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f68eeeb87eb74ea9615a3d679192a8a189640f049d63d11d5159692505645946

It should alleviate provider financial burdens.

Stern et al., 22 – Prof of Business Administration @ Harvard Business School

insurance create incentives to adopt AI while supporting patient-centered care if a product is safe insurance should be inexpensive insurers serve a credentialing function to ensure products are safe The credentialing function reinforce patient-centered incentives this alleviate provider concerns

AI liability insurance create incentives to adopt AI tools while adhering to and supporting patient-centered care with a focus on AI products that ensure safe, treatment Insurance companies will insure products at rates that are actuarially profitable. if a product is safe then insurance should be (relatively) inexpensive this approach would have the advantage of creating a more attractive AI product for smaller health care providers insurers can serve a vital credentialing function that complements review by regulators to ensure that AI products are safe and effective This is not unique to AI the availability of liability insurance shapes behavior alongside diverse areas regulation-through-insurance” incentivizes safe driving The credentialing function of insurance reinforce the patient-centered incentives of AI developers this alleviate health care provider concerns , at least to the point at which they are willing to adopt the AI technology.

create incentives to adopt AI tools patient-centered care credentialing function The credentialing function of insurance reinforce the patient-centered incentives of AI developers alleviate health care provider concerns , at least to the point at which they are willing to adopt the AI technology.

['(Ariel Dora Stern: Associate Professor of Business Administration in the Technology and Operations Management Unit at Harvard Business School, Avi Goldfarb: Rotman Chair in Artificial Intelligence and Healthcare, Joseph L. Rotman School of Managemen, Timo Minssen: Professor of Law, University of Copenhagen, W. Nicholson Price: Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 3-16-2022, "AI Insurance: How Liability Insurance Can Drive the Responsible Adoption of Artificial Intelligence in Health Care", NEJM Catalyst, https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/CAT.21.0242)//Neo', 'Insurance and Patient-Centered AI Development', 'AI liability insurance will create incentives to adopt AI tools and applications while adhering to and supporting patient-centered care — with a focus on AI products that ensure safe, high-quality treatment and outcomes for individual patients. Insurance companies will insure products at rates that are actuarially profitable. Thus, if a product is likely to improve patient safety overall and if the risk of its use can be estimated accurately, then insurance should be (relatively) inexpensive. Health care providers can then adopt the technology and purchase insurance for its use.', 'Alternatively, manufacturers could purchase such insurance and build the incremental cost of liability insurance into contracts with health care providers, who would, in turn, not be liable for problems specifically associated with the use of AI tools (this proposal is consistent with that used by IDx-DR, which, as noted above, carries medical malpractice insurance and indemnifies its users). By “building in” insurance to the product offering, this approach would have the advantage of creating a more attractive AI product for smaller health care providers who do not have the administrative bandwidth to research their own AI insurance policies, at least while AI tools are nascent. In contrast, if a product presents an exceptionally high risk or if its risk is not well established, insurance will be expensive, or perhaps not offered at all; whether the manufacturer or the health care provider (organization) holds the policy, its high cost would be a disincentive to adopting the product or developing it in the first place, and perhaps this is for the best.', 'In this way, insurers can serve a vital credentialing function that complements review by regulators (when relevant) to ensure that AI products are safe and effective. This function of insurance is not unique to AI; the availability and pricing of liability insurance shapes behavior alongside direct regulation in such diverse areas as driving, policing, and the practice of medicine.26 For example, such “regulation-through-insurance” incentivizes safe driving because the consequences of tickets and accidents include increased insurance premiums. The use of telematic devices to measure driving patterns (and provide insurance discounts when appropriate) further enforces this dynamic.27', 'The credentialing function of insurance will thus reinforce the patient-centered incentives of AI developers. Consequently, this insurance may alleviate health care provider concerns, at least to the point at which they are willing to adopt the AI technology.']

[(0, 5), (6, 12), (12, 16)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Neg-Georgetown-Round-5.docx

Michigan

McSk

925b665681dd474389c6a75a300ea3dd273083ba27723f33ba5bda4209713da2

4. CP is certainly preempted

O’Rourke ‘10 [Ken; 3/3/10; Senior Partner, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, an international law firm specializing in antitrust; “United States: The FTAIA In State Court: A Defense Perspective,” https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/trade-regulation-practices/95030/the-ftaia-in-state-court-a-defense-perspective?utm_source=pocket_mylist]

antitrust plaintiffs turn to state court and state likely to face some of the same federal doctrines federal doctrine arise in state court antitrust actions federal law preempts state law One objective was to ensure that the risk of Sherman Act liability did not prevent American exporters Applying state antitrust laws to regulate foreign trade by the FTAIA arguably would frustrate every one of these objectives imposition of as many as 50 states' antitrust laws would negate the federal objectives of international comity state antitrust laws do not expressly reference foreign commerce

some antitrust plaintiffs are focusing their attention on litigating in state court. And they are being creative about how to avoid removal to federal court Yet, as antitrust plaintiffs turn to state court and state law , they are likely to face some of the same federal doctrines they would prefer to avoid. One federal doctrine sure to arise in state court antitrust actions when there are allegations or damages based on the FTAIA under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution federal law preempts state law even in the absence of an express preemption provision when, "under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress the FTAIA's legislative history establishes that Congress had multiple objectives when enacting the statute. One objective was to ensure that the risk of Sherman Act liability did not prevent American exporters and other firms doing business abroad from entering into advantageous "business arrangements Another objective was to eliminate "ambiguity in the precise legal standard to be employed in determining whether American antitrust law is to be applied to a particular transaction Congress sought to adopt a "clear benchmark A third objective was to promote international comity Congress believed that respecting such foreign sovereign regulatory prerogatives would ultimately best serve U.S. interests Applying state antitrust laws to regulate foreign trade or commerce excluded from federal antitrust jurisdiction by the FTAIA arguably would frustrate every one of these objectives . American exporters and other businesses engaged in foreign trade or commerce could have no confidence that restraints exempted from federal antitrust attack would not be subject to alternative antitrust attack under the laws of one or more U.S. states Businesses would be deterred from entering into arrangements that Congress intended to enable the imposition of as many as 50 states' antitrust laws on foreign trade or commerce clearly would negate the federal objectives of international comity and respect for foreign regulation of foreign markets . At every level then, the application of state antitrust laws to foreign trade or commerce exempted by the FTAIA from federal antitrust regulation would " stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" in enacting the FTAIA . the Sherman Act has always extended to " commerce with foreign nations and was subject to a large body of pre-FTAIA case law addressing the limitations on its extraterritorial reach state antitrust laws do not expressly reference foreign commerce Congress had no cause to be concerned that states would attempt to apply state antitrust laws to foreign trade or commerce exempted from federal regulation by the FTAIA Even if there had been such a concern, Congress would have been amply justified in anticipating that the doctrine of implied obstacle preemption well established when the FTAIA was enacted in 1982 — would resolve any conflict

antitrust plaintiffs state court and state law same federal doctrines prefer to avoid. federal doctrine arise in state court antitrust actions FTAIA federal law preempts state law obstacle accomplishment execution full purposes and objectives of Congress FTAIA's legislative history multiple objectives Sherman Act liability not prevent American exporters advantageous "business arrangements eliminate "ambiguity precise legal standard promote international comity respecting foreign sovereign regulatory prerogatives best serve U.S. interests Applying state antitrust laws foreign trade commerce excluded federal antitrust jurisdiction FTAIA frustrate these objectives . businesses no confidence restraints subject alternative antitrust attack deterred entering into arrangements Congress enable imposition 50 states' antitrust laws negate federal objectives international comity respect foreign regulation foreign markets application state antitrust laws foreign trade or commerce stand[ ] as an obstacle accomplishment execution full purposes and objectives FTAIA Sherman Act extended commerce with foreign nations large body pre-FTAIA case law limitations extraterritorial reach state antitrust laws do not reference foreign commerce Congress no cause to be concerned states apply state antitrust laws foreign trade or commerce amply justified doctrine of implied obstacle preemption resolve any conflict

['As federal courts tighten the reins on private antitrust actions, some antitrust plaintiffs are focusing their attention on litigating in state court. And they are being creative about how to avoid removal to federal court.1 Yet, as antitrust plaintiffs turn to state court and state law, they are likely to face some of the same federal doctrines they would prefer to avoid.', 'One federal doctrine sure to arise in state court antitrust actions when there are allegations or damages based on cross-border conduct is the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA").2 The FTAIA defines the limits on the reach of the Sherman Act in cases involving foreign trade and commerce.', 'The FTAIA\'s parameters continue to evolve as litigants and the courts wrestle with new variations of the basic allegation that international price-fixing or overseas monopolistic conduct "caused" domestic injury on which a Sherman Act claim is based.', 'Congress enacted the FTAIA in 1982, some 92 years after the enactment of the Sherman Act. The FTAIA operates by "removing" anticompetitive conduct in foreign trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) "from the Sherman Act\'s reach," unless that same conduct also causes direct, foreseeable and substantial injury to domestic trade or commerce within the United States, U.S. import commerce, or exporting activities of American exporters.3', 'A threshold question is whether these limitations similarly restrict the extraterritorial application of state antitrust laws. Defendants will argue that the state antitrust laws cannot permissibly extend to reach conduct or give rise to damages that Congress has placed beyond the reach of federal antitrust law under the FTAIA.', 'The defendants\' argument goes like this. First, under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,4 federal law preempts state law even in the absence of an express preemption provision when, "under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."5', 'Second, the FTAIA\'s legislative history establishes that Congress had multiple objectives when enacting the statute. One objective was to ensure that the risk of Sherman Act liability did not prevent American exporters and other firms doing business abroad from entering into advantageous "business arrangements (such as joint selling arrangements), however anticompetitive, as long as those arrangements adversely affect only foreign markets."6', 'Another objective was to eliminate "ambiguity in the precise legal standard to be employed in determining whether American antitrust law is to be applied to a particular transaction."7', 'Congress sought to adopt a "clear benchmark ... for businessmen, attorneys and judges as well as [U.S.] trading partners"8 with the "ultimate purpose" of "promot[ing] certainty in assessing the applicability of American antitrust law to international business transactions and proposed transactions."9', 'A third objective was to promote international comity by acknowledging and respecting the prerogatives of other nations to establish and apply their own standards for regulating and remediating alleged restraints of trade in their own markets.10', 'Congress believed that respecting such foreign sovereign regulatory prerogatives would ultimately best serve U.S. interests by "encourage[ing] our trading partners to take more effective steps to protect competition in their markets."11', 'Applying state antitrust laws to regulate foreign trade or commerce excluded from federal antitrust jurisdiction by the FTAIA arguably would frustrate every one of these objectives.', 'American exporters and other businesses engaged in foreign trade or commerce could have no confidence that restraints exempted from federal antitrust attack would not be subject to alternative antitrust attack under the laws of one or more U.S. states. Businesses, therefore, would be deterred from entering into arrangements that Congress intended to enable.', 'Likewise, ambiguity in the "standard to be employed" for assessing the extraterritorial application of "American antitrust law" would not only persist, but would be multiplied fifty times.', "And the imposition of as many as 50 states' antitrust laws on foreign trade or commerce clearly would negate the federal objectives of international comity and respect for foreign regulation of foreign markets.", 'At every level then, the application of state antitrust laws to foreign trade or commerce exempted by the FTAIA from federal antitrust regulation would "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" in enacting the FTAIA.12', 'Plaintiffs likely will counter these preemption arguments by pointing out that there is a presumption against preemption and that Congress did not expressly overrule any state antitrust law when enacting the FTAIA.', 'True, Congress did not address the reach of state antitrust laws, one way or the other, when it enacted the FTAIA. However, the Sherman Act has always extended to "commerce with foreign nations,"13 and was subject to a large body of pre-FTAIA case law addressing the limitations on its extraterritorial reach.14', "By contrast, state antitrust laws such as California's Cartwright Act do not expressly reference foreign commerce and have no comparable history of being applied to it.", 'Congress, therefore, had no cause to be concerned that states would attempt to apply state antitrust laws to foreign trade or commerce exempted from federal regulation by the FTAIA.', 'Even if there had been such a concern, Congress would have been amply justified in anticipating that the doctrine of implied obstacle preemption — well established when the FTAIA was enacted in 198215 — would resolve any conflict.16']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Agrawal-Mikelson-Aff-harvard-Round1.docx

Michigan

AgMi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/AgMi/Michigan-Agrawal-Mikelson-Aff-harvard-Round1.docx

dadfc5712a2cf3edebe108a6ead52799d3b2b1a1ce6448ac235b14805872b2cf

2---A credible deterrent assuages modernization concerns BUT shifts in nuclear posture shake them.

Denmark 21, Senior Fellow, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Abraham M., 2021, “Nuclear Confidence and Strategic Uncertainty: Ally and Partner Reactions to China’s Nuclear Modernization,” The Wilson Center, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/Abraham_Denmark_Testimony.pdf) [Missing word]

allies view China’s modernization through the perceived credibility of U.S. deterrence anxiety is understandable and persistent Yet managed with robust engagements and resolve credible U.S. nuclear capability is seen as sufficient even considering modernization strategists in Seoul share the following analyses risk of conflict is viewed as very low , and deterrent stable advantages U S enjoys in raw capability means concerns are limited Absent dramatic changes to nuclear balance or collapse in confidence allied nations will seek U.S. deterrence China’s modernization has not been primary in driving concerns no ally is considering indigenous nuclear capability each ally possesses latent capability , and may pursue should confidence suffer

U.S. allies in East Asia view China’s nuclear modernization through the lens of how it effects the ability of the U S extended deterrence the perceived credibility of U.S. extended deterrence A degree of anxiety about U.S. credibility is therefore understandable and has been a persistent Yet these anxieties they can be managed with robust engagements between the U S and its allies, operations that signal resolve and commitment a credible U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability is seen by allies and partners as sufficient even considering China’s ongoing nuclear modernization strategists in Seoul , Taipei , and Tokyo share the following broad analyses of these issues The risk of a nuclear conflict between China and the U S is viewed by U.S. allies and partners as very low , and the deterrent relationship is viewed as stable The significant advantages the U S enjoys over China in terms of raw nuclear capability means that concerns about U.S. extended deterrence capabilities are limited even in the face of China’s modernization Absent dramatic changes to the nuclear balance or a collapse in confidence in American resolve , allied nations will continue to seek U.S. extended deterrence commitments China’s nuclear modernization has not been t he primary factor in driving allied and partner concerns about China or the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence Rather, concerns have intensified as a result of deepening uncertainties regarding American resolve no U.S. ally or partner in the Indo-Pacific is seriously considering the development of an indigenous nuclear capability at this time each U.S. ally and partner in the Indo-Pacific possesses some degree of a latent nuclear capability , and may pursue such a capability should confidence in U.S. extended deterrent commitments suffer a catastrophic collapse 2NC---AT: Racial Imperialism

view lens effects perceived degree of anxiety understandable persistent Yet anxieties managed robust engagements resolve commitment credible nuclear retaliatory capability sufficient even considering Seoul Taipei Tokyo share broad analyses risk nuclear conflict viewed very low deterrent relationship viewed stable significant advantages enjoys raw nuclear capability concerns limited Absent dramatic changes nuclear balance collapse confidence resolve continue seek has not been primary factor driving concerns concerns intensified result deepening uncertainties no seriously considering development indigenous at this time possesses some degree latent nuclear capability may pursue confidence suffer catastrophic collapse

['With the exception of India, U.S. allies and partners in East Asia generally view the significance of China’s nuclear modernization through the lens of how it effects the ability and will of the United States to support its extended deterrence commitments. Broadly speaking, the perceived credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments rests on two pillars: capability (does the United States possess sufficient resources to credibility threaten the effective use of nuclear weapons against China to produce a deterrent effect?) and resolve (does the United States possess the political will to risk tremendous costs in the defense of its allies and partners?). China’s nuclear modernization will not substantially undermine U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities, but it does potentially raise the costs and risks associated with those commitments. It is therefore not U.S. capabilities that concern U.S. allies and partners, per se, but worries about the resolve of the United States to risk potentially devastating costs in the defense of an ally or partner.', 'Dependence upon any country for nuclear deterrence is inherently disquieting, because the true intentions of another country are ultimately unknowable, and predictions of how a country will act in a potential crisis are unreliable. Moreover, while an aggressor can be certain that a state will fight to defend itself – even to the point of risking nuclear annihilation to avoid foreign occupation – it may doubt that a state would fulfill a pledge to defend a distant ally from foreign aggression – especially if that defense would lead to its own destruction.', 'A degree of anxiety about U.S. credibility is therefore understandable and has been a persistent feature of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence since it was first discussed in the early years of the Cold War. Western Europeans perpetually wondered if the United States would “sacrifice New York for Paris”19 by threatening nuclear use, and follow through with the threat if necessary, in a crisis with the Soviet Union. Indeed, European questions about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments constituted “the central concern of deterrence theory in the Cold War.”20', 'Those that depend on U.S. extended deterrence commitment in the Indo-Pacific today are familiar with this discomfort. Yet, while these anxieties will never be solved, they can be managed with a mix of robust engagements between the United States and its allies, operations that signal resolve and commitment, and investments in capabilities buttress the ability of the United States and its allied and partner military forces to accomplish their objectives. This is why the United States came to believe during the Cold War that its Western European allies must share an understanding of what would be done and the forces needed to maintain deterrence during a crisis, leading to the establishment of NATO’s nuclear planning group (NPG).21', 'When considering the views of U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, it is incumbent on American policymakers, to distinguish between the normal and manageable levels of uncertainty that are inherent to all extended deterrent relationships, and concerns that reflect deeper, more ominous doubts about the credibility and reliability of the United States. During the Cold War, two U.S. allies in Asia reacted to profound concerns about U.S. abandonment by pursuing indigenous nuclear capabilities: the ROK’s covert nuclear program launched in the wake of President Nixon’s announcement of his doctrine with the statement that “America cannot…undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world,” and Taiwan’s clandestine nuclear weapons program initiated out of Taipei’s (ultimately well-founded) fear that President Nixon’s engagement with Beijing portended a shift of U.S. recognition to the PRC and the end of U.S. security commitments to the island.22', 'Today, U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific are keenly attentive to the intricacies of U.S.- China competition, and their views of American credibility are similarly complex. While concerns about the reliability of the United States have certainly intensified in recent years, this has not been the result of China’s nuclear modernization program or doubts about U.S. extended deterrence capabilities. Rather, ally and partner concerns about U.S. credibility reflect a deeper apprehension about changes to the relative balance of power and uncertainties about the long-term intentions and resolve of the United States to pay a heavy price in the defense of its allies and partners. Yet, if unaddressed, a significant improvement in China’s nuclear capabilities could exacerbate these preexisting anxieties about the United States. The following review of allied and partner perceptions of Chinese nuclear modernization and U.S. credibility produces several conclusions in this regard.', 'For U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, nuclear dynamics between China and the United States do not receive significant public attention – especially compared to the prominent role that nuclear deterrence played during the Cold War. While competition between China and the United States has grown more intense in recent years, nuclear issues have not become a driving element of that competition relative to other issue areas. This is primarily because the nature of the U.S.-China competition – fueled by efforts on both sides to gain advantage in the relative distribution of comprehensive national power, and by incompatible visions for the future of the Indo-Pacific and the international order – is not existential. Unlike the Cold War, scenarios in which either China or the United States would seek to annihilate the other with nuclear weapons are vanishingly unlikely. Instead, when they do consider nuclear dynamics, allies and partners are concerned about the potential for nuclear escalation, and that China could strike them with nuclear weapons in order to destroy U.S. bases involved in a conflict, in an attempt to terminate a conflict on favorable terms, in the belief that U.S. nuclear threats were not credible, in the fear that its nuclear forces were threatened, or as the result of an accidental or unauthorized launch. 23', 'Yet these are generally seen as unlikely and at most playing a limited role in likely military contingencies, meaning that a credible U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability is generally seen by allies and partners as sufficient – even considering China’s ongoing nuclear modernization initiatives. Though for different reasons and at various levels of prioritization, strategists in Canberra, New Delhi, Seoul, Taipei, and Tokyo (except when noted otherwise) share the following broad analyses of these issues:', '• The risk of a nuclear conflict between China and the United States is generally viewed by U.S. allies and partners as very low, and the deterrent relationship is viewed as stable. Yet some scholars and strategists are concerned about possible nuclear escalation, especially in a crisis involving Taiwan. ', '• The significant advantages the United States enjoys over China in terms of raw nuclear capability means that concerns about U.S. extended deterrence capabilities are limited – even in the face of China’s nuclear modernization initiative. ', '• Absent dramatic changes to the nuclear balance or a collapse in confidence in American resolve, allied and partner [nations] will continue to seek U.S. extended deterrence commitments. ', '• With the exception of India, China’s nuclear modernization has not been the primary factor in driving allied and partner concerns about China or the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. Rather, concerns have intensified as a result of deepening uncertainties regarding American resolve. ', '• Uncertainties about American resolve have intensified across the Indo-Pacific as a result of broader changes to the U.S.-China balance of power, perceptions of declining American economic power and vitality, concerns about the predictability and future direction of American domestic politics, inconsistent U.S. foreign and national security policies (especially regarding allies and partners), and persistent questions about the long-term intentions of the United States to support its allies and lead the international community. ', '• With the exception of India, each U.S. ally and partner in the Indo-Pacific is developing limited conventional counterforce and/or countervalue deterrent capabilities as a hedge against the possibility of abandonment by the United States. ', '• With the exception of India, no U.S. ally or partner in the Indo-Pacific is seriously considering the development of an indigenous nuclear capability at this time. Nevertheless, (with the exception of Taiwan) each country’s policy community is actively debating the possibility. ', '• With the exception of India, each U.S. ally and partner in the Indo-Pacific possesses some degree of a latent nuclear capability, and may pursue such a capability should confidence in U.S. extended deterrent commitments suffer an unlikely catastrophic collapse. ', '', '', '2NC---AT: Racial Imperialism', 'Flow']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-5---Long-Beach-Round-7.docx

Kansas

MaPa

46b9c908ebe312f99c70a82e053412236f6144d2f40938314c29b7cce9ac5928

2)BETTING MARKETS.

Reklaitis 3-26, Reporter and Market Analyst, Morning Star (Victor Reklatis, March 26, 2024, “Biden now ahead or tied in 3 swing states, as Trump still leads in 4 others: poll,” Morning Star, https://www.morningstar.com/news/marketwatch/20240326105/biden-now-ahead-or-tied-in-3-swing-states-as-trump-still-leads-in-4-others-poll)

polls should be taken with a grain of salt they lead forecasters astray suggested " red wave " for midterm s that didn't come Biden's chance has climbed but still below the 45% bettors give Trump

polls should be taken with a grain of salt , as they can lead forecasters astray . Polls suggested a " red wave " for the 2022 midterm election s , but that didn't come to pass. Biden's chance of winning has climbed to a 10-month high of 37 .5%, according to betting markets but that's still below the roughly 45% chance that bettors give to Trump

polls grain of salt astray red wave midterm didn't come Biden's chance climbed 37 markets but still below 45% Trump

['To be sure, polls should be taken with a grain of salt, as they can lead forecasters astray. Polls suggested a "red wave" for the 2022 midterm elections, but that didn\'t come to pass. Biden\'s chance of winning re-election this year has climbed to a 10-month high of 37.5%, according to betting markets tracked by RealClearPolitics, but that\'s still below the roughly 45% chance that bettors give to Trump.']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Aff-00-NDT-Round-6.docx

Michigan

ShGa

6a9ce5329ed991a68cc161018c52a3d3ab4e53a12c5fd6d009fa3bab37da5a20

Vest doesn’t require all rights to be vested.

Jed Handelsman Shugerman 22, Professor of Law at the Fordham University School of Law, J.D. from Yale Law School, Ph.D. in History from Yale University, “Removal of Context: Blackstone, Limited Monarchy, and the Limits of Unitary Originalism,” Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, Vol. 33, Winter 2022, accessed via Nexis Advance

Framers had good reason not to claim they vested "all " executive power has to make double addition to deal with the fact the clause does not imply "all " neither the structure of the Constitution nor the word "vest" imply the word "all."

The Framers had good reason not to claim that they had vested "all " executive power in addition to adding "all," Amar needed to add "unless otherwise specified Amar has to make a double addition to deal with the fact the clause does not actually imply "all " at all neither the structure of the Constitution nor the word "vest" imply the word "all."

not to claim that they had vested "all the clause does not imply "all neither the structure of the Constitution nor the word "vest" imply the word "all."

['A problem with adding "all" by itself to the Executive Vesting Clause is not merely a problem by contrast with the text of the Legislative Vesting Clause, but also because it does not fit Article II. The Constitution shares traditional executive powers between the executive and the legislature: appointment (the Senate\'s advice and consent), war (to Congress), and peace (Senate ratification). The Framers had good reason not to claim that they had vested "all" executive power in the President. Thus, in addition to adding "all," Amar needed to add "unless otherwise specified," which assumes that the Executive Vesting Clause must have its own robust meaning of delegating powers, rather than a signification of a general structure and the basic law-execution-of-legislation power (which is a plausible limited interpretation offered by recent scholarship). 78Amar has to make a double addition to deal with the fact the clause does not actually imply "all" at all. As noted above, neither the structure of the Constitution nor the word "vest" imply the word "all."']

[(15, 27)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GrKi-Aff-Northwestern-Doubles.docx

Kentucky

GrKi

416a569ea498ba7e7f7287c4b8baa6df3c1892c0bc96681e5c866c4e86dff6d9

Integrating with NATO over ethical LAWs is a gateway to broader cohesion that saves the alliance.

Merwe 21 - (Joanna Van der Merwe, Non-resident Fellow with the Defense Tech Initiative at the Center for European Policy Analysis; MA in International Relations and Global Conflict in the Modern Era from Leiden University; Privacy and Protection Lead at the Centre for Innovation at Leiden University; 2-17-2021, CEPA, "NATO Leadership on Ethical AI is Key to Future Interoperability," doa: 7-18-2022) url: https://cepa.org/nato-leadership-on-ethical-ai-is-key-to-future-interoperability/

Establishing NATO ethical AI principles is the first step toward technical and political alignment Despite statements more work is required NATO must prioritize ethical AI to undertake joint operations risk of failing to gain acceptance depends on legal and ethical decisions made by governments could render a joint op impossible the inability to respond to threats would undermine the Alliance

Establishing NATO ethical AI principles is the first step toward both technical and political alignment . NATO highlighted the benefits of establishing a “transatlantic community coop erating on Artificial Intelligence ( AI ).” The DoD adopted Ethical Principles for AI in 2020 and has committed to bringing together NATO member and partners to operationalize these principles . Despite these statements and developments , more work is required to tackle the very real challenge that ethical AI will pose to future interoperability within NATO. As part of a broader strategy on emerging and disruptive technologies, NATO must prioritize ethical AI if it wishes to ultimately retain the ability of its members to undertake joint operations . Establishing NATO ethical AI principles is the first step toward both technical and political alignment , in turn enhancing and fostering interoperability Systems developers need to make a number of calls throughout the development cycle informed by the answers to key questions, including how to label data what data to use, and what is an acceptable outcome? These answers will also impact how AI systems are evaluated and ultimately deployed the assumptions made by those developing the tools and answering the key questions have a significant impact on the real-world functioning of the tool and societal acceptance of its ethics. The risk of tools failing to gain acceptance depends on the legal and ethical decisions made by governments . this could render a joint op eration impossible . Without the ability to interoperate across NATO, the inability to effectively and efficiently respond to future threats would undermine the Alliance . The role of the private sector is another aspect of ethical AI development that has proved a challenge to governments and the transatlantic relationship . The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems

NATO ethical AI principles first step technical political alignment coop AI DoD committed bringing together NATO member partners operationalize Despite these statements and developments more work is required very real challenge interoperability undertake joint operations technical political alignment fostering interoperability how assumptions developing the tools key questions significant impact real-world functioning societal acceptance gain acceptance legal ethical decisions joint op impossible undermine the Alliance role of the private sector ethical AI development transatlantic relationship coordinating core principles systematic governance

['', 'Establishing NATO ethical AI principles is the first step toward both technical and political alignment.', 'In October 2020, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Mircea Geoană highlighted the benefits of establishing a “transatlantic community cooperating on Artificial Intelligence (AI).” The Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit followed with a commitment to its responsible use. The US Department of Defense (DoD) adopted Ethical Principles for AI in 2020 and has committed to bringing together NATO member and partners to operationalize these principles. Despite these statements and developments, more work is required to tackle the very real challenge that ethical AI will pose to future interoperability within NATO.', 'Without a NATO-led initiative focused on aligning these ethical principles across the Alliance, the interoperability risk of nations fielding AI-based systems that hinder joint operations is high. As the foremost security framework for Europe and North America, as well as the leading defense alliance for promoting and protecting democratic values, NATO is able to facilitate alignment on this issue. As part of a broader strategy on emerging and disruptive technologies, NATO must prioritize ethical AI if it wishes to promote the shared values upon which it was founded, play a key role in facilitating innovation across the Atlantic, and ultimately retain the ability of its members to undertake joint operations.', 'Establishing NATO ethical AI principles is the first step toward both technical and political alignment, in turn enhancing and fostering interoperability, which is the foundation for NATO to respond to emerging threats as an Alliance, in a flexible and timely manner.', 'A key challenge for NATO is raising awareness that the answers to ethical questions can no longer be left to later stages of the development and procurement cycle. Decisions made at the political and legal level will have a significant impact on the engineering practices used to develop AI, as well as the technical characteristics of the AI-based systems. The answers to questions such as respecting human dignity, human control, and accountability will be the foundation upon which many technical elements are programed. Systems developers need to make a number of calls throughout the development cycle informed by the answers to key questions, including:', 'how to label data', 'what data to use, and', 'what is an acceptable outcome?', 'These answers will also impact how AI systems are evaluated and ultimately deployed.', 'If individual nations or groups are left to develop their own ethical principles without wider alignment to NATO, the result will be a number of AI-based systems with varying technical specifications based on the legal and policy decisions made by individual governments when answering the key questions. As has been demonstrated in areas such as facial recognition and policing algorithms, the assumptions made by those developing the tools and answering the key questions have a significant impact on the real-world functioning of the tool and societal acceptance of its ethics. The risk of tools failing to gain acceptance depends on the legal and ethical decisions made by governments. For the military, this may mean one state using an AI-based system that is seen as unacceptable by another, and in a joint operation one state fielding a system that cannot be used by another. Or worse yet, this could render a joint operation impossible. Without the ability to interoperate across NATO, the inability to effectively and efficiently respond to future threats would undermine the Alliance.', 'The role of the private sector is another aspect of ethical AI development that has proved a challenge to governments and the transatlantic relationship. Within states, governments have struggled to adequately regulate Big Tech firms, which has led to these companies encroaching on government responsibilities to protect and uphold the public interest. This encroachment permeates all aspects of government, including defense and security. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks discussed during her confirmation hearings, the lack of competition is also a challenge to innovation in the private defense industry. This, along with a lack of regulation, feeds into the power imbalance between the sectors. Consequently, private sector companies building the AI and AI systems that are or will be deployed on the battlefield are deciding the ethics policies for themselves.', 'The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaHa-Aff-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-2.docx

Minnesota

DaHa

8257e4d044302f35b283abb9dedb7ec078845df6ef6daaa15bce4cd92b72a29c

DOD will keep training irrespective of Congress – solves their impact.

Oren Liebermann & Haley Britzky 1/25, staff at CNN, “Despite no money left for Ukraine aid, Defense Department keeps training pipeline going,” CNN Politics, 1/25/24, https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/25/politics/pentagon-aid-ukraine-training/index.html

Despite no money for Ukraine Defense is keeping training going even as the US has run out of money

Despite there being no money for Ukraine the Defense Department is keeping the training pipeline going The training program has continued, even as the US has run out of money to provide Ukraine any more security packages

no money Ukraine training going US run out of money security packages

['Despite there being no money left for Ukraine aid, the Defense Department is keeping the training pipeline going, with nearly 1,600 Ukrainian troops currently in US training programs in Europe and the US.', 'At Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany — the US military’s largest training base in Europe — approximately 1,500 Ukrainian troops are taking part in weapons training, leadership courses, and reconstitution training, according to Col. Martin O’Donnell, a spokesman for US Army Europe and Africa.', 'Another 80 Ukrainian troops are undergoing training at the US base in Rheinland-Pfalz in Germany, O’Donnell said. A small number of Ukrainian pilots are also undergoing pilot training in Tucson, Arizona, to fly F-16 fighter jets.', 'Celeste Wallander, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, said earlier this week that the goal is to have Ukraine operating F-16s this year, “which would entail trained pilots, the platforms, but in addition, trained maintainers and sustainers, infrastructure, and spare parts, [and] ammunition.”', 'To date, the United States has trained approximately 18,000 Ukrainian troops in different programs like combined arms training, leadership training, and learning to use specific weapons and systems, O’Donnell said. The coalition of countries that are providing training to Ukrainian forces have trained more than 118,000 troops in 80 different training areas.', 'The training program for Ukrainian forces has continued, even as the US has run out of money to provide Ukraine with any more security packages. The Biden administration is pushing for $61.4 billion dollars for Ukraine aid in a supplemental national security package, but its future prospects remain unclear amid ongoing congressional negotiations over the southern border and immigration policies.', 'The last Ukraine security package, worth up to $250 million, was announced on December 27. Some weapons and equipment from previous drawdown packages and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) packages are still flowing into Ukraine, but the US has not been able to announce new packages.', 'Wallander warned that Ukraine has concerns about how equipped their units are and whether they have enough ammunition to stay in the fight against Russia.', '“We have heard reports from the Ukrainian government that they have concerns … that they believe that units do not have the stocks and the stores of ammunition that they require, and that is one of the reasons we have been focusing on the need to answer Congress’ questions so that they are able to move forward on a decision to pass the supplemental,” Wallander told reporters Tuesday.']

[(5, 17), (24, 36)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCa-Aff-8---Texas-Round-6.docx

Dartmouth

BaCa

4ab74dc84032ba0a7964a8237863851a93c722b1675e0201f8c7a0593930c5b4

2. No Russian first use---they’re deterred.

Jon Wolfsthal 23, Director of Global Risk at the Federation of American Scientists, Member of the U.S. Department of State International Security Advisory Board, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the National Security Council, “The Challenges of Deterrence, Reassurance, and Stability in a World of Growing Nuclear Competition,” in Project Atom 2023: A Competitive Strategies Approach for U.S. Nuclear Posture through 2035, pp. 61-76, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2023,

Deterring Russia remains a major objective the U S understands and remains highly capable of empirical ev suggests Russia remains highly deterred from nuc action holding Russian forces and means of control at risk, combined with non-nuc influence deter while Russia is likely to value nuclear forces more it remains far from certain Russian leaders value nuclear above financial or other means nuc s remain part of but by no means the most important feature of U.S. deterrence

Deterring Russia n nuclear attack remains a major U.S. objective , but one the U nited S tates understands well and remains highly capable of achieving empirical ev idence suggests Russia remains highly deterred from action against the U nited S tates and its allies especially nuc lear action holding Russian nuclear forces and other means of control at risk, combined with non-nuc lear influence , should continue to be sufficient to deter nuclear attack on the U nited S tates and its allies while Russia is likely to value its nuclear forces more it remains far from certain Putin and Russian leaders value nuclear force above financial or other means of control nuc lear weapon s will remain a part of but by no means the most important or most dominant feature of U.S. deterrence and reassurance

Russia U S understands well highly capable of achieving ev highly deterred U S especially nuc action non-nuc continue to be sufficient to deter nuclear attack U S far from certain nuc s by no means the most important

['Deterring Russian nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners remains a major U.S. objective, but one the United States understands well and remains highly capable of achieving. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that Russia remains highly deterred from taking action against the United States and its allies, and especially nuclear action. If one assumes that Russia leaders will remain rational, holding Russian nuclear forces and other means of military and state control at risk, combined with other non-nuclear means of state influence, should continue to be sufficient to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies.186 Moreover, while Russia is likely to value its nuclear forces more in the decades to come, especially now that its conventional forces have proven to be ineffective in Ukraine and elsewhere, it remains far from certain that Putin and Russian leaders value nuclear force above financial or other means of political and state control. As such, nuclear weapons will remain a part of but by no means the most important or most dominant feature of U.S. deterrence and reassurance strategy.']

[(4, 13), (14, 16)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-AdMc-Neg-Long-Beach-Round-1.docx

Kentucky

AdMc

40fd45e68e52cd6c0415f59de8e5fdad3e9a1d36c1b380591c7c14aca24e65f2

Reject unbacked pop-psychology claims---political activism reduces race related stress and has positive mental health effects

Caroline Reid 18, “Activism as a Source of Strength for Black College Students at Predominately White Institutions,” https://encompass.eku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1588&context=honors_theses

resiliency is powerful For students microaggresions create a difficult environment to navigate opportunities in activism manifest as tools to combat racism-related stress meta-analysis examines effects of activism on mental health argues the potential of utilization of activism as a source of strength combat the harms of racism

This resiliency is astoundingly powerful , however, dealing with the omnipresence of racism is a constant and significant internal labor. For Black college students at predominately white institutions, microaggresions and systemic racism create a difficult environment to navigate . Unique opportunities in activism manifest themselves as tools to combat discrimination and racism-related stress This thesis includes a meta-analysis that examines the findings on the effects of activism on mental health . As a result of this analysis, a counter argument argues the potential of the utilization of activism as a source of strength that may combat the harms of racism , supporting the earlier claim that certain factors involved in activism may be protective in nature

Unique opportunities in activism manifest as tools to combat racism-related stress meta-analysis utilization of activism

['Racism is deeply ingrained in American society, and white supremacy and the oppression of people of color has greatly contributed to the establishment of the very institutions that continue to perpetuate its existence today. Racism manifests itself in a variety of ways, and its most constant and daily appearance is in instances of microaggressions. These experiences contribute to feelings of invisibility, frustration, and anger, an experience known as racism- related stress, which research has shown to severely and negatively impact mental health. In order to combat the insidious effects of racism, Black Americans have utilized coping mechanisms for generations. This resiliency is astoundingly powerful, however, dealing with the omnipresence of racism is a constant and significant internal labor. For Black college students at predominately white institutions, microaggresions and systemic racism create a difficult environment to navigate. Unique opportunities in activism manifest themselves as tools to combat discrimination and racism-related stress. However, some argue that caution is needed in viewing activism as panacea for improving the lives of people of color, particularly Black people. Indeed, some research has suggested that activism is harmful to mental health, as it increases the intensity and frequency of experiences of perceived racism among some populations. This thesis includes a meta-analysis that examines the findings on the effects of activism on mental health. As a result of this analysis, a counter argument argues the potential of the utilization of activism as a source of strength that may combat the harms of racism, supporting the earlier claim that certain factors involved in activism may be protective in nature.', '']

[(9, 15), (15, 16)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

Michigan

MaMu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/MaMu/Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

8109ddbaa1a34ae891196613743e7c002415c4e7daa6b1d0bd9fcd351153b150

Treaty wording is useless. In the nuclear context, it means complete elimination.

Andrea Spagnolo 22. Senior Assistant Professor of International Law in the Law Department of the University of Turin. “Chapter 24: International Legal Obligations Related to Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Testing.” In International Law and Chemical, Biological, Radio-Nuclear (CBRN) Events, pp. 417-438. doi:10.1163/9789004507999_025.

There is no technical or normative definition of ‘disarmament’ no relevant treaties help scholars elaborated definition disarm embraces measures t o eliminate means of warfare more precise definition whereas disarm seeks to reduce capacity to zero arms control is concerned with ceilings for weapon systems When it comes to nuclear disarmament scholars maintain that disarm means that all nuclear arsenals must be dismantled the NPT mentions cessation of the all stockpiles, and means of their delivery

There is no technical or normative definition of ‘disarmament’ no ne of the relevant international treaties help in this regard It is possibly in the light of this that scholars have elaborated their definition of disarmament which can be found in the Encyclopaedia of Public Interna- tional Law: he term disarm ament embraces a variety of measures designed t o eliminate and cease the production of means of warfare From the same encyclopaedia , it is possible to infer a more precise definition of ‘disarmament’ by reference to the definition of ‘arms control’ whereas disarm ament seeks to reduce military capacity of all States to zero arms control is primarily concerned with curbing the build-up of arms by introducing quantitative or qualitative ceilings for weapon systems , arms, and manpower When it comes to nuclear disarmament , the absence of a normative definition is more sensitive Despite some differences, scholars maintain that nuclear disarm ament means that all nuclear arsenals must be dismantled such a view inspired the drafting of the NPT , which mentions in the Preamble, among its purposes, ‘the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons , the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery

no ne of the relevant international treaties help in this regard eliminate more precise definition of ‘disarmament’ to zero nuclear disarmament more sensitive scholars maintain that nuclear disarm ament means that all nuclear arsenals must be dismantled

['2 Nuclear Disarmament and Testing: Framing the Research Question(s)', 'There is no technical or normative definition of ‘disarmament’. As we will see in this chapter, none of the relevant international treaties help in this regard. It is possibly in the light of this that scholars have elaborated their definition of disarmament, which can be found in the Encyclopaedia of Public Interna- tional Law: ', '[t]he term disarmament embraces a variety of measures designed to limit or reduce, both quantitatively and qualitatively, eliminate, and cease the production of means of warfare.3', 'From the same encyclopaedia, it is possible to infer a more precise definition of ‘disarmament’ by reference to the definition of ‘arms control’. The difference between the two terms is spelled out as follows:', 'whereas disarmament seeks to reduce military capacity of all States – eventually to zero – arms control is primarily concerned with curbing the build-up of arms by introducing quantitative or qualitative ceilings for weapon systems, arms, and manpower.4', 'When it comes to nuclear disarmament, the absence of a normative definition is more sensitive. Despite some differences, scholars maintain that nuclear disarmament means that all nuclear arsenals must be dismantled.5 Admittedly, such a view inspired the drafting of the NPT, which mentions in the Preamble, among its purposes, ‘the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.’6', '', '']

[(7, 18)]

ndtceda

Emory-FeWa-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-1.docx

Emory

FeWa

67c8921af1ee330c02ea3cd2c87481e3c11da05b7489d9747aa46c1fda5570d8

2. The form/content binary is false. There’s no neat separation between words and action.

Dr. Roxanne Doty 96, Associate Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University, PhD in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, MA in Political Science from Arizona State University, Imperial Encounters, p. 5-6

certain rep s make action possible To attempt neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices assumes dichotomies word/world that critical genealogy calls into question relations occur within “reality” whose content has been defined by representational practices

representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices certain rep resentation s underlies the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible What is “really” going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices assumes a series of dichotomies —thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world , subjective/objective— that a critical genealogy calls into question global politics is linked to representational the issues that constitute these relations occur within a “reality” whose content has been defined by representational practices Focusing on discursive practices enables one to examine how the processes that produce “truth” and “knowledge”

inherent important inextricably bound up rep s make various courses of action possible neat separation assumes dichotomies word/world calls into question

['This study beings with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as “truth.” The goal of analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations underlies the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. As Said (1979: 21) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggest that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly “real,” though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when “American” is attached to the troops and “Grenada” to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it an “invasion,” a “show of force,” a “training exercise,” a “rescue,” and so on. What is “really” going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies—thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objective—that a critical genealogy calls into question. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms the material and performative character of discourse.6 ', 'In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices I am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a “reality” whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the “first world.” Focusing on discursive practices enables one to examine how the processes that produce “truth” and “knowledge” world and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.']

[(12, 19)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GrKi-Neg-Indiana-Round-3.docx

Kentucky

GrKi

921413fff285ba16a92ac676453b106c936c1fbe9cb894fcfab9d98d94e0d7a0

The plan sparks intense controversy that forces legislatures to confront personhood.

Jowitt ’21 [Joshua; January 6; Lecturer in Law at Newcastle University; The Conversation, “Happy the elephant was denied rights designed for humans – but the legal definition of ‘person’ is still evolving,” https://theconversation.com/happy-the-elephant-was-denied-rights-designed-for-humans-but-the-legal-definition-of-person-is-still-evolving-152410]

a court is necessary because someone needs to be a “ legal person ” to claim rights this would be a controversial shift with huge implications The Court refused the debate saying that is suited to the legislative process” But Congress are reluctant to recognise persons unless forced legislation is unlikely if on the radar at all. So any court must do nothing or force the legislature The courts will confront this again and in the orbit of activism If one thinks this, they may provide legal rights across the US

a court is necessary because , according to a legal principle someone needs to be recognised as a “ legal person ” in order to be able to claim legal rights – and it’s a status currently denied to non-human s But this would be a controversial legal shift with huge implications for animal rights. The New York Court refused to wade into the debate saying that is a matter “ better suited to the legislative process” In deciding this, the appeals court concurred with several cases from across the US that reached the same conclusion But the US Congress are usually reluctant to recognise new categories of legal persons unless their hand is forced After all, legislatures once turned a blind eye as many human beings were denied the status of legal persons and it was the courts that challenged this, long before legislation new legislation is unlikely given that the issue is considered a low priority – if it’s even on the political radar at all. So any court presented with a case must either do nothing or force the legislature Courts in Argentina have recognised the legal personhood of Cecilia the Chimpanzee The courts will confront this choice again and in the orbit of activism If one judge thinks this, then they may not be alone. The Court provide stronger legal rights for non-human animals across the US

a court necessary recognised legal person legal rights denied non-human s controversial legal shift huge implications refused better suited legislative concurred several cases same conclusion Congress usually reluctant unless hand is forced blind eye denied courts long before unlikely political radar any court force legislature Courts legal personhood confront in orbit activism one judge across US

['A team of lawyers requested a writ of habeas corpus – a claim of unlawful detention – on Happy’s behalf in an effort to have her rehomed. But on December 17 2020, an appeals court in New York denied the claim. Their reasoning was simple – Happy cannot claim legally enforceable rights under existing law. This is because Happy is an elephant.', 'If Happy had been human, the courts wouldn’t have hesitated to find in her favour, and people would consider this justified. But do we actually have reason to think any differently now we know she is an elephant? Does justice require different things for different species in the same circumstances? Or, as the Nonhuman Rights Project – a civil rights association campaigning for animal legal rights in the US – has argued on Happy’s behalf, is a subject’s species irrelevant in considerations of justice and legal rights?', 'If the Nonhuman Rights Project is correct here, then the courts need to recognise Happy as a legal person to hear her case. This is necessary because, according to a legal principle created by the ancient Romans but which is still with us today, someone – or thing – needs to be recognised as a “legal person” in order to be able to claim legal rights – and it’s a status currently denied to non-human animals in the US.', 'Legal personhood shouldn’t be confused with the ordinary meaning of what it means to be a “person”. Non-living entities such as idols, corporations or even ships have long been recognised as legal persons in legal systems worldwide. This means that, if non-living things have had their legal personhood recognised in the past, there should be no conceptual problem with recognising the legal personhood of a highly intelligent being such as Happy.', 'But this would be a controversial legal shift with huge implications for animal rights. The New York Court refused to wade into the debate and issued a statement saying that integrating other species into legal constructs designed for humans is a matter “better suited to the legislative process”.', 'In other words, extending legal personhood needs to be fully thought through and legislated for by Congress, not declared by the courts. In deciding this, the appeals court concurred with several cases from across the US that reached the same conclusion, from the whales and dolphins denied compensation for disturbances caused by Navy sonar, to the macaque monkey deemed not to be entitled to copyright protection for a selfie it took.', 'Letting politicians instead of judges deliberate the recognition of new legal persons might seem a sensible approach. It’s one that was recently taken by the New Zealand parliament when it voted to recognise a river as such. But the US Congress and other legislatures are usually reluctant to recognise new categories of legal persons unless their hand is forced.', 'After all, legislatures once turned a blind eye as many human beings were denied the status of legal persons based on their age, sexuality, religion, gender or race. The institution of slavery relied on legal systems denying the legal personhood of human beings, and it was the courts – most notably the Somerset case, heard in England in 1772 – that challenged this, long before slavery was abolished through legislation.', 'Legal precedent', 'The problem for Happy, then, is that new legislation to benefit her is unlikely given that the issue is considered a low priority – if it’s even on the political radar at all. So any court presented with a case like Happy’s must face a choice – either do nothing and maintain Happy’s suffering, or force the legislature’s hand by following the lead of other legal systems.', 'Courts in Argentina have recognised the legal personhood of\xa0Cecilia the Chimpanzee, who was detained in similar conditions to Happy. Chucho the Bear, also held in similar conditions, is a legal person too\xa0. Both were granted habeas corpus relief from their inhumane captivity as a result.', 'The New York courts will be confronted with this choice again. Happy’s legal team\xa0, and in doing so may bring the case into the orbit of a judge more sympathetic to this kind of activism. The last time an animal personhood case (about chimpanzees) reached the more powerful appellate level in New York,\xa0\xa0noted that:', 'The issue [of] whether a nonhuman animal has a fundamental right to liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus is profound and far-reaching… Ultimately, we will not be able to ignore it. While it may be arguable that a chimpanzee is not a person, there is no doubt that it is not merely a thing.', 'If one judge thinks this, then they may not be alone. The New York Court of Appeal may yet acknowledge the elephant in the room and provide a happy ending, with stronger legal rights for non-human animals across the US.']

[(0, 6), (7, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Neg-Dartmouth-Round-1.docx

Michigan

PiPh

10198d226ceed472fc15f2502e7697abe11c5f945994c9da40a517ab4f2c46a0

2. Modernization is stabilizing. Neither the US or North Korea will risk even conventional conflict.

William D’Ambruoso 23. fellow with the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Professor of International Relations at the Bowdoin Government and Legal Studies department. “The Restraining Effect of Nuclear Deterrence.” 6/16/23. Defense Priorities. https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/the-restraining-effect-of-nuclear-deterrence

U.S.-North Korean relations are example of deterrence missile tests observers fear we could be heading toward dangerous days a closer look makes it unsurprising neither side favored war North Koreans have focused rhetorical arrows North Korea has said less about American response it has said enormous casualties were likely bolsters the idea North Korea would prefer any other outcome to nuclear war U.S. officials admitted North Korea has enough firepower to ensure war is not worth the price North Korea can deliver damage the U S would find unacceptable

U.S.-North Korean relations are another example of mutual deterrence continuing to hold despite official concern. In some ways, the Korean Peninsula has been heating up again as a potential flashpoint The regime conduct frequent missile tests Due to these developments, some observers fear we could be heading toward the dangerous days of six years ago a closer look at the supposed “winning” scenarios makes it unsurprising that neither side ultimately favored war Collision with reality began e . The North Koreans have focused most of their rhetorical arrows on what they would do to the United States North Korea has said much less about the consequences of an American response , but what it has said admitting that enormous casualties were likely and only “ a few thousand” would still survive— bolsters the idea that North Korea would prefer almost any other outcome to nuclear war U.S. officials have admitted that North Korea has enough nonnuclear firepower to ensure war is not worth the price Bannon told a journalist, “There’s no military solution to North Korea’s nuclear threats], forget it. Whether U.S. officials like it or not, North Korea can deliver damage that the U nited S tates would find unacceptable compared to any potential gain that war might yield.

another example mutual deterrence heating up again unsurprising neither side began e rhetorical arrows consequences enormous casualties a few thousand” prefer almost any other outcome nonnuclear firepower is not worth the price no military solution can deliver damage unacceptable any potential gain

['U.S.-North Korean relations are another example of mutual deterrence continuing to hold despite official concern. In some ways, the Korean Peninsula has been heating up again as a potential flashpoint for nuclear conflict. The regime in Pyongyang continues to conduct frequent missile tests, with some flying over Japan or landing near South Korean territorial waters.32 Meanwhile, South Korea and the United States have again held large-scale, live-fire military exercises.33 North Korea loathes the exercises because they rehearse a preemptive strike against the DPRK and because military exercises are sometimes a cover for real invasions.34 North Korea and South Korea at night Due to these developments, some observers fear we could be heading toward the dangerous days of six years ago.35 In 2017, the Korean Peninsula saw not only U.S.-South Korea joint exercises and North Korean testing, but also very heated rhetoric. President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un led the chest-thumping: President Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea with “fire and fury,” and Chairman Kim talked of “taming” the adversary with “fire.” The warnings were followed by dutiful subordinates doing their level best to create a vision of victory in war. However, a closer look at the supposed “winning” scenarios makes it unsurprising that neither side ultimately favored war. Collision with reality began early. According to TIME, in April 2017, briefers showed President Trump a well-known satellite image of the Korean Peninsula at night. President Trump asked why Seoul was so close to the North Korean border and declared that its residents would “have to move,”36 presumably to blunt a North Korean response to a U.S.-South Korean joint attack. To put it mildly, a strategy contingent on South Korea abandoning its capital and largest city was unlikely to win much support. Those responsible for providing President Trump with military options against North Korea did not paint a pretty picture. Secretary of Defense James Mattis told a House committee that “[i]t would be a war like nothing we have seen since 1953,” when the last Korean War killed more than 2.5 million people.37 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford worked hard to keep threats against North Korea credible, but in describing the war, he recalled an even more deadly precedent. At an Aspen Institute forum, he said that a war on the peninsula “would be horrific, and it would be a loss of life unlike any we have experienced in our lifetimes, and I mean anyone who’s been alive since World War II has never seen the loss of life that could occur if there’s a conflict on the Korean Peninsula.” 38 Seoul, the capital of South Korea, is approximately 40 miles from the DMZ and 170 miles from Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. The Trump administration may have also considered limited strikes against North Korea—what the press called the “bloody nose” option—but circumstantial evidence suggests that the U.S. Department of Defense saw the move as prohibitively risky. On a 2021 public panel, Gen. Vincent Brooks, the top U.S. commander in South Korea in 2017, recommended against U.S. or South Korean strikes to thwart imminent North Korean missile tests since no one could be confident that Pyongyang would see the attacks as limited rather than a casus belli.39 Less is known about North Korea’s theory of victory, but what has been revealed is telling. The North Koreans have focused most of their rhetorical arrows on what they would do to the United States if forced. For instance, a Foreign Ministry spokesman warned that North Korea would “strike a merciless blow at the heart of the U.S. with our powerful nuclear hammer” if the United States should “dare to show even the slightest sign of attempt to remove our supreme leadership.”40 North Korea has said much less about the consequences of an American response, but what it has said—admitting that enormous casualties were likely and only “a few thousand” would still survive—bolsters the idea that North Korea would prefer almost any other outcome to nuclear war.41 In more candid moments, U.S. officials have admitted that North Korea has enough nonnuclear firepower to ensure war is not worth the price. Near the end of his time as President Trump’s chief political strategist, Steve Bannon told a journalist, “There’s no military solution [to North Korea’s nuclear threats], forget it. Until somebody solves the part of the equation that shows me that ten million people in Seoul don’t die in the first 30 minutes from conventional weapons, I don’t know what you’re talking about, there’s no military solution here, they got us.”42 The North Korean nuclear arsenal only reinforces the central point: Whether U.S. officials like it or not, North Korea can deliver damage that the United States would find unacceptable compared to any potential gain that war might yield. ', '']

[(8, 21)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-AdMc-Neg-Indiana-Round-4.docx

Kentucky

AdMc

4938437a97a176321202cafd26744192e0942656eec2559d0dc026f017b21b6c

Grid resilient.

Niiler 19, citing a study by the Electric Power Research Institute. (Eric, 4-30-2019, "The Grid Might Survive an Electromagnetic Pulse Just Fine", Wired, https://www.wired.com/story/the-grid-might-survive-an-electromagnetic-pulse-just-fine/)

existing tech protect the grid to buffer it from solar flares lightning and an EMP We have a strong technical basis technicians worked with the D o E They did real-world testing simulations contradict findings an EMP would wipe out the grid You could have a regional collapse but you wouldn’t damage a large number

the Electric Power Research Institute finds that existing tech nology can protect various components of the electric grid to buffer it from the effects of solar flares , lightning strikes , and an EMP from a nuclear blast all at the same time We have a strong technical basis for what the impacts might be EPRI technicians worked with experts at the D epartment o f E nergy labs to simulate some effects of an EMP They also did real-world testing of electrical equipment The study, which took three years to complete, looks at the effects of three kinds of energy spawned by a nuclear detonation. simulations contradict s earlier findings that an EMP would wipe out the US grid You could have a regional voltage collapse , but you wouldn’t damage a large number of bulk power transformers immediately ,” Horton There were some studies that said you could damage hundreds of transformers. We just didn’t find it

existing tech nology protect buffer solar flares lightning strikes EMP all at the same time strong technical basis D epartment o f E nergy labs real-world testing of electrical equipment three years contradict s wipe out the US grid regional voltage collapse wouldn’t damage large number of bulk power transformers immediately didn’t find it

['The study, by the Electric Power Research Institute, a utility-funded research organization, finds that existing technology can protect various components of the electric grid to buffer it from the effects of solar flares, lightning strikes, and an EMP from a nuclear blast all at the same time: a three-for-one surge protector. “We have a strong technical basis for what the impacts [of an EMP] might be,” says Randy Horton, EPRI project manager and author of the report being released today. “That is one thing that didn’t exist before.”', 'Horton says that EPRI technicians worked with experts at the Department of Energy labs at Los Alamos and Sandia to simulate some effects of an EMP on substations and distribution systems. They also did real-world testing of electrical equipment at an EPRI laboratory in Charlotte, North Carolina. The study, which took three years to complete, looks at the effects of three kinds of energy spawned by a nuclear detonation.', 'The first high-energy wave occurs in just a few nanoseconds and is called an E1. The second wave, called an E2, lasts up to a second and can fry electric systems the way a lightning strike does, unless they are properly grounded. Effects of an E2 wave on the grid are expected to be minimal. The third kind of wave can last for tens of seconds and is similar to what utility operators might expect from a low-frequency, long-duration solar flare or geomagnetic storm. The report says that the combination of an E1 and E3 would cause the most damage over the widest area.', 'Horton says simulations and testing by EPRI contradicts earlier findings that an EMP would wipe out the US grid. “You could have a regional voltage collapse, but you wouldn’t damage a large number of bulk power transformers immediately,” Horton says. “That was the difference in our finding. There were some studies that said you could damage hundreds of transformers. We just didn’t find it.”']

[(0, 6), (7, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HiVu-Aff-Hoosier-Invitational-Round-4.docx

Kansas

HiVu

51194a05df02b37d15e25eb5b9bc17dd5ae467fb9ba5b6a78acf6d1c3ffd0dbf

Trade secret protections are better and more efficient for innovators.

Matthew Johnson 21 Partner in Intellectual Property Law at Jones Day, United States: Protecting AI Innovations Through Trade Secrets And Patent Protection, 2-10, l/n

AI are well-suited for trade secret By keeping an as a trade secret inventor would prevent others from having access Such include method and know-how for extracting information from raw data and models It can be difficult to assert AI patent where infringement is difficult Trade secret lasts indefinitely licenses continue indefinitely without expiration Trade secret has a low barrier to entry effective immediately with no need to procure protection via the USPTO trade secrets do not have to be registered there are no preparation or filing fees

AI tech that are difficult to reverse engineer are well-suited for trade secret protection one reason for pursuing patent is to prevent others from developing products using the protected technology tech could be readily reverse engineered by a competitor absent patent protection the innovation would be vulnerable to copying The drive to pursue patent protection is lessened where the underlying innovation is difficult to reverse engineer By keeping such an AI technology as a trade secret , the inventor would be prevent ing others from having access to and potentially using the technology. Such may include the method and know-how for extracting useful information from raw data sets and generating models using the extracted information as well as methods and know-how for training and utilizing models. AI technologies where infringement would be difficult to detect can be candidates for trade secret protection It can be difficult to assert an AI patent where infringement is difficult For such trade secret can be considered Trade secret protection lasts indefinitely licenses can continue indefinitely without expiration dates. Trade secret protection may be available for IP that is ineligible for patent protection trade secret law is in a unique position to protect business plans use AI-generated information and models for its own competitive advantage Trade secret law can even protect know-how regarding what does and does not work. Trade secret protection has a low barrier to entry Trade secret protection is effective immediately with no need to procure protection via the USPTO trade secrets do not have to be registered at all there are no hefty preparation or filing fees

AI difficult reverse engineer trade secret protection patent prevent developing protected tech readily competitor vulnerable patent protection underlying innovation trade secret prevent ing access using method know-how infringement difficult to detect difficult infringement is difficult trade secret indefinitely indefinitely Trade secret protection IP ineligible for patent protection protect business plans competitive advantage a low barrier to entry immediately no need the USPTO no hefty preparation filing fees

['Trade secret protection offers several potential benefits for AI innovations:', 'AI technologies that are difficult to reverse engineer are particularly well-suited for trade secret protection. As discussed above, one major reason for pursuing patent protection is to prevent others from developing and marketing products using the protected technology. This is particularly the case where the technology could be readily reverse engineered by a competitor such that, absent patent protection, the innovation would be particularly vulnerable to copying. The drive to pursue patent protection is lessened where the underlying innovation is difficult to reverse engineer. By keeping such an AI technology as a trade secret, the inventor would be preventing others from having access to and potentially using the technology.', 'Such innovations may include the method and know-how for extracting useful information from raw data sets and subsequently generating models using the extracted information, as well as methods and know-how for training and utilizing models.', 'AI technologies where infringement would be difficult to detect can be candidates for trade secret protection. It can be difficult to assert an AI patent where infringement is difficult to detect and prove. For such technologies, trade secret protection can be considered; however, similar difficulties can arise with regard to identifying misappropriation of trade secrets by competitors (as opposed to by former employees who had access to such trade secrets).', 'Trade secret protection lasts indefinitely-so long as the information is maintained as a trade secret. Accordingly, licenses can continue indefinitely without expiration dates.', 'Trade secret protection may be available for IP that is ineligible for patent protection. Raw data, extracted features, or training sets, used to inform machine learning models and otherwise develop AI algorithms, may not be eligible for patent protection; but they may be protectable as trade secrets. Likewise, trade secret law is in a unique position to protect business plans for how a company intends to use AI-generated information and models for its own competitive advantage. Trade secret law can even protect know-how regarding what does and does not work.', 'Trade secret protection has a low barrier to entry. Trade secret protection is effective immediately, with no need to procure protection via the USPTO (and meeting the requirements of showing novelty or non-obviousness as required to obtain a patent). In fact, trade secrets do not have to be registered at all, so there are no hefty preparation or filing fees.']

