb. The law has been amended to include more detail on swine and to add wholesale pork. The act has been reauthorized three times, and the last reauthorization was set to expire September 30, 2015. In September 2015, the Senate and House passed the Agriculture Reauthorizations Act of 2015 (H.R. 2051), a Senate-amended version of the House-passed Mandatory Price Reporting Act of 2015, which reauthorized mandatory price reporting until September 30, 2020. The act was signed into law (P.L. 114-54) on September 30, 2015. Reauthorization was widely supported by livestock industry stakeholders. As in past years, stakeholders proposed changes that were intended to improve mandatory reporting as issues emerged between reauthorizations. In response to livestock stakeholders, the act makes several changes to swine reporting, creating a new negotiated formula purchase category and requiring that transactions reported after the day's reporting deadline be reported in the next-day price reports. It revises the definitions of lamb importers and packers by lowering the volume thresholds for determining if an importer or packer is subject to reporting requirements. Lastly, the act requires USDA to conduct a study on LMR ahead of the next reauthorization. However, the act did not include a provision to grant emergency authority to USDA to continue price reporting in the event of a government shutdown because of a lapse in appropriations. This provision was widely supported by livestock industry stakeholders and had been included in the House-passed version of H.R. 2051.

crs_RS20786

crs_RS20786_0

It is utilized by many foreign companies as a gateway to markets inmainlandChina. Hong Kong is a member of a variety of multilateral economic organizations,suchas the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. (5) The effects of the Asian economic crisis on Hong Kong were significant. U.S. officials continue to work with Hong Kong officials to ensure that Hong Kong is not used byChina to illegally circumvent U.S. controls on exports of dual-use and other high technology products and to combatviolations of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR) in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong is described by many observers as having the world's freesteconomy due to its low tax, free trade, and strong rule of law policies. Hong Kong is an important U.S. tradingpartnerand serves as a gateway for many U.S. companies doing business in China. For those reasons, the continuedeconomicautonomy of Hong Kong is of concern to Congress, as are a variety of trade issues such as the effectiveness of HongKong's export control regime on dual-use technologies, and protection of U.S. intellectual property rights. China. This report will be updated as events warrant.

crs_R43165

crs_R43165_0

Introduction In the course of executing their missions, all federal departments and agencies create federal records. The FRA requires federal departments and agencies to collect, retain, and preserve their records—thus providing Congress, the executive branch, and the public with a history of public-policy execution and its results. Pursuant to the FRA, agencies are to work with the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to create records schedules that permit agencies to dispose of records of temporary value properly and to preserve those with permanent value to the government and the public. In August 2012, NARA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) jointly released a directive to federal departments and agencies. With the increase in the creation and use of electronic records, Congress may have an interest in examining whether agencies are taking appropriate steps to ensure the authenticity and trustworthiness of the documents they create and preserve. It is unclear, for example whether the devices and applications agencies currently use to create and retain digital records will be viable over long periods of time and ensure enduring access to government information. Platforms for Records Creation In recent years, the number of platforms—specifically online and electronic platforms—that agencies employ to create records has rapidly increased. In 2008, for example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) determined that "e-mail records were not being appropriately identified and preserved" at certain federal agencies. NARA, therefore, may not know the true volume of the universe of federal records. Presidential records, pursuant to the Presidential Records Act (44 U.S.C. Electronic Records: Policy Concerns and Potential Policy Options With the increase in the creation and use of electronic records, and concern about the durability of those records, the 113 th Congress may have an interest in overseeing whether agencies are appropriately capturing and maintaining their federal records. Additionally, Congress may choose to revisit the laws that govern federal recordkeeping and disposal to ensure that they include federal records created on different platforms using diverse technologies. Congress may choose to continue its oversight of the implementation of the Administration's guidance on federal records management.

All federal departments and agencies create federal records "in connection with the transaction of public business." The Federal Records Act, as amended (44 U.S.C. Chapters 21, 29, 31, and 33), requires executive branch departments and agencies to collect, retain, and preserve federal records, which provide the Administration, Congress, and the public with a history of public-policy execution and its results. Increasing use of e-mail, social media, and other electronic media has prompted a proliferation of record creation in the federal government. The variety of electronic platforms used to create federal records, however, may complicate the technologies needed to capture and retain them. It is also unclear whether the devices and applications that agencies currently use to create and retain records will be viable in perpetuity—making access to federal records over time increasingly complicated, costly, and potentially impossible. In recent years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) reported records management deficiencies at federal agencies. NARA, which has government-wide records management responsibilities, found 45% of agencies were at high risk of mismanaging their records. Agencies' inabilities to comply with federal recordkeeping laws and responsibilities may make it difficult for NARA to predict future federal archiving needs because officials may not anticipate the true volume of records, nor will they know the variety of platforms used to create those records. The executive branch has taken steps to clarify records management responsibilities and attempted to improve recordkeeping administration. In August 2012, for example, NARA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) jointly released a directive providing agencies with a framework for managing federal records, including both paper and electronic records. Yet, challenges remain. Congress may have an interest in overseeing whether agencies are appropriately capturing and maintaining their federal records. Additionally, Congress may choose to revisit the laws that govern federal recordkeeping to address the variety of platforms used to create federal records. Congress may also choose to ensure that such records will be accessible to the public in perpetuity. Moreover, with the increase in the creation and use of electronic records, Congress may have an interest in examining whether agencies are taking appropriate steps to ensure the authenticity and trustworthiness of the electronic documents they create and preserve.

crs_RS22888

crs_RS22888_0

The assessment of these options is being undertaken by an integrated product team comprising representatives from the Infantry Center; the Armament, Research, Development, and Engineering Center; the Program Executive Office Soldier; and each of the other armed services. Individual Carbine Competition The Army intends to conduct an open competition for a successor to the M4. Its proposal is before the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for approval and, if approved as expected, would permit the Army to solicit submissions from the small arms industry by this fall. Complete results of the competition and selection of a new carbine are not expected before FY2013, and it is anticipated that it would then take another three to four years to fully field the new weapons. Concerns with M-4 Reliability and Lethality Reports suggest that soldiers have expressed concerns regarding the reliability and lethality of the M-4. Other reports, however, suggest that the M-4 has performed well and been generally well-received by troops.

The M-4 carbine is the Army's primary individual combat weapon for infantry units. While there have been concerns raised by some about the M-4's reliability and lethality, some studies suggest that the M-4 is performing well and is viewed favorably by users. The Army is undertaking both the M4 Carbine Improvement Program and the Individual Carbine Competition, the former to identify ways to improve the current weapon, and the latter to conduct an open competition among small arms manufacturers for a follow-on weapon. An integrated product team comprising representatives from the Infantry Center; the Armament, Research, Development, and Engineering Center; the Program Executive Office Soldier; and each of the armed services will assess proposed improvements to the M4. The proposal for the industry-wide competition is currently before the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and with the anticipated approval, solicitation for industry submissions could begin this fall. It is expected, however, that a selection for a follow-on weapon will not occur before FY2013, and that fielding of a new weapon would take an additional three to four years. This report will be updated as events warrant.

crs_RL32502

crs_RL32502_0

Introduction Concerns that the economy might be heading toward a recession have led some policymakers to consider economic stimulus legislation. Proponents of the tax cuts passed in 2001, 2002, and 2003 argued that they would have salutary effects on the economy. Most estimates predicted that the tax cuts would increase economic growth in the short-term and reduce it in the long run. Its major revenue-side provision was accelerated depreciation for business investment. It also reduced the tax rates on dividend and capital gains income. Table 1 gives the estimated revenue loss of the tax cuts and their key provisions as scored by the Joint Committee on Taxation at the time the tax cuts were enacted. Certain provisions that are large in the long run are small to date and will not be explored, most notably the repeal of the estate tax. In 2003, they increased 0.5 percentage points to 1.6% of GDP. Because government spending rose as a percentage of GDP in the years when taxes were cut, these tax cuts can be characterized as wholly deficit-financed tax cuts (financed by increasing the deficit or decreasing the surplus). Economists can observe how the economy performed after a tax cut, but because they cannot observe the counterfactual—how the economy would have performed in the absence of a tax cut—there is no direct way to tell what contribution the tax cut made to the economy's performance. If the deficit is the result of tax cuts, aggregate spending is boosted by the tax cut's recipient to the extent that the tax cut is spent (not saved or invested in financial securities). Since the 2001 tax cuts took place during a recession and the 2002-2003 tax cuts took place during a period of sluggish recovery characterized by an economy operating below full employment, the Keynesian framework is a valid one to capture, at least in part, the effects of these tax cuts on the economy. These include the child tax credit and marriage penalty relief for most taxpayers. There tends to be no modeling of monetary policy since there are no short term effects. (No estimates of JCWAA's effects were found.) Like all intertemporal models, a permanent deficit-financed tax cut is inconsistent with the model because it would have caused the national debt to grow indefinitely. Auerbach assumed that the tax cut would result in higher taxes at some point in the future and ran simulations in which either the tax on labor or the tax on capital was raised; an increase in the wage tax reduced output more than an increase in the capital tax. The life cycle model predicted that GDP would be increased by a cumulative total of 0.2% over the first five years, and decreased by a cumulative total over the next five years by 0.1% if the tax cuts were financed by reduced government transfer payments (e.g., Social Security) after 2013 and reduced 0.2% if financed by higher taxes after 2013. On average, the proposals would increase GDP by 0.2% in the MA model and 1.4% in the GI model. These estimates were made before the tax cut occurred, and were not based on actual ex-post data. Unfortunately, there is no consensus among macroeconomists as to which one model is most suitable for policy simulations, and no model with a strong track record in accurately projecting economic events. The effect of growth in other macroeconomic models is considered next. Investment, National Saving, Interest Rates, and Growth in the Solow Model Deficit-financed tax cuts reduce public saving; unless this is offset by higher private saving or borrowing from abroad, national saving will be reduced and interest rates will rise. Typically, the trade deficit declines when growth has been low.

Recession concerns have led policymakers to consider economic stimulus legislation. These proposals have raised questions about the economic effects of past policy changes. Congress enacted major tax cuts in 2001, 2002, and 2003. The acts reduced marginal income tax rates; reduced taxes on married couples, dividends, capital gains, and on estates and gifts; increased the child tax credit; and accelerated depreciation for business investment. The tax cuts resulted in an estimated revenue loss of 0.4% of GDP in 2001, 1.1% in 2002, and 1.6% in 2003. Since government spending rose as taxes were cut, the cuts can be characterized as deficit financed. It is hard to be certain what effects the tax cuts have had on the economy because there is no way to compare actual events to the counterfactual case where the tax cuts were not enacted. The most common method of estimating a tax cut's effect is to feed it into a macroeconomic model of the economy and see what the model predicts. Note that this is typically done before the fact: economic estimates of the tax cut's effect are not based on actual ex post data. These estimates are highly uncertain because there is no one macroeconomic model that adequately captures all of the economy's dynamics, no consensus among macroeconomists as to which one model is most suitable for policy simulations, and no model with a strong track record in accurately projecting economic events. Most estimates predicted that the tax cuts would increase economic growth in the short-term and reduce it in the long run. For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation predicted that the 2003 tax cut would increase GDP by an average of 0.2% to 0.5% in the first five years and decrease it by -0.1% to -0.2% over the next five years. Keynesian models find the largest positive short-term effect of the tax cuts on the economy. But these effects are completely temporary because they focus on how tax cuts boost aggregate spending; in the long run, prices adjust, and production rather than spending determines the level of output. In neo-classical (Solow) growth models, deficit-financed tax cuts reduce national saving, thereby reducing national income because capital investment can only be financed through national saving or foreign borrowing. If the latter occurs, the result will be an increased trade deficit. In intertemporal models, a deficit-financed tax cut is unsustainable: it must be offset in the future by a tax increase or spending cut to prevent the national debt from growing indefinitely. Thus, in these models, tax cuts followed by tax increases lead individuals to shift work and saving into the low-tax period, increasing growth then, and out of the high-tax period, reducing growth then. The period encompassing the tax cuts featured a recession of average duration but below-average depth, an initially sluggish recovery, a deep and unusually long decline in employment, a small decline in hours worked, a sharp and long lasting contraction in investment spending, a significant decline in national saving, and an unusually large trade deficit. Opponents see this as evidence that the tax cuts were ineffective; proponents argue that the economy would have performed worse in their absence. Also consider that some, perhaps most, of the recovery was due to monetary rather than fiscal stimulus.

crs_R41548

crs_R41548_0

House Rule XII, Clause 7(c) Summary of the Rule On January 5, 2011, the House of Representatives adopted an amendment to House Rule XII adding a requirement to all measures introduced in the House of Representatives that are intended to become law. Specifically, Rule XII, clause 7(c) requires that, to be accepted for introduction by the House Clerk, all bills (H.R.) and joint resolutions (H.J.Res.) must provide a document stating "as specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint resolution." The requirement is mandatory, and the House Clerk appears to have the authority to reject introduction of any bill and/or joint resolution that is not accompanied by such a statement. It should be noted, however, that the rule does not appear to vest the House Clerk with the responsibility or authority to evaluate the substantiality of the required statement. Further, based on the plain language of the rule, such a statement is not required for House Resolutions (H.Res. ), proposed amendments to already introduced bills, or other types of measures that may be considered by the House. Standard/Criteria for Determining Constitutional Authority The rule appears to adopt a subjective standard for determining what specific constitutional authority exists to enact an introduced bill. In other words, the rule appears to leave each individual Member free to ascertain, by whatever means the Member deems appropriate, his/her own basis for constitutional authority. Should a Member choose to consider the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court through its majority opinions, that appears to be permissible under the rule. Equally permissible sources for Members to rely on could include their own personal interpretations of the text of the Constitution; documents produced at the Constitutional Convention, such as James Madison's Notes on the Constitutional Convention of 1787 ; sources published contemporaneously with the consideration and ratification of the Constitution by the states, such as the Federalist Papers , Anti-Federalist Papers , and the ratification debates of the state legislatures; commentaries on the Constitution, such as Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States or The Heritage Guide to the Constitution ; academic journal articles, constitutional law treatises, and other publications; the advice of congressional support agencies; the advice of outside groups or think tanks; submitted statements for similar proposed legislation; and any other source that the Member believes to be relevant and authoritative. This section of the report will discuss four such broad categories of legislation: authorization legislation; appropriations legislation; legislation that places conditions on the availability of federal funds; and, finally, legislation that repeals existing laws and/or programs. Specific Constitutional Textual Authorities As noted above, it may be difficult to fully articulate the textual constitutional authorities which can serve as the basis for a proposed bill, as the various powers of the federal government may overlap, so that several constitutional authorities might individually suffice to authorize Congress's authority over a particular subject matter. Further, case law may have either expanded or limited the apparent reach of these authorizations. In addition, the "Necessary and Proper Clause" and other implied powers may also support the expansion of congressional authority beyond these explicit authorities in ways not easily discernible from the text. Outlined on the following pages is a list of general types of legislation and related provisions of the Constitution that might arguably provide the power to legislate on some aspects of an issue.

On January 5, 2011, the House of Representatives adopted an amendment to House Rule XII adding a requirement to all measures introduced in the House of Representatives that are intended to become law. Specifically, Rule XII, clause 7(c) requires that, to be accepted for introduction by the House Clerk, all bills (H.R.) and joint resolutions (H.J.Res.) must provide a document stating "as specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint resolution." The requirement is mandatory, and the House Clerk appears to have the authority to reject introduction of any bill and/or joint resolution that is not accompanied by such a statement. It should be noted, however, that the rule does not appear to vest the House Clerk with the responsibility or authority to evaluate the substantiality of the required statement. Further, based on the plain language of the rule, such a statement is not required for House Resolutions (H.Res.), proposed amendments to already introduced bills, or other types of measures that may be considered by the House. Rule XII, clause 7(c) appears to adopt a subjective standard for determining what specific constitutional authority exists to enact an introduced bill. In other words, the rule appears to leave each individual Member free to ascertain, by whatever means the Member deems appropriate, his/her own basis for constitutional authority. Should a Member choose to consider the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court through its majority opinions, that appears to be permissible under the rule. Equally permissible sources for Members to rely on could include their own personal interpretation of the text of the Constitution; documents produced at the Constitutional Convention; sources published contemporaneously with the consideration and ratification of the Constitution by the states; commentaries on the Constitution, academic journal articles, constitutional law treatises, and other publications; the advice of congressional support agencies; the advice of outside groups or think tanks; and any other source that the Member believes to be relevant and authoritative. The language of the rule requires an articulation of the specific textual constitutional basis for a piece of legislation to be made "as specifically as practicable." In some cases, however, it may be difficult to fully articulate textual constitutional authorities which can serve as the basis for a proposed bill in a summary form. For instance, as the powers of the federal government often overlap with each other, several constitutional authorities may individually suffice to authorize Congress's authority over a particular subject matter. Further, case law may have either expanded or limited the apparent reach of these authorizations in ways not apparent from constitutional text. In addition, the "Necessary and Proper Clause" and other implied powers may also support the expansion of congressional authority beyond these explicit authorities in ways not easily discernible from the text. This report will discuss the constitutional authority for four selected categories of legislation: authorization legislation; appropriations legislation; legislation that places conditions on the availability of federal funds; and, finally, legislation that repeals existing laws and/or programs. The report will then set out a list of general types of legislation in alphabetical order, which will be followed by constitutional provisions that might arguably provide the power to legislate on some aspects of this issue. Please refer to the Table of Contents for a convenient list of the types of legislation so addressed.

crs_R44793

crs_R44793_0

Overview The 115 th Congress and the Trump Administration are reviewing existing U.S. policies and programs in sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth, "Africa") as they establish their budgetary and policy priorities toward the region while also responding to emerging crises. Key issues for Congress include the authorization and appropriation of U.S. aid to Africa, the authorization and appropriation of funds for U.S. military activities on the continent, and oversight of U.S. programs and policies. In support of congressional deliberations, this report provides background on select issues related to Africa and U.S. policy in the format of frequently asked questions. The Obama Administration pursued several global development initiatives that sought to benefit Africa, as well as a number of Africa-specific initiatives and major programs. In 2012, the Obama Administration released a policy document entitled U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa , which prioritized as U.S. goals the strengthening of democratic institutions; the expansion of economic growth, trade, and investment; the advancement of peace and security; and the promotion of opportunity and development. Analysts continue to debate whether that Strategy reflected an appropriate mix and ranking of priorities, and the degree to which the Obama Administration's actions reflected its stated goals. Trump Administration views on many U.S.-Africa policy issues have not been publicly stated. Trade, Investment, and Economic Cooperation What is the nature and focus of U.S.-Africa trade and economic relations? Corruption also remains a challenge. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, see below) has been the cornerstone of U.S.-Africa trade policy since it was established by Congress in 2000. The original AGOA legislation states that the purpose of the Forum, which is held in alternate years in the United States and Africa, is to "discuss expanding [U.S.-Africa] trade and investment relations" and to encourage "joint ventures between small and large businesses," as well as to foster the broader goals of AGOA. Types of government and levels of democratic accountability vary widely among sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries. Democratic P rogress. How does the United States support democracy and human rights in Africa? 114-113 ), often through the enactment of foreign aid appropriations measures. Under the Obama Administration, which global presidential development initiatives channeled U.S. aid to Africa? What were the Obama Administration's Africa-specific presidential aid initiatives? He also announced new private sector pledges. In early 2016, President Obama signed into law the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (EAA, P.L. Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) . U.S. security assistance has increasingly focused on building counterterrorism capacity, with significant new funding allocated through the CTPF, which was proposed by President Obama in 2014 and first authorized and funded by Congress in P.L. 113-291 and P.L. These discussions are progressing in the context of the Trump Administration's release on March 16, 2017, of its FY2018 "budget blueprint," which suggests significant shifts in executive branch foreign policy priorities and foreign aid funding levels. Congressional responses to emerging crises, such as famine concerns in three African countries, increasingly intractable conflicts in South Sudan and Mali (among others), transnational security threats, and the appropriate balance between U.S. diplomacy, development, and defense priorities in Africa, may also influence or direct U.S. policy.

The 115th Congress and the Trump Administration are reviewing existing U.S. policies and programs in sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth, "Africa") as they establish their budgetary and policy priorities toward the region while also responding to emerging crises. Africa-specific policy questions did not feature prominently in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, and the views of the Trump Administration on many U.S.-Africa policy issues remain unspecified. The Obama Administration's Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa identified its policy priorities as strengthening democratic institutions; spurring economic growth, trade, and investment; advancing peace and security; and promoting opportunity and development. Analysts continue to debate whether that Strategy reflected an appropriate mix and ranking of priorities, as well as the degree to which the Obama Administration's actions reflected its stated goals. Congressional action on trade and electrification projects in Africa in the 114th Congress suggested some shared priorities with the Obama Administration. The Obama Administration's efforts to promote greater private sector engagement and youth leadership in Africa won praise from various quarters. At the same time, analysts have probed whether the Obama Administration's emphasis on building democratic institutions in Africa was matched with appropriate resource allocations, and whether President Obama's stated support for democratic accountability was undermined by close U.S. partnerships with authoritarian-leaning states in East Africa and by a growing emphasis on security relationships. Africa is a top destination of U.S. foreign aid. Following significant increases during the George W. Bush Administration in the 2000s, civilian-administered aid levels allocated for African countries remained largely flat during the Obama Administration, reflecting overarching budgetary constraints among other considerations. The areas of emphasis nonetheless shifted in some ways, with new presidential development initiatives focusing on electrification, trade, agricultural development, and health system strengthening. U.S. military cooperation and Defense Department-administered security assistance spending in Africa also increased substantially, in line with new congressionally enacted authorities for defense spending as well as Administration-led peacekeeping and counterterrorism initiatives. The United States has long been a top bilateral donor of emergency humanitarian and disaster assistance in Africa, as well as the top financial contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations, the majority of which are in Africa. The 114th Congress enacted several pieces of legislation that shaped U.S.-Africa policy and programs. These included the reauthorization of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 114-27), the Electrify Africa Act (P.L. 114-121), the Global Food Security Act (P.L. 114-195), the Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act (P.L. 114-231), annual National Defense Authorization Acts (most recently, P.L. 114-328), and foreign aid and defense appropriations measures. Congress has also influenced U.S.-Africa policy through its oversight activities, and through Member statements and communications with the executive branch and African leaders. To inform further congressional consideration of U.S.-Africa policy issues and challenges, this report provides background on the following: Sub-Saharan Africa's development and economic challenges; U.S.-Africa trade, investment, and economic cooperation; Governance, democracy, and human rights issues; Peace and security issues; and U.S. aid to Africa and other selected U.S. responses to policy challenges.

crs_R45250

crs_R45250_0

Introduction Despite steady urbanization, some 71% of U.S. road mileage is in rural areas. Rural roads received about 37% of federal highway funds during FY2009-FY2015, although they accounted for about 30% of annual vehicle miles traveled. According to Federal Highway Administration statistics, 2.9 million miles, or 71%, of the 4.1 million miles of public-access roads in the United States are rural roads. About 23% of the nation's rural roads are eligible for federal funding under the Federal-Aid Highway Program (FAHP). Although rural roads account for 71% of road mileage, only about 30% of annual vehicle miles traveled (VMT) are on rural roads. The most recent report, with data for 2012, found that pavement conditions on the Federal-Aid highways were generally better in rural areas with 92.8% of rural miles traveled being on roads of acceptable ride quality compared with 78.1% for urban roads. Bridges on the least-used rural roads, rural minor collectors or rural local roads, account for 76% of these structurally deficient rural bridges. Since 2000 the number of rural bridges that are structurally deficient has declined by 41% (from 75,793 in 2000 to 44,678 in 2017). When officials determine that a bridge is unsafe, they are to close it to traffic immediately. Most federal highway funds are apportioned to the states by formula. The department stated in April 2018 that "underinvestment in rural transportation systems has allowed a slow and steady decline in the transportation routes that connect rural American communities," and that it "intends to award a greater share of BUILD Transportation Discretionary Grant funding to projects located in rural areas that align well with the selection criteria than to such projects in urban areas." New Interstate Highway Construction A number of organizations have called for a major expansion of lane miles on the Interstate System and other National Highway System roads in rural areas. Without a net increase in federal spending, expanding the system to include lightly traveled rural collector and local roads would cause the states to spread their federal funds more thinly across the expanded network. Closing lightly used roads and bridges or pulverizing their pavement back to gravel could save maintenance and resurfacing costs, allowing states and counties to devote their funds to maintaining a smaller, more heavily used network of local roads. Congress could consider providing an incentive for pulverizing underused paved rural roads or permanently closing underused rural bridges that have nearby alternatives. Congress could increase funding for safety projects on rural roads by altering the rules for state use of HSIP grants or by eliminating the ability of states to transfer HSIP funds to other highway programs. It asserts that transportation can shape development but cannot create development where there is no demand.

Of the nation's 4.1 million miles of public access roads, 2.9 million, or 71%, are in rural areas. Rural roads account for about 30% of national vehicle miles traveled. However, with many rural areas experiencing population decline, states increasingly are struggling to maintain roads with diminishing traffic while at the same time meeting the needs of growing rural and metropolitan areas. Federal highway programs do not generally specify how much federal funding is used on roads in rural areas. This is determined by the states. Most federal highway money, however, may be used only for a designated network of highways. While Interstate Highways and other high-volume roads in rural areas are eligible for these funds, most smaller rural roads are not. It is these roads, often under the control of county or township governments, that are most likely to have poor pavement and deficient bridges. Rural roads received about 37% of federal highway funds during FY2009-FY2015, although they accounted for about 30% of annual vehicle miles traveled. As a result, federal-aid-eligible rural roads are in comparatively good condition: 49% of rural roads were determined to offer good ride quality in 2016, compared with 27% of urban roads. Although 1 in 10 rural bridges is structurally deficient, the number of deficient rural bridges has declined by 41% since 2000. When it comes to safety, on the other hand, rural roads lag; the fatal accident rate on rural roads is over twice the rate on urban roads. The Federal Highway Administration has generally urged states to select highway projects based on a broad view of transportation benefits; the FHWA has asserted that transportation can shape development but cannot create development where there is no demand. However, an April 2018 statement by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) contended "underinvestment in rural transportation systems has allowed a slow and steady decline in the transportation routes that connect rural American communities." DOT said that it intends to favor rural areas in awarding discretionary grants for highway projects. If it seeks to focus on the condition of rural roads and bridges, Congress could expand the network of federal-aid highways to include more local roads; could create new programs that would specifically target transportation in rural areas; and/or could fund an expansion of the Interstate System. Without an increase in overall funding levels, however, such measures might cause states to spread their federal highway funds across wider networks of highways, making it more difficult for them to marshal the funds needed to undertake large and costly projects. Alternatively, given the population loss in some rural areas, Congress might provide incentives for states and counties to close or pulverize underused roads back to gravel and close underused and structurally deficient rural bridges, encouraging them to devote more of their resources to more heavily used roads.

crs_R43983

crs_R43983_0

Introduction In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, Congress enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L. 107-40 ; 50 U.S.C. §1541 note) to authorize the use of military force against those who perpetrated or provided support for the attacks. As armed conflict against Al Qaeda and the Taliban has progressed, and U.S. counterterrorism strategy has evolved, U.S. use of military force has expanded outside Afghanistan. The 2001 AUMF, as many have argued and the executive branch has agreed, does not seem to authorize all uses of military force in furtherance of U.S. counterterrorism objectives. Because the 2001 AUMF covers only some uses of military force to counter terrorist threats, other legislation and presidential powers under Article II of the Constitution provide authority to carry out U.S. counterterrorism activities globally. The Obama Administration, however, still finds itself relying on 2001 AUMF authority not only for continuing U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, but also for beginning a new campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and possibly expanding operations to other countries if the Islamic State or Al Qaeda groups or associates effectively expand their reach and pose a threat to U.S. national security and interests. The President, in his February 11, 2015, letter to Congress concerning his draft proposal for a new authorization for use of military force against the Islamic State, stated, "I remain committed to working with the Congress and the American people to refine, and ultimately repeal, the 2001 AUMF." In the face of these issues, Congress has for several years considered a number of legislative proposals to change the authority in the 2001 AUMF, the manner in which it is used, and the congressional role in its oversight and continuing existence. This process has continued in the 114 th Congress, and deliberations over the future of the 2001 AUMF have become entwined with consideration of proposals to enact a new AUMF to respond to the actions of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In contrast to the authorization enacted by Congress in the 2001 AUMF, the legislation originally proposed by the Bush Administration in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks would have provided the authority to use military force not only against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but also to counter all terrorist threats generally, without necessitating a connection to the attacks: Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled— That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, harbored, committed, or aided in the planning or commission of the attacks against the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001, and to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States . U.S. military action in Afghanistan continues in a reduced form in 2015. Since the 2001 AUMF's enactment, presidential notifications to Congress have reported uses of military force, military deployments, and other activities in a number of countries and for a number of purposes, including to deploy U.S. Armed Forces and conduct military operations in several countries in a number of regions of the world, including most recently in Iraq and Syria against forces of the Islamic State and the Khorosan Group of Al Qaeda; counter generally the terrorist threat against the United States following September 11, 2001; engage terrorist groups "around the world"; engage terrorist groups "on the high seas"; detain individuals at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and to take other actions related to detainment decisions; and conduct trials of terrorist suspects in military commissions. Issues Concerning the Continued Use of the 2001 AUMF The executive branch's reliance on the 2001 AUMF has raised a number of concerns among some Members of Congress and policy analysts.

In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, Congress enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L. 107-40; 50 U.S.C. §1541 note) to authorize the use of military force against those who perpetrated or provided support for the attacks. Under the authority of the 2001 AUMF, U.S. Armed Forces have conducted military operations in Afghanistan since October 2001. As armed conflict against Al Qaeda and the Taliban progressed, and U.S. counterterrorism strategy evolved, U.S. use of military force has expanded outside Afghanistan to include Al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and most recently, Syria. The 2001 AUMF is not the sole authority for all U.S. uses of military force in furtherance of U.S. counterterrorism objectives; other legislation and presidential powers under Article II of the Constitution are invoked to carry out U.S. counterterrorism activities globally. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration still finds itself relying on 2001 AUMF authority not only for continuing U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, but also for beginning a new campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, with the possibility of expansion to other countries if the Islamic State or Al Qaeda groups or associates effectively expand their reach and pose a threat to U.S. national security and interests. At the same time, the President has requested that Congress enact new authority for U.S. operations to counter the Islamic State and has expressed a continued commitment to "working with the Congress and the American people to refine, and ultimately repeal, the 2001 AUMF." As the United States has engaged in counterterrorism and other military operations against Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist and extremist groups over the past 13-plus years, many Members of Congress and legal and policy analysts have questioned the continuing reliance on the 2001 AUMF as a primary, effective authority for U.S. military action in a number of countries. Some have asserted that the 2001 AUMF has become outdated, unsuited to the challenge of countering terrorism and extremism in a changed world, at times claiming that the executive branch has relied on the 2001 AUMF for military action outside its intended scope. Congress has for several years considered a number of legislative proposals to change the authority in the 2001 AUMF (by amending or repealing the law), the manner in which it is used, and the congressional role in its oversight and continuing existence. This process continues in the 114th Congress, and deliberations over the future of the 2001 AUMF have become entwined with consideration of proposals to enact a new authorization for use of military force to respond to the turmoil caused by the actions of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Debate in Congress over the status of the 2001 AUMF may evolve in response to numerous developments overseas and U.S. policy responses. For further information on the Islamic State crisis, the U.S. response, and proposals to enact a new AUMF targeting the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" Crisis and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] et al., and CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals in Brief, by [author name scrubbed].

crs_R40504

crs_R40504_0

Introduction The 12 th Amendment to the Constitution provides backup, or standby, procedures by which the House of Representatives would elect the President, and the Senate the Vice President, in the event no candidate wins a majority of electoral votes. Although this procedure, known as contingent election, has been implemented only once for each offic e since the amendment's ratification, the failure to win an electoral college majority is theoretically possible in any presidential election. Some contingencies that might lead to an electoral college deadlock include: an election that is closely contested by two major candidates, leading to a tie vote in the electoral college; one in which multiple candidates gain electoral votes so that no candidate wins a majority; or an election where a number of electors sufficient to deny a majority to any candidate votes against the candidates to whom they are pledged. Any one of these developments would require Congress to consider and discharge functions of great constitutional significance. Moreover, the magnitude of these responsibilities might well be further highlighted by the fact that an electoral college deadlock would arguably lead to a period of protracted and contentious political struggle. This report examines constitutional requirements and historical precedents associated with the contingent election process. It also identifies and evaluates contemporary issues that might emerge in the modern context. If no candidate received electoral votes equal to or greater than a majority of electors, or if there were a tie, then the House of Representatives would elect the President from among the five candidates who received the most electoral votes. The first instance occurred in 1825, following the presidential election of 1824. The Three-Candidate Limit The Amendment limits the number of presidential candidates eligible for consideration by stating that if no candidate receives a majority of electoral votes, then the House shall choose the President "from among the persons having the highest numbers [of electoral votes] not exceeding three.... " In the contemporary context, it is unlikely, but not impossible that more than three presidential candidates would gain electoral votes. The meaning of voting "by ballot" has been debated over the years. For the first round vote, within state delegations, a majority of state delegation Members present and voting was required to cast the state vote. Contingent Election of the Vice President: Constitutional Requirements and Senate Procedures in 1837 The 12 th Amendment's requirements for contingent election of the Vice President are less complex than those for the House in the case of the President. Section 3 of the 20 th Amendment also treats contingent election: it reinforces the 12 th Amendment provision that the Vice President (assuming one has been chosen) acts as President in the event the House is unable to elect a President in the contingent election process by the time the presidential term expires. Section 3 also empowered Congress to provide by law for situations in which neither a President nor a Vice President qualified. The act, which remains in effect, provides that the Speaker of the House would act as President during situations in which neither a President nor Vice President has qualified, and would continue to do so until the situation is resolved or the term of office expires. The Role of the Representative in Contingent Election Representatives participating in a contemporary contingent election of the President would be called on to perform a function of great constitutional significance. The District is thus not considered a state for the purposes of contingent election, and its Delegate to Congress would therefore not participate in the contingent election of either the President or Vice President. 75 ) would be present for a contingent election. Instead of each state casting a single vote, each Representative would cast one vote. A popular third party or independent candidacy, however, has always had the potential of disrupting this traditional rhythm.

The 12th Amendment to the Constitution requires that presidential and vice presidential candidates gain "a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed" in order to win election. With a total of 538 electors representing the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 270 electoral votes is the "magic number," the arithmetic majority necessary to win the presidency. What would happen if no candidate won a majority of electoral votes? In these circumstances, the 12th Amendment also provides that the House of Representatives would elect the President, and the Senate would elect the Vice President, in a procedure known as "contingent election." Contingent election has been implemented twice in the nation's history under the 12th Amendment: first, to elect the President in 1825, and second, the Vice President in 1837. In a contingent election, the House would choose among the three candidates who received the most electoral votes. Each state, regardless of population, casts a single vote for President in a contingent election. Representatives of states with two or more Representatives would therefore need to conduct an internal poll within their state delegation to decide which candidate would receive the state's single vote. A majority of state votes, 26 or more, is required to elect, and the House must vote "immediately" and "by ballot." Additional precedents exist from 1825, but they would not be binding on the House in a contemporary election. In a contingent election, the Senate elects the Vice President, choosing one of the two candidates who received the most electoral votes. Each Senator casts a single vote, and the votes of a majority of the whole Senate, 51 or more, are necessary to elect. The District of Columbia, which is not a state, would not participate in a contingent election, despite the fact that it casts three electoral votes. Although contingent election has been implemented only once each for President and Vice President since the 12th Amendment was ratified, the failure to win an electoral college majority is a potential outcome in any presidential election. Some examples include an election closely contested by two major candidates, one in which one or more third-party or independent candidacies might win a portion of the electoral vote, or one involving defections by a significant number of so-called "faithless" electors. A contingent election would be conducted by a newly elected Congress, immediately following the joint congressional session that counts and certifies electoral votes. This session is set by law for January 6 of the year following the presidential election, but is occasionally rescheduled. If the House is unable to elect a President by the January 20 inauguration day, the 20th Amendment provides that the Vice President-elect would act as President until the impasse is resolved. If neither a President nor Vice President has been chosen by inauguration day, the Presidential Succession Act applies, under which the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, or a Cabinet officer, in that order, would act as President until a President or Vice President qualifies. A contingent election would require Congress to consider and discharge functions of great constitutional significance, which could be complicated by a protracted and contentious political struggle that might stem from an electoral college deadlock. This report provides an examination of constitutional requirements and historical precedents associated with contingent election. It also identifies and evaluates contemporary issues that might emerge in the modern context.

crs_R40113

crs_R40113_0

Procedural change is a recurrent feature of federal budgeting, although the scope and impact of changes may vary from year to year. To advance their budgetary, economic, or political objectives, both Congress and the President regularly propose and make changes to the federal budget process. This report briefly discusses the context in which federal budget process changes are made and identifies selected reform proposals by major category. The Context of Budget Process Reform Sources of Budget Process Reform Proposals A variety of sources give rise to the interest in budget process reform, including Congress, the President, state and local government officials, and special commissions, among others. Congress initiated a thorough overhaul of its internal budget process and ameliorated ongoing conflicts with President Richard Nixon over the withholding of appropriated funds through enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. President Bill Clinton, like many Presidents before him, requested line-item veto authority, which Congress granted in 1996 in the Line Item Veto Act (but which was invalidated by court action in 1998). State and local government officials were instrumental in securing passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. Finally, special commissions, such as the President's National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), have recommended changes in budget structure and procedure that have been adopted. Avenues of Reform The federal budget process is rooted in constitutional mandates, statutory requirements, House and Senate rules and practices, and administrative directives. Thus, there are several avenues through which budget process changes can occur. Either chamber may focus on changes in its rules, thereby minimizing the time needed to effect the change and the scale of potential conflict needed to be resolved, but at the same time possibly minimizing the impact of the changes. Broader and potentially more consequential changes, involving statutes or constitutional amendments, may entail a larger set of participants in the decision-making (i.e., the other chamber, the President, state legislatures), likely escalating the effort required to reach agreement and lengthening the time period before the changes take effect. Legislative changes in the budget process may take the form of freestanding bills or joint resolutions (e.g., the Line Item Veto Act), or may be incorporated into other budgetary legislation, such as acts raising the debt limit (e.g., the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, also referred to as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), implementing reconciliation instructions (e.g., the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990), or providing annual appropriations (e.g., revisions in the Senate's cap on discretionary appropriations). Budget process changes also may be included in the annual budget resolution (a concurrent resolution), or in simple House or Senate resolutions.

Procedural change is a recurrent feature of federal budgeting, although the scope and impact of changes may vary from year to year. In order to advance their budgetary, economic, or political objectives, both Congress and the President regularly propose and make changes to the federal budget process. This report briefly discusses the context in which federal budget process changes are made and identifies selected reform proposals by major category. The identification of reform proposals in this report is not intended to be comprehensive. A variety of sources give rise to the interest in budget process reform, including Congress, the President, state and local government officials, and special commissions, among others. Congress initiated a thorough overhaul of its internal budget process and ameliorated ongoing conflicts with President Richard Nixon over the withholding of appropriated funds through enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. President Bill Clinton, like many Presidents before him, requested line-item veto authority, which Congress granted in 1996 in the Line Item Veto Act (but which was invalidated by court action in 1998). State and local government officials were instrumental in securing passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. Finally, special commissions, such as the President's National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), have recommended changes in budget structure and procedure that have been adopted. The federal budget process is rooted in constitutional mandates, statutory requirements, House and Senate rules and practices, and administrative directives. Thus, there are several avenues through which budget process changes can occur. Either chamber may focus on changes in its rules, thereby minimizing the time needed to effect the change and the scale of potential conflict needed to be resolved, but at the same time possibly minimizing the impact of the changes. Broader and potentially more consequential changes, involving statutes or constitutional amendments, may entail a larger set of participants in the decision-making (i.e., the other chamber, the President, state legislatures), likely escalating the effort required to reach agreement and lengthening the time period before the changes take effect. Legislative changes in the budget process may take the form of freestanding bills or joint resolutions (e.g., the Line Item Veto Act), or may be incorporated into other budgetary legislation, such as acts raising the debt limit (e.g., the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, also referred to as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), implementing reconciliation instructions (e.g., the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990), or providing annual appropriations (e.g., revisions in the Senate's cap on discretionary appropriations). Budget process changes also may be included in the annual budget resolution (a concurrent resolution), or in simple House or Senate resolutions. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

crs_RL30758

crs_RL30758_0

Some of these fuels are similar to conventional fuels, and can be used inconventional vehicles with little or no modification to the vehicle. Key factors in the ultimate success or failure of any alternative fuel includethe relative cost of the fuel, the ability to develop and expand fueling stations, and the performanceand safety of the fuel. These programs include tax incentives for the purchase ofalternative fuels and alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs), purchase requirements for government andprivate fleets, and research grants for the study of alternative fuels. 100-494 ), the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA, P.L. 101-549 ),and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct, P.L. 102-486 ). In addition, EPAct provides tax incentives for private purchases(both individual and commercial) of AFVs. Alternative Fuel Vehicle Policies The Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988 Beginning in FY1990, the Alternative Motor Fuels Act called for the federal government to acquire the "maximum practicable" number of light-duty alcohol and natural gas vehicles. This is because EPAct does not require the use of alternative fuels, only the purchase of AFVs. The order argued that the federalgovernment could provide impetus for the development and manufacture of alternative fuel vehicles,and the expansion of fueling stations and other infrastructure to support privately-owned AFVs. (32) Because of its wide use, if thedemand for LPG as an alternative fuel were toexpand, it is likely that the supply infrastructure could expand proportionally. Performance. Performance. (56) Although moreexpensive than conventional diesel, it has someimportant advantages. Infrastructure. Performance. However, this reduction in range can bemitigated somewhat by increasing fuel tank size (with the associated drawbacks of a larger tank). There are key environmental advantages to ethanol, as well as some drawbacks. Methanol has been touted as potential step from gasoline to hydrogen in fuel cell vehicles because the fueling infrastructure is similar togasoline, while the fuel is much cleaner. Most of this cost is related to the batteries, whichare very expensive to produce. (106) Depending on the fuel mix for local electric powergeneration, overall emissions can be decreased by 90% or more as compared to gasoline vehicles. Coal-Derived Liquid Fuels Although EPAct recognizes coal-derived fuels as alternative fuels, these fuels have seen little commercial success. Further possible benefits include lower emissions oftoxic pollutants, ozone-forming pollutants, and greenhouse gases. Provisions in various bills would have provided taxcredits for the purchase of alternative fuel and hybrid vehicles, and would have expanded the existingelectric vehicle tax credit. It is likely that a similar bill will be introducedin the 109th Congress. Another key piece alternative fuel legislation in the 108th Congress was the CLEAR ACT ( H.R.

The sharp increase in petroleum prices beginning in mid-1999, experiences with tighter supply, and international instability have renewed concern about our dependence on petroleum imports. Oneof the strategies for reducing this dependence is to produce vehicles that run on alternatives togasoline and diesel fuel. These alternatives include alcohols, gaseous fuels, renewable fuels,electricity, and fuels derived from coal. The push to develop alternative fuels, although driven byenergy security concerns, has been aided by concerns over the environment, because manyalternative fuels lead to reductions in emissions of toxic chemicals, ozone-forming compounds, andother pollutants, as well as greenhouse gases. Each fuel (and associated vehicle) has various advantages and drawbacks. The key drawback of all alternative fuels is that because of higher fuel and/or vehicle prices, alternative fuel vehicles(AFVs) are generally more expensive to own than conventional vehicles. And while many AFVshave superior environmental performance compared to conventional vehicles, their performance interms of range, cargo capacity, and ease of fueling may not compare favorably with conventionalvehicles. Furthermore, because there is little fueling infrastructure (as compared to gasoline anddiesel fuel), fueling an AFV can be inconvenient. Any policy to support AFVs must address the performance and cost concerns, as well as the issue of fueling infrastructure. Within this context, a "chicken and egg" dilemma stands out: Thevehicles will not become popular without the fueling infrastructure, and the fueling infrastructurewill not expand if there are no customers to serve. Three key laws, the Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988 ( P.L. 100-494 ), the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 ( P.L. 101-549 ), and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-486 ), as well asthree Executive Orders, support the development and commercialization of alternative fuels andalternative fuel vehicles. These legislative acts and administrative actions provide tax incentives topurchase AFVs, promote the expansion of alternative fueling infrastructure, and require the use ofAFVs by various public and private entities. The 108th Congress considered comprehensive energy legislation, but a final bill was not submitted to the President for signature. H.R. 6 would have promoted the developmentof renewable fuels, especially ethanol and hydrogen. Further, it would have provided incentives forthe development and purchase of alternative fuel and advanced technology vehicles. In addition tothe energy bill, other bills were introduced to create vehicle purchase tax credits, promote researchand development of fuels, and require the use of alternative fuels. It is likely that similar legislationwill be introduced in the 109th Congress. This report reviews these issues. It will be updated as events warrant.

crs_RS21665

crs_RS21665_0

Capsule History of OMB The Office of Management and Budget traces its origin to 1921. 1423) transferred the bureau to the newly created Executive Office of the President (EOP). For example, the Budget Review Division (BRD) coordinates the process for preparing the President's annual budget proposal to Congress. Major Functions As a primary support agency for the President, OMB has important and varied responsibilities. A-11 , which is updated each year to reflect the President's budget and management priorities. A-19 , OMB's LRD coordinates executive branch review and clearance of congressional testimony and correspondence and agencies' draft bills to ensure compliance with the President's policy agenda, make known the Administration's views on legislation, and allow affected agencies to provide input during intra-executive branch policy development.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is located within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). As a staff agency to the President, OMB acts on the President's behalf in preparing the President's annual budget proposal, overseeing the executive branch, and helping steer the President's policy actions and agenda. In doing so, OMB interacts extensively with Congress in ways that are both visible and hidden from view. This report provides a concise overview of OMB and its major functions, and highlights a number of issues influenced by OMB in matters of policy, budget, management, and OMB's internal operations. This report will be updated annually.

crs_R42491

crs_R42491_0

S. 1789: The 21st Century Postal Service Act of 2012 The Senate passed S. 1789 on April 25, 2012, by a vote of 62 to 37. Conclusion This report has described the scope of Postal Service collective bargaining and authority of Congress to modify employee-management relations by altering the scope of collective bargaining or terms of collective bargaining agreements. It also has summarized changes to collective bargaining proposed in H.R. The Postal Service Reform Act of 2011, H.R.

This report describes the scope of the collective bargaining authority that Congress has granted to the Postal Service and authority of Congress to modify employee-management relations by altering that scope or the terms of collective bargaining agreements. It also summarizes some provisions—H.R. 2309, the Postal Reform Act of 2011, and S. 1789, the 21st Century Postal Service Act of 2012, both of the 112th Congress—that relate to collective bargaining. This report will be updated to reflect changes in relevant developments.

crs_R44122

crs_R44122_0

Overview In May 2015, Charter Communications, Inc. announced that it reached agreements with Time Warner Cable Inc. (TWC) to merge the two companies in a deal valued at $78.7 billion, including the assumption of debt, and with Advance/Newhouse Partnership to acquire Bright House Networks (BHN) for $10.4 billion. The combination of Charter, TWC, and BHN would create a single entity providing cable television and broadband access service to 23.9 million customers in 41 states, making it the nation's second-largest cable television operator and broadband access provider. At the federal level, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must approve the transactions before they can close. As regulatory authorities begin their review of the proposed transactions, four key issues may merit analysis: 1. Members of Charter's board of directors also serve on the boards of several companies that create television programming, such as cable networks Discovery and Starz and film and television studio Lions Gate. These interlinks could potentially enable Charter to impede competition in the distribution of video programming. John Malone, a major investor in Charter, controls a significant stake in Charter's competitor, DIRECTV. Regulators may be concerned that Malone's influence over the combined AT&T-DIRECTV and the merged Charter could thwart competition among video distributors to acquire programming from creators and to sell programming to consumers. TWC has various joint ventures and partnerships with Comcast Corporation, the largest cable television and broadband access provider in the United States. Regulators may be concerned that the merger would result in close relations between Comcast and Charter, potentially reducing competition to acquire programming from creators and among broadband access providers distributing programming from online video distributors. However, Charter is expected to assume in excess of $24 billion of debt to finance the transaction. The FCC may be concerned that the debt could limit Charter's ability to fulfil its commitments to improve service quality and availability. Television Industry Background The television industry comprises many players. Because of this complex structure, many companies in the television industry are in frequent negotiation with one another for the right to transmit programming or to retransmit broadcast signals. The proposed Charter transactions, by altering the television industry's structure, could affect competition as well. The parties, not the agency, have the burden of demonstrating that the proposed transactions would be in the public interest based on a preponderance of evidence. 2. 3. In addition, the agencies may evaluate whether Charter's proposed commitments would be sufficient to mitigate potential harms. To verify this claim, the FCC would need to investigate whether TWC and BHN were planning to make such investments independently, absent the proposed transaction. The FCC may be concerned that Charter's debt could compromise its ability to fulfil commitments to provide sufficient capacity to deliver online video and other services to its broadband subscribers. MVPDs' national market shares indicate the relative bargaining power the MVPDs have when negotiating with studios and networks to deliver programming to video subscribers.

