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Six Irish students have been killed in Berkeley, California, when a fourth-floor balcony collapsed.
Niccolai Schuster (21), Eoghan Culligan (21), Eimear Walsh (21), Olivia Burke (21), Ashley Donohoe (22) and Lorcán Miller (21) were celebrating a 21st birthday when the balcony collapsed on to the balcony below.
Niccolai Schuster and Eoghan Culligan were former pupils of St Mary’s College in Rathmines, Dublin.
Ashley Donohoe is an Irish-American from Rohnert Park, which is 50 miles north of San Francisco. She and Olivia Burke are cousins.
Seven other people were seriously injured. Berkeley police spokeswoman Jennifer Coats said the survivors’ injuries were “very serious and potentially life-threatening”.
The victims, who had travelled to the United States on J-1 summer visas, fell from the fourth floor of an apartment building when the balcony gave way at 12.40am on Tuesday.
Four died at the scene and two others were pronounced dead at a local hospital, police said.
Pictures from the scene showed the balcony detached itself from the wall and collapsed into a balcony on the third floor of the pale stucco building on Kittredge Street, near the University of California Berkeley.
The City of Berkeley has released, along with the update on the incident, the 57-page building and safety inspection history for 2020 Kittredge Street.
The collapsed balcony and the three other similar balconies in the building, have been red-tagged, prohibiting access to those areas.
The City said it had ordered the property owner to immediately remove the collapsed balcony and to perform a structural assessment of the remaining balconies within 48 hours.
Blackrock, the investment giant that advises the property fund that owns the building, and Greystar, the Texas-based company that manages it, said that an independent structural engineer would carry out an investigation to determine the cause of the accident.
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Irish students who had been sleeping in the building at the time described hearing a bang. “I walked out and I saw rubble on the street and a bunch of Irish students crying,” said Mark Neville, a J-1 student.
Taoiseach Enda Kenny said the news from California was “truly terrible” and that his thoughts were with the victims’ families. “My heart breaks for the parents who lost children this morning and I can only imagine the fear in the hearts of other parents,” he said.
Mr Kenny will update the Dáil in the morning, and it is understood arrangements for the business of the House may be reviewed.
A number of TDs have called for the tragedy to be marked in some way.
A book of condolences will be open in the Mansion House in Dublin on Thursday and Friday from 10am-4pm.
Earlier the Department of Foreign Affairs set up an emergency telephone line (+353 1 418 0200) and activated its consular response team. The Irish consulate in San Francisco, a popular J-1 summer destination for Irish students, were also arranging grief counselling.
The balcony was holding 13 students when it collapsed, Mr Kenny said, citing California police.
The dead and injured were brought to three hospitals - Highland Hospital in nearby Oakland; Eden Medical Centre in Castro Valley, about 18 miles from the scene of the accident; and John Muir Medical Centre in Walnut Creek.
Apartments in the complex, completed in 2007, are available to rent for $2,150 to $4,000 a month, according to its website.
The cause of the collapse was not clear. As part of the City’s investigation of the incident, it will be retaining possession of the collapsed materials. Its investigation is expected to take several days.
Gene St Onge, an Oakland civil and structural engineer who reviewed a picture of the detached balcony at the request of the San Francisco Chronicle, said it appeared to be “a classic case of there being inadequate waterproofing at the point where the deck meets the house.”
While stressing that his assessment was preliminary, he said: “If the waterproofing is substandard, rainwater can enter the building, causing dry rot, which can destroy the wood members within a short time, i.e. only a few years from construction.”
Carrie Olson, a preservation expert who was a member of the City of Berkeley Design Review Committee for 14 years, told The Irish Times the balconies were not constructed to hold large numbers of people.
President Michael D Higgins sent a message of condolence while on a state visit to Italy. “I have heard with the greatest sadness of the terrible loss of life of young Irish people and the critical injury of others in Berkeley, California, today,” he said.
Minister for Foreign Affairs Charlie Flanagan said it was “an appalling loss of life for young people whose hopes and dreams of the future have suddenly and without notice been shattered.”
The US Ambassador to Ireland, Kevin O’Malley, expressed sympathy to the families, loved ones and friends of those who died.
Some of the students attended University College Dublin. The college has made counselling and student support services available to students in San Francisco and in Dublin. An online book of condolences will be opened on the website ucd.ie
Philip Grant, the Consul General of Ireland, held a wreath-laying ceremony at 5pm local-time near the site of the balcony collapse. ||||| Water seeping into the horizontal beams supporting a balcony could have caused dry rot, contributing to a balcony collapse that killed six people in Berkeley, engineers who visited the scene said Tuesday.
“It appears to be a classic case of dry rot, meaning water intruded into the building [and] rotted the wood” that supported the balcony, said Gene St. Onge, a civil and structural engineer in Oakland. With more than a dozen people on the balcony, “it gave way. It didn’t have enough residual strength, and it failed.”
St. Onge said the broken wooden beams protruding from the building that once held up the balcony show what looks like signs of dry rot.
“It appeared to be shredded and darkened and had all the appearance of wood that had been totally compromised by dry rot,” he said.
The balcony itself should have been able to support the weight of 13 or 14 people, he said.
“If you had 14 people, and they were all -- I don’t know -- football players, and they were jumping up and down, you would get a fair amount of deflection, depending on how well the railing was tied back,” St. Onge said. “But if the [wooden supports] were designed even under minimal standards, it should still have held.”
There are other clues that the wood had rotted. There is visible mold in one of the broken wooden joists. And it broke into short fibers at the failure point, a sign of dry rot; if the wood had not rotted, “you would see long slender splinters. It would look like a broken baseball bat,” said Bernard Cuzzillo, a consulting engineer who has a doctorate in mechanical engineering at UC Berkeley who visited the balcony scene Tuesday.
And when you look at what used to be the floor of the balcony, much of the wooden joists that once supported it have disintegrated.
Cuzzillo offered his interpretation of what happened:
The seven horizontal wooden joists that supported the balcony broke. The deck folded straight down 90 degrees, while the guardrail assembly flipped upside down.
With the deck flipped, it’s possible to see the condition of the balcony’s floor. “You will notice when you look through those things, you see a bunch of vertical lines. Those vertical lines correspond to where the joists had been attached at the bottom of the deck assembly,” he said.
“And the very startling thing is that only remnants of the joists remain in those locations,” Cuzzillo said. “You’re basically looking at what had been the joists, lined up now vertically, and now mostly gone, because they’re rotten. So basically, almost all that’s left of the joists are its shadows.”
Added Cuzzillo, “It became degraded over time due to dry rot. But then it completely disintegrated in the incident, in the fall, when it broke off.”
The wood was so deteriorated at the balcony site that when workers on the scene touched the wood, parts of it broke off, said Darrick Hom, president of the Structural Engineers Assn. of Northern California and an Oakland structural engineer for Estructure, who went to the scene Tuesday afternoon.
“It was decayed. They were touching it with their hand and pieces were coming off. Obviously, if you touch a wood beam on your deck, it should not come off in your hand,” Hom said.
Hom said as he left Tuesday afternoon workers were starting to cut open the intact balcony just below the collapsed one, possibly examining the condition of that balcony.
He agreed that had the balcony been built to the minimum code and was in good condition, the balcony should’ve been able to support 13 people. “Just the pure weight is not the deciding factor,” Hom said.
Hom said he expected investigators would look at how the balcony was designed by a structural engineer, and whether it was constructed based on the approved drawings.
He said it’s surprising to see this kind of collapse for such a new building. “To see something like this is very unexpected,” he said. It will be important to learn from this and prevent this from happening in the future, he said.
City records show the Library Gardens apartments at 2020 Kittredge Street were proposed as a mixed-use development in 2000 that was ultimately completed in 2007. The building has more than 175 rental units and 3,000 square feet of commercial space.
The owner of the land is listed as Granite Library Gardens, an investment fund managed by New York-based BlackRock. BlackRock leases the property to Greystar, a Virginia company that owns more than 400,000 residences nationwide, including Library Gardens.
Rent for one- and two-bedroom apartments at Library Gardens ranges from $2,150 a month to $4,000.
Waterproofing the supports that hold up balconies is extremely important. The wooden horizontal beams that hold them up protrude from the building. If the beams start to rot, the entire balcony can come tumbling down.
“That junction, where the [wooden] members come up beyond the exterior wall, is critically important to waterproof properly,” St. Onge said. “It appears as though that something failed there. Either the detailing wasn’t adequate, or the construction was not done properly, or something happened that allowed water to intrude.
St. Onge said it’s important to inspect apartment balconies.
“We’re seeing a lot of structures going back to the ’60s and ’70s -- they were built properly at the time – they’re starting to fail or failing completely because of age, and they’ve been neglected and not taken care of,” he said. “There have been a number of cases where decks have failed just simply because the owners haven’t been paying attention and repairing or replacing them as they should.”
City officials declined to comment at an early afternoon news briefing as to what caused the balcony to collapse. They said they are investigating.
Authorities said three of the building's other balconies have been red-tagged, meaning people are not allowed on them. They have asked for a complete structural evaluation.
The property management company of the apartment, the Library Gardens Apartment Complex, released a statement Tuesday expressing the firm's condolences over the tragedy.
"Our hearts go out to the families and friends of the deceased and those injured in this tragic accident. As the property management company, we have taken precautionary steps to limit access to other balconies at the apartment complex as law enforcement completes its investigation," the statement said. "The safety of our residents is our highest priority and we will be working with an independent structural engineer and local authorities to determine the cause of the accident. We will share more details as we have them." ||||| 6 dead, 7 hurt in Berkeley balcony collapse
A 21st birthday party in Berkeley full of students from Ireland turned into a scene of chaos and tragedy early Tuesday when the small fourth-floor balcony of the apartment hosting the bash gave way, killing six young people who crashed to the street below and injuring seven more.
The accident at the four-story Library Gardens complex at 2020 Kittredge St., near the UC Berkeley campus, unleashed waves of grief across Ireland as well as Rohnert Park, where one of the victims was from. It launched Berkeley homicide detectives and building inspectors into what they said would be a swift investigation.
While city officials wouldn’t comment on their initial findings, independent experts who viewed the damage in person or through photographs said it appeared rainwater had penetrated the balcony’s wood structure, causing dry rot that weakened it. Such rot, they said, can happen in just a few years if a building isn’t properly sealed from the elements.
Four people died at the scene and two others died at a hospital, police said. Two of the seven who were injured were in critical condition at trauma centers. And those who witnessed the balcony’s sudden plunge at 12:40 a.m. remained stunned hours later.
“I saw a bunch of bodies,” said Jason Biswas, 16, a student at nearby Berkeley High School. He said the victims were in “piles of blood,” adding, “It seemed like a movie, but it wasn’t.”
Alameda County officials identified the dead as Ashley Donohoe, 22, of Rohnert Park and Irish nationals Olivia Burke, Eoghan Colligan, Niccolai Schuster, Lorcan Miller and Eimear Walsh, who were each 21.
Donohoe was a soccer star and homecoming queen before she graduated from Rancho Cotate High School in 2011, and she and Burke were cousins. Their grieving family members were too overcome to speak Tuesday.
Irish officials said many of those at the party were in the United States on J-1 nonimmigrant visas, which are given to those approved to participate in work-and-study-based exchange visitor programs.
“The families who have been bereaved in the tragedy in Berkeley earlier today have now all been contacted,” Irish Foreign Affairs Minister Charlie Flanagan said in a statement. “I again want to express my deepest sympathy to the families and loved ones of those who lost their lives in this appalling incident.”
Makeshift memorial
On Kittredge Street, a makeshift memorial sprang up on the sidewalk. Neighbors delivered flowers and cards amid hugs and tears. Onlookers came throughout the day, crowding behind police barricades as city crews, hoisted by cranes, inspected what was left of the balcony and gathered shards for examination.
The balcony itself tumbled over and landed upside down on the third-floor balcony below. Red cups, tree branches and other debris littered the sidewalk.
In the evening, Mayor Tom Bates was joined by Ireland’s general consul in San Francisco, Philip Grant, for a ceremonial wreath-laying to honor the dead. A bagpiper played a mournful tune.
Berkeley officials said the apartment complex, which was built from 2005 to 2007, was subject to city and state building codes established in 1998, which mandated that balconies support at least 60 pounds per square foot. The balcony that collapsed appeared to be roughly 30 square feet. City officials said the apartment had no sign warning of the balcony’s capacity — and was not required by law to do so.
The officials would not speculate on what may have caused the balcony to break away. “In 48 hours we should know more,” said Matthai Chakko, a city spokesman.
As the investigation began, though, officials red-tagged three similar balconies at the 176-unit apartment complex out of concern that they might not be structurally sound. The city ordered the property owner to “perform a structural assessment of the remaining balconies within 48 hours,” said Chakko.
Bates said the tragedy was a “wake-up call,” and that city officials planned to inspect 13 other buildings under construction in the city to ensure they are safe.
Library Gardens, which consists of two buildings, has an assessed value for tax purposes of $65.6 million, according to public records. On its website, the manicured complex is described as the “premiere choice for convenient Berkeley apartments.” Units rent for $2,150 to $4,000 a month.
In a statement, property manager Greystar said, “Our hearts go out to the families and friends of the deceased and those injured in this tragic accident.
“The safety of our residents is our highest priority,” said Greystar, which is headquartered in Charleston, S.C., and has offices in San Francisco, “and we will be working with an independent structural engineer and local authorities to determine the cause of the accident.”
A similar statement was released by New York-based private equity group BlackRock, which bought the complex in 2007 and serves as the investment adviser for a real estate fund that owns the property. The owner is listed under the name Granite Library Gardens LP.
Wood joists ‘degraded’
Bernard Cuzzillo, a mechanical engineer who owns a Berkeley laboratory and studies why structures fail, came to the scene to view the damage and take photographs.
He said the wood structure of the balcony — which sat beyond a set of French doors — appeared to have been exposed to rain and that the “wood joists are obviously degraded due to dry rot.” He was not involved in the investigation.
Gene St. Onge, an Oakland civil and structural engineer, reviewed a picture of the detached balcony at the request of The Chronicle.
While stressing that his assessment was preliminary, St. Onge said, “This appears to be a classic case of there being inadequate waterproofing at the point where the deck meets the house. If the waterproofing is substandard, rainwater can enter the building, causing dry rot, which can destroy the wood members within a short time, i.e. only a few years from construction.”
Carrie Olson, who was on the Berkeley Design Review Committee that approved the building in 2001, said the balcony that collapsed was intended largely as decoration, and was “definitely not large enough to be what the city would call an ‘open space balcony,’ where groups of people could stand outside.” Olson abstained from the 2001 vote.
The number of people who fell, and the distance they dropped, horrified witnesses, who described a frantic scene on the street.
Gerald Robinson of Berkeley said he had just left a movie and was in his car when a young man and woman with blood on them flagged him down. He drove them to Highland Hospital in Oakland and stayed with them for about an hour.
“They were distraught. They were hanging on each other for comfort,” said Robinson, 65.
The two, both Irish, told Robinson that the balcony had collapsed during a 21st birthday celebration for a friend. “They were having a party — suddenly it went down,” Robinson said. “It came down really fast and chucked everybody off.”
Another witness, 18-year-old Xueyao Song, said, “It was really horrible. We came down and saw people crying, holding each other.”
Owen Buckley, who lives on the third floor of the building and is also an Irish student who came to the Bay Area for the summer to work, was not at the party but heard the collapse.
“I thought someone had gotten shot,” he said.
Rushed to hospitals
Two women and a man were taken by ambulance to Highland Hospital, officials said, while three men and a woman were rushed to Eden Medical Center in Castro Valley. At least one victim was taken to John Muir Medical Center in Walnut Creek.
The balcony collapsed about 40 minutes after Berkeley police officers were notified by dispatchers that someone had complained about a “loud party” in the building, said Police Chief Michael Meehan.
The chief said, however, that officers had not yet responded to the complaint because of other more serious calls and that, even if they had, it’s “highly doubtful” that officers would have gone inside.
San Francisco Chronicle staff writers J.K. Dineen and Michael Cabanatuan contributed to this report.
Jaxon Van Derbeken, Henry K. Lee, Hamed Aleaziz and Kurtis Alexander are San Francisco Chronicle staff writers. E-mail: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] and [email protected] Twitter: @jvanderbeken @henryklee @haleaziz @kurtisalexander ||||| . (AP) — Five of the Irish college students who died when a fifth-floor balcony collapsed were part of a popular cultural exchange program allowing foreign students to work and travel in the United States.
