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Of note, we also discovered the Sofacy group using a very similar delivery document to deliver a new Trojan called Cannon. Cannon uses SMTPS and POP3S as its C2 channel compared to Zebrocy that uses a more commonly observed HTTP or HTTPS based C2. Add the layer of encryption that the SMTPS and POP3S protocols provide to the legitimate web-based service and you have a very difficult C2 channel to block | ['T1071.003'] |
If you use /p, del displays the name of a file and sends the following message: FileName, Delete (Y/N)? To confirm the deletion, press Y. To cancel the deletion and display the next file name (that is, if you specified a group of files), press N. For example, the following command deletes all of the files in the \Work folder: Copy del \work - You can use wildcards (* and ?) to delete more than one file at a time. However, to avoid deleting files unintentionally, you should use wildcards cautiously with the del command. For example, if you type the following command: Copy del *.* The del command displays the following prompt: Are you sure (Y/N)? To delete all of the files in the current directory, press Y and then press ENTER. To cancel the deletion, press N and then press ENTER | ['T1070.004'] |
To do this, Tick uses a number of publicly available hacktools such as Mimikatz, GSecdump, and Windows Credential Editor | ['T1003.001'] |
Win32/Diskcoder.D has the ability to spread via SMB. First, it scans internal networks for open SMB shares. It looks for the following shares | ['T1135'] |
In January 2016 we published our analysis of a spearphishing attack against energy companies in Ukraine. That attack probably has a connection to the infamous BlackEnergy attacks in 2015 because the attackers used exactly the same mail server to send spearphishing messages. However, the attacks in January 2016 were different. Instead of using the BlackEnergy malware family, the attackers used a relatively simple open-source backdoor, written in the Python programming language, called GCat. The Python code of the GCat backdoor was obfuscated, then converted into a stand-alone executable using the PyInstaller program | ['T1070.004'] |
HttpBrowser is a remote access tool whose name originates from the hard-coded "HttpBrowser/1.0" User-Agent. Table 2 lists the commands available to threat actors in one of the HttpBrowser variants | ['T1083'] |
When the malicious RTF document is opened, two things happen that allow the attacker malware to run. First, the "packager trick" is leveraged in order to embed the initial QuasarRAT dropper (qrat.exe) in the malicious RTF document. Its called the "packager trick" because any file embedded in an RTF file using packager will be automatically dropped to the %tmp% folder (c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp) when the RTF document is opened. Second, the threat actors exploit CVE-2017-8570 to achieve code execution via a malicious "scriptlet" file, or .sct file, which is also embedded in the malicious RTF document. The contents of the malicious scriptlet file (displayed below) clearly show the threat actor executing the initial "qrat.exe" dropper from the current user's %tmp% directory | ['T1204.002'] |
It uses two components to avoid detection by a single component. The dropper uses an old trick in a new way: It appends the RAT to a Word document. Upon opening the document, a macro is executed that will extract the malware and execute it | ['T1059.005'] |
Finally, the attacker added their own devices as allowed IDs for active sync for a number of mailboxes using Set-CASMailbox | ['T1098.005', 'T1098.002'] |
SDBbot is a new remote access Trojan (RAT) written in C++ that has been delivered by the Get2 downloader in recent TA505 campaigns. Its name is derived from the debugging log file (sdb.log.txt) and DLL name (BotDLL[.]dll) used in the initial analyzed sample. It also makes use of application shimming [1] for persistence | ['T1566.001'] |
1) Text file Drive.txt (SHA-256: 4f75622c2dd839fb5db7e37fb0528e38c4eb107690f51f00b5331e863dc645d1) is created and contains the decimal-decoded VBS content. The content of both files is shown in the appendix section of this report. Audio.bat continues by creating two scheduled tasks referencing two files that are yet to exist: dphc.exe will run every 10 minutes and Drive.vbs at 20 minute intervals. When Drive.vbs is eventually executed by the task scheduler, it will download the BackConfig executable payload. and only continues if the file exists. 3) Similarly, the VBA code then writes batch code to another text file - Audio.txt. The content of both files is shown in the appendix section of this report. 6) Audio.bat continues by creating two scheduled tasks referencing two files that are yet to exist: dphc.exe will run every 10 minutes and Drive.vbs at 20 minute intervals. When Drive.vbs is eventually executed by the task scheduler, it will download the BackConfig executable payload. and only continues if the file exists | ['T1083'] |