[(8, 18)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGa-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

DiGa

d200b7fe0159de74bc5e6eefa5c6a047bfe617238dcc3ad8839c6411255290f9

South Korea nuclear acquisition triggers nuclear arms racing with regional powers

Moon 23 [Chung-in Moon, Distinguished University Professor of Yonsei University, Krause Distinguished Fellow at the School of Policy and Global Strategy at the University of California, San Diego, and co-Convener of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Special Advisor to President Moon Jae-in of South Korea for Foreign Affairs and National Security, “Going Nuclear Would Ruin South Korea’s Prosperity and Prestige,” March 2023, Vol. 18, No. 1, GlobalAsia, ]

acquiring nuc s set off a nuclear arms race by precipitating rapid build-up of Pyongyang’s arsenal increase likelihood of a nuclear war because of a misperception or mistake It would provoke a nuclear buildup in China and Russia heightening military tensions If So Ko goes nuclear while maintaining alliance turn into front line of confrontation between US and China/Russia . Japan is very likely to counter a nuclear So Ko with its own placing Korean Peninsula at center of nuclear domino effect in Asia China, Russia U S Britain and France move to zero unrealistic problem of verification mere possibility of such cheating cause other states to contemplate cheating chain of self- confirming hypothese everyone had to fear the worst case by the other states no better way increase the likelihood of use than to take such a plunge toward total nuclear disarm mutual fears lead to renew building own arsenals spread to additional countries increase the chances of use spiral could be disastrous countries previously elected not to acquire reverse their decision

case for acquiring nuc lear weapon s is based on argument that America’s extended deterrence is not reliable and South Korea should counter North Korea’s nuclear weapons we have more to lose than to gain South Korean nuclear armament would not only set off a nuclear arms race on Korean Peninsula by precipitating an even more rapid build-up of Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal but also increase likelihood of a nuclear war occurring because of a misperception , miscalculation or mistake It would provoke a nuclear buildup and other countermoves in China and the Russia n Far East, further heightening military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. If So uth Ko rea goes nuclear while maintaining alliance with the US, China and Russia would regard South Korea as the primary target for a nuclear strike, turn ing it into the front line of nuclear confrontation between the US and China/Russia . Japan has always been wary of a unified Korea armed with nuclear weapons and driven by nationalism it is very likely to counter a nuclear So uth Ko rea with its own nuclear weapons , placing Korean Peninsula at the center of a nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia China, Russia , and the U nited S tates would join Britain and France in committing to a verifiable move to zero nuclear weapons and would together coerce Israel, Pakistan, and India, and whoever else to match this expectations are surely unrealistic traditional objections to nuclear disarm problem s of verification mere possibility of such cheating cause other states to contemplate cheating themselves chain of self- confirming hypothese s would then emerge as everyone had to fear the worst case of behavior by the other states no better way to increase the likelihood of nuclear weapons’ coming into use than to take such a plunge toward total nuclear disarm ament mutual fears of cheating enough lead to mutual fears of preemptive nuclear attack nuclear escalation might cause Washington and Moscow to renew building their own nuclear arsenals such weapons would again be of great political and military relevance impact on further nuclear prolif spread of nuclear weapons possession to additional countries , and, conversely, the impact on the nonprolif tailored to preventing or reducing such spread increase the chances of further use spiral could be disastrous very plausible that several countries that had previously elected not to acquire nuclear weapons would reverse their decision

nuc s more to lose nuclear arms race more rapid build-up Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal increase likelihood nuclear war misperception miscalculation mistake provoke nuclear buildup China Russia military tensions If maintaining alliance front line nuclear confrontation US China/Russia Japan wary unified Korea very likely counter own nuclear weapons center nuclear domino Asia surely unrealistic no better way total nuclear disarm could be disastrous reverse their decision

['The case for acquiring nuclear weapons is based on the argument that America’s extended deterrence is not reliable and that South Korea should counter North Korea’s nuclear weapons with ones of its own. But we have more to lose than to gain from such a choice. South Korean nuclear armament would not only set off a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula by precipitating an even more rapid build-up of Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal but also increase the likelihood of a nuclear war occurring because of a misperception, miscalculation or mistake.', 'It would also provoke a nuclear buildup and other countermoves in China and the Russian Far East, further heightening military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. If South Korea goes nuclear while maintaining its alliance with the US, China and Russia would regard South Korea as the primary target for a nuclear strike, turning it into the front line of nuclear confrontation between the US and China/Russia. Japan has always been wary of a unified Korea armed with nuclear weapons and driven by nationalism. Thus, it is very likely to counter a nuclear South Korea with its own nuclear weapons, placing the Korean Peninsula at the center of a nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia.', '', 'The aff can’t solve – countries won’t reciprocate but proliferate – all of the aff warrants for deterrence failing are actually more likely to cause nuclear escalation, rearmament, and more – especially post use ', 'Quester 6 – Chairman of the Dept. of Government & Politics, U of Maryland George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo, pp. 66-67', 'There are some analysts who would even predict that any further use of nuclear weapons would finally bestir the world to make the appropriate moves and take the necessary risks to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world.23 These observers allege that the fact that something like Nagasaki could happen again would convince one and all that these weapons are so abominable that the world will not tolerate their use or even their existence. China, Russia, and the United States would join Britain and France in committing to a verifiable move to zero nuclear weapons and would together coerce Israel, Pakistan, and India, and whoever else to match this. But such expectations are almost surely unrealistic.24 The shock and horror of a use of nuclear weapons, especially if it were directed at a city, would indeed be great—great enough to shake us all out of traditional paths of thinking. But the traditional objections to nuclear disarmament would still have to be overcome, most specifically the problems of verification and the risks that someone would cheat to retain a rudimentary nuclear arsenal and then be free to dictate the political future of the world, if everyone else had gone ahead with nuclear disarmament. The mere possibility of such cheating, probably amid rumors of the imperfections in the control system, might cause other states to contemplate cheating themselves; and a chain of self- confirming hypotheses would then emerge, as everyone had to fear the worst case of behavior by the other states, and in the process confirmed the fears of others. There might indeed be no better way to increase the likelihood of nuclear weapons’ coming into use than to take such a plunge toward total nuclear disarmament. 25 The mutual fears of cheating would soon enough lead to mutual fears of preemptive nuclear attack, all of these being the kinds of fears that were easy to dismiss when the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States remained so very large but could not be dismissed now. Also, a nuclear escalation might cause Washington and Moscow to renew building their own nuclear arsenals, since such weapons would again be of great political and military relevance. Depending only a little on what kind of nuclear weapon was used in what kind of attack, the existing nuclear weapons states might well feel prodded to increase still more their inventory of smaller nuclear warheads, warheads capable of fulfilling military requirements without imposing as much collateral damage on civilian targets.26 The Impact on Weapons Proliferation An extremely important category of the anticipated aftermath of a nuclear escalation would be the impact on further nuclear proliferation, the spread of nuclear weapons possession to additional countries, and, conversely, the impact on the nonproliferation effort tailored to preventing or reducing such spread. If the use of nuclear weapons leads to a wider possession of such weapons, this would in turn increase the chances of further use, in a spiral that could be disastrous. Looking at the pessimistic possibilities, it is very plausible that several countries that had previously elected not to acquire nuclear weapons would reverse their decision after an actual breaking of the nuclear taboo. Japan would probably be near the top of the list for a variety of reasons, but there are European and Latin American states as well that once considered acquiring such weapons and then moved away from them, in face of international opinion and domestic opinion, that such weapons were no longer a natural accessory to sovereignty, that such weapons were not “just another weapon.”27 Especially if the user of nuclear weapons got away with something that would not have been possible without such nuclear escalation, and especially if the United States and the other established nuclear weapons states did not support the country that had lacked such weapons, the message would seem to be that even the most peace-minded of countries had better apply itself to acquiring a nuclear arsenal, in a world where such weapons had been used again.', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-BiAg-Neg-Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Round-4.docx

MichiganState

BiAg

a0adbad8839a439265adaeae71e5171cae26f548a2c6109b77feaaf5d76ddc48

3---The aff’s use of “dark” pedagogy repeats anti-black tropes and their focus on human-oriented solutions fails

Smith 17 (Anthony Paul Smith is Assistant Professor of Philosophical Theology in La Salle University’s Department of Religion and Theology in Philadelphia. His current research projects include a critical inquiry into forms of theodicy within European philosophy; “On the Use and Abuse of Objects for the Environmental Humanities: Recent Books in Object-Oriented Ontology and Ecotheory,” (2017), pp. 17-19//) viraj

“dark aesthetic” is endemic to speculative realism’s forms it repeats certain tropes and, indeed, political ontologies of anti-Blackness a prismatic ecology also surfaces themes that are very clearly “human-oriented”, This attempt in speculative realism to link realism with an anti-anthropocentrism often fails The supposed troubling of the nature- culture binary is a central element “the binding of the elements is love.” 32 Such a claim is made without any support, left to simply dazzle the reader, to impress upon her the importance of all these elemental colors and warn her off asking what exactly such a statement means

Such a self-proclaimed “dark aesthetic” is unfortunately endemic to speculative realism’s forms . 29 This colorism has not been interrogated for the way it repeats certain tropes and, indeed, political ontologies of anti-Blackness . Ecotheory , we are told, is all too often “conducted in the shade of ‘bright green’” which as a hue symbolically calls forth problematic themes and modalities that require one to be “affirmative, extraverted, and masculine” as well as “sunny, straightforward, ableist, holistic, hearty, and healthy”. 30 But a prismatic ecology also surfaces themes that are very clearly “human-oriented”, as most of the colors in the prism are specifically human ways of seeing. This attempt in speculative realism to link realism with an anti-anthropocentrism often fails . This is true even of the work of Quentin Meillassoux , who is not a proponent of OOO but who is rightly or wrongly taken as the inspiration behind the attempt to move beyond “ correlationism ” to realism. A clear-eyed reading of After Finitude will note that the supposedly realist ways of reaching the primary qualities of the ancestral realm are couched in numbers that are tied specifically to the rotation of the (human populated) earth around the sun The supposed troubling of the nature- culture binary is a central element of OOO, but it is not particularly new in environmental theory. Cohen and others are persistent in their slippage between emphasizing the autonomy of objects from the human subject and the demand to attend to particular questions of social justice produced by thinking that autonomy. Remaining with Cohen’s introductory remarks to Prismatic Ecology , he ends with a common sentimentality endemic to Morton’s work as well: “the binding of the elements is love.” 32 Such a claim is made without any support, left to simply dazzle the reader, to impress upon her the importance of all these elemental colors and warn her off asking what exactly such a statement means . Is this not ideology rather than analysis? Are we allowed to ask about the relationship of bondage to love? Can we really pass by the auto-deconstruction manifested by such a statement appearing on a page numbered with the roman numeral “xxx” that causes us to ask if OOO doesn’t confuse love with a kind of pornotroping through the rainbow?

['Such a self-proclaimed “dark aesthetic” is unfortunately endemic to speculative realism’s forms.29 This colorism has not been interrogated for the way it repeats certain tropes and, indeed, political ontologies of anti-Blackness. Ecotheory, we are told, is all too often “conducted in the shade of ‘bright green’” which as a hue symbolically calls forth problematic themes and modalities that require one to be “affirmative, extraverted, and masculine” as well as “sunny, straightforward, ableist, holistic, hearty, and healthy”.30 Such ecotheory may sound good as the natural framework for a popular documentary on climate change, but it is not a framework supported by a wider experience of the environment that includes biomes which exhibit a diversity of colors. To some the conceit of the Prismatic Ecology volume may sound arbitrary or even silly, but if the invitation to riff off of the associations produced by thinking through different colors produces a form of ecological thinking beyond the limitations of the problematic tropes associated with “bright green” then it would be worth it. So, the question then follows, does the volume live up to this promise? And yet to answer such a question within the bound of environmental theory we have to also ask if such a promise is itself ecological? These “bright green” tropes identified by Cohen (and explicitly drawn from Timothy Morton) are indeed problematic. Marxist and other radical left-wing theorists have identified these themes and frameworks as being shared with the ideology of fascism, particular in the form found in Nazi Germany, and these tropes haunt contemporary environmentalism in troubling ways. But a prismatic ecology also surfaces themes that are very clearly “human-oriented”, as most of the colors in the prism are specifically human ways of seeing. This attempt in speculative realism to link realism with an anti-anthropocentrism often fails. This is true even of the work of Quentin Meillassoux, who is not a proponent of OOO but who is rightly or wrongly taken as the inspiration behind the attempt to move beyond “correlationism” to realism. A clear-eyed reading of After Finitude will note that the supposedly realist ways of reaching the primary qualities of the ancestral realm are couched in numbers that are tied specifically to the rotation of the (human populated) earth around the sun. This is an issue because, for Meillassoux and those who align with his brand of realism, any real knowledge of primary qualities must be grounded on knowledge that is not dependent upon human subjectivity. All of the numbers that Meillassoux claims provide access to the reality of primary qualities are dependent upon the relative reality of the earth’s rotation as translated into “years”.31 So, despite rightly diagnosing a problem, Prismatic Ecology does not move past that problem. Perhaps a supporter of OOO would claim that this slippage is actually the result of rejecting the nature-culture binary. The supposed troubling of the nature- culture binary is a central element of OOO, but it is not particularly new in environmental theory. Cohen and others are persistent in their slippage between emphasizing the autonomy of objects from the human subject and the demand to attend to particular questions of social justice produced by thinking that autonomy. But this is not truly a deconstruction of the nature-culture binary, rather it is the refusal to think deeply the relationship between justice and object that runs throughout these three books. Such important problems are often elided in OOO- inflected environmental theory. Remaining with Cohen’s introductory remarks to Prismatic Ecology, he ends with a common sentimentality endemic to Morton’s work as well: “the binding of the elements is love.”32 Such a claim is made without any support, left to simply dazzle the reader, to impress upon her the importance of all these elemental colors and warn her off asking what exactly such a statement means. Is this not ideology rather than analysis? Are we allowed to ask about the relationship of bondage to love? Can we really pass by the auto-deconstruction manifested by such a statement appearing on a page numbered with the roman numeral “xxx” that causes us to ask if OOO doesn’t confuse love with a kind of pornotroping through the rainbow? ', '', '']

[(0, 8), (9, 375), (376, 385), (385, 408), (409, 414)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Harrington-McGraw-Neg-5-%20Navy-Octas.docx

Michigan

HaMc

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/HaMc/Michigan-Harrington-McGraw-Neg-5-%2520Navy-Octas.docx

6885aadff285eb418b470784f4bf001768a7a76af00ee485ad1425fbb415db4c

Open, modular AI empowers mitigation and adaptation for existential climate change. Closed AI fails because climate is inherently local, which means that response must rely on local datasets.

Wai Chee Dimock 22, William Lampson Professor English and American Studies, Yale University, “What AI Can Do for Climate Change, and What Climate Change Can Do for AI,” Scientific American, 4/5/22,

it is “now or never” for drastic steps this existential threat will be upon us climate change transforms AI, to be more crisis-responsive , focused on large-scale hazards climate AI” could be a game changer AI needs participatory democracy , networks of innovators knowledgeable about locales and acting urgently computer needs input from crowdsourced networks Rather than imposing a single metric AI make it sharable for everyone input-friendly architecture encourages researchers to “ collaboratively develop open-access code climate affects each location differently

it is “now or never” for the planet. We are on track toward an unlivable world global temperatures will soar by 3 degrees twice as much as the agreed-upon limit. Unless we take drastic steps the full force of this existential threat will be upon us In this context some researchers have taken a i to turn it into a vehicle for climate action climate change is the catalyst that transforms AI, challenging it to be more crisis-responsive , more focused on innovations addressing large-scale hazards Such technology could be just what we need at this juncture. It could generate emergency action very different from the algorithmic regime we are familiar with this “ climate AI” could be a game changer in the tech ecosystem, as in the physical ecosystems now facing their worst risks. AI can play a key role in prediction, mitigation, and adaptation, in ways we can’t ignore a harmful technology can be repurposed to make climate change personal , visceral and unforgettable AI is phenomenally adaptive , able to pivot to entirely different demands under crisis conditions. It’s most innovative coming from practitioners galvanized by fast-approaching disasters to fulfill ambitious climate goals, AI needs participatory democracy , networks of innovators deeply knowledgeable about their locales and acting urgently state-of-the-art data sets aren’t enough the computer needs active input from crowdsourced networks To make a difference to at-risk ecosystems, AI needs engaged communities as much as multinational datasets. open-source will collect data on biomass of forests , crucial to monitoring climate change as forests absorb carbon when they flourish, and release carbon when they burn and die. Rather than imposing a single metric input allows research communities to remain diverse , sticking with their own methods AI then make it sharable for everyone more ambitiously, this input-friendly architecture encourages researchers to “ collaboratively develop algorithms and codes ” to meet project-specific needs. These new algorithms will go into an open-access code repository . Because climate affects each location differently , AI innovations rest on broad-based input as an empirical foundation that validates and diversifies . This subset of a i turning an unprecedented crisis into grounds for solidarity , couldn’t be more different from weapon the path to a noncatastrophic future is technologically feasible. “Climate AI” could be key of that equation

“now or never” unlivable world soar 3 degrees twice as much drastic steps full force existential threat a i vehicle for climate action catalyst transforms crisis-responsive innovations large-scale hazards just what we need generate emergency action different game changer can’t ignore harmful repurposed climate change personal visceral unforgettable phenomenally adaptive entirely different demands most innovative galvanized fast-approaching disasters participatory democracy networks knowledgeable locales acting urgently aren’t enough active input crowdsourced networks engaged communities open-source collect data biomass forests forests absorb carbon imposing single metric input remain diverse own methods AI sharable everyone input-friendly architecture collaboratively develop algorithms and codes open-access code repository location differently rest broad-based input empirical foundation validates diversifies subset a i grounds for solidarity couldn’t be more different could be key of that equation

['The April 4, 2022 report from the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change makes it clear that it is “now or never” for the planet. We are “firmly on track toward an unlivable world,” U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said in releasing the report. There’s every chance that global temperatures will soar by 3 degrees Celsius, twice as much as the agreed-upon 1.5 C limit. Unless we take drastic steps and cut down emissions by 43 percent within this decade, the full force of this existential threat will be upon us.', 'In this context, it is interesting that some researchers have taken artificial intelligence—a technology often considered an existential threat in its own right–and tried to turn it into a vehicle for climate action. Since I’m writing a book on nonhuman actors in the 21st century, I have a more-than-passing interest in how these experiments turn out and what they say about our collective future. Could it be that climate change is the catalyst that transforms AI, challenging it to be more crisis-responsive, more focused on innovations addressing large-scale hazards? Such technology could be just what we need at this juncture. It could generate emergency action very different from the profit-driven, bias-amplifying and misinformation-spreading algorithmic regime we are familiar with. Giving much larger play to input from the field, from networks of engaged participants, this “climate AI” could be a game changer in the tech ecosystem, as in the physical ecosystems now facing their worst risks.', 'This new ethos was reflected in a report written by the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence and presented at the COP26 climate summit last November. The 15 co-authors, researchers and activists from 12 countries, argue that while we need to be vigilant about racial and gender biases and the tendency of big data to perpetuate inequities, AI can nonetheless play a key role in prediction, mitigation, and adaptation, in ways we can’t afford to ignore.', 'Take the visualization platform This Climate Does Not Exist, timed to coincide with the COP26 report. Built by motivated young researchers, this project demonstrates that a harmful technology can be repurposed to make climate change personal, visceral and unforgettable for the general public. Using the same machine learning algorithm that swaps visual and audio data to produce fabricated, hyperrealistic videos called deepfakes, it generates similarly real-looking views of floods or wildfires for any street address.', 'We have become “a bit blasé” about climate disasters when they happen to strangers, says lead researcher Sasha Luccioni, a postdoc at the Quebec Artificial Intelligence Institute. Seeing our own houses standing in several feet of water makes us take notice.', 'While the full impact of This Climate Does Not Exist remains to be seen, what seems clear is that AI is phenomenally adaptive, able to pivot to entirely different demands under crisis conditions. It’s most innovative coming from practitioners galvanized by fast-approaching disasters. Two other initiatives, from Microsoft and NASA, make clear that to fulfill ambitious climate goals, AI needs a participatory democracy, networks of on-site innovators deeply knowledgeable about their locales and acting urgently for just that reason.', 'Microsoft is building a planetary computer as the centerpiece of its AI for Earth program. First proposed in 2019 by the company’s chief environmental officer Lucas Joppa, it is designed to work as a geospatial search engine to expedite climate decision-making and “avert environmental disaster.” Toward that end, it aggregates data from NASA, NOAA and the European Space Agency, as well as data collected through the partnership between the U.K. Met Office, the Chinese Meteorological Administration and the Institute of Atmospheric Physics in the Chinese Academy of Sciences.', 'But state-of-the-art data sets alone aren’t enough. In a 2020 blog post, Microsoft president Brad Smith wrote that the planetary computer needs active input from the crowdsourced networks receiving grants from his company, such as iNaturalist, a mobile app platform for amateur ecologists to upload and share biodiversity information, now available in 37 languages. The “planetary computer is incredibly complex,” he stated, “and we cannot build it alone” without “the work and demands of our grantees.” To make a difference to at-risk ecosystems, AI needs engaged communities as much as multinational datasets.', 'The recently announced Multi-Mission Algorithm and Analysis Platform, jointly developed by NASA and the European Space Agency, is emphatic on this same point. The open-source project will begin by collecting data on the biomass of forests, crucial to monitoring climate change as forests absorb carbon when they flourish, and release carbon when they burn and die. Since forest types vary greatly from region to region, and since the data will be coming from a variety of sources, “including satellite instruments, the International Space Station, and airborne and ground campaigns,” the job for AI is to combine these heterogeneous data sets and make them “interoperable.”', 'Rather than imposing a single, supposedly universal, metric across the planet, the input protocol from NASA and ESA allows research communities to remain diverse, sticking with their own languages and methods. The cloud-based AI platform then integrates the data analytically to make it sharable for everyone. Even more ambitiously, this input-friendly architecture also encourages researchers to “collaboratively develop algorithms and codes” to meet project-specific needs. These new algorithms will go into an open-access code repository. The program is designed throughout to minimize barriers to participation and make sure that anyone interested in environmental data can pitch in, turning this platform into a vehicle for on-the-ground vigilance and inventiveness.', 'Because climate change affects each location differently, AI innovations here rest on broad-based input as an empirical foundation that motivates, validates and diversifies. This subset of artificial intelligence, turning an unprecedented crisis into grounds for solidarity, couldn’t be more different from social media algorithms, facial recognition software and autonomous weapon systems. The U.N. report notes that the path to a noncatastrophic future is technologically feasible. “Climate AI” could be a key part of that equation. It’s up to us to make the most of it.']

[(9, 18)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-ShVe-Aff-3---Kentucky-Octas.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

ebda1a5d27f20b44a3e38c7db8697791d9e8a34fbc34706aeab763510b6b86a8

Only preserving the “sovereign” solves short term eco-crisis – alt’s mindset shift takes too long

Parenti 13 (Christian Parenti, Christian Parenti is a Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow, contributing editor at The Nation and a visiting professor at Brooklyn College, CUNY, “A Radical Approach to the Climate Crisis” [http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-radical-approach-to-the-climate-crisis] Summer //mtc)

halting emissions is pressing time has run out radical transformation would be long and drawn-out marked by years of mass education of a scale not seen since the 30s Nor is there guarantee that the new system would not degrade forests A approach to climate change begins not with a long-term vision of an alternate society but with an engagement with the compressed timeframe that climate science implies. in the short-term realistic climate politics are reformist The fastest way to do it is to reorient procurement away from fossil fuel and toward clean tech If the climate unravels, all bets are off. progressive visions will be swallowed by the rising seas

Capitalism may be incapable of accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world However, that is not the same question as whether capitalism can solve the immediate climate crisis. halting greenhouse gas emissions is a much more specific problem , the most pressing subset of the larger apocalyptic panorama time has run out . radical social transformation would be a very long and drawn-out marked by years of mass education and organizing of a scale not seen since the 30s Nor is there guarantee that the new system would not also degrade forests and find itself addicted to coal and oil A more radical approach to the crisis of climate change begins not with a long-term vision of an alternate society but with an honest engagement with the very compressed timeframe that current climate science implies. In the age of climate change, these are the real parameters of politics there exist positive-feedback loops and tipping points the U S must cut emissions 25 percent to 40 percent by 2020 This would require 10 percent reductions per annum in the short-term realistic climate politics are reformist The fastest way to do it is to reorient procurement away from fossil fuel and toward clean tech If the climate system unravels, all bets are off. progressive visions will be swallowed by the rising seas of climate chaos

However, that is not the same question as whether capitalism can solve the immediate climate crisis. halting greenhouse gas emissions is a much more specific problem apocalyptic panorama time has run out . radical social transformation would be a very long and drawn-out scale long-term engagement compressed timeframe positive-feedback loops and tipping points reformist fastest If the climate system unravels, all bets are off.

['Several strands of green thinking maintain that capitalism is incapable of a sustainable relationship with non-human nature because, as an economic system, capitalism has a growth imperative while the earth is finite. One finds versions of this argument in the literature of eco-socialism, deep ecology, eco-anarchism, and even among many mainstream greens who, though typically declining to actually name the economic system, are fixated on the dangers of “growth.”¶ All this may be true. Capitalism, a system in which privately owned firms must continuously out-produce and out-sell their competitors, may be incapable of accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world. However, that is not the same question as whether capitalism can solve the more immediate climate crisis.¶ Because of its magnitude, the climate crisis can appear as the sum total of all environmental problems—deforestation, over-fishing, freshwater depletion, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, chemical contamination. But halting greenhouse gas emissions is a much more specific problem, the most pressing subset of the larger apocalyptic panorama.¶ And the very bad news is, time has run out. As I write this, news arrives of an ice-free arctic summer by 2050. Scientists once assumed that would not happen for hundreds of years.¶ Dealing with climate change by first achieving radical social transformation—be it a socialist or anarchist or deep-ecological/neo-primitive revolution, or a nostalgia-based localista conversion back to a mythical small-town capitalism—would be a very long and drawn-out, maybe even multigenerational, struggle. It would be marked by years of mass education and organizing of a scale and intensity not seen in most core capitalist states since the 1960s or even the 1930s.¶ Nor is there any guarantee that the new system would not also degrade the soil, lay waste to the forests, despoil bodies of water, and find itself still addicted to coal and oil. Look at the history of “actually existing socialism” before its collapse in 1991. To put it mildly, the economy was not at peace with nature. Or consider the vexing complexities facing the left social democracies of Latin America. Bolivia, and Ecuador, states run by socialists who are beholden to very powerful, autonomous grassroots movements, are still very dependent on petroleum revenue.¶ A more radical approach to the crisis of climate change begins not with a long-term vision of an alternate society but with an honest engagement with the very compressed timeframe that current climate science implies. In the age of climate change, these are the real parameters of politics.¶ Hard Facts¶ The scientific consensus, expressed in peer-reviewed and professionally vetted and published scientific literature, runs as follows: For the last 650,000 years atmospheric levels of CO2—the primary heat-trapping gas—have hovered at around 280 parts per million (ppm). At no point in the preindustrial era did CO2 concentrations go above 300 ppm. By 1959, they had reached 316 ppm and are now over 400 ppm. And the rate of emissions is accelerating. Since 2000, the world has pumped almost 100 billion tons of carbon into the atmosphere—about a quarter of all CO2 emissions since 1750. At current rates, CO2 levels will double by mid-century.¶ Climate scientists believe that any increase in average global temperatures beyond 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels will lead to dangerous climate change, causing large-scale desertification, crop failure, inundation of coastal cities, mass migration to higher and cooler ground, widespread extinctions of flora and fauna, proliferating disease, and possible social collapse. Furthermore, scientists now understand that the earth’s climate system has not evolved in a smooth linear fashion. Paleoclimatology has uncovered evidence of sudden shifts in the earth’s climate regimes. Ice ages have stopped and started not in a matter of centuries, but decades. Sea levels (which are actually uneven across the globe) have risen and fallen more rapidly than was once believed.¶ Throughout the climate system, there exist dangerous positive-feedback loops and tipping points. A positive-feedback loop is a dynamic in which effects compound, accelerate, or amplify the original cause. Tipping points in the climate system reflect the fact that causes can build up while effects lag. Then, when the effects kick in, they do so all at once, causing the relatively sudden shift from one climate regime to another.¶ Thus, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says rich countries like the United States must cut emissions 25 percent to 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020—only seven years away—and thereafter make precipitous cuts to 90 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. This would require global targets of 10 percent reductions in emissions per annum, starting now. Those sorts of emissions reductions have only occurred during economic depressions. Russia’s near total economic collapse in the early 1990s saw a 37 percent decrease in CO2 emissions from 1990 to 1995, under conditions that nobody wants to experience. ¶ The political implications of all this are mind-bending. As daunting as it may sound, it means that it is this society and these institutions that must cut emissions. That means, in the short-term, realistic climate politics are reformist politics, even if they are conceived of as part of a longer-term anti-capitalist project of totally economic re-organization.¶ Dreaming the Rational¶ Of course, successful reformism often involves radical means and revolutionary demands. What other sort of political pressure would force the transnational ruling classes to see the scientific truth of the situation? But let us assume for a second that political elites faced enough pressure to force them to act. What would be the rational first steps to stave off climate chaos?¶ The watchwords of the climate discussion are mitigation and adaptation—that is, we must mitigate the causes of climate change while adapting to its effects. Mitigation means drastically cutting our production of CO2 and other greenhouse gases, such as methane and chlorofluorocarbons, that prevent the sun’s heat from radiating back out to space.¶ Mitigation means moving toward clean energy sources, such as wind, solar, geothermal, and tidal kinetic power. It means closing coal-fired power plants, weaning our economy off fossil fuels, building a smart electrical grid, and making massive investments in carbon-capture and -sequestration technologies. (That last bit of techno-intervention would have to be used not as a justification to keep burning coal, as is its current function, but to strip out atmospheric CO2 rapidly and get back to 350 ppm and away from the dangerous tipping points.)¶ Adaptation, on the other hand, means preparing to live with the effects of climatic changes, some of which are already underway and some of which are inevitable. Adaptation is both a technical and a political challenge.¶ Technical adaptation means transforming our relationship to non-human nature as nature transforms. Examples include building seawalls around vulnerable coastal cities, giving land back to mangroves and everglades so they can act to break tidal surges during giant storms, opening wildlife migration corridors so species can move away from the equator as the climate warms, and developing sustainable forms of agriculture that can function on an industrial scale even as weather patterns gyrate wildly.¶ Political adaptation, on the other hand, means transforming social relations: devising new ways to contain, avoid, and deescalate the violence that climate change is fueling and will continue to fuel. That will require progressive economic redistribution and more sustainable forms of development. It will also require a new diplomacy of peace building.¶ Unfortunately, another type of political adaptation is already under way—that of the armed lifeboat. This adaptation responds to climate change by arming, excluding, forgetting, repressing, policing, and killing. The question then becomes how to conceive of adaptation and mitigation as a project of radical reform—reforms that achieve qualitative change in the balance of power between the classes.¶ The core problem in the international effort to cut emissions is fundamentally the intransigence of the United States: it failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and has played an obstructionist role at subsequent negotiations. Domestically, progress has been just as frustratingly slow. We have no carbon tax, nor any program of robust investment in clean technology. Even the minimal production tax credit for clean energy generated by solar, wind, and hydro power has not been locked in as a long-term commitment. This creates uncertainty about prices, and, as a result, private investment in clean tech is stalling.¶ China, on the other hand, though now the world’s second-largest economy and largest greenhouse gas polluter, is moving ahead with a fast-growing clean-tech industry—that is to say, with mitigation. The Chinese wind sector has grown steadily since 2001. “According to new statistics from the China Electricity Council,” reported American Progress senior fellow Joseph Romm, “China’s wind power production actually increased more than coal power production for the first time ever in 2012.” This growth is the result, in part, of robust government support: China has invested $200.8 billion in stimulus funding for clean tech. Estimates of U.S. stimulus funding for clean technology range from $50 to $80 billion.¶ The European Union is also moving forward to create a €1 trillion regional supergrid. Germany and Portugal in particular are moving aggressively to expand their already quite large clean-tech sectors. Action in the core industrial economies is essential because only they have the infrastructure that can propel the clean-tech revolution and transform the world economy.¶ A De Facto Carbon Tax¶ Environmental economists tend to agree that the single most important thing the United States could do to accelerate the shift to clean energy would be to impose a carbon tax. Despite our political sclerosis and fossil fuel fundamentalism, the means to do that already exist.¶ First and foremost, there is the Environmental Protection Agency, which could achieve significant and immediate emissions reductions using nothing more than existing laws and current technologies. According to Kassie Siegel at the Center for Biological Diversity, “The Clean Air Act can achieve everything we need: a 40 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions over 1990 levels by 2020.”¶ Rather boring in tone and dense with legalistic detail, the ongoing fight over EPA¶ rulemaking is probably the most important environmental battle in a generation. Since 2007, thanks to the pressure and lawsuits of green activists, the EPA has had enormous—but under-utilized—power. That was the year when the Supreme Court ruled, in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, that the agency should determine whether greenhouse gases threaten human health. In December 2010, the EPA published a science-based “endangerment finding,” which found that CO2 and five other greenhouse gases are, in fact, dangerous to human life because they cause global warming.¶ Once the EPA issues an endangerment finding, it is legally bound to promulgate regulations to address the problem. The first of these post–Massachusetts v. EPA “tailoring rules” were for “mobile sources.” Between 2011 and 2012, regulations for cars and for trucks went into effect. Then the EPA set strict limits for new power plants in 2012. But other major sources of greenhouse gas pollution—like existing electric power plants (which pump out roughly 40 percent of the nation’s total GHG emissions), oil refineries, cement plants, steel mills, and shipping—have yet to be properly regulated pursuant to Massachusetts v. EPA.¶ If the EPA were to use the Clean Air Act—and do so “with extreme prejudice”—it could impose a de facto carbon tax. Industries would still be free to burn dirty fossil fuels, but they would have to use very expensive, and in some cases nonexistent, new technology to meet emission standards. Or they would have to pay very steep and mounting fines for their emissions. Such penalties could reach thousands of dollars per day, per violation. Thus, a de facto carbon tax. Then cheap fossil fuel energy would become expensive, driving investment toward carbon-neutral forms of clean energy like wind and solar. For extra measure we could end fossil fuel subsidies. Before long, it would be more profitable to invest in clean energy sources than dangerous and filthy ones.¶ Big Green Buy and U.S. “Shadow Socialism”¶ According to clean-tech experts, innovation is now less important than rapid, large-scale implementation. In other words, developing a clean-energy economy is not about new gadgets but about new policies. Most of the energy technologies we need already exist. You know what they are: wind farms, concentrated solar power plants, geothermal and tidal power, all feeding an efficient smart grid that, in turn, powers electric vehicles and radically more energy-efficient buildings.¶ But leading clean technologies remain slightly more expensive than the old dirty-tech alternatives. This “price gap” is holding back the mass application of clean technology. The simple fact is that capitalist economies will not switch to clean energy until it is cheaper than fossil fuel. The fastest way to close the price gap is to build large clean-tech markets that allow for economies of scale. But what is the fastest way to build those markets? More research grants? More tax credits? More clumsy pilot programs?¶ Government procurement is one of the hidden tools of American capitalism’s “shadow socialism.”¶ No. The fastest, simplest way to do it is to reorient government procurement away from fossil fuel energy and toward clean energy and technology—to use the government’s vast spending power to create a market for green energy. Elsewhere, I have called this the Big Green Buy. Consider this: federal, state, and local government constitute more than 38 percent of our GDP. In more concrete terms, Uncle Sam owns or leases more than 430,000 buildings (mostly large office buildings) and 650,000 vehicles. (Add state and local government activity, and all those numbers grow by about a third again.) The federal government is the world’s largest consumer of energy and vehicles, and the nation’s largest greenhouse gas emitter.¶ Government procurement is one of the hidden tools of American capitalism’s “shadow socialism.” By shadow socialism I refer to the massively important but often overlooked role of government planning, investment, subsidy, procurement, and ownership in the economic development of American capitalism. A detailed account of that history is offered in Michael Lind’s book Land of Promise. From railroads, to telecommunications, and aviation and all the attendant sub-industries of these sectors, government has provided the capital and conditions for fledging industries to grow large. For example, government didn’t just fund the invention of the microprocessor; it was also the first major consumer of the device. Throughout the 1950s, more than half of IBM’s revenue came from government contracts. Along with money, these contracts provided a guaranteed market and stability for IBM and its suppliers, and thus attracted private investment—all of which helped create the modern computer industry.¶ Now consider the scale of the problem: our asphalt transportation arteries are clogged with 250 million gasoline-powered vehicles sucking down an annual $200 to $300 billion worth of fuel from more than 121,000 filling stations. Add to that the cost of heating and cooling buildings, jet travel, shipping, powering industry, and the energy-gobbling servers and mainframes that are the Internet, and the U.S. energy economy reaches a spectacular annual tab of 1.2 trillion dollars.¶ A redirection of government purchasing would create massive markets for clean power, electric vehicles, and efficient buildings, as well as for more sustainably produced furniture, paper, cleaning supplies, uniforms, food, and services. If government bought green, it would drive down marketplace prices sufficiently that the momentum toward green tech would become self-reinforcing and spread to the private sector.¶ Executive Order 13514, which Obama signed in 2009, directed all federal agencies to¶ increase energy efficiency; measure, report, and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions from direct and indirect activities; conserve and protect water resources through efficiency, reuse, and storm water management; eliminate waste, recycle, and prevent pollution; leverage agency acquisitions to foster markets for sustainable technologies and environmentally preferable materials, products, and services; design, construct, maintain, and operate high performance sustainable buildings in sustainable locations.¶ The executive order also stipulates that federal agencies immediately start purchasing 95 percent through green-certified programs and achieve a 28 percent greenhouse gas reduction by 2020. But it has not been robustly implemented.¶ Government has tremendous latitude to leverage green procurement because it requires no new taxes, programs, or spending, nor is it hostage to the holy grail of sixty votes in the Senate. It is simply a matter of changing how the government buys its energy, vehicles, and services. Yes, in many cases clean tech costs more up front, but in most cases, savings arrive soon afterward. And government—because of its size—is a market mover that can leverage money-saving deals if it wishes to. ¶ Protest and the “Relative Autonomy” of the State¶ Why would the capitalist state move to euthanize the fossil fuel industry, that most powerful fraction of the capitalist class? Or put another way, how can the state regain some of its “relative autonomy” from capital? History indicates that massive, crisis-producing protest is one of the most common reasons a modern state will act against the interests of specific entrenched elites and for the “general interest” of society. When the crisis of protest is bad enough, entrenched elites are forced to take a loss as the state imposes ameliorative action for the greater good of society.¶ Clearly, we need to build a well-organized, broadly supported, yet tactically and strategically radical movement to demand proper climate policy. For such a movement to be effective it must use myriad tactics, from lawsuits and lobbying to direct action such as tree-sits, road blockades, and occupations aimed at the infrastructure of the fossil fuel industry. Only by disrupting the working of the political and economic system as a whole can we forge a consensus that ending the fossil fuel sector is essential. (The work of Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward is, in my opinion, still among the best in tracing the dynamic of this process of rebellion and reform.)¶ At question, then, is not just the state’s capacity to evolve, but the capacity of the American people to organize and mobilize on a massive scale. Far be it from me to say exactly how such movements could or should be built, other than the way they always have been: by trial and error and with good leadership. Movement building is a mass and organic process.¶ The Rebellion of Nature¶ Along with protest, a more organic source of crisis is already underway and may also help scare political elites into confronting big carbon. Climate change is a “rebellion of nature,” by which I mean the disruption caused by ecological breakdown. The history of environmental regulation in the West is, in many ways, the story of protest and advocacy combining with the rebellion of nature at the local (urban) scale. Together, they have forced rudimentary regulation in the name of health and sanitation.¶ By the 1830s, America’s industrial cities had become perfect incubators of epidemic disease, particularly cholera and yellow fever. Like climate change today, these diseases hit the poor hardest, but they also sickened and killed the wealthy. Class privilege offered some protection, but it was not a guarantee of safety. And so it was that middle-class “goo-goos” and “mugwumps” began a series of reforms that contained and eventually defeated the urban epidemics.¶ First, garbage-eating hogs were banned from city streets, then public sanitation programs of refuse collection began, sewers were built, safe public water provided, and housing codes were developed and enforced. Eventually, the epidemics of cholera stopped. Soon other infectious diseases, such as pulmonary tuberculosis, typhus, and typhoid, were largely eliminated. At the scale of the urban, capitalist society solved an environmental crisis through planning and public investment.¶ Climate change is a problem of an entirely different order of magnitude, but these past solutions to smaller environmental crises offer lessons. Ultimately, solving the climate crisis—like the nineteenth-century victory over urban squalor and epidemic contagions—will require a re-legitimation of the state’s role in the economy.¶ The modern story of local air pollution offers another example of the “rebellion of nature.” As Jim McNeil outlines in Something New Under The Sun, smog inundations in industrial cities of the United States and Europe used to kill many people. In 1879–1880 smog killed 3,000 Londoners, and in Glasgow a 1909 inversion—where cold air filled with smoke from burning coal was trapped near the ground—killed 1,063. As late as 1952, a pattern of cold and still air killed 4,000 people in London, according to McNeil, and even more according to others. By 1956, the Britons had passed a clean air act that drove coal out of the major cities. In the United States there was a similar process. In 1953, smog in New York killed between 170 and 260 people, and as late as 1966 a smog inversion killed 169 New Yorkers. All of this helped generate pressure for the Clean Air Act of 1970.¶ Today, a similar process is underway in China. Local air quality is so bad that it is forcing changes to Chinese energy policy. A major World Bank study has estimated that “the combined health and non-health cost of outdoor air and water pollution for China’s economy comes to around $US 100 billion a year (or about 5.8% of the country’s GDP).” People across China are protesting pollution. Foreign executives are turning down positions in Beijing because of the toxic atmospheric stew that western visitors have taken to calling “airpocalypse.” The film director Chen Kaige, who won the Palme d’Or for his 1993 film Farewell My Concubine, told the world he couldn’t think or make films because of the Chinese capital’s appallingly bad air.¶ These local pressures are a large part of what is driving Chinese investment in renewable energy. Last year China added more energy capacity from wind than from the coal sector.¶ Capitalism vs. Nature?¶ Some of the first thinkers to note a conflict between capitalism and non-human nature were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. They came to their ecology through examining the local problem of relations between town and country—expressed simultaneously as urban pollution and rural soil depletion. In exploring this question they relied on the pioneering work of soil chemist Justus von Liebig. And from this small-scale problem, they developed the idea of capitalism creating a rift in the metabolism of natural processes.¶ Here is how Marx explained the dilemma:¶ Capitalist production collects the population together in great centers, and causes the urban population to achieve an ever-growing preponderance. This has two results. On the one hand it concentrates the historical motive force of society; on the other hand, it disturbs the metabolic interaction between man and the earth, i.e., it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; hence it hinders the operation of the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil….All progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil.¶ And as with “soil robbing,” so too concentrations of atmospheric CO2: the natural systems are out of sync; their elements are being rearranged and redistributed, ending up as garbage and pollution.¶ It may well be true that capitalism is incapable of accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world. But that is not the same question as whether or not capitalism can solve the climate crisis. Climate mitigation and adaptation are merely an effort to buy time to address the other larger set of problems that is the whole ecological crisis.¶ This is both a pessimistic and an optimistic view. Although capitalism has not overcome the fundamental conflict between its infinite growth potential and the finite parameters of the planet’s pollution sinks, it has, in the past, addressed specific environmental crises.¶ Anyone who thinks the existing economic system must be totally transformed before we can deal with the impending climate crisis is delusional or in willful denial of the very clear findings of climate science. If the climate system unravels, all bets are off. The many progressive visions born of the Enlightenment will be swallowed and forgotten by the rising seas or smashed to pieces by the wrathful storms of climate chaos.']

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ndtceda

Emory-BePa-Aff-2---Kentucky-Round-2.docx

Emory

BePa

d818053810a70ce36dc24c188763c9716823afa100eb36c0cbb47abd4209d906

Command accountability as a mechanism for meaningful human control solves—it allows battlefield flexibility while maintaining human control over autonomous weapons and fits within existing international legal frameworks.

Kraska, Professor of International Maritime Law at the US Naval War College, 2021 (James, “”, International Law Studies, 97 INT’L L. STUD. 407 (2021), , DoA 8/11/2021, DVOG)

The quest to develop a standard for human-machine integration in LAWS is motivated by the desire to ensure that humans, who are responsible under LOAC for decisions on the battlefield, are held accountable Human control over AI systems does not take away the responsibility of accountability no new legal standard is needed to ensure accountability . The existing principles in LOAC provide comprehensive and coherent framework that governs the use of force, including AI networked weapons Human accountability for the employment and effects of AI weapons derives from the military doctrine of command accountability. The commander has direct or individual accountability for all actions taken during war, including the employment of LAWS.

The quest to develop a standard for human-machine integration in LAWS is motivated by the desire to ensure that humans, who are responsible under LOAC for decisions on the battlefield, are held accountable for the results of those decisions. Human control over AI systems will be exercised in a different manner because it changes the tasks that humans do in armed conflict, but it does not take away the responsibility of humans to create a gap in accountability . it is difficult not to conclude that it will be impossible to assign human responsibility for the actions of AWS through some type of globally-accepted standard. As Russia stated, “[a] ttempts to develop certain universal parameters of the so-called “critical functions,” for the wide variety of anticipated systems, “can hardly give practical results.” Fortunately, no new legal standard is needed to ensure accountability of AWS during armed conflict . The existing principles and rules in LOAC already provide a comprehensive and coherent framework that governs the use of force, including AI networked weapons . Human accountability for the employment and effects of AI weapons derives from the military doctrine of command accountability. The commander has direct or individual accountability for all actions taken during war, including the employment of LAWS. Military commanders bear the burden of full accountability for the entire scope of their prosecution of the war effort, including employment of appropriate weapons during the conflict, how those weapons are applied in the operational environment, and the consequences for their successes and their failures, both anticipated and unforeseen.

['The quest to develop a standard for human-machine integration in LAWS is motivated by the desire to ensure that humans, who are responsible under LOAC for decisions on the battlefield, are held accountable for the results of those decisions. Human control over AI systems will be exercised in a different manner because it changes the tasks that humans do in armed conflict, but it does not take away the responsibility of humans to create a gap in accountability. But no matter what terms or standards are used, for some observers, if there is a gap it can never be closed for AI systems because the machine has an informational advantage over the operator, whether it is in navigation of autonomous vehicles or radar-based flight control.106 Humans are too slow, incapable of sifting through enough data quickly enough to control the analytical process. This perspective concludes that the designer of the machine gradually loses control over it, transferring control from the human to the machine itself.107 Humans in the loop are not just redundant–as illustrated by the Aegis system–they are disadvantageous.108 In this respect, it is difficult not to conclude that it will be impossible to assign human responsibility for the actions of AWS through some type of globally-accepted standard.109 As Russia stated, “[a]ttempts to develop certain universal parameters of the so-called “critical functions,” for the wide variety of anticipated systems, “can hardly give practical results.”110 In the end, the CCW GGE process likely will prove a disappointment. Any agreement that emerges from the GGE is likely to be too vague to provide meaningful guidance. Fortunately, no new legal standard is needed to ensure accountability of AWS during armed conflict. The existing principles and rules in LOAC already provide a comprehensive and coherent framework that governs the use of force, including AI networked weapons. Human accountability for the employment and effects of AI weapons derives from the military doctrine of command accountability. The commander has direct or individual accountability for all actions taken during war, including the employment of LAWS. Military commanders bear the burden of full accountability for the entire scope of their prosecution of the war effort, including employment of appropriate weapons during the conflict, how those weapons are applied in the operational environment, and the consequences for their successes and their failures, both anticipated and unforeseen.']

[(0, 6), (6, 7), (8, 76), (77, 81), (81, 81)]

ndtceda

Emory-MoCh-Aff-Wake-Round-4.docx

Emory

MoCh

0c2808f71fa408c314539ae8884d730321072d518b822954cd2bf81ae1723dfd

Uncontrolled agents aren’t used so extinction is impossible.

Juling 23 - (Dominik Juling​, Master of Science M.Sc., Conflict Studies from The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Master of Science M.Sc., Environmental Science at the Yale School of the Environment; Journal of Advanced Military Studies Vol. 14 No. 1, Spring 2023, "Future Bioterror and Biowarfare Threats," doa: 8-27-2023) url: https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-vol-14-no-1/Future-Bioterror-and-Biowarfare-Threats/

bio weapons not tactically or strategically usable against humans because of uncontrolled spread coupled with highly complex production and stabilization However advances make it possible to produce limited bio weapons .

Unlike chemical weapons, bio logical weapons have not been tactically or strategically usable against humans because of their potentially uncontrolled spread , coupled with their highly complex production and stabilization outside of laboratory conditions. However , advances in biotechnology make it possible to circumvent these previous barriers and produce limited bio logical weapons .

tactically strategically usable potentially uncontrolled spread highly complex production stabilization limited bio logical weapons

['', 'To provide an entry point and broad overview of the topic, the article provides a short history of biowarfare and bioterrorism and discusses the future biological threat environment, influential megatrends, emerging and disruptive technologies, possible biological threats by 2030, current and future means of delivery, and possible actors. It is argued that the threat from deliberately deployed biological agents will increase and change in nature by 2030. Unlike, for example, chemical weapons, biological weapons have not been tactically or strategically usable against humans because of their potentially uncontrolled spread, even to unprotected friendly forces, coupled with their highly complex production and stabilization outside of laboratory conditions. However, advances in biotechnology in modifying existing pathogens and creating entirely new ones now make it possible to circumvent these previous barriers and produce limited biological weapons for the first time. At the same time, it has already become cheaper, easier, and safer to produce dangerous agents, even more so by 2030. New technologies are also helping to deliver biological agents more effectively. In dual-use terms, by 2030 numerous civilian biotechnological successes will create a vast array of possibly ill-intentioned weapons that will provide NATO’s hostile actors with a wide range of methods. ']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaPa-Aff-5--Navy-Round-2.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

dc42e595440e9af9da5ffc7964951d58eec9c0ddb6c615b33acde7b4247e4565

b---IRB will shut it down.

Emily A. Largent et al. 2012. Emily A. Largent BSN, Program in Health Policy at Harvard University, Department of Bioethics at the Clinical Center at the National Institutes of Health. Christine Grady, PhD and RN, Department of Bioethics at the Clinical Center at the National Institutes of Health. Franklin G. Miller PhD, Department of Bioethics at the Clinical Center at the National Institutes of Health. Alan Wertheimer, PhD, Department of Bioethics at the Clinical Center at the National Institutes of Health. “MONEY, COERCION, AND UNDUE INDUCEMENT: A SURVEY OF ATTITUDES ABOUT PAYMENTS TO RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS”. IRB. 2012 Jan-Feb; 34(1): 1–8. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4214066/

national survey of attitudes of IRB considerable ethical concern payment constitute coercion or undue inducement Most agreed subjects are coerced if payment makes them participate when they otherwise would not views interfere with recruitment of research participants

conducted national survey of the attitudes of IRB members and human subjects protection professionals towards payment of research subjects considerable ethical concern that payment could constitute coercion or undue inducement . Most agreed that subjects are coerced if the offer of payment makes them participate when they otherwise would not views may interfere with the recruitment of research participants

['We conducted a national survey of the attitudes of IRB members and human subjects protection professionals towards payment of research subjects. Respondents indicated considerable ethical concern that payment could constitute coercion or undue inducement. Most agreed that subjects are coerced if the offer of payment makes them participate when they otherwise would not or when the offer of payment causes them to feel that they have no reasonable alternative but to participate. Most respondents had similar views about undue influence. The excessively expansive or inconsistent views about coercion and undue influence held by IRB members and human subjects professionals may interfere with the recruitment of research participants by needlessly limiting the payments offered to them and thereby impede valuable research without true cause.', '', '']

[(9, 23), (26, 28)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-Georgetown-College-Tournament-Round-3.docx

Emory

MiPi

ad98cb4a14dbe54852a97a22def32016c4db0e5e6ea08b8460466c704bb1bf2f

China perceives it can reap all the benefits of the global order now---means they’ll effectively contribute to global problem-solving

Suisheng Zhao 18, professor and director of the Center for China-US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver; Member of the Board of Governors of the US Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; Member of the National Committee on US-China Relations, 2018, “A Revisionist Stakeholder: China and the Post-World War II World Order,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 27, Iss. 113, p. 643-658

China’s transformation from a revolutionary state to stakeholder reflected its evolving position in globalization. Because the impact of globalization on sovereignty is determined by development level globalization represented a threat when China was weak as a great power, China can reap benefits without concern over sovereignty China has taken increasingly active steps toward bolstering international institutions to solve global problems abstentions on UN resolutions declined significantly One of the main obstacles to a climate agreement in 2009, China changed course , signed Paris stayed in spite of US withdrawal

China’s transformation from a revolutionary state to a stakeholder reflected its evolving position in globalization. Because the impact of globalization on state sovereignty is determined by the development level of individual states, globalization represented a significant threat to state sovereignty when China was relatively weak Rising as a great power, China can reap the benefits of globalization without undue concern over the loss of sovereignty As China needs the world as much as the world needs China , China found a stake in the order China has taken increasingly active steps toward bolstering international institutions to solve global problems its abstentions on UN resolutions have declined significantly . It supported most of the votes for sanctions One of the main obstacles to a global climate change agreement in 2009, China changed course , signed Paris and stayed in spite of the US withdrawal

transformation benefits China needs the world as much as the world needs China bolstering international institutions to solve global problems changed course

['China’s transformation from a revolutionary state to a stakeholder partially reflected its evolving position in globalization. Because the impact of globalization on state sovereignty is determined largely by the development level of individual states, globalization represented a significant threat to state sovereignty when China was relatively weak. Rising as a great power, China can reap the benefits of globalization without undue concern over the loss of sovereignty. China’s increasing prominence both allowed and obligated it to take on an influential role. As China needs the world as much as the world needs China, China found a stake in the order.', 'As a stakeholder, China has taken increasingly active steps toward bolstering international institutions to solve global problems. For decades, China was a fairly indifferent member of the UN Security Council, often abstaining from votes. But its abstentions on UN resolutions have declined significantly. It supported most of the votes for sanctions, including signing on to sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear programs. One of the main obstacles to a global climate change agreement at the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009, China changed course, signed the Paris Climate Accord in 2016 and has stayed in spite of the US withdrawal.']

[(9, 15), (15, 16)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Agbede-Stamenkovic-Diez%20Aff-NUSO-Round6.docx

Northwestern

AgSt

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/AgSt/Northwestern-Agbede-Stamenkovic-Diez%2520Aff-NUSO-Round6.docx

4ecf6f00717ab9b02cc1936eaf709215530d4a3d1fa05c4a4545666f04530a05

Entanglement is wrong---objects decohere at the macroscopic level.

David Waldner 17. Associate Professor of politics at the University of Virginia. “Schrödinger’s Cat and the Dog That Didn’t Bark: Why Quantum Mechanics is (Probably) Irrelevant to the Social Sciences.” Critical Review 29.2: 199-233.

Due to decoherence there is no quantum weirdness at the macroscopic level we do not need to become quantum scientists The question is not new the consensus among physicists that lived experience exists described adequately by Newtonian mechanics The brain is macroscopic if such objects exist despite quantum microfoundations, then no theory can be true rests on erasing the bright line between the quantum and classical domains there are separate domains , a microlevel and a classical The threshold is generated by decoherence Decoherence filters out quantum effects

while there is abundant weirdness at the quantum level, it almost entirely remains there Due to a phenomenon called quantum decoherence there is virtually no quantum weirdness at the macroscopic level of our everyday experience there is nothing for the dog to bark at The moral of this story is that, in all likelihood, we do not need to become quantum social scientists The question of whether the social sciences need to be quantum is not new Almond and Genco considered whether quantum mechanics should be the basis of a new social science that rejected Newton’s mechanics while agreeing that the social and political world could not be described with clocklike determinism, they doubted that quantum mechanics provided an adequate model for the study of politics the general consensus among physicists , tacitly assumed by most social scientists, is that while quantum mechanics governs the microworld of elementary particles, the everyday world of lived experience exists in the classical domain described adequately by Newtonian mechanics The brain is a macroscopic object , and if such objects exist in the classical domain despite their quantum microfoundations, then no theory of quantum brain or quantum decision making can be true Wendt’s entire position thus rests on erasing the bright line between the quantum and classical domains there are two separate domains , a microlevel domain of quantum objects with no determinate properties prior to measurement, and a classical domain governed by Newtonian mechanics and the second law of thermodynamics The threshold between these two domains, constituting the transition from the quantum to the classical, is generated by a process called decoherence Decoherence is a feature of open macroscopic systems that, in effect, filters out quantum effects

almost entirely remains there quantum decoherence no quantum weirdness macroscopic level do not not new Newton’s mechanics consensus among physicists everyday world of lived experience exists in the classical domain described adequately by Newtonian mechanics brain macroscopic object no theory entire position erasing the bright line between the quantum and classical domains two separate domains Decoherence filters out quantum effects

['The title of my paper refers to two stories. In the mid-1930s, the physicist Erwin Schrödinger devised a thought experiment involving a cat to exemplify some apparently absurd features of the emerging interpretation of quantum mechanics. The dog that didn’t bark appears in the Sherlock Holmes story Silver Blaze, in which the non-barking dog formed the basis of Holmes’s inference that nothing strange or out of the ordinary had occurred to trigger a dog’s bark, so the murderer must have been someone familiar. By juxtaposing these two stories, I intend to convey the main theme of this essay: while there is abundant weirdness at the quantum level, it almost entirely remains there. Due to a phenomenon called quantum decoherence, there is virtually no quantum weirdness at the macroscopic level of our everyday experience; there is nothing for the dog to bark at. The dog in this story represents social scientists. The moral of this story is that, in all likelihood, we do not need to become quantum social scientists.1', 'The question of whether the social sciences need to be quantum is not new. In 1977, for example, Gabriel Almond and Stephen Genco (1977) considered whether quantum mechanics should be the basis of a new social science that rejected the clock-like determinism of classical physics developed in the wake of Newton’s mechanics. But while agreeing that the social and political world could not be described with clocklike determinism, they also doubted that quantum mechanics provided an adequate model for the study of politics. In Quantum Mind and Social Science (Cambridge University Press, 2015), Alexander Wendt reopens this question and, departing from the conventional wisdom, refreshingly and brilliantly advances the radical claim that all of social life must be understood in quantum-mechanical terms. Wendt asks us to extirpate all traces of the classical worldview, replacing them with a novel hybrid of quantum mechanics and philosophy of mind in which quantum brains generate consciousness and subjectivity is shared by non-human quantum systems. This perspective, he argues, has multiple implications for the practice of social science, eliminating certain problematic features of a purely materialist ontology and generating a new, unified physicalist ontology better equipped to approach the agent-structure problem adequately.2', 'For the purposes of review and evaluation, let me reduce Wendt’s argument to three challenges to the intellectual status quo: the challenge of the autonomous classical domain, the challenge of consciousness, and the challenge of cognition.', 'First, the general consensus among physicists, tacitly assumed by most social scientists, is that while quantum mechanics governs the microworld of elementary particles, the everyday world of lived experience exists in the classical domain described adequately by Newtonian mechanics. Wendt asks us to take seriously the idea that this assumption is incorrect, such that we cannot safely ignore quantum mechanics when we study macroscopic objects like human beings.', 'Second, social scientists presume consciousness, either self-consciously or at least tacitly via the presumption of intentionality. But to understand and explain consciousness, we must be able to account for the mind-body problem, a project that Wendt considers incompatible with the idea of an autonomous classical domain. While consciousness is a feature of macroscopic agents, he proposes that it is a quantum phenomenon, rooted in quantum brain theory.', 'Finally, social scientists cannot explain long-standing anomalies in decision-making under uncertainty. These anomalies can be explained, however, by quantum decision theory, an approach that subsumes classical probability and decision theory. Wendt considers it highly unlikely that quantum decision theory would be so successful were some version of quantum consciousness and quantum brain theory not true.', 'Wendt’s most basic argument, then, is that human beings are “walking wave functions” (3). This view is bound to generate some healthy skepticism, and Wendt takes great pains to highlight the various ways in which his theory of quantum mind lacks evidence in some areas and goes well beyond the evidence in other areas. But it would be a large mistake for social scientists to cavalierly reject Wendt’s arguments as baseless speculation. Parallel to his articulation of a theory of quantum mind is a penetrating critique of social-science orthodoxy, which he argues is mired in unresolvable controversies that constitute an intellectual crisis of Kuhnian proportions. Whatever one thinks of Wendt’s argument about quantum minds, one cannot fall back on familiar orthodoxies without dealing seriously with the three challenges of the autonomous classical domain, consciousness, and cognition.', 'This essay takes up these three challenges, though not in equal proportions. The first challenge, the rejection of an autonomous classical domain governed by classical mechanics, is, I believe the most fundamental; indeed, Wendt refers to it as the “foundational assumption of social science” (3). Let’s be clear why this claim is foundational. The brain is a macroscopic object, and if such objects exist in the classical domain despite their quantum microfoundations, then no theory of quantum brain or quantum decision making can be true. Wendt’s entire position thus rests on erasing the bright line between the quantum and classical domains.', 'Accordingly, this essay spends most of its time defending the orthodox interpretation of an autonomous classical domain. To briefly anticipate, all complex objects are composed of atoms and subatomic particles whose behavior is fully accounted for by quantum theory. But in the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics that I outline and defend below, there are two separate domains, a microlevel domain of quantum objects with no determinate properties prior to measurement, and a classical domain governed by Newtonian mechanics and the second law of thermodynamics. The threshold between these two domains, constituting the transition from the quantum to the classical, is generated by a process called decoherence. Decoherence is a feature of open macroscopic systems that, in effect, filters out quantum effects.', '']

[(6, 16)]

ndtceda

Emory-LoKi-Neg-4---Long-Beach-Round-8.docx

Emory

LoKi

847da1470b279a1a900e0b5638e294accdc293c338660ca36412a5ecab822191

Their defense doesn’t assume geopolitics – makes BOTH existentially threatening accidents AND preemptive military conflict likely absent regulation

Shulman 11 (Carl Shulman, Research Fellow at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, “Arms races and intelligence explosions (extended abstract),” April 2011, )

numerous scholars have argued AI poses nontrivial risk of extinction appear benevolent in testing cause great harm after self-improvement Given time and careful efforts risks could be avoided However , the context of an arms race not such caution regulated using international agreements could avert arms race and control development with safety measures consequences disruptive change in i r and inadvertent disaster threatens human extinction distinctive of AI even nuclear war or pandemic would allow survivors to rebuild AIs would not leave survivors

numerous scholars have argued that advanced AI poses a nontrivial risk of extinction Many decision algorithms could thus appear benevolent when in weak positions during safety testing , only to cause great harm after extensive self-improvement Given abundant time and centralized careful efforts to ensure safety, it seems very probable that these risks could be avoided : development paths that seemed to pose a high risk of catastrophe could be relinquished in favor of safer ones. However , the context of an arms race might not permit such caution A risk of accidental AI disaster would threaten all of humanity Providing more computing power would allow AIs to either operate at superhumanly fast timescales or to proliferate very numerous copies render it infeasible for humans to engage in detailed supervision of AI activities Even obviously risky systems might be embraced for competitive advantage Could an AI arms race be regulated using international agreements similar to those governing nuclear technology? agreements prove highly beneficial could avert an arms race and allow for more control led AI development with more rigorous safety measures , and sharing of the benefits among all powers additional challenges might be addressed in light of the increased benefits of agreement, but might also become tractable thanks to early AI systems used to enforce safety regulations providing a chance to “go slow” on subsequent steps two important possible consequences of advanced AI: a disruptive change in i nternational power r elations and a risk of inadvertent disaster threatens human extinction , not only killing current people but also denying future generations existence Extinction risk is a distinctive feature of AI risks : even a catastrophic nuclear war or engineered pandemic that killed billions would still likely allow survivors to eventually rebuild human civilization , while AIs killing billions would likely not leave survivors

numerous scholars AI nontrivial risk of extinction appear benevolent safety testing cause great harm after extensive self-improvement Given time centralized careful efforts risks could be avoided However arms race not permit such caution accidental AI disaster threaten all of humanity risky systems embraced for competitive advantage regulated international agreements agreements avert an arms race control led AI development rigorous safety measures become tractable thanks to early AI systems enforce safety regulations providing a chance to “go slow” consequences disruptive change i nternational power r elations inadvertent disaster human extinction Extinction risk distinctive AI risks nuclear war engineered pandemic allow survivors rebuild human civilization AIs not leave survivors

['III. Accidental risks and negative externalities', 'A second critical difference between the nuclear and AI cases is in the expected danger of development, as opposed to deployment and use.Manhattan Project scientists did consider the possibility that a nuclear test would unleash a self-sustaining chain reaction in the atmosphere and destroy all human life, conducting informal calculations at the time suggesting that this was extremely improbable. A more formal process conducted after the tests confirmed the earlier analysis (Konopinski, Marvin, & Teller, 1946), although it would not have provided any protection had matters been otherwise. The historical record thus tells us relatively little about the willingness of military and civilian leaders to forsake or delay a decisive military advantage to avert larger risks of global catastrophe.', 'In contrast, numerous scholars have argued that advanced AI poses a nontrivial risk of catastrophic outcomes, including humane extinction. (Bostrom, 2002; Chalmers, 2010; Friedman, 2008; Hall, 2007; Kurzweil, 2005; Moravec, 1999; Posner, 2004; Rees, 2004; Yudkowsky, 2008). Setting aside anthropomorphic presumptions of rebelliousness, a more rigorous argument (Omohundro, 2007) relies on the instrumental value of such behavior for entities with a wide variety of goals that are easier to achieve with more resources and with adequate defense against attack. Many decision algorithms could thus appear benevolent when in weak positions during safety testing, only to cause great harm when in more powerful positions, e.g. after extensive self-improvement.', 'Given abundant time and centralized careful efforts to ensure safety, it seems very probable that these risks could be avoided: development paths that seemed to pose a high risk of catastrophe could be relinquished in favor of safer ones. However, the context of an arms race might not permit such caution. A risk of accidental AI disaster would threaten all of humanity, while the benefits of being first to develop AI would be concentrated, creating a collective action problem insofar as tradeoffs between speed and safety existed.', 'A first-pass analysis suggests a number of such tradeoffs. Providing more computing power would allow AIs to either operate at superhumanly fast timescales or to proliferate very numerous copies. Doing so would greatly accelerate progress, but also render it infeasible for humans to engage in detailed supervision of AI activities. To make decisions on such timescales AI systems would require decision algorithms with very general applicability, making it harder to predict and constrain their behavior. Even obviously risky systems might be embraced for competitive advantage, and the powers with the most optimistic estimates or cavalier attitudes regarding risk would be more likely to take the lead.', 'IV. Barriers to AI arms control', 'Could an AI arms race be regulated using international agreements similar to those governing nuclear technology? In some ways, there are much stronger reasons for agreement: the stability of nuclear deterrence, and the protection afforded by existing nuclear powers to their allies, mean that the increased threat of a new nuclear power is not overwhelming. No nuclear weapons have been detonated in anger since 1945. In contrast, simply developing AI capable of producing an intelligence explosion puts all states at risk from the effects of accidental catastrophe, or the military dominance engendered by a localized intelligence explosion.', 'However, AI is a dual-use technology, with incremental advances in the field offering enormous economic and humanitarian gains that far outweigh near-term drawbacks. Restricting these benefits to reduce the risks of a distant, novel, and unpredictable advance would be very politically challenging. Superhumanly intelligent AI promises even greater rewards: advances in technology that could vastly improve human health, wealth, and welfare while addressing other risks such as climate change. Efforts to outright ban or relinquish AI technology would seem to require strong evidence of very high near-term risks. However, agreements might prove highly beneficial if they could avert an arms race and allow for more controlled AI development with more rigorous safety measures, and sharing of the benefits among all powers.', 'Such an agreement would face increased problems of verification and enforcement. Where nuclear weapons require rare radioactive materials, large specialized equipment, and other easily identifiable inputs, AI research can proceed with only skilled researchers and computing hardware. Verification of an agreement would require incredibly intrusive monitoring of scientific personnel and computers throughout the territory of participating states. Further, while violations of nuclear arms control agreements can be punished after the fact, a covert intelligence explosion could allow a treaty violator to withstand later sanctions.', 'These additional challenges might be addressed in light of the increased benefits of agreement, but might also become tractable thanks to early AI systems. If those systems do not themselves cause catastrophe but do provide a decisive advantage to some powers, they might be used to enforce safety regulations thereafter, providing a chance to “go slow” on subsequent steps.', 'V. Game-theoretic model of an AI arms race', 'In the full paper, we present a simple game-theoretic model of a risky AI arms race. In this model, the risk of accidental catastrophe depends on the number of competitors, the magnitude of random noise in development times, the exchange rate between risk and development speed, and the strength of preferences for developing safe AI first.', 'VI. Ethical implications and responses', 'The above analysis highlights two important possible consequences of advanced AI: a disruptive change in international power relations and a risk of inadvertent disaster.', 'From an ethical point of view, the accidental risk deserves special attention since it threatens human extinction, not only killing current people but also denying future generations existence. (Matheny, 2007; Bostrom, 2003). While AI systems would outlive humanity, AI systems might lack key features contributing to moral value, such as individual identities, play, love, and happiness (Bostrom, 2005; Yudkowsky, 2008). Extinction risk is a distinctive feature of AI risks: even a catastrophic nuclear war or engineered pandemic that killed billions would still likely allow survivors to eventually rebuild human civilization, while AIs killing billions would likely not leave survivors. (Sandberg & Bostrom, 2008).', 'However, a national monopoly on an AI intelligence explosion could also have permanent consequences if it was used to stably establish its position. Permanent totalitarianism is one possibility (Caplan, 2008).']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-KoBe-Neg-77th-National-Debate-Tournament-Round-6.docx

MichiganState

KoBe

42f689c654942f77f95c82fca814977294a0a111eaefe0fd4637d0d7d1b167d8

Perm do the CP---Not responding to threats is the equivalent of an NFU policy

Panofsky 97, Professor Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, 1997, “APPENDIX D: The Remaining Unique Role of Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence,” in Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence, pp. 111-2, University of Kansas Libraries, National Academies E Book)

Restricting nuclear forces the question continues whether this should be declaratory policy Restricting the nuclear role to respond to nuclear threats only is de facto equivalent to a "no first use" policy

Restricting U.S. nuclear forces the question continues to resurface whether this fact should be recognized by declaratory policy Restricting the nuclear role to respond to nuclear threats only is de facto equivalent to a "no first use" policy

Restricting nuclear forces whether this declaratory Restricting respond nuclear threats de facto equivalent "no first use" policy

['CONCLUSIONS', '• The core purpose requires a considerably smaller number of strategic nuclear weapons than those implied by START II, and therefore a clear understanding of this sole role should make possible a more aggressive U.S. position in seeking reductions in START III. The naval ballistic missile nuclear submarine force is apt to remain the backbone of that role for the foreseeable future. The core role does not require a significant number of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus the total number of U.S. nuclear warheads, now foreseen to be nearly 10,000 for the beginning of the next century once START II has been implemented, could be drastically reduced. Tactical nuclear weapons could be totally eliminated.', '• Restricting the role of U.S. nuclear forces to the core role would make the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation against nuclear aggression by others more credible by not diluting the mission with other, less credible, deterrent roles. Thus under such a clear policy, U.S. forces would exert larger leverage against nuclear proliferation by making it clear that such proliferation would result in intolerable risks to the proliferant.', '• Restriction of U.S. nuclear weapons to the core function would go a long way to satisfy U.S. critics that the obligations under Article VI of the NPT are being met by decreasing the use of nuclear weapons as tools of international diplomacy and by permitting much more drastic reductions of nuclear forces than those inherent in present commitments. It could be viewed to meet obligations of Article VI as a step toward eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in a future era where possession of such weapons by other powers is no longer plausible.', 'If the core function remains the only justifiable role of U.S. nuclear weapons, the question continues to resurface whether this fact should be recognized by declaratory policy or merely be implemented by such actions as reduced numbers of nuclear weapons, elimination of tactical nuclear forces, reduced quick response readiness, improved survivability, and more robust command and control. Restricting the nuclear role to respond to nuclear threats only is de facto equivalent to a "no first use" policy which used to be advocated by the then Soviet Union, but has been withdrawn recently by Russia but is still proclaimed by China. A declaratory no first use policy has been so much used and abused in past propaganda by various nations that a similar proclamation by the United States would lack credibility. Moreover such a restriction could not be binding in case of war at any rate and therefore has limited operational significance in itself. Therefore a pragmatic shift in nuclear weapons deployments corresponding to the core function only is superior to a proclaimed policy.', 'The summary conclusion of these considerations is that the role of nuclear weapons to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear attack by other nations continues to have at least as much validity today as it had during the Cold War but that it should be their only mission. Although no strategy can assure that nuclear weapons will never by used again, such a highly limited role offers the maximum leverage toward avoidance of nuclear conflict and toward a worldwide decrease in nuclear weapons inventories. Deterrence of nonnuclear conflict should be separated as much as possible from the goal of deterrence of nuclear war.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Kansas-ReSo-Aff-ADA-Octas.docx

