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Starting with a simple scan, the first information that the malware can collect is related to files with the following extensions: .docx, .xlsx, .pdf, .pptx, .rar, .zip, .jpg, .bmp, .tiff. For each file found on the disk, it retrieves the full path and the last modified date of the file. That information is encrypted using the AES key mentioned earlier and stored in the file 0.txt. Another scan targets the extensions .dat, .json, .db and like the previous scan it retrieves the full path and last modified date of the file. Then it encrypts them and it stores it under the file 57.txt | ['T1119'] |
Reports system hardware and software configuration. This built-in utility is a command line version of the System Information.app (/Applications/Utilities/System Information.app) and is a mainstay of all types of malware, spyware, post-exploitation tools, adware, and PUPs. Because of its deep insight into the entire environment, it can be used for a variety of purposes relating to environment discovery, detection evasion and anti-analysis | ['T1082'] |
As seen in the above screenshot, there is a large overlap in unique strings in both samples. The original sample involved in the forbes.com breach used HTTP, which is consistent with the original variant discussed in this blog post. It should be noted that while the newest variant that uses direct network communication over port 22 no longer uses HTTP, references to the HTTP strings are still found within the sample itself. This is most likely due to code re-used by the attackers | ['T1140'] |
In late July 2021, we identified an ongoing spear phishing campaign pushing Konni Rat to target Russia. Konni was first observed in the wild in 2014 and has been potentially linked to the North Korean APT group named APT37 | ['T1566.001'] |
The orchestrator is the main component of the Carbon framework. It is mainly used to inject code into a process that communicates legitimately over the Internet and to dispatch the tasks received from the injected library to other computers on the same network either through named pipes or TCP | ['T1055.001'] |
The HTTP variant checks if Kaspersky is installed on the victim’s machine by searching for the existence of files in the Kaspersky installation folder | ['T1518.001'] |
The Zebrocy Trojan gathers system specific information that it will send to the C2 server via an HTTP POST request to the above URL. Like other Zebrocy samples, this Trojan collects system specific information it will send to the C2 server by running the command SYSTEMINFO & TASKLIST on the command line and by enumerating information about connected storage devices. This specific variant of Zebrocy will also send a screenshot of the victim host as a JPEG image to the C2 server | ['T1113', 'T1057', 'T1120', 'T1082'] |
PowerShower, named and previously disclosed by Palo Alto Networks in their blogspot (see above), is a malicious piece of PowerShell designed to receive PowerShell and VBS modules to execute on the local computer. This malware has been used since October 2018 by Cloud Atlas as a validator and now as a second stage | ['T1218.005'] |
We observed a number of phishing emails that reference an invoice, as seen in Figure 1. The attachment in these emails is a weaponized Microsoft Office document containing a malicious macro that – when enabled – leads to the download of Hancitor | ['T1566.001'] |
These are later used by the attackers to send targeted emails to the victims, with the obtained information being used to lure victims into opening those emails | ['T1135'] |
The trojanized update file is a standard Windows Installer Patch file that includes compressed resources associated with the update, including the trojanized SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll component | ['T1036.005'] |
Cisco Talos has observed another malware campaign that utilizes malicious Microsoft Office documents (maldocs) to spread the remote access trojan (RAT) ObliqueRAT. ObliqueRAT has been linked to the Transparent Tribe APT group in the past | ['T1566.001', 'T1566.002'] |
Xbash is a novel and complex Linux malware and the newest work of an active cybercrime group. From its characteristics and behaviors, we could realize many trends in current IoT/Linux security battleground | ['T1053.003'] |