The U.S. government's J-1 Summer Work Travel program brings 100,000 college students to this country every year, with many finding jobs at resorts, summer camps and other attractions.
Here's a look at the program:
WHAT IS IT?
The program — created under the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 — allows foreign college students to spend up to four months living and working in the U.S. It was meant to foster cultural understanding and has become a booming, multimillion-dollar international business. Participation has grown from about 20,000 in 1996 to a peak of more than 150,000 in 2008.
WHO RUNS IT?
The State Department has 41 designated sponsors that help students arrange visas and find jobs and housing. Students pay thousands of dollars to participate in the program. The San Francisco Bay Area is especially popular with Irish students, many of whom work at Fisherman's Wharf and other tourist sites.
HAVE THERE BEEN PROBLEMS?
A 2010 investigation by The Associated Press found that many students came to the U.S. only to learn the jobs they were promised didn't exist. Some had to share beds in crowded houses or filthy apartments. Following the AP's investigation, the State Department tightened its rules governing participating businesses.
IS THERE OVERSIGHT?
In the past, unscrupulous third-party brokers working for sponsors have taken advantage of students, cramming them into tiny, roach-infested apartments while charging exorbitant rent.
Sponsors now take a more active role with housing. They have to keep records on where the students are living and stay in contact with them during their four-month stay. There's currently no requirement for sponsors to vet the housing for the program's participants, said Susan Pittman, a spokesman for the State Department. Still, she insists the department monitors the program, adding that last year they made 717 unannounced visits to sponsors and employers. | In what should be a wake-up call for property owners, investigators believe the horrific balcony accident that killed six young people and injured seven in Berkeley, Calif., yesterday was caused by a "classic case of dry rot"—even though the building was less than 10 years old. A civil engineer who inspected the scene tells the Los Angeles Times that the fourth-floor balcony should have been able to support the weight of 13 people, even if they were football players jumping up and down, but water appears to have seeped in and "totally compromised" the wooden beams holding up the balcony. Officials say the apartment complex was completed in 2007 and three other balconies there have been red-tagged, the San Francisco Chronicle reports. Waterproofing the point where wooden beams come out of an exterior wall is "critically important," and it appears "something failed there," the engineer tells the LA Times. "Either the detailing wasn't adequate, or the construction was not done properly, or something happened that allowed water to intrude." The victims have been named as Irish citizens Niccolai Schuster, Eoghan Culligan, Eimear Walsh, Olivia Burke, and Lorcan Miller, all 21, and 22-year-old Irish-American Ashley Donohoe, who is Burke's cousin, the Irish Times reports. The Irish students were in the US as part of the J-1 Summer Work Travel exchange program that brings 100,000 students to the US every year, the AP reports. |
SOCOM and the Army are purchasing two separate active infrared countermeasure systems to protect U.S. aircraft. They plan to spend a total of approximately $2.74 billion, including about $2.475 billion for 815 ATIRCM systems and associated common missile warning systems and about $261 million for 60 DIRCM systems and its own unique missile warning system. In addition, there are many other potential customers for an active infrared countermeasure system, such as Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft that have not yet been committed to either ATIRCM or DIRCM. SOCOM and the Army both have a need for an effective integrated infrared countermeasure system capable of defeating infrared guided weapon systems. The Army considers this capability especially critical to counter newer, more sophisticated, infrared guided missiles. Likewise, SOCOM has established an urgent need for a near-term directional infrared countermeasure system capable of countering currently deployed infrared guided missiles. To meet its urgent need, SOCOM plans to exercise its first production option for 15 DIRCM systems in July 1998 and procure 45 additional systems during fiscal years 1998 and 1999. The Army expects to begin ATIRCM production in April 2001. Two generations of infrared missiles are currently deployed. First generation missiles can be defeated by current countermeasures, such as flares. Second generation infrared guided missiles are more difficult to defeat. More advanced infrared guided missiles are being developed that will have even greater capabilities against current countermeasures. To defeat infrared guided missiles, the ATIRCM and DIRCM systems will emit directed energy to decoy or jam the missile’s seeker. Both systems are composed of a missile approach warning system, a computer processor, a power supply, and energy transmitters housed in a pointing turret. After a missile is detected, the computer is to rotate the turret and point the transmitters at the missile. The transmitters are to then emit the directed energy. Congress and DOD have a long-standing interest in reducing proliferation of electronic warfare systems. By urging development of common systems, Congress expected to reduce the costly proliferation of duplicative systems and achieve cost savings in program development, production, and logistics. DOD agrees on the need for commonality, and its policy statements reflect congressional concerns about electronic warfare system proliferation. DOD policy states that prior to initiating a new acquisition program, the services must consider using or modifying an existing system or initiate a new joint-service development program. DOD policy also requires the services to consider commonality alternatives at various points in the acquisition process. Joint electronic warfare programs and increased commonality among the services’ systems results in economy of scale savings. Buying larger quantities for common use among the services usually results in lower procurement costs. Similarly, lower support costs result from a more simplified logistics system providing common repair parts, maintenance, test equipment, and training. For example, under Army leadership, a common radar warning receiver was acquired for helicopters and other special purpose aircraft of the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force. In addition, a follow-on radar warning system for certain Army and Marine Corps special purpose aircraft and helicopters was jointly acquired with savings estimated by Army officials of $187.7 million attributable to commonality benefits. The ATIRCM and DIRCM systems will initially have one key difference in technological capability. The DIRCM system will rely on existing flash lamp technology to defeat all currently deployed first and second generation threat missiles. (A flash lamp emits a beam of light energy to confuse the missile’s seeker.) The Army’s ATIRCM system will also be fielded with a flash lamp but it will also have a laser. According to SOCOM officials, after the flash lamp-equipped DIRCM is fielded, they plan to upgrade the DIRCM system with a laser that has completed development and is already in production. As described later in this report, the upgraded DIRCM system could be available around the same time as the ATIRCM system. Furthermore, the DIRCM laser could be the same as the one used in ATIRCM, according to DOD officials. The Army’s cost and effectiveness analysis used to justify the ATIRCM system indicates that with a laser upgrade, DIRCM could provide capability equal to the ATIRCM. The two systems will have a total of three different size turrets. According to DOD and contractor officials, the size of the turret matters because larger aircraft present larger targets and must apply more energy to decoy an incoming missile’s seeker. A larger turret can direct more of the flash lamp’s energy. The larger the amount of directed energy, the greater the likelihood the missile will become confused as to the actual location of the target aircraft. The DIRCM turret, to be used on SOCOM C-130s, is the largest of the three. The United Kingdom intends to use the larger DIRCM turret on its larger aircraft and a smaller turret for its helicopters and smaller aircraft. The ATIRCM turret is between the two DIRCM turrets in size. Since the ATIRCM turret will also have a laser, however, DOD acquisition officials believe it will ultimately be more effective than any system equipped only with a flash lamp. Both the DIRCM and ATIRCM programs are experiencing delays that have moved their projected availability dates significantly closer together. However, DOD has not yet taken advantage of the schedule changes to determine if one system will be more cost-effective than the other and if it can achieve significant savings by procuring only one system to protect all its aircraft. SOCOM plans to exercise the first of three production options and buy 15 DIRCM systems in July 1998. These systems will not be equipped with lasers. Production funds are projected to be included in the fiscal year 2001 budget for the DIRCM laser upgrade. Production of ATIRCM is to begin in April 2001. SOCOM officials maintain that because of their urgent need they cannot wait for the laser-equipped ATIRCM. However, the difference in the time frames for beginning production can be misleading. DIRCM is scheduled to go into production before operational testing begins, while the ATIRCM is not scheduled to begin production until operational testing is completed. If both DIRCM and ATIRCM production begin immediately after their respective operational tests, DIRCM’s production is delayed until April 2000 and ATIRCM is moved up to January 2001. As a result, the systems will start production within 9 months of each other. Additionally, DIRCM, with a laser upgrade, is projected to be available in 2001, about the same time as ATIRCM with a laser. The Army is developing ATIRCM and the United Kingdom with SOCOM is developing DIRCM to work on a variety of aircraft, including some that are the same or similar. (See table 1.) For example, the United Kingdom plans to use the DIRCM system on the CH-47 Chinook helicopter while the Army plans to use ATIRCM on the Chinook. By varying the size of the turret, the United Kingdom intends to use DIRCM on aircraft of a wide range of sizes, from its very large, fixed-wing C-130s to small rotary wing aircraft such as the Lynx. Although the Army currently has no plans to install ATIRCM on fixed-wing aircraft the size of C-130s, it too will be placing its system on a wide range of aircraft from the very large CH-47 heavy lift helicopter, to the small OH-58D helicopter. If development of both systems is successful, therefore, the Army and the United Kingdom will prove that ATIRCM and DIRCM provide redundant capability for many aircraft. In addition to those SOCOM and Army aircraft identified as platforms for DIRCM or ATIRCM, there are many potential Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft that are not yet committed to either system. These include large fixed-wing aircraft of the Air Force, as well as 425 future Marine Corps V-22 aircraft and the Navy’s SH-60 helicopters. DOD’s plans to acquire infrared countermeasure capability may not represent the most cost-effective approach. While we recognize SOCOM’s urgent need for a countermeasure capability in the near term, we believe that DOD can satisfy this need and meet the Army’s needs without procuring two separate systems. Specifically, proceeding with procurement of the first 15 DIRCM systems beginning in July 1998 appears warranted. However, continued production of DIRCM may not be the most cost-effective option for DOD since the Army is developing the ATIRCM system, which will have the same technology, be available at about the same time, and is being developed for the same or similar aircraft. We, therefore, recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) direct that the appropriate tests and analyses be conducted to determine whether DIRCM or ATIRCM will provide the most cost-effective means to protect U.S. aircraft and (2) procure that system for U.S. aircraft that have a requirement for similar Infrared Countermeasure capabilities. Until that decision can be made, we further recommend that the Secretary of Defense limit DIRCM system procurement to the first production option of 15 systems to allow a limited number for SOCOM’s urgent deployment needs. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our recommendation that the appropriate tests and analyses be conducted to determine whether ATIRCM or DIRCM will provide the most cost-effective protection for U.S. aircraft. According to DOD, the results of such analyses were completed in 1994 and 1995 and showed that both systems were the most cost-effective: DIRCM for large, fixed-wing C-130 aircraft and ATIRCM for smaller, rotary wing aircraft. However, as a result of events that have occurred in both programs since the analyses were conducted in 1994 and 1995, DOD’s earlier conclusions as to cost-effectiveness are no longer necessarily valid and a new analysis needs to be conducted as we recommended. For example, the 1994 cost- and operational effectiveness analysis conducted for SOCOM’s C-130s concluded that DIRCM should be selected because it was to be available significantly sooner than ATIRCM. As our report states, the DIRCM schedule has slipped significantly, and by the time the planned laser upgrade for DIRCM is available, ATIRCM is also scheduled to be available. Furthermore, the 1994 analysis justifying DIRCM concluded that ATIRCM would be a less expensive option and did not conclude that DIRCM would be more effective than ATIRCM. Thus, the question of which system would be most cost-effective for SOCOM’s C-130s is a legitimate issue that should be addressed by DOD in a new cost-effectiveness analysis before SOCOM commits fully to DIRCM. In addition, the Army’s 1995 cost- and operational effectiveness analysis justifying ATIRCM also concluded DIRCM could meet the Army’s rotary wing requirement if DIRCM’s effectiveness were to be improved by adding a laser. As our report notes, DOD now plans to acquire a laser as an upgrade for DIRCM. Thus, whether DIRCM or ATIRCM would be most cost-effective for the Army’s rotary wing aircraft remains a legitimate and viable question that DOD should reconsider. Further, in 1994 and 1995, when DOD conducted the prior cost-effectiveness analyses, effectiveness levels for DIRCM and ATIRCM had to be assumed from simulations because no operational test results were available at that time. Operational testing, including live missile shots against the DIRCM system, is scheduled to begin in the summer of 1998 and ATIRCM testing is scheduled for 1999. In the near future, then, DOD may be in a better position to know conclusively how effective DIRCM or ATIRCM will be and this should be taken into consideration in a new cost-effectiveness analysis. DOD did not concur with a recommendation in a draft of this report that one system be procured for all U.S. aircraft, arguing that one system cannot meet all aircraft requirements. We have clarified our recommendation by eliminating the word “all”. Our intent was to focus this recommendation on U.S. aircraft having a requirement for advanced infrared countermeasure protection, such as that to be provided by DIRCM or ATIRCM. For those aircraft that have an advanced infrared countermeasure requirement, we reiterate that the United Kingdom plans to use the DIRCM system on a wide variety of fixed- and rotary wing aircraft of many shapes and sizes, and the Army plans to use ATIRCM on a wide variety of rotary wing aircraft, as well as the fixed-wing CV-22. Thus, DOD should reconsider whether DIRCM or ATIRCM could provide the advanced infrared countermeasure protection necessary to meet the multiple U.S. aircraft requirements. In commenting further on its belief that one system cannot meet all U.S. aircraft requirements, DOD also stated that (1) the SOCOM DIRCM is too heavy for Army helicopters, (2) ATIRCM’s smaller turret drive motors are not designed for the increased wind in SOCOM C-130 applications, and (3) ATIRCM will not emit enough Band I and II jamming energy to protect SOCOM’s C-130s. We agree that the SOCOM DIRCM is too heavy for Army helicopters, but point out that the DIRCM contractor is designing a smaller DIRCM turret for the United Kingdom’s helicopters that would not be too heavy for the Army’s helicopters. DOD has never planned for DIRCM or ATIRCM to be the only means of protection for its aircraft from infrared guided missiles. Other systems are available to DOD to help protect against threat missiles, including those in Bands I and II, and these alternatives should be considered for use in conjunction with DIRCM or ATIRCM as DOD tries to determine how to protect its aircraft in the most cost-effective manner. DOD also did not concur with our recommendation that it limit initial DIRCM production to the first 15 units to begin filling its urgent need and to provide units to be used for testing and analysis before committing SOCOM’s entire fleet of 59 C-130s to the DIRCM program. DOD maintained that SOCOM’s remaining C-130s would remain vulnerable to missile threats such as the one that shot down a SOCOM AC-130 during Operation Desert Storm if any production decisions were delayed. We continue to believe that the additional analysis needs to be conducted before any DIRCM production decisions beyond the first one are made. More than 7 years have passed since the unfortunate loss of the SOCOM AC-130 and its crew in 1991. During that time, DOD delayed the first DIRCM production decision several times. The resolution of the technical problems causing these schedule slips can only be known through successful testing and implementation of our recommendation would allow units to be produced for testing. Finally, we agree with DOD that SOCOM’s need is urgent and believe that the best way to begin fulfilling the urgent need while determining whether DIRCM or ATIRCM is the more cost-effective system for C-130s is to limit DIRCM production to only the first 15 systems. To develop information for this report, we compared and examined the Army’s and the SOCOM’s respective plans and proposed schedules for acquiring the ATIRCM and DIRCM systems. We obtained acquisition and testing plans and the proposed schedule for acquiring and fielding the systems. We compared these plans to legislative and DOD acquisition guidance and to the results of past DOD procurements. We discussed the programs with officials of the ATIRCM Project Office, St. Louis, Missouri, and the DIRCM Project Office, Tampa, Florida. Also, we visited with Lockheed-Sanders, the ATIRCM contractor, and Northrop-Grumman, the DIRCM contractor, and discussed their respective programs. We conducted our review from August 1996 to December 1997 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date of the report. A written statement must also be submitted to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations with an agency’s first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report. We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the Secretary of the Army, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command. We will also make copies available to others on request. Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were Danny Owens, Wendy Smythe, Charles Ward, and Mark Lambert. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | GAO reviewed the Army's Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure system (ATIRCM) and the U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) Directional Infrared Countermeasure (DIRCM) system to determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is justified in acquiring both systems. GAO noted that: (1) DOD may be able to achieve sizable savings by procuring, supporting, and maintaining only one active infrared countermeasure system to protect its aircraft from infrared guided missiles; (2) despite congressional emphasis on, and DOD's stated commitment to, commonality, SOCOM and the Army are acquiring two separate countermeasure systems that eventually will have the same laser effect technology; (3) DOD should determine which system is more cost-effective and procure that one to protect its aircraft; (4) if DIRCM is determined to be more cost-effective, the ATIRCM program should be terminated; and (5) if ATIRCM is determined to be more cost-effective, no additional DIRCM systems should be procured beyond those planned to be procured in July 1998 to meet SOCOM's urgent need. |