Kansas

ReSo

490897334515a3fb2a119a9d0a62f59a75eb92334eb5b07c72709b3e7e61954d

Turns the AFF---debates over the implementation of legal personhood policies that challenge the assumptions behind them are uniquely valuable AND solves all of their offense

Barcan 20, Associate Professor in the Department of Gender and Cultural Studies @ the University of Sidney (Ruth, The Campaign for Legal Personhood for the Great Barrier Reef: Finding Political and Pedagogical Value in a Spectacular Failure of Care, Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space, 3(3), pp. 810-832, DOI:10.1177/2514848619886975)

Although LP is unlikely visibility act as a thought experiment when experimental concepts are energising law These experiments attempt to rattle anthropocentrism and Western conceptions of property we can be taught by failures’ to see pedagogical value us it as an opportunity to learn and advance discussion experimenting with possibilities is not construction of the new system but of learning from experimentation failures of mainstream law have generated a climate of experimentation that involve fundamental challenges experiments are welcomed as opportunities experiments or pressure points discussion of personhood needs to be alert to twin dangers on one hand unknowingly replicating dominant relations on the other shutting down alternatives at the moment we need them most

Although LP is unlikely visibility gives the campaign some potential to act as a scholarly thought experiment at a time when experimental legal concepts are energising law around the world These experiments attempt to rattle the foundations of the House that Modernity Built such as anthropocentrism and Western conceptions of autonomy, separability, and property modernity cannot be transformed all at once Solutions-oriented thinking will always carry with it elements of the system it is seeking to move beyond Not all experiments will be successful But ‘ we can be taught by our inescapable failures’ to see pedagogical value in a dead-end, us ing it as an opportunity to learn and advance discussion The point of experimenting with possibilities is not the construction of the new system , but of learning from the experimentation itself’ This paper focuses on one experiment with the legal personhood mechanism, holding it up to critical scrutiny by considering its conceptual foundations and ethico-political import failures of mainstream environmental law have generated a climate of legal experimentation in which existing frameworks are being creatively assayed in ways that involve fundamental challenges It outlines and critically examines the core propositions and exponents of experimental movements before turning to the personhood mechanism specifically such experiments are to be welcomed whether as immediate opportunities thought experiments or pressure points public and scholarly discussion of legal personhood needs to be alert to twin dangers on the one hand unknowingly and ironically replicating dominant power relations while seeking to overthrow them on the other , of shutting down alternatives at precisely the moment we need them most

unlikely scholarly thought experiment experimental legal concepts energising law rattle the foundations of the House that Modernity Built Western conceptions Solutions-oriented thinking will always carry with it elements of the system it is seeking to move beyond pedagogical value opportunity to learn advance discussion not the construction of the new system , but of learning from the experimentation itself’ conceptual foundations and ethico-political import legal experimentation fundamental challenges before turning to the personhood mechanism specifically welcomed opportunities thought experiments pressure points alert to twin dangers unknowingly and ironically replicating dominant power relations while seeking to overthrow them shutting down alternatives at precisely the moment we need them most

['Although LP for the Reef is now an unlikely practical result, the Reef’s visibility gives the campaign some potential to act as a serious piece of practical imagining. It can act as a popular and scholarly thought experiment – a public staging of alternative futures – at a time when experimental legal tactics and concepts are energising law around the world. These experiments are, to pick up a metaphor used by Andreotti et al. (Stein et al., 2017), attempts to rattle some of the foundations of the House that Modernity Built, such as anthropocentrism and Western conceptions of autonomy, separability, and property. Andreotti et al. argue that modernity cannot be transformed all at once, that some ‘hospic[ing]’ of a dying system is required and inevitable as a new system is being created (2018: 11). Solutions-oriented thinking will always carry with it elements of the system it is seeking to move beyond. Not all experiments will be successful, nor their implications always evident from the outset. But ‘we can be taught by our inescapable failures’ (Andreotti, 2016: 318).', 'To retrieve value from failure is neither to celebrate nor to romanticise it but instead to see pedagogical value in a dead-end, using it as an opportunity to learn and to advance public discussion: ‘The point of experimenting with possibilities is not so much the construction of the new system, but of learning from the experimentation itself’ (Andreotti, 2016: 318).', 'What might we learn from the LP campaign for the Reef? Among other things, it provides a good chance to think through more slowly, and in the hypothetical register, the ambiguous political implications for Indigenous people of using personhood as a mechanism for Rights of Nature interventions. A badly configured personhood proposal might inadvertently sideline Indigenous interests and risk obscuring an Indigenous view of climate change as an extension of colonial violence (Whyte, 2017a, 2017b). Even a well-designed one will never be decolonial in the stringently literal sense advocated by Tuck and Yang, who object to the metaphorical use of the term; it could, at best, be an example of anti-racist ‘social justice work’ (2012: 17). This is true not only of the legal personhood mechanism specifically but also the broader umbrella of Rights of Nature under which some personhood campaigns take place, which, despite its potential affinity with Indigenous worldviews, risks buying into romantic understandings of indigeneity, a politically hollow ‘new fantasy of a panhumanity’ (Stacey, 2000: 125), and hegemonic Western conceptions of personal autonomy (Rawson and Mansfield, 2018).', 'This paper does not address Rights of Nature in its entirety; instead, it focuses on one experiment with the legal personhood mechanism, holding it up to critical scrutiny by considering its practical efficacy, environmental merits, conceptual foundations and ethico-political import. It begins by making the case that the failures of mainstream environmental law have generated a climate of legal experimentation in which existing legal frameworks are being creatively assayed in ways that often involve fundamental longer-term challenges to the metaphysics that underpin them. It outlines and critically examines the core propositions and exponents of one of the liveliest of these experimental movements – Earth Jurisprudence (Wild Law) – before turning to the possibilities and pitfalls of the legal personhood mechanism specifically, using the Great Barrier Reef as a working example. Its overall argument is that such experiments are to be welcomed, whether as immediate opportunities, thought experiments, or pressure points, but that public and scholarly discussion of legal personhood needs to be alert to twin dangers: on the one hand unknowingly and ironically replicating dominant power relations while seeking to overthrow them; on the other, of shutting down alternatives at precisely the moment we need them most.', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-5.docx

Kansas

PaMa

a924fa61b0d54085ce1b55b5f39a0bd3fc4cc0dc40330f328d667c1e46a870f2

1. No AI patent crisis

Shemtov 19, Reader in Intellectual Property and Technology Law, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London (Dr. Noam Shemtov, February 2019, “A study on inventorship in inventions involving AI activity,” Commissioned by the European Patent Office, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Carl-Yelland_RFC-84-FR-44889.pdf)

the inventor would be the first owner unless employment can be established both concepts are meaningless in AI Since AI are capable neither of owning property , nor being employed a patent designating AI is likely to be rejected in the present context one may conceive an invention while adopting ideas from many sources so long as [they] maintain intellectual domination An inventor is the person who conceives there may be joint inventors What would be substantial AI activity it is about "intellectual domination even where materials prove to be the key invention processes require "intellectual domination" by human s , even if "inventive" and "non-obvious" part was produced by AI

under current regimes In each of the relevant jurisdictions inventorship serves as a starting point for establishing ownership . Hence, in all of the relevant jurisdictions the inventor would be the first owner of a patent , unless the invention was made in the course of employment and additional conditions were met In such a case, it may be the employer who is the first owner Hence, the default rule is that the inventor is the first owner unless an employment relationship can be established both concepts ownership and employment are meaningless in the context of AI systems designating an AI system as inventor may require a patent office or a court to find thereafter that the AI system is the owner of the invention in question, unless it is an employee . Since under the present general legal framework AI systems are capable neither of legally owning property , nor of being employed a patent application designating AI as an inventor is likely to be rejected as defective . In light of the reasoning above, it is necessary to evaluate whether the current regimes could provide a satisfactory designation of inventors in situations where an invention involves AI activity would identifying as an inventor a human actor that took part in an invention process involving AI activity suffice in order to meet the designation of inventor requirement under the patent law regime? In the US extensive interpretation of the term can be found in the jurisprudence of US courts The threshold question in determining inventorship is who conceived the invention Unless a person contributes to the conception of the invention, he is not an inventor It is noteworthy in the present context that one may conceive an invention and thus be considered as inventor even while adopting ideas and materials derived from many sources [such as] a suggestion from an employee or hired consultant so long as [they] maintain s intellectual domination of the work of making the invention down to the successful testing , selecting or rejecting as he goes Applying the aforementioned to inventions involving AI activity, it appears that the position in the U S may be described as follows. An inventor is the person who conceives the invention. Where more than one person is involved in the conception stage, there may be joint inventors . The invention itself is defined by reference to the subject-matter actually claimed in the application. As stated at the opening passage at present only natural persons can be identified as inventors What would be the case where there is substantial AI activity in the process leading to the invention? Would it still be possible to identify a human actor as an inventor It appears that the answer is affirmative . As the passage above indicates, it is about "intellectual domination " over the work leading the invention down to the successful testing, selecting or rejecting items and materials that may be produced by, inter alia, an AI system. This is the case even where such materials prove to be the key to solving the problem that the invention seeks to address . both at present as well as in the foreseeable future invention processes are likely to require "intellectual domination" by human actor s , even if the "inventive" and "non-obvious" part was produced by an AI system. Therefore, it appears that the present patent law framework in the United States may continue to function effectively in relation to inventions involving AI activity

current regimes each of the relevant jurisdictions ownership inventor first owner of a patent employment employer default inventor employment both concepts ownership employment are meaningless in the context of AI systems owner employee neither of legally owning property nor employed rejected defective satisfactory designation of inventors in situations where an invention involves AI activity suffice US conceived may conceive an invention inventor even adopting ideas and materials derived from many sources suggestion from an employee hired consultant intellectual domination of the work of making the invention down to the successful testing selecting or rejecting as he goes U S conceives joint claimed natural persons substantial AI activity It appears that the answer is affirmative about "intellectual domination " over the work even where such materials prove to be the key to solving the problem that the invention seeks to address likely to require "intellectual domination" by human actor s continue to function effectively in relation to inventions involving AI activity

['1(a) AI as inventor under current regimes', 'In each of the relevant jurisdictions inventorship serves as a starting point for establishing ownership. Hence, in all of the relevant jurisdictions the inventor would be the first owner of a patent, unless the invention was made in the course of employment and additional conditions were met. 10 In such a case, it may be the employer who is the first owner in some of the relevant jurisdictions, while in others the employer may be the automatic transferee of the right to the patent at issue.', 'Hence, the default rule is that the inventor is the first owner unless an employment relationship can be established. It is submitted that both concepts – ownership and employment – are meaningless in the context of AI systems. Hence, designating an AI system as inventor may require a patent office or a court to find thereafter that the AI system is the owner of the invention in question, unless it is an employee. Since under the present general legal framework AI systems are capable neither of legally owning property, nor of being employed within the legal sense of the term, a patent application designating AI as an inventor is likely to be rejected as defective.11', 'In light of the reasoning above, it is necessary to evaluate whether the current regimes could provide a satisfactory designation of inventors in situations where an invention involves AI activity. Namely, would identifying as an inventor a human actor that took part in an invention process involving AI activity suffice in order to meet the designation of inventor requirement under the patent law regime? In order to address this question, it is first necessary to briefly canvass the legal position regarding the concept of "inventorship" in all of the relevant jurisdictions.', '1(a)(i) United States', 'In the United States (US), 35 U.S.C., Section 115 requires that the correct inventor(s) be named in a patent application, while Section 116 sets out guidelines for joint inventorship. No statute or legal instrument in the US defines the concept of inventorship. However, extensive interpretation of the term can be found in the jurisprudence of US courts. For example, the court in Fiers v. Revel explained: "The threshold question in determining inventorship is who conceived the invention. ', 'Unless a person contributes to the conception of the invention, he is not an inventor [...]. Insofar as defining an inventor is concerned, reduction to practice, per se, is irrelevant." 12 One who merely proposes an idea as to a result that is to be achieved without the means for achieving the said result is not to be considered as an inventor or co-inventor.13 Conception of an invention in this context is not just a mere abstract idea of how to solve a problem, but the means by which such problem is to be solved, and their interaction with one another should also be realised.14', 'It is noteworthy in the present context that one may conceive an invention and thus be considered as inventor even while adopting "[…] ideas and materials derived from many sources15 [such as] a suggestion from an employee, or hired consultant [...] so long as [they] he maintains intellectual domination of the work of making the invention down to the successful testing, selecting or rejecting as he goes [...] even if such suggestion [or material] proves to be the key that unlocks his problem." 16', 'The invention for the purpose of determining who is the inventor is defined by reference to the language of the claims. An inventor or co-inventor is one who makes a contribution to at least one of the claims. Thus, according to Section 2137.01 of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure: "the designation of authorship or inventorship does not raise a presumption of inventorship with respect to the subject matter disclosed in the article or with respect to the subject matter disclosed but not claimed in the patent [...]".17 In the same vein, the same part of the manual states that "Each joint inventor must generally contribute to the conception of the invention. A co-inventor need not make a contribution to every claim of a patent. A contribution to one claim is enough." Hence, it is clear that conception of the invention for the purpose of identifying the inventor is assessed by reference to the language of the claims and the subject-matter effectively claimed therein.', 'Applying the aforementioned to inventions involving AI activity, it appears that the position in the United States may be described as follows. An inventor is the person who conceives the invention. Where more than one person is involved in the conception stage, there may be joint inventors. The invention itself is defined by reference to the subject-matter actually claimed in the application. As stated at the opening passage of this section, at present only natural persons can be identified as inventors.', 'What would be the case where there is substantial AI activity in the process leading to the invention? Would it still be possible to identify a human actor as an inventor in a manner that is compatible with the definition of the latter under US law? It appears that the answer is affirmative. As the passage above indicates, it is about "intellectual domination" over the work leading the invention down to the successful testing, selecting or rejecting items and materials that may be produced by, inter alia, an AI system. This is the case even where such materials prove to be the key to solving the problem that the invention seeks to address.', 'Hence, both at present as well as in the foreseeable future invention processes are likely to require "intellectual domination" by human actors, even if the "inventive" and "non-obvious" part was produced by an AI system. Therefore, it appears that the present patent law framework in the United States may continue to function effectively in relation to inventions involving AI activity. In the event that AI technology develops to such an extent that it would no longer be possible to identify human conception at all, and inventions could be produced in full without such human contribution, it may be necessary to consider tweaking the current regime. ', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-6.docx

Kansas

PaMa

ec9c5d51015d9d585dfbc3a2e3a4d6ac4ac6ec29530f6f239f97696f60dbfa5c

Specifically, South Africa has few civil lawsuits – the plan can resolve market failure.

Jenny ’20 [Frederic; January 22; Professor of Economics, ESSEC Business School, Paris, France; Chair OECD Competition Committee; The Antitrust Bulletin, “An Essay: Can Competition Law and Policy Be Made Relevant for Inclusive Growth of Developing Countries?” ; KS]

the competition experience is not encouraging There have been a few civil lawsuits There is hope precisions lead to an increase in class actions authors propose pro-development agenda with respect to advocacy of competition authorities in African countries the authors call on the international community to renew efforts to tackle export cartels by finding inspiration inspired by comity

the competition experience of South Africa is not entirely encouraging There have been a few civil lawsuits based on the claims of competition violations and those have been introduced not by “outsiders” or poor victims of anticompetitive abuses but by already fairly established competitors or institutional customers Section 38(c) of the South African Constitution allows for class actions and this applies to competition law There is some hope that these precisions will lead to an increase in the number of class actions in general the authors propose a pro-development agenda with respect to the advocacy function of competition authorities in African countries . This agenda targets both domestic public restraints to competition and transnational anticompetitive practices the authors suggest that the advocacy function of competition authorities should be aimed at regulatory laws that unnecessarily restrict competition; at state-owned monopoly boards, prevalent in African countries, trading with poor results; and at restrictive national trade laws which often protect domestic lobbies to the detriment of consumers and newcomers the authors call on the international community to renew efforts to tackle export cartels by finding inspiration in innovative mechanisms inspired by positive comity

competition experience South Africa not entirely encouraging few civil lawsuits hope precisions lead to an increase number class actions pro-development agenda advocacy function competition authorities advocacy function regulatory laws international community renew efforts tackle export cartels finding inspiration innovative mechanisms positive comity

['On closer scrutiny, the competition experience of South Africa, which is by far the most advanced of the African countries reviewed and has a strong judiciary, so far at least, is not entirely encouraging.3 There have been a few civil lawsuits based on the claims of competition violations and those have been introduced not by “outsiders” or poor victims of anticompetitive abuses but by already fairly established competitors or institutional customers. One plaintiff was South African Airline Nationwide, which brought a claim against national carrier South African Airways (SAA); another was the City of Capetown (which brought a suit against a number of construction companies for civil damages arising from their agreement to rig bids in relation to the construction of the Green Point Stadium in Cape Town).', 'Section 38(c) of the South African Constitution allows for class actions for an infringement of any fundamental right in the Bill of Rights and this applies to competition law. There have been two class action cases against bakers (The Trustees for the Time Being for the Children’s Resource Centre Trust and Others v. Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others, and Mukaddam and Others v. Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others) following the prosecution of the bread price-fixing cartel by the Competition Commission in 2010. The Pioneer case was the first of its kind and was brought by five individuals together with several NGOs against Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods, and Premier Foods for their participation in the bread cartel. It allowed the Supreme Appeals Court of South Africa to clarify a number of issues, particularly those pertaining to the certification of the class. There is some hope that these precisions will lead to an increase in the number of class actions in general. Those cases are still pending, however, nine years after the Competition Tribunal decision.4', 'Finally, the authors also propose a pro-development agenda with respect to the advocacy function of competition authorities in African countries. This agenda targets both domestic public restraints to competition and transnational anticompetitive practices.', 'With respect to domestic public restraints to competition, the authors suggest that the advocacy function of competition authorities (and their market investigation powers) should be aimed at regulatory laws that unnecessarily restrict competition; at state-owned monopoly boards, prevalent in African countries, trading in various commodities (including agricultural commodities) with poor results; and at restrictive national trade laws which often protect domestic lobbies to the detriment of consumers and also of newcomers.', 'With respect to transnational anticompetitive practices that often target developing countries where competition law enforcement is weak and victimize the consumers and the firms of these countries through a combination of exploitative and exclusionary practices, the authors call on the international community to renew efforts to tackle the vexing issue of export cartels by finding inspiration in innovative mechanisms inspired by the spirit of positive comity which has been adopted in other areas such as the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.']

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ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-Texas-Round3.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-Texas-Round3.docx

ba00426741e731cfd11aa33d04ff7318f1dcc268a5ab37abd9ab470d07fa4fba

Leaks.

Shane Harris et al. 23. Winner of the Gerald R. Ford Prize for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense, with Devil Barrett and Ellen Nakashima, 4-14-2023. "Leak raises fresh questions about Pentagon’s internal security ," https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/14/pentagon-leaked-documents/.

leak of hundreds of classified intel documents left officials asking: How did this happen again , a low-level National Guard member removed hundreds of classified doc s then shared them Teixeira was far from the first insider to expose government secrets his case raises fresh questions about whether the intelligence system is fundamentally vulnerable to disclosures new guardrails that will make breaches less likely consistently proved insufficient

leak of hundreds of classified intel ligence documents left officials asking: How did this happen again Teixeira , a 21-year-old, low-level National Guard member removed hundreds of classified doc ument s He then shared them with his friends Teixeira was far from the first insider in recent years to expose government secrets and his case raises fresh questions about whether earlier efforts to plug leaks were sufficient or if the U.S. intelligence system is fundamentally vulnerable to disclosures Every time a trusted employee has walked off the job with classified info officials have reassured the public that lessons learned will lead to new guardrails that will make breaches less likely . They have consistently proved insufficient after Manning shared hundreds of thousands of classified State Department cables and military reports the Defense Department tightened up the rules Three years later another massive leak occurred

hundreds of classified intel ligence documents happen again far from the first expose government secrets vulnerable to disclosures consistently proved insufficient another massive leak occurred

['The leak of hundreds of classified intelligence documents about the war in Ukraine and U.S. spying on allies has left many officials asking: How did this happen again?', 'Jack Teixeira, a 21-year-old, low-level National Guard member assigned to an intelligence support squadron in Massachusetts, allegedly removed hundreds of classified documents from his office on base and brought them home. He then shared them with his friends in an online community united by their love of guns and video games, the government says.', 'On Friday, he was charged with unlawfully taking and unlawfully transmitting sensitive information — crimes that carry a potential maximum sentence of 15 years in prison. Teixeira will be held in jail until a detention hearing next week, but bail is rarely granted in such cases.', 'It’s still unclear how closely Teixeira was monitored, if at all. But the timeline of his alleged activities, based on interviews with members of his Discord server group, as well as an FBI affidavit, shows that he was able to remove page after page of classified material, for months on end, with apparently no notice.', '“I just don’t know why he should be able to print lots of documents. That makes no sense,” said one former senior intelligence official familiar with past leaks, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. “What were we not doing, not noticing that pattern of behavior? Who’s not checking that? Where’s the human monitoring?”', 'Teixeira was far from the first insider in recent years to expose government secrets, and his case raises fresh questions about whether earlier efforts to plug leaks were sufficient or if the U.S. intelligence system, which is designed to promote collaboration and information sharing, is fundamentally vulnerable to disclosures from within.', 'Every time a trusted employee has walked off the job with classified information, U.S. officials have reassured the public that lessons learned will lead to new guardrails that will make breaches less likely. They have consistently proved insufficient.', 'In 2010, after Army Pvt. Chelsea Manning shared hundreds of thousands of classified State Department cables and military reports with WikiLeaks, the Defense Department tightened up the rules for using its most widely-used classified computer networks. Someone’s need to know classified information was supposed to be commensurate with their degree of access to it, recalled several former senior intelligence officials.', 'Three years later, another massive leak occurred. Edward Snowden, a contractor for the National Security Agency, removed vast amounts of classified data on thumb drives from the facility in Hawaii where he worked. “The irony was we had gotten rid of thumb drives in 95 percent of [NSA] computers,” said the first former intelligence official.']

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ndtceda

Emory-FeWa-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-6.docx

Emory

FeWa

781c67467e914d85a3e44dd4570be04a928b9634824d26c8efa182d6014d1df6

Empirics prove that attempts at creating new pharma infrastructure fails—government institutions are key

France 16 (David France is an American investigative reporter, non-fiction author, and filmmaker. France, who is gay, is best known for his investigative journalism on LGBTQ topics. November 29, 2016, accessed 9-30-21, “How to Survive a Plague: The Inside Story of How Citizens and Science Tamed AIDS,” Deckle Edge)

In AIDS research, there were nothing but questions in chemistry, cellular biology, immunology, and neurology. too little attention had been paid to the basic science What was needed was the active engagement of the entire community instead of building a whole new research system, parallel and distinct from NIH, they advocated for improving the way the existing one worked already sketching out a reform plan. eighteen separate centers at the NIH were engaged in AIDS research . streamline the NIH by eliminating duplications

THE TALK of a “Manhattan Project for AIDS” awakened Larry Kramer’s faith that the country had come to its senses original Manhattan Project managed to cut through complex bureaucracies and produce a deadly atom bomb in less than four years TAG people wanted nothing to do with either plan. what worked in physics couldn’t work in biology In AIDS research, there were nothing but questions in multiple fields, from pharmaceutical chemistry, cellular biology, immunology, and even neurology. It required blood samples but also many thousands of patients at various stages of deterioration. Even if they were willing to leave behind their jobs, lovers, friends, and families, it would be logistically impossible to hole up so many people with AIDS in one location. in the chaotic and undirected search for effective medicine, too little attention had been paid to the basic science of the epidemic. There was only a vague understanding of HIV Only slightly more was known about the mechanisms of human immunity itself. What was needed was the active engagement of the entire community of scientists, not just the few “celebrity leaders” on Kramer’s wish list. TAG team presented Kramer with a counterproposal: instead of building a whole new research system, parallel and distinct from NIH, they advocated for improving the way the existing one worked . already sketching out a reform plan. requesting vast amounts of information from every branch of the NIH discovered that eighteen separate institutes and centers at the NIH were engaged in AIDS research , all more or less independently, some overlapping total yearly cost to taxpayers was $800 million . were identifying ways to streamline the NIH by eliminating duplications and waste, adopting an official national agenda, and creating a top-down leadership structure

improving the way the existing one worked

['', 'THE TALK of a “Manhattan Project for AIDS” awakened Larry Kramer’s faith that the country had come to its senses at last. The original Manhattan Project brought together over 130,000 people at a cost of billions; with leadership from the White House, it managed to cut through complex bureaucracies and produce a deadly atom bomb in less than four years. If such a monumental campaign were to focus on HIV and the immune system, Kramer had no doubt, a cure would come along just as quickly.', 'With Clinton leading the polls, Kramer took a break from writing to help divine what this strategy might look like. One weekend that summer, he swallowed his pride and hosted a group of TAG activists in an East Hampton house he was renting from a friend, a startlingly grand, castle-sized structure with multiple turrets and chimneys. “Spoiled children,” he called his guests. But he knew a united front would be necessary for this plan to work. Besides, he had mellowed somewhat since moving to the country. His health improved as well. When he first arrived, he had three hundred CD4 cells; the ocean air and the country sun helped push them up substantially.', 'Mark Harrington agreed to Kramer’s weekend invitation. He brought along fellow TAG members Gregg Gonsalves, David Gold, and Mike Barr, a research associate at St. Vincent’s. Kramer laid out his plan, in which the renegade surgeon general C. Everett Koop would be put in charge of the massive Manhattan Project. People like the FDA head David Kessler and James Watkins, the admiral who rescued Reagan’s AIDS commissioner, would join as ranking officers, sequestered alongside bench scientists and Nobel Prize winners in a remote desert lab with a towering budget and an Oval Office mandate. Kramer had discussed these possibilities with Dr. Bernadine Healy, the current NIH head, who hoped to retain her position regardless of the election’s outcome. She agreed to solicit further thoughts. Separately, the reconstituted Science Committee of ACT UP was also looking at an ambitious proposal. However, in deference to the victims of atomic warfare in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they rejected the Manhattan Project as a name and called their initiative the Barbara McClintock Project to Cure AIDS, named after the first female scientist ever to win an unshared Nobel Prize in medicine, an iconoclast in her field (the chromosomes of corn). Mark Milano, a film editor by training, and two other ACT UP loyalists, the psychology professor Maxine Wolfe and a botanist named John Riley, fleshed out the broad strokes of a plan that would cost a billion dollars a year for five years.', 'The TAG people wanted nothing to do with either plan. Tensions that weekend ran high. Harrington had studied Richard Rhodes’s book The Making of the Atomic Bomb and concluded that what worked in physics couldn’t work in biology. It made sense to lock the world’s top minds in a bunker for them to puzzle through the challenge of atom splitting, he said. They knew what they needed to do, and had only to learn how to do it. In AIDS research, there were nothing but questions in multiple fields, from pharmaceutical chemistry, cellular biology, immunology, and even neurology. It required blood samples but also many thousands of patients at various stages of deterioration. Even if they were willing to leave behind their jobs, lovers, friends, and families, it would be logistically impossible to hole up so many people with AIDS in one location.', 'What’s more, Harrington and his TAG colleagues were now convinced that in the chaotic and undirected search for effective medicine, too little attention had been paid to the basic science of the epidemic. There was only a vague understanding of HIV—how it did its damage, why it killed different people at different speeds. Only slightly more was known about the mechanisms of human immunity itself. What was needed was the active engagement of the entire community of scientists, not just the few “celebrity leaders” on Kramer’s wish list. Harrington called Kramer’s idea “foolish, grandiose, and absurd.”', 'The TAG team presented Kramer with a counterproposal: instead of building a whole new research system, parallel and distinct from NIH, they advocated for improving the way the existing one worked. Harrington and Gonsalves were already sketching out a reform plan. Since early in the spring, they had been requesting vast amounts of information from every branch of the NIH—on budgets, staffing, corporate reporting charts, and much else. The work of analyzing the records soon proved too daunting for the two to carry out on nights and weekends, so TAG’s board put them on the payroll, the first time they had received money for their activist labors. They fired off even more detailed demands for public data. Fauci instructed his division heads to comply with their requests as thoroughly as possible. Cartons of dot-matrix, z-fold printouts were soon leaning in perilous towers along the walls of Harrington’s apartment.', 'They discovered that eighteen separate institutes and centers at the NIH were engaged in AIDS research, all more or less independently, some overlapping or else competing outright with one another. The total yearly cost to taxpayers was $800 million. Roughly half of that was invested in the world that Tony Fauci controlled directly—the infectious disease institute and its ACTG system, for clinical trials under Dan Hoth’s control. The rest was scattered among the branches devoted to cancer, childhood health, eyes, neurological disorders, and the circulatory system. The entity created to make sense of all this, the so-called Office of AIDS Research, which Fauci also ran, in fact competed for its own budget in ways that at times cannibalized from the other institutes. The two men were identifying ways to streamline the NIH by eliminating duplications and waste, adopting an official national agenda, and creating a top-down leadership structure—in effect, imposing order on the chaotic system.']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Aff-Fullertown-Round1.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaPa/Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Aff-Fullertown-Round1.docx

e57b7985e958bead56a2bed3d355aae6b3b7a04ecc272ded55036646e6a963df

We fiat that personhood is a cluster concept. That means the assessment of whether an entity deserves personhood happens on a case-by-case basis.

David N. Cassuto 7, Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, Winter 2007, “BRED MEAT: THE CULTURAL FOUNDATION OF THE FACTORY FARM,” Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 70, p. 59, advance-lexis-com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/api/document?collection=analytical-materials&id=urn:contentItem:4PC9-PJ50-00CW-H06H-00000-00&context=1516831

elevating animals from thinghood require reordering systems personhood fails to address quandaries by embryos and fetuses The difficulty stems from the fact person does not refer to a single concept but to a range of characteristics ; it is a " cluster ." characteristics of personhood vary according to the entity embrace of heterogeneity offers a legal system where practical issues guide adjudicative processes . Different traits demand different entitlements . Clustering them beneath personhood invites imprecision separating the term into components allows the legal system to treat difference differently while enabling access to the community replacing personhood with a cluster concept of rights offers embarkation to the posthuman world criteria for rights correspond to a being with different requirements . Those who claim rights based on biology ( newborn infants differ from those who do not fit nonhuman animals artificial intelligences granting rights to nonhuman animals does not mean granting rights humans enjoy The latter idea is absurd A posthuman landscape acknowledges differences . It allocates protections based on requirements of various beings that form the moral community Therein lies the flexibility of the posthuman , cluster approach to rights . Legal entitlements vary according to the nature of the user

elevating nonhuman animals from " thinghood " will require reordering the legal systems Critics complain reordering is impossible As has been noted, part of the problem is personhood is unworkable and self-undermining Along with the status of nonhuman animals , personhood fails to address quandaries raised by embryos and fetuses and others . The difficulty stems from the fact " person " does not refer to a single concept but to a range of characteristics ; it is a " cluster concept ." person does not stand for a single concept but for a cluster of ideas ," including biological humanity , rational agency , and consciousness The characteristics of personhood vary according to the type of entity under scrutiny This heterogeneity can lead to confusion over who is entitled to membership in the moral community a implemented embrace of heterogeneity offers the promise of a reordered legal system where in practical issues guide the statutory and adjudicative processes . The reordering must start with two assumptions : 1) the boundaries between human and nonhuman have been problematic, and 2) legal personhood is inadequate to the task of allocating legal entitlements Personhood refers to beings possessing characteristics for access to the legal system the word is overtaxed to nonreferentiality This stress will worsen as advances muddy the distinctions between humans , nonhumans , and machines That debate ought to have no legal relevance . One need not be a person in order to have rights ; rather, one needs rights to be a person When determining whether a being possesses rights , the question should not be whether the aspirant is a " person " but whether it possesses qualities personhood references Personhood becomes irrelevant as the investigation shifts to a determination of salient qualities for rights This forms the first step toward creating a posthuman legal landscape Past attempts differentiate humans from animals based on intellectual ability , self-consciousness , or biology None withstands close analysis No " human " characteristic emerged to set humans apart The posthuman world will contain creatures that are human and animal . It will contain machines that may be sentient and will have greater cognitive capacities than animals or humans chimeras creatures comprised of human and animal genes will pose a thorny standing issue for litigations No definition of " person " encompasses the range of legal entities with claims to its mantle Broadening personhood will not solve the predicament . Regardless of how wide its scope , the term will define itself through contrast with an other . It requires those possessing requisite characteristics evaluate whether other beings do as well even as a broader conception of personhood validates other beings as worthy of moral considerations , it does so by evaluating whether their essence resembles our own This technique for awarding ethical consideration suffers from circularity Even as it seeks to remove human orientation within the law , this scheme presupposes an Ur person against which aspirants to the moral community must evaluate themselves all aspirants to legal personhood must demonstrate they share some "human" traits any attempt to frame criteria for personhood begins with an inherently speciesist bias One way to address this problem is by doing away with personhood as a dispositive legal category . As an umbrella term encompassing a cluster of traits , personhood obfuscates responsibility Different traits demand different entitlements . Clustering them beneath personhood invites imprecision separating the term into components allows the legal system to treat difference differently while enabling access to the moral community replacing personhood with a cluster concept of rights offers a point of embarkation to the posthuman world . Each of the criteria for rights correspond s to a different being with different requirements . Those who claim rights based on biology ( newborn infants , brain-dead adults ) h ave differ ent requirements than those whose claim rests on rational agency who differ from group entities we face the category of those who do not fit into any categories but who may be entitled to some societal protections ( nonhuman animals artificial intelligences , et cetera That there exists a multiplicity of beings with varying demands on the legal system does not undermine that disenfranchised beings should enjoy expanded legal entitlements granting rights to nonhuman animals does not mean granting them the rights humans enjoy The latter idea is absurd the entitlements cows and humans should be entitled vary A posthuman legal landscape acknowledges these differences . It allocates protections based on requirements of various beings that form the moral community scenarios involve a rights framework drastically different from the one humans enjoy. Therein lies the flexibility of the posthuman , cluster approach to rights . Legal entitlements vary according to the nature of the user .

nonhuman animals thinghood reordering impossible problem personhood unworkable self-undermining nonhuman animals embryos fetuses others " person " single concept range characteristics cluster concept person single concept cluster ideas biological humanity rational agency consciousness characteristics vary type of entity scrutiny lead confusion membership moral community heterogeneity reordered legal system statutory adjudicative processes two assumptions human nonhuman legal personhood legal entitlements access legal overtaxed nonreferentiality worsen distinctions humans nonhumans machines debate no legal relevance person rights rights person being rights person Personhood salient qualities rights first step posthuman legal landscape intellectual ability self-consciousness biology human apart human animal machines sentient greater cognitive capacities animals humans chimeras human animal genes thorny standing issue person range legal entities mantle Broadening solve predicament wide its scope contrast other other beings do as well conception personhood moral considerations essence our own technique ethical consideration circularity remove law aspirants moral community evaluate legal personhood "human" traits personhood speciesist bias doing away personhood dispositive legal category cluster traits obfuscates responsibility Different traits different entitlements personhood imprecision components legal system difference differently access moral community personhood cluster concept of rights embarkation posthuman world . different requirements biology newborn infants brain-dead adults requirements rational agency group entities fit entitled societal protections nonhuman animals artificial intelligences et cetera multiplicity varying demands legal system legal entitlements rights nonhuman animals absurd cows humans vary posthuman legal landscape differences form moral community rights framework humans flexibility posthuman cluster approach rights vary nature user

[' [*81] It cannot escape notice, however, that elevating nonhuman animals from the realm of "thinghood" will require reordering the social and legal systems. 131Link to the text of the note Critics of the animal-rights movement often complain that such a reordering is impossible to visualize and logistically unfeasible. 132Link to the text of the note How, then, to proceed? The first step in what must necessarily be a long and complex dialogue entails shifting focus from attempting to locate the boundaries of the human to exploring the frontier of the posthuman.', 'V Imagining a Posthuman World', 'As has been often noted, part of the problem with the legal system is that the concept of "personhood" is unworkable and self-undermining. 133Link to the text of the note Along with the status of nonhuman animals, personhood fails to adequately address quandaries raised by embryos and fetuses, "brain-dead" people, corporations, nation-states, and others. The difficulty stems from the fact that "person" does not refer to a single concept but rather to a range of characteristics; it is a "cluster concept." 134Link to the text of the note A cluster concept refers to the idea that person "does not stand for a single concept but rather for a cluster of ideas," including biological humanity, rational agency, and unity of consciousness (as in the case of corporations). 135Link to the text of the note The characteristics of personhood necessarily vary according to the type of entity under scrutiny. 136Link to the text of the note', 'This heterogeneity can lead, and has led, to confusion over who and what is entitled to membership in the moral community. However, a properly implemented embrace of heterogeneity offers the promise of a reordered legal system wherein practical issues of need and ethical issues of compassion guide the statutory and adjudicative processes. The reordering must start with two fundamental assumptions: 1) the boundaries between human and nonhuman have always been and are becoming increasingly problematic, and 2) the legal concept of "personhood" is inadequate to the task of allocating legal and moral entitlements.', ' [*82] ', 'A. Personhood Serves No Legal Function', "Personhood refers to those beings possessing the requisite characteristics for access to the legal system. 137Link to the text of the note As such, the word is overtaxed to the point of nonreferentiality. 138Link to the text of the note This linguistic stress will only worsen as technological advances further muddy the distinctions between humans, nonhumans, and machines. One could imagine a lively debate, for example, regarding the personhood of a cloned Homo sapiens with a pig's heart, a mechanical arm, and genetically altered DNA. That debate, while epistemologically interesting, ought to have little or no legal relevance. One need not be a person in order to have rights; rather, one needs rights in order to be a person. 139Link to the text of the note", 'When determining whether a being possesses rights, the question should not be whether the aspirant is a "person" but rather whether it possesses the qualities that personhood references. 140Link to the text of the note Personhood becomes irrelevant as the investigation shifts to a determination of the salient qualities for the conferral of rights. 141Link to the text of the note This reordering and reevaluation of the language of law forms the first step toward creating a posthuman legal landscape.', 'Past attempts to differentiate humans from animals have taken many forms. Some, like Descartes, maintained that the difference lay with the capacity for language. 142Link to the text of the note Others based it on intellectual ability, self-consciousness, or basic [*83] biology. 143Link to the text of the note None of these rationales withstands close analysis. Nonhuman language capability has been conclusively demonstrated in innumerable cases, 144Link to the text of the note while differentiating based on intellect founders on the existence of cognitively impaired people who are nonetheless classified as human. Basic biology is also a thin reed on which to hang one\'s humanity. No quintessentially "human" characteristic has emerged to definitively set humans apart from other animals. 145Link to the text of the note This should not surprise, given that the human genome differs only minimally from that of a roundworm. 146Link to the text of the note', 'Furthermore, scientific advances in recent years have tied humans and nonhumans even more closely. As Judge Amestoy observed in an essay on the emerging posthuman legal landscape, "The posthuman world will … contain creatures that are part human and part animal. It will contain machines that may be sentient and likely will have greater cognitive capacities than animals or humans." 147Link to the text of the note He notes also that the emergence of chimeras - "genetically engineered creatures comprised of human and animal genes" - will pose a thorny standing issue for future litigations. 148Link to the text of the note', ' [*84] Courts and legislatures have struggled to adapt to this shifting epistemological landscape with little success. No one definition of "person" comfortably encompasses the range of legal entities with claims to its mantle. Steven Wise argues that courts elide the problem by cluttering the taxonomic landscape with legal fictions devised to sustain an arbitrary and exclusionary status quo. 149Link to the text of the note', 'Broadening the ambit of personhood will not solve the predicament. Regardless of how wide its scope, the term will always define itself through contrast with an excluded other. It requires that those possessing the requisite characteristics evaluate whether other beings do as well. In this sense, even as a broader conception of personhood validates other beings as worthy of moral considerations, it does so by evaluating whether their essence sufficiently resembles our own. 150Link to the text of the note', 'This technique for awarding ethical consideration suffers from the same vicious circularity as Freud\'s explanation of human evolution. Even as it seeks to remove the human orientation within the law, this scheme nevertheless presupposes an Ur person against which aspirants to the moral community must evaluate themselves. That Ur person must have existed as a right-holder prior to the determination of the essential characteristics for rights. Given that the legal system formed within human society, the Ur person must necessarily be human. In this sense, all aspirants to legal personhood must demonstrate that they share some "human" traits. Consequently, any attempt to frame a set of criteria for personhood begins with an inherently speciesist bias.', 'One way to address this problem is by doing away with personhood as a dispositive legal category. As an umbrella term encompassing a cluster of traits, personhood obfuscates rather than clarifies the issue of moral and legal responsibility. Any discussion of rights and membership in the legal community would be better served by focusing on the components of the term rather than the term itself. 151Link to the text of the note', ' [*85] Different traits demand different entitlements. Clustering them all beneath the term "personhood" invites imprecision. 152Link to the text of the note By contrast, separating the term into components allows the legal system to treat difference differently while still enabling access to the moral community. Thus, replacing personhood with a cluster concept of rights offers a point of embarkation to the posthuman world.', '', '', '', 'B. Different Characteristics Create Different Entitlements', 'Each of the currently acknowledged criteria for rights corresponds to a different sort of being with different societal and legal requirements. Those who claim rights based on biology (newborn infants, brain-dead adults, for example) have different requirements than those whose claim rests on rational agency (adult homo sapiens), who in turn differ from group entities (corporations, nation-states). Then we face the emerging category of those who do not fit neatly into any of the presently acknowledged categories but who nonetheless may be entitled to some form of societal protections (nonhuman animals, chimeras, artificial intelligences, et cetera).', 'That there exists a multiplicity of beings with varying demands on the legal system does not undermine the premise that traditionally disenfranchised beings could and should enjoy expanded legal entitlements. As many commentators have noted, granting rights to nonhuman animals does not mean granting them the same rights that humans enjoy. 153Link to the text of the note The latter idea is both absurd and counterproductive. As Peter Singer observed, a cow could happily live her entire life on a pasture in New Jersey. The same could not necessarily be said of a human. 154Link to the text of the note Therefore, the entitlements and protections to which cows and humans should respectively be entitled vary as well. 155Link to the text of the note', 'A posthuman legal landscape acknowledges these differences. It allocates protections based on the requirements of the various beings that form the moral community. 156Link to the text of the note This could mean, for example, that since farm animals are sentient and have the capacity to suffer, they should not be subjected to the grotesque and inhumane conditions of the factory farm. 157Link to the text of the note However, it may not mean that an agricultural system wherein farm animals live comfortably [*86] protected from disease and predators is necessarily unacceptable. This issue can and should form the basis for reasoned debate. 158Link to the text of the note', 'Similarly, domestic animals have a right to food, comfort, and friendship from their human companions. 159Link to the text of the note They also have a right to bodily integrity. However, given the demands that these expectations place on humans, and the structure of society, it does not seem per se unreasonable to require that domestic animals be neutered or spayed. 160Link to the text of the note', 'Both of the above scenarios involve a rights framework drastically different from the one that humans enjoy. Therein lies the flexibility of the posthuman, cluster approach to rights. Legal entitlements vary according to the nature and needs of the user.']

[(9, 18)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Aff-UMW-Debate-Tournament-Semis.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

e8ad944985bef06e81d9fff46de8096a55d60532ce8e076881e59c7b732859cd

Cap is the origin of ableism – Western able-bodied norms that value people as efficient machines started in the Industrial Revolution – market forces isolated the disabled into institutions, creating the basis for the medical model

Slorach 11 – Senior Disability Advisor at Imperial College London [Roddy, “Marxism and Disability,” International Socialism, Issue 129, 4 Jan 2011, http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=702, accessed 13 Jun 2016]

impaired members of pre-class societies were likely to survive capitalism forced people off land The factory worker could not have any impairment It was the economic necessity of producing efficient machines that established ablebodiedness as the norm the deaf blind, those with mobility difficulties, were seen as less “fit” The Industrial Revolution transformed them into disabled people Isolating disabled people in institutions led to study of impairments creating the basis for scientific classification capitalism created disability as oppression

Weaker or impaired members of pre-class societies were more likely to survive the rural production process, and the extended nature of the feudal family, allowed many to make a genuine contribution to daily economic life The rise of capitalism forced people off the land the population was being increasingly pressed by the new capitalist market forces, and when families could no longer cope the crippled members would have been most vulnerable and liable to turn to begging Market forces favoured machinery which was more efficient and able to produce cheaper more plentiful woven material The Industrial Revolution accelerated change Larger-scale machinery destroyed the old cottage industries as well as traditional family structures The new factory worker “ could not have any impairment which would prevent him or her from operating the machine It was , therefore, the economic necessity of producing efficient machines for large-scale production that established ablebodiedness as the norm for productive living People’s bodies were now valued according to their ability to function like machines Factory discipline, time keeping and production norms broke with the slower, more self-determined and flexible work pattern into which many disabled people had been integrated As work became rationalised , requiring precise mechanical movements of the body, repeated in quicker succession the deaf blind, and those with mobility difficulties, were seen as less “fit” to do the tasks required of factory workers, and were increasingly excluded from paid employment [ The Industrial Revolution ] removed crippled people from social intercourse and transformed them into disabled people Specialisms were developed to maintain and reproduce the new working class Poor Law officials developed pseudo-scientific categories to identify those of the poor who were unfit for work – ”the sick, the insane, defectives, and the aged and infirm” Dependence on others was identified as a social problem and impairment equated with sickness and illness those identified as disabled were segregated into workhouses, asylums, prisons and special schools it was efficient, it acted as a major deterrent to the able-boded malingerer, and it could instil good work habits into the inmates Isolating disabled people in institutions led to the intensive study and treatment of impairments , creating the basis for clearer scientific understanding and classification With labour power now a commodity whose components were identified and valued, people with mental health problems were also increasingly categorised and placed in segregated institutions In 1826 fewer than 5,000 people were confined in asylums By 1900, this had increased to 74,000 Capitalism represented the new working class creating this wealth were excluded from any say over what was produced and how, suffering for their pains physical and mental impairment on an unprecedented scale Those marginalised or excluded from production by injury or already existing impairments became marginalised or excluded from wider society capitalism created disability as a particular form of social oppression

['The creation of disability', 'Weaker, older or impaired members of pre-class societies were more likely to survive with the development of settled agricultural production and surplus crops. Feudal societies saw impairment in religious terms, as a mark of either good or evil, which meant those affected often faced persecution. However, the rural production process, and the extended nature of the feudal family, allowed many to make a genuine contribution to daily economic life. Families living and working as large groups were able to provide networks of care for children and the elderly. This way of life, typical for much of the world’s population for thousands of years, was to virtually disappear in the last three centuries.', 'The rise of capitalism forced people off the land. In Britain production for the market began on a scale sufficiently small as to be carried out in the home, and therefore impaired people could still play a role. However:', 'the rural population was being increasingly pressed by the new capitalist market forces, and when families could no longer cope the crippled members would have been most vulnerable and liable to turn to begging and church protection in special poor houses. Market forces soon favoured machinery which was more efficient and able to produce cheaper more plentiful woven material. Those working larger looms would more likely survive and cripples would have had greater difficulty working such equipment.7', 'The Industrial Revolution accelerated the pace of change enormously. Larger-scale machinery concentrated in factory towns increasingly destroyed the old cottage industries as well as traditional family structures, with members forced to find work away from the home or patch of land. The new factory worker “could not have any impairment which would prevent him or her from operating the machine. It was, therefore, the economic necessity of producing efficient machines for large-scale production that established ablebodiedness as the norm for productive (ie socially integrated) living…production for profit undermined the position of physically impaired people within the family and the community”.8', 'Working lives previously shaped by the hours of daylight and the seasons were now determined by the rhythm of the factory – even more so with the invention of gaslight and round the clock working. People’s bodies were now valued according to their ability to function like machines:', 'Factory discipline, time keeping and production norms broke with the slower, more self-determined and flexible work pattern into which many disabled people had been integrated. As work became more rationalised, requiring precise mechanical movements of the body, repeated in quicker succession, impaired persons – the deaf or blind, and those with mobility difficulties, were seen as – and without job accommodations to meet their impairments, were – less “fit” to do the tasks required of factory workers, and were increasingly excluded from paid employment. [The Industrial Revolution] removed crippled people from social intercourse and transformed them into disabled people.9', 'Specialisms were developed to help maintain and reproduce the new working class. Poor Law officials and an expanding medical profession developed pseudo-scientific categories to identify those of the poor who were unfit for work – ”the sick, the insane, defectives, and the aged and infirm”. Dependence on others was now identified as a social problem and impairment equated with sickness and illness. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries those identified as disabled were segregated into workhouses, asylums, prisons and special schools. This had “several advantages over domestic relief: it was efficient, it acted as a major deterrent to the able-boded malingerer, and it could instil good work habits into the inmates”.10', 'Isolating disabled people in institutions – barbaric and oppressive as they were – led to the intensive study and treatment of impairments, creating the basis for clearer scientific understanding and classification. Mental impairment, for example, was seen as a single category until Langdon Down’s reports for the London Hospital in 1866. These identified, among other conditions, what later became known as Down’s Syndrome.11', 'With labour power now a commodity whose components were separately identified and valued, people with mental health problems were also increasingly categorised and placed in segregated institutions. In 1826, the first year for which statistics are available, fewer than 5,000 people were confined in asylums throughout England. By 1900, this had increased to 74,000.12', 'Capitalism represented a huge advance from previous societies in many ways. For the first time in history the productive capacity existed to feed, clothe and house the entire global population, while scientific and medical advances offered the prospect of understanding and curing diseases. But the new working class creating this wealth were excluded from any say over what was produced and how, suffering for their pains physical and mental impairment on an unprecedented scale. Those marginalised or excluded from production, either by injury or already existing impairments, also became marginalised or excluded from wider society. In this way capitalism created disability as a particular form of social oppression.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Emory-BePa-Neg-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-RD-2.docx

Emory

BePa

e3ad6b8e4c04191f5039b7cd21f9d697936b8f0e4852367c25d036562af917e2

Embryonic stem cell research is indispensable to other stem-cell based research.

Rugnetta 9 (et al; Michael J. Rugnetta – who, at the time of the writing, was a Fellows Assistant, Center for American Progress. Since then Rugnetta has gone on to serve as The Deputy Attorney General, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General – “A Life Sciences Crucible” - Center for American Progress Reports - January 2009 - #E&F – modified for language that may offend - http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/01/pdf/stem_cells.pdf?_ga=2.175193830.535417375.1662788940-1373684941.1662788940)

Scientists determine whether other cells h old promise of delivering regenerative medicine by analyzing the surfaces to asses s) w hether they have same proteins and capabilities as e s c Regardless of what type of stem cells prove most useful process of embryonic stem cell comparison must be carried out for each application any conditions for which stem cell therapy might be possible.

Scientists determine whether other types of stem cells h old promise of delivering regenerative medicine by analyzing the surfaces to asses s) w hether they have the same proteins and therefore the same capabilities as e mbryonic s tem c ells Regardless of what type of stem cells prove to be the most useful , this process of embryonic stem cell comparison must be carried out for each therapeutic application any conditions for which stem cell therapy might be possible.

other types of stem cells e s c Regardless of what type of stem cells prove to be the most useful , this process of embryonic stem cell comparison must be carried

['', 'Scientists determine whether other types of stem cells hold the promise of delivering the kinds of regenerative medicine envisioned by life scientists by analyzing the surfaces of these alternative cells to see (assess) whether they have the same proteins and therefore the same capabilities as embryonic stem cells. Evidence suggests that these stem cell-specific proteins activate certain chemical pathways in the stem cells, which in turn allow them to maintain their pluripotency. Regardless of what type of stem cells prove to be the most useful, this process of embryonic stem cell comparison must be carried out for each therapeutic application, whether for Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, spinal cord injuries, or any of the other myriad conditions for which stem cell therapy might be possible.', '']

[(0, 10), (10, 10)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuMi-Neg-Gonzaga-Round-3.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

bb2a3a292238f4fc9f236cac85ac95d321b063813428f96027abf3073c75bd4e

It mandates broad protection using existing law, solving better than the case.

Laura Spitz 21, Professor of Law at the University of New Mexico School of Law, Professor of Law at Thompson Rivers University, Former Vice Provost and Associate Dean at Cornell University, J.S.D. from the Cornell University Law School, J.D. from the University of British Columbia Law School, B.A. from the University of Toronto; Eduardo M. Penalver, Professor of Law at Cornell Law School, Dean of Cornell Law School, J.D. from Yale Law School, M.A. from Oxford University, B.A. from Cornell University, “Nature’s Personhood and Property’s Virtues,” 2021, Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 45, p. 94-97

to bring interests of human s and nature into alignment Public Trust Doctrine recognizes the state has a special obligation to manage resources branches are judicially accountable for the trust review provides protection Court required restoration taking into account ecological harm In Juliana minors argu defendants violated obligations under the doctrine by ignoring impacts of fossil fuel s doctrine imposed restrictions property must be available for the public not sold and maintained expansion better to produce consequences hoped by personhood property law offer a more certain path to the same goals

Among the tools with potential to bring the interests of human s and nature into closer alignment the doctrine of “public trust” provide[s] a vehicle Public Trust Doctrine for intergenerational stewardship of natural resources doctrine recognizes certain resources as the common heritage of humankind, whose long-term interest the state has a special obligation to manage resources the legislative and executive branches are judicially accountable for dispositions of the public trust judicial review provides protection Although application has largely been limited to waters, there is no reason this must be the case interests the doctrine can consider are numerous the Hawaiian Supreme Court required restoration of waters taking into account both ecological harm as well as Native understandings of the appropriate uses In Juliana minors brought a claim against the U S argu ing that the defendants violated obligations under the doctrine by ignoring the impacts of fossil fuel con s umption the court held case law did not foreclose p t d from applying to the federal government the public trust doctrine imposed three restrictions on government: “first, property must be held available for use by the general public ; second property may not be sold and third, the property must be maintained the court left open the possibility for bringing actions again in the future an expansion of p t d would be better suited to produce the consequences hoped to bring about by recognizing personhood But even without such an expansion traditional property law provide more promising mech s to achieve the goals of those who would confer personhood on natural resources conferring personhood on nature is difficult to understand why it is a step worth taking existing legal tools offer a more certain path way to achieving the same goals property’s virtues outweigh personhood’s promise

judicially accountable protection expansion

['Among the property tools with potential to bring the interests of human beings (considered over the long term) and nature into closer long-term alignment, the ancient doctrine of “trust” and—more specifically—the doctrine of “public trust” provide[s] another possible vehicle for managing intergenerational interests. In his landmark 1970 article, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, Joseph Sax revived interest in that ancient doctrine, which traces its roots into Roman law, as a vehicle for intergenerational stewardship of natural resources.145 The doctrine recognizes certain resources—such as water and its attendant ecosystems—as the common heritage of humankind, in whose long-term interest the state has a special obligation to manage those resources.146 As one court has put it:', '“The duties imposed upon the state [as steward of resources subject to the public trust doctrine are] the duties of a trustee and not simply the duties of a good business manager.” Just as private trustees are judicially accountable to their beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive branches are judicially accountable for the dispositions of the public trust. The beneficiaries of the public trust are not just present generations but those to come. The check and balance of judicial review provides a level of protection against improvident dissipation of an irreplaceable res.147', 'Although the application of the public trust doctrine has largely been limited to waters, there is no conceptual reason why this must continue to be the case.148 The interests and values the doctrine can consider are numerous. Sax discusses an important 2000 Hawaii case in which the Hawaiian Supreme Court required the restoration of the natural flow of waters down a mountainside, taking into account both the ecological harm of diverting the water, as well as traditional Native Hawaiian understandings of the appropriate uses of those flows.149 In her survey of western states’ public trust doctrines, Robin Kundis Craig observes that California courts have extended public trust concepts to aquatic wildlife and their habitats.150', 'More recently, a U.S. district court held open the possibility for application of the public trust doctrine to the federal government in the context of global climate change. In Juliana v. United States, 151 a group of minors brought a claim against the United States and various federal officers, arguing in part that the defendants violated their obligations under the public trust doctrine by knowingly ignoring the impacts of continued fossil fuel consumption. In the district court, the plaintiffs’ public trust claims survived not only a motion to dismiss, but also a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court held that (1) it did not need to determine whether the public trust doctrine applied to the atmosphere at the summary judgment stage in the litigation because the plaintiffs’ claim was also based on public trust violations in connection with the territorial sea;152 (2) the case law did not foreclose the public trust doctrine from applying to the federal government;153 (3) public trust claims were uniquely linked to the fundamental attributes of sovereignty and thus not displaced by statutory law;154 and (4) the plaintiffs could properly bring their public trust claim in federal court because it was a substantive due process claim regarding the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights.155 “This lawsuit may be groundbreaking, but that fact does not alter the legal standards governing the motions to dismiss.”156', 'With respect to the public trust doctrine itself, the court found that it imposed three restrictions on government: “first, the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held available for use by the general public; second, the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third, the property must be maintained for particular types of uses.”157 The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ claim was based on the fact that the defendants “violated their duties as trustees by nominally retaining control over trust assets while actually allowing their depletion and destruction, effectively violating the first and third restrictions by excluding the public from use and enjoyment of public resources.”158', 'While the Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to dismiss the case for failing to satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing,159 it did so without ruling on the plaintiff’s public trust claims. In deciding that the case must be dismissed, the court left open the possibility for bringing such actions again in the future, provided that a plaintiff was able to prove the judiciary could provide a remedy. As of this writing, a motion for a rehearing en banc had yet to be decided.160 Viewed from the perspective of the Colorado River litigation, an expansion of public trust doctrine along the lines advocated by the Juliana plaintiffs would be better suited to produce the kinds of consequences the plaintiff hoped to bring about by recognizing the personhood of nature (procedural, substantive, and rhetorical).161 But even without such an expansion, the traditional tools of property law—including public regulation of private property— provide more promising mechanisms to achieve the substantive goals of those who would confer personhood on natural resources.', 'CONCLUSION', 'The idea of conferring personhood status on nature—or on discrete natural resources—is a heady and seemingly radical notion. But there may be less to it than meets the eye. Unless such recognition would ultimately yield better legal outcomes or encourage more thoughtful analysis of decisions about those resources, it is difficult to understand why it is a step worth taking. Contrary to the views of many advocates of the personhood approach, existing legal tools rooted in the law of property may offer a more certain pathway to achieving many of the same goals. In the end, we think property’s virtues outweigh personhood’s promise.', 'Consult Natives CP']

[(6, 14)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GrKi-Neg-Northwestern-Round-5.docx

Kentucky

GrKi

9ada85c9f53a7ec09de4ad72180975d2cb0acd852437a7afa6c02e490449949c

De-alerting fulfills commitment to NPT and non-prolif

De-Alerting Group 19 [NPT Rev Con Working group paper submitted by delegations from Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland, 2019 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/109/58/PDF/N1910958.pdf?OpenElement]

De-alerting is core of diminishing the role and significance of nuc s it is not only a disarm measure but also a significant contribution to non-prolif n w S should de-alert as a strategic step de-emphasizing nuc s reductions operational status are key to disarmament and non-prolif

Keeping nuclear weapons on high alert significantly multiplies their risks these include inadvertent launches owing to technical failure or operator error e possibility of misinterpreting early warning data leading to intentional but erroneous launches failures of and false reports by early warning systems and the use of nuclear weapons by unauthorized actors such as rogue military units, terrorists or cyberattackers; De-alerting is a core element of diminishing the role and significance of nuc lear weapon s in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. As such, it is not only a disarm ament measure but also a significant contribution to non-prolif eration given that emphasis on the importance of weapons on high alert could lead to false perceptions of nuclear weapons as desirable security instruments n uclear- w eapon S tates should de-alert as a strategic step in de-emphasizing the military role of nuc lear weapon s . concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems will diminish risks and hence increase human and international security; reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapons are key to disarmament and non-prolif eration, in particular for further dimi nishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;

significantly multiplies inadvertent launches erroneous launches use by unauthorized actors De-alerting disarm ament measure significant contribution to non-prolif eration n w S de-alert diminish risks disarmament non-prolif eration,

['6. The previous working papers submitted by the De-Alerting Group (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.24 and NPT/CONF.2015/WP.21) explain in detail how:', '(a) Keeping nuclear weapons on high alert significantly multiplies their risks. Some of these risks include inadvertent launches owing to technical failure or operator error, the possibility of misinterpreting early warning data leading to intentional but erroneous launches, failures of and false reports by early warning systems and the use of nuclear weapons by unauthorized actors such as rogue military units, terrorists or cyberattackers;', '(b) High alert levels are incompatible with the commitments entered into by all States parties to the Treaty to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and take concrete steps towards their eventual elimination.', '7. De-alerting is a core element of diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. As such, it is not only a disarmament measure but also a significant contribution to non-proliferation, given that continued emphasis on the importance of weapons on high alert could lead to false perceptions of nuclear weapons as desirable security instruments. Instead of continuing to emphasize the value of current launch postures, nuclear-weapon States should consider de-alerting as a strategic step in de-emphasizing the military role of nuclear weapons.', '8. In view of the above, the De-Alerting Group proposes that the 2020 Review Conference, when taking stock of concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, take the following steps: (a) Recognize the link between high alert levels, associated risks and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences posed by nuclear weapons, and also recognize that concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems will diminish risks and hence increase human and international security;', '(b) Recognize that reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapons are key to disarmament and non-proliferation, in particular for further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;', '(c) Reaffirm de-alerting as a pragmatic, interim and practical disarmament measure, pending the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty.', '']

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MichiganState-GuMi-Neg-ADA-Round-1.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

837820043d42f15860b47e11f1da99dc66b5066117670e44fad0df3044c83d5e

2. JAPAN.

Jennifer Knox 21, research and policy analyst for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists; Gregory Kulacki is a senior analyst and the China Project Manager for the program; Miyako Kurosaki in an independent researcher on nuclear policy and international relations, July 2021, “Japan Is Not an Obstacle to a US ‘No-First-Use’ Policy,” Union of Concerned Scientists, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/japan-is-not-an-obstacle-to-nfu.pdf

Japan is extremely unlikely to develop nuc s in response to n f u policy Even conservative officials do not claim that Japan would develop nuclear weapons Neither do they have political agency evidence is based entirely on confidential conversations Japan conducted two inquiries into nuc s. inquiry concluded that consequences would be unacceptable Withdrawal from NPT would collapse global effort to curb prolif deemed essential for Japanese security It would damage Japan-US alliance economic reprisal would threaten Japan’s survival population is concentrated in megacities this made m a d untenable national sentiment would precipitate polarizing confrontations that weaken the government inquiry looked at contingencies inquiry concluded Japan would not develop nuc s in response to a simultaneous collapse of the NPT and the US-Japan alliance Japanese officials who favor first-use will not admit it Abe denied he opposes n f u some quarters consider revising third non-nuclear principle When the Japanese Diet confronted the diplomat he denied secrecy reveals how worried officials are about opposition to reliance on the US nuclear umbrella It is difficult to imagine how this small group of secretive officials could transform Japan into a nuclear state after Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests 90 percent of Japanese respondents opposed developing nuc s after No Ko test 80 percent agreed Japan should prevent introduction of US nuc s important example is Abe not mentioning the Three Principles The public suspected that Abe test whether the political climate would tolerate weakening of the principles The public reaction was swift and politically significant

