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21. In its case-law relating to the Brussels Convention, the Court has thus held that an action is related to bankruptcy if it derives directly from the bankruptcy and is closely linked to proceedings for realising the assets or judicial supervision (see Gourdain , paragraph 4). An action with such characteristics does not, therefore, fall within the scope of that convention.

4AS FAR AS CONCERNS BANKRUPTCY , PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO THE WINDING-UP OF INSOLVENT COMPANIES OR OTHER LEGAL PERSONS , JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS , COMPOSITIONS AND ANALOGOUS PROCEEDINGS , ACCORDING TO THE VARIOUS LAWS OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES RELATING TO DEBTORS WHO HAVE DECLARED THEMSELVES UNABLE TO MEET THEIR LIABILITIES , INSOLVENCY OR THE COLLAPSE OF THE DEBTOR ' S CREDITWORTHINESS , WHICH INVOLVE THE INTERVENTION OF THE COURTS CULMINATING IN THE COMPULSORY ' ' LIQUIDATION DES BIENS ' ' IN THE INTEREST OF THE GENERAL BODY OF CREDITORS OF THE PERSON , FIRM OR COMPANY , OR AT LEAST IN SUPERVISION BY THE COURTS , IT IS NECESSARY , IF DECISIONS RELATING TO BANKRUPTCY AND WINDING-UP ARE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION , THAT THEY MUST DERIVE DIRECTLY FROM THE BANKRUPTCY OR WINDING-UP AND BE CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE ' ' LIQUIDATION DES BIENS ' ' OR THE ' ' REGLEMENT JUDICIAIRE ' ' . IN ORDER TO ANSWER THE QUESTION REFERRED TO THE COURT BY THE NATIONAL COURT IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF AN APPLICATION SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 99 OF THE FRENCH LAW IS BASED ON THE LAW RELATING TO BANKRUPTCY AND WINDING-UP AS INTERPRETED FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE CONVENTION .

36. The Court has consistently held that the principle of the right to a fair hearing, to which the principle of the right to be heard is closely linked, applies not only to citizens but also to the Member States. As regards the latter, that principle has been recognised in the context of proceedings brought by a Community institution against Member States (see, inter alia, Denmark v Commission , paragraph 46). It has been held that the right to a fair hearing is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of Community law and must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑48/90 and C‑66/90 Netherlands and Others v Commission [1992] ECR I‑565, paragraph 44; Case C‑288/96 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I‑8237, paragraph 99; and Case C‑287/02 Spain v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5093, paragraph 37).

49. Pour autant que le Royaume de Belgique fait état d’un projet d’arrêté royal ayant pour objet de rendre la réglementation en cause conforme aux articles 56 TFUE et 36 de l’accord EEE, il suffit de rappeler qu’il est de jurisprudence constante que l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et que les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts Commission/Grèce, C‑351/13, EU:C:2014:2150, point 20; Commission/Belgique, C‑317/14, EU:C:2015:63, point 34, et Commission/France, C‑485/14, EU:C:2015:506, point 30).

20. Selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (Commission/Italie, EU:C:2014:353, point 25 et jurisprudence citée).

56 Likewise, as is apparent from that same line of case-law, the scope of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations cannot be extended to the point of generally preventing new rules from applying to the future effects of situations which arose under the earlier rules (see, inter alia, judgment of 3 September 2015 in A2A, C‑89/14, EU:C:2015:537, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

30. In support of that view, the Court further observed that the rules breached are aimed solely at economic operators who have freely chosen to take advantage of an agricultural aid scheme (see Maizena and Others , paragraph 13; Germany v Commission , paragraph 26; and Käserei Champignon Hofmeister , paragraph 41). It added that, in the context of a European Union aid scheme in which the granting of the aid is necessarily subject to the condition that the beneficiary offers all guarantees of probity and trustworthiness, the penalty imposed in the event of non-compliance with those requirements constitutes a specific administrative instrument forming an integral part of the scheme of aid and intended to ensure the sound financial management of public funds of the European Union ( Käserei Champignon Hofmeister , paragraph 41).

41 In explaining the nature of the breaches complained of, the Court has emphasised on several occasions that the rules breached were aimed solely at traders who had freely chosen to take advantage of an agricultural aid scheme (see, to that effect, Maizena, paragraph 13, and Germany v Commission, paragraph 26). In the context of a Community aid scheme, in which the granting of the aid is necessarily subject to the condition that the beneficiary offers all guarantees of probity and trustworthiness, the penalty imposed in the event of non-compliance with those requirements constitutes a specific administrative instrument forming an integral part of the scheme of aid and intended to ensure the sound financial management of Community public funds.

48. Therefore, where they adopt measures which fall within the scope of the Directive, which gives specific expression, in the domain of employment and occupation, to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, the social partners must respect the Directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑127/92 Enderby [1993] ECR I‑5535, paragraph 22).

32 The Court has, lastly, held that provisions which confer exclusive jurisdiction, such as Article 16 of the Brussels Convention and Article 22 of Regulation No 44/2001, must not be given a wider interpretation than is required by their objective, since they deprive the parties of the choice of forum which would otherwise be theirs and may, in certain cases, result in a situation whereby the parties are brought before a court which is not that of any of them (judgments of 10 January 1990, Reichert and Kockler, C‑115/88, EU:C:1990:3, paragraph 9, and of 12 May 2011, BVG, C‑144/10, EU:C:2011:300, paragraph 30).

30. In this regard, it is to be recalled that the jurisdiction provided for in Article 2 of Regulation No 44/2001, namely that the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled are to have jurisdiction, constitutes the general rule. It is only by way of derogation from that general rule that the regulation provides for special rules of jurisdiction for cases, which are exhaustively listed, in which the defendant may or must, depending on the case, be sued in the courts of another Member State (see Case C-103/05 Reisch Montage [2006] ECR I-6827, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). The Court has thus adopted a strict interpretation in respect of Article 22 of Regulation No 44/2001 (Case C-372/07 Hassett and Doherty [2008] ECR I-7403, paragraphs 18 and 19). It has held that, as they constitute an exception to the general rule governing the attribution of jurisdiction, the provisions of Article 16 of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36; ‘the Brussels Convention’), which are identical in essence to those of Article 22 of Regulation No 44/2001, must not be given an interpretation broader than is required by their objective (see Case 73/77 Sanders [1977] ECR 2383, paragraphs 17 and 18; Case C‑8/98 Dansommer [2000] ECR I‑393, paragraph 21; and Case C‑343/04 ČEZ [2006] ECR I‑4557, paragraph 26).

51. First of all, it must be noted that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the choice of the legal basis for an EU measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include the aim and content of that measure (judgments in Parliament v Council , C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 42, and United Kingdom v Council , C‑431/11, EU:C:2013:589, paragraph 44).

31 As the Court acknowledged in paragraph 58 of Schindler, those objectives must be considered together. They concern the protection of the recipients of the service and, more generally, of consumers as well as the maintenance of order in society and have already been held to rank among those objectives which may be regarded as constituting overriding reasons relating to the public interest (see Joined Cases 110/78 and 111/78 Ministère Public v Van Wesemael [1979] ECR 35, paragraph 28, Case 220/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 3663, paragraph 20, and Case 15/78 Société Générale Alsacienne de Banque v Koestler [1978] ECR 1971, paragraph 5). Moreover, as held in paragraph 29 of this judgment, measures based on such reasons must be suitable for securing attainment of the objectives pursued and not go beyond what is necessary to attain them.

28TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PARTICULAR NATURE OF CERTAIN SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED , SUCH AS THE PLACING OF ENTERTAINERS IN EMPLOYMENT , SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON PERSONS PROVIDING SERVICES CANNOT BE CONSIDERED INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATY WHERE THEY HAVE AS THEIR PURPOSE THE APPLICATION OF PROFESSIONAL RULES , JUSTIFIED BY THE GENERAL GOOD OR BY THE NEED TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF THE ENTERTAINER , WHICH ARE BINDING UPON ANY PERSON ESTABLISHED IN THE SAID STATE , IN SO FAR AS THE PERSON PROVIDING THE SERVICE IS NOT SUBJECT TO SIMILAR REQUIREMENTS IN THE MEMBER STATE IN WHICH HE IS ESTABLISHED .

50. Néanmoins, il ne saurait être a priori exclu que, au jour du prononcé du présent arrêt, l’arrêt Commission/Grèce (C‑440/06, EU:C:2007:642) ait été exécuté de manière complète. Ainsi, l’astreinte ne doit être infligée que dans l’hypothèse où le manquement persisterait à la date de ce prononcé (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Commission/Grèce, C‑378/13, EU:C:2014:2405, point 51).

36. In that regard, it should be noted that the Court may, of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties, order the reopening of the oral procedure in accordance with Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case should be decided on the basis of an argument which has not been discussed between the parties (see, inter alia, Case C-284/06 Burda [2008] ECR I-4571, paragraph 37, and Case C‑42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International [2009] ECR I-7633, paragraph 31).

31. The Court may of its own motion, or on a proposal from the Advocate General, or at the request of the parties, order the reopening of the oral procedure in accordance with Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure if it considers that it lacks sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see, inter alia, Case C‑284/06 Burda [2008] ECR I‑4571, paragraph 37 and case-law cited).

17. A medicinal product is essentially similar, within the meaning of Article 10(1)(a)(iii) of Directive 2001/83, to an original medicinal product where it satisfies the criteria of having the same qualitative and quantitative composition in terms of active principles, of having the same pharmaceutical form and of being bioequivalent, unless it is apparent in the light of scientific knowledge that it differs significantly from the original product as regards safety or efficacy (Case C‑368/96 Generics (UK) and Others [1998] ECR I‑7967, paragraph 36, concerning an equivalent provision in Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to medicinal products (OJ, English Special Edition 1965-1966, p. 20).

En outre, l’article 56 TFUE confère des droits non seulement au prestataire de services lui-même, mais également au destinataire desdits services (arrêts Eurowings Luftverkehr, C‑294/97, EU:C:1999:524, point 34; FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen, C‑290/04, EU:C:2006:630, point 32; Dijkman et Dijkman-Lavaleije, C‑233/09, EU:C:2010:397, point 24, ainsi que X, C‑498/10, EU:C:2012:635, point 23).

23. Furthermore, according to settled case-law, Article 56 TFEU confers rights not only on the provider of services but also on the recipient of those services (see Case C-294/97 Eurowings Luftverkehr [1999] ECR I-7447, paragraph 34; FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen, paragraph 32; and Case C-233/09 Dijkman and Dijkman-Lavaleije [2010] ECR I-6645, paragraph 24).

41 By contrast, when the Commission has referred a matter to the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health and a decision has been adopted at Union level, the factual and legal assessments relating to that case and contained in such a decision are binding on all bodies of the Member State which is the addressee of such a decision, in accordance with Article 288 TFEU, including national courts which are called on to assess the lawfulness of measures adopted at national level (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2011, Monsanto and Others, C‑58/10 to C‑68/10, EU:C:2011:553, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).

30 In those circumstances, no difference may be discerned in the fact that pigs exported live are taxed at the time of exportation, whereas pigs intended for slaughter on the national market are taxed at the time of supply for purposes of slaughter, as in real economic terms those two moments correspond to the same marketing stage, both operations being carried out with a view to releasing the pigs from national primary production (see, along these lines, Sanders Adour and Guyomarc'h Orthez Nutrition Animale, cited above, paragraph 18, and Outokumpu, paragraph 25).

18 As to the requirement that the chargeable events be identical, no difference may be discerned in the present case in the fact that the charge is levied on an imported product at the time of importation and on the domestic product when it is sold or used, for in actual economic terms the marketing stage is the same since both operations are carried out with a view to utilization of the product.

20. As regards the aims of Directive 87/102, it is clear from the recitals in the preamble thereto that it was adopted with the dual aim of ensuring both the creation of a common consumer credit market (recitals three to five) and the protection of consumers who avail themselves of such credit (recitals six, seven and nine) (Case C-208/98 Berliner Kindl Brauerei [2000] ECR I-1741, paragraph 20, and Case C-264/02 Cofinoga [2004] ECR I‑2157, paragraph 25).

42. In addition, the Court has held that, even though the Vienna Convention does not bind either the Community or all its Member States, a series of provisions in that convention reflect the rules of customary international law which, as such, are binding upon the Community institutions and form part of the Community legal order (see, to that effect, Racke, paragraphs 24, 45 and 46; see, also, as regards the reference to the Vienna Convention for the purposes of the interpretation of association agreements concluded by the European Communities, Case C‑416/96 El-Yassini [1999] ECR I‑1209, paragraph 47, and Case C‑268/99 Jany and Others [2001] ECR I‑8615, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

47 Next, as regards the question whether, as Mr El-Yassini claims, the Court's case-law concerning the rules governing the EEC-Turkey association should be applied, by analogy, to the present case, it must be noted that, according to settled case-law, an international treaty is to be interpreted not solely by reference to the terms in which it is worded but also in the light of its objectives. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties provides in that respect that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (see, to that effect, Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, paragraph 14, and Case C-312/91 Metalsa [1993] ECR I-3751, paragraph 12).

29. Accordingly, European Union law requires that the sale be considered, in the territory of a Member State, to be a form of distribution to the public within the meaning of the copyright directive, or use in the course of trade within the meaning of the trade mark directive and the Community trade mark regulation. Such distribution to the public must be considered proven where a contract of sale and dispatch has been concluded.

64 In that respect, DEI and the Commission state that, if, according to the settled case-law of the Court, an omission attributed to a Member State may result in the emergence of State aid (judgment of 19 mars 2013, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others, C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P, EU:C:2013:175, paragraphs 100 to 103), such would, a fortiori, be the case of a measure taken by an organ of the State, even when it is not a legislative measure.

100. It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, it is not necessary to establish in every case that there has been a transfer of State resources for the advantage granted to one or more undertakings to be capable of being regarded as a State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU (see, to that effect, Case C‑387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14; Case C‑6/97 Italy v Commission [1999] ECR I-2981, paragraph 16; and Case C-482/99 France v Commission [2002] ECR I-4397, paragraph 36).

36. As the Italian Government has observed, the Court has repeatedly stated that the legislation on games of chance is one of the areas in which there are significant moral, religious and cultural differences between the Member States. In the absence of harmonisation in the field at EU level, it is for each Member State to determine in those areas, in accordance with its own scale of values, what is required in order to ensure that the interests in question are protected (see, inter alia, judgments in Stanleybet International and Others , C‑186/11 and C‑209/11, EU:C:2013:33, paragraph 24, and Digibet and Albers , C‑156/13, EU:C:2014:1756, paragraph 24).

S’agissant du bien-fondé du présent moyen, il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence bien établie, la motivation des actes des institutions de l’Union exigée à l’article 296 TFUE doit être adaptée à la nature de l’acte en cause et doit faire apparaître de façon claire et non équivoque le raisonnement de l’institution, auteur de l’acte, de manière à permettre aux intéressés de connaître les justifications de la mesure prise et à la juridiction compétente d’exercer son contrôle. L’exigence de motivation doit être appréciée en fonction de toutes les circonstances de l’espèce, notamment du contenu de l’acte, de la nature des motifs invoqués et de l’intérêt que les destinataires de l’acte ou d’autres personnes concernées directement et individuellement par celui-ci peuvent avoir à recevoir des explications. Il n’est pas exigé que la motivation spécifie tous les éléments de fait et de droit pertinents, dans la mesure où la question de savoir si la motivation d’un acte satisfait aux exigences de l’article 296 TFUE doit être appréciée au regard non seulement de son libellé, mais aussi de son contexte ainsi que de l’ensemble des règles juridiques régissant la matière concernée (arrêts Commission/Sytraval et Brink’s France, C-367/95 P, EU:C:1998:154, point 63, ainsi que Nexans et Nexans France/Commission, C‑37/13 P, EU:C:2014:2030, points 31 et 32 et jurisprudence citée).

32. It is also settled case-law that the requirement to state reasons must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to specify all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question ( Solvay v Commission , EU:C:2013:796, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited).

93. Or, une telle répétition de comportements infractionnels d’un État membre, dans un secteur spécifique de l’action de l’Union, constitue un indicateur de ce que la prévention effective de la répétition future d’infractions analogues au droit de l’Union est de nature à requérir l’adoption d’une mesure dissuasive, telle que la condamnation au paiement d’une somme forfaitaire (voir arrêt Commission/Italie, C‑196/13, EU:C:2014:2407, point 116 et jurisprudence citée).

12 In those four judgments, the Court added that unlawful imports or supplies of goods such as those at issue in those cases, release of which into the economic and commercial channels of the Community is by definition absolutely precluded and which can give rise only to penalties under the criminal law, are wholly alien to the provisions of the Sixth Directive (Einberger, paragraphs 19 and 20; Mol, paragraph 15; Happy Family, paragraph 17; and Witzemann, paragraph 19). That line of case-law thus concerns goods which, because of their special characteristics, may not be placed on the market or incorporated into economic channels.