Once we deobfuscated it, we found that the script contained a large array of hard coded domain names, with one of them being randomly selected and used for subsequent DNS queries. It is important to note that while the Powershell scripts for stages 3 and 4 contain two arrays of domains, the first array is only used if a failure condition is reached while the sample is using the second array. Figure 8: Stage 3 Domain List The 'logic' function present within this Powershell script randomly selects a C2 domain from the second array in the script and uses this domain to perform an initial lookup. If the result of the initial DNS TXT record request is empty or in the case the lookup fails, the 'do_lookup' function is then called and randomly selects a domain from the first array in the script. Interestingly, the domains used by the 'do_lookup' function did not appear to have active 'www' or 'mail' TXT records. The script also uses specific subdomains which are combined with the domains and used for the initial DNS TXT record queries performed by the malware. The malware uses the contents of the TXT record in the response to these queries to determine what action to take next. For instance, the first subdomain is 'www' and a query response with a TXT record containing 'www' will instruct the script to proceed. The response to this DNS request results in the transmission of the fourth stage malware, stored within the TXT record as displayed in Figures 10 and 11. Due to the size of the Stage 4 payload, DNS makes use of TCP for this transaction | ['T1071.004'] |
It writes a file using two data structures: one associated with the file and other used for reading data from the C&C | ['T1070'] |
The only way to ensure that deleted files, as well as files that you encrypt with EFS, are safe from recovery is to use a secure delete application. Secure delete applications overwrite a deleted file's on-disk data using techniques that are shown to make disk data unrecoverable, even using recovery technology that can read patterns in magnetic media that reveal weakly deleted files. SDelete (Secure Delete) is such an application. Note that SDelete securely deletes file data, but not file names located in free disk space | ['T1070.004', 'T1485'] |
Download and execution of ntbscan (SHA-1: 90da10004c8f6fafdaa2cf18922670a745564f45) – NetBIOS scanner tool widely used by multiple APT actor including the prolific Chinese group APT10 - Execution of Windows built-in networking utility tools - Access to the victim’s files, especially documents located on the Desktop | ['T1083'] |
Executive summary . The PROMETHIUM threat actor — active since 2012 — has been exposed multiple times over the past several years.. However, this has not deterred this actor from continuing and expanding their activities. The group has at least four new trojanized setup files we observed: Firefox (a browser), VPNpro (a VPN client), DriverPack (a pack of drivers) and 5kPlayer (a media player). How did it work. Talos could not pinpoint the initial attack vector, however, the use of trojanized installation files to well-known applications is consistent with the previously documented campaigns. The trojanized setup will install the malware and the legitimate application, which is a good way to disguise its activities. PROMETHIUM has been resilient over the years. We have no evidence that the websites of the real applications were compromised to host the malicious installer. We can conclude that the PROMETHIUM threat actor is interested in new countries or the malicious framework developed by this threat actor is exported in more countries than previously thought. The usage of the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key has a persistence mechanism that has been replaced by the creation of a service. The malicious service: rmaserv.exe . This binary has two main features. Conclusion . The PROMETHIUM threat actor is dedicated and resilient, exposing them hasn't refrained them from moving forward with their agenda | ['T1036.005'] |
As part of Reflective DLL loading the malware performs the following tasks on the DLL it has unwrapped in memory: Copy the unwrapped DLL into new locations in its own memory space. Build imports required by the DLL (based on the IAT of the DLL) - Copy the unwrapped DLL into new locations in its own memory space. Build imports required by the DLL (based on the IAT of the DLL | ['T1055.001'] |
4) Special attention was given to the design of the network communication, in order to reduce the noise a large number of encrypted machines may generate while contacting the Command and Control servers. 5) The encryption scheme is solid – using the AES and RSA algorithms | ['T1573.002', 'T1486'] |
The tool was primarily used by the attackers to move laterally on the victim’s network. PowerShell: Microsoft scripting tool that was used to run commands to download payloads, traverse compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance. WinSCP: Open source FTP client used to exfiltrate data from targeted organizations | ['T1048.003'] |
While investigating the domains and infrastructure used by the phishing components of Gorgon Group, Unit 42 researchers witnessed several common operational security flaws with Gorgon Group's actors throughout their many campaigns. It was one of these OPSEC failures that gave us an interesting cross-section of malware Gorgon Group is using. Included in the directories were a combination of files leveraged in targeted attacks mentioned above against nation states. Additionally, there was a plethora of malware samples that were criminal in nature | ['T1106'] |
Both variants of ServHelper use the same HTTP C&C protocol on port 443 (HTTPS) and, less frequently, port 80 (HTTP). An example of the initial phone home to the C&C server is shown in Figure 5 | ['T1071.001'] |