1) Text file Drive.txt (SHA-256: 4f75622c2dd839fb5db7e37fb0528e38c4eb107690f51f00b5331e863dc645d1) is created and contains the decimal-decoded VBS content. Similarly, the VBA code then writes batch code to another text file - Audio.txt. The content of both files is shown in the appendix section of this report. Audio.bat continues by creating two scheduled tasks referencing two files that are yet to exist: dphc.exe will run every 10 minutes and Drive.vbs at 20 minute intervals. In the case of file 8892279f3. the remote location is http://185.203.119[.]184/Dropbox/request. and only continues if the file exists. 2) Text file Drive.txt (SHA-256: 4f75622c2dd839fb5db7e37fb0528e38c4eb107690f51f00b5331e863dc645d1) is created and contains the decimal-decoded VBS content. 3) Similarly, the VBA code then writes batch code to another text file - Audio.txt. 6) Audio.bat continues by creating two scheduled tasks referencing two files that are yet to exist: dphc.exe will run every 10 minutes and Drive.vbs at 20 minute intervals. In the case of file 8892279f3. the remote location is http://185.203.119[.]184/Dropbox/request | ['T1070.004'] |
The dropped file is executed after terminating any process with the same name. For persistence, it adds a shortcut for the file at the %STARTUP% directory | ['T1547.001'] |
The data exfiltration process runs in the following sequence: The temp.ini files are copied into a text file that matches the pattern | ['T1020'] |
Recursively generate a list of files in a directory and send to the control server - Terminate a specific process. The process is identified by the control server sending the PID to the malware | ['T1057', 'T1543.003', 'T1119'] |
Upon opening the attachment, a typical luring mechanism is employed instructing the victim to enable macros, as seen in Figure 2. FireEye has observed the attackers behind this campaign using three different approaches | ['T1204.002'] |
After the files are encrypted the program will write a ransom note to each folder and directory on the system called read_me_unlock.txt | ['T1047'] |
In october 2016 Group-IB published the report about the Cobalt group. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. However, some of the email addresses belong to employees that no longer work at the organization, which means that the Cobalt group likely uses out-of-date mailing lists. Therefore, the Cobalt group registered domains are similar to real ones (for example, diebold.pw), and configured their email server to distribute acting as these legitimate domains (fig. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks. The goal is to set the startup path to the executable file or program code, launching it with the powershell.exe shell command to access the Internet resource specified in the code in order to download and install Cobalt Strike module. From our experience, the Cobalt group uses a new method to provide its survivability in every attack. Cobalt Strike provides the ability to use the Artifact Kit framework for these purposes and even modify it, as it is distributed in the source code. Use of standard tools Cobalt Strike is publicly accessible, and can be downloaded in order to learn and create detection rules on the network. Conclusion After infecting one computer on an organization's network, the Cobalt group analyzes the programs used on it and search for critical servers and the computers from which they are accessed | ['T1059.001'] |
The exploit used, named EternalBlue, exploits a vulnerability in the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol which allows the malware to spread to all unpatched Windows systems from XP to 2016 on a network that have this protocol enabled. This vulnerability allows remote code execution over SMB v1. WannaCry utilizes this exploit by crafting a custom SMB session request with hard-coded values based on the target system. Notably, after the first SMB packet sent to the victim’s IP address, the malware sends two additional packets to the victim containing the hard-coded IP addresses 192.168.56.20 and 172.16.99.5 | ['T1563.002'] |
The file /tmp/.rOuYXzdOF was most likely used as a mutex, ensuring only one copy of Netwire could run at a time. Next, .default.conf was a configuration file storing data required for Netwire to communicate with command and control. On the Windows side, this is usually stored in the Registry | ['T1112'] |
This time, the text is from the novel "The Brothers Karamazov" by Fyodor Dostoevsky (a Russian writer). The malicious document drops a Python interpreter and PoetRAT. The author made a few changes to the PoetRAT malware, though. First, the malware uses pyminifier to obfuscate the Python script and avoid detection based on string or YARA rules: The obfuscation is a base64 and an LZMA compression algorithm. For example, the variables are stored in a "Constant.py" file containing the C2 server and the configuration. The most notable change is the protocol used to download and upload files | ['T1071.001'] |
The backdoor determines its C2 server using a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) to construct and resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud[.]com. The Update method is responsible for initializing cryptographic helpers for the generation of these random C2 subdomains. Subdomains are generated by concatenating a victim userId with a reversible encoding of the victims local machine domain name | ['T1132.001'] |
The attack starts with a phishing email that contains a malicious link to a file hosted on Google Docs named “Annual Bonus Report.doc”. When the user clicks on the link, the TrickBot dropper downloads onto the target machine. This differs from previous TrickBot attacks we have seen, where TrickBot is usually dropped through a Microsoft Office document or by another malware like Emotet | ['T1204.002', 'T1566.002'] |