This report analyzes recent laws that relate to the regulation of guns in the District of Columbia (DC or District), and congressional proposals that would further amend these laws. The four main statutes or bills at issue are (1) federal provisions under the National Firearms Act of 1934 and the Gun Control Act of 1968; (2) the D.C. Firearms Control Regulation Act of 1976, as in effect prior to the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller ; (3) the proposed Second Amendment Enforcement Act introduced in February 2011 ( H.R. 645 ); and (4) the District's legislation that permanently amends its gun laws—the Firearms Control Amendment Act of 2008 (FCAA), and the Inoperable Pistol Amendment Act of 2008 (IPAA). Congressional proposals to address the District's firearms laws often arise when the issue of voting rights for the District is before Congress; thus, it is worth noting another congressional proposal from the 111 th Congress to amend the District's gun laws, Title II of S. 160 , which was the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009. While Title II of S. 160 of the 111 th Congress and H.R. 645 from the 112 th Congress are substantially similar, this report will point out the differences where appropriate. This report begins with an overview of the introduction of these bills and their status today. It proceeds to analyze current DC law after the passage of the FCAA and the IPAA, and the effect that the congressional proposals would have on the District's firearms laws. In doing so, the report traces the congressional proposals section by section. Much of the congressional activity on DC firearms laws occurred after the Supreme Court issued its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller . In Heller , the Supreme Court held, by a vote of 5-4, that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to possess a firearm, unconnected with service in a militia, and the use of such arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. The decision in Heller affirmed the lower court's decision that declared unconstitutional three provisions of the District's Firearms Control Regulation Act: (1) DC Code § [phone number scrubbed].02(a)(4), which generally barred the registration of handguns and thus effectively prohibited the possession of handguns in the District; (2) DC Code § 22-4504(a), which prohibited carrying a pistol without a license, insofar as that provision would prevent a registrant from moving a gun from one room to another within his or her home; and (3) DC Code § [phone number scrubbed].02, which required that all lawfully owned firearms be kept unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device. However, the Supreme Court's opinion did not address the District's license to carry requirement, making note of Heller's concession that such a requirement would be permissible if enforced in a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious. After the Supreme Court issued its decision, the DC Council enacted emergency legislation to temporarily amend the city's gun laws to comply with the ruling in Heller while considering permanent legislation. The DC Council enacted the Firearms Control Emergency Amendment Act of 2008, the first of several emergency enactments, and this attempt was met with criticism, as some felt that the changes did not comply with the decision in Heller . At the same time, perhaps in reaction to the Court's decision or the District's first attempt to temporarily amend its gun laws, H.R. 6691 , the Second Amendment Enforcement Act, was introduced in the 110 th Congress by Representative Travis Childers. The proposal appeared to overturn or loosen provisions of the District's existing gun laws (i.e., the DC Code as it was prior to any of the city's emergency regulations). The content of H.R. 6691 was subsequently adopted in the nature of a substitute into H.R. 6842 , which was passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 266-152. The Senate did not pass H.R. 6842 , and the bill did not become law. In the 111 th Congress, Senator John Ensign had introduced S.Amdt. 575 to S. 160 , the District of Columbia Voting Rights Act of 2009. This amendment, which also used the language of H.R. 6842 (110 th Congress), was approved by the Senate on February 26, 2009, and became Title II of S. 160 (hereinafter Title II- S. 160 ). Although S. 160 was passed in the Senate by a vote of 61-37, it was later reported that movement on this legislation was stalled. As the House passed H.R. 6842 (110 th Congress) in September 2008, the DC Council continued to enact emergency legislation until permanent legislation could become effective. Language contained in the emergency acts later was encompassed in the permanent legislation. In 2009, the Firearms Control Amendment Act of 2008 (FCAA) and the Inoperable Pistol Amendment Act of 2008 (IPAA) were passed by the DC Council and transmitted to Congress for the requisite 60 days before becoming effective, respectively, on March 31, 2009, and May 20, 2009. Overall, the FCAA and IPAA not only amended firearms provisions of the DC Code that were at issue in Heller , but also provided a different range of restrictions on the regulation of firearms and firearm ownership. It is worth noting that the District's new firearms amendments under the FCAA and IPAA were challenged and upheld in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on March 26, 2010. As discussed above, the language of Title II- S. 160 had been adopted from a bill ( H.R. 6842 ) introduced in the 110 th Congress, which originated prior to the enactment of the two new DC acts. The most recent congressional legislation, H.R. 645 , though it also seeks to overturn or loosen many of the District's gun provisions, takes into consideration the passage of these two new acts, the FCAA and IPAA. Sections 3-8 of H.R. 645 would amend firearms provisions in the DC Code in substantially the same manner as Title II- S. 160 , by limiting the District's ability to promulgate rules regulating firearm possession, and repealing the District's registration scheme, among other things. Sections 9-13 would preserve certain provisions of IPAA, while Section 14 would repeal other provisions of the IPAA and all of the FCAA. In general, federal firearms laws establish the minimum standards in the United States for firearms regulations. The states, territories, and the District of Columbia may choose to supplement the federal statutes—the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA) and the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA)—with their own more restrictive firearms laws in a manner that does not run counter to the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller . Under the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (the Home Rule Act), the District generally has authority to promulgate its own laws pursuant to the act's procedures. For instance, the Home Rule Act provides that "the legislative power of the District shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within the District ..." More specifically, the Home Rule Act authorizes the DC Council "to make … all such usual and reasonable police regulations … as the Council may deem necessary for the regulation of firearms." Since much of the District of Columbia's law that existed prior to home rule consisted of congressional enactments, this power has often been used by the District of Columbia to amend laws passed by Congress. Congress nonetheless retains the ability to legislate for the District, as well as to impose limits on the legislative authority of the District of Columbia government. In the Home Rule Act, Congress specifically reserved for itself "the right, at any time, to exercise its constitutional authority as legislature for the District by enacting legislation for the District on any subject, whether within or without the scope of legislative power granted to the Council ... including legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the District prior to or after enactment of this chapter and any act passed by the Council." Because the District legislates within delegated congressional authority under the Home Rule Act, the question of whether the District of Columbia can amend or repeal a particular congressional enactment would appear to depend upon whether Congress, either expressly or by inference, intended that such congressional act not be amended by the District. For instance, Section 3 of H.R. 645 , like Title II- S. 160 , would explicitly provide a limit upon the District of Columbia's authority to legislate in this area: Nothing in this section or any other provision of law shall authorize, or shall be construed to permit the Council, the Mayor, or any governmental or regulatory authority of the District of Columbia to prohibit, constructively prohibit, or unduly burden the ability of persons not prohibited from possessing firearms under Federal law from acquiring, possessing in their homes or businesses, transporting for legitimate purposes , or using for sporting, self-protection or other lawful purposes, any firearm neither prohibited by Federal law nor subject to the National Firearms Act. The District of Columbia shall not have the authority to enact laws or regulations that discourage or eliminate the private ownership or use of firearms (emphasis added). It is worth noting that the phrase—"transporting for legitimate purposes"—is included in H.R. 645 , presumably to address the transportation requirements that it would adopt from the IPAA. This phrase does not otherwise affect the analysis of this section's language under H.R. 645 . The proposed language emphasizes that the Council would not be empowered to promulgate laws relating to firearms regulation either by virtue of the authority granted under the DC Code or any other provision of law that could otherwise be interpreted as granting similar police power. It is unclear, however, what would constitute "a constructive prohibition or undue burden" on the ability of individuals to acquire firearms. The language would also appear to prevent the District from barring firearms possession by any persons not prohibited from possessing a firearm under current federal law and, moreover, appears to prevent the District from prohibiting the possession of any firearm that was not already prohibited or regulated under federal law. In other words, with the exception of carrying, discussed below, it appears that District firearms laws would be substantially the same as federal firearms laws because the District would be limited in its ability to create its own stricter provisions beyond that of the NFA and GCA. Furthermore, the language does not make clear what elements would render a law or regulation in violation of the proscription against discouraging or eliminating the private ownership or use of firearms. In addition, while the proposed language would not directly revoke the District's general authority to enact and enforce sanctions for the criminal misuse of firearms, it appears that the scope of this authority would be limited as well. The last part of Section 3 would not "prohibit the District of Columbia from regulating the carrying of firearms by a person, either concealed or openly, other than at the person's dwelling place, place of business, or on other land possessed by the person" (emphasis added). Under this phrase, it seems clear that the District could regulate concealed or open carry, but it would not be explicitly empowered to prohibit individuals from carrying firearms altogether. Because "regulating the carrying of firearms" could encompass an outright prohibition on such activity, the District could still argue that it would be able to prohibit open or concealed carry altogether (with the stated exceptions), notwithstanding the congressional provision; however, an opposing argument could be made that "regulating the carrying of firearms" does not give the District authority to have a ban on the open or concealed carriage of firearms. This last sentence of H.R. 645 differs from Title II- S. 160 , which stated that nothing "shall be construed to prohibit the District ... from regulating or prohibiting the carrying of firearms" (emphasis added). Prior to Heller , the DC Code's definition of "machine gun" included "any firearm, which shoots, is designed to shoot or can be readily converted to shoot ... semiautomatically, more than 12 shots without manual reloading." By virtue of this broad definition, any semiautomatic weapon that could shoot more than 12 shots without manual reloading, whether pistol, rifle, or shotgun, was deemed a "machine gun," and prohibited from being registered. It appears that under the District's old definition, registration of a pistol was largely limited to revolvers. Under the NFA, "machine gun" is defined as any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled into such parts are in the possession of or under the control of a person. In the FCAA, the District amended its definition of "machine gun" to conform with the federal definition, above. By doing so, semiautomatic firearms are generally no longer prohibited from being registered. However, the District has also chosen to mirror other state laws, like California, and has enacted a list of prohibited firearms. (See " Assault Weapons/Handgun Roster ," below.) If H.R. 645 were enacted, the definition of "machine gun" would be restored to its pre- Heller state because the bill would undo any changes made by the FCAA. Thus, Section 4 of H.R. 645 would essentially continue the definition of "machine gun" to conform with the federal definition, above. Although the DC Code has a scheme for registering firearms, the pre- Heller provisions prohibited registration of sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, short barreled rifles, or pistols not validly registered prior to September, 24, 1976. Together, the pre- Heller definition of "machine gun" and the ban on registering pistols post-1976 also acted as a virtual prohibition on handguns, which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in Heller . Pursuant to the FCAA, the District now allows the registration of pistols for self-defense, and because "machine gun" conforms to the federal definition, semiautomatic handguns may be registered so long as the applicant meets other requirements. Furthermore, the FCAA includes an exemption from the registration requirement for a person who temporarily possesses a firearm registered to another while in the home of the registrant, provided the temporary possessor is not barred from possessing a firearm and the person reasonably believes that possession is necessary for self-defense in that home. The FCAA makes several amendments to the provisions that set forth the qualification and information requirements for the registration of a firearm. For example, a person who has been convicted, within five years prior to applying for a registration certificate, of an intrafamily offense, or two or more violations of the District's or any other jurisdiction's law that restricts driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, is prohibited from registering. Similarly, applicants who, within five years of applying, (1) have a history of violent behavior; (2) have been a respondent in either an intrafamily proceeding in which a civil protection order was issued against him or her; or (3) have been a respondent in a proceeding in which a foreign protection order was issued against him or her, are prohibited from registering a firearm. The FCAA also requires applicants to complete a firearms training or safety course and provide an affidavit signed by the certified firearms instructor, in addition to expanding the firearms competency test. Additionally, the Chief of Police (Chief) is required to have any registered pistol submitted for a ballistics identification procedure; further, the Chief is barred from registering more than one pistol per registrant during any 30-day period, except for new residents who are able to register more than one pistol if such pistols have been lawfully owned in another jurisdiction for six months prior to the application. The District's existing registration scheme is all-encompassing, as the registration of a firearm is a method to also license firearms owners and acts as a permit to purchase. Though H.R. 645 would continue to prohibit the possession of sawed-off shotguns, short barreled rifles, and machine guns, it would, however, repeal all sections pertaining to the registration requirement. Thus, DC residents would no longer be required to have a registration certificate for the firearm, or as a prerequisite to purchasing a firearm, and there would be no provision for licensing of gun owners. H.R. 645 would also make other conforming amendments to eliminate all registration language. It is worth noting that with the repeal of the FCAA provisions under H.R. 645 , it appears that the Chief would no longer be required to have any pistol submitted for ballistics testing, nor would the Chief be required to limit registration of pistols to one per month. In other words, there would be no restriction on how many handguns an individual would be able to purchase per month. H.R. 645 would amend DC Code § [phone number scrubbed].02, which sets forth permissible sales and transfers of both ammunition and firearms. Currently, under DC law, a licensed dealer may sell or transfer ammunition only to "any nonresident person or business licensed under the acts of Congress," "any other licensed dealer," or "any law enforcement officer." A provision under Section 5 of H.R. 645 would allow the transfer of ammunition, excluding restricted pistol bullets, "to any person," which would include DC residents. In addition to eliminating any ammunition certificate language, this section would also eliminate the requirement of a licensed dealer to keep track of ammunition received or sold from his or her inventory. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3), a firearms dealer is generally prohibited from selling handguns to out-of-state persons, and must conduct such transactions by transferring the handgun to another firearms dealer in the state where the purchaser resides. Both H.R. 645 and Title II- S. 160 permit interstate purchase of firearms, but do so in different ways. In Title II- S. 160 , there would have been an amendment to the federal statute that would carve out an exception to the federal law to allow federal licensees whose places of business are located in Maryland or Virginia to sell and deliver handguns to residents of the District of Columbia. H.R. 645 , however, would place the amendment of interstate firearms transfer in the DC Code itself. Thereafter, under the DC Code, a federally licensed importer, manufacturer, or dealer of firearms in Maryland or Virginia would be treated as a dealer licensed under DC law. Thus, notwithstanding 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3), Maryland and Virginia firearms dealers would be permitted to sell handguns to District residents if "the transferee meets in person with the transferor to accomplish the transfer, and the sale, delivery, and receipt fully comply with the legal conditions in both the District of Columbia and the jurisdiction in which the transfer occurs." The GCA requires that licensed dealers sell or deliver handguns with a secure gun storage or a safety device, but there is no federal requirement on how firearms should be stored or whether trigger locks must be used. The District's trigger lock requirement, which was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, went further than federal law and required any firearm in the possession of a registrant, even if within the home, to be "unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device" unless the firearm was kept at the owner's place of business, or was being used for lawful recreational purposes within the District. Under the FCAA, the District amended the provisions of the trigger lock requirement so that it would be the policy of the District that any firearm in one's lawful possession be unloaded and either disassembled or secured by trigger lock. The FCAA prohibits a person from storing or keeping any loaded firearm on any premises under his control if "he knows or reasonably should know that a minor is likely to gain access to the firearm without the permission of the parent or guardian of the minor" unless he or she "keeps the firearms in a securely locked box ... container ... or in a location which a reasonable person would believe to be secure" or "carries the firearm on his person or within such close proximity that he can readily retrieve and use it as if he carried it on his person." The FCAA further provides that a person in violation of these firearm storage responsibilities can be found guilty of criminally negligent storage of a firearm or other criminal penalties. Title II- S. 160 would repeal this section of the FCAA. By contrast, Section 7 of H.R. 645 , similar to existing DC law, would create penalties for allowing access of minors to loaded firearms if injury results. Under this section of H.R. 645 , a person would be guilty of unlawful storage if the person knowingly stores or leaves a loaded firearm at any premises under the person's control; the person knows or reasonably should know that a minor is likely to gain access to the firearm without permission of the minor's parent or legal guardian; and the minor kills or injures any person (including the minor) by discharging the firearm. Any person who violates this section would be subject to a fine not to exceed $1,000 and/or a term of imprisonment not to exceed one year. However, there would be several exceptions. Penalties would not apply if (1) the firearm was stored in a securely locked container and the person did not inform the minor of the location of the key to, or the combination of, the container's lock; (2) the firearm was secured by a trigger lock and the person did not inform the minor of the location of the key to, or the combination of, the trigger lock; (3) the firearm was stored on the person's body or in such proximity that it could be used as quickly as if it were on the person's body; (4) the minor's access to the firearm was as a result of unlawful entry; (5) the minor was acting in self-defense; (6) the minor was engaged in hunting or target shooting under the supervision of a parent or adult over the age of 18; or (7) the firearm is in possession or control of a law enforcement officer while the officer is engaged in official duties. If the victim of a shooting under the section is the child of the person who committed the violation, "no prosecution shall be brought ... unless the person who committed the violation behaved in a grossly negligent manner, or unless similarly egregious circumstances exist." Currently, under DC law, a general violation of the registration scheme, including the maintenance of an unregistered firearm in a dwelling place, place of business, or on other land possessed by the owner of a firearm, warrants a fine of not more than $1,000 or not more than one year's imprisonment, or both. A person who is convicted a second time for unregistered possession of a firearm in such areas shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. As a conforming amendment to repealing the registration scheme, H.R. 645 would amend the DC Code to remove this provision. It is worth noting that Title II- S. 160 would have further removed the criminal penalties for the intentional sale or transfer of a firearm or destructive device to a person under the age of 18. When the District amended its firearms laws, it also amended several definitions such as "machine gun," (discussed above) "sawed off shotgun," and "firearm." The FCAA and IPAA are presumably meant to complement each other so that amended definitions or newly created terms are consistent in both Titles 7 and 22 of the DC Code. Section 9 of H.R. 645 would continue the harmonization of definitions between Titles 7 and 22 for certain definitions. These include the terms "firearm," "machine gun," "pistol," "place of business," "sawed off shotgun," and "shotgun." The IPAA amended DC law to permit the District of Columbia to prohibit or restrict the possession of firearms on its property or any property under its control. It also allows private persons or entities who own property in the District to prohibit or restrict possession of firearms on their property, with the exception of law enforcement personnel when they are lawfully authorized to enter. Section 10 of H.R. 645 also addresses property owners restricting firearms on their premises. Under the first part of this section, "[p]rivate persons or entities owning property in the District of Columbia may prohibit or restrict the possession of firearms on their property by any persons, other than law enforcement personnel when lawfully authorized to enter onto the property or lessees occupying residential or business premises " (emphasis added). This provision is unlike existing DC law because it would further prohibit the ability of private landlords of businesses or residential premises to restrict their tenants from possessing firearms on such premises. The second part of Section 10 relates to the District's authority to restrict or prohibit the possession of firearms on public property. Specifically, the District would be able to prohibit or restrict the possession of firearms within any building or structure under its control, or in any area of such building or structure, which has implemented security measures (including but not limited to guard posts, metal detection devices, x-ray or other scanning devices, or card-based or biometric access devices) to identify and exclude unauthorized or hazardous persons or articles, except that no such prohibition or restriction may apply to lessees occupying residential or business premises. This proposed language is arguably narrower in application in that it would apply to "buildings or structures under its control," whereas current law gives the District authority to regulate over "property under its control." Under the proposed language, it is not clear if the District could regulate firearms on real property under its control other than buildings and structures. Furthermore, while it is explicit that the District would not be able to exercise the granted authority upon lessees that occupy buildings under the District's control, it is unclear as to what kinds of buildings over which the District would be able to exercise this authority. Would the District be able to regulate the possession of firearms in any building that is under its control but that does not necessarily have the requisite security measures, or would it be limited to regulating firearm possession only in buildings and structures that have security measures. Should the phrase—", or in any other area of such building or structure, which has implemented security measures ..."