19 The Court therefore concluded that illegal imports of drugs into the Community, which can give rise only to penalties under the criminal law, are wholly alien to the provisions of the Sixth Directive on the definition of the basis of assessment and, in consequence, to the origination of a VAT debt .

23. As the European Commission correctly states, the Court has already held, in relation to a loan agreed between citizens resident in different Member States, that the cross-border lending of a vehicle free of charge constitutes a movement of capital within the meaning of Article 63 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment in van Putten and Others , C‑578/10 to C‑580/10, EU:C:201 2:246, paragraphs 28 and 36).

25. According to settled case-law, any national of a Member State who, irrespective of his place of residence and of his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in a Member State other than that of his residence falls within the scope of Article 45 TFEU (see, inter alia, Case C-152/03 Ritter-Coulais [2006] ECR I-1711, paragraph 31, and Case C-212/05 Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, paragraph 17).

31. It should be noted that any Community national who, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in a Member State other than that of residence falls within the scope of Article 48 EC (see Case C-385/00 De Groot [2002] ECR I-11819, paragraph 76; Case C-209/01 Schilling and Fleck-Schilling [2003] ECR I-13389, paragraph 23; and Case C-277/03 Van Pommeren-Bourgondiën [2005] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 19, 44 and 45).

24. However, the spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the preliminary-ruling procedure requires the national court, for its part, to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions. In order to enable the Court to provide a useful interpretation of Community law, it is appropriate that the national court should define the legal and factual context of the interpretation sought and it is essential for it to explain why it considers that a reply to its questions is necessary to enable it to give judgment (see to that effect Gantner Electronic , cited above, paragraphs 35, 37 and 38).

29. The Court has consistently held that, for national tax legislation to be capable of being regarded as compatible with the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the free movement of capital, the difference in treatment must concern situations which are not objectively comparable or it must be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest (Case C‑35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I‑4071, paragraph 43; Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraph 29; Case C‑512/03 Blanckaert [2005] ECR I‑7685, paragraph 42; and Case C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome [2009] ECR I-8591, paragraph 68).

68. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish between the unequal treatment permitted under Article 73d(1)(a) of the Treaty and the discriminatory treatment prohibited by Article 73d(3). It is clear from the case-law that for national tax legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings to be regarded as compatible with the provisions of the Treaty relating to the free movement of capital the difference in treatment must relate to situations which are not objectively comparable or be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest (see Case C-35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071, paragraph 43; Manninen, paragraph 29; and C‑512/03 Blanckaert [2005] ECR I-7685, paragraph 42).

46 On this point, it should be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must be adapted to the nature of the act in question. It must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Community institution which adopted the measure in such a way as to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review. It follows from the case-law that it is not necessary for details of all relevant factual and legal aspects to be given. The question whether the statement of the grounds for an act meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, to that effect, Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v Commission [1998] ECR I-2265, paragraph 70, and Case C-352/96 Italy v Council [1998] ECR I-6937, paragraph 40).

30. According to settled case-law, it is for the competent national authorities to show, in each case, that their rules or administrative practices are necessary to effectively protect the interests envisaged by Article 30 EC or to meet imperative requirements and, where appropriate, that the marketing of the products in question poses a risk to public health (see, to that effect, Case 304/84 Muller and Others [1986] ECR 1511, paragraph 25, Beer Purity , cited above, paragraph 46, and Joined Cases C-13/91 and C-113/91 Debus [1992] ECR I-3617, paragraph 18).

25 IL APPARTIENT AUX AUTORITES NATIONALES COMPETENTES DE DEMONTRER , DANS CHAQUE CAS , QUE LEUR REGLEMENTATION EST NECESSAIRE POUR PROTEGER EFFECTIVEMENT LES INTERETS VISES A L ' ARTICLE 36 DU TRAITE ET , NOTAMMENT , QUE LA COMMERCIALISATION DU PRODUIT EN QUESTION PRESENTE UN RISQUE POUR LA SANTE PUBLIQUE ET , LE CAS ECHEANT , QUE L ' ADJONCTION DES AGENTS DONT IL S ' AGIT NE REPOND PAS A UN BESOIN REEL .

24. It is to be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and national courts under Article 234 EC, it is for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, which alone has direct knowledge of the facts giving rise to that case and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, when the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of European Union law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, in particular, Case C‑144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I‑9981, paragraphs 34 and 35; Case C‑212/04 Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR I‑6057, paragraph 41; and the order of 12 June 2008 in C‑364/07 Vassilakis and Others [2008] ECR I‑0090, paragraph 42 and case-law cited).

48. As Article 6 thereof states, the provisions of that agreement, in so far as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of the Treaty and to acts adopted in application of that Treaty, must, in their implementation and application, be interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court given prior to the date of signature of that agreement. Furthermore, both the Court and the EFTA Court have recognised the need to ensure that the rules of the EEA Agreement which are identical in substance to those of the Treaty are interpreted uniformly (Case C-452/01 Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg [2003] ECR I-9743, paragraph 29; Case C-286/02 Bellio F.lli [2004] ECR I‑3465, paragraph 34; see also the judgment of the EFTA Court of 12 December 2003 in Case E-1/03 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland , EFTA Court Report, p. 143, paragraph 27).

34. It should be emphasised in this connection that, as Article 6 of the EEA Agreement states, the provisions of the agreement, in so far as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of the EC Treaty and to acts adopted in application of that Treaty, must, in their implementation and application, be interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court given prior to the date of signature of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, both the Court and the EFTA Court have recognised the need to ensure that the rules of the EEA Agreement which are identical in substance to those of the Treaty are interpreted uniformly (Case C-452/01 Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 29, and Case E-1/03 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland , not yet published in the EFTA Court Reports, paragraph 27).

36. On the other hand, mere adverse repercussions on the rights of third parties, even if the repercussions are certain, do not justify preventing an individual from relying on the provisions of a directive against the Member State concerned (see Wells , paragraph 57 and case‑law cited).

50. The assessment of the similarities between the signs at issue is of a factual nature and, save where the evidence and facts are distorted, is not subject to review by the Court of Justice. Such distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (see Case C‑8/95 P New Holland Ford v C ommission [1998] ECR I‑3175, paragraph 72; Case C‑551/03 P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraph 54; Case C‑167/04 P JCB Service v Commission [2006] ECR I‑8935, paragraph 108; and the judgment of 7 May 2009 in Case C‑398/07 P Waterford Wedgwood v Assembled Investments (Proprietary) and OHIM , paragraph 41).

41. It must also be borne in mind that such distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (see Case C‑8/95 P New Holland Ford v Commission [1998] ECR I‑3175, paragraph 72; Case C‑551/03 P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraph 54; and Case C‑167/04 P JCB Service v Commission [2006] ECR I‑8935, paragraph 108).

62 As follows from Article 171(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the appeal is to be served on the other parties to the relevant case before the General Court. The procedural documents thus communicated to the parties to the case before the Court of Justice are not available to the public. Consequently, Mr Breyer’s publication on the internet of the pleadings in the present proceedings, without being authorised to do so, constitutes misuse of the pleadings liable to harm the sound administration of justice, which should be taken into account when sharing the costs incurred in the present proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 September 2010, Sweden and Others v API and Commission, C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, paragraphs 92, 93 and 97 to 99).

39. So far as concerns, first of all, the principle of equivalence, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that observance of that principle requires that the national rule at issue be applied without distinction, whether the action is based on rights which individuals derive from European Union law or whether it is based on an infringement of national law, where the purpose and cause of action are similar. It is for the national court, which has direct knowledge of the detailed procedural rules applicable, to ascertain whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics (see, to that effect, Pontin , paragraph 45 and the case-law cited, and Case C-591/10 Littlewoods Retail and Others [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 31).

45. The principle of equivalence requires that the national rule at issue be applied without distinction, whether the infringement alleged is of Community law or national law, where the purpose and cause of action are similar (Case C-326/96 Levez [1998] ECR I-7835, paragraph 41). However, that principle is not to be interpreted as requiring Member States to extend their most favourable rules to all actions brought in the field of employment law (see Levez , paragraph 42). In order to establish whether the principle of equivalence has been complied with, it is for the national court, which alone has direct knowledge of the procedural rules governing actions in the field of domestic law, to determine whether the procedural rules intended to ensure that the rights derived by individuals from Community law are safeguarded under domestic law comply with that principle and to consider both the purpose and the essential characteristics of allegedly similar domestic actions (see Levez , paragraphs 39 and 43, and Case C‑78/98 Preston and Others [2000] ECR I‑3201, paragraph 49). For that purpose, the national court must consider whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics (see, to that effect, Preston and Others , paragraph 57).

54. Having regard to that objective of integration in the host Member State, the concept of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in that State for an indefinite period (see Case C-221/89 Factortame and Others [1991] ECR I-3905, paragraph 20, and Case C-246/89 Commission v United Kingdom [1991] ECR I-4585, paragraph 21). Consequently, it presupposes actual establishment of the company concerned in the host Member State and the pursuit of genuine economic activity there.

82 It follows from the foregoing that the Court of First Instance considered, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, that its findings regarding the effects of the infringement were not such as to alter the Commission's own assessment of the gravity of the infringement, or, more precisely, as to diminish the gravity of the infringement so assessed. It considered, in the light of the specific circumstances of the case and the context in which the infringement took place, as taken into account by the Commission's Decision and set out in paragraphs 74 and 75 of this judgment, and in the light of the deterrent effect of the fines imposed, all being factors which could be applied, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, in assessing the gravity of the infringement (see Musique Diffusion Française and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 106; order in SPO and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 54, and Ferriere Nord v Commission, cited above, paragraph 33), that it was not appropriate to reduce the level of the fine.

106 IT FOLLOWS THAT , IN ASSESSING THE GRAVITY OF AN INFRINGEMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF FIXING THE AMOUNT OF THE FINE , THE COMMISSION MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION NOT ONLY THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE BUT ALSO THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE INFRINGEMENT OCCURS AND MUST ENSURE THAT ITS ACTION HAS THE NECESSARY DETERRENT EFFECT , ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THOSE TYPES OF INFRINGEMENT WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY HARMFUL TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNITY .

25 Since the national court found that the minimum corporation tax at issue in the main proceedings before it might, in certain cases, be classified as an indirect tax, it must be pointed out that, according to the Court's settled case-law, the nature of a tax, duty or charge falls to be determined by the Court, under Community law, according to the objective characteristics by which it is levied, irrespective of its classification under national law (see, in particular, Nonwoven, cited above, paragraph 19).

60. In that regard, it must be conceded that some of the differences raised by the Italian Government relating to the manner in which fixed-term workers are recruited under stabilisation procedures such as those at issue in the main proceedings with respect to career civil servants recruited following a general competition, the qualifications required and the nature of the duties undertaken could, in principle, justify different treatment as regards their conditions of employment (see, to that effect, Rosado Santana , paragraph 78).

78. As the Advocate General pointed out in points 62 to 65 of her Opinion, some of the differences raised by the Spanish Government relating to the manner in which interim and career civil servants are engaged, the qualifications required and the nature of the duties undertaken could, in principle, justify different treatment as regards their conditions of employment.

41. However, the inclusion in another part of the labelling of a neutral and objective statement informing consumers of the absence from the product of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter would be sufficient to ensure that consumers are given correct information (see, to that effect, Commission v Spain , paragraph 93, and Commission v Italy , paragraph 88).

39. To require those who, among the residents of a Member State, are insured under the social security scheme of another Member State to finance, in addition, even if only partially, the social security scheme of the Member State of residence would give rise to unequal treatment under Article 13 of Regulation No 1408/71, since all other residents of the latter Member State are required to contribute only to its social security scheme (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v France , EU:C:2000:84, paragraphs 45 to 48, and Commission v France , EU:C:2000:85, paragraphs 42 to 45).

34 The fact that a levy is categorised as a tax under national legislation does not mean that, as regards Regulation No 1408/71, that same levy cannot be regarded as falling within the scope of that regulation and caught by the prohibition against overlapping legislation.

101 The contested decision was adopted as an `emergency measure' `temporarily' banning exports (fifth recital in the preamble). Moreover, the Commission acknowledges in the preamble to the decision the need for the significance of the new information and the measures to be taken to be subjected to detailed scientific study and, consequently, the need to review the contested decision following an overall examination of the situation (seventh recital).

101. It must further be added, as regards the notarial activities mentioned in paragraphs 97 to 100 of this judgment, that, as was stated in paragraph 78 above, professional services involving assistance, even when obligatory, to the operation of courts or tribunals do not thereby constitute a connection with the exercise of official authority ( Reyners , paragraph 51).

51 PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES INVOLVING CONTACTS, EVEN REGULAR AND ORGANIC, WITH THE COURTS, INCLUDING EVEN COMPULSORY COOPERATION IN THEIR FUNCTIONING, DO NOT CONSTITUTE, AS SUCH, CONNEXION WITH THE EXERCISE OF OFFICIAL AUTHORITY .

37. In addition, Article 4(1) and (2) of the Sixth Directive does not indicate that the status of taxable person depends on any authorisation or licence granted by the authorities for the exercise of an economic activity (see, to that effect, judgment in Tóth , C‑324/11, EU:C:2012:549, paragraph 30).

72. Since Bozkurt (cited above), paragraphs 14, 19 and 20, the Court has consistently inferred from the wording of Article 12 of the Association Agreement and Article 36 of the Additional Protocol, as well as from the objective of Decision No 1/80 ─ which is progressively to secure freedom of movement for workers, guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Treaty ─ that the principles laid down in those articles must be extended, so far as possible, to Turkish nationals who enjoy the rights conferred by Decision No 1/80 (see, inter alia , Case C-340/97 Nazli [2000] ECR I-957, paragraphs 50 to 55, and the references cited therein).

14 It should first be noted that Decision No 2/76 is presented, in Article 1 thereof, as constituting a first stage in securing freedom of movement for workers between the Community and Turkey which was to last for four years as from 1 December 1976. Section 1 of Chapter II, headed "Social Provisions", of Decision No 1/80, which includes Article 6, constitutes a further stage in securing freedom of movement for workers and has applied, pursuant to Article 16, since 1 December 1980. As from that date, Article 6 of Decision No 1/80 has replaced the corresponding, less favourable, provisions of Decision No 2/76. That being so, for the purposes of giving a helpful answer to the questions submitted to the Court, and having regard to the times at which the facts summarized above occurred, it is solely to Article 6 of Decision No 1/80 that reference should be made. The first question

28. The Court has consistently held that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently, and different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (see Case C‑127/07 Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others [2008] ECR I‑9895, paragraph 23).

19. The distinctive character of a trade mark within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 must be assessed by reference, first, to the goods or services in respect of which registration is sought and, secondly, to the perception of the relevant public. That means the presumed expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see, to that effect, in relation to Article 3(1)(b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1), which is identical to Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, Case C-218/01 Henkel [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited there; see also Joined Cases C-456/01 P and C-457/01 P Henkel v OHIM [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited there).

35. Where an economic operator applies for registration as a trade mark of the packaging of goods of the kind described in paragraphs 11 and 12 of this judgment, the shape of the product and that of its packaging must be assimilated to each other for the purposes of a refusal of registration based on the grounds set out in Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive.

58 However, in proceedings for a preliminary ruling, it is not for this Court but for the national court to determine which obligations are imposed by an earlier agreement on the Member State concerned and to ascertain their ambit so as to be able to determine the extent to which they thwart application of the provisions of Community law in question (see Case C-324/93 Evans Medical and Macfarlan Smith, cited above, paragraph 29).

17. The Court has held, on the one hand, that the external transit of non-Community goods is based on a legal fiction. Goods placed under this procedure are subject neither to the corresponding import duties nor to the other measures of commercial policy; it is as if they had not entered Community territory (Case C‑383/98 Polo v Lauren [2000] ECR I‑2519, paragraph 34).

34 After all, the external transit of non-Community goods is not completely devoid of effect on the internal market. It is, in fact, based on a legal fiction. Goods placed under this procedure are subject neither to the corresponding import duties nor to the other measures of commercial policy; it is as if they had not entered Community territory. In reality, they are imported from a non-member country and pass through one or more Member States before being exported to another non-member country. This operation is all the more liable to have a direct effect on the internal market as there is a risk that counterfeit goods placed under the external transit procedure may be fraudulently brought on to the Community market, as several Governments pointed out in their written observations and at the hearing.