President Joseph Biden can immediately declare that the United States will never be the first nation to use nuclear weapons without worrying about the effect of such a declaration in Japan . most Japanese—an estimated three-quarters of the nation’s 125 million people—would be encouraged to see the United States take this long overdue step toward reducing the risk of nuclear war President Barack Obama considered taking this step but did not, following his advisers’ warnings Those advisors are wrong. Japan is extremely unlikely to choose to develop nuc lear weapon s , especially in response to a policy change that would strengthen international antinuclear norms . Japan does not pose a proliferation risk, and the United States can declare a n o- f irst- u se policy without undermining Japan’s commitment to remaining a non-nuclear-weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Prior Japanese assessments of their country’s options concluded that the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons were ephemeral and not worth the political, diplomatic, and economic costs. Even the conservative Japanese officials who lobby the United States to retain first-use options do not claim that Japan would develop nuclear weapons in response to a US no-first-use declaration. Neither do they have the political agency to make it happen they have not identified any scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary or desirable, nor can they explain how no-first-use compromises Japan’s security Many members of Congress believe Japan is a proliferation risk State Department cables from the 1960s and 1970s mention concerns about a Japanese “ irrationality ” that both “ glorified war ” and could inspire a quick decision to develop nuclear weapons One US official argued that a nuclear Japan was possible, despite that country’s post-WWII pacifism: “the Japanese are an emotional people ,” he wrote. He drove the point home with a disturbingly racist caricature : of a Japanese officer The evidence presented in those essays was thin : a few provocative statements from a handful of conservative Japanese essayists and politicians. the perception in US government circles that Japan could leave the NPT and develop nuclear weapons if the United States adopts a no-first-use policy is based entirely on the reports of US officials who claim their Japanese counterparts convey this impression in confidential conversations the number of Japanese officials who would have the opportunity to communicate their views in this manner is extremely small Occasionally, a few Japanese officials have suggested that the latent potential to make nuclear weapons with civilian plutonium has some deterrent value, but they also admit that Japan “has no intention whatsoever of acquiring nuclear weapons Japanese experts noted that the country could not use civilian plutonium to develop nuclear weapons: this fissile material is under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards The Japan ese government has conducted two inquiries into whether Japan should develop nuc lear weapon s. Both inquiries concluded, without reservation, that Japan should choose the NPT over preserving a future nuclear option. The first inquiry was completed in 1970 during a period when the government was considering signing the NPT. The inquiry assessed Japan’s technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons. it was primarily the nontechnical considerations that weighed against a decision to move forward. the inquiry concluded that China’s program was defensive a Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons would make both the Soviet Union and the United States wary of the intentions of a more independent and remilitarized Japan. International and domestic political opposition to the decision would be destabilizing . the inquiry concluded that a nuclear weapons program would not strengthen Japan’s security the second inquiry was also conducted in secret and kept confidential for fear of public reprisal. The NPT text states that the signatories would consider extending the treaty for a fixed period or possibly indefinitely. This inquiry concluded that the geopolitical consequences of developing nuclear weapons would be unacceptable Withdrawal from the NPT would undermine and potentially lead to the collapse of a highly valued, increasingly successful global effort to curb nuclear prolif eration , an effort deemed essential for Japanese and international security . It would also damage the Japan-US alliance . A Japanese choice for an independent national defense over collective security would have serious economic repercussions not just for Japan but for the region and the rest of the world. A nuclear Japan would destabilize the Asian economy Widespread international condemnation could bring economic reprisal s that would threaten Japan’s survival as a trading nation. Japan is especially vulnerable to nuclear attacks because its population is concentrated in a few megacities this extreme vulnerability made a “ m utual a ssured d estruction ” strategy untenable constructing and maintaining the infrastructure for a nuclear weapons program and an independent national defense would be too costly, both politically and economically . developing nuclear weapons would undermine domestic security . Japan’s deeprooted national sentiment against nuclear weapons would precipitate polarizing confrontations that would destabilize domestic politics and weaken the government . The inquiry looked at several contingencies One was the possible development of nuclear weapons by North Korea the inquiry concluded that it was “ hard to see the need ” for Japan to confront a nuclear North Korea “by going nuclear.” The inquiry imagined a more “ nationalist ” China focused on unification and the possibility of a US-China war over Taiwan . Yet the inquiry concluded that a nuclear-armed Japan would not be a viable solution to the problems presented by this situation. the inquiry considered a worst-case scenario in which the NPT collapsed , various other countries started developing nuclear weapons, and the US-Japan alliance broke down . Even in such a case it is questionable whether there is any value for a trading nation that depends on the stability of international society to try to secure its survival and protect its interests with its own nuclear weapons inquiry concluded It is not favorable for Japan to take the nuclear option Japan would not choose the nuclear option even when considering changes to Japan’s security situation far more serious than comparatively small changes in US nuclear weapons policy. If the Japan ese government would not develop nuc lear weapon s in response to a simultaneous collapse of the NPT and the US-Japan alliance Japanese officials who are reported to favor preserving first-use options will not admit it . Former Prime Minster Abe Shinzo has denied telling US officials he opposes a US n o- f irst- u se declaration some Japanese government officials continued to lobby the United States in secret Four Japanese diplomats presented a memo describing Japan’s perspective on the future of the US nuclear umbrella The memo focused on Japanese reservations about the Obama administration’s intention to permanently retire nuclear-capable, sea-launched cruise missiles that had been in storage One of the Japanese diplomats responded to that request by telling the commission that concerns about China led “ some quarters ” to consider revising Japan’s third non-nuclear principle on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. When members of the Japanese Diet confronted the diplomat with a leaked copy of the memo and his response to the commission, he denied both . two US officials who attended the meeting falsely claimed that the diplomat had defended the third non-nuclear principle, and that the leaked memo was a fabrication Continued Diet inquiries forced Prime Minister Abe’s cabinet to confirm in writing that the memo existed and that it was presented to the congressional commission at the direction of the foreign minister. Secrecy and duplicity are tools used by both US and Japanese officials to prevent the deep antipathy of the Japanese public toward nuclear weapons from influencing their decisions The desire for secrecy reveals how worried Japanese officials are about public opposition to unquestioned reliance on the US nuclear umbrella much less to a Japanese nuclear capability It is difficult to imagine how this small group of secretive officials could transform Japan into a nuclear weapons state . Why did Prime Minister Abe deny reliable reports that he had lobbied the United States to preserve first-use options The most likely explanation is that Japan is a democracy , one in which an overwhelming majority wants to ban nuclear weapons. Japanese public opinion polls consistently register high levels of opposition to Japan developing nuclear weapons or introducing US nuclear weapons into Japanese territory In a poll conducted shortly after Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, 90 percent of Japanese respondents opposed to Japan’s developing nuc lear weapon s In a poll shortly after the first No rth Ko rean nuclear test in 2006, 80 percent of respondents agreed Japan should continue to prevent the introduction of US nuc lear weapon s into Japanese territory Japanese attitudes toward nuclear weapons are deeply held A decade later, growing public opposition to nuclear weapons compelled Prime Minister Satō, a conservative, pronuclear politician, to issue his statement to the Diet on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles Most of the Japanese anti-nuclear organizations created in the 1960s and 1970s still exist, and they are much larger than their counterparts in the United States and Europe Neither the Japanese government nor Japanese society can ignore their voices An important example is the controversy Prime Minister Abe created in 2015 by not mentioning the Three Non-Nuclear Principles during his obligatory address at the annual commemoration of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima The public suspected that Abe may have been test ing whether the political climate would tolerate some weakening of the principles . The public reaction was swift and politically significant , forcing him to explain the oversight this test of the political waters let Abe know he would pay a political price if he attempted to discard or alter Japan’s non-nuclear principles. Current US assessments of Japanese sensitivity to changes in US nuclear weapons policy significantly overestimate the risk that Japan would leave the NPT and develop nuclear weapons in response to a US no-first-use declaration. no evidence supports the assertion that these concerns constitute a proliferation risk; ample evidence indicates they do not. no changes are apparent in Japanese government behavior, Japanese public opinion, or the security problems Japan faces. Japanese government officials are still reticent about discussing their views on nuclear weapons, and they go to extraordinary lengths to keep their cooperation with US nuclear weapons policies secret. A US no-first-use declaration would not undermine the intended function of the US nuclear umbrella over Japan. It is difficult to understand why a small number of Japanese officials believe retaining the option to use nuclear weapons first is necessary to preserve the credibility of the US promise to retaliate if Japan were attacked with nuclear weapons But it is extremely unlikely any Japanese government would consider going nuclear in response to any change in US nuclear weapons policy

immediately declare without worrying Japan three-quarters encouraged reducing the risk of nuclear war Those advisors are wrong. extremely unlikely strengthen international antinuclear norms does not n o- f irst- u se policy undermining Japan’s commitment benefits not worth Even the conservative Japanese officials do not claim political agency not identified any scenario proliferation risk irrationality glorified war emotional people disturbingly racist caricature thin provocative statements based entirely confidential conversations extremely small a few Japanese officials no intention could not use civilian plutonium safeguards conducted two inquiries inquiries concluded, without reservation, choose the NPT destabilizing would not strengthen Japan’s security unacceptable collapse nuclear prolif eration Japanese and international security Japan-US alliance independent national defense serious economic repercussions destabilize the Asian economy threaten Japan’s survival especially vulnerable concentrated in a few megacities m utual a ssured d estruction untenable too costly, both politically and economically undermine domestic security polarizing confrontations destabilize domestic politics and weaken the government . several contingencies nuclear weapons by North Korea hard to see the need nationalist unification US-China war over Taiwan would not be a viable solution NPT collapsed US-Japan alliance broke down Even in such a case It is not favorable for Japan far more serious would not develop nuc lear weapon s simultaneous collapse of the NPT and the US-Japan alliance will not admit it Abe Shinzo denied n o- f irst- u se in secret Japanese reservations concerns about China revising Japan’s third non-nuclear principle he denied both prevent the deep antipathy worried public opposition small group of secretive officials nuclear weapons state reliable reports Japan is a democracy high levels of opposition Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests No rth Ko rean nuclear test Japanese anti-nuclear organizations much larger Prime Minister Abe public reaction was swift and politically significant political price significantly overestimate the risk no evidence would not undermine any change

['President Joseph Biden can immediately declare that the United States will never be the first nation to use nuclear weapons without worrying about the effect of such a declaration in Japan. He may disappoint a few conservative Japanese officials, but most Japanese—an estimated three-quarters of the nation’s 125 million people—would be encouraged to see the United States take this long overdue step toward reducing the risk of nuclear war (Baron, Gibbons, and Herzog 2020).', 'President Barack Obama considered taking this step but did not, following his advisers’ warnings that he would disappoint conservative Japanese officials who might respond by having Japan develop its own nuclear weapons. Brad Roberts, his deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, argued that Japanese opposition to a no-first-use policy made retaining the option to start a nuclear war a necessary “non-proliferation measure” (Roberts 2016).', 'Those advisors are wrong. Japan is extremely unlikely to choose to develop nuclear weapons, especially in response to a policy change that would strengthen international antinuclear norms. As three clear indicators show, Japan does not pose a proliferation risk, and the United States can declare a no-first-use policy without undermining Japan’s commitment to remaining a non-nuclear-weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).', 'Prior Japanese assessments of their country’s options concluded that the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons were ephemeral and not worth the political, diplomatic, and economic costs. The calculations underlying those conclusions have not changed.', 'An overwhelming majority of Japanese want to abolish nuclear weapons entirely.', 'Even the conservative Japanese officials who lobby the United States to retain first-use options do not claim that Japan would develop nuclear weapons in response to a US no-first-use declaration. Neither do they have the political agency to make it happen. An unrepresentative minority, they must operate in secret to avoid public dissent. Moreover, they have not identified any scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary or desirable, nor can they explain how no-first-use compromises Japan’s security. The threat of US nuclear retaliation would continue to deter nuclear attacks against Japan.', 'As a senator, Biden expressed support for a no-first-use policy, and many members of Congress support it today. Unfounded concerns about the possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan should not prevent US decisionmakers from taking this long overdue step toward reducing the risk of nuclear war.', 'The Origins of US Fears of a Nuclear-Armed Japan', 'Many members of Congress, as well as a number of other US government officials and nuclear policy experts, believe Japan is a proliferation risk.1 Officials in Washington have discussed the problem for decades. State Department cables from the 1960s and 1970s mention concerns about a Japanese “irrationality” that both “glorified war” and could inspire a quick decision to develop nuclear weapons (FRUS 1968; FRUS 1965). One US official argued that a nuclear Japan was possible, despite that country’s post-WWII pacifism: “the Japanese are an emotional people,” he wrote. He drove the point home with a disturbingly racist caricature: “The pendulum can swing wildly. The picture of a Japanese officer cutting off the head of a prisoner and then weeping fifteen minutes later at the sight of cherry blossoms is perfectly credible” (FRUS 1971).', 'In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a rush of US-authored essays raised the possibility Japan would go nuclear in response to North Korean missile tests, Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, or Chinese nuclear modernization.2 One of the more influential, co-authored by a US official who continues to play a leading role in shaping US Asia policy, opens with an interpretation of a Japanese comic book or “manga.” The manga reference intentionally revived the caricature of an unpredictable Japanese culture whose inscrutable lines between pacifism and militarism could shift quickly and result in a nuclear-armed Japan (Campbell and Sunohara 2004).', 'The evidence presented in those essays was thin: a few provocative statements from a handful of conservative Japanese essayists and politicians. Yet the impact on the US discussion was considerable. The specter of a nucleararmed Japan became so pervasive it was repeated in an episode of the popular television drama The West Wing (West Wing 2003).', 'Today, the perception in US government circles that Japan could leave the NPT and develop nuclear weapons if the United States adopts a no-first-use policy is based entirely on the reports of US officials who claim their Japanese counterparts convey this impression in confidential conversations (Roberts 2016). However, the number of Japanese officials who would have the opportunity to communicate their views in this manner is extremely small, perhaps no more than 15 to 20 individuals at any given period in US-Japan relations.', 'An additional reason so many US experts and officials believe reports that such a small group could rapidly transform Japan into a nuclear weapons state is their country’s ability to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and store the extracted plutonium (see Box 1). Occasionally, a few Japanese officials have suggested that the latent potential to make nuclear weapons with civilian plutonium has some deterrent value, but, like Tanaka Nobuo, a former senior nuclear policy official in Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, they also admit that Japan “has no intention whatsoever of acquiring nuclear weapons” (von Hippel, Takubo, and Kang 2019). More important, in 1970, when the Japanese government did seriously consider developing nuclear weapons, it made no mention of the availability of civilian plutonium as a contributing factor in its deliberations. When reviewing its nuclear options in 1995, Japanese experts noted that the country could not use civilian plutonium to develop nuclear weapons: this fissile material is under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, a requirement imposed by both the NPT and Japan’s nuclear technology agreement with the United States.', 'Japan’s Assessments of the Nuclear Option', 'The Japanese government has conducted two inquiries into whether Japan should develop nuclear weapons. Both inquiries concluded, without reservation, that Japan should choose the NPT over preserving a future nuclear option.', 'THE FIRST INQUIRY: DECIDING TO JOIN THE NPT', 'The first inquiry was completed in 1970 during a period when the government was considering signing the NPT. Conducted in secret, the inquiry has never been released to the public,4 which in 1967 had pressured elected officials into adopting what have come to be called Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles. The principles forbid Japan from possessing nuclear weapons, producing them, or permitting their introduction into Japanese territory.', 'The inquiry assessed Japan’s technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons. Further, it analyzed decisions of other nuclear weapons states, especially France and China, and examined the long-term threat to Japan from China’s program. It also considered the potential reactions of other nations, especially the Soviet Union, the United States, and neighboring Asian countries, to a Japanese decision to become a nuclear weapons state. Finally, it assessed how a decision to develop nuclear weapons might affect Japan’s international reputation and domestic politics (Study Group on Democracy 1968; Study Group on Democracy 1970).', 'The inquiry concluded that Japan could overcome most of the technical obstacles to developing nuclear weapons except, perhaps, the difficulty of conducting underground tests. However, it was primarily the nontechnical considerations that weighed against a decision to move forward. The inquiry noted that both France and China had developed nuclear weapons because they lacked confidence in the nuclear umbrellas of the United States and the Soviet Union. While expressing concern about China’s decision to develop nuclear weapons, which created a potential for nuclear blackmail against Japan, the inquiry concluded that China’s program was defensive, not aggressive—a product of and a remedy for Chinese fears of US and Soviet nuclear intimidation. For this reason, China would not be inclined to blackmail Japan, especially given the prospect of US retaliation. Moreover, a Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons would make both the Soviet Union and the United States wary of the intentions of a more independent and remilitarized Japan.', 'The inquiry also noted that while developing nuclear weapons might enhance Japanese national prestige, the effect would be short-lived. International and domestic political opposition to the decision would be destabilizing.', 'Having weighed all these factors carefully, the inquiry concluded that a nuclear weapons program would not strengthen Japan’s security (Study Group on Democracy 1970).', 'THE SECOND INQUIRY: PERMANENTLY EXTENDING JAPAN’S COMMITMENT TO THE NPT', 'Completed in 1995, the second inquiry was also conducted in secret and kept confidential for fear of public reprisal. Twentyfive years after declaring Japan a non-nuclear-weapons state under the NPT, the Japanese government once again considered the nuclear option and its commitment to the treaty.', 'The NPT text states that the signatories would consider extending the treaty for a fixed period or possibly indefinitely. Japanese agreement to its extension would imply a commitment to permanently abandoning the nuclear option. The NPT allows states to withdraw from the treaty but only if “extraordinary events” threaten their “supreme interests.” Having to make that case before the international community would require compelling proof, acknowledged by the other NPT signatories, of an extraordinary threat to Japan. Withdrawing without sufficient justification could subject Japan to the same severe international economic and political sanctions imposed on North Korea.', 'This inquiry concluded that the geopolitical consequences of developing nuclear weapons would be unacceptable (Japan Defense Agency 1995). Withdrawal from the NPT would undermine and potentially lead to the collapse of a highly valued, increasingly successful global effort to curb nuclear proliferation, an effort deemed essential for Japanese and international security. It would also damage the Japan-US alliance. The United States and other countries would begin to worry about new and complex security challenges posed by a more independent, nuclear-armed Japan. A decision to arm Japan with nuclear weapons would also undermine the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella for other non-nuclear nations and upset the global balance of power.', 'The inquiry connected these geopolitical consequences to anticipated economic costs. A Japanese choice for an independent national defense over collective security would have serious economic repercussions not just for Japan but for the region and the rest of the world. A nuclear Japan would destabilize the Asian economy, which by 1995 was becoming a major engine of global economic growth. Widespread international condemnation could bring economic reprisals that would threaten Japan’s survival as a trading nation.', 'The inquiry went further, identifying three domestic factors that called into question whether developing nuclear weapons would make Japan more secure. First, Japan is especially vulnerable to nuclear attacks because its population is concentrated in a few megacities on a comparatively small, mountainous, and geologically volatile land mass. In the opinion of the analysts conducting the inquiry, this extreme vulnerability made a “mutual assured destruction” strategy against nuclear weapons states like Russia, China, and the United States untenable.5 Second, constructing and maintaining the infrastructure for a nuclear weapons program and an independent national defense would be too costly, both politically and economically. Third, developing nuclear weapons would undermine domestic security. Japan’s deeprooted national sentiment against nuclear weapons would precipitate polarizing confrontations that would destabilize domestic politics and weaken the government.', 'The inquiry looked at several contingencies that US experts and officials often cite today as potential triggers of Japanese development of nuclear weapons. One was the possible development of nuclear weapons by North Korea. Yet the inquiry described that program sympathetically as “a dagger stuck to China’s throat.” The metaphor was intended to emphasize that North Korea’s program also threatens China, which had no grounds to stop it because it was motivated by the same “self-defense” rationale China had used to justify its own decision to develop nuclear weapons.', 'The Japanese inquiry also took a somewhat cynical view of international efforts to punish North Korea. It quoted a French military critic who characterized North Korea as an easy-to-punish “scapegoat” when compared with Israel, India, and Pakistan, which received more favorable treatment when they rejected the NPT. The quote highlighted the political importance of the North Korea problem to the United States, but in the end the inquiry concluded that it was “hard to see the need” for Japan to confront a nuclear North Korea “by going nuclear.”', 'The inquiry imagined a more “nationalist” China focused on unification and the possibility of a US-China war over Taiwan. It considered the possibility that China would abandon its policy of nuclear no-first-use, establish effective control over the Senkaku Islands, and unilaterally develop the continental shelf in disputed waters. Yet the inquiry concluded that a nuclear-armed Japan would not be a viable solution to the problems presented by this situation.', 'Finally, the inquiry considered a worst-case scenario in which the NPT collapsed, various other countries started developing nuclear weapons, and the US-Japan alliance broke down. “Even in such a case,” the inquiry concluded, “it is questionable whether there is any value for a trading nation that depends on the stability of international society to try to secure its survival and protect its interests with its own nuclear weapons.”', 'Having carefully considered these contingencies and taken many international and domestic factors into account, the 1995 inquiry concluded, “It is not favorable for Japan to take the nuclear option.”', 'The two in-depth inquiries into Japan’s nuclear options reveal that Japan would not choose the nuclear option even when considering changes to Japan’s security situation far more serious than comparatively small changes in US nuclear weapons policy. If the Japanese government would not develop nuclear weapons in response to a simultaneous collapse of the NPT and the US-Japan alliance, it is difficult to believe the reports of US officials who believe that Japan could go nuclear in response to a US expression of intent not to use nuclear weapons first.', 'Japan’s Secretive Pro-Nuclear Minority', 'It is difficult to assess how many Japanese officials want the United States to retain the option to use nuclear weapons first or why. Japanese officials who are reported to favor preserving first-use options will not admit it. Former Prime Minster Abe Shinzo, for example, has denied telling US officials he opposes a US no-first-use declaration (Abe 2018).', 'The US-Japan nuclear alliance has always relied on secrecy to protect Japanese officials from public scrutiny. For decades, they have been caught between US policies that call for the use of nuclear weapons to defend Japan and the Japanese public’s vehemently anti-nuclear sentiments. This challenge intensified when Japan adopted what are known as the Three Non-Nuclear Principles: Japan will not possess nuclear weapons, manufacture them, or allow their introduction into Japanese territory. Prime Minister Satō Eisaku introduced the principles in a 1967 speech to the Diet in response to Japanese public concern about nuclear weapons the United States had deployed on the island of Okinawa. The Diet formally adopted the principles in 1971.', 'In 1972, under the terms of the agreement returning Okinawa to Japan, the United States removed from the island its nuclear weapons, which at one point numbered just over 1,200 (Norris, Arkin, and Burr 1999). However, the United States also sought to retain the ability to reintroduce nuclear weapons into Okinawa if necessary (FRUS 1969). Prime Minister Satō signed a secret agreement with US President Richard Nixon granting that US request (Yushikisha Iinkai 2010). Rumors of the agreement, and that US nuclear weapons were entering Japanese territory on US ships, circulated in Japan for decades; Japanese officials denied both.', 'It was not until an opposition government came to power in 2009 and ordered a reluctant Ministry of Foreign Affairs to investigate and issue a public report that details about the entry of US nuclear weapons into Japan came to light. The investigation found that Japanese officials had systematically violated the third non-nuclear principle by allowing US nuclear weapons to enter Japanese territory. An informal “don’t ask, don’t tell” bureaucratic arrangement had been designed to make it difficult to determine the extent of official Japanese knowledge and participation in these transgressions (Yushikisha Iinkai 2010).', 'The investigation described how ambiguity conveniently enabled both governments to reconcile the contradictions inherent in the protection of pacifist Japan by a nucleararmed United States. The US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 made “the introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons, including intermediate and long-range missiles as well as the construction of bases for such weapons,” subject to prior consultation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1963). Japanese officials wanted to have a voice in setting policies that could result in the use of nuclear weapons in Japan (Yushikisha Iinkai 2010) (see Box 2).', 'However, the treaty gave Japan no explicit right to reject a US request (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1960; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1963). This allowed the United States to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan aboard US naval vessels even though Japanese officials believe it was inconsistent with the 1960 treaty. Those officials knew about the US practice but allowed it to continue unquestioned, setting aside the consultation obligation included in the 1960 treaty. This arrangement enabled them to deny accusations of complicity in a violation of the third non-nuclear principle (Yushikisha Iinkai 2010).', 'Jeffrey Bader, President Obama’s senior director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council, sternly criticized the decision of the new Japanese government to make this history public. He characterized the 2009 Ministry of Foreign Affairs investigation as an attempt to “reverse decades of US nuclear doctrine,” presumably for exposing that the don’t-ask-don’t-tell policy served as a means of withholding information about US nuclear weapons policy from the Japanese public (Bader 2012). Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya, who mandated the study, thought ending the secrecy and clarifying the situation on prior consultation might facilitate greater Japanese public acceptance of the US nuclear umbrella. The US government wanted to maintain secrecy, seeing Japanese public awareness as an unwelcome and threatening restriction on US freedom of action.', 'After the 2009 report, some Japanese government officials continued to lobby the United States in secret. As the Obama administration was preparing its Nuclear Posture Review, a congressional commission held a hearing at the US Institute of Peace. Four Japanese diplomats presented a memo describing Japan’s perspective on the future of the US nuclear umbrella (Kakujoho 2018). Rumors about the presentation created a stir in the US arms control community.', 'The memo focused on Japanese reservations about the Obama administration’s intention to permanently retire nuclear-capable, sea-launched cruise missiles that had been in storage since President George H.W. Bush removed them from US attack submarines in 1991 (Lewis 2009). But the heart of the controversy in Japan was what appeared to be a US request to prepare to redeploy US tactical nuclear weapons in Okinawa. One of the Japanese diplomats responded to that request by telling the commission that concerns about China led “some quarters” to consider revising Japan’s third non-nuclear principle on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory.', 'When members of the Japanese Diet confronted the diplomat with a leaked copy of the memo and his response to the commission, he denied both. In a letter to the Japan Times, two US officials who attended the meeting falsely claimed that the diplomat had defended the third non-nuclear principle, and that the leaked memo was a fabrication (Payne 2018). The director of the Institute of Peace denied requests by two Diet members to access the meeting records. He claimed the testimony was “off-the-record” and kept confidential at the request of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.', 'Continued Diet inquiries forced Prime Minister Abe’s cabinet to confirm in writing that the memo existed and that it was presented to the congressional commission at the direction of the foreign minister. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry refused to grant Diet members access to archived materials related to the testimony, including the memo, claiming the Institute of Peace insisted on keeping the materials confidential.', 'Secrecy and duplicity are tools used by both US and Japanese officials to prevent the deep antipathy of the Japanese public toward nuclear weapons from influencing their decisions. The desire for secrecy reveals how worried Japanese officials are about public opposition to unquestioned reliance on the US nuclear umbrella—much less to a Japanese nuclear capability. It also reveals that Japanese officials feel compelled to rely on an undemocratic policymaking process that enables a few unelected bureaucrats in both governments to control how the US nuclear umbrella over Japan functions, as well as to prevent informed public participation and debate. It is difficult to imagine how this small group of secretive officials could transform Japan into a nuclear weapons state. ', 'Japan’s Large Anti-Nuclear Majority', 'Why did Prime Minister Abe deny reliable reports that he had lobbied the United States to preserve first-use options (Rogin 2016)? The most likely explanation is that Japan is a democracy, one in which an overwhelming majority wants to ban nuclear weapons. In a recent survey, three-quarters of the population indicated a desire for Japan to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Joining would make the possession of nuclear weapons illegal and prohibit the introduction of US nuclear weapons into Japan (Baron, Gibbons, and Herzog 2020).', 'Japanese public opinion polls consistently register high levels of opposition to Japan developing nuclear weapons or introducing US nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. That opposition has not wavered even in response to threatening events. In a poll conducted shortly after Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, 90 percent of Japanese respondents opposed to Japan’s developing nuclear weapons (Gallup News Service 1999). In a poll shortly after the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, 80 percent of respondents agreed Japan should continue to prevent the introduction of US nuclear weapons into Japanese territory (Mansfield Foundation 2006).', 'Japanese attitudes toward nuclear weapons, developed in reaction to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are deeply held. The bombings made the enormous destructive power and inhumane biological effects of nuclear weapons clear to the Japanese public. Each year, Japanese political leaders travel to the two cities to remember the bombings and promise the survivors they will do their best to abolish nuclear weapons. The annual memorials, as well as constant public debates related to proper care and compensation for the survivors and their descendants, force Japanese government officials to reiterate and reaffirm Japan’s anti-nuclear commitments. The annual ritual denunciation of nuclear weapons is a defining feature of the contemporary national identity.', 'The Japanese public became more fully aware of what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the end of US military occupation in 1952, which also brought the end of strict US censorship on the bombings’ consequences. Then in 1954 Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment exploded into a politically potent social movement after a US nuclear test exposed Japanese fishermen to nuclear fallout (see Box 3). Japan’s prime minister at the time, Kishi Nobusuke, a staunch conservative, supported the use of US nuclear weapons as a deterrent and argued that Japan’s peace constitution permitted developing nuclear weapons. However, opposition to US plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Japan compelled Prime Minister Kishi to assure the Japanese public in 1957 that US nuclear weapons would not be allowed to enter Japanese territory. The protests, which also focused on opposition to signing a security treaty with the United States, were so large that President Eisenhower cancelled a state visit. Prime Minister Kishi was subsequently driven from office because of his support for the treaty, which he signed in 1960 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.).', 'A decade later, growing public opposition to nuclear weapons compelled Prime Minister Satō, a conservative, pronuclear politician, to issue his statement to the Diet on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Satō reportedly believed the principles were “nonsense,” and he qualified Japan’s adherence by making it dependent on progress in global nuclear disarmament and the viability of the US nuclear umbrella (FRUS 1969). Nevertheless, he publicly defended Japan’s non-nuclear principles in Oslo when he accepted the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize. The Nobel Committee gave the prize to Satō for his role in bringing Japan into the NPT. The former prime minister accepted the award “on behalf of the people of Japan” who, he proclaimed, had reached “a national consensus not to be armed with nuclear weapons” (Satō 1974). Japan ratified the NPT two years later.', 'Most of the Japanese anti-nuclear organizations created in the 1960s and 1970s still exist, and they are much larger than their counterparts in the United States and Europe. Neither the Japanese government nor Japanese society can ignore their voices even if, like anti-nuclear groups everywhere, they are smaller than they used to be and less prominent than civil society groups focused on climate change or gender equity. This continued strength is especially true for organizations representing the survivors and victims of the US nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.', 'An important example is the controversy Prime Minister Abe created in 2015 by not mentioning the Three Non-Nuclear Principles during his obligatory address at the annual commemoration of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The public suspected, with good reason, that this was not an oversight, and that Abe may have been testing whether the political climate would tolerate some weakening of the principles. The public reaction was swift and politically significant, forcing him to explain the oversight (Diet 2015). Clearly, this test of the political waters let Abe know he would pay a political price if he attempted to discard or alter Japan’s non-nuclear principles.', 'Take the Nuclear Option off the Table', 'Current US assessments of Japanese sensitivity to changes in US nuclear weapons policy significantly overestimate the risk that Japan would leave the NPT and develop nuclear weapons in response to a US no-first-use declaration. A small number of Japanese officials may have concerns about the effects of a US no-first-use policy, but no evidence supports the assertion that these concerns constitute a proliferation risk; ample evidence indicates they do not. After all, Japan considered and emphatically rejected taking the nuclear option twice: in the 1970s, before joining the NPT, and in the 1990s, before agreeing to a permanent extension of the treaty.', 'Twenty-five years have passed since Japan last seriously considered the nuclear option, and it is reasonable to wonder whether Japanese thinking has changed. In fact, no changes are apparent in Japanese government behavior, Japanese public opinion, or the security problems Japan faces. Measures of public opinion continue to show consistently high levels of support for abolishing nuclear weapons. For this reason, Japanese government officials are still reticent about discussing their views on nuclear weapons, and they go to extraordinary lengths to keep their cooperation with US nuclear weapons policies secret. They also feel obliged to reiterate support for international nuclear arms control and disarmament. And the central security challenges remain the same as in 1995: the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea and China.', 'President Biden faces a choice: mollify the few Japanese officials who have reportedly told US officials, secretly, that they want to preserve nuclear-first-use options or accede to the expectations of the three-quarters of Japan’s 125 million citizens who want the US government to not only advance international nuclear arms control negotiations but also lead the world toward the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. Respecting the preferences of an overwhelming majority of Japanese would demonstrate the sincerity of Biden administration statements on the importance of elevating democratic values and institutions, especially in East Asia.', 'During the 2020 presidential campaign, Senator Biden told US voters he could not imagine any circumstances in which the United States would use nuclear weapons first. Explicitly taking that option off the table would make clear to other nuclear weapons states, especially China, that the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons is to prevent a nuclear attack. That is also the sole purpose of the nuclear umbrella the United States provides to Japan: to assure the Japanese that the United States will retaliate if they are attacked with nuclear weapons. A US no-first-use declaration would not undermine the intended function of the US nuclear umbrella over Japan.', 'It is difficult to understand why a small number of Japanese officials believe retaining the option to use nuclear weapons first is necessary to preserve the credibility of the US promise to retaliate if Japan were attacked with nuclear weapons. No one in this small group has discussed their reasoning in public. A select set of US officials—who also want to preserve first-use options—argue the US government must placate these few Japanese officials to prevent their nation from developing nuclear weapons. But it is extremely unlikely any Japanese government would consider going nuclear in response to any change in US nuclear weapons policy, particularly a change that would not only preserve the US promise to retaliate but also reduce the risk of nuclear war. And even if some Japanese officials want their nation to develop nuclear weapons, Japanese voters would almost certainly not permit\xa0it.']

[(9, 16)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-HiLe-Aff-1---JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-1.docx

Northwestern

HiLe

90a571873e9e04da3c4a08f350d21a8f98030e3277553a08d0874d92d3f334a2

2. It trades off with other progressive and international agenda items.

Joseph Gerson 21. Director of Programs for American Friends Service Committee Northeast Region and Director of AFSC's Peace and Economic Security Program, convener of the Working Group for Peace and Demilitarization in Asia and the Pacific, co-founder of United for Peace and Justice (national) and United for Peace (Boston area.), member of the board of the International Peace Bureau and the Steering Committee of No to NATO/No to War. “A New Day for Human Survival: On the Promise of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.” January 21st, 2021. Massachusetts Peace Action. https://masspeaceaction.org/a-new-day-for-human-survival/

In addition to preserve democracy stanch the pandemic support economy we can hold Biden’s feet to the fire pledged to extend START with Russia, rejoin the JCPOA Biden previously stated his opposition With Markey and others urging no first use we should be encouraging our president to spend his political capital encouraging president to act on his doubts about ICBMs and standoff cruise missiles

In addition to doing all that we can to preserve constitutional democracy , to stanch the pandemic , and support revitalization of our economy , we can hold President Biden’s feet to the fire . He has pledged to extend the New START Treaty with Russia, due to expire in February, and to rejoin the JCPOA nuclear deal with Iran. Biden previously stated his opposition to the U.S. “first use” nuclear warfighting doctrine that could lead to miscalculations and “use them or lose them” missile launches by U.S. rivals. With Senator Markey and others in Congress urging a no first use policy, we should be encouraging our president to spend his political capital to ensure human survival. we should be encouraging the president (and Congress) to act on his doubts about the value of replacing U.S. ground-based ICBMs and standoff cruise missiles which undermine rather than augment our real security.

constitutional democracy pandemic revitalization of our economy hold President Biden’s feet to the fire START JCPOA opposition miscalculations Markey encouraging our president political capital replacing U.S. ICBMs standoff cruise missiles

['Those of us here in the United States who have confronted the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and understand the urgency of nuclear disarmament have our own work cut out for us. In addition to doing all that we can to preserve constitutional democracy, to stanch the pandemic, and support revitalization of our economy, we can hold President Biden’s feet to the fire. He has pledged to extend the New START Treaty with Russia, due to expire in February, and to rejoin the JCPOA nuclear deal with Iran. Biden previously stated his opposition to the U.S. “first use” nuclear warfighting doctrine that could lead to miscalculations and “use them or lose them” missile launches by U.S. rivals. With Senator Markey and others in Congress urging a no first use policy, we should be encouraging our president to spend his political capital to ensure human survival.', 'And, as we look for the funds to revitalize our pandemic ravaged economy, we should be encouraging the president (and Congress) to act on his doubts about the value of replacing U.S. ground-based ICBMs and standoff cruise missiles which undermine rather than augment our real security.']

[(7, 16)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Neg-Kentucky-Round-6.docx

Emory

KeRa

9b6c6833d49de37cc44ef184aff2c66fa27b794f90e22c525a32984b6f12d581

Its bipartisan.

Birnbaum 20 - (Emily Birnbaum, former tech policy reporter with Protocol; 12-8-2020, Protocol, "Congress is finally backing a national AI strategy," doa: 9-16-2022) url:

Republican Hurd alongside Democrat Kelly told Protocol ublicans and Democrats agree American leadership in artificial intelligence is important . the resolution is expected to pass near-unanimously It's vital we make investments in oversight bodies to ensure AI is a positive tool for society .

Republican Rep. Will Hurd , who co-led the effort alongside Democrat ic Rep. Robin Kelly , told Protocol . "The good news is, guess what: Rep ublicans and Democrats agree American leadership in artificial intelligence is important . " the resolution is expected to pass near-unanimously . As other countries continue to invest heavily in AI technologies, U.S. leadership is not assured It's vital that we make these investments now in our workforce, national security , research and development , and oversight bodies to ensure that AI is a positive tool for society . " She and Hurd have been working to carve out bipartisan paths forward on AI policy since 2018

Republican Rep. Will Hurd co-led Democrat ic Rep. Robin Kelly Rep ublicans Democrats agree American leadership in artificial intelligence is important resolution near-unanimously U.S. leadership is not assured vital make these investments national security research development oversight bodies ensure that AI is a positive tool for society bipartisan paths AI policy since 2018

['', '"Nobody thought we were going to be able to pull this together," Republican Rep. Will Hurd, who co-led the effort alongside Democratic Rep. Robin Kelly, told Protocol. "The good news is, guess what: Republicans and Democrats agree American leadership in artificial intelligence is important."', 'Hurd and Kelly introduced the resolution in September following extensive consultation with the Bipartisan Policy Center, which produced a series of deeply-researched white papers on AI-related topics including ethics, workforce development research and national security.', 'Those white papers ultimately informed the resolution, which is expected to pass near-unanimously. Hurd and Kelly, with the help of House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, worked on the resolution with the six House committees with jurisdiction over the relevant AI-related topics.', '"As other countries continue to invest heavily in AI technologies, U.S. leadership is not assured," Kelly said in a statement. "It\'s vital that we make these investments now in our workforce, national security, research and development, and oversight bodies to ensure that AI is a positive tool for society." She and Hurd have been working to carve out bipartisan paths forward on AI policy since 2018.', '', 'Vicarious liability is distinct—it does not evoke any sense of rights merely that AI are tools that sometimes get out of hand—liability is tied to humans—that’s Scherer.', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Aff-8---Indiana-Round-3.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

a49b5018e7a01a2261222001d45b75a4ecaa272275c40f1eca37fdb0a9c9e87a

Even abandoning denuclearization is insufficient to bring them to the table.

Bruce Klinger 22. Senior research fellow in The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. “This is not the time to abandon North Korean denuclearization.” 10/29/22. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3709953-this-is-not-the-time-to-abandon-north-korean-denuclearization/

Arms control advocates yet to provide argument approach would induce negotiations regime has rejected dialogue for years previous implementation did not work North violated each agreement no reason to believe concession would spark reciprocal response U S provided No Ko with security guarantees even reduced sanctions to no avail

The recent spate of North Korean missile tests has resurrected the “ denuclearization vs arms control” Eleven United N ations resolutions require Pyongyang to denuclearize by abandoning its nuclear and missile programs Arms control advocates deride this as an unrealistic policy goal But they have yet to provide a convincing argument that an arms control approach would be any more successful at curbing or even induce Pyongyang to resume negotiations The regime has rejected all U.S. and South Korean entreaties for dialogue for several years . Arms control proponents have mischaracterized denuclearization as requiring North Korea to rapidly abandon the entirety of its nuclear programs denuclearization proposals, including previous agreements call for incremental implementation over a period of years based on reciprocal actions by all parties The “limit and freeze” approach did not work when North Korea signed the Nonproliferation Treaty International Atomic Energy Agency the inter-Korean nuclear agreement and the Agreed Framework North Korea violated each of those agreement s , Having repeatedly broken its word why should we believe Pyongyang would honor its signature Abandoning denuclearization as a policy objective would have significant repercussions it would undermine the 11 UN resolutions requiring North Korea to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs Such a policy shift would also remove the legal authority for Washington and other nations to impose and enforce sanctions f Arms control advocates hope that, by renouncing denuclearization the U.S. could coax Pyongyang to resume talking . There is no reason to believe such a major unilateral concession would spark any reciprocal diplomatic response the U nited S tates and the international community provided No rth Ko rea with security guarantees curtailment of military exercises and a reduction of allied deterrence They have even reduced sanctions all to no avail . An effective arms control treaty would require a comprehensive verification protocol and on-site inspections Pyongyang has resisted or rejected such provisions during Six Party Talks

denuclearization vs arms control” unrealistic policy goal arms control approach even induce all U.S. and South Korean entreaties dialogue mischaracterized including previous agreements incremental implementation reciprocal actions each of those agreement s repeatedly broken its word honor its signature significant repercussions undermine the 11 UN resolutions remove the legal authority impose enforce by renouncing denuclearization resume talking would spark reciprocal security guarantees curtailment of military exercises even reduced sanctions all to no avail . resisted or rejected

['The recent spate of North Korean missile tests has resurrected the “denuclearization vs arms control” debate. Eleven United Nations resolutions require Pyongyang to denuclearize by abandoning its nuclear and missile programs in their entirety. Arms control advocates deride this as an unrealistic policy goal and call, instead, for freezing North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. But they have yet to provide a convincing argument that an arms control approach would be any more successful at curbing the North Korean threat — or even induce Pyongyang to resume negotiations, for that matter. The regime has rejected all U.S. and South Korean entreaties for dialogue for several years. Arms control proponents have mischaracterized denuclearization as requiring North Korea to rapidly abandon the entirety of its nuclear and missile programs before receiving any benefits. But denuclearization proposals, including previous agreements with Pyongyang, call for incremental implementation over a period of years based on reciprocal actions by all parties. In this, they follow the path of arms control treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union. Nor is the “new” arms control approach all that new. The “limit and freeze” approach did not work when North Korea signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (1985), International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards (1992), the inter-Korean nuclear agreement (1992) and the Agreed Framework (1994). North Korea violated each of those agreements, then failed to abide by its commitment in subsequent denuclearization accords. North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un’s denuclearization vow in the 2018 Singapore summit statement was also a sham. Having repeatedly broken its word, why should we believe Pyongyang would honor its signature on an arms control agreement? Abandoning denuclearization as a policy objective would have significant repercussions. If the U.S. forsook denuclearization, it would undermine the 11 UN resolutions requiring North Korea to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs in a complete, verifiable, irreversible manner. Such a policy shift would also remove the legal authority for Washington and other nations to impose and enforce sanctions for Pyongyang’s violations of international agreements. How could the U.S. negotiate “partial sanctions relief” for constraints on North Korean nuclear and missile programs if they no longer violated UN resolutions? Formally renouncing denuclearization would contradict the Non-Proliferation Treaty and decades of U.S. non-proliferation policy. It would send a dangerous signal to other nuclear weapons aspirants that they can violate agreements and outlast international resolve to uphold them. Legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenals could exacerbate South Korean and Japanese concerns about the viability of the U.S. commitment to their defense. They might worry that Washington would only seek to limit Pyongyang’s production of ICBMs capable of hitting the American homeland while allowing Pyongyang to retain hundreds of nuclear-capable short- and medium-range missiles. These concerns could increase advocacy within South Korea for an indigenous nuclear weapons program and greater reliance on preemption strategies. Arms control advocates hope that, by renouncing denuclearization, the U.S. could coax Pyongyang to resume talking. There is no reason to believe such a major unilateral concession would spark any reciprocal diplomatic, security or military response. Over the years, the United States and the international community provided North Korea with security guarantees, the curtailment of military exercises and a reduction of allied deterrence, large-scale economic benefits and humanitarian assistance. They have also overlooked human rights abuses, violations of UN resolutions and U.S. laws. They have even reduced sanctions ― all to no avail. Pyongyang continued to build its nuclear and missile forces. An effective arms control treaty would require, as was included in nuclear, chemical and conventional force agreements with the Soviet Union, a comprehensive verification protocol of data declaration, monitoring and on-site inspections, including short-notice challenge inspections of non-declared facilities. Pyongyang has resisted or rejected such provisions during Six Party Talks and subsequent diplomatic engagements. ']

[(6, 17)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Neg-4---Wake-Forest-Round-1.docx

Emory

MiPi

5bf2f5ed06da584e17f8e83806881c89e4d9fdc23b26527c7caa7e3648d6f404

Getting nuclear from the US is key to stop Saudi proliferation.

Stratfor 8-28. "In Search of U.S. Concessions, Saudi Arabia Reaches Out to China". Stratfor Worldview. 8-28-2023. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/search-us-concessions-saudi-arabia-reaches-out-china

If it can't reach an agreement with the U S Saudi may entertain a nuclear pact with China inking such a deal may prove risky this could see Saudi Arabia turn toward China which would not enforce as many proliferation restrictions compared with the U S another power would also require limitations on enrichment Western sanctions would make cooperation difficult

If it can't reach an agreement with the U S Saudi Arabia may entertain a nuclear pact with China but inking such a deal may still prove too risky for both Riyadh and Beijing To fulfill its desire for a nuclear deterrent this could see Saudi Arabia turn toward China which would not enforce as many proliferation restrictions as part of a nuclear deal compared with the U nited S tates China does not want to exacerbate a nuclear arms race in the Middle East Moreover, a nuclear agreement with China would undermine Saudi Arabia's vital defense ties with the U S Saudi Arabia could also try to sign an agreement with another enrichment power but most other exporters would also require limitations on Saudi Arabia's enrichment capabilities Western sanctions would make cooperation with Russia difficult for Saudi Arabia .

Saudi Arabia China still prove risky Riyadh Beijing deterrent turn toward China enforce proliferation restrictions nuclear deal compared China limitations enrichment capabilities Western sanctions Russia difficult Saudi Arabia

["If it can't reach an agreement with the United States, Saudi Arabia may entertain a nuclear pact with China, but inking such a deal may still prove too risky for both Riyadh and Beijing. If the United States and Saudi Arabia do not reach an agreement on nuclear or defense agreements, the mega-deal with Israel may fall apart. To fulfill its desire for a nuclear deterrent, this could see Saudi Arabia turn toward China, which would not enforce as many proliferation restrictions as part of a nuclear deal compared with the United States. But such a deal has remained elusive, despite Riyadh and Beijing having had multiple opportunities to reach a nuclear agreement in recent years amid slowing talks with the United States and its allies. This is in part because China does not want to exacerbate a nuclear arms race in the Middle East (the source of most of China's crude oil imports), which means that even if Beijing allows Riyadh to be involved in the enrichment process, it may seek an informal promise from Saudi Arabia to not enrich uranium for military purposes. Moreover, a nuclear agreement with China would undermine Saudi Arabia's vital defense ties with the United States. While China is a growing economic partner, Saudi Arabia's overall defense relationship with China remains relatively limited and is nowhere near the level where it could adequately replace the kingdom's robust defense partnership with the United States. Given this, Riyadh may decide that it's better off not angering Washington than signing a deal with China.", "Saudi Arabia could also try to sign an agreement with another enrichment power, but most other exporters of nuclear technology, like South Korea, would also require limitations on Saudi Arabia's enrichment capabilities. While Russian nuclear power company Rosatom may be willing to forego strict enrichment limits, Western sanctions would make cooperation with Russia difficult for Saudi Arabia. ", '']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Emory-LoKi-Neg-1---Northwestern-Round-6.docx

Emory

LoKi

46dcafd7635dcb3fc515a3a55f399ef856d7e1bec906dd5a6e13909bbaa79219

AI problem-solving is at its best exactly when it’s not approximating human intelligence.

Jacob Turner 19. MA, Law, Oxford; LLM, International Law and Legal Studies, Harvard Law; Barrister, Fountain Court Chambers; not John. “Unique Features of AI.” Chapter 2 in Robot Rules: Regulating Artificial Intelligence. Palgrave MacMillan. 2019.

Many benefits of AI result from it operating differently from humans avoiding heuristics and biases that cloud judgement It is thanks to decoupling AI can colonise tasks without understanding it is when we stop trying to reproduce human intelligence that we replace it otherwise AlphaGo would have never become better than anyone at Go

applying human moral requirements to AI may be inappropriate given AI does not function in the same manner as a human mind Laws take into account human frailties. Many of the benefits of AI result from it operating differently from humans avoiding heuristics and biases that might cloud our judgement It is thanks to this decoupling AI can colonise tasks without understanding or even wisdom it is precisely when we stop trying to reproduce human intelligence that we can successfully replace it . otherwise , AlphaGo would have never become so much better than anyone at playing Go

operating differently from humans cloud our judgement understanding reproduce human intelligence replace it . so much better than anyone

['Thirdly, applying human moral requirements to AI may be inappropriate given that AI does not function in the same manner as a human mind. Laws set certain minimum moral standards for humanity but also take into account human frailties. Many of the benefits of AI result from it operating differently from humans, avoiding unconscious heuristics and biases that might cloud our judgement.102 The director of the digital Ethics Lab at oxford University, Luciano Floridi, has written:', 'AI is the continuation of intelligence by other means. ... It is thanks to this decoupling that AI can colonise tasks whenever this can be achieved without understanding, awareness, sensitivity, hunches, experience or even wisdom. In short, it is precisely when we stop trying to reproduce human intelligence that we can successfully replace it. otherwise, AlphaGo would have never become so much better than anyone at playing Go.103']

[(6, 15)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCh-Aff-shirley-Round-6.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

ea303b36e0fc821093125d2422319495084fb2466f27c8874cf7f0c331075456

But synthetic cognition is a synonym to AI

Reed 22 [Patricia Reed, "Learner", in Chimeras: Inventory of Synthetic Cognition, eds. I. Manouach and A. Engelhardt, (Athens: Onassis Foundation), 2022.https://aestheticmanagement.com/writing/chimeras-inventory-of-synthetic-cognition/

disassemble and reformulate AI by taking apart both 'artificiality' and 'intelligence' 'synthetic cognition' highlights duality of 'artificial' and 'authentic', amplifies non-human methods of cognition and anticipates symbiosis

disassemble and reformulate what one might understand as AI by taking apart both notions of 'artificiality' and 'intelligence' 'synthetic cognition' highlights the duality of 'artificial' and 'authentic', amplifies non-human methods of cognition and anticipates modes of symbiosis

AI 'artificiality' and 'intelligence' 'synthetic cognition'

["This volume attempts to disassemble and reformulate what one might understand as AI by taking apart both notions of 'artificiality' and 'intelligence' and seeing what new meaning they produce when recombined.", "We summon the trickster of the natural order, chimera, both a mythical creature and a genetic phenomenon. Drawing upon chimerism allows us to broaden 'artificial intelligence' into 'synthetic cognition'\u2060—an approach that highlights the duality of 'artificial' and 'authentic', amplifies non-human methods of cognition and anticipates modes of symbiosis."]

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GlMe-Aff-7---Texas-Open-Round-5.docx

MichiganState

GlMe

b87db674d85c510eb72092f087b4ed10328a4fa73ae68a90acedd600902735ce

External to perception, making the promotion effective is a sufficient link---gives rise to political elites who causes instability---causes regional chaos, civil wars, and nationalism

Burcu Savun and Daniel Tirone, 4/15/9, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, Associate Professor of Political Science at Louisiana State University received Ph.D. in Political Science from University of Pittsburgh, “Democracy Aid, Democratization and Civil Conflict: How does Aid Affect Civil Conflict?”, file:///C:/Users/cguti/Downloads/SSRN-id1456753.pdf

democratization is violent democratizing states are more likely to get involved in wars Recent work associated with violent conflict treatments occurred with interstate wars studies link democratization and civil conflict the process two conditions (a) elites exploit nationalism to create divisions (b) central government is weak Democratization increases nationalism elites depict opponents and minorities as traitors tactics create tensions increase violent clashes during 87 Milosevic used TV to convince minority were suffering inciting polarizing pivotal in violence elites’ use exclusionary nationalism democratization gives elites control

The rise in the democracy promotion since the 1990s is a testament to this argument democratization is a violent process inevitably initiated a controversial debate the path to democracy can be a violent democratizing states are more likely to get involved in wars than consolidated regimes. Recent work is positively associated with violent conflict empirical treatments of democratization-conflict occurred with interstate wars systematic studies of the link between democratization and civil conflict , the democratization process , two conditions initiation of civil conflict emerge (a) political elites exploit rising nationalism to create divisions in the society (b) the central government is too weak to prevent elites’ polarizing tactics belonging to a nation is relatively weak Democratization increases nationalism provocation elites who feel threatened by democracy To maintain or increase political power elites depict opponents and ethnic minorities as traitors invoking nationalist sentiments These tactics create tensions and increase the risk of violent clashes during 19 87 Milosevic used TV to convince the Serbian minority were suffering discrimination inciting polarizing were pivotal in violence struggles in post-communist regimes during the 90s are other examples of nationalist upheavals during democratization elites’ use of exclusionary nationalism is strong and damaging during democratization institutions are usually fragile and weak gives elites the opportunity control the political discourse Without constraints elites have leeway to pull the society any direction their interests dictate

democratization is a violent more likely to get involved in wars (a) political elites exploit rising nationalism (b) the central government is too weak

['II. DEMOCRATIZATION, CIVIL CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY AID', 'The fact that democracies do not fight each other is one of the most well established findings of International Relations (e.g., Maoz and Abdoladi 1989; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003; Ray 1998; Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001; Weede 1992). It is safe to argue that no other empirical regularity identified by International Relations scholars has found as much resonance within the policy community as the “democratic peace” proposition. The rise in the democracy promotion efforts by the international community since the 1990s is a testament to this argument (e.g., Burnell 2000; Carothers 1999; Diamond 1995).', 'Within this context, when Mansfield and Snyder proposed that democratization is a violent process, it inevitably initiated a controversial debate in the literature. In a series of articles and books, Mansfield and Snyder (1995a, 1995b, 1997, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2009) argued that although mutually democratic states may be peaceful in their relations with one another, the path to democracy can be a violent one: i.e., democratizing states are more likely to get involved in wars than consolidated regimes. ', 'There have been several compelling criticisms of Mansfield and Snyder’s argument mostly on methodological grounds (e.g., Enterline 1996; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Narang and Nelson 2009; Thompson and Tucker 1997; Ward and Gleditsch 1998). Recent work by Mansfield and Snyder (2002, 2005, 2009) has refined and significantly improved upon the research design and addressed most of the empirical criticisms and the findings still hold, i.e., democratization is positively associated with violent conflict.', 'As Cederman, Hug and Krebs (2007) note, most theoretical and empirical treatments of the democratization-conflict link have occurred with a focus on interstate wars. In From Voting to Violence, Snyder (2000) provides one of the first exclusive systematic studies of the link between democratization and civil conflict, particularly ethnic conflicts. Snyder (2000) proposes that during the early phases of the democratization process, two conditions favorable to the initiation of civil conflict emerge: (a) political elites exploit rising nationalism for their own ends to create divisions in the society and (b) the central government is too weak to prevent elites’ polarizing tactics. According to Snyder, before democratization, the public is not politically active and hence its sense of belonging to a nation is relatively weak (35).3', 'Democratization increases the feeling of nationalism, especially with the provocation of the elites who feel threatened by the arrival of democracy. To maintain or increase their grab on political power, the elites may depict the political opponents and the ethnic minorities as traitors by invoking nationalist sentiments in the public (37).4', 'These polarizing tactics, in turn, create tensions among ethnic groups and hence increase the risk of violent clashes in the society.5', '3 Rustow (1970) argues that national unity is a background condition for democratization (354). 4 In Snyder’s argument, it is not entirely clear whether the elites represent the ancient régime or the new opposition. In our discussion, we treat political elites as a more generic group that may be a member of either the old or new regime. ', '6 For example, during 1987 Milosevic skillfully used the Serbian state TV to convince the Serbian minority that Serbs in the Kosovo were suffering discrimination and repression at the hands of the Albanian majority. These kinds of inciting polarizing tactics by Milosevic and the Serbian nationalist elites were pivotal in contributing to violence in Kosovo. Violent struggles in post-communist regimes such as Croatia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia during the 1990s are other examples of nationalist upheavals incited by the domestic political elites during democratization process.', 'Snyder (2000) argues that the elites’ use of exclusionary nationalism is particularly strong and damaging if the democratizing state has weak political institutions. If state institutions are strong, the institutions may be able to deter the elites’ opportunistic behavior and curb its potentially damaging impacts. However, during early phases of democratization, the institutions are usually new and fragile and the central authority is weak. The weakening of central authority gives the elites the opportunity to monopolize the media, create divisions in the society, and control the political discourse.', 'Without the constraints of strong institutions and state authority, the political elites have more leeway to pull the society to any direction their interests dictate.', '']

[(6, 11), (12, 15), (23, 29), (36, 37), (38, 38), (112, 112), (250, 250)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-ADA-Round6.docx

Michigan

MaMu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/MaMu/Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-ADA-Round6.docx

bac63237bc47f2724bfb29f89c59c3cd853f9bd581803bc31f6c0532fb54be56

Empirics.

Briana Hopes 21, Senior Managing Editor of the Tulane Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, J.D. candidate at Tulane University Law School, B.A. in Mass Communication and Public Relations from Louisiana State University, “Rights for Robots? U.S. Courts and Patent Offices Must Consider Recognizing Artificial Intelligence Systems as Patent Inventors,” Spring 2021, 23 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 119, p. 134-135, Lexis

objections addressed by limiting the scope of personhood rights should be limited and in no way allow rights of a natural person look at corporations rights for AI can be altered to what is best suited for a i

As discussed there are many objections and concerns to the idea of AI personhood but these objections can be addressed and solved by limiting the scope of an AI system’s legal personhood The rights and protections of an AI system should be limited and in no way allow the system to possess all rights and protections of a natural person The best place to start in developing AI personhood would be to look at non-human entities that currently possess legal personhood status such as corporations Based on the rights protections and liabilities of other artificial entities the rights for an AI system can be altered to what is best suited for an a rtificial i ntelligence system

objections can be addressed solved limiting the scope of an AI system’s legal personhood should be limited no way allow look at non-human entities currently possess legal personhood status corporations can be altered

['The first step in expanding our patent law to allow AI inventorship would likely require AI systems to be granted legal personhood status. As discussed, there are many objections and concerns to the idea of AI personhood, but these objections can be addressed and solved by limiting the scope of an AI system’s legal personhood. The rights and protections of an AI system should be limited and in no way allow the system to possess all rights and protections of a natural, human person. The best place to start in developing AI personhood would be to look at non-human entities that currently possess legal personhood status, such as corporations. Based on the rights, protections, and liabilities of other “artificial entities,” the rights for an AI system can be altered to what is best suited for an artificial intelligence system. Ultimately, the objective is to allow artificial intelligence the same rights and protections allowed to “individuals” under the U.S. patent laws that could expand even further to other intellectual property rights.', '']

[(7, 15)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGa-Aff-Shirley-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

DiGa

dc7e4e63695824e040d966a0bdabd846808cc408ce62ccdb92756363bdecb081

3---Biden won’t even consider the TPNW

Intondi 22, professor of history and director of the Institute for Race, Justice, and Civic Engagement at Montgomery College (Dr. Vincent Intondi, 11/01/2022, “Biden’s Nuclear Posture Review is a “Bad Idea,”” Inkstink, https://inkstickmedia.com/bidens-nuclear-posture-review-is-a-bad-idea/)

Biden’s NPR sets course for a long future for the US nuclear arsenal policies modernize an already large nuclear arsenal not leaving room to even consider the TPNW

Biden’s NPR digs in its heels and sets a course for a long future for the US nuclear arsenal Biden continue unproductive Cold War-era nuclear policies and modernize an already large US nuclear arsenal while threatening the first use of nuclear weapons in several scenarios. By not leaving room to even consider the TPNW , Biden’s NPR fails to respect those who have been advocating for a world free of nuclear weapons Biden’s NPR is a clear move away from where much of the world is on nuclear weapons

Biden’s NPR

['That was the answer President Joe Biden gave when, as a candidate, he was asked about Donald Trump’s decision to develop and deploy two types of missiles armed with low-yield nuclear weapons. Having these makes the United States “,” Biden said. Throughout his presidential campaign, Biden repeatedly endorsed the idea of a “no first use” policy, spoke favorably about disarmament, and expressed the belief that any modernization of US nuclear forces could be done for less than the $1.2 trillion that had been predicted at the time. Then last week came his\xa0\xa0(NPR).', 'In the\xa0, Emma Foley explains that while Biden’s NPR “affirms the goal of a world without nuclear weapons,” it “digs in its heels and sets a course for a long future for the US nuclear arsenal.” Foley was not the only expert in the field to voice strong concerns over Biden’s NPR. Stephen Young, the Senior Washington Representative for the Union of Concerned Scientists, referred to Biden’s NPR as a “.” Young argues that the president is not only keeping the world on a path of nuclear risk but, in fact, has increased that very risk. More importantly, the Biden administration is using both Russia and China to continue unproductive Cold War-era nuclear policies and modernize an already large US nuclear arsenal while threatening the first use of nuclear weapons in several scenarios.', 'What message does Biden’s NPR send to all of those countries, many from the Global South, who have rejected nuclear weapons and joined the\xa0\xa0(TPNW)? Do their voices not count? Are they somehow less important? Are their lives not worth the same because of their racial makeup? By not leaving room to even consider the TPNW or a No First Use policy, Biden’s NPR fails to respect those who have been advocating for a world free of nuclear weapons — and have shown their commitment by signing the TPNW.', 'WHAT THE NPR REALLY SAYS', 'Biden’s NPR is a clear move away from where much of the world is on nuclear weapons. As Alicia Sanders-Zakre, policy and research coordinator for the\xa0,\xa0, it is rich to argue that nuclear disarmament only works in democracies when it is “democracies like France, the UK, and the US who blatantly ignore popular support for disarmament and the TPNW, while spending billions on the weapons each year.”', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiMc-Aff-5---ADA-Round-3.docx

Kansas

WiMc

c31e6f9b6efb246037b00b2b17bfff5d5a4398a4cc33f70bf254166147e28580

We need a “hermeneutics of suspicion” to address debate’s current research paradigm that emerges from “civil” and “procedural” protocols – as settlers, we have a responsibility to force debate to reckon with the histories of genocide. Affective Rupture renders transparent the settler colonial metanarrative that underlies the abstracted knowledge of “neutral” instrumental propositions. Our method unravels respectable social science research that masquerades as “rigorous” and “productive” engagement

King 17 (Tiffany Lethabo King, Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State, PhD in American Studies from the University of MaryLand at College Park, Spring 2017, “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight,” Critical Ethnic Studies Volume 3 Number 1, footnotes 1 and 7 included in curly braces, modified, pg. 162-165)

How change the terms of the debate are invaluable Scholars must assume postures of suspicion — and outright refuse Western thought’s arrogant universalist assumptions, and reforms to the category of the human This in the classroom on a repeated basis can transform one’s educational and professional experience into one rife with stress, anxiety, and unease. . First, neither participate in the communicative acts of the humanist public sphere from within the terms of the debate. Further, they do not play by the rules.6 politics critique the logic of the discussion about the human and identity as well as the mode of communication. traditions of “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” that emerge from Native/Indigenous and Black studies expose the limits and violence of contemporary nonidentitarian and nonrepresentational impulses within white “critical” theory. hermeneutics of suspicion,”7 is needed in order to truly address the recurrent problem of the violence of the human in continental theory. . Engaging how forms of Native decolonization and Black abolition scrutinize the means in which the human has been written and conceived is generative because it sets terms of engagement for interrogating Western claims to and disavowals of identity. performance of skepticism challenge the sanctioned modes of protocol, politesse, and decorum in the universit critical disinterest is read as affront to scholarly discourse when in response to white thinkers Decolonial refusal and abolitionist skepticism respond to how perverse and reprehensible it is to ask Indigenous and Black people who cannot seem to escape death to move beyond the human or the desire to be human. In fact, Black and Indigenous people have never been fully folded into the category of the human

How these political and intellectual projects change the terms of the debate and discussion about identity and the human are invaluable to the project of critical ethnic studies. Scholars in the fields of critical ethnic, Black, and Native studies who welcome the charge of decolonization and abolition in the corporate university often labor to push back against and expose the limitations of the “epistemic turns” or “epistemic revolutions of Europe” that Sylvia Wynter so deftly tracks in her voluminous body of work. Scholars committed to the politics of Black abolitionist work and Native decolonization must often assume postures of suspicion — “misanthropy” — and sometimes must outright refuse Western thought’s arrogant universalist assumptions, commonsense tautologies, and professed reforms to the category of the human ; This kind of labor and violent confrontation in the classroom on a repeated basis can transform one’s educational and professional experience into one rife with stress, anxiety, and unease. . First, neither participate in the communicative acts of the humanist public sphere from within the terms of the debate. Further, they do not play by the rules.6 Specifically, the Native and Black “feminist” politics discussed throughout launch a critique of both the logic of the discussion about the human and identity as well as the mode of communication. This article tracks how traditions of “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” that emerge from Native/Indigenous and Black studies expose the limits and violence of contemporary nonidentitarian and nonrepresentational impulses within white “critical” theory. Further, this article asks whether Western forms of nonrepresentational ( subjectless and nonidentitarian ) theory can truly transcend the human through self- critique, selfabnegation , and masochism alone. External pressure, specifically the kind of pressure that “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” as forms of resistance that enact outright rejection of or view “ posthumanist ” attempts with a “ hermeneutics of suspicion,”7 is needed in order to truly address the recurrent problem of the violence of the human in continental theory. Engaging how forms of Native decolonization and Black abolition scrutinize the violently exclusive means in which the human has been written and conceived is generative because it sets some workable terms of engagement for interrogating Western and mainstream claims to and disavowals of identity. Rather than answer how Native decolonization and Black abolition construe the human or identity, the article examines how Native and Black feminists use refusal and misandry to question the very systems, institutions, and order of knowledge that secure humanity as an exclusive experience and bound identity in violent ways. I consider the practices and postures of refusal assumed by Native/Indigenous scholars such as Audra Simpson, Eve Tuck, Jodi Byrd, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith to be particularly instructive for exposing the violence of ostensibly nonrepresentational Deleuzoguattarian rhizomes and lines of flight. connect discursive performance of skepticism to embodied and affective responses I have witnessed in the academy that challenge the sanctioned modes of protocol, politesse, and decorum in the universit y. This comportment of critical disinterest is often read as an affront to the codes and customs of scholarly discourse and dialogue in the academic community, particularly when it is in response to the white thinkers of the Western cannon. Decolonial refusal and abolitionist skepticism respond to how perverse and reprehensible it is to ask Indigenous and Black people who cannot seem to escape death to move beyond the human or the desire to be human. In fact, Black and Indigenous people have never been fully folded into the category of the human

How these political and intellectual projects change the terms of the debate and discussion about identity and the human are invaluable to the project of critical ethnic studies. Scholars in the fields of critical ethnic, Black, and Native studies who welcome the charge of decolonization and abolition in the corporate university often labor to push back against and expose the limitations of the “epistemic turns” or “epistemic revolutions of Europe” that Sylvia Wynter so deftly tracks in her voluminous body of work. Scholars committed to the politics of Black abolitionist work and Native decolonization must often assume postures of suspicion — “misanthropy” — and sometimes must outright refuse Western thought’s arrogant universalist assumptions, commonsense tautologies, and professed reforms to the category of the human ; This kind of labor and violent confrontation in the classroom on a repeated basis can transform one’s educational and professional experience into one rife with stress, anxiety, and unease. . First, neither participate in the communicative acts of the humanist public sphere from within the terms of the debate. Further, they do not play by the rules.6 Specifically, the Native and Black “feminist” politics discussed throughout launch a critique of both the logic of the discussion about the human and identity as well as the mode of communication. This article tracks how traditions of “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” that emerge from Native/Indigenous and Black studies expose the limits and violence of contemporary nonidentitarian and nonrepresentational impulses within white “critical” theory. Further, this article asks whether Western forms of nonrepresentational ( subjectless and nonidentitarian ) theory can truly transcend the human through self- critique, selfabnegation , and masochism alone. External pressure, specifically the kind of pressure that “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” as forms of resistance that enact outright rejection of or view “ posthumanist ” attempts with a “ hermeneutics of suspicion,”7 is needed in order to truly address the recurrent problem of the violence of the human in continental theory. Engaging how forms of Native decolonization and Black abolition scrutinize the violently exclusive means in which the human has been written and conceived is generative because it sets some workable terms of engagement for interrogating Western and mainstream claims to and disavowals of identity. Rather than answer how Native decolonization and Black abolition construe the human or identity, the article examines how Native and Black feminists use refusal and misandry to question the very systems, institutions, and order of knowledge that secure humanity as an exclusive experience and bound identity in violent ways. I consider the practices and postures of refusal assumed by Native/Indigenous scholars such as Audra Simpson, Eve Tuck, Jodi Byrd, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith to be particularly instructive for exposing the violence of ostensibly nonrepresentational Deleuzoguattarian rhizomes and lines of flight. connect discursive performance of skepticism to embodied and affective responses I have witnessed in the academy that challenge the sanctioned modes of protocol, politesse, and decorum in the universit y. This comportment of critical disinterest is often read as an affront to the codes and customs of scholarly discourse and dialogue in the academic community, particularly when it is in response to the white thinkers of the Western cannon. Decolonial refusal and abolitionist skepticism respond to how perverse and reprehensible it is to ask Indigenous and Black people who cannot seem to escape death to move beyond the human or the desire to be human. In fact, Black and Indigenous people have never been fully folded into the category of the human

['The distinguishing ethical concerns and dilemmas of both Native/Indigenous decolonization and Black abolition inevitably alter and destabilize the ground on which discussions about identity and specifically the human unfold. How these political and intellectual projects change the terms of the debate and discussion about identity and the human are invaluable to the project of critical ethnic studies. Scholars in the fields of critical ethnic, Black, and Native studies who welcome the charge of decolonization and abolition in the corporate university often labor to push back against and expose the limitations of the “epistemic turns” or “epistemic revolutions of Europe” that Sylvia Wynter so deftly tracks in her voluminous body of work. Scholars committed to the politics of Black abolitionist work and Native decolonization must often assume postures of suspicion— “misanthropy”— and sometimes must outright refuse Western thought’s arrogant universalist assumptions, commonsense tautologies, and professed reforms to the category of the human; due to these ways, they often experience a great deal of hostility and violence. When decolonial and Black abolitionist thought has to contend with Western or European continental theory, specifically its critical theories of progressive (liberal) social change, one often encounters an epistemic crisis or what scholar Frank Wilderson refers to as an antagonism.1', 'Forced to wrestle with antagonisms that often require Native/Indigenous and Black death, the scholar committed to decolonization and abolition in the university seminar space often has to refuse necropolitical epistemological systems, which structure white liberal humanist ways of thinking and imagining the world. This kind of labor and violent confrontation in the classroom on a repeated basis can transform one’s educational and professional experience into one rife with stress, anxiety, and unease. More specifically, I have watched graduate students of color experience this kind of stress, anxiety, and unease as they confront the pressure to “take up” more contemporary impulses within Western “critical theory” to move “beyond the human” or toward the posthuman. One task of this article is to attend to the ways that Black and Indigenous academics, as well as Black and Native studies scholars, are expected to perform a commitment to a Deleuzian brand of posthumanist and nonrepresentational theory as proof that they are critical and postmodern scholars and disciplinary formations. Lately, I have heard questions posed to Black and Native scholars and activists who theorize the work of movements like Black Lives Matter, Idle No More, and other work addressing Black and Indigenous death to explain what relationship this (survival- based) work has to “identity,” “the subject,” or “the human.” More specifically, the questions are posed as ones that assume that these movements reify one or all of the above categories. Additionally, the inquiries are accompanied by an expectation that the person(s) and the movements will disavow all claims to identity, subjecthood, and the desire for humanity.', 'What kinds of hostilities, assumptions, and misrecognitions lurk in inquiries such as the following: “Is Black Lives Matter a humanist movement?”2 “Does BLM reify the notion and idea of the human?” “When will Native studies transcend or get beyond the subject or the human?”3 Because emerging scholars in the academy often contend with these hostile inquires in the seminar space, while teaching, at conferences and in other spaces of academe, a change in comportment, tone, affect, and ways of being in the academy also needs to accompany the modes of conceptual and theoretical resistance within Black and Native studies. This article is as interested in the postures, affective states (skepticism), and stubborn practices of insubordination such as refusal that frustrate forward movement and business- asusual in the academy. Specifically, this article tracks how Native feminist refusal and Black feminist suspicion respond to Deleuzian theory Native feminist politics of decolonial refusal and Black feminist abolitionist politics of skepticism informed by a misandry and misanthropic distrust of and animus toward the (over)representation of man/men as the human diverge from the polite, communicative acts of the public sphere, much like the politics of the “feminist killjoy.”4 Throughout this article, I deploy the term “feminist” both ambivalently and strategically to mark and distinguish the scholarly tradition created by Black and Native women, queer, trans, and other people marginalized within these respective communities and their anticolonial and abolitionist movements.5 Until a more useful and legible term emerges, I will use “feminist” to mark the practices of refusal and skepticism (misandry/misanthropy) as ones that largely exist outside more masculinist traditions within Indigenous/Native studies and Black studies. “Decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” depart from the kinds of masculinist anticolonial traditions that attempt to reason Native/ Black man to White Man within humanist logic in at least two significant ways. First, neither participate in the communicative acts of the humanist public sphere from within the terms of the debate. Further, they do not play by the rules.6 Specifically, the Native and Black “feminist” politics discussed throughout launch a critique of both the logic of the discussion about the human and identity as well as the mode of communication. In fact, practices of refusal and skepticism interrupt and flout codes of civil and collegial discursive protocol to focus on and illumine the violence that structures the posthumanist discourse. Attending to the comportment, tone, and intensity of an engagement is just as important as focusing on its content. The particular manner in which Black and Native feminists push back against violence is important. The force, break with decorum, and style in which Black and Native feminists confront discursive violence can change the nature of future encounters. Given that Black women who confront the logics of “nonrepresentational theory” are really confronting genocide and the white, whimsical disavowal of Black and Native negation on the way to subjectlessness, it is understandable that there is an equally discordant response. Refusal and skepticism are modes of engagement that are uncooperative and force an impasse in a discursive exchange. This article tracks how traditions of “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” that emerge from Native/Indigenous and Black studies expose the limits and violence of contemporary nonidentitarian and nonrepresentational impulses within white “critical” theory. Further, this article asks whether Western forms of nonrepresentational (subjectless and nonidentitarian) theory can truly transcend the human through self- critique, selfabnegation, and masochism alone. External pressure, specifically the kind of pressure that “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” as forms of resistance that enact outright rejection of or view “posthumanist” attempts with a “hermeneutics of suspicion,”7 is needed in order to truly address the recurrent problem of the violence of the human in continental theory. While this article does not directly stake a claim in embracing or rejecting identity per se, it does take up the category of the human. Because the category of the human is modified by identity in ways that position certain people (white, male, able- bodied) within greater or lesser proximity to humanness, identity is already taken up in this discussion. Conversations about the human are very much tethered to conversations about identity. In the final section, the article will explore how Black and Native/Indigenous absorption into the category of the human would disfigure the category of the human beyond recognition. Engaging how forms of Native decolonization and Black abolition scrutinize the violently exclusive means in which the human has been written and conceived is generative because it sets some workable terms of engagement for interrogating Western and mainstream claims to and disavowals of identity. Rather than answer how Native decolonization and Black abolition construe the human or identity, the article examines how Native and Black feminists use refusal and misandry to question the very systems, institutions, and order of knowledge that secure humanity as an exclusive experience and bound identity in violent ways. I consider the practices and postures of refusal assumed by Native/Indigenous scholars such as Audra Simpson, Eve Tuck, Jodi Byrd, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith to be particularly instructive for exposing the violence of ostensibly nonrepresentational Deleuzoguattarian rhizomes and lines of flight. While reparative readings and “working with what is productive” about Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s work is certainly a part of the Native feminist scholarly tradition, this article focuses on the underexamined ways that Native feminists refuse to entertain certain logics and foundations that actually structure Deleuzoguattarian thought.8 Further, I discuss “decolonial refusal” in relation to how Black scholars like Sylvia Wynter, Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, and Amber Jamilla Musser work within a Black feminist tradition animated by a kind of skepticism or suspicion capable of ferreting out the trace of the white liberal human within (self- )professed subjectless, futureless, and nonrepresentational white theoretical traditions. In other words, in the work of Sylvia Wynter, one senses a general suspicion and deep distrust of the ability of Western theory— specifically its attempt at self- critique and self- correction in the name of justice for humanity— to revise its cognitive orders to work itself out of its current “closed system,” which reproduces exclusion and structural oppositions based on the negation of the other.9 Wynter’s study of decolonial theory and its elaboration of autopoiesis informs her understanding of how the human and its overrepresentation as man emerges. Recognizing that humans (of various genres) write themselves through a “self- perpetuating and self- referencing closed belief system” that often prevents them from seeing or noticing “the process of recursion,” Wynter works to expose these blind spots.10 Wynter understands that one of the limitations of Western liberal thought is that it cannot see itself in the process of writing itself. I observe a similar kind of cynicism about the way the academic left invokes “post humanism” in the work of Jackson and Musser. Musser in particular questions the capacity of queer theories to turn to sensations like masochism within the field of affect studies to overcome the subject. Further, Jackson’s and Musser’s work is skeptical that white transcendence can happen on its own terms or rely solely on its own processes of self- critique and self- correction. I read Jackson’s and Musser’s work as distrustful of the ability for “posthumanism” to be accountable to Black and Indigenous peoples or for affect theory on its own to not replicate and reinforce the subjugation of the other as it moves toward self- annihilation. Both the human and the post human are causes for suspicion within Black studies. Like Wynter, the field of Black studies has consistently made the liberal human an object of study and scrutiny, particularly the nefarious manner in which it violently produces Black existence as other than and at times nonhuman. Wynter’s empirical method of tracking the internal epistemic crises and revolutions of Europe from the outside has functioned as a model for one way that Black studies can unfurl a critique of the human as well as Western modes of thought. I use the terms “misanthropy” and “misandry” in this article to evoke how Black studies has remained attentive to, wary about, and deeply distrustful of the human condition, humankind, and the humanas- man/men in the case of Black “feminists.” Both Black studies’ distrust of the “human” and Black feminism’s distrust of humanism in its version as man/men (which at times seeks to incorporate Black men) relentlessly scrutinize how the category of the human and in this case the “posthuman” reproduce Black death. I link misandry (skepticism of humankind- as- man) to the kind of skepticism and “hermeneutics of suspicion” that Black feminist scholars like Wynter, Jackson, and Musser at times apply to their reading and engagement with revisions to or expansions of the category of the human, posthuman discourses, and nonrepresentational theory. In this article, I connect discursive performance of skepticism to embodied and affective responses I have witnessed in the academy that challenge the sanctioned modes of protocol, politesse, and decorum in the university. For example, Wynter assumes a critically disinterested posture as she gazes empirically on and examines intra- European epistemic shifts over time. Paget Henry has described Wynter as an anthropologist of the Occident, as Europe becomes an object of study rather than the center of thought and humanity.11 Throughout the body of Wynter’s work, she seems to be more interested in drawing our attention to the capacity of European orders of knowledge to shift over time— or their fragility— than in celebrating the progress that European systems of knowledge have claimed to make. Wynter’s tracking is just a tracking and not a celebration of the progress narrative that Western civilization tells about itself and its capacity to define, refine, and recognize new kinds of humanity over time. This comportment of critical disinterest is often read as an affront to the codes and customs of scholarly discourse and dialogue in the academic community, particularly when it is in response to the white thinkers of the Western cannon. Decolonial refusal and abolitionist skepticism respond to how perverse and reprehensible it is to ask Indigenous and Black people who cannot seem to escape death to move beyond the human or the desire to be human. In fact, Black and Indigenous people have never been fully folded into the category of the human.']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Spiers-Zin-Aff-Wayne%20State-Round5.docx

Kansas

SpZi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/SpZi/Kansas-Spiers-Zin-Aff-Wayne%2520State-Round5.docx

c102e228cc1dba87660d6614b71449c63979d4f462b65fd2202499f285eebcaa

No enforcement thumper—Congress and Courts already block the frivolous government suits they cite

Carpenter 3—18—(staff writer). Jacob Carpenter. March 18, 2022. “Antitrust advocates should blame Congress for Amazon-MGM deal”. Fortune Magazine. .

