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36 Thus although State intervention in the fixing of the price of supply of natural gas to the final consumer constitutes an obstacle to the achievement of a competitive natural gas market, that intervention may none the less be accepted within the framework of Directive 2009/73 if three conditions are satisfied. First, the intervention must pursue an objective of general economic interest, secondly, it must comply with the principle of proportionality, and, thirdly, it must lay down public service obligations that are clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and verifiable, and guarantee equal access of EU gas undertakings to consumers (see, to that effect, judgments of20 April 2010, Federutility and Others, C‑265/08, EU:C:2010:205, paragraphs 20 to 22 and 47, and 10 September 2015, Commission v Poland, C‑36/14, not published, EU:C:2015:570, paragraphs 51 to 53).

47. The answer to the questions referred must therefore be that Articles 3(2) and 23(1) of Directive 2003/55 do not preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which permits determination of the price level for the supply of natural gas by the definition of ‘reference prices’, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, after 1 July 2007, provided that such intervention: – pursues a general economic interest consisting in maintaining the price of the supply of natural gas to final consumers at a reasonable level having regard to the reconciliation which Member States must make, taking account of the situation in the natural gas sector, between the objective of liberalisation and that of the necessary protection of final consumers pursued by Directive 2003/55; – compromises the free determination of prices for the supply of natural gas after 1 July 2007 only in so far as is necessary to achieve such an objective in the general economic interest and, consequently, for a period that is necessarily limited in time; – is clearly defined, transparent, non discriminatory and verifiable, and guarantees equal access for EU gas companies to consumers. Costs

104 The essential legal criterion for ascertaining whether an agreement involves a restriction of competition ‘by object’ is the finding that such an agreement reveals in itself a sufficient degree of harm to competition for it to be considered that it is not appropriate to assess its effects (see, inter alia, judgment of 26 November 2015, Maxima Latvija, C‑345/14, EU:C:2015:784, paragraph 20).

62 Such an examination by the Commission of whether particular measures can be classified as State aid because the public authorities did not act in the same way as a private creditor requires a complex economic assessment (judgments of 24 January 2013, Frucona Košice v Commission, C‑73/11 P, EU:C:2013:32, paragraph 74, and of 21 March 2013, Commission v Buczek Automotive, C‑405/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:186, paragraph 48).

48. L’examen par la Commission de la question de savoir si des mesures déterminées peuvent être qualifiées d’aide d’État, en raison du fait que les autorités publiques n’auraient pas agi de la même manière qu’un créancier privé, requiert de procéder à une appréciation économique complexe (arrêts précités Espagne/Lenzing, point 59, et Frucona Košice/Commission, point 74).

23. Such a reduction in a worker’s remuneration in respect of his paid annual leave, liable to deter him from actually exercising his right to take that leave, is contrary to the objective pursued by Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑155/10 Williams and Others EU:C:2011:588, paragraph 21). In that regard, the fact that that reduction in remuneration occurs, as is the case in the main proceedings, after the period of annual leave, is irrelevant.

45. Nevertheless, in exercising their powers, the Member States must observe the general principles of law that form part of the European Union legal order, which include, in particular, the principles of legal certainty and proportionality and the principle of protection of legitimate expectations (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑286/94, C‑340/95, C‑401/95 and C‑47/96 Molenheide and Others [1997] ECR I‑7281, paragraph 48; Case C‑384/04 Federation of Technological Industries and Others [2006] ECR I‑4191, paragraphs 29 and 30; and Case C‑271/06 Netto Supermarkt [2008] ECR I‑771, paragraph 18). As regards, in particular, the principle of proportionality, the Court has already held that, in accordance with that principle, the measures which the Member States may thus adopt must not go further than is necessary to attain the objectives of ensuring the correct levying and collection of the tax and the prevention of tax evasion (see, in particular, Case C‑188/09 Profaktor Kulesza, Frankowski, Jóźwiak, Orłowski [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 26).

48 The answer to be given in that regard must therefore be that the principle of proportionality is applicable to national measures which, like those at issue in the main proceedings, are adopted by a Member State in the exercise of its powers relating to VAT, since, if those measures go further than necessary in order to attain their objective, they would undermine the principles of the common system of VAT and in particular the rules governing deductions which constitute an essential component of that system.

51. That interpretation of Directive 2001/18 is substantiated by the requirement, referred to in the third indent of Article 25(4) thereof, that information concerning the environmental risk assessment may not be kept confidential. Indeed, such an assessment is possible only with full knowledge of the proposed release, because, without such information, it would not be possible validly to assess the potential effects of a deliberate release of GMOs on human health and the environment (see, to that effect, Case C‑121/07 Commission v France , paragraphs 75 and 77).

32 In addition, the Court has clarified — indeed, in relation to a provision of EU law expressly allowing the costs relating to the implementation, management and monitoring of a regime for issuing individual licences to be taken into account in calculating administrative costs — that the costs taken into account may not include the expenditure linked to the authority in question’s general supervisory activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2006, i-21 Germany and Arcor, C‑392/04 and C‑422/04, EU:C:2006:586, paragraphs 34 and 35).

34. According to the information submitted to the Court, the calculation of the fee at issue in the main proceedings includes expenditure relating to other tasks such as the regulatory authority’s general supervisory activities and, in particular, monitoring possible abuses of a dominant position.

36. In those circumstances, it must be held that, by authorising the irrigation project in the irrigable area of the Segarra-Garrigues Canal, the Member State concerned did not fulfil its obligation under the first sentence of Article 4(4) of the Birds Directive to take appropriate measures to avoid, in the areas affected by that project which ought to have been classified as SPAs, the prohibited disturbances, since that obligation exists, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, before any reduction is observed in the number of birds or any risk of a protected species becoming extinct has materialised (see Case C‑355/90 Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I‑4221, paragraph 15).

28. According to the case-law, whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by referen ce to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-388/02 Commission v Ireland [2003] ECR I-12173, paragraph 6).

6. It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia , Case C-71/99 Commission v Germany [2001] ECR I-5811, paragraph 29; and Case C-110/00 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-7545, paragraph 13.

40. That being the case, the harmonisation achieved at present is no more than partial (see, to that effect, Case C-434/97 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-1129, paragraph 17).

180 In this context, it must be pointed out first of all that, where a person seeks annulment of an act from the EU judicature, the matter to be considered by the latter relates only to those provisions of the act which concern him. Provisions concerning other persons which have not been challenged do not form part of the matter to be decided by the EU judicature (judgments in Commission v AssiDomän Kraft Products and Others, C‑310/97 P, EU:C:1999:407, paragraph 53, and Nachi Europe, C‑239/99, EU:C:2001:101, paragraph 25).

53 Consequently, if an addressee of a decision decides to bring an action for annulment, the matter to be tried by the Community judicature relates only to those aspects of the decision which concern that addressee. Unchallenged aspects concerning other addressees, on the other hand, do not form part of the matter to be tried by the Community judicature.

25. With regard to the question whether the mobility component of DLA is a special benefit, the Court has stated that DLA can be considered to include a ‘social assistance’ component and that the mobility component of DLA is in the nature of a special non-contributory benefit and ‘could’ lawfully be included in the list in Annex IIa to Regulation No 1408/71, as amended, as a non-exportable benefit (see Case C‑299/05 Commission v Parliament and Council , paragraphs 67 and 74). It is in this context that the Court, which annulled the reference to DLA in the list in that annex, decided provisionally to maintain the effects of inclusion of DLA in that list as regards solely the mobility part thereof so that, within a reasonable period, appropriate measures could be taken to include it in that annex (see, to that effect, Case C‑299/05 Commission v Parliament and Council , paragraph 75). It follows, in the view of the Court, that the mobility component of DLA may be a special benefit within the meaning of Article 4(2a) of Regulation No 1408/71, as amended.

26 The framework agreement, in particular clause 4 thereof, aims to apply the principle of non-discrimination to fixed-term workers in order to prevent an employer using such an employment relationship to deny those workers rights which are recognised for permanent workers (judgments of 13 September 2007, Del Cerro Alonso, C‑307/05, EU:C:2007:509, paragraph 37; of 22 December 2010, Gavieiro Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres, C‑444/09 and C‑456/09, EU:C:2010:819, paragraph 48 and of 13 March 2014, NierodzikC‑38/13, EU:C:2014:152, paragraph 23).

23. The framework agreement, in particular clause 4 thereof, aims to apply the principle of non-discrimination to fixed-term workers in order to prevent an employer using such an employment relationship to deny those workers rights which are recognised for permanent workers (Case C‑307/05 Del Cerro Alonso [2007] ECR I‑7109, paragraph 37, and Gaviero Gaviero and Igliesias Torres , paragraph 48).

23. Since that article clearly extends insurance cover to all passengers, Ireland’s argument can be accepted only in so far as persons carried in a vehicle that was not designed for their transport could not be classified as ‘passengers’.

22. In addition, to alter the substance of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, or to answer the additional questions mentioned by the applicants in the main proceedings in their observations, would be incompatible with the Court’s function under Article 234 EC and with its duty to ensure that the governments of the Member States and the parties concerned are given the opportunity to submit observations under Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, bearing in mind that under that provision only the order of the referring court is notified to the interested parties (see, to that effect, inter alia, Joined Cases 141/81 to 143/81 Holdijk and Others [1982] ECR 1299, paragraph 6; Case C‑178/95 Wiljo [1997] ECR I‑585, paragraph 30; Case C‑352/95 Phytheron International [1997] ECR I‑1729, paragraph 14; and Kainuun Liikenne and Pohjohlan Liikenne , paragraph 24).

14 Finally, to alter the substance of questions referred for a preliminary ruling would be incompatible with the Court's function under Article 177 of the Treaty and with its duty to ensure that the Governments of the Member States and the parties concerned are given the opportunity to submit observations under Article 20 of the EC Statute of the Court, bearing in mind that, under that provision, only the order of the referring court is notified to the interested parties (see inter alia the judgments in Joined Cases 141/81 to 143/81 Holdijk and Others [1982] ECR 1299, paragraph 6, and Case C-178/95 Wiljo v Belgium [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 30).

61 Consequently, a party’s disagreement with the Opinion of the Advocate General, irrespective of the questions examined in that Opinion, cannot in itself constitute grounds justifying the reopening of the oral procedure (see judgments of 22 November 2012, E.ON Energie v Commission, C‑89/11 P, EU:C:2012:738, paragraph 62, and of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission, C‑33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 26).

35. According to settled case-law, in an action for failure to fulfil obligations it is for the Commission to prove the allegation that the obligation has not been fulfilled. It is the Commission which must provide the Court with the evidence necessary for the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and it may not rely on any presumption (see, inter alia, Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands [1982] ECR 1791, paragraph 6, and Case C-194/01 Commission v Austria [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 34).

6 IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT , IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 169 OF THE EEC TREATY FOR FAILURE TO FULFIL AN OBLIGATION , IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE COMMISSION TO PROVE THE ALLEGATION THAT THE OBLIGATION HAS NOT BEEN FULFILLED . IT IS THE COMMISSION ' S RESPONSIBILITY TO PLACE BEFORE THE COURT THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO ENABLE THE COURT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE OBLIGATION HAS NOT BEEN FULFILLED , AND IN SO DOING THE COMMISSION MAY NOT RELY ON ANY PRESUMPTION .

60. So far as concerns the Portuguese Republic’s argument that the potential changes to the legislation at issue could render the selection of a second supplier superfluous, it should be recalled that the Court has repeatedly held that the existence of a failure to fulfil obligations must be assessed in the light of the EU legislation in force at the close of the period prescribed by the Commission for the Member State concerned to comply with its reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, judgments in Commission v Belgium , C‑377/03, EU:C:2006:638, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and Commission v France , C‑170/09, EU:C:2010:97, paragraph 6 and the case-law cited). Therefore, the possibility that legislation might be amended does not relieve a Member State of its obligation to transpose the directive in force into its national legal order within the period prescribed for that transposition.

28 Although it is therefore for the Commission to prove an infringement of the Community rules, the Member State concerned must demonstrate that the Commission committed an error as to the financial consequences to be attributed to it (see, to this effect, Case 49/83 Luxembourg v Commission [1984] ECR 2931, paragraph 30).

30 IT IS TRUE THAT , IN ORDER TO OBTAIN EAGGF FINANCING FOR THE STORAGE AID IN QUESTION , THE LUXEMBOURG GOVERNMENT HAD TO DEMONSTRATE , NOT ONLY THAT THE WINE STORED WAS ACTUALLY TABLE WINE AT THE TIME WHEN THE STORAGE CONTRACTS WERE CONCLUDED , BUT ALSO THAT IT WAS NEVER RECOGNIZED AS QUALITY WINE PSR . HOWEVER , IN VIEW OF THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES , THE QUESTION MUST BE ASKED WHETHER THE LUXEMBOURG GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SATISFIED THAT EVIDENTIAL REQUIREMENT .

23. It must be noted that, according to settled case-law, Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/126, and Article 1(2) of Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licences (OJ 1991 L 237, p. 1), which precedes Directive 2006/126, provide for the mutual recognition, without any formality, of driving licences issued by Member States (see, to that effect, judgments in Akyüz , C‑467/10, EU:C:2012:112, paragraph 40, and Hofmann , C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraphs 43 and 44).

25. Finally, even though, as the governments which have submitted observations have correctly observed, the wording used in Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38 is not sufficiently precise to enable an applicant for entry or residence to rely directly on that provision in order to invoke criteria which should in his view be applied when assessing his application, the fact remains that such an applicant is entitled to a judicial review of whether the national legislation and its application have remained within the limits of the discretion set by that directive (see, by analogy, Case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld and Others [1996] ECR I-5403, paragraph 56; Case C-127/02 Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging [2004] ECR I-7405, paragraph 66; and Joined Cases C-165/09 to C-167/09 Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Others [2011] ECR I-4599, paragraphs 100 to 103).

101. As to the content of the programmes that must be drawn up, it is true that, as follows from paragraph 88 of the present judgment, the Member States have wide flexibility in selecting the specific initiatives to be implemented, whilst it is also true that they are not obliged to adopt policies and measures to ensure that ceilings are not exceeded before the end of 2010.

10. Par ailleurs, c’est à la Commission seule d’apprécier l’opportunité d’introduire et de maintenir le recours en manquement (voir en ce sens, notamment, arrêt du 22 juin 1993, Commission/Danemark, C‑243/89, Rec. p. I‑3353, point 30).

30 It should be noted that it is settled case-law that Directive 80/987 has a social objective, which is to guarantee employees a minimum of protection at EU level in the event of the employer’s insolvency through payment of outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships and relating to pay for a specific period (see, inter alia, judgments in Maso and Others, C‑373/95, EU:C:1997:353, paragraph 56; Walcher, C‑201/01, EU:C:2003:450, paragraph 38; and Tümer, C‑311/13, EU:C:2014:2337, paragraph 42). In that context, the Court has on many an occasion observed that claims for salary are, by their very nature, of great importance to the individual concerned (see, inter alia, judgment in Visciano, C‑69/08, EU:C:2009:468, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

42. Furthermore, according to the case-law of the Court, the first subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Directive 80/987 must be interpreted in the light of the social objective of that directive, which is to guarantee employees a minimum of protection at EU level in the event of the employer’s insolvency through payment of outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships and relating to pay for a specific period. Member States therefore cannot define at will the term ‘employee’ in such a way as to undermine the social objective of that directive (see, by analogy, judgment in van Ardennen , C‑435/10, EU:C:2011:751, paragraphs 27 and 34).

43. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the conditions applicable to the supply of medicinal products to the public are not harmonised under European Union law as it currently stands. Accordingly, Member States may impose conditions for supplying medicinal products to the public within the limits laid down in the FEU Treaty (see recital 21 in the preamble to Directive 2011/62/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, as regards the prevention of the entry into the legal supply chain of falsified medicinal products (OJ 2011 L 174, p. 74)). Consequently, the regime applicable to persons entrusted with the retail supply of medicinal products varies from one Member State to another (Case C-531/06 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-4103, paragraph 38).