Ahnlab, a South Korean software company, simultaneously published a paper regarding Bisonal's activity in South Korea. In this case, the infection vector has changed from previous samples. The initial stage is a binary that drops a decoy document (Powerpoint or Excel document), a VisualBasic script and the packed Bisonal payload. The payload is dropped with a .jpg extension that's been renamed to ".exe. The payload has been packed with a new packer. The code of Bisonal is similar to the version of 2019 | ['T1137.006'] |
One of the discovered MarkiRAT variants was used to intercept the execution of Telegram and launch the malware along with it. The core of the malware is the same as described previously for MarkiRAT, with the exception of functions in charge of the malware’s deployment on the victim machine | ['T1518.001'] |
This behavior is detailed later in the blog under "Malware Functionality". Unlike WannaCry, Nyetya does not appear to contain an external scanning component. Two of the executables are used to recover user credentials (32 and 64 bits) while the third one is the PsExec binary. For example: The dropped .tmp executable seems to be based on Mimikatz, a popular open source tool used for recovery of user credentials from computer memory using several different techniques. The recovered credentials are then used for launching malware on the remote system using WMIC and PsExec. These mechanisms are used to attempt installation and execution of perfc.dat on other devices to spread laterally. The two exploits drop a modified version of DoublePulsar which is a persistent backdoor running in kernel space of the compromised system. The developer modified only few bytes from the original version but this modification allowed it to evade network detection and the open source DoublePulsar scanning tools available on the Internet. The modification can be divided in 3 parts: - The attacker modified the command codes: - The attacker modified the response codes: - The attacker modified where the response code is stored in the SMB response packet. PsExec is used to execute the following instruction (where w.x.y.z is an IP address) using the current user's windows token (from the "Recovery of User Credentials" section above) to install the malware on the networked device. WMI is used to execute the following command which performs the same function as above, but using the current user's username and password (as username and password), retrieved from the "Recovery of User Credentials" section above | ['T1003.001'] |
For persistence and remote control, the script downloads another base64-encoded Python script from hxxps://ptpb[.]pw/OAZG. After several steps of de-obfuscation, we found the attackers using EmPyre for post-exploitation control. EmPyre is a Python post-exploitation agent built on cryptologically-secure communications and a flexible architecture | ['T1059.006'] |
When required by the attacker, it is capable of remotely activating the microphone on the compromised computer and capturing sounds. The audio recordings are encoded to MP3 format using a legitimate lame.dll library, which is downloaded and misused by the malware | ['T1123'] |
2022–01–15, MSTIC (Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center) identified and unveiled a cyberattack targeting Ukrainian organizations with “WhisperGate” overwrites Master Boot Record(MBR) and files | ['T1561.002'] |
The AppleSeed payload has an export function named “DllRegisterServer” which will be called when the DLL is executed using RegSvr32.exe. DllRegisterServer has a function that is responsible for performing the DLL initialization and setup that includes the following steps | ['T1059.007', 'T1059.001'] |
Yet, both in August 2018 and 2019 Silent Librarian was lining up for the new academic years, once again targeting the same kind of victims in over a dozen countries | ['T1598.003'] |
Manage the use of privileged accounts. Configure access controls, including file, directory, and network share permissions with the principle of least privilege in mind. If a user only needs to read specific files, they should not have write access to those files, directories, or shares. Secure use of WMI by authorizing WMI users and setting permissions. Disable or limit remote WMI and file sharing. Block remote execution through PSEXEC. Segregate networks and functions. Harden network devices and secure access to infrastructure devices. Perform out-of-band network management. Disable SMBv1 and block all versions of SMB at the network boundary by blocking TCP port 445 with related protocols on UDP ports 137-138 and TCP port 139; this applies to all boundary devices | ['T1021.002'] |
The original malware scans the list of running process looking for outlook, iexplore or firefox. If found it injects the DLL into the process | ['T1055.001', 'T1057'] |
Download a file from a remote server - Create a text file on the local machine - Execute a file - Execute a shell (cmd.exe) command and save the results to disk - Upload the results of a previously executed shell command to a remote server | ['T1105'] |
The main purpose of P8RAT is downloading and executing payloads (consisting of PE and shellcode) from its C2 server. However, we were unable to obtain any sample of the subsequent payloads for this malware | ['T1105'] |