IcedID’s operators probably plan on targeting businesses because they added a network propagation module to the malware from the get-go. IcedID possesses the ability to move to other endpoints, and X-Force researchers also observed it infecting terminal servers | ['T1087.003'] |
Reaver proceeds to write a shortcut file to ‘%TEMP%\~WUpdate.lnk’. This file is then copied to a filename of ‘Windows Update.lnk’, which is placed in the startup path previously identified. This shortcut file points to the path of the previously written ‘Applet.cpl’ file. Finally, Reaver.v1 will execute the ‘~WUpdate.lnk’ file in a new process, thus loading the recently dropped malicious CPL file. In the event this is successful, the malware will use the following path to store any dropped files | ['T1218.002'] |
The attackers used the Windows Management Instrumentation Command Line Utility (wmic.exe) to execute commands on remote computers, such as adding a new user or executing additional downloaded PowerShell scripts. Cobalt Strike was also used to carry out credential dumping using ProcDump and to empty log files | ['T1136', 'T1047', 'T1070.001', 'T1003.001'] |
3, 2019): On May 16, 2019 FireEye's Advanced Practices team attributed the remaining "suspected APT33 activity" (referred to as GroupB in this blog post) to APT33, operating at the behest of the Iranian government. The actor leveraged this persistence mechanism to download and execute OS-dependent variants of the publicly available .NET POSHC2 backdoor as well as a newly identified PowerShell-based implant self-named POWERTON. Of note, Advanced Practices separately established that APT33 began using POSHC2 as of at least July 2, 2018, and continued to use it throughout the duration of 2018. At one point in late-August, after the POSHC2 kill date, the adversary used RULER.HOMEPAGE to directly download POWERTON, bypassing the intermediary stages previously observed. FireEye Intelligence has previously reported that APT33 has ties to destructive malware, and they pose a heightened risk to critical infrastructure. The operators behind each of the described intrusions are using publicly available but not widely understood tools and techniques in addition to proprietary implants as needed. Custom Backdoor: POWERTON . POWERTON is a backdoor written in PowerShell; FireEye has not yet identified any publicly available toolset with a similar code base, indicating that it is likely custom-built. FireEye has observed an increase in targeted adversaries challenging and subverting security controls on Exchange and Office365. At FireEye, our decisions are data driven, but data provided to us is often incomplete and missing pieces must be inferred based on our expertise in order for us to respond to intrusions effectively. Credential harvesting phishing scams, where harvested credentials may be sold, re-used, or documented permanently elsewhere on the internet | ['T1068'] |
The malware sets its persistence mechanism by creating a RunKey in the registry to ensure its survival after system reboot events | ['T1547.001'] |
Audio surveillance: The malware uses the NAudio library to interact with the microphone and manage the audio stream. The library is stored server-side and pushed to the victim’s machine using a special command. The bot will display the messages using a standard message box. The log includes the process name used by the victim, and keystrokes. The theft is performed by a specific component that enumerates credentials saved in various browsers. Process manager: The attacker can obtain a list of running processes and terminate these by using a specific button | ['T1123'] |
HAYMAKER is a backdoor that can download and execute additional payloads in the form of modules. It also conducts basic victim profiling activity, collecting the computer name, running process IDs, %TEMP% directory path and version of Internet Explorer. It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string. BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. It has the capability to find files, enumerate drives, exfiltrate data, take screenshots and provide a reverse shell. SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests. The malware’s capabilities include taking a system survey, access to the filesystem, executing commands and a reverse shell | ['T1059.003'] |
One of the custom tools used by the Leafminer group is a rebranded version of the widespread post-exploitation tool Mimikatz | ['T1083'] |
The default case when the service tag is empty allows the malware to treat the contents of the response from the C2 as a command to execute via the Go library functions os.exec.Command or os.exec.Start. The format of the received command is checked against the below regex pattern for validity before executing and the command is read from the body of the message received from the C2 | ['T1059.003'] |
In 2014, Imminent Monitor started supporting third-party plugins. The first of these offered the ability to turn the webcam light off while monitoring. Shockwave™ wrote: “Hey, good job on being the first to release a plugin for Imminent Monitor | ['T1125'] |