27. In that respect, it should be noted that the purpose of Directive 2003/6 – as is reiterated, in particular, in recitals 2 and 12 in the preamble thereto – is to protect the integrity of EU financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets. That confidence depends on, inter alia, investors being placed on an equal footing and protected against the improper use of insider information and price manipulations (see, to that effect, Case C‑45/08 Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 47).

35 Furthermore, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination and the obligation of transparency preclude any negotiation between the contracting authority and a tenderer during a public procurement procedure, which means that, as a general rule, a tender cannot be amended after it has been submitted, whether at the request of the contracting authority or at the request of the tenderer concerned. It follows that, where the contracting authority regards a tender as imprecise or as failing to meet the technical requirements of the tender specifications, it cannot require the tenderer to provide clarification (judgments of 7 April 2016, Partner Apelski Dariusz, C‑324/14, EU:C:2016:214, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited, and of 4 May 2017, Esaprojekt, C‑387/14, EU:C:2017:338, paragraph 37).

62 Furthermore, as the Court has already held, the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination and the obligation of transparency preclude any negotiation between the contracting authority and a tenderer during a public procurement procedure, which means that, as a general rule, a tender cannot be amended after it has been submitted, whether at the request of the contracting authority or at the request of the tenderer concerned. It follows that, where the contracting authority regards a tender as imprecise or as failing to meet the technical requirements of the tender specifications, it cannot require the tenderer to provide clarification (judgment in Manova, C-336/12, EU:C:2013:647, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

16. In that regard, it should be recalled that the Court may of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties, order that the oral procedure be reopened, in accordance with Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it lacks sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see order of 4 February 2000 in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I-665, paragraph 18, and Case C-147/02 Alabaster [2004] ECR I-3101, paragraph 35).

86. As the Portuguese Government points out, the Court has held that national measures which restrict the freedom to provide services, which are applicable without distinction and are justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest - as is the case here, as is evident from paragraphs 68 and 72 to 75 of this judgment - must, nevertheless, be such as to guarantee the achievement of the intended aim and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve it (Case C-288/89 Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda [1991] ECR I-4007, paragraphs 13 to 15, and Läärä and Others , cited above, paragraph 31).

13 As the Court has consistently held (see, most recently, the judgments in Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 15; Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 18; and Commission v Greece, cited above, paragraph 18), such restrictions come within the scope of Article 59 if the application of the national legislation to foreign persons providing services is not justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest or if the requirements embodied in that legislation are already satisfied by the rules imposed on those persons in the Member State in which they are established.

27. It is clear from the case-law of the Court that a restriction on the freedom to provide services is warranted only if it pursues a legitimate objective compatible with the EC Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons of public interest; if that is the case, it must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, in particular, Case C‑398/95 SETTG [1997] ECR I‑3091, paragraph 21, and Case C‑341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I‑11767, paragraph 101).

33 It must be borne in mind, as a preliminary point, that, as the Court has held, the legality of a decision concerning aid is to be assessed in the light of the information available to the Commission when the decision was adopted (Case 234/84 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 2263, paragraph 16).

16 IN SO FAR AS THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CONTENDS THAT THE SUBSCRIPTION OF CAPITAL IN QUESTION WAS LINKED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A PLAN FOR REORGANIZING THE UNDERTAKING , IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE LEGALITY OF THE CONTESTED DECISION IS TO BE ASSESSED IN THE LIGHT OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE COMMISSION WHEN THE DECISION WAS ADOPTED . ALTHOUGH THE EXISTENCE OF A REORGANIZATION PLAN WAS IN FACT BRIEFLY MENTIONED BY THE BELGIAN AUTHORITIES IN THEIR CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE COMMISSION , THE CONTENT OF THAT PLAN WAS NEVER NOTIFIED TO IT IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 93 OF THE TREATY .

Deuxièmement, il convient de rappeler que, si des points de droit examinés en première instance peuvent être de nouveau discutés au cours de la procédure de pourvoi dès lors qu’un requérant conteste, de manière spécifique, l’interprétation ou l’application du droit de l’Union faite par le Tribunal (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 30 mai 2013, Quinn Barlo e.a./Commission, C‑70/12 P, non publié, EU:C:2013:351, point 27, ainsi que du 19 janvier 2017, Commission/Total et Elf Aquitaine, C‑351/15 P, EU:C:2017:27, point 31), un pourvoi est irrecevable dans la mesure où il se limite à répéter les moyens et les arguments qui ont déjà été présentés devant le Tribunal, y compris ceux qui étaient fondés sur des faits expressément rejetés par cette juridiction, sans même comporter une argumentation visant spécifiquement à identifier l’erreur de droit dont serait entaché l’arrêt du Tribunal. En effet, un tel pourvoi constitue, en réalité, une demande visant à obtenir un simple réexamen de la requête présentée devant le Tribunal, ce qui échappe à la compétence de la Cour dans le cadre d’un pourvoi (arrêts du 7 janvier 2004, Aalborg Portland e.a./Commission,C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P et C‑219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, point 51, ainsi que du 26 janvier 2017, Mamoli Robinetteria/Commission, C‑619/13 P, EU:C:2017:50, point 43).

42. Nor are the legal principles referred to by the Netherlands Government and the Productschap such as to bring into question the assessment that, in a sector covered by a common organisation, a fortiori where that organisation is based on a common pricing system, Member States can no longer take action, through national provisions taken unilaterally, affecting the machinery of price formation at the production and marketing stages established under the common organisation (see Toffoli and Others , cited above, paragraph 12; Case 166/82 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 459, paragraph 5; Case 127/87 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 3333, paragraph 8; and Milk Marque and National Farmers’ Union , cited above, paragraph 63).

8 The prohibition on taking unilateral national measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions was extended to trade with non-member countries by Article 20 ( 2 ) of Regulation No 1837/80, cited above, which forms the basic regulation on the common organization of the market in sheepmeat and goatmeat . That regulation also set up a price system providing, inter alia, for a basic price and an intervention price and the Court consistently held ( see primarily the judgment of 6 November 1979 in Case 10/79 Toffoli v Regione Veneto (( 1979 )) ECR 3301 ) that in sectors covered by a common organization of the market, and a fortiori when that organization is based on a common price system, Member States can no longer take action, through national provisions adopted unilaterally, affecting the machinery of price formation at the same production or marketing stage established under the common organization . It must therefore be held that the contested Greek measure is also contrary to Regulation No 1837/80 .

38. In the absence of a definition in the EC Treaty of ‘movement of capital’ for the purposes of Article 56(1) EC, the Court has previously recognised the nomenclature annexed to Directive 88/361 as having indicative value, even though the latter was adopted on the basis of Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EEC Treaty (subsequently, Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EC Treaty, repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam), subject to the qualification, contained in the introduction to the nomenclature, that the list set out therein is not exhaustive (see, in particular, Case C‑513/03 van Hilten‑van der Heijden [2006] ECR I‑1957, paragraph 39; Case C‑452/04 Fidium Finanz [2006] ECR I‑9521, paragraph 41; Federconsumatori and Others , paragraph 20; and Case C‑256/06 Jäger [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 24).

26. In the absence of any EU rules in the area, the means of preventing VAT fraud falls within the internal legal order of the Member States under the principle of procedural autonomy of the latter. In that regard, it is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law that it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State, in particular, to designate the authorities responsible for combatting VAT fraud and to lay down detailed procedural rules for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, provided that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the EU legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgments in Marks & Spencer , C‑62/00, EU:C:2002:435, paragraph 34; Fallimento Olimpiclub , C‑2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 24; Alstom Power Hydro , C‑472/08, EU:C:2010:32, paragraph 17; and, ADV Allround , C‑218/10, EU:C:2012:35, paragraph 35).

34 It should be recalled at the outset that in the absence of Community rules on the repayment of national charges wrongly levied it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, first, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (the principle of equivalence) and, second, that they do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (the principle of effectiveness) (see, inter alia, Case C-228/96 Aprile [1998] ECR I-7141, paragraph 18, and the judgments cited above in Dilexport, paragraph 25, and Metallgesellschaft, paragraph 85).

33. Additionally, the Court has held that it is explicitly stated in the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the Framework Agreement that the agreement does not apply to temporary workers (see Della Rocca , EU:C:2013:235, paragraphs 36 and 45).

22 Secondly, that interpretation is confirmed by the Court’s case-law. According to that case-law, a restriction on capital movements, such as a less favourable tax treatment of foreign-sourced dividends, comes within the scope of Article 64(1) TFEU, inasmuch as it relates to holdings acquired with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting and direct economic links between the shareholder and the company concerned and which allow the shareholder to participate effectively in the management of the company or in its control (judgment of 24 November 2016, SECIL, C‑464/14, EU:C:2016:896, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited). Similarly, according to the Court, a restriction is covered by Article 64(1) TFEU as being a restriction on the movement of capital involving direct investment in so far as it relates to investments of any kind undertaken by natural or legal persons and which serve to establish or maintain lasting and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the undertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2008, Orange European Smallcap Fund, C‑194/06, EU:C:2008:289, paragraph 102). It is clear from those judgments, and, in particular, from their use of the phrases ‘inasmuch as’ and ‘in so far as’, that the scope of Article 64(1) TFEU does not depend on the specific purpose of a national restriction, but on its effect on the movements of capital referred to in that provision.

102. The answer to Question 2(a) must therefore be that a restriction is covered by Article 57(1) EC as being a restriction on the movement of capital involving direct investment in so far as it relates to investments of any kind undertaken by natural or legal persons and which serve to establish or maintain lasting and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the undertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity. Question 2(b) and 2(c)

27. It should be noted in that regard that Article 9 of the Sixth Directive contains rules for determining the place where services are deemed to be supplied for VAT purposes. Whereas Article 9(1) lays down a general rule in that regard, Article 9(2) sets out a number of specific instances of places where certain services are deemed to be supplied. The object of those provisions is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction which may result in double taxation, and, secondly, non-taxation (see, in particular, Case C‑327/94 Dudda [1996] ECR I‑4595, paragraph 20; Case C‑291/07 Kollektivavtalsstiftelsen TRR Trygghetsrådet [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 24; and Case C‑1/08 Athesia Druck [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 20).

19 It is also clear from settled case-law that, in the absence of Community rules governing the refund of national taxes levied though not due, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, however, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions and do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (see Rewe, paragraph 5, Comet, paragraphs 13 and 16, both cited above, and, more recently, Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck v Belgian State [1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12).

5 THE PROHIBITION LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 13 OF THE TREATY AND THAT LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 13 OF REGULATION NO 159/66/EEC HAVE A DIRECT EFFECT AND CONFER ON CITIZENS RIGHTS WHICH THE NATIONAL COURTS ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT . APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF COOPERATION LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 5 OF THE TREATY , IT IS THE NATIONAL COURTS WHICH ARE ENTRUSTED WITH ENSURING THE LEGAL PROTECTION WHICH CITIZENS DERIVE FROM THE DIRECT EFFECT OF THE PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW . ACCORDINGLY , IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMUNITY RULES ON THIS SUBJECT , IT IS FOR THE DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM OF EACH MEMBER STATE TO DESIGNATE THE COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION AND TO DETERMINE THE PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS GOVERNING ACTIONS AT LAW INTENDED TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS WHICH CITIZENS HAVE FROM THE DIRECT EFFECT OF COMMUNITY LAW , IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH CONDITIONS CANNOT BE LESS FAVOURABLE THAN THOSE RELATING TO SIMILAR ACTIONS OF A DOMESTIC NATURE . WHERE NECESSARY , ARTICLES 100 TO 102 AND 235 OF THE TREATY ENABLE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO REMEDY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PROVISIONS LAID DOWN BY LAW , REGULATION OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN MEMBER STATES IF THEY ARE LIKELY TO DISTORT OR HARM THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMON MARKET . IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH MEASURES OF HARMONIZATION THE RIGHT CONFERRED BY COMMUNITY LAW MUST BE EXERCISED BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY NATIONAL RULES . THE POSITION WOULD BE DIFFERENT ONLY IF THE CONDITIONS AND TIME-LIMITS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE IN PRACTICE TO EXERCISE THE RIGHTS WHICH THE NATIONAL COURTS ARE OBLIGED TO PROTECT . THIS IS NOT THE CASE WHERE REASONABLE PERIODS OF LIMITATION OF ACTIONS ARE FIXED . THE LAYING DOWN OF SUCH TIME-LIMITS WITH REGARD TO ACTIONS OF A FISCAL NATURE IS AN APPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY PROTECTING BOTH THE TAX-PAYER AND THE ADMINISTRATION CONCERNED .

15. Firstly, it must be stated that the concept of number portability covers the facility available to a telephone subscriber to retain the same number when changing operator (Case C‑438/04 Mobistar [2006] ECR I‑6675, paragraph 23).

41. That finding is in no way affected by the aim of that provision. In accordance with the case-law of the Court, the specific purpose of Article 5(8) of the Sixth Directive is to facilitate transfers of undertakings or of parts of undertakings by making such transfers simpler and by preventing the resources of the recipient from being overburdened by a disproportionate charge to tax which, in any event, would ultimately be recovered through deduction of the input VAT paid (see Zita Modes , paragraph 39, and Schriever , paragraph 23).

23. It is precisely in the light of the context of Article 5(8) of the Sixth Directive and the purpose of that directive that the Court has held that that provision is intended to enable the Member States to facilitate transfers of undertakings or of parts of undertakings by making such transfers simpler and by preventing the resources of the recipient from being overburdened by a disproportionate charge to tax which, in any event, would ultimately be recovered through deduction of the input VAT paid ( Zita Modes , paragraph 39).

17. Article 23(1)(c) of Directive 2003/55 provides that Member States must ensure that all customers are free to buy natural gas from the supplier of their choice as from 1 July 2007.

52. First, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, a pension scheme such as the TSS at issue in the main proceedings, which essentially relates to the employment of the person concerned, forms part of the pay received by that person and comes within the scope of Article 141 EC (to that effect, see in particular Case 170/84 Bilka [1986] ECR 1607, paragraph 22, Case C-262/88 Barber [1990] ECR I-1889, paragraph 28, Case C-7/93 Beune [1994] ECR I-4471, paragraph 46, and Joined Cases C-234/96 and C-235/96 Deutsche Telekom [2000] ECR I-799, paragraph 32).

28 It must therefore be concluded that, unlike the benefits awarded by national statutory social security schemes, a pension paid under a contracted-out scheme constitutes consideration paid by the employer to the worker in respect of his employment and consequently falls within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty .

36. It is therefore possible that there will be a refusal to rule on a question referred by a national court for a preliminary ruling where, inter alia , the problem is hypothetical or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, for example, PreussenElektra , paragraph 39, and Canal Satélite Digital , paragraph 19).

30 That being so, as regards, in the first place, a possible distortion of the evidence by the General Court, it must be recalled that such distortion must be obvious from the documents before the Court of Justice, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgments of 20 November 2014, Intra-Presse v Golden Balls, C‑581/13 P and C‑582/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2387, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited, and of 26 October 2016, Westermann Lernspielverlage v EUIPO, C‑482/15 P, EU:C:2016:805, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

39. It should also be recalled that such distortion must be obvious from the documents before the Court, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (see, inter alia, the judgments in Les Éditions Albert René v OHIM , C‑16/06 P, EU:C:2008:739, paragraph 69, and Waterford Wedgwood v Assembled Investments (Proprietary) and OHIM , C‑398/07 P, EU:C:2009:288, paragraph 41).

48. Il s’ensuit que, contrairement à ce que prétend la Commission, une interprétation purement littérale du régime particulier des agences de voyages fondée sur le texte d’une ou de plusieurs versions linguistiques, à l’exclusion des autres, ne saurait prévaloir. Conformément à une jurisprudence constante, il y a lieu de considérer que les dispositions du droit de l’Union doivent être interprétées et appliquées de manière uniforme à la lumière des versions établies dans toutes les langues de l’Union. En cas de disparité entre les diverses versions linguistiques d’un texte de l’Union, la disposition en cause doit être interprétée en fonction de l’économie générale et de la finalité de la réglementation dont elle constitue un élément (arrêt du 8 décembre 2005, Jyske Finans, C‑280/04, Rec. p. I‑10683, point 31).

15. However, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions referred concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑414/07 Magoora [2008] ECR I‑10921, paragraph 22; Joined Cases C‑316/07, C‑358/07 to C‑360/07, C‑409/07 and C‑410/07 Stoß and Others [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 51; and Case C‑45/09 Rosenbladt [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32).

51. In that regard, according to settled case‑law, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, in particular, Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38, and Case C‑169/07 Hartlauer [2009] ECR I‑1721, paragraph 24).

