Datasets:

vgoldberg

/

6k-longform-summ

like 0

Donald Trump on Thursday repeated a claim that he's seen a video showing a plane delivering $400 million in cash from the United States to Iran, even after his own campaign acknowledged such an assertion is incorrect. "A tape was made, you saw that? With the airplane coming in … and the money coming off, I guess,” he said while addressing supporters in Portland, Maine. At a campaign rally in Florida a day earlier, Trump for the first time said he had seen a video shot by Iran, “taking that money off that airplane.” But campaign officials later told CBS News that the video in question was actually footage of the released American hostages landing at Geneva, which had been aired on Fox News. Even so, Trump repeated the claim in Maine, insisting that the video was made public by the Iranians to embarrass the United States. "They want to embarrass our country. And they want to embarrass our president," he said. Trump's campaign in recent days has been fueling allegations that the Obama administration paid $400 million in cash ransom to win the release of four Americans as part of the agreement implemented in January to restrict Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear weapon. The administration has denied any ransom was paid, noting that it publicly disclosed the $400-million payment in January and that it was widely reported at the time. The administration says the money was being returned to Iran after being frozen following the 1979 Iranian revolution. The payment was to partly settle Iran's legal claims arising from a weapons purchase from the U.S. that never took place. Republicans and the Trump campaign have said the timing of the payment and use of cash give the appearance that the U.S. was paying ransom. At his rally on Thursday, Trump speculated that the money would be used by Iran to fund terrorism. "I wonder where that money really goes, by the way.... Well, it went either in their pockets, which I actually think more so, or toward terrorism -- probably a combination of both,” he said. ||||| Washington (CNN) Donald Trump backed off a false claim Friday morning, admitting he had not seen a video of a $400 million payment being unloaded from a US plane in Iran. The Republican nominee had claimed at rallies twice this week that such a video existed, saying in Maine on Thursday that it was provided by Iranians "to embarrass our president because we have a president who's incompetent." What Trump had actually seen in news reports was video of three American prisoners who Iran had released arriving in Geneva, Switzerland. Trump admitted his error in an early-morning tweet Friday, without actually saying he was wrong. "The plane I saw on television was the hostage plane in Geneva, Switzerland, not the plane carrying $400 million in cash going to Iran!" he tweeted. The plane I saw on television was the hostage plane in Geneva, Switzerland, not the plane carrying $400 million in cash going to Iran! It was a rare reversal for Trump, who has stood by inaccurate or unproven claims previously -- insisting he'd seen videos of Muslim Americans in New Jersey cheering the September 11, 2001, attacks. His political rise began during the 2012 campaign, when he insisted that Obama release his birth certificate, questioning the President's American citizenship. Democratic vice presidential nominee Tim Kaine hit Trump on Friday for the video claim, saying he seems "confused" on CBS' "This Morning," in an interview taped before Trump backtracked. "I have no idea what he's talking about. It (the video) doesn't exist. He might be thinking about Iran Contra from like 35 years ago or something like this," Kaine said. He pointed to Trump's recent criticism of Kaine, who Trump said in a late-July news conference "did a terrible job in New Jersey" -- despite Kaine being a governor and senator from Virginia, not New Jersey. Kaine said Trump must have confused him with Tom Kean, who was New Jersey's governor until 1990. "He was confusing it with a situation from two or three decades ago. Maybe that's what he's doing with this bogus video claim," Kaine said. Asked if he thinks Trump is confused, Kaine said: "I absolutely think he's confused." Paul Manafort, Trump's campaign chairman, responded to Kaine on Fox News Friday morning, saying he's "not sure there was confusion" on Trump's part. "The point that he was making is the cash-transfer took place and it was taking place consistent with the transfer of hostages," Manafort said. "Again, what the Obama administration wants to do is get off of the point. The point is, $400 million in cash that most likely ended up in terrorist camps used against the west was given in exchange for hostages and the President of the United States lied to the American people, that's the point." Trump has made criticism of the US delivery of $400 million in cash via a plane to Iran -- the first installment of $1.7 billion in payments related to a decades-old dispute over an unfulfilled us arms purchase before the Iranian revolution cut relations between the two countries and settled at the same time Iran released four American prisoners -- a staple this week on the campaign trail. But Wednesday in Florida and Thursday in Maine, he went a step further, claiming he'd seen video of the cash actually being delivered in Iran. "It was interesting because a tape was made. Right? You saw that? With the airplane coming in -- nice plane -- and the airplane coming in, and the money coming off, I guess. Right? That was given to us, has to be, by the Iranians," Trump said in Portland, Maine. "And you know why the tape was given to us? Because they want to embarrass our country. They want to embarrass our country. And they want to embarrass our president because we have a president who's incompetent. They want to embarrass our president," Trump said. "I mean, who would ever think they would be taking all of this money off the plane and then providing us with a tape? It's only for one reason. And it's very, very sad." ||||| Starting in 1996, Alexa Internet has been donating their crawl data to the Internet Archive. Flowing in every day, these data are added to the Wayback Machine after an embargo period. ||||| WASHINGTON — President Obama on Thursday flatly denied that a $400 million pallet of cash delivered to the Iranian government in January, on the same day that four American citizens who had been detained by Iran were released, was a ransom payment, calling the latest uproar over the landmark nuclear pact with Tehran “the manufacturing of outrage.” Mr. Obama said the payment was part of a decades-old dispute with Iran that had been litigated before an international tribunal, adding that his administration publicly disclosed the agreement in January. “We do not pay ransom for hostages,” Mr. Obama said during a news conference at the Pentagon. In a forceful rebuttal to accusations from critics who said that the payment could put more Americans in danger of being held, he called “the notion that we would start now, in this high profile way,” one that “defies logic.” On Jan. 17, the United States and European nations lifted oil and financial sanctions on Iran and released roughly $100 billion of its assets as part of the terms of the nuclear accord reached between Iran and six world powers. ||||| Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump told supporters at an August 3 rally in Daytona Beach, Fla., that he had watched a video of Iranian officials unloading cash from an airplane. (Reuters) As Fox News reported on the controversial transfer of $400 million in cash to Iran in January, it repeatedly played dark, grainy footage of shadowy figures walking off a small private plane with bags in hand. The video is often labeled as being from Jan. 17 in Geneva where three Americans first landed after being released from prison in Tehran. Republican nominee Donald Trump watched this sort of footage, according to his spokeswoman, and concluded that it showed the controversial money transfer that was described in detail for the first time this week by the Wall Street Journal. At a rally in Daytona Beach, Fla., on Wednesday afternoon, Trump announced that the months-old video had been recorded by the Iranian government and released to embarrass the United States. "Remember this: Iran — I don't think you heard this anywhere but here — Iran provided all of that footage, the tape of taking that money off the airplane," Trump said at the rally. "Right?" Trump provided no source for this exclusive information but described in detail what he saw in the video. "Now, here's the amazing thing: Over there, where that plane landed, top secret, you don't have a lot of paparazzi. You know, the paparazzi doesn't do so well over there, right?" Trump said, seeming to refer to Iran and not Switzerland, where the footage was recorded. "And they have a perfect tape, done by obviously a government camera, and the tape is of the people taking the money off the plane. Right? That means that in order to embarrass us further, Iran sent us the tapes. Right? It's a military tape; it's a tape that was a perfect angle, nice and steady, nobody getting nervous because they're gonna be shot because they're shooting a picture of money pouring off a plane." Twitter quickly filled with confusion and this central question: What is Trump talking about? Several senior U.S. officials involved in the Iran negotiations told the Associated Press on Wednesday they weren't aware of any such footage. There was speculation that perhaps Trump saw the footage during one of the classified security briefings provided to presidential nominees, but Trump's campaign chairman Paul Manafort said in an interview on Fox News earlier in the day that those briefings have not yet begun. The Washington Post asked Trump's staff to explain what Trump was talking about and emailed a link to a Fox News clip that showed the January footage from Geneva, asking if that was the video the nominee saw. "Yes," spokeswoman Hope Hicks responded in an email. "Merely the b-roll footage included in every broadcast." Hicks has yet to respond to a follow-up email asking why Trump thought the footage showed a money transfer and not the widely watched prisoner swap, and why Trump said it was recorded by the Iranian government. (Note: This wasn't the only questionable thing Trump said about Iran on Wednesday. Post fact-checker Glenn Kessler dug into Trump's assertion that Hillary Clinton "started talks to give 400 million dollars, in cash, to Iran," evaluating the untrue statement as worthy of four Pinocchios.) ||||| MYTH: “The Administration Did Not Reveal This To The Public” MYTH: Clinton Improperly Dismissed The Report As “Old News” MYTH: Sending Cash To Iran Was Essentially “Money Laundering” Resolution Of 35-Year-Old Dispute Coincided With Iran Nuclear Agreement And Prisoner Exchange Wash. Post: Nuclear Agreement Between U.S. And Iran “Helped Accelerate The Talks” About Freeing Prisoners. On January 16, after years of negotiations, the United States government secured the release of five Americans held prisoner in Iran, including Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian, who had been held in captivity for nearly two years. Their release was secured on the same day that the two nations agreed to an historic nuclear nonproliferation agreement, which President Obama heralded as “smart, patient and disciplined” diplomacy. According to the Obama administration, the prisoner release was “negotiated separately” from the nuclear accord “to ensure that the detainees were not used as leverage,” but the administration did concede that fruitful nuclear negotiations “helped accelerate the talks.” From a January 17 Washington Post article: The nuclear agreement and the release of the American prisoners were negotiated separately to ensure that the detainees were not used as leverage, U.S. officials said. But the completion of the nuclear deal last summer helped accelerate the talks about the prisoners, which loomed in the background of the negotiations. The Americans were freed in exchange for U.S. clemency in the cases of seven Iranians charged or imprisoned over sanctions violations, and the dismissal of outstanding charges against 14 Iranians outside the United States. At least five of the Iranians granted pardons or sentence commutations intend to stay in the United States, their attorneys said. [The Washington Post, 1/17/16] AFP: U.S. Agreed To Repay $400 Million Plus Interest To Iranian Government Over Disputed Arms Sale. On January 17, the United States government agreed to repay $400 million plus approximately $1.3 billion in accumulated interest to the Iranian government to resolve a disputed arms sale between the two nations that occurred “prior to the break in diplomatic ties” during the 1979 Iranian revolution. According to reporting from Agence France-Presse (AFP) and other news agencies, the payment resolved a deadlock at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal that had stood since the tribunal’s inception in 1981, and represented “a broader clearing of the decks between the old foes” just one day after the signing of an historic nuclear agreement. AFP reported at the time that the Obama administration’s political opponents were already attempting to scandalize the arrangement: The repayment, which settles a suit brought under an international legal tribunal, is separate from the tens of billions of dollars in frozen foreign accounts that Iran can now access after the end of nuclear sanctions. But the timing of the announcement, one day after the implementation of the Iran nuclear accord, will be seen as pointing to a broader clearing of the decks between the old foes. US President Barack Obama defended the settlement in a televised statement from the White House, saying it was for "much less than the amount Iran sought." [...] [Secretary of State John] Kerry described Sunday's payment of the 35-year-old trust as a "fair settlement." But the debt deal immediately drew the ire of those in Washington who think the Obama administration had already made too many concessions to secure the nuclear deal. [Agence France-Press, 1/17/16] The Wall Street Journal Reports U.S. “Secretly Organized” Cash Transfer To Iran WSJ: U.S. “Secretly Organized An Airlift Of $400 Million Worth Of Cash To Iran.” On August 3, The Wall Street Journal reported that the United States “secretly organized an airlift of $400 million worth of cash to Iran that coincided with the January release of four Americans detained in Tehran.” The Journal noted that “[t]he money represented the first installment of a $1.7 billion settlement the Obama administration reached with Iran to resolve a decades-old dispute over a failed arms deal signed just before the 1979 fall of Iran’s last monarch,” adding that “senior U.S. officials denied any link between the payment” and a prisoner exchange that resulted in five Americans being freed. From the August 3 article: The Obama administration secretly organized an airlift of $400 million worth of cash to Iran that coincided with the January release of four Americans detained in Tehran, according to U.S. and European officials and congressional staff briefed on the operation afterward. Wooden pallets stacked with euros, Swiss francs and other currencies were flown into Iran on an unmarked cargo plane, according to these officials. The U.S. procured the money from the central banks of the Netherlands and Switzerland, they said. The money represented the first installment of a $1.7 billion settlement the Obama administration reached with Iran to resolve a decades-old dispute over a failed arms deal signed just before the 1979 fall of Iran’s last monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. [...] Senior U.S. officials denied any link between the payment and the prisoner exchange. They say the way the various strands came together simultaneously was coincidental, not the result of any quid pro quo. [...] Meanwhile, U.S. officials have said they were certain Washington was going to lose the arbitration in The Hague, where Iran was seeking more than $10 billion, and described the settlement as a bargain for taxpayers. [...] The $400 million was paid in foreign currency because any transaction with Iran in U.S. dollars is illegal under U.S. law. Sanctions also complicate Tehran’s access to global banks. [...] The Iranians were demanding the return of $400 million the Shah’s regime deposited into a Pentagon trust fund in 1979 to purchase U.S. fighter jets, U.S. officials said. They also wanted billions of dollars as interest accrued since then. [The Wall Street Journal, 8/3/16] Right-Wing Media Distort WSJ Report To Renew Attacks On Iran Negotiations Fox’s John Bolton: “Of Course It’s Ransom. I Don’t Think There’s Any Way Of Getting Around It.” Reacting to the Journal article, Fox News contributor John Bolton said “of course” the payment to Iran was “ransom,” adding, “I don’t think there’s any way of getting around it.” From the August 4 edition of Fox News’ America’s Newsroom: JOHN BOLTON: Well, of course, it's ransom. I don't think there's any way of getting around it. It's not a question what the administration says it is or what Iran says it is, it's the reality that the money paid was -- got -- helped get the hostages released as part of the overall nuclear deal. But I think there may have been other questions that [the] Justice [Department] was asking here, because the way this transaction was handled, without more information, it looks to me to be in serious jeopardy of violating the prohibitions on using dollars for transactions with Iran. I don't think it should make any difference whether some government agency converted U.S. dollars into Swiss francs or euros. You could give the Iranians $400 million worth of pizzas, it would be exactly the same thing. It would be a transmission of resources to them. So I think -- I encourage all those investigative reporters at The Washington Post and The New York Times to get the scoop on what else Justice said. And importantly, who overruled them. I don't think the State Department could overrule the Justice Department on its own. [Fox News, America's Newsroom, 8/4/16] Fox’s Ralph Peters: “This Was Definitely A Ransom, Or A Bribe If You Prefer To Call It That.” Fox News strategic analyst Ralph Peters stated that the payment “was definitely ransom” and that “the rest of the world” would look at the arrangement and conclude “we did pay ransom.” From the August 3 edition of Fox News’ America’s Newsroom: RALPH PETERS: This was definitely a ransom, or a bribe if you’d prefer to call it that. And I can even tell you how it happened. It's the same thing as when you walk into a car dealership and you haggle with the car dealer. And finally you think the salesman -- you've agreed on a price, and the salesman disappears into the back room, and you're excited about that car, and the contract comes out, and it's $800 higher than you agreed on. And he says, "oh, that's a dealer prep charge." And, if you're a fool, as John Kerry was of the Iranians, you agree to the higher charge. It was clearly a sweetener to get the deal through and to get the Iranian-Americans released. And the problem is, Elizabeth, that we did pay ransom. That's how it looks to the rest of the world. [Fox News, America's Newsroom, 8/3/16] FACT: “No Concrete Evidence” That Payment Was A Ransom AP: “There Is No Concrete Evidence That The Cash Payment Was, In Fact, A Ransom.” According to an Associated Press (AP) fact-check of Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump’s reaction to the WSJ article, “There is no concrete evidence that the cash payment was, in fact, a ransom.” The AP reported that “The Obama administration has flatly denied it has ever paid ransoms, including in this case,” and “officials acknowledge that progress in the nuclear negotiations contributed to progress on the settlement of the claim as well as progress in talks on the release of the Americans.” From the August 3 fact-check: THE FACTS: There is no concrete evidence that the cash payment was, in fact, a ransom. Critics of the Iran deal, including many senior Republican lawmakers, maintain that the $400 million settlement was a ransom for the release of four private American citizens jailed in Tehran and freed a day after the Iran deal was implemented. Some Iranian officials have suggested the same thing. The Obama administration has flatly denied it has ever paid ransoms, including in this case. The timing of the prisoner release and the arrival of the payment has given weight to GOP claims. U.S. officials acknowledge that progress in the nuclear negotiations contributed to progress on the settlement of the claim as well as progress in talks on the release of the Americans. [Associated Press, 8/3/16] Vox: $400 Million “Wasn’t A Ransom Payment,” Trump Is Wrong To Characterize It That Way. An August 3 Vox post explaining the controversy over the payment stated “it wasn’t a ransom payment. It was a settlement.” The post further explained that Trump “is wrong” to go with the “‘secret ransom payment’ line.” [Vox, 8/3/16] CNN: Prisoner Release Was Part Of A “Separate [Negotiating] Session” That “Opened After The Iranian Nuclear Deal.” In January, CNN.com reported that the United States “insisted there had to be a separate session between the U.S. and Iran” to discuss the “prisoner exchange.” According to CNN.com, “A senior administration official who briefed reporters said a ‘window’ opened after the Iranian nuclear deal ‘and we wanted to take advantage of that window.’” From the January 16 report: The prisoner exchange between the U.S. and Iran capped 14 months of secret diplomacy and talks between Washington and Tehran as the U.S. and world powers negotiated the pact to curb Iran's nuclear program, reflecting a thaw in relations between the sworn enemies. The negotiation over the prisoners began on the sideline of the nuclear talks, intensified after the deal was completed last April and heated up even further in recent months, senior administration officials told CNN. The secret talks were led by Brett McGurk, the U.S. special envoy tapped by President Barack Obama to coordinate the global fight against ISIS, the officials said [...] The Iranians told the U.S. during the talks they wanted a "goodwill gesture" and gave the U.S. a list of Iranians they wanted released. The U.S. officials excluded any names of anyone charged with terrorism or violence, insisting that they would only consider those who had been convicted of sanctions violations or violations of the trade embargo. After every meeting on the nuclear deal between world powers and Iran, the U.S. insisted there had to be a separate session between the U.S. and Iran on the American prisoners, the officials said. [CNN.com, 1/16/16] State Department: “Any Suggestion That It Had Anything To Do With Ransom Is Absolutely And Utterly False.” In an interview on Fox News, State Department spokesman John Kirby explained that the prisoner exchange was negotiated by “a completely separate team than was working in The Hague tribunal to negotiate this claim.” After co-host Bill Hemmer said the payment “looks like it’s ransom,” Kirby reiterated the U.S. government’s policy that “We don't pay ransom. We just don't pay ransom. It is our policy. This was not ransom.” From the August 3 edition of Fox News’ America’s Newsroom: JOHN KIRBY: The teams that were negotiating the release of our Americans was a completely separate team than was working in The Hague tribunal to negotiate this claim. Completely separate processes, though simultaneously done. The timing is all coincidental. Again, we can -- BILL HEMMER (HOST): This is from The Wall Street Journal report, this is very important now, OK? Because, in its story today, it talks about Iranian press reports. And, straight out of Tehran, they've quoted senior Iranian defense officials saying, "it was a ransom payment." Now, are they wrong? JOHN KIRBY: Yes, they are. They're absolutely wrong, Bill. Completely wrong. Look, you can believe us, who've talked about this on camera and on the record since January, or you can believe an unnamed, anonymous defense official from Iran. You choose who you are going to believe to be more credible. HEMMER: Well, 1.3 billion to go, correct?So, that means what, is that more pallets of euros headed for Tehran? [...] HEMMER: And, you know, the series [of] events last January, it looks like it's ransom. It looks like Tehran said, "we'll go ahead and do this, but you have to give us the money, and you have to do it in cash." KIRBY: We don't pay ransom. We just don't pay ransom. It is our policy. This was not ransom. Any suggestion that it had anything to do with ransom is absolutely and utterly false. These were two separate processes run by two separate teams. Now, yes, they were done simultaneously, and so I understand the coincidental nature here of the timing. But, absolutely had nothing to do with ransom. We do not, and will not, pay ransom. [Fox News, America's Newsroom, 8/3/16] Fox’s Steve Doocy: “We Didn’t Know About This.” Fox & Friends co-host Steve Doocy hyped The Wall Street Journal’ article, saying of the $400 million cash payment was “ransom money” and that the American public “didn’t know about this.” Co-host Anna Kooiman also cited Trump’s misleading tweet about the article, which blamed Hillary Clinton for the so-called “scandal.” From the August 3 edition of Fox News’ Fox & Friends: STEVE DOOCY (CO-HOST): All right, The Wall Street Journal had an exclusive report yesterday late in the day and now everybody's got it. The same day that four American hostages were released by the country of Iran, earlier that day, under the cover of darkness we believe, the United States sent an unmarked cargo jet. There you've got the hostages landing in Geneva. They've been loaded up in Tehran. Earlier, an unmarked white cargo plane with $400 million on wooden pallets in Swiss francs was delivered to the country of Iran, and right now, people are saying, “wait, that’s hostage money, right? That’s ransom money.” No, the administration says it's not. It might look like it, but indeed what that was was part of $1.7 billion we owed to the country of Iran after that 1979 arms deal and the fall of the Shah of Iran. ANNA KOOIMAN (CO-HOST): Yeah, they say that it's -- that the settlement actually is resolving a decades-old dispute. But others others are going, "this looks a whole lot like ransom money." DOOCY: Do you think? KOOIMAN: And Donald Trump tweeted this earlier, and he has reason behind it. He says, “Our incompetent Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was the one who started talks to give 400 million dollars, in cash, to Iran. Scandal!” [...] DOOCY: So you’ve got four Americans released who had been held hostage, and then there's $400 million in that airplane. Remember the American sailors who were taken hostage and, of course, we were told that no money was paid regarding that. But we didn't know about this, what apparently was ransom money either. You got to wonder whether or not there was a secret deal regarding that, too. [Fox News, Fox & Friends, 8/3/16] Fox’s Tucker Carlson: “The Truth Remains That The Administration Did Not Reveal This To The Public.” Fox host Tucker Carlson stated that the payment “was ransom,” and that “the administration did not reveal this to the public.” While Carlson insisted that “any reasonable person looking at this is going to reach that conclusion,” he admitted that the claim is “[h]ard to prove” and “[m]aybe it’ll never be proved.” From the August 3 edition of Fox News’ America’s Newsroom: BILL HEMMER (CO-HOST): What do you make now with the administration pushing back, suggesting that John Kerry made this public months ago? Yet there does not appear to be a record of Kerry talking about money. TUCKER CARLSON: No, there doesn't, and of course the administration has talked about this deal in some great detail a lot over the last several months, and never mentioned this. It was done secretly in an unmarked aircraft, as you know. Not in U.S. dollars, in euros and francs. Pallets of them. And it was done that way because it would have been illegal to conduct it in U.S. dollars, which tells you everything right there. If you and I did this in American currency, we'd be charged with a felony. And so, there is a secretive component to this. Why would the administration keep this from the American people? It seems to me that’s a pretty obvious question for Admiral Kirby. But it has an odor to it. [...] This component of the deal was known that Iran was expecting payment of frozen funds, et cetera, et cetera. But the truth remains that the administration did not reveal this to the public, and that American hostages were released at the same time, and it's impossible not to draw the conclusion that this was, at least in part, ransom money. And boy, that's of a piece, by the way. For all the talk about how we never pay for ransom for hostages, we don't negotiate, the truth is that news organizations and governments very often pay ransom and negotiate, and everyone in Washington, for example, knows that. And the lying and the sanctimony around this subject is hard to take once you know that. [Fox News, America’s Newsroom, 8/3/16] Rush Limbaugh: “Obama Secretly Paid $400 Million To The Iranians For The Release Of Four American-Iranian Hostages.” Rush Limbaugh asserted that “Barack Hussein Obama secretly paid $400 million to the Iranians for the release of four Iranian American hostages.” From the August 3 edition of Premiere Radio Networks’ The Rush Limbaugh Show: RUSH LIMBAUGH (HOST): We were talking about Barack Hussein Obama’s excoriating Donald Trump for being “unfit” for office. For being unsuitable. Or maybe even being mentally unfit to hold the office of president of the United States. What have we learned since yesterday? We have learned that Barack Hussein Obama secretly paid $400 million to the Iranians for the release of four American-Iranian hostages. [Premiere Radio Networks, The Rush Limbaugh Show, 8/3/16] FACT: Most Details Of The WSJ Article Were Announced By The Obama Administration In January President Obama In January: “The United States And Iran Are Now Settling A Longstanding Iranian Government Claim Against The United States Government.” In a January 17 statement on the implementation of the Iran nuclear deal, President Obama explained that “engaging directly with the Iranian government on a sustained basis … has created a unique opportunity -- a window -- to try to resolve important issues.” Among those issues, Obama said, was the resolution of a “financial dispute that dated back more than three decades”: So, nuclear deal implemented. American families reunited. The third piece of this work that we got done this weekend involved the United States and Iran resolving a financial dispute that dated back more than three decades. Since 1981, after our nations severed diplomatic relations, we’ve worked through a international tribunal to resolve various claims between our countries. The United States and Iran are now settling a longstanding Iranian government claim against the United States government. Iran will be returned its own funds, including appropriate interest, but much less than the amount Iran sought. For the United States, this settlement could save us billions of dollars that could have been pursued by Iran. So there was no benefit to the United States in dragging this out. With the nuclear deal done, prisoners released, the time was right to resolve this dispute as well. [The Washington Post, 1/17/16] Secretary Of State John Kerry Issued Press Release Announcing Settlement Of Iranian Government’s Claims, Beginning With $400 Million Payment. On January 17, Secretary of State John Kerry issued a press release explaining that Iran will be paid $400 million, to be followed by $1.3 billion more to settle “a long outstanding claim at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in the Hague”: The United States and Iran today have settled a long outstanding claim at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in the Hague. This specific claim was in the amount of a $400 million Trust Fund used by Iran to purchase military equipment from the United States prior to the break in diplomatic ties. In 1981, with the reaching of the Algiers Accords and the creation of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Iran filed a claim for these funds, tying them up in litigation at the Tribunal. This is the latest of a series of important settlements reached over the past 35 years at the Hague Tribunal. In constructive bilateral discussions, we arrived at a fair settlement to this claim, which due to litigation risk, remains in the best interests of the United States. Iran will receive the balance of $400 million in the Trust Fund, as well as a roughly $1.3 billion compromise on the interest. Iran’s recovery was fixed at a reasonable rate of interest and therefore Iran is unable to pursue a bigger Tribunal award against us, preventing U.S. taxpayers from being obligated to a larger amount of money. [U.S. Department of State, 1/17/16] NY Times: $400 Million Transfer Was “For Military Equipment … Sold To The Shah Of Iran And Never Delivered When He Was Overthrown.” The New York Times reported on January 17 that the president announced the return of “over $400 million in payments for military equipment that the United States sold to the shah of Iran and never delivered when he was overthrown”: Mr. Obama also announced the resolution of another argument between Tehran and Washington that dates to the Iranian revolution, this one over $400 million in payments for military equipment that the United States sold to the shah of Iran and never delivered when he was overthrown. The Iranians got their money back, with $1.3 billion in interest that had accumulated over 37 years. [The New York Times, 1/17/16] Hillary Clinton Responds To Questions About WSJ Article: “Actually This Is Kind Of Old News. It Was First Reported About Seven Or Eight Months Ago, As I Recall.” In an interview with Denver-based NBC affiliate 9 News, Hillary Clinton was asked if she “knew” the payment to Iran “was coming” and whether she “approve[d] of it,” to which Clinton responded by saying “I think actually this is kind of old news. It was first reported about seven or eight months ago, as I recall.” Clinton added that the payment “had nothing to do with any kind of hostage swap or any other tit for tat. It was something that was intended to, as I am told, pay back Iran for contracts that were canceled when the Shah fell.” [KUSA, 9News.com, 8/3/16] Fox & Friends Hosts Object To Clinton’s Response To WSJ Report. Fox & Friends co-host Anna Kooiman took issue with Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton’s reaction to the Journal’s report. From the August 4 edition of Fox News’ Fox & Friends: BRIAN KILMEADE (CO-HOST): If you think the tone and tenor of that explanation from Hillary Clinton kind of saying, "where does that come" from sounds familiar, it's exactly what -- it sounds familiar [sic]. It's about Benghazi, it's about when she talks about her emails. She said, "where does this come from? I don’t know where you" -- it makes you feel ridiculous for asking the question. ANNA KOOIMAN (CO-HOST): Yeah, nothing to see here. Nothing to see here. But those are two stories that she hasn't been able to shake either. [Fox News, Fox & Friends, 8/4/16] Laura Ingraham: “When She’s Asked A Question About An Uncomfortable Topic” Clinton “Always Kind Of Has The Same Answer” That “It’s Always Old News.” Radio host Laura Ingraham said Clinton “always kind of has the same answer” when responding to “a question about an uncomfortable topic,” saying Clinton’s response is to say “it’s always old news.” From the August 4 edition of Courtside Entertainment Group’s The Laura Ingraham Show: LAURA INGRAHAM (HOST): [Hillary Clinton] was instrumental in initiating the talks that led to the Iran deal, and was supportive of the Iran deal, we have to remember that. But as far as the actual pallets moving on the cargo plane and being dropped off in Iran, she was already out of office by then. But do you know what? When she's asked a question about an uncomfortable topic, I get a sense she always kind of has the same answer. [BEGIN CLIP] HILLARY CLINTON: This is kind of old news. [END CLIP] INGRAHAM: Oh. It's always old news. It just broke yesterday in The Wall Street Journal, it's old news. [Courtside Entertainment Group, The Laura Ingraham Show, 8/4/16] FACT: Clinton Was Correct: Media Outlets Including Fox News And WSJ Reported On Payment To Iran In January Fox News On January 18: “The United States Has To Repay Iran A $400 Million Debt … Dating Back To The Islamic Revolution.” On January 18, Fox News correspondent Kevin Corke reported that along with the prisoner exchange and the nuclear deal with Iran, “the United States has to repay Iran a $400 million debt and $1.3 billion in interest dating back to the Islamic revolution.” Corke further explained, “[t]hat $400 million was actually set aside in a trust that Iranians hoped to use to buy U.S. military equipment back in 1979. But, of course, after the break down of diplomatic ties that money was held up so the U.S. has to give back that money; plus as I pointed out in the piece -- $1.3 billion on top of it.” [Fox News, Special Report with Bret Baier, 1/18/16, via Nexis] WSJ Reported On The Payment On January 21. The Wall Street Journal reported on January 21 that a “$1.7 billion financial settlement ended a 35-year legal saga that centered on a purchase of U.S. arms by Iran’s last monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, that were never delivered because of the Iranian revolution in 1979.” [The Wall Street Journal, 1/21/16] Fox’s Charles Krauthammer: “This Is Called Money Laundering.” Despite acknowledging that “there is a statute that prohibits” the United States “from engaging in Iran dealing with dollars,” Fox News contributor Charles Krauthammer still falsely claimed that the $400 million cash transfer, is “money laundering.” From the August 8 edition of Fox News’ Special Report with Bret Baier: CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER: Well of course the Justice Department objected. It was illegal. It isn't only the optics. It isn't only that they are just looking ridiculous in denying that it was a quid pro quo. Obviously it wasn't a coincidence. The reason that it was objected to by Justice, there is a statute that prohibits us from engaging in Iran dealing with dollars. So they had to -- they had to print the money here, ship it over to Switzerland, turn it into Swiss francs and euros, and ship it over to Iran. If a private company had done this, this is called money laundering, the CEO would be in jail right now. [Fox News, Special Report with Bret Baier, 8/3/16] Wash. Post’s Jennifer Rubin Alleges “Shady” Payment “Launder[ed] The Money Through European Central Banks.” Conservative Washington Post blogger Jennifer Rubin cited “foreign policy gurus” who described the “shady” payment as “bulk cash smuggling” and “laundering the money” through Europe. From an August 3 post on Rubin’s Right Turn blog: [A] number of foreign policy gurus have remarked on how shady the arrangement was. Michael Makovsky, CEO of JINSA, observes that “the president has gone rather rogue by circumventing sanctions restrictions on banks by laundering the money through European central banks, which is not only wrong but sends a dangerous signal to other countries and companies.” He further notes, “This payment coincided with not just the release of civilian hostages from Iran but also followed by a few days the release of American sailors who were abducted the prior week.” [...] Experts emphasize just how peculiar this arrangement was. “The White House sent pallets of cash in an unmarked plane to pay off a state sponsor of terrorism. This is what we call ‘bulk cash smuggling’ in the terrorism finance business,” Jonathan Schanzer of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies remarks. “Until recently, this kind of activity could result in punitive sanctions. Now, the Obama administration is trying to tell us that this is statecraft.” [The Washington Post, 8/3/16] FACT: “Due To International Sanctions Against Iran, The Payment, Made In Euros, Swiss Francs And Other Currencies, Had To Be Made In Cash” Reuters: “Due To International Sanctions Against Iran, The Payment … Had To be Made In Cash.” According to an August 4 report by Reuters, which detailed the Obama administration’s responses to claims that the cash settlement sent to Iran was a “ransom” payment, “international sanctions against Iran meant that the settlement had to be paid “in cash”: While there have long been questions about the timing of the payment, one Iranian concern was that the Obama administration could face too much domestic political criticism if it delayed acting on the tribunal's decision. Due to international sanctions against Iran, the payment, made in euros, Swiss francs and other currencies, had to be made in cash, U.S. officials argue. [Reuters, 8/4/16] CNN: Payment Could Not Be Made In American Dollars Because Of U.S. Sanctions. A CNN.com report explained that the payment to Iran had to be made in foreign currency because “existing US sanctions ban American dollars from being used in a transaction with Iran.” [CNN.com, 8/4/16] The Atlantic’s Steve Clemons Explains That America Doesn’t Have Banking Relationships With Iran, “So The Cash Payment Makes Total Sense.” MSNBC contributor and The Atlantic editor-at-large Steve Clemons explained that because of international sanctions, the United States “just simply [does not] have financial arrangements with Iranian financial institutions” to facilitate money transfers between the two governments, “so the cash payment makes total sense.” From the August 3 edition of MSNBC Live:

As the White House continued to deflect accusations from conservatives that a $400 million payment to Iran was ransom for four American detainees released earlier this year, Donald Trump twice this week claimed he had seen video of a "top secret" transaction in which the huge supposed payout was unloaded from a US airplane in Iran, per the Washington Post. At a rally Wednesday in Daytona Beach, Fla., Trump claimed the "military tape" purportedly showing "money pouring off a plane" had been released by Iran to "embarrass" the US. He again voiced the claim about the video during a Thursday rally in Portland, Maine, adding that Iran hoped to personally embarrass an "incompetent" President Obama with the video, the Los Angeles Times and CNN report. His remarks caused a temporary hubbub, as some speculated that perhaps he had seen a classified video during security briefings afforded to presidential nominees. But what Trump had actually seen soon came to light: "b-roll footage," his spokeswoman emailed the Post, that had been playing behind news reports. It showed not a money swap but an AP clip of three US prisoners released by Iran and arriving in Geneva on Jan. 17. That led Trump to point out his own error on Twitter on Friday morning (though CNN notes he did so "without actually saying he was wrong"): "The plane I saw on television was the hostage plane in Geneva, Switzerland, not the plane carrying $400 million in cash going to Iran!" he tweeted.

The Joint Forces Command, in coordination with the Joint Staff, the services, and other combatant commands and DOD agencies, is responsible for creating and exploring new joint war-fighting concepts, as well as for planning, designing, conducting, and assessing a program of joint experimentation. The Command executed its second large-scale field experiment, Millennium Challenge 2002, this year, and it plans another one in 2004 and others every third year thereafter. These experiments are intended to examine how well the concepts previously explored by the Command in smaller venues will work when applied with the emerging concepts being developed by the services and other combatant commands. For example, Millennium Challenge 2002 tested how well U.S. forces fared against a regional power with a sizable conventional military force and so called “anti-access” capabilities—which can include advanced surface-to-air missiles, antiship missiles and mines, and chemical and biological weapons—and validated the results of earlier experiments to develop the Command’s “rapid decisive” operations concept. The aim of the experiment was to come up with changes that can be made during the current decade. (App. I provides a chronology of major events important to joint experimentation.) Over the next several years, the Command’s experimentation will focus primarily on two concepts: one to develop a standing joint force headquarters to improve joint command and control; another to conduct more effective joint operations through “rapid decisive” operations. In November 2001, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the Command make development of the prototype headquarters its highest near-term priority. Additionally, the Command will develop a number of other concepts aimed at specialized issues or operational problems to support the two primary concepts. Joint experimentation is a continuous process that begins with the development of new operational and organizational concepts that have the potential to improve significantly joint operations (see fig. 1). The Joint Forces Command identifies new joint concepts including those developed by other DOD organizations (such as the Joint Staff, services, and combatant commands) and the private sector and tests them in experiments that range from simple (workshops, seminars, war games, and simulations) to complex (large-scale virtual simulations and “live” field experiments). Appendix II provides additional information on joint experimentation program activities. After analyzing experimentation data, the Command prepares and submits recommendations to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for review and, ultimately, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.Before submitting them to the Council, however, the Command submits its recommendations to the Joint Staff for preliminary review and coordination. The recommendations are distributed for review and comment to the Joint Staff directorates, the military services, the combatant commands, and other DOD and federal government organizations. The Council then reviews the recommendations and advises the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on whether they should be approved. The changes, if approved, provide the basis for pursuing the capabilities needed to implement a specific operational concept. The Council is also responsible for overseeing the implementation of the recommendations, but it can designate an executive agent, such as the Joint Forces Command, to do so. The Council (or its designated executive agent) is responsible for obtaining the resources needed to implement the recommendations through DOD’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The Council also assists the Chairman, in coordination with the combatant commands, the services, and other DOD organizations, to identify and assess joint requirements and priorities for current and future military capabilities. The Council considers requirements (and any proposed changes) for joint capabilities across doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. The Department of the Navy’s budget provides funding to the Joint Forces Command for joint experimentation and other Command missions. In fiscal year 2002, the Command received from the Navy about $103 million for its joint concept development and experimentation program, and it planned to spend about half of this amount for Millennium Challenge 2002. The Command has requested that the Navy provide about $98 million for the program in fiscal year 2003. The Command also provides some funds to the services, the combatant commands, and other DOD organizations for efforts that support its program activities. However, the services fund the operations and support costs of forces participating in joint experimentation. Also, the individual experimentation efforts of the services and the combatant commands are funded from within their own budgets. Since it first began joint experimentation, the Joint Forces Command has broadened and deepened the inclusion of other DOD organizations, federal agencies and departments, the private sector, and allies and coalition partners in its process for capturing and identifying new joint ideas and innovations. Organizations participating in joint experimentation are generally satisfied with current opportunities for their ideas to be considered, and many have increased their participation in the program. However, the participation of different stakeholders—the extent of which is determined by the stakeholder—varies considerably and some would like more visits and contacts with the Command. The Command is planning initiatives to increase stakeholder participation in the future, particularly for federal agencies and departments and key allies, but this increase will depend on agency-resource and national-security considerations. As the program gradually evolved, the Joint Forces Command solidified a process to involve the military services, the combatant commands, and other DOD organizations in the planning and execution of its joint experimentation activities. Because future joint operations will involve diplomatic, information, and economic actions, as well as military operations, many DOD, federal, and private organizations and governments participate and provide input into the joint experimentation program (see table 1). The Joint Forces Command functions as a facilitator to solicit and coordinate the involvement of these organizations and incorporate their input, as appropriate, into concept development and experimentation activities. Because the stakeholders determine the extent of their participation in the program, it can vary considerably. However, Joint Forces Command officials stated that participation by the services, the combatant commands, and other DOD organizations has grown steadily since the program was created and continues to grow, as participants become increasingly aware of the strong emphasis that DOD leaders are placing on experimentation. For example, in contrast to the first field experiment in 2000, which had limited involvement by the services, this year’s Millennium Challenge has seen the services more actively involved in early planning, and their individual experiments better coordinated and integrated into the field experiment. Our comparison of participation in the Command’s major field experiment in 2000 with plans for this year’s experiment found a significant increase in the diversity and number of participating organizations and in the number of concepts and initiatives proposed by these organizations. For example, the total number of organizations participating in Millennium Challenge 2002 more than doubled from the prior experiment in 2000 (from 12 to 29 organizations), and the total number of service initiatives increased from 4 to 29. The Command provides several ways for organizations to participate and provide inputs: they can review program plans and strategies; attend meetings, seminars, and workshops; take part in experimentation activities; and use various communication tools such as E-mail, Internet, and video conferencing. Additionally, the Command obtains input from the various experimentation and research and development organizations of the military services and of some combatant commands and DOD organizations. The Command also considers the results of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations efforts, innovations, and recent military operations in developing its program. For example, as a result of its operational experiences in Kosovo, the U.S. European Command identified various joint capability shortfalls in its recent list of Command priorities as a means of guiding the Joint Forces Command in selecting focal areas and activities for experimentation. Further, the Command is taking steps to (1) align its experimentation activities with the schedules of major service and combatant command exercises and (2) adjust its program to allow for earlier consideration of new concepts proposed by the services and the combatant commands in the input process. These adjustments would improve synchronization of experiments with the availability of forces and the training schedules of the services and the combatant commands, allow for greater involvement of these entities in the process, and increase the likelihood that joint requirements are sufficiently considered early in the development of concepts. Participating organizations also provide input during the annual preparation of two key joint experimentation-program documents: the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s guidance on joint experimentation and the Joint Forces Command’s Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan (see fig. 2). Each year the Chairman provides guidance to the Joint Forces Command to use in developing its Campaign Plan for joint concept development and experimentation. The basis for the Chairman’s guidance is derived from several sources, including strategy and planning documents, studies, and other assessments. Additionally, key DOD stakeholders, including the Chairman’s Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment teams and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, provide input to the Joint Staff to use in developing the Chairman’s guidance. The Joint Forces Command uses this guidance, with additional input from DOD stakeholders, in preparing its Campaign Plan, which is the primary vehicle for synchronizing its joint experimentation activities and coordinating resources. The Command also solicits and considers input for the Campaign Plan from some other federal agencies and departments, academia, private sector, and allies. After review and endorsement by the combatant commands, the services, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Chairman approves the Campaign Plan. Officials at the military services, the combatant commands, and other DOD organizations we talked with said they were generally satisfied with the opportunities for input provided by the Joint Forces Command. At the same time, DOD stakeholders have taken various actions to increase their participation. Some, however, would like more contacts and communication with the Command. The Command is responding with some initiatives. Each service, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Space Command, as well as some DOD and federal agencies (such as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the National Security Agency) have assigned liaison officers at the Joint Forces Command.However, officials at the Central, Pacific, and Southern Commands stated that their staffing levels currently do not allow them to devote personnel in this role. Combatant command officials indicated that the frequency and number of meetings, conferences, and other events held at the Joint Forces Command often make it difficult for their organizations to attend. The officials believe that as a result, the views and positions of their organizations are not always fully captured in some discussions and deliberations. Some of the combatant commands have or are planning to establish their own joint experimentation offices. Officials from the Pacific and Special Operations Commands stated that although their respective joint experimentation offices are largely focused on supporting their own experimentation efforts, the offices provide a cadre of staff who can better coordinate and participate more consistently in the Joint Forces Command’s joint experimentation program. For example, Pacific Command officials said that their own experimentation efforts to improve the command of joint operations over the past few years have contributed to joint experimentation by providing significant insights for the Joint Forces Command’s development of the standing joint-force headquarters concept. Central Command and Southern Command officials said their Commands have plans to establish similar offices soon. While satisfied with their participation and their ability to provide input into the program, officials at some combatant commands believe that a number of things could be done to improve the program, assuming resources are available. They believe that the Joint Forces Command could increase its visits to and participation in combatant-command activities. Some of the officials also believe that if the Joint Forces Command assigned liaison officers to their commands, the Command would obtain first-hand knowledge and a better appreciation of the various commands’ individual requirements. These officials believe that such a presence at their commands would demonstrate the Joint Forces Command’s commitment to joint experimentation and would allow for interaction with staff throughout their commands. The Joint Forces Command does not favor doing this because of the cost and the difficulty in providing the staff necessary to fulfill this role. Officials at the Pacific, Central, and Southern Commands also believe that some level of funding should be provided to the combatant commands for their use in supporting individual command and the Joint Forces Command experimentation efforts. Combatant command officials stated that currently, funds from other command activities must be diverted to support these efforts. Out of concern about the need to improve communications and participation in joint experimentation planning, the Joint Forces Command is planning some initiatives such as the following: It plans to create a virtual planning-center site for joint experimentation on its Intranet to provide DOD stakeholders with easily accessible weekly updates to information on planned experiments; participants; goals and objectives; and ongoing experimentation by the Joint Forces Command, the services, the combatant commands, and DOD agencies. It plans to develop the requirements for the site during fall 2002 and to initiate the project soon after. It established Project Alpha—a “think-tank” group—in early 2002 to provide another source of input and outputs. The project will interface with researchers throughout DOD, Department of Energy national laboratories, private industry, and academia to find cutting-edge technologies for inclusion in service and joint experimentation. This relationship will provide an opportunity for the Joint Forces Command to leverage the work of these organizations and similarly, for these organizations to gain a better understanding of and include their work in the joint experimentation program. As the joint experimentation program matured, participation by non-DOD federal agencies and departments gradually increased. Participation, however, depends upon the agencies’ desire to be involved and their available resources. Lack of involvement could lead to missed opportunities. And participation by allies and coalition partners has been limited by security concerns. The Joint Forces Command’s input process allows individual federal agencies and departments, such as the Departments of State and Justice, to participate in joint experimentation events as they choose. Interagency participation is improving, according to Command officials. For example, federal agencies and departments are participating in Millennium Challenge 2002 to assist the Command in developing its standing joint- force headquarters concept. However, resource and staffing constraints prevent some agencies and departments from taking part in experiments. For example, according to a Joint Forces Command official, the Department of Transportation and the Central Intelligence Agency decided not to send representatives to Millennium Challenge 2002 because of staffing constraints. Not only could non-DOD agencies provide important insights and contributions to joint operations, but also some important opportunities could be missed if these agencies do not consistently participate in joint experimentation events. While federal agencies and departments are beginning to increase their role in joint experimentation, several service and combatant command officials we spoke with believe that greater involvement is needed because of the role these organizations are likely to have in future joint operations. For example, these non-DOD federal agencies and departments would provide support (economic, diplomatic, and information actions) to U.S. military forces in their conduct of operations aimed at defeating an adversary’s war-making capabilities—support that is critical to implementation of the Joint Forces Command’s rapid decisive operations concept. Several DOD (service, combatant command, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other DOD organizations) officials we spoke with believe that the Joint Forces Command should explore ways to boost the participation and involvement of allies and coalition partners in joint experimentation. Joint Forces Command officials agree and believe that such cooperation would foster a better understanding of allied perspectives, allow the Command to leverage concept development work, expand available capabilities, and facilitate the development of multinational capabilities. The Command recently created a multinational concept-development and experimentation site on its Intranet to facilitate the involvement of allies and coalition partners in joint experimentation. However, some DOD officials believe that the Joint Forces Command should do more because future U.S. military operations will likely be conducted with other countries. The officials stress that other nations’ military personnel should be included in experiments to develop new operational concepts, if these concepts are to be successful. Joint Forces Command officials pointed out, however, that the participation and involvement of other countries are often constrained by restrictions on access to sensitive security information. For example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries only participated as observers in Millennium Challenge 2002 because of security information restrictions. The Command, however, plans to develop ways to better handle these restrictions to allow greater participation by other nations in its next major field experiment in 2004. Nearly 4 years after the program was established, only three recommendations have flowed from the joint experimentation program, and none of them have been approved. Confusion about proposed changes in guidance regarding the information required for submitting these recommendations has partly delayed their approval. At the time we concluded our review, official guidance on what information should accompany joint experimentation recommendations had not been approved. In addition, several DOD officials expressed concern that the process used to review and approve recommendations, the same as that used for major acquisition programs, may not be the most appropriate for a program whose aim is to integrate changes quickly. However, the officials could not pinpoint any specific impasses in the approval process. The DOD officials are also concerned about potential delays in the integration of new concepts because of the lengthy DOD resource allocation process. The Joint Forces Command submitted one recommendation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 2001 and two more in November 2001 (see table 2). At the time we ended our review, none of the recommendations had been approved. The recommendations to improve the planning and decision-making capabilities of joint forces and provide better training for personnel conducting theater missile defense operations were based on analyses of results of experiments carried out in the first 3 years of joint experimentation. Inputs included two major experiments: Millennium Challenge 2000 (live field experiment in August-September 2000) and the Unified Vision 2001 (virtual simulation experiment in May 2001). The first recommendation was submitted for review just 3 months after the end of the last experiment. According to a Joint Staff official, however, approval of the recommendations has been delayed because Joint Forces Command and Joint Staff officials were confused about proposed changes in guidance. In May 2001, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council proposed new guidance, which would require that information on costs and timelines be included in joint experimentation recommendations. Prior guidance did not require such information. Although the recommendations went through preliminary review by the Joint Staff, the omission was not caught until the recommendations were to be scheduled for review by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Joint Forces Command officials told us that they were not aware of the change in guidance until that time. When we ended our review, Joint Forces Command officials were working with the Joint Staff to assess how much data could be prepared and when. Command officials said that the recommendations will be resubmitted in fall 2002 together with other recommendations emerging from Millennium Challenge 2002. As a result, no recommendations have yet been reviewed or approved. Also, at the time we ended our review, the draft guidance on joint experimentation recommendations had not been approved and issued. This guidance will become especially important because joint experimentation is expected to produce new recommendations more rapidly as the program matures. The requirement for costs and timeline data is consistent with that of recommendations for major weapon-system-acquisition programs. However, joint experimentation officials at the Joint Forces Command believe that requiring this type of information on joint-experimentation recommendations may not be appropriate because (1) these recommendations are generally intended to convince decision makers to develop particular joint capabilities, not specific weapon systems; (2) the new requirement may slow the preparation of future recommendations; and (3) it will be difficult to provide accurate estimates of costs and timelines for recommendations that span further into the future. It is too early to determine whether these concerns are valid. Some DOD officials were also concerned that the system currently used to allocate resources to implement joint-experimentation recommendations—DOD’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System—may not be the most efficient because it usually takes a long time to review, approve, and provide funding in future budgets. A recommendation approved in 2002, for example, would not be incorporated into DOD’s budget until 2004 or even later. This delay could result in missed opportunities for more rapid implementation. A Joint Staff official told us that the Joint Staff and the Joint Forces Command recently adjusted the timing of events to better align the joint experimentation process with the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Additionally, DOD established a special fund for the Joint Forces Command to use as a temporary funding source to speed up the implementation of certain critical or time-sensitive recommendations. This source will provide early funding for implementation until funding is provided through DOD’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. However, Joint Forces Command and other DOD officials believe other ways to implement new joint capabilities within the framework of existing budget and oversight practices may need to be considered. DOD has been providing more specific and clearer guidance on its goals, expectations, and priorities for the joint experimentation program. Nevertheless, the management of joint experimentation is missing a number of key elements that are necessary for program success: some roles and responsibilities have not yet been defined; current performance measures are not adequate to assess progress; and the Joint Forces Command lacks strategic planning tools for the program. DOD officials stated that the joint experimentation program had difficulty in its first years because guidance was evolving and was not specific: DOD’s transformation goals were not adequately linked to transformation efforts, and roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined. Over time, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided more specific guidance on the goals and expectations for joint experimentation and its contribution to DOD’s transformation efforts. Guidance for joint experimentation has evolved gradually over the program’s nearly 4-year life span, partly because of shifting defense priorities and lack of clarity about the roles of various DOD stakeholders. Roles and responsibilities have also matured with the program. The Secretary of Defense’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Reportestablished