Unlike previous RDAT samples, this particular sample only uses DNS tunneling for its C2 communications with no HTTP fallback channel. This RDAT sample can only use TXT queries in its DNS tunnel and will issue queries structured like the following | ['T1071.004', 'T1008'] |
Other researchers have attributed these attacks to a group known as the Cobalt Gang, which has continued its activities even after the arrest of its alleged leader in Spain this year. AppLocker works well for executables and over time it has also been improved to control various script types, including JScript, PowerShell and VBScript. This has significantly reduced the attack surface and forced attackers, including more sophisticated groups, to find new methods of launching executable code. Payload dropper in an XSL file Another executable used to attempt bypass of the AppLocker feature is msxsl.exe, a Windows utility used to run XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) transformations. Stage 4 — Downloaders . PowerShell leading to shellcode . The PowerShell chain is launched from an obfuscated JScript scriptlet previously downloaded from the command and control (C2) server and launched using cmstp.exe. JScript downloader . As opposed to PowerShell loading a Cobalt Strike beacon, the other observed infection chain continues using JScript to deliver the final payload, which is a JScript backdoor. The commands are relatively limited, but are sufficient enough to instruct the backdoor to download and execute a new payload, remove itself from the system or download and launch additional scriptlets. Interestingly, if an attack used version 4.4, the attackers decided to add a variable "researchers" initialized to the string "We are not cobalt gang, stop associating us with such skids. Cobalt Strike beacon . On the PowerShell side of the infection chain, the downloaded final payload is a Cobalt Strike beacon, which provides the attacker with rich backdoor functionality. Cobalt Strike is used by penetration testers and offensive security researchers when delivering their services, but it is generally, just as Meterpreter, detected by anti-malware software as it can be easily used by malicious actors | ['T1059.001'] |
DUBNIUM (which shares indicators with what Kaspersky researchers have called DarkHotel) is one of the activity groups that has been very active in recent years, and has many distinctive features | ['T1518.001'] |
The malware initializes by gathering system and malware filename information and creates a mutex to make sure only one instance of the Trojan executes on the system at a time. Kazuar generates its mutex by using a process that begins with obtaining the MD5 hash of a string “[username]=>singleton-instance-mutex”. The Trojan then encrypts this MD5 hash using an XOR algorithm and the serial number of the storage volume. Kazuar uses the resulting ciphertext to generate a GUID that it appends to the string “Global\\” to create the mutex | ['T1087.001', 'T1082'] |
Key takeaways: - TeamTNT is using new, open source tools to steal usernames and passwords from infected machines. The campaign has been active for approximately one month and is responsible for thousands of infections globally. Background . TeamTNT has been one of the most active threat groups since mid 2020. One of the most recent findings (June 4, 2021) came from Palo Alto researchers who discovered the TeamTNT Chimaera repository. TeamTNT C&C website showing infection statistics . Figure 2. The full list of supported programs can be found on the Lazagne page on Github. Windows module - persistence . Kubernetes root payload component . This component is mainly responsible for installing a cryptocurrency miner on infected devices, allowing the attacker to connect remotely to the system using SSH. Decoded shell script . TeamTNT IRC bot . As described previously this year by Lacework, TeamTNT includes ZiggyStartux in their IRC bot. IRC Bot available commands . TeamTNT AWS stealer . Similar to the other TeamTNT components, the AWS stealer (see figure 11) first installs missing dependencies. Conclusion . AT&T Alien Labs has discovered new malicious files distributed by the threat actor TeamTNT | ['T1518.001'] |
As mentioned by the Cisco Talos Intelligence Group, after executing the Micropsia registers itself against the C2 server | ['T1082'] |
The binary uses a file system watcher in order to generate an event each time a file is modified in one of the directories in the "Paths" variable of the configuration file. Filesystem monitoring routine Once a file is available, the Dog.exe binary exfiltrates it, using email or FTP depending on the configuration | ['T1119'] |
At line 40, that data is piped through the base64 utility for decoding, dropped in a subfolder in the /tmp directory, given executable permissions via chmod, and then launched as the 2nd stage payload | ['T1222.002'] |
Sodinokibi ransomware, also known as REvil or Sodin, has been responsible for a series of high-profile attacks since April 2019 | ['T1204.002'] |
PowerShell scripts that perform system reconnaissance and credential theft from Windows Credential Manager and then send this information back to Waterbug C&Cs | ['T1555.004'] |
After successfully executing the command, POWRUNER sends the results back to the C2 server and stops execution | ['T1059.003'] |