31 On the other hand, the Court has already held that the scheme of Directive 2003/96 is founded on a clear distinction between motor fuels and heating fuels on the basis, in particular, of the criterion of use. The distinction between motor fuels and heating fuels, introduced in recitals 17 and 18 of that directive, is applied, inter alia, by Articles 7 to 9 of the directive, relating to the detailed rules for setting the minimum levels of taxation applicable, on the one hand, to heating fuels and, on the other, to motor fuels and to products used as motor fuels for specific industrial and commercial purposes (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 April 2014 in Kronos Titan and Rhein-Ruhr Beschichtungs-Service, C‑43/13 and C‑44/13, EU:C:2014:216, paragraph 28).

36 In this connection, it should be noted at the outset that any rights which are granted to third-country nationals by provisions of EU law on citizenship of the Union are not autonomous rights of those nationals, but rights derived from the exercise of freedom of movement and residence by a Union citizen (see, to this effect, judgments of 8 May 2013, Ymeraga and Others, C‑87/12, EU:C:2013:291, paragraph 35; of 10 October 2013, Alokpa and Moudoulou, C‑86/12, EU:C:2013:645, paragraph 22; and of 12 March 2014, O. and B., C‑456/12, EU:C:2014:135, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). Thus, a derived right of residence of a third-country national exists, in principle, only when it is necessary in order to ensure that a Union citizen can exercise effectively his rights to move and reside freely in the European Union.

36. Article 21(1) TFEU and Directive 2004/38 do not confer any autonomous right on third-country nationals (see, to that effect, Case C‑40/11 Iida [2012] ECR, paragraph 66, and Case C‑87/12 Ymeraga and Ymeraga-Tafarshiku [2013] ECR, paragraph 34). Any rights conferred on third-country nationals by provisions of EU law on Union citizenship are rights derived from the exercise of freedom of movement by a Union citizen (see Iida , paragraph 67; Ymeraga and Ymeraga-Tafarshiku , paragraph 35; and Case C‑86/12 Alokpa and Others [2013] ECR, paragraph 22).

39 According to settled case-law, the principle of collegiality is based on the equal participation of the Commissioners in the adoption of decisions, from which it follows in particular that decisions should be the subject of collective deliberation and that all the members of the college of Commissioners should bear collective responsibility at political level for all decisions adopted (Case 5/85 AKZO Chemie v Commission [1986] ECR 2585, paragraph 30; Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission [1986] ECR 2859, and Case 137/92 P Commission v BASF and Others, cited above, paragraph 63).

20. According to settled case-law, the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, judgment in OTP Bank , C‑672/13, EU:C:2015:185, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

27. According to the Court’s settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments in van der Weerd and Others , C‑222/05 to C‑225/05, EU:C:2007:318, paragraph 22, and Melki and Abdeli , C‑188/10 and C‑189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 27).

42. In so far as the Federal Republic of Germany submits that the disputed administrative practice is justified by the fact that the provision in question is contained in a bilateral international agreement, it must be noted that, when giving effect to commitments assumed under international agreements, be it an agreement between Member States or an agreement between a Member State and one or more non-member countries, Member States are required, subject to the provisions of Article 307 EC, to comply with the obligations that Community law imposes on them (see, inter alia, Gottardo , paragraph 33).

27 In that regard, it must be recalled that the need to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to the national court means that the national court is bound to observe scrupulously the requirements concerning the content of a request for a preliminary ruling, expressly set out in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, of which the referring court should be aware (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 July 2016, Ognyanov, C‑614/14, EU:C:2016:514, paragraphs 18 and 19 and the case-law cited, and of 27 October 2016, Audace and Others, C‑114/15, EU:C:2016:813, paragraph 35).

19 The requirements concerning the content of a request for a preliminary ruling, are expressly set out in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure, of which the national court should, in the context of the cooperation instituted by Article 267 TFEU, be aware and which it is bound to observe scrupulously (see order of 3 July 2014, Talasca, C‑19/14, EU:C:2014:2049, paragraph 21).

23 Those objectives in fact conform with the objectives of general interest pursued by the Community. It should be borne in mind, in particular, that the protection of literary and artistic property, which is a category of industrial and commercial property within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty, constitutes a ground of general interest which may justify restrictions on the free movement of goods (see Warner Brothers and Metronome Video, cited above, paragraph 11). It should also be noted that the cultural development of the Community forms part of the objectives laid down by Article 128 of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty on European Union, which is intended in particular to encourage artistic and literary creation.

34. First of all, that it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and the notes to the sections or chapters (see, in particular, Case C‑42/99 Eru Portuguesa [2000] ECR I‑7691, paragraph 13; Case C‑500/04 Proxxon [2006] ECR I‑1545, paragraph 21; and Case C‑183/06 RUMA [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 27).

21. According to settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be found in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, Case C-42/99 Eru Portuguesa [2000] ECR I-7691, paragraph 13; Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 47; and Case C-445/04 Possehl Erzkontor [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 19).

139. In this connection, the Court has already observed that it follows from Articles 61(2) and 76 of Regulation No 40/94 that, for the purposes of the examination as to the merits of the appeal brought before it, the Board of Appeal is to invite the parties, as often as necessary, to file observations on communications issued by itself and that it may also order preliminary measures, among which feature the submission of matters of fact or evidence. Article 62(2) of Regulation No 40/94 states that if the Board of Appeal remits the case for further prosecution to the department whose decision was appealed against, that department is to be bound by the ratio decidendi of the Board of Appeal, ‘in so far as the facts are the same’. In turn, such provisions demonstrate the possibility of seeing the underlying facts of a dispute multiply at various stages of the proceedings before OHIM ( OHIM v Kaul , paragraph 58).

37. However, where the issuer of the invoice has in sufficient time wholly eliminated the risk of any loss in tax revenues, the principle of the neutrality of VAT requires that VAT which has been improperly invoiced can be adjusted without such adjustment being made conditional by the Member States upon the issuer of the relevant invoice having acted in good faith (see Schmeink & Cofreth and Strobel , paragraph 58, and Karageorgou and Others , paragraph 50).

50. In that connection the Court has held that, in order to ensure VAT neutrality, it is for the Member States to provide in their internal legal systems for the possibility of correcting any tax improperly invoiced where the issuer of the invoice shows that he acted in good faith (Case C-342/87 Genius Holding [1989] ECR 4227, paragraph 18). However, where the issuer of the invoice has in sufficient time wholly eliminated the risk of any loss of tax revenues, VAT which has been improperly invoiced can be adjusted without such adjustment being made conditional upon the issuer of the relevant invoice having acted in good faith ( Schmeink & Cofreth and Strobel , cited above, paragraphs 60 and 63).

45. It should be remembered, as a preliminary point, that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the choice of legal basis for a Community measure must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, including in particular the aim and the content of the measure (see Case C‑178/03 Commission v Parliament and Council , paragraph 41, and Case C‑155/07 Parliament v Council [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 34).

36 Nonetheless, in exercising that power, the Member States must respect the principle of fiscal neutrality. That principle precludes in particular treating similar goods and supplies of services, which are thus in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes, so that those goods or supplies must be subjected to a uniform rate (see, to that effect, Case C-481/98 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-3369, paragraph 22).

22 That principle in particular precludes treating similar goods, which are thus in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes (see, to this effect, the eighth recital in the preamble to the First Directive and paragraphs 21 and 27 of the judgment in Case C-283/95 Fischer [1998] ECR I-3369). It follows that those products must be subject to a uniform rate. The principle of fiscal neutrality for that reason also includes the other two principles invoked by the Commission, namely the principles of VAT uniformity and of elimination of distortion in competition.

43. However, given that none of the provisions of the Sixth Directive specifically lays down the evidence required to be furnished by taxable persons in order for them to be eligible for the exemption from VAT, that issue, as is apparent from the first part of the sentence in Article 28c(A) of the Sixth Directive, falls within the competence of the Member States (see Collée , paragraph 24).

49. As regards the objective criteria that may indicate the existence of a cross-border interest, the Court has already held that such criteria may be, in particular, that the contract in question is for a significant amount, in conjunction with the place where the work is to be carried out or the technical characteristics of the market (see judgments in SECAP and Santorso , EU:C:2008:277, paragraph 31, and Belgacom , C‑221/12, EU:C:2013:736, paragraph 29). The referring court may, in its overall assessment of the existence of certain cross-border interest also take account of the existence of complaints brought by operators situated in other Member States, provided that it is determined that those complaints are real and not fictitious. More particularly, as regards ambulance services, the Court has held, in an action for failure to fulfil obligations, that certain cross-border interest cannot be established solely on the basis of the fact that several operators in other Member States had lodged a complaint with the European Commission and that the contracts concerned were of significant economic value (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission v Germany , C‑160/08, EU:C:2010:230, paragraph 18, 27 et seq., 54 and 123).

29. S’agissant de l’existence d’un intérêt transfrontalier certain, celle-ci peut résulter, notamment, de l’importance économique de la convention dont la conclusion est projetée, du lieu de son exécution (voir, en ce sens, arrêt ASM Brescia, précité, point 62 et jurisprudence citée) ou encore de caractéristiques techniques (voir, par analogie, arrêt du 15 mai 2008, SECAP et Santorso, C‑147/06 et C‑148/06, Rec. p. I‑3565, point 24).

28. In that regard, it is clear from the case-law that the presumption of relevance of questions referred for a preliminary ruling cannot be rebutted by the simple fact that one of the parties to the main proceedings contests certain facts, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine and on which the delimitation of the subject‑matter of those proceedings depend ( Cipolla and Others , paragraph 26, and van der Weerd and Others , paragraph 23).

69 In that regard, it should be pointed out that Framework Decision 2002/584 seeks, by the establishment of a simplified and effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or accused of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the objective set for the European Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice, founded on the high level of trust which should exist between the Member States in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 February 2013, Melloni, C‑399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraphs 36 and 37, and of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraphs 75 and 76).

75 It should be recalled, as a preliminary point, that the purpose of the Framework Decision, as is apparent in particular from Article 1(1) and (2) thereof and recitals 5 and 7 in the preamble thereto, is to replace the multilateral system of extradition based on the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 with a system of surrender between judicial authorities of convicted or suspected persons for the purpose of enforcing judgments or of conducting prosecutions, that system of surrender being based on the principle of mutual recognition (see judgments in West, C‑192/12 PPU, EU:C:2012:404, paragraph 54; Melloni, C‑399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraph 36; F., C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 34; and Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 27).

31. As the Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts need in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court by those courts (see, inter alia, Case C‑45/06 Campina [2007] ECR I‑2089, paragraph 31), the questions referred for a preliminary ruling must be understood as relating to Regulation No 1782/2003 or falling within the context of that regulation. All of the questions referred

60. According to settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of an EU provision cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. (see, in particular, Case C-187/07 Endendijk [2008] ECR I‑2115, paragraph 23; Case C-239/07 Sabatauskas and Others [2008] ECR I‑7523, paragraph 38). The various language versions of a text of EU law must be given a uniform interpretation and hence, in the case of divergence between the language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part (see, to that effect, Endendijk , cited above, at paragraph 24, and Case C‑340/08 M and Others [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 44).

23. According to settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a Community provision cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Such an approach would be incompatible with the requirement of the uniform application of Community law (see Case C-149/97 Institute of the Motor Industry [1998] ECR I-7053, paragraph 16).

44. As a preliminary remark, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that an alleged failure to have regard to the rules of evidence is a question of law, which is admissible in an appeal (see, to that effect, Case C-199/92 P Hüls v Commission [1999] ECR I‑4287, paragraph 65, and Joined Cases C‑403/04 P and C‑405/04 P Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission [2007] ECR I‑729, paragraph 40). Thus, in so far as Impala, under its general plea of inadmissibility, specifically argues that the third ground of appeal is inadmissible in its entirety, that argument cannot be accepted.

50. According to settled case-law, the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted autonomously, primarily by reference to the scheme and purpose of that regulation (see, to that effect, Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions Assurance , C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited, and Hi Hotel HCF , C‑387/12, EU:C:2014:215, paragraph 24).

24. It should be recalled at the outset that the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted independently, by reference to its scheme and purpose (Case C‑228/11 Melzer EU:C:2013:305, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

40. The Court points out that Regulation No 1408/71 establishes a system for the coordination of national social security schemes and lays down, in Title II, rules governing the determination of the legislation to be applied to employed persons moving within the European Union (see, inter alia, to that effect, judgment in Wencel , C‑589/10, EU:C:2013:303, paragraph 45).

25. Nor can the plant in question be regarded on its own as a co-incineration plant, that is to say, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 3(5) of Directive 2000/76, as a plant whose main purpose is the generation of energy or production of material products, which either uses wastes as a regular or additional fuel or in which waste is thermally treated for the purpose of its disposal (see Case C‑251/07 Gävle Kraftvärme [2008] ECR I‑7047, paragraph 35, and Lahti Energia , paragraph 26).

35. In accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 3(5), a plant whose main purpose is the generation of energy or production of material products and which either uses waste as a regular or additional fuel or in which waste is thermally treated for the purpose of disposal is to be regarded as a co-incineration plant.

47. In addition, according to settled case-law, medical services supplied for consideration fall within the scope of the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the freedom to provide services, there being no need to distinguish between care provided in a hospital environment and care provided outside such an environment (see, in particular, Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 53, and Commission v France , paragraph 30).

33 In that connection, it must be recalled that, in the absence of any specific provision in the VAT Directive as to the evidence that taxable persons are required to provide in order to be granted an exemption from VAT, it is for the Member States to lay down, in accordance with Article 131 of that directive, the conditions in which intra-Community supplies of goods will be exempt, with a view to ensuring the correct and straightforward application of those exemptions and of preventing any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse. However, when they exercise their powers, Member States must observe the general principles of law which form part of the European Union legal order (see judgments of 6 September 2012, Mecsek-Gabona, C‑273/11, EU:C:2012:547, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited, and of 9 October 2014, Traum, C‑492/13, EU:C:2014:2267, paragraph 27).

36. It is also apparent from the case-law that, in the absence of any specific provision in Directive 2006/112 as to the evidence that taxable persons are required to provide in order to be granted the exemption from VAT, it is for the Member States to lay down, in accordance with Article 131 of Directive 2006/112, the conditions in which intra-Community supplies of goods will be exempt, with a view to ensuring the correct and straightforward application of those exemptions and of preventing any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse. However, when they exercise their powers, Member States must observe the general principles of law which form part of the European Union legal order, which include, in particular, the principles of legal certainty and proportionality (see, to that effect, Case C-146/05 Collée [2007] ECR I-7861, paragraph 24; Twoh International , paragraph 25; X , paragraph 35; and R. , paragraphs 43 and 45).

118. It is true that the mere fact that the share capital of two separate commercial companies is held by the same person or the same family is insufficient, in itself, to establish that those companies are a single economic unit with the result that, under Community competition law, the actions of one company can be attributed to the other and that one can be held liable to pay the fine for the other (see Case C-196/99 P Aristrain v Commission [2003] ECR I-11005, paragraph 99).

58 The position is the same if national law confers on courts and tribunals a discretion to apply of their own motion binding rules of law. Indeed, pursuant to the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty, it is for national courts to ensure the legal protection which persons derive from the direct effect of provisions of Community law (see, in particular, Case C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 19, and Van Schijndel and Van Veen v SPF, cited above, at paragraph 14).

19 In accordance with the case-law of the Court, it is for the national courts, in application of the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, to ensure the legal protection which persons derive from the direct effect of provisions of Community law ( see, most recently, the judgments of 10 July 1980 in Case 811/79 Ariete SpA v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato (( 1980 )) ECR 2545 and Case 826/79 Mireco v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato (( 1980 )) ECR 2559 ).

34. In the absence in Directive 2006/112 of a definition of the ‘supply of services by organisations recognised as being devoted to social wellbeing by Member States and engaged in welfare or social security work’ referred to in point 15 of Annex III, that concept should be interpreted in the light of its context within Directive 2006/112 (see, by analogy, Commission v Spain , paragraph 17, and Case C-3/09 Erotic Center [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 14).

24 As the Court has consistently held, a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and may therefore not be relied upon as such against such a person (see, in particular, Case 152/84 Marshall I [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 48, Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori v Recreb [1994] ECR I-3325, paragraph 20, and Case C-192/94 El Corte Inglés v Blázquez Rivero [1996] ECR I-1281, paragraph 15). Consequently, there is no need to examine whether Article 6 of the First Directive is capable of having direct effect in the domestic legal order of a Member State.

48 WITH REGARD TO THE ARGUMENT THAT A DIRECTIVE MAY NOT BE RELIED UPON AGAINST AN INDIVIDUAL , IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 189 OF THE EEC TREATY THE BINDING NATURE OF A DIRECTIVE , WHICH CONSTITUTES THE BASIS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF RELYING ON THE DIRECTIVE BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT , EXISTS ONLY IN RELATION TO ' EACH MEMBER STATE TO WHICH IT IS ADDRESSED ' . IT FOLLOWS THAT A DIRECTIVE MAY NOT OF ITSELF IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS ON AN INDIVIDUAL AND THAT A PROVISION OF A DIRECTIVE MAY NOT BE RELIED UPON AS SUCH AGAINST SUCH A PERSON . IT MUST THEREFORE BE EXAMINED WHETHER , IN THIS CASE , THE RESPONDENT MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING ACTED AS AN INDIVIDUAL .