In May 2015, Charter Communications, Inc. announced that it reached agreements with Time Warner Cable Inc. (TWC) to merge the two companies in a deal valued at $78.7 billion, including the assumption of debt, and with Advance/Newhouse Partnership to acquire Bright House Networks (BHN) for $10.4 billion. The combination of Charter, TWC, and BHN would create a single entity providing cable television and broadband access service to 23.9 million customers in 41 states, making it the nation's second-largest cable television operator and broadband access provider. The proposed merger raises a number of potential concerns, reflecting the complex structure of the television industry and substantial changes in the way consumers choose to receive video programming. The many firms involved in content ownership, aggregation and packaging, and distribution of video programming often must cooperate with one another at the same time they are competing. Companies in the television industry are in frequent negotiation with one another for the right to transmit programming, and the merger of three players into a very large one could change the relative bargaining power of other parties. At the same time, growing numbers of consumers are now viewing programs online at a time of their choosing rather than subscribing to traditional cable or satellite services or watching based on a broadcaster's schedule. The proposed Charter transactions have the potential to affect the development of this relatively new online video distribution industry by inhibiting distributors' access to programming or their ability to send programs to customers over the Internet. At the federal level, both the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) must approve Charter's transactions before they can close. The DOJ will investigate whether the proposed transactions would reduce competition. The FCC will investigate whether the proposed transactions would, on balance, be in the public interest. As regulatory authorities begin their review of Charter's proposed transactions, three key issues related to television industry competition may merit analysis: 1) whether the presence of members of Charter's board of directors on the boards of several companies that create television programming, including the cable networks Discovery and Starz and film and television studio Lions Gate, might impede competition in the distribution of television programming; 2) whether the fact that a major investor in Charter, John Malone, also controls some shares of a competitor to Charter, DIRECTV (whose proposed sale to AT&T has met federal regulatory approval), could reduce competition among video distributors to acquire programming from creators and to sell programming to consumers; and 3) whether Charter's assumption of TWC's various joint ventures and partnerships with Comcast Corporation, the largest cable television and broadband access provider in the United States, would reduce competition to acquire programming from creators and disadvantage online video distributors. In addition, the agencies may evaluate whether Charter's proposed commitments regarding service quality and availability would be sufficient to mitigate potential harms. To obtain FCC approval, Charter is likely to make a number of commitments regarding service quality and availability. However, the company would assume more than $24 billion of debt through the transactions, and the FCC may be concerned that this debt could compromise Charter's ability to fulfil commitments to provide sufficient capacity to deliver online video and other services to its broadband subscribers.

crs_R44610

crs_R44610_0

Because yarn and fabric production are capital- and scale-intensive, they demand higher worker skills than apparel production. At the end of 2015, the domestic textile industry employed about 232,000 workers, accounting for about 2% of the 12.3 million domestic factory jobs (see Appendix A ). U.S. Trade in Textile Products In 2015, approximately one-third of U.S. textile production was exported, with a value of $17.6 billion (see Table 1 ). The United States has a strong export position in yarns and fabrics, posting a modest trade surplus in these products for two decades. Despite this cost differential, apparel producers in the NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, and CBI countries use U.S.-made textiles in products that are exported to the United States because the goods enter the United States free of tariffs. In Central America, virtually all fibers are imported. Among the regional apparel suppliers that have free-trade agreements with the United States, Mexico is the only significant producer of fabric and the only significant source of yarn. For U.S. textile exporters, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala represent the biggest yarn and fabric markets in the CAFTA-DR region (see Figure 4 ). If apparel produced in Asian TPP countries gains duty-free access to the U.S. market, it could displace apparel manufactured with U.S. fabric in the Western Hemisphere, adversely affecting U.S. textile exports. Also, should Vietnam develop a larger textile industry, U.S. textile exports could be hurt, as the proposed TPP allows apparel producers in countries such as Mexico and Peru to use textiles made in any TPP member country and still enjoy duty-free access to the U.S. market. Vietnam's apparel sector imports the majority of its yarns and fabrics from non-TPP nations, including China. Yarn Forward . Only the cutting and sewing of the finished article must occur in FTA member countries, providing maximum flexibility for sourcing. Under the TPP, tariffs on textile and apparel would either be eliminated immediately or phased out in various stages over a decade or more. If the proposed agreement is approved by Congress and foreign governments, the TPP will require that textiles and apparel meet a yarn-forward rule to qualify for duty-free treatment. Several TPP members, including Vietnam, had opposed U.S. demands for a yarn-forward requirement, supporting instead a "cut-and-sew" rule that would allow them to enjoy preferential access for apparel that has been cut and sewn from fabric made in China or other countries not included in the TPP. Since U.S. apparel companies and retailers purchase the bulk of their garments from Asian countries outside the TPP, they favored the immediate elimination of tariffs upon implementation of the TPP agreement and more liberal rules of origin for textiles and apparel. This would allow a limited amount of apparel cut, sewn, and assembled in Vietnam to enter the United States duty-free even if the garments include fabric from China and other non-TPP countries. Whatever the actual effects of the TPP on the U.S. economy, it is imaginable that the proposed TPP agreement could result in apparel made in Vietnam displacing apparel from the Western Hemisphere in the U.S. market, weakening the export markets now served by U.S. textile producers in Mexico and other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. An alternative scenario is that any TPP member country could over time shift sourcing of textile inputs from the United States to Japan, the one Asian TPP participant that currently has the textile production capacity to supply other TPP producers in this way, or to Vietnam should it develop a robust textile industry, and still enjoy duty-free access to the U.S. market. If the proposed agreement is implemented, those segments of the U.S. textile industry that supply industrial textiles are likely to face greater competition from Japan, the subsector where U.S. manufacturers are most internationally competitive. The largest export markets for U.S. industrial fabrics in 2015 were Mexico and Canada; Vietnam accounted for less than 1% of the $2 billion in shipments of technical fabrics from the United States to the world.

Textiles are a sensitive sector in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an agreement that would establish a free-trade zone across the Pacific if it is approved by Congress and foreign governments. Because the TPP includes Vietnam, a major apparel producer that now mainly sources yarns and fabrics from China and other Asian nations, the agreement could shift global trading patterns for textiles and demand for U.S. textile exports. Canada and Mexico, both significant regional textile markets for the United States, and Japan, a major manufacturer of high-end textiles and industrial fabrics, are also TPP members. U.S. textile manufacturers produce yarn, thread, and fabric for apparel, home furnishings, and various industrial applications. In 2015, the U.S. textile industry generated some $55 billion in shipments and directly employed about 232,000 Americans, accounting for approximately 2% of all U.S. factory jobs. More than a third of U.S. textile production is exported, with the bulk of the exports going to Western Hemisphere nations that are members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). These free-trade agreements provide that certain exports from member countries may enter the U.S. market duty-free only if they are made from textiles produced in the region. This has encouraged manufacturers in Mexico and Central America to use U.S.-made yarns and fabrics in apparel, home furnishings, and other products. Exports to the NAFTA and CAFTA-DR countries contributed to a U.S. trade surplus of $1.6 billion in yarns and fabrics in 2015. The proposed TPP would eliminate some tariffs on textiles and apparel immediately, and phase out others over a decade or more. The agreement has the potential to affect U.S. textile exporters in at least three ways: It could enable some Asian apparel producers, principally Vietnam, to export clothing to the United States duty-free. This would eliminate much of the advantage now enjoyed by Western Hemisphere apparel producers in the U.S. market, and, because Vietnamese manufacturers make little use of U.S.-made textiles, could reduce demand for U.S. textile exports. The TPP would allow Western Hemisphere apparel manufacturers to use yarn and fabric made anywhere in the TPP region and still enjoy preferential access to the U.S. market. Thus, an enlarged Vietnamese textile industry could, at some future time, compete with U.S. exporters in Mexico and Central America. The U.S. manufacturers of industrial textiles may experience more direct competition from Japan, also a leading producer of industrial textiles. On the upside, U.S. exports of these products could increase because the agreement would eliminate tariffs on industrial fabrics that are currently as high as 20% in some TPP countries. Responding to concerns from domestic textile manufacturers, the proposed TPP agreement includes a "yarn-forward" rule of origin that would allow a garment to enter the United States duty-free only if yarn production, fabric production, and cutting and sewing of the finished garment all occur within the TPP region. However, nearly 190 fibers, yarns, and fabrics in short supply in TPP-member countries could be sourced from outside the region, including China. This provision was a concession to U.S. retailers and apparel brands that wanted maximum flexibility to source yarns and fabrics from non-TPP countries.

crs_RL32762

crs_RL32762_0

The analysis presents scenarios showing what levels of greenhouse gas emissions would be if the world population was at a benchmark per capita GDP comparable to several European nations that currently have the lowest greenhouse gas emissions per million dollars of GDP among all developed nations. Eight of the top-20 per capita GDP nations achieve greenhouse intensities below 110. The implication for the two goals of economic growth and of constrained emissions is clear: if economies grow and population is stable or rises, emissions will rise unless intensity decreases enough to offset the rise. Defining an Economic Benchmark As shown by Table 1 , eight nations combined a greenhouse gas intensity of less than 110 tons per million dollars GDP with per capita GDPs of $23,490 or better. Per capita emissions and greenhouse gas intensity (emissions per unit of economic activity) have also been discussed as metrics for defining emissions goals. This compares to actual 2000 world GDP of $44 trillion and emissions of 9.1 billion tons. This analytical construct could be applied globally, to individual nations, or to groups of nations. One can calculate the implications of different population levels, different economic development levels, different emissions goals, etc. At a population of 6 billion, achieving a parity GDP of $23,500 and an intensity of 100, global greenhouse gas emissions would be 14.1 billion tons (+55%). Or, if one thought that a parity level of $23,500 were too high, one could calculate the implications of a lower level, say an average per capita GDP of $15,000 (slightly more than double the 2000 world average per capita GDP): At the 2000 population of 6 billion, an intensity of 100, an average per capita GDP of $15,000 (and ignoring grandfathering), emissions would be 9 billion tons, slightly lower than the 2000 level. Greenhouse gas intensity has been improving globally, and in many nations. The purpose of this analysis has been to give some tangible sense of a possible outcome from pursuing competing goals—economic growth and development versus constraining greenhouse gases—that are confounding efforts, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, to address global climate change. For some, the finding that one can construct an empirically based approach that achieves a standard of living for the existing population equal to that of several European nations while not increasing global greenhouse gas emissions by more than 60% will be optimistic. For others, the emissions may appear unacceptable despite the improvement in intensity—which could imply even more aggressive improvements in intensity and/or constraints on economic growth. For still others, worry about greenhouse gas emissions is misdirected.

This analysis identifies those nations that have combined the highest per capita GDPs with the lowest intensities of greenhouse gas emissions. Taking those nations as exemplars, it then examines possible outcomes from pursuing competing goals—economic growth and development versus constraining greenhouse gases—that are confounding efforts, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, to address global climate change. Eight nations—Austria, France, Italy, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland—combine high per capita GDP (among the top-20 nations) with the lowest intensity of greenhouse gas emissions of all nations (between 107 and 70 tons per million $GDP). Taking the lower level of their per capita GDP ($23,500) and an intensity of 100, this analysis examines the greenhouse gas emission implications of a world achieving those levels of economic activity and greenhouse gas intensity. The relationship of population, economic growth, and emissions is defined by: (population) x (per capita GDP) x (intensity) = emissions This relationship can be applied globally, to individual nations, or to groups of nations. One can calculate the implications of different population levels, different economic development levels, different emissions targets, etc. Obviously if population rises, emissions will rise unless per capita GDP and/or intensity decrease enough to offset the rise; likewise, if per capita GDP rises, emissions will rise unless intensity (and/or population) decrease enough to offset it. With the formula, one could test numerous variations; this analysis focuses on the one empirically-based set, a global per capita GDP of $23,500, an intensity of 100, and the 2000 world population of 6 billion. With those assumptions, greenhouse gas emissions would be 14.1 billion tons per year, about 55% more than the 9.1 billion tons actually emitted in 2000. Whether global greenhouse gas emissions of 14.1 billion tons per year (or more as population increases) would pose a threat of global warming sufficient to justify impeding that economic development and/or stimulating even more aggressive action to improve greenhouse gas intensity awaits growing scientific understanding and the decisions of world leaders—and the manifestation of events. For some, the finding that one can construct an empirically based approach that achieves a standard of living for 6 billion people equal to several European nations while not increasing global greenhouse gas emissions by more than about 55% will be optimistic. For others, the emissions level may appear unacceptable—implying either constraints on economic growth or even more aggressive improvements in intensity. For still others, any worry about greenhouse gas emissions is misdirected. This report will not be updated.

crs_R44858

crs_R44858_0

More than $2 billion annually has been allocated from foreign assistance funds over the past decade for democracy promotion activities, including support for good governance (characterized by participation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness, and equity), rule of law, and promotion of human rights. While there has been bipartisan support for the general concept of democracy promotion assistance, policy debates in the 116 th Congress may question the consistency, effectiveness, and focus of such foreign assistance. With President Trump indicating in various ways, including in proposed funding cuts for democracy promotion assistance, that promoting democracy and human rights are not top foreign policy priorities of his Administration, this debate has taken on new vigor. The 116 th Congress may consider the impact of the Trump Administration's requested foreign assistance spending cuts on U.S. democracy promotion assistance, review the effectiveness of democracy promotion activities, evaluate the various channels available for democracy promotion, and consider where democracy promotion ranks among a wide range of foreign policy and budget priorities. Human Rights and Rule of Law. Stability was the primary foreign policy objective of the Lyndon B. Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Administrations, during which it was perceived that stable dictators were better for U.S. interests than countries in democratic transition, which may be susceptible to communism. The global spread of democracy seemed inevitable to many at the time, and democracy promotion and support became deeply integrated into the U.S. foreign policy structure. State Department and USAID share primary responsibilities for democracy promotion and human rights assistance. Democracy Promotion Funding In recent years, 95%-99% of U.S. democracy promotion assistance has been funded within the Department of State and USAID budgets, with 11 other agencies providing the rest. This argument is often the basis for the efforts to restrict civil society organizations that promote democracy, sometimes with U.S. or other foreign funding. Relative Significance of Security, Trade, Human Rights As the history of democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy indicates, the emphasis placed on human rights and democracy at a given time or in a particular bilateral relationship depends significantly on competing security and economic interests (such as stabilizing a country or region with the potential of becoming a U.S. trading partner). While these challenges lead some to question ongoing U.S. efforts to promote democracy abroad, others assert that these activities are more important than ever because diminished U.S. leadership with respect to promoting democratic values could leave a void that other countries could fill, with detrimental consequences for the United States in the long term.

Promoting democratic institutions, processes, and values has long been a U.S. foreign policy objective, though the priority given to this objective has been inconsistent. World events, competing priorities, and political change within the United States all shape the attention and resources provided to democracy promotion efforts and influence whether such efforts focus on supporting fair elections abroad, strengthening civil society, promoting rule of law and human rights, or other aspects of democracy promotion. Proponents of democracy promotion often assert that such efforts are essential to global development and U.S. security because stable democracies tend to have better economic growth and stronger protection of human rights, and are less likely to go to war with one another. Critics contend that U.S. relations with foreign countries should focus exclusively on U.S. interests and stability in the world order. U.S. interest in global stability, regardless of the democratic nature of national political systems, could discourage U.S. support for democratic transitions—the implementation of which is uncertain and may lead to more, rather than less, instability. Funding for democracy promotion assistance is deeply integrated into U.S. foreign policy institutions. More than $2 billion annually has been allocated from foreign assistance funds over the past decade for democracy promotion activities managed by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the National Endowment for Democracy, and other entities. Programs promoting good governance (characterized by participation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness, and equity), rule of law, and promotion of human rights have typically received the largest share of this funding in contrast to lower funding for programs to promote electoral processes and political competition. In recent years, increasing restrictions imposed by some foreign governments on civil society organizations have resulted in an increased emphasis in democracy promotion assistance for strengthening civil society. Despite bipartisan support for the general concept of democracy promotion, policymakers in the 116th Congress may continue to question the consistency, effectiveness, and appropriateness of such foreign assistance. With President Trump indicating in various ways that promoting democracy and human rights are not top foreign policy priorities of his Administration, advocates in Congress may be challenged to find common ground with the Administration on this issue. As part of its budget and oversight responsibilities, the 116th Congress may consider the impact of the Trump Administration's FY2020 foreign assistance budget request for U.S. democracy promotion assistance, review the effectiveness of democracy promotion activities, evaluate the various channels available for democracy promotion, and consider where democracy promotion ranks among a wide range of foreign policy and budget priorities.

crs_RL33408

crs_RL33408_0

Congress, when authorizing and appropriating funds and in its oversight role, reviewsDepartment of Defense's (DOD's) plans to sustain and modernize the NCCS. (4) Increased momentum to implement the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) findings, as well as thepublication of DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), could provide an opportunity forCongress to revisit the structure and future relevance of the NCCS. This report will describe NCCSplatforms and functions, discuss the current role of the NCCS in light of the 2001 NPR and 2006QDR, examine current issues related to the role of the NCCS from both process and technologyperspectives, and review proposed modernization initiatives. National Military Command Center (NMCC) . (8) National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC). (11) USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center(GOC). (12) USSTRATCOM Airborne Command Post(ABNCP). (13) USSTRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command Center(MCCC). Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment(TW/AA). Force Management. Force Direction. (19) The NCCS must also be reliable. The NPR embodied this approach in the architecture of a "new triad" of capabilities. (44) Some might even arguethat highlighting a "China threat" represents the latest effort in the search for a great power peercompetitor--one that the defense establishment has not found since the end of the Cold War era,similar to the warnings about a "coming war with Japan" prevalent in the 1990s. North Korea has been actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability sincethe 1960s. (52) Nations that have small nuclear arsenals could threaten disproportionate effects on U.S.infrastructure, including command and control systems, through an electromagnetic pulse(EMP). critical infrastructure might be one way that China could use its nuclear capability against theUS, rather than launching a massive strike. Command and Control Issues from the 2001 NPR Some of the new missions addressed in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, specifically theinclusion of non-nuclear responses and of active defenses, will add to the challenges for the nuclearcommand and control system. It may need to expand itsreach to include additional participants, such as those responsible for the non-nuclear forces ordefensive forces, in the decision making process or at least as recipients of orders. In addition to support during crises and conflicts,the NMCC aids management of peacetime contingencies, such as natural disasters. Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network(MEECN). The DefenseDepartment is also requesting funds to enhance both of its airborne nuclear command and controlplatforms, the E-4B NAOC and the E-6B ABNCP (Airborne Command Post). (109) Satellite Communications. However, the key functionsperformed by the NCCS will likely remain requirements as long as the United States maintains anuclear deterrent. Through the FY2007 budget request, the Defense Department has continuedto focus on evolutionary upgrades of the Cold War NCCS architecture. Are they still needed?

The Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) infrastructure supports the Presidentand his combatant commanders when they direct nuclear forces. This report discusses the currentrole of the NCCS in light of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the 2006 QuadrennialDefense Review (QDR), examines current issues surrounding the NCCS, reviews modernizationinitiatives, summarizes NCCS functions and characteristics, and reviews NCCS platforms. Key NCCS platforms include fixed locations such as the National Military Command Center(NMCC), the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Global Operations Center (GOC), andSite-R, and mobile platforms such as the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), theE-6B Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), and the Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC).The NCCS must support situation monitoring, tactical warning and attack assessment of missilelaunches, senior leader decision making, dissemination of Presidential force-direction orders, andmanagement of geographically dispersed forces. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) 2001 NPR proposed a "new triad" of offensive nuclearand conventional forces, passive and active defenses, and a robust infrastructure, tied together by thecommand, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, andplanning architecture to confront the new, allegedly unpredictable post-Cold War environment. Adapting to non-nuclear responses and active defenses poses additional challenges for the currentNCCS. Some might question the continued relevancy of the legacy Cold War NCCS architecture. It wasdesigned against a "decapitation" threat from the Soviet Union. This threat might not still exist. However, some believe China is investing in a nuclear capability to compete with the United States. Iranand North Korea might be developing nuclear capabilities that, if not used to strike directly at the UnitedStates or U.S. forces, might be used to generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that could wreck U.S.infrastructure. In addition to confronting these potential catastrophic threats, the NCCS could directconventional military operations, aid continuity of government in crises, and support civil authoritiesduring natural disasters or emergencies. The Defense Department has proposed several modernization and procurement initiativesin its 2007 budget. The DOD budget requests upgrades for the Minimum Essential EmergencyCommunications Network (MEECN) links to the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),bombers, and tanker forces. It incorporates a redesign and consolidation of the NMCC, as part ofongoing Pentagon renovation efforts. It proposes several communications and aircraft upgrades tothe E-4B NAOC and the E-6B ABNCP. It seeks funding for a sweeping upgrade to its satellitecommunications capability through the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program andits follow-on, the Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) program. This report will be updated as needed.

crs_R43779

crs_R43779_0

These provisions would implement the Hague Convention on International Recovery of Child Support and any other multilateral agreement to which the United States is a party. On August 30, 2016, President Obama signed the instrument of ratification for the Convention. On September 7, 2016, the United States deposited its instrument of ratification with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which is the depository for the Convention. P.L. P.L. Summary of the Convention The Convention contains procedures for processing international child support cases that are intended to be uniform, simple, efficient, accessible, and cost-free to U.S. citizens seeking child support in other countries. For many international cases, U.S. courts and state CSE agencies already recognize and enforce child support obligations, whether or not the United States has a reciprocal agreement with the other country. However, many foreign countries will not enforce U.S. child support orders in the absence of a treaty obligation. History and Current Status of the Convention On November 23, 2007, after four years of deliberation, the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance was adopted at the conclusion of the Twenty-First Diplomatic Session of The Hague Conference on Private International Law at The Hague, The Netherlands. The United States delegation was the first country to sign the Convention. In the United States, a treaty must be consented to by the Senate. On September 29, 2010, the Senate approved the Resolution of Advice and Consent regarding the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance. H.R. 4980 was passed by the House on July 23, 2014, by a voice vote. It was passed by the Senate without amendment by unanimous consent on September 18, 2014. 4980 was enacted into law on September 29, 2014, as P.L. Once the treaty is in force, it will apply to cases being worked between countries that are party to it. 113-183, the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (H.R. 113-183 includes provisions that would implement the Convention. It will only apply to cases where the custodial parent and child live in one country and the noncustodial parent lives in another country. 113-183 gives other countries participating in the Convention access to the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS). 113-183 amends federal law so that the federal income tax refund offset program is available for use by a state to handle CSE requests from foreign reciprocating countries and foreign treaty countries. 113-183 amends Section 466(f) of the SSA to read as follows: "In order to satisfy Section 454(2)(A), each State must have in effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as approved by the American Bar Association on February 9, 1993, including any amendments officially adopted as of September 30, 2008 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws." In addition, P.L.

The Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (the Convention) was adopted at the Hague Conference on Private International Law on November 23, 2007. The Convention contains procedures for processing international child support cases that are intended to be uniform, simple, efficient, accessible, and cost-free to U.S. citizens seeking child support in other countries. The United States was the first country to sign the Convention. For many international cases, U.S. courts and state Child Support Enforcement (CSE) agencies already recognize and enforce child support obligations, whether or not the United States has a reciprocal agreement with the other country. However, many foreign countries will not enforce U.S. child support orders in the absence of a treaty obligation. On August 30, 2016, President Obama signed the instrument of ratification for the Convention. On September 7, 2016, the United States deposited its instrument of ratification with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which is the depository for the Convention. Thirty-three other countries, including the European Union, have also ratified the Convention. Although it is not the Senate's role to ratify treaties, it provides its advice and consent to a treaty's provisions. On September 29, 2010, the U.S. Senate approved the Resolution of Advice and Consent regarding the Convention. Implementing legislation for the Convention was included in the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (H.R. 4980), which was enacted into law on September 29, 2014, as P.L. 113-183. H.R. 4980 was passed by the House on July 23, 2014 (by voice vote under suspension of the rules), and by the Senate on September 18, 2014 (by unanimous consent). P.L. 113-183 included provisions that would implement the Convention. Specifically, it contains several provisions related to the international enforcement of child support orders. It contains provisions designed to improve child support collections in cases where the custodial parent and child live in one country and the noncustodial parent lives in another country. It ensures that the United States is compliant with the Convention and any other multilateral child support enforcement treaty and requires states to update their Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) law to incorporate any amendments adopted as of September 2008 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Additionally, P.L. 113-183 facilitates greater access to the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) by foreign countries and tribal governments as part of improving child support collections. P.L. 113-183 also allows the federal income tax refund offset program to be available for use by a state to handle CSE requests from foreign reciprocating countries and foreign treaty countries. Once the Convention is in force (January 1, 2017) it would apply to cases being worked between countries that are party to it (currently 34 countries, including the United States and the European Union).

crs_R42076

crs_R42076_0

Delphi Corporation is a "Tier 1" supplier that provides parts and components directly to vehicle manufacturers; GM is Delphi's largest customer. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) assumed responsibility for Delphi's defined benefit (DB) pension plans. Some union workers whose pensions have been reduced by the PBGC may be receiving supplemental "top-off" benefits provided by GM. GM honored these "top-off" agreements when Delphi's pensions were terminated. In general, the hourly workers were union members whereas the salaried workers were not. When an insured DB pension plan has insufficient funds and cannot pay all of the promised benefits to the workers, the plan may be "terminated" and the retirees receive their benefits from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Not all underfunded pension plans are trusteed by the PBGC. Major Events of Delphi Pension Plans Since 1999 Pension Benefits and the Delphi Spin-Off As part of the spin-off in 1999, GM continued to pay the pension benefits to workers who retired prior to October 1, 2000. These agreements obligated GM in the event of a termination of the Delphi hourly pension plans to supplement the benefits for workers who received the statutory maximum benefit from the PBGC. Salaried employees did not have similar agreements in place. On September 14, 2009, the Delphi Salaried Retiree Association (DSRA) filed a lawsuit against, among others, the PBGC, the U.S. Treasury Department, and the Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry. Some of the DSRA's claims include the termination of the Delphi Retirement Program for Salaried Employees was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; the termination of the Delphi Retirement Program for Salaried Employees was in violation of ERISA; and the agreement between GM and the unions representing hourly employees to "top-off" the hourly employees' pensions was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The Delphi Corporation is a parts and components supplier to auto makers that was created in 1999 as a spin-off from General Motors (GM). In May 2009, the pension plans of Delphi were terminated and responsibility for the payment of benefits to plan participants was turned over to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which is a government-run corporation that insures private pension benefits for workers in defined benefit (DB) pension plans. Although most workers in pension plans that are terminated by the PBGC receive their promised benefits, some workers may receive less than their full benefit. The PBGC may not pay an individual more than a statutory maximum benefit. In 1999, GM and some unions representing Delphi workers negotiated an agreement as part of the spin-off. GM agreed to provide the workers covered by the agreements the difference between the benefits earned under the plan and the maximum that the PBGC would pay if the pension plans were terminated. Some union workers and the non-union-salaried employees of Delphi did not have such a "top-off" agreement. Some contend that GM honored the top-off agreement under pressure from the Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry and that the Delphi pension plans were terminated to facilitate restructuring in the auto industry. A group of former Delphi salaried employees has filed a lawsuit against the PBGC. This report provides background on Delphi Corporation, relevant pension law, the role of the PBGC, a description of major events at Delphi since 1999, and a listing of congressional hearings and legislation introduced related to the Delphi Corporation since the 111th Congress.

crs_RS22900

crs_RS22900_0

480, administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), is the largest U.S. international food aid program. Title II provides humanitarian donations of U.S. agricultural commodities to respond to emergency food needs or to be used in development projects. Most of the farm bill food aid debate focused on P.L. The new farm law also includes a Sense of Congress declaration that in international negotiations the President shall seek commitments of higher levels of food aid from other donors; ensure that food aid implementing organizations be eligible to receive food aid resources based on their own needs assessments; and ensure that options for providing food aid shall not be subject to limitation, on condition that the provision of the food aid is based on needs assessments, avoids disincentive effects to local production and marketing, and is provided in a manner that avoids disincentives to local production and marketing and with minimal potential to disrupt commercial markets. Pilot Program for Local/Regional Cash Purchase The 2008 farm bill includes a scaled-down version of the Administration's only international food aid proposal for legislative authority to use up to $300 million of appropriated P.L. 480 funds. 480 Title I This title of P.L. 480 authorizes provision of long-term, low interest loans to developing countries for the purchase of U.S. agricultural commodities. The new farm bill makes some changes in the program, which has not received an appropriation since 2006 to reflect a food security rather than a market development emphasis of U.S. food aid. The 2008 farm bill reauthorizes the BEHT through FY2012.

Provision of U.S. agricultural commodities for emergency relief and economic development is the United States' major response to food security problems in developing countries. Title III in the omnibus farm bill enacted in June 2008, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246, H.R. 6124), reauthorizes and makes a number of changes in U.S. international food aid programs. Farm bill debate over U.S. food aid programs focused generally on how to make delivery of food aid more efficient and more effective. While most of the debate focused on P.L. 480 Title II, the largest food aid program, the farm bill trade title also reauthorizes and modifies other, smaller U.S. food aid programs. One of the most contentious issues was that of using appropriated P.L. 480 funds to purchase commodities overseas, rather than U.S. commodities, to respond to emergency food needs. The Bush Administration had asked for this authority in its farm bill proposals, but many, though not all, of the private voluntary organizations and cooperatives that use U.S. commodities for development projects instead argued for a pilot project for local or regional purchases of commodities.

crs_R42127

crs_R42127_0

Most recently, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) ( P.L. Elementary school teachers must show knowledge of basic elementary school curricular areas. Middle and secondary school teachers must demonstrate a high level of competency in all subject areas taught. Subject-matter knowledge and competency may be demonstrated by passing a state certification exam or licensing test in the relevant subject(s). One of the major goals of NCLB is to raise the achievement of students who currently fail to meet grade-level proficiency standards. To address this issue, Congress included in NCLB a requirement that poor and minority students have equal access to quality instruction. This report examines implementation of the NCLB requirement of a highly qualified teacher in every public school classroom. In the second section, the report analyzes data from a national survey of schools to assess teacher quality prior to enactment of NCLB and examines state reporting data to track how teacher quality may have improved throughout the law's implementation. Finally, the report discusses teacher quality issues that Congress may consider as the ESEA reauthorization process unfolds. Teacher Quality and the No Child Left Behind Act With regard to teacher quality, NCLB made three major amendments to the ESEA: (1) the law required that all teachers of core academic subjects be "highly qualified," (2) it mandated that the distribution of teacher quality be equal across poor and minority schools, and (3) it established accountability provisions to ensure that annual improvements in teacher quality are achieved. For a middle or secondary school teacher, Section 9101(23) states that a demonstration of subject-matter knowledge "may consist of a passing level of performance on a State-required certification or licensing test or tests in each of the academic subjects in which the teacher teaches." The letter also stated that data submitted in the 2005-2006 CSPR indicated that no state had reached 100% HQT (further examination of these data will be undertaken in the next section of this report). A Highly Qualified Teacher in Every Classroom This section examines progress made toward meeting the NCLB goal of placing a highly qualified teacher in every classroom. Table 2 presents the percentage of core subject classes taught by highly qualified teachers.

One of the major goals of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110), is to raise the achievement of students who currently fail to meet grade-level proficiency standards. Because student achievement is widely believed to depend largely on the quality of instruction, the law also contains provisions designed to improve teacher quality. These provisions establish professional credentials for teachers and charge states and school districts with developing plans to improve teacher quality. According to the law, these plans must ensure that all core subject-matter courses are taught by a highly qualified teacher and that poor and minority students have equal access to quality instruction. To be deemed highly qualified, NCLB requires that teachers possess a baccalaureate degree and a state teaching certificate, and that teachers also demonstrate subject-matter knowledge for their teaching level. Elementary school teachers must show knowledge of basic elementary school curricular areas. Middle and secondary school teachers must demonstrate a high level of competency in all subject areas taught. Demonstration of subject-matter knowledge and competency may be shown by passing a state certification exam or licensing test in the relevant subject(s). This report examines implementation of the NCLB requirement and examines the extent to which schools achieved the law's goal of placing a highly qualified teacher in every classroom. After describing the highly qualified teacher requirement in detail, the report analyzes data from a national survey of schools conducted a year before NCLB became law. These data suggest that as many as four out of five teachers met the NCLB requirement prior to its enactment. Data reported throughout implementation of the law indicate that the proportion of highly qualified teachers increased each year, but that no state has reached 100%. In addition, analysis of these data also support concerns about the equitable distribution of teaching quality between poor and nonpoor schools. This report concludes with a discussion of teacher quality issues that may be considered as the ESEA reauthorization process unfolds. Several of these issues have been the subject of waiver authority exercised by the Secretary of Education under both the current and previous Administrations. Congress has also taken up these issues along with reauthorization of the rest of the ESEA. This report will be updated as significant legislative developments occur.

crs_RL33688

crs_RL33688_0

Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in connection with the war against terrorism, establishing a role for federal courts to play in determining the validity of the military commissions convened pursuant to President Bush's Military Order (M.O.) of November 13, 2001. Circuit that had upheld the military commissions, holding instead that although Congress has authorized the use of military commissions, such commissions must follow procedural rules as similar as possible to courts-martial proceedings, in compliance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The Department of Defense has issued regulations for the conduct of military commissions pursuant to the MCA. Trials began for two other defendants, but were halted after the military judges dismissed charges based on lack of jurisdiction, finding in both cases that the defendants had not properly been found to be "unlawful enemy combatants." The prosecutors appealed the cases to the Court of Military Commissions Review (CMCR), which reversed the dismissal of charges in one case and remanded it to the military commission for a determination of whether the accused is an "unlawful enemy combatant." The CMCR decision rejected the government's contention that the determination by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) that a detainee is an "enemy combatant" was a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, but also rejected the military judge's finding that the military commission was not itself empowered to make the appropriate determination. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed. A person subject to the M.O. The Supreme Court has not clarified the scope of the "Global War on Terrorism," but has not simply deferred to the President's interpretation. Composition and Powers M.C.O. The MCA, 10 U.S.C. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. S. 576 and its companion bill, H.R. The bills would route appeals of military commissions to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces rather than the Court of Military Commissions Review. The following tables provide a comparison of the military tribunals under the regulations issued by the Department of Defense, standard procedures for general courts-martial under the Manual for Courts-Martial, and military tribunals as authorized by the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Table 2 , which compares procedural safeguards incorporated in the previous DOD regulations (in force prior to the Hamdan decision and the enactment of the MCA) and the UCMJ, follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts , by [author name scrubbed], in order to facilitate comparison of the proposed legislation to safeguards provided in federal court, the international military tribunals that tried World War II crimes at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and contemporary ad hoc tribunals set up by the UN Security Council to try crimes associated with hostilities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order (M.O.) pertaining to the detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism. Military commissions pursuant to the M.O. began in November 2004 against four persons declared eligible for trial, but proceedings were suspended after a federal district court found that one of the defendants could not be tried under the rules established by the Department of Defense (DOD). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision in Rumsfeld v. Hamdan, but the Supreme Court granted review and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. To permit military commissions to go forward, Congress approved the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), conferring authority to promulgate rules that depart from the strictures of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and possibly U.S. international obligations. DOD published regulations to govern military commissions pursuant to the MCA. The Court of Military Commissions Review (CMCR), created by the MCA, issued its first decision on September 24, 2007, reversing a dismissal of charges based on lack of jurisdiction and ordering the military judge to determine whether the accused is an "unlawful enemy combatant" subject to the military commission's jurisdiction. The CMCR rejected the government's argument that the determination by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) that a detainee is an "enemy combatant" was a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, but also rejected the military judge's finding that the military commission was not empowered to make the appropriate determination. This report provides a background and analysis comparing military commissions as envisioned under the MCA to the rules that had been established by DOD for military commissions and to general military courts-martial conducted under the UCMJ. After reviewing the history of the implementation of military commissions in the "global war on terrorism," the report provides an overview of the procedural safeguards provided in the MCA. The report identifies pending legislation, including H.R. 267, H.R. 1585, H.R. 2543, H.R. 2826, S. 1547, S. 1548, H.R. 1416, S. 1876, S. 185, S. 576, S. 447, H.R. 1415 and H.R. 2710. Finally, the report provides two tables comparing the MCA with regulations that had been issued by the Department of Defense pursuant to the President's Military Order with standard procedures for general courts-martial under the Manual for Courts-Martial. The first table describes the composition and powers of the military tribunals, as well as their jurisdiction. The second chart, which compares procedural safeguards required by the MCA with those that had been incorporated in the DOD regulations and the established procedures in courts-martial, follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts, by [author name scrubbed], to facilitate comparison with safeguards provided in federal court and international criminal tribunals.

crs_RL33925

crs_RL33925_0

Background Members of Congress and the public are increasingly concerned about the ability of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to ensure that the drugs sold in the United States are safe and effective. At the height of public and Congressional attention, FDA asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to "conduct an independent assessment of the current system for evaluating and ensuring drug safety postmarketing and make recommendations to improve risk assessment, surveillance, and the safe use of drugs." FDA issued its response in January 2007 and noted relevant activities the agency has begun and others it has planned. Report Highlights This report provides a side-by-side comparison of: Institute of Medicine: recommendations in its September 2006 report, The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public ; Food and Drug Administration: announced actions and plans to address problems identified in the IOM report; S. 468 / H.R. 788 would remove the post-approval drug safety activities from FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) and create a new Center for Postmarket Evaluation and Research for Drugs and Biologics (the Center). FDA authority to require action and to enforce compliance The bills and the IOM recommendations aim to strengthen FDA's ability to make sure drug manufacturers (application sponsors) appropriately design and conduct postmarket studies and disclose the results to the public. S. 468 / H.R. The IOM recommended and all the bills would allow the Secretary to penalize (through civil fines, injunctions, or withdrawal of marketing approval or licensure) sponsors who do not conduct required studies or complete them on time, or who fail to report study results. They differ in how to fund them. S. 468 / H.R. 788 would authorize appropriations to carry out the bill's provisions; S. 484 would rely on user fees, expanding FDA's existing authority to use such fees; and H.R. 1165 does not address funding.

Members of Congress and the public are increasingly concerned about the ability of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to ensure that the drugs sold in the United States are safe and effective. In November 2004, FDA asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to assess the current system for evaluating and ensuring drug safety and to make recommendations to improve risk assessment, surveillance, and the safe use of drugs. IOM released The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public in September 2006, and FDA issued its response in January 2007. The following drug safety bills have been introduced in the 110th Congress: S. 468 / H.R. 788, S. 484, and H.R. 1165. Although the legislation and the IOM report address many of the same drug safety issues, the bills differ in their treatment of FDA authority to require action and to enforce compliance, comparative effectiveness studies, and how to fund any additional agency activities. For example, S. 468 / H.R. 788 would strengthen FDA's post-approval drug safety activities by creating a new Center for Postmarket Evaluation and Research for Drugs and Biologics. The other bills would leave these activities where they currently reside in the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. All the bills would allow the FDA to penalize (through civil fines, injunctions, or withdrawal of marketing approval or licensure) drug manufacturers who did not conduct required postmarket studies or who failed to report study results. The IOM committee recommended that Congress provide substantially increased resources to FDA to bolster its drug safety activities. S. 468 / H.R. 788 would authorize appropriations to carry out the bill's provisions, S. 484 would rely on user fees, expanding FDA's existing authority to use such fees, and H.R. 1165 does not address funding.

crs_RL33963

crs_RL33963_0

Introduction The United States has made great strides in secondary school participation during the last century. Yet more than one-quarter of first-year high school students do not receive their diploma in four years. By age 24, more than one in 10 still do not have a high school degree or its equivalent. During the 2003-2004 school year alone, nearly 5% of students dropped out of high school. In addition, rates of graduation, completion, and dropping out vary significantly by race/ethnicity and immigration status with very high rates among Hispanics and new immigrants. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA, P.L. The law also contains requirements for state and local education agencies that stipulate how graduation, completion, and dropout rates are to be calculated and to whom they must be reported. Each of the act's authorizing the major federal dropout prevention programs is likely to be considered for reauthorization in the 110 th Congress. It is likely that the 110 th Congress will consider reauthorizing some, and perhaps all, of the federal programs and provisions pertaining to high school graduation, completion, and dropouts. This report will provide background on high school graduation, completion, and dropout rates in the United States. Second, the report will present the latest data on high school outcomes. The third section of the report will describe the federal programs designed to improve these outcomes. And finally, the report will discuss and analyze issues that may arise as Congress considers the reauthorization of these programs and provisions. Federally Mandated High School Indicators The NCLBA contains a handful of provisions that require the calculation and reporting of high school outcomes. Generally, federal programs for high school dropout prevention may be categorized as follows: programs with the primary purpose of preventing students from dropping out and/or helping dropouts re-enter and complete high school or an equivalency program, programs having multiple purposes , at least one of which is targeted to dropout recovery or dropout prevention, and programs with broad purposes not explicitly encompassing dropouts but whose funds may be used to help individuals complete high school. This section discusses several issues pertaining to dropouts that may arise as these Acts are considered for reauthorization. At-Risk Versus Out-of-School Youth Should the federal effort to encourage high school completion and prevent dropouts be divided between those at risk of dropping out and those who have already dropped out?

This report discusses federal policy, programs, and issues related to high school graduation, completion, and dropouts. The discussion covers the provisions enacted in federal law that govern the definition, calculation, and reporting requirements of these critical high school outcomes. (Note: this report does not address the issue of academic achievement among high school graduates.) The report then looks at historical data as well as the most recent indicators of these outcomes. That analysis is followed by a description of the federal programs designed to help youth who have dropped out, or who are at risk of dropping out, in completing high school or an equivalency certificate program. Finally, the report discusses issues that may arise as Congress considers reauthorizing the laws that pertain to this topic. The United States has made great strides in secondary school participation during the last century. Yet more than one-quarter of first-year high school students do not receive their diploma in four years. By age 24, more than one in 10 still do not have a high school degree or its equivalent. During the 2003-2004 school year alone, nearly 5% of students dropped out of high school. In addition, dropout rates vary significantly by race/ethnicity and immigration status, with very high rates among Hispanics and new immigrants. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act, authorizes several dropout prevention programs and contains the main federal requirements that stipulate how graduation, completion, and dropout rates are to be calculated and reported. Additional dropout prevention programs are authorized in the Higher Education Act and the Workforce Investment Act. These programs may be categorized as having: (1) the primary purpose of helping students complete high school, (2) multiple purposes, at least one of which is targeted toward dropout recovery or dropout prevention, or (3) broad purposes not explicitly encompassing dropouts but whose funds may be used at local discretion to help students complete high school. Each of these acts is likely to be considered for reauthorization in the 110th Congress. Several issues may be debated as Congress considers reauthorizing some, and perhaps all, of the federal programs and provisions pertaining to high school graduation, completion, and dropouts. These issues include program coordination, targeting, and effectiveness; the quality and reporting of data required to assess high school outcomes; whether the federal effort should focus on "at-risk" students or "out-of-school" youth; and whether recently enacted testing and accountability requirements have the perverse effect of increasing high school dropout rates.

crs_R44455

crs_R44455_0

There are many issues associated with the IC's ability to counter threats, balance its resources, and use those resources wisely. Some issues are agency centric—affecting a single agency—such as the NSA's encryption concerns. They impact the DNI's ability to horizontally integrate the IC agencies (often referred to as "stovepipes") so that the IC operates effectively as one team. This report focuses on eight issues associated with the horizontal leadership and management of the IC. These cross-cutting issues include: (1) the IC budget process, (2) analysis, (3) big data, (4) diversity, (5) global coverage, (6) continuous evaluation, (7) polygraphs, and (8) transparency. They were chosen because they affect a number of agencies and are widely discussed by professionals within and external to the IC (and are not so complex that they need their own separate report). The following section briefly describes several relevant aspects of the IC important to understanding the issues being examined: 17 elements (or components) of the IC; two key leadership positions—the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; key agency overseers—the Inspectors General; the national and military intelligence budget programs; and the National Intelligence Strategy. Efforts to address cross-cutting issues can be hampered by difficulties associated with managing the IC's confederation of separately managed component parts. Surprises are often termed intelligence 'failures' and thus, the issue of how to improve analysis is, and may always be, a focus for reform efforts. (Several of these initiatives are discussed in greater detail later in this report.) What is the IC doing to improve recruitment, education, and retention of its best analysts? The IC Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE, pronounced "eyesight") is an initiative focused on many of the challenges associated with big data. Diversity Diversity was selected because initiatives designed to attract and retain a diverse workforce have been recurring themes in intelligence-related legislation and IC policy directives over the past decade. How is progress being measured? Global coverage is a concept used to describe the IC's need to prepare for and respond to any and all crises and threats—worldwide. A current issue from a privacy and civil liberties perspective is the expanded use of publicly available data when reviewing the backgrounds of security clearance holders. The type of examination required varies within agencies and between agencies. Are the new principles of transparency sufficient? While all eight are different in many ways, they are similar in that they shine a light on important questions in common that can applied to oversight of other IC-wide cross-cutting issues. Best Practices ? Integration? Privacy and Civil Liberties? Trust ? Intelligence Community Principles of Transparency "The Intelligence Community Will: Provide appropriate transparency to enhance public understanding about: the IC's mission and what the IC does to accomplish it (including its structure and effectiveness); the laws, directives, authorities, and policies that govern the IC's activities; and the compliance and oversight framework that ensures intelligence activities are conducted in accordance with applicable rules.

This report focuses on cross-cutting management issues that affect the Intelligence Community's (IC's) ability to counter "pervasive and emerging threats" to the United States and balance resources both appropriately and wisely. As the IC's senior manager, these issues ultimately fall within the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI's) area of responsibility. The DNI is charged with integrating the community of intelligence agencies so that they operate effectively as one team. There are no easy solutions to the challenges examined in this report. The IC's efforts to demonstrate progress are hampered by difficulties such as the IC's diffuse structure—a confederation of separately managed component parts; the unique demands of operating in secret; the interrelationships between many issues; and diminishing resources. The issues selected for examination in this report were chosen because they affect a number of agencies and are widely discussed by professionals within and external to the IC (and are not so complex that they need their own separate report). 1. Budget. Are the resources in the IC budget (the national and military intelligence programs) managed and balanced appropriately to meet the needs of every agency and the IC mission as a whole? 2. Analysis. The heart and soul of the intelligence function; analysis is the responsibility of every IC agency. How to improve analysis is an enduring focus of reform efforts. 3. "Big Data." The IC Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE) is a major initiative focused on many of the challenges and opportunities associated with the current ocean of available information. How well is the IC putting vast amounts of unstructured data to valuable use? 4. Diversity. New initiatives designed to improve diversity in the entire IC workforce have been a recurring theme in intelligence-related legislation and IC policy directives over the past decade. Can anything else be done? 5. Global coverage. The IC's need to prepare for and respond to any and all crises and threats—worldwide—is referred to as global coverage. Do expectations about what the IC can and should cover need be adjusted? 6. Continuous Evaluation (CE). The expanded use of publicly available data when reviewing the backgrounds of a security clearance holder is the new standard for all IC agencies. What is the CE issue from a privacy and civil liberties perspective? 7. Polygraphs. Although polygraphs are required by every agency, their reliability and validity are questionable. As the IC moves toward CE, are they still necessary? 8. Transparency. What more can be done IC-wide to enhance public understanding of intelligence activities through greater transparency while still protecting national security? While the eight issues are different in many ways, they are similar in that they shine a light on important questions that can be applied to any IC issue in terms of balance, best practices, integration, privacy and civil liberties, transparency, and trust.

crs_RL31555

crs_RL31555_0

Purpose and Scope Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances U.S. security interests in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles as well as obtaining China's cooperation in weapons nonproliferation. Using unclassified consultations and citations, this CRS Report discusses the national security problem of the PRC's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation. PRC weapons proliferation has persisted, aggravating trends that result in more ambiguous technical assistance (vs. transfers of hardware), longer range missiles, more indigenous capabilities, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. China's "entities," including state-owned defense industrial corporations, reportedly were "associated" with Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs and Iran's missile programs. Moreover, China's own "entities" have supplied sensitive technology to Iran. Enacted on December 31, 2011, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2012, P.L. UNSC Resolutions and Sanctions Under U.S. and other foreign pressure, China has evolved to vote for some sanctions at the UNSC. Still, on February 4, China was one of 27 countries that voted at the IAEA to support a resolution to report Iran to the UNSC, showing some progress in China's cooperation since it abstained on a resolution on Iran in September 2005. Still, in diplomatic negotiations on another UNSC Resolution for a fourth set of sanctions, China reportedly opposed sanctions to target Iran's oil and gas industry. On June 9, 2010, China voted for UNSC Resolution 1929 to impose sanctions against Iran. In February 2012, the Section 721 Report for 2011 told Congress that PRC "entities" continued to supply missile-related items to Iran. PRC technology transfers have further implications for secondary, or retransferred, proliferation, since North Korea reportedly supplied technology to Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. However, some have raised issues of whether China has been helpful in fully using its leverage with North Korea, whether it seeks North Korea's denuclearization with as much urgency as the United States and its allies, whether China's role warrants a closer U.S.-PRC relationship that risks other U.S. interests, and whether China actually undermines regional stability, given its support for the status quo that includes a provocative, belligerent DPRK. The "Six-Party Talks" resumed on July 18-20. Implementation and Impasse However, the PRC-sponsored Joint Document of October 2007 raised a number of questions about implementation, including about the disposition of nuclear equipment (in North Korea, China, Russia, or elsewhere); disablement of nuclear facilities aside from the three cited; ultimate dismantlement of nuclear facilities; U.S.-only funding and work for disablement; declaration of nuclear weapons in addition to nuclear programs; clarification of uranium as well as plutonium programs; missile and nuclear proliferation (with the North Korean-built nuclear reactor in Syria just bombed by Israel in September); nuclear testing sites; verification and monitoring; timelines for bilateral normalization; other concerns of the United States and Japan about human rights, terrorism, and abductions; strains in the U.S.-Japan alliance; coordination with Seoul; and the State Department's consultations with Congress, Defense Department, and European allies. Reportedly, PRC policy makers reviewed their approach toward North Korea. Then, on June 12, 2009, the UNSC approved Resolution 1 874 to expand the sanctions previously imposed under Resolution 1718 in 2006. Given the DPRK's missile and nuclear tests, and sinking of the Cheonan , the Obama Administration shifted to call the talks explicitly the "six-party process," while doubting the credibility of any announcement in Beijing of repeated talks and looking for results in North Korea's implementation of the existing Joint Statement of 2005. The United States also warned North Korea through the U.N. channel. One question has been whether Xi would change China's approach to North Korea. Beijing continued its balanced approach that includes support for Pyongyang along with incremental implementation of UNSC sanctions. Policy Issues and Options Issues for Policy Weapons proliferation by the PRC and/or its organizations raises policy issues concerning (1) assessments of the nature and seriousness of the PRC government's role in the proliferation threat; (2) the priority of this issue relative to other U.S. interests (i.e., other security issues, Taiwan, trade, human rights); and (3) U.S. leadership and leverage (including the use of sanctions and diplomacy, and congressional actions) to obtain China's cooperation in nonproliferation. In April 2014, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces' markup of the FY2015 NDAA ( H.R. (The final FY2015 NDAA ( H.R. 3979 ) became P.L. 113-291 on December 19, 2014.) Nonetheless, President Obama has not announced significant breakthroughs, including in this meetings with PRC leader Xi Jinping in Sunnylands Retreat, CA, in June 2013 or in Beijing in November 2014. China has not joined the PSI. (See discussion on North Korea above.) In contrast to the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration repeatedly imposed sanctions on PRC "entities" (but not the PRC government) for transfers (related to ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and cruise missiles) to Pakistan and Iran, under the Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act, Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, Executive Order 12938, and Executive Order 13382. About half of the PRC entities, "serial proliferators," have faced repeated sanctions, raising questions about effectiveness. By 2014, President Obama's officials started to negotiate a potential renewal of the nuclear cooperation agreement. It also required a report on the PRC's adherence to the MTCR.