—be read as disjunctive from the preceding phrase? Alternatively, could the phrase be read to relate back to describe the buildings or structures under DC's control, thereby narrowing the range of areas that would fall under this provision? Under the IPAA, the District repealed the Chief's authority to issue licenses to a carry a concealed firearm. This provision would be repealed upon enactment of H.R. 645 , thus re-permitting the Chief to issue licenses for concealed carry within her discretion. H.R. 645 would continue a provision from the IPAA that explicitly prohibits a person from carrying a rifle or a shotgun within the District of Columbia, except as otherwise permitted by law. The exceptions for where a rifle or shotgun may be carried are discussed below. Congress passed a provision that regulates a qualified current or retired law enforcement officer's ability to carry a concealed firearm. Beyond this, states may impose their own laws on carrying firearms. As amended by the IPAA, the District currently permits persons who hold a valid registration for a firearm (handgun/rifles/shotguns) to carry it (1) within the registrant's home; (2) while it is being used for lawful recreational purposes; (3) while it is kept at the registrant's place of business; or (4) while it is being transported for a lawful purposes in accordance with the law. Because the Chief's authority to issue licenses to carry appears to be revoked under the IPAA, these four circumstances currently seem to be the only scenarios under which a person may possess and carry firearms. H.R. 645 would re-adapt from the IPAA and slightly modify the provision granting persons authority to carry their firearms in certain places for certain purposes without a license to carry. H.R. 645 would allow a person to carry a firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, without needing to obtain a license to carry in the person's dwelling house or place of business or on other land owned by the person; by invitation on land owned or lawfully possessed by another; while it is being used for lawful recreational, sporting, education, or training purposes; or while it is being transported for lawful purposes as expressly authorized by District or federal law and in accordance with the requirements of that law. As noted above, because the Chief's authority to issue licenses to carry concealed would be restored if H.R. 645 were enacted, it is likely that a firearm owner could obtain a concealed carry license and carry his or her firearm outside these four circumstances. H.R. 645 would continue provisions similar to those already enacted by the IPAA pertaining to the lawful transportation of firearms. Thus, it would remain that a person, who is not otherwise prohibited from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm, would be permitted to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place he may lawfully possess the firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess the firearm if the firearm is transported in accordance with this section. If the transportation is by vehicle, the firearm shall be unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported may be readily accessible or directly accessible from the passenger compartment of the transporting vehicle. Also, if the firearm is not being transported by vehicle, the firearm must be "unloaded, inside a locked container, and separate from any ammunition." The IPAA made a technical change to the District Code by including toy and antique pistols as types of firearms that are prohibited from being used to commit a violent or dangerous crime, and violators are subject to certain criminal penalties. Section 12 of H.R. 645 would continue this technical change. H.R. 645 would provide jurisdiction to the Office of Administrative Hearings to hear cases pertaining to the denial or revocation of firearms dealer licenses. The FCAA had provided such authority to the Office of Administrative Hearings, except that it went further to grant the office jurisdiction over the denial or revocation of a firearm registration certificate. However, since the registration scheme would be repealed under H.R. 645 , it is likely unnecessary to give the office such jurisdiction. The next provisions discussed were all amendments to the DC Code pursuant to the enactment of the FCAA and IPAA. These provisions would no longer exist under the congressional proposal because Section 14 of H.R. 645 would repeal the two acts, "and any provision of law amended or repealed by either of such Acts [would be] restored or revived as if such Acts had not been enacted into law." The DC Code's provisions that govern who may qualify to apply for a dealer's license, who is eligible to sell and transfer firearms to a dealer, and to whom a dealer can sell are dependent upon one's ability to obtain a registration certificate. Thus, anyone who wishes to obtain a dealer's license, or engage in purchasing or transferring a firearm, must meet the new requirements created by the FCAA (discussed in " Registration "), to obtain a registration certificate. Because H.R. 645 would repeal the District's registration scheme, it would allow any person who is not prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm under federal or District law to qualify in applying for a dealer's license, selling or transferring ammunition or any firearm to a licensed dealer, or making such purchase from a licensed dealer of firearms. The federal prohibitions are discussed in the next section. Furthermore, as noted in the discussion on " Ammunition Sales and Registration ," duties such as reporting the loss, theft, or destruction of any firearms or ammunition in the dealer's inventory would be repealed. The federal GCA lists nine categories of persons who are prohibited from possessing, shipping, or receiving firearms. They are (1) persons who have been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) persons who are fugitives; (3) persons who are users of or addicted to any controlled substances; (4) persons who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or who have been committed to a mental institution; (5) persons who are unlawfully in the United States or admitted under a nonimmigrant visa; (6) persons who have been dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces; (7) persons who have renounced U.S. citizenship; (8) persons who are on notice of or are subject to a court order restraining them from harassing, stalking or threatening an intimate partner; and (9) persons who have been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Among other federal regulations, it is unlawful for both licensed dealers and non-licensed persons to sell or transfer a firearm to another if he knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the purchaser falls within one of the nine categories above. Because the FCAA imposes new eligibility requirements before an applicant can be approved for a registration certificate (see " Registration ") it follows that a non-licensed person or licensed dealer wishing to transfer firearms must meet not only what is required by federal law but also the additional eligibility requirements under the FCAA since anyone wishing to transfer firearms must be eligible to register a firearm under DC law. Under D.C. law, a non-licensed person may sell or transfer firearm or ammunition only to a licensed dealer. In other words, a private sale between two non-licensed people must take place through a licensed dealer. This would remain unchanged in H.R. 645 . Under H.R. 645 , it would still be unlawful for licensed dealers to make transfers to those prohibited from receiving or possessing a firearm under federal or DC law , but because the bill would essentially remove any registration requirement that is required by the DC Code, it appears that the only disqualifications that would prohibit a transfer are those listed under federal law. Another amendment to DC law that would be affected by Section 14 of H.R. 645 is the assault weapons ban created by the FCAA. The FCAA created a new definition of "assault weapon" that includes a list of specific rifles, shotguns, and pistols and their variations, regardless of the manufacturer. It also includes semiautomatic rifles, pistols, and shotguns based on the presence of a single military-type characteristic. The definition of "assault weapon" also includes any shotgun with a revolving cylinder, except that it does not apply to "a weapon with an attached tubular device designed to accept, and capable of operating only with, .22 caliber rimfire ammunition." Currently, the Chief also has the power to designate as an assault weapon any firearm that he or she believes would reasonably pose the same threat as those weapons enumerated in the definition. The definition of assault weapon does not include antique firearms or certain pistols sanctioned for Olympic target shooting. The FCAA also makes this new definition of "assault weapon" applicable in the Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act of 1990. Thus, any manufacturer, importer, or dealer of a weapon deemed an "assault weapon" pursuant to this new definition can be held strictly liable in tort for all direct and consequential damage arising from bodily injury or death if either proximately results from the discharge of the assault weapon in the District of Columbia. These particular changes made by the FCAA would be repealed by Section 14 of H.R. 645 . The FCAA prohibits any person in the District from possessing, selling, or transferring any large capacity ammunition feeding device. The meaning of "large capacity ammunition feeding device" includes a "magazine, belt, drum, feed strip or similar device that has a capacity of, or that can be readily restored or converted to accept, more than 10 rounds of ammunition." However, the term does not include "an attached tubular device designed to accept, and capable of operating only with, .22 caliber rimfire ammunition." Thus, even though residents of DC are now allowed to register and possess semiautomatic firearms (see " DC Semiautomatic Ban "), the FCAA prevents them from possessing large capacity ammunition feeding devices, which some semiautomatic firearms are capable of holding. This provision would be repealed by Section 14 of H.R. 645 . Under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which amended the GCA to establish the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), a licensed dealer is generally prohibited from transferring a firearm to any other non-licensed person without running a background check by contacting NICS. The licensee may transfer the firearm if the system provides the licensee with a unique identification number, or if three business days have elapsed with no response from the system and the licensee has verified the identity of the transferee by examining valid identification documents that contain a photograph of the transferee. Generally, once the background check has been completed and the transferee approved, the licensee may transfer the firearm unless a state imposes a waiting period. Non-licensed persons are not required to perform a background check under federal law. The DC Code imposed a waiting period of 48 hours before a seller within the District can deliver a pistol or handgun. Under the IPAA, however, the waiting period for the transfer of a "firearm" is now 10 days. Firearm, as amended by the IPAA, means "any weapon regardless of operability , which will, or is designed or redesigned, made or remade, readily converted, restored or repaired or is intended to expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an explosive" (emphasis added). Thus, the IPAA makes the new waiting period apply to all firearms, not just pistols. Title II- S. 160 would not have changed the waiting period, which would have remained applicable to the transfer of pistols, and not shotguns or rifles. It should also be noted that if the IPAA is repealed under H.R. 645 , the waiting period to obtain a handgun would revert back to 48 hours. The FCAA added new provisions with regard to microstamping. The DC Code had already prohibited the sale of a firearm that does not have imbedded in it an identification or serial number unique to the manufacturer or dealer of the firearm. The FCAA now adds a new provision requiring that beginning January 1, 2011, "no licensee shall sell or offer for sale any semiautomatic pistol manufactured on or after January 1, 2011, that is not microstamp-ready as required by and in accordance with sec. 503." The FCAA creates two new sections, 503 and 504. New Section 503 sets forth requirements that determine if a semiautomatic pistol is microstamp-ready, and it also contains provisions that require manufacturers to provide the Chief with the make, model, and serial number of the semiautomatic pistol when presented with a code from a cartridge that was recovered as part of a legitimate law enforcement investigation. New Section 504 prohibits a pistol that is not on the California Roster of Handguns Certified for Sale (California Roster) from being manufactured, sold, given, loaned, exposed for sale, transferred, or imported into the District of Columbia as of January 1, 2009. Such a pistol is prohibited from being owned or possessed unless it was lawfully owned and registered prior to January 1, 2009. Furthermore, if a resident of DC lawfully owns a pistol not on the California Roster, that individual can sell or transfer ownership only through a licensed firearms dealer; or a licensed dealer who has such a pistol in its inventory prior to January 1, 2009, can only transfer it to another licensed firearms dealer. The FCAA also requires the Chief to review the California Roster at least annually for any additions or deletions, and the Chief is authorized to revise, by rule, the roster of handguns determined not to be unsafe. Under the IPAA, the District also makes unlawful the discharge of a firearm without a special written permit from the Chief, except as permitted by law which includes legitimate self-defense. It further allows the District to prohibit or restrict the possession of firearms on its property and any property under its control, and would similarly allow private persons owning property in the District to prohibit or restrict the possession of firearms on their property, except where law enforcement personnel is concerned. These two new provisions would be also repealed if H.R. 645 became law. | In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, which declared three firearms provisions of the DC Code unconstitutional, a flurry of legislation was introduced both in Congress and in the District of Columbia Council. In the 110th Congress, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 6842, the Second Amendment Enforcement Act. In the 111th Congress, similar provisions were incorporated as an amendment to the District of Columbia Voting Rights Act of 2009 (S. 160), which was passed by the Senate. Later, separate measures, which also would have overturned or loosened many of the District's gun provisions, were introduced in both the House of Representatives (H.R. 5162) and the Senate (S. 3265). Meanwhile, the District Council passed its own legislation that made permanent amendments to DC's firearms control regulations. The two bills from the District are the Firearms Control Amendment Act of 2008 and the Inoperable Pistol Amendment Act of 2008, which amended the DC Code in an effort to comply with the ruling in Heller as well as provide a different range of restrictions on firearm possession. In the 112th Congress, Representative Mike Ross introduced H.R. 645, "To restore Second Amendment rights in the District of Columbia." This measure is identical to H.R. 5162 from the previous Congress. This report provides an analysis of the District's firearms laws and congressional proposals. |
Senate Rule XXVI spells out specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules that govern its organization and operation. Those committee rules then elaborate, within Senate rules, how the committee will handle questions of order and procedure. A committee's rules may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Committees may add to the basic rules, but they may not add anything that is in conflict with Senate rules. Examining the rules for each committee can show how each approaches issues of comity and fairness in the conduct of its business. The rules also serve to illustrate how each committee handles the division of power and the allocation of responsibility within its membership. Several committees, for example, require that if the committee is conducting business with a quorum that is less than a majority of its members, a member from the minority party must be present. When issuing subpoenas or starting investigations, committees may take different approaches on how to give authority to the chair of the committee while still allowing the ranking minority member a role in the process. Some committees require the agreement of the ranking minority member, others require that he or she be notified before the subpoena is issued. The requirement that each committee must adopt its own set of rules dates back to the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act (P.L. 91-510). That law built on the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act (P.L. 79-601), which created a framework for most Senate committees by setting out some basic requirements that most committees must adhere to. Under the provisions of the 1970 law, Senate committees must adopt their rules and have them printed in the Congressional Record not later than March 1 of the first year of a Congress. Typically, the Senate also publishes a compilation of the rules of all the committees each Congress, and some individual committees also publish their rules as a committee print. Although committee rules govern the actions of Senators in committee proceedings, there is no means for the Senate to enforce rules on committee conduct if the requirement that a physical majority be present for reporting a measure or matter is met. There also is no means for the Senate to enforce committee rules that go beyond those set out in the Senate's standing rules. So, for example, if a committee's rules contain a provision requiring that a member of the minority party be present for a quorum, but the committee acts without regard to that provision, the minority could register their disapproval with the committee's actions, but there is no point of order that could be raised on the Senate floor. It should be noted that other factors may come into play when studying a committee's procedural profile. Along with the formal rules of the Senate and the individual rules for each committee, many committees have traditions or precedents they follow in practice that can affect their procedures. One committee, for example, does not allow Senators to offer second degree amendments during committee markups. This restriction is not contained in either the Senate or the committee's rules, it is a tradition. It is a tradition, however, the committee follows closely. This report analyzes the different approaches Senate committees have taken with their rules, focusing on additions to the overall Senate committee rules structure or unique provisions. A committee's rules can be extensive and detailed or general and short. The tables that conclude this report compare key features of the rules by committee. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or that are essentially restatements of the Senate's standing rules are not included. This report will review the requirements contained in Senate rules for committees, then explore how each Senate committee handles 11 specific procedural issues: meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, scheduling of witnesses, hearing quorum, business quorum, amendment requirements, proxy voting, polling, nominations, investigations, and subpoenas. Also, the report looks at unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in a "miscellaneous" category. Although there is some latitude for committees to set their own rules, the standing rules of the Senate set out the specific requirements that each committee must follow. The following provisions are taken from Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate. Some committees reiterate these rules in their own rules, but even for those committees that do not, these restrictions apply. This is not an exhaustive explanation of Senate Rules and their impact on committees, rather this summary is intended to provide a background against which to understand each committee's individual rules. Rules. Each committee must adopt rules; those rules must be published in the Congressional Record not later than March 1 of the first year of each Congress. If a committee adopts an amendment to its rules, that change only becomes effective when it is published in the Record . (Rule XXVI, paragraph 2). Meetings. Committees and subcommittees are authorized to meet and to hold hearings when the Senate is in session and when it has recessed or adjourned. A committee may not meet on any day (1) after the Senate has been in session for two hours, or (2) after 2:00 p.m. when the Senate is in session. Each committee must designate a regular day on which to meet weekly, biweekly or monthly (this requirement does not apply to the Appropriations Committee). A committee is to announce the date, place, and subject of each hearing at least one week in advance, though any committee may waive this requirement for "good cause." (Rule XXVI, paragraph 5(a); Rule XXVI, paragraph 3). Special meeting. Three members of a committee may make a written request to the chair to call a special meeting. The chair then has three calendar days in which to schedule the meeting, which is to take place within the next seven calendar days. If the chair fails to do so, a majority of the committee members can file a written motion to hold the meeting at a certain date and hour. (Rule XXVI, paragraph 3). Open meetings. Unless closed for reasons specified in Senate rules, such as a need to protect national security information, committee and subcommittee meetings, including hearings, are open to the public. When a committee or subcommittee schedules or cancels a meeting, it is required to provide that information, including the time, place, and purpose of the meeting, for inclusion in the Senate's computerized schedule information system. Any hearing that is open to the public also may be open to radio and television broadcasting, at the committee's discretion. Committees and subcommittees may adopt rules to govern how the media may broadcast the event. A vote by the committee in open session is required to close a meeting. (Rule XXVI, paragraph 5(b)). Quorums. Committees may set a quorum for doing business that is not less than one-third of the membership. A majority of a committee must be physically present when the committee votes to order the reporting of any measure, matter, or recommendation. The motion to order the reporting of a measure or matter requires the support of a majority of the members who are present and, in turn, the members who are physically present must constitute a majority of the committee. Proxies cannot be used to constitute a quorum. (Rule XXVI, paragraph Rule XXVI, paragraph 7(a)(1)). Proxy voting. A committee may adopt rules permitting proxy voting. A committee may not permit a proxy vote to be cast unless the absent Senator has been notified about the question to be decided and has requested that his or her vote be cast by proxy. A committee may prohibit the use of proxy votes on votes to report. (Rule XXVI, paragraph 7(a)(3)). Investigations and subpoenas. Each standing committee and its subcommittees is empowered to investigate matters within its jurisdiction and to issue subpoenas for persons and papers. (Rule XXVI, paragraph 1). Witnesses selected by the minority. During hearings on any measure or matter, the minority shall be allowed to select witnesses to testify on at least one day, when the chair receives such a request from a majority of the minority party members. This provision does not apply to the Appropriations Committee. (Rule XXVI, paragraph 4(d)). Reporting. Senate committees may report original bills and resolutions, in addition to those that have been referred to the panel. As stated in the quorum requirement, a majority of the committee must be physically present for a measure or matter to be reported. Also, a majority of those present are required to order a measure or matter reported. A Senate Committee is not required to issue a written report to accompany a measure or matter it reports; if the committee does write such a report, Senate rules specify a series of required elements that must be included in the report. (Rule XXVI, paragraph 7(a)(3); Rule XXVI, paragraph 10(c) . In their rules for the 111 th Congress, no Senate Committee uses either Monday or Friday for its regular meeting day, and the committees are relatively evenly spread over the remaining three days: 6 committees chose Tuesdays, 7 committees selected Wednesdays, and six committees picked Thursdays as their regular meeting days (see Table 1 ). The Armed Services Committee chose both Tuesday and Thursday. Two committees, Appropriations and Select Aging, meet at the call of the chair. Within those categories, some committees, including the Armed Services; Foreign Relations; Indian Affairs; and Judiciary provide for meeting at least once a week. The other committees set the meetings at once or twice a month. Committees must, according to Senate Rules, provide one week's notice of their hearings and business meetings. The rule, however, allows shorter notice, if "the committee determines there is good cause" to hold a hearing or meeting with less notice. When it comes to the determination of what "good cause" is, Senate committees allocate the task of making that decision differently (see Table 1 ). The rules of the Armed Services Committee, for example, say it is the decision of the committee as a whole. Three committees, Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; and Finance give the chair of the panel the authority to schedule a hearing or meeting with less than a week's notice. Six committees require some type of cooperation between the chair and ranking member of the committee to meet with less than a week's notice. Four of those committees, Budget; Environment and Public Works; Judiciary; and Special Aging, require the chair to obtain the agreement of the ranking member to make the decision to hold a hearing or meeting with less than usual notice. The Energy and Natural Resources Committee gives the responsibility to the chair and the committee together, while the Foreign Relations Committee chair must consult with the ranking minority member on the committee. Several committees go beyond Senate requirements in their rules regarding scheduling of witnesses, giving greater opportunity to the minority to include witnesses of their choosing during a hearing (see Table 1 ). The Finance Committee calls on its staff to ensure there is a "balance of views" early on in a hearing, and allows each member of the committee to designate individuals to testify. The Foreign Relations Committee minority may request an equal number of witnesses as the majority, and the Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee allows for an equal number of witnesses for the majority and minority unless there is to be just one administration witness. Similarly, if the Senate is evenly divided, the Budget Committee provides for equal numbers of witnesses for the majority and minority, with the same exception for a single administration witness. The Ethics and Select Intelligence committees' rules have provisions according an opportunity for an individual to testify before the committee if that person believes his or her reputation is at issue or if his or her name came up in previous testimony. For receiving testimony at hearings, most Senate committees reduce their quorum requirements to one or sometimes two Senators. One panel, the Armed Services Committee, requires that a member of the minority be present, unless the full committee stipulates otherwise. The "conduct of business" at a committee meeting typically refers to actions such as debating and voting on amendments, that allow the committee to proceed on measures up to the point of reporting the measure to the full Senate. For the conduct of business, the requirement that a member of the minority be present is a common feature of committee quorum rules. In order to report out a measure, Senate rules require that a majority of the committee be physically present. A dozen committees feature some kind of minority attendance requirement for the conduct of business during a committee business meeting (see Table 2 ). The Environment and Public Works Committee's business quorum requires two members of the minority and one-third of the committee in total. The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Small Business and Entrepreneurship committees require the presence of one member of the minority, as do the Veterans' Affairs and Special Aging committees. The Veterans' Affairs Committee rules also contain a provision designed to make sure that the lack of a minority member cannot indefinitely delay action on a measure or matter. The Finance Committee requires one member from the majority and one member of the minority for its business quorum as do the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Foreign Relations and Ethics committees. The Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee requires that any business quorum that is less than a majority of the committee include a member of the minority. The Armed Services Committee sets a business quorum at nine members, which must include a member of the minority party, but the committee may bypass the minority representation requirement if a simple majority of the committee is present. The Judiciary Committee also specifies a quorum of eight, with two members of the minority present. The Indian Affairs Committee has a rule stating that a quorum is presumed to be present unless the absence of a quorum is noted by a Member. Several committees require that Senators file any first degree amendments they may offer during a committee markup before the committee meets (see Table 2 ). This provision allows the chair and ranking member of the committee to see what kind of issues may come up at the markup, and also may allow them the opportunity to try to negotiate agreements with amendment sponsors before the formal markup session begins. It also provides an opportunity to Members to draft second degree amendments to possible first degree amendments before the markup begins. The Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and Small Business and Entrepreneurship committees call for submitting such amendments two business days before the markup, if sufficient notice of the markup has been given. The Appropriations; Environment and Public Works; Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions; Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; and Veterans' Affairs committees require 24 hours notice of first degree amendments. The Judiciary Committee requires that first degree amendments be filed with the committee by 5 p.m. of the day before the markup. All of these committees allow the full committee to waive this filing requirement and, in some cases, it is waived automatically if Senators were not given sufficient notice of the markup. All Senate committees except Special Aging permit some form of proxy voting, where a Senator does not have to be physically present to record his or her position on a measure or matter before the committee (see Table 3 ). The Armed Services; Foreign Relations; Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; Select Intelligence; Veterans' Affairs and Ethics committees require that proxies be executed in writing. The Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee requires that the responsibility for voting the proxy be assigned to a Senator or staffer who is present at the markup. The Commerce, Science and Transportation; Environment and Public Works; Judiciary and Small Business and Entrepreneurship committees allow several other methods of transmitting a Senator's proxy intentions, including telephone or personal instructions to another Member of the committee. Proxies cannot be used in any committee to count toward a quorum for reporting a measure or matter. The Budget Committee prohibits proxy voting during its annual markup of the budget resolution, and the Ethics Committee does not permit a Senator to vote by proxy on a motion to initiate an investigation. Polling is a method of taking a "vote" of the committee on a matter without the committee physically coming together. As such, it cannot be used to report out measure or matters (that would violate Senate rules that require a physical majority to be present to report a measure or matter). Polling can be used, however, for internal housekeeping matters before the committee, such as questions concerning staffing or perhaps how the committee ought to proceed on a measure or matter (see Table 3 ). Five committees have general provisions for polling in their rules: Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Budget; Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions; Homeland Security and Government Affairs; and Aging. Of those, all the committees except the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, allow a member to request that the matter being polled be formally voted on by the committee at the next business meeting. The Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee only permits polling if there is unanimous consent from the committee to do so. Many committees set out timetables in their rules for action on presidential nominations, and most committees also contain provisions allowing the timetables to be waived (see Table 3 ). The Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and Veterans' Affairs committees require a five-day layover between receipt of the nomination and committee action on it. The Foreign Relations Committee requires a six-day delay, the Armed Services Committee a seven-day delay and the Intelligence Committee calls for a fourteen-day waiting period before action on a nomination. In addition, the Intelligence panel rules require that the committee not act until seven days after the committee receives background and financial information on the nominee. The Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; Budget; Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Small Business committees require that nominees testify before their committees under oath. The Energy and Natural Resources; Indian Affairs; and Veterans' Affairs committees have provisions requiring the nominee and, if requested, anyone testifying at a nomination hearing to testify under oath. The Finance Committee allows any member to request that the testimony from witnesses be taken under oath. Several committees require advance permission for staff or a Senator to launch an investigation (see Table 4 ). The Select Intelligence Committee, for example, prohibits investigations unless five committee members request it. The Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee requires that either the full Senate, the full committee, or the chair and ranking member jointly authorize an investigation before it may begin. The Select Aging Committee authorizes its staff to initiate an investigation with the approval of the chair and ranking minority member and requires that all investigations be conducted in a bipartisan basis. The Energy and Natural Resources Committee requires that the full committee authorize any formal investigation. The Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee requires full committee approval for any investigation involving subpoenas and depositions, and the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee requires majority approval for any investigation involving a subpoena. Five Senate committees do not have specific rules that set out how the panel will decide to issue subpoenas (see Table 4 ). The lack of a subpoena provision does not mean the committees cannot issue subpoenas, just that the process for doing so is not specified in the committee's written rules. Of the committees that do have rules on subpoenas, one, the Special Committee on Aging, grants the authority to issue the subpoena to the chair alone. Nine other committees, Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Banking; Commerce; Energy and Natural Resources; Finance; Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; Indian Affairs; Small Business and Entrepreneurship; and Veterans' Affairs, require that the chair seek the agreement, approval, concurrence, or consent of the ranking member before issuing a subpoena. In all instances, however, the chair also may gain approval for a subpoena from a majority of the committee. Three committees—Foreign Relations; Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions; and Select Intelligence—give the decision as to whether to issue a subpoena to the full committee as a whole, while Ethics allows the chair and ranking minority member acting jointly or a majority of the committee to approve a subpoena. It is not clear how the Members would communicate their support to the chair, either by polling or through a committee vote. Some committees have unique provisions that are not included in other committee rules. The Budget Committee's rules limit the size and number of charts a Senator can display during debate on a subject. The Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee permits broadcasting of its proceedings only upon agreement by the chair and ranking member. The chair and ranking member of the Rules Committee are authorized to approve any rule or regulation that the committee must approve, and the Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee allows any member to administer the oath to any witness testifying "as to fact." Both the Finance and the Judiciary committees allow the chair to call a vote on whether to end debate on a pending measure or matter. This ability to end debate on a measure or matter does not appear in any other committees' rules and may allow these committees to move controversial measure through their panels. The Foreign Relations Committee includes in its rules a provision stating that, as much as possible, the committee not "resort" to formal parliamentary procedure. That would seem to suggest a committee where Senators attempt to resolve controversial issues before the committee markup, rather than relying on parliamentary tools to push legislation or nominations through. Both the Veterans' Affairs and the Environment and Public Works committees are charged with naming certain federal facilities, so their rules provide guidance on how those names may be chosen. The rules of the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee require that any measure seeking to give out the Congressional Gold Medal have 67 cosponsors to be considered. The Select Intelligence Committee gives direction to its staff director to ensure that covert programs are reviewed at least once per quarter. The Appropriations Committee rules empower any member of the committee who is managing an appropriations bill on the floor to make points of order against amendments being offered that would seem to violate Senate rules. The Armed Services Committee's rules reach out to the executive branch and call on the committee to obtain executive branch response to any measure referred to the committee. The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee requires that any report on a measure also include an evaluation of the regulatory impact of the measure. The Select Committee on Aging requires that investigative reports containing findings or recommendations may be published only with the approval of a majority of committee members. The Indian Affairs Committee urges its Members to disclose their finances in the same way in which they require nominees to presidentially appointed positions to do. The Energy and Natural Resources Committee appears to allow any Member to place a measure or matter on the committee's agenda, if the Member does so at least one week in advance of the business meeting at which it will be considered. The Judiciary Committee allows any member to delay consideration for one week any item on its agenda. The Select Committee on Ethics also allows any member of the committee to postpone discussion of a pending matter until a majority of the committee is present. | Senate Rule XXVI spells out specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules that govern its organization and operation. Those committee rules then elaborate, within Senate rules, how the committee will handle its business. Rules adopted by a committee may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate" (Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 2). Committees may add to the basic rules, but they may not add anything that is in conflict with Senate rules. This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committees. The report then compares the different approaches Senate committees have taken when adopting their rules. A committee's rules can be extensive and detailed or general and short. The tables that conclude this report compare selected, key features of the rules by committee. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to, or that are essentially restatements of, the Senate's standing rules are not included. This report will review the requirements contained in Senate rules pertaining to committees; it will then explore how each Senate committee addresses 11 specific issues: meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, scheduling of witnesses, hearing quorum, business quorum, amendment filing requirements, proxy voting, polling, nominations, investigations, and subpoenas. In addition, the report looks at the unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in the miscellaneous category. This report will be updated during the first session of each Congress after all Senate committees have printed their rules in the Congressional Record. |
Even in my most religious moments, I have never been able to take the idea of hell seriously. Prevailing Christian theology asks us to believe that an all-powerful, all-knowing being would do what no human parent could ever do: create tens of billions of flawed and fragile creatures, pluck out a few favourites to shower in transcendent love, and send the rest to an eternity of unrelenting torment. That story has always seemed like an intellectual relic to me, a holdover from barbarism, or worse, a myth meant to coerce belief. But stripped of the religious particulars, I can see the appeal of hell as an instrument of justice, a way of righting wrongs beyond the grave. Especially in unusual circumstances.