Despite the hullabaloo over anti-competition enforcement , Amazon and MGM closed an $8.5 billion acquisition announcement illustrated the limits of F T C authority Bedoya’s nomination is languishing Even if that happens enforcers won’t succeed they can thank Congress , which is showing little appetite for changing decades-old laws. judges err on the side of corporations . Congress would need to upend antitrust laws and jurisprudence to hobble mergers this showed lack of momentum on that front

Despite the hullabaloo over the Biden administration amping up anti-competition enforcement , Amazon and MGM said Thursday they had closed an $8.5 billion acquisition that lets the e-commerce giant put the movie studio’s library on its Prime Video streaming platform. The announcement , for now, illustrated the limits of F ederal T rade C ommission Chair Lina Khan’s authority While antitrust advocates hoped the FTC would file suit to muck up the merger Khan and fellow Democratic Federal couldn’t persuade either of the two Republican commissioners to pursue a case While Bedoya’s nomination is languishing in Congress Republicans unanimously oppose his selection Even if that happens , though, antitrust enforcers likely won’t succeed . For that, they can thank Congress , which is showing little appetite for changing America’s decades-old merger and acquisition laws. judges err on the side of corporations . In Amazon’s case, it’s hard to argue that the MGM purchase would dramatically reshape the streaming landscape broadly Congress likely would need to upend current antitrust laws and jurisprudence to hobble many vertical mergers . And this week showed the lack of momentum on that front

hullabaloo anti-competition enforcement $8.5 billion acquisition F T C hoped couldn’t persuade either of the two Republican commissioners to pursue a case languishing won’t succeed thank Congress little appetite side of corporations dramatically reshape the streaming landscape broadly upend current antitrust laws and jurisprudence lack of momentum on that front

['', 'Despite the hullabaloo over the Biden administration amping up anti-competition enforcement, Amazon and MGM said Thursday they had closed an $8.5 billion acquisition that lets the e-commerce giant put the movie studio’s library on its Prime Video streaming platform.', 'The announcement, for now, illustrated the limits of Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan’s authority to curb sprawling tech giants’ outsize power in numerous industries. While antitrust advocates hoped the FTC would file suit to muck up the merger, largely on the grounds that Amazon is already too damn big, Khan and fellow Democratic Federal Trade Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter couldn’t persuade either of the two Republican commissioners to pursue a case, The Information reported Thursday.', 'Attention naturally turned Thursday to Georgetown University’s Alvaro Bedoya, Biden’s nominee to fill the fifth seat on the commission. While Bedoya’s nomination is languishing in Congress, where Senate Republicans unanimously oppose his selection, Democrats expect to eventually get him confirmed. Once that happens, the FTC’s three Democrats could sue to unwind the deal.', 'Even if that happens, though, antitrust enforcers likely won’t succeed. For that, they can thank Congress, which is showing little appetite for changing America’s decades-old merger and acquisition laws.', 'Historically, the courts have analyzed lawsuits seeking to stop vertical mergers—deals in which a company buys one of its suppliers of parts, content, or other goods—by determining whether the “effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition.” ', 'In the past, judges have tended to err on the side of corporations. In perhaps the most glaring example, a federal judge in 2018 rejected the Justice Department’s claim that AT&T’s $85 billion acquisition of Time Warner would substantially stifle competition.', 'In Amazon’s case, it’s hard to argue that the MGM purchase would dramatically reshape the streaming landscape. ', 'While MGM boasts voluminous content, totaling 4,000 films and 17,000 television episodes, its library could use some freshening up. MGM reinvigorated its James Bond and Rocky franchises in the past decade, but the rest of its movie business feels dusty. Is anyone signing up for Amazon Prime to watch Pink Panther and RoboCop flicks? MGM’s television series, meanwhile, trend toward relatively niche titles, such as The Handmaid’s Tale and Fargo.', '“If you’re really concerned about how big a company is—just how big it is, not that it’s creating a monopoly in a particular market—this acquisition will bother you, and the antitrust laws as currently constituted aren’t designed to deal with something like this,” Sam Weinstein, an associate professor at Yeshiva University’s Cardozo School of Law, told Bloomberg last year.', 'More broadly, Congress likely would need to upend current antitrust laws and jurisprudence to hobble many vertical mergers. And this week showed the lack of momentum on that front.', '', '']

[(0, 14), (65, 126)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-00%20NDT-Round1.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-00%2520NDT-Round1.docx

a2ad51303bbc11ec18ec95e76c4ee3acda4d3a76b3fc8ab95787019e094da615

Operators’ presence will be required in every state, overloading the industry

Alan McQuinn 19, Senior Policy Analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, B.S. in Public Relations and Political Communications from the University of Texas, Austin, and Daniel Castro, Vice President at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) and Director of ITIF's Center for Data Innovation, M.S. in Information Security Technology and Management from Carnegie Mellon University, B.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, “The Case for a U.S. Digital Single Market and Why Federal Preemption Is Key”, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 10/7/2019, https://itif.org/publications/2019/10/07/case-us-digital-single-market-and-why-federal-preemption-key

states laws create a regulatory tower of Babel If Congress does not lead U S will lose its single market with significant benefits from it when multiple creat laws companies must engage in each state an expensive undertaking national rules are better A single framework with clear obligations reduce burdens on companies

with the growth of the digital economy, there is a growing disjuncture between local governance and the national nature of the Internet. As such, when states pass laws and regulations governing digital activities this create s a regulatory tower of Babel where firms with digital business models having to cope with a tangled amalgamate of overlapping and conflicting rules. If Congress does not become the lead authority on digital issues, the U S will lose its chance at a fully digital single market along with the significant economic and social benefits that flow from it A motivation for states to erect regulations is to protect domestic “bricks and mortar” firms from out-of-state digital competitors when multiple states are creat ing laws and regulations on the same issue area , companies operating in those states must engage in policy debates in each state to ensure their interests are not overlooked— an expensive undertaking national rules are better than individual state rules for policies that impact the U.S. digital economy A single , common framework with clear obligations can reduce burdens on existing companies

local national create regulatory tower of Babel Congress lead authority U S single market significant economic and social benefits A multiple creat same issue area engage in policy debates in each state expensive undertaking national better state single , common framework clear obligations reduce burdens

['INTRODUCTION', 'In today’s digital world, commerce and speech are much less tied to particular geographic locations than ever before—as access to broadband is the only natural barrier to going online. Yet, governance is still tied to location. In an analog world where much of commerce was conducted locally within specific geographic boundaries, there was considerable overlap between governance and economic activity, with the latter being regulated where it was conducted. However, with the growth of the digital economy, there is a growing disjuncture between local governance and the national and international nature of the Internet. As such, when U.S. localities and states pass laws and regulations governing digital activities—including on data privacy, net neutrality, and Internet taxation—this creates a regulatory tower of Babel where firms with digital business models having to cope with a tangled amalgamate of overlapping and conflicting rules. If Congress does not become the lead authority on digital issues, the United States will lose its chance at a fully digital single market—a national market for digital goods and services free of artificial barriers—along with the significant economic and social benefits that flow from it.', 'The Founders understood the importance of knitting together the colonies into a more integrated market, which is why they inserted the Commerce Clause into the Constitution.1And indeed, for over 200 years that clause has helped the federal government and the courts ensure a more-integrated national market. But before the Internet a significant share of commerce was still local. Consumers bought products from locally owned neighborhood stores, received health care from a nearby doctor, and banked at a local financial institution. This dynamic meant that the lack of uniformity in state laws and regulations had less impact on business and the overall economy because many businesses operated in a particular state or region.', 'While there have long been communications technologies, such as the telegraph and telephone, that enabled cross-state commerce, the emergence of the Internet, and its evolution over the last two decades, has increased the share of out-of-state commerce. The Internet has simply made distance irrelevant for a growing share of economic activities. Consumers from Florida to Alaska shop from the same online retailers, stream movies and music from the same websites, and use the same apps to send money. The Internet has also made scale much more important to businesses, and the most successful ones are those that leverage the Internet to access as many customers as possible. This is as true for the largest Internet giants as it is for the mom-and-pop startup in a rural hamlet that has created an app it wants to sell across the nation.', 'In the early days of the Internet, policymakers generally recognized the growing rates of digital connectivity as a driving force for economic progress and by and large embraced a light-touch regulatory system.2 For example, in 1996 Congress created intermediary liability rules that ensure online companies are not liable for the content posted by their users and in 1998 restricted states from imposing taxes on Internet service.3 States also generally avoided passing rules that impacted interstate digital commerce, often only doing so as part of multi-state compacts (e.g., state electronic signature laws).4 Congress also worked to preempt state laws restricting consumer choice in the digital market. For example, in 2003 it passed the Fairness to Contact Lens Act that gave consumers the right to their lens prescriptions wherever they lived. As a result, many digital businesses faced few state and local barriers to operating in the United States.', 'But even from the beginning of the Internet era, cracks began to appear in the system. States have traditionally regulated many areas of the economy that have evolved into having nation-wide business models. For example, companies wanting to sell alcohol online nationally often found that state laws interfered with their business models.5 Similarly, the rules for practicing law and medicine online vary from state to state, as do the regulations for online gambling.6 As more parts of the economy have become digital, state-based regulation has become a growing impediment to a U.S. digital single market.', 'Many state and local legislators no longer feel a need to employ a light-touch approach to Internet policy or to avoid creating their own unique set of rules.7 They are no longer afraid of “breaking the Internet.” There are many reasons for this change. Some lawmakers feel emboldened by a growing “techlash”—the growing animosity against technology and the companies that offer it. Some feel, rightly so in some cases, that Congress has not done enough to address problems and thus it is up to the states to intervene. Others argue they are closer to their constituents and thus more attuned to their needs than more distant federal legislators. Moreover, states often see themselves as “laboratories of democracy,” a phrase coined by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis to describe how states try novel policy experiments that, if successful, can be adopted by their counterparts and even the national government.8 These factors mean that lawmakers are now much more willing to enact rules for the online economy without regard to what other states are doing, creating a thicket of regulations that make it much more difficult and costly for firms, especially small and mid-sized firms, to offer products and services online.', 'Multiple jurisdictions have the ability to set laws affecting activity the Internet. But if every jurisdiction imposed its own set of rules, most companies would find it burdensome to do business online, especially if these rules are not uniform. To avoid this problem, there have been various attempts at the international and national levels to harmonize rules impacting different sectors of the global digital economy. At the international level, the United States has sought to reduce digital regulatory conflicts with other countries through its trade deals. For example, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) seeks to harmonize rules across each of the various jurisdictions.9 Likewise, the European Union has undertaken a major initiative to establish a “digital single market,” which would harmonize many laws affecting digital products and services, including those on consumer protection, contracts, copyright, telecommunications, and cross-border taxes.10 EU officials have recognized that a major factor holding Europe back from not only wider digital adoption but also the creation of more globally competitive companies with Internet-based business models is the patchwork of different laws and regulations across the European Union. While Europe has made considerable progress, it still has a long way to go, in part because national governments continue to resist EU-wide harmonization (see Box 1).11', 'While EU officials understand the importance of creating a digital single market and are taking needed steps in that direction, the United States is going in the opposite direction. Many states have already created conflicting rules, including California with its new privacy law, and many more are seeking to add their own rules.12 For example, many states have their own unique data-breach notification laws. Certainly, one reason why some states have acted is because the federal government has not.', 'Another motivation for states to erect their own regulations is to protect domestic “bricks and mortar” firms from out-of-state digital competitors. For example, several state governments blocked Tesla from opening stores in their jurisdictions to sell cars directly to consumers due to anti-competitive laws that required consumers to buy through incumbent third-party car dealerships.13 States have also passed laws making it harder for companies to sell a variety of good and services online, including contact lenses, real estate, wine, human resources services, and more, all strongly supported by incumbent businesses and professions seeking to be sheltered from competition. These efforts ultimately raise costs, limit innovation and reduce welfare for consumers, who must pay more for services or lose access to them entirely.14 This regulatory patchwork imposes higher compliance costs on companies, making it more difficult, time consuming, and costly for companies, especially smaller firms and startups, to scale services to the entire United States.15 And when multiple states are creating laws and regulations on the same issue area, companies operating in those states must engage in policy debates in each state to ensure their interests are not overlooked—an expensive undertaking.', 'Regardless of the rationale for any state to reason for its position on a particular policy issue, there should be wide agreement that national rules are better than individual state rules for policies that impact the U.S. digital economy. There is little reason to create one level of protections for the online privacy and security of residents of Florida and a different one for residents of Alabama. It is time for Congress, which is empowered by the U.S. Constitution to be the arbitrator of interstate commerce, to step in and create a U.S. digital single market by preempting states from erecting barriers in the U.S. digital economy.16 A single, common framework with clear obligations can reduce burdens on existing companies, lower entry costs for new firms, and bring greater transparency to crucial, contested policy questions. This report will show that the United States lacks a digital single market and make the case for why Congress should change that. It will then outline steps Congress can take to address this challenge.']

[(5, 15)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Stockstill-Aff-ADA-Round2.docx

Kentucky

AdSt

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdSt/Kentucky-Adam-Stockstill-Aff-ADA-Round2.docx

b4fdb33fabb0e0833811922b5b944b2dc5a2ca59b15c545d689b521b64c3be51

Physical limits aren’t absolute or are chronically underestimated, AND resource use is declining now.

Bailey ’18 [Ronald; February 16; B.A. in Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Is Degrowth the Only Way to Save the World?” https://reason.com/2018/02/16/is-degrowth-the-only-way-to-save-the-wor; RP]

"degrowth." gussies up Malthusianism Americans transgress all boundaries one paragon Haiti performs abysmally on all indicators "Countries with higher life transgress boundaries," ingenuity in markets is making boundaries irrelevant energy costs will be lower reactors supply all carbon-free energy Peak phosphorus is not at hand reserves last 266 The total over 1,140 "There are no shortages crops use less while maintaining yields biotech create efficient staples drought and saline-tolerant crops Humanity reached peak farmland, and 400 million hectares will be restored farming will be replaced by developments The price system is a mechanism for innovators growth provides tech to lift from poverty while lightening footprint Rather than degrowth, the planet need more

Unless rich countries drastically reduce material living standards and distribute to poor countries, the world will come to an end The researchers think the way to prevent apocalypse is "degrowth." The new study gussies up old-fashioned Malthusianism by devising biophysical indicators of environmental pressure researchers calculate that annual per capita boundaries for the world's 7 billion consist of 1.6 tons of carbon dioxide per year consumption of 0.9 kilograms of phosphorus, 8.9 kilograms of nitrogen, 574 cubic meters of water, 2.6 tons of biomass plus 1.7 hectares of land and 7.2 tons per person how does the U.S. do with regard to biophysical boundaries and social outcomes Americans transgress all seven of the biophysical boundaries those transgressions provided a good life satisfaction is 7.1; healthy life expectancy is 69.7 years; and democratic quality stands at 0.8 points our hemisphere is home to one paragon of sustainability — Haiti But the Caribbean country performs abysmally on all 11 social indicators . Life satisfaction at 4. life expectancy is 52.3 years Haiti's GDP is $719 per capita Other near-sustainability champions include Malawi , Nepal , Myanmar , and Nicaragua . All of them score dismally on social indicators, and GDPs The country that comes closest to researchers' ideal biophysical boundaries while social indicators is… Vietnam "Countries with higher levels of life satisfaction and expectancy tend to transgress biophysical boundaries," A better way to put this is that wealth and technology make people happier, healthier, and freer human ingenuity unleashed in markets is well on the way toward making supposed planetary boundaries irrelevant . Take carbon dioxide emissions : Supporters of renewable energy technologies say costs are already or will be lower than fossil fuels . Boosters of nuclear reactors argue that they can supply all of the carbon-free energy the world will need battery-powered vehicles replace mass transit Peak phosphorus is not at hand at current rates of mining, the world's known reserves will last 266 years . The estimated total resources of phosphate rock would last over 1,140 years . "There are no imminent shortages of rock," With respect to deleterious effects researchers are working to endow crops with traits that enable them to use less while maintaining yields nitrogen fertilizer is a problem, but plant breeders are working to solve researchers used biotech nology to create nitrogen- efficient varieties of staples like rice and wheat that enable farmers to increase yields while reducing fertilizer use other projects engineer fixation the crops would make their own fertilizer from air Most water is devoted to irrigation the ongoing development of drought -resistant and saline-tolerant crops will help Humanity already reached peak farmland, and nearly 400 million hectares will be restored to nature by 2060—an area almost double the size of the U S east of the Mississippi most animal farming will be replaced by lab-grown steaks and milk. developments in food production undermine worries about overconsumption humanity's material footprint is likely to get smaller as trends toward dematerializatio n take hold. The price system is a superb mechanism for encouraging innovators to wring more value out less stuff absolute dematerialization has taken off many commodities "If all people are to lead life within planetary boundaries the level of resource use associated with basic needs must be reduced." They are entirely backward with how to achieve those goals. Economic growth provides tech nologies to lift people from poverty while lightening humanity's footprint on the world. Rather than degrowth, the planet —and poor people— need more and faster growth

old-fashioned Malthusianism biophysical indicators per capita boundaries transgress all seven life expectancy democratic quality paragon of sustainability abysmally Malawi Nepal Myanmar Nicaragua closest Vietnam life satisfaction expectancy technology ingenuity irrelevant emissions renewable energy lower than fossil fuels all of the carbon-free energy not at hand 266 years total resources over 1,140 years imminent shortages endow crops maintaining yields biotech nology efficient varieties make their own fertilizer drought -resistant saline-tolerant already reached 400 million hectares double the size replaced food production get smaller dematerializatio superb mechanism entirely backward Economic growth poverty lightening humanity's footprint more faster

['Unless us folks in rich countries drastically reduce our material living standards and distribute most of what we have to people living in poor countries, the world will come to an end. Or at least that\'s the stark conclusion of a study published earlier this month in the journal Nature Sustainability. The researchers who wrote it, led by the Leeds University ecological economist Dan O\'Neill, think the way to prevent the apocalypse is "degrowth." Vice, pestilence, war, and "gigantic inevitable famine" were the planetary boundaries set on human population by the 18th-century economist Robert Thomas Malthus. The new study gussies up old-fashioned Malthusianism by devising a set of seven biophysical indicators of national environmental pressure, which they then link to 11 indicators of social outcomes. The aim of the exercise is to concoct a "safe and just space" for humanity. Using data from 2011, the researchers calculate that the annual per capita boundaries for the world\'s 7 billion people consist of the emission of 1.6 tons of carbon dioxide per year and the annual consumption of 0.9 kilograms of phosphorus, 8.9 kilograms of nitrogen, 574 cubic meters of water, 2.6 tons of biomass (crops and wood), plus the ecological services of 1.7 hectares of land and 7.2 tons of material per person. On the social side, meanwhile, the researchers say that life satisfaction in each country should exceed 6.5 on the 10-point Cantril scale, that healthy life expectancy should average at least 65 years, and that nutrition should be over 2,700 calories per day. At least 95 percent of each country\'s citizens must have access to good sanitation, earn more than $1.90 per day, and pass through secondary school. Ninety percent of citizens must have friends and family they can depend on. The threshold for democratic quality must exceed 0.8 on an index scale stretching from -1 to +1, while the threshold for equality is set at no higher than 70 on a Gini Index where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 implies perfect inequality. They set the threshold for percent of labor force employed at 94 percent. So how does the U.S. do with regard to their biophysical boundaries and social outcomes measures? We Americans transgress all seven of the biophysical boundaries. Carbon dioxide emissions stand at 21.2 tons per person; we each use an average of 7 kilograms of phosphorus, 59.1 kilograms of nitrogen, 611 cubic meters of water, and 3.7 tons of biomass; we rely on the ecological services of 6.8 hectares of land and 27.2 tons of material. Although the researchers urge us to move "beyond the pursuit of GDP growth to embrace new measures of progress," it is worth noting that U.S. GDP is $59,609 per capita. On the other hand, those transgressions have provided a pretty good life for Americans. For example, life satisfaction is 7.1; healthy life expectancy is 69.7 years; and democratic quality stands at 0.8 points. The only two social indicators we just missed on were employment (91 percent) and secondary education (94.7 percent). On the other hand, our hemisphere is home to one paragon of sustainability—Haiti. Haitians breach none of the researchers\' biophysical boundaries. But the Caribbean country performs abysmally on all 11 social indicators. Life satisfaction scores at 4.8; healthy life expectancy is 52.3 years; and Haitians average 2,105 calories per day. The country tallies -0.9 on the democratic quality index. Haiti\'s GDP is $719 per capita. Other near-sustainability champions include Malawi, Nepal, Myanmar, and Nicaragua. All of them score dismally on the social indicators, and their GDPs per capita are $322, $799, $1,375, and $2,208, respectively. The country that currently comes closest to the researchers\' ideal of remaining within its biophysical boundaries while sufficient social indicators is…Vietnam. For the record, Vietnam\'s per capita GDP is $2,306. "Countries with higher levels of life satisfaction and healthy life expectancy also tend to transgress more biophysical boundaries," the researchers note. A better way to put this relationship is that more wealth and technology tend to make people happier, healthier, and freer. O\'Neill and his unhappy team fail drastically to understand how human ingenuity unleashed in markets is already well on the way toward making their supposed planetary boundaries irrelevant. Take carbon dioxide emissions: Supporters of renewable energy technologies say that their costs are already or will soon be lower than those of fossil fuels. Boosters of advanced nuclear reactors similarly argue that they can supply all of the carbon-free energy the world will need. There\'s a good chance that fleets of battery-powered self-driving vehicles will largely replace private cars and mass transit later in this century. Are we about to run out of phosphorous to fertilize our crops? Peak phosphorus is not at hand. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that at current rates of mining, the world\'s known reserves will last 266 years. The estimated total resources of phosphate rock would last over 1,140 years. "There are no imminent shortages', '', '', ' of phosphate rock," notes the USGS. With respect to the deleterious effects that using phosphorus to fertilize crops might have outside of farm fields, researchers are working on ways to endow crops with traits that enable them to use less while maintaining yields. O\'Neill and his colleagues are also concerned that farmers are using too much nitrogen fertilizer, which runs off fields into the natural environment and contributes to deoxygenated dead zones in the oceans, among other ill effects. This is a problem, but one that plant breeders are already working to solve. For example, researchers at Arcadia Biosciences have used biotechnology to create nitrogen-efficient varieties of staples like rice and wheat that enable farmers to increase yields while significantly reducing fertilizer use. Meanwhile, other researchers are moving on projects to engineer the nitrogen fixation trait from legumes into cereal crops. In other words, the crops would make their own fertilizer from air. Water? Most water is devoted to the irrigation of crops; the ongoing development of drought-resistant and saline-tolerant crops will help with that. Hectares per capita? Humanity has probably already reached peak farmland, and nearly 400 million hectares will be restored to nature by 2060—an area almost double the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. In fact, it is entirely possible that most animal farming will be replaced by resource-sparing lab-grown steaks, chops, and milk. Such developments in food production undermine the researchers\' worries about overconsumption of biomass. And humanity\'s material footprint is likely to get smaller too as trends toward further dematerialization take hold. The price system is a superb mechanism for encouraging innovators to find ways to wring ever more value out less and less stuff. Rockefeller University researcher Jesse Ausubel has shown that this process of absolute dematerialization has already taken off for many commodities. After cranking their way through their models of doom, O\'Neill and his colleagues lugubriously conclude: "If all people are to lead a good life within planetary boundaries, then the level of resource use associated with meeting basic needs must be dramatically reduced." They are right, but they are entirely backward with regard to how to achieve those goals. Economic growth provides the wealth and technologies needed to lift people from poverty while simultaneously lightening humanity\'s footprint on the natural world. Rather than degrowth, the planet—and especially its poor people—need more and faster economic growth.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Neg-5%20-%20Texas-Round3.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/ShVe/Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Neg-5%2520-%2520Texas-Round3.docx

9c4728626a8d22f9b44ca306123e1e1465ee8f35497645e552c755e2c7661af8

3---Megaships isolate India from global trade

Iyer 19, Fellow with the ORF Maritime Policy Initiative. She tracks ocean governance policies and international maritime trade sustainability for global development. (Gayathri, Mega-ships in the Indian Ocean: Evaluating the impact and exploring littoral cooperation, https://www.orfonline.org/research/mega-ships-in-the-indian-ocean-evaluating-the-impact-and-exploring-littoral-cooperation-53235/)

countries in the Indian Ocean have to deal with reduced port calls due t nability to serve mega-ship more countries could be increasingly cut off India’s largest port can accommodate ships only up to 18,000 TEU India unable to attract calls will be vulnerable to geopolitical risks international trade could require ships of up to 50,000 TEU

direct port calls by ships are considered important because they reduce risks , and turnaround time countries in the Indian Ocean have to deal with reduced direct port calls due t o their i nability to serve mega-ship port calls With the size of ships predicted to grow after 2020, more countries could be increasingly cut off from direct call s unless they undertake extensive modernisation India’s largest port can currently accommodate ships only up to 18,000 TEU India will be unable to attract direct port calls to its shores, and will be vulnerable to geopolitical risks emerging from Chinese and Pakistan’s Gwadar mega-port international trade could require container ships of up to 50,000 TEU capacity which are likely to sail exclusively between trans-shipment terminals and mega-port complexes

Indian Ocean reduced direct port calls mega-ship increasingly cut off 18,000 TEU geopolitical risks international trade 50,000 TEU

['According to the ITF, direct port calls by ships are considered important because they reduce risks, feeder vessel costs, and turnaround time in comparison to the option of trans-shipment feedering[2] via other ports.[23] Ports are considered competitive when they are chosen more regularly for direct calls than other ports.[24] Maritime landside infrastructure limitations dictate direct call options. A terminal’s integration with the wider set of requirements in the supply chain decides the choice of routes.[25] Even if a terminal is large enough to handle the berthing of a mega-ship, it needs several large cranes, better yard management capability, increased automation, larger storage facilities, more inland connectivity, and enhanced labour productivity. Mega vessels seek speedy unloading of the large volumes they carry.[26] Most countries in the Indian Ocean have to deal with reduced direct port calls due to their inability to serve mega-ship port calls.[27] With the size of ships predicted to grow beyond 21,000 TEU after 2020, more countries could be increasingly cut off from direct calls unless they undertake extensive modernisation. India’s largest port, the Adani CMA Mundra Terminal Private Limited on its west coast, can currently accommodate ships only up to 18,000 TEU. The majority of India’s container traffic is therefore shipped through ports outside the country, mainly from Colombo and Singapore. India is developing six deep-water sea mega-ports for receiving mega-ships under its ambitious Sagarmala Project, though the project is still in its nascent stages.[28] Unless India invests in maritime infrastructure, it will be unable to attract direct port calls to its shores, and will be vulnerable to geopolitical risks emerging from the Chinese investments in Colombo’s Hambantota mega-port and Pakistan’s Gwadar mega-port.[29] Cities unable to manage land acquisition for mega-port complexes are in danger of becoming completely cut out of direct calls. Long-term market projections suggest that by mid-century, international trade could require container ships of up to 50,000 TEU capacity which are likely to sail exclusively between trans-shipment terminals and mega-port complexes.[30] Mega-ship port calls could therefore mark the beginning of the end for the link between cities and ports.[31]']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Park-Semrick-Aff-00%20NDT-Round6.docx

Kansas

PaSe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/PaSe/Kansas-Park-Semrick-Aff-00%2520NDT-Round6.docx

812d74e9ffd352e86c5e87125c4f58589958a1b041aba30679ad38da8e49a623

Vesting artificial entities with IP rights snowballs into malignant superintelligence – extinction.

Khoury ’17 [Amir; 2017; Associate Professor of Law and Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Tel Aviv University, Ph.D. from Haifa University, LL.M. from Fordham University; Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal, “Intellectual Property Rights for ‘Hubots’: On the Legal Implications of Human-Like Robots as Innovators and Creators,” vol. 35]

there is a divide between humans and bots Strong A.I . is around the corner . But despite increases in memory and processing we are no closer question of bots is not simply legalistic appears existential scientists concerned about full blown A.I development could end human race once superintelligence exists, it prevent us from replacing or changing it human s must not tolerate granting IP to robots lest dilut difference and end up overrun by machines nature of innovation is bound to this outcome , and needs to be preempted by law IP must not allow rights to Hubots

there is a great unbridgeable divide between humans and Hu bots , no matter how sophisticated the later become In order for a Hubot to theoretically be eligible for IP protection for its innovative "creation," it needs to meet two conditions alive nor truly conscious .I. researchers have been claiming that Strong A.I . is just around the corner . But despite monumental increases in computer memory , speed , and processing power , we are no closer than before the question of Hu bots as humans is not simply limited to the legalistic it even appears existential even the most avid of scientists are very concerned , to say the least, about the full blown independent A.I . Musk, refers to this bluntly as " summoning the demon ." "the development of full a i could spell the end of the human race ." this curiosity could eventually bring our collective demise " once unfriendly superintelligence exists, it would prevent us from replacing it or changing it s preferences. Our fate would be sealed ." That is why human made law s must not tolerate the idea of granting IP rights to robots lest we end up dilut ing the cardinal difference between humans and Hubots and end up being overrun by machines with consciousness the nature of human innovation and innate curiosity is bound to lead to this inevitable outcome , and needs to be preempted from the outset by the law Thus, IP laws must not allow for granting IP rights to Hubots , and their byproducts should forever rest in the public domain

unbridgeable divide humans bots theoretically IP protection alive conscious Strong A.I corner monumental computer memory speed processing power no closer bots not limited existential very concerned full blown independent A.I . summoning demon a i spell the end human race collective demise superintelligence prevent replacing changing would be sealed human s not tolerate granting IP rights dilut ing cardinal difference overrun machines human innovation bound inevitable outcome preempted outset IP laws not granting IP rights public domain

['III. Why Robots Cannot be Considered to be Equal to Humans?', 'In examining the interface between intellectual property law and Hubots, the question of whether Hubots or robots qualify for some form of "human" rights, including the right to own property, is clearly an underlying theme. My position is that there is a great unbridgeable divide between humans and Hubots, no matter how sophisticated the later become. My position is based on two primary reasons\xa0150\xa0- the fist reason is that Hubots cannot be considered to be alive, and second, that they do not have true consciousness. In order for a Hubot to theoretically be eligible for IP protection for its innovative or artistic "creation," it needs to meet those two conditions. Thus, it is important to explain why Hubots are, in fact, neither alive nor truly conscious of their surroundings. This section is devoted towards these complex issues. But before addressing these two cumulative conditions, I will examine two situations where humans do not meet those two conditions but are still granted human rights: the first relates to deceased persons, or their remains, and the second relates to persons who are, for whatever reason, not mentally aware of their surroundings, such as when they are unconscious or in a state of coma. In those two cases, despite the absence of the two above-mentioned conditions, these humans are protected by human rights.\xa0151\xa0But notice that this outcome flows not from the present state of the person, but rather to the person who is in that given state. The qualifying factor in both cases is not death or the\xa0lack of consciousness, but rather that the individual is, or was, a living conscious human before said state of affairs ensued. Thus, these two cases do not justify equating the granting of rights to robots to the rights that are granted to the deceased (by way of respect for their remains and their will) or to unconscious people who lack awareness (at a certain period of time). In both cases, the human right is granted to the human no matter what his condition is at the time. Now that this distinction has been made, I would like to examine the two conditions of life and awareness in the context of Hubots.', 'According to Frederic Py,', 'Alive is a concept applied to biologic entities and actually the only thing they really have in common: life is what distinguishes biological species form the rest of the universe. A machine, at least the one we have right now and in the foreseeable future, are not a biological entity so it probably will never be considered as alive.\xa0152', 'Although the observation is logical, I think that it is rather simplistic. Consider a case where a robot is able to energize itself, to rebuild and fix any part therein, and to even build similar Hubots in its "own image." Could we not say then that the robot fits the description of "alive?" But is life only limited to our physical existence or should one also look at the essence of life - some form of spiritual existence or what people of faith refer to as the soul? Obviously, trying to answer these questions is impossible, with the use of only legalistic reasoning. It might be possible to theorize and consider various options and beliefs, but this discussion is beyond the scope of this Article: . Still, the word "alive" denotes a notion of existence that terminates with death. In the case of machines, this does not seem to apply as they are neither alive nor do they die. To say that the machine is alive is to say that it is functioning as a part of nature, whereas a Hubot would never fit into that definition no matter how superior or intricate it is. I would like to offer another definition of life which sets robots apart from humans, and all living things for that matter. When robots "perish" they become parts made of materials that do not blend back into nature. All true living things blend back into nature and give back to nature as they decompose. They are part of a cycle of nature that all living organisms are part of. So the best way to determine what life is, is to contrast it with what transpires to the dead physical entity after death.\xa0153', 'Py observes that "consciousness is a concept even harder to define, let alone identify, than intelligence."\xa0154\xa0Indeed, consciousness is about being aware of our place in the world around us. According to Bobby Azarian, "brains and computers work very differently. Both compute, but only one understands - and there are some very compelling reasons to believe that this is not going to change. It appears that there is a more technical obstacle that stands in the way of Strong A.I. ever becoming a reality."\xa0155\xa0Azarian adds that:', 'Since as early as the 1960s, A.I. researchers have been claiming that Strong A.I. is just around the corner. But despite monumental increases in computer memory, speed, and processing power, we are no closer than before. So for now, just like the brainy sci-fi films of the past that depict apocalyptic A.I. scenarios, truly intelligent robots with inner conscious experience remain a fanciful fantasy.\xa0156', 'Even in the grand scheme of things, the question or treatment of Hubots as humans is not simply limited to the legalistic or philosophical realms - to some it even appears existential. In this context, even the most avid of scientists, innovators, and visionaries are very concerned, to say the least, about the full blown independent A.I. For example, innovator and visionary, Elon Musk, refers to this bluntly as "summoning the demon."\xa0157\xa0He expresses concern about creating robots with deep intelligence that may even possess awareness.\xa0158\xa0A similar warning was also given by Bill Gates.\xa0159\xa0Furthermore, in an interview, Stephen Hawking told BBC News that "the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race."\xa0160\xa0I find myself largely agreeing with this position as professed by Gates, Musk and Hawking. It is worth noting that not all agree with their view and\xa0think it to be exaggerated.\xa0161\xa0I predict that the warnings expressed by Gates, Musk, and Hawking will ultimately not be heeded. This is due to the nature of innate human curiosity. It is my belief that humanity will not rest until it explores the world of A.I to the point of no return - it is simply too amazing and enticing for humans to withstand the temptation. But it is this innate curiosity that could eventually bring our collective demise. Nick Bostrom also warns that "once unfriendly superintelligence exists, it would prevent us from replacing it or changing its preferences. Our fate would be sealed."\xa0162\xa0That is why human made laws must not tolerate the idea of granting IP rights, or any other rights for that matter, to robots lest we end up diluting the cardinal difference between humans and Hubots and, ultimately, end up being overrun by machines with consciousness. Granted, this dire warning seems far-fetched at this point, but the nature of human innovation and innate curiosity is bound to lead to this inevitable outcome, and, as such, it needs to be preempted from the outset by the law.', 'Conclusion', 'Robots, including Hubots, cannot be equated with human innovators and creators. Their "byproducts" are not generated in a way that resembles human creativity. In this regard, what they generate and "create," however awesome it may be, is no different from the music that is created by the wind rustling through the trees or moving through wind chimes. Thus, IP laws must not allow for granting IP rights to Hubots, and their byproducts should forever rest in the public domain. ']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Neg-ADA-Round-1.docx

Michigan

McSk

a15a559a4f96ce93e79199372005f8f803bffc735178475cb6101a8a30a0b3e7

trade Internet fracturing collapses trade

Sarah Box 16, Economist in the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, with; Jeremy West; 2016, “Economic and Social Benefits of Internet Openness,” OECD Digital Economy Papers No. 257, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5jlwqf2r97g5-en.pdf?expires=1583006282&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=48A074043793053419187C3F80E2D03B

There is growing lit on costs to trade of policies that introduce frictions to data flows Openness can boost trade providing access via e-commerce it enables firms to enter GVCs the Internet enabled firms in developing countries to easily engage in trade moving large amounts of data is essential reductions in openness create significant impediments localisation undermine ability to participate in global networks

There is a growing lit erature on the positive effects of the Internet on trade and the costs to trade of policies that introduce frictions to “business as usual” data flows on the Internet Internet openness facilitates international trade for existing businesses by making it easier for suppliers to connect with existing consumers who are located beyond the borders of the supplier’s home country or countries and by improving logistics control Openness can boost trade by providing access to a wider customer base via e-commerce And it enables new firms to enter more geographic markets and (for the most efficient ones) to enter global value chains GVCs Internet openness and digitisation make it possible to complete transactions and deliver products, services, and payments faster and more efficiently by replacing some physical trade with online trade Both goods and services may be produced in GVCs electronics and cars are common examples where design, raw material, production and marketing inputs are spread across countries The rise of GVCs has been made possible in part by technological advances, notably the information management systems that allow firms to co-ordinate their participation in GVCs The combination of GVCs and the Internet has not only enabled firms in developing countries to more easily engage in international trade but also smalland medium-sized enterprises as digital platforms enable even tiny firms to connect with global suppliers and purchasers moving large amounts of data across countries is an essential part of supporting intermediate and final trade flows and allowing firms to participate in GVCs reductions in Internet openness could create significant impediments to trade localisation barriers to trade including restrictions on data undermine firms’ ability to participate in global networks because the barriers raise costs and reduce technology diffusion The Software Alliance highlights the trade-dampening effect of country-specific technology standards and other forms of “digital protectionism,” such as nationally-oriented IT procurement.

growing lit erature positive effects trade costs to trade frictions to “business as usual” data flows on the Internet facilitates Openness boost trade e-commerce GVCs electronics cars large amounts of data across countries essential part reductions in Internet openness significant impediments to trade restrictions on data participate in global networks “digital protectionism,”

['There is a growing literature on the positive effects of the Internet on trade and the potential costs to trade of policies that introduce frictions to “business as usual” data flows on the Internet. Internet openness facilitates international trade for existing businesses by making it easier for suppliers to connect with existing consumers who are located beyond the borders of the supplier’s home country (or countries) and by improving logistics control. Openness can also boost trade by providing access to a wider customer base via e-commerce. And it enables new firms to enter more geographic markets and (for the most efficient ones) to enter global value chains (GVCs). At the same time, Internet openness and digitisation make it possible to complete transactions and deliver products, services, and payments faster and more efficiently by replacing some physical trade with online trade (in books and music, for instance – or with more complex products via online shipment of designs followed by local production such as with 3D printers). ', 'GVCs are central to the trade and Internet story. Behind aggregate trade data lie a huge number of intermediate trade flows, with inputs sourced globally and stages of production shifting from location to location to complete a final product. Both goods and services may be produced in GVCs – electronics and cars are common examples where design, raw material, production and marketing inputs are spread across countries. One can also think of aircraft, clothing, film animation, law briefs and medical advice being created in GVCs. The rise of GVCs has been made possible in part by technological advances, notably the information management systems that allow firms to co-ordinate their participation in GVCs. The combination of GVCs and the Internet has not only enabled firms in developing countries to more easily engage in international trade (by specialising in one stage of a chain, e.g. auto electronics), but also smalland medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as digital platforms enable even tiny firms (micro-multinationals) to connect with global suppliers and purchasers.', 'Given the pervasiveness of GVCs, seamlessly moving potentially large amounts of data across countries is an essential part of supporting intermediate and final trade flows and allowing firms to participate in GVCs. In other words, reductions in Internet openness could create significant impediments to trade. Small frictions may multiply into large barriers, especially if production is split into stages that entail numerous border crossings where imposed frictions multiply. The Swedish National Board of Trade suggest that policies such as data localisation requirements (where firms are either forced to store data and locate data centres within a country’s borders, or have restricted ability to move and process data across borders) could lead a firm to reorganise its GVC, either moving or closing parts of its operations, with service to end-users being restricted in some cases (2015: 14-15). Ezell et al. (2013: 46-47) make a similar point, noting that localisation barriers to trade, including restrictions on data, undermine firms’ ability to participate in global networks because the barriers raise costs and reduce technology diffusion. The Software Alliance (BSA, 2014) additionally highlights the trade-dampening effect of country-specific technology standards and other forms of “digital protectionism,” such as nationally-oriented IT procurement. ']

[(6, 12)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Aff-Kentucky%20Round%20Robin-Round4.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Aff-Kentucky%2520Round%2520Robin-Round4.docx

155112ce9bb61ae890271d133d9482fa27bfde44b56fa588b548f4c1b5d812e3

Indian nuclear tests prove.

Smetana & O'Mahoney 22. Dr. Michal Smetana, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Head of the Peace Research Center Prague (PRCP), Head Researcher at the Experimental Lab for International Security Studies (ELISS), Ph.D. in International Relations, Charles University, Habilitation in Political Science, Masaryk University; Dr. Joseph O'Mahoney, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at University of Reading, Member of the Monroe Group, an interdisciplinary research group at the University of Reading focused on the study of US politics, formerly Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at MIT's Security Studies Programme, Ph.D., George Washington University. “NPT as an antifragile system: How contestation improves the nonproliferation regime.” Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, Contemporary Security Policy, 2022, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 32-34. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523260.2021.1978761?needAccess=true. Accessed 26 August 2023.

India’s nuclear test led to changed meaning of nonprolif norms Before 1974 , enrichment rem ained peaceful contestation led to mo re concrete meaning of these norms consensus was such that the USSR was supportive Indian test led to a more distinct boundary between members and non-members resulted from states prioritizing membership but also re-evaluation of what membership meant non-members became an outgroup to be frozen out of nuclear coop Following India nonprolif became the dominant criterion in Canada’s export policy more stringent than it had been the two years following India’s test countries that had been holdouts were pressured into ratification making Italians and Japanese believe their access to nuclear materials was dependent upon NPT ratification

India’s nuclear test led to a changed shared meaning of nonprolif eration norms First, there was a practical specification of what was allowed and what was not Second, there was an attenuation of the dichotomy between civilian and military uses of nuclear technology And third, there was securitization of enrichment and reprocessing Before 1974 , enrichment and reprocessing rem ained under the category of peaceful nuclear activities that, subject to safeguards the applicatory contestation after India’s test led to a mo re concrete understanding of the meaning of these norms The extent of great power consensus on this issues was such that the USSR was fully supportive of these efforts The Indian test led to a creation of a more distinct boundary between NPT members and non-members This resulted from certain states not only prioritizing NPT membership in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, but also from a re-evaluation of what NPT membership meant States like the United States and Canada pushed the narrative that NPT parties constituted an in-group whose members could get access to transfers of nuclear material and technology more easily non-members became an outgroup who were likely going to be frozen out of nuclear coop eration Previously, states acceding to the NPT were putting themselves under more restrictions than those outside the treaty Following the India n nuclear test, nonprolif eration became almost immediately the dominant criterion in Canada’s nuclear export policy Debate about nuclear exports was subsequently charged with strategic considerations This was far more stringent than it had been and included lifetime safeguards on all facilities, equipment, and fissile material, as well as a binding assurance would be required of recipients that no Canadian nuclear material, equipment, or technology would be used to produce an explosive device for whatever purpose In the two years following India’s nuclear test , several countries that had been notable holdouts on NPT were pressured into ratification by the United States and Canada this involved making the Italians and Japanese believe that their continued access to nuclear fuel, enriched uranium, and other nuclear materials and technology as well as financing for nuclear projects, was dependent upon NPT ratification In 1973, the United States signed a contract to supply fuel (enriched uranium) to two of South Africa’s reactors

changed shared meaning of nonprolif norms practical specification attenuation of the dichotomy between civilian and military uses securitization of enrichment and reprocessing Before 1974 ained under the category of peaceful nuclear activities re concrete understanding of the meaning of these norms extent of great power consensus USSR was fully supportive more distinct boundary prioritizing NPT membership re-evaluation of what NPT membership meant frozen out of nuclear coop nonprolif dominant criterion Canada’s nuclear export policy far more stringent had been notable holdouts pressured into ratification dependent upon NPT ratification

['Meaning clarification', 'India’s nuclear test led to a changed shared meaning of nonproliferation norms. First, there was a practical specification of what was allowed and what was not. Second, there was an attenuation of the dichotomy between civilian (or “peaceful”) and military uses of nuclear technology, with particular reference to “peaceful nuclear explosions” (PNEs). And third, there was securitization of enrichment and reprocessing.', 'Before 1974, enrichment and reprocessing “remained under the category of peaceful nuclear activities that, subject to safeguards, were the right of every party to the NPT” (Anstey, 2018, p. 14). The NPT provides for an “inalienable right” to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” and signatories agree to “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information” (NPT Article IV, para 1). What the actual meaning of this NPT article was in practice was not widely agreed upon. For example, during the negotiations leading to the drafting of the NPT, the United States and the United Kingdom disagreed about whether gas centrifuge technology, or other processes for the separation of uranium isotopes, were, or should be, inhibited under the treaty (Krige, 2012, p. 222).', 'However, the applicatory contestation after India’s test led to a more concrete understanding of the meaning of these norms. For example, the assessment of the U.S. National Intelligence Council in 1985 was that “during the last 10 years or so […] the consensus has developed among supplier governments that it is legitimate to restrict the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies and materials abroad,” while this consensus has “developed primarily in response to India’s ‘peaceful’ nuclear test in 1974” (National Intelligence Council, 1985). The extent of great power consensus on this issues was such that the USSR was fully supportive of these efforts. Just one example is in a deal to supply India with Heavy Water, the USSR purposefully elided the distinction between weapons and peaceful explosives (Joshi, 2018, p. 1079).', 'Ingroup vs outgroup', 'The Indian test led to a creation of a more distinct boundary between NPT members and non-members. This resulted from certain states not only prioritizing NPT membership in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, but also from a re-evaluation of what NPT membership meant. States like the United States and Canada pushed the narrative that NPT parties constituted an in-group whose members could get access to transfers of nuclear material and technology more easily. By contrast, non-members became an outgroup who were likely going to be frozen out of nuclear cooperation. Previously, states acceding to the NPT were putting themselves under more restrictions than those outside the treaty.', 'Five days after India’s test, the United States approved National Security Study Memorandum 202, in which President Nixon “directed a review of U.S. policy concerning the [NPT]” (U.S. National Security Council, 1974). The goal of this review was to produce a study that would “review present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation and the NPT […] in particular, in light of India’s announcement of its underground nuclear test.” The study should “consider specifically whether the U.S. should press for renewed support for the treaty by those now party to it and accession to the treaty by those not yet signators” (U.S. National Security Council, 1974). Washington subsequently changed its nonproliferation policy to prioritize adherence to the NPT and to limit nuclear exports to those recipient states who were NPT members or who had stricter IAEA safeguards (Miller, 2018).', 'Following the Indian nuclear test, nonproliferation became almost immediately the dominant criterion in Canada’s nuclear export policy, and has remained so, although the government has always maintained that such exports must continue. Debate about nuclear exports, previously couched almost entirely in economic terms, was subsequently charged with strategic considerations (Morrison, 1978, p. 60). Canada announced a new safeguards policy on nuclear exports in December 1974. This was far more stringent than it had been and included lifetime safeguards on all facilities, equipment, and fissile material, as well as a binding assurance would be required of recipients that no Canadian nuclear material, equipment, or technology would be used to produce an explosive device for whatever purpose. Then in December 1976, Canada announced that only those non-nuclear weapon states who were NPT parties or who had full-scope safeguards on their entire nuclear program would receive any Canadian nuclear exports (Hunt, 1977). This included insisting “that no nuclear deals will be made with any nation which has not ratified the non-proliferation treaty” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1975). For example, Argentina had to renegotiate the terms of the agreement regarding the export of a nuclear power plant and technological knowhow, which both countries had agreed to in 1973 (Patti & Mallea, 2018, p. 1004). This drew a clear line between a favored in-group and a deviant outgroup.', 'In the two years following India’s nuclear test, several countries that had been notable holdouts on NPT were pressured into ratification by the United States and Canada. For the United States, this involved making the Italians and Japanese believe that their continued access to nuclear fuel, enriched uranium, and other nuclear materials and technology as well as financing for nuclear projects, was dependent upon NPT ratification. The Canadian government was much more directly coercive, making the supply of uranium (to Italy) and nuclear reactors (to Korea) explicitly conditional upon ratification (O’Mahoney, 2020). Italy and South Korea ratified in 1975, with Japan following in 1976.', 'A particularly good example of how the distinction between in-group and out-group became relevant is U.S. policy towards South Africa. In 1973, the United States signed a contract to supply fuel (enriched uranium) to two of South Africa’s reactors. However, as part of the nuclear export policy review resulting from India’s test, President Gerald Ford decided in 1976 to threaten to withhold export licenses for enriched uranium from South Africa unless it signed the NPT and put all of its nuclear facilities and equipment under IAEA safeguards. Then, in 1977, when Carter came into office, he immediately put this policy into practice and suspended the export licenses (Van Wyk, 2007).']

[(0, 22)]

ndtceda

Emory-LoKi-Neg-1---Northwestern-Round-2.docx

Emory

LoKi

b471cff7fcbd2dcd27b34d77cb6320c7e5306c30f6dfc0a80332749014a0712f

Breakdown cause nuclear war.