86. As regards the first part of the third ground of appeal, the Commission submits, referring to the judgment in Elliniki Nafpigokataskevastiki and Others v Commission (T‑384/08, EU:T:2011:650, paragraphs 66 to 68), that the absence of an advantage to the purchaser does not exclude the presence of an advantage to the purchased business. Moreover, in the judgment in Commission v Scott (C‑290/07 P, EU:C:2010:480, paragraphs 5 to 11, 25 and 26), the finding that aid was granted to an undertaking was unaffected by the purchase of the shares of that undertaking by another undertaking or by the purchase of the assets constructed by means of that aid by a third undertaking. It follows that the fact that a purchaser pays a market price and thus does not itself benefit from aid is not relevant to the assessment of whether the purchased entity received aid.

30. As the Court has repeatedly held, it is the responsibility of traders to make the necessary arrangements in their contractual relations in order to guard against the risks of an action for post-clearance recovery ( Pascoal & Filhos , paragraph 60; order in Case C‑299/98 P CPL Imperial 2 and Unifrigo v Commission [1999] ECR I‑8683 paragraph 38; and Beemsterboer Coldstore Services , paragraph 41).

41. It is the responsibility of traders to make the necessary arrangements in their contractual relations in order to guard against the risks of an action for post-clearance recovery ( Pascoal & Filhos , paragraph 60).

99. The requirement that national law be interpreted in conformity with Community law is inherent in the system of the EC Treaty, since it permits national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of Community law when they determine the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 114, and Adeneler and Others , paragraph 109).

26. It should also be noted that it follows from the Court’s case-law that a special benefit is defined by its purpose (see, inter alia, Case C‑154/05 Kersbergen-Lap and Dams-Shipper [2006] ECR I‑6249, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

30. A special benefit within the meaning of Article 4(2a) of Regulation No 1408/71 is defined by its purpose. It must either replace or supplement a social security benefit and be by its nature social assistance justified on economic and social grounds and fixed by legislation setting objective criteria (see Case C-160/02 Skalka [2004] ECR I-5613, paragraph 25, and case-law cited).

29 Having noted that, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law of the Court, the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’ is intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, since each of them could, depending on the circumstances, be particularly helpful in relation to the evidence and the conduct of the proceedings (judgment of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others, C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

54 Even if the provisions of the Greek Constitution are directly applicable, the relevant special Greek rules do not satisfy the requirements laid down by the case-law of the Court according to which the principles of legal certainty and the protection of individuals require an unequivocal wording which would give the persons concerned a clear and precise understanding of their rights and obligations and would enable the courts to ensure that those rights and obligations are observed (see Commission v Denmark, cited above, paragraph 10).

10 SINCE THOSE WORKERS ARE NOT UNIONIZED AND WORK IN SMALL OR MEDIUM-SIZED BUSINESSES , PARTICULAR CARE MUST BE TAKEN TO GUARANTEE THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE DIRECTIVE . THE PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL CERTAINTY AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS THUS REQUIRE AN UNEQUIVOCAL WORDING WHICH WOULD GIVE THE PERSONS CONCERNED A CLEAR AND PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND WOULD ENABLE THE COURTS TO ENSURE THAT THOSE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ARE OBSERVED .

72. It must also be pointed out that apprehension of internal difficulties in the course of implementing a decision on State aid cannot justify a failure by a Member State to comply with its obligations under Community law (see, to that effect, in particular, Case C‑52/95 Commission v France [1995] ECR I‑4443, paragraph 38; Case C‑265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I‑6959, paragraph 55; Case C‑280/95 Commission v Italy , paragraph 16; and Case C‑441/06 Commission v France [2007] ECR I‑8887, paragraph 43).

99. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, for the purposes of Article 87(3) EC, the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion, the exercise of which involves assessments of an economic and social nature which must be made within a Community context. The Court, in reviewing whether that freedom was lawfully exercised, cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authority but must restrict itself to examining whether the authority’s assessment is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of powers (see, in particular, Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission , paragraph 45, Case C-456/00 France v Commission [2002] ECR I-11949, paragraph 41, and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission , paragraph 135).

41. In this connection it should be remembered, first, that the Commission, for the purposes of applying Article 87(3) EC, enjoys a wide discretion, the exercise of which involves assessments of an economic and social nature which must be made within a Community context (see, inter alia , Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 67, and Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission [2002] ECR I-2289, paragraph 45), and second, that the Court, in reviewing whether that freedom was lawfully exercised, cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authority but must restrict itself to examining whether the authority's assessment is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of powers (see Case C-288/96 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-8237, paragraph 26, and Italy v Commission , cited above, paragraph 46).

33. It should be noted, however, that the first of those situations referred to by the Commission is irrelevant for the purposes of assessing the proportionality of Section 119(4) of the CTA 2010. It is settled law that losses sustained by a non-resident subsidiary cannot be characterised as definitive, as described in paragraph 55 of the judgment in Marks & Spencer (EU:C:2005:763), by dint of the fact that the Member State in which the subsidiary is resident precludes all possibility of losses being carried forward (see judgment in K , EU:C:2013:716, paragraphs 75 to 79 and the case-law cited). In such a situation, the Member State in which the parent company is resident may not allow cross-border group relief without thereby infringing Article 49 TFEU.

20. An independent interpretation of those exemptions is all the more essential because, as the Court held in Case C-346/97 Braathens [1999] ECR I‑3419, paragraph 31, Article 8(1) of Directive 92/81 imposes on the Member States the obligation not to levy the harmonised excise duty on mineral oils supplied for use as fuel for a number of activities set out in that provision.

31 That is the position here. Article 8(1)(b) of Directive 92/81 imposes on the Member States, first, the clear and precise obligation not to levy the harmonised excise duty on fuel used for the purpose of air navigation other than private pleasure flying. Second, the degree of latitude afforded to Member States by the introductory wording of Article 8(1), whereby exemptions are granted by the Member States `under conditions which they shall lay down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and of preventing any evasion, avoidance or abuse', cannot detract from the unconditional nature of the obligation imposed by that provision to grant exemption (see, mutatis mutandis, paragraphs 32 to 35 of Becker, cited above).

48 It is, on the contrary, settled case-law that Article 107(1) TFEU does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or their aims but defines them in relation to their effects, and thus independently of the techniques used (judgment of 15 November 2011, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).

21. It should be noted at the outset that whilst the first subparagraph of Article 4 of the directive does not specify the actual content of the measures which must be taken in order to ensure that waste is disposed of without endangering human health and without harming the environment, it is none the less true that it is binding on the Member States as to the objective to be achieved, whilst leaving to the Member States a margin of discretion in assessing the need for such measures (Case C‑365/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-7773, paragraph 67).

67 Whilst that provision does not specify the actual content of the measures which must be taken in order to ensure that waste is disposed of without endangering human health and without harming the environment, it is none the less true that it is binding on the Member States as to the objective to be achieved, whilst leaving to the Member States a margin of discretion in assessing the need for such measures.

À cet égard, il ressort également d’une jurisprudence constante que la motivation exigée par l’article 296 TFUE doit être adaptée à la nature de l’acte en cause et doit faire apparaître de façon claire et non équivoque le raisonnement de l’institution, auteur de l’acte, de manière à permettre aux intéressés de connaître les justifications de la mesure prise et à la juridiction compétente d’exercer son contrôle (voir, notamment, arrêts du 6 mars 2003, Interporc/Commission, C‑41/00 P, EU:C:2003:125, point 55, et du 29 septembre 2011, Elf Aquitaine/Commission, C‑521/09 P, EU:C:2011:620, point 147).

33. As regards the first ground of appeal, as the Advocate General observed in paragraphs 36 to 38 of his Opinion, it matters little whether the principle set out in Article 9(5) of the basic regulation is described as the ‘principle of equal treatment’ or the ‘principle of non-discrimination’. They are simply two labels for a single general principle of Community law, which prohibits both treating similar situations differently and treating different situations in the same way unless there are objective reasons for such treatment (see, inter alia, Case C-442/00 Rodríguez Caballero [2002] ECR I-11915, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). It is clear from paragraphs 50, 51 and 57 of the judgment under appeal that the Court of First Instance examined the treatment given to imports of LAECs from Japan, the United States and Thailand in the light of that principle, as set out, in particular, in Article 9(5). Accordingly, Chemi-Con cannot claim that, in paragraph 48 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance failed to have regard to the principle whose infringement Chemi-Con was pleading before it.

32. Fundamental rights include the general principle of equality and non-discrimination. That principle precludes comparable situations from being treated in a different manner unless the difference in treatment is objectively justified (see, for example, Case C-189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I-5689, paragraph 129, and Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395, paragraph 91).

87 Since that decision to transfer the third-country national constitutes one of the measures provided for by Directive 2008/115 in order to bring his illegal stay to an end and a stage preparatory to his removal from the territory of the European Union, the Member State concerned must, in the light of the directive’s objectives, adopt that decision with diligence and speedily so that he is transferred as soon as possible to the Member State responsible for the return procedure (see, to this effect, judgments of 6 December 2011 in Achughbabian, C‑329/11, EU:C:2011:807, paragraphs 31 and 45, and of 15 February 2016 in N., C‑601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 76).

39. Since the Parliament and the French Government submit in their respective pleadings that a large part of the appeal is inadmissible on the ground that the appellant merely reproduces his pleas in law to the Court of First Instance without indicating precisely the contested passages of the judgment under appeal or the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, it should be noted that under Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1), first subparagraph, (c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. That requirement is not satisfied by an appeal which, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment under appeal, merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance (Case C‑352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraphs 34 and 35, and Case C-76/01 P Eurocoton and Others v Council [2003] ECR I‑10091, paragraphs 46 and 47).

46. First of all, as regards the objection of inadmissibility raised against the first ground of appeal by the Council, it follows from Article 168a of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC), the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1), first subparagraph, (c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraph 34).

6 In that regard according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, in particular, Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26).

46. It is not unusual that certain sectors of activity, in particular sectors involving public service utilities, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, are subject to rules which may have the effect of limiting the financial risks entailed. First, the detailed rules of public law, to which the economic and financial operation of the service is subject, facilitate the supervision of how that service is operated, and scale down the factors which may threaten transparency and distort competition. Second, it must remain open to the contracting authorities, acting in all good faith, to ensure the supply of services by way of a concession, if they consider that to be the best method of ensuring the public service in question, even if the risk linked to such an operation is limited ( Eurawasser , paragraphs 72 to 74).

72. It is not unusual that certain sectors of activity, in particular sectors involving public service utilities, such as the distribution of water and the disposal of sewage, are subject to rules which may have the effect of limiting the financial risks entailed.

33. However, the Court has already held that it follows from the very wording of Article 11a(2) of Regulation No 1062/87, as well as from the substantially identical provisions which succeeded it, namely Article 49(2) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1214/92 of 21 April 1992 on provision for the implementation of the Community transit procedure and for certain simplifications of that procedure (OJ 1992 L 132, p. 1) and Article 379(2) of Regulation No 2454/93, that notification by the office of departure to the principal of the time-limit by which the proof requested must be furnished is mandatory and must precede recovery of the customs debt (see, to that effect, Case C‑460/01 Commission v Netherlands [2005] ECR I‑2613, paragraphs 62 and 80).

40. In that regard, it should be noted that activities which consist in allowing users to participate, for remuneration, in a game of chance constitute ‘services’ for the purposes of Article 49 EC (see, to that effect, Case C‑275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I‑1039, paragraph 25, and Case C‑67/98 Zenatti [1999] ECR I‑7289, paragraph 24).

24 As the Court held in Schindler, the Treaty provisions on the freedom to provide services apply, in the context of running lotteries, to an activity which enables people to participate in gambling in return for remuneration. Such an activity therefore falls within the scope of Article 59 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 49 EC) if at least one of the providers is established in a Member State other than that in which the service is offered.

35 With regard to the alleged failure to act on the part of the institutions, as the Court has already stated in Commission v Germany, cited above, at paragraph 45, Directive 76/464 itself lays down in a binding manner the measures to be taken by the Member States where the Council does not lay down emission limit values for List I substances. Therefore, that directive does not dispense the Member State from complying with the obligations which it imposes pending adoption of measures by the Council under Article 6.

Dans la mesure où les requérantes visent une réduction des montants des amendes qui leur ont été infligées, il convient de rappeler qu’une violation, par une juridiction de l’Union, de son obligation résultant de l’article 47, deuxième alinéa, de la Charte de juger les affaires qui lui sont soumises dans un délai raisonnable doit trouver sa sanction dans un recours en indemnité porté devant le Tribunal, un tel recours constituant un remède effectif. Ainsi, une demande visant à obtenir réparation du préjudice causé par le non‑respect, par le Tribunal, d’un délai de jugement raisonnable ne peut être soumise directement à la Cour dans le cadre d’un pourvoi, mais doit être introduite devant le Tribunal lui‑même (arrêts du 26 novembre 2013, Gascogne Sack Deutschland/Commission, C‑40/12 P, EU:C:2013:768, points 89 et 90 ; du 26 novembre 2013, Groupe Gascogne/Commission, C‑58/12 P, EU:C:2013:770, points 83 et 84, ainsi que du 10 juillet 2014, Telefónica et Telefónica de España/Commission, C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, point 66).

90. Il s’ensuit qu’une demande visant à obtenir réparation du préjudice causé par le non-respect, par le Tribunal, d’un délai de jugement raisonnable ne peut être soumise directement à la Cour dans le cadre d’un pourvoi, mais doit être introduite devant le Tribunal lui-même.

54. As follows from paragraphs 43 to 45 above, the concept of ‘redundancy’ in the first subparagraph of Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 98/59 directly determines the scope of the protection and the rights conferred on workers under that directive. That concept therefore has an immediate bearing on the costs which such protection entails. Accordingly, any national legislative provision or any interpretation of that concept to the effect that, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, the termination of an employment contract is not a ‘redundancy’ for the purpose of Directive 98/59 would alter the scope of the directive and thus to deprive it of its full effect (see, to that effect, judgment in Confédération générale du travail and Others , C‑385/05, EU:C:2007:37, paragraph 47).

42 It should be noted that it follows from well-established case-law that the application, for the purpose of calculating fines imposed for competition infringements, of new guidelines, such as the 2006 Guidelines, and in particular of a new method of calculating the amount of a fine contained therein, even to infringements committed before the adoption or the amendment of those guidelines, does not breach the principle of non-retroactivity in so far as those new guidelines and that new method were reasonably foreseeable at the time when the infringements in question were committed (see, to that effect, in particular, judgments of 28 June 2005, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission (C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraphs 217, 218, and 227 to 232; of 18 May 2006, Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, C‑397/03 P, EU:C:2006:328, paragraph 25; of 18 July 2013, Schindler Holding and Others v Commission, C‑501/11 P, EU:C:2013:522, paragraph 75; and of 14 September 2016, Ori Martin and SLM v Commission, C‑490/15 P and C‑505/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:678, paragraphs 82 to 94).

Eu égard aux considérations qui précèdent, le deuxième argument doit être écarté comme étant non fondé.

28 As for the question whether the system in question may nevertheless be justified, as the Greek Government claims, under Article 36 of the Treaty, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, national rules adopted in order to achieve one of the objectives referred to in that provision are compatible with the Treaty only in so far as they do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the desired objective (see Case C-128/89 Commission v Italy [1990] ECR I-3239, paragraph 18).

59. In order to assess the implications of Article 51 of Regulation No 800/1999, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with recitals 63 and 64 in the preamble to that regulation, the purpose of the EU legislation, in the light of experience, is to combat irregularities and notably fraud harmful to the EU budget, by providing for penalties designed to encourage exporters to comply with rules in this field (see, to that effect, judgment in Elfering Export , C‑27/05, EU:C:2006:260, paragraph 31), the subjective aspect of the fault committed having no impact in that regard (judgment in Eurofit , EU:C:2013:487, paragraph 38).

38. Secondly, as regards Article 11 of Regulation No 3665/87, it follows from the first and second recitals to Regulation No 2945/94 that, in the light of experience, measures to combat irregularities and notably fraud prejudicial to the Union budget should be intensified and provision should, therefore, be made for the recovery of amounts unduly paid and the sanctions, the subjective aspect of the fault committed having no impact in that regard (see, to that effect, Käserei Champignon Hofmeister , paragraphs 40 and 60). Thus, Article 11 of that regulation makes the exporter responsible, subject to sanctions, for the accuracy of the declaration, taking precise account of the exporter’s role as the last participant in the chain of production, processing and export of agricultural products (see, to that effect, Käserei Champignon Hofmeister , paragraph 62 and 81).