Where the number of passed parameters is one, the payload will read the sys.bin.url file from %appdata%\systemconfig. It will then spawns a new svchost process as C:\\windows\\system32\\svchost.exe –k update in suspended state and injects the payload. Finally, it patches the entry point of svchost.exe so it can execute the malicious payload after the ResumeThread call | ['T1055.012'] |
This module intercepts HWP documents on an infected computer. The HWP file format is similar to Microsoft Word documents, but supported by Hangul, a South Korean word processing application from the Hancom Office bundle. This malware module works independently of the others and maintains its own Bulgarian e-mail account. The account is hardcoded in the module along with the master’s e-mail to which it sends intercepted documents. It is interesting that the module does not search for all the HWP files on infected computer, but reacts only to those that are opened by the user and steals them. This behavior is very unusual for a document-stealing component and we do not see it in other malicious toolkits | ['T1005'] |
In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. In the new campaign JavaScript files have been used to execute batch and PowerShell files. The new campaign uses Powershell and URLMON API calls to download the cab file while in the old campaign it used certutil to download the cab file. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated. Also, its configuration is encrypted and is not base64 encoded anymore. It also does not use FTP for exfiltration | ['T1041', 'T1140'] |
TEARDROP is a memory only dropper that runs as a service, spawns a thread and reads from the file “gracious_truth.jpg”, which likely has a fake JPG header. TEARDROP does not have code overlap with any previously seen malware. We believe that this was used to execute a customized Cobalt Strike BEACON | ['T1105'] |
The adversary used the built-in lateral movement possibilities in Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has various methods for deploying its beacons at newly compromised systems. We have seen the adversary using SMB, named pipes, PsExec, and WinRM. They continue lateral movement and discovery in an attempt to identify the data of interest | ['T1021.006'] |
It is used by the financially motivated GOLD SOUTHFIELD threat group, which distributes ransomware via exploit kits, scan-and-exploit techniques, RDP servers, and backdoored software installers. CTU™ researchers attribute GandCrab to the GOLD GARDEN threat group | ['T1190', 'T1133'] |
CWS or WSA web scanning prevents access to malicious websites, including watering hole attacks, and detects malware used in these attacks | ['T1189'] |
The attackers typically distribute Netwalker ransomware with the use of a reflective PowerShell loader script that has been protected from casual analysis with several layers of obfuscation | ['T1059.001', 'T1027'] |
BRONZE UNION appears to use a combination of self-registered IP addresses and commercial VPN services in its command and control (C2) and operational infrastructure. The threat actors also integrate infrastructure they likely previously compromised for espionage purposes. For example, CTU researchers identified the group using IP addresses owned by several, presumably compromised, research organizations to interact with web shells in other target environments | ['T1003.002', 'T1003.004'] |
As mentioned previously, this backdoor also supports loading plugins. The server creates a thread that searches for files matching the following pattern lPH*.dll. If such a file exists, it is loaded and its export function ModuleStart is called. Among the various plugins we have located so far, one is able to steal recent files and files from USB thumb drives | ['T1025', 'T1083'] |
Phishing emails continued to use links to external ZIP or RAR archives, which ultimately contained an executable with the extension SCR. The attackers also made extensive use of Hostinger’s cheap web hosting services to deliver initial payloads | ['T1204.001'] |
After decrypting the C&C server address, the shellcode proceeds to send an HTTP GET request to fetch the resource: “msdn.cpp” on the server | ['T1071.001'] |
The purpose of the bytecode is to decrypt the embedded payload, load it into memory reflectively and execute it | ['T1140'] |
The backdoor contain narrow capabilities: download and upload files, run commands and send the attackers the results. However short the list, they allow the attackers to upload and execute additional tools for further reconnaissance and lateral movement | ['T1105'] |
Network analysis — run one of the plugins to retrieve Active Directory and network information (Fig | ['T1016'] |
Before running the above command to open the decoy document, the shellcode enumerates the running processes on the system, specifically looking for processes created for an executable with a filename that starts with “avp. presumably in an attempt to find Kaspersky’s antivirus process. If the process is found, the shellcode will not open the decoy document and exits | ['T1057'] |