Congress has long been concerned about whether policy advances the U.S. interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of PRC technology included Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. Unclassified intelligence reports told Congress that China was a "key supplier" of technology, particularly with PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran. Policy issues in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite and nuclear exports. PRC proliferation activities have continued to raise questions about China's practices and policies in weapons nonproliferation. The United States has imposed sanctions on various PRC "entities" (including state-owned entities) for troublesome transfers related to missiles and chemical weapons to Pakistan, Iran, or perhaps another country, including repeated sanctions on some "serial proliferators." Since 2009, the Obama Administration has imposed sanctions on 18 occasions on numerous entities in China for weapons proliferation. By 2014, the Administration started to negotiate a renewal of the U.S.-PRC nuclear cooperation agreement. President Obama's summits with PRC leader Xi Jinping have not produced significant results. Skeptics question whether China's roles in weapons nonproliferation warrant a closer relationship with China, even as sanctions were required on some PRC technology transfers. Some criticize the imposition of U.S. sanctions targeting PRC "entities" but not the government. Others doubt the effectiveness of any stress on sanctions over diplomacy or a comprehensive strategy. Concerns grew that China expanded nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, supported North Korea, and could undermine sanctions against Iran (including in the oil/gas energy sector). In 2002-2008, the U.S. approach relied on China's influence on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons. Beijing hosted the Six-Party Talks (last held in December 2008) with limited results. Since 2006, China's balanced approach has evolved to vote for some U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against missile or nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran. Some called for engaging more with Beijing to use its leverage against Pyongyang and Tehran. However, North Korea's nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013 prompted greater debate about how to change China's calculus and the value of its cooperation. After negotiations, the PRC voted in June 2009 for UNSC Resolution 1874 to expand sanctions imposed under Resolution 1718 in 2006 against North Korea. The PRC voted in June 2010 for UNSC Resolution 1929 for the fourth set of sanctions against Iran. In 2013, the PRC voted for UNSC Resolutions 2087 and 2094 on North Korea for missile and nuclear tests. Still, China has continued its balanced approach that includes incremental implementation of UNSC sanctions. China's approach has not shown fundamental changes toward Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. China has called for resuming the Six-Party Talks, but the Administration says the goal is North Korea's credible denuclearization. Legislation in the 113th Congress includes the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 113-66) with Section 1248 to require a report on a plan to reduce missile proliferation in Iran, North Korea, and Syria, including how to secure the PRC's cooperation. In its report on the FY2015 NDAA (H.R. 4435), the House Armed Services Committee required a report from the Defense Intelligence Agency on the PRC's support for Karl Lee's repeated transfers to Iran. The final FY2015 NDAA (H.R. 3979) became P.L. 113-291 on December 19, 2014.

crs_RS22752

crs_RS22752_0

Introduction The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) follows current U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) practice in containing two types of formal dispute settlement: (1) State-State, applicable to disputes between the Parties to the PTPA, and (2) investor-State, applicable to claims by an investor of one Party against the other Party for breach of PTPA investment obligations. The United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, which approves the PTPA and provides legislative authorities needed to carry it out, was signed into law December 14, 2007 ( P.L. 110-138 ). The Agreement entered into force on February 1, 2009. A protocol of amendment, signed June 24 and June 25, 2007, which revises the PTPA to incorporate certain provisions involving labor, the environment, intellectual property, government procurement, port security, and investment, entered into force on the same day. The additional language stems from a bipartisan agreement on trade policy between Congress and the Administration finalized on May 10, 2007 (often referred to as the May 10 agreement), setting out various provisions to be added to completed or substantially completed FTAs pending at the time. The same approach to labor and environmental disputes is found in U.S. free trade agreements with Colombia, Korea, and Panama, each of which continue to await approval by Congress. To date, no disputes have been initiated under the PTPA State-State dispute settlement mechanism. On July 19, 2011, however, the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) of the U.S. Department of Labor accepted for review a petition by a Peruvian union representing tax agency workers filed under Chapter Seventeen of the PTPA, the agreement's labor chapter, alleging that Peru had violated the PTPA by failing to effectively recognize collective bargaining rights as required under Article 17.2.1 of the agreement. The review could possibly lead to further State-State dispute settlement proceedings if efforts to settle the dispute through consultations are unsuccessful. To establish a violation of an obligation under Article 17.2.1, the United States must demonstrate that Peru has failed to adopt or maintain a law, regulation or practice in a manner that affects trade or investment between the Parties. The firm, which alleges that Peru violated investment agreements and PTPA investment obligations with regard to its treatment of a metallurgical smeltering and refining operation run by a Renco affiliate in Peru, reportedly filed its arbitral claim in April 2011. State-State Dispute Settlement (Chapter Twenty-One) State-State or general dispute settlement is set out in Chapter Twenty-One of the PTPA, which applies to disputes involving the interpretation or application of the Agreement or wherever a Party considers (1) that an actual or proposed measure of the other Party is or would be inconsistent with the PTPA, (2) that the other Party has violated the PTPA, or (3) that one or more of enumerated PTPA benefits owed it by the other Party—for example, a tariff reduction—is being nullified or impaired by a measure of the other Party that not inconsistent with the agreement. Labor and Environmental Disputes Due to its incorporation of principles set out in the inter-branch "May 10 agreement," the PTPA differs from earlier FTAs with labor and environment chapters in containing additional labor and environmental obligations, not restricting its general dispute settlement procedures to specified provisions of its labor and environmental chapters, and not limiting the remedy for non-compliance with an adverse panel report to the payment of an annual monetary assessment, that is, a fine by the defending Party. As noted earlier, in the event the prevailing PTPA Party does propose trade sanctions, the defending Party has the option of paying an annual monetary assessment to the prevailing Party, or, if the Parties agree, to a fund that would distribute funds to the defending Party to facilitate compliance with its obligations in the case. Investor-State dispute settlement may also be invoked in certain cases involving investors and investments in financial services institutions in the United States and Peru. A tribunal may only make monetary awards to the claimant and thus may not direct a Party to withdraw or modify a disputed measure.

The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) follows current U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) practice in containing two types of formal dispute settlement: (1) State-State, applicable to disputes between PTPA Parties, and (2) investor-State, applicable to claims by an investor of one State Party against other State Party for breach of a PTPA investment obligation. A Party in a State-State dispute found to have violated a PTPA obligation is generally expected to remove the complained-of measure; remedies for non-compliance include compensation and the suspension of PTPA concessions or obligations (e.g., imposition of a tariff surcharge on the defending Party's products), with the defending Party having the option of paying a fine to the prevailing Party or, in some cases, into a fund that may be used to assist the defending Party in complying in the case. An investor-State tribunal may only make monetary awards and thus may not direct a PTPA Party to withdraw or modify the offending measure. If the defending State Party does not comply, the investor may seek to enforce the award under one of the international conventions for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards to which the United States and Peru are party. State-State dispute settlement may also be initiated against the non-complying Party. The PTPA State-State dispute settlement mechanism differs from earlier U.S. FTAs in that it applies to all obligations contained in the labor and environmental chapters of the PTPA instead of only domestic labor or environmental law enforcement obligations. In addition, in the event a Party is found to be in breach of one of these obligations and has not complied in the dispute, the prevailing Party may impose trade sanctions instead of, as under earlier agreements, being limited to requesting that a fine be imposed on the non-complying Party with the funds to be expended for labor or environmental initiatives in that Party's territory. The changes stem from a bipartisan agreement on trade policy between Congress and the Administration finalized on May 10, 2007 (May 10 agreement), setting out various provisions to be added to completed or substantially completed FTAs pending at the time. Among the aims of the agreement was to expand and further integrate labor and environmental obligations into the U.S. free trade agreement structure. The same approach to labor and environmental disputes is found in FTAs entered into with Colombia, Korea, and Panama, each of which continue to await congressional approval. Implementing legislation approving the PTPA and providing legislative authorities needed to carry it out was signed into law on December 14, 2007 (P.L. 110-138). The agreement entered into force on February 1, 2009. A protocol of amendment revising the PTPA to incorporate provisions involving labor, the environment, intellectual property, port services, and investment, as set out in the May 10 agreement, entered into force on the same day. To date, no disputes have been initiated under the PTPA State-State dispute settlement chapter. On July 19, 2011, however, the U.S. Department of Labor agreed to review a petition filed by a Peruvian labor union alleging that Peru had failed to effectively recognize collective bargaining rights in violation of the PTPA labor chapter. The fact-finding review could possibly lead to a State-State dispute proceeding if the United States considers that Peru has acted inconsistently with the agreement and efforts to settle the dispute through consultations are unsuccessful. To establish a PTPA violation, the United States must demonstrate that Peru has failed to adopt or maintain a law, regulation, or practice in a manner that affects trade or investment between the Parties. In addition, one case has been brought under the PTPA investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. In April 2011, a U.S. firm filed an arbitral claim alleging that Peru had violated its PTPA investment obligations in its treatment of a metallurgical smeltering and refining operation run by the claimant's affiliate in Peru.

crs_RS22121

crs_RS22121_0

Background and Introduction In FY2006, the federal government's real property portfolio consisted of 3.87 billion square feet of owned and leased office space. However, the federal government had no formally established building security standards for either federally owned or leased buildings when the April 1995 domestic terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building occurred in Oklahoma City, OK. 12977, which established a permanent Interagency Security Committee (ISC) within the executive branch to address "continuing government-wide security" for federal facilities. Section 5 of E.O. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center heightened concerns about the vulnerability of federal buildings to violence or bombing attacks. On February 28, 2003, the chairmanship of the ISC was transferred from the GSA Administrator to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and a representative from GSA was added to the ISC's membership. In July 2004, the ISC was designated to oversee and review each agency's physical security plan pertaining to protection of the nation's infrastructure and key resources. On December 13, 2006, the ISC issued its 2007-2008 Action Plan, which included operational procedures for identifying and applying updated security technologies.

The federal government owns or leases 3.7 billion square feet of office space, which may be vulnerable to acts of terrorism and other forms of violence. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) was created by E.O. 12977 in 1995, following the domestic terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK, to address the quality and effectiveness of physical security requirements for federal facilities. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center renewed concerns about the vulnerability of federal buildings to bombing or other forms of attack. On February 28, 2003, the chairmanship of the ISC was transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security from the Administrator of General Services by E.O. 13286. In July 2004, based on Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, the ISC began reviewing federal agencies' physical security plans to better protect the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources. On December 13, 2006, the ISC issued its 2007-2008 Action Plan, which sets forth revised policy recommendations for enhancing the quality and effectiveness of security in federal facilities. This report will not be updated.

crs_RL33399

crs_RL33399_0

110-5 , the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2007. The bill also provides funds for agencies in two other departments: the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the Indian Health Service in the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as funds for the Environmental Protection Agency. Continuing funding is needed to fund agency operations and activities because Congress did not enact a regular FY2007 appropriations bill for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. It continues funds at the FY2006 account level, except where otherwise specified. 109-275 ). The bill provided $26.05 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2007, $110.8 million (0.4%) above the House-passed level ($25.94 billion). The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported level would have been a $384.0 million (1%) decrease from the FY2006 enacted level of $26.44 billion, but a $522.8 million (2%) increase over the President's request for FY2007 of $25.53 billion. Among the proposed decreases in the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported bill for FY2007, from the FY2006 level, were the following: $-209.5 million (9%) for the National Park Service (NPS); $-153.5 million (10%) for the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); $-123.6 million (3%) for the Forest Service (FS); and $-108.5 million (1%) for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Among the increases for FY2007 were the following: $147.5 million (5%) for the Indian Health Service (IHS); $50.2 million (3%) for the Bureau of Land Management (BLM); and $29.3 million (5%) for the Smithsonian Institution. The Senate Appropriations Committee adopted a few amendments in addition to a Manager's package. One sought to require the Secretary of the Interior to re-negotiate leases for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas lease sales where no royalties are currently being paid, and to include the price thresholds that were inadvertently left out of leases from 1998 and 1999. A second amendment, similar to House-passed language, prohibited funds in the bill from being used to issue new lease sales to current OCS oil and gas lessees who do not have price thresholds in their leases. 5386 ( H.Rept. 5386 ) and the FY2007 Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2007 ( P.L. Within the S&T account, both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committee reports on H.R. The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations laws have provided funds to DOI agencies for restoration projects.

The FY2007 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and for two agencies within other departments—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also includes funding for arts and cultural agencies; the Environmental Protection Agency, which was recently transferred to the appropriations subcommittees that deal with Interior and Related Agencies; and numerous other entities and agencies. On June 29, 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 5386 (S.Rept. 109-275), providing $26.05 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2007, $110.8 million (0.4%) above the House-passed level ($25.94 billion). The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported level would have been a $384.0 million (1%) decrease from the FY2006 enacted level of $26.44 billion, but a $522.8 million (2%) increase over the President's request for FY2007 of $25.53 billion. Among the proposed decreases in the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported bill for FY2007, from the FY2006 level, were the following: $-209.5 million (9%) for the National Park Service (NPS); $-153.5 million (10%) for the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); $-123.6 million (3%) for the Forest Service (FS); and $-108.5 million (1%) for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Among the increases for FY2007 were the following: $147.5 million (5%) for the Indian Health Service (IHS); $50.2 million (3%) for the Bureau of Land Management (BLM); and $29.3 million (5%) for the Smithsonian Institution. The Senate Appropriations Committee adopted a few amendments in addition to a Manager's package. One sought to require the Secretary of the Interior to re-negotiate leases for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas lease sales where no royalties are currently being paid, and to include the price thresholds that were inadvertently left out of leases from 1998 and 1999. A second amendment, similar to House-passed language, would have prohibited funds in the bill from being used to issue new lease sales to current OCS oil and gas lessees who do not have price thresholds in their leases. The Senate did not consider H.R. 5386, and Congress did not enact a regular annual appropriations law for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2007. Instead, funds were included in P.L. 110-5, the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2007. The law provides funding for FY2007 essentially at the FY2006 account levels, except where otherwise stated. Funding below the account level is being determined by the agencies.

crs_RS22965

crs_RS22965_0

The federal role in assisting states and communities to clean up brownfields for productive use has been an ongoing issue for more than a decade. In 2002, Congress provided specific statutory authority for EPA to address brownfields with the enactment of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act ( P.L. 107-118 ). The mere perception of contamination at brownfield sites often hinders redevelopment. Subsection 128(a) created a non-competitive grant program to support state and tribal response programs. Considerations for Policymakers There appears to be broad consensus that a federal role in the cleanup and redevelopment of brownfields is desirable. However, issues regarding the degree of financial assistance and overall program effectiveness have been raised.

The federal role in assisting states and communities to clean up brownfield sites—real property affected by the potential presence of environmental contamination—has been an ongoing issue for more than a decade. With the enactment of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act ( P.L. 107-118 ) in 2002, Congress provided specific authority for EPA to address brownfield sites. In contrast to Superfund sites, environmental contamination present at brownfield sites is typically less of a risk to human health. With the primary motivation to aid cleanup efforts, the 2002 statute, among other things, authorized two grant programs: (1) a competitive grant program to address specific sites; and (2) a non-competitive grant program to support state cleanup programs. While there appears to be broad consensus that a federal role in the cleanup and redevelopment of brownfields is desirable, issues regarding the degree of financial assistance and overall program effectiveness have been raised.

crs_R45324

crs_R45324_0

Introduction Social Security and Medicare assist in providing financial security to most elderly and disabled individuals in the United States. Eligible individuals may enroll in one program and not the other; however, for individuals who are enrolled in both Social Security and Medicare, certain interactions between the two programs may have important financial implications. For instance, individuals who are both Social Security beneficiaries and Medicare Part B enrollees have their Medicare Part B premium automatically deducted from their monthly Social Security benefit. Although annual adjustments are made to both the Social Security benefit an individual receives and the Medicare premiums an individual pays, these adjustments are indexed to different inflation measures. The Social Security annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) is based on the Consumer Price Index-Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), which is a measure of general inflation. Medicare premium growth, by contrast, is based on program expenditure growth, which reflects spending for covered medical services. Congress has acted several times to protect beneficiaries from the impact of large Medicare Part B premium increases. Medicare Medicare is a federal program that provides health insurance coverage for elderly and permanently disabled individuals. Since 2007, high-income beneficiaries have paid higher premiums set to cover a greater percentage of Medicare Part B costs than the standard premium. Medicare Part D Premiums Each year, the Medicare Part D base premium is set at 25.5% of the expected per capita costs for standard prescription drug coverage. Social Security Benefits and Medicare Part B Premiums from 2000 to 2018 Social Security benefits and Medicare Part B premium amounts are adjusted annually using different methods, which typically has resulted in a higher percentage increase in Medicare Part B premiums than in Social Security benefit increases. Since 2000, the Social Security annual COLA has resulted in a cumulative benefit increase of approximately 50%, considerably less than the Medicare Part B premium growth of close to 195%. Hold-Harmless Provision for Medicare Part B Premiums A hold- harmless provision in the Social Security Act prevents certain Social Security beneficiaries' benefit amount from decreasing from one year to the next due to an increase in standard Medicare Part B premiums. The hold-harmless provision does not apply to Medicare Part D premiums. The following groups may receive reduced Social Security benefit payments due to Medicare premium increases that are greater than the Social Security COLA: New enrollees to either Medicare or Social Security; Medicare Part B enrollees who do not receive Social Security benefits; High-income individuals who pay income-related Medicare Part B premiums; Low-income beneficiaries who are in a Medicare Savings Program (Medicaid typically pays the premiums on their behalf). However, by law, standard Medicare Part B premiums are calculated to cover 25% of the expected costs of Medicare Part B program costs. Thus, in certain years, those not held harmless may bear the burden of meeting the 25% requirement disproportionately. Projected Impact of Medicare Premium Growth on Social Security Benefits Medicare per capita cost growth is expected to continue to increase at a faster rate than inflation measured by the CPI-W, thus increasing Medicare premiums at a faster rate than Social Security COLAs. The Medicare Trustees project that Medicare beneficiaries will use a larger portion of their Social Security benefits to pay Medicare Part B and Part D premiums in the future. For example, in 2018, the Medicare Part B and Part D premiums account for 12.4% of the average Social Security benefit; the Medicare Trustees project that this will increase to approximately 14.0% in 2028 and to 16.8% in 2092. The historical and estimated increases in average Social Security benefits, the average Medicare Part B and Part D benefits, average Medicare Part B and Part D premiums, and average out-of-pocket costs as indicated by the Medicare Trustees' long-range projections are shown in Figure 2 .

Social Security and Medicare assist in providing financial security to most elderly and disabled individuals in the United States. Certain interactions between Social Security and Medicare may have important financial implications for individuals who are enrolled in both programs. Social Security provides monthly cash benefits to retired or disabled workers and their family members. The Social Security benefits that are paid to retired workers are based on workers' past earnings. Medicare is a federal insurance program that pays for covered health care services for most individuals aged 65 and older. Medicare Part B and Part D are voluntary, premium-based programs for Medicare beneficiaries providing coverage for physician services (Part B) and prescription medications (Part D). Standard Medicare Part B and Part D premiums are set at a rate each year to cover approximately 25% of per capita program costs. High-income beneficiaries may pay higher than standard premiums. Individuals who are enrolled in both Social Security and Medicare must have their Medicare Part B premiums automatically deducted from their monthly Social Security benefit and may choose to have their Medicare Part D premiums automatically deducted from their monthly Social Security benefit. Although annual adjustments are made to both the Social Security benefit an individual receives and the Medicare premiums an individual pays, these adjustments are indexed to different inflation measures. The Social Security annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) is based on the Consumer Price Index-Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), which is a measure of general inflation. Medicare premium growth, by contrast, is based on program expenditure growth, which reflects spending for covered medical services. These different adjustment measures have resulted in Medicare premiums that typically increase at a rate greater than Social Security COLAs. From 2000 to 2018, Social Security COLAs have averaged a 2.2% annual increase, resulting in a cumulative benefit increase of approximately 50%, considerably less than the average 6.1% annual increase in standard Medicare Part B premiums, which has resulted in Medicare Part B premium growth of close to 195% over the same period. As a result, a greater percentage of total Social Security benefits is being deducted to pay for Medicare premiums. Congress has acted several times to protect beneficiaries from the impact of large Medicare Part B premium increases. The hold-harmless provision, made permanent by P.L. 110-360 Section 211(b), modified the Social Security Act to prevent certain Social Security beneficiaries' monthly benefit amount from decreasing from one year to the next due to an increase in Medicare Part B premiums. The hold-harmless provision does not apply to Medicare Part D premiums and does not cover several groups of beneficiaries including high-income individuals, Medicare Part B enrollees who do not receive Social Security benefits, new enrollees, and low-income beneficiaries (typically, Medicaid will pay low-income beneficiaries' Medicare Part B premiums). When a majority of beneficiaries are held harmless, such as in years with no Social Security COLA, premiums are typically still calculated to cover 25% of the expected costs of the Medicare Part B program; thus, those not held harmless may bear the burden of meeting any resulting increase in premiums disproportionately. The Medicare Trustees' long-range projections indicate that Medicare per capita cost growth will increase greater than inflation as measured by the CPI-W, increasing Medicare premiums at a faster rate than Social Security COLAs. The Medicare Trustees therefore project that a larger portion of Medicare beneficiaries' Social Security benefits will be required to pay standard Medicare Part B and Part D base premiums in the future. For example, in 2018, Medicare Part B and Part D premiums account for approximately 12.4% of the average Social Security benefit; the Medicare Trustees project that this will increase to approximately 14.0% in 2028 and to approximately 16.8% of the average Social Security benefit in 2092.

crs_RL33263

crs_RL33263_0

I n 2006, the Supreme Court decided Rapanos v. United States, the most recent and well-known of three Supreme Court decisions wrestling with the question of which wetlands are covered by the wetlands permitting program in the Clean Water Act (CWA). The Sixth Circuit Decisions Rapano s in the Sixth Circuit involved the Corps' assertion of 404 jurisdiction over a wetland adjacent to a tributary (man-made ditch) that ultimately flowed, miles later, into a traditional navigable water. The problem is that no single rationale in these three opinions commands the support of a majority of the Justices. No circuit decision has opted for the plurality test alone. The Corps and EPA had previously issued other guidance, attempting to clarify the Court's rulings on the jurisdictional issues discussed here. Under this test, the existence of a continuous surface connection, as demanded by the plurality, but not Kennedy or the dissenters, is required to establish adjacency. However, in May 2015, EPA and the Corps jointly announced a rule to revise regulations that define "waters of the United States," that is, waters protected under the CWA. According to the agencies, the new rule—which they now refer to as the Clean Water Rule—revises the existing administrative definition of "waters of the United States" in regulations consistent with legal rulings—especially the recent Supreme Court cases—and science concerning the interconnectedness of tributaries, wetlands, and other waters to downstream waters and effects of these connections on the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of downstream waters. The rule was controversial even before it was proposed in March 2014, and controversies have persisted since the final rule was issued, including among Members of Congress. Policy Implications As with the legal questions, the policy questions associated with the Supreme Court cases—what should be the outer limit of CWA regulatory jurisdiction and what are the consequences of restricting that jurisdiction—also have challenged regulators, landowners and developers, and policymakers since passage of the act in 1972. The answer to this question is important, because it may determine the extent of federal CWA regulatory authority not only for the Section 404 program, but also for purposes of implementing other CWA programs. While regulators and the regulated community debate the legal dimensions of federal jurisdiction, scientists contend that there are no discrete, scientifically supportable boundaries or criteria along the continuum of waters/wetlands to separate them into meaningful ecological or hydrological compartments. Wetland scientists believe that all such waters/wetlands are critical for protecting the integrity of waters, habitat, and wildlife downstream. SWANCC, Rapanos , and the subsequent lower court decisions also highlight the role of states in protecting waters not addressed by federal law. But if a larger portion of wetlands are no longer federally jurisdictional, they say, it can be argued that the Section 404 program no longer provides a baseline for consistent, minimum standards to regulate wetlands. None of these court rulings prevents states from protecting non-jurisdictional waters through legislative or administrative action, but few states have done so. It defined "waters of the United States" by a rewritten version of the regulatory definition in use by EPA and the Corps: The term "waters of the United States" means all waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, the territorial seas, and all interstate and intrastate waters including lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, and natural ponds, all tributaries of any of the above waters, and all impoundments of the foregoing. In the 114 th Congress, bills to narrow the statutory definition of waters that are subject to CWA jurisdiction have been introduced, as has legislation to bar EPA and the Corps from issuing a revised "waters of the United States" rule or to require the agencies to re-start the rulemaking process for such a regulation. (For details, see CRS Report R43943, EPA and the Army Corps' "Waters of the United States" Rule: Congressional Response and Options , by [author name scrubbed].)

In 1985 and 2001, the Supreme Court grappled with issues as to the geographic scope of the wetlands permitting program in the federal Clean Water Act (CWA). In 2006, the Supreme Court rendered a third decision, Rapanos v. United States, on appeal from two Sixth Circuit rulings. The Sixth Circuit rulings offered the Court a chance to clarify the reach of CWA jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent only to nonnavigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters—including tributaries such as drainage ditches and canals that may flow intermittently. (Jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters was established in the 1985 decision.) The legal and policy questions associated with Rapanos—regarding the outer geographic limit of CWA jurisdiction and the consequences of restricting that scope—have challenged regulators, landowners and developers, and policymakers for 40 years. The answer may determine the reach of CWA regulatory authority for all CWA programs, since the CWA uses but one jurisdiction-defining phrase ("navigable waters") throughout the statute. The Court's decision provided little clarification, however, splitting 4-1-4. The four-Justice plurality decision, by Justice Scalia, said that the CWA covers only wetlands connected to relatively permanent bodies of water (streams, rivers, lakes) by a continuous surface connection. Justice Kennedy, writing alone, demanded a substantial nexus between the wetland and a traditional navigable water, using an ambiguous ecological test. Justice Stevens, for the four dissenters, would have upheld the existing broad reach of Corps of Engineers/EPA regulations. Because no rationale commanded the support of a majority of the Justices, lower courts are extracting different rules of decision from Rapanos for resolving future cases. Corps/EPA guidance issued in 2008 says that a wetland generally is jurisdictional if it satisfies either the plurality or Kennedy tests. In 2011, the agencies proposed revised guidance intended to clarify whether waters are protected by the CWA, but this proposal was controversial and was not finalized. The ambiguity of the Rapanos decision and questions about the agencies' guidance increased pressure on EPA and the Corps to initiate a rulemaking to promulgate new regulations, which they did with regulatory revisions to define "waters of the United States" that are subject to CWA jurisdiction, issued in May 2015. (For discussion of this rule, seeCRS Report R43455, EPA and the Army Corps' Rule to Define "Waters of the United States"). The rule has been very controversial, including among Members of Congress. (For discussion, see CRS Report R43943, EPA and the Army Corps' "Waters of the United States" Rule: Congressional Response and Options, by [author name scrubbed] ). Challenges to the rule, called the Clean Water Rule, have been brought in a number of federal courts, and the rule has been stayed for the duration of litigation. While regulators and the regulated community debate the legal dimensions of federal jurisdiction under the CWA, scientists contend that there are no discrete, scientifically supportable boundaries or criteria along the continuum of wetlands to separate them into meaningful ecological or hydrological compartments. Wetland scientists believe that all such waters are critical for protecting the integrity of waters, habitat, and wildlife downstream. Changes in the limits of federal jurisdiction highlight the role of states in protecting waters not addressed by federal law. From the states' perspective, federal programs provide a baseline for consistent, minimum standards to regulate wetlands and other waters. Most states are either reluctant or unable to take independent steps to protect non-jurisdictional waters through legislative or administrative action.

crs_RL30787

crs_RL30787_0

Introduction House procedures are not based solely on the Rules that the chamber adopts at the outset of each new Congress. The foundations of House parliamentary procedure also include constitutional mandates, principles of parliamentary practice set forth in Jefferson ' s Manual , provisions of law that have the force and effect of rules, published precedents reflecting authoritative rulings and interpretations of the foregoing authorities, and informal practices. These authorities, which are presented in the House Manual with annotations by the parliamentarian, include the Constitution; Jefferson ' s Manual ; the adopted Rules of the House; and provisions of law that have the force and effect of rules ("rule-making statutes"). Finally, parliamentary reference documents prepared by committees, offices, and other organs of the House include Committee rules, adopted by the respective committees and compiled, in each Congress, by the House Committee on Rules in a print, Rules Adopted by Committees of the House of Representatives; "Memorandums of understanding" (often called "letters of agreement") between committees regarding committee jurisdiction; Floor Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives from the House Committee on Rules; How Our Laws Are Made from the Office of the House Parliamentarian; and the rules of the Democratic Caucus and of the Republican Conference, adopted by the respective bodies and prepared by each for its own Members. This report begins by reviewing some principles of House procedure that condition the way in which these parliamentary reference sources can be used. Although some of these illustrations do not reflect the most recent, current edition of the document from which they are taken, the format and other features they illustrate are retained in the current editions. Appendix A furnishes citations for each printed reference document covered in this report, and for related Congressional Research Service (CRS) products. These include a single comprehensive index to all the authorities contained in the Manual ; the annotations by the Parliamentarian of the House to the provisions of each authority, summarizing pertinent precedents that bear on each provision; and a preface that presents a summary of changes to House Rules adopted since the last Congress. This section sets forth procedures for House floor consideration of the budget resolution. In addition, however, House precedents in general are compiled, digested, described, or referenced in five official publications of the House: House Practice ; Deschler ' s Precedents ; Hinds ' and Cannon ' s Precedents ; Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives and its supplement; and Cannon ' s Procedure . Hinds ' and Cannon ' s Precedents is very useful, however, when other reference sources cite a specific precedent in the 11-volume set. The precedents are grouped in unnumbered topical chapters. Additional Authorities As noted at the outset, in the section "The House Adheres to Many Informal Practices," procedure in the House is governed not only by the Constitution, formally adopted rules, and precedents interpreting those authorities, but also by a variety of other practices that have become usual in the course of time. Upon adoption, the rules are printed and distributed to Members belonging to the respective conference. Senate. CRS Report 98-309, House Legislative Procedures: Published Sources of Information , by [author name scrubbed]. There are links to current versions of House and Senate rules and CRS reports on specific procedural topics.

House procedures are based not solely on the code of Rules the chamber adopts at the start of each Congress, but also on constitutional mandates, published precedents reflecting authoritative rulings and interpretations of the foregoing authorities, procedural principles set forth in the manual of practice prepared by Jefferson, "rule-making" statutes, and practices that have developed without being formally adopted.. Rules adopted by committees and by the party conferences also serve as sources of parliamentary practice in the House. This report describes the coverage, format, and availability of documents that set forth these procedural authorities, and notes principles of House procedural practice that bear on appropriate use of these sources. Summaries and appendices provide citations to print and electronic versions, and list related CRS products. The main procedural authorities of the House are set forth in the House Manual ("House Rules and Manual" or, colloquially, "Jefferson's Manual"), published in each Congress and distributed to House offices. They include the Constitution, applicable portions of Jefferson's Manual, the adopted Rules of the House, and provisions of statute that have procedural effects, often governing proceedings on specified measures. In the House Manual, provisions of each authority are accompanied by the parliamentarian's annotations of precedents interpreting those provisions. Budget resolutions may also contain provisions with procedural effect. The current practice of the House is summarized by topic, with references to pertinent rules and precedents, in House Practice, prepared by the Office of the Parliamentarian and provided to all House offices. Precedents from 1936 to 1976 or later are set forth in full, or topical chapters, in the 16 volumes (so far) of Deschler-Brown Precedents. Currently applicable precedents, including some later than 1976, are digested in Procedure in the House, a single volume with a similar chapter structure. Precedents before 1936 are set forth in the 11 volumes (with indexes) of Hinds' and Cannon's Precedents, with their own topical order. The older works among these are out of print, but copies are available for House offices. Other authorities include policies announced by Speakers in implementing certain rules, and "memorandums of understanding" reached by committees about areas of potentially shared jurisdiction. Some of these policies and memorandums are published in the Congressional Record. Also, House Rules require each committee to adopt and publish rules, which the Committee on Rules compiles in a single document in each Congress. Rules adopted by each party conference are in general made available only to its members. Finally, this report also mentions two brief procedural guides published under the auspices of House committees. This report assumes a basic familiarity with House procedure. It will be updated to reflect the appearance of new editions of the documents discussed and to address substantial changes in their content and availability. Information about Senate parliamentary reference sources is covered in CRS Report RL30788, Parliamentary Reference Sources: Senate, by Megan Suzanne Lynch and [author name scrubbed].

crs_R45256

crs_R45256_0

O n June 27, 2018, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy announced that, effective July 31, 2018, he would retire from active service as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States. His decisive role on the Court, particularly during the Roberts Court era, cannot be overstated. While Justice Kennedy has been a critical vote on the Court for much of his 30-year tenure, since the October 2005 term that marked the beginning of the Roberts Court, Justice Kennedy has been the Court's "median Justice," voting for the winning side in a case more often than any of his colleagues in 9 out of 12 terms. During this era, the High Court issued a number of landmark rulings that spanned the ideological spectrum. On July 9, 2018, President Trump announced the nomination of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill the impending vacancy on the Supreme Court caused by Justice Kennedy's scheduled retirement. CRS reports analyzing Judge Kavanaugh's jurisprudence on particular areas of the law, as well as a tabular listing of lower-court decisions in which he authored opinions, are in preparation. Unlike Justice Antonin Scalia, his colleague for nearly 28 years on the High Court, Justice Kennedy did not subscribe to a particular judicial philosophy, such as originalism or textualism. Individual Liberty Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence was often grounded in concerns for personal liberty, that is, freedom from government interference with "thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct." Justice Kennedy's emphasis on liberty also manifested itself in a number of decisions he authored or joined on issues implicating religion. Structural Protections of the Constitution The structural protections of the Constitution—i.e., restraints imposed on the federal government by the doctrines of separation of powers and federalism—also influenced Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence. Accordingly, for Justice Kennedy, separation of powers was a "defense against tyranny," and, in this vein, the Roberts Court era witnessed Justice Kennedy authoring or joining a number of majority opinions that invalidated on separation-of-powers grounds intrusions on the executive, legislative, or judicial functions. During the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, Justice Kennedy often found himself joining majority opinions that recognized federalism-based limitations on the power of the federal government, establishing limitations on Congress's legislative powers and reaffirming protections for state sovereignty grounded in part in the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. Given Justice Kennedy's deciding vote on many of the cases mentioned above, his replacement could have an especially influential role in a host of civil rights matters. These opinions have tended to defer to the authority of the political branches on national security matters. Justice Kennedy's views on the separation of powers placed him in the middle of the Roberts Court in cases concerning the allocation of powers among the three branches of the federal government, suggesting that Justice Kennedy's successor may be quite influential on the future direction of the Court's approach in such cases. Accordingly, because of the "difference one Justice [can] make" on the Court, Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence and the areas in which he was a deciding vote may be relevant considerations as the Senate determines whether to confirm the President's choice to replace the soon-to-be-retired Justice.

On June 27, 2018, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy announced that, effective July 31, 2018, he would retire from active service as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States. His decisive role on the Court, particularly since the Roberts Court era began in 2005, cannot be overstated. The Roberts Court era has witnessed the Court issue a number of landmark rulings, many of which have involved matters where the sitting Justices were closely divided. Justice Kennedy typically voted with the majority of the Court in such cases. Since the October 2005 term that marked the beginning of the Roberts Court, Justice Kennedy voted for the winning side in a case more often than any of his colleagues in 9 out of 12 terms. Unlike several other Justices on the Court, Justice Kennedy did not necessarily subscribe to a particular judicial philosophy, such as originalism or textualism. Instead, Justice Kennedy's judicial approach seemed informed by a host of related principles. First, Justice Kennedy's views on the law were often grounded in concerns for personal liberty, particularly freedom from government interference with thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. His emphasis on liberty manifested itself in a range of opinions he wrote or joined during his tenure on the Court, including on issues related to free speech, religious freedom, and government policies concerning same-sex relationships. Second, the structural protections of the Constitution—i.e., restraints imposed on the federal government and its respective branches by the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers—also animated Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence. For Justice Kennedy, separation of powers was a "defense against tyranny," and he authored or joined a number of Court opinions that invalidated on separation-of-powers grounds intrusions on the executive, legislative, or judicial functions. Likewise, during the Rehnquist Court and Roberts Court eras, Justice Kennedy joined several majority opinions that recognized federalism-based limitations on the enumerated power of the federal government, established external limitations on Congress's legislative powers over the states, and reaffirmed protections for state sovereignty. Third, Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence was undergirded by his view that the Court often has a robust role to play in resolving issues of national importance. With Justice Kennedy casting critical votes, over the last 30 years the Court has reasserted its role in a number of areas of law in which it was previously deferential to the judgment of the political branches. Given Justice Kennedy's outsized role on the Roberts Court, whoever succeeds him could have an important influence on any number of areas of law. In particular, Justice Kennedy's votes were critical to the outcome of numerous Court decisions on matters relating to abortion, business law, civil rights, the death penalty, the regulation of elections, eminent domain, the environment, federalism, the First Amendment, gun rights, immigration, national security, oversight of the administrative state, and separation of powers. Accordingly, Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence in these areas—particularly in cases where he was the deciding vote—may be especially relevant to the Senate as it determines whether to approve the President's nominee to replace the soon-to-be-retired Justice. On July 9, 2018, President Trump announced the nomination of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to– fill the impending vacancy on the Supreme Court caused by Justice Kennedy's scheduled retirement. CRS reports analyzing Judge Kavanaugh's jurisprudence on particular areas of the law, as well as a tabular listing of lower-court decisions in which he authored opinions, are in preparation.

crs_R43453

crs_R43453_0

T he renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC) expired on January 1, 2018, for nonwind facilities. Under current law, wind facilities that begin construction before the end of 2019 may qualify for the PTC. However, the PTC for wind started phasing down in 2017. Whether the PTC should be extended, modified, or remain expired is an issue that may be considered in the 116 th Congress. Description The renewable electricity PTC is a per-kilowatt-hour tax (kWh) credit for electricity generated using qualified energy resources. The maximum credit amount for 2017 and 2018 is 2.4 cents per kWh. Wind (before applying the 2017-2019 phaseout rates), closed-loop biomass, and geothermal energy technologies qualify for the maximum credit amount (see Table 1 ). Other technologies, including open-loop biomass, small irrigation power, municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower, and marine and hydrokinetic energy facilities, qualify for a reduced credit amount, where the amount of the credit is reduced by one-half (see Table 1 ). Before 2018, the PTC was available for taxpayers subject to the AMT for the first four years of the credit. There are also production tax credits for Indian coal and refined coal. Since 1999, the PTC has been extended 11 times (see Table 2 ). Hydropower was added as a half-credit qualifying resource. The PTC for wind and refined coal was extended for one year, through 2009, while the PTC for closed-loop biomass, open-loop biomass, geothermal energy, small irrigation power, municipal solid waste, and qualified hydropower was extended for two years, through 2010. The PTC for wind, which was scheduled to expire at the end of 2012, was extended for one year, through 2013, as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. As part of Division P of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. For wind facilities beginning construction in 2017, the credit is reduced by 20%. The PTCs for nonwind technologies and the PTC for Indian coal expired at the end of 2016, but were retroactively extended for tax year 2017 in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. 115-123 ). PTC Revenue Cost Estimates and Claims Estimates of the cost, or foregone revenue, associated with tax expenditure provisions can be found in the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) annual tax expenditure tables. Between 2018 and 2022, estimated revenue losses associated with the PTC are $25.8 billion (see Table 3 ). When the PTC was extended as part of a "tax extenders" package in 1999, Congress noted that the PTC had been important to the development of environmentally friendly renewable power, and extended the credit to promote further development of wind (and other) resources. The use of tax equity investors, often major financial institutions, reduces the amount of federal financial support for renewable energy that is delivered directly to the renewable energy sector. Policy Options and Proposals Without legislative action, the PTC is not available to nonwind projects that began construction after December 31, 2017, or wind projects that begin construction after December 31, 2019. One option is to allow the PTC to expire as scheduled. Another option would be to provide a temporary extension of the PTC. 114-113 , the expiration date for the PTC for wind is different than the expiration date for the PTC for other technologies. The extension could be made retroactive for 2018. If the PTC for nonwind technologies were extended, the phaseout that currently applies to wind could be applied to other technologies. Another alternative would be to extend the PTC for nonwind technologies, and remove the phaseout for wind, such that all PTC-eligible technologies qualified for the PTC at the same rate. Under this proposal, the PTC inflation adjustment factor would have been eliminated. This would reduce the value of the PTC for renewable electricity to 1.5 cents per kWh, for all PTC-eligible properties still within the 10-year eligibility window.

The renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC) is a per-kilowatt-hour (kWh) tax credit for electricity generated using qualified energy resources. For nonwind technologies, the credit expired at the end of 2017, so that only projects that began construction before the end of 2017 qualify for tax credits. After 2016, the PTC for wind remains available, at reduced rates, for wind facilities that begin construction before the end of 2019. Since the PTC is available for the first 10 years of production at a qualified facility, PTCs will continue to be claimed after the PTC's stated expiration date. Whether the PTC should be extended, modified, or allowed to expire as scheduled is an issue Congress may choose to consider. Most recently, the PTC for nonwind technologies was retroactively extended for tax year 2017 as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. 115-123). The PTC for wind was last extended in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). This legislation had extended the PTC for two years, through 2016, for all eligible technologies. Additionally, the PTC for wind was extended an additional three years, through 2019, but at reduced credit rates for wind facilities beginning construction in 2017, 2018, or 2019. The PTC for wind and closed-loop biomass was first enacted in 1992. When first enacted, the PTC was scheduled to expire on July 1, 1999. Since 1999, the PTC has been extended 11 times. On several occasions, the PTC was allowed to lapse before being retroactively extended. In addition to being extended, the PTC has also been expanded over time to include additional qualifying resources. In 2017, closed-loop biomass, and geothermal technologies qualified for the full credit amount of 2.4 cents per kWh. Other technologies (open-loop biomass, small irrigation power, municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower, marine, and hydrokinetic) qualified for a half-credit amount, or 1.2 cents per kWh in 2017. Wind facilities starting construction in 2017 qualified for 80% of the full credit amount. Credit amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that in 2018, foregone revenues (or "tax expenditures") for the PTC were $4.8 billion. Between 2018 and 2022, under current law, tax expenditures for the renewable electricity PTC are estimated to be $25.8 billion. Extensions or modification of the PTC could increase or decrease the estimated tax expenditures associated with this provision. The PTC has been important to the growth and development of renewable electricity resources, particularly wind. Tax incentives for renewables, however, may not be the most economically efficient way to correct for distortions in energy markets or to deliver federal financial support to the renewable energy sector. Tax subsidies reduce the average cost of electricity, increasing demand for electricity overall, countering energy-efficiency and emissions-reduction objectives. Subsidies delivered as nonrefundable tax incentives often require those wishing to use the credit find "tax-equity" partners to provide equity investments in exchange for tax credits. The use of tax equity reduced the amount of the incentive that flows directly to the renewable energy sector. There are a number of policy options that might be considered related to the PTC. For example, the PTC could be allowed to expire as scheduled. Alternatively, the PTC could be temporarily extended. The extension could apply only to nonwind technologies. If the PTC is retroactively extended for nonwind technologies, the phaseout that currently applies to wind could be applied to nonwind PTC-eligible technologies. Another option would be to remove the phaseout that applies to wind starting in 2017. Other forms of PTC phaseout have been proposed in recent years, including elimination of the inflation adjustment factor. Another option would be to make the PTC a permanent feature of the tax code.

crs_R45010

crs_R45010_0

Introduction Growing demands on the transportation system and constraints on public resources have led to calls for more private-sector involvement in the provision of transportation infrastructure through what are known as "public-private partnerships" or "P3s." As defined by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), "public-private partnerships (P3s) are contractual agreements between a public agency and a private-sector entity that allow for greater private-sector participation in the delivery and financing of transportation projects." The federal government exerts influence over the prevalence and structure of P3s through its transportation programs, funding, and regulatory oversight, but is usually not a party to a P3 agreement. The report outlines a number of issues and policy options that Congress might consider: project evaluation and transparency, asset recycling, incentive grants, infrastructure banks, tax credits for equity and debt, Interstate highway tolling, and changes to an existing federal loan program. It is these last two types of P3s, DBFOM and long-term lease agreements, which generate the most interest and discussion. To date, the number of transportation P3s in the United States is relatively small, as is the amount of long-term private financing provided. They require some type of revenue stream, such as a toll, fare, or tax, to service debt and provide a return on private equity, and such measures can be unpopular. Many states have very limited experience with P3s. Benefits of P3s There are three main potential benefits of P3s. First, P3s are a way to attract private capital to invest in transportation infrastructure. Second, P3s may be able to build and operate transportation facilities more efficiently than the public sector through better management and innovation in construction, maintenance, and operation. Third, through P3s the public sector can transfer to the private-sector partner many of the risks of building, maintaining, and operating transportation infrastructure ( Table 1 ). Limitations of P3s Concerns with P3s include the types of projects involved, the risks retained by the public sector, and transportation planning. P3s that are reliant on tolls or other user fees, therefore, are unlikely to address transportation issues in rural areas or on lightly traveled routes. However, P3s in these areas may be viable if based on state and local government availability payments. Although some risks are typically transferred to the private sector in a P3, the public sector may retain significant risk. P3s may have longer-term effects on the transportation system insofar as they influence decisions about what to build and where. Most transportation P3s to date have involved highways or marine cargo terminals. Only a few have involved public transportation, intercity passenger rail, or airports. Federal Role in P3s Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) Program The main way in which the federal government has encouraged P3s and private financing in surface transportation is through the TIFIA program, which provides long-term, low-interest loans and other types of credit to project sponsors. Several factors may explain the generally low level of activity of state infrastructure banks and the dominance of public projects. Limiting the formation of P3s would predominantly entail restricting federal benefits to such projects. Two broad policy options for expanding use of P3s would be to actively encourage P3s with program incentives, but with regulatory controls to protect the public interest, or to aggressively encourage the use of P3s through program incentives and deregulation.

Public-private partnerships (P3s) in transportation are contractual relationships typically between a state or local government, who are the owners of most transportation infrastructure, and a private company. P3s provide a mechanism for greater private-sector participation in all phases of the development, operation, and financing of transportation projects. Although there are many different forms P3s can take, this report focuses on the two types of agreements that generate the most interest and discussion: (1) design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM); and (2) long-term lease. P3s have emerged, in part, because of the growing demands on the transportation system and constraints on public resources. To date, however, the number of transportation P3s in the United States is relatively small, as is the amount of long-term private financing provided. Among the reasons for this are the availability to state and local governments of tax-preferred municipal bonds; the need for some kind of revenue stream, such as a toll, fare, or tax, to provide funding; and the fact that many states have very limited experience with P3s. Most transportation P3s to date have been in highways or marine cargo terminals; only a few have involved public transportation, intercity passenger rail, or airports. There are three main potential benefits of P3s: (1) P3s are a way to attract private capital to invest in transportation infrastructure; (2) P3s may be able to build and operate transportation facilities more efficiently than the public sector through better management and innovation in construction, maintenance, and operation; and (3) the public sector can transfer to the private-sector partner many of the risks of building, maintaining, and operating transportation infrastructure. Concerns with P3s include the types of projects involved, the risks retained by the public sector, and transportation planning. P3s that are reliant on tolls or other user fees are unlikely to address transportation issues in rural areas or on lightly traveled routes. However, P3s in these areas may be viable if based on state and local government availability payments. Although some risks are typically transferred to the private sector in a P3, the public sector may retain significant risk. P3s may have longer-term effects on the transportation system because they influence decisions about what to build and where, and can limit what other projects the government can pursue. The federal government exerts influence over the prevalence and structure of P3s through its transportation programs, funding, and regulatory oversight, but is usually not a party to a P3 agreement. The current federal role in P3s includes project loans through the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) Program, the authorization of private activity bonds (PABs), certain tax provisions such as depreciation schedules, state infrastructure banks, and the provision of technical advice through the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Limiting the formation of P3s would predominantly entail restricting federal benefits to such projects. Two broad policy options for expanding use of P3s would be to actively encourage P3s with program incentives, but with regulatory controls to protect the public interest, or to aggressively encourage the use of P3s through program incentives and deregulation. This report discusses several possible issues and policy options that Congress may want to consider. These include P3 project evaluation and transparency, asset recycling, incentive grants, a national infrastructure bank, equity investment tax credits, and deregulation of Interstate highway tolling. The report also discusses changes to the existing TIFIA and PABs programs.

crs_R41758

crs_R41758_0

On June 19, 2008, the Speaker of the House of Representatives received a referral regarding U.S. District Court Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr. of the Eastern District of Louisiana. The Senate convicted him on all four articles of impeachment later that year. Judge Kent was impeached by the House of Representatives. His Senate impeachment trial was dismissed after he resigned from office and the House indicated that it did not wish to pursue the matter further. The statutory framework stems from the Judicial Improvements Act of 2002, P.L. 107-273 , Div. §§351-364. The current statutory procedures are applicable to complaints against federal circuit judges, district judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. In addition, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are each required to prescribe rules, consistent with the provisions in 28 U.S.C. If the Judicial Conference concurs in the judicial council's determination that impeachable offenses may be involved, or if the Judicial Conference makes its own determination that consideration of impeachment may be warranted, the conference must certify and transmit the determination and the record of proceedings to the House of Representatives for whatever action the House considers necessary. If a judge has been convicted of a federal or state felony and has exhausted direct appeals of the conviction or if the time to seek further direct review has passed and no such review has been sought, then that judge shall not hear or decide cases unless the judicial council of the circuit in the case of federal circuit judges, district judges, bankruptcy judges, or magistrate judges; or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, or the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit, respectively, in the case of a judge of one of those courts, determines otherwise. § 353(c) to the complainant and to the judge who is the subject of the complaint; (2) the judicial council of the circuit, the Judicial Conference of the United States, or the Senate or the House by resolution, releases any such material believed necessary to an impeachment investigation or trial of a judge under article I of the Constitution; or (3) such disclosure is authorized in writing by the judge who is the subject of the complaint and by the chief judge of the circuit, the Chief Justice, or the chairman of the standing committee established under 28 U.S.C. It does not apply to U.S. Supreme Court Justices. As in the recent cases of Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr. and Judge Samuel B. Kent, where an investigation under this judicial discipline process uncovers conduct which may rise to the level of an impeachable offense, the matter may be referred by the Judicial Conference of the United States to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives for the House to consider whether to pursue impeachment of the judge involved.

The current statutory structure with respect to complaints against federal judges and judicial discipline was enacted on November 2, 2002, as the Judicial Improvements Act of 2002, P.L. 107-273, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364. These provisions are applicable to federal circuit judges, district judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. They do not apply to the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are each directed to prescribe rules consistent with these provisions to address complaints pertaining to their own judges. The procedures under 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 include a complaint process, review of complaints initially by the chief judge of the circuit within which the judge in question sits, and, if appropriate, referral of the complaint to a special investigating committee, to a panel of the judicial council of the circuit involved, and, if needed, to the Judicial Conference of the United States. At any point in the process, as deemed appropriate, action may be taken on the complaint. Where a complaint alleges conduct that may rise to the level of impeachable offenses, the Judicial Conference may certify that the matter may warrant consideration of impeachment and transmit the determination and the record of proceedings to the House of Representatives for whatever action the House of Representatives considers necessary. Two such referrals were received by the House in the 111th Congress regarding Judge Samuel B. Kent of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas and Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Judge Kent was impeached by the House of Representatives. His Senate impeachment trial was dismissed after he resigned from office and the House indicated that it did not wish to pursue the matter further. Judge Porteous was also impeached by the House of Representatives. On December 8, 2010, the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, voted to convict Judge Porteous on all four of the articles of impeachment brought against him. A judgment of removal from office flowed automatically from his conviction. In a rare additional judgment, the Senate disqualified him from holding federal office in the future.

crs_R42576

crs_R42576_0

For all other eligible renewable energy projects, the PTC is available to projects placed in service before January 1, 2014. In 2012, the U.S. wind manufacturing sector is estimated to have the capacity to produce approximately 13 gigawatts (GW) of wind turbines annually. Proponents of extending the wind PTC point to the potential loss of manufacturing and construction jobs that will result if the tax incentive is allowed to expire, the environmental benefits of U.S. wind development, and the potential to re-establish the United States as a global leader in an emerging industry. Impact of Current PTC Expiration U.S. wind installations are expected to reach record levels in 2012, with industry analysts estimating between 10 GW and 12 GW of total installations by the end of the year. Wind developers, utility companies, and investors are accelerating their planned wind projects in order to qualify for tax credit incentives that might not be available in 2013 and beyond. In essence, the pending PTC expiration at the end of 2012 has actually created a short-term surge in wind-related manufacturing and employment. However, the PTC incentive is only one of several factors that influence wind development, and a PTC extension, in isolation of other market factors, may not result in ever-larger levels of wind deployment. Other important factors for project development include state renewable portfolio standards, electricity demand growth, and natural gas prices. Short-Term versus Long-Term PTC Extension Some advocates for extending the availability of the PTC for wind projects argue that a long-term extension is needed to provide stable incentives that will result in certainty within the wind industry and may stimulate growth. AWEA and other proponents of extending the availability of the PTC incentive argue that the expiring nature of production tax credits has created a volatile U.S. wind market with new installations ramping up just before the credits expire, and the following year having very little new wind development. It is possible that such uncertainty could reduce investment, research, and employment in the wind industry. Going forward, an element of the PTC debate may include the duration of PTC availability. State RPS policies are the primary renewable electricity demand driver, although demand for renewable power can also be encouraged by voluntary green power programs and fundamental economics. However, EIA projects modest growth levels for U.S. electricity demand over the next several years (see Figure 4 ). Generally, lower natural gas prices can reduce the economic competitiveness of wind power, while higher natural gas prices can create opportunities for wind to compete on economics alone, in some cases without subsidies. Low natural gas prices can lower electricity prices and result in making ACPs more economical than either building or paying for renewable generation. However, as part of the policy design, the California RPS includes a cost containment design element, which is directly linked to the price of natural gas. Policy Discussion The 112 th Congress may decide if the PTC incentive for wind electricity will be extended, modified, or terminated. Some market estimates indicate that a PTC extension would result in increasing U.S. wind capacity installations, when compared with allowing the PTC to expire—but at levels less than those observed since 2009 and less than current U.S. wind turbine manufacturing capacity (see Figure 2 ). Generally, the shorter the extension the more near-term wind market activity that may be stimulated since project developers are motivated to install new capacity in order to qualify for PTC incentives. The design of a PTC phase-out policy could potentially be difficult because, in order to stimulate U.S. wind development, the rate at which the PTC is reduced may need to be offset by, or aligned to changes in, other market factors (e.g., higher natural gas prices, more stringent state RPS policies, increased U.S. electricity demand). Legislative Action The Family and Business Tax Cut Certainty Act of 2012 ( S. 3521 ) passed a Senate Finance committee vote and was reported to the Senate on August 28, 2012. The wind PTC extension and modification outlined in S. 3521 enables projects to qualify for the PTC if construction begins before January 1, 2014; however, there is no requirement for the qualified project to be placed in service by a certain date.