91. It should however be recalled, first, that, as the Court of Justice has repeatedly held, the requirement that the Court of First Instance give reasons for its decisions cannot be interpreted as meaning that it is obliged to respond in detail to every single argument advanced by the appellant, particularly if the argument was not sufficiently clear and precise (see, inter alia, Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR I‑1611, paragraph 121; Case C-197/99 P Belgium v Commission [2003] ECR I‑8461, paragraph 81; and Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission , paragraph 90).

121 As the Advocate General observed in point 61 of his Opinion, although the Court of First Instance is required to give reasons for its decisions, it is not obliged to respond in detail to every single argument advanced by the appellant, particularly if the argument was not sufficiently clear and precise and was not adequately supported by evidence. In that regard, the appellant has not proved, or even asserted, that the arguments referred to in paragraph 119 of this judgment meet those requirements or that they were supported by evidence which was distorted by the Court of First Instance, or that in its assessment of that evidence the Court of First Instance contravened the rules of procedure or general legal principles concerning the burden of proof or the taking of evidence.

46 Recourse to this justification presupposes the existence of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society (see, as far as public policy is concerned, Bouchereau, cited above, paragraph 35).

16. The terms used to specify those exemptions are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see Case C‑287/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I‑5811, paragraph 43, and Case C‑8/01 Taksatorringen [2003] ECR I‑13711, paragraph 36). Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT (see Case C‑45/01 Dornier [2003] ECR I‑12911, paragraph 42; Case C‑498/03 Kingscrest Associates and Montecello [2005] ECR I‑4427, paragraph 29; and Case C‑106/05 L.u.P . [2006] ECR I‑5123, paragraph 24). Thus, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 13 should be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effect (see, to that effect, Case C‑284/03 Temco Europe [2004] ECR I‑11237, paragraph 17, and also, in relation to university education, Commission v Germany , paragraph 47).

42. According to the Court ' s case-law, the exemptions envisaged in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see in particular Case C-2/95 SDC [1997] ECR I-3017, paragraph 20; and Kügler , cited above, paragraph 28). However, the interpretation of the terms used in that provision must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT.

36. First of all, it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes even if they constitute a correct application of the Community law rule which is the subject of the action for failure to fulfil obligations (see, to that effect, Case C‑111/00 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I‑7555, paragraphs 13 and 14; Case C‑103/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I‑1147, paragraph 23; the judgment of 28 April 2005 in Case C‑157/04 Commission v Spain , not published in the ECR, paragraph 19; and the judgment of 7 July 2005 in Case C‑214/04 Commission v Italy , not published in the ECR, paragraph 14).

38. The Court has thus stated, first, that the fact that a substance or object undergoes one of the disposal or recovery operations listed, respectively, in Annexes II A and II B to the Directive does not, by itself, mean that a substance or object involved in such an operation is to be classified as waste (see, to that effect, inter alia, Niselli , paragraphs 36 and 37); and, secondly, that the concept of waste does not exclude substances and objects which are capable of economic re-use (see, to that effect, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑304/94, C‑330/94, C‑342/94 and C‑224/95 Tombesi and Others [1997] ECR I‑3561, paragraphs 47 and 48). The system of supervision and control established by the Directive is intended to cover all objects and substances discarded by their owners, even if they have a commercial value and are collected on a commercial basis for recycling, recovery or re-use (see, inter alia, Case C‑9/00 Palin Granit and Vehmassalon kansanterveystyön kuntayhtymän hallitus [2002] ECR I‑3533, ‘ Palin Granit’ , paragraph 29).

47 As regards the interpretation of the Community legislation on waste, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the concept of waste within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 75/442, in its original version, and Article 1 of Directive 78/319 was not to be understood as excluding substances and objects which were capable of economic reutilization. National legislation which defines waste as excluding substances and objects which are capable of economic reutilization is not compatible with Directive 75/442, in its original version, and Directive 78/319 (Case C-359/88 Zanetti and Others [1990] ECR I-1509, paragraphs 12 and 13, and Case C-422/92 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-1097, paragraph 22).

69. In the context of that assessment, it is particularly important to determine whether the aim of that advertising is solely to distinguish between the products of the advertiser and those of his competitor and thus to highlight differences objectively ( Toshiba Europe , paragraph 53, and Case C-59/05 Siemens [2006] ECR I-2147, paragraph 14).

17 The Court has held, in its judgment in Schumacher, cited above, paragraph 20, that the purchase of a medicinal preparation in a pharmacy in another Member State provides a guarantee equivalent to that which would arise from sale of the preparation by a pharmacy in a Member State into which the medicinal preparation is imported by a private individual, and that that conclusion is all the more compelling inasmuch as the conditions for access to the profession of pharmacist and the conditions for exercise of that profession regulated in Council Directives 85/342 and 85/433, cited above.

20 The purchase of a medicinal preparation in a pharmacy in another Member State provides a guarantee equivalent to that referred to by the German and Danish Governments, that is to say that which arises from the fact that the medicinal preparation is sold through a pharmacy in the Member State into which the medicinal preparation is imported by a private individual . That conclusion is all the more compelling inasmuch as the conditions for access to the profession of pharmacist and the conditions for the exercise of that profession are regulated in Council Directives 85/432 and 85/433 of 16 September 1985 ( Official Journal 1985, L 253, pp . 34 and 37 ).

125. According to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure, in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for it and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see Joined Cases C‑121/91 and C‑122/91 CT Control (Rotterdam) and JCT Benelux v Commission [1993] ECR I‑3873, paragraph 31, and Case C‑76/01 P Eurocoton and Others v Council [2003] ECR I‑10091, paragraph 88).

35. A procedure which makes the provision of services through the posting of workers on national territory by an undertaking established in another Member State subject to the issue of such an administrative licence is likely to constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU (see, by analogy, Case C-43/93 Vander Elst [1994] ECR I-3803, paragraph 15, and Case C-244/04 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I-885, paragraph 34).

15 Similarly, the Court has already held that national legislation which makes the provision of certain services on national territory by an undertaking established in another Member State subject to the issue of an administrative licence constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the meaning of Article 59 of the Treaty (see the judgment in Saeger, paragraph 14). Furthermore, it is apparent from the judgment in Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81 Seco and Desquenne & Giral v Etablissement d' Assurance contre la Vieillesse et l' Invalidité [1982] ECR 223 that legislation of a Member State which requires undertakings established in another Member State to pay fees in order to be able to employ in its own territory workers in respect of whom they are already liable for the same periods of employment to pay similar fees in the State in which they are established proves financially to be more onerous for those employers, who in fact have to bear a heavier burden than those established within the national territory.

30. Ainsi que la Cour l’a maintes fois jugé, l’article 49 CE exige non seulement l’élimination de toute discrimination à l’encontre du prestataire de services établi dans un autre État membre en raison de sa nationalité, mais également la suppression de toute restriction, même si elle s’applique indistinctement aux prestataires nationaux et à ceux des autres États membres, lorsqu’elle est de nature à prohiber, à gêner ou à rendre moins attrayantes les activités du prestataire établi dans un autre État membre, où il fournit légalement des services analogues (voir, notamment, arrêt du 13 février 2003, Commission/Italie, C‑131/01, Rec. p. I‑1659, point 26, et jurisprudence citée).

28 Although Article 7 of the Charter cannot be interpreted as depriving the Member States of the margin of appreciation available to them when examining applications for family reunification, the provisions of Directive 2003/86 must nonetheless, in the course of such an examination, be interpreted and applied in the light of — inter alia — Article 7 of the Charter, as is moreover apparent from recital 2 in the preamble to that directive, which requires the Member States to examine applications for reunification with a view to promoting family life (see, to that effect, judgment in O and Others, C‑356/11 and C‑357/11, EU:C:2012:776, paragraphs 79 and 80).

80. However, in the course of such an examination and when determining in particular whether the conditions laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/86 are satisfied, the provisions of that directive must be interpreted and applied in the light of Articles 7 and 24(2) and (3) of the Charter, as is moreover apparent from recital 2 in the preamble to and Article 5(5) of that directive, which require the Member States to examine the applications for reunification in question in the interests of the children concerned and with a view to promoting family life.

Furthermore, according to settled case-law, it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, in particular, judgments of 4 September 2014 in Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 43, and of 5 March 2015 in Ezz and Others v Council, C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 111). In this regard, Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice specifies that the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on must identify precisely those points in the grounds of the decision of the General Court which are contested.

99. However, those conditions may not be less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims and must not be such as in practice to make it impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation ( Francovich and Others , paragraph 43).

43 Further, the substantive and procedural conditions for reparation of loss and damage laid down by the national law of the Member States must not be less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims and must not be so framed as to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation (see, in relation to the analogous issue of the repayment of taxes levied in breach of Community law, inter alia the judgment in Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595).

102. Under Article 11 of Regulation No 1150/2000, any delay in making the entries in the account referred to in Article 9(1) of that regulation gives rise to the payment of interest by the Member State concerned at the interest rate applicable to the entire period of delay. That interest is payable in respect of any delay, regardless of the reason for the delay in making the entry in the Commission’s account (see, inter alia, Case C-460/01 Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 91).

36 By contrast, terms ancillary to those that define the very essence of the contractual relationship cannot fall within the concept of ‘main subject matter of the contract’, within the meaning of that provision (judgments of 30 April 2014, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai, C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraph 50, and of 23 April 2015, Van Hove, C‑96/14, EU:C:2015:262, paragraph 33).

33. Contractual terms falling within the concept of ‘the main subject-matter of the contract’, within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13, must be understood as being those that lay down the essential obligations of the contract and, as such, characterise it (see, to that effect, judgments in Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid , C‑484/08, EU:C:2010:309, paragraph 34, and Kásler et Káslerné Rábai , C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraph 49). By contrast, terms ancillary to those that define the very essence of the contractual relationship cannot fall within the concept of ‘the main subject-matter of the contract’, within the meaning of that provision (judgments in Kásler et Káslerné Rábai , C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraph 50, and Matei , C‑143/13, EU:C:2015:127, paragraph 54).

36. In the light of the permanent and continuous nature of the planning and management services provided by Saudaçor, the fact that that compensation is determined not on the basis of individualised services but on a flat-rate and annual basis to cover the operating costs of that company is not in itself such as to affect the direct link between the supply of services made and the consideration received, the amount of which is determined in advance on the basis of well-established criteria (see, to that effect, judgment in Le Rayon d’Or , C‑151/13, EU:C:2014:185, paragraphs 36 and 37).

29 Secondly, although a contracting authority may request the correction or amplification of data relating to an offer, such corrections or additions may relate only to data which can be objectively shown to pre-date the deadline for applying to take part in the tendering procedure concerned and may not relate to information which must be communicated, failing which the tender will be excluded (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 October 2013, Manova, C‑336/12, EU:C:2013:647, paragraphs 39 and 40).

40. However, it should be explained that this would not be the case if the contract documents required provision of the missing particulars or information, on pain of exclusion. It falls to the contracting authority to comply strictly with the criteria which it has itself laid down (see, to that effect, Case C‑496/99 P Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta [2004] ECR I‑3801, paragraph 115).

31 That is the position here. Article 8(1)(b) of Directive 92/81 imposes on the Member States, first, the clear and precise obligation not to levy the harmonised excise duty on fuel used for the purpose of air navigation other than private pleasure flying. Second, the degree of latitude afforded to Member States by the introductory wording of Article 8(1), whereby exemptions are granted by the Member States `under conditions which they shall lay down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and of preventing any evasion, avoidance or abuse', cannot detract from the unconditional nature of the obligation imposed by that provision to grant exemption (see, mutatis mutandis, paragraphs 32 to 35 of Becker, cited above).

22. Since the Court has jurisdiction to impose a financial penalty not suggested by the Commission (see, to that effect, Case C-304/02 Commission v France [2005] ECR I-6263, paragraph 90), the action is not inadmissible simply because the Commission takes the view, at a certain stage of the procedure before the Court, that a penalty is no longer necessary.

90. So far as concerns the German Government’s argument as to the Court’s lack of political legitimacy to impose a financial penalty not suggested by the Commission, the various stages involved in the procedure laid down in Article 228(2) EC should be distinguished. Once the Commission has exercised its discretion as to the initiation of infringement proceedings (see, inter alia, in relation to Article 226 EC, the judgment in Case C-74/02 Commission v Germany [2003] ECR I‑9877, paragraph 17, and the judgment of 21 October 2004 in Case C-477/03 Commission v Germany , not published in the ECR, paragraph 11), the question of whether or not the Member State concerned has complied with a previous judgment of the Court is subjected to a judicial procedure in which political considerations are irrelevant. It is in performance of its judicial function that the Court assesses the extent to which the situation prevailing in the Member State in question complies with the initial judgment and, where appropriate, assesses the seriousness of a persisting breach of obligations. It follows that, as the Advocate General has observed in point 24 of his Opinion of 18 November 2004, the appropriateness of imposing a financial penalty and the choice of the penalty most suited to the circumstances of the case can be appraised only in the light of the findings made by the Court in the judgment to be delivered under Article 228(2) EC and therefore fall outside the political sphere.

18 It must also be borne in mind that in its judgment of 2 December 1971 in Case 5/71 Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schoeppenstedt v Council (( 1971 )) ECR 975, paragraph 11, the Court held that the Community does not incur non-contractual liability for damage suffered by individuals as a consequence of action involving choices of economic policy, by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty, unless a sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual has occurred .

82. It is settled case-law that such a special situation is established where it is clear from the circumstances of the case that the person liable is in an exceptional situation as compared with other operators engaged in the same business (see, to that effect, Case C-86/97 Trans-Ex-Import [1999] ECR I-1041, paragraphs 21 and 22, and Case C-61/98 De Haan [1999] ECR I-5003, paragraphs 52 and 53). It is in the light of those circumstances that the question whether they constitute a special situation for the purposes of Article 239 of the CCC must be examined.

21 In undertaking its examination, in the light of the objective of fairness underlying Article 239 of the Code, the customs authority must confine itself to verifying whether the circumstances relied on are liable to place the applicant in an exceptional situation as compared with other operators engaged in the same business.

44 Secondly, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see judgment in Lukoyl Neftohim Burgas, C‑330/13, EU:C:2014:1757, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

165. According to established case-law, observance of the rights of the defence, during the formal investigation procedure under Article 88(2) EC, requires the Member State concerned to be placed in a position in which it may effectively make known its views on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents obtained by the Commission to support its claim that there has been infringement of European Union law (see, to that effect, Case 40/85 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2321, paragraph 28, and Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263, paragraph 27), as well as on the observations submitted by interested third parties in accordance with Article 88(2) EC. In so far as the Member State has not been afforded the opportunity to comment on those observations, the Commission may not use them in its decision against that State (see Case C‑301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I‑307, paragraph 30; Case C‑142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I‑959, paragraph 47; and Case C‑288/96 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I‑8237, paragraph 100).

30 The Court recognized in those judgments that this principle requires the Member State in question to be placed in a position in which it may effectively make known its views on the observations submitted by interested third parties under Article 93(2 ) of the Treaty and on which the Commission proposes to base its decision . The Court held that in so far as the Member State had not been afforded the opportunity to comment on such observations, the Commission could not incorporate them in its decision against that State .

32 It is apparent from Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/78 that the directive applies, within the limits of the areas of competence conferred on the EU, ‘to all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies’, in relation inter alia to ‘employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay’ (judgment of 26 September 2013, Dansk Jurist- og Økonomforbund, C‑546/11, EU:C:2013:603, paragraph 24).

34. Directive 76/308 establishes common rules on mutual assistance in order to ensure the recovery of claims relating, inter alia, to certain levies, duties and taxes (see, to that effect, Case C-470/04 N [2006] ECR I‑7409, paragraph 53).

53. Moreover, Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims resulting from operations forming part of the system of financing the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and of the agricultural levies and customs duties (OJ 1976 L 73, p. 18), as amended by Council Directive 2001/44/EC of 15 June 2001 (OJ 2001 L 175, p. 17), provides that a Member State may request the assistance of another Member State in the recovery of debts relating to certain taxes, including those on income and capital.