Retrieves the following data from the system by leveraging Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries and environment variables: IP Address from Network Adapter Configuration OS Name OS Architecture Computer Name Computer Domain Name Username - IP Address from Network Adapter Configuration - OS Name - OS Architecture - Computer Name - Computer Domain Name - Username | ['T1047', 'T1082', 'T1016'] |
Endpoint Protection . The Trojan.Hydraq Incident . It has been about a week since news of the mysterious Hydraq Trojan (also known as Aurora) attack broke with the unveiling of a threat by Google to pull its operations out of China. Although concrete details of the attacks are not yet public, Google made reference to a number of Gmail accounts that were compromised during or after the attacks. In the more sophisticated attacks, the attacker will use a new zero day vulnerability, as obviously this will have a greater success rate. In this attack a PDF file was used to exploit the Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and Flash Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1862/BID35759). This PDF installed a Trojan horse which was an earlier version of the current Trojan.Hydraq. Considering the efforts that the attackers put into staging the attack as a whole, the end malware is not so sophisticated. This means the remote attacker has the ability to see in real time any user interface activity as if they were sitting right next to the user. The backchannel URL addresses have been changed by the Dynamic DNS sites to resolve to a loopback address (127.0.0.2). This in effect severs the connection to the control servers. As described in the previously posted blog (Hydraq - An Attack of Mythical Proportions), an unpatched Internet Explorer vulnerability (BID 37815) was used as one of the propagation vectors for this particular Trojan.Hydraq attack. This security hole allows remote exploitation, which means that attackers can run any malicious code of their liking on a victim’s machine by taking advantage of the vulnerability. The use of browsers other than Internet Explorer by an increasingly large number of people may have helped limit the “attack surface” by reducing the number of computers vulnerable to the Internet Explorer vulnerability used in this attack | ['T1016'] |
One of the most noticeable differences is the use of encryption over the entire TCP segment, as a way for it to evade detection. Additionally, this seems to be a lightweight version of Gh0stRAT, as it only has 12 commands, compared to the 73 for a full Gh0stRAT sample; 3 of those commands are undocumented. Also, unlike most samples that I receive on my honeypot, this sample did not start as a DLL that communicates to a distribution server in order to download the stage1 | ['T1573', 'T1095'] |
The attackers gain an initial foothold on targeted machines via phishing emails containing malicious attachments. The emails are often industry-specific and crafted to entice a victim to open the message and execute the attached document | ['T1566.001'] |
The companies believe that the actors acquired legitimate credentials prior to the cyber-attack to facilitate remote access | ['T1078', 'T1219'] |
A loading script, written in Ruby, was saved to the following location and set to run as a Scheduled Task | ['T1053.005'] |
The name EvilBunny is derived from debug information embedded in the malware’s dropper. Furthermore, the specified piece incorporates a Lua 5.1 interpreter, which allows the malware to execute Lua scripts and change its behavior at runtime. The dropper will place the EvilBunny malware under %APPDATA%\Perf Manager\ or %WINDIR%\msapps\; depending whether the dropper is running with administrative privileges or not. Also, the malware will generate numerous files to help its execution and frequently reply back to the C&C with status messages. Similar to its dropper, the binary seeks to evade sandboxes. Next to that, the main thread also runs sub threads to maintain log files the malware creates during execution and to keep track of the overall system load the malware creates. The worker threads are internally dubbed ‘hearer’, which is believed to stand for ‘listener’. It can be concluded thereafter that the malware authors were no English native speakers. The main action of the malware is carried out in the main thread, which parses commands and executes Lua scripts, provided by the worker threads via command files. Each hearer has a dedicated method to receive instructions which is either separately via HTTP from the server, aggregated through a downloaded data file or as tasks to be configured as scheduled tasks. In general this is a rather uncommon technique, but it has been observed before, especially in connection with some adware variants | ['T1497.001'] |
The malware continues by creating a service named mssecsvc2.0 with a binary path pointing to the running module with the arguments "-m security". Once created, the malware starts the service | ['T1543.003'] |
Sends phishing mail to given recipients and receives user’s access token using device code authentication flow | ['T1528'] |