This RAT is also known for its keylogging and file transfer functionality. As such, any remote attacker can load any files onto the infected machine or even steal documents | ['T1036.005', 'T1105'] |
The malware will setup the miner and then the miner will persist it in the system in two ways: 1) by adding itself as a service if the malware gains admin privileges or 2) by adding the batch file to the startup folder | ['T1543.003'] |
Registered and active during late June 2020, newspointview[.]com has been used with more recent SombRAT variants as the primary C2 domain | ['T1105'] |
An example of these tasks is shown below: • write a file and execute it with CreateProcess() capturing all of the standard output • update C&C configuration, plugin storage, etc • update autoruns • write arbitrary files to the filesystem (“File Upload”) • read arbitrary files from the filesystem (“File Download”) • update itself • uninstall • push task results to C2 servers | ['T1105'] |
Exploits a kernel privilege escalation vulnerability to gain SYSTEM privileges using CVE-2018-8453. Whitelists files, folders and extensions from encryption. Encrypts files on local and network storage. Customizes the name and body of the ransom note, and the contents of the background image. Exfiltrates encrypted information on the infected host to remote controllers. REvil uses Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) for communication with its controllers | ['T1486'] |
In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. In the new campaign JavaScript files have been used to execute batch and PowerShell files. The new campaign uses Powershell and URLMON API calls to download the cab file while in the old campaign it used certutil to download the cab file. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated. It also does not use FTP for exfiltration | ['T1059.001'] |
Once you have set up the database and logged into the BloodHound web application, you need to pull AD data from your environment using the BloodHound PowerShell ingestor. Figure 1 shows a sample command that searches all domains in the forest (-SearchForest) and the folder location used to save the resulting CSV files | ['T1059.001'] |
If the DoublePulsar backdoor does not exist, then the SMB worm attempts to compromise the target using the Eternalblue SMBv1 exploit. After the first thread determines the local network subnet, the SMB worm scans local addresses beginning at the start of the netblock and increasing by one to the end of the netblock | ['T1016'] |
This Unix binary is widely used by many malware families to determine the device’s unique ID (for campaign tracking), usually in the form of the machine’s serial number. This may or may not be hashed with another utility (e.g. md5) before being sent to the C2. To facilitate anti-analysis and evasion, ioreg is also used by some threat actors to determine whether the device is running in a virtual environment | ['T1497.001'] |
It uses a GetCurrentProcessID to find the process ID of the current process. It compares the UniqueProcessID member of the SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO_EX structure with the current process ID | ['T1057'] |
Encryption is definitely the simplest method to hide the C&C server. We have encountered cases where the port has been stored in the data section, in the Delphi form data, or randomly chosen from a range | ['T1102.001'] |
The Helminth implant is routinely delivered through macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents requiring user interaction to execute an obfuscated Visual Basic Script | ['T1204.002'] |
1) The malicious macro scans the victim’s Outlook inbox and looks for the strings “$$cpte” and “$$ecpte”. 2) Then the macro will open a CMD shell that will execute whatever instruction / command is in between the strings. 4) The macro searches for the special strings in the “Deleted Items” folder to find the attacker’s email address and sends the data back to the attackers via email. 5) Lastly, the macro will delete any evidence of the emails received or sent by the attackers | ['T1566.001'] |
A recent lull in the distribution of spam spreading information-stealing malware via the Hancitor downloader has been snapped | ['T1566.002'] |
There are three types of URLs present in the decrypted configuration. The first type of URL listed in the configuration data is used for the plain HTTP (that is, non-Tor) communication with C&C servers. The bot reports to the C&C server using the typical request pattern: for example, the initial checkin to the C&C server is in the form of: cfg_url + “/images/” + encoded_data + (.jpeg||.gif||.bmp | ['T1132'] |
Similar to many other ransomware operators, CARBON SPIDER not only encrypted victim files using Darkside, but also exfiltrated data for publication on a dedicated leak site (DLS) hosted on Tor. For exfiltration, CARBON SPIDER primarily leveraged the MEGASync client for hosting provider MEGA but also employed GoToAssist | ['T1567.002'] |