Kampf ’20 [David; June 16; PhD Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School, MA in International Affairs from Columbia University; World Politics Review, “How COVID-19 Could Increase the Risk of War,” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28843/how-covid-19-could-increase-the-risk-of-war]

If interdependence kept peace, then rise of protectionism are disconcerting internal conflicts easily escalate into global wars Civil wars spill over migration reignite conflicts research indicates civil wars increase interstate spillover effects provoke wider wars conflagrations can spiral economic bonds limit wars countries preserve ties when there are expectations for trade chance of a U.S.-Russia nuclear confrontation is high Tehran will acquire nuc s Korea’s menace get potent together World War III proxy wars precipitate international conflicts

Civil wars were becoming numerous with dangerous consequences for stability in many regions of the world the global dynamics cited to explain the falling incidence of interstate war economic prosperity were being upended If globalization and economic interdependence kept the peace, then the rise of nationalism and protectionism are disconcerting internal conflicts could easily escalate into regional or global wars Civil wars spill over borders migration can reignite conflicts recent research indicates civil wars increase the risk of interstate war because they are attracting more and more outside involvement in addition to spillover effects civil wars increase international tensions and could provoke wider interstate wars : external interventions and regime attacks across borders Conflicts in Syria , Yemen and Libya attract meddlers including the U S Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, France and many others these conflicts could spark wider international conflagrations . Wars, after all, can quickly spiral out of control economic bonds between countries have limit ed wars in recent decades countries work to preserve ties when there are high expectations for future trade , but war becomes increasingly possible when trade is predicted to fall. If globalization brought peace, the recent wave of far-right nationalism and populism around the world may increase the chances of war widening economic inequalities are not likely to enhance support for free trade we may head toward an increasingly multipolar or nonpolar world, which could prove destabilizing in its own right the chance of a U.S.-Russia nuclear confrontation is high Tehran will acquire nuc lear weapon s North Korea’s nuclear menace get potent The end result may be a less stable world with more nuclear actors together , they are World War III the increase in civil wars is likely to lead to more external meddling , and these next proxy wars could soon precipitate all-out international conflicts With the usual deterrents to conflict declining around the world, major wars could soon return

many regions economic prosperity globalization economic interdependence nationalism protectionism disconcerting internal easily escalate global wars spill over migration reignite conflicts research increase interstate attracting outside involvement spillover effects tensions wider interstate wars regime attacks Syria Yemen Libya attract U S spark international conflagrations quickly spiral economic bonds limit preserve ties high expectations for future trade increasingly possible predicted nationalism populism increase the chances of war head destabilizing own right a nuclear confrontation high Tehran nuc s nuclear menace potent less stable nuclear actors World War III external meddling precipitate all-out international conflicts usual deterrents to conflict declining major wars

['But that overlooked the ways in which the risk of interstate war was already rising before COVID-19 began to spread. Civil wars were becoming more numerous, lasting longer and attracting more outside involvement, with dangerous consequences for stability in many regions of the world. And the global dynamics most commonly cited to explain the falling incidence of interstate war—democracy, economic prosperity, international cooperation and others—were being upended.', 'If the spread of democracy kept the peace, then its global decline is unnerving. If globalization and economic interdependence kept the peace, then a looming global depression and the rise of nationalism and protectionism are disconcerting. If regional and global institutions kept the peace, then their degradation is unsettling. If the balance of nuclear weapons kept the peace, then growing risks of proliferation are disquieting. And if America’s preeminent power kept the peace, then its relative decline is troubling.', 'Now, the pandemic, or more specifically the world’s reaction to it, is revealing the extent to which the factors holding major wars in check are withering. The idea that war between nations is a relic of the past no longer seems so convincing.', 'The Pessimists Strike Back', 'More than any other individual, it was cognitive scientist Steven Pinker who popularized the idea that we are living in the most peaceful moment in human history. Starting with his 2011 bestseller, “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” Pinker argued that the frequency, duration and lethality of wars between great powers have all decreased. In his 2019 book, “Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress,” he wrote that war “between the uniformed armies of two nation-states appears to be obsolescent. There have been no more than three in any year since 1945, none in most years since 1989, and none since the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.”', 'Optimists like Pinker held that, rather than the world falling apart, as a quick glance at headline news might suggest, the opposite was true: Humanity was flourishing. More regions are characterized by peace; fewer mass killings are occurring; governance and the rule of law are improving; and people are richer, healthier, better educated and happier than ever before.', 'In their book, “Clear and Present Safety: The World Has Never Been Better and Why That Matters to Americans,” Michael A. Cohen and Micah Zenko argued that the evidence is so overwhelming that it is difficult to argue against the idea that wars between great powers, and all other interstate wars, are becoming vanishingly rare. Even when wars do break out, they tend to be shorter and less deadly than they were in the past. John Mueller, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, also reasoned that the idea of war, like slavery and dueling before it, was in terminal decline, while Joshua Goldstein, an international relations researcher at American University, credited the United Nations and the rise of peacekeeping operations for helping win the “war on war.”', 'But in recent years, a range of critics have begun to poke holes in these arguments. Tanisha M. Fazal, an international relations professor at the University of Minnesota, contends that the decline in war is overstated. Major advances in medicine, speedier evacuations of wounded soldiers from the field of battle and better armor have made war less fatal—but not necessarily less frequent. Fazal and Paul Poast, who is at the University of Chicago, further assert that the notion of war between great powers as a thing of the past is based on the assumption that all such conflicts resemble World War I and II—both are historical anomalies—and overlooks the actual wars fought between great powers since 1945, from the Korean War and the Vietnam War to proxy wars from Afghanistan to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Bear F. Braumoeller, an Ohio State political science professor, analyzed the same historical data on conflicts used by Pinker, Mueller and Goldstein, and found no general downward trend in either the initiation or deadliness of warfare over the past two centuries. What’s more, Braumoeller contends that the so-called “long peace”—the 75 years that have passed without systemic war since World War II—is far from invulnerable, and that wars are just as likely to escalate now as they used to be. Just because a major interstate war hasn’t happened for a long time, doesn’t mean it never will again. In all probability, it will.', 'And by focusing solely on interstate wars, the optimists miss half the story, at least. Wars between states have declined, but civil wars never disappeared—and these internal conflicts could easily escalate into regional or global wars.', 'The number of conflicts in the world reached its highest point since World War II in 2016, with 53 state-based armed conflicts in 37 countries. All but two of these conflicts were considered civil wars. To make matters worse, new studies have shown that civil wars are becoming longer, deadlier and harder to conclusively end, and that these internal conflicts are not really internal. Civil wars harm the economies and stability of neighboring countries, since armed groups, refugees, illicit goods and diseases all spill over borders. Some 10 million refugees have fled to other countries since 2012. The countries that now host them are more likely to experience war, which means states with huge refugee populations like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey face legitimate security challenges. Even after the threat of violence has diminished in refugees’ countries of origin, return migration can reignite conflicts, repeating the brutal cycle.', 'A Yugoslav Federal Army tank.', 'Perhaps most importantly, recent research indicates that civil wars increase the risk of interstate war, in large part because they are attracting more and more outside involvement. In a 2008 paper, researchers Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan and Kenneth Schultz explained that, in addition to the spillover effects, two other factors in civil wars increase international tensions and could possibly provoke wider interstate wars: external interventions in support of rebel groups and regime attacks on insurgents across international borders.', 'Immediately after the Cold War, none of the ongoing civil wars around the world were internationalized. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, there were 12 full-fledged civil wars in 1991—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and elsewhere—and foreign militaries were not active on the ground in any of them. Last year, by contrast, every single full-fledged civil war involved external military participants. This is due, in part, to the huge growth in U.S. military interventions abroad into civil conflicts, but it’s not only the Americans. All of today’s major wars are in essence proxy wars, pitting external rivals against one another. Conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya are best understood not as civil wars, but as international warzones, attracting meddlers including the United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, France and many others, which often intervene not to build peace, but to resolve conflicts in a way that is favorable to their own interests. These internationalized wars are more lethal, harder to resolve and possibly more likely to recur than civil wars that remain localized. It is not that difficult to imagine how these conflicts could spark wider international conflagrations. Wars, after all, can quickly spiral out of control.', 'As Risks Increase, Deterrents Decline', 'To make matters worse, most of the global trends that explained why interstate war had decreased in recent decades are now reversing. The theories that democracy, prosperity, cooperation and other factors kept the peace have been much debated—but if there was any truth to them, their reversals are likely to increase the chance of war, irrespective of how long the coronavirus pandemic lasts.', 'Democracy is often considered a prophylactic for war. Fully democratic countries are less likely to experience civil war and rarely, if ever, go to war with other democracies—though, of course, they do still go to war against non-democracies. While this would be great news if democracy and pluralism were spreading, there have now been 14 consecutive years of global democratic decline, and there have been signs of additional authoritarian power grabs in countries like Hungary and Serbia during the pandemic. If democracy backslides far enough, internal conflicts and foreign aggression will become more likely.', 'Other theories posit that economic bonds between countries have limited wars in recent decades. Dale Copeland, a professor of international relations at the University of Virginia, has argued that countries work to preserve ties when there are high expectations for future trade, but war becomes increasingly possible when trade is predicted to fall. If globalization brought peace, the recent wave of far-right nationalism and populism around the world may increase the chances of war, as tariffs and other trade barriers go up—mostly from the United States under President Donald Trump, who has launched trade wars with allies and adversaries alike.', 'The coronavirus pandemic immediately elicited further calls to reduce dependence on other countries, with Trump using the opportunity to pressure U.S. companies to reconfigure their supply chains away from China. For its part, China made sure that it had the homemade supplies it needed to fight the virus before exporting extras, while countries like France and Germany barred the export of face masks, even to friendly nations. And widening economic inequalities, a consequence of the pandemic, are not likely to enhance support for free trade.', 'This assault on open trade and globalization is just one aspect of a decaying liberal international order, which, its proponents argue, has largely helped to preserve peace between nations since World War II. But that old order is almost gone, and in all likelihood isn’t coming back. The U.N. Security Council appears increasingly fragmented and dysfunctional. Even before Trump, the world’s most powerful country ratified fewer treaties per year under the Obama administration than at any time since 1945.', 'Trump’s presidency only harms multilateral cooperation further. He has backed out of the Paris Agreement on climate change, reneged on the Iran nuclear deal, picked fights with allies, questioned the value of NATO and defunded the World Health Organization in the middle of a global health crisis. Hyper-nationalism, rather than international collaboration, was the default response to the coronavirus outbreak in the U.S. and many other countries around the world.', 'It’s hard to see the U.S. reluctance to lead as anything other than a sign of its inevitable, if slow, decline. The country’s institutionalized inequalities and systemic racism have been laid bare in recent months, and it no longer looks like a beacon for others to follow. The global balance of power is changing. China is both keen to assert a greater leadership role within traditionally Western-led institutions and to challenge the existing regional order in Asia. Between a rising China, revanchist Russia and new global actors, including non-state groups, we may be heading toward an increasingly multipolar or nonpolar world, which could prove destabilizing in its own right.', 'Finally, the pacifying effect of nuclear weapons could be waning. While vast nuclear arsenals once compelled the United States and the Soviet Union to reach arms control agreements, old treaties are expiring and new talks are breaking down. Mistrust is growing, and the chance of an unwanted U.S.-Russia nuclear confrontation is arguably as high as it has been since the Cuban missile crisis.', 'The theory of nuclear peace may no longer hold if more countries are tempted to obtain their own nuclear deterrent. Trump’s decision to abandon the Iran nuclear deal, for one thing, has only increased the chance that Tehran will acquire nuclear weapons. It’s almost easy to forget that, just a few short months ago, the United States and Iran were one miscalculation or dumb mistake away from waging all-out war. And despite Trump’s efforts to negotiate nuclear disarmament with Kim Jong Un’s regime in Pyongyang, it is wishful thinking to believe North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons. At this point, negotiators can only realistically try to ensure that North Korea’s nuclear menace doesn’t get even more potent.', 'In other words, by turning inward, the United States is choosing to leave other countries to fend for themselves. The end result may be a less stable world with more nuclear actors.', 'If leaders are smart, they will take seriously the warning signs exposed by this global emergency and work to reverse the drift toward war.', 'If only one of these theories for peace were worsening, concerns would be easier to dismiss. But together, they are unsettling. While the world is not yet on the brink of World War III and no two countries are destined for war, the odds of avoiding future conflicts don’t look good.', 'The pandemic is already degrading democracies, harming economies and curtailing international cooperation, and it also seems to be fostering internal instability within states. Rachel Brown, Heather Hurlburt and Alexandra Stark argue that the coronavirus could in fact sow more civil conflict. If this proves accurate, the increase in civil wars is likely to lead to more external meddling, and these next proxy wars could soon precipitate all-out international conflicts if outsiders aren’t careful. With the usual deterrents to conflict declining around the world, major wars could soon return.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Neg-Texas-Round3.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/BaCh/Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Neg-Texas-Round3.docx

c2395e72a52aa433ad4add604c75a802ff689fca5bef8028a71acaa17489030d

Korea prolif spirals and escalates hotspots

Cirincione 20—(president of Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation). Cirincione, Joe, and Zach Brown. 2020. “Why Letting Our Allies Get Nuclear Weapons Is a Bad Idea.” Responsible Statecraft. May 20, 2020. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/05/20/why-letting-our-allies-get-nuclear-weapons-is-a-bad-idea/.

domino theory is generally correct . Britain and France got the bomb because the Soviets and U.S. India because China ; Pakistan because India . if So Ko build a nuc Others would follow . Japan , Taiwan , Vietnam . Saudi Turk s and Egypt . arms races would blanket the globe with nuclear tripwires , primed to unleash unprecedented destruction

nuclear domino theory is generally correct . The Soviet Union got the bomb because, as Stalin told his scientists after Hiroshima , “ the bomb will remove the great danger from us.” Britain and France got the bomb because the Soviets ( and the U.S. ) had it. China did the same, then India got the bomb because China did ; Pakistan because India did . Nuclear competition in Asia would not end if So uth Ko rea decided to build a nuc lear arsenal. Others in the region would likely follow suit . Japan , Taiwan , perhaps Vietnam . Saudi Turk s and Egypt . Far from making the region safer, these arms races would blanket the globe with nuclear tripwires , each primed to unleash unprecedented destruction at the slightest twitch Uniqueness

nuclear domino theory generally correct Soviet Union Hiroshima Britain and France Soviets U.S. China India China Pakistan India would not end So Ko nuc Others Japan Taiwan Vietnam Saudi Turk s Egypt arms races blanket the globe nuclear tripwires unprecedented destruction slightest twitch

['', 'There is nothing automatic about the nuclear domino theory, and it has been successfully countered in some regions, but the theory is generally correct. The Soviet Union got the bomb because, as Stalin told his scientists after Hiroshima, “The balance has been broken. Build the bomb. It will remove the great danger from us.” Britain and France got the bomb because the Soviets (and the U.S.) had it. China did the same, then India got the bomb because China did; Pakistan because India did. Nuclear competition in Asia would not end if South Korea decided to build a nuclear arsenal. Others in the region would likely follow suit. Japan, Taiwan, perhaps Vietnam. Similarly, a Saudi bomb would likely beget an Iranian bomb, a Turkish bomb and even an Egyptian bomb. Far from making the region — and the United States — safer, these arms races would blanket the globe with nuclear tripwires, each primed to unleash unprecedented destruction at the slightest twitch.', '']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-HaBe-Neg-Kentucky-Round-4.docx

Minnesota

HaBe

3324a6b10c3b246511ebb0280dbba092f4d03ffdeb23b33a7f7cf6b552f48ad1

Especially for antitrust

Harry First 1, Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law, “Pyrrhic Victories? Reexamining the Effectiveness of Antitrust Remedies in Restoring Competition and Detterring Misconduct: Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement”, George Washington Law Review, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1004, October / December 2001, Lexis

data for antitrust indicate high ability New York obtained a wide range of remedies It is hard to believe results could be achieved by lawyers with low competence Posner ascribes

the data for state antitrust enforcement provided above indicate a high level of ability , at least if success is a measure of ability New York successfully obtained a wide range of remedies in the cases that it concluded in the period under study, including divestitures and dissolutions multistate efforts in which New York participated resulted in recoveries of nearly half a billion dollars in the two years under study It is hard to believe that such results could have be en achieved by lawyers with the low level of competence that Posner ascribes to state antitrust attorneys

antitrust high level of ability success wide range divestitures dissolutions hard to believe be low level of competence

['Low pay does not mean that state enforcers are competent, of course. Nevertheless, the data for state antitrust enforcement provided above indicate a high level of ability, at least if success is a measure of ability. As shown in Table 4, New York successfully obtained a wide range of remedies in the cases that it concluded in the period under study, including divestitures and dissolutions. As shown in Table 5, multistate efforts in which New York participated resulted in recoveries of nearly half a billion dollars in the two years under study, with benefits to New York state consumers and taxpayers of nearly $ 35 million. It is hard to believe that such results could have been achieved by lawyers with the low level of competence that Posner ascribes to state antitrust attorneys.', '']

[(6, 13)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Stockstill-Neg-ADA-Round4.docx

Kentucky

AdSt

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdSt/Kentucky-Adam-Stockstill-Neg-ADA-Round4.docx

76726bc38666b758571d181c296640d21ad763805589535a1010bc8f451fe85a

3. It avoids every pitfall of existing deterrence posture.

Gregory Giles 21, Senior Director at the Science Applications International Corporation, “Conventional-Nuclear Integration: Avoiding Misconceptions and Mistakes,” War on the Rocks, 08-10-2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/conventional-nuclear-integration-avoiding-misconceptions-and-mistakes

No one is advocating a return to Cold War excess rediscovered enthusiasm for nuc warfighting is wrong and misleading conventional-nuclear integration “is different we’re trying to prepare with whatever force necessary to raise that threshold of use of nuc s to the highest possible these roots frame the debate

No one in the U.S. government is advocating a return to Cold War excess es. To imply a rediscovered U.S. enthusiasm for nuc lear warfighting is wrong and misleading today’s conventional-nuclear integration “is different than a Cold War mentality where we had nuclear artillery short-range [nuclear] rockets [nuclear] weapons that would allow us to fight tactically we’re trying to prepare to respond with whatever force is necessary We want to raise that threshold of use of nuc lear weapon s to the highest level possible current wave of interest during the Obama-Biden administration Acknowledging these roots helps frame the debate

No one is advocating a return to Cold War excess nuc wrong misleading different whatever force is necessary raise that threshold of use of nuc s to the highest level possible

['The Pentomic Division and the Davy Crockett short-range nuclear rocket were early attempts by the U.S. military to integrate conventional and nuclear weapons. No one in the U.S. government is advocating a return to such Cold War experiments and excesses. To link such anachronisms to contemporary planning and thinking, and to imply a rediscovered U.S. enthusiasm for nuclear warfighting, is wrong and misleading. Indeed, senior military leaders have repudiated this connection explicitly. Lt. Gen. Richard Clark, while serving as the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, noted that today’s conventional-nuclear integration “is different than a Cold War mentality where we had nuclear artillery, we had short-range [nuclear] rockets, where we had [nuclear] weapons that would allow us to fight tactically in a conflict.” Clark added that:', 'Today, really what we’re trying to prepare ourselves to do is to respond with whatever force is necessary in a nuclear environment … really the ultimate goal here is to deter. We want to raise that threshold of use of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic … to the highest level possible.', 'The current wave of Pentagon interest in conventional-nuclear integration began during the Obama-Biden administration. It surfaced in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review as a concern that adversaries could try to escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression. Acknowledging these roots helps frame the debate for how the Biden-Harris administration can derive the most benefit from integrating conventional and nuclear planning.']

[(8, 16)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Neg-Shirley-Round-7.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

6b6f594aad5f81178994f2a3c5e9fdc21e6e6b6c6719817a17b4118214fffc93

If they’re right other countries follow on with nuclear reductions, that makes their arsenals vulnerable to conventional counterforcing---nuclear war.

Lieber and Press 19, *PhD, professor in the Center for Security Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government @ Georgetown. **PhD, Professor of Government @ Dartmouth. (*Keir A. and **Daryl G., “Why Nuclear Disarmament and Strategic Stability Are Incompatible” in Nuclear Disarmament: A Critical Assessment, pg. 54-55)

new tech means further nuclear cuts would undermine deterrence engineers improve weapons accuracy and remote sensing nuclear cuts reduce the number of targets an attacker must destroy in a disarming strike exacerbated by nonnuclear means through conventional strike missile defense anti-sub and cyber tech developments are so integral to conventional war and society they would be impossible to halt nuclear cuts and stability are no longer compatible smaller arsenals are more vulnerable

In the past arms control could pursue both strategic stability and smaller arsenals Such an approach is increasingly dubious today A new era of tech means further nuclear cuts would undermine deterrence leading to a world without the stalemating benefits of nuclear possession yet with all the dangers engineers have toiled to improve weapons accuracy and remote sensing capabilities nuclear arms cuts today effectively reduce the number of targets that an attacker must destroy in a disarming strike The danger of nuclear reductions is exacerbated by improvements in the nonnuclear means of attacking nuclear forces through precision conventional strike missile defense anti-sub war and cyber the tech developments in accuracy and remote sensing are so integral to modern conventional war fare and modern society they would be impossible to halt if nuclear forces are becoming easier to attack, then all else being equal, nuclear need to deploy more capable retaliatory arsenals the rapid rate of change in counterforce technologies increases uncertainty about adversaries’ future capabilities better counterforce could be a source of danger: not only might improved disarming strike capabilities – in any country’s hands – increase the temptation to attack also potential victims of disarming strikes will seek to escape their vulnerability triggering incentives to strike pre-emptively nuclear arms cuts and stability are no longer compatible smaller arsenals are more vulnerable arsenals

smaller arsenals increasingly dubious today further nuclear cuts would undermine deterrence all the dangers weapons accuracy remote sensing capabilities destroy in a disarming strike nuclear reductions exacerbated nonnuclear means precision conventional strike missile defense anti-sub war and cyber so integral and modern society impossible to halt more capable incentives to strike pre-emptively nuclear arms cuts and stability are no longer compatible more vulnerable arsenals

['', 'Conclusion', 'In the past, nuclear arms control could arguably pursue both strategic stability (by preserving the survivability of retaliatory forces and thus reducing the incentives for pre-emptive disarming strikes) and smaller arsenals (by cutting the numbers of weapons). Such an approach is increasingly dubious as a means of deterring nuclear conflict today. A new era of technology means that further nuclear cuts would likely undermine deterrence – leading to a world without the stalemating benefits of nuclear possession yet with all the traditional dangers and more.', 'For decades, engineers have toiled to improve weapons accuracy and remote sensing capabilities. Meanwhile, arms negotiators have devised agreements to reduce nuclear arsenals. Either endeavor – improving weapons or cutting stockpiles – can be defended as a policy for promoting strategic stability, but taken together they are creating underappreciated vulnerabilities. Good intentions aside, nuclear arms cuts today effectively reduce the number of targets that an attacker must destroy in a disarming strike. The danger of nuclear reductions is exacerbated by improvements in the nonnuclear means of attacking nuclear forces, for example, through precision conventional strike, missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, and cyber operations.', 'Arms controllers may respond that one merely needs to restrict the development of advanced counterforce systems, and then arms cuts will be safe again. However, the technological developments in accuracy and remote sensing are so integral to modern conventional warfare – and modern society – that they would be nearly impossible to halt, even if arms controllers could come up with clever treaty designs.', 'The implications of the new era of counterforce extend beyond the wisdom of future nuclear arms control. First, if nuclear forces are becoming easier to attack, then all else being equal, nuclear-armed states need to deploy more capable retaliatory arsenals to counter the growing risks. Whether one believes that a deterrent force must present potential attackers with “near-certain retaliation,” “likely retaliation,” or some other level of risk, improvements in counterforce systems require that retaliatory forces adapt – through better capabilities, increased numbers, or both – to maintain the same level of deterrent threat. Furthermore, the rapid rate of change in counterforce technologies increases uncertainty about adversaries’ future capabilities – suggesting that countries will need to retain diverse retaliatory forces as a hedge against adversary breakthroughs.', 'Second, one should ask whether it is wise for the United States in particular to continue improving its nuclear and non-nuclear counterforce capabilities. On the one hand, improved counterforce capabilities could be invaluable in a range of plausible scenarios – particularly in a crisis or conventional war when an adversary threatens or has begun to escalate. Improved offensive capabilities could help the United States deter weak countries from initiating conventional conflicts or from escalating in the midst of war. Enhanced counterforce capabilities could also help protect US forces, allies, and the US homeland from nuclear attack if a conventional war did escalate. On the other hand, better counterforce could be a source of danger: not only might improved disarming strike capabilities – in any country’s hands – increase the temptation to attack, but also potential victims of disarming strikes will seek to escape their vulnerability, thereby possibly triggering arms racing and incentives to strike pre-emptively.', 'Ultimately, both views about the wisdom of enhancing counterforce capabilities may be correct. The net benefit will therefore depend on the particular case. For countries that perceive a highly malign threat environment, face aggressive nuclear-armed adversaries, or have ambitious foreign policy goals, the benefits of developing advanced counterforce capabilities may outweigh the costs. For those countries that face a benign environment and have more modest goals, however, the secondary costs of enhancing counterforce may be too great. In either case, however, policymakers and analysts need to reckon with the ways that rapidly changing technologies are eroding the foundation of deterrence and nuclear arms control. In a world where nuclear arms cuts and strategic stability are no longer compatible, smaller arsenals are more vulnerable arsenals.']

[(0, 16), (17, 19)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HaSh-Neg-CEDA-Nationals-at-Fullerton-Round-7.docx

Kansas

HaSh

98ef2b813f1fc73c6cf3bf5f5edc61ae28d5068560ebfb1c0598795c40029323

a. The “core antitrust laws” means Sherman, Clayton, and FTC.

FTC ND. “The Antitrust Laws.” 2013. Federal Trade Commission. June 11, 2013. https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws.

the Sherman Act the F T C Act and the Clayton Act are the core antitrust laws The word " its " meaning belonging to it.

Congress passed the first antitrust law, the Sherman Act , in 1890 . In 1914, Congress passed two additional antitrust laws: the F T C Act , which created the FTC, and the Clayton Act . With some revisions, these are the three core federal antitrust laws The word " its " is the possessive case of "it", meaning belonging to it.

Sherman Act F T C Act Clayton Act core antitrust laws its belonging to it.

['Congress passed the first antitrust law, the Sherman Act, in 1890 as a "comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade." In 1914, Congress passed two additional antitrust laws: the Federal Trade Commission Act, which created the FTC, and the Clayton Act. With some revisions, these are the three core federal antitrust laws still in effect today.', '', 'b. “Its” means the plan must expand the scope of the US’ antitrust laws.', 'Supreme Court of Oklahoma 34', '(Swindall v. State Election Board, 168 Okla. 97, Lexis)//BB', 'However, I view another phase of the act which is not considered in the majority opinion. It is my opinion that the expression, "its nominees," should have been construed by this court. Had this court so construed those words, it would have assisted the State Election Board in the furtherance of its ministerial duties, and would have set to rest the immediate question. It is my theory that the correct interpretation to place upon those words, "its nominees," is to the effect that those words do not mean all the nominees of any particular party. The word "its" is the possessive case, or the possessive adjective of "it", meaning of or belonging to it. Webster\'s International Dictionary. In other words, the expression, "its nominees," as applied to the Republican party, means nominees of it (the Republican party). The words, "nominees" of the "Republican party," do not and necessarily cannot mean all the nominees of the Republican party. Those words, however, do mean more than one nominee. It seems reasonable to conclude, in the absence of an expression like "all of its nominees," or words of similar import, that it was not the intent of the Legislature to make those words, "its nominees," all inclusive. It seems to me that a fair and reasonable interpretation would be that those words support and embrace the thought expressed by the New York statute, to wit, that it is the intention of the candidate to support generally at the next general election the nominees of the party from which he seeks his nomination, or that it is his intention to support a majority of the candidates of that party.', '']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-6%20-%20Texas%20Two%20Step%202-Round2.docx

Kansas

HaWi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/HaWi/Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-6%2520-%2520Texas%2520Two%2520Step%25202-Round2.docx

d30b40d983bee1fc06b00eb3ec1e37b31ff3875c93a923134b73b0c3389ac4c4

2. The omitted-case canon blocks.

SCOTUS 21 [Supreme Court of the United States, December 17, 2021. Bartenwefer v. Buckley. https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21-908/205574/20211217155123168_41563%20pdf%20Bartenwerfer%20br.pdf]

wrong approach grafts an extension not found anywhere in the statute court lacks authority to go beyond the statute to stretch a statute To supply omissions transcends the judicial function Courts are not to speculate on what the legislature would have wanted

the wrong approach grafts onto the statute an extension based upon judge-made common law that is not found anywhere in the statute itself A court lacks authority to go beyond the text of the statute We have not traveled, in our search for the meaning of the lawmakers, beyond the borders of the statute courts lack authority to stretch a statute into areas that the statute does not cover Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est To supply omissions transcends the judicial function Courts are not to speculate on what the legislature would have wanted but did not provide The question . . . is not what Congress ‘would have wanted’ but what Congress enacted

wrong approach grafts onto the statute judge-made common law not found anywhere in the statute itself lacks authority to go beyond the text of the statute stretch a statute into areas that the statute does not cover transcends the judicial function not to speculate

['Winkler is the wrong approach because, among other problems, it grafts onto the statute an extension based upon judge-made common law that is not found anywhere in the statute itself. A court lacks authority to go beyond the text of the statute. A verbis legis non est recedendum. “We have not traveled, in our search for the meaning of the lawmakers, beyond the borders of the statute.” United States v. Great Northern Ry., 287 U.S. 144, 154 (1932) (Cardozo, J.). Likewise, courts lack authority to stretch a statute into areas that the statute does not cover. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. “To supply omissions transcends the judicial function.” Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926) (Brandeis, J.). Courts are not to speculate on what the legislature would have wanted but did not provide. Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554 (1925) (Brandeis, J.). “The question . . . is not what Congress ‘would have wanted’ but what Congress enacted.” Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (Scalia, J.). The discharge in bankruptcy, and its exceptions, apply to the debtor alone. There is nothing in the statute or the Bankruptcy Code providing that a debtor’s discharge can be eliminated, unilaterally, by the acts of someone else, without her participation or even knowledge. ', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-77th-National-Debate-Tournament-Round-8.docx

Emory

MiPi

377bf51a67533721119de68e611350803a468e87cd48d06cdcac47ce2b0c22c2

10. Nuclear systems can’t be successfully hacked.

Dr. M.N. Sirohi 15, Cyber Terrorism and Information Warfare, p. Google Books

it is virtually impossible to use the Internet to inflict death resilience of systems is the result of significant investments Nuclear weapons are “air-gapped,” not connected to the Internet and inaccessible to hackers Defence has been vigilant in protecting by isolating All software must be submitted to N S A for testing

it is virtually impossible to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale The resilience of computer systems to attack is no accident but rather the result of significant investments of time, money, and expertise Nuclear weapons and other sensitive military systems enjoy the most basic form of Internet security. They are “air-gapped,” meaning that they are not physically connected to the Internet and are therefore inaccessible to outside hackers . The Defence Department has been particularly vigilant in protecting key systems by isolating them from the Internet and even from the Pentagon’s internal computer network. All new software must be submitted to the N S A for security testing

virtually impossible significant investments “air-gapped,” inaccessible to outside hackers vigilant N S A

['Many computer security specialists believe it is virtually impossible to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale and scoff at the notion that terrorists would bother trying. The resilience of computer systems to attack, they point out, is no accident but rather the result of significant investments of time, money, and expertise. Nuclear weapons and other sensitive military systems enjoy the most basic form of Internet security. They are “air-gapped,” meaning that they are not physically connected to the Internet and are therefore inaccessible to outside hackers. The Defence Department has been particularly vigilant in protecting key systems by isolating them from the Internet and even from the Pentagon’s internal computer network. All new software must be submitted to the National Security Agency for security testing.']

[(9, 15), (16, 18)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Neg-NDT-Round-4.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

1455c7a48328fcd4eb0b82c446bda4203f32b0c0d576dbfba06627001f55a7b3

Robo-advisors occupy a legal grey area---that makes adoption and integration impossible.

John Lightbourne 17. Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2018; M.A. in Applied Economics, The University of Alabama, 2015; B.S. in Economics and Finance, The University of Alabama, 2015. “ALGORITHMS & FIDUCIARIES: EXISTING AND PROPOSED REGULATORY APPROACHES TO ARTIFICIALLY INTELLIGENT FINANCIAL PLANNERS.” .

robo-advisers meet fiduciary standard begs question of who can be held liable If representative gave unsuitable advice rep ’s conduct breaches fiduciary duty firm is liable a robo-adviser design give rise to conduct that breaches fiduciary duty alternate liability need to fill gaps reasoning may become impossible for a human to explain failure to explain would violate firm’s fiduciary duty algorithmic complexity making conduct difficult to explain underlying abilities will change, becomes difficult to assign liability if the adviser provides services beyond investment advice fiduciary standard does not provide a liability framework

If robo-advisers can meet a fiduciary standard it begs the question of who can be held liable when robo-advisers fail to meet that standard advent of AI raises many profound questions about legal quasipersonhood related theories of liability robo-advisers exist solely for one purpose creating and effectuating financial strategies for clients the fiduciary standard examined above provides an appropriate liability scheme If an investment adviser representative gave unsuitable advice or profited from trades with clients the rep resentative ’s conduct breaches the firm’s fiduciary duty The firm is liable for that breach of fiduciary duty a robo-adviser ’s poor design —for example, a failure to disclose conflicts, or an inaccurate algorithm give rise to robo-adviser conduct that breaches the firm’s fiduciary duty As a human investment adviser’s firm bears responsibility for its representatives so too would a robo-adviser’s firm be subject to liability corresponding to its role in creating and using the algorithms investors have a means to recovery for injuries caused by the algorithms as robo-advisers become more complex an alternate liability scheme will be need ed to fill gaps in the current liability framework such gaps might arise and then explores possible alternative liability schemes As an algorithm learns the reasoning behind its selections may become impossible for a n investment firm, or any human to explain failure to explain the algorithm’s reasoning would likely violate the firm’s fiduciary duty a robo-adviser could be designed to work in tandem with other data collection services generating algorithmic complexity and making the robo-adviser’s conduct increasingly difficult to explain the robo-adviser’s algorithm collects data from that user’s online bank accounts or financial aggregator services Based on spending habits, the algorithm would learn to ask more direct or probing questions to get a fuller view of the consumer’s financial health as the algorithm develops for cross-platform integration architecture underlying those abilities will change, becoming more complex and, likely, harder to explain. A market shock which changes the algorithm’s weighting scheme could affect an adviser’s ability to explain the algorithm’s actions becomes more difficult to assign liability if the robo- adviser provides services beyond merely providing investment advice robo-adviser achieved cross-platform integration flags suspicious spending credit monitoring service falls outside of the fiduciary liability scheme of a financial adviser despite it using the client’s spending patterns to better inform its investment advice the fiduciary standard does not provide a liability framework

fiduciary standard be held liable when robo-advisers fail to meet that standard creating and effectuating financial strategies for clients appropriate liability scheme the rep resentative ’s conduct breaches the firm’s fiduciary duty give rise to robo-adviser conduct that breaches the firm’s fiduciary duty an alternate liability scheme will be need ed to fill gaps in the current liability framework to explain would likely violate the firm’s fiduciary duty generating algorithmic complexity and making the robo-adviser’s conduct increasingly difficult to explain cross-platform integration becomes more difficult to assign liability if the robo- adviser provides services beyond merely providing investment advice despite it using the client’s spending patterns to better inform its investment advice the fiduciary standard does not provide a liability framework

['If robo-advisers can meet a fiduciary standard, it begs the question of who can be held liable when robo-advisers fail to meet that standard. The advent of AI raises many profound questions about legal quasipersonhood and related theories of liability, but robo-advisers exist solely for one purpose—creating and effectuating financial strategies for clients. Fortunately, the fiduciary standard examined above provides an appropriate liability scheme. If an investment adviser representative, working for a firm registered as an investment adviser, gave unsuitable advice or profited from trades with clients, the representative’s conduct breaches the firm’s fiduciary duty. The firm is liable for that breach of fiduciary duty, because the federal duty attaches to the firm registered as an investment adviser.112 Per the SEC’s guidance, a robo-adviser’s poor design—for example, a failure to disclose conflicts, or an inaccurate algorithm— may similarly give rise to robo-adviser conduct that breaches the firm’s fiduciary duty.113 As a human investment adviser’s firm bears responsibility for its representatives, so too would a robo-adviser’s firm be subject to liability corresponding to its role in creating and using the algorithms. Thus, investors have a means to recovery for injuries caused by the algorithms from the firm as the registered investment adviser. But it is possible that as robo-advisers become more complex, an alternate liability scheme will be needed to fill gaps in the current liability framework. This Part first illustrates possible ways such gaps might arise and then explores possible alternative liability schemes. A. Illustrating the Need To Think Outside the Box for Robo-Adviser Liability As an algorithm learns, the reasoning behind its selections may become impossible for an investment firm, or any human, to explain. This failure to explain the algorithm’s reasoning, which influences the robo-adviser’s conduct on a client’s behalf, would likely violate the firm’s fiduciary duty. Current robo-advisory architecture is not as sophisticated as some of the more complex artificial neural networks used for tasks like image recognition. But it is not unrealistic to expect that in the near future a robo-adviser could be designed to work in tandem with other data collection services, generating algorithmic complexity and making the robo-adviser’s conduct increasingly difficult to explain. For instance, suppose that to allow the robo-adviser to get a better idea of a client’s financial picture, the robo-adviser’s algorithm collects data from that user’s online bank accounts or financial aggregator services like Mint. Based on spending habits, the algorithm would learn to ask more direct or probing questions to get a fuller view of the consumer’s financial health. If the robo-adviser notices higher levels of entertainment spending, it may ask if the client has come into more money. Or, if the user is spending more frequent and larger amounts at home improvement stores, the algorithm may ask if there is a renovation or new home purchase upcoming and if there has been a change in the user’s debt level. Basically, as the algorithm develops for cross-platform integration, the architecture underlying those abilities will change, becoming more complex and, likely, harder to explain. If that happens, developers must ensure that the firm can still easily explain to a client why the algorithm chose to make a trade. A market shock which dramatically, and quickly, changes the algorithm’s weighting scheme could affect an adviser’s ability to explain the algorithm’s actions. It becomes more difficult to assign liability if the robo-adviser provides services beyond merely providing investment advice. Imagine that a robo-adviser has already achieved cross-platform integration, and it flags suspicious spending as it monitors the client’s spending patterns and reports those suspicious transactions to the bank. Then, imagine the local power company was recently the unwitting victim of hackers who used the collected account information to charge client accounts. The data collected from other platforms allows the algorithm to see that fraudulent transactions with the power company were constantly cancelled by users and banks. The algorithm might then report for cancellation all power company charges on the client’s account, one of which was legitimate and goes unpaid. The client is then charged a late fee. Realistically, a power bill late fee may not be expensive enough to inspire a client to file suit against the robo-adviser. But imagine for the sake of argument that the client did. This credit monitoring service falls outside of the fiduciary liability scheme of a financial adviser, despite it using the client’s spending patterns to better inform its investment advice. As a result, the fiduciary standard does not provide a liability framework. The rest of this Note imagines this sort of sophisticated robo-adviser, which is integrated into multiple aspects of a person’s finances, to evaluate alternate theories of liability.114', '']

[(5, 19)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-NDT-Round-1.docx

Emory

MiPi

b3451e9342cff593032d979538929fdfc1b8c3db0d9cdac16fbcf2ae5d807b41

2 – Preemption – Sherman Act and Commerce Clause exclude state action.

Swaine ‘1 [Edward T; December; Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law (Fourth), Foreign Relations Law of the United States, and an elected member of the American Law Institute. He is a member of the Advisory Committee on Public International Law for the U.S. State Department, a past member of the Executive Council of the American Society of International Law, and former co-chair of the International Law in Domestic Groups interest group. At GW, Professor Swaine has served as the Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Director of the Competition Law Center; William & Mary Law Review, “The Local Law of Global Antitrust,” https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1438&context=wmlr; KS]

State law claims wind up in federal court One infer preemptive limits from federal law Sherman Act adopted states lacked constitutional authority nondiscriminatory state legislation was reviewed Commerce Clause limits preserve regulation on the federal plane domestic imple- mentation requires national supervision of state restraint U S confront questions regarding sovereignty as well as maintaining interstate coop threatens federal supremacy in foreign affairs

States also have considerable authority by virtue of state antitrust State law claims usually wind up in federal court One may still infer preemptive limits from federal law in the service of international norms, The Sherman Act originally was adopted out of the perception that the states lacked constitutional authority to regulate interstate or foreign commerce even nondiscriminatory state antitrust legislation was reviewed for consistency with the territorial limits on state authority imposed by the Commerce Clause and with due process limits on legislative jurisdiction. Commerce Clause limits served to preserve a domain for regulation on the federal plane while domestic cooperation on interstate matters is not legally binding , the theory of local international law suggests that international cooperation , in the form of antitrust comity, is federal arrange- ments on the international plane may require the protection afforded by custom against both national and subnational breach the domestic imple- mentation of that custom as local international law requires the national supervision of state restraint , if only as an alternative to more decisive jurisdictional limits. If it is not forthcoming, the U nited S tates may be forced to confront awkward questions regarding the significance of subnational sovereignty in an international system, as well as the tenability of maintaining interstate coop eration that threatens federal supremacy in foreign affairs

State law claims in federal court preemptive limits states lacked constitutional authority regulate reviewed for consistency Commerce Clause limits preserve domain for regulation federal plane legally binding international cooperation is domestic imple- mentation national supervision of state restraint confront awkward questions significance of subnational sovereignty tenability maintaining interstate coop eration threatens federal supremacy foreign affairs

['States also have considerable authority by virtue of state antitrust laws, and considering the relationship between that authority and the federal enforcement of antitrust law dem- onstrates the inevitably precarious nature of jurisdictional restraints-domestic or foreign. State law claims usually wind up in federal court,581 seemingly positioning the federal judiciary to rationalize antitrust comity,582 but congruity in a federal system may be more difficult to ensure than that. If customary inter- national law is directly binding federal law, equivalent to treaties and statutes, then states must of course conform their state laws to it.583 If, on the other hand, custom merely influences the inter- pretation of the federal antitrust statutes, it arguably has little purchase on state law, no matter where it is applied.', 'At the very least, the consensus on Charming Betsy fractures on this question.584 One may still infer preemptive limits from federal law, particularly in the service of international norms,585 but the Supreme Court lately envisions a more limited role for federal courts in generating such rules.586 Where state antitrust law differs from federal law, at least-and does not differ so distinctly as to raise preemption issues-local international law may fail to authoritatively constraint state law enforcement not constrained of its own accord.587', 'The history of state antitrust law reminds us, however, how illusory jurisdictional limits may prove, and provides a useful account concerning the potential for judicial enforcement of international norms. Federal enactments have traditionally posed little preemptive constraint.588 Over half the existing states had antitrust laws when the Sherman Act was adopted,589 Congress appears to have desired to supplement those laws,59 and the Supreme Court employs the presumption against preemption in areas traditionally regulated by the states.591 ', 'The Sherman Act originally was adopted, however, largely out of the perception that the states lacked constitutional authority to regulate interstate or foreign commerce.592 At the time, even nondiscriminatory state antitrust legislation was reviewed for consistency with the territorial limits on state authority imposed by the Commerce Clause 593 and with due process limits on legislative jurisdiction.594 In short, as Professor Hovenkamp has observed,595 the Supreme Court\'s contemporaneous view likely resembled Justice Holmes\'s opinion on the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act: namely, that it would be "startling" to evaluate the legality of an act by any standard other than that of the place where it was committed.596 Territorial limits protected against unjustified encroachments by a state against other states and their citizens, while Commerce Clause limits served to preserve a domain for regulation, if at all, on the federal plane.597 ', 'Just as judicial attempts to restrict federal authority to interstate matters faded as the century wore on,598 so did the limits on state authority. The Supreme Court has never squarely held that state antitrust statutes may apply freely to interstate commerce,599 and state courts developed interpretive practices designed to avoid potential conflicts,600 but there has been little attempt to hold any line.601 Despite a continued insistence on substantial contacts between a regulating state and an out-of-state activity over which it seeks control,602 due process limits on the territorial reach of states have likewise eroded.603', 'The solution, instead, has been enlightened self-restraint, encouraged by the federal government. In the area of criminal antitrust, for example, a relatively meager program to deputize state attorneys general to assist in federal criminal prosecutions604 evolved into a more significant protocol providing for the occasional transfer to states of responsibility for potential offenses having a "particularly local impact."605 The NAAG\'s efforts at coordinating state enforcement in important areas like merger control has also attempted to maintain some consistency with federal enforce- ment,"606 and federal and state officials subsequently agreed on a protocol designed to facilitate joint investigations and settlement discussions.607 Federal and state officials also formed an Executive Working Group for Antitrust to provide for broader coordination of efforts.608', 'These efforts have scarcely obviated the need for a more formal protocol on international matters, one encompassing state enforce- ment of both federal and state laws; some state representatives, indeed, have indicated something like jealousy concerning the working relationship between the federal agencies and foreign authorities.609 But the similarities to the course of international cooperation are striking. While interstate enforcement of state law was originally thought to exceed ironclad constitutional delim- itations, and potentially to conflict with the Sherman Act, neither argument won the day-just as statutory and international law objections to extraterritoriality ultimately subsided. In their stead, cooperative agreements have prevailed, without entirely resolving the potential for conflict.', 'The difference, facially, is that while domestic cooperation on interstate matters is not legally binding, the theory of local international law suggests that international cooperation, in the form of antitrust comity, is. Even that difference may be somewhat overstated. Where subnational cooperation is inconsistent with domestic arrangements, it too has been regarded as sufficiently concrete to warrant legal intervention.610 Just so, federal arrange- ments on the international plane may require the protection afforded by custom against both national and subnational breach. In the case of antitrust comity, at least, the domestic imple- mentation of that custom as local international law requires the national supervision of state restraint, if only as an alternative to more decisive jurisdictional limits. If it is not forthcoming, the United States may be forced to confront awkward questions regarding the significance of subnational sovereignty in an international system,611 as well as the tenability of maintaining interstate cooperation that potentially threatens federal supremacy in foreign affairs.612', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-ADA-Round3.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-ADA-Round3.docx

6f126e376041a5e364ce3b3f5204fcb4a14f1ac54a2ad53c4c151fdaa5fc632b

It’s meaningless without judicial support---cases won’t even get brought.

Posner ’21 [Eric; July 21; Professor at the University of Chicago Law School, fourth-most cited legal scholar in the United States; Project Syndicate, “The Antitrust War’s Opening Salvo,” ]

Biden agenda will face obstacles . Over 40 years , a friendly Court has gutted antitrust it weakened standards raised burden of a case; limited the victims allowed arbitration to protect from suits the Court disseminated a suspicion of claims The pretexts for practices are swallowed there is little his adm can do unless it has courts the FTC are not going to commit resources that will fail

the Biden administration’s antitrust agenda will face significant judicial obstacles . Over the past 40 years , a n increasingly business- friendly Supreme Court has gutted antitrust law. In ruling after ruling , it has weakened the standards used to evaluate anti-competitive behavior; raised the burden of bringing a n antitrust case; limited the types of antitrust victims who are allowed to bring cases; allowed businesses to use arbitration clauses to protect themselves from law suits ; and much else the Supreme Court has disseminated throughout the judiciary a generalized suspicion of antitrust claims . Judges at all levels have absorbed an academic skepticism about antitrust law business plaintiffs are usually seen as sore losers who have resorted to the law because they were beaten in the marketplace The pretexts businesses offer for anti-competitive practices are swallowed whole there is little that his adm inistration can do unless it has the courts on its side . This accounts for the order’s careful language. Agencies like the DOJ and the FTC would like to enforce antitrust laws more vigorously but they are not going to commit resources to bringing cases that will fail in court

antitrust agenda significant judicial obstacles 40 years business- friendly gutted ruling after ruling weakened raised the burden limited antitrust victims allowed arbitration clauses protect themselves disseminated generalized suspicion all levels absorbed skepticism sore losers beaten in the marketplace pretexts swallowed whole little courts on its side like not going to commit fail in court

['Still, the Biden administration’s antitrust agenda will face significant judicial obstacles. Over the past 40 years, an increasingly business-friendly Supreme Court has gutted antitrust law. In ruling after ruling, it has weakened the standards used to evaluate anti-competitive behavior; raised the burden of bringing an antitrust case; limited the types of antitrust victims who are allowed to bring cases; allowed businesses to use arbitration clauses to protect themselves from class action lawsuits; and much else.', 'On top of that, the Supreme Court has disseminated throughout the judiciary a generalized suspicion of antitrust claims. Judges at all levels have absorbed an academic skepticism about antitrust law that is now 30 years out of date. Accordingly, business plaintiffs are usually seen as sore losers who have resorted to the law because they were beaten in the marketplace. Consumer cases are attributed to the machinations of trial lawyers. The pretexts businesses offer for their anti-competitive practices are swallowed whole.', 'So, while Biden is right that “federal government inaction” is partly to blame for the decline in antitrust enforcement, there is little that his (or any) administration can do unless it has the courts on its side. This probably accounts for the order’s careful language. Agencies like the DOJ and the FTC would surely like to enforce antitrust laws more vigorously than in the past, but they are not going to commit resources to bringing cases that will fail in court.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx

6751ff31e7aa4110ca706e1f97396d22f17b9d70a0ad9c039a3a3acfdbac79a2

No impact to slow growth

Posen 16 Adam S. Posen, Government and Economics PhD from Harvard, economic advisor to the Congressional Budget Office, faculty of the World Economic Forum, consultant for the International Monetary Fund and the United States government. [Why We Need A Reality Check, Reality Check for the Global Economy, Peterson Institute for International Economics Briefing 16-3]

confidence in resilience is justified . fears are unfounded economies, China and U S grow more sustainably now at slow rates. That is not built on rising leverage markets seem confusing strains with instability normal muddling with poor but stable conditions is a better bet in markets fear economic laws reversed they are proven wrong clarity to distinguish solid outlook and shadows thrown by puppetry is critical to avoid unnecessary recession . A comb o of policies and decentralized responses increased resilience , diminished spillovers and created room for stimulus better capitalized , monitored , and more risk averse

Greater confidence in world economy’s resilience is justified . Market fears are exaggerated or unfounded most major economies, starting with China and the U S are grow ing more sustainably now at their slow er rates. That growth is not built on rising private or public leverage markets seem to be confusing strains and suboptimal situations with acute instability A more normal muddling through with poor but stable conditions is a far better bet in markets moving prices fear that normal economic laws have been reversed they are likely to be proven clearly wrong , Having clarity to distinguish between solid underlying economic outlook and the shadows thrown by financial puppetry is critical to avoid an unnecessary recession . A comb o of public policies and decentralized private-sector responses to the crisis have increased our economic resilience , diminished the systemic spillovers between economies, and created room for additional stimulus if needed. the global financial system are better capitalized , monitored , and more risk averse than a decade ago with less leverage. central banks are now committed to stabilization making them unlikely to repeat some policy errors from 2007–10

Greater confidence resilience justified exaggerated unfounded more sustainably now not built more normal muddling poor but stable far better bet markets moving prices fear likely to be proven underlying economic outlook shadows thrown by financial puppetry critical unnecessary recession public policies decentralized private-sector responses increased our economic resilience diminished systemic spillovers room for additional stimulus global financial system capitalized monitored more risk averse

['Greater confidence in the world economy’s resilience and near-term prospects is justified. Market fears about the ability of policy to stabilize growth and promote inflation, if understandable, are exaggerated or in some cases unfounded. All the more reason then not to allow ourselves to be distracted by a financial market tail wagging the macroeconomic dog. At a fundamental level, most of the major economies, starting with China and the United States, are growing more sustainably now than a decade ago, at their slower rates. That growth is not built on rising private or public leverage, with the notable exception of China—and even in China some restructuring is under way with ample savings to cushion the process. Even where the situation is not so rosy, many in the markets seem to be confusing strains and suboptimal situations with acute instability, not just for Italian banks and for Brazilian budgets but also for Latin America more generally or for trends in global trade. A more normal muddling through with poor but stable conditions is a far better bet. And where some in the markets moving prices fear that normal economic laws have been reversed—that monetary policy is ineffective or that low oil prices are on net harmful—they are likely to be proven clearly wrong, as they were previously on inflation and commodity prices. Having some clarity to distinguish between the more solid underlying economic outlook and the shadows thrown by financial puppetry is critical to making the right policy decisions to avoid an unnecessary recession. A combination of public policies and decentralized private-sector responses to the crisis have increased our economic resilience, diminished the systemic spillovers between economies, and even created some room for additional stimulus if needed. Large parts of the global financial system are better capitalized, monitored, and frankly more risk averse than they were a decade ago, with less leverage. The riskier parts of today’s global economy are less directly linked to the center’s growth and fi nancing than when the troubles were within the United States and most of Europe in 2008. Trade imbalances of many key economies are smaller, though growing, and thus accumulations of foreign debt vulnerabilities are also smaller than a decade ago. Most central banks are now so committed to stabilization that they are attacked for being too loose or supportive of markets, making them at least unlikely to repeat some policy errors from 2007–10 of delaying loosening or even excessive tightening. Finally, corporate and household balance sheets are far more solid in the US and some other major economies than they were a decade ago (though not universally), and even in China the perceptions of balance sheet weakness exceed the reality in scope and scale.']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-3%20-%20Harvard-Round6.docx

Kansas

HaWi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/HaWi/Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-3%2520-%2520Harvard-Round6.docx

41fe0f24642e45e4ea5017b4f11b34d66025e29068a282cbe774e6af2ab8d7f2

1—They only affect the “law”—judicial interpretations aren’t laws.

Chattin 35—(Indiana University School of Law). Carl L. Chattin. 1935. “In Re Todd' and Constitutional Amendment”. Indiana Law Journal, Volume 10, Issue 9. . Accessed 7/2/21.

judges do not make the law but only apply it , and judicial decisions are not laws in and of themselves in the same sense that legislative enactments are law, but are only evidence of the law the older rule had never been the law

judges do not make the law but only apply it , and judicial decisions are not laws in and of themselves in the same sense that legislative enactments are law, but are only evidence of the law . evidence is always rebuttable and it is rebutted when the courts later change the rule. When a pre-existing rule is changed, the new rule becomes the better evidence of the law , the result is the same as if the older rule had never been the law

do not make the law apply it not laws in and of themselves legislative enactments evidence of the law had never been the law

['', 'The retroactive rule, or, as it is sometimes called, the declaratory theory, is "that the judges do not make the law but only apply it, and that judicial decisions are not laws in and of themselves in the same sense that legislative enactments are law, but are only evidence of the law. The evidence is always rebuttable, and it is rebutted when the courts later change the rule. When a pre-existing rule is changed, the new rule becomes the better evidence of the law, not only prospectively, as to all transactions arising in the future, but it also has been given a retrospective operation embracing jural relations created prior to the overruling decision, but after the decision overruled. Put more concisely, though less accurately, the result is the same as if the older rule had never been the law." 29', '']

[(0, 7), (8, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-1%20-%20NUSO-Round5.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-1%2520-%2520NUSO-Round5.docx

183c6b203c33d133fed55a2606098ef82aa7003bea07822a8ec21646bd3ee39e

3. AI is not “good/evil” or “aligned/misaligned” – instead, it will have a difficult time assessing human interest and morals cannot be guaranteed. Try-or-die for boxing.

Yampolskiy ’15 [Roman; June 25; Associate Professor in the Speed School of Engineering, Ph.D. in Computer Science, Director of the Cybersecurity Laboratory; Artificial Intelligence: A Futuristic Approach, “Superintelligence Safety Engineering,” Ch. 7]

norms are not universal , a “ correct ” code could never be selected we do not need ethic s we need safe and law abiding “In the long run, what matters most is acceptable law not e “ right ” values A theme in AI safety is keeping sealed a “ leakproof ” singularity restricted to simulated worlds until understood under control AI fall under dangerous tech and should be restricted AGIs outcompet humans making humankind subject to extinction If allowed the machines will dominate because of self-improvement People will be dependent machines lead to consequences for humankind

However, because ethical norms are not universal , a “ correct ” ethical code could never be selected to the satisfaction of humanity we do not need machines that are full ethic al agent s we need our machines to be inherently safe and law abiding “In the long run, what matters most is that we all share a mutually acceptable law not that we agree on th e “ right ” values It is a good law we should preserve. Law really matters .” A common theme in AI safety research is the possibility of keeping a superintelligent agent in sealed hardware a “ leakproof ” singularity for safety reasons , AI systems first be restricted to simulated virtual worlds until their behavioral tendencies fully understood under the control led conditions AI research fall under the category of dangerous tech nologies and should be restricted a g i research should be considered unethical true AGIs have the potential of outcompet ing humans in any domain, essentially making humankind unnecessary and so subject to extinction If AGIs are allowed to develop, there will be direct competition between superintelligent machines and people. Eventually, the machines will come to dominate because of their self-improvement capabilities People won’t be able to just turn the machines off , because they will be so dependent on them that turning them off would amount to suicide ” A world run by machines will lead to unpredictable consequences for overall probability of survival for humankind

ethical norms universal correct never not need ethic s inherently safe law abiding matters most mutually acceptable not right good law really matters common theme safety research sealed leakproof safety reasons restricted virtual worlds fully understood control dangerous tech restricted a g i unethical outcompet humankind unnecessary extinction allowed direct competition machines dominate self-improvement won’t machines off so dependent suicide unpredictable consequences survival humankind

['7.1 Ethics and Intelligent Systems', 'The first decade of the twenty-first century has seen a boom of new subfields of computer science concerned with development of ethics in machines. Machine ethics (Anderson and Anderson 2007; Tonkens 2009; McDermott 2008; Allen, Wallach, and Smit 2006; Moor 2006); computer ethics (Margaret and Henry 1996); robot ethics (Lin, Abney, Bekey 2011; Sharkey 2008; Sawyer 2007); ethicALife (Wallach and Allen 2006); machine morals (Wendell and Colin 2008); cyborg ethics (Warwick 2003); computational ethics (Ruvinsky 2007); roboethics (Veruggio 2010); robot rights (RR; Guo and Zhang 2009); and artificial morals (Allen, Smit, and Wallach 2005) are just some of the proposals meant to address society’s concerns with safety of ever-more-advanced machines (Sparrow 2007). Unfortunately, the perceived abundance of research in intelligent machine safety is misleading. The great majority of published papers are purely philosophical in nature and do little more than reiterate the need for machine ethics and argue about which set of moral convictions would be the right ones to implement in our artificial progeny: Kantian (Powers 2006), utilitarian (Grau 2006), Jewish (Rappaport 2006), and others. However, because ethical norms are not universal, a “correct” ethical code could never be selected over others to the satisfaction of humanity as a whole.', '7.2 Artificial Intelligence Safety Engineering', 'Even if we are successful at designing machines capable of passing a moral Turing test (Allen, Varner, and Zinser 2000), human-like performance means some immoral actions, which should not be acceptable from the machines we design (Allen, Varner, and Zinser 2000). In other words, we do not need machines that are full ethical agents (Moor 2006) debating about what is right and wrong; we need our machines to be inherently safe and law abiding. As Robin Hanson elegantly puts it (Hanson 2009): “In the long run, what matters most is that we all share a mutually acceptable law to keep the peace among us, and allow mutually advantageous relations, not that we agree on the “right” values. Tolerate a wide range of values from capable law-abiding robots. It is a good law we should most strive to create and preserve. Law really matters.”', 'Consequently, I propose that purely philosophical discussions of ethics for machines be supplemented by scientific work aimed at creating safe machines in the context of a new field I term artificial intelligence (AI) safety engineering. Some concrete work in this important area has already begun (Gordon 1998; Gordon-Spears 2003, 2004). A common theme in AI safety research is the possibility of keeping a superintelligent agent in sealed hardware to prevent it from doing any harm to humankind. Such ideas originate with scientific visionaries such as Eric Drexler, who has suggested confining transhuman machines so that their outputs could be studied and used safely (Drexler 1986). Similarly, Nick Bostrom, a futurologist, has proposed (Bostrom 2008) an idea for an oracle AI (OAI), which would only be capable of answering questions. Finally, in 2010 David Chalmers proposed the idea of a “leakproof” singularity (Chalmers 2010). He suggested that, for safety reasons, AI systems first be restricted to simulated virtual worlds until their behavioral tendencies could be fully understood under the controlled conditions.', 'I proposed a formalized notion of an AI confinement protocol that represents AI-Boxing as a computer security challenge (Yampolskiy 2012). The artificial intelligence confinement problem (AICP) is defined as the challenge of restricting an artificially intelligent entity to a confined environment from which it cannot exchange information with the outside environment via legitimate or covert channels if such information exchange is not authorized by the confinement authority. An AI system that succeeds in violating the confinement problem (CP) protocol is said to have escaped (Yampolskiy 2012).', 'The proposed protocol is based on the idea of asking what are called “safe questions” with restricted answers. A safe question is defined as one for which a human being could find an answer without any help from superintelligence, all on the human being’s own merit. Why is this useful? Suppose that a scientist working on a cure for cancer is looking at two potential cures. Each one could be developed and tested without assistance from the AI but would take about three years of effort each. Which one should be tried first if the scientist believes that they have about an equal chance of working? If a wrong option is chosen to be tested first, humanity will still obtain a cure for cancer but it will happen three years later. What if we could ask the AI to suggest which option to try first?', 'This question is safe for a number of reasons. First, each potential answer has an equal probability of being correct. Second, a human being could answer it without assistance from the AI, so asking the AI for help will only speed up progress but in no way change the outcome. It is essentially equal to being lucky at guessing multiple-choice answers. Finally, the answer to this question could be encoded in a single bit, making it hard to hide additional messages in the provided answer.', 'To make sure that a potential question is safe, a group of experts could be used to review it. The experts should all be trained AI safety engineers, meaning that they are familiar with the design of the AI and its confinement environment as well as the latest developments in machine ethics (Hall 2000; Anderson and Anderson 2007; Tonkens 2009; Allen, Wallach, and Smit 2006; Moor 2006). Experts may also need to be trained in computer psychology, a currently nonexistent profession that might become a reality in the future (Epstein 1997). An existing discipline that might be of greatest help for training of AI question review experts is artimetrics, a field of study proposed by Yampolskiy et al. that identifies, classifies, and authenticates AI agents, robots, and virtual reality avatars for security purposes (Yampolskiy 2007; Mohamed et al. 2011; Bouhhris et al. 2011; Yampolskiy and Govindaraju 2008; Ajina et al. 2011; Yampolskiy and Govindaraju 2007; Yampolskiy et al. 2011; Gavrilova and Yampolskiy 2010; Ali, Hindi, and Yampolsky 2011; Mohamed and Yampolskiy 2011).', '7.3 Grand Challenge', 'As the grand challenge of AI safety engineering, I propose the problem of developing safety mechanisms for self-improving systems (Hall 2007). If an artificially intelligent machine is as capable as a human engineer of designing the next generation of intelligent systems, it is important to make sure that any safety mechanism incorporated in the initial design is still functional after thousands of generations of continuous self-improvement without human interference. Ideally, every generation of self-improving system should be able to produce a verifiable proof of its safety for external examination. It would be catastrophic to allow a safe intelligent machine to design an inherently unsafe upgrade for itself, resulting in a more capable and more dangerous system.', 'Some have argued that this challenge is either not solvable or, if it is solvable, one will not be able to prove that the discovered solution is correct. As the complexity of any system increases, the number of errors in the design increases proportionately or perhaps even exponentially. Even a single bug in a self-improving system (the most complex system to debug) will violate all safety guarantees. Worse yet, a bug could be introduced even after the design is complete either via a random mutation caused by deficiencies in hardware or via a natural event, such as a short circuit modifying some component of the system.', '7.4 Artificial General Intelligence Research is Unethical', 'Certain types of research, such as human cloning, certain medical or psychological experiments on humans, animal (great ape) research, and others, are considered unethical because of their potential detrimental impact on the test subjects and so are either banned or restricted by law. In addition, moratoriums exist on development of dangerous technologies, such as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, because of the devastating effects such technologies may exert on humankind.', 'Similarly, I argue that certain types of AI research fall under the category of dangerous technologies and should be restricted. Classical AI research in which a computer is taught to automate human behavior in a particular domain (e.g., mail sorting or spell-checking documents) is certainly ethical and does not present an existential risk problem to humanity. On the other hand, I argue that artificial general intelligence (AGI) research should be considered unethical. This follows logically from a number of observations. First, true AGIs will be capable of universal problem solving and recursive self-improvement. Consequently, they have the potential of outcompeting humans in any domain, essentially making humankind unnecessary and so subject to extinction. Also, a truly AGI system may possess a type of consciousness comparable to the human type, making robot suffering a real possibility and any experiments with AGI unethical for that reason as well.', 'I propose that AI research review boards are set up, similar to those employed in review of medical research proposals. A team of experts in AI should evaluate each research proposal and decide if the proposal falls under the standard AI-limited domain system or may potentially lead to the development of a full-blown AGI. Research potentially leading to uncontrolled artificial universal general intelligence should be restricted from receiving funding or be subject to complete or partial bans. An exception may be made for development of safety measures and control mechanisms specifically aimed at AGI architectures.', 'If AGIs are allowed to develop, there will be direct competition between superintelligent machines and people. Eventually, the machines will come to dominate because of their self-improvement capabilities. Alternatively, people may decide to give power to the machines because the machines are more capable and less likely to make an error. A similar argument was presented by Ted Kaczynski in his famous manifesto: “The decisions necessary to keep the system running will be so complex that human beings will be incapable of making them intelligently. … People won’t be able to just turn the machines off, because they will be so dependent on them that turning them off would amount to suicide” (Kaczynski 1995, 80).', 'Humanity should not put its future in the hands of the machines because it will not be able to take the power back. In general, a machine should never be in a position to terminate human life or to make any other nontrivial ethical or moral judgment concerning people. A world run by machines will lead to unpredictable consequences for human culture, lifestyle, and overall probability of survival for humankind. The question raised by Bill Joy: “Will the future need us?” is as important today as ever. “Whether we are to succeed or fail, to survive or fall victim to these technologies, is not yet decided” (Joy 2000).']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-ShVe-Neg-8---Texas-Doubles.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

fda25f1a0d230fcb1d64467cab194297a3990bbf889a5cd43d7969302b98de4d

AI arms racing goes nuclear.

Maas 19—(PhD Fellow in Law and Policy on Global Catastrophic and Existential Threats at the University of Copenhagen’s Centre for International Law). Matthijs M. Maas. Conflict and Crisis. “How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence? Three lessons from nuclear weapons.” p. 286-287. Contemporary Security Policy. Volume 40. Number 3.

AI is escalating into a strategic arms race between major states . deployment is but a matter of time . AI shift the tactical offense-defense balance , eroding nuclear deterrence stability creating mutual uncertainty which feed miscalc military AI raises inadvertent “flash war” between systems

nations have begun to emphasize the role of AI as a cornerstone in military doctrine further advances are continually being made, with many states showing an interest in further developing military uses of AI As a result, there is today a widespread perception amongst the public, policymakers, and scholars, that the global development of AI is swiftly escalating into a strategic arms race between major states such as the United States and China . widespread militarization of AI, and its deployment to the battlefield, is but a matter of time . Should we be at all concerned about AI arms races? yes AI capabilities adversely affect strategic stability between states—by shift ing the tactical offense-defense balance , eroding nuclear deterrence stability or creating mutual uncertainty over the new balance of power, which may feed destabilizing miscalc ulation As states race to deploy increasingly autonomous military AI systems , their intrinsic vulnerability to unexpected interactions or operational accidents raises the specter of inadvertent escalation into a “flash war” between autonomous military systems , similar to the algorithmic flash crashes already observed in the financial sector

strategic arms race but a matter of time shift offense-defense balance nuclear deterrence stability mutual uncertainty feed destabilizing miscalc inadvertent escalation into a “flash war” between autonomous military systems

['', 'The strategic potential—and appeal—of AI has hardly gone unnoticed by states. In recent years, many nations have begun to emphasize the role of AI as a cornerstone in both their national strategies and military doctrine (cf. China’s State Council, 2017; Putin, 2017; Work, 2015). Moreover, while many military AI applications remain somewhat immature at present (Payne, 2018a, p. 9), a range of systems are now seeing development or deployment (Maas, Sweijs, & De Spiegeleire, 2017). Indeed, a 2017 review by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute already identified 49 deployed weapon systems with autonomous targeting capabilities sufficient to engage targets without the involvement of a human operator (Boulanin & Verbruggen, 2017, p. 26). Moreover, further advances are continually being made, with many states showing an interest in further developing military uses of AI (Ayoub & Payne, 2016; Horowitz, 2018a). As a result, there is today a widespread perception amongst the public, policymakers, and scholars, that the global development of AI is swiftly escalating into a strategic arms race—or even a “new Cold War”—between major states such as the United States and China (cf. Allen & Kania, 2017; Auslin, 2018; Barnes & Chin, 2018; Geist, 2016; Hogarth, 2018; Lee, 2018; Thompson & Bremmer, 2018). Related to this, there is a fear that the widespread militarization of AI, and its deployment to the battlefield, is but a matter of time. Some have challenged the overall “arms race” narrative on the grounds that such framings not only misrepresent the nature of AI and its innovation (Kania, 2018), but also play into adversarial and zero-sum thinking that is counterproductive or outright dangerous (Cave & Ó hÉigeartaigh, 2018; Zwetsloot, Toner, & Ding, 2018). While these are valid and important points, it is important still to consider the strategic and governance implications of the AI arms race framing, given how prevalent it already is. Should we be at all concerned about AI arms races? Most likely, yes: In the past, international efforts to control the proliferation, production, development or deployment of certain military technologies—from chemical and biological weapons to land mines and ballistic missile-defense systems—were all, to various degrees, motivated and grounded by four distinct rationales: ethics, legality, stability, or safety. Military AI likewise has raised concerns on all four grounds. Some have objected to “killer robots” on ethical grounds (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Nehal, Beck, Geiss, Liu, & Kress, 2016; Roff, 2014), or in terms of their noncompliance with principles of international (humanitarian) law (cf. Davison, 2017). Others worry that AI capabilities may adversely affect strategic stability between states—by shifting the tactical offense-defense balance (Rickli, 2017), eroding nuclear deterrence stability (Geist & Lohn,2018; Lieber & Press, 2017); or creating mutual uncertainty over the new balance of power, which may feed destabilizing miscalculation (Kroenig & Gopalaswamy, 2018). Finally, concerns are raised over safety, reflecting fears that the pursuit of narrow military supremacy can trap states in what Danzig (2018) has called a “technology roulette.” As states race to deploy increasingly autonomous military AI systems, their intrinsic vulnerability to unexpected interactions or operational accidents (Scharre, 2016a) raises the specter of inadvertent escalation into a “flash war” between autonomous military systems, similar to the algorithmic flash crashes already observed in the financial sector (Scharre, 2016b, 2018b). In sum, because military AI again invokes these four seminal concerns, the question of appropriate regulation appears pertinent. It also appears timely, since “the idea of arms control for AI remains in its infancy” (Payne, 2018a, p. 19), and both customary and formal international law remain still very much in flux. It as such seems prudent to consider today whether or not, or how, hazardous AI militarization or arms race dynamics might be contained or channeled. How viable is international arms control for military AI?']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Prost-Neg-UMW-Round5.docx

Minnesota

AmPr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmPr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Prost-Neg-UMW-Round5.docx

ade76cf201ad2116a702485013ec4673c3115f2d6e48376a25d3b49c92272380

Replacing them all.

Tara Copp 23. Associated Press. “Inside the delicate art of maintaining America's aging nuclear weapons.” ABC News. Sept. 20, 2023. https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/inside-delicate-art-maintaining-americas-aging-nuclear-weapons-103331446#

The U.S. will spend $750 billion replacing every component of nuclear defenses including new bombers , submarines in the most ambitious effort since Manhattan

The U.S. will spend $750 billion over the next 10 years replacing every component of its nuclear defenses including new stealth bombers , submarines in the most ambitious nuclear effort since the Manhattan Project.

every component of its nuclear defenses including bombers submarines most ambitious

['The Associated Press was granted rare access to key parts of the highly classified nuclear supply chain and got to watch technicians and engineers tackle the difficult job of maintaining an aging nuclear arsenal. Those workers are about to get a lot busier. The U.S. will spend more than $750 billion over the next 10 years replacing almost every component of its nuclear defenses, including new stealth bombers, submarines and ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in the country’s most ambitious nuclear weapons effort since the Manhattan Project.']

[(5, 12)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCa-Aff-5---Wake-Round-4.docx

Dartmouth

BaCa

cfe4de00c3556cd32dc2562b06cced84ca4d9a71ac180935d24d454a3b794ee0

Law is not a shortcut to ethical alignment. It’s written ambiguously and can’t be engrained in software.

Charlie Steiner 22, PhD in condensed matter physics studying value learning, comment on “Aligning AI with Humans by Leveraging Legal Informatics,” EA, 2022, https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/XmKhYQfnfqb3Z7Dkr/aligning-ai-with-humans-by-leveraging-legal-informatics

The notion that " Law is a computational engine that converts values into legible directives " is wrong Legibility is not inherent of directives If an AI doesn't try to follow law law will not be legible laws works for humans , but has numerous flaws even for that purpose

The notion that " Law is a computational engine that converts human values into legible directives " is wrong Legibility is not an inherent property of directives It is a property of the directives with respect to the one interpreting them , which is humans . If you build an AI that doesn't try to follow the law in a human-recognizable way, the law will not be legible in the way you want. The notion that it would be good to build AI that humans direct by the same process that we currently create laws is wrong . Such a process works for laws for humans , but we currently apply it in many ways large and small, and has numerous flaws even for that purpose (as you mention, about expressions of power).

Law computational engine converts human values legible directives wrong not an inherent property of directives with respect to the one interpreting them humans doesn't try to follow the law not be legible good to build AI that humans direct wrong laws humans currently even that

['First, the bad: The notion that "Law is a computational engine that converts human values into legible directives" is wrong. Legibility is not an inherent property of the directives. It is a property of the directives with respect to the one interpreting them, which in the case of law is humans. If you build an AI that doesn\'t try to follow the spirit of the law in a human-recognizable way, the law will not be legible in the way you want.', 'The notion that it would be good to build AI that humans direct by the same process that we currently create laws is wrong. Such a process works for laws, specifically for laws for humans, but the process is tailored to the way we currently apply it in many ways large and small, and has numerous flaws even for that purpose (as you mention, about expressions of power).']

[(8, 18)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCh-Neg-77th-National-Debate-Tournament-Round-6.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

fe7feb65b0c5fc9f8856aaf8d23df733a7b77e352729ff43184bdedd61adc8fe

F—Key to space colonization—alternatives are insufficient—solves extinction and sustainability—industrialism makes it feasible.