First-stage analysis . When the user opens the phishing email, it presents a Spanish social engineering message ("Payment: Find scheduled payment dates attached"). The figure below shows a screenshot of one of the emails we looked at. It decrypts the URL for the second-stage from hardcoded bytes, saves it to the "Templates" folder, and executes it. Second-stage analysis . The second-stage executable is packed with a Delphi-based packer. The DLL sets a timer, as shown below, which will execute the downloader function periodically. The DLL decodes the hex string using the following steps: We have written a small Python script to decrypt the third stage. The same decryption method was also used to decrypt the hardcoded command and control (C2).The resulting file is also a DLL, which the second stage reflectively loads. Injected DLL analysis (UAC bypass using two techniques) . It checks if `C:\Windows\Finex` exists. Decrypting and executing Lokibot . After attempting to bypass the UAC, the third-stage DLL will check if `AutoRunKeyFlag` is set. For this DLL, it is not set. This dropper uses three stages and three layers of encryption to hide its final payload | ['T1053'] |
Find out all system information, including hardware being used and the exact version of your operating system, including security patches. Steal from your clipboard (things you’ve copied) - Control your printer - Lock/Restart/Shutdown your computer - Update the implant with a new address to beacon to or new functionality | ['T1082'] |
This step establishes the persistence of the malware across reboots on the endpoint - Once the decrypted MZ marker is written to the Startup folder, the 2.hwp is deleted from the endpoint | ['T1547.001'] |
Interestingly as we continued to expand and pivot in our data set, one of the C2 IPs used by an IRC bot payload from Magic Hound was found to be the same IP used to deliver a different IRC bot called MPK | ['T1071'] |
They include registry, file system manipulations, and searching files with specific patterns, and retrieving and transferring them back to the server and gathering network status information | ['T1083'] |
OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents. As seen in the above request, the Trojan will generate a URL for its beacon with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/chk. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit | ['T1071.001'] |
The encrypted file names are appended with a string of random characters as the new extension. For example, it renames a file named “My_files.zip” to “My_files.zip.IAsnM”, “My_files2.zip” to “My_files2.zip.WZlF” and so on. Also, the threat actor creates the “RECOVER-FILES.txt” with ransom note in all folders that contain encrypted files, as shown in the figure below | ['T1486'] |
Task 0x1: react_exec The react_exec command appears to execute a payload received from the server. Interestingly it attempts to first execute the payload directly from memory. Specifically it invokes a function named ei_run_memory_hrd which invokes the Apple NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory, NSLinkModule, NSLookupSymbolInModule, and NSAddressOfSymbol APIs to load and link the in-memory payload. In some cases the file will be set to executable via a call to chmod. Specifically it instructs the malware to spawn a background thread to execute a function named eilf_rglk_watch_routine. This function creates an event tap (via the CGEventTapCreate API), add it to the current runloop, then invokes the CGEventTapEnable to activate the event tap | ['T1106'] |
Its functions include self-starting of the backdoor, collection of network configuration, keystroke records, and schedule other modules to execute by means of timers | ['T1016'] |
Talos has identified at least three different campaigns since July 2019. It is interesting to note that this threat actor uses HTTPS on the C2. They always use self-signed certificates | ['T1587.003'] |
The malware will then write a base64 encoded PowerShell script (which is contained in xmlparse.dll as a resource) to \%TEMP%\enu1.ps1 and execute it. The script, intended for reconnaissance purposes, checks if a machine is part of a domain and if the user has Admin privileges or is part of the Admin Group | ['T1059.001'] |
The malicious payload associated with the campaign appears to be a new version of Zeus Panda, a banking trojan designed to stealing banking and other sensitive credentials for exfiltration by attackers. The payload that Talos analyzed was a multi-stage payload, with the initial stage featuring several anti-analysis techniques designed to make analysis more difficult and prolonged execution to avoid detection. It also featured several evasion techniques designed to ensure that the malware would not execute properly in automated analysis environments, or sandboxes. The overall operation of the Zeus Panda banking trojan has been well documented, however Talos wanted to provide additional information about the first stage packer used by the malware. The malware will first query the system's keyboard mapping to determine the language used on the system. It will terminate execution if it detects the any of the following keyboard mappings | ['T1059.001', 'T1614.001'] |
Grandoreiro also employs a technique for privilege escalation described in more detail here. The method relies on registering a binary as the default handler for .MSC files and then running such a file | ['T1548.002'] |