six transformation goals, which include improving U.S. capabilities to defend the homeland and other bases of operations, denying enemies sanctuary, and conducting effective information operations. According to DOD officials, the Secretary of Defense’s most recent planning guidance tasked the Joint Forces Command to focus its experimentation on developing new joint operational concepts for these goals. To begin meeting these goals, the Chairman has also provided the Joint Forces Command with clarifying guidance that identified specific areas for the Command to include in its experimentation, such as the development of a standing joint-force headquarters concept and of a prototype to strengthen the conduct of joint operations. The Command has reflected this new guidance in its latest Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense reassigned the Command’s geographic responsibilities to focus it more clearly on its remaining missions, particularly transformation and joint experimentation. DOD officials at both headquarters and the field believe that the recent guidance begins to provide a better framework for the Joint Forces Command to establish and focus its joint experimentation efforts. Some officials, however, believe that future guidance should further clarify the link between joint experimentation and DOD priorities and the required resources necessary to support joint experimentation. DOD, in its comments to a draft of this report, stated that it expects the Transformation Planning Guidance—currently being prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense—will establish the requirements necessary to link experimentation to changes in the force. While roles and responsibilities for DOD organizations are now broadly defined, the new DOD Office of Force Transformation’s role in joint experimentation and its relationship to other stakeholders have not yet been clearly established. The Office’s charter or terms of reference have not been released. DOD plans to issue a directive later this year that will include a charter and description of the Office’s authorities and responsibilities. However, there is still uncertainty about the extent of authority and involvement the Office will have in the joint experimentation program and the Office’s ability to link the program with DOD’s overall transformation efforts. Joint Forces Command and other DOD officials consider having a transformation advocate in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as a beneficial link between the Joint Forces Command’s, the services’, and the combatant commands’ joint experimentation programs and DOD’s overall transformation agenda. According to DOD’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the Office of Force Transformation, created in November 2001, is to play a role in fostering innovation and experimentation and should have an important responsibility for monitoring joint experimentation and for providing the Secretary of Defense with policy recommendations. An Office of Force Transformation official told us that the Office will be an advocate for transformation and will help develop guidance and make recommendations on transformation issues to the Secretary of Defense (the Office provided comments on the Secretary’s annual planning guidance and developed instructions for the services on preparing their first transformation road maps). The Office has also decided to take a cautious approach in carrying out its mission because of possible resistance from other DOD organizations, the same official said. The Office plans to offer its assistance to DOD organizations in their transformation efforts and attempt to influence their thinking on key issues, rather than asserting itself directly into their efforts, for example by funding military use of existing private-sector technology to act as a surrogate for evaluating possible concepts, uses, and designs. Joint Forces Command officials stated that as of May 2002, they had had only limited discussions with the Office and had not established any working agreements on how the Office would participate in the joint experimentation program. The Office of Force Transformation has only recently assembled its staff and is beginning to plan its work and establish contacts within DOD and with other organizations. The Office’s budget for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 is about $18 million and $35 million, respectively. DOD’s performance measures (or metrics) for assessing joint experimentation—by measuring only the number of experiments carried out—do not provide a meaningful assessment of the program’s contribution toward meeting its performance goal for military transformation because they are only quantitative. Consistent with good management practices and in order to effectuate the purposes of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, federal agencies devise results-oriented metrics that provide an assessment of outcomes or the results of programs as measured by the difference they make. In its fiscal year 2000 performance report, the most recent it has issued, DOD described the performance indicators for the joint experimentation program in terms of the number of experiments conducted against a target goal for the prior, current, and following fiscal years. In fiscal year 2000, DOD exceeded its target number of experiments and did not project any shortfalls in meeting its target in the next fiscal year. Although this measure does provide a quantitative assessment of experimental activity, it does not provide a meaningful method for assessing how joint experimentation is helping to advance military transformation. An Office of the Secretary of Defense official stated that DOD recognizes that better performance measures are needed for assessing how joint experimentation advances transformation and for two other metrics currently used to assess its military transformation goal. The official stated that developing such measures is a challenge because joint experimentation does not easily lend itself to traditional measurement methods. For example, most programs consider a failure as a negative event, but in joint experimentation, a failure can be considered as a success if it provides insights or information that is helpful in evaluating new concepts or the use of new technologies. An Office of the Secretary of Defense official told us that the RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analyses recently completed studies to identify possible performance measures for assessing the progress of transformation. DOD is evaluating them and is preparing the Transformation Planning Guidance to provide more specific information on the priorities, roles, and responsibilities for executing its transformation strategy. The same official stated that the new guidance will include a discussion of the types of performance measures needed for assessing transformation progress or will assign an organization to determine them. In either case, measures will still need to be developed and implemented. DOD plans to issue the new guidance later in 2002 but has not determined how new performance measures would be incorporated into its annual performance report. The Joint Forces Command has not developed the strategic planning tools—a strategic plan, an associated performance plan, and performance- reporting tools—for assessing the performance of the joint experimentation program. Strategic planning is essential for this type of program, especially considering its magnitude and complexity and its potential implications for military transformation. Such planning provides an essential foundation for defining what an organization seeks to accomplish, identifies the strategy it will use to achieve desired results, and then determines—through measurement—how well it is succeeding in reaching results-oriented goals and achieving objectives. Developing strategic-planning tools for the joint experimentation program would also be consistent with the principles set forth in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which is the primary legislative framework for strategic planning in the federal government. The Joint Forces Command prepares an annual Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan that broadly describes the key goals of its program, the strategy for achieving these goals, and the planned activities. However, a February 2002 progress report, prepared by the Joint Forces Command’s Joint Experimentation Directorate, on the development of the Directorate’s performance management system indicated that one-fourth of those organizations providing feedback on the Campaign Plan believed that the Plan lacks specificity in terms of the program’s goals and objectives and an associated action plan that outlines the activities to be carried out in order to achieve those goals. Officials we spoke with at the military services, the combatant commands, and the Joint Forces Command all cited the need for more specific and clearer goals, objectives, and performance measures for the program. In the progress report, the Command acknowledged the benefits of strategic planning and the use of this management tool to align its organizational structure, processes, and budget to support the achievement of missions and goals. The report proposed that the Command develop a strategic plan, possibly by modifying its annual Campaign Plan, and subsequently prepare a performance plan and a performance report. Command officials indicated that the basic requirements of a strategic plan could be incorporated into the Campaign Plan, but they were unsure, if such an approach were taken, whether the changes could be made before the annual Campaign Plan is issued later this year. Similarly, the Joint Forces Command has had difficulty in developing specific performance measures for joint experimentation. A Command official stated that the Command has tried to leverage the performance measures developed by other organizations like itself, but found that there is widespread awareness throughout the research and development community, both within and outside DOD, that such measures are needed but do not exist. Additionally, a Joint Forces Command official stated that whatever metrics the Command develops must be linked to its mission-essential tasks for joint experimentation and that the Command is currently developing these tasks. At the time we ended our review, the Command had identified six broad areas for which specific metrics need to be developed. These included quality of life, customer relationships, and experimentation process management. After nearly 4 years, the Joint Forces Command’s process for obtaining inputs for the development and execution of DOD’s joint experimentation program has become more inclusive. However, questions continue about whether the program is the successful engine for change envisioned when it was established. Since the program’s inception, only three recommendations have flowed from experimentation activities and their review, approval, and implementation have been delayed from confusion over a change in guidance that required additional information be included in the recommendations. As a result, no recommendations for change have been approved or implemented to date. To the extent that the draft guidance on what should be submitted with joint experimentation recommendations can be officially approved and issued, future recommendations could be submitted for approval and implementation more quickly. Underscoring the need to finalize the guidance is the anticipated recommendations to be made after this year’s major field experiment, Millennium Challenge 2002. The lack of strategic planning for joint experimentation deprives the Joint Forces Command of necessary tools to effectively manage its program. Implementation of strategic planning at the Joint Forces Command would create a recurring and continuous cycle of planning, program execution, and reporting and establish a process by which the Command could measure the effectiveness of its activities as well as a means to assess the contributions of those activities to the operational goals and mission of the program. Such planning could also provide a tool—one that is currently missing—to identify strengths and weaknesses in the development and execution of the program and a reference document for the effective oversight and management of the program. Performance measures developed under the Command’s strategic planning could provide the standard for assessing other experimentation efforts throughout DOD, which are also lacking such metrics. The lack of a meaningful performance measure for assessing the contribution of the joint experimentation program to advance DOD’s transformation agenda limits the usefulness and benefit of this management tool to assist congressional and DOD leaders in their decision-making responsibilities. Establishing a “meaningful” joint experimentation performance measure for its annual performance report would provide congressional and DOD leadership a better assessment of the program’s contribution and progress toward advancing transformation. Such a metric would also be consistent with the intent of the Results Act to improve the accountability of federal programs for achieving program results. Because the role and relationships of the Secretary of Defense’s new Office of Force Transformation have not yet been clarified, the Secretary may not be effectively using this office in DOD’s transformation efforts. This office, if given sufficient authority, could provide the Secretary with a civilian oversight function to foster and monitor the joint experimentation program to ensure that it is properly supported and provided resources to advance the DOD’s overall transformation agenda. Rectifying these shortcomings is critical in view of the importance that DOD has placed on joint experimentation to identify the future concepts and capabilities for maintaining U.S. military superiority. To improve the management of DOD’s joint experimentation program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to approve and issue guidance that clearly defines the information required to accompany joint experimentation recommendations for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s review and approval and require the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Joint Forces Command to develop strategic planning tools to use in managing and periodically assessing the progress of its joint experimentation program. We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop both quantitative and qualitative performance measures for joint experimentation in DOD’s annual performance report to provide a better assessment of the program’s contribution to advancing military transformation and clarify the role of the Office of Force Transformation and its relationship to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Forces Command, and other key DOD stakeholders in DOD’s joint experimentation program. We received written comments from DOD on a draft of this report, which are included in their entirety as appendix III. DOD agreed with our recommendations and indicated that it expects that a forthcoming Transformation Planning Guidance and subsequent guidance will be responsive to them by clarifying roles and missions across DOD, implementing recommendations for changes, and establishing clear objectives. We believe such strategic guidance from the Secretary of Defense could provide a significant mechanism for better linking and clarifying the importance of the joint experimentation program with DOD’s transformation agenda. DOD also provided technical comments to the draft that were incorporated in the report where appropriate. To determine the extent to which the Joint Forces Command obtains input from stakeholders and other relevant sources in developing and conducting its joint experimentation activities, we reviewed an array of documents providing information about participants in joint experimentation, including guidance and other policy documents, position papers, fact sheets, reports, and studies of the military services, the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and other DOD organizations. We also reviewed Joint Forces Command plans and reports. Additionally, we made extensive use of information available on public and DOD Internet web sites. To assess the change in participation by various stakeholders over time, we compared the differences in the numbers of participating organizations and initiatives provided by these organizations between the Joint Forces Command’s first two major field experiments in 2000 and 2002 (Millennium Challenge 2000 and Millennium Challenge 2002). We conducted discussions with officials at five combatant commands, the Joint Staff, the military services, and other DOD organizations, such as the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Appendix IV lists the principal organizations and offices where we performed work. At the Joint Forces Command, we discussed with joint experimentation officials the process for soliciting and incorporating inputs for joint experimentation from the military services and the combatant commands. We also attended conferences and other sessions hosted by the Joint Forces Command to observe and learn about joint experimentation participants and their contributions and coordination. For example, we attended sessions for the Command’s preparation of its annual Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan and planning for this year’s Millennium Challenge experiment. With officials from each of the services and the combatant commands, we discussed perceptions of the effectiveness of coordination and participation in joint experimentation. We also obtained observations about participants’ involvement from several defense experts who track joint experimentation and military transformation. Although we did not include a specific assessment of the individual experimentation efforts of the services and combatant commands, we did discuss with service and command officials how their efforts were coordinated and integrated into joint experimentation. We also did not determine the extent that individual inputs obtained from various participating organizations were considered and incorporated into the joint experimentation program. To determine the extent to which recommendations flowing from the joint experimentation process have been approved and implemented, we reviewed and analyzed data that tracked the progress of the first three joint experimentation recommendations submitted by the Joint Forces Command. We also obtained and analyzed relevant guidance and held discussions with Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process for reviewing and approving joint experimentation recommendations. We also discussed issues relating to implementation of joint experimentation recommendations through DOD’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. To assess whether key management elements, such as policy, organization, and resources, were in place for the program, we conducted a comprehensive review of current legislative, policy, planning, and guidance documents and reports and studies. We used the principles laid out in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 as an additional benchmark for assessing the adequacy of performance measures established for the program and of tools used to manage the program. We also discussed the status and evolution of joint experimentation oversight and management, including office roles and responsibilities and joint experimentation metrics, with officials at the Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, the services, the combatant commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Force Transformation, and other DOD organizations. Several defense experts who follow joint experimentation and military transformation discussed with us joint experimentation oversight and management and gave us their impressions regarding current joint experimentation management practices. Our review was conducted from October 2001 through May 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact Richard G. Payne at (757) 552-8119 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Key contacts and contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. DOD’s Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review issued. Secretary of Defense designated Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command, as executive agent for joint experimentation. Joint Advanced Warfighting Program established. Relevance to joint experimentation This vision of future war fighting provides a conceptual template for the Department of Defense’s (DOD) transformation efforts across all elements of the armed forces. Report discussed the importance of preparing for future national security challenges. It concluded that DOD needed to institutionalize innovative investigations, such as war-fighting experiments, to ensure future concepts and capabilities are successfully integrated into the forces in a timely manner. The Secretary of Defense tasked the Joint Forces Command to design and conduct joint war-fighting experimentation to explore, demonstrate, and evaluate joint war-fighting concepts and capabilities. DOD established the program at the Institute for Defense Analyses to serve as a catalyst for achieving the objectives of Joint Vision 2010 (and later Joint Vision 2020). To that end, the program is to develop and explore breakthrough operational concepts and capabilities that support DOD’s transformation goals. Joint concept development and experimentation program initiated. Joint Forces Command assumed responsibility as the executive agent for joint experimentation. Joint Advanced Warfighting Program conducted the first joint experiment for Joint Forces Command. An experiment—J9901—that investigated approaches for attacking critical mobile targets. Experiment allowed the Joint Forces Command to begin its learning process on how to conduct joint experimentation. Report proposed several recommendations to promote military transformation. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Warfighting Transformation issued. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Joint Vision 2020. Millennium Challenge 2000 major field experiment conducted. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued updated Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan. Transformation Study Report: Transforming Military Operational Capabilities issued. Joint Forces Command conducted Unified Vision 2001 experiment. Secretary of Defense’s planning guidance issued. DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review Report issued. Updated vision statement described the joint war-fighting capabilities required through 2020. The first major field experiment coordinated by the Joint Forces Command among the services and other stakeholders. Guidance described the process for generation, coordination, approval, and implementation of recommendations emerging from joint experimentation and defined the roles and responsibilities of DOD stakeholders. Study conducted for the Secretary of Defense to identify capabilities needed by U.S. forces to meet the twenty-first century security environment. Made several recommendations directed at improving joint experimentation. A major joint experiment—largely modeling and simulation— conducted to refine and explore several war-fighting concepts, such as “rapid decisive” operations. Required studies by defense agencies and the Joint Staff to develop transformation road maps and a standing-joint-force headquarters prototype. The report established priorities and identified major goals for transforming the Armed Forces to meet future challenges. It called for new operational concepts, advanced technological capabilities, and an increased emphasis on joint organizations, experimentation, and training. Event Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued joint experimentation guidance. Office of Force Transformation established. Unified Command Plan 2002 issued. Secretary of Defense’s planning guidance issued. Joint Forces Command conducted Millennium Challenge 2002. Relevance to joint experimentation The guidance directed the Joint Forces Command to focus its near- term experimentation on developing a standing joint force headquarters prototype. Office assists the Secretary of Defense in identifying strategy and policy, and developing guidance for transformation. Plan reduced the number of missions assigned to the Joint Forces Command to allow the Command to devote more attention to its remaining missions such as joint experimentation. The guidance directed the Joint Forces Command to develop new joint concepts that focus on the six transformation goals set forth in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Second major field experiment conducted to culminate a series of experiments to assess “how” to do rapid decisive operations in this decade. The Joint Forces Command uses various types of assessment activities to develop, refine, and validate joint concepts and associated capabilities. As shown in figure 3, the Command begins to move through the five joint concept development phases by conducting workshops, seminars, and war games to develop information and identify possible areas to explore in developing new concepts and associated capabilities and then uses simulated or live experiment events to confirm, refute, or modify them. These activities vary in scale and frequency, but each activity becomes larger and more complex. They can involve a small group of retired flag officers and academics, up to 100 planners, operators, and technology experts, or several thousand in the field. Near the end of the process, the Command will conduct a large-scale simulation experiment (such as Unified Vision 2001), followed by a major field experiment (such as Millennium Challenge 2002). The process continuously repeats itself to identify additional new concepts and capabilities. Table 3 provides additional information about the characteristics, scale, and frequency of these and other associated activities and experiments. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program Defense Advanced Research Project Agency Office of Force Transformation Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate Joint Vision and Transformation Division Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Directorate Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate Directorate of Training Directorate of Integration Directorate for Strategy, Concepts, and Doctrine Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Marine Corps Combat Development Command Department of the Air Force Booz Allen Hamilton The Carlyle Group Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Hicks & Associates, Inc. In addition to the individuals named above, Carol R. Schuster, Mark J. Wielgoszynski, John R. Beauchamp, Kimberley A. Ebner, Lauren S. Johnson, and Stefano Petrucci made key contributions to this report.