U.S. wind projects that use large turbines—greater than 100 kilowatts (kW)—are eligible to receive federal tax incentives in the form of production tax credits (PTC) and accelerated depreciation. Originally established in 1992, the PTC has played a role in the evolution and growth of the U.S. wind industry. Under existing law, wind projects placed in service on or after January 1, 2013, will not be eligible to receive the PTC incentive. Industry proponents are advocating for an extension of PTC availability, citing employment, economic development, and other considerations as justification for the extension. While a PTC extension may improve the prospects for U.S. wind development and manufacturing next year and beyond, the wind industry is influenced by a number of other factors. It is uncertain how the near- or long-term availability of the PTC incentive—in isolation of changes to other market factors—would either grow or sustain current wind development and manufacturing levels. For 2012, the pending expiration of the wind PTC is actually creating a short-term surge in wind project development and related investment and employment. Wind installations in 2012 are expected to range somewhere between 10 to 12 gigawatts (GW)—a record year for the industry. However, market estimates for new installations in 2013 range from 1-2 GW if the PTC expires and 2-4 GW if the PTC is extended. Limited market activity in 2013 is partially explained by the uncertain nature of the PTC, which results in reduced manufacturing orders and development activity as developers and investors wait for official policy direction. Wind installation projections for 2014 and beyond vary with the assumed availability, and duration, of PTC incentives. However, all projections reviewed for this report expect annual U.S. wind turbine demand to be less than the existing U.S. turbine manufacturing capacity—approximately 13 GW per year. Other factors that can affect wind development include (1) state renewable portfolio standards (RPS), (2) U.S. electricity demand growth, and (3) the price of natural gas. State RPS policies have been the primary demand creator for wind projects, in most cases, by requiring certain utilities to source a percentage of their retail electricity sales from renewable generators. Market analysis indicates that incremental RPS-driven demand for all sources of renewable power is estimated to be 4 GW-5 GW annually until 2025. Additionally, U.S. electricity demand growth is expected to be modest for the foreseeable future, meaning that there will likely be modest demand for new electric power capacity. Finally, the price of natural gas can also influence wind markets. Low natural gas prices can erode the economic competitiveness of wind electricity, while high natural gas prices can result in opportunities for wind to compete economically without the PTC. Current estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) project sustained low, but increasing, natural gas prices for the next several years. By the end of 2012, Congress will either allow the PTC incentive to expire or it may choose to extend or modify the incentive. Should Congress decide to extend the availability of wind PTC incentives, the duration (e.g., two years, four years, permanent) of such an extension will likely be part of the policy debate. Generally, the shorter the extension the greater the short-term economic and employment activity as developers and investors accelerate development plans in order to qualify for the PTC incentive. However, this development acceleration is likely to reduce future RPS-driven demand. A permanent PTC is also a policy option that may be considered, and EIA estimates indicate that such a policy may actually reduce near-term wind capacity additions, with annual installations peaking at 4 GW in the 2030 timeframe. Higher natural gas prices, more aggressive RPS policies, and increased U.S. electricity demand could change this outlook. The Family and Business Tax Cut Certainty Act of 2012 (S. 3521) was reported in the Senate on August 28, 2012. S. 3521 includes a one-year extension and modification of the wind PTC, making it available to projects that begin construction before January 1, 2014.

crs_R40865

crs_R40865_0

Introduction A common theme in controversies over the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is that a conflict is triggered by the need for the same dwindling resources by humans and a listed species. Sagebrush habitat in the West is diminishing and becoming fragmented due to urbanization, global climate change, roads, fences, grazing, energy development, water scarcity, power lines, etc. Petitions have been filed under the ESA to protect the Gunnison grouse, the greater sage grouse, a western subspecies of the greater sage grouse, the Bi-State population, and the Columbia River Basin population. However, on January 11, 2013, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS or Service) proposed listing the Gunnison grouse as endangered. In a court settlement, FWS agreed to decide whether to list the Bi-State population by the end of FY2013 and the Columbia sage grouse population and the greater sage grouse by the end of FY2015. It remains a game bird in many western states. The sage grouse was once abundant in 16 western states. Within this genus, there are two recognized species: the Gunnison grouse ( Centrocercus minimus ) and the sage grouse ( Centrocercus urophasianus ). Populations have declined, although there is no consensus as to the extent of the decline, or whether it is part of a natural cycle. In January 2000, citizen organizations petitioned FWS to list the Gunnison grouse, and in December 2000, FWS published a notice designating the Gunnison grouse as a candidate species, finding that listing was warranted but precluded due to resource constraints on the service. Proposed Eastern Subspecies Some believe the sage grouse can be divided into subspecies, such as an eastern subspecies: the Institute for Wildlife Protection filed a petition to list an eastern subspecies of the sage grouse under the ESA. Bi-State or Mono Basin Distinct Population Segment Some groups hold that the sage grouse population in the area around Mono Lake (in California and Nevada) constitutes a DPS of sage grouse. These programs help illustrate another issue in sage grouse management: until a species is listed under federal law, it is managed under state law, even on federal lands. Bureau of Land Management Policy Under BLM policy, species that are listed, proposed for listing, or candidate species under the ESA are known as special status species. When it is making a listing determination, FWS is required to consider whether there are adequate regulatory mechanisms in place such that additional protection under the ESA is not needed. According to the FWS listing determination regarding the sage grouse, the impact of the Forest Service policy on sage grouse protection is uncertain and inconsistent. Courts have found that "voluntary" actions are not regulatory; the protections must be enforceable. States are taking action to protect the sage grouse, in part to protect a game bird, but also to forestall the listing that many see as an obstruction to development of the sagebrush territory that covers so much of the western United States. Congressional pushes for more energy development, both for oil and gas and for green energy such as wind farms and solar collectors, may end up conflicting with the grouse and the protections offered by the ESA. "Sagebrush" includes all species and subspecies of the genus Artemisia except the mat-forming sub-shrub species: frigida (fringed) and pedatifida (birdfoot); 2. is riparian, wet meadow (native or introduced) or areas of alfalfa or other suitable forbs (brood rearing habitat) within 275 meters of sagebrush habitat with 5% or greater sagebrush canopy cover (for roosting/loafing); 3. is reclaimed habitat containing at least two native grasses (at least one bunchgrass) and two native forbs (see "reclamation" in Attachment B of the SGEO) and no point within the grass/forb habitat is more than 60 meters from adjacent 5% or greater sagebrush cover; or 4. is "transitional" sage-grouse habitat, which is land that has been treated or burned prior to 2011, resulting in < 5% sagebrush cover but is actively managed to meet a minimum of 5% sagebrush canopy cover with associated grasses and forbs by 2021 (as determined by analysis of local condition and trend) and may or may not be considered "disturbed." Pole fences. 11. State Conservation Efforts Under Colorado law, the species is not protected as a threatened or endangered species. However, as noted earlier in this report, FWS has proposed listing the Gunnison grouse as endangered.

Western states have seen conflicts over natural resources for more than a century, involving issues such as grazing, roads, fences, oil and gas development, urban expansion, spread of invasive species, water rights, timber harvest, and pollution. In many cases, the conflicts involve the protection of endangered and threatened species, often with one group seeing listed species as an obstacle to their development goals or property rights, and another group advocating protection in line with their environmental, scientific, or economic goals. One such controversy is developing in 11 western states over sage grouse, whose numbers can be threatened by roads, fences, power lines, urban expansion, and energy development. This report describes the state of knowledge about these birds, history of efforts to protect them, and current controversies. The sage grouse, once abundant in western sagebrush habitat in 16 states, has dropped in numbers, and is now found in 11 states. Its decline can be attributed to several factors—increased use of sage grouse habitat by ranching and energy development, decreased sagebrush due to noxious invasive species, and loss of habitat due to more frequent fires. However, the extent of the decline is not certain, and some dispute that the sage grouse is in peril. There is some discussion over how many species of grouse there are and how they may be related. Currently, two closely related species are recognized by scientists: the Gunnison grouse (Centrocercus minimus) and the sage grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus), sometimes referred to as the greater sage grouse. At one time, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS or Service) also recognized two subspecies—the eastern sage grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus urophasianus) and the western sage grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus phaios)—but FWS reversed that position. In addition, FWS has designated distinct population segments (DPS) of sage grouse under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Parties have filed petitions seeking to protect these birds under the ESA by having them listed as threatened or endangered, but none are listed under the act. On January 11, 2013, however, FWS proposed listing the Gunnison grouse as endangered. In July 2011, FWS reached a settlement in several lawsuits regarding delays in listing species, include the sage grouse. According to the settlement agreement, a proposed listing rule or a decision that listing is not warranted is due for the Mono Basin sage grouse DPS by the end of FY2013, and for the Columbia River Basin sage grouse DPS and the greater sage grouse by the end of FY2015. At present, those grouses' protection under the ESA has been deemed warranted but precluded by higher protection priorities. Thus, the sage grouse is treated as a candidate species and does not have the protections that a listed species would have. One factor in making a listing decision is whether other regulations are in place to provide adequate protection of a species so that federal listing is not necessary to prevent extinction. States in primary sage grouse habitat have taken action to forestall an endangered species listing, which some believe would inhibit energy development on vast amounts of public and private property. Additionally, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service have policies to protect the grouse on their lands, although courts have found those policies lacking. These issues are at the forefront as Congress considers increased energy development on federal lands, while balancing the mission of the ESA.

crs_R44238

crs_R44238_0

Introduction On October 23, 2015, the House passed a reconciliation bill containing provisions submitted by three committees—Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Education and the Workforce—pursuant to reconciliation instructions included in the FY2016 budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. The bill, the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015 ( H.R. 3762 ), would repeal several provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended). This report provides background on the reconciliation process and summarizes the provisions in H.R. 3762 , including their projected budgetary impact. It then briefly examines the bill's policy implications. The report will be updated as necessary to reflect key legislative developments. FY2016 Budget Resolution S.Con.Res. 11 established the congressional budget for the federal government for FY2016 and set forth budgetary levels for FY2017-FY2025. It also included reconciliation instructions for House and Senate committees to submit changes in laws to reduce the federal deficit to their respective budget committees. 3762 , the House reconciliation bill. The table also shows the impact that repealing these ACA provisions would have on the federal deficit, excluding any macroeconomic effects, as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). According to CBO and JCT, the House reconciliation bill would reduce federal deficits by $78.1 billion over the 2016-2025 period, excluding any macroeconomic effects. 3762 would appropriate an additional $235 million for each of FY2016 and FY2017 to the federal health centers program. 3762 . Individual Mandate H.R. H.R. Medical Device Tax H.R. Auto-enrollment Requirement H.R. Prevention and Public Health Fund H.R. Federal Funding for Planned Parenthood and Health Centers The bill's one-year prohibition on federal funding—made available to a state either directly or through a managed-care organization—for any entity that meets the criteria set out in the legislation, which were summarized in the " House Reconciliation Bill " section of this report, would probably impact the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliates and clinics. H.R.

On December 3, 2015, the Senate passed an amendment to H.R. 3762. For information about the Senate amendment to H.R. 3762 and how it compares to the House-passed version of H.R. 3762, see CRS Report R44300, Provisions of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3762, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. This report will not be updated to reflect the Senate's actions or subsequent actions taken by the House. The FY2016 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 11) established the congressional budget for the federal government for FY2016 and set forth budgetary levels for FY2017-FY2025. It also included reconciliation instructions for House and Senate committees to submit changes in laws to reduce the federal deficit to their respective budget committees. On October 23, 2015, the House passed H.R. 3762, a reconciliation bill containing provisions submitted by three committees—Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Education and the Workforce—pursuant to the reconciliation instructions included in the FY2016 budget resolution. The House reconciliation bill—H.R. 3762, the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015—would repeal several provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended). These provisions are as follows: the individual mandate; the employer mandate; the excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored coverage (the Cadillac tax); the medical device tax; the auto-enrollment requirement for large employers; and the Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF). Additionally, H.R. 3762 could restrict federal funding for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliates and clinics for a period of one year. The bill also would appropriate an additional $235 million for each of FY2016 and FY2017 to the federal health centers program. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimate that the House reconciliation bill would reduce federal deficits by $78.1 billion over the 2016-2025 period. This report provides background on the reconciliation process and summarizes the provisions in H.R. 3762, including their projected budgetary impact. It then briefly examines some of the bill's policy implications. The report will be updated as necessary to reflect key legislative developments.

crs_R43926

crs_R43926_0

On January 12, 2017, the Obama Administration announced a major change in U.S. immigration policy by ending the so-called wet foot/dry foot policy in which thousands of undocumented Cuban migrants have entered the United States in recent years. 114-328 ), which continued prohibitions on funding for the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and restricted FY2017 funding for Cuba's participation in certain joint or multilateral exercises or related security conferences. 114-254 ) providing FY2017 appropriations for most programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of almost 0.2% through April 28, 2017. On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law a full-year FY2017 military construction appropriations measure (Division A of P.L. 114-223 , H.R. In December 2014, just after the adjournment of the 113 th Congress, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving away from a sanctions-based policy aimed at isolating Cuba to a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. Legislative initiatives in the 114 th Congress are noted throughout the report, and four appendixes provide a listing of enacted measures and approved resolutions ( Appendix A ), bills receiving some action in 2015 and 2016 ( Appendix B ), and additional bills and resolution introduced in the 114 th Congress ( Appendix C ). While Raúl Castro began implementing economic reforms in 2008, there has been no change to his government's tight control over the political system, and few observers expect such changes to occur with the government backed up by a strong security apparatus. In conformity with the new two-term limit for top officials, Castro indicated that this would be his last term, which means that he would serve until February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Short-term detentions for political reasons have increased significantly over the past several years, a reflection of the government's change of tactics in repressing dissent away from long-term imprisonment. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantánamo and Panama; and the 1996 shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban-American group Brothers to the Rescue, which resulted in the deaths of four U.S. crew members. In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people. The President maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about democracy and human rights in Cuba but stated that "we can do more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through engagement." Increase in Travel, Commerce, and the Flow of Information The White House announced a number of policy changes to implement this third step. As noted above, the LIBERTAD Act ties the lifting of the embargo to conditions in Cuba (including that a democratically elected government is in place). March 2016 Presidential Visit President Obama traveled to Cuba from March 20 to 22, 2016—the first visit of a U.S. President since Calvin Coolidge visited in 1928. Some Members of Congress lauded the Administration's actions as in the best interests of the United States and a better way to support change in Cuba, while other Members strongly criticized the President for not obtaining concessions from Cuba to advance human rights. Selected Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations For many years, Congress has played an active role in U.S. policy toward Cuba through the enactment of legislative initiatives and oversight on the numerous issues that comprise policy toward Cuba. These include U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba, such as restrictions on travel, remittances, and agricultural and medical exports; terrorism issues, including Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism; human rights issues, including funding and oversight of U.S.-government sponsored democracy and human rights projects; funding and oversight for U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba (Radio and TV Martí); migration issues; bilateral antidrug cooperation; and U.S. claims for property confiscated by the Cuban government. It also would have funded costs associated with additional diplomatic personnel in Cuba. 114-328 ) enacted in December 2016, Section 1286 prohibits the Secretary of Defense from authorizing FY2017 funds for the Department of Defense to invite, assist, or otherwise assure the participation of Cuba in certain joint or multilateral exercises or related security conference between the governments of the United States and Cuba until the Secretaries of Defense and State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to Congress written assurances regarding Cuba's fulfillment of conditions for Cuba related to human rights, support to the security forces of Venezuela, cessation of Cuba's demand that the United States relinquish control of the U.S. Three bills would have lifted the overall embargo, H.R. In contrast, two other introduced bills, S. 1388 and H.R. Efforts to ease and tighten travel restrictions played out in the FY2016 appropriations process, but ultimately no such provisions were included in the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure ( P.L. Legislative Activity. H.R. In the FY2017 appropriations process, House and Senate bills again had provisions that would have tightened and eased economic sanctions on Cuba, but the 114 th Congress did not complete action on FY2017 appropriations. 5393 , Commerce, and H.R. In contrast to the House, the Senate version of the FY2017 Senate Financial Services appropriations bill, S. 3067 , had provisions that would have lifted restrictions on financing for agricultural exports to Cuba and on seaborne vessel entry into the United States if the vessel had been involved in trade with Cuba within the previous 180 days, except pursuant to a DOT license. 635 (Rangel); and H.R. The House Financial Services appropriations bill, H.R. The Administration's request for FY2016 was $20 million in ESF, and the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. The House version of the FY2017 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. As noted previously, the 114 th Congress did not complete action on FY2017 appropriations, but it did approve a continuing resolution ( P.L. Finally, H.R. P.L. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, without congressional action. The House bill had three Cuba provisions that would have blocked part of the Administration's policy shift on Cuba related to travel and the importation of goods from Cuba, and would have introduced an additional sanction on financial transactions with Cuba. 114-113 ( H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. S. 1389 (Udall) / H.R. S. 1489 (Rubio)/ H.R. S. 1543 (Moran ) / H.R. H.R.

Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country's political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In 2013, Raúl began his second and final five-year term, which is scheduled to end in February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Castro has implemented a number of market-oriented economic policy changes over the past several years. An April 2016 Cuban Communist Party congress endorsed the current gradual pace of Cuban economic reform. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system. While the government has released most long-term political prisoners, short-term detentions and harassment have increased significantly over the past several years. U.S. Policy Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. U.S. policy over the years has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, while a second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights and democracy projects. In December 2014, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving away from a sanctions-based policy toward one of engagement and a normalization of relations. The President maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about democracy and human rights in Cuba, but he emphasized that the United States could do more through engagement than isolation. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. In order to implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations five times (most recently in October 2016) in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. The overall embargo, however, remains in place, and can only be lifted with congressional action or if certain conditions in Cuba are met, including that a democratically elected government is in place. With the goal of advancing the normalization process, President Obama visited Cuba in March 2016, the first visit of a U.S. President to Cuba in almost 90 years. On January 12, 2017, President Obama announced a change in U.S. immigration policy by ending the special treatment for undocumented Cuban migrants entering the United States. Legislative Activity The Obama Administration's shift in Cuba policy has spurred strong interest in Congress. Some Members lauded the initiative as in the best interest of the United States and a better way to support change in Cuba, while others criticized the President for not obtaining more concessions from Cuba to advance human rights and protect U.S. interests. In the 114th Congress, numerous legislative initiatives were introduced on both sides of the policy debate. In 2015, five FY2016 House appropriations bills had Cuba provisions that would have blocked some of the Administration's policy changes and introduced new economic sanctions, and one Senate appropriations bill had provisions that would have eased certain economic sanctions. Ultimately, none of these provisions were included in the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. 114-113. In 2016, three FY2017 House appropriations measures (Commerce, H.R. 5393; Financial Services, H.R. 5485; and Homeland Security, H.R. 5634) had provisions that would have blocked some of the Cuba policy changes, and one FY2017 Senate appropriations measure (Financial Services, S. 3067) had provisions lifting restrictions on travel and financing for agricultural exports. In addition, the Senate version of the FY2017 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, S. 3117, would have funded U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba and additional personnel costs and would have fully funded the $15 million request for democracy programs. In contrast, the House version of the bill, H.R. 5912, would have prohibited assistance for expanding the U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba and provided $30 million for democracy programs. The 114th Congress did not complete action on FY2017 appropriations, but it did approve a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254) in December 2016 funding most programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of almost 0.2% through April 28, 2017. The 115th Congress will face completing action on FY2017 appropriations. With regard to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, both the FY2016 and the FY2017 military construction appropriations measures, P.L. 114-113 and P.L. 114-223, have provisions prohibiting funding for the station's closure. Both the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 114-92, and the FY2017 NDAA, P.L. 114-328, also have prohibitions on funding for the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. P.L. 114-328 also restricts FY2017 funding for Cuba's participation in certain joint or multilateral exercises or related security conferences. (See Appendix A.) Several other bills introduced in the 114th Congress would have lifted or eased sanctions: H.R. 274, H.R. 403, and H.R. 735 (overall embargo); H.R. 634, H.R. 664, and S. 299 (travel); H.R. 635 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); S. 491 and S. 1543/H.R. 3238 (some embargo restrictions); S. 1049 (financing of agricultural sales); S. 1389/H.R. 3055 (telecommunications); H.R. 3306 (energy resources and technologies); H.R. 3687 (agricultural exports and investment); and S. 2990 (foreign carriers traveling to or from Cuba). Other bills would have increased restrictions on engagement with Cuba: S. 1388/H.R. 2466 (travel and trade); S. 1489/ H.R. 2937 (Cuban military and intelligence); and H.R. 4772 and H.R. 5728/S. 3289 (U.S. flights). For more on these on other bills and resolutions, see Appendix C.

crs_RL30206

crs_RL30206_0

106-113 ). It provided a total of $14.928 billion in Interiorappropriations for FY2000 compared to the FY1999 enacted level of $14.298billion--an increase of $630.6 million. These FY2000 amounts, and othersin this report, do not reflect the government-wide cut of 0.38% in discretionaryappropriations for FY2000 that is required by the consolidated appropriationsmeasure. Previously, a series of sevencontinuing resolutions had been enacted to provide continuing funding for FY2000for Interior and other appropriations measures which had not been enacted. Introduction The annual Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill includes fundingfor agencies and programs in four separate federal departments, as well as numeroussmaller agencies and diverse programs. The bill includes funding for the InteriorDepartment except the Bureau of Reclamation, but only segments of the funding ofthe other three departments, Agriculture, Energy, and Health and Human Services.The President's FY2000 budget request for Interior and Related Agencies totals$15.27 billion compared to the $14.30 billion enacted by Congress for FY1999. On February 1, 1999, the President submitted his FY2000 budget to Congress. 105-277 ), an increase of almost $1 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported the FY2000 Interior Appropriations bill ( S. 1292 , S.Rept. 106-99 ) on June 28, 1999, and the House Appropriations Committeereported its version of the bill ( H.R. 106-222 ) on July 2, 1999. Thecommittee-approved funding levels were $14.058 billion in the Senate and $14.105 billion in theHouse, a difference of $46.7 million. On July 15, 1999, the House passed H.R. On September 23, 1999, the Senate passed its version of the Interior Appropriations bill by a vote of 89-10, providing $14.06 billion in FY2000 funding, including $57.4 million in mandatoryfunding. 2466 ( H.Rept. 106-406 ) was agreed to by both the House and Senate onOctober 21, 1999. However, after scorekeepingadjustments, the conference report provided a total of $14.565 billion (including $57.4 million inmandatory funding.) Also, the FY2000 totals included $68 million ofemergency funding for the United Mine Workers of America combined benefit fund. Originally this measure provided appropriations onlyfor the District of Columbia. This omnibus measure passed the House on November 18, 1999 andthe Senate on November 19, 1999, and was sent to the President on November 22, 1999. TheInterior appropriations portion of the consolidated measure also was introduced as a separate bill( H.R. 3423 ), which the consolidated measure would enact by cross-reference. On November 29, 1999, the President signed into law the consolidated appropriations measure ( P.L. The law contained a total Interior appropriation of $14.928billion; after scorekeeping adjustments, the total was $14.959. 3194 , H.Rept. The House and Senate bothrecommended $5 million for the land consolidation project; the conference report on H.R. For FY1999, P.L. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000, ( H.Rept.106-479 / H.R. H.R. Department of the Interior (DOI) .

The Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill includes funding for agencies and programs in four separate federal departments as well as numerous smaller agencies and diverseprograms. The bill includes funding for the Interior Department except the Bureau of Reclamation,but only segments of the funding of the other three departments, Agriculture, Energy, and Health andHuman Services. On February 1, 1999, President Clinton submitted his FY2000 budget to Congress. The FY2000 request for Interior and Related Agencies totaled $15.266 billion compared to the $14.298billion enacted for FY1999 ( P.L. 105-277 ), an increase of almost $1 billion. The Administration alsoproposed $579 million for Department of Interior agencies as part of the $1 billion Lands LegacyInitiative. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported the FY2000 Interior Appropriations bill ( S. 1292 , S.Rept. 106-99 ) on June 28, 1999, and the House Appropriations Committeereported its version of the bill ( H.R. 2466 , H.Rept. 106-222 ) on July 2, 1999. Thecommittee-approved levels were $14.058 billion in the Senate and $14.105 billion in the House, adifference of $46.7 million. On July 15, 1999, the House passed H.R. 2466 by a voteof 377-47, providing $13.935 billion in FY2000 funding. On September 23, 1999, the Senate passedits version of H.R. 2466 by a vote of 89-10, providing $14.056 billion for FY2000. The conference report ( H.R. 2466 , H.Rept. 106-406 ) was agreed to by both the House and Senate on October 21, 1999. It provided a total of $14.534 billion; after scorekeepingadjustments, the amount was $14.565 billion (including $57.4 million in mandatory funding). Thetotals included $68 million of emergency funding for the United Mine Workers of Americacombined benefit fund. However, this conference agreement was not sent to the President. Instead, following renegotiations, the House and Senate incorporated the five remaining appropriations measures into a single measure ( H.R. 3194 , H.Rept. 106-479 ), whichinitially provided funding only for the District of Columbia. The omnibus measure passed the Houseon November 18, 1999, and the Senate on November 19, 1999. The "Consolidated AppropriationsAct for FY2000" was enacted into law on November 29, 1999 ( P.L. 106-113 ). The Interiorappropriations portion of the consolidated measure also was introduced as a separate bill( H.R. 3423 ), which the consolidated measure enacted by cross-reference. Theconsolidated measure contained a total Interior appropriation of $14.928 billion; after scorekeepingadjustments, the total was $14.959. These amounts, and others in this report, do not reflect thegovernment-wide cut of 0.38% in discretionary appropriations for FY2000 that was required by theomnibus appropriations measure. Before the consolidated appropriations measure was signed intolaw, a total of seven measures providing continuing appropriations for Interior (and otherappropriations measures) had been enacted. These continuing resolutions covered October 1, 1999,through December 2, 1999. Key Policy Staff Division abbreviations: DSP = Domestic Social Policy; G&F = Government and Finance; RSI =Resources, Science, and Industry.

crs_R43003

crs_R43003_0

Each bill would have amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act—more commonly referred to as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA; 42 U.S.C. This report looks primarily at how state programs to regulate CCRs may be developed and implemented by a state according to directives in the bills proposed in the 112 th Congress; it does not attempt to identify detailed requirements that may be applied by a state regulatory program. Exactly how state solid waste management programs have been created varies from state to state. That a RCRA program has never been authorized or established by Congress using such an approach does not mean that this new approach would not meet a particular objective. Since those specifications do not include an explicit deadline for fully implementing the program (e.g., issuing permits and assuring facility compliance with applicable regulations), it cannot, as a practical matter, be determined in advance when EPA might evaluate state programs for deficiencies. In a continuing effort to determine whether CCRs should be subject to federal requirements established under RCRA, EPA has gathered data on CCR use and disposal for more than 30 years. On June 21, 2010, EPA proposed for public comment two options to regulate CCRs pursuant to those Subtitle C and D authorities. Of relevance to CCRs would be whether the waste could be identified and specifically listed by EPA as hazardous waste based on its toxicity. To address potential gaps (i.e., to establish regulations applicable to CCR disposal and use in states that are not already regulating CCRs in a manner that protects human health), EPA's June 2010 proposal was intended to create a national standard to regulate CCRs destined for disposal. Proposed CCR Legislation Amending RCRA As noted, the House and Senate bills considered in the 112 th Congress would add to Subtitle D of RCRA a new Section 4011, "Management and Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals." EPA would be required to implement the program in states that choose not to do so. The potential for EPA to review a substantive element of a CCR Permit Program is limited to a directive to EPA to notify a state and provide an opportunity to remedy deficiencies if at any time the state is not implementing a program that meets the Permit Program Specifications in Section 4011(c) or is consistent with the narrative description of its program, included in the narrative description provided in the program certification (required in the State Actions provisions in 4011(b)), and maintains fully effective statutes or regulations necessary to implement a CCR Permit Program. For example, EPA would be required to implement a CCR Permit Program for a state if the agency identified some deficiency in that state's permit program, and the state does not remedy the deficiency within the "reasonable timeframe" negotiated between the state and EPA. Proposed CCR Permit Program elements likely to have the most impact on state program implementation that are different from existing programs to regulate MSW landfills pertain to the following (each of which is discussed in more detail below): The potential flexibility in state program development and implementation —in the absence of provisions comparable to general regulatory standards, applicable either to regulations that would be implemented by the permit program or to the permit program itself, it would appear that each state could determine key elements related to program implementation (e.g., program applicability) and facility compliance, at least to the degree that such state determinations did not undercut a viable state program. One such provision is the definition of "structures" that may receive CCRs. There is no legislative history for the Senate-proposed bill. The bills would provide no formal role for EPA in this regulatory development process. Part 258 are those EPA determined (as part of a public rulemaking process) are necessary to protect human health and the environment from risks specific to the management of MSW in landfills; baseline federal criteria were applied to owners and operators of regulated units within two years of EPA promulgating the regulations, regardless of when states adopted the regulations or created a permit program to implement them; many states used the federal regulatory criteria as a model for their own regulations, in most cases modifying existing programs to meet the federal criteria; individual state regulations applicable to MSW landfills could vary, as long as facility compliance with those regulations would meet the baseline federal level of protection. The bills did not explicitly require EPA to set uniform national standards of protection or promulgate regulations applicable to CCR structures. Would EPA issue guidance to clarify what it would consider a CCR "structure"? Determining Criteria Necessary to "Protect Human Health and the Environment" Under RCRA Under RCRA, when Congress has required EPA to promulgate regulations applicable to solid waste disposal facilities and required those regulation to be implemented using a permit program, at a minimum, those standards have been explicitly required to be those necessary to protect human health and the environment from threats specific to a particular type of waste disposal facility or units that may receive a particular type of waste.

In the 112th Congress, the House passed two bills to address the long-standing regulatory impasse over coal combustion residuals (CCRs). The impasse originated in 1980, when an amendment to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) excluded CCRs from regulation as a hazardous waste, pending further study by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). That study was required to identify adverse effects on human health and the environment, if any, of CCR disposal and use before determining whether the materials should be subject to hazardous waste requirements. For over 30 years, EPA has gathered information, conducted studies, solicited input from state agencies, industry, and the public, and evaluated existing state and federal regulatory programs to determine whether the management of CCRs warranted regulation as a hazardous waste. In June 2010, EPA proposed its most recent regulatory determination for public comment. In that proposal, EPA included two options to regulate CCRs, which were immediately controversial. In the wake of EPA's proposal, the House passed two CCR bills that embodied a new approach to creating state programs to regulate a solid waste under RCRA. Similar legislation was introduced in the Senate, but the chamber took no action. The 113th Congress may consider legislation patterned after the bills considered in the 112th Congress. This report identifies key elements of that new approach and compares it to existing RCRA solid waste management programs. The report concludes that there are significant differences between the two. Under the new approach, EPA would have no formal role in creating state programs to regulate CCRs (though an informal one may evolve). Further, in contrast to existing RCRA programs, EPA would not be directed to establish regulations applicable to disposal facilities or to approve of state programs to implement those regulations. Instead, states that opt to implement a CCR Permit Program would be expected to establish regulations applicable to "CCR structures" based on program specifications included in the bills. In contrast to existing state waste management programs created under RCRA, such an approach would Allow individual states to define key terms (e.g., "CCR structures"). Hence, program applicability could vary from state to state, depending on how each state defines those terms. For example, a "CCR landfill" could be defined to include only land disposal units that receive CCRs or may include large-scale fill operations at construction sites (a common use of CCRs that may pose risks similar to landfilling). Establish no explicit deadlines for the issuance of permits or for facility compliance with applicable regulations, allowing individual states to establish such deadlines—although a court might impose deadlines if it determines a state has unreasonably delayed. Require EPA to identify any deficiencies in a state's CCR Permit Program. However, it cannot be predicted what program elements EPA would regard as a "deficiency," or when EPA would make such an evaluation. Require EPA to implement a CCR Permit Program for any state that chooses not to do so or fails to remedy a program deficiency identified by EPA. State regulations adopted under RCRA (e.g., municipal solid waste landfill regulations) have been required by Congress to be those necessary to meet a national "standard of protection" (e.g., "protect human health and the environment"). In contrast, state regulations applicable to CCR structures that would be applied by a CCR Permit Program created under this new approach would not explicitly be required to do so. Each state arguably could apply its own standard of protection. The absence of an explicit statement in the bills has implications for how EPA might exercise its authority in the event of absent or deficient state action. Given the potential for similar legislation to be proposed in the 113th Congress, and as a result of the complexities inherent in creating a regulatory program using a new legislative approach (that specifies new roles for states and EPA), this report provides additional background information and expands on an earlier CRS analysis.

crs_R44741

crs_R44741_0

A Basic Definition of Ground Combat Systems Modernization Many nations maintain armies whose ultimate responsibility is to defeat other nations' combat formations on the battlefield. In order to accomplish this, nations indigenously develop, maintain, and improve a variety of ground combat systems or purchase them from other nations. Ground combat system development and improvement is informed by existing and emerging technologies and budgets as well as observations from current land conflicts. As this process is also intended to address potential future battlefield threats, beliefs as to what the future combat operational environment will look like, as well as what future technologies might be available for military use, also influence a nation's developmental efforts. The Dilemma of Army Ground Combat Systems Modernization The U.S. Army's current fleet of main battle tanks (MBTs), tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), tracked self-propelled (SP) artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), the nucleus of the Army's armored ground forces, was developed in the 1970s and fielded in the 1980s to counter the Soviet Union's and Warsaw Pact's numerically superior ground forces. The combat performance of these systems against Iraqi forces Operation Desert Storm in 1991 reaffirmed for many the role these systems would play in future Army ground operations. Army leadership notes for the first time since World War I, that the Army does not have a new ground combat vehicle under development and "at current funding levels, the Bradley and Abrams will remain in the inventory for 50 to 70 more years." Regarding armored vehicle development, the Army suggests "our enemies, and even our friends and allies, have not remained static and, in fact, even our allies are modernizing to such an extent that they have outpaced us in some areas," raising the possibility that in the not- too-distant future, foreign armored vehicle design and capabilities could surpass existing U.S. systems. Current and Future Operating Environment As previously discussed, observations from current conflicts as well as beliefs as to what future conflicts might look like inform the military modernization process. These observations and beliefs are used to help determine what types of improvements should be made to existing ground combat systems in terms of lethality, survivability, mobility, and maintainability. They may also prompt a conclusion that an entirely new combat system will be required to address current and potential future threats. Could U.S. Ground Combat Systems Be Surpassed by Foreign Systems in the Near Future? Are Increasingly Capable Foreign Ground Combat Systems an Option for the U.S. Army?

Many nations maintain armies whose ultimate responsibility is to defeat other nations' combat formations on the battlefield. In order to accomplish this, nations indigenously develop, maintain, and improve a variety of ground combat systems or purchase them from other nations. Ground combat system development and improvement is informed by existing and emerging technologies and budgetary factors as well as observations from current land conflicts. As this process is also intended to address potential future battlefield threats, beliefs as to what the future combat operational environment will look like, as well as what future technologies might be available for military use, also influence a nation's developmental efforts. The U.S. Army's current fleet of main battle tanks (MBTs), tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), tracked self-propelled (SP) artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), which constitutes the nucleus of the Army's armored ground forces, were developed in the 1970s and fielded in the 1980s to counter the Soviet Union's and Warsaw Pact's numerically superior ground forces. The combat performance of these vehicles against Iraqi forces during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 reaffirmed for many the role these systems would play in future Army ground operations. U.S. Army leadership notes for the first time since World War I, that the Army does not have a new ground combat vehicle under development and "at current funding levels, the Bradley and Abrams will remain in the inventory for 50 to 70 more years." Regarding armored vehicle development, the Army suggests "our enemies, and even our friends and allies, have not remained static and, in fact, even our allies are modernizing to such an extent that they have outpaced us in some areas." This comment raises the possibility that in the not-too-distant future, foreign armored vehicle design and capabilities could surpass existing U.S. systems. Observations from current conflicts as well beliefs as to what future conflicts might look like help determine what types of improvements should be made to existing combat vehicles in terms of lethality, survivability, mobility, and maintainability. They may also lead to a conclusion that an entirely new combat vehicle will be required to address current and potential future threats. Comparison of selected U.S. and foreign ground combat systems and observations from current conflicts as well beliefs as to what future conflicts might look like raise implications for U.S. ground combat system modernization. Some of these implications include the following: the possibility U.S. ground combat systems could be outpaced by foreign systems; that increasingly capable foreign ground combat systems could be an option for acquisition; the reemergence of air attack, artillery, and electronic warfare (EW) as ground combat system modernization concerns: and the consideration of system level issues such as Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) and Fire Control Systems (FCS); Active Protection Systems (APS); new and Cluster Munitions Ban-compliant artillery rounds and rocket warheads; and digitally enhanced and longer-ranged artillery and rocket systems.

crs_R43511

crs_R43511_0

The United States also imports DFO in the form of heating oil. In 2013, distillate fuel oil imports exceeded 56.4 million barrels; although up from the previous year's 46.2 million barrels, distillate fuel imports have declined. Overall, some 6.9 million households rely on heating oil nationally. The number of household users, however, has declined from the 8.7 million households in 2006-2007, and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects a 3% decline for 2013-2014. By and large, the Northeast United States represents the greatest demand for home heating oil where slightly more than 5.5 million households relied on it for primary space heating during the winter of 2012-2013. Policy Considerations No single factor explains the Northeast's declining demand for heating oil. In its 13-year history, NHHOR has only released fuel in response to distillate fuel shortages during natural disasters, and not in response to a market dislocation. While the NHHOR release demonstrated the utility of maintaining a distillate stockpile, it was not based on the conditions of a heating oil supply shortage. The Northeast region's reduced dependence on heating oil and the increased availability of alternative heating fuels raise the question of whether DOE should continue maintaining NHHOR, and whether Congress should continue to monitor the region's heating oil supply. It also includes No. 1 Fuel Oil). National Oilheat Research Alliance Congress authorized the National Oilheat Research Alliance (NORA) in the 2000 Energy Act to develop projects for the research, development, and demonstration of clean and efficient oilheat utilization equipment; and to operate programs that enhanced consumer and employee training. Appendix C. Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve A number of factors may have contributed to the near doubling of heating oil prices in some Northeastern states during the winter of 1999-2000, but the most significant may have been the sharply lower storage levels of middle distillate stocks (the range of home heating oil and diesel fuels) at the time. Heating oil prices continue to remain high, as do other petroleum products and the price of crude oil, which may be discouraging use. In response to the 1999-2000 heating oil price spike and supply shortage, Congress authorized the Secretary of Energy to establish the Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve (NHHOR) in the Energy Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-469 ). As a 2 million barrel emergency stockpile of government-owned heating oil, NHHOR was intended to meet roughly 10 days of demand by the Northeastern states at the time it was created.

The United States' exports and imports of refined petroleum products include distillate fuel oil—the general category for heating oil. In 2013, distillate fuel oil imports exceeded 56.4 million barrels, up from the previous year's 46.2 million barrels. However, distillate fuel imports have been declining. Overall, some 6.9 million households rely on heating oil nationally. The number of overall household users, however, has declined from 8.7 million in 2006-2007, and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects a 3% decline for 2013-2014. By and large, the greatest demand for home heating oil is in the Northeast United States, where some 5.5 million households relied on it for primary space heating during the winter of 2012-2013, consuming 645.5 gallons per household on average (compared to 766.4 gallons by Midwest households). In response to the near doubling of heating oil prices in some Northeastern states during the winter of 1999-2000, which raised the concern of many Northeastern lawmakers, Congress authorized 2 million barrel Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve (NHHOR) in the Energy Policy Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-469). As an emergency stockpile of government-owned heating oil, Congress intended NHHOR to meet roughly 10 days of demand by the Northeastern states at the time. Currently, NHHOR stands at under 1 million barrels, split between Groton, CT (400,000 barrels), and Revere, MA (500,000 barrels). Middle-distillate range petroleum products can serve as both heating and transportation needs. In its 13-year history, NHHOR has only released fuel for use by federal, state, and local emergency responders during natural disasters and not for retail sales during market dislocations. While the release demonstrated the utility of maintaining a distillate stockpile, it was not based on the conditions of a heating oil supply shortage. The recent sale of NHHOR stocks and replacement with ultra-low sulfur distillate increased its utility as a transportation fuel. In the absence of NHHOR, residential consumers have the recourse of substituting ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel for their heating needs, although this fuel tends to be more expensive per gallon than heating oil. Congress also authorized the National Oilheat Research Alliance (NORA) to develop projects for the research, development, and demonstration of clean and efficient oilheat utilization equipment; and to operate programs that enhanced consumer and employee training. Further, Congress authorized the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) to help offset some homeowners' heating bills. Several charities also provide assistance. A number of factors may contribute to the nation's declining demand for heating oil. The most significant factor may be that the increasing price of heating oil has discouraged use. Heating oil prices continue to remain high, as do other petroleum products and crude oil. These factors raise several questions: what factors have contributed to the decline of heating oil consumption; does the Northeast still depend on heating oil to the extent it did over a decade ago; and should Congress continue to monitor the Northeast heating oil supply?

crs_R41957

crs_R41957_0

Introduction The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation program run by the National Guard. It also serves as a mechanism for training National Guard personnel. The SPP relates to several areas of potential interest to Congress, including improving the capabilities of partner nations to protect their citizens; strengthening relationships with partners to facilitate cooperation, access, and interoperability; improving cultural awareness and skills among U.S. military personnel; and fostering the integration of reserve and active component forces into a "total force." The program has expanded greatly since then. Nearly every state National Guard participates in the SPP, as do the National Guard of Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The SPP's rapid expansion has led to congressional scrutiny of the conformity of some SPP activities with the law, the effectiveness of the program, and the relationship of SPP activities to the priorities of U.S. geographic combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors abroad. Congressional interest in SPP is also tied to broader concerns that some DOD security cooperation activities may encroach on, complicate, or conflict with State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) responsibilities and prerogatives. Typical Missions Performed The SPP conducts a variety of activities in support of partner nations. Subject Matter Expert Exchanges. These are demonstrations of certain capabilities that the Army or Air National Guard has, or discussions of policy issues related to those capabilities. These are visits between senior leaders of the state National Guard, such as the adjutant general, and senior leaders of the partner nation's armed forces. National Guard personnel have embedded with their partner nation's OMLTs and accompanied them throughout their deployments to Afghanistan (they have also conducted similar embedded operations with partner nation forces in Iraq and Kosovo). Some common focus areas are disaster management and disaster relief activities, military education, non-commissioned officer development, command and control, search and rescue, border operations, military medicine, port security, and military justice. Unique Aspects of the SPP The SPP is based upon a variety of statutory authorities (detailed in the section entitled " Statutory Authorities "). They are authorities used generally by active and reserve component forces to conduct security cooperation activities. Enduring Relationships One unique aspect of the SPP is the ability to forge relationships between particular individuals over a long period of time. For the state and the foreign nation, the SPP provides a link between senior state and foreign nation officials. Should the Contours of the Program Be Modified?

The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation program run by the National Guard. It also serves as a mechanism for training National Guard personnel. Since the program began in 1992, it has expanded to the point where nearly every state National Guard participates, as do the National Guard of Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The SPP relates to several areas of potential interest to Congress, including improving the capabilities of partner nations to protect their citizens; strengthening relationships with partners to facilitate cooperation, access, and interoperability; improving cultural awareness and skills among U.S. military personnel; and fostering the integration of reserve and active component forces into a "total force." In addition, the rapid expansion of the SPP has led to congressional scrutiny of the conformity of some SPP activities with the law, the effectiveness of the program, and the relationship of SPP activities to the priorities of U.S. geographic combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors abroad. Congressional interest in SPP is also tied to broader concerns that some DOD security cooperation activities may encroach on, complicate, or conflict with State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) responsibilities and prerogatives. The SPP conducts a variety of activities in support of partner nations, including exchanges of subject matter experts, demonstrations of certain military capabilities, discussions of policy issues, and visits between senior leaders of a state National Guard and senior leaders of the partner nations armed forces. These interactions commonly focus on topics such as disaster management, command and control, search and rescue, border operations, military medicine, and military education. In some of the more developed partnerships, teams of National Guard personnel have embedded with the military forces of its partner nations as they prepared for and deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. The SPP is based on general statutory authorities used by active and reserve component forces to conduct security cooperation. Some unique aspects of the SPP include the potential for establishing enduring relationships between individuals in the state National Guard and their peers in the partner nation's armed forces; the ability to share specialized expertise about topics such as disaster response, civil disorder, counter-narcotics operations, and border security; and the ability to link senior officials of a state with senior officials of a foreign nation, which can open avenues for greater cooperation between the state and the partner nation in non-military areas. This report traces the origin and development of the program; summarizes its unique aspects; and outlines its statutory basis, funding mechanisms, organization, and activities. It details recent legislative and executive branch actions. It also explores issues that may merit congressional attention and provides options for policymakers who may be interested in modifying the program.

crs_RL34400

crs_RL34400_0

The Demand and Supply for Business Loans Most economic and financial analysts view the market for business loans in the U.S. economy in a traditional supply and demand framework that takes into consideration alternative ways to finance a business and various ways for those controlling capital to invest. The economic outlook is more important for long-term borrowing because of its impact on a project's profitability. These concerns are one reason that the Small Business Administration (SBA) created its microloan program. For many purposes, the Small Business Administration defines a small business as one with 500 or fewer employees. On the one hand, small businesses are unable to take advantage of economies of scale in raising capital such as bonds. Those who are concerned about the availability of credit to small businesses frequently suggest a number of reasons that small businesses may pay a higher interest rate or face more requirements to get a loan than an equally creditworthy larger business. This can lead to lenders (and the SBA) requiring owners to pledge personally owned real estate as collateral. SBA loan guarantees might offset this caution during a slowdown and help small businesses to expand. An economic slowdown (recovery) could reduce (increase) the risk-adjusted profitable opportunities for small businesses to invest, reducing (increasing) small businesses' demand for loans. The 2007-2012 decline in house prices is likely to have reduced the collateral value of any real estate owned by a small business and of the business owner's home. In both cases, however, loan volume falls. This risk premium can change as lenders' attitudes toward risk change. Statistics on the SBA's two largest business loan guarantee programs—7(a) and 504/CDC Loan Guaranty programs—can be found in CRS reports. The SBA's Office of Advocacy publishes research based on surveys concerning small business loans, annual reports on small business lending, and occasional reports on other small business issues. Given that the Federal Reserve does not use the SBA's industry based definition of "small," the results are more indicative than an exact measure of what is happening to small business lending as viewed by the SBA. In general, there can be many reasons for declining employment by small businesses. In this case, expanding SBA loan guarantees might help. Conclusion A number of factors affect the supply and demand for small business loans, independent of the SBA's guarantee. Forecasting the impact of the business cycle on the demand for SBA guarantees on loans to small businesses is particularly difficult for two reasons.

Small businesses (usually defined as companies with 500 or fewer employees) are an important part of the nation's economy. At various times during the business cycle, concern is voiced about the difficulties that small businesses have obtaining loans. There can be many reasons for periodic declines in small business lending over the business cycle: loan standards change, the quality of projects to be financed changes, and small businesses' demand for loans fluctuates with anticipated customer demand. Congress created the Small Business Administration (SBA) to assist small businesses in many ways, including by guaranteeing loans made by the private sector. This guarantee reduces a lender's potential loss on a small business loan and should make lenders look more favorably on small business loan requests. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why the volume of small business loans varies over time despite the availability of the SBA's guarantee. The business cycle's impact on the volume of SBA guarantees is not clear. When the economy is growing, demand for SBA loan guarantees can increase as small business expands to take advantage of opportunities or small businesses might reduce their demand because they can obtain loans without the SBA's guarantee. In an expanding ecomomy, lenders are more willing to make loans on more favorable terms. In slowdowns, concern over potential losses leads lenders to tighten all loan standards, perhaps affecting small businesses disproportionately. The demand for SBA loan guarantees can increase as small businesses are unable to obtain loans without the government's backing or interest in SBA loan guarantees can fall because there are fewer reasons to borrow. Even with an SBA guarantee, small business owners frequently pledge their personal residences as collateral for business loans. During the 2007-2009 recession, the widespread decline in home prices reduced owners' abilities to provide such credit enhancement. The ultimate impact of these factors on SBA loan volume, which work in opposite directions, cannot, however, be predicted with confidence. This report analyzes reasons used to justify government intervention in small business lending and discusses how making the proper analysis of problems improves the policy outcome. For program information on SBA loan guarantees, see CRS Report R41146, Small Business Administration 7(a) Loan Guaranty Program, by [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report R41184, Small Business Administration 504/CDC Loan Guaranty Program, by [author name scrubbed]. This report also identifies some sources of information about the condition of the small business loan market. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

crs_R41022

crs_R41022_0

Introduction The attempted attack on a U.S.-bound airliner on December 25, 2009, and the earlier shootings at Fort Hood Army Base in November 2009 and various other incidents have led to increased concerns about the effectiveness of the laws, regulations, and organizational relationships created in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks to prevent future terrorist attacks. Within the sprawling U.S. Intelligence Community, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was specifically established in 2004 to bring together all available information on terrorism, analyze the information, and provide warning of potential attacks on the U.S. The act established the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) along with the Office of the DNI (ODNI) and it created an NCTC with a statutory charter and placed it within the ODNI. In accordance with the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Director of the NCTC was henceforth to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. P.L. 108-458 sets forth the duties and responsibilities of the NCTC Director: to serve as principal adviser to the DNI on intelligence operations relating to terrorism; to provide strategic operational plans for military and civilian counterterrorism efforts and for effective integration of counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency boundaries within and outside the United States; to advise the DNI on counterterrorism programs recommendations and budget proposals; to disseminate terrorism information, including current terrorism threat analysis, to the President and other senior officials of the Executive Branch and to appropriate committees of Congress; to support the efforts of the Justice and Homeland Security Departments and other appropriate agencies in disseminating terrorism information to State and local entities and coordinate dissemination of terrorism information to foreign governments; to develop a strategy for combining terrorist travel intelligence operations and law enforcement planning and operations; to have primary responsibility within the Government for conducting net assessments of terrorist threats; and consistent with presidential and DNI guidance, to establish requirements for the Intelligence Community in collecting terrorist information. The NCTC is housed in suburban Virginia and has a staff of more than 500 officials of which some 60 percent are on detail from other agencies. Press reports indicate, however, that he had been in contact with a known terrorist living in Yemen . The problem in December 2009 was inadequate analysis. Despite the information "available to all-source analysts at the CIA and the NCTC prior to the attempted attack, the dots were never connected and, as a result, the problem appears to be more about a component failure to 'connect the dots,' rather than a lack of information sharing." Specifically, the Senate Intelligence Committee found that NCTC's Directorate of Intelligence failed to connect reporting on Abdulmutallab; it was neither adequately organized or resourced for this effort. In particular, Congress may wish to satisfy itself that the NCTC has access to all appropriate information and intelligence.