For the purpose of social engineering, the threat actor chose file names related to legitimate online services, including Microsoft OneDrive. In a few instances, we observed the use of file names resembling McAfee’s endpoint security product. Even the file icons for these binaries are selected to masquerade as the corresponding legitimate applications | ['T1036'] |
Additionally, each beacon is accompanied with a screenshot that is initially saved as ‘scr.jpg’ in the public directory and subsequently issued to the C2 using the same HTTP POST request as in the ‘uploadsf’ command | ['T1113'] |
The TajMahal framework is an intriguing discovery that’s of great interest, not least for its high level of technical sophistication, which is beyond any doubt. For example, it has its own indexer, emergency C2s, is capable of stealing specific files from external drives when they become available again, etc | ['T1083', 'T1119', 'T1041'] |
Analysis of the “log.dat” payloads determined them to be variants of the publicly available POSHC2 proxy-aware stager written to download and execute PowerShell payloads from a hardcoded command and control (C2) address. These particular POSHC2 samples run on the .NET framework and dynamically load payloads from Base64 encoded strings | ['T1132.001'] |
This threat group has conducted broad targeting across a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. Join us in a live webinar as we discuss this threat group whom we assess to be working on behalf of the Iranian Government, with a mission that would benefit nation-state geopolitical and economic needs. APT34 uses a mix of public and non-public tools, often conducting spear phishing operations using compromised accounts from trusted third parties, sometimes coupled with social engineering tactics. Register today to gain deeper insights into this threat group | ['T1555.003'] |
The ‘tasklist’ command will use a WMI query or the “ps” command, which allows Kazuar to obtain running processes from both Windows and Unix systems. Also, Kazuar’s ‘cmd’ command will run commands using “cmd.exe” for Windows systems and “/bin/bash” for Unix systems. These two commands provide evidence that the authors of Kazuar intended to use this malware as a cross-platform tool to target both Windows and Unix systems | ['T1047', 'T1057'] |
Obviously, the request sent to the C&C is encoded with Base64. The bot subsequently receives its unique ID and uses it for identification at the start of the packet | ['T1027'] |
1) Writes itself to %AppData%\Microsoft\Word\log.ps1 2) Sets up persistence for this file, using a run key. 3) Adds a registry key so that future powershell.exe instances are spawned off-screen by default – this trick is explained here. 6) Removes all registry entries that are left behind during the dropper process | ['T1547.001', 'T1564.003', 'T1112'] |
After deobfuscation you can see “Imminent Monitor” string which may indicate it is related to Imminent Monitor RAT | ['T1070.004', 'T1123', 'T1125'] |
In February 2013, AlienVault performed analysis on the CallMe Trojan and found that it is based on a tool called Tiny SHell, an OSX shell tool whose source code is available on the Internet. The Trojan uses AES to encrypt the communication channel its C2 server, which will provide one of three commands to carry out activities on the compromised system, as seen in Table 4 | ['T1059.004', 'T1573.001'] |
Aside from the aforementioned executables, the droppers also contained a remote access Trojan (RAT). The RAT executable allows criminals to perform various operations on a host, such as uploading/downloading, executing files, etc | ['T1105', 'T1547'] |
CTU analysis indicates that BRONZE BUTLER primarily targets organizations located in Japan. The threat group has sought unauthorized access to networks of organizations associated with critical infrastructure, heavy industry, manufacturing, and international relations. Secureworks analysts have observed BRONZE BUTLER exfiltrating the following categories of data | ['T1039', 'T1005'] |
The Trojan will attempt to inject code into these browsers to carry out its C2 communications. To carry out C2 communications via injected code in a remote process, the injected code reaches out to the C2 server and saves the response to a memory mapped file named SNFIRNW. Command and Control Communications In addition to being able to communicate with its C2 server from code injected into a web browser, the Trojan can also carry out the same communication process within its own process | ['T1071.001', 'T1055'] |
All the scripts are deleted immediately after being executed. TeamTNT also uses the “history -c” command to clear the shell log in every script | ['T1070.004', 'T1070.003'] |
McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) analysts have discovered an aggressive Bitcoin-stealing phishing campaign by the international cybercrime group Lazarus that uses sophisticated malware with long-term impact | ['T1560', 'T1059.003', 'T1573.001'] |
Transparent Tribe has historically used military and defense-themes in their phishing emails and maldocs to target Indian military and government personnel. Figure 6: Transparent Tribe's spear-phishing email targeting defense personnel. This is in line with previous reporting on Transparent Tribe's use of official COVID-19 applications and content to serve Android malware. Figure 7: Attached malicious XLS macro. Another lure targeted Indian Defense Advisors attached to various Indian embassies in Southeast Asia, as seen in Figure 8 | ['T1566.001'] |