19. The principle of the right to deduct VAT is, however, subject to the derogation in Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive. The Member States are thereby authorised to retain their existing legislation as at the date of entry into force of the Sixth Directive in regard to exclusion from the right of deduction until such time as the Council has adopted the provisions envisaged by that article (see Case C‑371/07 Danfoss and AstraZeneca [2008] ECR I‑9549, paragraph 28, and X Holding and Oracle Nederland , paragraph 38).

34. However, before that date, the Court had already held, as is apparent from the third recital in the preamble to Regulation No 2195/91, that even though Article 13(2)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 did not expressly refer to the case of a worker who was not employed when he applied for sickness insurance benefit, that provision referred, where necessary, to the legislation of the State in whose territory the worker was last employed, so that a worker who ceased to be employed in the territory of one Member State and did not go to work in the territory of another Member State continued to be subject to the legislation of the Member State in which he was last employed (see, to that effect, Case 150/82 Coppola [1983] ECR 43, paragraph 11, and Ten Holder , paragraphs 13 to 15).

11 BY VIRTUE OF THAT PROVISION , AND IN THE ABSENCE OF CONTRARY PROVISIONS REFERRING TO THE PARTICULAR TYPE OF BENEFIT IN QUESTION , ONLY THE LEGISLATION OF THE STATE IN WHOSE TERRITORY THE WORKER IS EMPLOYED IS THEREFORE APPLICABLE . ALTHOUGH THAT PROVISION DOES NOT EXPRESSLY MENTION THE CASE OF A WORKER WHO IS NOT EMPLOYED WHEN HE SEEKS SICKNESS BENEFIT , IT IS APPROPRIATE TO INTERPRET IT AS MEANING THAT , WHERE NECESSARY , IT REFERS TO THE LEGISLATION OF THE STATE IN WHOSE TERRITORY THE WORKER WAS LAST EMPLOYED .

44 It must be borne in mind that classification as ‘State aid’ requires all the conditions laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU to be satisfied. Thus, for the purpose of a classification as State aid, that provision presupposes in particular that there is an advantage conferred on an undertaking (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2015, EasyPay and Finance Engineering, C‑185/14, EU:C:2015:716, paragraphs 35 and 36 and the case-law cited).

116 Lastly, the imposition of the obligation to recover that aid infringes neither the principle of proportionality nor the principle of equal treatment. First, it is the Court’s settled case-law that abolishing unlawful aid by means of recovery is the logical consequence of a finding that it is unlawful. Accordingly, the recovery of such aid, for the purpose of restoring the previously existing situation, cannot in principle be regarded as disproportionate to the objectives of the provisions of the FEU Treaty relating to State aid (judgments of 11 March 2010, CELF and Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, C‑1/09, EU:C:2010:136, paragraph 54, and of 28 July 2011, Diputación Foral de Vizcaya and Others v Commission, C‑471/09 P to C‑473/09 P, not published, EU:C:2011:521, paragraph 100).

54. In a situation such as that in the main proceedings, the existence of an exceptional circumstance cannot, finally, be upheld in the light of the principle of proportionality. Abolishing unlawful aid by means of recovery is the logical consequence of a finding that it is unlawful. Accordingly, the recovery of such aid, for the purpose of restoring the previously existing situation, cannot in principle be regarded as disproportionate to the objectives of the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to State aid (see, inter alia, Case C‑298/00 P Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I‑4087, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).

16 In that connection it is settled case-law that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for by Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. The Court may not decline to give a ruling on a question referred to it by a national court unless it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law or the consideration of the validity of a Community rule sought by that court bears no relation to the facts of the main action or its purpose (see, in particular, Case C-318/98 Fornasar and Others [2000] ECR I-4785, paragraph 27, and Joined Cases C-223/99 and C-260/99 Agorà and Excelsior [2001] ECR I-3605, paragraphs 18 and 20).

102 As regards the conditions relating to the effect of the scheme to guarantee the shares of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector at issue in the main proceedings on trade between Member States and the distortion of competition capable of being caused by that scheme, it should be noted that, for the purpose of categorising a national measure as State aid, it is not necessary to establish that the aid has a real effect on trade between Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, it being necessary only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition (judgments of 29 April 2004, Italy v Commission, C‑372/97, EU:C:2004:234, paragraph 44; of 15 December 2005, Unicredito Italiano, C‑148/04, EU:C:2005:774, paragraph 54; and of 19 March 2015, OTP Bank, C‑672/13, EU:C:2015:185, paragraph 54).

54. For the purpose of categorising a national measure as State aid, it is not necessary to establish that the aid has a real effect on trade between Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, it being necessary only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition (judgments in Italy v Commission , C‑372/97, EU:C:2004:234, paragraph 44, and Unicredito Italiano , C‑148/04, EU:C:2005:774, paragraph 54).

62. Institutions for occupational retirement provision are subject to rules of the same kind by virtue of Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 June 2003 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (OJ 2003 L 235, p. 10). These rules, coordinated at European Union level, are designed to ensure a high degree of security for future pensioners who are to enjoy the benefits of those institutions (see, to this effect, Case C-343/08 Commission v Czech Republic [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 45).

38. It is true that, according to the line of authority devolving from Guimont , the Court’s answer to questions concerning fundamental freedoms of the European Union may, even in a purely internal situation, nevertheless be of use to the referring court, especially if its national law were to require it to allow a national to enjoy the same rights as those which a national of another Member State would derive from EU law in the same situation (see, inter alia, Case C‑393/08 Sbarigia [2010] ECR I‑6337, paragraph 23, and Susisalo and Others , paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

23. As regards next the arguments raised by Assiprofar, the Ordine dei Farmacisti della Provincia di Roma and the Greek Government, according to which all aspects of the main proceedings are confined within one Member State, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that its answer may be useful to the referring court even in such circumstances, in particular if its national law were to require it to allow a national to enjoy the same rights as those which a national of another Member State would derive from European Union law in the same situation (see, inter alia, Case C‑451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti [2006] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 29; Cipolla and Others , paragraph 30; and Joined Cases C‑570/07 and C‑571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 36).

51. It is apparent from the Court’s case-law that, in order to rebut the presumption that a parent company which holds 100% of the capital of its subsidiary actually exercises a decisive influence over that subsidiary, it is for the parent company to put before the EU judicature any evidence relating to the organisational, economic and legal links between its subsidiary and itself which are apt to demonstrate that they do not constitute a single economic entity (see Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , paragraph 65).

59. The scope of the Directive is very wide, as the Court has already held (see Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others , paragraph 43, and Lindqvist , paragraph 88), and the personal data covered by the Directive are varied. The length of time such data are to be stored, defined in Article 6(1)(e) of the Directive according to the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further processed, can therefore differ. Where the length of time for which basic data are to be stored is very long, the data subject’s interest in exercising the rights to object and to remedies referred to in paragraph 57 of the present judgment may diminish in certain cases. If, for example, the relevant recipients are numerous or there is a high frequency of disclosure to a more restricted number of recipients, the obligation to keep the information on the recipients or categories of recipient of personal data and on the content of the data disclosed for such a long period could represent an excessive burden on the controller.

43. Moreover, the applicability of Directive 95/46 to situations where there is no direct link with the exercise of the fundamental freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty is confirmed by the wording of Article 3(1) of the directive, which defines its scope in very broad terms, not making the application of the rules on protection depend on whether the processing has an actual connection with freedom of movement between Member States. That is also confirmed by the exceptions in Article 3(2), in particular those concerning the processing of personal data "in the course of an activity ... provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union" or "in the course of a purely personal or household activity" . Those exceptions would not, at the very least, be worded in that way if the directive were applicable exclusively to situations where there is a sufficient link with the exercise of freedoms of movement.

48. Furthermore, the Court has already held that the social provisions of Decision No 1/80, of which the first paragraph of Article 7 forms part, constitute a further stage in securing freedom of movement for workers on the basis of Articles 45 TFEU, 46 TFEU and 47 TFEU and that, therefore, the principles enshrined in those Treaty articles must be transposed, so far as possible, to Turkish nationals who enjoy the rights conferred by that Decision (see, to that effect, Case C-171/95 Tetik [1997] ECR I-329, paragraph 20, and Case C-351/95 Kadiman [1997] ECR I-2133, paragraph 30).

40. In the procedure referred to in Article 267 TFEU, it is for the national court hearing a dispute concerning the application of Article 6(4) of the Sixth Directive to inquire, having regard to all the details of the case, and in particular the nature of the contractual obligations of the trader concerned towards its customers, whether or not that condition is met (see, to that effect, in relation to Article 26 of the Sixth Directive, Case C-163/91 Van Ginkel [1992] ECR I-5723, paragraph 21, and Case C‑200/04 ISt [2005] ECR I‑8691, paragraphs 19 and 20).

19. To answer that question, it is necessary to ask whether a company such as iSt acts in its own name and whether it qualifies as a trader covered by the special scheme for travel agents and uses for its operations supplies and services provided by other taxable persons.

35. However, it should be pointed out that where the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but the operative part of the judgment is shown to be well founded for other legal reasons, the appeal must be dismissed (Case C‑210/98 P Salzgitter v Commission [2000] ECR I‑5843, paragraph 58, and Case C‑352/09 P ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission [2011] ECR I‑2359, paragraph 136).

63 In that regard, it is true that the Court has held that, in order to give effect to the transitional rules in Article 94(1) to (3) of Regulation No 1408/71, it was necessary to take account of periods of insurance completed before that regulation came into effect (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 February 2002, Kauer, C‑28/00, EU:C:2002:82, paragraph 52, and of 18 April 2002, Duchon, C‑290/00, EU:C:2002:234, paragraph 23). In the cases giving rise to those two judgments, the parties concerned who had requested that they be granted an Austrian pension had been insured under the relevant national legislation. The Court therefore found it appropriate to assess the legality of the national measures in question in light of the EU law which applied following the accession of the Republic of Austria to the European Union (judgment of 18 April 2002, Duchon, C‑290/00, EU:C:2002:234, paragraph 28) and that, consequently, the competent institution had to apply the principles relating to the freedom of movement for workers and the transitional rules in Article 94(1) to (3) of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 February 2002, Kauer, C‑28/00, EU:C:2002:82, paragraphs 45 and 50, and of 18 April 2002, Duchon, C‑290/00, EU:C:2002:234, paragraph 32).

52 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that Article 94(2) of Regulation No 1408/71, read in conjunction, depending on the case, with Articles 8a, 48 and 52 of the Treaty, is to be interpreted as precluding application of a Member State's legislation under which child-raising periods completed in another State party to the EEA Agreement or in another Member State of the European Union are not treated as substitute periods for the purposes of old-age insurance unless: - they were completed after the entry into force of that regulation in the first State, and - the applicant receives, or received, for the children concerned, cash maternity allowances or equivalent allowances under the legislation of that same State, when such periods completed in national territory are treated as substitute periods for the purposes of old-age insurance without any limitation in time or any other condition.

34. Moreover, the exercise of rights granted to a woman under that Article cannot be made subject to unfavourable treatment regarding conditions to be fulfilled in order for her to attain a higher grade in the professional hierarchy. From that point of view, Directive 76/207 is intended to bring about equality in substance rather than in form (see, to that effect, Merino Gómez , paragraph 37, and Thibault , paragraph 26).

58. As regards the second point, it is true that the Court has held that the possibility cannot be excluded that a Member State might succeed in ensuring compliance with its obligations under the Treaty by concluding a convention for the avoidance of double taxation with another Member State (see, to that effect, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation , paragraph 71; Amurta , paragraph 79; and Commission v Italy , paragraph 36).

71. It is for the national court to determine, in each case, whether that obligation has been complied with, taking account, where necessary, of the provisions of the DTC that that Member State has concluded with the State in which the shareholder company is resident (see, to that effect, Case C-265/04 Bouanich [2006] ECR I-923, paragraphs 51 to 55).

50 In relation to the German Government's argument concerning the simplification of the payment of VAT, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, although the introductory sentence of Article 13(A)(1) of the Sixth Directive states that Member States are to lay down the conditions for exemptions in order to ensure the correct and straightforward application of the exemptions and to prevent any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse, those conditions cannot affect the definition of the subject-matter of the exemptions envisaged (see, in particular, Case C-124/96 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-2501, paragraphs 11 and 12, and Case C-76/99 Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 26).

27. According to the Court’s settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments in van der Weerd and Others , C‑222/05 to C‑225/05, EU:C:2007:318, paragraph 22, and Melki and Abdeli , C‑188/10 and C‑189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 27).

22. According to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of Community law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (see Case C‑300/01 Salzmann [2003] ECR I‑4899, paragraphs 29 and 31). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 39, and Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25).

37 The assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the internal market, under Article 107(3) TFEU, falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union (see judgment of 21 November 2013, Deutsche Lufthansa, C‑284/12, EU:C:2013:755, paragraph 28).

30. It also follows from the case-law relating to the Sixth Directive that the terms used to specify the exemptions in Article 132 of Directive 2006/112 are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle, arising from Article 2(1)(a) and (c) of Directive 2006/112, that VAT is to be levied on all goods and services supplied for consideration by a taxable person. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Thus, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 132 should be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effect (see by analogy, in particular, Case C‑445/05 Haderer [2007] ECR I‑4841, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited; Case C‑461/08 Don Bosco Onroerend Goed [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited; as well as Eulitz , paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

25. It should be noted at the outset that, according to consistent case-law, the terms used to specify an exemption such as that set out in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since that exemption constitutes an exception to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all goods and services supplied for consideration by a taxable person. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Thus, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 13 should be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effect (see, to that effect, Case C‑445/05 Haderer [2007] ECR I‑4841, paragraph 18; Case C‑407/07 Stichting Centraal Begeleidingsorgaan voor de Intercollegiale Toetsing [2008] ECR–I0000, paragraph 30; and Case C‑357/07 TNT Post UK [2009] ECR I–0000, paragraph 31).

10 Moreover, a provision is sufficiently precise to be relied on by an individual and applied by the court where the obligation which it imposes is set out in unequivocal terms (judgments in Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Health Authority [1986] ECR 723 and Case 71/85 Netherlands v Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging [1986] ECR 3855).

18 In the second place, the Hellenic Republic argues, as regards Article 65(1)(a) TFEU and the case-law of the Court on direct taxation, particularly the judgments of 6 June 2000 in Verkooijen (C‑35/98, EU:C:2000:294, paragraph 43), of 7 December 2004 in Manninen (C‑319/02, EU:C:2004:484, paragraphs 28 and 29), and of 25 October 2012 in Commission v Belgium (C‑387/11, EU:C:2012:670, paragraph 45), that, as regards the exemption from inheritance tax relating to immovable property considered to be the primary residence, the situation of heirs who are permanently resident in Greece is not objectively comparable to that of heirs who are not permanently resident in that Member State. Whereas resident heirs would not have adequate immovable property in Greece and would have housing needs in that Member State, which property acquired by inheritance could cover or supplement, non-resident heirs would, as a general rule, have a primary residence outside Greece and would not be relying on property received by inheritance and located in Greece in order to satisfy their housing needs.

43 In addition, the possibility granted to the Member States by Article 73d(1)(a) of the Treaty of applying the relevant provisions of their tax legislation which distinguish between taxpayers according to their place of residence or the place where their capital is invested has already been upheld by the Court. According to that case-law, before the entry into force of Article 73d(1)(a) of the Treaty, national tax provisions of the kind to which that article refers, in so far as they establish certain distinctions based, in particular, on the residence of taxpayers, could be compatible with Community law provided that they applied to situations which were not objectively comparable (see, in particular, Case C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225) or could be justified by overriding reasons in the general interest, in particular in relation to the cohesion of the tax system (Case C-204/90 Bachmann v Belgian State [1992] ECR I-249 and Case C-300/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-305).