Take the case of Adolf Hitler. On the afternoon of 29 April 1945, Hitler was stashed deep in his Berlin bunker, watching his Third Reich collapse, when he received word that Benito Mussolini was dead. Hitler was aghast at the news, not because he’d lost yet another ally, but because of the way Mussolini had died. The Italian dictator had been trying to slink into Switzerland when he was caught, shot, and dragged to a public square in Milan, where a furious mob kicked and spat on his body, before hanging it upside down on a meat hook.
Worried that he might meet a similar fate, Hitler decided to test the strength of his cyanide capsules by feeding a few of them to his dog, Blondie. By midafternoon on the following day, 30 April, the Red Army was rampaging through Berlin, and the Fuhrer's empire had shrunk to a small island of land in the city centre. Rather than fight to the end and risk capture, Hitler bit into one of his cyanide pills, and fired a bullet into his head for good measure. When the Soviets reached the bunker two days later, his body had been burned and his ashes buried, in a shallow bomb crater just above ground.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Hitler got off easy, given the scope and viciousness of his crimes. We might have moved beyond the Code of Hammurabi and ‘an eye for an eye’, but most of us still feel that a killer of millions deserves something sterner than a quick and painless suicide. But does anyone ever deserve hell?
That used to be a question for theologians, but in the age of human enhancement, a new set of thinkers is taking it up. As biotech companies pour billions into life extension technologies, some have suggested that our cruelest criminals could be kept alive indefinitely, to serve sentences spanning millennia or longer. Even without life extension, private prison firms could one day develop drugs that make time pass more slowly, so that an inmate's 10-year sentence feels like an eternity. One way or another, humans could soon be in a position to create an artificial hell.
At the University of Oxford, a team of scholars led by the philosopher Rebecca Roache has begun thinking about the ways futuristic technologies might transform punishment. In January, I spoke with Roache and her colleagues Anders Sandberg and Hannah Maslen about emotional enhancement, ‘supercrimes’, and the ethics of eternal damnation. What follows is a condensed and edited transcript of our conversation.
Suppose we develop the ability to radically expand the human lifespan, so that people are regularly living for more than 500 years. Would that allow judges to fit punishments to crimes more precisely?
Roache: When I began researching this topic, I was thinking a lot about Daniel Pelka, a four-year-old boy who was starved and beaten to death [in 2012] by his mother and stepfather here in the UK. I had wondered whether the best way to achieve justice in cases like that was to prolong death as long as possible. Some crimes are so bad they require a really long period of punishment, and a lot of people seem to get out of that punishment by dying. And so I thought, why not make prison sentences for particularly odious criminals worse by extending their lives?
But I soon realised it’s not that simple. In the US, for instance, the vast majority of people on death row appeal to have their sentences reduced to life imprisonment. That suggests that a quick stint in prison followed by death is seen as a worse fate than a long prison sentence. And so, if you extend the life of a prisoner to give them a longer sentence, you might end up giving them a more lenient punishment.
The life-extension scenario may sound futuristic, but if you look closely you can already see it in action, as people begin to live longer lives than before. If you look at the enormous prison population in the US, you find an astronomical number of elderly prisoners, including quite a few with pacemakers. When I went digging around in medical journals, I found all these interesting papers about the treatment of pacemaker patients in prison.
Suppose prisons become more humane in the future, so that they resemble Norwegian prisons instead of those you see in America or North Korea. Is it possible that correctional facilities could become truly correctional in the age of long lifespans, by taking a more sustained approach to rehabilitation?
Roache: If people could live for centuries or millennia, you would obviously have more time to reform them, but you would also run into a tricky philosophical issue having to do with personal identity. A lot of philosophers who have written about personal identity wonder whether identity can be sustained over an extremely long lifespan. Even if your body makes it to 1,000 years, the thinking goes, that body is actually inhabited by a succession of persons over time rather than a single continuous person. And so, if you put someone in prison for a crime they committed at 40, they might, strictly speaking, be an entirely different person at 940. And that means you are effectively punishing one person for a crime committed by someone else. Most of us would think that unjust.
Let’s say that life expansion therapies become a normal part of the human condition, so that it’s not just elites who have access to them, it’s everyone. At what point would it become unethical to withhold these therapies from prisoners?
Roache: In that situation it would probably be inappropriate to view them as an enhancement, or something extra. If these therapies were truly universal, it’s more likely that people would come to think of them as life-saving technologies. And if you withheld them from prisoners in that scenario, you would effectively be denying them medical treatment, and today we consider that inhumane. My personal suspicion is that once life extension becomes more or less universal, people will begin to see it as a positive right, like health care in most industrialised nations today. Indeed, it’s interesting to note that in the US, prisoners sometimes receive better health care than uninsured people. You have to wonder about the incentives a system like that creates.
Where is that threshold of universality, where access to something becomes a positive right? Do we have an empirical example of it?
Roache: One interesting case might be internet access. In Finland, for instance, access to communication technology is considered a human right and handwritten letters are not sufficient to satisfy it. Finnish prisons are required to give inmates access to computers, although their internet activity is closely monitored. This is an interesting development because, for years, limiting access to computers was a common condition of probation in hacking cases – and that meant all kinds of computers, including ATMs [cash points]. In the 1980s, that lifestyle might have been possible, and you could also see pulling it off in the ’90s, though it would have been very difficult. But today computers are ubiquitous, and a normal life seems impossible without them; you can’t even access the subway without interacting with a computer of some sort.
In the late 1990s, an American hacker named Kevin Mitnick was denied all access to communication technology after law enforcement officials [in California] claimed he could ‘start a nuclear war by whistling into a pay phone’. But in the end, he got the ruling overturned by arguing that it prevented him from living a normal life.
What about life expansion that meddles with a person’s perception of time? Take someone convicted of a heinous crime, like the torture and murder of a child. Would it be unethical to tinker with the brain so that this person experiences a 1,000-year jail sentence in his or her mind?
Roache: There are a number of psychoactive drugs that distort people’s sense of time, so you could imagine developing a pill or a liquid that made someone feel like they were serving a 1,000-year sentence. Of course, there is a widely held view that any amount of tinkering with a person’s brain is unacceptably invasive. But you might not need to interfere with the brain directly. There is a long history of using the prison environment itself to affect prisoners’ subjective experience. During the Spanish Civil War [in the 1930s] there was actually a prison where modern art was used to make the environment aesthetically unpleasant. Also, prison cells themselves have been designed to make them more claustrophobic, and some prison beds are specifically made to be uncomfortable.
I haven’t found any specific cases of time dilation being used in prisons, but time distortion is a technique that is sometimes used in interrogation, where people are exposed to constant light, or unusual light fluctuations, so that they can’t tell what time of day it is. But in that case it’s not being used as a punishment, per se, it’s being used to break people’s sense of reality so that they become more dependent on the interrogator, and more pliable as a result. In that sense, a time-slowing pill would be a pretty radical innovation in the history of penal technology.
I want to ask you a question that has some crossover with theological debates about hell. Suppose we eventually learn to put off death indefinitely, and that we extend this treatment to prisoners. Is there any crime that would justify eternal imprisonment? Take Hitler as a test case. Say the Soviets had gotten to the bunker before he killed himself, and say capital punishment was out of the question – would we have put him behind bars forever?
Roache: It’s tough to say. If you start out with the premise that a punishment should be proportional to the crime, it’s difficult to think of a crime that could justify eternal imprisonment. You could imagine giving Hitler one term of life imprisonment for every person killed in the Second World War. That would make for quite a long sentence, but it would still be finite. The endangerment of mankind as a whole might qualify as a sufficiently serious crime to warrant it. As you know, a great deal of the research we do here at the Oxford Martin School concerns existential risk. Suppose there was some physics experiment that stood a decent chance of generating a black hole that could destroy the planet and all future generations. If someone deliberately set up an experiment like that, I could see that being the kind of supercrime that would justify an eternal sentence.
In your forthcoming paper on this subject, you mention the possibility that convicts with a neurologically stunted capacity for empathy might one day be ‘emotionally enhanced’, and that the remorse felt by these newly empathetic criminals could be the toughest form of punishment around. Do you think a full moral reckoning with an awful crime the most potent form of suffering an individual can endure?
Roache: I’m not sure. Obviously, it’s an empirical question as to which feels worse, genuine remorse or time in prison. There is certainly reason to take the claim seriously. For instance, in literature and folk wisdom, you often hear people saying things like, ‘The worst thing is I’ll have to live with myself.’ My own intuition is that for very serious crimes, genuine remorse could be subjectively worse than a prison sentence. But I doubt that’s the case for less serious crimes, where remorse isn’t even necessarily appropriate – like if you are wailing and beating yourself up for stealing a candy bar or something like that.
I remember watching a movie in school, about a teen that killed another teen in a drunk-driving accident. As one of the conditions of his probation, the judge in the case required him to mail a daily cheque for 25 cents to the parents of the teen he’d killed for a period of 10 years. Two years in, the teen was begging the judge to throw him in jail, just to avoid the daily reminder.
Roache: That’s an interesting case where prison is actually an escape from remorse, which is strange because one of the justifications for prison is that it’s supposed to focus your mind on what you have done wrong. Presumably, every day you wake up in prison, you ask yourself why you are there, right?
What if these emotional enhancements proved too effective? Suppose they are so powerful, they turn psychopaths into Zen masters who live in a constant state of deep, reflective contentment. Should that trouble us? Is mental suffering a necessary component of imprisonment?
Roache: There is a long-standing philosophical question as to how bad the prison experience should be. Retributivists, those who think the point of prisons is to punish, tend to think that it should be quite unpleasant, whereas consequentialists tend to be more concerned with a prison’s reformative effects, and its larger social costs. There are a number of prisons that offer prisoners constructive activities to participate in, including sports leagues, art classes, and even yoga. That practice seems to reflect the view that confinement, or the deprivation of liberty, is itself enough of a punishment. Of course, even for consequentialists, there has to be some level of suffering involved in punishment, because consequentialists are very concerned about deterrence.
I wanted to close by moving beyond imprisonment, to ask you about the future of punishment more broadly. Are there any alternative punishments that technology might enable, and that you can see on the horizon now? What surprising things might we see down the line?
Roache: We have been thinking a lot about surveillance and punishment lately. Already, we see governments using ankle bracelets to track people in various ways, and many of them are fairly elaborate. For instance, some of these devices allow you to commute to work, but they also give you a curfew and keep a close eye on your location. You can imagine this being refined further, so that your ankle bracelet bans you from entering establishments that sell alcohol. This could be used to punish people who happen to like going to pubs, or it could be used to reform severe alcoholics. Either way, technologies of this sort seem to be edging up to a level of behaviour control that makes some people uneasy, due to questions about personal autonomy.
It’s one thing to lose your personal liberty as a result of being confined in a prison, but you are still allowed to believe whatever you want while you are in there. In the UK, for instance, you cannot withhold religious manuscripts from a prisoner unless you have a very good reason. These concerns about autonomy become particularly potent when you start talking about brain implants that could potentially control behaviour directly. The classic example is Robert G Heath [a psychiatrist at Tulane University in New Orleans], who did this famously creepy experiment [in the 1950s] using electrodes in the brain in an attempt to modify behaviour in people who were prone to violent psychosis. The electrodes were ostensibly being used to treat the patients, but he was also, rather gleefully, trying to move them in a socially approved direction. You can really see that in his infamous [1972] paper on ‘curing’ homosexuals. I think most Western societies would say ‘no thanks’ to that kind of punishment.
To me, these questions about technology are interesting because they force us to rethink the truisms we currently hold about punishment. When we ask ourselves whether it’s inhumane to inflict a certain technology on someone, we have to make sure it’s not just the unfamiliarity that spooks us. And more importantly, we have to ask ourselves whether punishments like imprisonment are only considered humane because they are familiar, because we’ve all grown up in a world where imprisonment is what happens to people who commit crimes. Is it really OK to lock someone up for the best part of the only life they will ever have, or might it be more humane to tinker with their brains and set them free? When we ask that question, the goal isn’t simply to imagine a bunch of futuristic punishments – the goal is to look at today’s punishments through the lens of the future. ||||| Whole brain emulation (WBE), mind upload or brain upload (sometimes called "mind copying" or "mind transfer") is the hypothetical futuristic process of scanning the mental state (including long-term memory and "self") of a particular brain substrate and copying it to a computer. The computer could then run a simulation model of the brain's information processing, such that it responds in essentially the same way as the original brain (i.e., indistinguishable from the brain for all relevant purposes) and experiences having a conscious mind.[1][2][3]
Mind uploading may potentially be accomplished by either of two methods: Copy-and-transfer or gradual replacement of neurons. In the case of the former method, mind uploading would be achieved by scanning and mapping the salient features of a biological brain, and then by copying, transferring, and storing that information state into a computer system or another computational device. The biological brain may not survive the copying process. The simulated mind could be within a virtual reality or simulated world, supported by an anatomic 3D body simulation model. Alternatively the simulated mind could reside in a computer that is inside (or connected to) a (not necessarily humanoid) robot or a biological body.[4]
Among some futurists and within the transhumanist movement, mind uploading is treated as an important proposed life extension technology. Some believe mind uploading is humanity's current best option for preserving the identity of the species, as opposed to cryonics. Another aim of mind uploading is to provide a permanent backup to our "mind-file", to enable interstellar space travels, and a means for human culture to survive a global disaster by making a functional copy of a human society in a Matrioshka brain, i.e. a computing device that consumes all energy from a star. Whole brain emulation is discussed by some futurists as a "logical endpoint"[4] of the topical computational neuroscience and neuroinformatics fields, both about brain simulation for medical research purposes. It is discussed in artificial intelligence research publications as an approach to strong AI. Computer-based intelligence such as an upload could think much faster than a biological human even if it were no more intelligent. A large-scale society of uploads might, according to futurists, give rise to a technological singularity, meaning a sudden time constant decrease in the exponential development of technology.[5] Mind uploading is a central conceptual feature of numerous science fiction novels and films.
Substantial mainstream research in related areas is being conducted in animal brain mapping and simulation, development of faster supercomputers, virtual reality, brain–computer interfaces, connectomics and information extraction from dynamically functioning brains.[6] According to supporters, many of the tools and ideas needed to achieve mind uploading already exist or are currently under active development; however, they will admit that others are, as yet, very speculative, but still in the realm of engineering possibility. Neuroscientist Randal Koene has formed a nonprofit organization called Carbon Copies to promote mind uploading research.