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established in 2004 to ensure that information from any source about potential terrorist acts against the U.S. could be made available to analysts and that appropriate responses could be planned. Investigations of the 9/11 attacks had demonstrated that information possessed by different agencies had not been shared and thus that disparate indications of the looming threat had not been connected and warning had not been provided. As a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the NCTC is composed of analysts with backgrounds in many government agencies and has access to various agency databases. It prepares studies ranging from strategic assessments of potential terrorist threats to daily briefings and situation reports. It is also responsible, directly to the President, for planning (but not directing) counterterrorism efforts. The NCTC received a statutory charter in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458); it currently operates with a staff of more than 500 personnel from its headquarters in northern Virginia. The NCTC Director is appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. Although there have been a number of arrests of individuals suspected of planning terrorist attacks in the U.S., two incidents in 2009—the assassination by an Army Major of some 13 individuals at Fort Hood Army Base on November 5, 2009, and the failed attempt to trigger a bomb on an airliner approaching Detroit on December 25, 2009—contributed to increased concern about counterterrorism capabilities domestically and internationally. An Executive Branch assessment of the December 2009 bombing attempt concluded that, whereas information sharing had been adequate, analysts had failed to "connect the dots" and achieve an understanding of an ongoing plot. Attention has focused on the NCTC which is responsible for ensuring both the sharing of information and for all-source analysis of terrorist issues. A review by the Senate Intelligence Committee released in May 2010 found there were systemic failures across the Intelligence Community and, in particular, that the NCTC was inadequately organized and resourced for its missions. In addition, the committee concluded that intelligence analysts (not only those in NCTC) tended to focus more on threats to U.S. interests in Yemen than on domestic threats.

crs_R44501

crs_R44501_0

The region, home to more than 625 million people, has numerous countries with large Muslim populations, including Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim-majority nation and the world's third most populous democracy (after India and the United States). The region is home to several longstanding and sometimes violent separatist movements, as well as pockets of Islamist radicalism, which have led to instances of violence over the past 30 years, particularly during the 2000s. Many observers have noted the success of some Southeast Asian governments' efforts combatting violent militancy and degrading some of the region's foremost terrorist groups, including the pan-regional, but largely Indonesian based, Jemaah Islamiyah and the Philippines' Abu Sayyaf. These include helping Indonesia create a centralized antiterrorism unit and providing U.S. advisory troops on the Southern Philippine island of Basilan to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines combat violent groups in the country's deep South. A January 2016 terrorist attack in Jakarta, Indonesia, that killed eight individuals, four of them civilians, demonstrated that militants in the region are seeking support or inspiration from the Islamic State, increasing the risks of terrorism in Southeast Asia—risks that could harm United States citizens or adversely affect U.S. security interests in the region. The Trump Administration has indicated that combatting IS is one of its highest priorities. As Congress considers U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia, it may wish to consider several questions: What is the nature and extent of radicalization in Southeast Asia, and does it constitute a threat to U.S. interests in the region? Are threat levels affected by the rise of the Islamic State? The vast majority of Southeast Asian Muslims have traditionally subscribed to moderate, syncretic forms of the religion. IS has conducted online recruitment efforts in Indonesia's national language (called "Bahasa Indonesia") and in the Malay language. Analysts estimate that hundreds of Southeast Asians have travelled to the Middle East to fight with IS—just as some did in the late 1990s in Afghanistan with Al Qaeda. Several Southeast Asian governments, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have intensified counterterror efforts since 2014, outlawing calls for support of IS and strengthening policing and border-control efforts. Interests and Policy Responses The threat of terrorism in or emanating from Southeast Asia has implications for numerous U.S. interests. The United States has coordinated, participated in, or advised a number of global and regional counterterrorism-related policymaking or information exchange bodies in which Asian governments participate: The Global Counterterrorism Forum is a multilateral body launched in 2011, whose goal is to reduce the vulnerability of people to terrorism by effectively preventing, combating, and prosecuting terrorist acts and countering incitement and recruitment to terrorism; The ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) Experts' Working Group on Counterterrorism focuses on strengthening security and defense cooperation in the region; The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Terrorism Prevention Branch is responsible for providing assistance to countries toward ratification and implementation of legal instruments against terrorism; The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) fosters dialogue and consultation on political and security issues, including regional counterterrorism activities; The U.S. Department of State's Regional Strategic Initiative has supported Ambassadors and their Country Teams in developing regional approaches to counterterrorism; The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international policymaking and standard-setting body dedicated to combating money laundering and terrorist financing; FATF-style regional bodies bring together governments in the region to conduct mutual self-assessments and promote best practices; Malaysia and Singapore are members of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, an informal grouping that grew out of U.N.-centered efforts to combat IS. U.S. counterterrorism assistance has generally been welcomed by Southeast Asian governments. Country-Level Issues Southeast Asia is a diverse region, comprising three Muslim-majority states (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei), and several countries with substantial Muslim minorities (the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Burma). Indonesia Indonesia is Southeast Asia's most populous nation, and the world's largest Muslim-majority state. However, Indonesia has been the site of several of the region's deadliest terrorist attacks: Several bombings in Jakarta and tourist center Bali hit Western targets in the 2000s, and the January 2016 attack in Jakarta was a signal event for many, demonstrating that the rise of the Islamic State has inspired some militants to conduct attacks in Indonesia. However, human rights concerns remain. The rise of the Islamic State and the potential it raises for militant recruitment in Southeast Asia and beyond raises new challenges that may guide U.S. counterterrorism policy. Most analysts assess that terrorist threats in Southeast Asia remain lower than in some other regions.

Southeast Asia is home to more than 625 million people and around 15% of the world's Muslim population. The region has faced the threat of terrorism for decades, but threats in Southeast Asia have never been considered as great as threats in some other regions. However, the rise of the Islamic State poses new, heightened challenges for Southeast Asian governments and for U.S. policy towards the region. Southeast Asia has numerous dynamic economies and three Muslim-majority states, including the world's largest Muslim-majority nation, Indonesia, which also is the world's third largest democracy (by population) after India and the United States. Although the mainstream of Islamic practice across the region is comparatively tolerant of other religions, Southeast Asia is also home to several longstanding and sometimes violent separatist movements and pockets of Islamist radicalism, which have led to instances of violence over the past 30 years. These were particularly acute during the 2000s, when several attacks in Indonesia killed hundreds of Indonesians and dozens of Westerners. The threat seemingly eased in the late 2000s-early 2010s, with the success of some Southeast Asian governments' efforts to combat violent militancy and degrade some of the region's foremost terrorist groups. Several Southeast Asian governments, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have intensified counterterror efforts since 2014, outlawing calls for support of the Islamic State and strengthening policing and border-control efforts. Nevertheless, the challenges that governments in the region face were exemplified in January 2016 by a violent attack in Jakarta, Indonesia, that killed eight people, including four civilians. There are several factors that characterize the terrorism threat in Southeast Asia. The region's largest Muslim-majority nations, Indonesia and Malaysia, have long been known for moderate forms of Islam and the protection of religious diversity—policies that have widespread popular support but which raise resentments among small numbers of conservative actors. In other Southeast Asian countries with substantial Muslim populations, including the Philippines and Thailand, simmering resentments in Muslim-majority regions have been fed by perceived cultural and economic repression, leading to separatist movements that have posed threats to domestic groups—and in the case of the Philippines, to Western targets. Threats are evolving with the rise of the Islamic State, which has conducted extensive recruitment in Indonesia's national language (called "Bahasa Indonesia") and in the Malay language widely spoken in the region. Though the number of Southeast Asians who have traveled to the Middle East to fight with the Islamic State is considerably lower than numbers from other regions, such as Europe, North Africa, and South Asia, observers estimate that hundreds of Southeast Asians have joined the fight, raising concerns that battle-trained individuals may return to the region and conduct attacks. Southeast Asia's borders are comparatively porous, raising concerns about trans-border threats that may lead to attacks in third-party states, such as Singapore. This raises the issue of border controls, an important factor for addressing terrorism. Governments in the region have sought better coordination and intelligence sharing—efforts that have been supported by the United States. The Trump Administration has indicated that combatting terrorism broadly, and IS specifically, is among its highest foreign-policy priorities. This has implications for numerous other U.S. interests, as U.S. policy towards the Asia-Pacific region balances a wide range of security and economic goals. The United States has offered counterterrorism assistance to several Southeast Asian nations. These include helping Indonesia create a centralized antiterrorism unit and providing U.S. troops on the Southern Philippine island of Basilan to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines combat violent groups in the country's deep South. Congress may wish to evaluate the effectiveness of such assistance, and examine funding levels for counterterrorism assistance. Congress may also wish to consider the relationship between counterterrorism assistance and other U.S. goals in the region, including the development of human rights and civil society in Southeast Asia. This report will be updated periodically.

crs_RL30889

crs_RL30889_0

Title III established the National Commission on Consumer Finance "to study and make recommendations to the Congress and to the President on the functions and structure of the consumer finance industry, as well as consumer credit transactions generally." Congress enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act after President Johnson called for consumer credit protection in his message to Congress dated February 16, 1967. Since its enactment, the Consumer Credit Protection Act has been amended several times to add provisions relating to debt collection, credit reporting, credit billing, consumer leasing, and electronic fund transfers. Truth-in-Lending Act The Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) was enacted in 1969 as Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Fair Credit Reporting Act The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) was enacted on October 26, 1970.

Congress enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act in 1969, answering President Johnson's call for consumer credit protection legislation. The original Act consisted of the Truth-in-Lending Act, which was aimed at closing an important gap in consumer information, as well as provisions restricting garnishment of wages and establishing the National Commission on Consumer Finance. Since its enactment, the Consumer Credit Protection Act has been amended several times to add provisions relating to debt collection, credit reporting, credit billing, consumer leasing, and electronic fund transfers. In addition, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act was enacted to prohibit discrimination in considering an application for credit. This report discusses the major components of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, as amended, including recent amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Truth-in-Lending Act, and summarizes the consumer's rights and remedies under each. This report will be updated as necessary.

crs_R41903

crs_R41903_0

Moreover, the Supreme Court recently held in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd that "an objectively reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness pursuant to a validly obtained warrant cannot be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of allegations that the arresting authority had an improper motive." Critics, however, contend that since September 11, 2001, seventy individuals, mostly Muslims, have been arrested and detained in abuse of the statute's authority. Earlier Legislative Activity H.R. 3199 (109th Congress) Witnesses at Congressional oversight hearings charged that the authority under 18 U.S.C. 3199 following the hearings, section 12 of the bill would have amended section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act by directing periodic review of the exercise of the authority under section 3144. Perhaps due to Administration opposition, the provision was dropped from H.R. 3199 prior to House passage. No similar provision could be found in H.R. 3199 ( S. 1389 ) as approved in the Senate, in the conference bill, H.Rept. S. 1739 (109th Congress) S. 1739 , introduced by Senator Leahy, would have rewritten section 3144. In its recast form, section 3144 among other things would: establish a preference for postponing arrest until after a material witness has been served with a summons or subpoena and failed or refused to appear, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that service is likely to result in flight or otherwise unlikely to secure the witness' attendance; make it clear that the provision applies to grand jury proceedings; explicitly permit arrest by officers who are not in physical possession of the warrant; require an initial judicial appearance without unnecessary delay in the district of the arrest or in an adjacent district if more expedient or if the warrant was issued there and the appearance occurs on the day of arrest; limit detention to 5 day increments for a maximum of 30 days (10 days in the case of grand jury witness); require the Attorney General to file an annual report to the Judiciary Committees on the number of material witness warrants sought, granted and denied within the year; the number of material witnesses arrested who were not deposed or did not appear before judicial proceedings; and the average number of days arrested material witnesses were detained. The 109 th Congress adjourned without further action on these or any other legislative proposal to amend section 3144. No comparable proposals emerged in any subsequent Congress. Citations to State Material Witness Statutes

This is an overview of the law under the federal material witness statute which authorizes the arrest of material witnesses, permits their release under essentially the same bail laws that apply to federal criminal defendants, but favors their release after their depositions have been taken. Legislative efforts in the 109th Congress to amend the provisions never fully developed. Witnesses at Congressional oversight hearings did alleged that the authority to arrest and hold material witnesses until their appearance at federal criminal proceedings (including grand jury proceedings) had been abused following September 11, 2001. Section 12 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act (H.R. 3199) as reported by the House Judiciary Committee would have required periodic reviews and reports on the use of the material witness statute. In the face of Administration opposition, however, the provision was dropped from the bill prior to House consideration. No similar proposal could be found in the version of H.R. 3199 (S. 1389) approved in the Senate or in the conference bill sent to the President. S. 1739, as introduced, would have rewritten the federal statute, setting detention time limits and raising evidentiary standards for arrest and detention among other things. The 109th Congress adjourned without further action on the material witness proposals, and subsequent Congresses passed without renewed legislative interest. The Supreme Court resolved on other grounds a case which might have been used as a vehicle to address constitutional challenges to the statute or use, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011). Concurring opinions there, however, suggest that several members of the Court consider the matter an open question. A list of citations to comparable state statutes is appended. The report appeared in an earlier version as CRS Report RL33077, Arrest and Detention of Material Witnesses: Federal Law In Brief, by [author name scrubbed].

crs_98-212

crs_98-212_0

The actcontains $2.350 billion, a 2.7% increase over the FY1998 appropriation of $2.288 billion. Also on October 21, the President signed into law an omnibus consolidated and emergency supplemental appropriations bill that contains FY1999 emergencyfunding of $223.7 million for legislative branch activities. These funds were made available to three legislativeentities to cover expenses associated with theYear-2000 conversion of "information technology systems" ($16.9 million), to the Capitol Police Board forenhanced security of the Capitol complex and theLibrary of Congress ($106.8 million), and to the Architect of the Capitol for expenses of "planning, engineering,design, and construction" of a Capitol VisitorCenter ($100 million). 4112 ( H.Rept. 105-595 ). (3) On July 21, the Senate passed its version of H.R. (4) Earlier, on June 5, 1998, the Senate Committeeon Appropriationsreported S. 2137 ( S.Rept. 105-204 ). (5) Conferees met and approved a final bill on October 18, and the House Appropriations Committee issued the conference report on October 22 ( H.Rept. 105-734 ).The House adopted the report on September 24, by a vote of 356-65; the Senate adopted it the following day, byvoice vote. 4112 , as amended. On June 25, the House passed H.R. (20) The majority of the increase is formandatory cost-of-living pay adjustments and related costs; Provided an actual decrease of 0.52% from the FY1998 funding level, when allowing for inflation (based on a projected Consumer PriceIndex increase of 2.2%); Eliminated 438 FTE positions from the legislative branch; Made possible staff cuts, in addition to the 438 FTE reduction, by authorizing staff buy-outs by the Architect of the Capitol and theGovernment Printing Office; Was a 6.7% decrease from the FY1999 budget request; and, Was $555.3 million below the 302(b) allocation established by the House Committee on Appropriations. 4112 on June 23. What additional staff and funds might be necessary to ensure that Congress makes its computers Year-2000compliant? What are the appropriations needs for technology development, including online information, electronicdocument printing, and continueddevelopment of a legislative information system? What should be the funding levels for the congressional support agencies, including the GovernmentPrinting Office, the CongressionalBudget Office, the Library of Congress (including the Congressional Research Service), and the General AccountingOffice? The legislative branch budget is not particularly large. It is 0.15% of the total federal budget. Senate Committee Funding. Ultimately, both were included. Security Issues Capitol Complex Security Plan. Funding for the Capitol Police Board. Capitol Visitor Center. General Accounting Office Budget. Legislative Branch Appropriations, FY1999 In H.R.4112 (Regular Annual Appropriations, P.L.105-275) and H.R. Source is the U.S. Budget.

Summary On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed H.R. 4112 , the FY1999 Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, into P.L. 105-275 . The act contains$2.350 billion, a 2.7% increase over the FY1998 appropriation of $2.288 billion. Later the same day, the Presidentsigned into law an omnibus appropriations billthat contains FY1999 emergency funding of $223.7 million for legislative branch activities. These funds were madeavailable to cover expenses associated withthe Year-2000 conversion of "information technology systems" ($16.9 million), to the Capitol Police Board forsecurity of the Capitol complex and the Library ofCongress ($106.8 million), and to the Architect of the Capitol for expenses of "planning, engineering, design, andconstruction" of a Capitol Visitor Center ($100million). On June 5, 1998, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 2137 , its version of the FY1999 legislative branch budget ( S.Rept. 105-204 ). On June 23, the House Committee on Appropriations reported its version, H.R. 4112 ( H.Rept. 105-595 ). OnJune 25, the House passed H.R. 4112 (235-179), after agreeing to two amendments, and, on July 21, the Senate passed H.R. 4112 ,as amended (90-9). Confereesmet and cleared the bill on September 18, and the House Appropriations Committee issued the conference reporton September 22, 1998 ( H.Rept. 105-734 ). TheHouse adopted the report on September 24, by a vote of 356-65, and the Senate adopted it the following day, byvoice vote. Among the issues considered by both houses were the - (1) Number of additional staff and amount of funds necessary to ensure that Congress makes its computers Year-2000 compliant; (2) Funds for additional Capitol complex security, including construction of a Capitol Visitor Center; (3) Level of funding needed for capital improvements requested by the Architect of the Capitol; (4) Pay of the U.S. Capitol Police; (5) Appropriations needed for technology development, including online information, electronic documentprinting, and continued development of a legislativeinformation system; and (6) Funding levels for the congressional support agencies, including the Government Printing Office, theCongressional Budget Office, the Library of Congress(including the Congressional Research Service), and the General Accounting Office. The legislative budget is not particularly large, only 0.15% of the total federal budget. Key Policy Staff Division abbreviations: GOV = Government.

crs_R40248

crs_R40248_0

Prior to the submission of the FY2013 budget, Navy plans called for having Mayport ready to homeport a CVN in 2019. The Navy's proposed FY2014 budget, like the Navy's proposed FY2013 budget, requested no funding for Military Construction (MilCon) projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The Navy's FY2013 budget deferred the Navy's plan to homeport a CVN at Mayport, and the Navy's FY2013-FY2017 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contained no funding for MilCon projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The Navy stated in its FY2013 budget submission: "Although the FY 2013 budget does not contain a construction project supporting the homeporting of a CVN in Mayport, FL, the Department [of the Navy] is committed to the requirement and policy to strategically disperse CVNs on each coast. This is a deferral at this time due to fiscal constraints." The Navy's desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport is an issue of strong interest to certain Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Transferring a CVN from Norfolk, VA, to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources estimate as being worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year. DOD's final report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released on February 1, 2010, endorsed the Navy's desire to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by homeporting a CVN at Mayport, FL. Certain Members of Congress from Florida have expressed support for the Navy's desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing (as have DOD and the Navy) that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy's Atlantic Fleet CVNs are worth the costs associated with moving a CVN to Mayport. Certain Members of Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition to, the Navy's desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy's Atlantic Fleet CVNs are questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could achieve greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities.

The Navy's proposed FY2014 budget, like the Navy's proposed FY2013 budget, requested no funding for Military Construction (MilCon) projects required to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at Mayport, FL. The Navy's FY2013 budget deferred the Navy's plan to homeport a CVN at Mayport, and the Navy's FY2013-FY2017 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contained no funding for MilCon projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The Navy stated in its FY2013 budget submission: "Although the FY 2013 budget does not contain a construction project supporting the homeporting of a CVN in Mayport, FL, the Department [of the Navy] is committed to the requirement and policy to strategically disperse CVNs on each coast. This is a deferral at this time due to fiscal constraints." The Navy's Atlantic Fleet CVNs are all homeported at Norfolk, VA. The Navy wants to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by homeporting a CVN at Mayport. Prior to the submission of the FY2013 budget, Navy plans called for having Mayport ready to homeport a CVN in 2019. Transferring a CVN from Norfolk to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources estimate as being worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year. The Navy's desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport is an issue of strong interest to certain Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Certain Members of Congress from Florida have expressed support for the Navy's desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing (as have DOD and the Navy) that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy's Atlantic Fleet CVNs are worth the costs associated with moving a CVN to Mayport. Certain Members of Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition to, the Navy's desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy's Atlantic Fleet CVNs are questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could achieve greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities.

crs_RS20185

crs_RS20185_0

The major law which deals with this subject with respect to financial companies is Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA; P.L. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. It establishes standards for collection and permissible purposes for dissemination of data by consumer reporting agencies. With the passage of the Fair Credit Reporting Act Amendments of 1996, P.L. Other customer information, such as credit report or application information, may be shared with other companies in the corporate family if the customers are given "clear and conspicuous" notice about the sharing and an opportunity to direct that the information not be shared; that is, an "opt out." 108-159 , 117 Stat. The Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Title X of P.L. 111-203 , the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), makes the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which is located within the Federal Reserve System, the major rulemaking and enforcement authority for federal consumer protection laws, including the GLBA privacy provisions. GLBA requires that federal regulators issue rules that call for financial institutions to establish standards to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records. It prohibits financial institutions from disclosing nonpublic personal information to unaffiliated third parties without providing customers the opportunity to decline to have such information disclosed. The CFPB has primary enforcement authority over non-depository institutions (subject to certain exceptions) and over depository institutions with more than $10 billion in assets. Although depository institutions with assets of $10 billion or less are now subject to the CFPB's rules, enforcement remains with the "prudential regulators," subject to certain prerogatives of the CFPB. Given the CFPB's predominant role in implementing the GLBA privacy regime and increasing attention to the problem of Internet data security, Congress is likely to scrutinize how the CFPB implements such programs by (1) identifying any problems arising in the transfer of regulatory power from the financial institution prudential regulators and the FTC to the CFPB; (2) monitoring the CFPB's rulemaking efforts to determine whether any newly issued rules unreasonably increase the regulatory burden on struggling institutions; (3) evaluating any effect on financial institutions operating nationwide stemming from application of non-preempted state laws; and (4) examining issues that may arise in connection with the increasing use by banks of social media both to communicate with customers and for marketing purposes. Legislation in the 113th Congress The 113 th Congress has two bills that would eliminate GLBA's requirement for an annual privacy notice under certain circumstances. H.R. S. 635 would eliminate the annual notice requirements for financial institutions if their privacy policies have not changed from their last disclosure notice and they share nonpublic personal information only pursuant to certain permissible exceptions to GLBA's prohibitions and otherwise provide customers access to their most recent disclosure in electronic or other form. Other bills, H.R. 3990 , S. 1193 , S. 1897 , and S. 1995 , would require commercial concerns to secure personal information and to provide notification of data breaches. Exemptions are provided for financial institutions covered by the GLBA privacy provisions.

One of the functions transferred to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) under P.L. 111-203, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), is authority to issue regulations and take enforcement actions under the two major federal statutes that specify conditions under which customer financial information may be shared by financial institutions: Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA, P.L. 106-102) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Possible topics for congressional oversight in the 113th Congress include (1) the transition of power from the financial institution prudential regulators and the Federal Trade Commission to the CFPB; (2) CFPB's interaction with other federal regulators and coordination with state enforcement efforts; and (3) the CFPB's success at issuing rules that adequately protect consumers without unreasonably increasing the regulatory burden on financial institutions. GLBA prohibits financial institutions from sharing nonpublic personally identifiable customer information with non-affiliated third parties without providing customers an opportunity to opt out and mandates various privacy policy notices. It requires financial institutions to safeguard the security and confidentiality of customer information. FCRA regulates the credit reporting industry by prescribing standards that address information collected by businesses that provide data used to determine eligibility of consumers for credit, insurance, or employment and limits purposes for which such information may be disseminated. One of its provisions, which became permanent with the enactment of P.L. 108-159, permits affiliated companies to share non-public personal information with one another provided the customer does not choose to opt out. The creation of CFPB alters the regulatory landscape for these laws. It has primary enforcement authority over non-depository institutions (subject to certain exceptions) and over depository institutions with more than $10 billion in assets. For depository institutions with assets of $10 billion or less, the CFPB's rules apply but enforcement authority remains with the banking regulators, subject to certain prerogatives of the CFPB. In the first session of the 113th Congress, the House passed H.R. 749, which would eliminate the GLBA requirement for an annual privacy notice if the financial institution has not changed its policies and practice with respect to sharing nonpublic personal information since its last disclosure. A similar bill, S. 635, would require that any financial institution eliminating its annual privacy notice must provide electronic access to its privacy policies. Several bills that require data breach notifications, H.R. 3990, S. 1193, S. 1897, and S. 1995, provide exemptions for financial institutions covered by the GLBA privacy provisions. For further information, see CRS Report R41338, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title X, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL31666, Fair Credit Reporting Act: Rights and Responsibilities, by [author name scrubbed].

crs_RL33726

crs_RL33726_0

Introduction This is a comparison of the law of the United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom (UK) relating to the authority to investigate terrorism. Many of the differences can be understood in light of the reach of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The use of these methods are subject to a lengthy and complex legislative regime contained in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), the Police Act 1997, and the Intelligence Services Act 1994; and supplemented by the protections in the European Convention on Human Rights. In the United States, a court order is required for the lawful interception of communications in most circumstances and can be obtained either under the Electronic Communications Act (Title III) or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

This is a comparison of the laws of the United Kingdom and of the United States that govern criminal and intelligence investigations of terrorist activities. Both systems rely upon a series of statutory authorizations: in the case of the United States primarily the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act; in the case of the United Kingdom, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, the Police Act, the Intelligence Services Act. Among other differences, the U.S. procedures rely more heavily upon judicial involvement and supervision, while those of the UK employ other safeguards. The UK procedures afford greater latitude to arrest, detain and supervise suspected terrorists than those available in the United States.

crs_RL31570

crs_RL31570_0

Introduction The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks called attention to the fact that the U.S. governmentis unaware of the addresses and whereabouts of many foreign nationals (1) in the United States. (7) The Attorney General is authorized to prescribe special regulations and formsfor the registration and fingerprinting of certain enumerated groups, including aliens of any classwho are not legal permanent residents (LPRs) of the United States. Under the rule, expanded specialregistration requirements apply to nonimmigrant aliens from designated countries. (20) Upon arrival in the United States, aliens subject to special registration under the rule are fingerprinted, photographed, and checked against databases of known criminals and terrorists. The original rule, which hassince been amended as described below, required aliens registered at a port of entry to satisfysubsequent 30-day and annual registration requirements. Under the original rule, if these aliensremained in the country for 30 days or longer, they had to report to an immigration office betweenday 30 and day 40 to complete their registration by providing additional documentation ofcompliance with their visas, including proof of residence, employment, and school enrollment asapplicable. Those aliens remaining for more than 1 year had to reaffirm their registrationinformation annually. (21) On September 11, 2002, NSEERS was implemented at selected ports of entry. It coversnonimmigrants who are citizens or nationals of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria, as well as othernonimmigrants determined to pose an elevated national security risk as explained above. They were required to report to an immigration office by January 10, 2003, tobe registered, fingerprinted, and photographed. As described below, this annual re-registration requirement was suspended inDecember 2003. A rule proposed by INS on July 26, 2002, would provide notice to aliens of their obligation to submit address notices and the consequences of failing to do so. (37) The rule would amend variousimmigration forms to require aliens applying for immigration benefits to acknowledge havingreceived notice of the following: the alien must provide a valid current address, including any change of address within 10 days of the change; the most recent address provided by the alien will be used for all purposes,including the service of a written notice informing the alien of the initiation of removal proceedings(referred to as a "notice to appear"); and if the alien has changed addresses and failed to provide notification, the alienwill be held responsible for any communications sent to the prior address. 2003 Changes to the Special Registration System On December 2, 2003, DHS published an interim rule in the Federal Register to amend the NSEERS regulations. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, as enacted by the 107thCongress, directs the General Accounting Office to conduct a study of the feasibility and utility ofrequiring nonimmigrants in the United States to submit a current address and, where applicable, thename and address of an employer every year. Among its other registration-related provisions, H.R. It did, however, includelanguage requiring the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of DHS, to provide theAppropriations Committees by March 1, 2003, with the NSEERS-related documents and materialsdescribed in the Senate amendment.

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, many U.S. officials and others have expressed concerns that the U.S. government is unaware of the addresses and whereabouts of many foreignnationals in the country. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) contains provisions for theregistration of aliens, including the requirement that aliens provide notification of any change ofaddress within 10 days. For many years, however, this address reporting requirement was generallynot enforced. The INA also authorizes the Attorney General to prescribe special regulations for the registration and fingerprinting of any class of aliens who are not U.S. legal permanent residents(LPRs). The Attorney General has exercised this authority at various times by requiring thatnonimmigrant aliens (legal temporary residents) from designated countries be registered,photographed, and fingerprinted at the port of entry. A rule, which took effect on September 11, 2002, applies expanded special registration requirements to certain newly arriving nonimmigrants as part of the National Security Entry-ExitRegistration System (NSEERS). NSEERS covers arriving nonimmigrants from designatedcountries, as well as other arriving nonimmigrants who are determined to pose an elevated nationalsecurity risk. Among other requirements, aliens subject to special registration under this rule areregistered, fingerprinted, photographed, and checked against databases of known criminals andterrorists at the port of entry. Under the original rule, which has since been amended, those whoremained for at least 30 days had to report to an immigration office to complete their registration andthose remaining for more than 1 year had to reaffirm their registration information annually. A seriesof Federal Register notices published in late 2002 and early 2003 similarly required certainnonimmigrant males in the United States from designated countries to report to an immigrationoffice to be registered, fingerprinted, and photographed. A subsequent rule, which became effectiveon December 2, 2003, amended the NSEERS regulations. Among other changes, it suspended theautomatic 30-day and annual re-registration requirements. A proposed rule, published in July 2002, would give notice to aliens, including LPRs, of their obligation to provide the government with a current address, including any change of address within10 days, and the consequences of failing to do so. Congress has acted on alien registration-related measures in recent years. The 107th Congress enacted the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-173 ), whichdirects the General Accounting Office to study the feasibility and utility of requiring nonimmigrantsto submit a current address and, where applicable, the name and address of an employer every year. In the 108th Congress, the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution ( P.L. 108-7 ) containslanguage requiring the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security,to provide Congress with NSEERS-related documents and materials. This report will be updatedas related developments occur.

crs_RL34717

crs_RL34717_0

Introduction The United States and the 27-Member European Union (EU) share a huge, dynamic, and mutually beneficial economic partnership. To deal with this situation, a variety of government-to-government efforts and transatlantic dialogues have been created to increase understanding between policymakers and regulators on both sides of the Atlantic, to minimize existing regulatory barriers, and to prevent the emergence of new regulatory barriers. These efforts, falling under the rubric of transatlantic regulatory cooperation (TRC), are seen as being important to today's U.S.-EU economic relationship. Six TEC meetings have been held since it was established in 2007, the most recent in November 2011 in Washington, DC. This report is intended to serve as an introduction and primer on a complicated, broad, and often highly technical set of issues. U.S.-EU Regulatory Barriers Since the mid-1990s, both U.S. and European multinational companies (MNCs) have viewed divergent ways of regulating markets for both goods and services as the most serious barriers to transatlantic commerce. Economic Rationale The primary reason why many export industries seek to achieve greater harmonization in international standards is to reduce costs associated with complying with two different sets of regulations and standards. U.S.-EU Differences in Regulatory Approaches Transatlantic regulatory cooperation must deal with a number of key differences between the United States and EU concerning approaches to regulation. Forms of Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation Regulatory cooperation is an elastic concept that subsumes a broad range of activities. At the other end of the spectrum, these activities may involve attempts at harmonizing regulatory approaches through acceptance of common principles and standards. In between are activities that involve varying degrees of intrusion into the autonomy of regulators. To promote more effective TRC by overcoming these obstacles, three policy options are often put forth: (1) attracting high-level political support for TRC; (2) increasing dramatically the involvement of legislators on both sides in the process; and (3) developing an institutional architecture that can prioritize the problems and challenges that need to be addressed. Given that the two TEC leaders are cabinet-level appointees, the TEC was expected to have the kind of high-level political support that previous efforts at economic integration may have lacked. In late 2010, the two sides agreed to focus future efforts on aligning regulations and standards in emerging or new technologies, (such as nanotechnology or electric cars) well before laws or regulations have been promulgated. By and large, TRC exchanges and dialogues have been confined to regulators and officials of the executive branches on both sides of the Atlantic. These examples highlight a larger and more pivotal role Congress could play in regulatory cooperation if it chose to become more involved. To the extent that an overwhelming domestic orientation of regulatory agencies is a problem in moving TRC initiatives forward, Congress has the power through both the authorization and appropriations process to mandate that U.S. regulators cooperate.

Commercial ties between the United States and the 27-member European Union are substantial, growing, and mutually beneficial. However, differences in regulatory approaches limit an even more integrated marketplace from developing. To deal with this situation, a variety of government-to-government efforts have been created to dismantle existing regulatory barriers and to prevent new ones from emerging. These efforts fall under the rubric of transatlantic regulatory cooperation (TRC) and are at the heart of today's U.S.-EU economic relationship. This report is intended to serve as an introduction and primer on a complicated, broad, and often highly technical set of issues. Since the mid-1990s, both U.S. and European multinational companies have viewed divergent ways of regulating markets for both goods and services as the most serious barriers to transatlantic commerce. The primary reason why these companies seek to achieve greater harmonization in standards and regulatory procedures is to reduce costs imposed by having to comply with two different sets of regulations and standards. TRC must deal with a number of key differences between the United States and EU concerning approaches to regulation. These differences involve political support for regulation and public attitudes towards risk and transparency. Until they converge or are re-aligned, a transatlantic gap in regulatory policies is likely to persist. Regulatory cooperation is an umbrella concept that incorporates a broad range of activities. At one end of the spectrum are information exchanges and dialogues among regulators that are designed to build trust and confidence. At the other end of the spectrum are activities designed to harmonize regulatory approaches through acceptance of common principles and standards. In between are activities that involve varying degrees of intrusion into the autonomy of regulators. TRC initiatives have made progress in reducing costs to businesses and consumers in some sectors, but not in others. One of the key obstacles to more extensive cooperation frequently cited is the domestic orientation of regulatory agencies involved in the process. To promote more effective TRC, two policy options are commonly advanced: (1) attracting high-level political support and (2) increasing dramatically the involvement of legislators (Congress and the European Parliament). The Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), which was created in April 2007, was designed, in part, to generate the kind of high-level political support that previous initiatives may have lacked. At the last TEC meeting, held in November 2011, the two sides agreed to avoid creating new and unintended barriers to trade and investment, especially in emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology, biobased food, and cloud computing. The leaders also encouraged regulators on both sides to implement common regulatory principles and best practices. TRC has been mostly an executive branch driven process. Yet, through authorization and appropriations of the many different regulatory agencies involved in TRC, Congress could play a more central role if it decided to move in this direction. As domestic regulation takes place in an increasingly integrated transatlantic marketplace, Congress will be called upon to balance the often competing demands of trade expansion and barrier reduction against domestic health and safety concerns.

crs_RS20490

crs_RS20490_0

For the United States, Singapore is a crucial partner in trade and security cooperation as the Obama Administration executes its rebalance to Asia strategy. Singapore's heavy dependence on international trade makes regional stability and the free flow of goods and services essential to its existence. As a result, the nation is a firm supporter of both U.S. trade policy and the U.S. security role in Asia, but also maintains close relations with China. Government and Politics The People's Action Party (PAP) has won every general election since the end of the colonial era in 1959, aided by a fragmented opposition, Singapore's economic success, and electoral procedures that strongly favor the ruling party. Some point to shifts in the political and social environment that may herald more political pluralism, including generational changes and an increasingly international outlook among Singaporeans. In May 2011, opposition parties claimed their most successful results in history, taking six of parliament's 87 elected seats, and garnering about 40% of the popular vote. Though this still left the PAP with an overwhelming majority in Parliament, the ruling party described the election as a watershed moment for Singapore and vowed to reform the party to respond to the public's concerns. The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) went into effect in January 2004—the U.S.'s first bilateral FTA with an Asian country—and trade has burgeoned. In 2012, Singapore was the 17 th largest U.S. trading partner with $50 billion in total two-way goods trade, and a substantial destination for U.S. foreign direct investment. Singapore and the United States are among the 12 countries on both sides of the Pacific involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is the centerpiece of the Obama Administration's economic rebalance to Asia.

A former trading and military outpost of the British Empire, the tiny Republic of Singapore has transformed itself into a modern Asian nation and a major player in the global economy, though it still substantially restricts political freedoms in the name of maintaining social stability and economic growth. Singapore's heavy dependence on international trade makes regional stability and the free flow of goods and services essential to its existence. As a result, the island nation is a firm supporter of both U.S. international trade policy and the U.S. security role in Asia, but also maintains close relations with China. The Obama Administration's strategy of rebalancing U.S. foreign policy priorities to the Asia-Pacific enhances Singapore's role as a key U.S. partner in the region. Singapore and the United States are among the 12 countries on both sides of the Pacific involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is the centerpiece of the Obama Administration's economic rebalance to Asia. The People's Action Party (PAP) has won every general election since the end of the colonial era in 1959, aided by a fragmented opposition, Singapore's economic success, and electoral procedures that strongly favor the ruling party. Some point to changes in the political and social environment that may herald more political pluralism, including generational changes and an ever-increasingly international outlook among Singaporeans. In May 2011, opposition parties claimed their most successful results in history, taking six of parliament's 87 elected seats. Though this still left the PAP with an overwhelming majority in Parliament, the ruling party described the election as a watershed moment for Singapore and vowed to reform the party to respond to the public's concerns. In 2012, Singapore was the 17th largest U.S. trading partner with $50 billion in total two-way goods trade, and a substantial destination for U.S. foreign direct investment. The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) went into effect in January 2004, and trade has burgeoned. In addition to trade, mutual security interests strengthen ties between Singapore and the United States. A formal strategic partnership agreement outlines access to military facilities and cooperation in counterterrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, joint military exercises, policy dialogues, and shared defense technology.

crs_RL31829

crs_RL31829_0

1559 / H.Rept. 108-76 ) providing $78.49 billion to cover the costsof military operations in Iraq, relief and reconstruction of Iraq, ongoing U.S. costs in Afghanistan,additional aid to coalition partners and nations cooperating in the global war on terrorism, andhomeland security. Theconference version includes a $3.1 billion airline industry relief package that was not requested bythe President. 108-11 ). The $2.475 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund will follow theauthorities of regular foreign aid programs that are usually managed by the Department of State andthe U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). As passed, H.R. However, it also sets up a new$15.7 billion Iraq Freedom Fund to give DOD additional flexibility. (3) For homeland security, the conference version provides $5.12 billion, $749 million more than requested. For defense, the conference version allocates much of the $59.9 billion requested by the Department of Defense in the Defense Emergency Response Fund to regular appropriationsaccounts, reserving $15.7 billion in a new Iraq Freedom Response Fund to be allocated by thePresident subject to various ceilings and floors set in the bill. The conference report also allocates most of these fundsto specific accounts. The conference version of H.R. Congressional Action on the Department of Defense's Request The Administration requested $62.6 billion for the Department of Defense (DOD) for the costof the war in Iraq, continued U.S. operations in Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism, andenhanced security at military bases in the United States. Balancing Congressional oversight and DOD Flexibility : DOD requested that $59.9 billion be provided in the Defense Emergency Response Account (DERF) where DODwould have discretion to spend the funds, flexibility reduced by Congress because of concerns aboutoversight; (14) Flexibility to fund foreign military forces : DOD requested funds for foreign military forces who cooperate with the U.S. in combating terrorism, and Congress responded byadding reporting requirements; Compensation for war duty: Congress increased combat pay and family separation allowances for military personnel in theater because of concerns aboutadequacy; Defining DOD's postwar role : The Administration request allowed the President to allocated funds for reconstruction and relief activities in Iraq to any agency, includingDOD, and Congress agreed; and Costs and other effects of the war : Costs beyond FY2003 and effects on DOD's readiness and forces over the longer-term are unclear from DOD's request and remainconcerns of Congress. International Assistance. Turkey -- $1 billion for economic grants which could be applied to fees associated with $8.5 billion in direct loans or loanguarantees. Congressional Action on International Assistance. 1559 , as approved, includes$4.52 billion in additional aid to countries and regional programs, about $180 millionless than requested. U.S. Country Assistance. of Homeland Security items below. Support to State and Local Governments for Terrorism Prevention and Security Enhancements (63) The Bush Administration's request for FY2003 supplemental appropriations included $2 billion for the ODP. The enacted supplemental ( P.L. For Homeland Security Counterterrorism Fund, the Senaterecommended $1.135 billion after shifting $580 million for the Coast Guard to aseparate account, but including $215 million for the President's Emergency ResponseFund. 1559 combines approaches taken in the House and Senate bills of allocating most of the proposed $500 million DOJCounterterrorism Fund to specific accounts.

On March 25, 2003, President Bush requested $74.8 billion in the FY2003 Emergency Supplemental for ongoing military operations in Iraq, postwar occupation, reconstruction and reliefin Iraq, international assistance to countries contributing to the war in Iraq or the global war onterrorism, the cost of the continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan, and additional homeland security. On April 12, 2003, the House and Senate passed the conference version of the FY2003 supplemental ( H.R. 1559 / H.Rept. 108-76 / P.L. 108-11 ). It includes $78.49 billion, $3.7billion more than requested by the President. Additions made by Congress include $3.1 billion forassistance to the airlines, $749 million more for homeland security programs, and $369 million infood aid for Iraq and other countries. The Administration asked Congress to approve funding that would be lodged in several large emergency funds where agencies could determine the actual allocation of funds to particularpurposes or specific countries. The conference version distributes most of these funds to regularappropriations accounts and generally requires additional notifications to Congress of transfers incases where the Administration is given additional flexibility. The largest fund proposed was $59.9 billion for the DOD's Defense Emergency Response Fund that would cover the costs associated with the war in Iraq, the continued U.S. presence inAfghanistan, enhanced security at U.S. military bases, and postwar occupation in Iraq. Theconference includes $15.7 billion in a new Iraq Freedom Fund but distributes the remaining fundsto specific accounts. Congress further provides $2.475 billion for an Iraq Relief and Reconstruction that will fall under the authorities of regular foreign assistance programs usually managed by the StateDepartment and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). H.R. 1559 ,however, extends considerable flexibility to the President, allowing him to directly apportion fundsto several federal agencies, including the Defense Department. The FY2003 EmergencySupplemental also includes $4.7 billion in international assistance for about 22 countries which havecontributed in some fashion to the war in Iraq or the global war on terrorism. This includessubstantial increases in current aid levels for Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, andTurkey. Israel, Egypt and Turkey would also receive U.S. government guaranteed loans. The Administration also requested that substantial appropriations be provided en bloc for homeland security, including $2 billion for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for grantsto states and enhancements of security, and $500 million for a DHS Counterterrorism Fund for investigations and operations. The conference provides $749 million more for homeland securitybut allocates funds to specific appropriation accounts.

crs_RL32870

crs_RL32870_0

Background: Policy Dilemmas Over the last two years, the European Union (EU) has been considering lifting its armsembargo on the People's Republic of China (PRC), imposed after the June 1989 Tiananmen Squarecrackdown. The Bush Administration opposes an end to the EU's arms embargo on China, seeing it asa relaxation in the EU's human rights and arms export policies toward China, and out of step withU.S. Overall, there are two sets ofquestions for Congress in examining U.S. policy toward this question. If U.S. interests are adverselyaffected, what are some options for Congress to discourage the EU from lifting its arms embargo onChina and, if it is lifted, to protect U.S. national security interests? At the same time, the current disagreement presents an opportunity forcloser coordination of U.S.-European policies, including controls over military-related exports andstrategy towards China. Because some European companies have transferred defense-related systems to China underthe arms embargo that is not legally binding, the United States has called for the EU to maintain theembargo and strengthen export controls. (8) However, in response to theTiananmen Crackdown, the United States suspended military-to-military contacts and arms sales. In other words, all member states of the now-25 member EU must agree beforethe arms embargo can be lifted. The United Kingdom (U.K.) and the Netherlands have shared U.S.concerns about the strategic implications of an end to the embargo, while some of the Scandinaviancountries and other smaller states with strong human rights advocacy policies have also been lessenthusiastic. However, the EU did not move ahead with lifting the embargo in the spring of 2005. (24) As a result, ending the arms embargo on China does not appear to be high on the EU's agendafor the near to medium term. However, many analysts point out that the EU remains politically committed to lifting the embargo,and believe that its end may ultimately be only a matter of time. EU officials stress that if and when the embargois lifted, its end would be accompanied by the simultaneous introduction of a package of measures,including an enhanced EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, to curtail more effectively Europeanarms sales to China (and elsewhere), and to address U.S. concerns. (42) Nonetheless, if the EU lifts its arms embargo on China, there are U.S. concerns that this stepcould: increase China's leverage if there are more competingbidders increase China's acquisitions of arms and militarytechnology improve China's domestic defense industries strengthen China's ability to threaten or use force against Taiwan, U.S. allies,or U.S. forces increase China's weapons proliferation to unstable areas (in the Mideast, Asia,and Africa) increase China's rising influence regionally as well asglobally. Its end, they assert, will pave the way for a strengthened EUarms export control regime -- including a revised and enhanced EU Code of Conduct on ArmsExports -- that will be more effective in controlling arms sales not only to China, but also globally. Political Motivations(68) The EU is seeking to develop a "strategic partnership" with China. (74) A Symbolic Embargo? These can be summarized as follows: (1) Consistency of export with international commitments arising from U.N., EU, or theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) arms embargoes; (2) Risk that export would be used for internal repression or where the recipient country has engagedin serious violations of human rights; (3) Risk that export would provoke or prolong armed conflicts; (4) Risk of recipient using export to undermine regional peace and security; (5) Effect of export on defense and national security interests of friends, allies, and other EU memberstates; (6) Commitment of purchaser to fight terrorism and uphold international law; (7) Risk of diversion to third parties or to a terrorist organization; (8) Risk that export would undermine the sustainable development of the recipient country. concerns about lifting the arms embargo on China. Implications for U.S. Resolutions Urging the EU to Keep the Embargo.