They stop the Volume Shadow Copy service; the ransomware itself includes a command to delete existing shadow copies | ['T1490'] |
Emotet artifacts are typically found in arbitrary paths located off of the AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming directories. Persistence is typically maintained through Scheduled Tasks or via registry keys. Additionally, Emotet creates randomly-named files in the system root directories that are run as Windows services | ['T1053.005'] |
The backdoor also creates a separate thread that installs a Windows hook procedure on message WH_KEYBOARD_LL, through which it can intercept keystrokes. We believe this is mainly used to intercept credentials from other browsers, specifically Google Chrome | ['T1056.001'] |
Kimsuky is a highly motivated APT that has traditionally targeted entities in South Korea. The APT group has used a variety of malware such as Gold Dragon, Babyshark and Appleseed to target entities ranging from defense to education and think tanks. Some file enumerators will exfiltrate all files with specific extensions. What's interesting here, however, is that the attackers knew exactly which files they were looking for | ['T1567.002'] |
The Trojan obfuscates its executable code prior to compilation, rather than packing it like most other ransomware, making it harder for researchers to reverse engineer and analyze the malicious code. It also obscures the links to the necessary API function, and stores hashes to strings rather than the actual strings. Upon installation, the Trojan reviews the directory its executable is started from, and if it spots an attempt to launch it from an ‘incorrect’ directory – such as a potential automated sandbox – it exits. Before encrypting files on a victim device, SynAck checks the hashes of all running processes and services against its own hard coded list. If it finds a match, it tries to kill the process | ['T1083', 'T1497.001'] |
Before being sent to the server, the data structure has to pass through shaping as shown in Fig | ['T1560'] |
When the backdoor is configured to use HTTPS to communicate with the C2, the functionality is largely the same as when in HTTP mode. The differences are that it lacks the options to update a session key due to encryption being handled by the TLS layer and it also does not have the option to send data to and from the C2 in the chunking mode previously described. In addition, only one transmission is made to the C2 when the malware is establishing a connection as there is no exchange of an AES session key. The hello message that is sent contains the same plaintext data as the HTTP mode | ['T1071.001'] |
For persistence and remote control, the script downloads another base64-encoded Python script from hxxps://ptpb[.]pw/OAZG. After several steps of de-obfuscation, we found the attackers using EmPyre for post-exploitation control | ['T1027'] |
The Magic Hound campaign used Word and Excel documents containing malicious macros as a delivery method, specifically attempting to load either the Pupy RAT or meterpreter which we have called MagicHound.Rollover. The malicious macros were all designed to use Windows PowerShell to download a shellcode-based payload from a remote server. We discovered two different techniques used in the PowerShell scripts, the first being a straightforward execute command of a string retrieved from the remote server. The second technique appeared to be from a tool called Magic Unicorn, an open source module for meterpreter. Specifically, we discovered code in the PowerShell script that was a match for code in Magic Unicorn containing the comment “one line shellcode injection with native x86 shellcode | ['T1105'] |
Throughout the year, Volexity identified multiple Vietnamese-language news websites that appeared to be compromised, as they were being used to load an OceanLotus web profiling framework. The exact functionality varied from site to site, but the goal of these frameworks was to gather information about site visitors and, in some cases, deliver malware. This code appears to be a variation of what Volexity has previously described as Framework A | ['T1583.001'] |
For example, here is a folder and a list of files created by picking the C:\Windows\system32\TCPSVCS.exe executable as a source of data | ['T1543.003'] |
The attackers used both families concurrently from late last year through November 2017 and there is some C2 infrastructure overlap between the two families, as well as links to historical reporting. Reaver Malware Analysis To date, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified 10 unique samples and three distinct variants of a new malware family we have named “Reaver”. As such, we identify each variant as Reaver.v1, Reaver.v2, and Reaver.v3. Reaver.v1 has been observed delivering a payload that uses HTTP for network communication, while versions 2 and 3 use a payload that uses raw TCP connections for this communication. The flow for Reaver is as shown | ['T1071.001', 'T1095'] |