33. In addition, it is appropriate to point out that a national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of European Union law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, including procedural provisions, and it is not necessary for the court to await the prior setting aside of that national provision by legislative or other constitutional means (see, to that effect, Case C‑173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I-8889, paragraph 31).

24 Moreover, according to equally settled case-law, the intended use of a product may also constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (judgments of 20 June 2013 in Agroferm, C‑568/11, EU:C:2013:407, paragraph 41, and of 4 March 2015 in Oliver Medical, C‑547/13, EU:C:2015:139, paragraph 47). In addition, the intended use of a product is a relevant criterion only where the classification cannot be made on the sole basis of the objective characteristics and properties of the product (judgments of 16 December 2010 in Skoma-Lux, C‑339/09, EU:C:2010:781, paragraph 47, and of 28 April 2016, in Oniors Bio, C‑233/15, EU:C:2016:305, paragraph 33).

47. Finally, for the purposes of classification under the appropriate heading, it should be recalled that the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see judgment in Olicom , C‑142/06, EU:C:2007:449, paragraph 18).

42. As regards, first, the aim of protecting acquired rights alluded to by the referring court, protection of the acquired rights of a category of persons constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest (judgment in Specht and Others , C‑501/12 to C‑506/12, C‑540/12 and C‑541/12, EU:C:2014:2005, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

15 Moreover, according to the settled case-law of the Court (see, inter alia, judgments in Case 24/75 Petroni v ONPTS [1975] ECR 1149, at paragraph 13 and in Case C-302/90 CAAMI v Faux [1991] ECR 4875, at paragraph 27), the aim of Articles 48 to 51 would not be attained if, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, workers were to lose advantages in the field of social security guaranteed to them in any event by the laws of a single Member State.

27 The Court has consistently held (see judgments in Case 9/67 Colditz v Caisse d' Assurance Vieillesse des Travailleurs Salariés de Paris [1967] ECR 229, Case 24/75 Petroni v Office National des Pensions pour Travailleurs Salariés [1975] 1149, paragraph 13, and Case C-10/90 Masgio v Bundesknappschaft [1991] ECR I-1119, paragraph 18) that the objective of Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty would not be attained if, after exercising their right of free movement, migrant workers were to lose social security advantages guaranteed by the legislation of a single Member State.

36 In that regard, the Court has previously noted that, in matters of insurance, prorogation of jurisdiction is strictly circumscribed by the aim of protecting the economically weaker party (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2005, Société financière et industrielle du Peloux, C‑112/03, EU:C:2005:280, paragraph 31).

52. Similarly, the Court has held that, where the transaction in question goes beyond what the companies concerned would have agreed under fully competitive conditions, the corrective tax measure must, in order not to be considered disproportionate, be confined to the part which exceeds what would have been agreed under such conditions (see, to that effect, SGI , paragraph 72).

72. Second, where the consideration of such elements leads to the conclusion that the transaction in question goes beyond what the companies concerned would have agreed under fully competitive conditions, the corrective tax measure must be confined to the part which exceeds what would have been agreed if the companies did not have a relationship of interdependence.

28 First of all, it must be noted that the Member States are obliged, under, inter alia, the principle of sincere cooperation, laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU, to ensure, in their respective territory, the application of and compliance with EU law and that, under the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU, the Member States are to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2017, The Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme, C‑628/15, EU:C:2017:687, paragraph 47).

9 As the Commission has pointed out, it is settled case-law that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-214/96 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-7661, paragraph 18).

18 As regards those arguments relating to internal difficulties, it is sufficient to observe that, as the Court has consistently held, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-259/94 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-1947, paragraph 5, and Case C-298/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-6747, paragraph 18).

25. It should be noted in that regard that it is clear from the recitals in the preamble thereto that the Directive was adopted with the dual aim of ensuring both the creation of a common market in consumer credit (third to fifth recitals) and the protection of consumers who avail themselves of such credit (sixth, seventh and ninth recitals) (Case C-208/98 Berliner Kindl Brauerei [2000] ECR I-1741, paragraph 20).

27. By its first three questions, the referring court asks the Court about the compatibility of the Italian legislation with the rules of EU law. It must be borne in mind, however, that it is not the task of the Court, in preliminary ruling proceedings, to rule upon the compatibility of provisions of national law with the legal rules of the European Union. By contrast, the Court does have jurisdiction to give the national court full guidance on the interpretation of EU law in order to enable it to determine the issue of compatibility for the purposes of the case before it (see judgment in Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales , C‑118/08, EU:C:2010:39, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited, and order in Agricola Esposito , C‑492/09, EU:C:2010:766, paragraph 19). The first and fourth questions

23. It must be recalled in this respect that, although it is not the task of the Court, in preliminary ruling proceedings, to rule upon the compatibility of provisions of national law with the legal rules of the European Union, it has repeatedly held that it has jurisdiction to give the national court full guidance on the interpretation of European Union law in order to enable it to determine the issue of compatibility for the purposes of the case before it (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑292/92 Hünermund and Others [1993] ECR I‑6787, paragraph 8, and Case C‑380/05 Centro Europa 7 [2008] ECR I‑349, paragraph 50).

21. As regards the provisions concerning the requirement for genuine use of the Community mark in the European Union, such as Articles 15(1) and 51 of Regulation No 207/2009, those provisions pursue a different objective from that pursued by the provisions relating to the extended protection conferred on trade marks that have a reputation in the European Union, such as Article 9(1)(c) thereof (see, to that effect, judgment in Leno Merken , C‑149/11, EU:C:2012:816, paragraph 53). While the latter provision concerns conditions governing protection extended beyond the categories of goods and services for which a Community trade mark has been registered, the notion of ‘genuine use’ in Articles 15(1) and 51 of Regulation No 207/2009 expresses the minimum condition for use that all the marks must satisfy in order to be protected.

57. It must be borne in mind that, according to the very terms of the third paragraph of Article 161 EA, the Member States are entitled to choose the form and methods for implementing directives which best ensure the result to be achieved by the directives. It is clear from that provision that the transposition of a directive into national law does not necessarily require legislative action in each Member State. Thus, the Court has repeatedly held that it is not always necessary formally to enact the requirements of a directive in a specific express legal provision (see, to that effect, Case C-233/00 Commission v France [2003] ECR I-6625, paragraph 76, and Case C-296/01 Commission v France [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 55).

76. While it is therefore essential that the legal situation resulting from national implementing measures is sufficiently precise and clear to enable the individuals concerned to know the extent of their rights and obligations, it is none the less the case that, according to the very words of the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty, Member States may choose the form and methods for implementing directives which best ensure the result to be achieved by the directives, and that provision shows that the transposition of a directive into national law does not necessarily require legislative action in each Member State. The Court has thus repeatedly held that it is not always necessary formally to enact the requirements of a directive in a specific express legal provision, since the general legal context may be sufficient for implementation of a directive, depending on its content. In particular, the existence of general principles of constitutional or administrative law may render superfluous transposition by specific legislative or regulatory measures provided, however, that those principles actually ensure the full application of the directive by the national authorities and that, where the relevant provision of the directive seeks to create rights for individuals, the legal situation arising from those principles is sufficiently precise and clear and that the persons concerned are put in a position to know the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, to be able to rely on them before the national courts (see, inter alia, Case 29/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 1661, paragraphs 22 and 23, and Case C-217/97 Commission v Germany , cited above, paragraphs 31 and 32).

80. According to consistent case-law, national legislation making the addition of a nutritive substance to a foodstuff lawfully manufactured and/or marketed in other Member States subject to prior authorisation is not in principle contrary to Community law provided certain conditions are fulfilled (see, to that effect, Case C-344/90 Commission v France [1992] ECR I-4719, paragraph 8, and Commission v Denmark , paragraph 44).

128 In the first place, it must be borne in mind that the Court of First Instance alone has jurisdiction to examine how in each particular case the Commission appraised the gravity of unlawful conduct. In an appeal, the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, first, to examine to what extent the Court of First Instance took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the essential factors to assess the gravity of particular conduct in the light of Article 85 of the Treaty and Article 15 of Regulation No 17 and, second, to consider whether the Court of First Instance responded to a sufficient legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant with a view to having the fine cancelled or reduced (see, on the latter point, Case C-219/95 P Ferriere Nord v Commission [1997] ECR I-4411, paragraph 31).

31 The applicant may not rely on the Italian version of Article 85 of the Treaty in order to require the Commission to demonstrate that the agreement had both an anti-competitive object and effect. That version cannot prevail by itself against all the other language versions, which, by using the term "or", clearly show that the condition in question is not cumulative but alternative, as the Court of Justice has consistently held since its judgment in Société Technique Minière (cited above, p. 249). The uniform interpretation of rules of Community law requires that they be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other Community languages (judgments of the Court of Justice in Case 19/67 Van der Vecht [1967] ECR 345 at p. 354, and in Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415, paragraph 18).' 13 The appellant complains that the Court of First Instance failed to take account of the Italian version of Article 85(1) of the Treaty, according to which an agreement must have as its object and effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, with the result that the provision lays down a cumulative, and not an alternative, condition. The reasoning of the Court of First Instance in paragraph 31 of the contested judgment is incorrectly based on case-law not relating to the Italian version of Article 85. The other language versions should be called in aid only where the meaning of one version of a provision is not clear, which is not the case here. 14 Admittedly, unlike the other language versions of Article 85, it appears from the Italian version, as a result of its use of the coordinating conjunction `e', that the agreement must have as its object and effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. However, that difference cannot cast doubt on the interpretation of Article 85 given by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 30 of the contested judgment. 15 In fact, as the Court of First Instance rightly held, it is settled case-law that Community provisions must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in the other Community languages (Van der Vecht and CILFIT v Ministry of Health, paragraph 18). This is unaffected by the fact that, as it happens, the Italian version of Article 85, considered on its own, is clear and unambiguous, since all the other language versions expressly render the condition set out in Article 85(1) of the Treaty in the form of an alternative. 16 It follows that the first limb of the first plea must be rejected. 17 The second limb of the first plea relates to paragraphs 32 to 35 of the contested judgment, which read: `32 ... Article 85(1) of the Treaty does not require that the restrictions on competition which have been established have actually affected trade between Member States, but only requires that it be established that such agreements are capable of having that effect (judgment in Miller, cited above, paragraph 15). 33 In the present case, the fact that the applicant's units of production of welded steel mesh are far away from the French market is not in itself of such a nature as to hinder its exports to that market. Moreover, the applicant's arguments themselves show that the agreements were, in so far as they tended to increase prices, likely to increase its exports to France and thereby to affect trade between Member States. 34 Furthermore, assuming, as the applicant claims, that the agreements did not alter the total market share held by the Italian producers and that its exports remained far below its allocated quota, it is nevertheless the case that the restrictions on competition which have been established were likely to divert patterns of trade from the course which they would otherwise have followed (judgment in Van Landewyck, cited above, paragraph 172). The object of the agreements was to allocate quotas for imports into the French market in order to bring about an artificial increase in prices on that market. 35 It follows that, as is found in the Decision, by being a party to agreements which had as their object the restriction of competition within the common market and which might have affected trade between Member States, the applicant infringed Article 85(1) of the Treaty.' 18 The appellant complains that the Court of First Instance merely held in paragraph 32 that it is sufficient that the agreements to which it was a party were capable of actually affecting trade in order for them to be contrary to Article 85 of the Treaty, whereas the Court of First Instance should also have established in what respect those agreements hampered trade between Member States. In its view, the agreements at issue were not capable of actually affecting trade between Italy and France. 19 In this connection, it must be held that the Court of First Instance rightly pointed out in paragraph 32 of the contested judgment that, according to Case 19/77 Miller v Commission [1978] ECR 131, paragraph 15, Article 85(1) of the Treaty does not require that agreements referred to in that provision have actually affected trade between Member States, which, moreover, is difficult to prove to a sufficient legal standard in most cases, but requires that it be established that the agreements are capable of having that effect. 20 Furthermore, it has been consistently held that in order that an agreement, decision or concerted practice may affect trade between Member States it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of factors of law or fact that it may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States such as to give rise to the fear that the realization of a single market between Member States might be impeded (see Case 54/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235 and Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck v Commission [1980] ECR 3125, paragraph 170). 21 It follows that the second limb of the first plea must also be rejected. 22 The third limb of the first plea relates to paragraph 29 of the contested judgment: `29 With regard to the effect on competition, it is true, as the applicant observes, that the price of welded steel mesh depends largely on that of wire rod, but it does not follow from this that any possibility of effective competition in that sector was precluded. The producers still had a sufficient margin to allow effective competition in the market. The agreements could therefore have had an appreciable effect on competition ...'. 23 The appellant complains that the Court of First Instance gave no reasons for its finding that, despite the legislative and economic context relating to wire rod, any possibility of effective competition in the sector of welded steel mesh was not for all that excluded. 24 Admittedly, the appellant does not contest the existence of a margin of competition on the market in welded steel mesh despite the ECSC regime applicable to wire rod. However, it complains that the Court of First Instance did not consider whether the agreements on welded steel mesh might not have been consistent with Article 85 of the Treaty in so far as they helped to increase the price of welded steel mesh and hence, indirectly, of wire rod. The Commission wanted the price level on the wire rod market to recover. Consequently, the appellant claims that the true aim of the agreement with French manufacturers of welded steel mesh was not to restrict competition in the sector, but to pursue the same aims as the Commission in the wire rod sector. 25 In this regard, it must be held that the Court of First Instance was right in law to find merely that there was a sufficient margin to allow effective competition in the market in welded steel mesh. The fact that the market in wire rod - upstream of the market in welded steel mesh - was subject to production quotas, and not imposed prices as the appellant seems to be arguing, has no bearing on the finding made by the Court of First Instance. In any event, the legislative and economic context of wire rod did not authorize the appellant to take part in anti-competitive agreements relating to a derived product on the pretext of protecting the product upstream, thereby substituting itself for the competent authorities, which alone had the power to do so. 26 The whole of the first plea must therefore be rejected. Second plea, alleging infringement of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 27 This plea is concerned with fixing and determining the amount of the fine in accordance with Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17. 28 Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 provides as follows: `The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of undertakings fines ... where, either intentionally or negligently: (a) they infringe Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the Treaty; or (b) ... In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the gravity and to the duration of the infringement.' 29 The appellant asks that the fine imposed on it by the contested decision be abolished or, at least, reduced. 30 In this regard, it maintains that the Court of First Instance did not consider all the arguments which it raised before it or that it did not consider sufficiently to what extent they were well founded. In the alternative, it argues that, assuming the fine to be well founded in principle, its amount is in any case excessive and unjust. 31 As regards the allegedly unjust nature of the fine, it is important to point out that it is not for this Court, when ruling on questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the Court of First Instance exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines imposed on undertakings for infringements of Community law (Case C-310/93 P BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission [1995] ECR I-865, paragraph 34). In contrast, the Court of Justice does have jurisdiction to consider whether the Court of First Instance has responded to a sufficient legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant with a view to having the fine abolished or reduced.

55. Comme il ressort de la jurisprudence constante, l’article 141 CE interdit toute discrimination en matière de rémunération entre travailleurs masculins et travailleurs féminins quel que soit le mécanisme qui détermine cette inégalité. D’après cette même jurisprudence, la fixation d’une condition d’âge différente selon le sexe pour l’octroi d’une pension constituant une rémunération au sens de l’article 141 CE est contraire à cette disposition (voir arrêts Barber, précité, point 32; du 14 décembre 1993, Moroni, C‑110/91, Rec. p. I‑6591, points 10 et 20; du 28 septembre 1994, Avdel Systems, C‑408/92, Rec. p. I‑4435, point 11, ainsi que Niemi, précité, point 53).

17 With respect to the application of those principles to national rules fixing a minimum price which is applicable without distinction to domestic products and imported products, the Court considers that a minimum price which is situated at such a level that the competitive advantage conferred on the importer by lower cost prices is cancelled out constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction for the purposes of Article 30 (see the judgment in Case 82/77 Van Tiggele [1978] ECR 25, paragraph 14, and the judgment in Case 231/83 Cullet [1985] ECR 305, paragraph 23).

14THUS IMPORTS MAY BE IMPEDED IN PARTICULAR WHEN A NATIONAL AUTHORITY FIXES PRICES OR PROFIT MARGINS AT SUCH A LEVEL THAT IMPORTED PRODUCTS ARE PLACED AT A DISADVANTAGE IN RELATION TO IDENTICAL DOMESTIC PRODUCTS EITHER BECAUSE THEY CANNOT PROFITABLY BE MARKETED IN THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN OR BECAUSE THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE CONFERRED BY LOWER COST PRICES IS CANCELLED OUT .