The European Union (EU) has been considering lifting its arms embargo on China, whichwas imposed in response to the June 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown. France, Germany, and other EUmembers claim that the embargo hinders the development of a "strategic partnership" with China. The Bush Administration and Members of Congress strongly oppose an end to the EU's armsembargo and urge stronger arms export controls. The United States contends that engagement withChina need not send the wrong signals on China's human rights record and military buildup thatthreatens a peaceful resolution of Taiwan and other Asian issues. The EU argues that the arms embargo -- which is not legally binding -- is weak and largelysymbolic. Indeed, some EU members reportedly have allowed defense-related exports to Chinaunder the arms embargo. While such sales have raised questions about the effectiveness of the EU'sarms embargo on China, they also point to the potential for future sales of military equipment ortechnology to China, particularly without the political restraint of the embargo. EU governments,led by the United Kingdom, stress that if and when the embargo is overturned, its end would beaccompanied by a stronger EU arms export control regime -- including an enhanced EU Code ofConduct on Arms Exports -- that will improve accountability and better control arms sales to Chinaand elsewhere. U.S. critics, however, remain skeptical that even a tighter EU Code will containsufficient enforcement and transparency mechanisms to dissuade EU countries from exportingadvanced defense technologies that could enhance China's military buildup and ultimately threatencommon U.S., European, and Asian interests in peace and stability. All 25 EU member states must agree before the embargo can be overturned. Although manyobservers had expected that the EU would lift the embargo in the spring of 2005, some membersgrew hesitant amid vocal and high-level U.S. opposition, especially since early 2005. Those arguingagainst lifting the embargo have cited persistent human rights problems in China, including a refusalto reexamine the Tiananmen Crackdown, and China's adoption in March 2005 of its "Anti-SecessionLaw" warning of a possible use of force against Taiwan. At present, ending the arms embargo onChina does not appear to be high on the EU's agenda. Still, the EU is politically committed tooverturning the embargo, and many observers believe that its end is ultimately only a matter of time. In the meantime, U.S. diplomacy could be effective, and the disagreement presents a chance forcloser coordination of U.S.-European policies, including those dealing with arms export controls anda rising China. Overall, there are two sets of questions for Congress in examining U.S. policy toward the fateof the EU's arms embargo on China. What are the implications for U.S. interests in trans-Atlanticrelations and China? If U.S. interests are adversely affected, what are some options for Congressto discourage the EU from lifting its arms embargo on China and, if it is lifted, to protect U.S.national security interests in both Asia and Europe? Issues raised by these questions are the subjectof this CRS Report. This report will be updated as warranted.

crs_R45447

crs_R45447_0

Introduction Four major principles currently underlie U.S. policy for admitting lawful permanent residents (LPRs): reunifying families, admitting individuals with needed skills, providing humanitarian assistance, and diversifying immigrant flows by country of origin. Origin-country diversity occurs primarily through the Diversity Immigrant Visa. Employment-based immigrants enter the United States through one of five preference categories, each with its own eligibility requirements and numerical limitations and, in some cases, different application processes. In addition to the numerical limits imposed upon each preference category, employment-based immigrants face a per-country ceiling, or "cap," that limits the number of immigrants from any single country of origin to 7% of the annual limit for each of the five preference categories. Some assert that the current numerical limits on employment-based LPRs are not working in the national economic interest and potentially lead to exploitation of foreign workers who are waiting to acquire LPR status. The Per-country Ceiling The INA further specifies a "per-country ceiling," or "cap," limiting the number of family-sponsored preference immigrants and the number of employment-based immigrants from any single country to 7% of the limit in each preference category. While some prospective employment-based immigrants can self-petition, most require U.S. employers to petition on their behalf. DOS is also responsible for the allocation, enumeration, and assignment of all numerically limited "visa numbers" or slots, regardless of where prospective immigrants reside. The final stage in the employment-based immigration process is an interview with either a DOS consular official for foreign nationals residing abroad or a USCIS adjudicator for foreign nationals residing in the United States. In FY2017, these 137,855 employment-based immigrants represented 12% of the 1,127,167 foreign nationals who received LPR status. In FY2017, for example, 82% of employment-based LPRs adjusted to LPR status from within the United States; only 18% acquired LPR status as new arrivals from abroad. While the six distinct groups of petitions and applications discussed here illustrate the pools of prospective employment-based immigrants at different stages of administrative processing, only two pools represent applicants who are limited from advancing because of the INA's numerical limits. Those two pools (the third and the fourth) include those with approved employment-based immigrant petitions who are either waiting overseas to obtain a visa or waiting in the United States to adjust their status. Arguments In Favor Those who favor raising or eliminating the employment-based per-country ceiling argue that the current employment-based immigration system makes prospective employment-based immigrants wait for excessively long periods to acquire LPR status. If the per-country ceiling is eliminated and the current queue of pending petitions and visas is processed, proponents argue, employers would have no incentive to sponsor employment-based immigrants from any one country over others except based on conventional labor market criteria. From a national interest perspective, many have argued that current circumstances discourage skilled foreign workers from countries such as India from seeking employment and immigration sponsorship in the United States. If Congress eliminated the per-country ceiling for employment-based immigrants, many expect that Indian and Chinese nationals would dominate the flow of new employment-based LPRs for as many years as needed to clear out the accumulated queue of prospective immigrants from those countries. For example, shorter wait times for LPR status might actually incentivize greater numbers of nationals from India, China, and the Philippines to seek employment-based LPR status.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) specifies a complex set of categories and numerical limits for admitting lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to the United States that includes economic priorities among the admission criteria. These priorities are addressed primarily through the employment-based immigration system, which consists of five preference categories. Each preference category has specific eligibility criteria; numerical limits; and, in some cases, distinct application processes. The INA allocates 140,000 visas annually for all five employment-based LPR categories, roughly 12% of the 1.1 million LPRs admitted in FY2017. The INA further limits each immigrant-sending country to an annual maximum of 7% of all employment-based LPR admissions, known as the per-country ceiling, or "cap." Prospective employment-based immigrants follow two administrative processing trajectories depending on whether they apply from overseas as "new arrivals" seeking LPR status or from within the United States seeking to adjust to LPR status from a temporary status that they currently possess. While some prospective employment-based immigrants can self-petition, most require U.S. employers to petition on their behalf. In both cases, the Department of State (DOS) is responsible for allocating the correct number of employment-based immigrant "visa numbers" or slots, according to numerical limits and the per-country ceiling specified in the INA. This report reviews the employment-based immigration process by examining six pools of pending petitions and applications, representing prospective employment-based immigrants and any accompanying family members at different stages of the LPR process. While four of these pools represent administrative processing queues, two result from the INA's numerical limitations on employment-based immigration and the per-country ceiling. These latter two pools of foreign nationals, who have been approved as employment-based immigrants but must wait for statutorily limited visa numbers, totaled in excess of 900,000 as of mid-2018. Most originate from India, followed by China and the Philippines. Some employers maintain that they continue to need skilled foreign workers to remain internationally competitive and to keep their firms in the United States. Proponents of increasing employment-based immigration levels argue that it is vital for economic growth. Opponents cite the lack of compelling evidence of labor shortages and argue that the presence of foreign workers can negatively impact wages and working conditions in the United States. With this statutory and economic backdrop, the policy option of revising or eliminating the per-country ceiling on employment-based LPRs has been proposed repeatedly in Congress. Some argue that eliminating the per-country ceiling would increase the flow of high-skilled immigrants from countries such as India and China, who are often employed in the U.S. technology sector, without increasing the total annual admission of employment-based LPRs. Currently, nationals from India in particular, and to a lesser extent China and the Philippines, face lengthy queues and inordinately long waits to receive LPR status. Many of those waiting for employment-based LPR status are already employed in the United States on temporary visas, a potentially exploitative situation that some argue incentivizes immigrant-sponsoring employers to continue to recruit foreign nationals primarily from these countries for temporary employment. Others counter that the statutory per-country ceiling restrains the dominance of a handful of employment-based immigrant-sending countries and preserves the diversity of immigrant flows.

crs_RL32792

crs_RL32792_0

Introduction This report considers population longevity in the United States, as measured by life expectancy. Life expectancy is also routinely calculated for other ages. This report documents the improvements in life expectancy that have occurred, analyzing both the underlying factors that contributed to mortality reductions as well as the continuing longevity differentials by sex and race. In addition, it considers whether life expectancy will continue to increase in future years. While this report focuses on describing the demographic context of longevity change in the United States, these trends have implications for a wide range of social and economic issues that are likely to be considered by Congress. Trends in the Level of Longevity Over the Past Century As seen in Table 1 and Appendix B Table B -1 , life expectancy at birth increased dramatically over the past century in the United States—from 49.2 years (the average for 1900-1902) to 77.5 years in 2003, the most recent year for which official data have been released by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)/National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). A significant reduction in the life expectancy gap between American white and black men was also observed over the 20 th century. The values for black females and white males are quite similar to each other—76.1 years and 75.3 years, with black females having the slight advantage. Life expectancy at birth in 2003 for black males measured 69.0 years, falling short of the comparable figure for white males by 6.3 years. Detailed Life Expectancy Tables

As a result of falling age-specific mortality, life expectancy rose dramatically in the United States over the past century. Final data for 2003 (the most recent available) show that life expectancy at birth for the total population has reached an all-time American high level, 77.5 years, up from 49.2 years at the turn of the 20 th century. Record-high life expectancies were found for white females (80.5 years) and black females (76.1 years), as well as for white males (75.3 years) and black males (69.0 years). Life expectancy gaps between males and females and between whites and blacks persisted. In combination with decreasing fertility, the life expectancy gains have led to a rapid aging of the American population, as reflected by an increasing proportion of persons aged 65 and older. This report documents the improvements in longevity that have occurred, analyzing both the underlying factors that contributed to mortality reductions and the continuing longevity differentials by sex and race. In addition, it considers whether life expectancy will continue to increase in future years. Detailed statistics on life expectancy are provided. A brief comparison with other countries is also provided. While this report focuses on a description of the demographic context of life expectancy change in the United States, these trends have implications for a wide range of social and economic programs and issues that are likely to be considered by Congress. This report will be updated upon release of final data for 2004 by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS).

crs_R40493

crs_R40493_0

September 11, 2009—Former President Chen Shui-bian was given a life sentence on corruption charges. 96-8 ), remains rooted in a general notion of maintaining the "status quo" as it existed when the TRA was enacted. Complex political changes have occurred in both Taiwan and the PRC. U.S. unofficial relations with Taiwan since then have been built on the framework of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act ( P.L. 96-8 ) and further shaped by three U.S.-China communiqués. Absent formal diplomatic relations, the United States continues to maintain substantial economic and security relationships with Taiwan, including the sale of defensive military weapons and services. Other CRS reports provide more details about the myriad historical complexities of Taiwan's current situation in U.S. policy, such as: historical background about how the ROC on Taiwan went from a U.S. ally to a government with no diplomatic U.S. relations, including the fundamentals governing U.S. policy toward Taiwan today (CRS Report RS22388, Taiwan's Political Status: Historical Background and Its Implications for U.S. Policy ); the increase in U.S.-Taiwan tensions under the former administration of President Chen Shui-bian (CRS Report RL33684, Underlying Strains in Taiwan-U.S. Fundamentals of U.S. Policy The fundamental framework of U.S. policy toward Taiwan was laid down decades ago, beginning with the Nixon opening to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 that resulted in the severing of official relations with the government on Taiwan in 1979. the Communiqué on Normalization of Relations with the PRC (1979), in which the United States recognized the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of all China and "acknowledge[d] the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China", and the August 17 Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan (1982), in which the United States stated it had no intention of pursuing a "two-China" policy; that it appreciated China's pledges to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question; and that it did not plan on a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan. Under Taiwan's new KMT government, then, the United States faces new challenges concerning the popularity of the elected government, the implications of closer and more cordial ties between Taiwan and the PRC for U.S. interests, and what role, if any, Washington should play in cross-strait relations. A second round in Taiwan on November 4-7, 2008, resulting in four agreements on direct sea transportation, air transportation, food safety, and direct postal links. PRC and Taiwan officials also have talked about creating a comprehensive agreement to expand economic cooperation between Taiwan and China—the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)—discussed elsewhere in this memo. Several aspects of the judicial proceedings against Chen have led to criticism of the Taiwan government under Ma Ying-jeou. On January 16, 2009, the USTR announced that Taiwan had made sufficient improvements to be removed from the list. To date, U.S.-Taiwan trade discussions have been held under a 1994 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), a non-binding consultative mechanism the United States employs for resolving trade and investment difficulties with countries still opening their economies. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) Taiwan also has sought to qualify for coverage under the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which eliminates some visa requirements for qualified countries, allowing their citizens to make temporary U.S. visits without first obtaining a valid visa. Whether such nuance will continue in the Obama Administration remains to be seen. The Taiwan Relations Act and the current policy approach, according to these proponents, should be maintained and regularly reaffirmed. With Taiwan under the KMT government, the United States will be faced with some challenges familiar from past years, including decisions on: new arms sales; how to accommodate requests for visits to the United States by President Ma and other senior Taiwan officials; the level of U.S. relations with the Ma government; and whether to pursue closer economic ties, such as through a Free Trade Agreement. Legislation in the 111th Congress S. 1390 (Levin) National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010. H.Con.Res. H.Con.Res. The resolution reaffirms the unwavering U.S. commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, reaffirms strong U.S. support for Taiwan's democratic development, and supports deepening U.S.-Taiwan ties.

U.S. policy toward Taiwan is unique. Since both the Chinese governments on Taiwan and on mainland China held that they alone were China's legitimate ruling government, U.S. diplomatic relations with Taiwan had to be severed in 1979 when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) government as China's sole legitimate government. While maintaining diplomatic relations with the PRC, the United States maintains extensive but unofficial relations with Taiwan based on the framework of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA—P.L. 96-8) and shaped by three U.S.-PRC communiqués. U.S. interests in Taiwan include significant commercial ties, objections to PRC military threats against Taiwan, arms sales and security assurances, and support for Taiwan's democratic development. U.S. policy remains rooted in a general notion of maintaining the "status quo" between the two sides. But other factors have changed dramatically since 1979, including growing PRC power and influence, Taiwan's democratization, and the deepening of Taiwan-PRC economic and social linkages. These changes have led to periodic discussions about whether or not U.S. policy should be reviewed or changed. Taiwan's current president, Ma Ying-jeou, elected in March 2008, moved quickly to jump start Taiwan-PRC talks that had been stalled since 1998. The talks to date have yielded agreements to establish regular direct charter flights, direct sea transportation, postal links, and food safety mechanisms. Taiwan also has lifted long-standing caps on Taiwan investment in the PRC and lowered the profile of its bids for participation in U.N. agencies. Many welcome these and other initiatives as contributing to greater regional stability. More pessimistic observers believe growing PRC-Taiwan ties are eroding U.S. influence, strengthening PRC leverage and, particularly in the face of expanding economic links, jeopardizing Taiwan autonomy and economic security. The changing dynamic between Taiwan and the PRC poses difficult, competing policy challenges for the United States. Along with new challenges—such as what U.S. policy should be if Taiwan continues to move closer to the PRC; and how U.S. officials should respond to the life sentence on corruption charges given to former President Chen Shui-bian—the Obama Administration faces other challenges familiar from past years, including decisions on new arms sales to Taiwan, which are anathema to the PRC; how to accommodate requests for visits to the United States by President Ma and other senior Taiwan officials; the overall nature of U.S. relations with the Ma government; whether to pursue closer economic ties with Taiwan; what role, if any, Washington should play in cross-strait relations; and more broadly, what form of defense assurances to offer Taiwan. In addition, the Taiwan government also seeks to raise its international profile in other ways involving the United States. Taiwan successfully has sought to be removed from the U.S. Special 301 "Watch List" for intellectual property rights violations, and it is seeking to qualify for the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which eliminates some visa requirements for qualified countries. The Taiwan government also continues to ask for a U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which would broaden the current and stalled avenue for U.S.-Taiwan trade discussions, the 1994 Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA). Legislation in the 111th Congress concerning Taiwan includes H.Con.Res. 18, urging that the United States resume diplomatic relations with Taiwan; H.Con.Res. 55, expressing U.S. support for and commitment to Taiwan; and S. 1390/H.R. 2647, including a mandatory report assessing the strength and capacity of Taiwan's air force. This report will be updated as events warrant.

crs_R44636

crs_R44636_0

When this process is delayed beyond the start of the fiscal year, one or more continuing appropriations acts (commonly known as continuing resolutions or CRs) can be used to provide funding until action on regular appropriations is completed. In recent fiscal years, the referenced funding level has been the amount of budget authority that was available under specified appropriations acts from the previous fiscal year. In contrast, a formula based on the previous fiscal year's appropriations laws was used to provide full-year continuing appropriations for the other projects and activities that normally would have been funded in the remaining 11 FY2011 regular appropriations bills ( P.L. 112-175 ) provided the following with regard to OCO funding: Whenever an amount designated for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism pursuant to Section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (in this section referred to as an "OCO/GWOT amount") in an Act described in paragraph (3) or (10) of subsection (a) that would be made available for a project or activity is different from the amount requested in the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request, the project or activity shall be continued at a rate for operations that would be permitted by ... the amount in the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request. As an example, an interim CR may prohibit an agency from initiating or resuming any project or activity for which funds were not available in the previous fiscal year. Congress may also limit certain contractual actions such as multiyear procurement contracts. Such prohibitions are typically only applied to the Department of Defense. An interim CR may provide funds at the rate of the prior year's appropriation and, as a result, may provide funds in a manner that differs from an agency's budget request. Anomalies Even though CRs typically provide funds at a particular rate, CRs may also include provisions that enumerate exceptions to the duration, amount, or purposes for which those funds may be used for certain appropriations accounts or activities. Such provisions are commonly referred to as anomalies . The purpose of anomalies is to insulate some operations from potential adverse effects of a CR while providing time for Congress and the President to agree on full-year appropriations and avoiding a government shutdown. In many cases, the degree of a CR's impact can be directly related to the length of time that DOD operates under a CR. This "consolidated anomalies list" included approximately 75 programs that would be delayed by a prohibition on new starts and nearly 40 programs that would be negatively affected by a limitation on production quantity increases. All federal agencies face management challenges under a CR, but DOD faces unique challenges in providing the military forces needed to deter war and defend the country. DOD has started the fiscal year under a CR for 13 of the past 17 years (FY2002-FY2018) and every year since FY2010. The average number of days of operation under a CR has increased over that same period. Since 2010, DOD has spent over 38 months operating under a CR, compared to less than 9 months during the preceding 8 years.

This report provides a basic overview of interim continuing resolutions (CRs) and highlights some specific issues pertaining to operations of the Department of Defense (DOD) under a CR. As with regular appropriations bills, Congress can draft a CR to provide funding in many different ways. Under current practice, a CR is an appropriation that provides either interim or full-year funding by referencing a set of established funding levels for the projects and activities that it funds (or covers). Such funding may be provided for a period of days, weeks, or months and may be extended through further continuing appropriations until regular appropriations are enacted, or until the fiscal year ends. In recent fiscal years, the referenced funding level on which interim or full-year continuing appropriations has been based was the amount of budget authority that was available under specified appropriations acts from the previous fiscal year. CRs may also include provisions that enumerate exceptions to the duration, amount, or purposes for which those funds may be used for certain appropriations accounts or activities. Such provisions are commonly referred to as anomalies. The purpose of anomalies is to preserve Congress's constitutional prerogative to provide appropriations in the manner it sees fit, even in instances when only interim funding is provided. The lack of a full-year appropriation and the uncertainty associated with the temporary nature of a CR can create management challenges for federal agencies. DOD faces unique challenges operating under a CR while providing the military forces needed to deter war and defend the country. For example, an interim CR may prohibit an agency from initiating or resuming any project or activity for which funds were not available in the previous fiscal year (i.e., prohibit new starts). Such limitations in recent CRs have affected a large number of DOD programs. Before the beginning of FY2018, DOD identified approximately 75 weapons programs that would be delayed by the FY2018 CR's prohibition on new starts and nearly 40 programs that would be affected by a restriction on production quantity. In addition, Congress may include provisions in interim CRs that place limits on the expenditure of appropriations for programs that spend a relatively high proportion of their funds in the early months of a fiscal year. Also, if a CR provides funds at the rate of the prior year's appropriation, an agency may be provided additional (even unneeded) funds in one account, such as research and development, while leaving another account, such as procurement, underfunded. By its very nature, an interim CR can prevent agencies from taking advantage of efficiencies through bulk buys and multiyear contracts. It can foster inefficiencies by requiring short-term contracts that must be reissued once additional funding is provided, requiring additional or repetitive contracting actions. DOD has started the fiscal year under a CR for 13 of the past 17 years (FY2002-FY2018) and every year since FY2010. The amount of time DOD has operated under CR authorities during the fiscal year has increased in the past 9 years and equates to a total of more than 38 months since 2010.

crs_R40146

crs_R40146_0

The Act and Some Issues It Raises The Robinson-Patman Act (R-P)(15 U.S.C. In pertinent part, the statute states that it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or sale within the United States ..., and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with the customers of either of them. Since its enactment in 1936, the Robinson-Patman Act has been less than enthusiastically viewed by the Department of Justice, which believes that the act is not beneficial to consumers. In its 1977 Report on the Robinson-Patman Act, the Antitrust Division noted that It should not be surprising ... that Robinson-Patman can be shown to have many adverse effects on the economy. Government enforcement of the act, therefore, has always been entrusted to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which over the years has acted inconsistently with respect to R-P actions. Other Defenses to Robinson-Patman Challenges Meeting Competition In addition to the commodities-not-of-"like grade and quality" and sales-for-export justifications for price differentials, an additional, affirmative defense permitted to refute the Robinson-Patman illegality of differential pricing is the so-called "meeting competition" defense, which has at least two levels: a defendant may assert (and must prove) that the lower price charged to a favored buyer was selected in order to permit the seller to meet that of a competing seller (primary line competition); or he may assert (and must prove) that the challenged price was necessary in order to enable his buyer to meet the competition of one of the buyer's competitors (secondary line competition). A seller may not, however, knowingly "beat" the prices of a competitor. The Non-Profit Exemption There is yet another defense to an allegation of unlawful price differentials under the Robinson-Patman Act. The 1938 Nonprofit Institutions Act (15 U.S.C. Further, a number of courts have specifically held that health maintenance organizations, such as HPs, are charitable institutions for tax purposes. Further, the court relied on the expression of the "for their own use" criterion propounded by the Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggist s to decide that the "basic institutional function" of a health plan—providing a "complete panoply" of health-care services, including continuing and preventative services, to its members—requires that "drugs purchased by an HMO ... for resale to its members [be considered as] purchased for the HMO's 'own use' within the meaning of the Nonprofit Institutions Act." To our knowledge, the inclusion of HMOs in the list of entities entitled to take advantage of the "for their own use" language of the Nonprofit Institutions Act has not been judicially repudiated, although the Supreme Court has not yet provided an opinion on the subject. That the successful plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of the unlawful price differential is not, however, a foregone conclusion. § 15, which requires as a prerequisite to recovery that one have been 'injured in his business or property'], then, a plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. At that time, representatives of small business, and others, contended that retention of Robinson-Patman was essential. Whether the current economic climate will result in a further renewal of efforts to modify or repeal the statute, or whether Congress will determine that statutory intervention is appropriate, is not known at this time.

The Robinson-Patman (R-P) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a, makes it unlawful, with certain exceptions, to knowingly sell goods "in commerce," for use or sale within the United States, at differing prices to contemporaneous buyers of those goods. The "in commerce" language of Robinson-Patman has been held to mean that the interstate commerce requirement is satisfied only when at least one of the two (or more) sales is made "in the stream of commerce"—that is, across state lines. Enacted during the Depression at the behest of small grocers who feared the buying power of large and growing chain grocers, Robinson-Patman is the exception to the notion that the antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors in that it generally prohibits precisely the kind of price differentiation which would normally be thought to result from vigorous competition. Allegations of Robinson-Patman violations may be defended by asserting and proving either that the differing prices reflect only the cost of the seller's manufacture or delivery (the "cost justification" defense); or, that the seller is attempting either (1) to meet the competition of another seller, or (2) enable his buyer to meet the competition of a competitor of the buyer ("meeting competition" defense). In addition, there is also a broad exception to the prohibition against price discrimination when one of the sales is made to any of certain entities listed in the Nonprofit Institutions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13c, and the goods are purchased for the institution's "own use"; nonprofits may not, however, take advantage of their privileged Robinson-Patman status to purchase commodities at favorable prices in order to compete commercially with entities not so entitled. Further, lower courts have found that health maintenance organizations (HMOs) qualify as organizations entitled to take advantage of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, on the theory that they perform services that traditionally have been considered as "charitable"; the Supreme Court has not had occasion to rule on the status of HMOs. Disfavored purchasers who prove a Robinson-Patman violation are not, however, automatically entitled to damages on that account. The Supreme Court has held that since, technically, Robinson-Patman prohibits any price differential whose effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, (emphasis added)," not all proven R-P violations actually damage those who prove them: "[t]o recover treble damages … a plaintiff must … make some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent"—that is, a causal connection between the violation and the injury allegedly suffered. Although there have been some attempts at amending or repealing Robinson-Patman, none has been successful. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has always believed the statute to be inflationary; that it artificially deprives consumers of the advantages of the lower prices that are the aim of the antitrust laws; and that, inter alia, it "reduces pricing flexibility [and] discourages the development of efficient distribution systems." Small businesses, and others, have contended, on the other hand, that their survival depends on the prevention of unjustified price differentials. Whether the current economic climate will revive efforts to modify the statute, which has not been enforced by the Department of Justice since its enactment, and has been enforced sporadically by the Federal Trade Commission, is not known.

crs_RL33623

crs_RL33623_0

Short-term accounting or budget measures, however, provide only a partial view of the costs of federal programs and policies, and they frequently offer a potentially misleading view of the federal government's ability to pay its bills in the long term. Short-term measures, such as annual budget estimates, or medium-term measures, such as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 10-year baseline estimates, do not reflect long-term fiscal imbalances, and in particular they do not reflect the large anticipated costs needed to finance the baby-boom generation's retirement. Therefore, if short- and medium-term measures are not used in conjunction with long-term fiscal measures, then long-term fiscal effects of current policy will be understated or hidden. Most independent analysts believe that changes will be enacted to limit revenues collected by the AMT to levels far below CBO baseline projections. This implies that political pressure to extend AMT fixes will be substantial. Those measures will then provide an overly optimistic picture of the long-term fiscal situation. Second, the structure of the economy changes over time in unpredictable ways. The determinants of economic growth are discussed below. Small differences in economic growth rates lead to large differences in the size of the economy in the long term, so assumptions that affect growth rates will have significant effects on long-term forecasts. Faster growth rates would lead to higher tax revenues, but would also increase spending for two reasons. Health Care Trends Rising spending on federally-financed health care is the major cause for projected increases in government expenditures and accounts for the largest part of long-term fiscal imbalances. Graphical Presentations of Year-by-Year Projections Perhaps the most direct method of showing the magnitude of future fiscal challenges is to present figures depicting the projected path of deficits or the divergence between federal spending and revenues. Future taxes and future benefits from government programs will be risky for various reasons. Fiscal gap is defined as the size of the immediate and permanent increase in tax revenues or decrease in non-interest expenditures needed to ensure that the public debt to GDP ratio at the end of the budget window is the same as the initial public debt to GDP ratio. However, short-term measures may provide a misleading impression of the government's fiscal condition because of the revenues and spending in the years beyond the budget window, which they do not measure. How Big Are Federal Fiscal Imbalances? Typically, these alternative projections assume that major tax cuts will not sunset in 2010, the number of filers subject to the AMT will be capped and that discretionary expenditures will increase at the same rate as the rest of the economy. The Long-Term Fiscal Situation The federal government faces large fiscal imbalances.

Short-term budget estimates, while critical for program administration and congressional spending decisions, provide a partial and potentially misleading impression of the federal government's fiscal situation. On the other hand, long-term measures have their own limitations. On the positive side, they indicate the magnitude of long-term budget imbalances resulting from the gap between future federal tax revenues and the costs of providing retirement and health care for the baby-boom generation. However, long-term projections are subject to substantial uncertainties for two reasons. First, statistical theory implies that expected forecasting error is larger for more-distant events because errors accumulate over each period into the future. Second, the structure of the economy changes over time, so that assumptions based on the past behavior of the economy may not hold in the future. Thus short-term measures, which are relatively certain but which ignore future imbalances, must be used in conjunction with long-term measures, which indicate the size of future imbalances, but with more variability, in order to gain an accurate picture of the fiscal challenges facing the federal government. Long-run fiscal projections depend on determinants of economic growth—such as productivity, and increases in capital stock and labor force—and the growth of health care costs. This report describes and analyzes several measures of the long-term fiscal condition of the federal government. The strengths and limitations of long-term, short-term, and medium-term fiscal measures are discussed. The report then provides an overview of the federal government's long-term fiscal situation. Most independent analysts believe the federal government's fiscal position is more accurately summarized by projections that modify the Congressional Budget Office baseline by assuming the reach of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) will be capped at present levels, that tax cuts slated to expire in 2010 will in fact be extended, and that discretionary spending will keep pace with overall economic growth. Seventy-five-year projections employing these alternative assumptions put the long-term fiscal gap between revenues and spending at 7%-8% of gross domestic product (GDP). Fiscal gap is defined as the size of the immediate and permanent increase in tax revenues or decrease in non-interest expenditures needed to ensure that the public debt to GDP ratio at the end of the budget window is the same as the initial public debt to GDP ratio. These modified-baseline projections indicate that putting federal fiscal policy on a sustainable path for the next 75 years requires substantial increases in taxes, decreases in spending, or both. Changes needed to maintain a permanently sustainable fiscal stance would be even greater. This report will be updated as events warrant.

crs_R40682

crs_R40682_0

The Administration has not explained the effect of these withdrawals on other troops deployed for OIF, or the Iraq War, which includes not only U.S. troops located in Iraq but also some 80,000 to 90,000 troops providing theater-wide support in neighboring areas. To identify the implications of troop levels for these and other policy issues, this report explains how and why measures of troop levels in five different DOD data sources differ; estimates future troop strength in Afghanistan and Iraq for FY2009-FY2012 under the Obama Administration plan using "Boots on the Ground," the most commonly cited measure; discusses the potential cost implications of these changes in troop levels along with other adjustments; analyzes and explains past trends in troop levels for the Afghan and Iraq Wars under the different measures; and measures contributions and burdens of deployment for the four services. This figure of 294,000 troops is over 100,000 higher than the December 2008 total of 181,000 reported in DOD's oft-cited Boots on the Ground," (BOG) report. Likely Overall Declines: FY2008-FY2012 Based on the plans announced by the Obama Administration described above, CRS estimates that average monthly troop strength in Afghanistan and Iraq will decline from 187,900 in FY2008 to 67,500 in FY2012, a drop of 64%. By showing average troop strength both in the past and estimating troop strength in the future, CRS hopes to provide a tool that can help Congress assess the pacing cost implications in current plans to increase troop levels in Afghanistan and decrease troop levels in Iraq including: Are the planned increases in Afghanistan too much, too little or about right and how long are higher levels likely to be maintained? Changes in Afghanistan and Iraq For Afghanistan, troops in-country grew gradually from 5,200 in FY2002 to 20,400 in FY2006. Between FY2006 and FY2008, average strength there jumped by another 10,000 to 30,100. Under the Administration's plans, CRS estimates that average monthly Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan may increase to 50,700 in FY2009 with a further increase to 63,500 the following year once all new units are in-place (see Table 2 ). Currently, additional increases have not been approved. For Iraq, troops in-country nearly doubled between FY2003 and FY2004 reaching an average of 130,600. By the following year, average strength grew by another 13,000 to 143,800, with that level maintained in FY2006. During the surge in troops initiated by President Bush, average troop strength in Iraq initially grew by 7,000 or 6% in FY2007, less than the increase between FY2005 and FY2004. By the next year with another 9,500 troops, troops or another 9%, reaching a peak of 157,800 even as the additional combat brigades began to be withdrawn. CRS estimates that troop strength in Iraq will average 135,600 in FY2009, 88,300 in FY2010, 42,800 in FY1011, and 4,100 in FY2012. For FY2010, the Administration has requested $130 billion in FY2010 for both wars. Because of these transfers, the FY2010 war request would be expected to be $8 billion lower than in FY2009. Based on currently announced plans, CRS estimates that war costs could total $92 billion in FY2011 and $70 billion in FY2012. These levels would be $42 billion and $20 billion, respectively, above the current planning figures. Using this method, average monthly troop strength for both wars in FY2008 ranged from: 188,000 for DOD's Boots on the Ground or troops deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq; 223,000 in the Central Command's Operations Report including some but not all troops deployed in the region, or 19% above the BOG total; 248,000 in average strength estimated from combat pay, or 32% above the BOG total; 294,000 in the Defense Manpower Data Center average strength or 56% above the BOG total; and 307,000 troops based on DMDC's Location Report, or 64% above BOG figures; (see Table 4 ). Before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, all troops deployed in the theater were allocated to OEF. Changes in troop levels in Iraq appear to be loosely related to changes in military strategy including: a quick peak for the invasion itself followed by a rapid drawdown; limits on troop strength reflecting the military strategy endorsed by General Abizaid, the commander in-country, to minimize military presence in order to prevent insurgents from using the U.S. occupation as a way to gain popular support; a shift in the U.S. strategy in October 2005 announced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to "clear, hold, and build" so as to "clear areas from insurgent control," that would gradually be implemented as U.S. troops moved out of large bases to work more closely with Iraqi forces; and the surge in troops announced by President Bush in January 2007 that temporarily increased the number of troops by 30,000 and the number of Brigade Combat Teams from 15 to 20 in order to implement the new counter-insurgency policy to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods. It is not clear whether average costs will continue to rise or fall as the number of troops in-country increases. CBO does not distinguish between OEF and OIF.

In February and March 2009, the Obama Administration announced its plans to increase troop levels in Afghanistan and decrease troop levels in Iraq. In Afghanistan, 30,000 more troops are deploying this year while in Iraq, troops will gradually decline to 35,000 to 50,000 by August 31, 2011 with all troops to be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011. The most commonly cited measure of troop strength is "Boots on the Ground" or the number of troops located in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Based on average monthly Boots on the Ground figures, the number of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq increased from 5,200 in FY2002 to a peak of 187,900 in FY2008 primarily because of increases in Iraq beginning with the invasion in March 2003. In FY2009, total troop strength is expected to remain the same as planned increases in Afghanistan offset declines in Iraq. By FY2012, overall troop strength for the two wars is likely to decline to 67,500 when the withdrawal from Iraq is expected to be complete. For Afghanistan, troops in-country grew gradually from 5,200 in FY2002 to 20,400 in FY2006. Between FY2006 and FY2008, average strength there jumped by another 10,000 to 30,100. Under the Administration's plans, CRS estimates that average monthly Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan may increase to 50,700 in FY2009 with a further increase to 63,500 the following year once all new units are in place. Currently, additional increases have not been approved. For Iraq, troops in-country nearly doubled between FY2003 and FY2004 reaching 130,600. By the following year, average strength grew by another 13,000 to 143,800, with that level maintained in FY2006. During the surge in troops initiated by President Bush, average troop strength in Iraq grew by 7,000 or 6% in FY2007 and another 9,500 or 9% in FY2008, reaching a peak of 157,800. CRS estimates that average troop strength in Iraq will decline to 135,600 in FY2009, 88,300 in FY2010, 42,800 in FY2011, and 4,100 in FY2012. While it is not clear whether war costs will change precisely in tandem with troop levels, these changes can provide a benchmark to assess requests. Based on changes in troop levels and other adjustments, CRS estimates that war costs could be about $8 billion less than the Department of Defense (DOD) $141 billion request for FY2009, and about $13 billion below its $130 billion request for FY2010. For the next year, FY2011, CRS estimates that DOD's requests could be $42 billion more than the current planning figure of $50 billion. And in FY2012, CRS estimates war costs could be $20 billion higher than the Administration's estimate of $50 billion. Although Boots on the Ground is the most commonly cited measure of troop strength, that measure does not include over 100,000 other troops deployed in the region providing theater-wide support for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the Afghan War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Iraq War. Before the 9/11 attacks, the United States had deployed about 26,000 troops in the Central Command region, which includes Afghanistan and Iraq. Based on the most comprehensive DOD measure of troop strength, 294,000 troops were deployed for OEF and OIF as of December 2008, a tenfold increase since 2001.This more inclusive measure may more accurately capture the overall demand for troops. The Administration has not indicated how its plans would affect troops providing support in the region. Using five DOD sources, this report describes, analyzes, and estimates the number of troops deployed for each war from the 9/11 attacks to FY2012 to help Congress assess upcoming DOD war funding requests as well as the implications for the long-term U.S. presence in the region.

crs_RL31936

crs_RL31936_0

Introduction This report provides a brief history and analysis of general revenue sharing (GRS). The United States implemented a GRS program in 1972 that expired on September 30, 1986. The budget gaps for is estimated to be $31.0 billion for the remainder of FY2009 and for FY2010 it is estimated to be $64.7 billion. An examination of the GRS program that existed from 1972 to 1986 could provide some historical perspective if policy makers were to consider a revised GRS program in 2009. The first section provides a brief overview of GRS as authorized by the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-512, the 1972 Act) and the three extensions. Amount Over the almost 15-year life of the GRS program (1972 through 1986), over $83 billion was transferred from the federal government to state and local governments. To achieve a comparable magnitude of assistance today, approximately $313 billion (in 2008 dollars) would need to be distributed over the next 15 years. Thus, the proponents and opponents of GRS modified their political and economic arguments depending on the current political and economic conditions. Because of this turbulence, the rationale behind GRS cannot be traced to a single political or economic objective. This section of the report summarizes three frequently mentioned economic rationales behind GRS: to initiate an intergovermental fiscal reallocation, to address state and local government liquidity crises, and to synchronize federal and state-local fiscal policy. Fiscal Reallocation Fiscal reallocation has two components. A countercyclical GRS program could help alleviate these relatively short-term liquidity problems for states. Implementation Issues The above discussion assumed that federal spending would flow seamlessly from the federal government through states to the designated spending program. Fiscal Policy Time Lags Time lags in implementation are the primary impediment to effective fiscal stimulus. A Brief History and Analysis of Prior GRS Legislation The 1972 Act The GRS grants authorized by the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (the 1972 Act) were essentially unconditional. The grants could not be used for education. In the Senate report accompanying the legislation, Congress identified the following two reasons for the extension: (1) "Rapidly rising services costs coupled with sluggish declining tax bases has meant that State and local governments have had to raise tax rates and/or cut services," and (2) "A chronic problem State and local governments face is that the demand for public services is more elastic than the availability of revenues to finance them." Until the 1980 Act, approximately one-third of the GRS grants had been allocated to the states. The countercyclical aid program was not extended.

This report provides background and analysis of the general revenue sharing program (GRS) as authorized in the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-512, the 1972 Act). The GRS program was extended three times before finally expiring on September 30, 1986. Over the almost 15-year life of the GRS program (1972 through 1986), more than $83 billion was transferred from the federal government to state and local governments. From 1972 to 1980, states received approximately one-third of the grants and local governments received two-thirds. State governments were excluded from GRS beginning in the 1981 fiscal year (FY). In 2003, policymakers suggested using the original GRS program as a model for a new, short-term, GRS program. The FY2004 budget resolution contained a proposal (H.Con.Res. 95, Sec. 605) expressing a sense of the Senate that $30 billion should be set aside over the next 18 months for state fiscal relief. Congress ultimately approved $20 billion in aid to states; $10 billion through Medicaid and $10 billion distributed by population. By comparison, in 1972, the federal government authorized $8.3 billion ($42.1 billion in 2008 dollars) for the first 18 months of the original GRS program. More recently, the recession that began in 2008 has prompted similar proposals. The rationale behind GRS in 1972 cannot be traced to a single political or economic objective, such as economic stimulus. The turbulent economic and political environment that characterized the 1960s and 1970s led proponents and opponents of GRS to modify their political and economic arguments as that environment changed. Generally, GRS could be implemented to (1) initiate intergovernmental fiscal reallocation; (2) address state and local government liquidity crises; and (3) synchronize federal and state-local fiscal policy. A revised GRS program intended to help close state budget deficits (estimated to be $31.0 billion for the remainder of FY2009 and estimated to be $64.7 billion for FY2010) has been advocated based on the last two objectives. The budget crisis facing state and local governments in 2009 has generated renewed concern at the state and local level. A GRS program designed as a countercyclical initiative would encounter two primary implementation issues: fiscal policy time lags and variability in the state response to GRS grants. In addition, as with all fiscal policy, the overall size of the additional federal spending is critical to the impact of the fiscal stimulus. This report provides general background and analysis and does not track current legislation. It will not be updated.

crs_RL34016

crs_RL34016_0

Introduction The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) is a private, nonprofit, federally funded corporation that helps provide legal assistance to low-income people in noncriminal (i.e., civil) matters. The primary responsibility of the LSC is to manage and oversee the congressionally appropriated federal funds that it distributes in the form of grants to local legal services providers, which in turn give legal assistance to low-income clients in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Micronesia (which includes the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau). During 2015, the LSC funded 134 local programs in 812 offices employing about 4,591 attorneys. Local programs establish their own priorities and financial eligibility criteria subject to the LSC limits that stipulate that clients served may not have household income that exceeds 125% of the federal poverty guidelines, with limited exceptions for some household incomes of up to 200% of those guidelines. Under the LSC's competitive process, legal services providers in every jurisdiction bid to become the LSC grantee for a designated service area in a state. In 2015, 70% of LSC clients were females and 30% were males. Approximately 81% of LSC clients were between the ages of 18 and 59, almost 17% were age 60 or older, and 2% were under age 18. Funds for the LSC are included in the annual appropriation for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS). Although the LSC is the largest single source of funding for the civil legal services system in the United States, it is not the only source of funding. Local legal services programs supplement their LSC grants with funds from a variety of government and private sources. As shown in Table 3 , in 2015 LSC funding accounted for 38% of the $966.0 million spent in the United States and territories for civil legal services for the poor. Pursuant to P.L. Pursuant to P.L. 114-113 (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016), enacted December 18, 2015, the LSC was funded for FY2016 at $385 million. The FY2016 LSC appropriation included $352 million for basic field programs and required independent audits, $19 million for management and grants oversight, $4 million for client self-help and information technology, $5 million for the Office of the Inspector General, $1.0 million for loan repayment assistance, and $4 million for a pro bono innovation fund. FY2017 For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested $475.0 million for the LSC. On April 21, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported their FY2017 CJS appropriations bill ( S. 2837 ), which recommended $395 million for the LSC for FY2017. This amount is $10 million more than the FY2016 appropriation and $80 million less than the Administration's budget request. On June 7, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations reported their FY2017 CJS appropriations bill ( H.R. 5393 ), which included an appropriation of $350 million for the LSC for FY2017. This amount is $35 million less than the FY2016 appropriation and $125 million less than the Administration's budget request. 114-223 (the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act; enacted September 29, 2016), the LSC was funded for FY2017 at the FY2016 rate of $385 million annually (prorated) minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, through December 9, 2016, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation. Pursuant to P.L. 114-254 (Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017; enacted December 10, 2016), the LSC is funded for FY2017 at the FY2016 rate of $385 million annually (prorated) minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.1901%, through April 28, 2017, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation. It is important to note that since FY1996, all of the LSC appropriations laws have included language stipulating the retention of provisions restricting the activities of LSC grantees enacted in previous LSC appropriations laws.

The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) is a private, nonprofit, federally funded corporation that helps provide legal assistance to low-income people in civil (i.e., noncriminal) matters. The primary responsibility of the LSC is to manage and oversee the congressionally appropriated federal funds that it distributes in the form of grants to local legal services providers, which in turn give legal assistance to low-income clients in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Micronesia (which includes the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau). The authorization of appropriations for the LSC expired at the end of FY1980. Since then the LSC has operated under annual appropriations laws. Moreover, since FY1996 all of the LSC appropriations laws have included language that restricts the activities of LSC grantees. Pursuant to P.L. 114-113 (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016), enacted December 18, 2015, the LSC was funded for FY2016 at $385 million. The FY2016 LSC appropriation included $352 million for basic field programs and required independent audits, $19 million for management and grants oversight, $4 million for client self-help and information technology, $5 million for the Office of the Inspector General, $1.0 million for loan repayment assistance, and $4 million for a pro bono innovation fund. For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested $475.0 million for the LSC. On April 21, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported their FY2017 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill (S. 2837), which recommended $395 million for the LSC for FY2017. This amount is $10 million more than the FY2016 appropriation and $80 million less than the Administration's budget request. On June 7, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations reported their FY2017 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 5393), which included an appropriation of $350 million for the LSC for FY2017. This amount is $35 million less than the FY2016 appropriation and $125 million less than the Administration's budget request. Pursuant to P.L. 114-223 (the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act; enacted September 29, 2016), the LSC was funded for FY2017 at the FY2016 rate of $385 million annually (prorated) minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, through December 9, 2016, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation. Pursuant to P.L. 114-254 (Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017; enacted December 10, 2016), the LSC is funded for FY2017 at the FY2016 rate of $385 million annually (prorated) minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.1901%, through April 28, 2017, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation. Under the LSC's competitive process, legal services providers in every jurisdiction bid to become the LSC grantee for a designated service area in a state. During 2015, the LSC funded 134 local programs/grantees in 812 offices employing 4,591 attorneys. Local programs establish their own priorities and financial eligibility criteria subject to the LSC limits that stipulate that clients served may not have household income that exceeds 125% of the federal poverty guidelines, with limited exceptions for some household incomes of up to 200% of those guidelines. In 2015, 70% of LSC clients were females and 30% were males. The majority of LSC clients (81%) were between the ages of 18 and 59, 17% were age 60 or older, and 2% were under the age of 18. In 2015, 44% of LSC clients were non-Hispanic white, 28% were non-Hispanic black, 3% were Asian or Pacific Islander, nearly 3% were Native American, nearly 4% were of other races, and 18% were Hispanic. In 2015, LSC grantees closed 755,774 cases involving issues primarily related to families (divorce, child support, etc.), housing, income maintenance, consumer finance, and health. Although the LSC is the largest single source of funding for the civil legal services system in the United States, it is not the only source of funding. Local legal services programs supplement their LSC grants with funds from a variety of governmental and private sources. LSC funding accounts for 38% of all funding for civil legal services for the poor in the United States (including the District of Columbia and the territories).

crs_R43432

crs_R43432_0

Introduction The Expiring Provisions Improvement Reform and Efficiency (EXPIRE) Act ( S. 2260 ) would extend a set of expired tax provisions (including bonus depreciation) through the end of 2015. One of these permanent provisions was bonus depreciation (originally, in H.R. The temporary provisions enacted in the past for only a year or two and extended multiple times are generally referred to collectively as the "extenders." One reason advanced for temporary provisions has been that time is needed to evaluate them. Most of these provisions, however, have been extended multiple times (e.g., the R&D credit has been extended 15 times since 1981) without such an evaluation, which leads some to suggest that these provisions are actually permanent but are extended a year or two at a time because assuming permanence would increase costs in budget projections. Bonus depreciation is not a traditional "extender." It was enacted for a specific, short-term purpose: to provide an economic stimulus during the recession. Its temporary nature is critical to its effectiveness. What Is Bonus Depreciation? If depreciation has a greater present value than economic depreciation the effective tax rate falls below the statutory rate for firm-level taxes on equity investment; if all of the cost is immediately deducted the effective tax rate is zero. The most recent bonus depreciation rule allowed half of the cost of equipment purchased and placed in service in 2013 to be deducted immediately. Bonus depreciation was not the centerpiece of the stimulus; the major tax cut, much larger than bonus depreciation, was an individual tax rebate. The temporary nature of bonus depreciation makes it, in theory, a more effective fiscal stimulus than other investment incentives because it is in the nature of a fire sale. Overall, bonus depreciation did not appear to be very effective in providing short-term economic stimulus compared with alternatives. Bonus Depreciation as a Permanent Provision If bonus depreciation is permanent, it affects the size and allocation of the capital stock. That makes bonus depreciation a more attractive option for permanent tax subsidies than the investment credit, which substantially favors short-lived assets. Accelerated depreciation exacerbates this negative effect. Under the average 26% effective tax rate for equipment under current law without bonus depreciation, the effective tax rate on debt financed investment is -19%. With bonus depreciation, it is -37%. If bonus depreciation is a permanent feature of the tax code, these estimates should be adjusted. For equipment, the tax rates are two to four percentage points larger; bonus depreciation lowers the U.S. rate to six to seven percentage points below the OECD average. To indicate the nature of the depreciation plan in these proposals, their effective tax rates are discussed with reference to a 35% tax rate, although Wyden-Coats proposes a 24% tax rate, the Senate draft proposes lower rates but does not provide a specific number, and the Camp proposal would lower the rate to 25%. Bonus Depreciation and Revenues Some have suggested that the traditional extenders have been repeatedly enacted on a temporary basis because the revenue cost is much smaller for a single year's extension compared with a permanent extension with the 10-year budget horizon. Thus, these estimates indicate that a one year extension costs $5 billion for FY2014-FY2024, less than 2% of the cost of $263 billion for a permanent provision. The effective tax rate for an investment financed wholly by equity at the firm level is ( r – R ) / r . When including individual level taxes and debt finance, the tax rate is measured by determining r as above, where R = f ( i ( 1 – u ) – π) + ( 1 – f ) E , where f is the share of the investment that is debt financed, i is the nominal interest rate, and E is the real rate of return to equity before individual tax but after the corporate tax.

The Expiring Provisions Improvement Reform and Efficiency (EXPIRE) Act (S. 2260) would extend expiring provisions, including bonus depreciation. The Jobs for America Act (H.R. 4) would make bonus depreciation permanent. The temporary provisions enacted in the past for only a year or two and extended many times are generally referred to collectively as the "extenders." One reason advanced for these extenders is that time is needed to evaluate them. Most provisions have been extended multiple times, and some suggest they are actually permanent but are extended a year or two at a time because permanent provisions would significantly increase the costs in the budget horizon. Historically, bonus depreciation has not been a traditional "extender." Bonus depreciation allows half of equipment investment to be deducted immediately rather than depreciated over a period of time. Bonus depreciation was enacted for a specific, short-term purpose: to provide an economic stimulus during the recession. Most stimulus provisions have expired. Bonus depreciation has been in place six years (2008-2013), contrasted with an earlier use of bonus depreciation in place for three years. Is bonus depreciation temporary or permanent? The analysis of bonus depreciation differs for a temporary stimulus provision, compared with a permanent provision that can affect the size and allocation of the capital stock. A temporary investment subsidy was expected to be more effective than a permanent one for short-term stimulus, encouraging firms to invest while the benefit was in place. Its temporary nature is critical to its effectiveness. Yet, research suggests that bonus depreciation was not very effective, and probably less effective than the tax cuts or spending increases that have now lapsed. If bonus depreciation is made permanent, it increases accelerated depreciation for equipment, contributing to lower, and in some cases more negative, effective tax rates. In contrast, prominent tax reform proposals would reduce accelerated depreciation. Making bonus depreciation a permanent provision would significantly increase its budgetary cost. Compared with a statutory corporate tax rate of 35%, bonus depreciation lowers the effective tax rate for equipment from an estimated 26% rate to a 15% rate. Buildings are taxed approximately at the statutory rate. Total tax rates would be slightly higher because of stockholder taxes. Because nominal interest is deducted, however, effective tax rates with debt finance can be negative. For equity assets taxed at an effective rate of 35%, the effective tax rate on debt-financed investment is a negative 5%. The rate on equipment without bonus depreciation is minus 19%; with bonus depreciation it is minus 37%. If bonus depreciation is permanent, estimates of U.S. effective tax rates reflecting concerns that the U.S. rate is higher than that of other countries overstate the effective U.S. corporate tax rate; U.S. effective tax rates on equipment would be significantly lower than the OECD average. Moving to permanent bonus depreciation is inconsistent with tax reform proposals made by the Wyden-Coats bill, the Senate Finance Committee Staff discussion draft, and Chairman Camp's proposal. All of these proposals would reduce the current accelerated depreciation for equipment. The usual extenders cost a fraction of the cost of permanent provisions in a 10-year budget window, but bonus depreciation is a smaller fraction because it is a timing provision. A one-year extension costs $5 billion for FY2014-FY2024, less than 2% of the cost of $263 billion for a permanent provision.

crs_RL33412

crs_RL33412_0

A continuing resolution ( P.L. 109-383 ) is providing temporary funding for FY2007 through February 15, 2007, at the lower of either the FY2006 level or the House-passed level in H.R. 5384 . The full House passed the FY2007 agriculture appropriations bill on May 23, 2006 ( H.R. 5384 , H.Rept. 109-463 ). The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version on June 22, 2006 ( H.R. 5384 , S.Rept. 109-266 ). The full Senate took up the agriculture appropriations bill on December 5, 2006, to consider a crop disaster amendment; the amendment was defeated by a procedural vote of 56-38. The House-passed bill provides a total of $93.9 billion, $691 million (-0.7%) less than the $94.6 billion Senate-reported bill. The House bill has no disaster provisions. The House bill provides $17.8 billion in "net" discretionary appropriations, about $1 billion above FY2006. Because the bills limit certain mandatory programs, the "gross" discretionary amounts are higher. The House's $18.4 billion "gross" discretionary subtotal is 1.5% less than the Senate's, and 0.7% less than in FY2006. The other 20% of the agriculture and related agencies appropriations bill is for discretionary programs. Action on FY2007 Appropriations The agriculture appropriations bill includes all of USDA (except the Forest Service), plus the Food and Drug Administration and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Appropriations for mandatory programs would be down nearly $7 billion from FY2006, mostly due to how crop subsidies are financed and changing economic conditions for food stamps. In addition, the Senate-reported bill includes $4 billion of emergency agricultural disaster assistance, which does not count against budgetary caps. These accounting distinctions help explain why "gross" discretionary programs recommended by the bill are within 1% of FY2006 levels (declining about $130 million from FY2006 in the House bill, and increasing $140 million in the Senate bill), even though the "net" discretionary amount—which tracks the official 302(b) allocation—is increasing by about $1 billion (+6.1%) in the House bill and $1.4 billion (+8.5%) in the Senate bill ( Table 3 and Table 12 ). The rest are for rural development, and animal and plant health programs. However, both amendments were stripped from the House bill on the floor by points of order for legislating in an appropriations bill. 754) to extend the peanut storage subsidy. In addition, the Senate and House bills reject the Administration's proposal to provide no new funds to continue a five-state extension of the free fresh fruit and vegetable program in schools and, instead, provide more funding for the program. The President's request outlines programs—distributed across most FDA Centers and field units—related to: pandemic preparedness ($30.5 million increase); the House-passed and Senate-reported bills would annualize the FY2006 $20 million supplemental; for new activities, the House would provide another $8.1 million and the Senate would give another $30.5 million; food defense ($19.8 million increase); the House-passed bill would include $4.9 million and the Senate-reported bill recommends $5.5 million; critical path to personalized medicine ($5.9 million increase); the House-passed bill would include a $4.9 million increase; and the Senate-reported bill would include the $5.9 million requested; drug safety ($4 million increase); the House-passed bill would include the requested $4 million plus $1 million relating to anti-counterfeiting technologies; and the Senate-reported bill would include $4 million; and human tissues ($2.5 million increase), also in the House-passed and Senate-reported bills.