Execute a remote shell; - Silently start a program on a victim host; - Retrieve a list of processes from the victim host; - Terminate any process; - Upload/Download/Delete files to/from victim host; - Retrieve a list of available drives from the victim host; - Retrieve a filelist of a specified folder from the victim host | ['T1105', 'T1083'] |
While the ports associated with this sample’s configuration pertain normally to HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS, network communication takes place via raw sockets | ['T1095', 'T1571'] |
If the victim appears valuable to the attackers, a GRIFFON implant installer is pushed to the victim’s workstation. This module stores another instance of the GRIFFON implant inside the registry to achieve persistence. Here is a PowerLinks-style method used by the attackers to achieve persistence and execute the GRIFFON implant at each user logon. The new GRIFFON implant is written to the hard drive before each execution, limiting the “file-less” aspect of this method | ['T1059.007'] |
This folder is used as a temporary location to copy all files from a newly connected logical drive to and upload them to the C2 server. The files are transferred to the hardcoded C2 server "195.62.52.93" one by one via HTTP POST method. The following request is used which also includes information about the victim, the file to be transferred as well as the source drive | ['T1083', 'T1041', 'T1071.001'] |
It then modifies several registry key values to disable the IE browser’s functions such as auto-complete, auto-suggest, etc. The disabled keys are: "Use FormSuggest", "FormSuggest Passwords", "FormSuggest PW Ask" under the sub-key “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main”, and "AutoSuggest" under the sub-key "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\AutoComplete | ['T1112'] |
Indeed, any decent firewall would block incoming packets to any ports that have not explicitly been opened for operational purposes. However, with Chaos using a raw socket, the backdoor can be triggered on ports running an existing legitimate service. As an example, a Webserver that would only expose SSH (22), HTTP (80) and HTTPS (443) would not be reachable via a traditional backdoor due to the fact that those services are in use, but with Chaos it becomes possible | ['T1205'] |
The malicious script executed by the Microsoft Publisher file downloads and runs yet another JavaScript file, 0.js, hosted on the attacker-controlled server | ['T1105'] |
The Netsh commands for Windows Firewall provide a command-line alternative to the capabilities of the Windows Firewall Control Panel utility. By using the Netsh firewall commands, you can configure and view Windows Firewall exceptions and configuration settings | ['T1518.001', 'T1562.004'] |
Strings in the malware are obfuscated using the RC4 algorithm and the decryption key stored inside the sample | ['T1027'] |
This specific key is set to point towards the path of the previously copied Cardinal RAT executable path. The executable will periodically query this registry key to ensure it is set appropriately. If the executable finds the registry key has been deleted, it will re-set it. The Load registry key acts as a persistence mechanism, ensuring that this Cardinal RAT executes every time a user logs on | ['T1112'] |
Additional tools were recovered during the incident, including a network scanning/enumeration tool, the archiving tool WinRAR and a bespoke Microsoft SharePoint enumeration and data dumping tool, known as ‘spwebmember | ['T1213.002', 'T1018', 'T1213.002'] |
Overall the code is very well written and designed to execute quickly to encrypt the defined files in the configuration of the ransomware. The embedded configuration file has some interesting options which we will highlight further in this article | ['T1027'] |
The group has the capability to set up phishing infrastructure to mimic well known websites and trick victims to enter their credentials. This is one of the main methods used by this actor to collect email addresses that later will be used to send spearphishing emails | ['T1586.002'] |
Use of custom routines to decrypt strings (Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information [T1140]) - Ability to self-delete once installed (Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion [T1070.004]) - Masquerade as GrowlHelper (Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service [T1036.004]) - And as Software Update Check (Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service [T1036.004]) - Decrypt strings in-memory, per CIA guidelines (Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027 | ['T1140'] |
With the emergence of the Log4j security vulnerability, we’ve already seen multiple threat actors, mostly financially motivated, immediately add it to their exploitation arsenal. It comes as no surprise that some nation-sponsored actors also saw this new vulnerability as an opportunity to strike before potential targets have identified and patched the affected systems | ['T1595.002'] |
The attack group has made incremental changes to ZeroT since our last analysis. The encrypted ZeroT payload, named Mctl.mui, is decoded in memory revealing a similarly tampered PE header and only slightly modified code when compared to ZeroT payloads we analyzed previously | ['T1573.001'] |