89. Consequently, in that specific situation, the Commission is entitled to require the holding company to pay the fine imposed on the last subsidiary of the group jointly and severally, unless the holding company can rebut that presumption by demonstrating that either the interposed company or the subsidiary operate independently on the market (see, by analogy, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission , paragraph 29, and Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , paragraph 61).

85. Furthermore, the fact, highlighted by the Portuguese Republic, that the provision of construction services generally takes some time and that it may, as a result, prove difficult to make a distinction between those services and the situation in which the provider is actually established in the host Member State, does not in any way have the effect of automatically precluding those services from being covered by Article 49 EC. Thus, the Court has already held that Article 49 EC may also include services which are provided over an extended period, even over several years, giving, in particular, the example of services supplied in connection with the construction of a large building (see Case C‑215/01 Schnitzer [2003] ECR I‑14847, paragraph 30).

30. Thus, "services" within the meaning of the Treaty may cover services varying widely in nature, including services which are provided over an extended period, even over several years, where, for example, the services in question are supplied in connection with the construction of a large building. Services within the meaning of the Treaty may likewise be constituted by services which a business established in a Member State supplies with a greater or lesser degree of frequency or regularity, even over an extended period, to persons established in one or more other Member States, for example the giving of advice or information for remuneration.

57. It must be borne in mind, however, that it is not for the Court to rule on the interpretation of national provisions, as such an interpretation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national courts. Thus, the Court, when a question is referred to it by a national court, must base itself on the interpretation of national law as described to it by that court (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑360/06 Heinrich Bauer Verlag [2008] ECR I-7333, paragraph 15 and case-law cited). The questions referred for a preliminary ruling Preliminary considerations

31. Moreover, the presence, on the customs territory of the European Union, of non-Community goods carries the risk that those goods will end up forming part of the economic networks of the Member States without having been cleared through customs (see, by analogy, Case C‑459/07 Elshani [2009] ECR I‑2759, paragraph 32), a risk which Article 204 of the Customs Code helps to prevent, as was pointed out by the Commission.

32. In that regard, it should be pointed out that the presence of unlawfully introduced goods in the customs territory of the Community of unlawfully introduced goods comprises, of itself, a very high risk that those goods will end up forming part of the economic networks of the Member States and that, once those goods have gone beyond the area in which the first customs office is situated inside the customs territory, there is less likelihood that the customs authorities will, fortuitously, discover those goods in the course of spot checks.

55 It should, next, be pointed out that measures involving a political choice reserved to the EU legislature due to the fact that they are necessary for the pursuit of the objectives of the common agriculture and fisheries policies must be based on Article 43(2) TFEU. By contrast, the adoption of measures on the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities, in accordance with Article 43(3) TFEU, does not require such a choice, since such measures are principally technical and are intended to be taken in order to implement provisions adopted on the basis of Article 43(2) TFEU (see, to that effect, Parliament and Commission v Council, C‑103/12 and C‑165/12, EU:C:2014:2400, paragraph 50, and of 1 December 2015 in Parliament and Commission v Council, C‑124/13 and C‑125/13, EU:C:2015:790, paragraphs 48 and 50).

44. Next, as regards Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive, the Court has repeatedly stated that the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, in particular, Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties , paragraph 13, and Case C-287/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-5811, paragraph 43).

13 It is clear from the foregoing that the terms used to specify the exemptions envisaged by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that turnover tax is levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person .

26. As observed by the United Kingdom Government and the European Commission, that interpretation is in keeping with the case-law in which it has been held that, when possible, the informed user will make a direct comparison between the designs at issue (see judgment in PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic , C‑281/10 P, EU:C:2011:679, paragraph 55, and Neuman and Others v José Manuel Baena Grupo , C‑101/11 P and C‑102/11 P, EU:C:2012:641, paragraph 54), because that type of comparison actually relates to the impression produced on that user by earlier individualised and defined designs, as opposed to an amalgam of specific features or parts of earlier designs.

31. As regards the applicability of Article 12 EC, which lays down a general prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality, it should be noted that that provision applies independently only to situations governed by European Union law for which the Treaty lays down no specific rules of non-discrimination (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑397/98 and C‑410/98 Metallgesellschaft and Others [2001] ECR I‑1727, paragraphs 38 and 39; Case C‑443/06 Hollmann [2007] ECR I‑8491, paragraphs 28 and 29; and Case C‑105/07 Lammers & Van Cleeff [2008] ECR I‑173, paragraph 14).

39 It is common ground that, in relation to the right of establishment, the principle of non-discrimination was implemented and specifically laid down by Article 52 of the Treaty (Halliburton Services, cited above, paragraph 12, Case C-193/94 Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos [1996] ECR I-929, paragraph 21, and Baars, paragraph 24).

36 Next, in accordance with settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and subsequent changes cannot be taken into account by the Court (see Case C-214/96 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-7661, paragraph 25, and Case C-384/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-3823, paragraph 35).

155. In this respect, it must be noted that the subsequent irrevocability of the statement of 23 July 1997 does not prevent the appellant from contesting, by an action before the European Union judicature, the interpretation of the content of the statement, as set out in paragraphs 64 to 66 of Krupp Thyssen Stainless and Acciai speciali Terni v Commission , or the express or implied acknowledgment of matters of fact or law during the administrative procedure before the Commission, since that cannot restrict the actual exercise of the right of a natural or legal person to bring proceedings before the General Court under the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC (Case C‑407/08 P Knauf Gips v Commission [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 90).

90. Although an undertaking’s express or implicit acknowledgement of matters of fact or of law during the administrative procedure before the Commission may constitute additional evidence when determining whether an action is well founded, it cannot restrict the actual exercise of a natural or legal person’s right to bring proceedings before the General Court under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

19. From that, the Court concludes that a Turkish worker is entitled to a temporary interruption of his employment relationship. In spite of such an interruption he continues to be duly registered as belonging to the labour force in the host Member State, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80, during the period which is reasonably necessary for him to find other paid employment. He may therefore claim an extension of his residence permit in that Member State in order to exercise his right to free access to any paid employment of his choice, provided that he does in fact try to find a new job and, if appropriate, registers with the employment services in order to find another job within a reasonable time (see, to that effect, Tetik , paragraphs 30, 31, 41, 46 and 48, and Nazli , paragraphs 38 and 40).

15. Article 18 EC, which sets out in general terms the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, finds specific expression in Article 43 EC with regard to freedom of establishment and in Article 39 EC with regard to freedom of movement for workers (Case C-345/05 Commission v Portugal [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 13).

13. Article 18 EC, which sets out in general terms the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, finds specific expression in Article 43 EC with regard to freedom of establishment (Case C-470/04 N [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 22) and in Article 39 EC with regard to freedom of movement for workers.

45 Finally, in Case C-285/95 Kol v Land Berlin [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 27, the Court held that the periods in which a Turkish national was employed under a residence permit which was issued to him only as a result of fraudulent conduct which led to his conviction were not based on a stable situation, and that such employment could not be regarded as having been secure in view of the fact that, during the periods in question, the person concerned was not legally entitled to a residence permit.

53. In that regard, it follows from the case-law that it is for the national authorities, in accordance with Community law and subject to review by the national courts, to take into account, in particular, the existence of specific provisions, be they national or regional, legislative or administrative, or tax or social security provisions, the general interest of the activities of the taxable person concerned, the fact that other taxable persons carrying on the same activities already have similar recognition, and the fact that the costs of the supplies in question may be largely met by health insurance schemes or other social security bodies (see Kügler , paragraphs 57 and 58, and Dornier , paragraph 72).

58 In the main proceedings, the national court will thus be able to take into account the existence of specific provisions, be they national or regional, legislative or administrative, or tax or social security provisions, the fact that associations carrying on the same activities as the claimant in the main proceedings are already entitled to a similar exemption, given the public interest inherent in those activities, and the fact that the costs of the services supplied by the claimant in the main proceedings may be largely met by statutory health funds or by social security bodies with which private operators such as the claimant in the main proceedings have contractual relations.

33. The Court has held in relation to the provision that was the predecessor of Article 203 of Directive 2006/112, namely Article 21(1)(c) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1), as amended by Council Directive 91/680/EEC of 16 December 1991 (OJ 1991 L 376, p. 1), that, according to that provision, any person who mentions VAT on an invoice or other document serving as invoice is liable to pay that tax. In particular, those persons are liable to pay VAT mentioned on an invoice independently of any obligation to pay it on account of there being a transaction subject to VAT (see Case C-566/07 Stadeco [2009] ECR I-5295, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

23. Any exception to the application of that obligation must consequently be interpreted strictly (see Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau EU:C:2005:5, paragraph 46).

46. Any exception to the application of that obligation must consequently be interpreted strictly. Thus the Court has held, concerning recourse to a negotiated procedure without the prior publication of a contract notice, that Article 11(3) of Directive 92/50, which provides for such a procedure, must, as a derogation from the rules intended to ensure the effectiveness of the rights conferred by the EC Treaty in relation to public service contracts, be interpreted strictly and that the burden of proving the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying the derogation lies on the person seeking to rely on those circumstances (Joined Cases C‑20/01 and C‑28/01 Commission v Germany [2003] ECR I‑3609, paragraph 58).

14 It is clear from paragraph 14 of Hoffmann-La Roche that the proprietor of a trade mark right which is protected in two Member States at the same time is justified, for the purposes of the first sentence of Article 30 EC, in preventing a product to which the trade mark has lawfully been applied in one of those States from being put on the market in the other Member State after it has been repacked in new packaging to which the trade mark has been affixed by a third party. That paragraph also states, however, that such prevention of marketing will constitute a disguised restriction on trade between Member States, within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 30 EC, where: - it is established that the use of the trade mark right by the proprietor, having regard to the marketing system which he has adopted, will contribute to the artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States; - it is shown that the repackaging cannot adversely affect the original condition of the product; - the proprietor of the mark receives prior notice of the marketing of the repackaged product; and - it is stated on the new packaging by whom the product has been repackaged.

28 Finally, as the Court also held in De Peijper, paragraph 27, simple cooperation between the authorities of the Member States would enable them to obtain the necessary substantiating documents on a reciprocal basis.

27 MOREOVER , SIMPLE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES OF THE MEMBER STATES WOULD ENABLE THEM TO OBTAIN ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS THE DOCUMENTS NECESSARY FOR CHECKING CERTAIN LARGELY STANDARDIZED AND WIDELY DISTRIBUTED PRODUCTS .

37. In addition, as the Advocate General noted in point 93 of his Opinion, the grant of compensatory interest does not fall within the legal framework of the measure adopted to comply with the judgment, for the purposes of the first paragraph of Article 266 TFEU, but comes under the second paragraph of Article 266 TFEU, which refers to Article 340 TFEU, that is to say, to the general law on the non-contractual liability of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others , C‑136/92 P, EU:C:1994:211, paragraph 42). That category of interest is designed to compensate for the time that passes before the judicial assessment of the amount of damage, irrespective of any delay attributable to the debtor.

20. If those advantages for national production processed or marketed on the national market fully offset the burden borne by that production, the charge levied on the product must, being a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty, be regarded as unlawful in its entirety; if on the contrary those advantages only partly offset the burden borne by national products processed or marketed on the national market, the charge levied on exported national products, which is legal in principle, will have to be prohibited to the extent to which it offsets that burden and reduced proportionally (see, to that effect, UCAL , paragraph 23, and Nygård , paragraph 42).

23 If the advantages for domestic production fully offset the burden borne by it, the charge levied on the product must, being a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty, be regarded as unlawful in its entirety; if on the contrary those advantages only partly offset the burden borne by domestic production, the charge levied on the imported product, which is legal in principle, will simply have to be reduced proportionally (Case 94/74 IGAV v ENCC [1975] ECR 699, paragraph 13, and Compagnie Commerciale de l'Ouest and Others, cited above, paragraph 27).

24. It must be borne in mind that measures taken by a Member State, the aim or effect of which is to treat goods coming from other Member States less favourably and, in the absence of harmonisation of national legislation, obstacles to the free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods, even if those rules apply to all products alike, must be regarded as ‘measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports’ for the purposes of Article 28 EC (see to that effect, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649, paragraphs 6, 14 and 15; Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689, paragraph 8; and Case C-322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband [2003] ECR I-14887, paragraph 67). Any other measure which hinders access of products originating in other Member States to the market of a Member State is also covered by that concept (see Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 37).

20 As far as the right to join an occupational scheme is concerned, it stated that there was no reason to suppose that those concerned could have been mistaken as to the applicability of Article 119. It has been clear since the judgment in Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus v Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607 that a breach of the rule of equal treatment as regards recognition of such a right is caught by Article 119 (Vroege, paragraphs 28 and 29 and Fisscher, paragraphs 25 and 26).

28 The answer to the second question must therefore be that the limitation of the effects in time of the Barber judgment does not apply to the right to join an occupational pension scheme. The third question

33. Moreover, the requirement that the cost should be ‘not prohibitively expensive’ pertains, in environmental matters, to the observance of the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and to the principle of effectiveness, in accordance with which detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under European Union law must not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by European Union law (see, inter alia, Case C‑240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK [2011] ECR I‑1255, paragraph 48).

19. That being said, it should be noted, as the Commission of the European Communities pointed out, that the Court has already held that a national provision of one Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, while it does not operate any distinction according to the origin of goods, nevertheless entails, in relation to nationals of other Member States, direct discrimination based on the nationality of the claimant, in so far as it does not require security from nationals of the first-mentioned State (Case C‑43/95 Data Delecta and Forsberg [1996] ECR I‑4661, paragraphs 17 and 22, and Case C‑323/95 Hayes [1997] ECR I‑1711, paragraph 19).

17 A provision such as the one at issue in the main proceedings manifestly constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of nationality.

57 Finally, according to the settled case-law of the Court, in the particular context of the preparation of decisions on the clearance of accounts, the reasons for a decision must be considered adequate if the Member State to which the decision is addressed was closely involved in the decision-making process and is therefore aware of the reasons why the Commission considered that it was not required to charge the sum in dispute to the EAGGF (see Germany v Commission, cited above, paragraph 21).

30 It follows that Article 14(1)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 remains an exception to the State of employment rule (see Manpower, paragraph 10) and that, consequently, an undertaking which provides temporary personnel and wishes to offer cross-border services may benefit from the advantage afforded by that provision only if it normally carries on its activities in the Member State in which it is established.

10 THE EXCEPTION TO ARTICLE 12 OF THE SAME REGULATION THUS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 13 ( 1 ) ( A ) AIMS AT OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES LIKELY TO IMPEDE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF WORKERS AND AT ENCOURAGING ECONOMIC INTERPENETRATION WHILST AVOIDING ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS, UNDERTAKINGS AND SOCIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS .

32. As regards Eurest’s argument that it dismissed Ms Chacón Navas without reference to the fact that she was absent from work on grounds of sickness because, at that time, her services were no longer necessary, it must be recalled that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, which are based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court. Similarly, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑326/00 IKA [2003] ECR I‑1703, paragraph 27, and Case C‑145/03 Keller [2005] ECR I‑2529, paragraph 33).

Or, il y a lieu de rappeler que, conformément à l’article 256, paragraphe 1, TFUE et à l’article 58, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, le pourvoi est limité aux questions de droit. Le Tribunal est seul compétent pour constater et apprécier les faits pertinents ainsi que pour apprécier les éléments de preuve. L’appréciation de ces faits et éléments de preuve ne constitue donc pas, sous réserve du cas de leur dénaturation, une question de droit soumise, comme telle, au contrôle de la Cour dans le cadre d’un pourvoi (arrêt du 9 octobre 2014, ICF/Commission, C‑467/13 P, non publié, EU:C:2014:2274, point 26).

26. En tant qu’ICF conteste la conclusion à laquelle le Tribunal est parvenu quant à la possibilité que, en l’absence de l’irrégularité procédurale commise, la procédure administrative ait pu aboutir à un résultat différent, il convient de rappeler que, conformément aux articles 256, paragraphe 1, TFUE et 58, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour, le pourvoi est limité aux questions de droit. Le Tribunal est seul compétent pour constater et apprécier les faits pertinents ainsi que pour apprécier les éléments de preuve. L’appréciation de ces faits et éléments de preuve ne constitue donc pas, sous réserve du cas de leur dénaturation, une question de droit soumise, comme telle, au contrôle de la Cour dans le cadre d’un pourvoi (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Acino/Commission, C‑269/13 P, EU:C:2014:255, point 34 et jurisprudence citée).