16 IN VIEW OF THESE OBSERVATIONS , THE COURT POINTS OUT THAT ALTHOUGH IT ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE JUDGMENT IN THE HANSEN & BALLE CASE , TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY LAW , THAT CERTAIN TAX EXEMPTIONS OR TAX CONCESSIONS ARE LAWFUL , THIS IS ON CONDITION THAT THE MEMBER STATES USING THOSE POWERS EXTEND THE BENEFIT THEREOF WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION TO IMPORTED PRODUCTS IN THE SAME CONDITIONS . IT IS NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THOSE PRACTICES WERE LAWFUL IN PARTICULAR SO AS TO ENABLE PRODUCTIONS OR UNDERTAKINGS TO CONTINUE WHICH WOULD NO LONGER BE PROFITABLE WITHOUT THESE SPECIAL TAX BENEFITS BECAUSE OF THE RISE IN PRODUCTION COSTS . ON THE OTHER HAND , THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED IN THAT JUDGMENT CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD AS LEGITIMATING TAX DIFFERENCES WHICH ARE DISCRIMINATORY OR PROTECTIVE . THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE DISPUTE AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION

42. Second, according to the Court’s settled case-law, for a request for substitution of grounds to be admissible, the appellant must have an interest in bringing proceedings, in so far as the request must be capable, if successful, of procuring an advantage to the party making it. That may be the case where the request for substitution of grounds amounts to a defence to one of the applicant’s pleas (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑501/06 P, C‑513/06 P, C‑515/06 P and C‑519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission [2009] ECR I‑9291, paragraph 23, and the judgment of 21 December 2011 in Case C‑329/09 P Iride v Commission , paragraphs 48 to 51).

23. According to the Court’s settled case-law, for an appellant to have an interest in bringing proceedings the appeal must be capable, if successful, of procuring an advantage to the party bringing it (orders in Case C-111/99 P Lech‑Stahlwerke v Commission [2001] ECR I-727, paragraph 18, and Case C‑503/07 P Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v Commission [2008] ECRI‑2217, paragraph 48 and case-law cited).

23 As the Court held in the judgment in Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, at paragraph 18, Article 6 does not prescribe a specific measure to be taken in the event of a breach of the prohibition of discrimination, but leaves Member States free to choose between the different solutions suitable for achieving the objective of the Directive, depending on the different situations which may arise.

21. Conformément au principe de précaution, tel qu’interprété par la Cour, lorsque des incertitudes subsistent quant à l’existence ou à la portée de risques pour la santé des personnes, des mesures de protection peuvent être prises sans avoir à attendre que la réalité et la gravité de ces risques soient pleinement démontrées (arrêt Monsanto Agricoltura Itali a e.a., C‑236/01, EU:C:2003:431, point 111, ainsi que, en ce sens, arrêts Codacons et Federconsumatori, C‑132/03, EU:C:2005:310, point 61, et Agrarproduktion Staebelow, C‑504/04, EU:C:2006:30, point 39).

39. Therefore, it must be accepted that, where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, the institutions, applying the principle of precaution and preventive action, may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent (see, to that effect, National Farmers’ Union and Others, cited above, paragraph 63).

33. Next, it must be noted that the obligation to provide a statement of reasons is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, the latter being concerned with the substantive legality of the measure at issue (see to that effect, Case C‑310/99 Italy v Commission [2002] ECR I‑2289, paragraph 48). Since the objective of the Commission’s single ground of appeal is precisely to contest the legal analysis of the obligation of the Court of First Instance to provide a statement of reasons, the Commission cannot be criticised for inviting the Court of Justice to re-examine the substance of the contested decision.

41. In accordance with the principles common to the laws of the Member States, the right to restitution from the person enriched is conditional upon there being no valid legal basis for the enrichment at issue (Case C‑47/07 P Masdar (UK) v Commission [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 44 to 46 and 49).

46. On the other hand, in order for an action for unjust enrichment to be upheld, it is essential that there be no valid legal basis for the enrichment. That condition is not satisfied, in particular, where the enrichment derives from contractual obligations.

44 Secondly, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see judgment in Lukoyl Neftohim Burgas, C‑330/13, EU:C:2014:1757, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

17 Lastly, Article 20 TFEU, while establishing citizenship of the Union, merely provides that citizens of the Union enjoy the rights conferred by the Treaty and are subject to the duties imposed thereby. It cannot therefore be applied independently of the specific provisions of the Treaty which govern the rights and the duties of the citizens of the Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2004, My, C‑293/03, EU:C:2004:821, paragraph 32).

32. Article 17 EC, whilst establishing citizenship of the Union, merely provides that citizens of the Union enjoy the rights conferred by the Treaty and are subject to the duties imposed thereby. It cannot therefore be applied independently of the specific provisions of the Treaty which govern the rights and duties of the citizens of the Union.

69. In that respect, it must observed that the request for an advisory opinion concerned the respective obligations and responsibilities of the flag State and the coastal State in relation to IUU fishing, which undermines the conservation and management of fish stocks. As noted in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the present judgment, IUU fishing falls within the scope of a range of provisions of UNCLOS, to which the European Union is a contracting party, of the FAO Compliance Agreement, to which the Community acceded by Decision 96/428, of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, which the Community ratified by Decision 98/414, and of partnership agreements between the European Union and member States of the SRFC, which form an integral part of the legal order of the European Union pursuant to Article 216(2) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment in Air Transport Association of America and Others , C‑366/10, EU:C:2011:864, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited). It is also the subject of detailed regulation in EU law, which, moreover, was reinforced in 2008 in order to take into account the European Union’s international commitments, as noted in paragraphs 14 to 19 of the present judgment.

29. Thus, it is apparent from the Court’s recent case-law that the interpretation of the third subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 applies equally to the possibility of an administrative penalty as to that of an administrative measure (judgment in Pfeifer & Langen , C‑52/14, EU:C:2015:381, paragraphs 40, 43 and 47).

43. It follows therefrom that an act must set out with sufficient precision the transactions to which the suspicions of irregularities relate in order to constitute an ‘act relating to investigation or legal proceedings’, within the meaning of the third subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95. That requirement for precision does not, however, require the act to state the possibility that a penalty or particular administrative measure may be imposed.

50 With regard to the second objection, it is true that the UVG establishes an original right vested in the child. That said, family benefits by their nature cannot be regarded as payable to an individual in isolation from his or her family circumstances (see Hoever and Zachow, paragraph 37). It follows, as regards application of Articles 73 and 74 of Regulation No 1408/71, first, that the legal classification of the benefit under domestic law has no bearing on their interpretation and, second, that it is irrelevant that the person to whom that benefit is to be awarded is a member of the worker's family rather than the worker himself.

43. In that regard, the Court has acknowledged, first, that the objective of maintaining a balanced medical and hospital service open to all may fall within the derogations on grounds of public health provided for in Article 46 EC, in so far as such an objective contributes to the attainment of a high level of health protection ( Kohll , paragraph 50; Müller‑Fauré and van Riet , paragraphs 67 and 71, and Watts , paragraph 104), and, secondly, that it cannot be excluded that the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social security system may constitute an overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying an obstacle to the principle of freedom to provide services ( Kohll , paragraph 41; Müller‑Fauré and van Riet , paragraph 73; Watts , paragraph 103, and Elchinov , paragraph 42).

73. However, in so far as, in particular, it could have consequences for the overall level of public-health protection, the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social security system may also constitute per se an overriding general-interest reason capable of justifying a barrier of that kind (Kohll , paragraph 41, and Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 72).

67. Before imposing supplementary requirements to cover differences between the education and training provided in the Member State of origin and that provided in an applicant’s host Member State, the competent national authorities must therefore assess whether the knowledge acquired by an applicant, including knowledge acquired in the host Member State, in the course of practical experience can be taken into account for the purpose of proving possession of the knowledge required by the latter (see, to that effect, Vlassopoulou , paragraph 20; Fernández de Bobadilla , paragraph 33; Case C‑313/01 Morgenbesser [2003] ECR I‑13467, paragraph 62; and Case C‑345/08 Peśla [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41).

32. Regarding the objective of the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, the Court acknowledges that, as pointed out by the Spanish and the Swedish Governments, partial recognition of professional qualifications could, theoretically, have the effect of fragmenting the professions regulated in a Member State into various activities. That would lead essentially to a risk of confusion in the minds of the recipients of services, who might well be misled as to the scope of those qualifications. The protection of the recipients of services, and consumers in general, has already been held by the Court to be capable of justifying restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (Case 220/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 3663, paragraph 20; Case C-124/97 Läärä and Others [1999] ECR I-6067, paragraph 33; and Case C-6/01 Anomar and Others [2003] ECR I-8621, paragraph 73).

20 IN ITS JUDGMENT DELIVERED THIS DAY IN CASE 205/84 COMMISSION V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY , THE COURT HELD THAT IN THE INSURANCE SECTOR IN GENERAL THERE WERE IMPERATIVE REASONS RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSUMER BOTH AS A POLICY-HOLDER AND AS AN INSURED PERSON WHICH MIGHT JUSTIFY RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES . THE COURT ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT IN THE PRESENT STATE OF COMMUNITY LAW , IN PARTICULAR WITH REGARD TO THE COORDINATION OF THE RELEVANT NATIONAL RULES , THE PROTECTION OF THAT INTEREST WAS NOT NECESSARILY GUARANTEED BY THE RULES OF THE STATE OF ESTABLISHMENT . THE COURT CONCLUDED THEREFROM THAT , AS REGARDS THE FIELD OF DIRECT INSURANCE IN GENERAL , THE REQUIREMENT OF A SEPARATE AUTHORIZATION GRANTED BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICE WAS PROVIDED REMAINED JUSTIFIED SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS . ON THE OTHER HAND , THE COURT CONSIDERED THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ESTABLISHMENT , WHICH REPRESENTED THE VERY NEGATION OF THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES , EXCEEDED WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO ATTAIN THE OBJECTIVE PURSUED AND THAT , ACCORDINGLY , THAT REQUIREMENT WAS CONTRARY TO ARTICLES 59 AND 60 OF THE TREATY .

29. In that regard, the Court has already held that situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae of Community law include those involving the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and those involving the exercise of the freedom, as conferred by Article 18 EC, to move and reside within the territory of the Member States (Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, paragraph 33; Case C-403/03 Schempp [2005] ECR I-6421, paragraphs 17 and 18; and Nerkowska , paragraph 26).

30. If that is not the case, the referring court considers that no rule in Title II of Regulation No 1408/71 applies as such. Accordingly, since it is unacceptable for a worker to whom the regulation applies not to be subject to any social security scheme, the referring court considers it necessary to identify the most relevant connecting factor. In the case before it, the employee’s residence must, in its view, be discounted, since there is no indication of any link whatsoever between his residence and the employment relationship. The same is true of the place in which his employment income is taxed, since Regulation No 1408/71 attaches no significance to that factor. By a process of elimination, the place where the employer is established assumes particular significance, the national court referring in that regard to the judgment in Aldewereld (EU:C:1994:271).

10 Since it is agreed that a person in Mr Aldewereld' s situation falls within the scope ratione personae of the regulation, as defined in Article 2 thereof, the rule in Article 13(1), cited above, that the legislation of a single Member State is to apply is in principle applicable and the national legislation applicable is determined in accordance with the provisions of Title II of that regulation.

36 The principles identified by the Court in defining payment for services rendered seek to give full effect to the provisions of the Treaty prohibiting charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties which, by their nature, affect only imported products; such principles consequently seek to allow the levying of various charges and payments when a frontier is crossed only if the amounts so levied constitute consideration for a specific service actually and individually rendered to the trader (see to that effect Case 340/87 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 1483, paragraph 15).

66 It follows that Member States wishing to strengthen the judicial protection of applicants by giving automatic suspensive effect to an appeal or a review brought against a transfer decision may not, for the sake of meeting the requirement of expedition, be placed in a less favourable situation than those Member States which did not deem it necessary to do so. Such would be the case if the former Member States did not have a sufficient period in which to carry out the transfer when the person concerned is detained and that person has decided to lodge an appeal (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 January 2009, Petrosian, C‑19/08, EU:C:2009:41, paragraphs 49 and 50).

49. Those Member States which wished to introduce appeal remedies liable to lead to decisions having suspensive effect in the context of transfer procedures may not, for the sake of meeting the requirement of expedition, be placed in a less favourable situation than those Member States which did not deem it necessary to do so.

74. In accordance with settled case-law, national measures restricting the free movement of capital may be justified inter alia by overriding reasons in the public interest, provided, first, that there is no harmonising measure of EU law providing for measures necessary to ensure the protection of those interests and, second, that they are appropriate to secure the attainment of the objective which they pursue and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, inter alia, Case C-112/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-8995, paragraphs 72 and 73; Case C-233/09 Dijkman and Dijkman-Lavaleije [2010] ECR I-6649, paragraph 49, and Case C-284/09 Commission v Germany , paragraph 74).

72. In that connection, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the principle of proportionality requires that measures implemented through Community provisions should be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (Case C-434/02 Arnold André [2004] ECR I-11825, paragraph 45; Case C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, paragraph 47; and Joined Cases C-453/03, C‑11/04, C-12/04 and C‑194/04 ABNA and Others [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 68).

45. It should also be borne in mind that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that measures implemented through Community provisions are appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (see, inter alia, Case 137/85 Maizena [1987] ECR 4587, paragraph 15; Case C-339/92 ADM Ölmühlen [1993] ECR I-6473, paragraph 15; and Case C-210/00 Käserei Champignon Hofmeister [2002] ECR I-6453, paragraph 59).

39 In that regard, it should be recalled that it is settled case-law that all the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by EU nationals of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the European Union, and preclude measures which might place such nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State. In that context, nationals of the Member States have in particular the right, which they derive directly from the Treaty, to leave their State of origin to enter the territory of another Member State and reside there in order there to pursue an economic activity (see, in particular, judgments in Ritter-Coulais, C‑152/03, EU:C:2006:123, paragraph 33; Government of the French Community and Walloon Government, C‑212/06, EU:C:2008:178, paragraph 44; Casteels, C‑379/09, EU:C:2011:131, paragraph 21; and Las, C‑202/11, EU:C:2013:239, paragraph 19).

45 In the present case, there is no doubt that the fact that a person has a lower level of cover when he receives hospital treatment in another Member State than when he undergoes the same treatment in the Member State in which he is insured may deter, or even prevent, that person from applying to providers of medical services established in other Member States and constitutes, both for insured persons and for service providers, a barrier to freedom to provide services (see, by analogy, Luisi and Carbone, paragraph 16, Case C-204/90 Bachmann v Belgium [1992] ECR I-249, paragraph 31, and Kohll, paragraph 35).

16 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES INCLUDES THE FREEDOM , FOR THE RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES , TO GO TO ANOTHER MEMBER STATE IN ORDER TO RECEIVE A SERVICE THERE , WITHOUT BEING OBSTRUCTED BY RESTRICTIONS , EVEN IN RELATION TO PAYMENTS AND THAT TOURISTS , PERSONS RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT AND PERSONS TRAVELLING FOR THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATION OR BUSINESS ARE TO BE REGARDED AS RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES .

34. Secondly, it is clear from the case‑law of the Court of Justice that a service c oncession exists where the agreed method of remuneration consists in the right of the service provider to exploit for payment his own service and means that he assumes the risk connected with operating the services in question (see Case C‑324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress [2000] ECR I‑10745, paragraph 58; the order in Case C‑358/00 Buchhändler‑Vereinigung [2002] ECR I‑4685, paragraphs 27 and 28; and Parking Brixen , paragraph 40).

45 According to settled case-law, Article 30 is designed to prohibit all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5).

5 ALL TRADING RULES ENACTED BY MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF HINDERING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ACTUALLY OR POTENTIALLY, INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS MEASURES HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS .

20. In order for such a difference in treatment to be compatible with the provisions of the EC Treaty on the freedom of establishment, it must relate to situations which are not objectively comparable or be justified by an overriding reason in the general interest (see, to that effect, Case C‑446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I‑11753, paragraph 167).