The Department of Defense (DOD) considers the transformation of the U.S. military a strategic imperative to meet the security challenges of the new century. In October 1998, DOD established a joint concept development and experimentation program to provide the engine of change for this transformation. In the nearly 4 years since becoming the executive agent for joint concept development and experimentation, the Joint Forces Command has increased in participation of key DOD stakeholders--the military services, the combatant commands, and other organizations and agencies--in its experimentation activities. The Command has also expanded the participation of federal agencies and departments, academia, the private sector, and some foreign allies. No recommendations flowing from joint experimentation have been approved or implemented. Although the Joint Forces Command issued three recommendations nearly a year ago, they were not approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council because of confusion among the Joint Staff and the Joint Forces Command about a proposed change in guidance that required additional data be included when submitting these recommendations. Although DOD has been providing more specific and clearer guidance for joint experimentation, DOD and the Joint Forces Command are missing some key management elements that are generally considered necessary for successful program management.

“Fragmentary evidence” and a sense of inevitability that Boko Haram may be planning an attack on U.S. interests in Nigeria has intelligence and counterterrorism officials in Washington on alert. U.S. intelligence officials, speaking with NBC News on condition of anonymity, declined to characterize the nature of the evidence, other than to say it was recent and non-specific. But they said it is prompting efforts to locate the terrorist group’s “military assets” and identify other senior leaders beyond Abubakar Shekau. They also said that Boko Haram’s desire to strike against a U.S. target apparently has been heightened by the increasing U.S. involvement in the hunt for 276 missing Nigerian schoolgirls abducted by the group last month, though the goal itself is not new. “Boko Haram has a long standing interest in this,” said one senior U.S. counterterrorism official when asked about the possibility of an attack. “… It’s consistent with what we've seen from them. Broadly speaking, it’s in line with what we are tracking.” Play Facebook Twitter Embed Lessening the threat of Boko Haram 5:01 autoplay autoplay Copy this code to your website or blog A U.S. intelligence official agreed that an attack on a U.S. target is something Shekau, Boko Haram's leader, has "long aspired his followers to carry out" -- one reason the U.S. offered a $7 million reward in June of last year for "information leading to the location Abubakar Shekau." But this official noted that the stronger desire to make a statement could be traced through the recent increase in Shekau's anti-U.S. rhetoric, including a diatribe aimed at President Barack Obama in his latest video, released last week. Of specific interest to the U.S. is the range of weaponry Boko Haram has at its disposal. In recent attacks, it has used automatic weapons fired from armored personnel carriers disguised as Nigerian military vehicles, as well as car bombs -- some driven by suicide bombers -- increasingly its weapon of choice for larger attacks. As for the Boko Haram chain of command, the U.S. is trying to determine who – beyond Shekau – wields power or influence in the group, the officials said. A man claiming to be Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Nigerian Islamist extremist group Boko Haram, speaks in a video released by the Nigerian Islamist extremist group earlier this month. Reuters file Mounting an attack on U.S. interests in the region would be difficult for Boko Haram, which has so far shown a limited ability to strike outside its stronghold in northeastern Nigeria. The intelligence official said there are "fewer and fewer Americans" in that part of the country because of security concerns. "It's basically a no-go area, even for relief workers," said the official. The security situation in the region was the reason that plans for a new consulate in Kano, the north's largest city, were scrapped last year, said John Campbell, former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria now at the Council on Foreign Relations. "It's dead in the water," he said. "It was approved by Secretary (Hillary) Clinton but never implemented because of security concerns." Follow NBC News Investigations on Twitter and Facebook. Most “U.S. interests” – a term the intelligence community uses broadly to include government and commercial facilities and individual Americans -- in Nigeria are located in the Christian south, near Lagos, the former capital, and the nearby oilfields. Thus far, Boko Haram has not demonstrated an ability to mount attacks in that area, more than 800 miles to the southwest of its base of operations. The numerous U.S. government and corporate facilities in the Nigerian capital of Abuja are more likely targets, the officials said. Already, Boko Haram has carried out at least five attacks in Abuja in the last three years, killing more than 150 people. Among the attacks was an apparent suicide car bombing at the United Nations headquarters in Abuja in August 2011, only blocks away from the U.S. Embassy. Twenty-three people were killed in that attack, and two Americans – a diplomat and a lawyer -- were in the building at the time but were not injured, according to Nigerian human rights lawyer Emmanuel Ogebe. Firefighters and rescue workers respond after a large explosion struck the United Nations' main office in Nigeria's capital of Abuja on Aug. 26, 2011, flattening one wing of the building and killing 23 people. Saharareporters via AP file Just last month, more than 70 people were killed by car bombs at a crowded bus station on the outskirts of Abuja. The U.S. intelligence official said security at the embassy and other diplomatic facilities in the capital is "generally high," and many of the recent attacks have been on the capital's periphery. Still, said the official, the attacks on the bus station were particularly sophisticated and designed to inflict maximum casualties, with the first attack taking place during morning rush hour and the second during the evening rush. In addition to providing new impetus for a possible attack, U.S. military personnel in the region to help the Nigerian government hunt for the missing school girls could become targets. The search for the girls, abducted on April 14 from a government-run school in the town of Chibok, now includes both Global Hawk drones, apparently flown from a base in Sicily, and Predator drones flown from a base in Njamena, the capital of Chad. The White House announced Wednesday that 80 American service members are on the ground in North Africa to oversee the operations of the unarmed drones -- half to operate the remotely piloted aircraft and half to provide security. There are also 30 other specialists from the State and Defense departments, the FBI and the intelligence community who have been sent to Nigeria to advise officials there. Related U.S. Deploys 80-Man Drone Force to Help Find Nigerian Girls Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau: The Man Who Would Be Africa's Bin Laden Terror on a Budget: Where Boko Haram Gets Its Weapons In addition, the Defense Department's African policy expert, Amanda Dory, told a congressional committee Wednesday that U.S. personnel are helping the Nigerian military with its communications and intelligence gathering and began working with a newly created Nigerian counterterrorism organization. Because Boko Haram fighters “cross the border” every day, U.S. officials also are concerned that they could attack a broader range of U.S. targets in either Cameroon or Chad, including aid workers. Ogebe, the human rights lawyer, said the group already has tried to abduct American relief workers in northern Nigeria. The U.S. is not alone in taking Boko Haram more seriously as a result of the schoolgirls’ kidnapping and other heinous crimes and attacks carried out by the group in Nigeria. U.N. Security Council approved sanctions Thursday against the group, adding it to the so-called 1267 sanctions list -- a roster of al Qaeda-linked organizations subject to arms embargoes, travel bans and asset freezes. ||||| Story highlights Boko Haram seems intent on destroying Nigeria Attacks have shown it can coordinate operations Boko Haram is also forcing thousands of Christians from hotspot areas Its ultimate ambition could now be creating its twisted version of God's Kingdom on Earth. A large part of northern and central Nigeria is now at the mercy of intensified attacks by Boko Haram, and the group seems to be embarking on a new phase of its campaign against the Nigerian state -- piling further pressure on the government of President Goodluck Jonathan. The last four days have seen devastating bomb attacks in Jos, in central Nigeria, as well as a suicide bombing in Kano - the largest city in the north. Two more villages in the state of Borno, Boko Haram's stronghold in the northeast, came under attack, with at least 30 civilians killed. There have also been two bomb attacks in the federal capital, Abuja, in the last five weeks. What alarms analysts is the way Boko Haram and its supporters are able to carry out multiple attacks on targets far apart, all within days of each other. Jos and Kano are more than 300 miles from Borno. The double car-bomb attack against a market in Jos on Tuesday, which killed 118 people, according to the National Emergency Management Agency, is typical of its strategy beyond Borno: to strike soft targets in places where sectarian tensions are already high, with massive force. The use of two bombs some 30 minutes apart copied an al Qaeda tactic. Jacob Zenn, a long-time observer of Boko Haram, says its aim is likely to stretch Nigeria's beleaguered security forces, possibly by combining with another Islamic militant group: Ansaru. "In 2012, one of Boko Haram's goals was to launch attacks in the Middle Belt and southern Nigeria via the Ansaru networks - in order to spread Nigerian forces thin in Borno," Zenn told CNN. "We may be seeing a similar tactic employed now." Zenn says Ansaru networks carried out more than 15 bombings in Jos, Kaduna and Abuja between 2010 and 2012, even though the attacks were attributed to Boko Haram. Those networks, he believes, have now been reactivated. Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Police in riot gear block a route in Abuja, Nigeria, on Tuesday, October 14, during a demonstration calling on the Nigerian government to rescue schoolgirls kidnapped by the Islamist militant group Boko Haram. In April, more than 200 girls were abducted from their boarding school in northeastern Nigeria, officials and witnesses said. Hide Caption 1 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Women in Abuja hold a candlelight vigil on Wednesday, May 14, one month after the schoolgirls were kidnapped. Hide Caption 2 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – People march in Lagos, Nigeria, on Monday, May 12, to demand the release of the kidnapped schoolgirls. Hide Caption 3 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Catholic faithful in Abuja take Holy Communion and pray for the safety of the kidnapped schoolgirls on Sunday, May 11. Hide Caption 4 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Catholic faithful attend a morning Mass in honor of the kidnapped schoolgirls in Abuja on May 11. Hide Caption 5 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Catholics nuns pray in Abuja on May 11. Hide Caption 6 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – A woman attends a demonstration Tuesday, May 6, that called for the Nigerian government to rescue the girls. Hide Caption 7 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Community leader Hosea Sambido speaks during a May 6 rally in Abuja. Hide Caption 8 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Brig. Gen. Chris Olukolade, Nigeria's top military spokesman, speaks to people at a demonstration May 6 in Abuja. Hide Caption 9 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Women march Monday, May 5, in Chibok, Nigeria. Hide Caption 10 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – People rally in Lagos on Thursday, May 1. Hide Caption 11 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Police stand guard during a demonstration in Lagos on May 1. Hide Caption 12 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Protesters take part in a "million-woman march" Wednesday, April 30, in Abuja. Hide Caption 13 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Obiageli Ezekwesili, former Nigerian education minister and vice president of the World Bank's Africa division, leads a march of women in Abuja on April 30. Hide Caption 14 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – A woman cries out during a demonstration in Abuja on Tuesday, April 29, along with other mothers whose daughters have been kidnapped. Hide Caption 15 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – A man weeps as he joins parents of the kidnapped girls during a meeting with the Borno state governor in Chibok on Tuesday, April 22. Hide Caption 16 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Mothers weep April 22 during a meeting with the Borno state governor in Chibok. Hide Caption 17 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Four female students who were abducted by gunmen and reunited with their families walk in Chibok on Monday, April 21. Hide Caption 18 of 19 Photos: Photos: Nigerians protest over kidnapped girls Nigerians protest over kidnapped schoolgirls – Borno state Gov. Kashim Shettima, center, visits the girls' school in Chibok on April 21. Hide Caption 19 of 19 JUST WATCHED Terror rules in northeastern Nigeria Replay More Videos ... MUST WATCH Terror rules in northeastern Nigeria 01:36 JUST WATCHED U.S. troops join missing girls search Replay More Videos ... MUST WATCH U.S. troops join missing girls search 05:52 Zenn, an analyst at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, says Boko Haram recruits who have trained in Borno - disaffected young Muslims from across the Middle Belt region - may be returning home to "carry out attacks against their enemies -- whether rival Christians or the government." John Campbell, a former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria and now a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, agrees that Ansaru seems to be reappearing but adds that little is known about the group and its leadership. What is known is that Boko Haram and Ansaru have plenty of money to recruit and finance operatives -- through bank robberies and kidnappings. Campbell says Boko Haram has become adept at bank robberies and stealing weapons from government armories. Zenn believes Ansaru's connections to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have helped fill its coffers. In 2012 it kidnapped a French engineer, Francis Collomp. AQIM also held four French hostages - who were freed in late 2013 - reportedly for a ransom payment of $27 million. A few weeks later Collomp escaped, or perhaps was allowed to escape, provoking speculation that Ansaru had been in on the deal and shared the ransom money. Last year, Zenn says, Ansaru received part of a $3 million ransom paid to secure the release of a French family kidnapped by Boko Haram in northern Cameroon. The challenge for the Nigerian security forces grows by the day. According to locals quoted in the Nigerian media, Boko Haram fighters were able to spend several hours unchallenged looting and killing in the village of Alagano early Wednesday. The village is only a few miles from the school where the girls were abducted in April, and supposedly in an area where there is a heightened military presence. Photos: Bring Back Our Girls Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – Weeks after the April 14 kidnapping of more than 200 Nigerian girls, worried families and supporters blamed the government for not doing enough to find them. Their cries spread worldwide on social media under the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls. From regular people to celebrities, here are some of the people participating in the movement. Hide Caption 1 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – First Lady Michelle Obama tweeted this picture of herself holding a #BringBackOurGirls sign in support of the schoolgirls abducted by Boko Haram in Nigeria. Hide Caption 2 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – "We hear it like it's not happening in our region so it doesn't concern us but that's not right," says Milliscent Maduagwu from Port Harcourt, Nigeria. "This fight on terrorism is not just the Commander in Chief's and the army, but ours as well!" Hide Caption 3 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – "These girls could have been my sisters or worst still my daughter," says Emmanuel Oleabhiele from Doha, Qatar. "My daughter is 6 months old and I fear for her future as a Nigerian." Hide Caption 4 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – Malala Yousafzai, the world's most famous advocate for girls' right to education, says that "girls in Nigeria are my sisters." This photo was posted to the @MalalaFund Twitter account on May 6. Hide Caption 5 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – Ify Elueze of Bonn, Germany, asks, "How can the world sit and watch?! It is no longer just the responsibility of the Nigerian government, now it is your responsibility and mine!" Hide Caption 6 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – British supermodel Cara Delevingne posted this photo on her Instagram account saying, "Everyone help and raise awareness #regram #repost or make your own!" Hide Caption 7 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – "Government should stop playing politics with our sister[s]," says Nigerian Dauda Kaks Hide Caption 8 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – American singer-songwriter Alicia Keys posted this photo on her Instagram account with this message: "I'm so saddened and enraged that these girls are not back where they belong! Safe at home and at school! Safe with their families! Safe to become the incredible leaders and powerful voices they are yet to be." Hide Caption 9 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – "You are most likely thinking to yourself, 'What's the point in posting another picture or status to speak about this issue?,"' says Uchenna Mildred Udeh from St. John, New Brunswick. "I can tell you this: it will. Do not underestimate the power of your voice. We have to make this personal." Hide Caption 10 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – British singer-songwriter Leona Lewis took a stand to #BringBackOurGirls on her Twitter account on May 7. Hide Caption 11 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls 'Bring Back Our Girls!' – "I think it's high time we all start praying for Nigeria and stop complaining," says Lotanna Ugwu from Abuja, Nigeria. "It's only God that can touch the hearts of those who kidnapped the young girls." Hide Caption 12 of 13 Photos: Bring Back Our Girls Bring Back Our Girls – Singer Steven Tyler posted this image on both his Twitter and Instagram accounts alonth with the hashtag #RealMenDontBuyGirls. Hide Caption 13 of 13 JUST WATCHED No sign of Nigerian violence slowing Replay More Videos ... MUST WATCH No sign of Nigerian violence slowing 02:51 JUST WATCHED Nigerian Muslims speak out Replay More Videos ... MUST WATCH Nigerian Muslims speak out 01:48 One option to squeeze Boko Haram would be better military coordination with neighboring states, where the group takes refuge and resupplies itself. On Tuesday, President Jonathan announced plans to bolster a Joint Task Force - with a battalion each from Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. But Zenn says that "thus far all initiatives of this sort have absolutely flunked. It's supposed to exist already in the Multinational Joint Task Force but, because of language issues, mistrust and lack of funding, doesn't really work." There is also a larger question looming in a country that has had military rule for more than half its life as an independent state. Nigeria has had civilian rule since 1999, but Zenn says there is now a risk that "the still less than 20-year old democracy experiment in Nigeria may be coming to an end, since there are increasing reports of military defections and mutinies." "With the potential for instability ahead of the elections [due in February next year], the military may step in in one way or another," he adds. Campbell says the surprise is that the military hasn't moved before now, given the deteriorating situation. But he says it is a much smaller and weaker organization than 10 or 15 years ago; the top brass has been thoroughly politicized and is close to the Presidency. The nightmare scenario, he says, is a mutiny by junior officers. But Campbell cautions that the Nigerian military is little understood by outsiders, which incidentally makes foreign assistance to improve its performance more difficult to deliver. There is another larger danger for Nigeria stoked by the Boko Haram campaign: a version of ethnic cleansing. Thousands of Christians have already fled areas like Gwoza in Borno, and Campbell says that sectarian divisions and violence have divided the city of Jos into predominantly Muslim and Christian districts. After Tuesday's bombings, which were likely calculated to inflame religious tension, Christian youths began setting up roadblocks around their neighborhoods. The Kano attack was also in a Christian neighborhood. In another sign that sectarian tensions are spreading, some Christian groups have demanded that the next Governor of Lagos - the country's commercial capital and the city least prone to religious conflict - be a Christian. For now, Campbell says, Boko Haram has the wind in its sails, after a series of devastating attacks in recent months that have humiliated the government and military. The abduction of the schoolgirls has brought it international notoriety and attention. Far from seizing the opportunity to outline demands for greater autonomy and resources for northern Nigeria, Boko Haram seems set on two goals: the destruction of the Nigerian state and what it -- and it alone -- sees as creating God's Kingdom on Earth. ||||| The UN Security Council committee on al-Qaeda sanctions has blacklisted Nigeria's Boko Haram, a month after the armed group kidnapped hundreds of schoolgirls. Nigeria, which until recently had been reluctant to seek international help to combat Boko Haram, requested earlier this week that the group be sanctioned. As a result, it is now subject to an international asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo. "What will the practical impact of that be? Hard to say but it's an essential step we had to take," said Australian UN Ambassador Gary Quinlan, the al-Qaeda sanctions committee chair, adding that the aim was to "dry up support" for the group. "We will work to try and make sure that anybody supplying any material assistance to Boko Haram - whether funding or arms - will in fact be stopped, will be deterred by the fact they too will be eligible for listing on the sanctions list." RELATED: The origins of Nigeria's Boko Haram Boko Haram kidnapped nearly 300 girls from a secondary school in Chibok in remote northeastern Nigeria on April 14 and has threatened to sell them into slavery. Eight other girls were taken from another village earlier this month. Boko Haram's five-year-old insurgency is aimed at creating an Islamic state in the north of Nigeria, whose 170 million people are split roughly evenly between Christians and Muslims. 'Terrorist expertise' The UN listing entry describes Boko Haram as an affiliate of al-Qaeda and the Organisation of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). "Boko Haram has maintained a relationship with the Organisation of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb for training and material support purposes," according to the narrative summary accompanying the listing. "For example, Boko Haram gained valuable knowledge on the construction of improvised explosive devices from AQIM. A number of Boko Haram members fought alongside al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Mali [in] 2012 and 2013 before returning to Nigeria with terrorist expertise," Reuters quoted the document as saying. US Ambassador Samantha Power hailed the sanctions as "an important step" to support Nigeria in defeating "Boko Haram and hold its murderous leadership accountable for atrocities." The group has recently escalated its campaign of attacks that have left thousands dead since 2009, and the abduction of the schoolgirls have sparked global outrage. Twenty-nine farm workers were shot dead by suspected Boko Haram members on Thursday in a remote area in the northeast. It comes day after bombings in the city of Jos , blamed on the group, killed about 130 people. Abuja protest In the Nigerian capital Abuja on Thursday, about 200 protesters called on President Goodluck Jonathan to do more to recover the girls. Al Jazeera's Mohammed Adow, reporting from the protest, said the demonstrators marching towards the president's office were stopped by police. "The police formed a ring around the protesters who defiantly sat in the middle of the road," he said. A government delegation met the marchers and delivered a statement from Jonathan. In it, the Nigerian leader reiterated the government's commitment to finding the girls but said protests should be directed at "the terrorists who have abducted our innocent daughters." The statement irked the demonstrators, who demanded to meet Jonathan. "Please let Mr President know that none of the issues raised has been addressed," said march organiser Obi Ezekwesili, a former education minister and World Bank executive. Many state-run schools were shut on Thursday on the orders of the Nigerian Union of Teachers to allow a "day of protest" against the abduction of the girls, the AFP news agency reported. The United States announced Wednesday that 80 military personnel had been deployed to neighbouring Chad to help find the 223 missing girls. Nigeria has also accepted help from British, French and Israeli specialists amid a groundswell of pressure fuelled by a social media campaign.