Another payload of the Ecipekac loader, which we call SodaMaster (a.k.a DelfsCake), is also a new fileless malware. In our research we found more than 10 samples of SodaMaster. The only differences were in the configuration data, including a hardcoded C2, an encoded RSA key and additional data for calculating a mutex value | ['T1105', 'T1573.002'] |
When executed, the DLL drops and launches using a WinExec API call. This stage of the Valak malware uses a malicious JavaScript file with a random name that changes per execution | ['T1218.010'] |
The script modifies Windows Defender settings to exclude the target logical drive it is going to wipe from scheduled and real-time scanning | ['T1059.005'] |
MSTIC has observed NICKEL actors using exploits against unpatched systems to compromise remote access services and appliances. Upon successful intrusion, they have used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts. NICKEL actors created and deployed custom malware that allowed them to maintain persistence on victim networks over extended periods of time. MSTIC has also observed NICKEL perform frequent and scheduled data collection and exfiltration from victim networks | ['T1016', 'T1119', 'T1587.001', 'T1078'] |
To load the driver, a new service is created using the API CreateServiceW. The name and display name for this service is the 4-character name used for the file name. Next, StartServiceW is called in a loop five times to ensure the driver is loaded. Immediately after the driver is loaded, the service is removed by deleting the entire registry key | ['T1106', 'T1543.003'] |
Once the attackers identify the files of interest, the module is instrumented for exfiltration of the files.The VBScript-based file recon module used by the attackers is somewhat different. The URL constructed had the following format:http://<attacker_controlled_domain/>report.php | ['T1071.001'] |
Between 2016 and 2020, we have seenScreenConnect and Onehub used in malicious cyber activity by different, unassociated threat actors. For example, between 2016 and 2019 unknown threat actors targeted IT outsourcing firms, including compromising US-based Cognizant and India-based Wipro. 7] The actors responsible for these attacks used ScreenConnect to connect to endpoints on client networks, enabling them to conduct further lateral movements and automated actions on objectives. During an incident impacting Cognizant and their client Maritz Holdings, actors used ScreenConnect to propagate to other connected systems and caused over $1.8 million (USD) in losses through a gift card fraud scheme. 6] In 2019, another threat group used ConnectWise to execute PowerShell commands in their target environments. 7] In 2020, ScreenConnect/ConnectWise has been utilized by the cybercriminal group Pinchy Spider (GOLD SOUTHFIELD, GOLD GARDEN, Sodinokibi, REvil, GandCrab) to distribute Sodinokibi ransomware | ['T1059.001'] |
Stage 1: A Master Boot Record (MBR) locker used to overwrite the operating system's MBR, which effectively prevents the operating system from loading successfully - Stage 2: A disk-wiper used to wipe and destroy files on the target machine | ['T1561.002'] |
The MuddyWaters group has carried out a large number of attacks and demonstrated advanced social engineering, in addition to the active development of attacks, infrastructure and the use of new methods and techniques | ['T1105'] |
BADNEWS Much of BADNEWS has remained consistent from when it was originally discussed by Forcepoint in August 2016. To briefly recap, the BADNEWS malware family acts as a backdoor, with communication occurring over HTTP. A number of commands are provided to the attackers, including the ability to download and execute additional information, upload documents of interest, and take screenshots of the desktop. This tactic uses public web services to host content that contains encoded commands that are decoded by the malware | ['T1113'] |
As we can see, it simply downloads a file from secure.dropinbox[.]pw using HTTP on port 443 (not HTTPS), and proceeds to decrypt the file using AES-128 prior to executing it. At this point, Cardinal RAT has been downloaded and executed, and execution is directed to this sample. Of course, the Carp Downloader is not required to download Cardinal RAT, however, based on our visibility, it has exclusively done so | ['T1105', 'T1071.001'] |
Many fields in the installation program are forged into Acrobat Reader installation program, and the interface after running is related to Acrobat Reader | ['T1036.005'] |
The use of the legitimate regsvr32.exe application to run a .sct file is an AppLocker bypass technique originally discovered by Casey Smith (@subtee), which eventually resulted in a Metasploit module. The WINDOWSTEMP.ps1 script is a dropper that decodes an embedded executable using base64 and decompresses it with the System.IO.Compression.GzipStream object. The WindowsTemplate.exe executable is a new variant of RogueRobin written in C | ['T1059.003', 'T1218.010', 'T1059.001', 'T1140', 'T1547.009'] |