22. Should the taxable person choose to treat capital goods used for both business and private purposes as business goods, the input VAT due on the acquisition or construction of those goods is, as a rule, immediately deductible in full ( Seeling , paragraph 41, and Charles and Charles-Tijmens , paragraph 24).

24. Should the taxable person choose to treat capital goods used for both business and private purposes as business goods, the input VAT due on the acquisition of those goods is, in principle, immediately deductible in full (see, in particular, Case C‑97/90 Lennartz [1991] ECR I-3795, paragraph 26, Bakcsi , paragraph 25, and Seeling, paragraph 41).

62. That said, it is clear that the right to appoint a director constitutes a restriction on the free movement of capital since such a specific right constitutes a derogation from general company law and is laid down by a national legislative measure for the sole benefit of the public authorities (see Commission v Germany , paragraph 61). While it is true that that facility can be conferred by legislation as a right of a qualified minority, it is clear that it must, in such a case, be accessible to all shareholders and must not be reserved exclusively to the State.

17. In that respect, it should first be recalled that, according to consistent case‑law, the exemptions under Article 13 of the Sixth Directive have their own independent meaning in Community law and must therefore be given a Community definition, and that interpretation of the concept of a leasing of immovable property contained in Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive cannot depend on that given by the civil law of a Member State ( Maierhofer , cited above, paragraphs 25 and 26, and case‑law cite d).

25. Further, it should also be borne in mind that according to settled case-law the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive have their own independent meaning in Community law and that they must therefore be given a Community definition (see Case C-358/97 Commission v Ireland [2000] ECR I-6301, paragraph 51).

82. The prohibition on measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions set out in Article 28 EC covers all measures which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see, in particular, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5; Case C‑192/01 Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR I‑9693, paragraph 39; Commission v France , paragraph 22; and Commission v Germany , paragraph 80).

81 Moreover, the Court has already held that Article 4(10) of the Customs Code must be interpreted as meaning that import duties do not include the VAT to be levied on the importation of goods (judgment of 29 July 2010, Pakora Pluss, C‑248/09, EU:C:2010:457, paragraph 47).

47. Therefore, the answer to the fourth question is that Article 4(10) of the Customs Code must be interpreted as meaning that import duties do not include the VAT to be levied on the importation of goods. The fifth question

36 As to whether a two-year limitation period, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, fulfils the conditions set out in paragraph 34 above, it must be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, it is for the national court to determine whether national measures are compatible with EU law. The Court may, however, provide it with any helpful guidance to resolve the dispute before it (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2012 in EMS-Bulgaria Transport, C‑284/11, EU:C:2012:458, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

16. It is appropriate at the outset to note that the Court may of its own motion examine the question whether the conditions laid down in Article 226 EC for the bringing of an action for failure to fulfil obligations are satisfied (see, inter alia, Case C-362/90 Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-2353, paragraph 8, and Case C-525/03 Commission v Italy [2005] ECR I-9405, paragraph 8).

8 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the fact that the Italian Government formally pleaded the inadmissibility of the action only in its rejoinder cannot prevent the Court from examining this issue. The arguments relied upon in that respect by the Italian Government had already been submitted in its defence, in which it had formally contended that the action be dismissed. The Commission therefore had the opportunity to answer those arguments in its reply. Furthermore, and in any event, the Court may of its own motion examine the question whether the conditions laid down in Article 169 of the Treaty for the bringing of an action for failure to fulfil an obligation are satisfied.

22. Il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante que la Cour n’impose pas au Tribunal de fournir un exposé qui suivrait, de manière exhaustive et un par un, tous les raisonnements articulés par les parties au litige. La motivation peut donc être implicite, à condition qu’elle permette aux intéressés de connaître les raisons pour lesquelles les mesures en question ont été prises et à la juridiction compétente de disposer des éléments suffisants pour exercer son contrôle (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 7 janvier 2004, Aalborg Portland e.a./Commission, C-204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P et C-219/00 P, Rec. p. I-123, point 372). Toutefois, s’il est vrai que l’obligation pour le Tribunal de motiver ses décisions ne saurait être interprétée comme impliquant que celui-ci soit tenu de répondre dans le détail à chaque argument invoqué par une partie, en particulier si ce dernier ne revêt pas un caractère suffisamment clair et précis et ne repose pas sur des éléments de preuve circonstanciés (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 6 mars 2001, Connolly/Commission, C-274/99 P, Rec. p. I-1611, point 121), le Tribunal doit, à tout le moins, examiner toutes les violations de droits alléguées.

48. In the present case, application of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings to a migrant worker in the same way as to a non-migrant worker gives rise to unforeseen consequences, hardly compatible with the aim of Article 39 EC and attributable to the very fact that the migrant worker’s entitlement to invalidity benefits are governed by two different bodies of legislation, as is apparent from paragraphs 28 to 33 of this judgment (see, by analogy, van Munster , paragraph 30).

31 Those differences can be traced to the fact that one of the two retirement schemes provides for a higher pension rate for a worker whose spouse is not in receipt of a retirement pension or equivalent benefit, it being assumed that such a pension or benefit increases the couple' s total income and may, in any event, be waived, while the other scheme, in the same circumstances, awards each spouse, on reaching retirement age, a non-renounceable pension of an equal amount, without however implying any increase at all in the couple' s total income.

58 It is established case-law that the system of rules put in place by Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (OJ 1985 L 210, p. 29) does not preclude the application of other systems of contractual or non-contractual liability based on other grounds, such as fault (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 January 2006, Skov and Bilka, C‑402/03, EU:C:2006:6, paragraph 47).

18. In this regard, although it is true that the subject-matter of proceedings brought under Article 226 EC is circumscribed by the pre-litigation procedure provided for in that provision and that, consequently, the Commission’s reasoned opinion and the application must be based on the same objections, that requirement cannot go so far as to mean that in every case exactly the same wording must be used in both, where the subject-matter of the proceedings has not been extended or altered but simply narrowed (see, in particular, Case C‑229/00 Commission v Finland [2003] ECR I-5727, paragraphs 44 and 46, Case C-433/03 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-6985, paragraph 28, and Case C-150/04 Commission v Denmark [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 67). Accordingly, in its application the Commission may clarify its initial grounds of objection provided, however, that it does not alter the subject-matter of the dispute (Case C-67/99 Commission v Ireland [2001] ECR I-5757, paragraph 23, judgment of 12 October 2004 in Case C-328/02 Commission v Greece , not published in the ECR, paragraph 32, and Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR I-3331, paragraph 38).

44. It should be recalled in that regard that, in accordance with settled case-law, the letter of formal notice from the Commission to the Member State, and then the reasoned opinion issued by the Commission, delimit the subject-matter of the dispute, so that it cannot thereafter be extended. The opportunity for the State concerned to submit its observations, even if it chooses not to avail itself thereof, constitutes an essential guarantee intended by the EC Treaty, adherence to which is an essential formal requirement of the infringement procedure. Consequently, the reasoned opinion and the proceedings brought by the Commission must be based on the same complaints as those set out in the letter of formal notice initiating the pre-litigation procedure (Case C-365/97 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-7773, paragraph 23).

34. As a preliminary point, it should be remembered that under Article 92(2) of the Rules of Procedure the Court may at any time of its own motion consider whether there exists any absolute bar to proceeding with a case (Case C-152/98 Commission v Netherlands [2001] ECR I‑3463, paragraph 22).

35 In that regard, it should be noted that the limitation on the exercise of the right to liberty resulting from the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of Directive 2013/33 is provided for by EU legislation and that it does not affect the essence of the right to liberty laid down in Article 6 of the Charter. The first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of that directive does not render the guarantee of that right less secure and — as is apparent from the wording of the provision and recital 15 of the directive — the power that it confers on Member States enables them to detain an applicant only on the basis of his individual conduct and under the exceptional circumstances referred to in the same provision, those circumstances also being circumscribed by all the conditions set out in Articles 8 and 9 of the directive (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 February 2016, N., C‑601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraphs 51 and 52).

52 In addition, point (e) of the first subparagraph of Article 8(3) of Directive 2013/33 does not affect the essence of the right to liberty laid down in Article 6 of the Charter. That provision of the directive does not render the guarantee of that right less secure and — as is apparent from the wording of the provision and recital 15 of the directive — the power that it confers on Member States enables them to detain an applicant only on the basis of his individual conduct and under the exceptional circumstances referred to in the same provision, those circumstances also being circumscribed by all the conditions set out in Articles 8 and 9 of the directive.

37. In this respect, it should be added that the deterrent nature and dissuasive purpose of the measures to be adopted, together with their independence of any particular dispute, mean that such actions may be brought even though the terms which it is sought to have prohibited have not been used in specific contracts (see Commission v Italy , paragraph 15).

38. Furthermore, just like other expressions which define taxable transactions for the purposes of the Sixth Directive (see Joined Cases C‑354/03, C-355/03 and C‑484/03 Optigen and Others [2006] ECR I‑483, paragraph 44, and Joined Cases C‑439/04 and C‑440/04 Kittel and Recolta Recycling [2006] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 41), the meanings of ‘intra-Community supply’ and ‘intra-Community acquisition’ are objective in nature and apply without regard to the purpose or results of the transactions concerned.

41. In fact, an analysis of the definitions of ‘supply of goods effected by a taxable person acting as such’ and ‘economic activities’ shows that those terms, which define taxable transactions for the purposes of the Sixth Directive, are objective in nature and apply without regard to the purpose or results of the transactions concerned (see, to that effect, Optigen , paragraphs 43 and 44).

69 In the second place, as regards the substance, it should be borne in mind that the Member States are entitled, while complying with EU law, to define the scope and the organisation of their SGEIs, and may take into account, in particular, objectives pertaining to their national policy (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2011, ENEL, C‑242/10, EU:C:2011:861, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

112. In addition, where a Member State has levied charges in breach of the rules of Community law, individuals are entitled to reimbursement not only of the tax unduly levied but also of the amounts paid to that State or retained by it which relate directly to that tax. As the Court held in paragraphs 87 and 88 of the judgment in Metallgesellschaft and Others , that also includes losses constituted by the unavailability of sums of money as a result of a tax being levied prematurely ( Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 205 and the case-law cited there).

88 The national court has said that it is in dispute whether English law provides for restitution in respect of damage arising from loss of the use of sums of money where no principal sum is due. It must be stressed that in an action for restitution the principal sum due is none other than the amount of interest which would have been generated by the sum, use of which was lost as a result of the premature levy of the tax.

18. Although the Court decided, at paragraph 26 of Käserei Champignon Hofmeister , that Article 47 of Regulation No 3665/87 is one of the procedural rules that an exporter must observe to obtain a refund payment, the fact remains that the contravention of these rules can lead to a reduction in, or the loss of, the amount of the refund due to the exporter.

82. As regards the derogations permitted under Article 58 EC, it cannot be denied that the objective invoked by the Portuguese Republic of safeguarding a secure energy supply in that Member State in case of crisis, war or terrorism may constitute a ground of public security (see judgment of 14 February 2008 in Case C‑274/06 Commission v Spain , paragraph 38; Case C‑171/08 Commission v Portugal , paragraph 72; and Case C‑543/08 Commission v Portugal , paragraph 84) and may possibly justify an obstacle to the free movement of capital. The importance attached by Member States and the European Union to the protection of a secure energy supply can, moreover, be seen, for example, with regard to oil, in Directive 2006/67 and, with regard to the natural gas sector, in Directive 2003/55.

84. As regards the derogations permitted under Article 58 EC, it cannot be denied that the objective invoked by the Portuguese Republic to ensure a secure energy supply in that Member State in case of crisis, war or terrorism may constitute a ground of public security (see Case C‑274/06 Commission v Spain , paragraph 38, and Case C‑171/08 Commission v Portugal , paragraph 72) and possibly justify an obstacle to the free movement of capital. The importance attached by Member States and the European Union to the protection of a secure energy supply can moreover be seen, for example, in Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ 2009 L 211, p. 55).

38. The damage would be even more serious if the application of the criteria in question gave the defendant a wide choice, thereby encouraging the practice of forum shopping which the Convention seeks to avoid and which the Court, in its judgment in Kalfelis , specifically sought to prevent (see Kalfelis , paragraph 9).

55. Should the taxable person decide to retain capital goods entirely within his private assets, whether or not he uses them for both business and private purposes, no portion of the input VAT due or paid on the acquisition of the goods is deductible (Case C‑415/98 Bakcsi [2001] ECR I‑1831, paragraph 27). In that case, the use of those goods for the purposes of the business cannot be subject to VAT (see, to that effect, Bakcsi , paragraph 31).

31 In contrast, if the taxable person has chosen to retain a capital item wholly within his private assets and was therefore not entitled to deduct the input VAT paid on the acquisition, the use of the item for his business purposes cannot be subject to VAT.

88. In the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for by Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, in particular, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59, and Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691, paragraph 18).

57 Next, it must be pointed out that Article 10(9)(a) of the CIRS is capable of ensuring the preservation of the distribution of the power to impose taxes between the Member States concerned. The final settlement tax levied at the time of the transfer of a residence is intended to subject the unrealised capital gains — which arose within the ambit of that State’s power of taxation before the transfer of that residence — to the Member State of origin’s tax on profits. Capital gains realised after that transfer of the residence are taxed exclusively in the host Member State in which they have arisen, thus avoiding double taxation (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 November 2011, National Grid Indus, C‑371/10, EU:C:2011:785, paragraph 48).

48. Having regard to those factors, legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is appropriate for ensuring the preservation of the allocation of powers of taxation between the Member States concerned. The final settlement tax levied at the time of the transfer of a company’s place of effective management is intended to subject to the Member State of origin’s tax on profits the unrealised capital gains which arose within the ambit of that State’s power of taxation before the transfer of the place of management. Unrealised capital gains relating to an economic asset are thus taxed in the Member State in which they arose. Capital gains realised after the transfer of the company’s place of management are taxed exclusively in the host Member State in which they have arisen, thus avoiding double taxation.

24. It should also be noted that, according to settled case-law, it is for the national court hearing a dispute to determine both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. The Court may, however, refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court, inter alia where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose (see, inter alia, Case C-421/97 Tarantik [1999] ECR I-3633, paragraph 33, Case C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I‑1157, paragraph 52, and Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 19).

24 The Court has held that that provision seeks, first, to ensure that the determination of the tax base of the proportional excise duty on tobacco products, that is the maximum retail selling price of those products, is subject to the same rules in all the Member States and, secondly, to maintain the freedom of the economic operators, by which they may make effective use of the competitive advantage resulting from any lower cost prices (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 March 2010, Commission v France, C‑197/08, EU:C:2010:111, paragraph 36).

36. In that regard, Article 9(1) of Directive 95/59 provides that manufacturers, or, where appropriate, their representatives or authorised agents in the Community and importers of tobacco from non-member countries are to be free to determine the maximum retail selling price for each of their products, the aim being to ensure effective competition between them ( Commission v Greece , paragraph 20). That provision seeks to ensure that the determination of the tax base of the proportional excise duty on tobacco products, that is the maximum retail selling price of those products, is subject to the same rules in all the Member States. It also aims, as the Advocate General states in point 40 of her Opinion, to maintain the freedom of the abovementioned economic operators, by which they may make effective use of the competitive advantage resulting from any lower cost prices.

145 In complaining that the Court of First Instance attributed responsibility for the infringement to it although it had transferred its polypropylene business to Monte, Anic is disregarding the principle of personal responsibility and neglecting the decisive factor, identifiable from the case-law of the Court of Justice (see to this effect Suiker Unie and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 80 and 84), that the `economic continuity' test can only apply where the legal person responsible for running the undertaking has ceased to exist in law after the infringement has been committed. It also follows that the application of these tests is not contrary in any way to the principle of legal certainty.