Boko Haram may be planning an attack on US interests in Nigeria, US intelligence officials tell NBC News. The evidence of this is "fragmentary" and lacks specifics, the sources admit, but counterterror officials are sufficiently worried to the point that they're stepping up efforts to locate the group's military assets and trying to determine who sits at the top with frontman Abubakar Shekau—who already has a $7 million bounty on his head. "Boko Haram has a long standing interest in this," one senior official said. But officials think that interest has intensified as the US steps up its role in hunting for the kidnapped school girls. Of course, there are precious few US targets in Nigeria's northeast, where Boko Haram is strongest, but there are some in the capital of Abuja. Boko Haram has been blamed for two bombings in Abuja in the past five weeks, according to CNN, amidst a wave of violence that has grew especially intense this week with the massive Jos bombing. The UN yesterday officially blacklisted Boko Haram—a step Nigeria's government had refrained from requesting until now—which will make the group's members subject to asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes, al-Jazeera reports.

There has been a great deal of concern over the effect of the current economic downturn on retirement plans. One company recently reported that at the end of 2008, the "chaos" in the financial markets led to a $409 billion deficit in defined benefit pension plan funding for the plans of S&P 1500 companies. The report indicated that this deficit will negatively affect corporate earnings in 2009. Due in part to the large investment losses in pension plans and other retirement accounts, in December of 2008, Congress unanimously enacted H.R. 7327 , the Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008 ("WRERA" or "the Act"). While several provisions of WRERA make technical corrections to the Pension Protection Act of 2006 ("PPA"), the Act also provides some temporary relief from certain requirements that may be difficult for pension plans to meet due to current economic conditions. This report provides an overview of some of the key provisions of WRERA, in particular, the provisions relating to the funding of single and multiemployer plans, the temporary waiver for required minimum distributions, as well as certain technical corrections and other provisions that affect the two primary types of pension plans, defined benefit and defined contribution plans, as well as individual retirement accounts and annuities (IRAs). Title II of WRERA contains provisions designed to protect both individuals and retirement plans from the potentially large losses of plan amounts due to the decline of the stock market and the current economic climate. These provisions include a temporary waiver of the required minimum distributions, and temporary relief from funding rules created by the PPA that apply to single and multi-employer plans. In essence, these provisions permit a delay in taking required distributions and meeting pension funding obligations, in an effort to give retirement plans and accounts more time for economic conditions to improve and for the losses in investments to be recovered. Under section 401(a)(9) of the Internal Revenue Code, employer-sponsored retirement plans, such as 401(k), 403(b) and 457 plans, and individual retirement accounts and annuities ("IRAs") must make certain annual required minimum distributions in order to maintain their "qualified" (i.e., tax-favorable) status. The theory behind these required distributions is to ensure that tax-deferred retirement accounts that have been established to provide income during retirement are not used as permanent tax shelters or as vehicles for transmitting wealth to heirs. For employer-sponsored plans, required minimum distributions to participants must start no later than April 1 of the year after the year in which the participant either attains age 70 ½,or retires, whichever is later. For traditional IRAs, required minimum distributions must commence by April 1 following the year the IRA owner reaches age 70 ½. Alternative minimum distribution requirements apply to beneficiaries in the event that the participant dies before the entire amount in the participant's account is distributed. Failure to make a required distribution results in an excise tax equal to 50 percent of the required minimum distribution amount that was not distributed for the year, which is imposed on the participant or beneficiary. Following the decline in the stock market, there was concern about individuals taking these required distributions when there has not been enough time to recover losses. Section 201 of WRERA suspends the minimum distribution requirements, both initial and annual required distributions, for defined contribution arrangements, including IRAs, for calendar year 2009. Thus, plan participants and beneficiaries are allowed, but are not required, to take required minimum distributions for 2009. However, it should be noted that the required distributions for 2008, or for years after 2009, are not waived by the new law. The Internal Revenue Code sets out certain minimum funding standards that apply to defined benefit plans. The funding standards for single-employer plans were completely revamped by the PPA, which created more stringent standards than under prior law. When fully phased in, the new funding requirements established by the PPA will generally require plan assets to be equal to 100 percent of plan liabilities on a present value basis. Under these standards, when the value of a plan's assets is less than the plan's "funding target," a plan's minimum required contribution for a plan year is comprised of the plan's " target normal cost," (i.e. , the present value of the benefits expected to be accrued or earned during the year, minus certain plan expenses), plus a "shortfall amortization base," an amount which is established if the plan has a funding shortfall. However, under a special exemption, if the value of the plan's assets is equal to or greater than the funding target, then the shortfall amortization amount will be zero. The PPA also created a transition rule, under which a shortfall amortization base does not have to be established if, for plan years beginning in 2008 and ending in 2010, the plan's assets are equal to a certain percentage of the plan's funding target for that year. The percentage of the funding target is 92 percent for 2008, 94 percent for 2009, and 96 percent for 2010. In other words, the PPA, through this transition rule, gave pension plans a three year period to ease into the new plan funding requirements, in which plans could gradually increase the value of the plan assets, thus relieving them from the burden of having to contribute a large part of the funding shortfall in one year. The PPA placed a limitation on the transition rule, under which the rule will not apply with respect to any plan year after 2008 unless the shortfall amortization base was zero (e.g., the plan failed to meet the transition rule, or be 92 percent funded in 2008). Section 202 of WRERA allows plans to follow the transition rule even if the plan's shortfall amortization base was not zero in the preceding year. Thus, a plan that was not 92 percent funded in 2008 would only be required to be 94 percent funded in 2009, instead of 100 percent. This provision gives plans some additional time to be 100 percent funded, a requirement that may have become more difficult to fulfill because of the decline in the financial markets and the resulting loss of value of plan assets. As provided by the PPA, underfunded single-employer defined benefit plans may be subject to certain restrictions on benefits and benefit accruals. Under one of these restrictions, if a plan's "adjusted funding target attainment percentage" (AFTAP) is less than 60 percent (i.e., generally speaking, if a plan is less than 60 percent funded) for a plan year, a plan must stop providing future benefit accruals. Section 203 of WRERA provides that for the first plan year beginning during the period of October 1, 2008 through September 30, 2009, this restriction on benefit accruals is determined using the AFTAP from the preceding year, instead of the current year, if the AFTAP for the preceding year is greater. Thus, this provision allows a plan to look to the previous year's funding levels in order to determine whether there must be a restriction of benefit accruals. For plans that have lost a lot in the value of plan assets, looking to the AFTAP for the previous year may allow some plans to continue providing future benefit accruals that would otherwise have to cease them. However, plans that have higher funding levels for the current year will not be affected by this provision. Under section 432 of the Internal Revenue Code as created by the PPA, multiemployer plans failing to meet certain funding levels may be subject to certain additional funding obligations and benefit restrictions. These additional requirements depend on whether the plan is in "endangered" or "critical" status. A multiemployer plan is considered to be endangered if it is less than 80 percent funded or if the plan has an accumulated funding deficiency for the plan year, or is projected to have a deficiency within the next six years. A plan that is less than 80 percent funded and is projected to have an accumulated funding deficiency is considered to be "seriously endangered." Endangered plans must adopt a funding improvement plan, which contains options for a plan to attain a certain increase in the plan's funding percentage, while avoiding accumulated funding deficiencies. A multiemployer plan is considered to be in critical status if, for example, the plan is less than 65 percent funded and the sum of the fair market value of plan assets, plus the present value of reasonably anticipated employer and employee contributions for the current plan year and each of the next six plan years is less than the present value of all benefits projected to be payable under the plan during the current plan year and each of the next six years (plus administrative expenses). Plans in critical status must develop a rehabilitation plan containing options to enable the plan to cease being in critical status by the end of the rehabilitation period, generally 10 years. The rehabilitation plan may include reductions in plan expenditures and future benefit accruals. Employers may also have to pay a surcharge in addition to other plan contributions. Each year, a plan's actuary must certify whether or not the plan is in endangered or critical status. Under section 204 of WRERA a sponsor of a multiemployer defined benefit pension plan may elect for the status of the plan year that begins during the period between October 1, 2008 and September 30, 2009, to be the same as the plan's certified status for the previous year. Accordingly, if a plan was not in endangered or critical status for the prior year, the sponsor may elect to retain this status and may avoid additional plan funding requirements. A plan that was in endangered or critical status during the preceding year does not have to update its funding improvement plan, rehabilitation plan, or schedule information until the plan year following the year that the plan's status remained the same. However, for plans that are in critical status, the Act clarifies that the freezing of the certification status does not relieve the plan from certain requirements. Section 432 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a multiemployer plan that is in endangered or critical status must meet certain additional funding requirements. In general, endangered plans must adopt a funding improvement plan, and critical plans must adopt a rehabilitation plan. Under both a funding improvement and a rehabilitation plan, there is a 10-year period under which a plan must meet a certain funding percentage. Seriously endangered plans have 15 years to improve their funding percentage. Section 205 of WRERA provides that a plan sponsor of a plan in endangered or critical status may elect, for a plan year beginning in 2008 or 2009, to extend the funding improvement period or the rehabilitation period by three years, to 13 years instead of 10 years. Plans in seriously endangered status have a funding improvement period of 18 years, rather than 15 years. The provision gives plans more time to meet their funding obligations. An election must be made by the plan in order to take advantage of this relaxed funding requirement. WRERA made several technical corrections to the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA). Some of the corrections are effective as if they were enacted as part of the PPA, while other provisions are to be applied prospectively. The technical corrections include the following: In general, distributions from retirement plans or accounts are subject to tax in the year they are distributed. Prior to the PPA, in the event that a participant died, distributions from the retirement plan of a participant could transfer (or "rollover") into a surviving spouse's IRA tax-free. This rollover scheme was not available to non-spouse beneficiaries. Under section 402(c)(11) of the Internal Revenue Code, as created by the PPA, certain tax-qualified plans (e.g., a 401(k)) could offer a direct rollover of a distribution to a nonspouse beneficiary (e.g., a sibling, parent, or a domestic partner). The direct rollover must be made to an individual retirement account or annuity (IRA) established on behalf of the designated beneficiary that will be treated as an inherited IRA. As a result, the rollover amounts would not be included in the beneficiary's income in the year of the rollover. The Internal Revenue Service had previously taken the position that section 402(c)(11) permitted, but did not require, plans to provide this type of rollover option. Section 108(f) of the WRERA clarifies that distributions to a nonspouse beneficiary's inherited IRA are to be considered "eligible rollover distributions," and plans are thus required to allow these beneficiaries to make these direct rollovers. Plans must also provide direct rollover notices in order to maintain plan qualification. This provision is effective for plan years beginning on January 1, 2010. In general, an employer that chooses to terminate a fully funded defined benefit plan must comply with certain requirements with regard to participants or beneficiaries whom the plan administrator cannot locate after a diligent search. For these individuals, a plan administrator may either purchase an annuity from an insurer or transfer the missing participant's benefits to the PBGC. Prior to the PPA, the missing participant requirements only applied to single-employer plans. The PPA amended these requirements to apply to multiemployer plans, defined contribution plans, and other plans that do not have termination insurance through the PBGC. Section 104(e) of WRERA specifies that the missing participant requirements apply to plans that at no time provided for employer contributions. WRERA also narrows the missing participant requirements to defined contribution plans (and other pension plans not covered by PBGC's termination insurance) that are qualified plans. The requirements of this section take effect as if they were included in the PPA. Under the funding rules created by the PPA, single-employer defined benefit plans that fall below certain funding levels are subject to several additional requirements. One of these requirements prevents plans that have a funding percentage of less than 60 percent from making "prohibited payments," (i.e., certain accelerated forms of distribution, such as a lump sum payment) to plan participants. Current law also specifies that if the present value of a participant's vested benefit exceeds $5,000, the benefit may not be immediately distributed without the participant's consent. Accordingly, if the vested benefit is less than or equal to $5,000 this consent requirement does not apply. Section 101 of WRERA amends the definition of "prohibited payment" to exclude benefits which may be distributed without the consent of the participant. As a result, lump sum payments of $5,000 or less may be paid by an underfunded plan that is otherwise precluded from paying larger lump sum distributions. This amendment applies to plan years beginning in 2008. Under ERISA, pension plans must meet extensive notice and reporting requirements that disclose information about the plan to participants and beneficiaries as well as government agencies. Among these disclosures is a requirement that a terminating single-employer defined benefit plan provide "affected parties" with certain information required to be submitted to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Section 105 of WRERA clarifies that in order for a plan to terminate in a distress termination, a plan administrator must not only provide affected parties with information that the administrator had to disclose to the PBGC along with the written notice of intent to terminate, but also certain information that was provided to the PBGC after the notice was given. This information may include a certification by an enrolled actuary regarding the amount of the current value of the assets of the plan, the actuarial present value of the benefit liabilities under the plan, and whether the plan's assets are sufficient to pay benefit liabilities. Further, in an involuntary termination, certain confidentiality provisions exist that prevent the plan administrator or sponsor from providing information about the termination in a form which includes any information that may be associated with, or identify affected parties. Section 105 of WRERA extends this confidentiality protection disclosure of this information by the PBGC. Other notable provisions included in WRERA are the following: Roth IRAs, a type of individual retirement arrangement, are a popular retirement savings vehicle. While contributions to a Roth IRA are not deductible, qualified distributions from a Roth IRA are not included in an individual's gross income. Roth IRAs are subject to certain contribution limitations, however, these limitations do not apply to qualified rollover contributions. Section 125 of the WRERA permits a "qualified airline employee" who receives an "airline payment amount" to transfer any portion of this amount to a Roth IRA as a qualified rollover contribution. This transfer must occur within 180 days of receipt of the amount (or, if later, within 180 days of the enactment of WRERA). Thus, if such amounts are transferred to the former employee's Roth IRA, the employee may benefit, as qualified distributions from Roth IRAs are tax free. This section also provides that certain income limitations placed upon Roth IRA qualified rollover contributions should not apply to this transfer. In order to determine the minimum required contribution that must be made to a single-employer defined benefit plan, and the extent (if any) to which a plan is underfunded, the value of plan assets must be determined. For purposes of the minimum funding rules, the value of the plan's assets is, in general, the fair market value of the assets. However, the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the PPA, permits plans to calculate the value of the assets by averaging fair market values, but only if (1) the averaging method is permitted under regulations, (2) the calculation is not over a period of more than 24 months, and (3) the averaged amount cannot result in a determination that is at any time less than 90 percent or more than 110 percent of fair market value. This averaging method may be more beneficial for plan sponsors in an economic downturn, as an averaging approach can produce lower asset values when asset values are rising, and higher asset values when asset values are decreasing. Section 121 of WRERA provides that plans using the averaging method must adjust such averaging to account not only for the amount of contributions and distributions to the plan, but also for expected investment earnings, subject to a cap. It has been noted that this provision could result in smaller underfunded amounts and, therefore, smaller required contributions. The PPA created certain relaxed funding requirements for defined benefit plans maintained by a commercial airline or an airline catering service. Under the PPA, plan sponsors of these plans could elect to amortize unfunded plan liabilities over an extended period of 10 years, or may instead follow special rules that permit these plan sponsors to amortize unfunded liabilities over 17 years. Plan sponsors selecting the17-year amortization period, referred to by the Act as an "alternative funding schedule," had to comply with certain benefit accrual requirements, which included freezing some of the benefits offered under the plan and eliminating others. In determining the minimum required contribution to the plan each year for purposes of these special rules, the PPA provided that the value of plan assets generally is the fair market value of the assets. Section 126 of WRERA provides that plans following the alternative funding schedule may determine the value of plan assets in the same manner as other single-employer plans. Thus, plans can use a fair market value determination, or they may use the averaging method as laid out in Section 430(g)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

In December of 2008, Congress unanimously enacted the Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008 (WRERA) (P.L. 110-458), which makes several technical corrections to the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-280) and contains provisions designed to help pension plans and plan participants weather the current economic downturn. This report highlights the provisions of WRERA relating to the economic crisis, such as the temporary waiver of required minimum distributions and provisions that temporarily relax certain pension plan funding requirements. This report also discusses certain technical corrections to the Pension Protection Act made by WRERA, and certain other notable provisions of the Act affecting retirement plans and benefits.