Juniper Threat Labs has been monitoring a campaign that pushes a new IcedID banking trojan. This new campaign changes tactics by injecting into msiexec.exe to conceal itself and use full steganography for downloading its modules and configurations. Previous versions of IcedID injected into svchost.exe and downloaded encrypted modules and config as “.dat” files. IcedID is a banking malware that performs Man-in-the-Browser attacks to steal financial information | ['T1105'] |
Execution through API (Batch file for example). - Application processes discovery with some procedures as the hashes of the name, and directly for the name of the process. File and directory discovery: to search files to encrypt. Encrypt files. Create files | ['T1486'] |
The malware uses at least three separate encryption methods for its traffic, depending on the type of message. The first method, implemented within HTTPDLL.dll, is used for the decryption of values and traffic relating to the HTTP GET requests (i) and (ii) discussed above. It appears to use an implementation of AES to encrypt the data which is then transmitted in its encrypted format. The key (shown in the image below) is apparently static, at least among the samples tested, and generated by drawing byte values from multiple parts of the binary and performing a number of bitwise operations on them | ['T1132.001', 'T1573.001'] |
1) The script uses the function fromCharCode() that returns a string created from a sequence of UTF-16 code units. By using this function, it avoids explicitly writing commands it wants to execute and it hides the actual code it is initiating. In particular, the script uses this function to hide information related to process names. To the best of our knowledge, this method was not used in early versions of the spam campaign. 2) The script uses the function radador(), which returns a randomized integer. This function is able to obfuscate code so that every iteration of the code is presented differently. In contrast to the first method of obfuscation, this has been used effectively since early versions of the Astaroth Trojan campaign | ['T1027'] |
Implant Type – WaterBear is a stage-2 implant with many capabilities; BendyBear is a stage-0 downloader | ['T1105'] |
Monday, February 12, 2018 . Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics . This blog post is authored by Warren Mercer and Paul Rascagneres. Olympic Destroyer Workflow . Initial stage . The initial edb1ff2521fb4bf748111f92786d260d40407a2e8463dcd24bb09f908ee13eb9 sample is a binary that, when executed, drops multiple files on to the victim host. SQLite is embedded in the sample: . System Credential Stealer . In additional to the browsers credential stealer, Olympic Destroyer drops and executes a system stealer. This step is executed to ensure that file recovery is not trivial - WBAdmin can be used to recover individual files, folders and also whole drives so this would be a very convenient tool for a sysadmin to use in order to aid recovery. Additionally, the destroyer disables all the services on the system: The malware uses the ChangeServiceConfigW API to change the start type to 4 which means: "Disabled: Specifies that the service should not be started. Legitimate File . Additionally, the Olympic Destroyer drops the legitimate, digitally signed, PsExec file in order to perform lateral movement by using this legitimate tool from Microsoft. Using legitimate tools like PsExec will save the adversary time from writing their own tooling. Disruption is the clear objective in this type of attack and it leaves us confident in thinking that the actors behind this were after embarrassment of the Olympic committee during the opening ceremony. Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware used by these threat actors. categories . Subscribe To Our Feed . Blog Archive . - - - - - - - - - - - - ▼ February (14) CannibalRAT targets Brazil Who Wasn’t Responsible for Olympic Destroyer | ['T1021.002'] |
SOMBRAT evades forensic analysis by patching the process memory used to record command line arguments. It replaces the initial command line with the base filename of the program executable, removing any arguments. This means that investigators that inspect a process listing via memory forensics will see the innocuous-looking command line `powershell.exe` rather than references to the uncommon filename such as `WwanSvc.c | ['T1057', 'T1564.010'] |
POWRUNER may also receive batch commands from the C2 server to collect host information from the system | ['T1083', 'T1057', 'T1047', 'T1049', 'T1016', 'T1082', 'T1033'] |
The 0x1 bit in the control flags is used in this module to specify if the download should be done via HTTPS | ['T1071.001'] |
TeamTNT targets exposed Docker API to deploy malicious images. Docker images containing TeamTNT malware are being hosted in public Docker repos via account takeovers. TeamTNT leverages exposed Docker hub secrets within GitHub to stage malicious Docker images. The following MITRE ATT&CK techniques were observed: Deploy Container (T1610), User Execution: Malicious Image (T1204.003), Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.002), Implant Internal Image (T1525), and Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004 | ['T1204.003'] |