46. With regard to the claim that the General Court distorted the economic evidence adduced by the appellants, it is not alleged that the General Court construed those economic reports in a manner manifestly at odds with their wording (see, to that effect, Case C‑260/09 P Activision Blizzard Germany v Commission [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 57), rather that the General Court erred in its assessment of the content of those reports. In any event, the appellants do not indicate precisely which parts of those reports the General Court misconstrued as to their real meaning. Accordingly that argument is inadmissible.

57. It should be borne in mind in that connection that the review carried out by the Court in order to assess the present ground of appeal – that the evidence produced in the form of those faxes was distorted – is restricted to ascertaining that, in finding on the basis of those faxes that CD-Contact Data had participated in an illegal agreement intended to limit parallel trade in general, the General Court had not manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of those faxes. The task of the Court of Justice in the present case is not, therefore, to assess independently whether the Commission has established such participation to the requisite legal standard and thus discharged the burden of proof necessary to show that the rules of competition law were infringed, but to determine whether, in finding that that was actually so, the General Court construed those faxes in a manner manifestly at odds with their wording, which is not the case.

40. Moreover, as is clear from Article 32d(1) CS and Article 51 of the ECSC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on a point of law only. Therefore, the Court of First Instance has sole jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence, except where those facts and that evidence have been distorted (see, to that effect, Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraphs 49 and 66; Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P, C-251/99 P, C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375, paragraph 194; and Case C-312/00 P Commission v Camar and Tico [2002] ECR I-11355, paragraph 69).

12 The Court has nonetheless considered that, in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction, it is necessary to examine the conditions in which the case has been referred to it by the national court. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in preliminary ruling proceedings requires the national court to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to give opinions on general or hypothetical questions (judgments in Case 149/82 Robards v Insurance Officer [1983] ECR 171 and Meilicke, cited above, paragraph 25).

25 Nevertheless, in Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 21, the Court considered that, in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction, it is a matter for the Court of Justice to examine the conditions in which the case has been referred to it by the national court. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the preliminary-ruling procedure requires the national court to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions (Foglia v Novello, cited above, paragraphs 18 and 20, and Case 149/82 Robards v Insurance Officer [1983] ECR 171, paragraph 19).

39. Third, the contribution in question is a ‘provision of services by a member’. It is true that that contribution was paid not by a member of Senior GmbH (Senior BV) but by the parent company of the latter (Senior Limited), and thus by a member of a member. However, it must be borne in mind that the Court has adopted, with regard to the origin of contributions, an informal approach based on the real appropriation of the contribution (see, to that effect, Weber Haus , paragraphs 11 and 13; ESTAG , paragraphs 37 to 39 and 41; and Case C-71/00 Develop [2002] ECR I-8877, paragraphs 25 to 29). As the contribution in question was paid by the grandparent company (Senior Limited) to the sub-subsidiary (Senior GmbH) in order to increase the value of the shares in the latter, and as that increase was primarily in the interests of its sole member, namely Senior BV, it must be held that that contribution must be attributed to the latter, that is to say Senior BV. It is therefore a ‘provision of services by a member’ within the meaning of Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 69/335.

108. The functions of notaries in connection with the attachment of immovable property can thus be seen to be exercised under the supervision of the court, to which the notary must refer any disputes, and which takes the final decision. Those functions cannot therefore be regarded as directly and specifically connected, as such, with the exercise of official authority (see, to that effect, Thijssen , paragraph 21; Case C‑393/05 Commission v Austria , paragraphs 41 and 42; Commission v Germany , paragraphs 43 and 44; and Commission v Portugal , paragraphs 37 and 41).

42. It is therefore apparent that private bodies carry out their activities under the active supervision of the competent public authority which, in the final analysis, is responsible for the inspections and decisions of those bodies, as is demonstrated by that authority’s obligations noted in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment. That conclusion is also supported by the system of supervision of private bodies put in place by the Law of 1975 on Foodstuffs, which provides that it is the Landeshauptmänner, as the supervisory authorities, who adopt the measures referred to in Article 9(9)(b) of Regulation No 2092/91, since private bodies have, in that field, only the power to propose such measures. It follows that the auxiliary and preparatory role devolved on private bodies by that regulation vis-à-vis the supervisory authority cannot be regarded as being directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority, within the meaning of Article 55 EC, read in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 45 EC.

15. It is also established case‑law that the measures prohibited by Article 63(1) TFEU, as restrictions on the movement of capital, include those which are such as to discourage non‑residents from making investments in a Member State or to discourage that Member State’s residents from doing so in other States (Case C‑370/05 Festersen [2007] ECR I‑1129, paragraph 24; Case C‑101/05 A [2007] ECR I‑11531, paragraph 40; and Joined Cases C‑436/08 and C‑437/08 Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen [2011] ECR I‑305, paragraph 50).

58. That being so, it cannot be accepted that the processing of personal data carried out for the purposes of the operation of the search engine should escape the obligations and guarantees laid down by Directive 95/46, which would compromise the directive’s effectiveness and the effective and complete protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons which the directive seeks to ensure (see, by analogy, L'Oréal and Others EU:C:2011:474, paragraphs 62 and 63), in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data, a right to which the directive accords special importance as is confirmed in particular by Article 1(1) thereof and recitals 2 and 10 in its preamble (see, to this effect, Joined Cases C‑465/00, C‑138/01 and C‑139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others EU:C:2003:294, paragraph 70; Case C‑553/07 Rijkeboer EU:C:2009:293, paragraph 47; and Case C‑473/12 IPI EU:C:2013:715, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

70. Directive 95/46 itself, while having as its principal aim to ensure the free movement of personal data, provides in Article 1(1) that "Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data" . Several recitals in its preamble, in particular recitals 10 and 11, also express that requirement.

17 The Court of Justice has consistently held that pursuant to Article 168a of the Treaty and Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EC, an appeal may be based only on grounds relating to infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, paragraph 67).

72. The primacy of international agreements concluded by the European Union over instruments of secondary law means that those instruments must as far as possible be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements (Joined Cases C‑320/11, C‑330/11, C‑382/11 and C‑383/11 Digitalnet and Others [2012] ECR, paragraph 39, and HK Danmark , paragraph 29).

39. According to equally settled case‑law, even though the provisions of an agreement such as the ITA are not such as to create rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the courts under European Union law, where the European Union has legislated in the field in question, the primacy of international agreements concluded by the European Union over provisions of secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements ( British Sky Broadcasting Group and Pace , paragraph 83 and the case‑law cited).

61 Thus, such an organisation must be able to challenge, in such an action, not only a decision not to carry out an appropriate assessment of the implications for the site of the plan or project in question but also, as the case may be, the assessment carried out inasmuch as it is alleged to be vitiated by defects (see by analogy, in respect of Article 10a of Directive 85/337, judgment of 7 November 2013, Gemeinde Altrip and Others, C‑72/12, EU:C:2013:712, paragraph 37).

48 However, it should be recalled that, in accordance with case-law which has been settled since Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, paragraph 26, the Member States' obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 5 of the Treaty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts. As is clear from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, in applying national law and in particular the provisions of a law which, as in the main proceedings, were specifically introduced in order to implement a directive, the national court is required to interpret its national law, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter and thereby to comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty (see Case C-106/89 Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8, and Case C-334/92 Wagner Miret v Fondo de Garantía Salarial [1993] ECR I-6911, paragraph 20).

8 In order to reply to that question, it should be observed that, as the Court pointed out in its judgment in Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, paragraph 26, the Member States' obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 5 of the Treaty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts . It follows that, in applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before or after the directive, the national court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty .

18 It must be pointed out that this ground of appeal raises a separate issue and has been put forward by the appellant for the first time in its appeal. According to settled case-law, under Articles 113(2) and 116(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice new pleas, not contained in the original application, cannot be raised in an appeal (see, in particular, Case C-153/96 P De Rijk v Commission [1997] ECR I-2901, paragraph 18).

10 It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties, as defined in the relevant headings of the Common Customs Tariff and the notes to the sections or chapters. Likewise, for the purpose of interpreting the Common Customs Tariff, the Court has consistently held that both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the Nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council are important means for ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see the judgment in Case C-395/93 Neckermann Versand v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1994] ECR I-4027, paragraph 5).

5 It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their characteristics and objective properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the Common Customs Tariff and of the notes to the sections or chapters (judgment in Case 40/88 Weber v Milchwerke Paderborn-Rimbeck [1989] ECR 1395, paragraph 13). Likewise, for the purpose of interpreting the Common Customs Tariff, the Court has consistently held that both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the Nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council are important means for ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (judgment in Case 200/84 Daiber v Hauptzollamt Reutlingen [1985] ECR 3363, paragraph 14).

16 First of all, it should be borne in mind that the Brussels I Regulation seeks to unify the rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters by way of rules of jurisdiction which are highly predictable and accordingly pursues an objective of legal certainty which consists in strengthening the legal protection of persons established in the European Union, by enabling the applicant to identify easily the court in which he may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee before which court he may be sued (see, to this effect, judgment of 23 April 2009 in Falco Privatstiftung and Rabitsch, C‑533/07, EU:C:2009:257, paragraphs 21 and 22).

48. However, while it is true that, in consequence, the competent national authorities have a broad discretion in determining the manner in which a tax such as that at issue in the main proceedings is to be calculated, the fact remains that the tax so determined must not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objective pursued (see, to that effect, the judgment in Futura Immobiliare and Others , EU:C:2009:479, paragraph 55).

55. While the distinction drawn for fiscal purposes must not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that financing objective, it is however to be noted that here, as Community law currently stands, the competent national authorities have a broad discretion when determining the manner in which such a tax or charge is calculated.

65. Furthermore, in the area of value added tax, the Court declared in Commission v Spain that there had been a failure to fulfil obligations on the ground that the Kingdom of Spain had not shown that the exemption from that tax on imports and acquisitions of arms, ammunition and equipment exclusively for military use, an exemption provided for by Spanish legislation, was justified, under Article 296(1)(b) EC, by the need to protect the essential interests of the security of that Member State ( Commission v Greece , paragraph 53).

37. Such a restriction on freedom of establishment can be accepted only if it pursues a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty or is justified by overriding reasons of public interest. But even if that were so, application of that measure would still have to be such as to ensure achievement of the aim in question and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose (see, inter alia, Marks & Spencer , paragraph 35 and the case-law cited there, and Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas , paragraph 47).

35. Such a restriction is permissible only if it pursues a legitimate objective compatible with the Treaty and is justified by imperative reasons in the public interest. It is further necessary, in such a case, that its application be appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective thus pursued and not go beyond what is necessary to attain it (see, to that effect, Case C-250/95 Futura Participations and Singer [1997] ECR I-2471, paragraph 26, and Case C-9/02 De Lasteyrie du Saillant [2004] ECR I-2409, paragraph 49).

95. Furthermore, the Member State, instead of making the product concerned subject to such a procedure, could have prescribed suitable labelling warning consumers of the potential risks related to taking this product. The protection of public health would thus have been ensured without such serious restrictions on the free movement of goods (see, to that effect, Case C-17/93 van der Veldt [1994] ECR I-3537, paragraph 19).

33. As the Court has consistently held, Article 2(4) of Directive 76/207 is specifically and exclusively designed to authorise measures which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in society. That provision thus authorises national measures relating to access to employment, including promotion, which give a specific advantage to women with a view to improving their ability to compete on the labour market and to pursue a career on an equal footing with men (see Case C-450/93 Kalanke [1995] ECR I-3051, paragraphs 18 and 19; Case C-409/95 Marschall [1997] ECR I-6363, paragraphs 26 and 27; Case C-158/97 Badeck and Others [2000] ECR I-1875, paragraph 19; and Lommers , paragraph 32).

19 The Court noted, first, that since Article 2(4) is specifically and exclusively designed to authorise measures which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social life, it authorises national measures relating to access to employment, including promotion, which give a specific advantage to women with a view to improving their ability to compete on the labour market and to pursue a career on an equal footing with men (Marschall, paragraphs 26 and 27).

24. With regard to the second condition, the Court has repeatedly held that the distinction between benefits excluded from the scope of Regulation No 1408/71 and those which fall within its scope is based essentially on the constituent elements of each particular benefit, in particular its purposes and the conditions on which it is granted, and not on whether a benefit is classified as a social security benefit by national legislation (see, in particular, the judgment in Hughes , cited above, paragraph 14, and Joined Cases C-245/94 and C-312/94 Hoever and Zachow [1996] ECR I-4895, paragraph 17).

36 Accordingly, in the absence of Community harmonisation in this field, the conditions governing the right or obligation to become a member of a social security scheme are a matter to be determined by the legislation of each Member State (Case 110/79 Coonan [1980] ECR 1445, paragraph 12, and Case C-349/87 Paraschi [1991] ECR I-4501, paragraph 15), as are the conditions for entitlement to benefits (Joined Cases C-4/95 and C-5/95 Stöber and Piosa Pereira v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1997] ECR I-511, paragraph 36).

12 THE EFFECT OF THOSE TWO PROVISIONS WHEN READ TOGETHER IS THAT IT IS FOR THE LEGISLATURE OF EACH MEMBER STATE TO LAY DOWN THE CONDITIONS CREATING THE RIGHT OR THE OBLIGATION TO BECOME AFFILIATED TO A SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEME OR TO A PARTICULAR BRANCH UNDER SUCH A SCHEME PROVIDED ALWAYS THAT IN THIS CONNEXION THERE IS NO DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN NATIONALS OF THE HOST STATE AND NATIONALS OF THE OTHER MEMBER STATES . THE COURT ACKNOWLEDGED IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 12 JULY 1979 IN CASE 266/78 BRUNORI ( 1979 ) ECR THAT NATIONAL LEGISLATURES ARE COMPETENT IN THIS FIELD .

37. In a chain of contracts transferring ownership, the relationship of succession between the initial buyer and the sub-buyer is not regarded as the transfer of a single contract or the transfer of all the rights and obligations for which it provides. In such a case, the contractual obligations of the parties may vary from contract to contract, so that the contractual rights which the sub-buyer can enforce against his immediate seller will not necessarily be the same as those which the manufacturer will have accepted in his relationship with the first buyer ( Handte , paragraph 17).

39 Nevertheless, the Court has also stated that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court, in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction (see, to that effect, Case 244/80 Foglia [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 21). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Bosman, paragraph 61; Case C-36/99 Idéal Tourisme [2000] ECR I-6049, paragraph 20; Case C-322/98 Kachelmann [2000] ECR I-7505, paragraph 17).

21 THE REPLY TO THE FIRST QUESTION MUST ACCORDINGLY BE THAT WHILST , ACCORDING TO THE INTENDED ROLE OF ARTICLE 177 , AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEED TO OBTAIN AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION RAISED , REGARD BEING HAD TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF FACT AND OF LAW INVOLVED IN THE MAIN ACTION , IS A MATTER FOR THE NATIONAL COURT IT IS NEVERTHELESS FOR THE COURT OF JUSTICE , IN ORDER TO CONFIRM ITS OWN JURISDICTION , TO EXAMINE , WHERE NECESSARY , THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE CASE HAS BEEN REFERRED TO IT BY THE NATIONAL COURT .

27 IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AS FAR AS THE INTERESTED PARTIES ARE CONCERNED, THE ISSUE OF OR REFUSAL TO ISSUE THE IMPORT LICENCES MUST BE BOUND UP WITH THIS DECISION .

42 The Court has also held that, where work is performed in more than one Contracting State, it is important to avoid any multiplication of courts having jurisdiction in order to preclude the risk of irreconcilable decisions and to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of judgments in States other than those in which they were delivered and that, consequently, Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention cannot be interpreted as conferring concurrent jurisdiction on the courts of each Contracting State in whose territory the employee performs part of his work (Mulox IBC, paragraphs 21 and 23, and Rutten, paragraph 18).

23 It follows that Article 5(1) of the Convention cannot be interpreted as conferring concurrent jurisdiction on the courts of each Contracting State in whose territory the employee performs part of his work.