32. Such legislation introduces an additional cost for stopovers made by aircraft or boats operated by persons having their tax domicile outside the territory of the region and established in other Member States, and thus creates an advantage for some categories of undertaking established in that territory (see Case C-353/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I‑4069, paragraph 25; Case C-250/06 United Pan-Europe Communications Belgium and Others [2007] ECR I‑11135, paragraph 37; and Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government [2008] ECR I‑1683, paragraph 50).

53. Moreover, an absolute prohibition of advertising the characteristics of a product is liable to impede access to the market by products from other Member States more than it impedes access by domestic products, with which consumers are more familiar (Case C-405/98 Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I-1795, paragraph 21).

21 Even without its being necessary to carry out a precise analysis of the facts characteristic of the Swedish situation, which it is for the national court to do, the Court is able to conclude that, in the case of products like alcoholic beverages, the consumption of which is linked to traditional social practices and to local habits and customs, a prohibition of all advertising directed at consumers in the form of advertisements in the press, on the radio and on television, the direct mailing of unsolicited material or the placing of posters on the public highway is liable to impede access to the market by products from other Member States more than it impedes access by domestic products, with which consumers are instantly more familiar.

71. In SAT Fluggesellschaft , the Court, while not specifically ruling on Eurocontrol’s activity of assisting the national administrations, considered at paragraph 30 of that judgment that, taken as a whole, Eurocontrol’s activities, by their nature, their aim and the rules to which they are subject, are connected with the exercise of powers relating to the control and supervision of air space, which are typically those of a public authority and are not of an economic nature. The Court therefore held that Articles 86 and 90 of the Treaty (now Articles 82 EC and 86 EC) must be interpreted as meaning that an international organisation such as Eurocontrol is not an undertaking for the purposes of those provisions.

37. In that regard, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that, if the purpose of a formality imposed on the importer of a product subject to a national tax is to ensure payment of the debt corresponding to that tax, such a formality is related to the event giving rise to the tax, namely an intra-Community acquisition, and not to the crossing of a frontier in the sense of that provision (see, to that effect, judgments in Brzeziński , EU:C:2007:33, paragraphs 47 and 48, and Kalinchev , EU:C:2010:312, paragraph 27).

48. That being so, the purpose of the simplified declaration being to ensure payment of the debt corresponding to the excise duty, that formality thus relates to the event giving rise to the excise duty. Under that interpretation, the duty will be owing, as provided for by Article 80(3)(3) of the 2004 Law, as from the time of acquisition of the right to use the passenger vehicle as owner and, at the latest, as from the time of its registration in Poland in accordance with the road traffic provisions.

24 As to the complaint that the Court of First Instance failed to consider the overall impression conveyed by a composite sign (see, as regards Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, Case C-383/99 P Procter & Gamble v OHIM [2001] ECR I-6251, paragraph 40), that complaint is unfounded. As stated in paragraph 23 above, the Court of First Instance directed a significant part of its reasoning to considering, in relation to a sign composed of words, the sign's distinctiveness as a whole.

47. A difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, if the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment (see, to that effect, Case 114/76 Bela-Mühle Bergmann [1977] ECR 1211, paragraph 7; Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale [1982] ECR 2745, paragraphs 11 and 13; Case C‑122/95 Germany v Council [1998] ECR I‑973, paragraphs 68 and 71; and Case C‑535/03 Unitymark and North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation [2006] ECR I‑2689, paragraphs 53, 63, 68 and 71).

68 Therefore, in order to justify recourse to a measure such as the one at issue in this case, the Council should have demonstrated that the balance disturbed by the increase in the tariff quota and the concomitant lowering of customs duties, which also benefit Category B operators, could be restored only by granting a substantial advantage to that same category of operators and, thus, at the cost of introducing a new difference in treatment detrimental to the other categories of operators who had already, when the tariff quota and the machinery for dividing it up were introduced, been subjected to similar restrictions and differences in treatment.

121. In order to establish the selective nature of the contested measures, it is not necessary for the competent national authorities to have a discretionary power in the application of the tax deduction at issue (see Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission , paragraph 27) even if the existence of such a power may enable the public authorities to favour certain undertakings or productions to the detriment of others and, therefore, to establish the existence of aid within the meaning of Articles 4(c) CS or 87 EC.

24. That said, it should also be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, in the absence of EU rules governing claims for the repayment of taxes, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the conditions under which those claims may be made; subject, nevertheless, to observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (see Case C‑291/03 MyTravel [2005] ECR I‑8477, paragraph 17, and Case C‑35/05 Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken [2007] ECR I‑2425, paragraph 37).

37. It must be pointed out in that regard that, in the absence of Community rules on applications for the repayment of taxes, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the conditions under which such applications may be made; those conditions must observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, that is to say, they must not be less favourable than those relating to similar claims founded on provisions of domestic law or framed so as to render virtually impossible the exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal order (see, inter alia, Case C‑30/02 Recheio – Cash & Carry [2004] ECR I‑6051, paragraph 17, and Case C‑291/03 MyTravel [2005] ECR I‑8477, paragraph 17).

37. However, according to settled case-law, the proof required to demonstrate the genuine link must not be too exclusive in nature or unduly favour one element which is not necessarily representative of the real and effective degree of connection between the claimant and the Member State, to the exclusion of all other representative elements (see judgments in D’Hoop , EU:C:2002:432, paragraph 39; Prinz and Seeberger , EU:C:2013:524, paragraph 37; and Thiele Meneses , EU:C:2013:683, paragraph 36).

53. It is, admittedly, not apparent from the documents submitted to the Court that the Italian Government communicated those measures to the Commission in accordance with Article 193 TFEU. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, while that provision requires Member States to communicate to the Commission the more stringent protective measures which they intend to maintain or introduce in environmental matters, it does not make implementation of the planned measures conditional upon agreement by the Commission or its failure to object. In that context, as the Advocate General noted at point 38 of his Opinion, neither the wording nor the purpose of the provision under examination therefore provides any support for the view that failure by the Member States to comply with their notification obligation under Article 193 TFEU in itself renders unlawful the more stringent protective measures thus adopted (see, by analogy, Case 380/87 Enichem Base and Others [1989] ECR 2491, paragraphs 20 to 23; Case C‑209/98 Sydhavnens Sten & Grus [2000] ECR I‑3743, paragraph 100; and Case C‑159/00 Sapod Audic [2002] ECR I‑5031, paragraphs 60 to 63).

100 Neither the wording nor the purpose of that provision provides any ground for the view that failure by the Member States to observe their obligation to give prior notice in itself renders unlawful the measures thus adopted (see, in that regard, concerning Article 3(2) of Directive 75/442, in the version prior to Directive 91/156, Case 380/87 Enichem Base and Others [1989] ECR 2491, paragraph 22).

99 As regards members of the Bar, it has consistently been held that, in the absence of specific Community rules in the field, each Member State is in principle free to regulate the exercise of the legal profession in its territory (Case 107/83 Klopp [1984] ECR 2971, paragraph 17, and Reisebüro, paragraph 37). For that reason, the rules applicable to that profession may differ greatly from one Member State to another.

93. It follows that, with respect to foreign workers enjoying equal treatment as regards remuneration and other conditions of work, the denial of the right to stand as a candidate for election to a body representing and defending the interests of workers, such as the chambers of workers in Austria, can be justified neither by the legal nature of the body in question under national law nor by the fact that certain of its functions could involve participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law (see ASTI I , paragraph 20).

20 Consequently, the exclusion of workers from other Member States from the right to vote in elections to the occupational guilds can be justified, under Article 8(1), neither by the legal nature of the guild in question under national law nor by the fact that certain of its functions could involve participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law.

19 It must next be considered, as the Court stated in its judgment in Reiff (paragraph 20), whether the public authorities have delegated their powers in the matter of fixing tariffs to private economic operators.

22. In that connection, the Court has already held that, according to Article 11(2) of Directive 2002/46, in the absence of specific European Union rules laid down in that directive, national rules may be applied without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty (see Case C-319/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-9811, paragraph 84).

84. In this case, it is not necessary to examine whether the product concerned may be classified as a food supplement within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2002/46 or as a foodstuff within the meaning of Article 2 of Regulation No 178/2002. It is sufficient to hold that, according to Article 11(2) of Directive 2002/46 and Article 14(9) of Regulation No 178/2002, in the absence of specific Community rules laid down in those provisions, national rules may be applied without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty.

7. According to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑143/02 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I‑2877, paragraph 11).

20 Having regard to the foregoing considerations, it is necessary to establish whether a public employment agency such as the Bundesanstalt may be regarded as an undertaking within the meaning of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.

26. Furthermore, the Court has held that, in order to ensure the coherent application of the competition rules in the Member States, a cooperation mechanism between the Commission and the national competition authorities was set up by the Regulation, as part of the general principle of sincere cooperation (see, to that effect, Case C‑429/07 X [2009] ECR I‑4833, paragraphs 20 and 21).

89. Although Article 10(1) of Decision No 1/80 does not establish a principle of freedom of movement for Turkish workers within the Community, whilst Article 48 of the Treaty lays down for the benefit of Community nationals the principle of freedom of movement for workers, Article 10(1) lays down for workers of Turkish nationality, once they are legally employed within the territory of a Member State, a right to equal treatment as regards conditions of work and remuneration of the same extent as that conferred in similar terms by Article 48(2) of the Treaty on nationals of the Member States (see, by analogy, Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer , paragraphs 40 and 41).

41 However, the first indent of Article 37(1) of the Europe Agreement establishes, in favour of workers of Polish nationality, once they are legally employed within the territory of a Member State, a right to equal treatment as regards conditions of employment of the same extent as that conferred in similar terms by Article 48(2) of the Treaty on Member State nationals.

104. Article 6(2) of Directive 93/104 satisfies those criteria, since it imposes on Member States in unequivocal terms a precise obligation as to the result to be achieved, which is not coupled with any condition regarding application of the rule laid down by it, which provides for a 48-hour maximum, including overtime, as regards average weekly working time.

32. On the other hand, only State aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty is subject to the notification procedure laid down in Article 93(3) of the Treaty (Joined Cases 91/83 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 11). Pursuant to Article 92(1) of the Treaty, for a measure to be classified as State aid it must, inter alia, be liable to affect trade between Member States (see, to that effect, Case C‑280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747, paragraphs 74 and 75, and Case C‑172/03 Heiser [2005] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 27).

11 THOSE PROVISIONS MAY BE RELIED UPON BY INDIVIDUALS ONLY IF THE NATIONAL MEASURES IN QUESTION CONSTITUTE AID WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 92 AND IF THE PROCEDURE FOR REVIEW PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 93 ( 3 ) HAS NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH ( JUDGMENT OF 22 MARCH 1977 IN CASE 78/76 STEINIKE AND WEINLIG ( 1977 ) ECR 595 ). WHERE IT IS APPARENT FROM THE FACTS OF THE CASE THAT THE PROCEDURAL RULES WERE FOLLOWED , IT IS IN ANY EVENT UNNECESSARY TO INQUIRE INTO THE NATURE OF THE NATIONAL MEASURE CONCERNED . CONSEQUENTLY , THE COURT CONSIDERS IT APPROPRIATE TO EXAMINE IN THE FIRST PLACE THE QUESTIONS DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE PROCEDURAL RULES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 93 ( 3 ) OF THE TREATY WERE COMPLIED WITH . THE SECOND QUESTION

102. Lastly, in the event that the dominant undertaking were nonetheless to apply a price on the retail market which was so low that sales would engender losses, beyond the fact that such conduct is likely to constitute an autonomous form of abuse, namely the application of predatory prices, the Court has in any event already rejected the argument that, even in such a case, proof of the possibility of recoupment of losses suffered by the application, by an undertaking in a dominant position, of prices lower than a certain level of costs constitutes a necessary precondition to establishing that such a pricing policy is abusive (see, to that effect, France Télécom v Commission , paragraph 110).

18. In that regard, it should be recalled that the Court may order that the oral procedure be reopened, in accordance with Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure, if it forms the view that it lacks sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see Joined Cases C-270/97 and C‑271/97 Deutsche Post [2000] ECR I‑929, paragraph 30, and Case C‑299/99 Philips [2002] ECR I-5475, paragraph 20).

20 The Court may of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties, order that the oral procedure be reopened, in accordance with Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it lacks sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see Joined Cases C-270/97 and C-271/97 Deutsche Post [2000] ECR I-929, paragraph 30).

29. The Court has consistently held that when national courts apply domestic law they are bound to interpret it, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the relevant directive in order to achieve the result sought by the directive and consequently to comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU. That obligation to interpret national law in a manner consistent with European Union law is inherent in the system of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, since it permits national courts, for matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of European Union law when they determine the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraph 114, and Dominguez , paragraph 24).

36. In order to determine whether an agreement involves a restriction of competition ‘by object’, regard must be had to the content of its provisions, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part (see GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others , paragraph 58; Football Association Premier League and Others , paragraph 136; and Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique , paragraph 35). When determining that context, it is also appropriate to take into consideration the nature of the goods or services affected, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and structure of the market or markets in question (see Expedia , paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

136. In order to assess whether the object of an agreement is anti-competitive, regard must be had inter alia to the content of its provisions, the objectives it seeks to attain and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part (see, to this effect, GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others , paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

27. In any event, it must be recalled that it is settled case-law that the different language versions of a Community text must be given a uniform interpretation and hence, in the case of divergence between the language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part (see Case C‑236/97 Codan [1998] ECR I‑8679, paragraph 28; Case C‑420/98 W.N . [2000] ECR I‑2847, paragraph 21; and judgment of 16 March 2006 in Case C‑332/04 Commission v Spain of 16 March 2006, not published in the ECR, paragraph 52).

24 This interpretation is, moreover, corroborated by Article 9 of Regulation No 222/77 and Article 71 of Regulation No 223/77, which provide for the retroactive issue of document T2 and document T2 L respectively. As the Court pointed out in Trend-Moden Textilhandel, paragraph 15, those provisions incorporate the Community legislature's intention to exclude other means of proof while at the same time facilitating the task of the party concerned.

15 That interpretation is borne out by Article 9 of Regulation No 222/77 which provides that where, in the cases provided for in the regulation, "the provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community which relate to free movement of goods are only applied on presentation of an internal Community transit document issued to establish the Community status of the goods, the party concerned may, for any valid reason, obtain that document subsequently from the competent authorities of the Member State of departure ". That provision incorporates the Community legislature' s intention to exclude other means of proof while at the same time facilitating the task of the party concerned . A similar provision contained in Article 71 of the implementing regulation, Regulation No 223/77, provides that the document T2L may be issued retroactively .

29. Therefore, under Article 2(2) thereof, that directive does not preclude national provisions prohibiting the use of personal watercraft on certain waters for reasons connected with the protection of the environment, provided that they do not infringe the provisions of the Treaty ( Mickelsson and Roos , paragraph 21).

64. In that respect, it should be noted that the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient penalty, which forms part of the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and of the general principles of law, the observance of which the Court ensures (Joined Cases C‑387/02, C‑391/02 and C‑403/02 Berlusconi and Others [2005] ECR I‑3565, paragraphs 67 and 68; Case C‑420/06 Jager [2008] ECR I‑1315, paragraph 59; Case C‑61/11 PPU El Dridi [2011] ECR I‑3015, paragraph 61), also appears in the third sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter.

67. It must be pointed out in this regard that, according to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of which the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories (see, inter alia, Case C‑112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I‑5659, paragraph 71 and the case-law there cited, and Joined Cases C‑20/00 and C‑64/00 Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood [2003] ECR I‑7411, paragraph 65 and the case-law there cited).

32. Similarly, in areas covered by EU law, the legal rules of the Member States must be worded unequivocally so as to give the persons concerned a clear and precise understanding of their rights and obligations and to enable national courts to ensure that those rights and obligations are observed (see judgment in Commission v Italy , 257/86, EU:C:1988:324, paragraph 12).

61 The Kingdom of Spain maintains that the General Court erred in law, in paragraphs 101 to 110 of the judgment under appeal, in its analysis of the compatibility of the aid with the internal market for the purpose of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. The Kingdom of Spain submits that the General Court’s reasoning contains several errors which demonstrate that it did not carry out its judicial review in accordance with the case-law arising from the judgment of 15 February 2005, Commission v Tetra Laval (C‑12/03 P, EU:C:2005:87, paragraph 39).

39. Whilst the Court recognises that the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the Community Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature. Not only must the Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. Such a review is all the more necessary in the case of a prospective analysis required when examining a planned merger with conglomerate effect.

12. It is true that, in interpreting certain provisions of the Protocol, the Court has distinguished between a tax intended to provide for the general expenses of public authorities and a contribution intended to finance a social security scheme, even if such a contribution is levied in a manner resembling the levying of taxes (see Case 23/68 Klomp v Inspektie der Belastingen [1969] ECR 43, paragraphs 18 to 22).