Ashworth 10 (*Stephen Ashworth: British Interplanetary Society fellow, 12-18-2010, “Towards the Sociology of the Universe: Towards a Universal Society,” Astronist, http://www.astronist.co.uk/astro_ev/2000/Sociology2.shtml)

continued growth taking us onto sustainable tech maturity carrying capacity of the Solar System is a million times greater t han Earth zero growth failed in stability or planned growth likelihood of climate change pollution asteroid vulcanism ice-age solar variations high-tech conflict nuc s viruses engineered organisms or robots decline would be plausible it will be possible for Earth to invest in extraterrestrial development and receive dividends interplanetary civilisation will be secure against any disaster can only affect a limited region economic mechanism must be in place to drive it most suitable is cap need for expansion makes it ap propriate for colonising anti- growth agendas would not promote disruptive tech socialist society they might make the leap Moon-race showed if one drops out the other lose interest collectivist society is unlikely to make tech unique feature of industrialism is applicability to wide range of environments capable of making a home anywhere

There are thus two plausible end-points to our current phase of growth: collapse back to a pre-industrial level or continued growth taking us onto a sustainable level of tech nological maturity the carrying capacity of the Solar System is at least a million times greater t han that of a high-tech Earth and that of the Galaxy at least a billion times greater again than that of the Solar System The present-day situation finds itself at a cross-roads of unparalleled significance If growth is not maintained our descendants are forever restricted to Earth could a socialist society preserve zero growth indefinitely? I think not societies evolve in an unpredictable manner Governments which have tried to maintain control in Tokugawa Japan or Soviet Russia have failed in their goals of stability or planned growth modern liberal democracy works by limiting its ambitions and ceding power to the economy at large The result would then be either the breakout of a new phase of growth , or decline and collapse In view of the likelihood of long-term adverse climate change triggered by industrial pollution or asteroid impact or outbreak of super- vulcanism or return of ice-age conditions or solar variations and in addition the persistent threat of global high-tech conflict whether spreading destruction by nuc lear weapon s computer viruses or genetically engineered organisms or microscopic or macroscopic robots decline would be the more plausible outcome the question as to how long a global zero-growth industrial civilisation could survive in a stable state on one planet is interesting while the resources of Earth are limited those of the Solar System are very much greater Growth in population sizes and in usage of energy and raw materials may therefore continue for a number of centuries into the future provided that Material growth in space and on other planets takes over the upward trend Is this not equivalent to saying Earth must settle down with a zero-growth society before space development begins ? No so long as the terrestrial and extraterrestrial economies are linked it will be possible for investors on Earth to invest capital in extraterrestrial development and receive dividends back from that development most Earth-dwelling people will remain on the mother planet there will also be flows of people goods and ideas between Earth and colonies which have a profound economic effect net inflow of value to Earth is necessary in order that terrestrial investment in outer space does not merely produce inflation inflow need not be of material goods more likely to consist of energy solar power delivered on microwaves or lasers and information software and product development An interplanetary industrial civilisation is secure for the long term in a way that a monoplanetary one is not because it is too large to form a unity either politically or environmentally and because it is forced to adapt to a wide range of hostile environmental conditions It will be secure against any conceivable environmental or military disaster , because such a disaster can only affect a single planet or at most a limited region of the system Climate change or world war on Earth has no effect on Mars even a major change in solar luminosity could be tolerated With interplanetary civilisation the social system as a whole can tolerate decline and collapse in particular locations because they can then be recolonised from outside in order for interplanetary growth to occur an economic mechanism must be in place to drive it The most suitable economic mechanism that has been demonstrated so far is cap italism Its need for continuous expansion makes it highly ap propriate as an economic system for a society colonising its local planetary system If the ideology was oriented towards social stability and economic stagnation in view of the environmentalist anti- growth or anti-consumerist agendas it might very likely serve it would not want to promote disruptive new tech nologies such as those of access to space The idea of a socially just socialist society expanding into space is therefore a questionable one they might make the leap to interplanetary capability even without the driving force of capitalist economics However the competitive Moon-race of the 19 60s showed that if one competitor drops out the other may well lose interest to the point of abandoning capabilities developed for that competition an ideologically based collectivist society is unlikely to make a good showing in the tech nologies required growth has a vested interest in preserving and extending gains made Given that the opportunities for growth in space are so large it seems unlikely that the present burst of growth will reach a plateau until space has been colonised There is an inconsistency about the idea of an industrial civilisation which does not move beyond its home planet a persistent industrial civilisation on one planet will naturally tend to populate its local planetary system because the unique feature of industrialism is its applicability to a wide range of environments not only earthlike capable of making a home for itself anywhere in the astronomical universe

plausible end-points current phase pre-industrial level continued growth sustainable tech maturity carrying capacity million times greater high-tech Earth Galaxy billion times greater Solar System cross-roads unparalleled significance not maintained forever restricted Earth socialist society zero growth indefinitely? I think not unpredictable manner Tokugawa Japan Soviet Russia failed stability planned growth power breakout new phase of growth decline collapse climate change industrial pollution asteroid super- vulcanism ice-age conditions solar variations high-tech conflict destruction nuc s computer viruses genetically engineered organisms microscopic or macroscopic robots plausible outcome global zero-growth industrial civilisation stable state one planet limited Solar System very much greater population sizes usage of energy raw materials number of centuries Material growth space other planets zero-growth society begins No terrestrial extraterrestrial economies linked extraterrestrial development dividends mother planet people goods ideas Earth colonies profound economic effect net inflow of value inflation material goods energy solar power microwaves lasers information software product development interplanetary industrial civilisation long term monoplanetary not unity politically environmentally adapt wide range hostile environmental conditions secure any conceivable environmental or military disaster single planet limited region Climate change world war Earth no effect Mars major change solar luminosity tolerated interplanetary civilisation decline collapse particular locations recolonised must be in place most suitable economic mechanism cap continuous expansion highly ap propriate local planetary system social stability economic stagnation environmentalist anti- growth anti-consumerist agendas not promote disruptive new tech space socialist society questionable one make the leap However Moon-race 60s one competitor drops out lose interest abandoning capabilities competition collectivist society good showing tech required vested interest preserving extending gains made so large unlikely present burst of growth plateau colonised not move beyond home planet unique feature industrialism wide range not only earthlike making a home anywhere

['', 'There are thus two plausible end-points to our current phase of growth: collapse back to a pre-industrial level (the supernova burns out), or continued growth taking us onto a sustainable level of technological maturity (the baby grows up). ', 'The difference between these two future courses is immense. In terms of population, the carrying capacity of Earth for human populations is greater than the current 6 or 7 billion, but not very much so, perhaps a few tens of billions (depending on the technologies available). Any retreat to medieval levels of technology would cut this figure by a factor of ten, probably down to less than a billion. ', 'But the carrying capacity of the Solar System is at least a million times greater than that of a high-tech Earth, and that of the Galaxy at least a billion times greater again than that of the Solar System. The present-day situation of human society is therefore that it finds itself at a cross-roads of unparalleled significance. ', 'If growth is not maintained, then, unless they can reignite that growth phase, our descendants are forever restricted to planet Earth. But must they necessarily fall back to a medieval or even more primitive level? Could industrial civilisation survive for a while in a zero-growth phase at around its present-day level of development, and if so, for how long? ', 'In any discussion of mankind and space, this is a key question which must be addressed. Certainly, pre-industrial civilisations have survived with little change over millennial timespans, but to what extent does industrial technology change this picture? And what about million-year timespans? ', 'The only types of industrial civilisation we have observed so far have been that based on capitalist economics, and that based on socialism, in which a political ideology takes over the role of capital. Capitalist societies would seem to be expansionary in their very nature: they are defined by the self-multiplying power of capital. But could a socialist society, one with a suitable ideology which was sufficiently severely imposed, preserve zero growth indefinitely?', 'I think not, because societies evolve in an unpredictable manner. Governments which have tried to maintain control in, say, Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868) or Soviet Russia (1917-1989) have failed in their goals of stability (Japan) or planned growth (Russia), and modern liberal democracy works by limiting its ambitions and ceding much power to the economy at large. Even a global dictatorship, which unlike those two historical examples would by definition not face competition from abroad, would, I think, be unable to control all the disruptive political, technological and economic forces emerging unpredictably worldwide over centuries and millennia. ', 'The result would then be either the breakout of a new phase of growth, or decline and collapse. In view of the likelihood of long-term adverse climate change (whether triggered by industrial pollution, or asteroid impact, or an outbreak of super-vulcanism, or the return of ice-age conditions, or solar variations), and in addition the persistent threat of global high-tech conflict (whether spreading destruction by nuclear weapons, or computer viruses, or genetically engineered organisms, or microscopic or macroscopic robots), decline would be the more plausible outcome. ', 'Nevertheless, the question as to how long a global zero-growth industrial civilisation could survive in a stable state on one planet is an interesting one, though not one that is likely to attract unbiased analysis by modern sociology. ', 'What, however, if growth is maintained? Surely Earth will become overburdened and that growth will lead to environmental and social collapse? ', 'The point here is that, while the resources of Earth are limited, those of the Solar System are very much greater. Growth in population sizes and in the usage of energy and raw materials may therefore continue for a number of centuries into the future, provided that two conditions are met: ', 'Material growth on Earth levels off; ', 'Material growth in space and on other planets takes over the upward trend. ', 'Is this not equivalent to saying that Earth must settle down with a zero-growth society before space development begins? No, so long as the terrestrial and extraterrestrial economies are linked. While this remains true, it will be possible for investors on Earth to invest capital in extraterrestrial development, and receive dividends back from that development. While most Earth-dwelling people will remain on the mother planet, there will also be flows of people, goods and ideas between Earth and her colonies, which must also have a profound economic effect. ', 'A net inflow of value to Earth is in any case necessary in order that terrestrial investment in outer space does not merely produce inflation in the home economy. But that inflow need not be of material goods, and is more likely to consist of energy (solar power delivered on microwaves or lasers) and information (software and product development). ', 'But surely ultimately the limits of the Solar System will be reached, and the interplanetary civilisation have to settle down as a zero-growth society? Yes, granted. But this differs from a zero-growth planet Earth due to the immense size of the Solar System, which is larger than Earth by between four and six orders of magnitude, depending how far out one wants to go – to the distance of Mars, say, or to the Oort comet cloud far beyond Pluto. ', 'An interplanetary industrial civilisation is secure for the long term in a way that a monoplanetary one is not, because it is too large to form a unity, either politically or environmentally, and because it is forced to adapt to a wide range of hostile environmental conditions. ', 'It will therefore be secure against any conceivable environmental or military disaster, because such a disaster can only affect a single planet, or at most a limited region of the system. Climate change or world war on Earth has no effect on Mars, and vice versa. And with the majority of the population in orbiting artificial space colonies, even a major change in solar luminosity could be tolerated (though such a change is not expected to have a noticeable effect for hundreds of millions of years yet). ', 'With interplanetary civilisation, the social system as a whole can tolerate decline and collapse in particular locations, because they can then be recolonised from outside. Once humanity achieves interstellar status, this security factor is clearly vastly enhanced. ', 'However, in order for interplanetary growth to occur in the first place, an economic mechanism must be in place to drive it. The most suitable economic mechanism that has been demonstrated so far is capitalism. Its need for continuous expansion makes it highly appropriate as an economic system for a society colonising its local planetary system. ', 'It is not clear whether an economic system based on ideology could perform this function of capitalism. If the ideology was growth-oriented, then it would have no reason to conflict with the existing capitalist order, but would rather work in concert with it. But in the more plausible case that it was oriented towards social stability and economic stagnation, particularly in view of the environmentalist, anti-growth or anti-consumerist agendas it might very likely serve, then it would not want to promote disruptive new technologies such as those of access to space. The idea of a socially just socialist society (if such a hypothetical entity is possible) expanding into space is therefore a questionable one. ', 'If Earth remained divided among competing centres of power, then they might make the leap to interplanetary capability even without the driving force of capitalist economics. However, the competitive Moon-race of the 1960s showed, firstly, that if one competitor drops out, the other may well lose interest to the point of abandoning capabilities developed for that competition, and secondly, that an ideologically based collectivist society is unlikely to make a good showing in the technologies required. Economic growth, however, has a vested interest in preserving and extending gains made. ', 'Given that the opportunities for growth in space are so large, it seems unlikely that the present burst of growth will reach a plateau until space has been colonised. There is in fact an inconsistency about the idea of an industrial civilisation which does not move beyond its home planet – like a lone tree in the middle of a fertile plain. Such a tree will either die off, or it will naturally reproduce until it has engendered a whole forest, in which a far greater variety of life is possible than on the unsheltered plain. ', 'Similarly, a persistent industrial civilisation on one planet will naturally tend to populate its local planetary system, because the unique feature of industrialism is its applicability to a wide range of environments, not only earthlike ones. ', 'We here refer to an interplanetary civilisation as a “universal society”, because is it capable of making a home for itself anywhere in the astronomical universe. Some comments on the sociology of such a society follow.', '', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Neg-10---D4-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

9710beb155b5cbeb06540e092410e58d24b39f1ca18259686d08aec689f614de

2. CONVENTIONAL---adversaries focus nuclear and conventional attacks on the remaining triad.

Dodge 21, is a Research Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy and received her Ph.D. from George Mason University. (Michaela, 1-12-2021, “ICBMs and Their Importance for Allied Assurances and Security,” National Institute for Public Policy, Number 475, https://nipp.org/information_series/dodge-michaela-icbms-and-their-importance-for-allied-assurances-and-security-information-series-no-475-2/)

ICBMs create synergies that contribute to deterrence dispersed over swaths of territory adversary have to spend hundreds in direct attack on U.S. Without adversaries concentrate attack on three bomber two submarines limited homeland would be within reach have more warheads available to damage cities other delivery can be destroyed by conventional

The nuclear triad, including its ICBM leg, provides flexibility Even though ICBMs do not have the signaling potency and physical visibility of other U.S. delivery systems they create important synergies that contribute to deterrence Since ICBMs are dispersed over large swaths of U.S. territory , an adversary would have to spend hundreds of nuclear warheads in a direct attack on the U.S. homeland to destroy them Without ICBMs , adversaries could concentrate their attack on just three bomber bases and two submarine bases leaving submarines at sea as the only strategic system available for retaliation. Such a limited homeland attack would be well within the reach of other nuclear powers without ICBMs, adversaries could then concentrate their resources and focus on countering U.S. submarines at sea without ICBMs, adversaries would have more warheads available to cause damage to U.S. cities Unlike ICBMs, other nuclear delivery systems can be destroyed by conventional weapons The vulnerability of these systems to conventional weapons result in a substantive ambiguity as to the intentions of an adversary should a nuclear aircraft or a strategic submarine be lost to a conventional attack

flexibility important synergies contribute dispersed large swaths direct attack concentrate three two only well within reach concentrate resources focus countering more available Unlike other destroyed conventional vulnerability result substantive ambiguity intentions lost

['The importance of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons for extended deterrence and allied assurance was also recognized by the bipartisan congressionally mandated Strategic Posture Commission Report in 2009. The Commission noted that requirements for extended deterrence in Europe and Asia are “evolving,” implying the need for a degree of flexibility in a way that the United States postures its nuclear forces.[7] The Commission also noted that allied “assurance that extended deterrence remains credible and effective may require that the United States retain numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that it might not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense.”[8] The nuclear triad, including its ICBM leg, provides such flexibility, and linking U.S. strategic forces with U.S. nuclear assurances has been U.S. policy for decades. Even though ICBMs do not have the signaling potency and physical visibility of other U.S. delivery systems, particularly long-range nuclear-armed bombers and dual-capable aircraft, they create important synergies that contribute to deterrence.', 'Since ICBMs are dispersed over large swaths of U.S. territory, an adversary would have to spend hundreds of nuclear warheads in a direct attack on the U.S. homeland to destroy them. This reality—enforced by the U.S. deployment of ICBMs—likely serves to frustrate any nuclear attack planning against the United States. By bolstering deterrence of attacks on the U.S. homeland, ICBMs enhance the credibility of U.S. security guarantees to allies, as the United States is more likely to come to the defense of others when the risks to its own territory are minimized. Without ICBMs, adversaries could concentrate their attack on just three bomber bases and two submarine bases on U.S. territory, leaving submarines at sea as the only strategic system available for retaliation. Such a limited homeland attack would be well within the reach of other nuclear powers. And, without ICBMs, adversaries could then concentrate their resources and focus on countering U.S. submarines at sea. Moreover, without ICBMs, adversaries would have more warheads available to cause damage to U.S. cities.', 'Unlike ICBMs, other nuclear delivery systems can be destroyed by conventional weapons, notwithstanding the fact that an adversary would have a difficult time finding U.S. strategic submarines, at least for the foreseeable future. The vulnerability of these systems to conventional weapons could result in a substantive ambiguity as to the intentions of an adversary should a nuclear aircraft or a strategic submarine be lost to a conventional attack. Bombers and dual-capable aircraft flying conventional missions add to the complexity of this problem. No such ambiguity is plausible when an adversary chooses to destroy ICBMs.']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiWi-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-5.docx

Kansas

WiWi

399e354e37415646749a20d5a3a2475bbbeb78eb3c78fba63daa1b675efece7c

C. Aerospace.

DI 22. Written by Data Insights at Airport Technology using Global Data with access to over 1bn data points including companies, deals, projects and forecasts and trends. “Artificial intelligence innovation: Leading companies in computer vision for autonomous navigation for the aerospace and defence industry” 12/3/22.

aerospace continues to be a hotbed of innovation driven by artificial tech and machine learning t here are 180+ innovation areas that will shape the future of the industry Computer vision for autonomous navigation has significant application Whilst the existing patents are largely being filed in the commercial sector it will have significant impact in defence

aerospace and defence industry continues to be a hotbed of innovation , with activity driven by developments in artificial tech nology and machine learning , and growing importance of technologies such as drones, satellite technology and big data there have been over 174,000 patents filed and granted in the aerospace and defence industry, according to GlobalData’s report on here are 180+ innovation areas that will shape the future of the industry . Among maturing innovation areas is sensor-guided aiming assists, which is now well established in the industry. Stradvision is the company with the largest number of patents in computer vision for autonomous navigation Computer vision for autonomous navigation has significant application and can be utilised to facilitate autonomous driving in battlefield scenarios as well as target recognition . Whilst the existing patents are largely being filed in the commercial sector , it will have significant impact in defence .

hotbed of innovation artificial tech nology 180+ innovation areas shape the future of the industry autonomous navigation target recognition largely being filed in the commercial sector

['The aerospace and defence industry continues to be a hotbed of innovation, with activity driven by developments in artificial technology and machine learning, and growing importance of technologies such as drones, satellite technology and big data. In the last three years alone, there have been over 174,000 patents filed and granted in the aerospace and defence industry, according to GlobalData’s report on . However, not all innovations are equal and nor do they follow a constant upward trend. Instead, their evolution takes the form of an S-shaped curve that reflects their typical lifecycle from early emergence to accelerating adoption, before finally stabilising and reaching maturity. Identifying where a particular innovation is on this journey, especially those that are in the emerging and accelerating stages, is essential for understanding their current level of adoption and the likely future trajectory and impact they will have. 180+ innovations will shape the aerospace and defence industry According to GlobalData’s Technology Foresights, which plots the S-curve for the aerospace and defence industry using innovation intensity models built on over 262,000 patents, there are 180+ innovation areas that will shape the future of the industry. Within the emerging innovation stage, machine learning for autonomous navigation, battery thermal management system, and satellite image mosaicing are disruptive technologies that are in the early stages of application and should be tracked closely. 3D image segmentation, AV on-board control systems, and lidar for 3D object detection are some of the accelerating innovation areas, where adoption has been steadily increasing. Among maturing innovation areas is sensor-guided aiming assists, which is now well established in the industry.\u202f Innovation S-curve for artificial intelligence in the aerospace and defence industry Computer vision for autonomous navigation is a key innovation area in artificial intelligence Computer vision is a machine learning technique, which provides a machine with means to detect and identify objects including pedestrians or other objects in order to aid navigation. GlobalData’s analysis also uncovers the companies at the forefront of each innovation area and assesses the potential reach and impact of their patenting activity across different applications and geographies. According to GlobalData, there are 10+ companies, spanning technology vendors, established aerospace and defence companies, and up-and-coming start-ups engaged in the development and application of computer vision for autonomous navigation. Key players in computer vision for autonomous navigation – a disruptive innovation in the aerospace and defence industry ‘Application diversity’ measures the number of different applications identified for each relevant patent and broadly splits companies into either ‘niche’ or ‘diversified’ innovators. ‘Geographic reach’ refers to the number of different countries each relevant patent is registered in and reflects the breadth of geographic application intended, ranging from ‘global’ to ‘local’. Stradvision is the company with the largest number of patents in computer vision for autonomous navigation. The company is developing computer vision solutions for autonomous vehicles for both the civil and defence sector and utilising LiDAR and low-cost cameras to detect objects. The second leading company is Luminar Technologies, which is trying to make autonomous driving safer through its computer vision solutions and aims to detect and clarify objects up to 250 meters away even in low light levels. In terms of application diversity, Luminar Technologies leads the pack, followed by Amazon.com and Intel. By means of geographic diversity, Plus AI leads, followed by Stradvision and Baidu. Computer vision for autonomous navigation has significant application and can be utilised to facilitate autonomous driving in battlefield scenarios as well as target recognition. Whilst the existing patents are largely being filed in the commercial sector, it will have significant impact in defence. To further understand how artificial intelligence is disrupting the aerospace and defence industry, access GlobalData’s latest thematic research report on . ', '']

[(0, 5)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-NDT-Round-3.docx

Emory

MiPi

02032ee4e02844e703fa9b6f8a51b2bdbd1858382a6f0f514142fa732f83653a

Patents for AI inventorship are fundamentally stupid. They are a bad way of encouraging innovation. Direct incentives are better.

Dr. Schlomit Yanisky Ravid & Xiaoqiong Liu 18, Ravid is Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Information Society Project (ISP), Fellow at the Fordham University School of Law, Visiting Professor at the Ono Academic Law School, Israel (OAC), and Senior Faculty at the Shalom Comparative Legal Research Center, OAC, Founder and Director; Liu is an engineer and Fordham Intellectual Property Institute Fellow, “When Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: An Alternative Model for Patent Law at the 3A Era,” 39 Cardozo L. Rev. 2215, August 2018, WestLaw

The patent reward is questionable Granting exclusive rights may not incentivize inventors patent law only rewards the first inventor patent law grants exactly the same length for all inventions patent law fails in the multiplayer cumulative environment characteristic of AI patent law only offers four ways to allocate rewards making it harder for other AI to build on inventions it is difficult to identify the human responsible inefficiency forces us to imagine alternative venues to satisfy stakeholders

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR PATENT LAW AT THE 3A ERA--INCENTIVIZING STAKEHOLDERS The patent reward in general is questionable patent laws fail to reach their goal of maximizing benefit to society Granting exclusive rights may not incentivize inventors even CEOs see patent incentives as relatively unimportant If corporate leaders do not see the value of patent incentives, then certainly such an incentive is meaningless to the multiple players and cumulative patent models When determining whether to grant patent rights in uncertain situations, therefore, such as in regard to AI we should not overemphasize the importance of the patent system What are the flaws in patent incentives First, patent law only rewards the first inventor , while second comers get nothing . The drive to be first can force competing owners of AI systems deep into diminishing returns . This is wasteful. Second, patent law grants exactly the same length of protection for all inventions regardless of [their] R&D costs and ... other economically relevant factors.” Although simple, it “grossly overreward[s] some inventions and underreward[s] others patents are superfluous for products that would be invented anyway . “conventional software developed rapidly even before courts were willing to grant it patent protection.” Patent protection serves a limited purpose. patent law fails in the multiplayer and cumulative patent environment characteristic of AI systems It is not flexible patent law only offers four ways to allocate rewards among two parties: “0:0 (both patents invalid), 50:50 (both patents upheld), 100:0 (first patent valid, second invalid), [and] 0:100 (first patent invalid, second valid).” Patent law may also impede future technological progress by making it harder for other AI systems to build on earlier inventions in practice, patent law would pose difficulties in bringing patent infringement actions against or on behalf of inventions by an AI or against the copying of an AI's invention. Because of the unpredictable nature of AI, it is difficult to identify the human responsible Sometimes the human involved in the process does not know how AI arrives at an invention. In other cases, the AI system can “break” data into electronic nanocomponents and rebuild it in different ways, thus rendering it impossible to establish proof of infringement The inefficiency of the patent system regarding AI inventions forces us to imagine alternative venues to satisfy the needs and goals of stakeholders

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR PATENT LAW AT THE 3A ERA--INCENTIVIZING STAKEHOLDERS patent reward in general questionable fail to reach their goal of maximizing benefit to society exclusive rights not incentivize inventors CEOs relatively unimportant corporate leaders certainly meaningless multiple players cumulative patent models uncertain AI not overemphasize the importance of the patent system flaws first second nothing diminishing returns same length of protection for all inventions superfluous would be invented anyway before multiplayer cumulative AI not flexible also impede future technological progress difficulties in bringing patent infringement actions unpredictable nature difficult to identify the human responsible not know how AI arrives impossible to establish proof of infringement inefficiency imagine alternative venues

['VI. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR PATENT LAW AT THE 3A ERA--INCENTIVIZING STAKEHOLDERS WITHIN THE AI MULTIPLAYER MODEL', 'A. Rethinking the Incentive Effect of the Current Patent Regime', "The patent reward in general is questionable. Scholars argue that patent laws fail to reach their goal of maximizing benefit to society. Granting twenty years of exclusive rights to the inventor or the inventor's transferee may not significantly incentivize inventors. Surveys show that even CEOs in most industries see patent incentives as relatively unimportant.192 If corporate leaders who are driven by a profit motive do not see the value of patent incentives, then certainly such an incentive is meaningless to the multiple players and cumulative patent models. When determining whether to grant patent rights in uncertain situations, therefore, such as in regard to inventions by AI systems and the multiplayer and cumulative patent models, we should not overemphasize the importance of the patent system compared to other alternatives.", 'What are the flaws in patent incentives that make them irrelevant to AI? First, patent law only rewards the first inventor, while second comers get nothing. The drive to be first--even by an hour or two193-- *2253 can force competing owners of AI systems deep into diminishing returns. This is wasteful.', 'Second, patent law grants exactly the same length of protection for all inventions,194 “regardless of [their] R&D costs and ... other economically relevant factors.”195 Although this approach is simple, it “grossly overreward[s] some inventions and underreward[s] others.”196', 'Third, patents are superfluous for products that would be invented anyway.197 For instance, “conventional software developed rapidly even before courts were willing to grant it patent protection.”198 Patent protection serves a limited purpose.', 'As a fourth point, patent law fails in the multiplayer and cumulative patent environment characteristic of AI systems. It is not flexible in allocating rewards and is thus economically inefficient. Indeed, patent law only offers four ways to allocate rewards among two parties: “0:0 (both patents invalid), 50:50 (both patents upheld), 100:0 (first patent valid, second invalid), [and] 0:100 (first patent invalid, second valid).”199 Patent law may also impede future technological progress by making it harder for other AI systems to build on earlier inventions.200', "Fifth, in practice, patent law would pose difficulties in bringing patent infringement actions against or on behalf of inventions by an AI or against the copying of an AI's invention. Because of the unpredictable nature of AI, it is very difficult to identify the human that is responsible for the “actions” of an AI system. Sometimes the human involved in the process does not know how an AI system arrives at an invention. In other cases, the AI system can “break” data into electronic nanocomponents and rebuild it in different ways, thus rendering it impossible to establish proof of infringement.201", '*2254 The inefficiency of the patent system regarding AI inventions forces us to imagine alternative venues to satisfy the needs and goals of stakeholders. These alternatives are described below.', '']

[(21, 28), (39, 45)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-ShVe-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-5.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

9879710e9596be314e147448ac5ed57dcbd938c42339bb737d1cf222d2d3a9d6

4. Negative messaging outweighs positive messaging.

Kent Weaver 13. Professor at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, “Policy Leadership and the Blame Trap: Seven Strategies for Avoiding Policy Stalemate”, March 2013 http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/03/29-policy-leadership-blame-weaver

Negative messages increasingly dominate politics dominated by negative messaging tends to result in stalemate people pay more attention to negative info and are more sensitive to losses than gains

Negative messages about political opponents increasingly dominate the policymaking process politics dominated by negative messaging tends to result in policy stalemate Negative messaging is attractive to politicians because people tend to pay more attention to negative info rmation than positive information, and they are more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains Political polarization, competitive, nationalized elections, increased fiscal stress and changes in campaign law and practice have all exacerbated pressures to engage in negative messaging

pay more attention to negative info rmation are more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains

['Negative messages about political opponents increasingly dominate not just election campaigns in the United States, but the policymaking process as well. And politics dominated by negative messaging (also known as blame-generating) tends to result in policy stalemate. Negative messaging is attractive to politicians because people tend to pay more attention to negative information than positive information, and they are more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains. Political polarization, competitive, nationalized elections, increased fiscal stress and changes in campaign law and practice have all exacerbated pressures to engage in negative messaging in recent years. There are a number of strategies that allow politicians to maneuver around the “blame trap” and avoid policy deadlock in some circumstances, including passing the buck to non-elected bodies and putting in place triggering mechanisms that generate politically unpopular policy changes in the future. All of these strategies have limitations and disadvantages, however, so both blame-generating politics and policy stalemate are likely to be the “new normal” in American politics in the near future.']

[(5, 14)]

ndtceda

Emory-GiKe-Neg-georgetown-Semis.docx

Emory

GiKe

46b48a15c29ed4edda45c3a1ac97e2cdefb6b8f09b34884dd66667285831c584

Interlocutors advocate in favor of a joint approach.

Susan A. Thornton et. al. 21. Thornton is the Senior Fellow, Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School, Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center. Li Nan is Senior Research Fellow - Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of American Studies . Juliet Lee is the Project Manager - National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Forum on Asia-Pacific Security . “Debating North Korea: US and Chinese perspectives.” Brookings. 8-27-2021. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/debating-north-korea-us-and-chinese-perspectives/#:~:text=It%20is%20positive%20that%2C%20although,the%20stability%20of%20the%20peninsula.

China is willing to work with the U.S provided consistent with stability Chinese interlocutors argue in favor of coop on Korea in favor of denuc step-by-step approach and for a dual track

of all the things that might keep your government officials awake at night, this should not be one of them , China is nevertheless willing to work with the U.S . toward denuclearization provided the approach is consistent with maintaining the stability of the peninsula I have heard Chinese interlocutors argue in favor of U.S.-China coop eration on the Korea n Peninsula in favor of a road map for denuc learization that would outline a step-by-step approach , and for a simultaneous dual track on denuclearization and addressing North Korean security concerns

not be one of them willing Chinese interlocutors road map for denuc learization step-by-step approach

['I was very interested to hear of Chinese concerns about a possible U.S.-DPRK axis against China and, in response, I would just say that, of all the things that might keep your government officials awake at night, this should not be one of them. It is positive that, although China suspects that the U.S. is using the DPRK issue as an excuse together with its allies to undermine China’s security, China is nevertheless willing to work with the U.S. toward denuclearization provided the approach is consistent with maintaining the stability of the peninsula. I would like to hear more about what kind of stability you have in mind, but I grant that it is hard to see how a unified Korea of any sort happens without significant turmoil.', 'I have heard Chinese interlocutors argue in favor of U.S.-China cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, in favor of a road map for denuclearization that would outline a step-by-step approach, and for a simultaneous dual track on denuclearization and addressing North Korean security concerns. You indicate that Pyongyang, while regressing in terms of internal repression and state control of the economy, will be more motivated by economic enticements from the outside once it comes out of the pandemic and that this presents an opportunity. I hope you are right; we are still waiting to see. The problem has always been, though, that such economic enticements pale in comparison to what Pyongyang sees as its existential security shield: nuclear weapons capability. The DPRK has shown incredible resilience in the face of sanctions and has even gone as far as to close its border with China, further isolating itself during the pandemic. It is also the case that such economic enticements are exceedingly difficult to offer and bestow, given the objectionable practices of and low trust in the North Korean regime.']

[(9, 28)]

ndtceda

Emory-LoKi-Neg-3---Shirley-Round-5.docx

Emory

LoKi

1a8ee3f8fb878102efd043622d10839dfd1ad3685e2ae73551c430334c5723c2

Counterplan causes congressional follow-on

Brownell 01 --- Roy E. Brownell II, attorney at the Washington, D.C. law firm of Muldoon Murphy & Faucette LLP and a member of the Maryland and District of Columbia Bars, ARTICLE:THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE PRESIDENT'S IMPOUNDMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY FUNDS, 12 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 1 Fall 2001, Lexis

the ICA did not stop Carter from impoundment to force Congress to cut back funding of Bomber and Minuteman proposals prompted congressional momentum against programs ignored the ICA Although Congress complained they acquiesced

Ford engaged in more policy impoundments than Nixon More specifically, with respect to the impoundment of national security funds , the ICA did not stop Carter from using impoundment to force Congress to cut back funding of the B-1 Bomber and Minuteman III missile Carter's rescission proposals against the B-1 bomber and Minuteman III missile programs prompted congressional momentum against both programs In both instances, Carter took steps to terminate production contracts and ignored the ICA Although members of Congress complained bitterly they nevertheless, acquiesced to the President's action

the ICA did not stop B-1 Bomber and Minuteman III missile prompted congressional momentum against both programs terminate production contracts ignored the ICA complained bitterly nevertheless, acquiesced to the President's action

['F. Impoundment following ICA and Train', 'In the period following passage of the ICA, the issue of impoundment largely faded from public view. That is not to say, however, that the practice was discontinued. Quite the contrary, President Ford actually engaged in more policy impoundments than did President Nixon, 282 flooding Congress with hundreds of special messages. 283', "More specifically, with respect to the impoundment of national security funds, the ICA did not stop President Carter from using impoundment to force Congress to cut back funding of the B-1 Bomber and Minuteman III missile. 284 President Carter's rescission proposals against the B-1 bomber and Minuteman III missile programs prompted congressional momentum against both programs. 285 [*54] In both instances, Carter took steps to terminate production contracts prior to sending rescission proposals to Congress, and ignored the strictures of the ICA. 286 Although members of Congress complained bitterly, they, nevertheless, acquiesced to the President's action. 287", '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-JaSc-Neg-ADA-Round-2.docx

MichiganState

JaSc

d2f55ad7b32e7dab20062c4f3e3e096897ab40bba59d88f1f8d485d7d5b8eccf

Alt can’t solve disease innovation---profit driven pharma should be regulated not nationalized.

Ara Darzi 20. Co-director, Institute of Global Health Innovation, Imperial College London. “Is it time to nationalise the pharmaceutical industry?” BMJ 2020 https://www.bmj.com/content/368/bmj.m769.long

profit driven pharma is the worst system apart from all others pharma delivered improvements in global health That is incontestable smallpox HIV drugs antibodies saved millions profits are necessary We need to not destroy it pharma excels at taking ideas and bringing them to market No government could we get value from pharma the downsides can be managed We should not kill it

profit driven pharma is the worst system for discovering new drugs apart from all of the others This familiar trope contains truth There are downsides The challenge is to manage them pharma has delivered transformative improvements in global health That is incontestable The eradication of smallpox discovery of HIV drugs introduction of monoclonal antibodies these saved millions of lives profits are necessary to fund new medicines the last thing we need is a hostile environment We need to foster our innovative and competitive pharmaceutical industry , not destroy it . True profits does not work for every drug class some de-linkage is required, where governments step in Big pharma excels at taking the best ideas and bringing them to market No government could risk the huge sums involved drug companies make profits The flipside is tough regulation we get excellent value from the pharma ceutical industry the downsides of its profit driven nature can be managed We should support, monitor, and regulate it— not kill it .

apart from all of the others truth manage them incontestable eradication of smallpox discovery of HIV drugs monoclonal antibodies millions of lives new medicines hostile environment foster our innovative and competitive pharmaceutical industry excels best ideas bringing them to market No government could tough regulation managed support, monitor, and regulate it— not kill it

['The profit driven pharmaceutical industry is the worst system for discovering new drugs—apart from all of the others. This is a familiar trope, but it contains an important truth. There are downsides to any system. The challenge is to manage them.', 'Over the past 50 years, big pharma has delivered transformative improvements in global health. That is incontestable. The eradication of smallpox, the discovery of HIV drugs, the introduction of monoclonal antibodies: these three alone have saved millions of lives. The UK’s long history of drug discovery and development is the envy of the developed world. The life sciences industry employs 140\u2009000 people in one of the most productive sectors of the economy.', 'Drug companies do make big profits, but these are necessary to fund the enormous costs of developing new medicines. Glaxo spent £19bn (€22.3bn; $24.4bn) on research and development (R&D) over the five years to the end of 2018.13 AstraZeneca spent nearly £30bn.14 Could a state controlled industry match these outlays? Would it?', 'Licensing and de-linkage', 'There are problems. They include “me too” drugs offering minimal gains, excessive advertising, price gouging, lack of transparency, and protectionism. During last year’s election campaign the Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, highlighted patients being “held to ransom” by one manufacturer, Vertex, which was locked in a battle with the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) over Vertex’s £100\u2009000-plus price tag for the cystic fibrosis drug Orkambi.15 It wasn’t pretty, but it was resolved by negotiation, and the drug is now available on the NHS.', 'Yet Mr Corbyn threatened to establish a publicly owned generics company and to strip existing drug companies of their intellectual property by introducing compulsory licensing—which would give the government the right to copy medicines deemed too expensive for the NHS.16', 'With Brexit done, the last thing we need is a hostile environment for intellectual property and entrepreneurship. We need to foster our innovative and competitive pharmaceutical industry, not destroy it. True, an industry that relies on profits does not work for every drug class. There is an urgent need for new last line antibiotics, but the market is too small to generate returns. Here, some form of de-linkage is required, where governments step in with financial guarantees.17', 'Critics of big pharma go further, favouring de-linkage more widely, whereby governments would expand direct funding of R&D.17 Yet governments already fund R&D, through our great science based universities (now doing ground breaking work on the 2019 novel coronavirus). Big pharma excels at the subsequent stage: taking the best ideas generated by scientists and bringing them to market, using its huge financial firepower to navigate the complex regulatory environment. No government could risk the huge sums involved.', 'Successful regulation', 'So, yes: British drug companies make big profits, which are necessary to fund the development of better treatments and save lives. The flipside is tough regulation to manage the downsides.', 'Here, Britain also has a proud record of success. This is the country that developed NICE to ensure that only cost effective drugs were prescribed on the NHS—a model since copied around the world. The consumer regulator, the Competition and Markets Authority, has shown its mettle against big pharma by winning an £8m refund for the NHS last October from Aspen, a company accused of anti-competitive behaviour.18 And the NHS successfully struck a deal with the industry last year—the voluntary pricing and access scheme—under which the growth in NHS sales of branded medicines will be capped at no more than 2% a year for five years from 2019.19', 'The result? Our spending on drugs is lower than most of our European neighbours, amounting to just 12% of total health spending and placing the UK in the bottom quarter of OECD countries.20 The upshot is that we get excellent value from the pharmaceutical industry, and the downsides of its profit driven nature can be managed. We should support, monitor, and regulate it—not kill it.', '']

[(4, 12)]

ndtceda

Emory-HeMi-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Doubles.docx

Emory

HeMi

f6b28d05af7df3071e17e5576fcbed8cfc65fad7887b548c1c4a3ca9b407424c

Congress is laser focused on averting shutdown – the plan disrupts fragile negotiations

Macasasa 1/31 [Joseph Anthony Macasasa, “Congressional Consensus Reached on Key Government Spending Legislation,” https://www.thestockdork.com/congressional-consensus-reached-on-key-government-spending-legislation/, Go Green!!]

bipart negotiators in Congress reached agreement on spending levels for 12 bills. essential to prevent shutdown consensus is key development To avert shutdown Congress must now pass these bills otherwise operational disruptions Joyce emphasized urgency We’re on it. We’re going to continue to focus on that until we get them done.” the tight timeline Diaz-Balart mentioned We don’t have a lot of time. And there’s going to be issues.”

bipart isan negotiators in the U.S. Congress have successfully reached an agreement on spending levels for 12 critical bills. This step is essential to prevent a looming government shutdown in early March. This consensus is a key development after Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson and Democratic Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer previously set a $1.59 trillion discretionary spending level. To avert a partial shutdown of federal agencies, Congress must now pass these 12 bills . The shutdown would otherwise commence on March 1, creating significant operational disruptions . Republican Representative Dave Joyce emphasized the urgency , stating, “ We’re on it. We’re going to continue to focus on that until we get them done.” Acknowledging the tight timeline and potential hurdles, Republican Representative Mario Diaz-Balart mentioned , “ We don’t have a lot of time. And there’s going to be a lot of really, really contentious issues.”

urgency We’re going to continue to focus on that until we get them done.”

['In Washington, bipartisan negotiators in the U.S. Congress have successfully reached an agreement on spending levels for 12 critical bills. This step is essential to prevent a looming government shutdown in early March. The Importance of Agreement This consensus is a key development after Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson and Democratic Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer previously set a $1.59 trillion discretionary spending level. The fiscal agreement is for the year that began on October 1. The Legislative Challenge To avert a partial shutdown of federal agencies, Congress must now pass these 12 bills. The shutdown would otherwise commence on March 1, creating significant operational disruptions. A Commitment to Action Republican Representative Dave Joyce emphasized the urgency, stating, “We’re on it. We’re going to continue to focus on that until we get them done.” Time Constraints and Challenges Acknowledging the tight timeline and potential hurdles, Republican Representative Mario Diaz-Balart mentioned, “We don’t have a lot of time. And there’s going to be a lot of really, really contentious issues.”', '', '', '']

[(0, 8), (8, 8), (9, 13)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuMi-Neg-Texas-Round-2.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

bd06d853d02604bdd2f6bbbb592b9c7e1089ce1e65f21c61bd6bf4176dc93a8c

1. Liberalism is radically reclaimable---the normative rhetoric used in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be retooled to address structural oppression in global hegemony.

Mills 17, Caribbean Philosopher from Jamaica, Ph.D., University of Toronto (Charles Mills, 2017, “Occupy Liberalism!” in Black Rights/ White Wrongs The Critique of Racial Liberalism, pp. 10-17)

liberalism should not be rejected but retrieved for a radical agenda a democratic movement to challenge patriarchy , and white supremacy is more likely successful if it appeals to values Americans already endorse Liberalism has historically been complicit with patriarchy , and supremacy , but this is contingent we need to take into account hypothetical liberalisms could be generated the question is even if dominant liberalisms been conservative why does rule out emancipatory , radical liberalisms? One answer is a normative logic that precludes any development Another is it doesn’t domination is result of group interests can be negotiated by drawing on liberalism itself the second is correct we need a radical agenda with normative liberalism Since liberalism is globally hegemonic , such would have great advantage of appealing to values people endorse radicals would demand a ontology that can accommodate gender and racial oppression But this is not a definitional constituent of liberalism. Liberalism has recognized oppression : absolutism it opposed from the nineteenth century Nazism in the twentieth failure to address structural oppression is a contingent artifact not intrinsic

I am going to argue that liberalism should not be contemptuously rejected by radicals but retrieved for a radical agenda to build a broad democratic movement to challenge plutocracy, patriarchy , and white supremacy in the U nited S tates. is more likely to be successful if it appeals to principles and values most Americans already endorse Liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the U nited S tates. historically been complicit with plutocracy, patriarchy , and white supremacy , but this complicity is a contingent function of dominant group interests rather than the result of an immanent conceptual logic . Therefore, progressives should try to retrieve liberalism for a radical democratic agenda rather than rejecting it, thereby positioning themselves in the ideological mainstream Let me now try to make this argument plausible for an audience likely to be aprioristically convinced of its obvious unsoundness we need to take into account not merely the spectrum of actual liberalisms but also hypothetical liberalisms that could be generated through novel framings one would need to differentiate dominant versions of liberalism from oppositional versions, and actual from possible variants the question then raised is this: even if actual dominant liberalisms have been conservative in various ways (corporate, patriarchal, racist) why does this rule out the development of emancipatory , radical liberalisms? One kind of answer is a n immanent normative logic to liberalism that precludes any emancipatory development of it Another kind of answer is it doesn’t . The historic domination of conservative exclusionary liberalisms is the result of group interests barriers to an emancipatory liberalism can be negotiated by drawing on the normative resources of liberalism itself Most self-described radicals would endorse the first answer . But the second answer is actually the correct one . The obstacles to developing a “ radical liberalism ” are primarily externalist in nature: material group interests we need to try to justify a radical agenda with the normative resources of liberalism rather than writing off liberalism. Since liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the U nited S tates and is now globally hegemonic , such a project would have the great ideological advantage of appealing to values and principles that most people already endorse REASONS WHY LIBERALISM CANNOT BE RADICALIZED (AND MY REPLIES ) Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology Today radicals would demand a richer ontology that can accommodate the realities of gender and racial oppression also. But this evasive ontology is not a definitional constituent of liberalism. Liberalism has certainly recognized some kinds of oppression : the absolutism it opposed from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century Nazism in the twentieth century. Liberalism’s failure to systematically address structural oppression in supposedly liberal-democratic societies is a contingent artifact of the group perspectives and group interests privileged by those structures, not an intrinsic feature of liberalism’s conceptual apparatus

liberalism not rejected retrieved radical agenda democratic movement patriarchy white supremacy U S more likely successful values Americans already endorse always dominant U S complicit patriarchy white supremacy contingent function interests immanent logic retrieve liberalism democratic agenda positioning ideological mainstream an audience aprioristically convinced unsoundness not merely liberalisms hypothetical generated differentiate dominant oppositional possible variants even if dominant conservative rule out emancipatory liberalisms? One answer normative logic precludes any development Another answer it doesn’t domination exclusionary group interests liberalism negotiated liberalism itself radicals first answer second is correct one obstacles radical liberalism externalist justify normative liberalism writing off liberalism dominant U S globally hegemonic great advantage values people endorse CANNOT RADICALIZED MY REPLIES Cannot Group Oppression Ontology richer ontology accommodate gender racial oppression ontology not a definitional constituent certainly recognized oppression opposed nineteenth Nazism twentieth failure address liberal-democratic contingent artifact not an intrinsic feature

['The “Occupy!” movement, which has made headlines around the country, has raised the hopes of young American radicals new to political engagement and revived the hopes of an older generation of radicals still clinging to nostalgic dreams of the glorious ’60s. If the original and still most salient target was Wall Street, a long list of other candidates for “occupation” has since been put forward. In this chapter, I\xa0want to propose as a target for radical occupation the somewhat unusual candidate of liberalism itself. But contrary to the conventional wisdom prevailing within radical circles, I\xa0am going to argue for the heretical thesis that liberalism should not be contemptuously rejected by radicals but retrieved for a radical agenda. Summarized in bullet-point form, my argument is as follows: ', '• The “Occupy Wall Street” movement provides an opportunity unprecedented in decades to build a broad democratic movement to challenge plutocracy, patriarchy, and white supremacy in the United States. ', '• Such a movement is more likely to be successful if it appeals to principles and values most Americans already endorse. ', '• Liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States. ', '• Liberalism in the United States has historically been complicit with plutocracy, patriarchy, and white supremacy, but this complicity is a contingent function of dominant group interests rather than the result of an immanent conceptual\xa0logic. ', '• Therefore, progressives in philosophy (and elsewhere) should try to retrieve liberalism for a radical democratic agenda rather than rejecting it, thereby positioning themselves in the ideological mainstream of the country and seeking its transformation.', 'Let me now try to make this argument plausible for an audience likely to be aprioristically convinced of its obvious unsoundness.', 'PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATION OF\xa0TERMS', 'First we need to clarify the key terms of “radicalism” and “liberalism.” While of course a radicalism of the right exists, here I\xa0refer to radicals who are progressives. But “progressive” cannot just denote the left of the political spectrum, since the whole point of the “new social movements” of the 1960s onward was that the traditional left-right political spectrum, predicated on varying positions on the question of public versus private ownership of the means of production, did not exhaust the topography of the political. Issues of gender and racial domination were to a significant extent “orthogonal” to this one-dimensional trope. So I\xa0will use “radicalism” broadly, though still in the zone of progressive politics, to refer generally to ideas/concepts/principles/values endorsing pro-egalitarian structural change to reduce or eliminate unjust hierarchies of domination.', '“Liberalism” may denote both a political philosophy and the institutions and practices characteristically tied to that political philosophy. My focus will be on the former. The issue of how bureaucratic logics may prove refractory to reformist agendas is undeniably an important one, but it does not really fall into the purview of philosophy proper. My aim is to challenge the radical shibboleth that radical ideas/concepts/principles/values are incompatible with liberalism. Given the deep entrenchment of this assumption in the worldview of most radicals, refuting it would still be an accomplishment, even if working out practical details of operationalization are delegated to other\xa0hands.', 'In the United States, of course, “liberalism” in public parlance and everyday political discourse is used in such a way that it really denotes left-liberalism specifically (“left” by the standards of a country whose political center of gravity has shifted right in recent decades). In this vocabulary, right-liberals are then categorized as “conservatives”—in the market sense, as against the Burkean sense. On the other hand, some on the right would insist that only they, the heirs to the classic liberalism of John Locke and Adam Smith, are really entitled to the “liberal” designation. Later welfarist theorists are fraudulent pretenders to be exposed as socialist intruders unworthy of the title. Rejecting both of these usages, I\xa0will be employing “liberalism” in the expanded sense typical of political philosophy, which links both ends of this spectrum. “Liberalism” then refers broadly to the anti-feudal ideology of individualism, equal rights, and moral egalitarianism that arises in Western Europe in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries to challenge the ideas and values inherited from the old medieval order, and which is subsequently taken up and developed by others elsewhere, including many who would have been explicitly excluded by the original conception of the ideology. Left-wing social democrats and right-wing market conservatives, fans of John Rawls on the one hand and Robert Nozick on the other, are thus both liberals.1', 'From this perspective, it will be appreciated that liberalism is not a monolith but an umbrella term for a variety of positions. Here are some examples—some familiar, some perhaps less so: ', 'VARIETIES OF LIBERALISM', 'Left-wing (social democratic) vs. Right-wing (market conservative) Kantian vs. Lockean Contractarian vs. Utilitarian Corporate vs. Democratic Social vs. Individualist Comprehensive vs. Political Ideal-theory vs. Non-ideal-theory Patriarchal vs. Feminist Imperial vs. Anti-imperial Racial vs. Anti-racial Color-blind vs. Color-conscious Etc.2', 'It is not the case, of course, that these different species of liberalism have been equally represented in the ideational sphere or equally implemented in the institutional sphere. On the contrary, some have been dominant while others have been subordinate, and some have never, at least in the full sense, been implemented at all. But nonetheless, I\xa0 suggest they all count as liberalisms and as such they are all supposed to have certain elements in common, even those characterized by gender and racial exclusions. (My motivation for making these last varieties of liberalism rather than deviations from liberalism is precisely to challenge liberalism’s self-congratulatory history, which holds an idealized liberalism aloft, untainted by its actual record of complicity with oppressive social systems.) So the initial question we should always ask people making generalizations about “liberalism” is this:\xa0 What particular variety of liberalism do you mean? And are your generalizations really true about all the possible kinds of liberalism, or only a subset?', 'Here is a characterization of liberalism from a very respectable source, the British political theorist, John\xa0Gray:', 'Common to all variants of the liberal tradition is a definite conception, distinctively modern in character, of man and society…. It is individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the claims of any social collectivity; egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men the same moral status and denies the relevance to legal or political order of differences in moral worth among human beings; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species and according a secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms; and meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements. It is this conception of man and society which gives liberalism a definite identity which transcends its vast internal variety and complexity.3', 'What generate the different varieties of liberalism are different concepts of individualism, different claims about how egalitarianism should be construed or realized, more or less inclusionary readings of universalism (Gray’s characterization sanitizes liberalism’s actual sexist and racist history), different views of what count as desirable improvements, conflicting normative balancings of liberal values (freedom, equality) and competing theoretical prognoses about how best they can be realized in the light of (contested) socio-historical facts. The huge potential for disagreement about all of these explains how a common liberal core can produce such a wide range of variants. Moreover, we need to take into account not merely the spectrum of actual liberalisms but also hypothetical liberalisms that could be generated through novel framings of some or all of the above. So one would need to differentiate dominant versions of liberalism from oppositional versions, and actual from possible variants.', 'Once the breadth of the range of liberalisms is appreciated—dominant and subordinate, actual and potential—the obvious question then raised is this:\xa0even if actual dominant liberalisms have been conservative in various ways (corporate, patriarchal, racist) why does this rule out the development of emancipatory, radical liberalisms?', 'One kind of answer is the following (call this the internalist answer):\xa0because there is an immanent conceptual/normative logic to liberalism as a political ideology that precludes any emancipatory development\xa0of\xa0it.', 'Another kind of answer is the following (call this the externalist answer):\xa0it doesn’t. The historic domination of conservative exclusionary liberalisms is the result of group interests, group power, and successful group political projects. Apparent internal conceptual/normative barriers to an emancipatory liberalism can be successfully negotiated by drawing on the conceptual/normative resources of liberalism itself, in conjunction with a revisionist socio-historical picture of modernity.', 'Most self-described radicals would endorse—indeed, reflexively, as an obvious truth—the first answer. But as indicated from the beginning, I\xa0think the second answer is actually the correct one. The obstacles to developing a “radical liberalism” are, in my opinion, primarily externalist in nature:\xa0material group interests, and the way they have shaped hegemonic varieties of liberalism. So I think we need to try to justify a radical agenda with the normative resources of liberalism rather than writing off liberalism. Since liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States and is now globally hegemonic, such a project would have the great ideological advantage of appealing to values and principles that most people already endorse. All projects of egalitarian social transformation are going to face a combination of material, political, and ideological obstacles, but this strategy would at least reduce somewhat the dimensions of the last. One would be trying to win mass support for policies that—and the challenge will, of course, be to demonstrate this—are justifiable by majoritarian norms, once reconceived and put in conjunction with facts not always familiar to the majority. Material barriers (vested group interests) and political barriers (organizational difficulties) will of course remain. But they will constitute a general obstacle for all egalitarian political programs, and as such cannot be claimed to be peculiar problems for an emancipatory liberalism.', 'But the contention will be that such a liberalism cannot be developed. Why? Here are ten familiar objections, variants of internalism, and my replies to\xa0them.', 'TEN REASONS WHY LIBERALISM CANNOT BE RADICALIZED (AND MY REPLIES)', '1. Liberalism Has an\xa0Asocial, Atomic Individualist Ontology', 'This is one of the oldest radical critiques of liberalism; it can be found in Marx’s derisive comments—for example, in the Grundrisse—about the “Robinsonades” of the social contract theory whose “golden age” (1650– 1800) had long passed by the time he began his intellectual and political career:', 'The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who forms the starting-point with Smith and Ricardo belongs to the insipid illusions of the eighteenth century. They are Robinson Crusoe stories … no more based on such a naturalism than is Rousseau’s contrat social which makes naturally independent individuals come in contact and have mutual intercourse by contract…. Man is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon politikon, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society. Production by individuals outside society … is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language without individuals living together and talking to one another.4', 'But several replies can be made to this indictment. To begin with, even if the accusation is true of contractarian liberalism, not all liberalisms are contractarian. Utilitarian liberalism rests on different theoretical foundations, as does the late nineteenth-century British liberalism of T.\xa0H. Green and his colleagues:\xa0a Hegelian, social liberalism.5 Closer to home, of course, we have John Dewey’s brand of liberalism. Moreover, even within the social contract tradition, resources exist for contesting the assumptions of the Hobbesian/Lockean version of the contract. Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (1755) (nowhere cited by Marx) rethinks the “contract” to make it a contract entered into after the formation of society, and thus the creation of socialized human beings. So the ontology presupposed is explicitly a social one. In any case, the contemporary revival of contractarianism initiated by John Rawls’s 1971 A Theory of Justice makes the contract a thought-experiment, a “device of representation,” rather than a literal or even metaphorical anthropological account.6 The communitarian/contractarian debates of the 1980s onward recapitulated much of the “asocial” critique of contractarian liberalism (though usually without a radical edge). But as Rawls pointed out against Michael Sandel, for example, one needs to distinguish the figures in the thought-experiment from real human beings.7 And radicals should be wary about accepting a communitarian ontology and claims about the general good that deny or marginalize the dynamics of group domination in actual societies represented as “communities.” The great virtue of contractarian liberal individualism is the conceptual room it provides for hegemonic norms to be critically evaluated through the epistemic and moral distancing from Sittlichkeit that the contract, as an intellectual device, provides.', '2. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in\xa0Its Ontology—I (Macro)', 'The second point needs to be logically distinguished from the first, since a theory could acknowledge the social shaping of individuals while denying that group oppression is central to that shaping. (So #1 is necessary, but not sufficient, for #2.) The Marxist critique, of course, was supposed to encapsulate both points:\xa0people were shaped by society and society (post-“primitive communism”) was class dominated. The ontology was social and it was an ontology of class. Today radicals would demand a richer ontology that can accommodate the realities of gender and racial oppression also. But whatever candidates are put forward, the key claim is that a liberal framework cannot accommodate an ontology of groups in relations of domination and subordination. To the extent that liberalism recognizes social groups, these are basically conceived of as voluntary associations that one chooses to join or not join, which is obviously very different from, say, class, race, and gender memberships.', 'But this evasive ontology, which obfuscates the most central and obvious fact about all societies since humanity exited the hunting-and-gathering stage—that is, that they are characterized by oppressions of one kind or another—is not a definitional constituent of liberalism. Liberalism has certainly recognized some kinds of oppression:\xa0the absolutism it opposed from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, the Nazism and Stalinism it opposed in the twentieth century. Liberalism’s failure to systematically address structural oppression in supposedly liberal-democratic societies is a contingent artifact of the group perspectives and group interests privileged by those structures, not an intrinsic feature of liberalism’s conceptual apparatus.', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Aff-6---Brick-City-Round-Robin-Round-5.docx

Kansas

MaPa

9c6cca541d3fe3964131dbbe9bf6aad2353c7e53068ddf2e7c04b59b84e8449a

Independently the plan resolves confusion caused by the boundaries of the ‘firm’ in first amendment boycotting privileges.

Paul 19 - (Sanjukta Paul, Assistant Professor of Law at Wayne State University; 2019, Duke Law Journal: Law and Contemporary Problems, "Fissuring and The Firm Exemption," doa: 2-20-2022) url: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4919&context=lcp

The Court incorporated coordination rights determined under antitrust into expressive boycotts . The Court’s rejection of the boycott revolved around special advantage sought by lawyers’ and equality the Court agreed were preconditions of the free market sought by Claiborne . characterization as special relies on particular coordination rights antitrust chose to espouse . collective action would be no more special han other forms Both the majority and the dissent limited the First Amendment’s reach reading Chicago School antitrust into the First Amendment the Court held economic boycotts by service-providers or small producers were unprotected a concept that requires the firm exemption Thus Trial Lawyers , the purest expression of the firm exemption

Extending Antitrust’s Allocation of Coordination Rights to the First Amendment The Court incorporated its preferred allocation of economic coordination rights , determined under antitrust , into its construction of the First Amendment law of expressive boycotts . The Court’s rejection of the application of Claiborne Hardware to the lawyers’ boycott revolved around the fundamental distinction it drew between the aims of the two boycotts: “ special ” advantage in the market ( sought by the lawyers’ boycott ), and “ equality and freedom ” that the Court agreed were “ preconditions of the free market ” ( sought by the Claiborne Hardware boycott) . Many have pointed out the problem with putting “ labor subordination ” in a different constitutional category than “ racial subordination .” the characterization of the lawyers’ boycott as special market advantage relies up on the particular allocation of coordination rights that antitrust has chose n to espouse . collective action among the lawyers would be no more a “ special ” market advantage t han other forms of coordination that the Court permits. the purpose of the boycott was also defined as a private advantage from the outset the Trial Lawyers opinion epitomizes the antitrust reasoning that dominates today, so far as ordering producers’ and workers’ interests are concerned this ordering is a judgment the Court imported into its construction of the First Amendment . Both the majority and the dissent limited the First Amendment’s reach in the case of boycotts to the political rather than the economic The majority’s application of this distinction relied upon reading Chicago School antitrust ’s allocation of coordination rights into the First Amendment law of expressive boycotts , in that an unprotected economic boycott was defined in terms of “special” market advantage . the Court held that economic boycotts for reasonable rates by service-providers or small producers were unprotected by the First Amendment specifically because they seek “special advantage ,” a concept that requires the normative framework of Chicago School antitrust and the firm exemption . Thus , Trial Lawyers , the purest expression of the firm exemption also extends this allocation of coordination rights to the First Amendment

Coordination Rights First Amendment preferred allocation economic coordination rights determined under antitrust construction First Amendment law of expressive boycotts Claiborne Hardware lawyers’ boycott fundamental distinction “ special ” advantage in the market lawyers’ boycott equality and freedom labor subordination different constitutional category racial subordination characterization special market advantage on the particular allocation of coordination rights antitrust chose to espouse collective action no more a “ special ” market advantage other forms of coordination boycott private advantage Trial Lawyers opinion antitrust reasoning dominates ordering producers’ workers’ interests imported First Amendment limited First Amendment’s reach boycotts political economic Chicago School antitrust ’s allocation First Amendment expressive boycotts “special” market advantage economic boycotts service-providers small producers unprotected seek “special advantage normative framework firm exemption Trial Lawyers the firm exemption extends this allocation First Amendment

['', 'B. Extending Antitrust’s Allocation of Coordination Rights to the First Amendment', 'The Court then incorporated its preferred allocation of economic coordination rights, determined under antitrust, into its construction of the First Amendment law of expressive boycotts. The Court was principally concerned with the applicability of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 66 which also involved a boycott. The Court’s rejection of the application of Claiborne Hardware to the lawyers’ boycott revolved around the fundamental distinction it drew between the aims of the two boycotts: “special” advantage in the market (sought by the lawyers’ boycott), and “equality and freedom” that the Court agreed were “preconditions of the free market” (sought by the Claiborne Hardware boycott).67 Many have queried and pointed out the problem with putting “labor subordination” in a different constitutional category than “racial subordination.”68 Additionally, the characterization of the lawyers’ boycott as special market advantage—in contrast to a precondition of the free market— relies upon the particular allocation of coordination rights that antitrust has chosen to espouse. As discussed in the preceding section, collective action among the lawyers would be no more a “special” market advantage than other forms of coordination that the Court permits.', 'Thus, the purpose of the boycott was also defined as a private advantage from the outset.69 This is in contrast to the Court’s placement of consumer welfare in its normative framework as, effectively, a public value. But after all, consumer benefit is also simply a benefit to a particular set of actors in the market, yet the Court emphasized only the absence of public value in benefits to producers. 70 Whether one considers the situation specifically in terms of labor subordination or not, it is plausible to consider a producer-oriented norm like making a reasonable living, fair competition, or fair rates as a public value to be considered along with others, including consumer welfare.71 However one ultimately decides to value these considerations, the evaluation should not begin by placing one consideration in the category of public value and the other in the category of private value. In this and other ways, the Trial Lawyers opinion epitomizes the antitrust reasoning that dominates today, so far as ordering producers’ and workers’ interests are concerned.', 'Importantly, this ordering is a judgment the Court imported into its construction of the First Amendment. Both the majority and the dissent in Trial Lawyers limited the First Amendment’s reach in the case of boycotts to the political rather than the economic, while reaching different conclusions regarding which side the lawyers’ boycott fell on.72 The majority’s application of this distinction relied upon reading Chicago School antitrust’s allocation of coordination rights into the First Amendment law of expressive boycotts, in that an unprotected economic boycott was defined in terms of “special” market advantage. In other words, the Court held that economic boycotts for reasonable rates by service-providers or small producers were unprotected by the First Amendment specifically because they seek “special advantage,” a concept that requires the normative framework of Chicago School antitrust and the firm exemption.73 Special market advantage is defined by a normative benchmark constituted by antitrust’s preferred and disfavored coordination mechanisms (firm-based and horizontal, respectively). The holding thus incorporates the conventional antitrust understanding that coordination outside business firms is special and usually disfavored—but it is now also a holding about what the First Amendment protects, not only about what is not permitted under antitrust. Thus, Trial Lawyers, the purest expression of the Court’s rule against horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries, is itself an object lesson in the firm exemption, and it also extends this allocation of coordination rights to the First Amendment.74', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-00NDT-Doubles.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-00NDT-Doubles.docx

8443004881532d607156921e3f8f65e1d71301b98a767283db51c808d35d2f4c

Deterrence is unquantifiable.

Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail Hall 9/8. Professor of Economics at George Mason University and the Associate Director of the F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the Mercatus Center. Associate Professor in Economics at the University of Tampa. “Nuclear Deterrence Melts Down: The Limits of Deterrence & Alternative Paths to Peace.” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4559465

whether others can be deterred at all and quantity and quality of weapons necessary knowledge is not possible to obtain There are no well-established criteria for gauging deterrence ignores role perceptions play nuc s creates perceptual dilemma parties prefer to cooperate believe other will take advantage takes increasingly aggressive actions to avoid appearing weak incentivized accumulation perceptions from deterrence-related actions run counter to deterrence

nuclear deterrence assumes government has requisite knowledge to accomplish stated ends knowledge of whether others can be deterred at all and quantity and quality of weapons necessary to effectively deter knowledge is not possible to obtain T here is just no way for military leaders to know when their country accumulated enough nuclear firepower to satisfy requirement of effective deterrent There are simply no well-established and accepted criteria for gauging deterrence assumption nuclear deterrence ignores role perceptions play Acquiring nuc lear weapon s in name of deterrence creates certain perceptions that influence behaviors of others perceptual dilemma parties prefer to cooperate but believe other will take advantage each side takes increasingly aggressive actions to avoid appearing weak deterrence activities reinforce other side’s perception actions aimed at cooperation met with opportunism result being conflict and confrontation become more likely as both sides seek to flex military might incentivized accumulation of weapons knowledge problem regarding nuclear weapons is how one actor’s actions influence subjective perceptions of others cannot be fully anticipated ex ante perceptual dilemma perceptions resulting from deterrence-related actions result in outcome with less peace and security run ning counter to main justification for deterrence

requisite knowledge deterred at all quantity quality effectively deter not possible just no way military leaders effective deterrent simply no accepted criteria perceptions name of deterrence certain perceptions perceptual dilemma cooperate take advantage increasingly aggressive appearing weak other side’s perception opportunism more likely accumulation of weapons knowledge problem subjective perceptions fully anticipated deterrence-related actions main justification

['The argument in favor of nuclear deterrence assumes that the acquiring government has the requisite knowledge to accomplish the stated ends. This includes knowledge of whether others can be deterred at all and, if they can, the quantity and quality of weapons necessary to effectively deter. But this knowledge is not possible to obtain. As Barash (2018) notes, ', '[T]here is just no way for civilian or military leaders to know when their country has accumulated enough nuclear firepower to satisfy the requirement of having an ‘effective deterrent’. For example, if one side is willing to be annihilated in a counterattack, it simply cannot be deterred, no matter the threatened retaliation. Alternatively, if one side is convinced of the other’s implacable hostility, or of its presumed indifference to loss of life, no amount of weaponry can suffice (n.p.) ', 'In these scenarios, the acquisition of nuclear weapons yields nothing in terms of deterrence while reducing safety and security due to the issues with errors in command and control discussed in a subsequent sub-section below. ', 'Consider a contemporary example. According to SIPRI (2023b), the total U.S. government’s warhead stockpile (all deployed warheads plus warheads in storage that could potentially be deployed after preparation) is 3,708 as of January 2023. Russia’s total is estimated to be 4,489 while China’s is 410 (p. 248). What ratio would lead to adequate deterrence between the three countries? If the U.S. government increased it stockpile by 50%, holding the stockpile of others constant, would that deter Russia and China more, less, or not at all from deploying their nuclear weapons? What if Russia or China increased their stockpiles? There are simply no well-established and accepted criteria for gauging deterrence. ', 'The assumption of the necessity of nuclear deterrence also ignores the role that perceptions play in human interactions. We have expectations of how others will behave towards us based partially on past behaviors, and based partially on the actions that people take in the present. Acquiring nuclear weapons in the name of deterrence creates certain perceptions that influence the behaviors of others. The importance of perceptions is captured in the idea of the “perceptual dilemma” which exists when parties prefer to cooperate but believe the other will take advantage of their peace-making actions (Plous 1988, 1993). When these perceptions exist, each side takes increasingly aggressive actions in order to avoid appearing weak. One problem with deterrence activities is that they reinforce the other side’s perception that actions aimed at cooperation will be met with opportunism; the result being that conflict and confrontation become more likely as both sides seek to flex their military might. ', 'Plous (1988, 1993) applies the logic of the perceptual dilemma to the arms race between the United States government and the Soviet Union. In his telling, leaders of both countries truly preferred mutual disarmament to other outcomes. Both sides, he argues, wanted to avoid unilateral disarmament and perceived the other side as preferring unilateral armament to all other outcomes. In other words, this was a matter of perception of the preferences of others. ', 'Because each side viewed the other as preferring unilateral armament to mutual disarmament, it incentivized the accumulation of weapons. The subsequent arms race reinforced these perceptions and made mutual disarmament — the true preferred outcome — even less likely. Part of the knowledge problem regarding nuclear weapons is how one actor’s actions will influence the subjective perceptions of others in ways that cannot be fully anticipated ex ante (Jervis 1976). The logic of the perceptual dilemma clarifies how the perceptions resulting from deterrence-related actions can result in an outcome with less peace and security, running counter to the main justification for deterrence. ', '']

[(15, 22), (31, 39)]

ndtceda

Emory-OkYa-Aff-kansas-Round-6.docx

Emory

OkYa

6f461e88444fb9e2eebc72890a2c1b57232185961a7a62894f697cc9d64786b2

Nearest person means the DAO is the property of someone who can go bankrupt or have it seized---destroys user certainty

Max Ganado 18, retired attorney formerly Managing Partner and Senior Partner at Ganado Advocates, currently a consultant to the firm; and Steve Tendon, Director at ChainStrategies, 6/6/18, “Legal Personality For Blockchains, DAOs And Smart Contracts,” https://www.mondaq.com/fin-tech/707696/legal-personality-for-blockchains-daos-and-smart-contracts

If a business face bankruptcy assets do not become immune because they take form of a Tech Arrangement how can one guarantee continued usage by third parties a matter of protecting millions of people Arrangement needs to stand on its own, from a legal point Without a legal entity marking its own assets user assets may be seized patrimonies from legal personality are important liability assets must not be caught in bankruptcy managed by acknowledging the Arrangement as a separate legal entity

businesses will be built around Blockchain technologies, and they will seek to generate profits businesses will somehow be considered the owners of the Technology Arrangements that they create and deploy to a Blockchain. Yet businesses come and go . If a business has to face bankruptcy , their assets do not become immune from seizure just because they take the form of a Tech nology Arrangement on a Blockchain due to the autonomy of the Technology Arrangement , it might have evolved as to supporting use cases that go beyond the actual scope of accountability/liability of the original designer business how can one guarantee the continued legal usage of the Technology Arrangement by other third parties in such a case of extended use cases? It becomes a matter of protecting potentially millions of people who trust the Technology Arrangement and to let them continue to exercise that trust, rather than trusting the designer ; a designer who might go bankrupt or simply pass away Tech nology Arrangement needs to be able to stand on its own, from a legal point of view because that clarity of patrimonial segregation from the patrimonies of every other legal or natural persons in the world means the user assets on the blockchain can never be confused with the software owned by the legal entity and used to secure or enforce an obligation of the legal entity. Without a legal entity clearly marking off its own assets available for recourse, user assets may be seized and use to settle an obligation arising from a loss caused on the blockchain by causes totally unrelated to the user Most people would see the irrationality of making users jointly and severally liable with the underlying operating technology but in litigious communities and aggressive litigants who have suffered serious loss there is no rhyme or reason . Segregated patrimonies resulting from legal personality are a very important starting point in drawing lines for liability purposes assets hosted by the Technology Arrangement must not be caught in any bankruptcy process that hits the original designer business for obvious reasons . There might be provisions to pass on the ownership of the entity to someone else; but more easily this can be managed by acknowledging the Technology Arrangement as a separate legal entity , with its own legal personality the original designer business can no longer be considered as the owner of the Technology Arrangement and of the assets controlled by the Technology Arrangement

businesses come and go Tech due to the autonomy of the Technology Arrangement protecting potentially millions of people who trust the Technology Arrangement rather than trusting the designer Tech needs to be able to stand on its own, from a legal point of view can never be confused with the software owned by the legal entity Without a legal entity clearly marking off its own assets user assets may be seized and use to settle an obligation totally unrelated to the user no rhyme or reason a very important starting point in drawing lines for liability purposes must not be caught in any bankruptcy process that hits the original designer business for obvious reasons more easily this can be managed by acknowledging the Technology Arrangement as a separate legal entity

['Case of Technology Arrangement Protection', 'It is clear that businesses will be built around Blockchain technologies, and that they will seek to generate profits. Therefore, businesses will somehow be considered the owners of the Technology Arrangements that they create and deploy to a Blockchain. Yet, as we saw above, businesses come and go. If for whatever reason a business has to face bankruptcy, their assets do not become immune from seizure just because they take the form of a Technology Arrangement on a Blockchain. However due to the autonomy of the Technology Arrangement, it might have evolved as to supporting use cases that go beyond the actual scope of accountability/liability of the original designer business. The issue that is raised is: how can one guarantee the continued legal usage of the Technology Arrangement by other third parties in such a case of extended use cases?', 'It becomes a matter of protecting potentially millions of people who trust the Technology Arrangement (the Bitcoin network, to give a clear example), and to let them continue to exercise that trust, rather than trusting the designer; a designer who might go bankrupt or simply pass away.', 'The Technology Arrangement needs to be able to stand on its own, from a legal point of view because that clarity of patrimonial segregation from the patrimonies of every other legal or natural persons in the world means that the user assets on the blockchain can never be confused with the software owned by the legal entity and used to secure or enforce an obligation of the legal entity. Without a legal entity clearly marking off its own assets available for recourse, user assets may potentially be seized and use to settle an obligation arising from a loss caused on the blockchain by causes totally unrelated to the user18. That becomes more possible when the user has a vote or other means of influencing administration as we see with miners or token holders which are structured like shares in a company. Most people would see the irrationality of making users jointly and severally liable with the underlying operating technology but in litigious communities and aggressive litigants who have suffered serious loss there is no rhyme or reason. Segregated patrimonies resulting from legal personality are therefore a very important starting point in drawing lines for liability purposes.', 'The assets hosted by the Technology Arrangement must not be caught in any bankruptcy process that hits the original designer business for obvious reasons. There might be provisions to pass on the ownership of the entity to someone else; but more easily this can be managed by acknowledging the Technology Arrangement as a separate legal entity, with its own legal personality. The indirect consequence is also that the original designer business can no longer be considered as the owner of the Technology Arrangement and of the assets controlled by the Technology Arrangement; notwithstanding that the business is the creator of the Technology Arrangement.']

[(4, 13)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Aff-Texas-Open-Round-1.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

1b7ad56755c1c5731436dbc424ecaa89b6bd49239dece60ec6fcb73b48fff66d

2) China coop---U.S.-Iran war decimates U.S. soft power and boosts Chinese leadership---they’ll see the U.S. in terminal decline and have no incentive to make deals or moderate

Nathan Levine 19, U.S.-China relations fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, 5/29/19, “China Will Be the True Winner of a U.S.-Iran War,” https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-will-be-true-winner-us-iran-war-60052

U S is locked into confrontation with China tough approach enjoys bipart support Iran war would achieve nothing U S long-term global position When U S invaded Iraq China began to improve its relative power the same mistake greater scale Iran conflict would be soft-power disaster China could support Iran conflict would disastrously weaken position vis-à-vis China leaving China free to fulfill ambitions surpassing the U S and leading evolution of the global system

The U S is locked into an intensifying confrontation with China America abandoned hope China could be persuaded to liberalize and become a “responsible stakeholder” in the U.S.-led liberal international order tough approach to China enjoys broad bipart isan support the country is being driven toward war by the long-running irrational obsession with Iran while such a war might benefit some of America’s so-called allies in the Middle East it would achieve nothing for the U S s’ long-term global position When the U S invaded Iraq China ’s leadership began to speak gleefully of the surprising two-decade-long “period of strategic opportunity breathing space in which China could improve its relative power while the U S squandered its strength America may be about to make the same mistake again, but an even greater scale Iran conflict would be a soft-power disaster that damages U.S. international standing conflict would quickly become a new quagmire that makes our military struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan look simple China and Russia could easily provide material support to Iran in any conflict with their American rival such a conflict would disastrously weaken America’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis China at the worst possible time Iran Derangement Syndrome may thus end up leaving China free to fulfill its ambitions of surpassing the U S economically, securing military predominance in the Western Pacific, and achieving a leading role in the evolution of the global system

U S abandoned enjoys broad bipart isan support achieve nothing for the U S s’ long-term global position U S U S an even greater scale soft-power disaster disastrously weaken America’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis China worst possible time leaving China free to fulfill its ambitions surpassing the U S

['The United States is locked into an intensifying confrontation with China, and relations continue to rapidly deteriorate. In the past several weeks alone trade talks have broken down, President Donald Trump has raised tariffs on Chinese goods, and signed an order blacklisting China’s Huawei from purchasing American technology. Chinese state media is flooded with nationalist rhetoric preparing the Chinese public for “protracted war” on trade, and warning Americans that they will be the “most difficult opponents they have ever met since 1776.”', 'These tensions are aftershocks of a tectonic shift in America’s approach to China, as the Trump administration transitions from four decades of strategic “engagement” with Beijing to a new era of “strategic competition.” Trump has abandoned the naive hope that China could be persuaded to liberalize and become a “responsible stakeholder” in the U.S.-led liberal international order, and this adjustment is one for which he deserves significant credit. Indeed, Trump’s tough approach to China is the one area where he enjoys broad bipartisan support, as even in badly divided Washington there is growing recognition that China will be the most formidable geostrategic competitor the United States has ever faced.', 'Yet at the very moment when the United States faces its greatest strategic challenge since the Cold War, if not ever, some in the administration appear utterly distracted, beating the drums of war over an entirely less relevant threat: Iran.', 'In reaction to what they say is an Iranian threat to U.S. forces, the administration has in recent days deployed an aircraft carrier and B-52 bombers to the Persian Gulf, and it has prepared a plan to deploy up to 120,000 troops to region.', 'Despite the current crisis apparently being the result of misinterpreted intelligence, the country is nonetheless being driven toward war by the long-running irrational obsession with Iran that dominates the minds of some of Trump’s closest advisers, namely National Security Adviser John Bolton (of “Bomb, Bomb Iran” fame) and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.', 'This obsession is irrational because, while such a war might benefit some of America’s so-called allies in the Middle East, namely Saudi Arabia, it would achieve nothing for the United States’ long-term global position.', 'When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, China’s leadership began to speak gleefully of the surprising two-decade-long “period of strategic opportunity” that had just landed in their lap, breathing space in which China could improve its relative power while the United States squandered its strength. Now, America may be about to make the same mistake again, but on an even greater scale.', 'Keeping in mind that Iran is three times the size and population of Iraq, and that its military forces are far more formidable, there is simply no possibility that a war with the country would be anything other than a mess. At best a short conflict would be a soft-power disaster that damages U.S. international standing. But, more likely, the conflict would quickly become a new quagmire that makes our military struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan look simple by comparison.', 'This is made all the more likely by the fact that China and Russia could easily provide material support to Iran in any conflict with their American rival, including through the handy network of infrastructure links China is building across Central Asia as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.', 'So, leaving aside all the other reasons war in the Middle East might be a bad idea, such a conflict would disastrously weaken America’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis China at the worst possible time, expending and diminishing U.S. military and economic strength when every ounce of that strength is needed to balance a rapidly rising China.', 'Iran Derangement Syndrome may thus end up being catastrophic to America’s long-term national interest, extending the “period of strategic opportunity” beyond Beijing’s wildest dreams and leaving China free to fulfill its ambitions of surpassing the United States economically, securing military predominance in the Western Pacific, and achieving a leading role in the evolution of the global system.', '', '']

[(7, 16)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-HiZi-Neg-Wake-Round-3.docx

Northwestern

HiZi

d20968cab09acfbf6b28da8b262ff4904b34ba2914c22523fe174bb1ab7d8853

Alt causes to economic implosion—Dr. Doom opinions.

Bove 11—8 (*Tristan Bove: Editorial fellow with Fortune; Degrees in International Studies and Chinese from DePaul University, 11-8-2022, "Nouriel Roubini says it's 'mission impossible' for the U.S. to avoid a recession," Fortune, https://fortune.com/2022/11/08/nouriel-roubini-interview-mission-impossible-to-avoid-us-recession-hard-landing/)

a recession are all but guaranteed says Roubini professor emeritus inflation rate is 8.2% only a steep spike in unemployment might fix it never been an episode where inflation was 5% and unemployment was below 5% when raising rates avoided a hard landing it’s going to be mission impossible factors could collide that combines elements of 70s energy shocks and 08 financial crash downturn will be severe and protracted rising debt supply-chain issues and a energy crisis debt reached new heights topping $31 trillion high inflation with slower growth could lead to stagflation

if history is any indication a recession and an economic “hard landing” are all but guaranteed says Nouriel Roubini professor emeritus at New York University’s Stern School of Business and CEO of Roubini Macro Associates He earned the nickname Dr. Doom for his prophetic visions of looming economic downturns including an accurate prediction of the 2008 housing crash and market crisis With the U.S. annual inflation rate as high as it is 8.2% only a deep recession and a steep spike in unemployment might be enough to fix it there has never been an episode where inflation was above 5% and unemployment was below 5% when the Fed started raising rates and avoided a hard landing it’s going to be near mission impossible to avoid a hard landing any continued economic downturn may result in something worse Multiple factors could collide to create a recession that combines the elements of the two worst financial crises in recent U.S. history the 19 70s energy shocks and the 20 08 financial crash the coming downturn will not be “short and shallow” and is instead likely to be “ severe and more protracted .” a confluence of factors including rising national debt levels supply-chain issues and a global energy crisis could bring together the worst of historically bad economic downturns Th e war in Ukraine has severely disrupted global energy markets Natural gas is expected to remain in low supply the war has agg ravated an oil crunch that started during the pandemic a big difference with the 1970s and a worrying parallel with the downturn of the late 2000s is the soaring level of U.S. national debt the U.S. national debt has reached new heights The U.S. government went on a borrowing spree in the earlier days of the pandemic that borrowing has returned with a vengeance with the national debt topping $31 trillion we have negative supply shocks worse than the ’70s And we have the worst of the GFC because the debt ratios are through the roof resulting combination might push the U.S. economy into something worse than a recession as high inflation combined with slower economic growth due to high debt levels could lead to stagflation

history recession economic “hard landing” guaranteed Nouriel Roubini Dr. Doom looming economic downturns accurate prediction 2008 housing crash market crisis 8.2% deep recession steep spike in unemployment 5% 5% hard landing near mission impossible worse Multiple factors could collide to create a recession that combines the elements of the 70s energy shocks and 08 financial crash severe and more protracted rising national debt levels supply-chain issues global energy crisis Ukraine global energy markets low supply oil crunch soaring level of U.S. national debt new heights borrowing spree vengeance $31 trillion through the roof high inflation slower economic growth stagflation

['', 'The Federal Reserve is playing a complicated balancing act with huge implications. It’s trying to slow the economy bit by bit through interest rate hikes to reduce soaring inflation, while not tipping the economy into a recession.', 'Fed Chairman Jerome Powell still says it’s possible to cool the economy and keep employment stable—all without causing a severe downturn, in what would be a “soft landing.” ', 'But if history is any indication, a recession and an economic “hard landing” are all but guaranteed, says Nouriel Roubini, professor emeritus at New York University’s Stern School of Business and the CEO of Roubini Macro Associates. He earned the nickname “Dr. Doom” for his prophetic visions of looming economic downturns, including an accurate prediction of the 2008 housing crash and subsequent market crisis.', 'With the U.S. annual inflation rate as high as it is—8.2% in October—only a deep recession and a steep spike in unemployment might be enough to fix it, Roubini warned in a recent interview with Fortune.', '“In U.S. history, over the last 60 years, there has never been an episode where inflation was above 5% and unemployment was below 5% [when] the Fed started raising rates and avoided a hard landing,” Roubini said. “History suggests it’s going to be near mission impossible to avoid a hard landing.”', 'But any continued economic downturn may result in something worse than higher unemployment, Roubini warned. Multiple factors could collide to create a recession that combines the elements of the two worst financial crises in recent U.S. history: the 1970s energy shocks and the 2008 financial crash.', 'Recession on the way', 'In September, Powell said that a “modest” increase in unemployment would signal that the Federal Reserve’s effort to tame inflation was succeeding, as higher unemployment means less of the competition for workers that has driven up wages and contributed to inflation over the past year as companies pass costs onto consumers through higher prices.', 'The U.S. unemployment rate in October was 3.7%, up from 3.5% in September—though still relatively low by historical standards. To bring today’s levels of inflation in check, unemployment may need to go much higher, and the Fed just doesn’t want to talk about it, said David Rubenstein, billionaire investor and cofounder of the Carlyle Group.', '“He can’t quite say this, but if the unemployment rate goes up to 4% or 5% or 6%, inflation will [probably] be tamed a bit,” he said of Powell during a September interview with CNN. ', 'Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers gave a similar estimate to the Financial Times last month, predicting that the Fed is “unlikely to achieve inflation stability without a recession of a magnitude that would take unemployment toward the 6% range.”', 'Roubini told Fortune that a recession is coming and will likely send unemployment much higher than its current level. ', 'But unlike the many banks and strategists that have forecast a mild recession, Roubini said that the coming downturn will not be “short and shallow” and is instead likely to be “severe and more protracted.” ', 'Worst of both worlds', 'Roubini warned that a confluence of factors—including rising national debt levels, supply-chain issues, and a global energy crisis—could bring together the worst of two historically bad economic downturns in the U.S.', '“In some sense, we’re going to have maybe the worst of the 1970s and the worst of the post-GFC [Global Financial Crisis] period,” he said.', 'Roubini said that the coming recession has some similarities to the 1970s economic crisis that was largely caused by two oil supply shocks in 1973 and 1979, which led to high global oil prices and fuel shortages.', 'Today the world is in the grip of another global energy shock, this time with natural gas in the spotlight. The war in Ukraine has severely disrupted global energy markets, including severely limiting natural gas flows from Russia to Europe and sparking an energy crisis on the continent. Natural gas is expected to remain in low supply well into next year, while the war has also aggravated an oil crunch that started during the pandemic era.', '“In the 1970s we had two negative supply shocks. Today we have many more than two,” Roubini said.', 'But a big difference with the 1970s—and a worrying parallel with the downturn of the late 2000s—is the soaring level of U.S. national debt, according to Roubini.', '“[In the 1970s] we did not have high debt levels so there was no widespread debt crisis,” he said. “After the GFC there was a debt crisis to match the debt of households with the banks, mortgages, and the housing bubble gone bust.”', 'In 2022, after years of higher government spending and pandemic-era stimulus, the U.S. national debt has reached new heights. The U.S. government went on a borrowing spree in the earlier days of the pandemic to help shore up the economy as businesses faced closures and unemployment soared, but that borrowing has returned with a vengeance with the national debt topping $31 trillion for the first time last month.', '“Today, we have negative supply shocks worse than the ’70s,” Roubini said. “And we have the worst of the GFC because the debt ratios are through the roof,” referring to today’s soaring national debt crisis and its similarities with U.S. debt in the late 2000s.', 'Roubini said that the resulting combination might push the U.S. economy into something even worse than a recession, as high inflation combined with slower economic growth due to high debt levels could lead to stagflation, a toxic mix of high prices and low-to-zero growth.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Neg-Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Round-6.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

a788a3e098bd78683ae1a3c61688f009cb2e8820680f1e8f05d316cd3762cdbf

Punitive damages solve indistinguishably as much as treble—that’s Hocket and Graham and…

Karshtedt 17 (Dmitry Karshtedt, PhD in chemistry from U.C. Berkeley, Professor of Law @ Geoerge Washington University, exact date unknown but year is 2017, "Enhancing Patent Damages" 51 UC Davis Law Review 1427, https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2521&context=faculty_publications, accessed 3-21-2022)

be court may increase damages three times amount found look to torts to see how courts handle enhanced damages punitive damages a tort analog of treble damages is useful guidance patent cases glean from close examination of tort

Supra-compensatory damages begin of damages compensatory damages must be adequate to compensate for infringement the court may increase damages up to three times the amount found courts look ed to private law particularly torts to see how courts handle enhanced damages Congress meant for common-law principles to apply to cognate patent law issues courts in patent cases draw on torts the theory of punitive damages a tort -law analog of patent treble damages there is much useful guidance courts deciding patent cases glean from a close examination of tort

three times torts punitive damages

['**edited for language', '', 'Supra-compensatory damages in patent law present a very different∂ picture. To begin, although the section of the Patent Act governing∂ damages, 35 U.S.C. § 284, at least states the function of compensatory∂ damages — unsurprisingly, they must be “adequate to compensate for∂ the infringement”11 — that section says nothing about the purpose of∂ enhanced damages or the standard for awarding them. The only∂ “guidance” given by Congress is that “the court may increase the∂ damages up to three times the amount found or assessed” beyond the∂ damages clearly denominated as compensatory.12 In an effort to give∂ content to the statutory authorization to award these so-called “treble damages,”13 courts have sometimes looked to private law, and∂ particularly to the common law of torts, to see how courts handle∂ enhanced damages in those cases.14 This instinct is understandable,∂ and seems sound as a matter of statutory interpretation.15 After all, the∂ various iterations of the Patent Act have been passed with little∂ indication that, when it comes to issues shared with other areas of law,∂ courts in patent cases are to develop rules that are unique and patentspecific.16 Indeed, there is much evidence to the contrary — that Congress meant for background common-law principles to apply to∂ cognate patent law issues.17 Accordingly, courts in patent cases have∂ drawn on the law of torts to deal with problems ranging from mental∂ states for indirect infringement,18 to proximate cause limits on the∂ scope of the defendant’s liability,19 to — reasonably enough — the∂ but-for causation requirement for awarding compensatory damages.20∂ This move has not always enabled dispute-free resolutions of these∂ various aspects of patent infringement claims,21 but it has at least∂ given courts a starting point for interpreting the sometimes sparse∂ language of the Patent Act.', 'When it comes to treble damages, however, examination of other∂ areas of law has not yielded a clear answer even with respect to the basic purpose of this remedy. In recent times, consensus has∂ developed that such damages should be reserved for “willful” patent∂ infringement,22 however defined. But over the long history of treble∂ damages in patent law, courts have variously mentioned∂ punishment,23 deterrence,24 and even adequate compensation25 as∂ potential justifications for these awards, and legal scholarship has sent∂ similarly conflicting messages over the years.26 Although it is certainly∂ possible for a remedy to have multiple purposes,27 at least some of the∂ pairings — like punishment and compensation — might be at odds.28∂ Moreover, deciding which of these multiple possible purposes of treble damages is dominant would be helpful because that framing could∂ shape the standards for awarding them.29', 'But the fact that the common law has not supplied ready answers for∂ enhanced damages in patent law is, unfortunately, not a surprise. The∂ very idea of awarding more than make-whole damages in civil cases∂ has been controversial, and the theory of punitive damages — a∂ potential tort-law analog of patent treble damages that courts and∂ scholars have often looked to for content when dealing with this issue∂ in patent law30 — is widely debated and appears rather unsettled, as∂ evidenced by the prodigious amount of scholarship devoted to this∂ field.31 Nonetheless, as I argue in this Article, there is much useful guidance that courts deciding patent cases can still glean from a close∂ examination of the historical developments that brought forth the∂ modern law of punitive damages in tort.32 Indeed, tort law can help∂ courts develop a standard for awarding treble damages for patent∂ infringement that is more rational than the one currently in place.33', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-00%20NDT-Round1.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-00%2520NDT-Round1.docx

e3cb755a98dbe6a397194ea4a9256ad07b2040f3624bd50f805f9feb1ca9a4a7

“In” designates an object of vesting---you can’t ignore it.

Julian Velasco 97. Associate Attorney, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York City; former law clerk to the Honorable E.A. Van Graafeiland, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1994-95; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1994; B.S.B.A., Georgetown University, 1991. Congressional Control Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View, 46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 671 (1996-1997). Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/673

In The power is vested but in whom The Constitution vests in Courts To ignore the word "in" is intellectually dishonest . There is no reason to suppose that it is merely excess Where possible, each word is to be given meaning; no words are to be ignored

" In " The judicial power is vested but in whom is it vested? The Constitution vests in one supreme Court, and in inferior Courts By repeating the word "in," the Constitution vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court, and also in inferior courts The whole judicial power is vested separately in each To ignore the word "in" is intellectually dishonest . There is no reason to suppose that it is merely excess verbiage It cannot be presumed that any clause is intended to be without effect Where possible, each word is to be given meaning; no words are to be ignored

" In " in whom is it vested? vests the word "in," To ignore the word "in" is intellectually dishonest each word is to be given meaning; no words are to be ignored

['B. "In"', 'The judicial power is vested by the Constitution, but in whom is it vested? A cursory examination leads to the conclusion that it is vested in the federal judiciary as a whole. This is the view of most commentators. A careful reading of the constitutional text, however, shows that it is not so simple.', 'The Constitution vests the judicial power "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."\' 43 It is important to note what the Constitution does not do. It does not vest judicial power "in a federal judiciary, which shall consist of one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Nor does it vest judicial power "in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." If either of these alternatives were adopted, it could fairly be said that the judicial power was vested in the federal judiciary as a whole.', 'The Constitution does something different; it repeats the word "in." This may be a subtle distinction, but it is important. By repeating the word "in," the Constitution vests the judicial power, the entire judicial power, in the Supreme Court, and also in whatever inferior courts Congress creates. The whole judicial power is vested separately in each; it is not simply shared by the two.144 To ignore the repetition of the word "in" is easy, even convenient, but it is intellectually dishonest. There is no reason to suppose that it is merely excess verbiage.145 ---FOOTNOTE 145 STARTS, END OF PARAGRAPH--- 145. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it."); see also Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 242 ("Where possible, each word of the Constitution is to be given meaning; no words are to be ignored as mere surplusage."). ---FOOTNOTE 145 ENDS, PARAGRAPH ENDS---']

[(7, 17)]

ndtceda

Emory-GiKe-Neg-dartmouth-RR-Round-7.docx

Emory

GiKe

1899b1ad268508e8f28e858d6f1d693015dba4b515f3cc8d0c111ea7fecf5e02

No violent China rise, territorial conflict, or trade war

Yan Xuetong 19. Distinguished Professor and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University. “The Age of Uneasy Peace.”

a bipolar world will not be on the brink of apocalyptic war China’s ambitions are much narrower Chinese policy will focus on maintaining growth Both will remain careful to manage tensions At the top of Beijing’s priorities is a liberal order built on trade There is no indication this will change tariffs may sting but will neither change Beijing’s incentives nor turn away from trade the image of a revisionist China is misleading Beijing relies on trade ties it is loath to court confrontation caution will be the order of the day China will carefully avoid pressing issues that might lead to war such as the S C S cybersecurity, and weaponization of space the will remain minimal even as competition intensifies threat of nuclear war keep tensions from escalating China’s leadership is acutely aware of benefits from the status quo and will avoid putting these on the line Expect tensions but not global chaos.

a bipolar U.S.-Chinese world will not be a world on the brink of apocalyptic war China’s ambitions for the coming years are much narrower than many in the Western foreign policy establishment tend to assume Chinese foreign policy will focus on maintaining the conditions necessary for the country’s continued economic growth a focus that will likely push leaders in Beijing to steer clear of open confrontation the coming bipolarity will be an era of uneasy peace between the two superpowers Both sides will remain careful to manage tensions Beijing and Washington will largely carry out their competition in the and realms At the top of Beijing’s priorities is a liberal economic order built on free trade economic transformation was built on exports exports are the lifeblood of the Chinese economy: they ensure a consistent trade surplus, and the jobs they create are a vital engine of domestic social stability There is no indication this will change Even amid escalating trade tensions China’s overall export volume continued to grow in 2018 U.S. tariffs may sting but they will neither change Beijing’s fundamental incentives nor portend a general turn away from global free trade on its part because China’s exports are vital to its economic and political success one should expect Beijing to double down on its attempts to gain and maintain access to foreign markets the Chinese Communist Party went so far as to enshrine a commitment to the initiative in its constitution a signal that the party views the infrastructure project as more than a regular foreign policy the image of a revisionist China that has gained traction in many Western capitals is misleading Beijing relies on a global network of trade ties so it is loath to court direct confrontation with the United State Chinese leaders fear confrontation might cut off its access to U.S. markets and lead U.S. allies to band together against China caution will be the order of the day in Beijing’s foreign policy in the coming years China will carefully avoid pressing issues that might lead to war with the United States, such as those related to the S outh C hina S ea, cybersecurity, and the weaponization of space the between China and the United States will remain minimal even as military, technological, and economic competition between them intensifies neither China nor the United States can improve its antimissile systems to the point of making the country completely impervious to a nuclear counterattack The threat of nuclear war will also keep Chinese tensions with other nuclear-armed powers, such as India, from escalating into outright war bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will be shaped by fluid, issue-specific alliances rather than rigid opposing blocs divided along clear ideological lines neither side appears willing to build or maintain an extensive network of alliances China avoids explicit alliances and the United States regularly complains about free-riding allies U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will not be an ideologically driven, existential conflict over the fundamental nature of the global order it will be a competition over consumer markets and technological advantages disputes about the norms and rules governing trade investment employment exchange rates, and intellectual property rather than form clearly defined military-economic blocs states will adopt a two-track foreign policy Whether or not the United States recovers from its Trumpian fever and leads a renewed push for global liberalism is of little consequence opposed in their strategic interests but evenly matched in their power, China and the United States will be unable to challenge each other directly and settle the struggle for supremacy definitively each side’s nuclear warheads will prevent proxy conflicts China’s leadership is acutely aware of the benefits its country derives from the status quo it is chief among the conditions for China’s continued economic and soft-power expansion and will avoid putting these benefits on the line Chinese leaders will therefore work hard to avoid setting off alarm bells in already jittery Western capitals foreign policy will reflect this Expect recurring tensions and fierce competition, yes, but not a descent into global chaos.

not be a world on the brink of apocalyptic war much narrower economic growth remain careful to manage tensions At the top no indication double down so it is loath to court direct confrontation will be the order of the day carefully avoid pressing issues remain minimal even as avoids explicit alliances of little consequence acutely aware of the benefits avoid benefits on the line foreign policy will reflect this not a descent into global chaos.

['What kind of world order will this bring? Contrary to what more alarmist voices have suggested, a bipolar U.S.-Chinese world will not be a world on the brink of apocalyptic war. This is in large part because China’s ambitions for the coming years are much narrower than many in the Western foreign policy establishment tend to assume. Rather than unseating the United States as the world’s premier superpower, Chinese foreign policy in the coming decade will largely focus on maintaining the conditions necessary for the country’s continued economic growth—a focus that will likely push leaders in Beijing to steer clear of open confrontation with the United States or its primary allies. Instead, the coming bipolarity will be an era of uneasy peace between the two superpowers. Both sides will build up their militaries but remain careful to manage tensions before they boil over into outright conflict. And rather than vie for global supremacy through opposing alliances, Beijing and Washington will largely carry out their competition in the and realms. At the same time, U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will likely spell the end of sustained multilateralism outside strictly economic realms, as the combination of nationalist populism in the West and China’s commitment to national sovereignty will leave little space for the kind of political integration and norm setting that was once the hallmark of liberal internationalism. WHAT CHINA WANTS China’s growing influence on the world stage has as much to do with the United States’ abdication of its global leadership under President Donald Trump as with China’s own economic rise. In material terms, the gap between the two countries has in recent years: since 2015, China’s GDP growth has slowed to less than seven percent a year, and recent estimates put U.S. growth above the three percent mark. In the same period, the value of the renminbi has decreased by about ten percent against the U.S. dollar, undercutting China’s import capacity and its currency’s global strength. What has changed a great deal, however, is the expectation that the United States will continue to promote—through diplomacy and, if necessary, military power—an international order built for the most part around liberal internationalist principles. Under Trump, the country has broken with this tradition, questioning the value of free trade and embracing a virulent, no-holds-barred nationalism. The Trump administration is modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal, attempting to strong-arm friends and foes alike, and withdrawing from several international accords and institutions. In 2018 alone, it ditched the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the , and the UN Human Rights Council. It is still unclear if this retrenchment is just a momentary lapse—a short-lived aberration from the norm—or a new U.S. foreign policy paradigm that could out-live Trump’s tenure. But the global fallout of Trumpism has already pushed some countries toward China in ways that would have seemed inconceivable a few years ago. Take Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who effectively reversed Japan’s relations with China, from barely hidden hostility to , during a state visit to Beijing in October 2018, when China and Japan signed over 50 agreements on economic cooperation. Meanwhile, structural factors keep widening the gap between the two global front-runners, China and the United States, and the rest of the world. Already, the two countries’ military spending dwarfs everybody else’s. By 2023, the U.S. defense budget may reach $800 billion, and the Chinese one may exceed $300 billion, whereas no other global power will spend more than $80 billion on its forces. The question, then, is not whether a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will come to be but what this order will look like. At the top of Beijing’s priorities is a liberal economic order built on free trade. China’s economic transformation over the past decades from an agricultural society to a major global powerhouse—and the world’s second-largest economy—was built on exports. The country has slowly worked its way up the value chain, its exports beginning to compete with those of highly advanced economies. Now as then, these exports are the lifeblood of the Chinese economy: they ensure a consistent trade surplus, and the jobs they create are a vital engine of domestic social stability. There is no indication that this will change in the coming decade. Even amid escalating trade tensions between Beijing and Washington, China’s overall export volume continued to grow in 2018. U.S. tariffs may sting, but they will neither change Beijing’s fundamental incentives nor portend a general turn away from global free trade on its part. Quite to the contrary: because China’s exports are vital to its economic and political success, one should expect Beijing to double down on its attempts to gain and maintain access to foreign markets. This strategic impetus is at the heart of the much-touted , through which China hopes to develop a vast network of land and sea routes that will connect its export hubs to far-flung markets. As of August 2018, some 70 countries and organizations had signed contracts with China for projects related to the initiative, and this number is set to increase in the coming years. At its 2017 National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party went so far as to enshrine a commitment to the initiative in its constitution—a signal that the party views the infrastructure project as more than a regular foreign policy. China is also willing to further open its domestic markets to foreign goods in exchange for greater access abroad. Just in time for a major trade fair in Shanghai in November 2018—designed to showcase the country’s potential as a destination for foreign goods—China lowered its general tariff from 10.5 percent to 7.8 percent. Given this enthusiasm for the global economy, the image of a revisionist China that has gained traction in many Western capitals is misleading. Beijing relies on a global network of trade ties, so it is loath to court direct confrontation with the United States. Chinese leaders fear—not without reason—that such a confrontation might cut off its access to U.S. markets and lead U.S. allies to band together against China rather than stay neutral, stripping it of important economic partnerships and valuable diplomatic connections. As a result, caution, not assertiveness or aggressiveness, will be the order of the day in Beijing’s foreign policy in the coming years. Even as it continues to modernize and expand its military, China will carefully avoid pressing issues that might lead to war with the United States, such as those related to the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and the weaponization of space. NEW RULES? Indeed, much as Chinese leaders hope to be on par with their counterparts in Washington, they worry about the strategic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order. American leaders balk at the idea of relinquishing their position at the top of the global food chain and will likely go to great lengths to avoid having to accommodate China. Officials in Beijing, in no hurry to become the sole object of Washington’s and scorn, would much rather see a multipolar world in which other challenges—and challengers—force the United States to cooperate with China. Chinese leaders worry about the strategic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order. In fact, the United States’ own rise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides something of a model for how the coming power transition may take place. Because the United Kingdom, the world’s undisputed hegemon at the time, was preoccupied with fending off a challenger in its vicinity—Germany—it did not bother much to contain the rise of a much bigger rival across the pond. China is hoping for a similar dynamic now, and recent history suggests it could indeed play out. In the early months of George W. Bush’s presidency, for instance, relations between Beijing and Washington were souring over regional disputes in the South China Sea, reaching a boiling point when a Chinese air force pilot died in a midair collision with a U.S. surveillance plane in April 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks a few months later, however, Washington came to see China as a useful strategic partner in its global fight against terrorism, and relations improved significantly over the rest of Bush’s two terms. Today, unfortunately, the list of common threats that could force the two countries to cooperate is short. After 17 years of counterterrorism campaigns, the sense of urgency that once surrounded the issue has faded. Climate change is just as unlikely to make the list of top threats anytime soon. The most plausible scenario is that a new global economic crisis in the coming years will push U.S. and Chinese leaders to shelve their disagreements for a moment to avoid economic calamity—but this, too, remains a hypothetical. To make matters worse, some points of potential conflict are here to stay—chief among them . Relations between Beijing and Taipei, already tense, have taken a turn for the worse in recent years. Taiwan’s current government, elected in 2016, has questioned the notion that mainland China and Taiwan form a single country, also known as the “one China” principle. A future government in Taipei might well push for de jure independence. Yet a Taiwanese independence referendum likely constitutes a redline for Beijing and may prompt it to take military action. If the United States were to respond by coming to Taiwan’s aid, a military intervention by Beijing could easily spiral into a full-fledged U.S.-Chinese war. To avoid such a crisis, Beijing is determined to nip any Taiwanese independence aspirations in the bud by political and economic means. As a result, it is likely to continue lobbying third countries to cut off their diplomatic ties with Taipei, an approach it has already taken with several Latin American countries. Cautious or not, China set somewhat different emphases in its approach to norms that undergird the international order. In particular, a more powerful China will push for a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty in international law. In recent years, some have public statements by Chinese leaders in support of globalization as a sign that Beijing seeks to fashion itself as the global liberal order’s new custodian, yet such sweeping interpretations are wishful thinking: China is merely signaling its support for a liberal economic order, not for ever-increasing political integration. Beijing remains fearful of outside interference, particularly relating to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and , as well as on matters of press freedom and online regulations. As a result, it views national sovereignty, rather than international responsibilities and norms, as the fundamental principle on which the international order should rest. Even as a new superpower in the coming decade, China will therefore pursue a less interventionist foreign policy than the United States did at the apex of its power. Consider the case of Afghanistan: even though it is an open secret that the United States expects the Chinese military to shoulder some of the burden of maintaining stability there after U.S. troops leave the country, the Chinese government has shown no interest in this idea. Increased Chinese clout may also bring attempts to promote a vision of world order that draws on ancient Chinese philosophical traditions and theories of statecraft. One term in particular has been making the rounds in Beijing: wangdao, or “humane authority.” The word represents a view of China as an enlightened, benevolent hegemon whose power and legitimacy derive from its ability to fulfill other countries’ security and economic needs—in exchange for their acquiescence to Chinese leadership. BIPOLARITY IN PRACTICE Given the long shadow of nuclear escalation, the between China and the United States will remain minimal, even as military, technological, and economic competition between them intensifies. Efforts on both sides to build ever more effective antimissile shields are unlikely to change this, since neither China nor the United States can improve its antimissile systems to the point of making the country completely impervious to a nuclear counterattack. If anything, the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty will encourage both sides to build up their nuclear forces and improve their second-strike capabilities, ensuring that neither side will be confident it can launch a nuclear attack on the other without suffering a devastating retaliation. The threat of nuclear war will also keep Chinese tensions with other nuclear-armed powers, such as India, from escalating into outright war. Proxy wars, however, cannot be ruled out, nor can military skirmishes among lesser states. In fact, the latter are likely to become more frequent, as the two superpowers’ restraint may embolden some smaller states to resolve local conflicts by force. Russia, in particular, may not shy away from war as it tries to regain its superpower status and maintain its influence in eastern Europe and the Middle East. Faced with calls to reform the UN Security Council, fraying powers such as France and the United Kingdom may seek to buttress their claim to permanent membership in the council through military interventions abroad. In the Middle East, meanwhile, the struggle for regional dominance among Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia shows no signs of abating. Across the globe, secessionist conflicts and terrorist attacks will continue to occur, the latter especially if competition between China and the United States reduces their cooperation on counterterrorism measures. China’s emphasis on national sovereignty, together with Western societies’ turn away from globalism, will deal an additional blow to multilateralism. In the economic realm, export-driven economies, such as China, Germany, and Japan, will ensure the survival of a global liberal trade regime built on free-trade agreements and membership in the World Trade Organization—no matter what path the United States takes. On other matters of global governance, however, cooperation is likely to stall. Even if a future U.S. administration led a renewed push toward multilateralism and international norm setting, China’s status as a junior superpower would make it difficult for the United States to sustain the strong leadership that has traditionally spurred such initiatives in the past. Differences in ideology and clashing security interests will prevent Beijing and Washington from leading jointly, but neither will have enough economic or military clout to lead on its own. To the extent that multilateral initiatives persist in such a world, they will be limited to either side’s respective sphere of influence. China’s emphasis on national sovereignty, together with Western societies’ turn away from globalism, will deal an additional blow to multilateralism. The European Union is already fraying, and a number of European countries have reintroduced border controls. In the coming decade, similar developments will come to pass in other domains. As technological innovation becomes the primary source of wealth, countries will become ever more protective of their intellectual property. Many countries are also tightening control of capital flows as they brace for a global economic slump in the near future. And as concerns over immigration and unemployment threaten to undermine Western governments’ legitimacy, more and more countries will increase visa restrictions for foreign workers. Unlike the order that prevailed during the Cold War, a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will be shaped by fluid, issue-specific alliances rather than rigid opposing blocs divided along clear ideological lines. Since the immediate risk of a U.S.-Chinese war is vanishingly small, neither side appears willing to build or maintain an extensive—and expensive—network of alliances. China still avoids forming explicit alliances, and the United States regularly complains about free-riding allies. Moreover, neither side is currently able to offer a grand narrative or global vision appealing to large majorities at home, let alone to a large number of states. For some time to come, then, U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will not be an ideologically driven, existential conflict over the fundamental nature of the global order; rather, it will be a competition over consumer markets and technological advantages, playing out in disputes about the norms and rules governing trade, investment, employment, exchange rates, and intellectual property. And rather than form clearly defined military-economic blocs, most states will adopt a two-track foreign policy, siding with the United States on some issues and China on others. Western allies, for instance, are still closely aligned with the United States on traditional security matters inside NATO, and Australia, India, and Japan have supported the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, these states still maintain close trade and investment relations with China, and several of them have sided with Beijing in trying to reform the World Trade Organization. This two-track strategy shows just how far down the road to bipolarity the world has already advanced. And the fundamental driver of this process—the raw economic and military clout on which American and, increasingly, Chinese dominance rests—will further cement Beijing’s and Washington’s status as the two global heavyweights in the coming decade. Whether or not the United States recovers from its Trumpian fever and leads a renewed push for global liberalism is, ultimately, of little consequence to the outcome: opposed in their strategic interests but evenly matched in their power, China and the United States will be unable to challenge each other directly and settle the struggle for supremacy definitively. As during the Cold War, each side’s nuclear warheads will prevent proxy conflicts from easily escalating into a direct confrontation between the two superpowers. More important still, China’s leadership is acutely aware of the benefits its country derives from the status quo, for now—it is chief among the conditions for China’s continued economic and soft-power expansion—and will avoid putting these benefits on the line anytime soon, unless China’s core interests are in the balance. Chinese leaders will therefore work hard to avoid setting off alarm bells in already jittery Western capitals, and their foreign policy in the coming years will reflect this objective. Expect recurring tensions and fierce competition, yes, but not a descent into global chaos.']

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ndtceda

Michigan-KuSi-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-1.docx

Michigan

KuSi

e70d3f8cc0c57721bf68012266ce55bc0846b2bbc136c67b4316ed103f3280ba

PGS inevitable but fails for reasons outside the scope of their link.

Brad Dress 23. Defense reporter for The Hill focusing on the beat’s intersection with Congress, defense contractors and veterans’ affairs. “Why the US is going full throttle on hypersonic missiles.” https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3900329-why-the-us-is-going-full-throttle-on-hypersonic-missiles/.

The U S opening throttle push develop hypersonic pushing to procure 24 missiles invoked Defense Production meet hypersonic mission remain challenges industrial production base testing limiting how fast we can develop and test them

The U nited S tates is opening the throttle in its push to develop and procure hypersonic missiles falling behind key foreign adversaries China and Russia in the race to field a potentially game-changing defense system The U.S. is pushing to procure at least 24 hypersonic missiles in the near future the Biden administration invoked the Defense Production Act to boost the defense industrial base to “ meet the hypersonic warfighting mission .” there remain challenges industrial production base testing limiting us [now] is how fast we can develop and how fast we can test them

opening the throttle China Russia at least 24 challenges industrial production base testing develop test

['The United States is opening the throttle in its push to develop and procure hypersonic missiles after falling behind key foreign adversaries China and Russia in the race to field a potentially game-changing defense system. The U.S. is pushing to procure at least 24 hypersonic missiles in the near future, according to the fiscal year 2024 budget proposal for the Pentagon released Monday. And earlier this month, the Biden administration invoked the Defense Production Act to boost the defense industrial base to “meet the hypersonic warfighting mission.” While hypersonics have been well-developed and prototyped, the Defense Department has not fielded the weapons yet, and there remain challenges in the industrial production base and with testing infrastructure. George Nacouzi, a senior engineer at the RAND Corporation, said the U.S. is now in a pivotal stage where it will soon transition to initial production. “One of the things that’s limiting us [now] is how fast we can develop and how fast we can test them,” Nacouzi said. “But those are going to be increasing and they are increasing, so I expect to see more deployment of a larger number of these in the future.”']

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ndtceda

Emory-LoKi-Aff-5---Texas-Round-5.docx

Emory

LoKi

9c9376e82488132741ac9af9c2916104de65603266edcc26017665e2c3706aa6

Reclaim development as a global public good. Neoliberal modernity should be repurposed so everyone has necessary social needs met and emancipated from domination.

Arias-Maldonado 22 (Manuel, Arias-Maldonado, Manuel. "Reformulating emancipation in the Anthropocene: From didactic apocalypse to planetary subjectivities." European Journal of Social Theory 25.1 (2022): 136-154)

Ecomodernism is hardly the caricature made of it as neoliberal set on reproducing modernity ecomodernism points to global social democracy Ecomodernism is transformative and draws on emancipation through technology and public policy they reject the destruction of neoliberalism and suggest that it be repurposed towards common ends This means making it safe so humanity can thrive without inequalities ecomodernist strategy can adopt emancipatory language emancipation is both empowering and sustainable

Ecomodernism is hardly recognisable in the caricature that is often made of it as a neoliberal project that is set on reproducing the megalomaniac ethos of modernity ecomodernism points to some kind of global social democracy Ecomodernism is not just the continuation of ecological modernisation by other means: it is far more transformative and it draws on the promise of modernism as an open-ended process oriented emancipation through the clever use of technology and public policy . they reject the destruction of the material platform of neoliberalism and suggest instead that it needs to be repurposed towards common ends This means making it safe so that a flourishing humanity can thrive on it without generating vast inequalities between societies and within them. In turn, this has implications for emancipation Whereas a degrowth agenda is not compatible with the modern understanding of emancipation, an ecomodernist strategy can adopt an emancipatory language , but also because it opens up the possibility of pursuing emancipation in a manner that is both empowering and sustainable . A similar claim has been criticised in the past and that is why the idea of limits has been central to environmentalism from its inception

Ecomodernism is hardly recognisable in made of it as neoliberal set on reproducing modernity ecomodernism points to global social democracy Ecomodernism is transformative and emancipation through they reject the destruction of be repurposed towards common ends so without inequalities ecomodernist strategy can adopt emancipatory language emancipation is both empowering and sustainable

['Ecomodernism is hardly recognisable in the caricature that is often made of it as a neoliberal project that is set on reproducing the megalomaniac ethos of modernity (see Fremaux, 2019). As Symons (2019, p. 59) has argued, this is a misreading: ecomodernism argues that the state should play an active economic role shaping the trajectory of technological and economic change. For some thinkers, ecomodernism points to some kind of global social democracy (Karlsson, 2018; Symons, 2019). Disputable as this view may be, the fact is that ecomodernism advocates greater global equality and the protection of the natural world for its own worth – it is an eco after all. Ecomodernism is not just the continuation of ecological modernisation by other means: it is far more transformative and it draws on the promise of modernism as an open-ended process oriented towards emancipation through the clever use of technology and public policy. The progressive use of technology brings ecomodernists close to accelerationists – as they reject the destruction of the material platform of neoliberalism and suggest instead that it needs to be repurposed towards common ends (Srniceck & Williams, 2017)', 'What ecomodernism demonstrates is that there is not just one way to respond to the challenges of the Anthropocene – on the contrary, there are different views on how the planet’s habitability is to be secured. This means making it safe so that a flourishing humanity can thrive on it without generating vast inequalities between societies and within them. In turn, this has implications for emancipation. Whereas a degrowth agenda is not compatible with the modern understanding of emancipation, an ecomodernist strategy can adopt an emancipatory language as it promises material well-being for all in a sustainable planet. Against the idea that the Anthropocene dramatically diminishes human possibilities, ecomodernism affirms that ecological limits can be navigated in imaginative ways. In the words of Bruno Latour, the dream of emancipation has not turned into a nightmare – it just was too limited as it excluded non-humans and did not care about the unexpected consequences of human expansion (Latour, 2011, p. 23). To put it differently, it was a careless emancipation that stands in stark contrast to the kind of careful emancipation that the Anthropocene requires. As Vogel puts it, choices have not yet been made regarding the shape of socionatural relations ‘if choices are understood as the outcome of conscious social decision-making’ (Vogel, 2016, p. 230).', 'In this sense, the Anthropocene can be said to be emancipatory insofar as it puts an end to the delusion of an unbounded human power, but also because it opens up the possibility of pursuing emancipation in a manner that is both empowering and sustainable. A similar claim has been criticised in the past and that is why the idea of limits has been central to environmentalism from its inception (see Dobson, 2016). Yet the Anthropocene represents a substantial novelty that harbours the potential for redefining how socionatural relations are socially perceived, conceptually represented and acted upon.']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCh-Aff-northwestern-Round-5.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

c19d5b1fc0ada614f462ed8c8e7621fd5739072619b03f04695fc30e8a70470c

3—We’ve already passed the brink—their author, later—that ship has sailed!

Cropsey ’19 [Seth; April 8; Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, Director of Hudson’s Center for American Seapower; The National Review, “Retiring the USS Harry S. Truman Is a Terrible Idea,” ]

Pentagon wants to reduce the carrier fleet insisted Truman be tied up problem is service is not funded The U.S. needs ships and tech ships are vulnerable to missiles Navy has serious problems with repairs , maintenance , and training because of growing demands Central and Pacific could not meet obligations with eleven Tying up Truman would cut to ten idle shipyard workers harming the industrial base Reducing carrier fleet is like a campfire in a drought the budget’s bottom line are insufficient a crisis is “ undermining deterrence and confidence of allies Decommissioning a carrier is an unforced error

The Pentagon wants to reduce the Navy’s carrier fleet Shanahan insisted that the USS Truman should be tied up to save money Laying up Truman would reduce the carrier fleet below its congressionally mandated level which commanders say is insufficient to meet their requirements The large problem is military service suited to deter China’s ambitions is not being funded at a level commensurate with competition. The U.S. needs enough ships and advanced tech nology to equip them. Cutting either is like giving up your health insurance Another ailment is the notion that large deck ships are vulnerable to Chinese missiles the Navy has been experiencing serious problems with repairs , maintenance , and training because of growing demands on its fleet the U.S. Central and Pacific Commands could not meet their obligations with the eleven existing carriers. Tying up the Truman would cut the number to ten It would idle shipyard workers further harming the U.S.’s industrial base weakness, in this case the diminished ability to bring powerful forces to bear swiftly, is an invitation to bad behavior Reducing the U.S. carrier fleet today is like lighting a campfire in a drought -stricken forest But the bottom line here is the defense budget’s bottom line . This administration’s defense-budget increases are insufficient They will not build up the U.S. military at the rate needed to address the re-emergent great-power competition Navy could have a twelve-carrier fleet by 2030 — at the earliest The Defense Department has no plan for this budgets will not substantially ameliorate a crisis that is “ undermining deterrence and confidence of allies Decommissioning a n aircraft carrier with a quarter century of life left is an unforced error , an exercise in strategic malfeasance

reduce tied up reduce carrier fleet mandated level insufficient large problem not being funded enough ships advanced tech nology either giving up health insurance ailment vulnerable Chinese missiles serious problems repairs maintenance training growing demands not meet their obligations idle shipyard workers invitation to bad behavior lighting a campfire in a drought -stricken forest defense budget’s bottom line insufficient not no plan crisis undermining deterrence confidence of allies a unforced error strategic malfeasance

['', 'The Pentagon wants to reduce the Navy’s carrier fleet. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 26, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan said that aircraft carriers remain “vital” to the United States’ security. Shanahan also insisted that a carrier, the USS Harry S. Truman, which needs refueling for its nuclear reactor so that it can stay in the U.S. fleet for another 25 years, should be tied up to save money for the “future force.” The two assertions are contradictory. “Future force” includes unmanned planes that would fly from carrier decks. Laying up the Truman would reduce the carrier fleet below its congressionally mandated level of eleven, which U.S. combatant commanders say is insufficient to meet their requirements. Cutting the carrier force would undercut the rationale for investing in future technology — for example, unmanned planes.', 'The large problem is that the military service best suited to deter China’s regional and global ambitions — the U.S. Navy — is not being funded at a level commensurate with the reemergence of great-power competition. The U.S. needs both enough ships to meet its global commitments and advanced technology to equip them. Cutting either to fund the other is like giving up your health insurance to replace a leaking roof.', 'Arguments for retiring the Truman stand up neither to facts nor to reason. The cost savings from failing to refuel the Truman in the fiscal year that begins this October would be no more than $17 million. Greater savings would accrue in later years. They amount, in constant dollars, to less than 75 percent of the Truman’s original cost — a lot of money, but worth it to keep the carrier fleet at the absolute minimum needed to meet the U.S.’s peacetime commitments in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific.', 'Another ailment to which Pentagon leadership has succumbed is the selectively applied notion that large deck ships are particularly vulnerable to Chinese missiles, whose unproven capability is believed to threaten aircraft carriers and large amphibious ships underway at sea as far as 2,500 miles distant. “Selectively applied” is an appropriate description because Pentagon leadership has also agreed to buy two Ford-class aircraft carriers to be built simultaneously, thereby saving $4 billion dollars. This is a good deal for which the Pentagon deserves credit, but is the Truman more vulnerable than the two future carriers?', 'No argument exists to support that it is. The Navy already possesses late-model missiles that can defend against cruise and ballistic missiles. The U.S. Air Force long since demonstrated its ability to launch intermediate-range ballistic missiles at land targets from the air. This ability can be updated to threaten Chinese anti-ship missile batteries. A straightforward answer to Chinese missiles, as they present an increasing threat to ships underway at sea, is to invest in unmanned aerial vehicles whose range is much greater than that of manned aircraft and then to change the composition of planes aboard aircraft carriers so that they can launch strikes out of range of China’s missiles. That investment should not be made at the expense of a ship that can carry new unmanned combat aircraft. In any event, the back-and-forth of new weapons answered by newer ones does not end with China’s anti-ship missiles.', 'No less important, the Navy has been experiencing serious problems with repairs, maintenance, and training because of growing demands on its fleet. Former Pacific Command commander Admiral Sam Locklear told the House Armed Services Committee five years ago that the U.S. Central and Pacific Commands could not meet their obligations with the eleven existing carriers. Tying up the Truman would cut the number of carriers to ten, from its congressionally mandated requirement of eleven. It would idle shipyard workers whose skills cannot be turned on and off like a fan, thereby further harming the U.S.’s industrial base. It would nullify President Trump’s promise to expand the Navy to include “having the twelve-carrier Navy we need.”', 'The threatened aircraft carrier’s namesake, Harry S. Truman, was a self-taught historian who once observed that “there is nothing new in the world except the history that you do not know.” The lesson on which American defense planners have lost their grip is that weakness, in this case the diminished ability to bring powerful forces to bear swiftly, is an invitation to bad behavior from a foe. China insists that taking Taiwan by force remains an option and continues to increase the amphibious fleet required for that objective, along with its aggressive deployments of air and naval forces around Taiwan. Reducing the U.S. carrier fleet today is like lighting a campfire in a drought-stricken forest.', 'But the bottom line here is the defense budget’s bottom line. This administration’s defense-budget increases are prudent and necessary but insufficient. They will help end the unreadiness that the previous administration’s defense cuts created. They will not build up the U.S. military at the rate needed to address the re-emergent great-power competition that the Trump administration correctly identifies. Achieving the Trump administration’s original goal of a twelve-carrier fleet would require building a new aircraft carrier every three years. At that rate, Navy could have a twelve-carrier fleet by 2030 — at the earliest. (Many of the existing eleven carriers would be retired as new ones come on line.) The Defense Department has no plan for this.', 'The administration’s budgets will not substantially ameliorate what the 2017 congressionally mandated commission on the national-defense strategy identified as “a crisis of national security for the United States” that is “undermining deterrence of U.S. adversaries and the confidence of American allies, thus increasing the likelihood of conflict.” They will not reverse what the current commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in April last year: that “there is no guarantee that the U.S. would win a future conflict with China.” Of course, there is no guarantee of anything in a conflict, but this statement by the officer responsible for American forces in the Indo-Pacific is a powerful warning against the less capable Navy that the U.S. will have if USS Truman leaves the fleet.', 'The most apt parallel to our current situation is the one that Britain faced in the 1930s. China should not be compared to Nazi Germany, but the responses of British and American leadership to strategic danger bear examination. Up until it was too late to deter war, the British political class saw appeasement as an acceptable answer to Hitler’s increasing aggression. They dismissed the idea that Britain was in a political struggle with Germany. Accede enough and the Germans will be satisfied, they thought. This is parallel to our decades-long hope that integrating China into the global economic system would make Chinese leadership “stakeholders” in the world order. Appeasing Germany failed for Britain. Using inclusion to moderate China has failed for us.', 'Comparisons between Britain’s experience and our policy today do not stop here. Today’s perception is that the British sat on their hands as Germany armed. This misses the mark. After dipping slightly between 1930 and 1933, the U.K.’s defense budget increased by 128.8 percent from 1934 to 1939, the year that World War II began. Winston Churchill’s reviled trio of British leaders, Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin, and Neville Chamberlain, held the premiership during that five-year military buildup during which the defense budget increased by an average of 29.9 percent per year. It was not enough. The Germans seized the continent, drove the British off it, and inflicted devastation on London and other major cities.', 'Our increases in naval expenditures are less impressive than those of Britain in the 1930s. Measured in constant dollars, the U.S. Navy’s budget in 2008 was $162.7 billion dollars. One decade later, the Navy’s budget was $172.9 billion dollars. This is an annual growth rate of 1.02 percent. It compares unfavorably with Britain’s large defense increases that Churchill rightfully criticized as inadequate to defend against the arms buildup that accelerated as Berlin openly violated the Versailles Treaty’s proscription against German rearmament after 1933.', 'If there is a conflict between the U.S. and China, it will be waged at sea. China’s naval buildup began in earnest in 2000. Eleven years ago, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) started to deploy guided-missile frigates and logistics ships to the waters off the Horn of Africa — a demonstration, which has been repeated dozens of times since, of Beijing’s ability to dispatch and supply naval forces at great distance from their base. The Pentagon’s unwillingness to refuel the USS Truman so that it can fund new and indispensable technologies to offset Chinese competition is a symptom of the U.S.’s failure to take Beijing’s ambitions seriously — both in dollars and in strategy. Decommissioning an aircraft carrier, one with a quarter century of life left, to pay for new technology is an unforced error, an exercise in strategic malfeasance. Keep the Truman and pay for the weapons to deter or, if need be, defeat China.', '', '', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Neg-FullerTown-Round6.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaPa/Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Neg-FullerTown-Round6.docx

60c6e72427dbca122a85e3fc00b6fd5e3a7085d2092f869e1b9a14f8a0266f84

China thumps.

Steven Feldstein 19, 1-22-2019, "We Need to Get Smart About How Governments Use AI," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/22/we-need-to-get-smart-about-how-governments-use-ai-pub-78179

China has been the frontrunner in exploiting tech for surveillance China wants to be the world leader by 2030 and committed to spending $150 billion Americans trail behind Chinese counterparts when it comes to digital data because Chinese companies access one billion users data makes the difference China support authoritarianism overseas China is promoting a digital silk road to spread tech worldwide China assumes the more it shifts other countries the less of a threat those pose to Chinese hegemony

AI can be channeled maliciously and destructively . For one thing, AI’s capability offers startling ways for authoritarian and illiberal states to monitor and control their citizens China has been the frontrunner in exploiting this tech for surveillance in Xinjiang and Tibet , China is using AI to observe every aspect of individuals’ lives Beijing is rolling out “social credit scores” as part of a broader system of political control AI can rapidly spread disinformation Authoritarian regimes can exploit such algorithms too For Beijing, AI is an essential part of a broader system of domestic political control. China wants to be the world leader in AI by 2030 , and committed to spending $150 billion to achieve global dominance in the field China has training data in abundance Americans increasingly trail behind Chinese counterparts when it comes to the sheer amount of digital data available because Chinese companies can access the data of one billion domestic users with almost non-existent privacy controls data increasingly makes the difference when it comes to building AI companies that can outperform competitors , the reason being that large datasets help algorithms produce increasingly accurate results and predictions. China sees tech as a way to achieve its grand strategic aims . Part of this strategy involves spreading AI tech to support authoritarianism overseas China is promoting a digital silk road to spread sophisticated tech to governments worldwide These efforts include plans to construct a network of “smart” or “safe” cities in Pakistan and Kenya In Latin America, China sold AI and facial recognition software to Ecuadorian, Bolivian, and Peruvian authorities to enhance public surveillance in Singapore Zimbabwe Malaysia China shrewdly assumes the more it shifts other countries ’ political systems closer to its , the less of a threat those countries will pose to Chinese hegemony Beijing knows providing critical tech will make them dependent on China

maliciously destructively authoritarian illiberal monitor Xinjiang Tibet broader system political control rapidly world leader 2030 data abundance Chinese counterparts sheer amount one billion non-existent AI companies outperform competitors grand strategic aims overseas digital silk road worldwide Singapore Zimbabwe Malaysia other countries ’ Chinese hegemony dependent

['But AI can also be channeled maliciously and destructively. For one thing, AI’s surveillance capability offers startling new ways for authoritarian and illiberal states to monitor and control their citizens.', 'China has been one of the frontrunners in exploiting this technology for surveillance purposes. For example, in Xinjiang and Tibet, China is using AI-powered technology to combine multiple streams of information—including individual DNA samples, online chat history, social media posts, medical records, and bank account information—to observe every aspect of individuals’ lives.', 'But China is not just using AI to manage restive populations in far-flung provinces. Beijing is also rolling out what it calls “social credit scores” into mainstream society. These scores use big data derived from public records, private technology platforms, and a host of other sources to monitor, shape, and rate individuals’ behavior as part of a broader system of political control.', 'Second, AI can manipulate existing information in the public domain to rapidly spread disinformation. Social media platforms use content curation algorithms to drive users toward certain articles, in order to influence their behavior (and keep users addicted to their social media feeds). Authoritarian regimes can exploit such algorithms too. One way they can do so is by hiring bot and troll armies to push out pro-regime messaging.', 'Beyond that, AI can help identify key social-media influencers, whom the authorities can then coopt into spreading disinformation among their online followers. Emerging AI technology can also make it easier to push out automated, hyperpersonalized disinformation campaigns via social media—targeted at specific people or groups—much along the lines of Russian efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. election, or Saudi troll armies targeting dissidents such as recently murdered journalist Jamal Khashoggi.', 'Finally, AI technology is increasingly able to produce realistic video and audio forgeries, known as deep fakes. These have the potential to undermine our basic ability to judge truth from fiction. In a hard-fought election, for example, an incumbent could spread doctored videos falsely showing opponents making inflammatory remarks or engaging in vile acts.', 'WHICH COUNTRIES ARE INVESTING THE MOST IN AI?', 'Several countries are spending a lot of money to beef up their AI capabilities. For instance, French President Emmanuel Macron announced in March 2018 that France would invest $1.8 billion in its AI sector to compete with China and the United States. Likewise, Russian President Vladimir Putin has publicly stated that “whoever becomes the leader in this sphere [AI] will become the ruler of the world,” implying a hefty Russian investment in developing this technology as well. Other countries like South Korea have also made big AI investment pledges.', 'But the world leaders in AI are the United States and China. For Beijing, AI is an essential part of a broader system of domestic political control. China wants to be the world leader in AI by 2030, and has committed to spending $150 billion to achieve global dominance in the field.', 'HOW DO CHINA’S AI CAPABILITIES STACK UP AGAINST THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES?', 'There are three central components of AI—training data for machine learning, strong algorithms, and computing power.', 'Of those three, China has training data in abundance and an improving repertoire of algorithms. But the country’s ability to manufacture advanced computer chips—and tap the computing power they supply—lags behind U.S. capabilities.', 'By contrast, the United States has the world’s most advanced microchips and most sophisticated algorithms. Yet Americans increasingly trail behind their Chinese counterparts when it comes to the sheer amount of digital data available to AI companies. This is because Chinese companies can access the data of over one billion domestic users with almost non-existent privacy controls. And data increasingly makes all the difference when it comes to building AI companies that can outperform competitors, the reason being that large datasets help algorithms produce increasingly accurate results and predictions.', 'WHAT KIND OF AI IS CHINA EXPORTING TO OTHER COUNTRIES?', 'China sees technology as a way to achieve its grand strategic aims. Part of this strategy involves spreading AI technology to support authoritarianism overseas. The Chinese are aggressively trying to develop their own AI, which they can then vigorously peddle abroad.', 'As China develops its AI sector, it is promoting a digital silk road (as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, which involves Chinese investment in other countries’ infrastructure) to spread sophisticated technology to governments worldwide.', 'These efforts include plans to construct a network of “smart” or “safe” cities in countries such as Pakistan and Kenya. These cities have extensive monitoring technology built directly into their infrastructure.', 'In Latin America, China has sold AI and facial recognition software to Ecuadorian, Bolivian, and Peruvian authorities to enhance public surveillance.', 'Likewise, in Singapore, China is providing 110,000 surveillance cameras fitted with facial recognition technology. These cameras will be placed on all of Singapore’s public lampposts to perform crowd analytics and assist with anti-terrorism operations.', 'Similarly, China is supplying Zimbabwe with facial recognition technology for its state security services and is building a national image database.', 'Additionally, China has entered into a partnership with Malaysian police forces to equip officers with facial recognition technology. This would allow security officials to compare instantly live images captured by body-cameras with images stored in a central database.', 'WHY DOES CHINA WANT TO EXPORT ITS AI OVERSEAS?', 'China shrewdly assumes that the more it shifts other countries’ political systems closer to its model of governance, the less of a threat those countries will pose to Chinese hegemony.', 'Beijing also knows that providing critical technology to eager governments will make them more dependent on China. The more that governments rely on advanced Chinese technology to control their populations, the more pressure they will feel to align with Beijing’s strategic interests.', 'In fact, China’s AI strategy is blunt about the technology’s perceived benefits. A press release from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology states that AI “will become a new impetus for advancing supply-side structural reforms, a new opportunity for rejuvenating the real economy, and a new engine for building China into both a manufacturing and cyber superpower.”', '', '', '', '', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Neg-Wyoming-Octas.docx

Minnesota

AmFr