50. The principle of mutual recognition on which the European arrest warrant system is based is itself founded on the mutual confidence between the Member States that their national legal systems are capable of providing equivalent and effective protection of the fundamental rights recognised at European Union level, particularly in the Charter, so that it is therefore within the legal system of the issuing Member State that persons who are the subject of a European arrest warrant can avail themselves of any remedies which allow the lawfulness of the criminal proceedings for the enforcement of the custodial sentence or detention order, or indeed the substantive criminal proceedings which led to that sentence or order, to be contested (see, by analogy, Case C‑491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga [2010] ECR I‑14247, paragraphs 70 and 71).

37. According to settled case-law, each Member State is bound to implement the provisions of directives in a manner that fully meets the requirements of clarity and certainty in legal situations imposed by the Community legislature, in the interests of the persons concerned established in the Member States. To that end, the provisions of a directive must be implemented with unquestionable binding force and with the requisite specificity, precision and clarity (see Case C-207/96 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I‑6869, paragraph 26).

26 Second, it is settled case-law that the incompatibility of national legislation with Community provisions, even provisions which are directly applicable, can be finally remedied only by means of national provisions of a binding nature which have the same legal force as those which must be amended and also that the provisions of a directive must be implemented with unquestionable binding force and with the specificity, precision and clarity necessary to satisfy the need for legal certainty, which requires that, in the case of a directive intended to confer rights on individuals, the persons concerned must be enabled to ascertain the full extent of their rights (Case C-197/96 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-1489, paragraphs 14 and 15).

47 Having regard to the particular nature of such a transaction, the Court has held that, in order to classify a transaction as an ‘intra-Community acquisition’, it is necessary to conduct an overall assessment of all the relevant objective evidence in order to determine whether the goods purchased have actually left the territory of the Member State of supply and, if so, in which Member State the final consumption will take place. Factors likely to be of significance in that respect, other than the process of transporting the goods in question, are, inter alia, the place of registration and usual use of the goods, the place of residence of the purchaser and the presence or absence of links between the purchaser and the Member State of supply or another Member State (see to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2010, X, C‑84/09, EU:C:2010:693, paragraphs 41 to 45 and 50).

30. According to settled case-law, the rules regarding equal treatment forbid not only overt discrimination based on the location of the registered offices of companies, but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result (see, by analogy, inter alia, Case C‑279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I‑225, paragraph 26; Case C‑383/05 Talotta [2007] ECR I‑2555, paragraph 17; and Case C‑440/08 Gielen [2010] ECR I‑2323, paragraph 37).

17. The rules regarding equal treatment forbid not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result (Case C‑279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I‑225, paragraph 26 and the case‑law cited).

81. As the Advocate General noted in point 49 of his Opinion, the EU legislature must take account of the precautionary principle, according to which, where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, protective measures may be taken without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent (see judgment in Acino v Commission , C‑269/13 P, EU:C:2014:255, paragraph 57).

44. Even on the assumption that the organisation of the labour market, including the prevention of the loss of qualified workers, could, in some circumstances and subject to certain conditions being complied with, justify restrictions on the freedom of movement for workers, it must in any event be held that national legislation such as the legislation at issue in the main proceedings goes beyond what appears necessary to achieve the objectives pursued. Such objectives do not justify the systematic refusal of the benefit of recruitment vouchers to persons seeking employment who are recruited in other Member States. Such a measure is tantamount to an outright negation of the freedom of movement for Community workers laid down by Article 39 EC, which aims to guarantee to workers and persons seeking employment the right to gain access to employment of their choice and to exercise that activity in the territory of another Member State (see, as regards freedom of establishment, Case C-208/00 Überseering [2002] ECR I‑9919, paragraph 93).

93 Such objectives cannot, however, justify denying the legal capacity and, consequently, the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings of a company properly incorporated in another Member State in which it has its registered office. Such a measure is tantamount to an outright negation of the freedom of establishment conferred on companies by Articles 43 EC and 48 EC.

Il importe de rappeler que, d’une part, la condition relative à l’existence d’une impossibilité absolue n’est pas remplie lorsque l’État membre défendeur se borne à invoquer des difficultés juridiques, politiques ou pratiques auxquelles il s’est trouvé confronté pour mettre en œuvre la décision concernée, sans entreprendre une véritable démarche auprès des entreprises en cause aux fins de récupérer l’aide et sans proposer à la Commission des modalités alternatives de mise en œuvre de cette décision qui auraient permis de surmonter ces difficultés, et que, d’autre part, de prétendus problèmes internes rencontrés lors de l’exécution de la décision de la Commission ne sauraient justifier le non-respect par cet État membre des obligations qui lui incombent au titre du droit de l’Union (arrêt du 24 janvier 2013, Commission/Espagne, C‑529/09, EU:C:2013:31, point 101).

30 Finally, it must be emphasized that, although the social provisions of Decision No 1/80, which include the first paragraph of Article 7, constitute a further stage in securing freedom of movement for workers on the basis of Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Treaty, and although, therefore, the Court has held that it is essential to transpose, so far as possible, the principles enshrined in those Treaty articles to Turkish workers who enjoy the rights conferred by that decision (see Case C-434/93 Bozkurt v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1995] ECR I-1475, paragraphs 14, 19 and 20, and Case C-171/95 Tetik [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 20), the fact nevertheless remains that, as the law stands at present, Turkish nationals are not entitled to move freely within the Community but benefit only from certain rights in the host Member State whose territory they have lawfully entered and where they have been in legal employment for a specified period (Tetik, cited above, paragraph 29) or, in the case of members of a Turkish worker's family, they have been authorized to join him and have been legally resident there for the period laid down in the two indents of the first paragraph of Article 7.

20 In order to ensure compliance with that objective, it would seem to be essential to transpose, so far as is possible, the principles enshrined in those articles to Turkish workers who enjoy the rights conferred by Decision No 1/80.

61. By contrast, where VAT is included in the price of goods or services, the systematic rounding down at a lower level than the periodic VAT return would result in the taxable person collecting from his customer the amount of the VAT actually due whilst systematically paying to the State a lower amount, retaining the difference for his own benefit. That result would be contrary to the principle that VAT is collected by taxable persons at each stage of the production or distribution process on behalf of the tax authorities, to which those taxable persons are required to pay it (see Case C‑291/03 MyTravel [2005] ECR I‑8477, paragraph 30).

62. Furthermore, it is settled case-law that the determination of the existence of injury to the Community industry requires an appraisal of complex economic situations and the judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether there has been manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or misuse of powers (see Ikea Wholesale , paragraph 41 and the case-law cited, and Case C‑398/05 AGST Draht- und Biegetechnik [2008] ECR I-1057, paragraph 34).

41. Furthermore, it is settled case-law that the choice between the different methods of calculating the dumping margin, such as those set out in Article 2(11) of the basic regulation, together with the assessment of the normal value of a product or the determination of the existence of harm require an appraisal of complex economic situations and the judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers (see, to that effect, Case 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing and Others v Council [1987] ECR 1809, paragraph 19; Case C-156/87 Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission [1990] ECR I-781, paragraph 63; and Case C-150/94 United Kingdom v Council [1998] ECR I-7235, paragraph 54).

71. As for the compatibility of the 1997 decision and the 1997-1999 aid scheme with the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the Court has repeatedly held that the right to rely on that principle extends to any person in a situation where a European Union institution has caused him to entertain expectations which are justified. However, a person may not plead infringement of that principle unless he has been given precise assurances by that institution. Similarly, if a prudent and alert economic operator could have foreseen the adoption of a measure likely to affect his interests, he cannot plead that principle if the measure is adopted (see, to that effect, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission , paragraph 147 and the case-law cited, and Case C‑519/07 P Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina [2009] ECR I‑8495, paragraph 84).

64. Nevertheless, given that the Member States are under an obligation to ensure full compliance with Community law, the Commission may show that compliance with the provision of a directive governing such relations requires the adoption of specific measures transposing that provision into the national legal order (see Case C-296/01 Commission v France , cited above, paragraph 92, and Case C-429/01 Commission v France , cited above, paragraph 68).

68. Article 6(2) of Directive 90/220 states that the competent authority must respond in writing to the notifier within 90 days of receipt of the notification. It also provides that a positive response must indicate that the notification has been verified to be compliant with that directive and that the release may proceed, while a negative response must mention that the notification does not fulfil the conditions of the directive and that it is therefore rejected. Arguments of the parties

56. In the judgment in ETI and Others , to which the Court of Justice expressly referred in paragraph 144 of the judgment in ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission , the Court of Justice held that the Commission was entitled to impute the infringement to a company which had not committed the infringement where the entity which had done so continued to exist as an economic operator on other markets (see ETI and Others , paragraph 45). The Court of Justice based that assessment on the fact that, at the time of the infringement, the companies concerned were held by the same public entity ( ETI and Others , paragraph 50).

33. It is, therefore, clear both from the objective of Directive 1999/70 and the framework agreement and from the wording of the relevant provisions thereof that, contrary to what the Italian Government in essence maintains, the sphere of that agreement is not limited solely to workers having entered into successive fixed-term employment contracts; on the contrary, the agreement is applicable to all workers providing remunerated services in the context of a fixed-term employment relationship linking them to their employer, whatever the number of fixed-term contracts concluded by those workers ( Angelidaki and Others , paragraph 116 and case-law cited).

116. Therefore, it is clear both from the objective of Directive 1999/70 and the Framework Agreement and from the wording of the relevant provisions thereof that, contrary to the submissions, in essence, made by the Greek Government and the Commission, the scope of the Framework Agreement is not limited solely to workers who have entered into successive fixed-term employment contracts; on the contrary, the agreement is applicable to all workers providing remunerated services in the context of a fixed-term employment relationship linking them to their employer ( Del Cerro Alonso , paragraph 28), irrespective of the number of fixed-term contracts entered into.

23. Moreover, the interpretation of the terms used in that provision must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and must comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT (see, by analogy, United Utilities , paragraph 22).

35 As to the character of the rules at issue in the main proceedings, it follows from Walrave, paragraphs 17 and 18, and Bosman, paragraphs 82 and 83, that the Community provisions on freedom of movement for persons and freedom to provide services not only apply to the action of public authorities but extend also to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful employment and the provision of services in a collective manner. The abolition as between Member States of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons and freedom to provide services would be compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associations or organisations not governed by public law.

18 THE ABOLITION AS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES OF OBSTACLES TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR PERSONS AND TO FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES, WHICH ARE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNITY CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 3 ( C ) OF THE TREATY, WOULD BE COMPROMISED IF THE ABOLITION OF BARRIERS OF NATIONAL ORIGIN COULD BE NEUTRALIZED BY OBSTACLES RESULTING FROM THE EXERCISE OF THEIR LEGAL AUTONOMY BY ASSOCIATIONS OR ORGANIZATIONS WHICH DO NOT COME UNDER PUBLIC LAW .

49. In the second place, the Court has already repeatedly held that, in view of both the wording of Directive 93/104 and its purpose and scheme, the various requirements it lays down concerning maximum working time and minimum rest periods constitute rules of Community social law of particular importance from which every worker must benefit as a minimum requirement necessary to ensure protection of his safety and health (see BECTU , paragraphs 43 and 47, Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 100, and Wippel , paragraph 47).

37. It is clear from the case-law of the Court that, where a contract contains elements relating both to a public works contract and another type of public contract, it is the main purpose of the contract which determines which Community directive on public contracts is to be applied in principle (see Case C-331/92 Gestiόn Hotelera Internacional [1994] ECR I-1329, paragraph 29).

29 The answer to the first question must therefore be that a mixed contract relating both to the performance of works and to the assignment of property does not fall within the scope of Directive 71/305 if the performance of the works is merely incidental to the assignment of property. Question 2

50. In that regard, it should be pointed out that the tax authority does not have the information necessary to determine the amount of the tax chargeable and the deductions to be made until it receives the taxable person’s tax return. In the case of an inaccurate return, or where it turns out to be incomplete, it is therefore only from that time that the authorities can reassess the tax return and, where necessary, recover unpaid tax (see, to that effect, Case C‑85/97 SFI [1998] ECR I‑7447, paragraph 32).

40 According to the Court’s case-law, the division of production and sales activities within a group made up of legally distinct companies can in no way alter the fact that the group is a single economic entity which organises in that way activities that in other cases are carried on by what is, also from a legal point of view, a single entity (see, by analogy, judgment of 13 October 1993, Matsushita Electric Industrial v Council, C‑104/90, EU:C:1993:837, paragraph 9).

9 The Court has consistently held that the division of production and sales activities within a group made up of legally distinct companies can in no way alter the fact that the group is a single economic entity which organizes in that way activities that in other cases are carried on by what is, also from a legal point of view, a single entity (Case 250/85 Brother v Council [1988] ECR 5683, paragraph 16; and in Case C-175/87 Matsushita v Council [1992] ECR I-1409, paragraph 12).

86. As regards the review carried out by the Community judicature in respect of Commission decisions on competition matters, it should be borne in mind that, more than a simple review of legality, which merely permits dismissal of the action for annulment or annulment of the contested measure, the unlimited jurisdiction conferred on the Court of First Instance by Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003 in accordance with Article 229 EC authorises that court to vary the contested measure, even without annulling it, by taking into account all of the factual circumstances, so as to amend, for example, the amount of the fine ( Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission , paragraph 692).

22 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that any national of the European Union who, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement of workers and who has been employed in a Member State other than that of his residence comes within the scope of Article 45 TFEU (judgment of 28 February 2013 in Petersen, C‑544/11, EU:C:2013:124, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

34. It should be borne in mind that any national of the European Union who, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in a Member State other than that of his residence come within the scope of Article 45 TFEU (see, to that effect, Case C-385/00 de Groot [2002] ECR I-11819, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).

13. Under the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment in Brey , C‑140/12, EU:C:2013:565, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

33. It follows that the Austrian tax legislation which makes application of the definitive tax rate of 25%, or of the tax rate reduced by half, to revenue from capital subject to the condition that such revenue must be of Austrian origin does not relate to a difference in situation within the meaning of Article 73d(1)(a) of the Treaty between revenue from capital of Austrian origin and revenue from capital originating in another Member State (see, to that effect, Case C-107/94 Asscher [1996] ECR I-3089, paragraphs 41 to 49, and Case C-234/01 Gerritse [2003] ECR I-5933, paragraphs 47 to 54).

52. Moreover, as regards the application to non-residents of a flat rate of tax of 25% while residents are subject to a progressive table, as the Commission has pointed out, the Netherlands as State of residence, pursuant to the bilateral convention, integrates the income in respect of which the right to tax belongs to Germany into the basis of assessment, in accordance with the progressivity rule. It does, however, take account of the tax levied in Germany, by deducting from the Netherlands tax a fraction which corresponds to the relation between the income taxed in Germany and worldwide income.

25. In that regard, it is apparent from settled case-law that national legislation which places certain nationals at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State constitutes a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU on every citizen of the Union (judgments in Morgan and Bucher , EU:C:2007:626, paragraph 25, and Prinz and Seeberger , EU:C:2013:524, paragraph 27).

48. According to settled case-law, migrant workers are guaranteed certain rights linked to the status of worker even when they are no longer in an employment relationship (see, to that effect, Case 39/86 Lair [1988] ECR 3161, paragraph 36; Case C‑85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691, paragraph 32; Case C‑35/97 Commission v France [1998] ECR I‑5325, paragraph 41; Case C‑413/01 Ninni‑Orasche [2003] ECR I‑13187, paragraph 34; and Case C‑138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I‑2703, paragraph 27).

32 In the context of Article 48 of the Treaty and Regulation No 1612/68, a person who, for a certain period of time, performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration must be considered to be a worker. Once the employment relationship has ended, the person concerned as a rule loses his status of worker, although that status may produce certain effects after the relationship has ended, and a person who is genuinely seeking work must also be classified as a worker (see, in that connection, Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraph 17, Case 39/86 Lair [1988] ECR 3161, paragraphs 31 to 36, and Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745, paragraphs 12 and 13).