The Agriculture and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes all of USDA (except the Forest Service), plus the Food and Drug Administration and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The full House passed the FY2007 agriculture appropriations bill on May 23, 2006 (H.R. 5384, H.Rept. 109-463). On June 22, 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version (H.R. 5384, S.Rept. 109-266). The full Senate took up the bill on December 5, 2006, but only to consider a crop disaster amendment, which was defeated. Because a final bill has not been enacted, a continuing resolution (P.L. 109-383) is providing funds for agriculture-related agencies through February 15, 2007, at the lower of either the FY2006 level or the House-passed level in H.R. 5384. The House-passed bill provides a total of $93.9 billion, $691 million (-0.7%) less than the $94.6 billion Senate-reported bill. In addition, the Senate-reported bill includes $4 billion of emergency agricultural disaster assistance, which does not count against budgetary caps. The House bill has no disaster provisions. The House bill provides $17.8 billion in "net" discretionary appropriations, but because certain mandatory programs are limited, the "gross" discretionary amounts are higher. The House's $18.4 billion "gross" discretionary subtotal is 1.5% less than the Senate's, and 0.7% less than in FY2006. About $76 billion, or about 81%, of both bills is for mandatory programs (e.g., Commodity Credit Corporation, crop insurance, and most food and nutrition programs). Mandatory funding would decline nearly $7 billion from FY2006, due to how crop subsidies are financed and economic conditions for food stamps. The House bill would allow prescription drug importation, and the Senate bill would facilitate travel to Cuba for selling licensed agricultural and medical goods. Both provisions have drawn veto threats from the White House in previous years. Two farm commodity provisions were stripped from the House bill by points of order. The provisions would have extended the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) and a peanut storage subsidy. The latter remains in the Senate-reported bill. The Senate-reported bill reduces rural development programs by 11% from FY2006 (-14% in the House bill). Discretionary conservation programs fall by $3 million in the Senate bill and $75 million in the House bill. Animal and plant health programs rise $94 million (+12%) in the Senate and $115 million in the House. Both bills reject the President's proposal to award more research funds competitively. Both bills reject an Administration proposal to terminate the Commodity Supplemental Food Program. Moreover, the House bill would provide $25 million of discretionary funds to expand a fresh fruit and vegetable program to school in all states, while the Senate bill would add $9 million in discretionary funds to a $9 million mandatory pool. This report will be updated as events warrant.

crs_R43820

crs_R43820_0

Introduction California is experiencing serious water shortages due to widespread and exceptional drought. Even though much of the state is served by two large water infrastructure projects that store water for future use—the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP)—both projects have had to reduce water deliveries to the farmers and communities they serve. The dry hydrological conditions, in combination with regulatory restrictions on water being pumped from the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers Delta confluence with the San Francisco Bay (Bay-Delta) to protect water quality and fish and wildlife, have resulted in water supply cutbacks for CVP and SWP water users throughout their respective service areas, and in historic cutbacks to senior water rights in some areas. The effects are widespread and are being felt by many economic sectors. Several bills have been introduced in the 113 th Congress to address California water supply and drought, and management of the CVP and SWP in particular. This report provides a description and analysis of H.R. 5781 , the California Emergency Drought Relief Act of 2014, which was introduced on December 2, 2014, and includes brief comparisons with H.R. 3964 , which passed the House on February 5, 2014, and S. 2198 , which passed the Senate on May 22, 2014. Some of this analysis draws from a CRS report comparing the two earlier bills: CRS Report R43649, Federal Response to Drought in California: An Analysis of S. 2198 and H.R. It includes a brief summary of key provisions of H.R. 5781 , and compares it to two other bills aiming to address different aspects of water supply and management in California, H.R. 3964 , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. 5781 was introduced on December 2, 2014, and passed the House on December 9, 2014. Protection of Third Party Water Rights. This title states that there shall be no effect on the Bureau of Reclamation's obligation to operate the CVP in conformance with state law and provides a sunset provision for the act (September 30, 2016, or the end of the California drought emergency declaration, whichever is later). Title I. California Emergency Drought Relief Section 101.

California is experiencing serious water shortages due to widespread drought. Both of the state's large water infrastructure projects, the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP), have had to reduce water deliveries in 2014 to the farmers and communities they serve. Dry hydrological conditions, in combination with regulatory restrictions on water being pumped from the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers Delta confluence with the San Francisco Bay (Bay-Delta) to protect water quality and fish and wildlife, have resulted in water supply cutbacks for CVP and SWP water users throughout their respective service areas and historic cutbacks to senior water rights in some areas. The effects are widespread and are being felt by many economic sectors, including agriculture, urban areas, and fish and wildlife resources. Several bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress to address California water supply and drought in particular. The most recent of these was H.R. 5781, the California Emergency Drought Relief Act of 2014, introduced on December 2, 2014. It contains three titles that aim to increase water supplies for users through approving modifications in water conveyance operations and certain water projects. Under the bill, these actions are to be consistent with existing laws and regulations. It also would aim to protect water rights and existing water allocations for users under certain circumstances, and would aim to prohibit any "redirected adverse water supply or fiscal impacts." The proposed legislation would expire on either September 30, 2016, or on the date that the governor of California suspends the state of drought emergency declaration, whichever is later. This report provides a description and analysis of H.R. 5781, the California Emergency Drought Relief Act of 2014, which passed the House December 9, 2014. It includes a summary of key provisions of the bill, and compares it with two other bills from the 113th Congress aiming to address different aspects of drought and water management in California: H.R. 3964, which passed the House on February 5, 2014; and S. 2198, which passed the Senate on May 22, 2014. Some of this analysis draws from a CRS report comparing the two earlier bills: CRS Report R43649, Federal Response to Drought in California: An Analysis of S. 2198 and H.R. 3964, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].

crs_R43814

crs_R43814_0

Introduction Congress created federal inspectors general (IGs) to combat waste, fraud, and abuse within designated federal departments and agencies. Congress may have an interest in ensuring that federal OIGs have the appropriate authorities and access they need to perform their investigations, audits, and evaluations. Concurrently, Congress has a responsibility to protect from improper release some records and information, such as information related to national security or to ongoing criminal investigations. This report provides background on the statutory creation of federal OIGs and provides historical context for contemporary debates about the strengths and limitations of the offices. As a result, statutory IGs are not identical. A few IGs, however, have express authority to audit and investigate more than one agency, organization, program, or activity. 110-323 ); Government Printing Office ( P.L. 100-504 ); Library of Congress ( P.L. Purposes Pursuant to Section 2 of the IG Act, the three principal purposes of inspectors general who are governed by the IG Act are conducting and supervising audits and investigations related to agency programs and operations; providing leadership and coordination as well as recommending policies for activities designed to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the affiliated agencies' programs and operations; providing for the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in such programs and operations; and keeping the agency head and Congress "fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to" such programs and the necessity for and "progress of corrective action." Congress, however, has mandated in legislation that OIGs conduct certain reviews. In recent Congresses, these legislative and oversight authorities have been used in a variety of ways, including through introduction or passage of bills, through formal letters to and from overseers, and through oversight hearings. Selected Legislation in Recent Congresses Congress has perennially attempted to address IG oversight through legislation in a number of ways, including expanding an existing IG's oversight to additional federal entities; creating a new IG for an agency that appears to be without such an oversight mechanism; amending the appointment structure of an existing IG; requiring additional reporting measures by one or several IGs; and various other administrative initiatives like ensuring competitive pay rates for IGs. 314 in the 113 th Congress and H.R. For example, H.R. For example, in December 2015, Congress created a new agency-head-appointed IG to oversee the operations of the Committee for Purchase from People Who Are Blind and Severely Disabled, also known as the AbilityOne Program. H.R. On September 9, 2015, H.R. 3770 , 113 th Congress). Oversight of IG Recommendations A December 10, 2015, hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs examined IGs' required processes for audit and follow-up on their audit recommendations. On June 29, 2016, Senator Heidi Heitkamp introduced the Inspector General Recommendation Transparency Act ( S. 3109 ), which, among other requirements, would require federal IGs to post online a list of the recommendations that the IG has made to the agency "that [have] not been adopted or implemented" by the agency affiliated with the IG. The list of open recommendations would be required to be updated at least every six months. Appendix.

Federal inspectors general (IGs) are authorized to combat waste, fraud, and abuse within their affiliated federal entities. To execute their missions, offices of inspector general (OIGs) conduct and publish audits and investigations—among other duties. Two major enactments—the Inspector General Act of 1978 and its amendments of 1988 (codified at 5 U.S.C. Appendix)—established federal IGs as permanent, nonpartisan, and independent offices in more than 70 federal agencies. OIGs serve to assist Congress in overseeing executive branch—and a few legislative branch—agencies. They provide recommendations and findings to their affiliated agency head and to Congress that may save the government millions of dollars per year. As a result, Congress may have an interest in ensuring that federal OIGs have the appropriate authorities and access to information they need to perform their investigations, audits, and evaluations. Concurrently, Congress has a responsibility to protect some records and information, such as national security information or information about an ongoing criminal investigation, from improper release. This report provides background on the statutory creation of federal OIGs and provides historical context for contemporary debates about the strengths and limitations of the offices. Congress has a number of tools at its disposal to enhance OIG oversight, including through the introduction or passage of legislation, through formal letters to and from overseers, and through oversight hearings. Recent legislative initiatives have sought to enhance OIG oversight by creating new IGs (P.L. 114-113, 114th Congress; H.R. 302 and H.R. 3770, 113th Congress), expanding the authority of existing ones (P.L. 113-6, H.R. 314, 113th Congress), amending IGs' appointment structures (P.L. 113-126 §§401, 413), or increasing IGs' reporting requirements to Congress (H.R. 1211, 113th Congress; H.R. 658, 112th Congress). In December 2015, Congress established a new agency-head-appointed IG to assist oversight of the Committee for Purchase from People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled, an organization also referred to as AbilityOne. Some Members of Congress have recently focused on how IGs might leverage technology to assist congressional staff in their oversight of Congress. In December 2015, for example, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs examined IGs' required processes for audit and follow-up on their audit recommendations to their affiliated agencies. Some committee members suggested that the IG community establish a single, centralized database in which all open IG recommendations are collected. Officials from the IG community welcomed the idea, but expressed concerns about the costs and administration of such a database. On June 30, 2016, Senator Heidi Heitkamp introduced legislation that she said "would fill a gap ... I saw in federal management" as a result of the hearing. The bill, S. 3109, would require federal IGs to publish online all recommendations that remain open after one year. The online list would be required to be updated at least every six months. Strengthening government oversight through IGs and ensuring proper access to agency records, among other issues, will likely continue to be of interest to Congress in the future.

crs_R44067

crs_R44067_0

Designating War Funding to Meet Spending Caps In the current debate on the level of FY2016 defense spending, Congress is considering how to stay within the spending limits, or caps, set by the Budget Control Act (BCA) as amended ( P.L. 113-67 ). Under the BCA, all defense spending for the defense base budget—excluding amounts designated for "Overseas Contingency Operations" (OCO) or emergencies—is subject to annual BCA caps for FY2012-FY2021. If enacted appropriations exceed these limits, the President is required to levy a sequester or across-the-board spending reductions to achieve the savings and meet the limits. For funds to be considered OCO funding and essentially exempt from BCA caps, Congress must first designate funds on an account-by-account basis in an appropriations bill and the President must subsequently do the same, typically in a letter to Congress after enactment. The OCO designation therefore requires a consensus between the legislative and executive branches on the status of the funds. The President, some Members of Congress, and military leaders have voiced concerns that the FY2016 BCA defense spending caps—set at $2 billion above FY2015 spending caps in FY2016 and increasing by about $11 billion annually through FY2021—are insufficient to meet defense needs. Congressional Action The President's FY2016 national defense request of $561 billion for the base budget exceeds the BCA cap by $38 billion, providing defense with a 6.8% annual increase. To meet the BCA cap, Congress would need to cut the base budget defense request by 6.8% in FY2016. As part of this year's debate about defense spending, the FY2016 annual budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. 11 ) and the National Defense Authorization Act as passed by the House and Senate propose to transfer and designate funds totaling $38 billion from the defense base budget spending to Title IX where OCO funding is specified. Similarly, the FY2016 House-passed Defense Appropriations bill ( H.R. Potential Implications If the President does not designate the transferred funds as OCO, those funds would count as part of the base budget, which would breach BCA spending levels and trigger a sequester. On the other hand, if a CR included defense spending levels that exceeded BCA caps and non-defense funding levels were set at BCA caps level—positions opposed by the Administration—then the President might not sign the CR. Designating Base Budget Funds as OCO DOD and other Administration officials have argued that designating base budget funds as OCO and transferring them to the OCO title could complicate defense budgeting by setting up a one-year spike in funding that might not be "sustainable" (i.e., not followed by higher levels in later years). The President, some policymakers, and Members of Congress have called for raising BCA caps for both defense and non-defense, as was done in the Ryan-Murray compromise in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 ( P.L. Finding offsets, either in mandatory programs or by raising taxes to offset increases above BCA caps, could be problematic. At the same time, U.S. deployed troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan, the main factor in setting OCO funding levels, are slated to fall 15,700 in FY2015 to 10,000 in FY2016, and to an "embassy presence" of about 1,000 by January 1, 2017.

In the FY2016 debate on the level of defense spending, Congress is considering how to stay within the spending limits, or caps, set by the Budget Control Act (BCA). Under the BCA, all defense spending for the defense base budget—excluding amounts designated for "Overseas Contingency Operations" (OCO) or emergencies—is subject to annual BCA caps. For funds to be counted as OCO funding that is essentially exempt from BCA caps, Congress must first designate funds in law on an account-by-account basis, and the President must subsequently do the same. The OCO designation therefore requires a consensus between the legislative and executive branches on the designation and is independent of any particular criteria about the types of expenses that would be covered. The President, some Members of Congress, and military leaders have voiced concerns that the FY2016-FY2021 BCA defense spending caps—set at $2 billion above FY2015 spending caps in FY2016 and increasing by $11 billion annually after that—are insufficient to meet defense needs. Others have suggested that Department of Defense (DOD) planning has largely accommodated BCA caps. The President's budget request plan exceeds BCA caps by $182 billion, or 5%, for FY2016-FY2021 rather than the trillion dollars in savings originally needed. BCA caps are slated to rise from $523 billion in FY2016 to $590 billion in FY2021, setting defense spending at a real freeze (i.e., the same level adjusted for inflation) in later years. The President's national defense request of $561 billion for the base budget, including $534 billion for the DOD, exceeds the FY2016 BCA cap by $38 billion. To meet the cap, Congress would need to cut DOD's base budget request for defense spending by 6.8% in FY2016. The FY2016 annual budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 11), the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) as passed by the House (H.R. 1735) and by the Senate, and the appropriations bills funding DOD (H.R. 2685 as reported by the House and H.R. 2029 as passed by the House) all propose to transfer about $38.5 billion from the defense base budget to OCO-designated funding. If the President also designates these as OCO, they would not breach BCA caps and would not require offsets as in previous BCA amendments. If signed by the President, these bills would increase defense spending but stay within BCA caps. This would bring OCO-designated spending to $89 billion, 75% above the request at a time U.S. troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan are projected to fall from 15,700 in FY2015 to below 10,000 in FY2016 and to 1,000 in FY2017. In response to congressional action, the Administration has threatened a veto, characterizing the transfer as "budget gimmickry," and calling instead for raising BCA caps for both defense and non-defense spending, with alternate savings from raising revenues and reducing mandatory spending. DOD officials have also opposed the transfer, arguing that it would complicate defense budgeting by setting up a one-year spike in funding that might not necessarily be sustained. If the President does not designate the transfers as OCO, they would revert to base-budget status, BCA caps would be breached, and OMB would implement a sequester to ensure that BCA spending limits are met. This would entail largely across-the-board cuts in total defense resources. Some policymakers have called for increasing BCA caps, as was done by the Ryan-Murray compromise in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-67). If no agreement is reached, a continuing resolution (CR) and government shutdown could be possible.

crs_RL32541

crs_RL32541_0

Exploited Weaknesses in Aviation Security The National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11Commission) found that al Qaeda terrorists exploited weaknesses in the aviation security system tocarry out the attacks of September 11, 2001. 2490). Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission The 9/11 Commission also recognized many of these vulnerabilities. The 9/11 Commissionconcluded that "[m]ajor vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general aviation security. (5) These are: 1) enhancingpassenger pre-screening; 2) improving measures to detect explosives on passengers; 3) addressinghuman factors issues at screening checkpoints; 4) expediting deployment of in-line baggagescreening systems; 5) intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo;and 6) deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition to these sixaviation-specific recommendations, the 9/11 Commission also issued an overarchingrecommendation for transportation security policy to set priorities based on risk and implement themost practical and cost effective deterrents assigning appropriate roles and missions to federal, state,and local authorities, as well as private stakeholders. The 9/11 Commission recommended that improved passenger pre-screeningcapabilities should not be delayed while the argument about a successor to CAPPS continues. 108-90 ; 117 Stat. Strategic Plan for Aviation Security. The 108th Congress passed two major pieces of legislation containing numerous provisionspertaining to aviation security: Vision 100 -- Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act ( P.L.108-176 ), which was enacted prior to the 9/11 Commission's final report, and the NationalIntelligence Reform Act ( P.L. 108-458 ; 118 Stat. 108-176 )which was enacted on December 12, 2003. The act authorizes the TSA to take necessary action to expedite the installation and use ofin-line baggage screening equipment at airports.

The 9/11 Commission found that al Qaeda operatives exploited known weaknesses in U.S.aviation security to carry out the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While legislation andadministration actions after September 11, 2001 were implemented to strengthen aviation security,the 9/11 Commission concluded that several weaknesses continue to exist. These include perceivedvulnerabilities in cargo and general aviation security as well as inadequate screening and accesscontrols at airports. The 9/11 Commission issued several recommendations designed to strengthen aviationsecurity by: enhancing passenger pre-screening; improving measures to detect explosives onpassengers; addressing human factors issues at screening checkpoints; expediting deployment ofin-line baggage screening systems; intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentiallydangerous cargo; and deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition to thesespecific recommendations, an overarching recommendation for transportation security policy assertsthat priorities should be set based on risk, and the most practical and cost effective deterrents shouldbe implemented assigning appropriate roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities, aswell as private stakeholders. In response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, the National Intelligence ReformAct of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ; 118 Stat. 3638) was enacted on December 17, 2004. The act containsnumerous aviation security provisions, many of which address 9/11 Commission recommendationsrelated to aviation safety. These provisions build upon prior aviation security-related provisions,contained in Vision 100 - the Century of Aviation Reathorization Act ( P.L. 108-176 ; 117 Stat. 2490)that was enacted a year earlier on December 12, 2003, addressing many of the concerns expressedby the 9/11 Commission. This report will not be updated.

crs_R45303

crs_R45303_0

Context An officially secular nation, India has a long tradition of religious tolerance (with periodic and sometimes serious lapses), which is protected under its constitution. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, leader of the BJP, took office after serving as chief minister of the western Gujarat state for nearly 13 years. For some observers, Prime Minister Modi's 2016 U.S. visit—and address to a Joint Session of Congress—completed the "political rehabilitation" of a foreign leader who was at one time viewed by many in the United States as a pariah: In 2005, Modi had been denied a U.S. visa over concerns about his role in government during lethal anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat in 2002. In early 2017, the BJP won a sweeping state-level victory in north-central Uttar Pradesh (UP), India's most populous state with more than 200 million residents, one-fifth of them Muslim. Human Rights in India India continues to be the site of numerous reported human rights violations, some of them seen to be undertaken or facilitated by state actors. Foreign funding regulations were used to target nongovernmental organizations critical of government actions or policies. Religious Freedom Issues Reported abuses of religious freedom in India attract international attention, in particular when the Modi government and its allies are assumed to be moving forward with emotive, Hindu nationalist initiatives promised in the BJP manifesto and eagerly sought by Hindu groups. Perceived abuses have produced friction in the U.S.-India relationship, including within the U.S. Congress. Muslim and Christian Demographics As noted above, independent India's tradition of religious tolerance has seen occasional and sometimes catastrophic fatal lapses. The population of approximately 1.3 billion includes a Hindu majority of about 80%, as well as a large Muslim minority of some 185 million (about 14%; India's Muslim community is the world's third-largest, after Indonesia's and Pakistan's). Kerala's coastal Ernakulam district is itself home to more than 1.2 million Christians—more than one-third of the population. The BJP was born as the political wing of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS or "National Volunteer Organization"), a hardline Hindu nationalist and social service group, and leading component of the "Sangh." The BJP (along with its 1951-1977 antecedent, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh) has been a primary political purveyor of Hindutva in Indian society. Many of these are found in the BJP's 2014 election manifesto. Leading Hindutva and widely-held RSS aspirations include scaling back laws and government programs designed to benefit the religious minorities, Muslims in particular; establishing a Uniform Civil Code (to replace current personal law based on religious customs and thus standardizing all national laws regarding such topics as marriage, divorce, and inheritance); repealing Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which grants limited autonomy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir (a step that would, if implemented, allow citizens from other states to buy property in Jammu and Kashmir, see " The Kashmir Dispute ," below); redrafting public school textbooks to remove what are alleged to be insults to Hindu gods and excessive praise of the subcontinent's past Muslim rulers; constructing a Ram temple on the Ayodhya site of the Babri Mosque that was razed in 1992; and preventing cow slaughter through legislation (cows are revered animals in Hinduism). Cow protection through vigilante action largely is a new phenomenon in India. In 2016, researchers from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom were denied visas for a long-planned visit to India, a development that left the U.S. government "disappointed." Freedom of Expression and Social Media The Indian Constitution provides for freedom of speech and expression, but does not explicitly mention freedom of the press. Jammu and Kashmir is India's only state with a Muslim majority.

India is the world's second-most populous country with more than 1.3 billion people and is the birthplace of four major world religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, and Jainism. It is also home to about 180 million Muslims—only Indonesia and Pakistan have more. A small Christian minority includes about 30 million people. An officially secular nation with thousands of ethnic groups and 22 official languages, independent India has a long tradition of religious tolerance (with periodic and sometimes serious lapses). Religious freedom is explicitly protected under its constitution. Hindus account for a vast majority (nearly four-fifths) of the country's populace. Hindu nationalism has been a rising political force in recent decades, by many accounts eroding India's secular nature and leading to new assaults on the country's religious freedoms. The 2014 national election victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian Peoples' Party or BJP) brought newly acute attention to the issue of religious freedom in India. Tracing its origins to a political party created in 1951 in collaboration with the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Organization or RSS), the BJP has since gone on to win control of numerous state governments, including in Uttar Pradesh, the country's most populous state with more than 200 million residents, one-fifth of them Muslim. The BJP's leader, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is a self-avowed Hindu nationalist and lifelong RSS member with a controversial past: In 2002, during his 13-year tenure as chief minister of the Gujarat state, large-scale anti-Muslim rioting there left more than 1,000 people dead, and Modi faced accusations of complicity and/or inaction (he was later formally exculpated). In 2005, Modi was denied a U.S. visa under a rarely-used law barring entry for foreign government officials found to be complicit in severe violations of religious freedom, and he had no official contacts with the U.S. government until 2013. Many in the U.S. Congress were critical of Modi's role in the 2002 violence, and some continue to call attention to signs that religious freedom abuses are increasing under his and his party's rule, as documented by the U.S. State Department and independent human rights groups. This report provides an overview of religious freedom issues in India, beginning with a brief review of U.S.-India relations and India's human rights setting broadly, then discussing the country's religious demographics, religious freedom protections, and conceptions of Hindu nationalism and its key institutional proponents in Indian society. It then moves to specific areas of religiously-motivated repression and violence, including state-level anti-conversion laws, cow protection vigilantism, and perceived assaults on freedoms of expression and operations by nongovernmental organizations that are seen as harmful to India's secular traditions and the U.S-promoted goal of interfaith tolerance.

crs_R45069

crs_R45069_0

Background Drug compounding is a process by which a pharmacist or physician combines, mixes, or alters various drug ingredients to create a drug to meet the unique needs of an individual patient. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) authorizes FDA to regulate the manufacturing and sale of drugs in the United States, including compounded drugs. Generally, a new drug may not be sold unless the FDA, through its drug approval process, has determined that the drug is safe and effective for its intended use. Although compounded drugs are considered new drugs, it would not be practicable for pharmacies to obtain approval for each drug compounded for an individual patient. 105-115 ). Among other things, FDAMA added new FFDCA Section 503A, "Pharmacy Compounding," designed to clarify FDA's authority to regulate compounded drugs. Following the NECC event and numerous other reports of problems resulting from compounded drugs, Congress passed the Compounding Quality Act (CQA) as Title I of the Drug Quality and Security Act (DQSA; P.L. 113-54 ). The CQA also added a new FFDCA Section 503B and created a new category of drug compounders called outsourcing facilities , a term that describes entities that compound sterile drugs in circumstances that go beyond what 503A compounding pharmacies are allowed to do (e.g., compounding drugs in large volumes without obtaining patient-specific prescriptions). The agency has communicated with stakeholders and state regulators via annual listening sessions, notice-and-comment guidance development, intergovernmental meetings, and information posted to FDA's website, among other things. Some states have found FDA communication to be helpful, while others have reported several communication challenges. In addition, legislation has been introduced that would amend certain compounding provisions in the FFDCA. Outsourcing Facility Compounding In response to the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak and a series of adverse event reports and quality problems linked to compounding facilities, Congress held a series of hearings, which led to the enactment of the CQA in November 2013. A drug may be compounded by or under the direct supervision of a licensed pharmacist in a registered outsourcing facility if it is not compounded using bulk drug substances unless they comply with specified limitations; it is compounded using ingredients (other than bulk drug substances) that comply with the applicable USP or NF monograph, or any other compendium or pharmacopeia recognized by the Secretary; it does not appear on the Secretary's list, established by regulation, of drugs that have been withdrawn or removed from the market because they have been found to be unsafe or not effective; it is not "essentially a copy of one or more approved drugs"; it does not appear on the Secretary's list, established by regulation, of "drugs or categories of drugs that present demonstrable difficulties for compounding that are reasonably likely to lead to an adverse effect on the safety or effectiveness of the drug or category of drugs, taking into account the risks and benefits to patients" unless compounding is done "in accordance with all applicable conditions identified on the list ... as conditions that are necessary to prevent" such difficulties; the drug is subject to a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), the outsourcing facility must demonstrate a plan to use "controls comparable to the controls applicable" under the REMS; it will not be sold or transferred by any entity other than the outsourcing facility that compounded it; it is compounded in an outsourcing facility that had paid fees pursuant to FFDCA Section 744K; the drug label bears the statement "this is a compounded drug" or a comparable statement; the name, address, and phone number of the outsourcing facility; and the following specified information with respect to the drug: the lot or batch number; the established name of the drug; dosage form and strength; statement of quantity or volume; date that the drug was compounded; expiration date; storage and handling instructions; National Drug Code (NDC) number, if available; the statement "not for resale," and if the drug is dispensed or distributed other than pursuant to a prescription for an individual identified patient, the statement "Office-use Only," as well as a list of active and inactive ingredients by established name and quantity or proportion of each ingredient; and the container "from which individual units of the drug are removed for dispensing or administration" includes a list of active and inactive ingredients (if there is not space on the label), adverse event reporting information, and directions for use (e.g., dosage and administration). The agency also has issued a draft MOU addressing the interstate distribution of certain compounded drug products. Additionally, since enactment of the CQA, FDA has conducted over 400 inspections of drug compounders, issued more than 150 warning letters advising compounders of violations of federal law, and overseen more than 125 recall events. Policy Considerations In working to address the issues raised by stakeholders and maintain public health protections, policymakers may consider issues such as patient access to compounded drugs, drug quality, and necessity of compounding. For these patients, preserving timely access to compounded medications is important, a concern raised by those who support compounding for office-use. Drug quality is also a consideration, particularly in the context of patient safety. For these reasons, among others, FDA maintains that compounded drugs pose a higher risk than FDA-approved drugs. A related policy consideration is necessity. However, FDA and outsourcing facility groups have generally disagreed that 503A pharmacies need to compound for office-use. If a hospital, clinic, or health care practitioner wants to keep compounded drugs in stock for office-use, they can generally obtain non-patient-specific compounded drugs from outsourcing facilities that are registered under Section 503B.

Drug compounding is a process by which a pharmacist or physician combines, mixes, or alters various drug ingredients to create a drug to meet the unique needs of an individual patient for whom an approved drug may not be appropriate (e.g., due to an allergy to a dye in the product). The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) authorizes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate the manufacturing and sale of drugs in the United States, including compounded drugs. Generally, a drug may not be sold unless the FDA, through its drug approval process, has determined that the drug is safe and effective for its intended use. Although compounded drugs are considered new drugs, it would not be practicable for pharmacies to obtain FDA approval for each drug compounded for an individual patient. Thus, compounded drugs are not evaluated by FDA prior to marketing for safety, effectiveness, or quality. In 1997, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA, P.L. 105-115), which attempted to clarify FDA's authority to regulate compounded drugs. The act set forth, in a new FFDCA Section 503A, the conditions that must be met for a compounded drug to be exempt from certain statutory requirements related to new drug approval. Following the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak and a series of adverse event reports and quality problems linked to compounding facilities, Congress passed the Drug Quality and Security Act (DQSA, P.L. 113-54). Title I of the DQSA, the Compounding Quality Act (CQA), created a new category of drug compounders called outsourcing facilities, a term that describes entities that compound drugs in circumstances that go beyond what 503A compounding pharmacies are allowed to do (i.e., compounding drugs in bulk for use in hospitals and other facilities, referred to as "office-use"). Since the enactment of the CQA, FDA has issued various guidance documents to facilitate implementation of the law and a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) addressing the interstate distribution of certain compounded drug products. FDA has also increased its enforcement efforts with respect to compounding, conducting over 400 inspections of drug compounders, issuing over 150 warning letters, and overseeing 120 recalls involving compounded drugs. Additionally, FDA has communicated with stakeholders and state regulators via listening sessions, meetings, and information posted on the FDA website. Some stakeholders have found FDA guidance and communication to be helpful; others have reported communication challenges and disagreement with the agency's interpretation of the statutory provisions. These reported challenges have resulted in certain actions by some in Congress, including letters to FDA, report directives, and the introduction of legislation that would amend certain compounding provisions in the FFDCA. In working to address the issues raised by stakeholders and maintain public health protections, policymakers may consider issues such as patient access, drug quality, and the necessity of compounded drugs. For patients with a legitimate medical need, preserving timely access to compounded medications has been identified as a concern by supporters of office-use compounding. However, in the context of patient safety, drug quality is also a consideration. Compounded drugs are not evaluated by FDA prior to marketing, and pharmacies that compound pursuant to FFDCA Section 503A are not required to register with FDA or report adverse events to the agency. For these reasons, among others, FDA maintains that compounded drugs pose a higher risk than FDA-approved drugs. A third consideration is necessity, specifically whether pharmacies need to compound for office-use. If a hospital, clinic, or health care practitioner wants to keep compounded drugs in stock for office-use, these entities can generally obtain non-patient-specific compounded products from outsourcing facilities that are registered with FDA and subject to more stringent regulatory requirements.

crs_R41892

crs_R41892_0

Federal Transfer In order to identify properties that agencies no longer need, each agency is required to conduct an annual survey of its real property holdings. Generally, sponsoring agencies have expertise in the policy areas they sponsor. In FY2009, the government held more than 10,000 excess buildings with total operating costs of $134 million. Disposal Costs Unneeded buildings are often among the older properties in an agency's portfolio. The Department of the Interior has said that it can be stymied by the competing concerns of local and state governments, historic preservation offices, and other political factors, when attempting to dispose of some of its unneeded real property. Availability and Quality of Real Property Data The Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) is the government's most comprehensive source of information about real property under the control of executive branch agencies. The FRPP contains, for example, the number of excess properties held by each agency and the annual operating costs of those properties—issues about which Congress has expressed ongoing interest—but the summary report only provides the number and annual operating costs of disposed assets, thereby providing the "good news" of future costs avoided through disposition while omitting the "bad news" of the ongoing operating costs associated with unneeded properties the government maintained. 1205: Federal Real Property Disposal Enhancement Act H.R. 1205 includes several major provisions that would increase the real property data available to Congress, beyond those already discussed. 665: Excess Federal Building and Property Disposal Act41 H.R. 1734: Civilian Property Realignment Act H.R. Table 1 , below, outlines how each proposal would address the four obstacles to expediting real property disposition discussed in this report: budgetary disincentives, administrative burden, stakeholder conflict, and lack of access to comprehensive, accurate data. By reinvesting in disposal, agencies could further reduce their inventories of unneeded properties and the costs associated with maintaining them. As a consequence, the usefulness of the database as an oversight tool might be limited by the inaccuracy or incompleteness of the data. 1205 for reinvestment in their real property portfolios. Stakeholder conflict may be reduced by establishing an independent apparatus for making real property disposal decisions, similar to the process by which the Department of Defense disposes of property under the Base Realignment Closure Act.

Federal executive branch agencies hold an extensive real property portfolio that includes 429,000 buildings. These assets have been acquired over a period of decades to help agencies fulfill their diverse missions. Agencies hold buildings with a range of uses, including offices, health clinics, warehouses, and laboratories. As agencies' missions change over time, so, too, do their real property needs, thereby rendering some assets less useful or unneeded altogether. Healthcare provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), for example, has shifted in recent decades from predominately hospital-based inpatient care to a greater reliance on clinics and outpatient care, with a resulting change in space needs. Similarly, the Department of Defense (DOD) reduced its force structure by 36% after the cold war ended, and has engaged in several rounds of base realignments and installation closures. Real property disposition is the process by which federal agencies identify and then transfer, donate, or sell real property they no longer need. Disposition is an important asset management function because the costs of maintaining unneeded properties can be substantial, consuming financial resources that might be applied to pressing real property needs, such as repairing existing facilities, or towards other pressing policy issues, such as reducing the national debt. In FY2009—the most recent data available—the government held 10,327 unneeded buildings and spent $134 million dollars to maintain them. Agencies have said that their disposal efforts are often hampered by legal and budgetary disincentives, and competing stakeholder interests. In addition, Congress is limited in its capacity to conduct oversight of the disposal process because it lacks access to reliable, comprehensive, real property data. The government's inability to efficiently dispose of its unneeded property is a major reason that federal real property management has been identified by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) as a "high-risk" area since 2003. This report begins with an explanation of the real property disposal process, and then discusses some of the factors that have made disposition relatively inefficient and costly. It then examines three bills introduced in the 112th Congress that would address those problems: the Federal Real Property Disposal Enhancement Act (H.R. 1205), the Excess Federal Building and Property Disposal Act (H.R. 665), and the Civilian Property Realignment Act (H.R. 1734). This report concludes with a discussion of policy options for enhancing both the disposal process and congressional oversight of it.

crs_R40887

crs_R40887_0

Introduction National security letters (NSL) are roughly comparable to administrative subpoenas. Five bills, introduced in the 111 th Congress, proposed substantial changes in the law governing NSL authority: H.R. 1800 , the National Security Letters Reform Act of 2009 (Representative Nadler); H.R. 3845 , the USA PATRIOT Amendments Act of 2009 (Representative Conyers); H.R. 3969 , the Counterterrorism Authorities Improvements Act of 2009 (Representative Reyes); S. 1686 , the Judicious Use of Surveillance Tools in Counterterrorism Efforts Act (JUSTICE Act) of 2009 (Senator Feingold)/ H.R. 4005 (Representative Holt); S. 1692 , the USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009 (Senator Leahy); and S. 2336 , the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act of 2009 (Senator Sessions). 111-92 (2009). The House Judiciary Committee reported out an amended version of H.R. 111-382 Pt. 1 (2009). The 111 th Congress adjourned without taking further on any of the proposals. 2006 Amendments Several of the USA PATRIOT Act's intelligence gathering provisions were temporary and originally set to expire after five years. More specifically, the report found that: a "significant number of NSL-related possible violations were not being identified or reported" as required; the only FBI data collection system produced "inaccurate" results; the FBI issued over 700 exigent letters acquiring information in a manner that "circumvented the ECPA NSL statute and violated the Attorney General's Guidelines ... and internal FBI policy;" the FBI's Counterterrorism Division initiated over 300 NSLs in a manner that precluded effective review prior to approval; 60% of the individual files examined showed violations of FBI internal control policies; the FBI did not retain signed copies of the NSLs it issued; the FBI had not provided clear guidance on the application of the Attorney General's least-intrusive-feasible-investigative-technique standard in the case of NSLs; the precise interpretation of toll billing information as it appears in the ECPA NSL statute is unclear; SAC supervision of the attorneys responsible for review of the legal adequacy of proposed NSLs made some of the attorneys reluctant to question the adequacy of the underlying investigation previously approved by the SAC; there was no indication that the FBI's misuse of NSL authority constituted criminal conduct; personnel both at FBI headquarters and in the field considered NSL use indispensable; and information generated by NSLs was fed into a number of FBI systems. In addition to authority to review and set aside NSL nondisclosure requirements, the federal courts also enjoy jurisdiction to review and enforce the underlying NSL requests. Proposed Amendments Sunset and Repeal Three provisions governing foreign intelligence investigations sunset on February 28, 2011. The NSL provisions are not among them. The Nadler bill would have returned all but the National Security Act statute (50 U.S.C. 2709, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. At the first sunset of USA PATRIOT Act provisions, Congress amended each of the NSL statutes in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorization Amendments Act. They state that the issuing agency may prohibit recipients from disclosing the request—to anyone other than their attorney and those necessary to comply with the request, ever. On the other hand, they would have placed no express time limit on the recipient's right to judicial review nor upon the court's jurisdiction over the question; they stated only that the recipient would have a right to judicial review of the order, that the recipient would have needed to notify the agency of any desire for judicial review, and that the agency would have been obligated to petition the court for review within 30 days of receiving a recipient's request. Reports and Audits Some of the NSL statutes provide for periodic reports to various Congressional committees. The same legislation directed the Inspector General of the Department of Justice to audit and report on the use of NSL authority for calendar years 2002 through 2006.

Five federal statutes authorize various intelligence agencies to demand, through National Security Letters (NSLs), certain customer information from communications providers, financial institutions, and consumer credit reporting agencies, under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the National Security Act, and Electronic Communications Privacy Act. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded NSL authority. Later reports of the Department of Justice Inspector General indicated that (1) the FBI considered the expanded authority very useful; (2) after expansion the number of NSLs requests increased dramatically; (3) the number of requests relating to Americans increased substantially; and (4) FBI use of NSL authority had sometimes failed to comply with statutory, Attorney General, or FBI policies. Originally, the NSL statutes authorized nondisclosure requirements prohibiting recipients from disclosing receipt or the content of the NSL to anyone, ever. They now permit judicial review of these secrecy provisions. As understood by the courts, recipients may request the issuing agency to seek and justify to the court the continued binding effect of any secrecy requirement. Several USA PATRIOT Act provisions are scheduled to expire on February 28, 2011. The NSL statutory provisions are not among them. Nevertheless, several bills were introduced in the 111th Congress which would have amended and in some cases repealed NSL authority. The bills included: (1) the National Security Letter Reform Act of 2009 (H.R. 1800), introduced by Representative Nadler; (2) the USA PATRIOT Amendments Act of 2009 (H.R. 3845), introduced by Representative Conyers and reported out by the House Judiciary Committee ( H.Rept. 111-382, Pt.1); (3) the Counterterrorism Authorities Improvements Act of 2009 (H.R. 3969), introduced by Representative Reyes; (4) the Judicious Use of Surveillance Tools in Counterterrorism Efforts Act of 2009 (JUSTICE Act) (S. 1686/H.R. 4005), introduced by Senator Feingold and Representative Holt; and (5) the USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009 (S. 1692), introduced by Senator Leahy and reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee (S.Rept. 111-92). A sixth bill, the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act of 2009 (S. 2336), introduced by Senator Sessions, which would have neither amended nor repealed NSL authority, would have amended the judicial review provisions governing NSL recipient secrecy requirements. In addition to sunset and repeal, the bills raise issues involving amendment of nondisclosure requirements; the promulgation of standards to minimize capturing, using, and holding (long term) NSL generated information, continued periodic IG audits and reports, and limitations on statutory provisions thought by some to permit circumvention of NSL statutory requirements. The 111th Congress adjourned without further action on any of the proposals. This report includes a chart comparing the provisions of the bills and current law. It also reprints the text of the five NSL statutes as they now appear and as they appeared prior to amendment by the USA PATRIOT Act (to which form they would have returned under some of the bills).

crs_R45401

crs_R45401_0

Congressional interest in testing also encompasses a national assessment program, authorized by the National Assessment of Educational Progress Assessment Act (NAEPAA; Title III, Section 303 of P.L. 107-279 , Section 153(a)(6)). At the international level, U.S. students participate in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), and Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). Purposes of Large-Scale Assessments The primary purposes of large-scale assessments are to highlight achievement gaps, track national progress over time, compare student achievement within the United States, and compare U.S. academic performance to the performance of other countries. States that receive Title I-A ESEA funding (currently, all states) are also required to participate in biennial NAEP assessments of reading and mathematics for the 4 th and 8 th grades. The main NAEP program consists of three subprograms: national NAEP, state NAEP, and the Trial Urban District Assessment (TUDA). In 2017, the most recent administration of the main NAEP, 585,000 4 th and 8 th grade students participated. Since it was initially the only NAEP assessment, the LTT NAEP assessment items changed over time throughout the 1970s and 1980s to reflect changes in the nation's curricula. Average reading scores did not change significantly for 4 th grade students, but there was a small, statistically significant improvement for 8 th grade students. In general achievement gaps have significantly narrowed or remained unchanged. International Assessments The United States regularly participates in three international assessments: TIMSS, PIRLS, and PISA. While U.S. students have participated in international assessments since the 1960s, the modern era of international assessments began in the mid-1990s. Increases in achievement for 4 th grade mathematics may be driven by the performance of average or above average groups, however, the increases are not statistically significant. Figure 6 shows the results for 4 th grade reading achievement by achievement level across time. PISA PISA is an international comparative study of 15-year-old students in the content areas of science, reading, and mathematics "literacy." Issues of Interpretation in Large-Scale Assessments Results of national and international assessments are difficult to interpret for a number of reasons. Perhaps the most difficult issue in the interpretation of large-scale assessments is processing the large volume of data presented in reports. When large numbers of results are reported in national and international assessments, it can be challenging to compile assessment results across assessments to determine how well U.S. students are achieving over time and relative to other countries. Statistical significance cannot determine the magnitude of the difference and whether or not it is of educational significance. A narrow focus on one assessment at one point in time, however, may not provide appropriate context for interpreting the results. Another issue to consider is the trend over time. Comparing Results Across Assessments Since U.S. students participate in national assessments and several international assessments, there is a natural inclination to want to compare results from one assessment to another, especially when results are released within a short timeframe. The specific content measured by statewide assessments, however, is aligned with the state's content standards. There are also some additional considerations, including the different target populations, participating education systems, differences in voluntary student participation, and the precision of measurement. As previously discussed, students already participate in myriad assessments at the state and local levels, including state assessments in reading, mathematics, and science required under ESEA Title I-A. Additional Resources on National and International Assessments For more information on NAEP: https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/ For more information on TIMSS: https://nces.ed.gov/timss/https://iea.nl/timss/ For more information on PIRLS: https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pirls/https://iea.nl/pirls/ For more information on PISA: https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/http://www.oecd.org/pisa/ For more information on the coordination of NAEP and international assessments: https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/international.aspx Other CRS reports on assessment in elementary and secondary education: CRS In Focus IF11021, National and International Educational Assessments CRS Report R45048, Basic Concepts and Technical Considerations in Educational Assessment: A Primer CRS Report R45049, Educational Assessment and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act Appendix C. Glossary of Acronyms CCSS: Common Core State Standards ED: U.S. Department of Education EL: English learner ESEA: Elementary and Secondary Education Act ESRA: Education Sciences Reform Act ( P.L. 107-279 , Title I) ESSA: Every Student Succeeds Act ( P.L. 114-95 ) FIMS: First International Math Study GDP: Gross domestic product IEA: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement LTT NAEP: Long-term trends National Assessment of Educational Progress NAEP: National Assessment of Educational Progress NAEPAA: National Assessment of Educational Progress Assessment Act ( P.L.

U.S. students participate in many assessments to track their educational achievement. Perhaps the most widely discussed of these are statewide assessments required by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which was most recently comprehensively amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95). However, U.S. students also participate in large-scale national assessments, authorized by the National Assessment of Educational Progress Assessment Act (NAEPAA; Title III, Section 303 of P.L. 107-279), and international assessments, authorized by the Education Sciences Reform Act (ESRA; Title I, Section 153(a)(6) of P.L. 107-279). At the national level, students participate in the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). At the international level, U.S. students participate in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), and Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). Although there are some similarities between statewide, national, and international assessments, they differ in purpose and level of reporting. For example, the purpose of statewide assessments is primarily to inform statewide accountability systems and provide information on individual achievement. By contrast, the purpose of large-scale assessments is to highlight achievement gaps, track national progress over time, compare achievement within the United States, and compare U.S. achievement to that of other countries. Results of these assessments are not reported for individuals. National Assessments: The NAEP is a series of assessments measuring achievement in various content areas. The long-term trends NAEP (LTT NAEP) has tracked achievement since the 1970s and has remained relatively unchanged. The main NAEP assessment has tracked achievement since the 1990s and changes periodically to reflect changes in school curricula. The main NAEP has three levels: national, state, and Trial Urban District Assessment (TUDA). States that receive Title I-A funding under the ESEA are required to participate in biennial state NAEP assessments in reading and mathematics for 4th and 8th grade. Results from the 2017 main NAEP show a small but significant increase in 8th grade reading since 2015. There were no significant changes in 4th grade reading, 4th grade mathematics, or 8th grade mathematics since 2015. Longer term, however, average reading and mathematics scores have increased significantly since the initial administrations in the 1990s. International Assessments: The United States participates in three international assessments: TIMSS, PIRLS, and PISA. TIMSS is an assessment of mathematics and science for 8th grade students. PIRLS is an assessment of reading literacy for 4th grade students. PISA is an assessment of reading literacy, mathematics literacy, and science literacy for 15 year old students. In general, U.S. students have made statistically significant gains since the initial administrations of international assessments; however, achievement did not consistently increase in the most recent administrations of international assessments. Issues of Interpretation of National and International Assessments: Results of national and international assessments are difficult to interpret. One challenge is processing the large amount of data. Another is understanding the difference between statistical significance and educational significance. Reporting statistical significance is standard practice in research, but it does not convey the magnitude of a difference and its associated educational significance. Another issue is the tendency to focus narrowly on one assessment at one point in time. A narrow focus may not provide the appropriate context to interpret results accurately. International assessment results may also be affected by socioeconomic considerations within and across countries. Comparing Results Across Assessments: Comparing results across national and international assessments can be challenging. Each assessment was created for a unique purpose by different groups of stakeholders, which makes direct comparisons difficult. There are a number of issues to consider when evaluating U.S. students' performance across assessments. For example, consideration must be given to the differences in (1) the degree of alignment of content standards and assessments, (2) the target population being assessed, (3) the voluntary nature of student participation, (4) the participating education systems, (5) the scale of the assessment, and (6) the precision of measurement for each assessment.

crs_RL31433

crs_RL31433_0

USAID is the U.S. agency primarily responsible for implementing international health programs. Allfigures include Global Fund contributions. (12) Issues and Options for Congress In its deliberations over the FY2003 appropriations for global health in the foreign operationsbill, Congress considered a number of issues, including: the adequacy of the global health budget,global health funding versus other development assistance, HIV/AIDS spending versus other globalhealth programs, and the number of directives in global health programs. $384 million isdirected for maternal and child health activities, the Administration requested $344 million. (19) HIV/AIDS Versus Other Global Health Programs How does funneling a significant portion of the global health budget to HIV/AIDS programs affect the other health programs? It has maintained its support for infectious diseases, and has funded the programs aboverequested levels. At the hearing on the USAIDbudget proposal for FY2003, some Members expressed concern about the impact of increasingspending on HIV/AIDS activities at the expense of other global health programs. Congressfunded this initiative in FY2003.

Global health has become a major focus of the U.S. foreign assistance program. Congressional proponents of more health assistance have successfully increased appropriations aboveAdministration requests in recent years. Some have challenged the Administration's FY2003 budgetproposal during the foreign operations debate, particularly the manner in which the Administrationproposed the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) allocate its funds. Itrequested a $36 million increase in FY2003 for global health programs. It proposed that more than40% of the global health budget be spent on HIV/AIDS activities, up substantially from the previousfiscal year. USAID emphasized that HIV/AIDS affects all sectors of societies, and thus it is apriority in global health. Some in Congress have expressed concern about the consequences ofspending a significant portion of global health funds on HIV/AIDS, and suggested that more moneybe spent on other programs, namely infectious diseases and child survival. As Congress debatedfunding levels for FY2003 global health activities it discussed several issues including: global healthfunding versus other development assistance programs, and increasing funding to HIV/AIDS at theexpense of other global health programs. This report will be updated as needed.

crs_R41070

crs_R41070_0

Background1 The Al Qaeda movement has transformed in recent years: some of the strategic objectives of the original, or core, organization have remained consistent while the views and goals of new affiliates, leaders, and recruits have evolved and become more diverse. In addressing threats to global security interests before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in September 2010, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that "the range of Al Qaeda's core, affiliated, allied, and inspired U.S. citizens and residents plotting against the homeland during the past year suggests the threat against the West has become more complex and underscores the challenges of identifying and countering a more diverse array of homeland plotting." The often-termed jihadi movement has increasingly become an issue of concern for senior members of the U.S. national security community. Though Al Qaeda affiliated entities have attempted numerous deadly terrorist attacks in recent years, some analysts view these operations as evidence of desperation signifying that the core organization and its affiliates are no longer capable of launching a large-scale catastrophic terrorist attack directed at U.S. interests. Notwithstanding the challenges associated with continuing to limit core Al Qaeda's planning and destructive capabilities while also attempting to thwart potential attacks by lesser-known affiliated entities, some in the counterterrorism community suggest that the organization and the philosophical following it has spawned are significantly degraded. The group has lost many of its key operational leaders to arrest or assassination; a number of Al Qaeda franchises—including in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Algeria—have been substantially weakened or defeated; and a host of ideological challenges, including recantations from prominent jihadis themselves, have compelled Al Qaeda to spend valuable time defending its reputation and actions. According to the non-governmental Bipartisan Policy Center four key strategic issues are contributing to the demise of Al Qaeda: indiscriminate killing of Muslims, the lack of a political movement to represent the organization's interests, an ever-growing list of enemies, and the lack of a desirable vision that sustains interest in the group and its ideology (see " Al Qaeda's Global Strategy and Implications for U.S. Policy " below). Some attribute the Bin Laden-Azzam differences to the growing influence on Bin Laden of the Egyptians in his inner circle, such as Abd al Rahman, who wanted to use Al Qaeda's resources to install an Islamic state in Egypt. Cells and associates have been located in over 70 countries, according to U.S. officials. No one was killed. In December 2001, in the course of the post-September 11 major combat effort, U.S. Special Operations Forces and Central Intelligence Agency operatives reportedly narrowed Osama bin Laden's location to the Tora Bora mountains in Nangarhar Province (30 miles west of the Khyber Pass crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan), but the Afghan militia fighters who were the bulk of the fighting force did not prevent his escape. Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden and his deputy, Egyptian Islamist radical Ayman al-Zawahiri, are widely believed to be hiding in northwestern Pakistan, along with most other senior operatives. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan has seen substantive success with the vital assistance of neighboring Pakistan. President Obama has bolstered the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan with a central goal of neutralizing the Al Qaeda threat emanating from the region. Yemen is an attractive base of operations for AQAP. AQAP also may be working with other AQ affiliates. The merger is seen by some observers as a surrender after a string of defeats on the ground. Over the past decade, many Somalis have returned to Somalia to work as journalists, humanitarian workers, and teachers. It is thought that a militant named Saptono took over the Aceh cell after Dulmatin was killed. Al Qaeda's Global Strategy and Implications for U.S. Policy110 Overall, Al Qaeda leaders' statements from the mid-1990s through the present suggest that they see themselves and their followers as the armed vanguard of an international Islamist movement. Saudi security officials believe that once local Al Qaeda affiliates shifted the focus of their attacks away from foreign targets and onto local security forces, Al Qaeda created an opportunity for the government to directly engage and eliminate the group.

Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that perpetrated the September 11, 2001, attacks. At the time, Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a core cadre of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union, with a centralized leadership structure made up mostly of Egyptians. Most of the organization's plots either emanated from the top or were approved by the leadership. Some analysts describe pre-9/11 Al Qaeda as akin to a corporation, with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile chief executive officer issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates. Some would argue that the Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists. Out of necessity, due to pressures from the security community, in the ensuing years it has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence. The core leadership, headed by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, is thought to live in the mountainous tribal belt of northwest Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, where it continues to train operatives, recruit, and disseminate propaganda. But Al Qaeda franchises or affiliated groups active in countries such as Yemen and Somalia now represent critical power centers in the larger movement. Some affiliates receive money, training, and weapons; others look to the core leadership in Pakistan for strategic guidance, theological justification, and a larger narrative of global struggle. Over the past year senior government officials have assessed the trajectory of Al Qaeda to be "less centralized command and control, (with) no clear center of gravity, and likely rising and falling centers of gravity, depending on where the U.S. and the international focus is for that period." While a degraded corporate Al Qaeda may be welcome news to many, a trend has emerged over the past few years that some view as more difficult to detect, if not potentially more lethal. The Al Qaeda network today also comprises semi-autonomous or self radicalized actors, who often have only peripheral or ephemeral ties to either the core cadre in Pakistan or affiliated groups elsewhere. According to U.S. officials Al Qaeda cells and associates are located in over 70 countries. Sometimes these individuals never leave their home country but are radicalized with the assistance of others who have traveled abroad for training and indoctrination through the use of modern technologies. In many ways, the dispersion of Al Qaeda affiliates fits into the larger strategy of Bin Laden and his associates. They have sought to serve as the vanguard of a religious movement that inspires Muslims and other individuals aspiring to join a jihadi movement to help defend and purify Islam through violent means. The name "Qaeda" means "base" or "foundation," upon which its members hope to build a robust, geographically diverse network. Understanding the origins of Al Qaeda, its goals, current activities, and prospective future pursuits is key to developing sound U.S. strategies, policies, and programs. Appreciating the adaptive nature of Al Qaeda as a movement and the ongoing threat it projects onto U.S. global security interests assists in many facets of the national security enterprise, including securing the homeland; congressional legislative process and oversight; alignment of executive branch resources and coordination efforts; and prioritization of foreign assistance. The focus of this report is on the history of Al Qaeda, known (or attributed) actions and suspected capabilities of the organization and non-aligned entities, and an analysis of select regional Al Qaeda affiliates. This report may be updated as events warrant.

crs_R44695

crs_R44695_0

Hiring flexibilities are a suite of tools that are intended to simplify, and often accelerate, the federal hiring process. The subsections below describe six hiring flexibilities that, according to DOD, were used most frequently for external hires to the civilian acquisition workforce between FY2008 and FY2014 (during the acquisition workforce growth initiative): Direct-hire authority (DHA) Expedited hiring authority for civilian defense acquisition workforce positions (EHA) Pathways Recent Graduates program (established in December 2010) Pathways Internship program (established in December 2010) Federal Career Intern Program (eliminated in March 2011) Delegated examining authority Direct-Hire Authority DHA and EHA—a type of DHA—allow agencies to appoint individuals directly to a position or group of positions without regard for certain competitive hiring requirements in Title 5 of the United States Code . Two of six flexibilities were available throughout the six-year period, while one was discontinued and three were established during that period. Table 3 presents data from DOD on average time to hire between FY2008 and FY2014 for five of the six hiring flexibilities described above—the flexibilities that are still currently available. Questions for Congress As Congress continues to consider reforms to the defense acquisition system, the following policy questions regarding hiring flexibilities for the civilian defense acquisition workforce may be of interest: Are flexibilities improving the civilian defense acquisition workforce? Accurate and comprehensive data on the use of flexibilities is an integral first step in determining their effectiveness. What Factors May Impact the Use of Available Flexibilities to Improve the Civilian Acquisition Workforce? Several factors may impact the use of flexibilities for the defense acquisition workforce, and by extension, their effectiveness in improving the workforce. Congressional Oversight Options The oversight options presented in this section may help Congress gauge whether the current number and type of hiring flexibilities are appropriate and are improving the civilian acquisition workforce. Results from the study could help determine whether flexibilities should be expanded or created, consolidated or removed, or otherwise restructured. implement the proxy measures described above for determining flexibilities' recruitment power and quality of acquisition personnel hired under flexibilities; identify the factors that affect the effective use of flexibilities for the workforce, including those previously described; and determine whether personnel hired under flexibilities have improved defense acquisition outcomes, such as delivering acquisition programs with the desired capabilities within the projected costs and timeline. Improved Implementing Guidance for Flexibilities Congress could direct DOD to undertake specific activities, such as the ones listed below, to clarify and align department- and component-level implementing guidance for hiring flexibilities.

Policymakers and defense acquisition experts have asserted that improved recruitment for the defense acquisition workforce is a necessary component for comprehensive acquisition reform. To help rebuild the workforce and enhance recruitment, DOD has used several hiring flexibilities authorized by Congress, the President, and OPM in recent years. Hiring flexibilities are a suite of tools that are intended to simplify, and sometimes accelerate, the hiring process. The impact of hiring flexibilities on recruitment and workforce quality, however, remains unclear. Congress may consider three high-level questions regarding hiring flexibilities for the workforce: Are flexibilities effectively improving the workforce? Are the current number and type of flexibilities appropriate? What factors may impact effective use of flexibilities to improve the workforce? Congress could consider several oversight options to help gauge and improve the effectiveness of flexibilities in improving the civilian defense acquisition workforce. Such options might help Congress determine whether flexibilities should be expanded or newly created, consolidated or removed, or otherwise restructured. Congress could direct DOD to provide data on the use of all available flexibilities to fill the full range of civilian defense acquisition positions, including any barriers to producing such data; establish proxy measures for effectiveness related to employee quality (such as employee timeliness in earning required certifications and retention and career progression rates) and recruitment (such as time to hire from the perspective of the candidate and job acceptance rates); conduct a study that evaluates the effectiveness of flexibilities; and improve the quality, clarity, and use of implementing guidance for flexibilities. At least 38 hiring flexibilities are currently available for the civilian defense acquisition workforce. According to DOD, the following six flexibilities were used most frequently to fill external civilian acquisition positions between FY2008 and FY2014: 1. Direct-hire authority (DHA) 2. Expedited hiring authority (EHA) for certain civilian acquisition positions 3. Pathways Recent Graduates program 4. Pathways Internship program 5. Federal Career Intern Program 6. Delegated examining authority The six flexibilities accounted for roughly 66% of total external civilian acquisition hires between FY2008 and FY2014 (i.e., hires from outside the government). Some of the flexibilities were available throughout the six-year period, while others were discontinued or established during that period. Potential factors affecting the use of flexibilities include their structure, clarity of implementing guidance, establishment of new flexibilities, staff knowledge of appropriate use, budgetary constraints, and efforts to balance hiring speed with equity.

crs_R41390

crs_R41390_0

Introduction Implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is having a substantial impact on federal mandatory spending. Most of the mandatory spending under the law is for expanding health insurance coverage. In addition, the ACA authorized new Medicare spending and appropriated billions of dollars in mandatory funds to support numerous other activities and programs. For example, it provided a permanent appropriation—available for 10-year periods—for a Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation to test and implement innovative health care payment and service delivery models. The two agencies primarily responsible for the ACA's implementation are the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), within the Department of the Treasury. ACA Authorizations of Appropriations The ACA authorized numerous new discretionary grant programs and provided for each an authorization of appropriations, typically through FY2014 or FY2015. The ACA also was a convenient legislative vehicle to reauthorize funding—in most instances through FY2014 or FY2015—for many existing discretionary grant programs, primarily ones authorized under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). They include most, but not all, of the health workforce education and training programs administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). The authorizations of appropriations for many of these established programs had expired prior to the ACA, though most of them were continuing to receive annual funding. Importantly, the ACA permanently reauthorized appropriations for the federal health centers program, the National Health Service Corp (NHSC), and many programs and services provided by the Indian Health Service (IHS). Amendatory provisions either add a new program to the statute or modify an existing one. Annual Appropriation Amounts to Date The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that fully funding the discretionary grant programs authorized (or reauthorized) by the ACA, based on the amounts specified in the authorizations of appropriations, would result in appropriations of almost $100 billion over the period FY2012-FY2021. An examination of the tables in this report, however, shows that the total amount of discretionary funding provided to date falls well below CBO's estimate. The first reason is that few of the new grant programs authorized by the ACA have received any discretionary appropriations, though a handful have received mandatory funds from the ACA's Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF). The second reason is that programs that were reauthorized by the ACA generally have received discretionary appropriations at levels well below the amounts authorized in the law. Both agencies have requested an increase in their annual appropriations in each of the past five years (i.e., FY2013-FY2017) to help cover those costs. But Congress has repeatedly denied their requests for additional discretionary funding for ACA implementation. CMS has instead relied on funding from a variety of sources to support the development and operation of the federally facilitated exchange (FFE).

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) authorized many new discretionary grant programs and provided each one with an authorization of appropriations—typically through FY2014 or FY2015—to carry them out. The ACA also reauthorized funding for numerous existing programs with expired authorizations of appropriations, most of which were still receiving annual funding. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that fully funding the discretionary grant programs authorized (or reauthorized) by the ACA, based on the amounts specified in the authorizations of appropriations, would result in appropriations of almost $100 billion over the period FY2012-FY2021. However, the total amount of discretionary funding provided to date falls well below CBO's estimate for two reasons. First, few of the new grant programs authorized by the ACA have received any discretionary appropriations. Second, programs that were reauthorized by the ACA generally have received discretionary appropriations at levels well below the amounts authorized in the law. The ACA included provisions intended to strengthen the health care safety net and improve access to care. For example, it permanently reauthorized the federal health center program and the National Health Service Corps (NHSC). The NHSC provides scholarships and student loan repayments to individuals who agree to a period of service as a primary care provider in a federally designated Health Professional Shortage Area. In addition, the ACA addressed concerns about the current size, specialty mix, and geographic distribution of the health care workforce. It reauthorized and expanded existing health workforce education and training programs under Titles VII and VIII of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). Title VII supports the education and training of physicians, dentists, physician assistants, and public health workers through grants, scholarships, and loan repayment. The ACA created several new programs to increase training experiences in primary care, in rural areas, and in community-based settings, and provided training opportunities to increase the supply of pediatric subspecialists and geriatricians. It also expanded the nursing workforce development programs authorized under PHSA Title VIII. As part of a comprehensive framework for federal community-based public health activities, including a national strategy and a national education and outreach campaign, the ACA authorized several new grant programs with a focus on preventable or modifiable risk factors for disease (e.g., sedentary lifestyle, tobacco use). The new law also leveraged a number of mechanisms to improve health care quality, including new requirements for quality measure development, collection, analysis, and public reporting; programs to develop and disseminate innovative strategies for improving the quality of health care delivery; and support for care coordination programs such as medical homes and the co-location of primary health care and mental health services. Additionally, the ACA authorized funding for programs to prevent elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation; grants to expand trauma care services and improve regional coordination of emergency services; and demonstration projects to implement alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving medical malpractice claims, among other provisions. The two agencies primarily responsible for implementing the ACA's expansion of insurance coverage and its revenue provisions—the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)—have requested an increase in their annual appropriations in each of the past five years (i.e., FY2013-FY2017) to help cover these costs. But Congress has not provided the agencies with any additional discretionary funding for ACA implementation. CMS, in particular, has relied on funding from a variety of other sources to support these activities.

crs_R43445

crs_R43445_0

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Minimum Wage The FLSA, enacted in 1938 (P.L. 75-718), is the federal legislation that establishes the general minimum wage that must be paid to all covered workers. History and Mechanics of Tip Credit Provisions Congress amended the FLSA in 1966 to add a "tip credit" provision to the minimum wage provisions. That is, the "credit" is the amount from employee tips that an employer may count against its liability for the required payment of the full federal minimum wage. Under the current federal minimum wage and the current required minimum employer cash wage, the maximum tip credit is $5.12 per hour (i.e., $7.25 minus $2.13). Thus, all workers covered under the tip credit provision of the FLSA are guaranteed the federal minimum wage. Prior to 1996, the amounts for the minimum employer cash wage and tip credit were set as a percentage of the minimum wage and ranged from 40% to 55% of the minimum wage. That is, during the 30 year period of 1966-1996, employers of tipped employees could take a credit from tip earnings of between 40% and 55% of the federal minimum wage against their liability to provide the minimum wage to their employees. The 1996 FLSA amendments set the employer's statutory minimum cash wage at $2.13 per hour (rather than a percentage of the minimum wage) and the size of the tip credit became dependent on the value of the minimum wage (i.e., the tip credit after 1996 equals the minimum wage minus $2.13). If the tip credit continues to be set by reference to a fixed dollar amount, rather than as a percentage of the minimum wage rate, the tip credit percentage of the guaranteed minimum wage will continue to increase and the employer cash wage percentage will continue to decrease if and when the federal minimum wage increases. With the minimum wage increase in 2007, the tip credit began to increase to its current level of 71% of the minimum wage. Under the current federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, employers are required to pay a minimum cash wage of $2.13 per hour (29% of the federal minimum wage) and may take up to $5.12 per hour (71% of the federal minimum wage) as a credit against their liability to provide the full minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. Proposed Changes to Tip Credit Provisions Legislation was introduced in the 113 th Congress that would have amended Section 203(m)(1) of the FLSA to alter the payment structure for tipped employees. Specifically, the most common proposed changes included in the bills introduced in the 113 th Congress would have increased the required employer contribution from the current level of $2.13 per hour to 70% of the prevailing federal minimum wage rate. Changing the tip credit provisions to set the required employer minimum cash wage from a fixed dollar amount ($2.13) to a percentage of the minimum wage (70%) has implications for tipped employees, their employers, and the total cost of the increase: Under the proposed changes, the tip credit would remain a constant share, 30%, of the federal minimum wage. Interaction with State Minimum Wage Provisions Because several states have minimum wage rates that are different (mostly higher) than the federal minimum wage and different tip credit provisions, the impact of increasing the federal employer minimum cash wage would vary across states. 39 jurisdictions allow a tip credit: 26 states and the District of Columbia require a minimum employer cash wage greater than the federal rate of $2.13 per hour.

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938 (P.L. 75-718), is the federal legislation that establishes the general minimum wage that must be paid to all covered workers. In 1966, Congress amended the FLSA to add a "tip credit" provision to the minimum wage provisions. These amendments, which apply to "tipped workers," do not change the guaranteed minimum wage of $7.25 per hour but they allow a combination of earnings from employer cash wages and employee tips to equal the federal minimum wage (currently $7.25 per hour). That is, the "credit" is the amount from employee tips that an employer may count against his or her liability for the required payment of the full federal minimum wage. Under the current federal minimum wage and the current required minimum employer cash wage, the maximum tip credit is $5.12 per hour (i.e., $7.25 minus $2.13). Thus, all workers covered under the tip credit provision of the FLSA are guaranteed the federal minimum wage but tipped workers receive some of this income from employers and some from tips. From the introduction of the tip credit provisions in 1966 through 1996, the amounts for the minimum employer cash wage and tip credit were set as a percentage of the minimum wage, ranging from 40% to 60%. That is, during that 40-year period, employers of tipped employees could take a credit from tip earnings of between 40% and 60% of the federal minimum wage against their liability to provide the minimum wage to their employees. The 1996 FLSA amendments changed the tip credit provisions to set the employer's statutory minimum cash wage obligation to a dollar amount ($2.13 per hour), rather than a percentage of the minimum wage. The maximum tip credit thereafter became the difference between $2.13 and the federal minimum wage. If the tip credit continues to be set by reference to a fixed dollar amount, rather than as a percentage of the minimum wage rate, the tip credit percentage of the guaranteed minimum wage will continue to increase and the employer cash wage percentage will continue to decrease if and when the federal minimum wage increases. With the minimum wage increase in 2007, the tip credit increased to its current level of 71%. Thus, under the current federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour employers are required to pay a minimum cash wage of $2.13 per hour (29% of the federal minimum wage) and may take up to $5.12 per hour (71% of the federal minimum wage) as a credit against their liability to provide the full minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. In the 113th Congress, legislation was introduced that would have amended the FLSA to alter the payment structure for tipped employees. Specifically, the most common proposed changes in the different bills would have increased the required employer contribution from the current level of $2.13 per hour to 70% of the prevailing federal minimum wage rate and would thus reduce the tip credit to 30% of the federal minimum wage. Several states have minimum wage rates that are different (mostly higher) than the federal minimum wage and different tip credit provisions. Of the 50 states and Washington DC, seven do not allow a tip credit, while the other 44 have a range of tip credit provisions, most of which require a minimum employer cash wage higher than the federal rate of $2.13 per hour. In cases in which states enact more protective minimum wage laws (i.e., higher minimum wage, lower tip credit), the employee is entitled to the provisions of state law.

crs_R43332

crs_R43332_0

Since 1973, the farm bill has included the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (formerly, Food Stamp Program) and has come to include certain other (new and existing) nutrition programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS). As Congress formulated the Nutrition provisions of the 2014 farm bill, policy makers grappled with the following questions: Should the reauthorization of SNAP continue to be a part of the omnibus farm bill? Should spending reductions be achieved by changes in households' eligibility and benefit amounts? Should the farm bill include provisions to increase the funding and capacity of emergency feeding organizations (e.g., food banks and food pantries)? Finally, the report summarizes the new law and Senate and House proposals related to SNAP (specifically, length of authorization, eligibility rules [including work-related], benefit calculation, retailers, and benefit redemption); Programs in Lieu of SNAP (that some territories and tribes operate); Commodity Distribution Programs (TEFAP, CSFP, and USDA Commodities in School Meals); as well as certain other nutrition-related programs. 113th Congress Legislative Timeline of the Reauthorization of SNAP and Related Programs8 June 10, 2013: Senate Passes Farm Bill (S. 954), Including Nutrition Title On May 14, 2013, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry marked up the Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2013 and reported an original bill, S. 954 , to the Senate. As Table 1 shows, CBO estimated that the 2014 farm bill's Nutrition Title—which contains SNAP and non-SNAP provisions—will result in a net reduction in spending of approximately $8.0 billion over 10 years. The SNAP provisions alone are estimated to reduce spending by slightly more than $8.6 billion over 10 years; certain non-SNAP provisions are estimated to result in spending increases. The law's Nutrition Title cost estimate is largely the result of three SNAP policy decisions: the House's more stringent LIHEAP Standard Utility Allowance language, creating certain work-related pilot projects and related funding, and declining to make changes on SNAP categorical eligibility. In fact, like the farm bills before it, the vast majority of the spending authorized by the 2014 farm bill is for SNAP and related nutrition programs. The House bill would have reauthorized the nutrition programs for three years (FY2014-FY2016), and the Senate's would have reauthorized the programs for five years (FY2014-FY2018). However, states also have the option to adopt so called "broad-based" categorical eligibility. Section 4022 of the Agriculture Act of 2014 ( P.L. This provision was a compromise conference agreement, between (1) no changes to work rules in the Senate-passed bill and (2) House-passed changes that would have required additional monitoring and reporting, a repeal of USDA's authority to grant areas waivers from the ABAWD time limit, and a work-related pilot that would have offered fiscal incentives for states to reduce their SNAP caseloads. In addition to pilot projects, the law also requires all states to set performance goals for their existing SNAP Employment & Training (E&T) programs and to report annually. The law also specifies that this disqualification is not to apply to convictions that occurred before the new law's enactment (February 7, 2014); this specification had been included in the House bill but not the Senate bill. The 2014 farm bill, for the most part, maintains current federal law on SNAP benefit calculation; however, the 2014 bill changes the way the excess shelter deduction is calculated (specifically, the treatment of energy assistance payments). As shown in Table 1 , the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that this LIHEAP-related change included in the 2014 farm bill will reduce SNAP spending by approximately $8.6 billion over the 10-year budget window of FY2014-FY2023. The House-passed farm bill ( H.R. 2642 combined with H.R. Instead, participating households are provided benefits on an electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card which participants may only redeem for SNAP-eligible foods at authorized retailers . 111-296 )—provides formula grant funding for states to provide programs for SNAP (and other domestic food assistance program) participants as well as other low-income households. The House bill would have reduced funding in FY2014 and then would have adjusted for inflation in subsequent years; CBO estimated that that proposal would have reduced funding for the program by $146 million over 5 years and $308 million over 10 years. 2014 Farm Bill: Increases Entitlement Commodities Funding, Makes Funds Available for Two Years According to CBO's accounting for inflation, the 2014 farm bill increases funding for TEFAP's entitlement commodities by $125 million over five years and $205 million over 10 years. Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP) Background and Prior Law CSFP is a household-based food assistance program that provides distribution of USDA commodity foods to a household. The law, like the House and Senate bills, also includes a new provision that allows USDA to contract with a processor and retain title to those foods while processing. Below are a few highlights, including the reauthorization of programs included in the 2008 farm bill (e.g., Senior Farmers' Market Nutrition Program, Community Food Projects, and Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program), and new mandatory funding that makes federal funding available for SNAP bonus incentive projects. Senior Farmers' Market Nutrition Program : Reauthorization. "Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive" Grants. Like the Senate bill, the new law includes $100 million in mandatory funding over five years for these grants. Comparison of the Enacted 2014 Farm Bill ( P.L. 113-79 ) Nutrition Title to the Nutrition Titles of the 2013 Conference Proposals and Prior Law

After action to reauthorize the 2008 farm bill in both the 112th and 113th Congresses, the Agriculture Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79; "2014 farm bill") was enacted on February 7, 2014. In addition to farm programs and other agricultural policies, this newest omnibus farm bill reauthorizes the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and other related nutrition programs. Farm bills since 1973 have included reauthorization of the Food Stamp Program (now called SNAP). The enacted 2014 law reconciles differences between the House-passed bill (H.R. 2642, as combined with H.R. 3102, Nutrition Reform and Work Opportunity Act) and the Senate-passed bill (S. 954). The Nutrition Title reauthorizes SNAP and related programs for five years, and CBO estimates that the Nutrition Title will reduce spending by $8.0 billion over 10 years (FY2014-FY2023). The SNAP provisions alone are estimated to reduce spending by slightly more than $8.6 billion over 10 years. Certain other Nutrition provisions are estimated to increase spending, which together result in the total estimated reduction of $8.0 billion. Farm bill conferees were faced with significant differences in the SNAP provisions in the Senate- and House-passed bills. Over the 10-year budget window (FY2014-FY2023), CBO estimated that the Senate's Nutrition Title would have reduced spending by approximately $4 billion and the House's Nutrition Title would have reduced spending by approximately $39 billion. The House bill would have reauthorized SNAP and related programs for three years, while the Senate would have reauthorized the programs for five years. Although the Nutrition Title of the 2014 law contains a number of provisions that change aspects of SNAP and related nutrition programs, conferees largely retained the provisions in the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 and other nutrition program authorizing statutes. The budgetary impact of the 2014 farm bill's Nutrition Title is largely the result of changes to SNAP eligibility and benefit calculation rules. The law's treatment of major issues in households' eligibility and benefit amounts include the following: The 2014 farm bill amends how Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) payments are treated in the calculation of SNAP benefits. According to information from June 2012, this change to benefit calculation is expected to reduce household benefit amounts in approximately 17 states. The 2014 farm bill disqualifies from SNAP certain ex-offenders who are not complying with the terms of their sentence. This is a narrower disqualification than that proposed in the House and Senate bills. The law includes policies related to the SNAP Employment and Training (E&T) program, including a pilot project authority and related funding ($200 million over FY2014 and FY2015) for states to implement and USDA to evaluate a variety of work programs for SNAP participants. The law includes the House bill's provisions that would expand reporting measures for all E&T programs. The law makes no changes to broad-based categorical eligibility. The law does not give states the option to administer drug testing as part of their eligibility determination processes (as had been proposed in the House bill). Since SNAP provides benefits redeemable for SNAP-eligible foods at SNAP-eligible retailers, much of SNAP law pertains to retailer authorization and benefit issuance and redemption. The 2014 farm bill includes the changes to retailer and redemption provisions that had been included in both the House and Senate bills. The law now requires stores to stock more fresh foods, requires retailers to pay for their electronic benefit transfer (EBT) machines, and provides additional funding for combatting trafficking (the sale of SNAP benefits). The 2014 farm bill also includes $100 million in mandatory funding (over 10 years) for Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive grants, which will support organizations that offer bonus incentives for SNAP purchases of fruits and vegetables. The law increases funding for the Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), the program that provides USDA foods and federal support to emergency feeding organizations (e.g., food banks and food pantries). Taking into account CBO's estimates of inflation, the conference agreement is estimated to provide an additional $205 million for TEFAP over 10 years, $125 million of which is provided in the first five years. The law's Nutrition Title includes many other changes to SNAP and related program policy. These changes include amendments to the nutrition programs operated by tribes and territories, the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), and the distribution of USDA foods to schools. The 2010 child nutrition reauthorization (Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, P.L. 111-296) has already reauthorized WIC and the child nutrition programs through FY2015, but the 2014 farm bill does include related policies, such as farm-to-school efforts.

crs_R40229

crs_R40229_0

Background The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 ( P.L. 105-33 , BBA-97) established the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) under a new Title XXI of the Social Security Act. CHIP builds on Medicaid by providing health care coverage to low-income, uninsured children in families with incomes above applicable Medicaid income standards. This report provides a summary of major changes to CHIP enacted in public laws beginning with the legislation authorizing the program in 1997. State Children's Health Insurance Program Allotments Extension Act, P.L.

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33, BBA-97) established the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) under a new Title XXI of the Social Security Act. CHIP builds on Medicaid by providing health care coverage to low-income, uninsured children in families with incomes above applicable Medicaid income standards. This report provides a summary of major changes to the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) enacted in public laws beginning with the legislation authorizing the program in 1997. It will be updated as legislative activity warrants.

crs_R45079

crs_R45079_0

The Marshall Plan and the Present1 Between 1948 and 1951, the United States undertook what many consider to be one of its more successful foreign policy initiatives and most effective foreign aid programs. The Marshall Plan (the Plan) and the European Recovery Program (ERP) that it generated involved an ambitious effort to stimulate economic growth in a despondent and nearly bankrupt post-World War II Europe, to prevent the spread of communism beyond the "iron curtain," and to encourage development of a healthy and stable world economy. It was designed to accomplish these goals by achieving three objectives: the expansion of European agricultural and industrial production; the restoration of sound currencies, budgets, and finances in individual European countries; and the stimulation of international trade among European countries and between Europe and the rest of the world. Formulation of the Marshall Plan The Marshall Plan was proposed in a speech by Secretary of State George Marshall at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, in response to the critical political, social, and economic conditions in which Europe found itself at that time. In addition, Marshall called for this assistance to be a joint effort, "initiated" and agreed by European nations. The formulation of the Marshall Plan, therefore, was, from the beginning, a work of collaboration between the Truman Administration and Congress, and between the U.S. Government and European governments. Economic Cooperation Administration Due to the complex nature of the recovery program, the magnitude of the task, and the high degree of administrative flexibility desired with regard to matters concerning procurement and personnel, Congress established a new agency—the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)—to implement the ERP. To advance this purpose, the OEEC developed analyses of economic conditions and needs, and, through formulation of a Plan of Action, influenced the direction of investment projects and encouraged joint adoption of policy reforms such as those leading to elimination of intra-European trade barriers. The ECA also provided loans. Dollar assistance kept the dollar gap to a minimum. The emphasis in financial and technical assistance on productivity helped to maximize the efficient use of dollar and counterpart funds to increase production and boost trade. Other aspects of its deliberate character were distinctive. While, in some cases, a direct connection can be drawn between American assistance and a positive outcome, for the most part, the Marshall Plan may be viewed best as a stimulus which set off a chain of events leading to the accomplishments noted below. U.S. The Marshall Plan also launched the first participant training programs bringing Europeans to the United States for training and leveraged private sector investment in recipient countries through the use of U.S. government guaranties. From its inception, some Members of Congress voiced fears that the ERP would have a negative effect on U.S. business. It was a multiyear plan designed specifically to bring about the economic recovery of Europe and avoid the repeated need for relief programs that had characterized U.S. assistance to Europe since the War. The roughly $13.3 billion provided by the United States to 16 nations over a period of less than four years equals an estimated $143 billion in 2017 currency. A Marshall Plan for Middle and Eastern Europe? Washington, U.S. Govt. Subcommittee on United States Foreign Aid to Europe. Washington, U.S. Govt.

The European Recovery Program (ERP), more commonly known as the Marshall Plan (the Plan), was a program of U.S. assistance to Europe during the period 1948-1951. The Marshall Plan—launched in a speech delivered by Secretary of State George Marshall on June 5, 1947—is considered by many to have been the most effective ever of U.S. foreign aid programs. An effort to prevent the economic deterioration of postwar Europe, expansion of communism, and stagnation of world trade, the Plan sought to stimulate European production, promote adoption of policies leading to stable economies, and take measures to increase trade among European countries and between Europe and the rest of the world. Since its conclusion, some Members of Congress and others have periodically recommended establishment of new "Marshall Plans"—for Central America, Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere. Design. The Marshall Plan was a joint effort between the United States and Europe and among European nations working together. Prior to formulation of a program of assistance, the United States required that European nations agree on a financial proposal, including a plan of action committing Europe to take steps toward solving its economic problems. The Truman Administration and Congress worked together to formulate the European Recovery Program, which eventually provided roughly $13.3 billion ($143 billion in 2017 dollars) of assistance to 16 countries. Implementation. Two agencies implemented the program, the U.S.-managed Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and the European-run Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The latter helped ensure that participants fulfilled their joint obligations to adopt policies encouraging trade and increased production. The ECA provided dollar assistance to Europe to purchase commodities—food, fuel, and machinery—and leveraged funds for specific projects, especially those to develop and rehabilitate infrastructure. It also provided technical assistance to promote productivity, offered guaranties to encourage U.S. private investment, and approved the use of local currency matching funds. Accomplishments. While, in some cases, a direct connection can be drawn between American assistance and a positive outcome, for the most part, the Marshall Plan may be viewed best as a stimulus that set off a chain of events leading to a range of accomplishments. At the completion of the Marshall Plan period, European agricultural and industrial production were markedly higher, the balance of trade and related "dollar gap" much improved, and significant steps had been taken toward trade liberalization and economic integration. Historians cite the impact of the Marshall Plan on the political development of some European countries and on U.S.-Europe relations. European Recovery Program assistance is said to have contributed to more positive morale in Europe and to political and economic stability, which helped diminish the strength of domestic communist parties. The U.S. political and economic role in Europe was enhanced and U.S. trade with Europe boosted. Although the Marshall Plan has its critics and occurred during a unique point in history, many observers believe it offers lessons that may be applicable to contemporary foreign aid programs. This report examines aspects of the Plan's formulation and implementation and discusses its historical significance. The Appendix lists numerous related studies and publications.

crs_RL34304

crs_RL34304_0

This is a brief description of those that outlaw interference with congressional activities. 1512 (tampering with federal witnesses), 1513 (retaliating against federal witnesses), 1503 (obstruction of pending federal court proceedings), 1505 (obstruction of pending congressional or federal administrative proceedings), 371 (conspiracy), and contempt. All but §1503 apply to congressional activities. Witness Tampering (18 U.S.C. "The elements of misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. corruptly III. Prosecutions under §1505 have been relatively few, at least until recently, and most of these arise as obstructions of administrative proceedings. Obstruction of Justice by Violence or Threat In addition to the basic federal crimes of obstruction of justice, federal law features a host of criminal statutes that proscribe various obstructions according to the obstructive means used, be it physical violence, bribery, property destruction, or deception. In the wake of McNally , Congress expanded the scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes with the passage of 18 U.S.C. Mail fraud and wire fraud are both RICO and money laundering predicate offenses. 371 is an alternative. Obstruction of Justice by Destruction of Evidence Other than subsection 1512(c), three federal statutes expressly outlaw the destruction of evidence in order to obstruct justice, only one of which may apply to obstruction of Congress: 18 U.S.C. The laws relating to aiding and abetting, accessories after the fact, misprision, and conspiracy, however, apply to all four. §3C1.1) Regardless of the offense for which an individual is convicted, his sentence may be enhanced as a consequence of any obstruction of justice for which he is responsible, if committed during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing for the offense of his conviction. The enhancement may result in an increase in his term of imprisonment by as much as 4 years. The examples in the section's commentary cover conduct: (B) committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury, including during the course of a civil proceeding if such perjury pertains to conduct that forms the basis of the offense of conviction; (F) providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate; (G) providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense; (H) providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court; [and] (I) other conduct prohibited by obstruction of justice provisions under Title 18, United States Code (e.g., 18 U.S.C.

Obstruction of justice is the impediment of governmental activities. There are a host of federal criminal laws that prohibit obstructions of justice. The six most general outlaw obstruction of judicial proceedings (18 U.S.C. 1503), witness tampering (18 U.S.C. 1512), witness retaliation (18 U.S.C. 1513), obstruction of congressional or administrative proceedings (18 U.S.C. 1505), conspiracy to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. 371), and contempt (a creature of statute, rule and common law). All but Section 1503 cover congressional activities. The laws that supplement, and sometimes mirror, the basic six tend to proscribe a particular means of obstruction. Some, like the perjury and false statement statutes, condemn obstruction by lies and deception. Others, like the bribery, mail fraud, and wire fraud statutes, prohibit obstruction by corruption. Some outlaw the use of violence as a means of obstruction. Still others ban the destruction of evidence. A few simply punish "tipping off" those who are the targets of an investigation. A good number of these apply in a congressional context. Many of these offenses may also provide the basis for racketeering and money laundering prosecutions, and each provides the basis for criminal prosecution of anyone who aids and abets in or conspires for their commission. Moreover, regardless of the offense for which an individual is convicted, his sentence may be enhanced as a consequence of any obstruction of justice for which he is responsible, if committed during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing for the offense of his conviction. The enhancement may result in an increase in his term of imprisonment by as much as four years. This report is available in abbreviated form—without footnotes, quotations, or citations—as CRS Report RS22784, Obstruction of Congress: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal Laws Relating to Interference with Congressional Activities. Both versions have been excerpted from CRS Report RL34303, Obstruction of Justice: an Overview of Some of the Federal Statutes that Prohibit Interference with Judicial, Executive, or Legislative Activities. Other excerpted portions are also available as the following: CRS Report RS22783, Obstruction of Justice: An Abridged Overview of Related Federal Criminal Laws; CRS Report 98-808, Perjury Under Federal Law: A Brief Overview; and CRS Report 98-807, Perjury Under Federal Law: A Sketch of the Elements, all by [author name scrubbed].

crs_98-194

crs_98-194_0

This report examines only cases involving the question of whether a Member-elect was duly elected , that is, questions regarding elections and returns. Questions regarding qualifications (age, citizenship, and inhabitancy) are not the focus of this report. The case summaries highlight the nature of the contest and the disposition of the case. For more detailed information regarding each contest, it is important to consult relevant House records. This report is limited to those cases considered by the House of Representatives; cases decided at the state level are beyond the scope of this report. Furthermore, information contained in this report is derived solely from findings made by the reporting congressional committee or as documented in the Congressional Record ; CRS did not make any of the findings independently. For the purposes of this report, the term contestant refers to an individual who challenged the election of a Member-elect of the House of Representatives, and the term contestee refers to a Member or Member-elect of the House of Representatives whose election was challenged. Of these cases, a vast majority were resolved in favor of the contestee. Cases Where the Contestant Was Ultimately Seated It appears that of the 107 contested election cases considered by the House since 1933, in at least 3 cases, the House ultimately seated the contestant, and in at least 1 case, the House ultimately refused to seat any individual. Generally, in the majority of the other cases, the contest was dismissed based on reasons including lack of evidence; a determination that voting irregularities, fraud, or misconduct were insufficient to affect the results of the election; failure to sustain the burden of proof necessary to award the contested seat to the contestant; and improper initiation of a contest or other procedural failures. Cases Where Member-elect Was Asked To "Step Aside" or "Remain Seated" on the First Day of a New Congress Of the 107 contested election cases considered by the House since 1933, it appears that in at least 15 cases, the Member-elect was asked to "step aside" or "remain seated" while the oath of office was collectively administered to the other Members-elect on the first day of a new Congress. Of those 15 cases where a Member-elect was asked to step aside, it appears that in at least 2 instances, the Member-elect was subsequently administered the oath on an expressly provisional basis. In at least 2 of the 15 cases where a Member-elect was asked to step aside, the House declined to administer the oath of office to any Member-elect, deciding to wait until after the committee to which the question was referred had conducted an investigation and issued a report. In the remaining 11 of the 15 cases where a Member-elect was asked to step aside, in most instances, the House adopted a resolution providing merely that the Member-elect "be now permitted" to take the oath of office, with no specific reference to final determination of the right to the seat nor any express reference to a filed election contest. The contestant, Saunders, challenged the election in accordance with the Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA), 2 U.S.C. 112th Congress No election contests.

From 1933 to 2011 (the 73rd Congress through the 112th Congress), the U.S. House of Representatives considered 107 contested election cases. The vast majority of these cases were resolved in favor of the contestee, a term referring to a Member or Member-elect of the House of Representatives whose election was challenged. The term contestant refers to an individual who challenged the election of a Member-elect of the House of Representatives. It appears that of the 107 contested election cases considered by the House since 1933, in at least three cases, the House ultimately seated the contestant, and in at least one case, the House ultimately refused to seat any individual, declaring a vacancy. In the majority of the other cases, the contest was dismissed based on reasons including lack of evidence; a determination that voting irregularities, fraud, or misconduct was insufficient to affect the results of the election; failure to sustain the burden of proof necessary to award the contested seat to the contestant; and improper initiation of a contest or other procedural failures. With regard to procedures followed on the first day of a new Congress, of the 107 contested election cases considered by the House since 1933, it appears that in at least 15 cases, the Member-elect was asked to "step aside" or "remain seated" while the oath of office was collectively administered to the other Members-elect. Of those 15 cases where a Member-elect was asked to step aside, it appears that in at least 2 instances, the Member-elect was subsequently administered the oath on an expressly provisional basis. In at least 2 of the 15 cases where a Member-elect was asked to step aside, the House declined to administer the oath of office to that Member-elect, until after the committee to which the question was referred had conducted an investigation and issued a report. In the remaining 11 of the 15 cases where a Member-elect was asked to step aside, in most instances, the House adopted a resolution providing merely that the Member-elect "be now permitted" to take the oath of office, with no specific reference to final determination of the right to the seat nor any express reference to a filed election contest. As has been noted by House Parliamentarians, the seating of a Member-elect does not prejudice a contest pending under the Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA) regarding the final right to a seat. The summaries of contested election cases contained in this report focus primarily on the nature of the contest and the disposition of the case. For more detailed information regarding each contest, it is important to consult relevant House records. This report examines only cases considered by the House of Representatives involving the question of whether a Member-elect was duly elected, that is, questions regarding elections and returns, not questions regarding qualifications (age, citizenship, and inhabitancy). Cases decided at the state level are beyond the scope of this report. Furthermore, information contained in this report is derived solely from findings made by the reporting congressional committee or as documented in the Congressional Record; CRS did not make any of the findings independently.

crs_R44675

crs_R44675_0

D uring the final months and weeks leading up to the November 8, 2016, presidential election, courts across the country have ruled in numerous challenges to state election laws. As a result of some of these rulings, several laws have been recently invalidated, enjoined, or altered. For example, in Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas there have been recent court rulings affecting the laws regulating early voting, voter photo identification (ID) requirements, registration procedures, straight-party voting, and voter rolls. These decisions are notable because of their impact on state election laws shortly before a presidential election, and in some cases, because they invalidated laws that were recently enacted. Furthermore, the rulings in North Carolina and Texas have drawn attention because the challenged state laws were held, in part, to violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which generally prohibits discriminatory voting laws based on race, color, or membership in a language minority and has typically been applied in the context of challenges to redistricting maps. In order to facilitate determination of the totality of the circumstances, the Court listed the following factors, which originated in the legislative history accompanying enactment of Section 2: 1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivisions is racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Recent rulings in Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas are illustrative examples. Michigan Straight-Party Voting Straight-party voting, also known as straight-ticket voting, permits a voter to cast a vote for a political party's entire slate of candidates by making a single notation on the ballot. The court ruled it was likely that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA. The partially divided court held that the laws were enacted with a racially discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA. In contrast to its ruling on voter rolls, on August 23, 2016, the Sixth Circuit upheld a 2014 Ohio law that eliminated a period of early voting and the availability of same-day registration, known as "Golden Week," against a challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the VRA. Affirming a lower court, a plurality of the court concluded that the voter photo ID law has a discriminatory effect on minorities' voting rights and therefore violates Section 2 of the VRA. Therefore, the attendant case law is just beginning to develop. Likewise, questions of whether specific voter photo ID laws comply with the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the VRA continue to be answered. Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an Indiana voter photo ID law in 2008 against a facial challenge, some courts have concluded that other state laws are distinguishable from the Indiana law or have evaluated such laws under Section 2 of the VRA. It is possible that the Supreme Court may ultimately decide to revisit this issue.

During the final months and weeks leading up to the November 8, 2016, presidential election, courts across the country have ruled in numerous challenges to state election laws. For example, there have been recent court rulings affecting the laws regulating early voting, voter photo identification (ID) requirements, registration procedures, straight-party voting, and voter rolls. Accordingly, many such laws have been recently invalidated, enjoined, or altered. Others continue to be subject to litigation. Recent rulings in Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas are illustrative examples. In Michigan, a court preliminarily enjoined a 2016 law that ended the ability of voters to vote for a political party's entire slate of candidates with a single notation—straight-party voting—concluding that it was likely that the challengers would succeed on the merits of their claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In North Carolina, a court invalidated several recent changes to that state's election laws, including a voter photo ID law, holding that the laws were enacted with a racially discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA. In Ohio, a court held that a law setting forth the process for removing the names of inactive voters from the voter rolls violates the National Voter Registration Act, and in another case, upheld a law that eliminated a period of early voting and same-day registration, known as "Golden Week," against a challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the VRA. Finally, in contrast to the North Carolina ruling, a court declined to invalidate a Texas voter photo ID law, but required it to be administered on November 8, 2016, with modifications, holding that the law has a discriminatory effect on minority voting rights in violation of Section 2 of the VRA. These decisions are notable because of their impact on state election laws shortly before a presidential election and, in some cases, because they invalidated laws that were recently enacted. Furthermore, the rulings in North Carolina and Texas have drawn attention because the challenged state laws were held, in part, to violate Section 2 of the VRA, which in the past has generally been applied in the context of challenges to redistricting maps. Accordingly, the case law in this area is just beginning to develop. Likewise, questions of whether specific voter photo ID laws comply with the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the VRA continue to be answered. Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an Indiana voter photo ID law in 2008 against a facial challenge, some courts have found other state laws distinguishable or have evaluated such laws under Section 2 of the VRA. It is possible that the Supreme Court may ultimately decide to revisit this issue.

crs_R42047

crs_R42047_0

Background From the 19 th century to the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in 1978, the federal government, states, and private agencies sought to separate Indian children from their tribes and families in order to "civilize" the children or provide them with better lives. One survey reported that "approximately 25–35 percent of all Indian children are separated from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions." The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs—the predecessor of the present-day House Committee on Natural Resources—termed the disparity between placement rates for Indians and non-Indians "shocking." The committee concluded, "[i]n judging the fitness of a particular family, many social workers, ignorant of Indian cultural values and social norms, make decisions that are wholly inappropriate in the context of Indian family life and so they frequently discover neglect or abandonment where none exists." The committee noted also that "[t]he decision to take Indian children from their natural homes is, in most cases, carried out without due process of law" and that most cases did not go through adjudication because parents voluntarily waived their parental rights in the face of coercion from the state. Adoptions Under the ICWA To counter the high rate at which states were removing Indian children from their families and Indian communities, the ICWA provides uniform and heightened standards for involuntarily terminating parental rights, preferences for placing Indian children in Indian adoptive homes, and procedural protections for parents and Indian tribes in state court proceedings. In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl , the Supreme Court determined that Section 1912(f) does not apply to the termination of a parent's rights when the parent never had custody. In Adoptive Couple , the Supreme Court wrote that the ICWA's placement preferences for adoption placements apply only when there are multiple parties seeking to adopt the Indian child. In that case, the ICWA placement preferences did not apply because no parties other than the non-Indian couple were seeking to adopt the Indian child. The conflict between Indian and non-Indian social systems sometimes operates to defeat due process. The ICWA's Jurisdictional Scheme By recognizing both exclusive and concurrent tribal court jurisdiction over custody proceedings involving Indian children, the ICWA provides an important mechanism by which tribes may participate in the placement of Indian children. Nonetheless, Indian children are still removed from their homes and placed in foster care at a rate higher than that for non-Indian children.

From the 19th century to the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in 1978, the federal government, states, and private adoption agencies sought to remove Indian children from their tribes and families in order to "civilize" the children or provide them with better lives. Congress passed the ICWA to end this practice and the high rate at which Indian children were being removed from their homes and placed with non-Indians. One survey reported that 25%-35% of all Indian children were being separated from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions. The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs termed the disparity between placement rates for Indians and non-Indians "shocking." The committee concluded that many non-Indian social workers who recommended removal of Indian children from their families and communities were ignorant of Indian cultural values and social norms, and biased against typical Indian family life. The report indicated that this bias too often resulted in finding neglect or abandonment when there was none. The committee noted also that the decision to take Indian children from their natural homes was frequently carried out without due process of law and that most cases did not go through adjudication because parents voluntarily waived their parental rights in the face of coercion from the state. Accordingly, Congress passed the ICWA to establish standards for removing Indian children from their homes, prioritizing placement of Indian children with extended family members and other Indians, and giving tribes a recognized role in the placement of Indian children by, among other things, recognizing tribal court jurisdiction over Indian child placements and adoptions. In addition, the ICWA includes important procedural protections for Indian parents, custodians, and tribes to provide due process of law. In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Supreme Court determined that, in a proceeding to terminate parental rights in connection with an Indian child, a number of ICWA's provisions do not apply when the parent seeking to invoke them never had legal or physical custody of the Indian child. In addition, the Court stated that the ICWA's placement preferences for adoptions of Indian children apply only when multiple parties seek to adopt the Indian children. In Adoptive Couple, because the only party before the court seeking to adopt the Indian child was a non-Indian couple, the ICWA's placement preferences did not apply to block their adoption.

crs_RL32884

crs_RL32884_0

This potential has received attention in connection with implementation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act, CWA). For the more than 30 years since Congress enacted FIFRA and the Clean Water Act, there had been little apparent direct conflict between them. However, EPA's interpretation and operating practice regarding the relationship between the two laws have recently been challenged in several arenas. This report provides background on the conflict over interpretation and implementation of FIFRA and the Clean Water Act. A brief discussion of the two laws is followed by a review of the major litigation of interest. EPA's efforts to clarify its policy in this area, its 2006 rule, and the 2009 federal court ruling are discussed, as well as possible options for EPA and Congress to further address the FIFRA-CWA issues. Despite EPA's efforts to streamline the permit and its applicability, the permit is controversial. Its objective is to protect human health and the environment from unreasonable adverse effects of pesticides. To that end, it establishes a nationally uniform pesticide labeling system requiring the registration of all pesticides and herbicides sold in the United States, and requiring users to comply with conditions of use included on the national label. To that end, it creates a comprehensive regulatory scheme to control the discharge of waste and pollutants; the discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States without a permit violates the act. The Litigation Five federal court cases testing the relationship between FIFRA and the CWA have drawn the most attention, three in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the West, concerning pesticide applications by agricultural and natural resource managers, and two in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the East, involving the use of pesticides by government and public health authorities for mosquito control. Two of the Ninth Circuit decisions have held that CWA permits are required for at least some activity involving the point source discharge of FIFRA-regulated pesticides over or into waters of the United States, and the third held that a permit was not required because the specific pesticide was not a chemical waste. The CWA permit considers local environmental conditions, which the FIFRA label does not. A final rule was promulgated in November 2006 but was vacated by a federal court in 2009, as described next. The rule added two specific circumstances that would be excluded from NPDES permit requirements, when the application complies with relevant requirements of FIFRA: the application of pesticides directly to waters of the United States in order to control pests (e.g., to control mosquito larvae or aquatic weeds); and the application of pesticides to control pests that are present over waters of the United States, including near such waters, where a portion of the pesticides will unavoidably be deposited to waters of the United States in order to target the pests effectively. Instead, the government petitioned the court for a two-year stay of the order vacating the exemption, to give EPA time to work with states and the regulated community to develop a general permit for pesticide applications covered by the decision. EPA issued the pesticide general permit on October 31, 2011, as required by the federal court. Legislative Options Prior to the 2009 federal court ruling that vacated EPA's rule, some environmental activists favored legislation to clarify that NPDES permits are required, since they contended that the rule was unlawful. The House passed H.R. In addition, a provision similar to H.R. This bill proposed to clarify congressional intent regarding the regulation of the use of pesticides in or near U.S. waters. 897 , the Reducing Regulatory Burdens Act) and was approved by the House Agriculture Committee in March 2015. The House passed a modified version on May 24, 2016. Separate Senate legislation, S. 2899 , the Zika Response and Regulatory Relief Act, was introduced to provide a temporary, 180-day waiver of the PGP and its reporting requirements solely for the purpose of public health pesticide applications of a mosquito control program.

This report provides background on the emerging conflict over interpretation and implementation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA). For the more than 30 years since they were enacted, there had been little apparent conflict between them. But their relationship has recently been challenged in several arenas, including the federal courts and regulatory proceedings of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In this report, a brief discussion of the two laws is followed by a review of the major litigation of interest. EPA's efforts to clarify its policy in this area are discussed, including a regulation issued in 2006 that was subsequently vacated by a federal court, as well as possible options for EPA and Congress to address the issues further. FIFRA governs the labeling, distribution, sale, and use of pesticides, including insecticides and herbicides. Its objective is to protect human health and the environment from unreasonable adverse effects of pesticides. It establishes a nationally uniform labeling system requiring the registration of all pesticides sold in the United States, and requiring users to comply with the national label. The CWA creates a comprehensive regulatory scheme to control the discharge of pollutants into the nation's waters; the discharge of pollutants without a permit violates the act. Several federal court cases testing the relationship between FIFRA and the CWA have drawn attention since 2001. In two cases concerning pesticide applications by agriculture and natural resources managers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that CWA permits are required for at least some discharges of FIFRA-regulated pesticides over, into, or near U.S. waters. It held in a third case that no permit was required for the specific pesticide in question. In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a CWA discharge permit for mosquito control activities was not required before April 2011. Several of the rulings alarmed a range of stakeholders who fear that requiring CWA permits for pesticide application activities would present significant costs, operational difficulties, and delays. Pressed to clarify its long-standing principle that CWA permits are not required for using FIFRA-approved products, EPA in 2006 issued a rule to formalize that principle in regulations. Environmental activists strongly opposed EPA's actions, arguing that FIFRA does not protect water quality from harmful pollutant discharges, as the CWA is intended to do. Other stakeholders, such as pesticide applicators, endorsed the rule. However, the rule was challenged, and in 2009, a federal court vacated the regulation. The federal government asked the court to stay the order vacating the exemption for two years, to provide time for working with states to develop a general permit for pesticide applications covered by the decision. The court denied the request for rehearing and granted the requested delay, which was extended until October 31, 2011, when EPA issued the permit. Despite the agency's efforts to minimize regulatory burdens and cost, the permit is controversial. Some believe that the controversy will only be resolved by congressional action to clarify the intersecting scope of the Clean Water Act and FIFRA. The House passed legislation intended to nullify the 2009 federal court ruling in the 112th and 113th Congresses. Similar bills were approved by House and Senate committees in the 114th Congress (H.R. 897, S. 659, and S. 1500). The House passed a modified version of H.R. 897, retitled the Zika Vector Control Act, on May 24, 2016. Separate Senate legislation, S. 2899, was proposed to provide a temporary, 180-day waiver of the pesticide general permit (PGP) and its reporting requirements for the purpose of public health pesticide applications of a mosquito control program. Similar waiver provisions were debated in connection with FY2017 appropriations legislation, but none was enacted.