Overview [ edit ]
Neuron anatomical model
The human brain contains, on average, about 86 billion nerve cells called neurons, each individually linked to other neurons by way of connectors called axons and dendrites. Signals at the junctures (synapses) of these connections are transmitted by the release and detection of chemicals known as neurotransmitters. The established neuroscientific consensus is that the human mind is largely an emergent property of the information processing of this neural network.[citation needed]
Neuroscientists have stated that important functions performed by the mind, such as learning, memory, and consciousness, are due to purely physical and electrochemical processes in the brain and are governed by applicable laws. For example, Christof Koch and Giulio Tononi wrote in IEEE Spectrum:
Consciousness is part of the natural world. It depends, we believe, only on mathematics and logic and on the imperfectly known laws of physics, chemistry, and biology; it does not arise from some magical or otherworldly quality.[7]
The concept of mind uploading is based on this mechanistic view of the mind, and denies the vitalist view of human life and consciousness.[citation needed]
Eminent computer scientists and neuroscientists have predicted that specially programmed[clarification needed] computers will be capable of thought and even attain consciousness, including Koch and Tononi,[7] Douglas Hofstadter,[8] Jeff Hawkins,[8] Marvin Minsky,[9] Randal A. Koene, and Rodolfo Llinás.[10]
However, even though uploading is dependent upon such a general capability, it is conceptually distinct from general forms of AI in that it results from dynamic reanimation of information derived from a specific human mind so that the mind retains a sense of historical identity (other forms are possible but would compromise or eliminate the life-extension feature generally associated with uploading). The transferred and reanimated information would become a form of artificial intelligence, sometimes called an infomorph or "noömorph".[citation needed]
Many theorists have presented models of the brain and have established a range of estimates of the amount of computing power needed for partial and complete simulations.[4][citation needed] Using these models, some have estimated that uploading may become possible within decades if trends such as Moore's law continue.[11]
Theoretical benefits and applications [ edit ]
"Immortality" or backup [ edit ]
In theory, if the information and processes of the mind can be disassociated from the biological body, they are no longer tied to the individual limits and lifespan of that body. Furthermore, information within a brain could be partly or wholly copied or transferred to one or more other substrates (including digital storage or another brain), thereby – from a purely mechanistic perspective – reducing or eliminating "mortality risk" of such information. This general proposal was discussed in 1971 by biogerontologist George M. Martin of the University of Washington.[12]
Space exploration [ edit ]
An “uploaded astronaut” could be used instead of a "live" astronaut in human spaceflight, avoiding the perils of zero gravity, the vacuum of space, and cosmic radiation to the human body. It would allow for the use of smaller spacecraft, such as the proposed StarChip, and it would enable virtually unlimited interstellar travel distances.[13]
Relevant technologies and techniques [ edit ]
The focus of mind uploading, in the case of copy-and-transfer, is on data acquisition, rather than data maintenance of the brain. A set of approaches known as loosely coupled off-loading (LCOL) may be used in the attempt to characterize and copy the mental contents of a brain.[14] The LCOL approach may take advantage of self-reports, life-logs and video recordings that can be analyzed by artificial intelligence. A bottom-up approach may focus on the specific resolution and morphology of neurons, the spike times of neurons, the times at which neurons produce action potential responses.
Computational complexity [ edit ]
[15] Estimates of how much processing power is needed to emulate a human brain at various levels (from Ray Kurzweil and the chart to the left), along with the fastest supercomputer from TOP500 mapped by year. Note the logarithmic scale and exponential trendline, which assumes the computational capacity doubles every 1.1 years. Kurzweil believes that mind uploading will be possible at neural simulation, while the Sandberg, Bostrom report is less certain about where consciousness arises.
Advocates of mind uploading point to Moore's law to support the notion that the necessary computing power is expected to become available within a few decades. However, the actual computational requirements for running an uploaded human mind are very difficult to quantify, potentially rendering such an argument specious.
Regardless of the techniques used to capture or recreate the function of a human mind, the processing demands are likely to be immense, due to the large number of neurons in the human brain along with the considerable complexity of each neuron.
In 2004, Henry Markram, lead researcher of the "Blue Brain Project", stated that "it is not [their] goal to build an intelligent neural network", based solely on the computational demands such a project would have.[16]
It will be very difficult because, in the brain, every molecule is a powerful computer and we would need to simulate the structure and function of trillions upon trillions of molecules as well as all the rules that govern how they interact. You would literally need computers that are trillions of times bigger and faster than anything existing today.[17]
Five years later, after successful simulation of part of a rat brain, Markram was much more bold and optimistic. In 2009, as director of the Blue Brain Project, he claimed that “A detailed, functional artificial human brain can be built within the next 10 years.”[18]
Required computational capacity strongly depend on the chosen level of simulation model scale:[4]
Level CPU demand
(FLOPS) Memory demand
(Tb) $1 million super‐computer
(Earliest year of making) Analog network population model 1015 102 2008 Spiking neural network 1018 104 2019 Electrophysiology 1022 104 2033 Metabolome 1025 106 2044 Proteome 1026 107 2048 States of protein complexes 1027 108 2052 Distribution of complexes 1030 109 2063 Stochastic behavior of single molecules 1043 1014 2111 Estimates from Sandberg, Bostrom, 2008
Simulation model scale [ edit ]
A high-level cognitive AI model of the brain architecture is not required for brain emulation
Simple neuron model: Black-box dynamic non-linear signal processing system
Metabolism model: The movement of positively charged ions through the ion channels controls the membrane electrical action potential in an axon.
Since the function of the human mind and how it might arise from the working of the brain's neural network, are poorly understood issues, mind uploading relies on the idea of neural network emulation. Rather than having to understand the high-level psychological processes and large-scale structures of the brain, and model them using classical artificial intelligence methods and cognitive psychology models, the low-level structure of the underlying neural network is captured, mapped and emulated with a computer system. In computer science terminology,[dubious – discuss] rather than analyzing and reverse engineering the behavior of the algorithms and data structures that resides in the brain, a blueprint of its source code is translated to another programming language. The human mind and the personal identity then, theoretically, is generated by the emulated neural network in an identical fashion to it being generated by the biological neural network.
On the other hand, a molecule-scale simulation of the brain is not expected to be required, provided that the functioning of the neurons is not affected by quantum mechanical processes. The neural network emulation approach only requires that the functioning and interaction of neurons and synapses are understood. It is expected that it is sufficient with a black-box signal processing model of how the neurons respond to nerve impulses (electrical as well as chemical synaptic transmission).
A sufficiently complex and accurate model of the neurons is required. A traditional artificial neural network model, for example multi-layer perceptron network model, is not considered as sufficient. A dynamic spiking neural network model is required, which reflects that the neuron fires only when a membrane potential reaches a certain level. It is likely that the model must include delays, non-linear functions and differential equations describing the relation between electrophysical parameters such as electrical currents, voltages, membrane states (ion channel states) and neuromodulators.
Since learning and long-term memory are believed to result from strengthening or weakening the synapses via a mechanism known as synaptic plasticity or synaptic adaptation, the model should include this mechanism. The response of sensory receptors to various stimuli must also be modelled.
Furthermore, the model may have to include metabolism, i.e. how the neurons are affected by hormones and other chemical substances that may cross the blood–brain barrier. It is considered likely that the model must include currently unknown neuromodulators, neurotransmitters and ion channels. It is considered unlikely that the simulation model has to include protein interaction, which would make it computationally complex.[4]
A digital computer simulation model of an analog system such as the brain is an approximation that introduces random quantization errors and distortion. However, the biological neurons also suffer from randomness and limited precision, for example due to background noise. The errors of the discrete model can be made smaller than the randomness of the biological brain by choosing a sufficiently high variable resolution and sample rate, and sufficiently accurate models of non-linearities. The computational power and computer memory must however be sufficient to run such large simulations, preferably in real time.
Scanning and mapping scale of an individual [ edit ]
When modelling and simulating the brain of a specific individual, a brain map or connectivity database showing the connections between the neurons must be extracted from an anatomic model of the brain. For whole brain simulation, this network map should show the connectivity of the whole nervous system, including the spinal cord, sensory receptors, and muscle cells. Destructive scanning of a small sample of tissue from a mouse brain including synaptic details is possible as of 2010.[19]
However, if short-term memory and working memory include prolonged or repeated firing of neurons, as well as intra-neural dynamic processes, the electrical and chemical signal state of the synapses and neurons may be hard to extract. The uploaded mind may then perceive a memory loss of the events and mental processes immediately before the time of brain scanning.[4]
A full brain map has been estimated to occupy less than 2 x 1016 bytes (20,000 TB) and would store the addresses of the connected neurons, the synapse type and the synapse "weight" for each of the brains' 1015 synapses.[4][not in citation given] However, the biological complexities of true brain function (e.g. the epigenetic states of neurons, protein components with multiple functional states, etc.) may preclude an accurate prediction of the volume of binary data required to faithfully represent a functioning human mind.
Serial sectioning [ edit ]
Serial sectioning of a brain
A possible method for mind uploading is serial sectioning, in which the brain tissue and perhaps other parts of the nervous system are frozen and then scanned and analyzed layer by layer, which for frozen samples at nano-scale requires a cryo-ultramicrotome, thus capturing the structure of the neurons and their interconnections.[20] The exposed surface of frozen nerve tissue would be scanned and recorded, and then the surface layer of tissue removed. While this would be a very slow and labor-intensive process, research is currently underway to automate the collection and microscopy of serial sections.[21] The scans would then be analyzed, and a model of the neural net recreated in the system that the mind was being uploaded into.
There are uncertainties with this approach using current microscopy techniques. If it is possible to replicate neuron function from its visible structure alone, then the resolution afforded by a scanning electron microscope would suffice for such a technique.[21] However, as the function of brain tissue is partially determined by molecular events (particularly at synapses, but also at other places on the neuron's cell membrane), this may not suffice for capturing and simulating neuron functions. It may be possible to extend the techniques of serial sectioning and to capture the internal molecular makeup of neurons, through the use of sophisticated immunohistochemistry staining methods that could then be read via confocal laser scanning microscopy. However, as the physiological genesis of 'mind' is not currently known, this method may not be able to access all of the necessary biochemical information to recreate a human brain with sufficient fidelity.
Brain imaging [ edit ]
[22] Process from MRI acquisition to whole brain structural network
It may be possible to create functional 3D maps of the brain activity, using advanced neuroimaging technology, such as functional MRI (fMRI, for mapping change in blood flow), magnetoencephalography (MEG, for mapping of electrical currents), or combinations of multiple methods, to build a detailed three-dimensional model of the brain using non-invasive and non-destructive methods. Today, fMRI is often combined with MEG for creating functional maps of human cortex during more complex cognitive tasks, as the methods complement each other. Even though current imaging technology lacks the spatial resolution needed to gather the information needed for such a scan, important recent and future developments are predicted to substantially improve both spatial and temporal resolutions of existing technologies.[23]
Brain simulation [ edit ]
There is ongoing work in the field of brain simulation, including partial and whole simulations of some animals. For example, the C. elegans roundworm, Drosophila fruit fly, and mouse have all been simulated to various degrees.[citation needed]
The Blue Brain Project by the Brain and Mind Institute of the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland is an attempt to create a synthetic brain by reverse-engineering mammalian brain circuitry.
Issues [ edit ]
Philosophical issues [ edit ]
Underlying the concept of "mind uploading" (more accurately "mind transferring") is the broad philosophy that consciousness lies within the brain's information processing and is in essence an emergent feature that arises from large neural network high-level patterns of organization, and that the same patterns of organization can be realized in other processing devices. Mind uploading also relies on the idea that the human mind (the "self" and the long-term memory), just like non-human minds, is represented by the current neural network paths and the weights of the brain synapses rather than by a dualistic and mystic soul and spirit. The mind or "soul" can be defined as the information state of the brain, and is immaterial only in the same sense as the information content of a data file or the state of a computer software currently residing in the work-space memory of the computer. Data specifying the information state of the neural network can be captured and copied as a "computer file" from the brain and re-implemented into a different physical form.[24] This is not to deny that minds are richly adapted to their substrates.[25] An analogy to the idea of mind uploading is to copy the temporary information state (the variable values) of a computer program from the computer memory to another computer and continue its execution. The other computer may perhaps have different hardware architecture but emulates the hardware of the first computer.
These issues have a long history. In 1775 Thomas Reid wrote:[26] “I would be glad to know... whether when my brain has lost its original structure, and when some hundred years after the same materials are fabricated so curiously as to become an intelligent being, whether, I say that being will be me; or, if, two or three such beings should be formed out of my brain; whether they will all be me, and consequently one and the same intelligent being.”
A considerable portion of transhumanists and singularitarians place great hope into the belief that they may become immortal, by creating one or many non-biological functional copies of their brains, thereby leaving their "biological shell". However, the philosopher and transhumanist Susan Schneider claims that at best, uploading would create a copy of the original person's mind.[27] Susan Schneider agrees that consciousness has a computational basis, but this does not mean we can upload and survive. According to her views, "uploading" would probably result in the death of the original person's brain, while only outside observers can maintain the illusion of the original person still being alive. For it is implausible to think that one's consciousness would leave one's brain and travel to a remote location; ordinary physical objects do not behave this way. Ordinary objects (rocks, tables, etc.) are not simultaneously here, and elsewhere. At best, a copy of the original mind is created.[27] Neural correlates of consciousness, a sub-branch of neuroscience, states that consciousness may be thought of as a state-dependent property of some undefined complex, adaptive, and highly interconnected biological system.[28]
Others have argued against such conclusions. For example, Buddhist transhumanist James Hughes has pointed out that this consideration only goes so far: if one believes the self is an illusion, worries about survival are not reasons to avoid uploading,[29] and Keith Wiley has presented an argument wherein all resulting minds of an uploading procedure are granted equal primacy in their claim to the original identity, such that survival of the self is determined retroactively from a strictly subjective position.[30][31] Some have also asserted that consciousness is a part of an extra-biological system that is yet to be discovered and cannot be fully understood under the present constraints of neurobiology. Without the transference of consciousness, true mind-upload or perpetual immortality cannot be practically achieved.[32]
Another potential consequence of mind uploading is that the decision to "upload" may then create a mindless symbol manipulator instead of a conscious mind (see philosophical zombie).[33][34] Are we to assume that an upload is conscious if it displays behaviors that are highly indicative of consciousness? Are we to assume that an upload is conscious if it verbally insists that it is conscious?[35] Could there be an absolute upper limit in processing speed above which consciousness cannot be sustained? The mystery of consciousness precludes a definitive answer to this question.[36] Numerous scientists, including Kurzweil, strongly believe that determining whether a separate entity is conscious (with 100% confidence) is fundamentally unknowable, since consciousness is inherently subjective (see solipsism). Regardless, some scientists strongly believe consciousness is the consequence of computational processes which are substrate-neutral. On the contrary, numerous scientists believe consciousness may be the result of some form of quantum computation dependent on substrate (see quantum mind).[37][38][39]
In light of uncertainty on whether to regard uploads as conscious, Sandberg proposes a cautious approach:[40]
Principle of assuming the most (PAM): Assume that any emulated system could have the same mental properties as the original system and treat it correspondingly.
Verification issues [ edit ]
It is argued that if a computational copy of one's mind did exist, it would be impossible for one to verify this.[41] The argument for this stance is the following: for a computational mind to recognize an emulation of itself, it must be capable of deciding whether two Turing machines (namely, itself and the proposed emulation) are functionally equivalent. This task is uncomputable due to the undecidability of equivalence, thus there cannot exist a computational procedure in the mind that is capable of recognizing an emulation of itself.
Ethical and legal implications [ edit ]
The process of developing emulation technology raises ethical issues related to animal welfare and artificial consciousness.[40] The neuroscience required to develop brain emulation would require animal experimentation, first on invertebrates and then on small mammals before moving on to humans. Sometimes the animals would just need to be euthanized in order to extract, slice, and scan their brains, but sometimes behavioral and in vivo measures would be required, which might cause pain to living animals.[40]
In addition, the resulting animal emulations themselves might suffer, depending on one's views about consciousness.[40] Bancroft argues for the plausibility of consciousness in brain simulations on the basis of the "fading qualia" thought experiment of David Chalmers. He then concludes:[42] “If, as I argue above, a sufficiently detailed computational simulation of the brain is potentially operationally equivalent to an organic brain, it follows that we must consider extending protections against suffering to simulations.”