THE FAMiLY LEADER Strengthening families ... FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Thursday, July 7, 2011 The FAMiLY LEADER UNVEILS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE PLEDGE DOCUMENT Signing of the Pledge Required for Endorsement by The FAMiLY LEADER Pleasant Hill, IA - The FAMiLY LEADER unveiled a candidate pledge document this morning at a press conference on the West steps of the Iowa State Capitol. The candidate pledge is titled "The Marriage Vow - A Declaration of Dependence Upon Marriage and FAMiLY". The purpose of The Marriage Vow is to have on record the personal convictions of each presidential candidate as it relates to the issue of marriage. The signing of the pledge will be a requirement for future endorsement by The FAMiLY LEADER. Presidential candidates who sign The Marriage Vow will sign off on support of personal fidelity to his/her spouse, appointing faithful constitutionalists as judges, opposition to any redefinition of marriage, and prompt reform of uneconomic and anti-marriage aspects of welfare policy, tax policy, and divorce law. The Marriage Vow also outlines support for the legal advocacy for the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), humane efforts to protect women and children, rejection of anti-women Sharia Islam, safeguards for all married and unmarried U.S. military personnel, and commitment to downsizing government and the burden upon American families. Bob Vander Plaats, President & CEO of The FAMiLY LEADER, said, "We are intentional about the opportunity to take another step in fulfilling our mission to 'Strengthen Families' by providing The Marriage Vow to presidential candidates. The FAMiLY LEADER views this pledge as an important component needed to inform constituents about the personal stand that each presidential candidate takes regarding marriage. We believe that the candidates' positions on core values, such as marriage, correlate directly to his/her moral stances on energy issues, sound budgeting policies, national defense, and economic policies." The FAMiLY LEADER is a Christian conservative organization which provides a consistent, courageous voice in the churches, in the legislature, in the media, in the courtroom, in the public square ...always standing for God's truth in order to strengthen the family. Contact: Chris Nitzschke Phone: 515-263-3495, ext. 19 Cell Phone: 515-210-7475 Email: [email protected] ### THE FAMiLY LEADER Strengthening families ... THE MARRIAGE VOW A Declaration of Dependence upon MARRIAGE and FAMiLY1 Faithful monogamy is at the very heart of a designed and purposeful order - as conveyed by Jewish and Christian Scripture, by Classical Philosophers, by Natural Law, and by the American Founders - upon which our concepts of Creator-endowed human rights, racial justice and gender equality all depend.2 Enduring marital fidelity between one man and one woman protects innocent children, vulnerable women, the rights of fathers, the stability of families, and the liberties of all American citizens under our republican form of government. Our exceptional and free society simply cannot endure without the transmission of personal virtue, from one generation to the next, by means of nurturing, nuclear families comprised of sexually-faithful husbands and wives, fathers and mothers. We acknowledge and regret the widespread hypocrisy of many who defend marriage yet turn a blind eye toward the epidemic of infidelity and the anemic condition of marriages in their own communities. Unmistakably, the Institution of Marriage in America is in great crisis: .. Slavery had a disastrous impact on African-American families, yet sadly a child born into slavery in 1860 was more likely to be raised by his mother and father in a two-parent household than was an MricanAmerican baby born after the election of the USA's first Mrican-American President.3 LBJ's 1965 War on Poverty was triggered in part by the famous "Moynihan Report" finding that the black out-of-wedlock birthrate had hit 26%; today, the white rate exceeds that, the overall rate is 41%, and over 70% of Mrican-American babies are born to single parents4 - a prime sociological indicator for poverty, pathology and prison regardless of race or ethnicity. 5 About one million U.S. children suffer through divorce each year - the outcome of about half of all first marriages and about 60 percent of remarriages, disproportionately affecting economically-vulnerable families.s The taxpayer-borne social costs of family fragmentation exceeds $112 billion per year, especially when all costs to the justice system are recognized.7 Social protections, especially for women and children, have been evaporating as we have collectively "debased the currency" of marriage. This debasement continues as a function of adultery; "quickie divorce;" physical and verbal spousal abuse; non-committal co-habitation; exemplary infidelity and "unwed cheating" among celebrities, sports figures and politicians; anti-scientific bias which holds, in complete absence of empirical proof, that non-heterosexual inclinations are genetically determined, irresistible and akin to innate traits like race, gender and eye color; as well as anti-scientific bias which holds, against all empirical evidence, that homosexual behavior in particular, and sexual promiscuity in general, optimizes individual or public health. 8 .. .. .. .. The Candidate Vow: Therefore, in any elected or appointed capacity by which Lmay have the honor of serving our fellow citizens in these United States, I the undersigned do hereby solemnly vow" to honor and to cherish, to defend and to uphold, the Institution of Marriage as only between one man and one woman. I vow" to do so through my: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Personal fidelity to my spouse.v Respect for the marital bonds of others.w Official fidelity to the U.S. Constitution, supportingthe elevation of none but faithful constitutionalists as judges or justices." Vigorous opposition to any redefinition of the Institution of Marriage - faithful monogamy between one man and one woman - through statutory-,.bureaucratic-, or court-imposed recognition of intimate unions which are bigamous, polygamous, polyandrous, same-sex, etc.> Recognition of the overwhelming statistical evidence that married people enjoy better health, better sex, longer lives, greater financial stability, and that children raised by a mother and a father together experience better learning, less addiction, less legal trouble, and less extramarital.pregnancy. 13 Support for prompt reform of uneconomic, allti-marriage aspects of welfare policy, tax policy, and marital! divorce law, and extended "second chance" or "cooling-off' periods forthose seeking a "quickie divorce." 14 Earnest, bonafide legal advocacy for the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) at the federal and state levels. IS Steadfast embrace of a federal MarriageAmendment to the U.S. Constitution which protects the definition. of marriage as between onemanand one woman-in all oftheUnitedStates. 16 Humane protection of women and the innocent fruit of conjugal intimacy - our next generation of American.children from human trafficking, sexual slavery, seduction into promiscuity, and all forms of pornography and prostitution, infanticide, abortion and other types of coercion or stolen innocence.'? Support for the enactment of safeguards for all Iilarried and unmarriedU.S. MilitaryandNational Guard personnel, especially our combat troops, from inappropriate same-gender or opposite-gender sexual harassment,adultery or intrusively intimate commingling among attracteds (restrooms, showers, barracks, tents, etc.); plus prompt termination of military policymakers who would expose American wives and daughters to rape or sexual harassment, torture, enslavement or sexual leveraging by the enemy in forward combat roles.'s Rejection of Sharia.Islam and all other anti-woman, anti-human rightsforrnsoftotalitarian control.w Recognition that robust childbearing and reproduction is beneficial to U.S. demographic, economic, strategic and actuarial health and security. 20 Commitment to downsizing government and the enormous burden upon American families •of the USA's $14.3 trillion public debt, its$77trillion in unfunded liabilities, its $1.5 trillion federal deficit, and its $3.5 trillion federal budget.« Fierce defense of the First Amendment's rights of Religious Liberty and Freedom of.Speech=, especially against the intolerance of any who would undermine law-abiding American citizens and institutions of faith and conscience for their adherence to, and defense of, faithful heterosexual monogamy. The Vow of Civic, Religious, Lay, Business, and Social Leaders: We the undersigned do hereby solemnly vow* that no U.S. Presidential primary candidate - nor any primary candidate for the U. S. House, Senate, Governor, state or municipal office - will, in his or her public capacity, benefit from any substantial form of aid, support, endorsement,contribution, independent expenditure, or affirmation from any of us without first affirming this Marriage Vow. Furthermore, to uphold and advance the natural Institution of Marriage, we ourselves also herebyvow* our own fidelity to this Declaration and especially, to our spouses. So help us God. * NOTE: Or, "solemnly attest". Each signatory signs only in his or her individual capacity as an American citizen and current or potential leader; affiliations herein are foridentification institution or organization. purposes only and do not necessarily imply formal embrace of this vow or the sentiments herein by any Signatories: Name Candidacy or Title/Affiliation Date END NOTES AND SOURCES: 1 The Marriage Vow is a work product of The a public advocacy organization affiliated with the Iowa Family Policy Center, and collaborating supporters across the U.S. political and lC spectrum, recognize that enduring, healthy marriages are necessary to healthy children and a healthy American society. Sociological data squares with argue that self-centered adult egos and agendas in American families must be subordinated to the long-term interests of America's children. 2 Genesis 2:18-25; Mark 10:2-9, Ephesians 5:22-33; Sherif Girgis, Robert P.George and Ryan T. Anderson, "What is Marriage?," Harvard Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 34, NO.1, pp. 245-287, Winter 2010 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract id=1722lli5}; Jay Budziszewski, What We Can't Not Know: A Guide, Spence Publishing, 2011, pp. 38-39; The Declaration ofIndependence. 3 Lorraine Blackman, Obie Clayton, Norval Glenn, Linda Malone-Colon, and Alex Roberts, "The Consequences of Marriage for African Americans: A Comprehensive Literature Review," Institute for American Values, 2005 CW""-Lamericanvalues.org/pdfs/conseqnences of marriage. pdf). 4 Gretchen Livingston and D'Vera Cohn, "The New Demography of American Motherhood," Pew Research Center, (Revised August 19,2010) May 6,2010; Centers for Disease National Centerfor Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Report, "Births: Preliminary Data for 2008," April 6, 2010, Table 1 at ~'l~,hl;~ciJ~~~~~~i'ci0~i 6 1979 cohort (NYLS79). William J. Doherty and Leah Ward Sears, "Second Chances: A Proposal to Reduce Unnecessary Divorce," Institute for American Values, to be published in 2011. 7 Scafidi, Benjamin, The Taxpcujer Costs of Divorce and Unwed Childbearing (New York; Institute for American Values, 2008, ISBN: 1-931764-14-X), Appendix A, pp. 22-30. 8 No peer-reviewed empirical science or rational demonstration has ever definitively proven, nor even has shown an overwhelming probability, that homosexual preference or behavior is irresistible as a function of genetic determinism or other forms of fatalism. Furthermore, no peer-reviewed empirical science or rational, scholarly demonstration has ever definitively proven, nor even has shown an overwhelming probability: (1) That society's interest in the physical, psychological and sociological health of infants, children, young people and other minors is not best upheld through the enduring institution of legal marriage, especially faithful monogamy, as between only one man and one woman; (2) That society's interest in a healthy, vibrant, and growing indigenous population and workforce to drive economic growth and actuarially support public and private pension, benefit and entitlement systems is in any way advanced by undermining the institution of faithful, lawful marriage as between only one man and one woman; (3) That the longstanding religious liberties of American parents, children, religious and civic leaders who adhere to Jewish and Christian tradition, teaching and sacred texts regarding faithful heterosexual monogamy are not jeopardized by recent or pending redefinitions oflegal marriage to include same-sex unions, polygamy and other kinds of intimate relations; (4) That practices such as adultery, bisexuality, homosexuality, anal intercourse, group sex, promiscuity, serial marriage, polygamy, polyandry and extramarital sex, individually or collectively, lead to general improvements in: a. Human mortality; See for example, Robert S. Hogg et ai, "Modeling the Impact of HIV Disease on Mortality in Gay and Bisexual Men," International Journal of Epidemiology, 1997, Vol. 26, no. 3. From the abstract: "In a major Canadian centre, life expectancy at age 20 years for gay and bisexual men is 8 to 20 years less than for all men. If the same pattern of mortality were to continue, we estimate that nearly half of gay and bisexual men currently aged 20 years will not reach their 65th birthday. Under even the most liberal assumptions, gay and bisexual men in this urban centre are now experiencing a life expectancy similar to that experienced by all men in Canada in the year 1871." b. Public health, c. Public health costs (Medicaid, Medicare, etc.) d. General health care price inflation (medical, hospital, insurance, etc). e. Incidence of single parent households and related social costs, f. Incidence of epidemics and pandemics, g. Incidence of: i. HIV/ AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus); ii. Other retroviruses like XMRV, HTLV, etc. (affecting venereal fluids, semen, breast milk, blood); iii. Septic bacterial infections (such as from E Coli); iv. Hepatitis (forms of which are transmitted via fecal-oral, venereal contact); v. Chancroid (Haemophilus ducreyi); vi. Chlamydia (Chlamydia trachomatis); vii. Granuloma inguinale or (Klebsiella granulomatis); viii. Gonorrhea (Neisseria gonorrhoeae); ix. Syphilis (Treponema pallidum); x. Herpes simplex xi. Genital warts xii. HPV (Human Papilloma Virus) Xl11. Phthirius pubis (pubic lice) xiv. xv. X\~. xvii. xviii. Sarcoptes scabiei (scabies) Trichomoniasis (Trichomonas vaginalis) Anal incontinence Abortion Abortion-related complications "As applicable if married now, wed in the future, or whenever interacting with another's spouse, a person ofthe opposite sex or of personal attraction. No signer herein claims to be without past wrongdoing, including that of adultery. Yet going forward, each hereby vows fidelity to his or her marital vows, to his or her spouse, to all strictures and commandments against adultery, and to resist the lure of pornography destructive to marital intimacy. 10 Personal infidelity often destroys two marriages and two families. "It is no secret that a handful of state and federal judges, some of whom have personally rejected heterosexuality and faithful monogamy, have also abandoned bonafide constitutional interpretation in accord with the discernible intent of the framers. In November, 2010, Iowa voters overwhelmingly rejected three such justices from the state Supreme Court in retention elections. Yet, certain federal jurists with lifetime appointments stand poised, even now, to "discover" a right of so-called same-sex marriage or polygamous marriage in the U.S. Constitution. 12 Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas (hUn:! !w v.law.comell.edu/supctlhtml/02-102.ZD.html) holds that laws against such things as bigamy/polygamy, prostitution, bestiality, adult incest -- customs historically rejected within the United States -- may become Constitutionally-inevitable under U.S. Supreme Court logic which could be used to invalidate the Defense of Marriage Act and laws, in the overwhelming majority of states, against so-called same-sex marriage and nearequivalents. This is particularly problematic with regard to polygamy, a demographic and strategic means for the advancement of Sharia Islamist misogyny, for attacks upon the rights of women, for the violent persecution of homosexuals, for the undermining of basic human rights, and for general religious and civil intolerance for Jewish, Christian and other non-Islamic faiths under Sharia law. 13 U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2006-2008; W. Bradford Wilcox, William J. Doherty, Helen Fisher, William A. Galston, Norval D. Glenn, John Gottman, Robert Lerman, Annette Mahoney, Barbara Markey, Howard J. Markman, Steven Nock, David Popenoe, Gloria G. Rodriguez, Scott M. Stanley, Linda J. Waite, Judith Wallerstein, "Why Marriage Matters: Twenty-Six Conclusions from the Social Sciences," Institute for American Values, 2005 15 Although signed by President Clinton in 1996, the U.S, Justice Department has abandoned good faith legal defense of the Defense of Marriage Act(DOMA), the repeal of which President Obama favors so states may be forced by courts to recognize so-called same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. Therefore, we hereby applaud the commitment of Speaker John Boehner and his House Leadership to bring about appropriate legal intervention by the U.S. House of Representatives, in defense of both DOMA and the institution of the Congress itself; a binding act of the Legislative Branch of the federal government has been abandoned for-ideological reasons by the Executive Branch. Forthe event that activist Federal courts orthe U.S. Supreme Court may ultimately strike down DOMA or state laws limiting legal marriage to one man and one woman, the signatories hereby vow to support a Marriage Amendment which would constitutionally define and limit legal marriage or marriage equivalents in the U.S. to one man and one woman, thereby especially protecting American women and children from Sharia polygamy, same-sex unions, and other debasements of Judeo-Christian heteromonogamy. To date, the ONLY states whose elected lawmakers and governors have enacted same-sex marriage onhehalf of their constituentsare: Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire and New York. , In all 31 states in which marriage has been putto a vote of the People, same-sex marriage has been defeated and natural marriage has been upheld (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota.Tennessee.Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin). 17 Human trafficking, child pornography and prostitution, .pimping, sexual slavery and forced abortion are inherently coercive of vulnerable females. ,Infanticide and abortion are inherently coercive of the babies who are killed; as a matter of human rights, we reject any form of intrauterine or extrauterine child killing which is partialbirth; live-birth; post-viability; third trimester; involving fetal pain; taxpayer-subsidized; based on gender or disability or racial discrimination against the baby; without fully-informed consent; without disclosure of pregnancy care and adoption placement options; without disclosure of abortion's eugenicandracisthistory;invohing a minor without parental knowledge or consent; in disregard of conscience objections of health care professionals and institutions; involving cloning or experimentation on non-consenting human subjects;involving dangerous abortifacient drugs; orfor.alleged necessities, other than to save the life of the mother. 18 See, e.g., Center for Military Readiness: www.cmrlinkorg/HMilitarv.asp, ,www.cmrlinkorgtWomenlnCombat.asp 19,Wedo ,not oppose peaceful Muslims, only the intolerant system of Sharia Islam: Princeton's Bernard Lewis,dean of Western scholarsofIslam, says, "<My own feeling is that the greatest defect of Islam and the main reason they fell behind the West is the treatment of women,' he says. He makes the powerful point that repressive homes pave the way for repressive governments. Think of a child that grows up in a Muslim household where the mother has no rights, where she is downtrodden and subservient. That's preparation for a life of despotism and subservience. It prepares the way for an authoritarian society,''' (The Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2011 at A13). Sharia Islamist aims are abusive of women, young girls and .Iudeo-Christian notions of gender equality, civil tolerance and liberty. Over the long run, Sharia polygamy, multi-partner childbearing, demographic jihad andthe persecution of Jews, Christians, blacks, artists, feminists, gays, freethinkers and other non-conformists poses a threat to Western human rights in general, and to American liberty in particular. 20 See, e.g., Julian Lincoln Simon, The Ultimate Resource and The UltimateResource 2, Princeton University Press,1981 and 1996, respectively; Mark Steyn, America Alone, Regnery Publishing, 2006;, Ben J.Wattenberg, l'ewer: How the New Demography of Depopulation Will Shape Our Future, Ivan R.Dee, 2004;''Demographic Winter: The Decline of the Human Family," 2008, SRB Documentary, LLC, 585 West 500 South #110, Bountiful, UT 84010; It is beyond debate that 50 million American abortions since Roe v. Wade have thrown actuarial assumptions about Social Security, Medicare and public and private pensions into chaos. 21 United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of the Public Debt (December 2010). "The debt to the penny and who holds it". TreasuryDirect. Retrieved March 2, 2011. Z2 Amendment 1: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The FAMiLY LEADER 1100 N. Hickory Blvd.,Suitel07, PleasantHill, TheFamilyLeader.com·877-866-4372 IA50327 The Alliance Defense Fund,the world'slargestChristian legal organization, is an alliance of more than 2,000 attorneys and 300 like-minded organizations defending the right of people to freely live out their faith. Unlike any other organization, ADF.employs a unique combination of strategy, training, funding, and litigation to defend religious liberty, sanctity of life, marriage and family. www.telladf.org ADF is thelegalleaderin the battle to preserve marriage.ADF has participated. in57 cases. Of those, 42 have been concluded successfully- a 79.2% victory ratio.<ADF is currently part of the litigation team in Perry v. Brown, the federal challenge to Prop 8, California's state constitutional marriage amendment. Marriage isasocial,cultural,economic,andmoraigood .•Americans believe this. At ballot boxes.in 31 out of 31 states, Americans have affirmed marriage by an average vote of nearly 68%. Altogether, total of 63 million Americans have voted on state marriage amendments. Fortv million--63%--votedyes '::=~~=~~l::!l:lc::' in their state constitutions. However, those attempting to redefine marriage have attacked. marriage through activist. courts and have spent untold .millions. enlisting. the mainstream media; the. entertainment ••• industry, and major .corporations. to position •• arriage (supporters •••• m as loathsome bigots .. The solid.rnajority.ofAmericans who continue to support marriage have all but lost their voices in the. face of these assaults on their collective character. In response, ADF commissioned Public Opinion. Strategies to conduct what is likelv :the most comprehensive. national study ever to •determine what America •finds rnostappeal.ingabgut marriage and what ideas they are most confidentexpressing in today'sincreasinglyhostileenvironment. After 14 focus groups (comprising 124 "swing voters" "undecided" on marriage) in Chicago, Orange County (CA) and Atlanta/and a national survey of 1.500 Americans,the research affirmed: • • • • • • By a 62-36 margin, Americans said iiI believe marriage should be defined ONLY as the union between one man and one woman." (53% STRONGLY AGREEwith this statement) Americans believe marriage is a special, unique, timeless, and universally-defined ideal that benefits society like no other relationship is able to do. Americans believe that the societal purpose of marriage is to naturally build healthy families for the good of future generations and that children do best with both a mom and a dad. Americans reject the idea that it is bigoted or discriminatory to believe that society should uphold and promote the ideal - marriage as the lifelong, faithful union of one man and one woman in which children are raised with both a mom and a dad. Pro-marriage Americans list marriage as their number one issue at more than two-and-a-half times the rate as those who favor marriage redefinition. Americans believe that voting matters and are tired of having their votes threatened by courts. we are eager to share more details about the survey and to discuss how we may move forward together to preserve marriage. Contact: Greg Scott - ADF Director of National Media Relations - [email protected]/480-388-8111 For those who wish to work in alliance with ADF (www.telladf,orq), ALLIANCE DEFENSE FUND NEWS RELEASE June 16, 2011 - FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT ADF MEDIA RELATIONS: (480) 444-0020 Married to marriage: 62°kof Americans say it's one man, one woman, nothing else Comprehensive survey shows supportJQr marriage remains high despite recent, flawed polls. that create illusion of momentum against it SCOTTSDALE, Ariz. - Results from what is likely the most extensive national research survey of its kind show that 62 percent of Americans believe that'.'marriage should be defined only as a union between one man and one woman." Fifty-three percent of Americans "strongly agreed." ===:::"==-:'..=;.L' sponsored by the Alliance Defense Fund and completed by Public Opinion 9, waspartofa comprehensive examination of American attitudes toward marriage. In addition to the national survey, theresearch included 14 focus groups completed across the country. "Americans recognize that marriage providesastrongfoundation forathrivingsociety," saidADF Senior Counsel Brian Raum .••"The union between husband and wife benefitssociety--especially children--in unique ways that cannot be duplicated by any other relationship. Throughout history, diverse cultures and faiths have recognized this universally defined ideal as the best way to promote healthy, natural families for the good of future generations." The survey resultsmirrorAmerican voter behavior when faced with the decisiqn to. either affirm marriage in their state constitutions or leave it open to legal challenges or other attacks. "These numbers are not surprising," said Public Opinion Strategies partner, .andthe survey's director, Gene Vim. "More than 63 .miHion Americans in 3 I state elections have voted on constitutional marriage amendments -.Forty million Atnericansin all-.-63% oflotal voters--have voted t().affirm marriage as a.union between a man and a woman." "Americans strongly affirm the lifelong, faithfulunionofa man anda womanasthefundamental building block of civilization," said Raum. "This surveY,along with the nearly 80 percent win rate in ADF marriage cases,shows the opposition has created an illusion of momentum but nota real base of support or track record of victoryinthe courts." POS is a nationally-known public opinion research firm. In addition to pollingJorFortunelOO companies, 80 mernbers of Congress, .19 sel1ators,.and sixgoyernors, the firtn'spartners(in conjunction with two other firms) poll for NBC News/Wall Street Journal and National Public Radio. • Pronunciation guide: Raum (RAHM') ADFisa legal alliance OfChristian attorneys and like-minded organizations defending the right of people to free/yJiveouttheir faith. Launchedin 1994,ADF employs a unique combination of strategy, training, funding, and litigation to protect and preserve religious liberty, the sanctity of life, marriage, and the family. ||||| Former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney's campaign said Tuesday that he will not sign a conservative Iowa Christian group's far-reaching pledge opposing gay marriage, making him the first Republican presidential candidate to reject it. Republican presidential candidate, former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney reaches out to shake a hand while arriving for a private fundraiser in Portland, Ore., Monday, July 11, 2011. Romney has scheduled... (Associated Press) Two of Romney's rivals for the Republican nomination, Minnesota Rep. Michele Bachmann and former Pennsylvania Sen. Rick Santorum, have signed the The Family Leader's 14-point pledge, which calls on the candidates to denounce same-sex marriage rights, pornography, same-sex military accommodations and forms of Islamic law. When it was first circulated last week, the introduction to the pledge stated that African American children were more likely to be raised in two-parent households when they were born into slavery than they are today. The group struck that language and apologized after black ministers complained, but it said it stands by the rest of the document. Andrea Saul, a spokeswoman for Romney, told The Associated Press in a written statement Tuesday that Romney "strongly supports traditional marriage," but that the oath "contained references and provisions that were undignified and inappropriate for a presidential campaign." Bachmann and Santorum have been campaigning hard to court the influential social conservatives in Iowa, which holds the nation's first caucuses. Romney's rejection of the pledge reflects his diminished focus on winning Iowa, where he spent $10 million during his 2008 presidential campaign only to finish second. None of the other GOP presidential hopefuls, including former Minnesota Gov. Tim Pawlenty and former U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich, have said whether they will sign the pledge or not. Romney, who supported rights for gay couples in Massachusetts, was criticized in Iowa by some Iowa social conservatives during his 2008 campaign, when he finished second in the caucuses after aggressively courting Christian conservatives. In his second bid, Romney, who leads in national GOP polls, has cast himself as a national figure more focused on the economy, and has said he would not spend as much time and money campaigning in Iowa as he did during his $10 million effort for the 2008 caucuses. The Family Leader, an organization formed last year and positioning itself to be an influential player in the 2012 caucuses, said Tuesday they stand by the 14 policy positions listed under the promise to "defend and to uphold the institution of marriage as only between one man and one woman." The points include the promise to be faithful to their spouses, enforce the federal Defense of Marriage Act and support a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. The group said signing the oath is a condition of winning its endorsement before the caucuses. "We are standing firm that the 14 points of the marriage vow are right on target and we are creating higher standards for the presidential candidates," said Julie Summa, director of marketing and public outreach for The Family Leader. "We are not backing away from that at all." Gay marriage has been a volatile issue in Iowa in recent years, and came to a head in 2009 when the Iowa Supreme Court struck down the state's statutory ban on gay marriage, making same-sex marriages legal. Republican presidential candidate Jon Huntsman is not campaigning in Iowa, citing his past opposition to farm subsidies, although he also supported rights for same-sex couples as governor of Utah. Huntsman campaign aides said Tuesday the former U.S. ambassador to China is declining to sign any pledges as part of his campaign.