36. By contrast, measures, the only effect of which is to create additional costs in respect of the service in question and which affect in the same way the provision of services between Member States and that within one Member State, do not fall within the scope of Article 56 TFEU (judgment in Mobistar and Belgacom Mobile , Joined Cases C‑544/03 and C‑545/03, EU:C:2005:518, paragraph 31).

As regards, in the second place, the appellants’ line of argument alleging a breach of the principle of equal treatment, it must be borne in mind that that principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique and Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 23).

23. The general principle of equal treatment, as a general principle of Community law, requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Case 106/83 Sermide [1984] ECR 4209, paragraph 28; Joined Cases C‑133/93, C‑300/93 and C‑362/93 Crispoltoni and Others [1994] ECR I‑4863, paragraphs 50 and 51; and Case C‑313/04 Franz Egenberger [2006] ECR I‑6331, paragraph 33).

34. Such an interpretation is consistent with the objective pursued by the directives in this area of attaining the widest possible opening-up of public contracts to competition to the benefit not only of economic operators but also contracting authorities (see, to that effect, Case C‑305/08 CoNISMa [2009] ECR I‑12129, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). In addition, as the Advocate General noted at points 33 and 37 of his Opinion, that interpretation also facilitates the involvement of small- and medium-sized undertakings in the contracts procurement market, an aim also pursued by Directive 2004/18, as stated in recital 32 thereof.

29. As is clear from paragraphs 21 and 22 of the judgment in Case C-212/99 Commission v Italy, the principle of equal treatment laid down by Article 39 EC required that, where former assistants who have been employed under a fixed-term contract have that contract replaced by one of indeterminate duration, they should retain all the rights acquired from the date of their original rec ruitment. That guarantee had consequences not only with regard to increases in salary, but also with regard to seniority and to payment by the employer of social security contributions.

21 It should be noted at the outset that, when a worker whose employment relationship is governed by private law is entitled, under Law No 230, to have his fixed-term employment contract converted into one of indeterminate duration, all his acquired rights are guaranteed from the date of his original recruitment. That guarantee has consequences not only with regard to increases in salary, but also with regard to seniority and to payment, by the employer, of social security contributions.

42. In accordance with settled case-law of the Court, the object of the provisions determining the point of reference for tax purposes of supplies of services is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction which may result in double taxation and, secondly, non-taxation (see, to that effect, judgment in ADV Allround , EU:C:2012:35, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

40. However, when giving a preliminary ruling the Court may, where appropriate, provide clarification designed to give the national court guidance in its interpretation (see, inter alia, Case C-79/01 Payroll and Others [2002] ECR I‑8923, paragraph 29, and Manfredi and Others , paragraph 48).

29 Although, as regards the division of jurisdiction between the Community judicature and national courts, it is in principle for the national court to determine whether those conditions are fulfilled in the case pending before it, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may, where appropriate, provide clarification designed to give the national court guidance in its interpretation (see, for example, Haim, cited above, paragraph 58).

29. Under these circumstances, it is for each Member State to define, in its own domestic law, the paramedical professions in the context of which medical care is exempt from VAT, pursuant to Article 13A(1)(c) of the Sixth Directive. The Court has already held that that provision confers discretion on the Member States in this respect (Case C-45/01 Dornier [2003] ECR I-12911, paragraph 81).

41. It follows that, with regard to workers on sick leave which has been duly granted, the right to paid annual leave conferred by Directive 2003/88 itself on all workers ( BECTU , paragraphs 52 and 53) cannot be made subject by a Member State to a condition concerning the obligation actually to have worked during the leave year laid down by that State.

53 The expression in accordance with the conditions for entitlement to, and granting of, such leave laid down by national legislation and/or practice must therefore be construed as referring only to the arrangements for paid annual leave adopted in the various Member States. As the Advocate General observed in point 34 of his Opinion, although they are free to lay down, in their domestic legislation, conditions for the exercise and implementation of the right to paid annual leave, by prescribing the specific circumstances in which workers may exercise that right, which is theirs in respect of all the periods of work completed, Member States are not entitled to make the existence of that right, which derives directly from Directive 93/104, subject to any preconditions whatsoever.

53 In that respect, it must be recalled that the Member States must, when exercising their powers to determine the conditions referred to in the preceding paragraph, respect the basic freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU (see, by analogy, judgment of 27 June 2013, Nasiopoulos, C‑575/11, EU:C:2013:430, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

116 Those provisions must be viewed in the light of the duty to cooperate in good faith with the Commission, established by Article 5 of the EC Treaty, which, with particular regard to the utilisation of Community resources, requires Member States to set up comprehensive administrative checks and on-the-spot inspections, thus guaranteeing the conformity of financial operations with Community law. Consequently, if, as in the present case, no comprehensive system exists or if the system introduced gives rise to doubts as to compliance with the conditions imposed for eligibility for the reimbursement of the expenditure concerned, the Commission is entitled to disallow certain expenditure incurred by the Member State in question (see Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 16 to 21).

20 With particular regard to the correct utilization of Community resources, it is clear from those provisions, viewed in the light of the obligation of faithful cooperation with the Commission laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty, that Member States are required to set up comprehensive administrative checks and on-the-spot inspections thus guaranteeing the proper observance of the substantive and formal conditions for the grant of the premiums in question .

22 Furthermore, a reference by a national court can be rejected only if it appears that the procedure laid down by Article 177 of the Treaty has been misused and a ruling from the Court elicited by means of a contrived dispute, or it is obvious that Community law cannot apply, either directly or indirectly, to the circumstances of the case referred to the Court (Case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2 [1997] ECR I-4161, paragraph 26).

60. In this connection, it is to be noted that Article 18(1) TFEU prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality ‘[w]ithin the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein’. The second subparagraph of Article 20(2) TFEU expressly states that the rights conferred on Union citizens by that article are to be exercised ‘in accordance with the conditions and limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted thereunder’. Furthermore, under Article 21(1) TFEU too the right of Union citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is subject to compliance with the ‘limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect’ (see judgment in Brey , C‑140/12, EU:C:2013:565, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

46. It should be borne in mind that the right of nationals of one Member State to reside in the territory of another Member State without being engaged in any activity, whether on an employed or a self-employed basis, is not unconditional. Under Article 21(1) TFEU, the right of every citizen of the Union to reside in the territory of the Member States is recognised subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty and by the measures adopted for its implementation (see, to that effect, Trojani , paragraphs 31 and 32; Case C‑200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I‑9925, paragraph 26; and Case C‑291/05 Eind [2007] ECR I‑10719, paragraph 28).

59. In those circumstances, the Community Court must restrict itself to considering whether the exercise of that discretion is vitiated by manifest error or misuse of powers and whether the Community institutions clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretion (see Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission , cited above, paragraph 48, Case C-110/97 Netherlands v Council , cited above, paragraph 62, and Case C-301/97 Netherlands v Council , cited above, paragraph 74).

31. As regards the second condition, with which the question in the present case is concerned, the Court has held that the authorisation required cannot be refused if the same or equally effective treatment cannot be given in good time in the Member State of residence of the person concerned (see, to that effect, Inizan , C 56/01, EU:C:2003:578, paragraphs 45 and 60; Watts , C‑372/04, EU:C:2006:325, paragraph 61, and Elchinov , EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 65).

60. In view of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second part of the question must be that: ─ the second subparagraph of Article 22(2) of Regulation No 1408/71 must be interpreted as meaning that the authorisation to which that provision refers may not be refused where it is apparent, first, that the treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by the legislation of the Member State on whose territory the person concerned resides and, secondly, that treatment which is the same or equally effective cannot be obtained without undue delay in that Member State; ─ Articles 49 EC and 50 EC must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, first, makes reimbursement of the cost of hospital care provided in a Member State other than that in which the insured person's sickness fund is established conditional upon prior authorisation by that fund and, secondly, makes the grant of that authorisation subject to the condition that it be established that the insured person could not receive within the territory of the Member State where the fund is established the treatment appropriate to his condition. However, authorisation may be refused on that ground only if treatment which is the same or equally effective for the patient can be obtained without undue delay in the territory of the Member State in which he resides.

23 Moreover, to accept that it is possible for Member States to exclude any reduction of the VAT taxable amount would run counter to the principle of the neutrality of VAT, which means, inter alia, that the trader, as tax collector on behalf of the State, is entirely to be relieved of the burden of tax due or paid in the course of his economic activities, themselves subject to VAT (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 March 2008, Securenta, C‑437/06, EU:C:2008:166, paragraph 25, and of 13 March 2014, Malburg, C‑204/13, EU:C:2014:147, paragraph 41).

67 However, it is only in circumstances where the action for annulment would unquestionably have been admissible that the Court has held that a person may not plead the invalidity of an act of the European Union before a national court (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 March 1994, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf, C‑188/92, EU:C:1994:90, paragraphs 17 to 25; of 30 January 1997, Wiljo, C‑178/95, EU:C:1997:46, paragraphs 15 to 25; of 15 February 2001, Nachi Europe, C‑239/99, EU:C:2001:101, paragraphs 29 to 40; and of 22 October 2002, National Farmers’ Union, C‑241/01, EU:C:2002:604, paragraphs 34 to 39). In numerous other cases, the Court has held that it was not established that the action would unquestionably have been admissible (see, inter alia, to that effect, judgments of 23 February 2006, Atzeni and Others, C‑346/03 and C‑529/03, EU:C:2006:130, paragraphs 30 to 34; of 8 March 2007, Roquette Frères, C‑441/05, EU:C:2007:150, paragraphs 35 to 48; of 29 June 2010, E and F, C‑550/09, EU:C:2010:382, paragraphs 37 to 52; of 18 September 2014, Valimar, C‑374/12, EU:C:2014:2231, paragraphs 24 to 38; and of 5 March 2015, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraphs 27 to 32).

19 It is true that in its judgment in Joined Cases 133 to 136/85 Rau v BALM [1987] ECR 2289, on which the French Government relies in its observations, the Court held that the possibility of bringing a direct action under the second paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty against a decision adopted by a Community institution did not preclude the possibility of bringing an action in a national court against a measure adopted by a national authority for the implementation of that decision, on the ground that the latter decision was unlawful.

33. The Court has already held that Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive makes it possible to comply with the fundamental objective of preservation and protection of the quality of the environment, including the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, and establishes a general obligation of protection consisting in avoiding deterioration as well as disturbance which could have significant effects in the light of the directive’s objectives (Case C‑226/08 Stadt Papenburg [2010] ECR I‑131, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

72. In whatever form it is given, information which is precise, unconditional and consistent and comes from authorised and reliable sources constitutes such assurances (see Case C‑537/08 P Kahla Thüringen Porzellan v Commission [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 63). However, a person may not plead breach of that principle unless he has been given precise assurances by the administration (see Joined Cases C‑182/03 and C‑217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission [2006] ECR I‑5479, paragraph 147, and judgment of 25 October 2007 in Case C‑167/06 P Komninou and Others v Commission , paragraph 63).

63. In accordance with settled case-law, to which the General Court, moreover, correctly referred in paragraph 146 of the judgment under appeal, the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations applies to any individual in a situation in which an institution of the European Union, by giving that person precise assurances, has led him to entertain well-founded expectations (see, inter alia, judgment of 24 November 2005 in Case C-506/03 Germany v Commission , not published in the ECR, paragraph 58, and judgment in Case C‑213/06 P EAR v Karatzoglou [2007] ECR I‑6733, paragraph 33). Such assurances, in whatever form they are given, constitute precise, unconditional and consistent information (see, to that effect, judgment in Case C-47/07 P Masdar (UK) v Commission [2008] ECR I‑9761, paragraphs 34 and 81).

39. The Court has, on the contrary, held that when the Commission considers the compatibility of a measure of State aid with the common market, it must take all the relevant factors into account, including, where relevant, the circumstances already considered in a prior decision and the obligations which that previous decision may have imposed on a Member State (see, in particular, Case C-261/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-4437, paragraph 20; TWD v Commission , paragraph 26). The Court deduced in particular that, where the Commission has not been informed of any new fact allowing it to assess whether the aid in question might have the benefit of a derogation under the Treaty, it is justified in basing its decision on the assessments it has already made in its previous decision and the failure to comply with the condition it has imposed thereby ( Italy v Commission , paragraph 23).

63 As regards the request for measures of inquiry, the case-law of the Court (see, in particular, Case 77/70 Prelle v Commission [1971] ECR 561, paragraph 7, and Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 53) makes it clear that, if made after the oral procedure is closed, such a request can be admitted only if it relates to facts which may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the case and which the party concerned could not put forward before the close of the oral procedure.

53 After hearing again the views of the Advocate General, the Court considers that that application must be dismissed. It was made at a time when, in accordance with Article 59(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the oral procedure was closed. The Court has held (see Case 77/70 Prelle v Commission [1971] ECR 561, paragraph 7) that such an application can be admitted only if it relates to facts which may have a decisive influence and which the party concerned could not put forward before the close of the oral procedure.

29. Although adequate monitoring of the old version of the medicinal product remains necessary and may in certain cases mean that information is requested from the importer, it must be pointed out that pharmacovigilance satisfying the relevant requirements of Directive 75/319 as amended can ordinarily be guaranteed for medicinal products that are the subject of parallel imports, such as those in question in the main proceedings, through cooperation with the national authorities of the other Member States by means of access to the documents and data produced by the manufacturer or other companies in the same group, relating to the old version in the Member States in which that version is still marketed on the basis of a marketing authorisation still in force (Ferring , paragraph 38).

51. As far as concerns the principle of effectiveness, the Court has already held that every case in which the question arises as to whether a national procedural provision makes the application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies. In that context, it is necessary to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (see, in particular, judgment in Pohotovosť , C‑470/12, EU:C:2014:101, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

51. As regards, secondly, the principle of effectiveness, the Court has already held that every case in which the question arises as to whether a national procedural provision makes the application of European Union law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies. In that context, it is necessary to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (see Case C‑413/12 Asociación de Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y León [2013] ECR, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

7. À cet égard, il suffit de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et que les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 11 octobre 2001, Commission/Autriche, C‑111/00, Rec. p. I-7555, point 13, et du 17 janvier 2002, Commission/Irlande, C‑394/00, Rec. p. I-581, point 12).

24. It should be recalled that it is settled case-law of the Court that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties, as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, judgment in Kyowa Hakko Europe , C‑344/14, EU:C:2015:615, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

25. Next, it should be recalled that it is settled case-law of the Court that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties, as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, judgments in Thyssen Haniel Logistic , C‑459/93, EU:C:1995:160, paragraph 8, and Nutricia , C‑267/13, EU:C:2014:277, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

17 To answer that question, it should be noted as a preliminary point that the subject of the regulation is the placing on the market of novel foods and novel food ingredients (judgment of 9 June 2005, HLH Warenvertrieb and Orthica, C‑211/03, C‑299/03 and C‑316/03 to C‑318/03, EU:C:2005:370, paragraph 81).

89 It is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely, that those concerned must have acted in good faith and there must be a risk of serious difficulties (judgments of 15 March 2005, Bidar, C‑209/03, EU:C:2005:169, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited, and of 22 September 2016, Microsoft Mobile Sales International and Others, C‑110/15, EU:C:2016:717, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).

67. It is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order, be moved to restrict the possibility for any person concerned of relying on a provision it has interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith (see Blaizot , paragraph 28; Case C‑163/90 Legros and Others [1992] ECR I‑4625, paragraph 30; and Case C‑262/96 Sürül [1999] ECR I‑2685, paragraph 108).

25. Next, in principle it is for the national courts alone to determine, in the light of the particular features of each case, both the need to refer a question for a preliminary ruling in order to give their judgment and the relevance of that question as referred to the Court ( Guimont , paragraph 22). A reference for a preliminary ruling from a national court may be rejected by the Court only if it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law sought by that court is unrelated to the actual nature of the case or the subject-matter of the main proceedings (Case C‑281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I‑4139, paragraph 18, and Anomar and Others , paragraph 40).