It might help reduce emulation suffering to develop virtual equivalents of anaesthesia, as well as to omit processing related to pain and/or consciousness. However, some experiments might require a fully functioning and suffering animal emulation. Animals might also suffer by accident due to flaws and lack of insight into what parts of their brains are suffering.[40] Questions also arise regarding the moral status of partial brain emulations, as well as creating neuromorphic emulations that draw inspiration from biological brains but are built somewhat differently.[42]
Brain emulations could be erased by computer viruses or malware, without need to destroy the underlying hardware. This may make assassination easier than for physical humans. The attacker might take the computing power for its own use.[43]
Many questions arise regarding the legal personhood of emulations.[44] Would they be given the rights of biological humans? If a person makes an emulated copy of themselves and then dies, does the emulation inherit their property and official positions? Could the emulation ask to "pull the plug" when its biological version was terminally ill or in a coma? Would it help to treat emulations as adolescents for a few years so that the biological creator would maintain temporary control? Would criminal emulations receive the death penalty, or would they be given forced data modification as a form of "rehabilitation"? Could an upload have marriage and child-care rights?[44]
If simulated minds would come true and if they were assigned rights of their own, it may be difficult to ensure the protection of "digital human rights". For example, social science researchers might be tempted to secretly expose simulated minds, or whole isolated societies of simulated minds, to controlled experiments in which many copies of the same minds are exposed (serially or simultaneously) to different test conditions.[citation needed]
Political and economic implications [ edit ]
Emulations could create a number of conditions that might increase risk of war, including inequality, changes of power dynamics, a possible technological arms race to build emulations first, first-strike advantages, strong loyalty and willingness to "die" among emulations, and triggers for racist, xenophobic, and religious prejudice.[43] If emulations run much faster than humans, there might not be enough time for human leaders to make wise decisions or negotiate. It is possible that humans would react violently against growing power of emulations, especially if they depress human wages. Emulations may not trust each other, and even well-intentioned defensive measures might be interpreted as offense.[43]
Emulation timelines and AI risk [ edit ]
There are very few feasible technologies that humans have refrained from developing. The neuroscience and computer-hardware technologies that may make brain emulation possible are widely desired for other reasons, and logically their development will continue into the future. Assuming that emulation technology will arrive, a question becomes whether we should accelerate or slow its advance.[43]
Arguments for speeding up brain-emulation research:
If neuroscience is the bottleneck on brain emulation rather than computing power, emulation advances may be more erratic and unpredictable based on when new scientific discoveries happen. [43] [45] [46] Limited computing power would mean the first emulations would run slower and so would be easier to adapt to, and there would be more time for the technology to transition through society. [46]
Limited computing power would mean the first emulations would run slower and so would be easier to adapt to, and there would be more time for the technology to transition through society. Improvements in manufacturing, 3D printing, and nanotechnology may accelerate hardware production, [43] which could increase the "computing overhang" [47] from excess hardware relative to neuroscience.
which could increase the "computing overhang" from excess hardware relative to neuroscience. If one AI-development group had a lead in emulation technology, it would have more subjective time to win an arms race to build the first superhuman AI. Because it would be less rushed, it would have more freedom to consider AI risks.[48][49]
Arguments for slowing down brain-emulation research:
Greater investment in brain emulation and associated cognitive science might enhance the ability of artificial intelligence (AI) researchers to create "neuromorphic" (brain-inspired) algorithms, such as neural networks, reinforcement learning, and hierarchical perception. This could accelerate risks from uncontrolled AI. [43] [49] Participants at a 2011 AI workshop estimated an 85% probability that neuromorphic AI would arrive before brain emulation. This was based on the idea that brain emulation would require understanding some brain components, and it would be easier to tinker with these than to reconstruct the entire brain in its original form. By a very narrow margin, the participants on balance leaned toward the view that accelerating brain emulation would increase expected AI risk. [48]
Participants at a 2011 AI workshop estimated an 85% probability that neuromorphic AI would arrive before brain emulation. This was based on the idea that brain emulation would require understanding some brain components, and it would be easier to tinker with these than to reconstruct the entire brain in its original form. By a very narrow margin, the participants on balance leaned toward the view that accelerating brain emulation would increase expected AI risk. Waiting might give society more time to think about the consequences of brain emulation and develop institutions to improve cooperation.[43][49]
Emulation research would also speed up neuroscience as a whole, which might accelerate medical advances, cognitive enhancement, lie detectors, and capability for psychological manipulation.[49]
Emulations might be easier to control than de novo AI because
We understand better human abilities, behavioral tendencies, and vulnerabilities, so control measures might be more intuitive and easier to plan for.[48][49] Emulations could more easily inherit human motivations.[49] Emulations are harder to manipulate than de novo AI, because brains are messy and complicated; this could reduce risks of their rapid takeoff.[43][49] Also, emulations may be bulkier and require more hardware than AI, which would also slow the speed of a transition.[49] Unlike AI, an emulation wouldn't be able to rapidly expand beyond the size of a human brain.[49] Emulations running at digital speeds would have less intelligence differential vis-à-vis AI and so might more easily control AI.[49]
As counterpoint to these considerations, Bostrom notes some downsides:
Even if we better understand human behavior, the evolution of emulation behavior under self-improvement might be much less predictable than the evolution of safe de novo AI under self-improvement.[49] Emulations may not inherit all human motivations. Perhaps they would inherit our darker motivations or would behave abnormally in the unfamiliar environment of cyberspace.[49] Even if there's a slow takeoff toward emulations, there would still be a second transition to de novo AI later on. Two intelligence explosions may mean more total risk.[49]
Advocates [ edit ]
Ray Kurzweil, director of engineering at Google, claims to know and foresee that people will be able to "upload" their entire brains to computers and become "digitally immortal" by 2045. Kurzweil made this claim for many years, e.g. during his speech in 2013 at the Global Futures 2045 International Congress in New York, which claims to subscribe to a similar set of beliefs.[50] Mind uploading is also advocated by a number of researchers in neuroscience and artificial intelligence, such as Marvin Minsky[citation needed] while he was still alive. In 1993, Joe Strout created a small web site called the Mind Uploading Home Page, and began advocating the idea in cryonics circles and elsewhere on the net. That site has not been actively updated in recent years, but it has spawned other sites including MindUploading.org, run by Randal A. Koene, who also moderates a mailing list on the topic. These advocates see mind uploading as a medical procedure which could eventually save countless lives.
Many transhumanists look forward to the development and deployment of mind uploading technology, with transhumanists such as Nick Bostrom predicting that it will become possible within the 21st century due to technological trends such as Moore's law.[4]
Michio Kaku, in collaboration with Science, hosted a documentary, Sci Fi Science: Physics of the Impossible, based on his book Physics of the Impossible. Episode four, titled "How to Teleport", mentions that mind uploading via techniques such as quantum entanglement and whole brain emulation using an advanced MRI machine may enable people to be transported to vast distances at near light-speed.
The book Beyond Humanity: CyberEvolution and Future Minds by Gregory S. Paul & Earl D. Cox, is about the eventual (and, to the authors, almost inevitable) evolution of computers into sentient beings, but also deals with human mind transfer. Richard Doyle's Wetwares: Experiments in PostVital Living deals extensively with uploading from the perspective of distributed embodiment, arguing for example that humans are currently part of the "artificial life phenotype". Doyle's vision reverses the polarity on uploading, with artificial life forms such as uploads actively seeking out biological embodiment as part of their reproductive strategy.
Skeptics [ edit ]
Kenneth D. Miller, a professor of neuroscience at Columbia and a co-director of the Center for Theoretical Neuroscience, raised doubts about the practicality of mind uploading. His major argument is that reconstructing neurons and their connections is in itself a formidable task, but it is far from being sufficient. Operation of the brain depends on the dynamics of electrical and biochemical signal exchange between neurons; therefore, capturing them in a single "frozen" state may prove insufficient. In addition, the nature of these signals may require modeling down to the molecular level and beyond. Therefore, while not rejecting the idea in principle, Miller believes that the complexity of the "absolute" duplication of an individual mind is insurmountable for the nearest hundreds of years.[51]
See also [ edit ] ||||| by Rebecca Roache
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Edit 26th March 2014: It’s been pointed out to me by various people that this blog post does not make adequately clear that I don’t advocate the punishment methods described here. For a clarification of my views on the subject, please go here. For a Q&A, see here.
Today, the mother and stepfather of Daniel Pelka each received a life sentence for his murder. Daniel was four when he died in March last year. In the last few months of his short life, he was beaten, starved, held under water until he lost consciousness so that his mother could enjoy some ‘quiet time’, denied medical treatment, locked in a tiny room containing only a mattress on which he was expected both to sleep and defecate, humiliated and denied affection, and subjected to grotesquely creative abuse such as being force-fed salt when he asked for a drink of water. His young sibling, who secretly tried to feed and comfort Daniel, was forced to witness much of this; and neighbours reported hearing Daniel’s screams at night.
Daniel’s mother, Magdelena Luczak, and stepfather, Mariusz Krezolek, will each serve a minimum of thirty years in prison. This is the most severe punishment available in the current UK legal system. Even so, in a case like this, it seems almost laughably inadequate. The conditions in which Luczak and Krezolek will spend the next thirty years must, by law, meet certain standards. They will, for example, be fed and watered, housed in clean cells, allowed access to a toilet and washing facilities, allowed out of their cells for exercise and recreation, allowed access to medical treatment, and allowed access to a complaints procedure through which they can seek justice if those responsible for their care treat them cruelly or sadistically or fail to meet the basic needs to which they are entitled. All of these things were denied to Daniel. Further, after thirty years—when Luczak is 57 and Krezolek 64—they will have their freedom returned to them. Compared to the brutality they inflicted on vulnerable and defenceless Daniel, this all seems like a walk in the park. What can be done about this? How can we ensure that those who commit crimes of this magnitude are sufficiently punished?
In cases like this, people sometimes express the opinion that the death penalty should be reintroduced—indeed, some have responded to Daniel’s case with this suggestion. I am not sympathetic to this idea, and I will not discuss it here; the arguments against it are well-rehearsed in many other places. Alternatively, some argue that retributive punishment (reactionary punishment, such as imprisonment) should be replaced where possible with a forward-looking approach such as restorative justice. I imagine, however, that even opponents of retributive justice would shrink from suggesting that Daniel’s mother and stepfather should escape unpunished. Therefore, I assume—in line with the mainstream view of punishment in the UK legal system and in every other culture I can think of—that retributive punishment is appropriate in this case.
We might turn to technology for ways to increase the severity of Luczak and Krezolek’s punishment without making drastic changes to the current UK legal system. Here are some possibilities.
Lifespan enhancement: Within the transhumanist movement, the belief that science will soon be able to halt the ageing process and enable humans to remain healthy indefinitely is widespread. Dr Aubrey de Grey, co-founder of the anti-ageing Sens research foundation, believes that the first person to live to 1,000 years has already been born. The benefits of such radical lifespan enhancement are obvious—but it could also be harnessed to increase the severity of punishments. In cases where a thirty-year life sentence is judged too lenient, convicted criminals could be sentenced to receive a life sentence in conjunction with lifespan enhancement. As a result, life imprisonment could mean several hundred years rather than a few decades. It would, of course, be more expensive for society to support such sentences. However, if lifespan enhancement were widely available, this cost could be offset by the increased contributions of a longer-lived workforce.
Mind uploading: As the technology required to scan and map human brain processes improves, some believe it will one day be possible to upload human minds on to computers. With sufficient computer power, it would be possible to speed up the rate at which an uploaded mind runs. Professor Nick Bostrom, head of Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, calls a vastly faster version of human-level intelligence ‘speed superintelligence’. He observes that a speed superintelligence operating at ten thousand times that of a biological brain ‘would be able to read a book in a few seconds and write a PhD thesis in an afternoon. If the speed‑up were instead a factor of a million, a millennium of thinking would be accomplished in eight and a half hours’.1 Similarly, uploading the mind of a convicted criminal and running it a million times faster than normal would enable the uploaded criminal to serve a 1,000 year sentence in eight-and-a-half hours. This would, obviously, be much cheaper for the taxpayer than extending criminals’ lifespans to enable them to serve 1,000 years in real time. Further, the eight-and-a-half hour 1,000-year sentence could be followed by a few hours (or, from the point of view of the criminal, several hundred years) of treatment and rehabilitation. Between sunrise and sunset, then, the vilest criminals could serve a millennium of hard labour and return fully rehabilitated either to the real world (if technology facilitates transferring them back to a biological substrate) or, perhaps, to exile in a computer simulated world. For this to be a realistic punishment option, however, some important issues in the philosophy of mind and personal identity would need to be addressed. We would need to be sure, for example, that scanning a person’s brain and simulating its functions on a computer would be equivalent to literally transferring that person from his or her body onto a computer—as opposed to it being equivalent to killing him or her (if destroying the brain is necessary for the scanning process), or just copying his or her brain activity. Personally, I have serious doubts that such theoretical issues are ever likely to be resolved to the extent where mind uploading could be practicable as a form of punishment.
Altering perception of duration: Various factors can cause people to perceive time as passing more slowly. Science can explain some of these factors, and we can expect understanding in this area to continue to progress. Our emotional state can influence our perception of how quickly time passes: one recent study revealed that time seems to pass more slowly when people are experiencing fear than when experiencing sadness or a neutral state.2 Another study demonstrated that our perception of other people’s emotions—read through their facial expressions—affects our experience of duration: time seems to pass more slowly when faced with a person expressing anger, fear, joy, or sadness.3 In addition, our experience of duration changes throughout life, with time seeming to pass more slowly for children than for adults. Exactly why is not fully understood, but some believe that it relates to attention and the way in which information is processed.4 Time also appears to pass more slowly for people taking psychoactive drugs,5 engaging in mindfulness meditation,6 and when the body temperature is lowered. 7 This research on subjective experience of duration could inform the design and management of prisons, with the worst criminals being sent to special institutions designed to ensure their sentences pass as slowly and monotonously as possible.
Robot prison officers: The extent to which prison can be made unpleasant for prisoners is limited by considerations of the welfare of the prison staff who must deal with prisoners on a day-to-day basis. It is in the interests of these staff to keep prisoners relatively content to ensure that they can be managed safely and calmly. If human staff could one day be replaced by robots, this limiting factor would be removed. Robotics technology has already produced self-driving cars and various other impressive machines, which places robot prison officers within the bounds of possibility.
Technology, then, offers (or will one day offer) untapped possibilities to make punishment for the worst criminals more severe without resorting to inhumane methods or substantially overhauling the current UK legal system. What constitutes humane treatment in the context of the suggestions I have made is, of course, debatable. But I believe it is an issue worth debating.
References
1 Bostrom, N. 2010: ‘Intelligence explosion: groundwork for a strategic analysis’. Unpublished manuscript.
2 Droit-Volet, S., Fayolle, S.L. and Gil, S. 2011: ‘Emotion and time perception: effects of film-induced mood’, Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 5: 33.
3 Gil, S. and Droit-Volet, S. 2011: ‘How do emotional facial expressions influence our perception of time?’, in Masmoudi, S., Yan Dai, D. and Naceur, A. (eds.) Attention, Representation, and Human Performance: Integration of Cognition, Emotion and Motivation (London: Psychology Press, Taylor & Francis).
4 Gruber, R.P., Wagner, L.F. and Block, R.A. 2000: ‘Subjective time versus proper (clock) time’, in Saniga, M., Buccheri, R. and Di Gesù, V. (eds.) Studies on the Structure of Time: From Physics to Psycho(patho)logy (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers).
5 Wittmann, M., Carter, O., Hasler, F., Cahn, B.R., Grimberg, U., Spring, P., Hell, D., Flohr, H. and Vollenweider, F.X. 2007: ‘Effects of psilocybin on time perception and temporal control of behaviour in humans’, Journal of Psychopharmacology 21/1: 50–64.
6 Kramer, R.S., Weger, U.W. and Sharma, D. 2013: ‘The effect of mindfulness meditation on time perception’, Consciousness and Cognition 22/3: 846–52.
7 Wearden, J.H. and Penton-Voak, I.S. 1995: ‘Feeling the heat: body temperature and the rate of subjective time, revisited’, The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section B: Comparative and Physiological Psychology 48/2: 129–41. | We could someday see prison sentences radically altered—in the prisoner's own mind, the Telegraph reports. An Oxford philosophers are considering how future technology could, for instance, make a jail sentence feel as though it lasted 1,000 years, they tell Aeon magazine. After all, there are already "a number of psychoactive drugs that distort people’s sense of time," and existing interrogation scenarios tinker with lighting to prevent subjects from knowing the time, says Rebecca Roache. In a blog post, Roache advances an even more mind-bending idea: Some point to a future in which brain scans allow us to upload the human brain onto a computer (there's even a Wikipedia page about it). If that happens, we could perhaps "speed up" a prisoner's mind. "Uploading the mind of a convicted criminal and running it a million times faster than normal would enable the uploaded criminal to serve a 1,000 year sentence in eight-and-a-half hours," Roache writes. That would, she notes, "be much cheaper for the taxpayer." But, she points out, "the goal isn’t simply to imagine a bunch of futuristic punishments—the goal is to look at today’s punishments through the lens of the future." |
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