Mitt Romney is rejecting an anti-gay-marriage pledge concocted by an Iowa Christian group, becoming only the second GOP candidate—after Gary Johnson—to do so. The controversial 14-point pledge, already signed by Michele Bachmann and Rick Santorum, calls on candidates to "defend and uphold" marriage as uniting one man and one woman, and to reject pornography, "comingling attracteds" in military accommodations, and Islamic law. The group behind the pledge has removed a preamble suggesting that black children born into slavery had more stable family structures than exist today. Romney "strongly supports traditional marriage," but the oath "contained references and provisions that were undignified and inappropriate for a presidential campaign," a spokeswoman tells the AP. Other GOP hopefuls, including Tim Pawlenty and Newt Gingrich, haven't said whether they'll sign the pledge.

A streetcar is a type of light rail public transportation that operates mostly in mixed traffic on rail lines embedded in streets and highways. Streetcar service is typically provided by single cars with electric power delivered by overhead wires known as catenaries, although streetcars can also draw power from underground cables or from batteries. Compared with non-streetcar light rail, streetcar lines tend to be shorter and the stops more frequent. Because of the short distance between stops and the overall operating environment, streetcars are slow compared with non-streetcar light rail and other types of rail public transportation, such as commuter rail and heavy rail. Streetcar systems can be categorized into four different types: 1. legacy systems, lines that have been in operation for many years, but are the remnants of more extensive past systems (e.g., New Orleans); 2. heritage systems, new or revived systems using historical equipment (e.g., Memphis); 3. replica systems, new or revived systems using equipment built to replicate historical systems, but sometimes with modern amenities such as air conditioning (e.g., Tampa); 4. modern systems, new systems using modern equipment (e.g., Portland, OR). In early 2014, there were 12 operating streetcar systems, 7 new systems under construction, and approximately 21 new systems in the planning stages ( Figure 1 ). Not included in these figures are several short streetcar lines associated with museums (e.g., Issaquah, WA) or primarily oriented to tourists (e.g., San Pedro, CA). Additionally, a few systems already in operation have extensions in construction or being planned. Because they are often controversial, streetcar systems that are being planned may not be built. The streetcars systems with the largest ridership include those in Philadelphia; New Orleans; San Francisco; Portland, OR; Tacoma; Memphis; and Seattle. Streetcars are intended to provide high-quality transit service for traveling short distances in urban environments. As part of this service, streetcars can link to other transportation modes as part of the "last mile" of a trip, as in Salt Lake City, where a new streetcar line links to light rail and bus lines. Streetcars are often promoted as a means of increasing transit ridership by offering a better quality of service than buses, including such things as frequency of service, predictability of trip time, passenger capacity, and comfort. Additionally, streetcars can more easily accommodate wheelchairs and bicycles. Service quality, however, is not better in all cases: streetcars can be delayed by problems that would not affect buses, such as fallen catenaries or vehicles double-parked on the tracks. Greater capacity in modern streetcars may in part come at the expense of seating. Overall, there is no clear evidence as to whether streetcars attract new riders to transit. In some circumstances, streetcars can help attract and focus development by providing a more permanent transportation investment than buses and by promoting a walkable environment. For example, the greater permanence of a streetcar may improve the coherence of the urban environment, and may reduce the risk for developers of offices, residences, and retail, spurring job creation. The proximity of a streetcar may also reduce some costs that would otherwise confront private developers, such as the need for a large numbers of parking spaces. According to one study, the area within a quarter-mile of the Little Rock streetcar system, opened in 2004, has had a capital investment of $800 million in new businesses, residences, and other activities between 2000 and 2012. In addition, during construction, streetcars tend to be less disruptive of existing activities than other forms of rail systems. However, it is possible that development spurred by streetcar lines is merely shifted from other parts of the urban area. This is a concern in analyzing the effects of rail transit in general, but there is little empirical research on this question for streetcars specifically. In addition to the expense of the streetcar itself, development along streetcar lines has sometimes benefited from other subsidies. Not all streetcar lines have succeeded in stimulating property development. The city planning literature suggests that if a streetcar is to spur development, the host locality needs to at least provide supportive land use laws, such as permitting higher-density, mixed-use developments along a corridor. One study found that government support in the form of such things as incentives, zoning changes, and marketing is the leading factor determining whether or not development occurs around investment in public transportation. The same study found that both light rail transit, including streetcars, and bus rapid transit (BRT) led to development, but that BRT leveraged much more private investment per dollar of transit expenditure. Streetcar systems can be much less costly to build than light rail systems, and may be particularly attractive in small and medium-size cities where a larger and more expensive rail system is not appropriate. Capital costs per mile can vary dramatically, however, depending on the specific circumstances of projects, including the need for major new infrastructure. A study of 21 light rail, streetcar, and BRT lines found that streetcars were middling in terms of capital cost per mile. While the 21 projects ranged from below $10 million per mile to over $80 million per mile, the two streetcar projects analyzed, Portland, OR, and Seattle, cost about $30 million per mile and $60 million per mile to build, respectively (in 2010 dollars). Although conventional buses do not provide some of the advantages of BRT and rail transit, including streetcars, regular bus service improvements are likely to be the least costly of all measures to increase transit capacity. Operating costs, including such things as drivers' salaries, fuel, and track and vehicle maintenance, are difficult to compare among modes because of differing service characteristics. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis of operational costs, for example, showed no consistent advantage for BRT or light rail. A comparison of operating costs of streetcar and bus service in seven cities found that costs per trip were higher for streetcars in only two cities. But measured by cost per passenger mile, streetcar operating costs were significantly higher than bus operating costs. There are currently three main sources of funding available for the construction of streetcar systems: (1) the TIGER grant program; (2) the New Starts and Small Starts program; and (3) flexible federal-aid highway program funds, including funding from the Surface Transportation Program and the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement (CMAQ) program. The predominant form of federal support for the construction of streetcars over the past few years has been the Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) program. This is likely because TIGER provides moderate sums of discretionary funding, streetcars are favored by the Obama Administration as so-called "livability" projects, and, until passage of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ) in 2012, streetcar projects did not score well in the evaluation of projects funded by the New Starts and Small Starts program. Initially enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ), the TIGER program has been funded in five subsequent appropriations bills. TIGER funding was $1.5 billion in FY2009, $600 million in FY2010, $527 million in FY2011, $500 million in FY2012, $474 million in FY2013, and $600 million in FY2014. Funds are drawn from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. Nine streetcar projects have been awarded a total of $279 million from the TIGER program (see Table 1 ). To date, FY2014 funding has not been awarded. According to a notice of funding availability, applications for FY2014 funding must be submitted by April 28, 2014. The New Starts and Small Starts program provides federal funds to public transportation agencies on a largely competitive basis for the construction of new fixed guideway transit systems and the expansion of existing systems (49 U.S.C. §5309). The New Starts and Small Starts program is one of six major funding programs administered by FTA, accounting for about 18% of FTA's budget. Unlike the other major federal transit programs, which are funded from the mass transit account of the highway trust fund, funding for the New Starts and Small Starts program comes from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. MAP-21 authorized $1.9 billion for FY2013 and FY2014. Funding appropriated for the program was $1.855 billion in FY2013 and $1.943 billion in FY2014. In addition, the FY2014 appropriations act provided $93 million in unobligated funds from the former discretionary bus and bus facilities program for bus rapid transit projects, and an unspecified amount of unobligated funds from the former alternatives analysis program for any type of New Start and Small Start project. Streetcar projects typically fall into the Small Starts category, defined as projects requesting $75 million or less in federal assistance and costing $250 million or less in total. To go with the smaller amount of federal funds being committed, the approval process for Small Starts projects is simpler than for larger and more expensive New Starts projects. Few streetcar projects have received New Starts and Small Starts program funding over the past two decades, but changes in the way projects are evaluated by FTA may make it easier in the future. GAO found that of the 57 projects approved for funding under the New Starts and Small Starts program between October 2004 and June 2012, only one was a streetcar project (Portland, OR). This was likely due to the use of cost of time savings as part of the evaluation of projects prior to MAP-21, as that measure tended to favor projects supporting faster long-distance trips, like those on commuter rail, rather than slower, shorter trips like those on streetcars. As required by MAP-21, the cost of time savings measure has now been dropped in favor of cost per rider. In December 2013, two streetcar projects, those in Tempe, AZ, and Ft. Lauderdale, FL, were in the project development phase of the Small Starts process. In its study, GAO did not include projects receiving less than $25 million in New Starts and Small Starts program funding, which were exempt from the normal New Starts and Small Starts evaluation process. In FY2010, five streetcar projects were awarded $25 million or less. Streetcar projects in Fort Worth, St. Louis, Charlotte, and Cincinnati were awarded $24.99 million each, and Dallas received $4.9 million. These funds distributed by FTA were from $130 million in unallocated New Starts and Small Starts program funds. The Obama Administration decided that it would use them for what it termed "urban circulator" projects, mainly streetcar and bus rapid transit projects. Instead of the New Starts and Small Starts selection criteria, the Urban Circulator grant program evaluated projects based on livability, including providing additional transportation options, sustainability, and economic development. MAP-21 continues to allow certain federal-aid highway funds to be used for public transportation projects at the discretion of state and local officials. Most of the "flexed" funds have come from two programs, the Surface Transportation Program (STP) and the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ). Several streetcar projects have used or are proposing to use flexed funding. For example, the streetcar project in Tempe, AZ, is proposing to use $32.1 million dollar of CMAQ funding in addition to $56 million from the New Starts and Small Starts program and $41.24 million in local funding. The costs of operating transit service include such functions as vehicle operation and maintenance, maintenance of stations and other facilities, general administration, and purchase of transportation from private operators. In general, federal law prohibits transit operators in urbanized areas of 200,000 or more residents from using federal transit funds for operating expenditures, including annual distributions of federal public transportation funds by formula. Federal support in urbanized areas of this size is limited to capital expenditures. However, the definition of transit capital expenses includes some items traditionally considered to be operating expenses, such as preventive maintenance. In some circumstances, CMAQ funds can be used to support the operating expenses of streetcars. As the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) notes, "projects designed to attract new riders, typically by providing new transit facilities or services, are eligible for CMAQ funds ... Projects can include both constructing and operating new facilities." Among other things, CMAQ funds may be used to provide fare subsides. However, FHWA also notes that CMAQ funds typically provide short-term help to launch new or expanded service. Relatively recent changes in federal programs, should they be maintained, are likely to lead to greater support for streetcars in the coming years. These changes include the creation of the TIGER program in FY2009 and its continued funding through FY2014, and reforms to the evaluation of projects in the New Starts and Small Starts program that favor streetcars. Increased funding of these programs may lead to even greater federal support for building new streetcar lines, although this would depend on the competition for funds from other types of projects. Another way to increase federal support for streetcar construction would be to direct more existing funding to these types of projects. One way for Congress to accomplish this would be to reinstitute the set-aside of New Starts and Small Starts funding for Small Starts projects, those requesting $75 million or less in federal assistance and costing $250 million or less in total. Prior to MAP-21, $200 million of the program's funding was reserved for Small Starts projects. This again would not guarantee the funding of streetcars because Small Starts grants also go to other types of projects, such as BRT, but it would limit the competition for these funds. Congress might also consider supporting streetcar systems by allowing the use of federal transit funds to pay for operating costs. The federal government generally prohibits the use of federal transit funds for operating expenses in urbanized areas over 200,000. However, small bus operators in these larger urbanized areas were provided support in MAP-21. Operators of small fixed-guideway systems, such as streetcars, might be afforded the same opportunity. Alternatively, Congress might decide to reduce or eliminate the use of federal funds for streetcar construction and operation. This could be accomplished by reducing or eliminating funding for the TIGER program, the New Starts and Small Starts program, and flexible highway programs, or by prohibiting the use of program funds for streetcars. In the case of the New Starts and Small Starts program it might be easier to reinstitute evaluation criteria that are unfavorable to streetcar projects. This might entail requiring the use of time savings or passenger miles, not passenger trips, as a measure of mobility benefits.

Streetcars, a type of rail public transportation, are experiencing a revival in the United States. Also known as trolleys, streetcars were widespread in the early decades of the 20th century, but almost extinct by the 1960s. Several new streetcar systems have been built over the past 20 years, and many more are being planned. In early 2014, there were 12 operating streetcar systems, 7 new systems under construction, and approximately 21 new systems in the planning stages. Many streetcars systems, though not all, have been built or are being built with the support of federal funds. This report answers some frequently asked questions about streetcars and federal involvement in their construction and operation. It concludes by laying out policy options for Congress in dealing with streetcars.

Craig Timberg covers technology for The Washington Post. Google’s motto is “Don’t be evil.” But what would it mean for democracy if it was? That’s the question psychologist Robert Epstein has been asking in a series of experiments testing the impact of a fictitious search engine — he called it “Kadoodle” — that manipulated search rankings, giving an edge to a favored political candidate by pushing up flattering links and pushing down unflattering ones. Not only could Kadoodle sway the outcome of close elections, he says, it could do so in a way most voters would never notice. Epstein, who had a public spat with Google last year, offers no evidence of actual evil acts by the company. Yet his exploration of Kadoodle — think of it as the equivalent of Evil Spock, complete with goatee — not only illuminates how search engines shape individual choices but asks whether the government should have a role in keeping this power in check. “They have a tool far more powerful than an endorsement or a donation to affect the outcome,” Epstein said. “You have a tool for shaping government. . . . It’s a huge effect that’s basically undetectable.” There is no reason to believe that Google would manipulate politically sensitive search results. The company depends on its reputation for presenting fair, useful links, and though that image has taken some hits in recent years with high-profile investigations in the United States and Europe, it would be far worse to get caught trying to distort search results for political ends. Yet Epstein’s core finding — that a dominant search engine could alter perceptions of candidates in close elections — has substantial support. Given the wealth of information available about Internet users, a search engine could even tailor results for ­­­certain groups, based on location, age, income level, past searches, Web browsing history or other factors. The voters least tuned in to other sources of information, such as news reports or campaign advertisements, would be most vulnerable. These are the same people who often end up in the crucial middle of American politics as coveted swing voters. “Elections are won among low-information voters,” said Eli Pariser, former president of ­MoveOn.org and the author of “The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding From You.” “The ability to raise a negative story about a candidate to a voter . . . could be quite powerful.” Even efforts to refine search algorithms, he said, can unintentionally affect what voters see on their results pages. A search engine that favorscertain news sources — based, for example, on the sophistication of the writing as measured by vocabulary or sentence length — might push to prominence links preferred by highly educated readers, helping the political party and ideas they support. Epstein’s research is slated to be presented in Washington this spring at the annual meeting of the Association for Psychological Science. The Washington Post shared an advance copy of a five-page research summary with officials at Google. “Providing relevant answers has been the cornerstone of Google’s approach to search from the very beginning,” the company said in a statement. “It would undermine people’s trust in our results and company if we were to change course.” It certainly is clear that outside groups seek to manipulate Google’s results. The consequences of such tactics in the consumer world are well-known, with companies spending vast sums trying to goose search rankings for their products in make-or-break bids for profit. In the political realm, the creators of “Google bombs” managed to link the name of then-Sen. John Kerry, the Democratic presidential nominee in 2004, with the word “waffles” in search results. President George W. Bush had his name linked, through similar tactics, to the words “miserable failure.” In 2010, a conservative group used a collection of linked Twitter accounts to affect search rankings about the Massachusetts special election that brought Scott Brown to the Senate, according to research by two computer science professors at Wellesley College. Google has resisted such tactics, and its vulnerability to ma­nipu­la­tion from outside was limited in the 2012 election cycle, according to researchers, political professionals and search experts. Though search results on Google are generated by a complex and ever-changing algorithm — weighing, for example, links to other sites, content quality and the time spent on sites when people click through — the key factors emphasize relevance to users. The company works to spot and defeat those who seek to alter results unfairly, and it sometimes punishes those who do by demoting their search rankings. But Epstein’s argument is based on a different scenario: What if ma­nipu­la­tion came from within? Even those who harbor no doubts about Google’s intentions generally agree that internal ma­nipu­la­tion would be potent and, at least initially, hard to spot. “They could do something manually with these results, but I can’t see why they would do that,” said Mike Grehan, publisher of Search Engine Watch and a commentator whose views often are in line with Google’s. Yet Epstein and some others say the company’s power alone — whether or not it uses it — calls out for legal safeguards. Though Microsoft, Yahoo and Facebook also operate search engines, Google has about two-thirds of the U.S. market. Even if Google has no plan to skew search rankings today, what if conditions — or its corporate leadership — changed over time? “There is a history of powerful communications companies directly meddling in elections. I don’t think Google has an incentive to do this, but a future Google could,” said Tim Wu, a Columbia University law professor and the author of “The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires.” “The question of free speech in America is controlled by a few powerful gatekeepers who could subtly shape things.” In the 1800s, Wu noted, Western Union employees often read telegrams from Democrats and shared their contents with Republicans — their political allies — or didn’t deliver them. This stopped, Wu said, only with the arrival of forceful federal regulation. Epstein, a Harvard-trained psychologist and former editor in chief of Psychology Today, turned his attention to Google after the company flagged search results for a Web site that he ran, warning that it was infected with malicious programs that could harm visitors. Epstein complained publicly about the move and the lack of responsiveness from Google, e-mailing senior company officials.He later acknowledged that his site had been infiltrated by hackers, but the experience left him aghast at what he considered Google’s unchecked power. He wrote blog posts calling for greater regulatory oversight of the company. For his experiment, conducted with colleague Ronald E. Robertson at the American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology, Epstein attempted to shape the perceptions of a random sampling of potential voters in California. The test involved an election most of the subjects knew little about: a close-fought campaign for prime minister of Australia in 2010. The researchers secretly altered the rankings of search results to help favored candidates. After 15 minutes of searching and reading linked articles, it was clear that the ma­nipu­la­tion had worked, with about 65 percent of subjects favoring the candidate getting elevated rankings, compared with 50 percent among a control group that saw impartial search results, according to Epstein. Three out of four subjects, meanwhile, reported no awareness that the search rankings had been altered. The lack of prior knowledge about the race or alternative sources of information accentuated the effects of the search rankings, Epstein acknowledged. But he said the experiment made clear that ma­nipu­la­tion is possible, powerful and hard to detect. However, the sheer volume of other information available to voters would make such ma­nipu­la­tion hard to execute, said David Vladeck, a Georgetown University law professor and the former head of consumer protection at the Federal Trade Commission. Traditional news organizations, he said, probably have more power over the views of voters. “It is not clear to me that, even if Google tried to, it could exercise the same power over the American public as Fox News or MSNBC,” Vladeck said. “The claim is such a difficult one to sustain that I find it hard to take it seriously.” Federal regulations have in some circumstances limited what news organizations can do. The Fairness Doctrine once required broadcasters to present both sides of controversial issues, and media cross-ownership rules can still limit the ability of newspapers, for example, to own radio or television stations in the same metropolitan area. Some legal scholars contend that search engine rankings are covered under the First Amendment’s free speech protections. Yet, even those who think that search engines can have potent effects on elections differ on what kind of regulation, if any, would be sensible and effective. And it’s not even clear what federal agency would have the authority to investigate allegations of abuse. The key lesson may be that search engines are not mere machines spitting out perfectly impartial results. They are driven by decisions, made by people who have biases. This does not necessarily make them evil — merely human. “The more trust we give to these kinds of tools, the more likely we can be manipulated down the road,” said Panagiotis T. Metaxas, one of the computer science professors at Wellesley College who studied the Massachusetts election. “We need to understand, as people, as citizens, why we believe what we believe.” [email protected] Read more from Outlook, friend us on Facebook, and follow us on Twitter. ||||| Craig Timberg covers technology for The Washington Post. Google’s motto is “Don’t be evil.” But what would it mean for democracy if it was? That’s the question psychologist Robert Epstein has been asking in a series of experiments testing the impact of a fictitious search engine — he called it “Kadoodle” — that manipulated search rankings, giving an edge to a favored political candidate by pushing up flattering links and pushing down unflattering ones. Not only could Kadoodle sway the outcome of close elections, he says, it could do so in a way most voters would never notice. Epstein, who had a public spat with Google last year, offers no evidence of actual evil acts by the company. Yet his exploration of Kadoodle — think of it as the equivalent of Evil Spock, complete with goatee — not only illuminates how search engines shape individual choices but asks whether the government should have a role in keeping this power in check. “They have a tool far more powerful than an endorsement or a donation to affect the outcome,” Epstein said. “You have a tool for shaping government. . . . It’s a huge effect that’s basically undetectable.” There is no reason to believe that Google would manipulate politically sensitive search results. The company depends on its reputation for presenting fair, useful links, and though that image has taken some hits in recent years with high-profile investigations in the United States and Europe, it would be far worse to get caught trying to distort search results for political ends. Yet Epstein’s core finding — that a dominant search engine could alter perceptions of candidates in close elections — has substantial support. Given the wealth of information available about Internet users, a search engine could even tailor results for ­­­certain groups, based on location, age, income level, past searches, Web browsing history or other factors. The voters least tuned in to other sources of information, such as news reports or campaign advertisements, would be most vulnerable. These are the same people who often end up in the crucial middle of American politics as coveted swing voters. “Elections are won among low-information voters,” said Eli Pariser, former president of ­MoveOn.org and the author of “The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding From You.” “The ability to raise a negative story about a candidate to a voter . . . could be quite powerful.” Even efforts to refine search algorithms, he said, can unintentionally affect what voters see on their results pages. A search engine that favorscertain news sources — based, for example, on the sophistication of the writing as measured by vocabulary or sentence length — might push to prominence links preferred by highly educated readers, helping the political party and ideas they support. Epstein’s research is slated to be presented in Washington this spring at the annual meeting of the Association for Psychological Science. The Washington Post shared an advance copy of a five-page research summary with officials at Google. “Providing relevant answers has been the cornerstone of Google’s approach to search from the very beginning,” the company said in a statement. “It would undermine people’s trust in our results and company if we were to change course.” It certainly is clear that outside groups seek to manipulate Google’s results. The consequences of such tactics in the consumer world are well-known, with companies spending vast sums trying to goose search rankings for their products in make-or-break bids for profit. In the political realm, the creators of “Google bombs” managed to link the name of then-Sen. John Kerry, the Democratic presidential nominee in 2004, with the word “waffles” in search results. President George W. Bush had his name linked, through similar tactics, to the words “miserable failure.” In 2010, a conservative group used a collection of linked Twitter accounts to affect search rankings about the Massachusetts special election that brought Scott Brown to the Senate, according to research by two computer science professors at Wellesley College. Google has resisted such tactics, and its vulnerability to ma­nipu­la­tion from outside was limited in the 2012 election cycle, according to researchers, political professionals and search experts. Though search results on Google are generated by a complex and ever-changing algorithm — weighing, for example, links to other sites, content quality and the time spent on sites when people click through — the key factors emphasize relevance to users. The company works to spot and defeat those who seek to alter results unfairly, and it sometimes punishes those who do by demoting their search rankings. But Epstein’s argument is based on a different scenario: What if ma­nipu­la­tion came from within? Even those who harbor no doubts about Google’s intentions generally agree that internal ma­nipu­la­tion would be potent and, at least initially, hard to spot. “They could do something manually with these results, but I can’t see why they would do that,” said Mike Grehan, publisher of Search Engine Watch and a commentator whose views often are in line with Google’s. Yet Epstein and some others say the company’s power alone — whether or not it uses it — calls out for legal safeguards. Though Microsoft, Yahoo and Facebook also operate search engines, Google has about two-thirds of the U.S. market. Even if Google has no plan to skew search rankings today, what if conditions — or its corporate leadership — changed over time? “There is a history of powerful communications companies directly meddling in elections. I don’t think Google has an incentive to do this, but a future Google could,” said Tim Wu, a Columbia University law professor and the author of “The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires.” “The question of free speech in America is controlled by a few powerful gatekeepers who could subtly shape things.” In the 1800s, Wu noted, Western Union employees often read telegrams from Democrats and shared their contents with Republicans — their political allies — or didn’t deliver them. This stopped, Wu said, only with the arrival of forceful federal regulation. Epstein, a Harvard-trained psychologist and former editor in chief of Psychology Today, turned his attention to Google after the company flagged search results for a Web site that he ran, warning that it was infected with malicious programs that could harm visitors. Epstein complained publicly about the move and the lack of responsiveness from Google, e-mailing senior company officials.He later acknowledged that his site had been infiltrated by hackers, but the experience left him aghast at what he considered Google’s unchecked power. He wrote blog posts calling for greater regulatory oversight of the company. For his experiment, conducted with colleague Ronald E. Robertson at the American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology, Epstein attempted to shape the perceptions of a random sampling of potential voters in California. The test involved an election most of the subjects knew little about: a close-fought campaign for prime minister of Australia in 2010. The researchers secretly altered the rankings of search results to help favored candidates. After 15 minutes of searching and reading linked articles, it was clear that the ma­nipu­la­tion had worked, with about 65 percent of subjects favoring the candidate getting elevated rankings, compared with 50 percent among a control group that saw impartial search results, according to Epstein. Three out of four subjects, meanwhile, reported no awareness that the search rankings had been altered. The lack of prior knowledge about the race or alternative sources of information accentuated the effects of the search rankings, Epstein acknowledged. But he said the experiment made clear that ma­nipu­la­tion is possible, powerful and hard to detect. However, the sheer volume of other information available to voters would make such ma­nipu­la­tion hard to execute, said David Vladeck, a Georgetown University law professor and the former head of consumer protection at the Federal Trade Commission. Traditional news organizations, he said, probably have more power over the views of voters. “It is not clear to me that, even if Google tried to, it could exercise the same power over the American public as Fox News or MSNBC,” Vladeck said. “The claim is such a difficult one to sustain that I find it hard to take it seriously.” Federal regulations have in some circumstances limited what news organizations can do. The Fairness Doctrine once required broadcasters to present both sides of controversial issues, and media cross-ownership rules can still limit the ability of newspapers, for example, to own radio or television stations in the same metropolitan area. Some legal scholars contend that search engine rankings are covered under the First Amendment’s free speech protections. Yet, even those who think that search engines can have potent effects on elections differ on what kind of regulation, if any, would be sensible and effective. And it’s not even clear what federal agency would have the authority to investigate allegations of abuse. The key lesson may be that search engines are not mere machines spitting out perfectly impartial results. They are driven by decisions, made by people who have biases. This does not necessarily make them evil — merely human. “The more trust we give to these kinds of tools, the more likely we can be manipulated down the road,” said Panagiotis T. Metaxas, one of the computer science professors at Wellesley College who studied the Massachusetts election. “We need to understand, as people, as citizens, why we believe what we believe.” [email protected] Read more from Outlook, friend us on Facebook, and follow us on Twitter.

The Washington Post explores a provocative question about Google in its Outlook section tomorrow: Do we need laws in place to safeguard against the company deliberately manipulating elections? It may sound far-fetched on the surface, but the story follows the experiments of psychologist Robert Epstein, who showed that it's relatively easy to sway potential voters by manipulating search results. Epstein, though, isn't talking about Google bombs, in which outsiders try to rig results. What if the folks inside Google—if not the current leaders, but the next generation 20 years from now—subtly changed their algorithms to give an edge to a favorite candidate? It would be nearly impossible to detect, and the very possibility should have us worried, argues Epstein. Others agree. "Elections are won among low-information voters," says Eli Pariser, former president of ­MoveOn.org. "The ability to raise a negative story about a candidate to a voter ... could be quite powerful." Epstein will formally present his findings this spring at a psychology forum, but Google disputes the premise. "Providing relevant answers has been the cornerstone of Google’s approach to search from the very beginning," it says. "It would undermine people’s trust in our results and company if we were to change course." (Click for the full story, which notes that Epstein's research was prompted by a public beef he had with the company.)

In fiscal year 2000, VA’s Veterans Health Administration (VHA) provided primary and specialty medical care to approximately 3.2 million veterans at a cost of about $18 billion. VA’s pharmacy benefit cost approximately $2 billion—about 12 percent of the total VHA budget—and provided approximately 86 million prescriptions. In contrast, 10 years ago VA’s pharmacy benefit represented about 6 percent of VA’s total health care budget. Health care organizations’ efforts to control pharmacy costs and improve quality of care include (1) implementing formularies that limit the number of drug choices available; (2) establishing financial incentives, such as variable copayments, to encourage the use of formulary drugs; (3) using compliance programs, such as prior authorization, that encourage or require physicians to prescribe formulary drugs; and (4) developing clinical guidelines for prescribing drugs. VA does not have authority to use financial incentives to encourage compliance with its formulary. VA provides outpatient pharmacy services free to veterans receiving medications for treatment of service-connected conditions and to low-income veterans whose incomes do not exceed a threshold amount. Other veterans who have prescriptions filled by VA may be charged $2 for each 30-day supply of medication. In 1995, VA began transforming its delivery and management of health care to expand access to care and increase efficiency. As part of this transformation, VA decentralized decision-making and budgeting authority to 22 VISNs, which became responsible for managing all VA health care. VISNs were given substantial operational autonomy. Although VISN and medical center directors are held accountable in annual performance agreements for meeting certain national and local goals, attaining formulary goals has not been part of their performance standards. VA medical centers began using formularies as early as 1955 to manage their pharmacy inventories. Because of the geographic mobility of VA patients, VA officials believed that a national formulary would improve veterans’ continuity of care. In September 1995, VA established a centralized group to manage its pharmacy benefit on a nationwide basis. In November 1995, VISNs were established, and the Under Secretary for Health directed each VISN to develop and implement a VISN-wide formulary. To develop their formularies, the VISNs generally combined existing medical center formularies and eliminated rarely prescribed drugs. VISN formularies became effective on April 30, 1996. Also in 1996, the Congress required VA to improve veterans’ access to care regardless of the region of the United States in which they live. As part of its response, VA implemented a national drug formulary on June 1, 1997, by combining the core set of drugs common to the newly developed VISN formularies. In addition to the national and VISN formularies, a few medical centers retained their own formularies. VA’s Pharmacy Benefits Management Strategic Healthcare Group (PBM) is responsible for managing the national formulary list, maintaining databases that reflect drug use, and monitoring the use of certain drugs. VISN directors are responsible for implementing and monitoring compliance with the national formulary, ensuring that VISN restrictions placed on national formulary products are appropriate, and ensuring that a nonformulary drug approval process is functioning in all of their medical centers. As all formularies do, VA’s national formulary limits the number of drug choices available to health care providers. VA’s formulary lists more than 1,100 unique drugs that are assigned to 1 of 254 drug classes—groups of drugs similar in chemistry, method of action, or purpose of use. After performing reviews of drug classes representing the highest costs and volume of prescriptions, VA decided that some drugs in 4 of its 254 drug classes were therapeutically interchangeable—that is, essentially equivalent in terms of efficacy, safety, and outcomes—and therefore had the same therapeutic effect. This determination allowed VA to select one or more of these drugs for its formulary to seek better prices through competitively bid committed-use contracts. Other therapeutically equivalent drugs in these classes were then excluded from the formulary. These four classes are known as “closed” classes. VA has not made clinical decisions regarding therapeutic interchange in the remaining 250 drug classes, and it does not limit the number of drugs that can be added to these classes. These are known as “open” classes. In some cases, drugs listed on the national formulary may be restricted. Restrictions are generally placed on the use of drugs if they have the potential to be used inappropriately. For example, restrictions are placed on drugs with potentially serious side effects, such as interferon, which is used to treat such conditions as hepatitis C. VA has also adopted guidelines to assist practitioners in making decisions about the diagnosis, treatment, and management of specific clinical conditions, such as congestive heart failure. In addition, VA has adopted criteria to help standardize treatment, improve the quality of patient care, and promote cost-effective drug prescriptions. Finally, VA limits prescribing privileges for some drugs to specially trained physicians and requires consultation with a specialist before certain drugs can be prescribed. VA has made significant progress in establishing a national formulary, with most drugs being prescribed from the formulary list. Nevertheless, VA’s oversight has not been sufficient to ensure that it is fully achieving its national formulary goal of standardizing its drug benefit nationwide. We found that some facilities have omitted required national formulary drugs. In addition, the extent to which VISNs add drugs to supplement the national formulary has the potential for conflicting with VA’s ability to achieve standardization if not closely managed. Also, we found that some facilities, contrary to policy, have modified the list of drugs available in closed classes. Almost 3 years after VA facilities were directed to make available locally all national formulary drugs, two of the three medical centers we visited did not list all national formulary drugs in the formularies used by their prescribers. VHA’s national formulary policy directive states that items listed on the national formulary shall be made available throughout the VA health care system and must be available in all VA facilities. While a physical supply of all national formulary drugs is not required to be maintained at all facilities, if a clinical need for a particular formulary drug arises in the course of treating a patient, it must be made available to the patient. Many drugs listed on the national formulary were not available as formulary choices in two of the three medical centers we visited. In the first, about 25 percent (286 drugs) of the national formulary drugs were not available as formulary choices. These included drugs used to treat high blood pressure and mental disorders, as well as drugs used to treat the unique medical needs of women. At the second medical center, about 13 percent (147 drugs) of the national formulary drugs were omitted, including drugs used to treat certain types of cancer and others used to treat stomach conditions. Health care providers at these two medical centers were required to seek nonformulary drug approvals for over 22,000 prescriptions of national formulary drugs from October 1999 through March 2000. If the national formulary had been properly implemented at these medical centers, prescribers would not have had to use extra time to request and obtain nonformulary drug approvals for these drugs, and patients could have started treatment earlier. Our analysis showed that over 14,000 prescriptions were filled as nonformulary drugs for 91 of the 286 drugs at the first center. No prescriptions were filled for the remaining 195 drugs. At the other medical center, over 8,000 prescriptions for 23 of the 147 drugs were filled as nonformulary drugs. No prescriptions were filled for the remaining 124 drugs. VA’s policy allowing VISNs to supplement the national formulary locally has the potential for conflicting with VA’s ability to achieve standardization if not closely managed. From June 1997 through March 2000, VISNs added 244 unique drugs to supplement the list of drugs on the national formulary. The number of drugs added by each VISN varies widely, ranging from as many as 63 by VISN 20 (Portland) to as few as 5 by VISN 8 (Bay Pines). (Fig. 1 shows the number of drugs added by each VISN.) Adding drugs to supplement the national formulary is intended to allow VISNs to be responsive to the unique needs of their patients and to allow quicker formulary designation of new FDA-approved drugs. However, the wide variation in the number of drugs added by the VISNs to supplement the national formulary raises concern that this practice, if not appropriately monitored, could result in unacceptable decreases in formulary standardization. VA officials have acknowledged that this variation affects standardization and told us they plan to address it. For example, the PBM plans to review new drugs when approved by the FDA to determine if they will be added to the national formulary or if VISNs may continue to add them to their formularies to supplement the national formulary. The medical centers we visited also inappropriately modified the national formulary list of drugs in the closed classes. Contrary to VA formulary policy, two of three medical centers added two different drugs to two of the four closed classes, and one facility did not make a drug available (see fig. 2). While our analysis was performed at the medical center level, the IOM found similar nonconformity at the VISN level. Specifically, IOM reported that 16 of the 22 VISNs modified the list of national formulary drugs for the closed classes. From October 1999 through March 2000, 90 percent of VA outpatient prescriptions were written for national formulary drugs. The percentage of national formulary drug prescriptions filled by individual VISNs varied slightly, from 89 percent to 92 percent. We found wider variation among medical centers within VISNs—84 percent to 96 percent (see table 1). The remaining 10 percent of prescriptions filled systemwide were for drugs VISNs and medical centers added to supplement the national formulary or for nonformulary drugs. VA’s PBM and IOM estimate that drugs added to supplement the national formulary probably account for about 7 percent of all prescriptions filled and nonformulary drugs account for approximately 3 percent of all prescriptions filled. However, at the time of our review, VA’s nationwide data could identify a filled prescription only as either a national formulary drug or not. Without specific information, VA does not know if the additions are resulting in an appropriate balance between local needs and national formulary standardization. VA officials told us that they are modifying the database to enable it to identify which drugs are added to supplement the national formulary and which are nonformulary. Medical center approval processes for nonformulary drugs are not always timely, and the amount of time needed to obtain such approvals varied widely across medical centers. In addition, some VISNs have not established processes to collect and analyze data on nonformulary requests. As a result, VA does not know if approved requests met its established criteria or if denied requests were appropriate. Although the national formulary directive requires certain criteria for approval of nonformulary drugs, it does not dictate a specific nonformulary approval process. As a result, the processes health care providers must follow to obtain nonformulary drugs differ among VA facilities regarding how requests are made, who receives them, who approves them, and how long it takes. In addition, IOM documented wide variations in the nonformulary drug approval process. Figure 3 shows the steps prescribers must generally follow to obtain nonformulary and formulary drugs. The person who first receives a nonformulary drug approval request may not be the person who approves it. For example, 61 percent of prescribers reported that nonformulary drug requests must first be submitted to a facility pharmacist, 14 percent said they must first be submitted to facility pharmacy and therapeutics (P&T) committees, and 8 percent said they must first be sent to service chiefs. In contrast, 31 percent of prescribers reported that it is a facility pharmacist who approves nonformulary drug requests, 26 percent said that the facility P&T committee approves them, and 15 percent told us that the facility chief of staff approves them. The remaining 28 percent reported that various other facility officials or members of the medical staff approve nonformulary drug requests. The time required to obtain approval for use of a nonformulary drug varied greatly depending on the local approval processes. The majority of prescribers (60 percent) we surveyed reported that it took an average of 9 days to obtain approval for use of nonformulary drugs. But many prescribers also reported that it took only a few hours (18 percent) or minutes (22 percent) to obtain such approvals. During our medical center visits, we observed that some medical center approval processes are less convenient than others. For example, to obtain approval to use a nonformulary drug in one facility we visited, prescribers were required to submit a request in writing to the P&T committee for its review and approval. Because the P&T committee met only once a month, the final approval to use the requested drug was sometimes delayed as long as 30 days. The requesting prescriber, however, could write a prescription for an immediate 30-day supply if the medication need was urgent. In contrast, in another medical center we visited, a clinical pharmacist was assigned to work directly with health care providers to help with drug selection, establish dose levels, and facilitate the approval of nonformulary drugs. In that facility, clinical pharmacists were allowed to approve the use of nonformulary drugs. If a health care provider believed that a patient should be prescribed a nonformulary drug, the physician and pharmacist could consult at the point of care and make a final decision with virtually no delay. Prescribers in our survey were almost equally divided on the ease or difficulty of getting nonformulary drug requests approved (see table 2). Regardless of whether the nonformulary drug approval process was perceived as easy or difficult, the vast majority of prescribers told us such requests were generally approved. According to our survey results, 65 percent of prescribers sought approval for a nonformulary drug in 1999. These prescribers reported that they made, on average, 25 such requests (the median was 10 requests). We estimated that 84 percent of all prescribers’ nonformulary requests were approved. When a nonformulary drug request was disapproved, 60 percent of prescribers reported that they switched to a formulary drug. However, more than one-quarter of the prescribers who had nonformulary drug requests disapproved resubmitted their requests with additional information. The majority of prescribers we surveyed told us they were more likely to convert VA patients who were on nonformulary drugs obtained at another VA facility to formulary drugs than to request a nonformulary drug (see table 3). Consequently, patients who move from one area of the country to another or temporarily seek care in a different VA facility are likely to be switched from a nonformulary drug to a formulary drug. VA’s national formulary policy requires that a request to use a nonformulary drug be based on at least one of six criteria: (1) the formulary agent is contraindicated, (2) the patient has had an adverse reaction to the formulary agent, (3) all formulary alternatives have failed therapeutically, (4) no formulary alternative exists, (5) the patient has previously responded to the nonformulary agent and risk is associated with changing to the formulary agent, and (6) other circumstances involving compelling evidence-based reasons exist. Each VISN is responsible for establishing a process to collect and analyze data concerning nonformulary drug requests. Contrary to the national formulary policy, not all VISNs have established a process to collect and analyze nonformulary request data at the VISN and local levels. Twelve of VA’s 22 VISNs reported that they do not collect information on approved and denied nonformulary drug requests. Three VISNs reported that they collect information only on approved nonformulary drug requests, and seven reported that they collect information for both approved and denied requests. Consequently, data that could help VISNs, medical centers, and the PBM offices are not always collected and analyzed for trends in a systematic manner. Such information could help VA at all levels to determine the extent to which nonformulary drugs are being requested and whether medical center processes for approving these requests meet established criteria. In its report, IOM noted that inadequate documentation could diminish confidence in the nonformulary process. Seventy percent of VA prescribers in our survey reported that the formulary they use contains the drugs their patients need either to a “great extent” or to a “very great extent.” Twenty-seven percent reported that the formulary meets their patients’ needs to a “moderate extent,” with 4 percent reporting that it meets their patients’ needs to “some extent.” No VA prescribers reported that the formulary meets their patients’ needs to a “very little or no extent.” This is consistent with IOM’s conclusion that the VA formulary “is not overly restrictive.” Overall, two and one-half times as many prescribers indicated that the formulary they currently use “helps” or “greatly helps” their ability to prescribe drugs as those who said it “hinders” or “greatly hinders” them (see table 4). Some prescribers reported that the formulary they use helps them keep current with new drugs and helps remove some of the pressures created by direct-to-consumer advertising. Other prescribers reported that newly approved drugs are not made available on the national formulary as soon as they would like, and some reported their frustration with delays experienced when certain formulary drugs must be approved by specially trained physicians before they can be prescribed. Prescribers we surveyed reported they were generally satisfied with the national formulary. We asked prescribers who said that they had worked for VA before the national formulary was established whether the current formulary does a better job of keeping the list of drugs in the drug classes from which they most frequently prescribe up to date, as compared with the formulary they used to use. Three-quarters told us that they had worked for VA before the national formulary was implemented in June 1997. Thirty- eight percent of these prescribers reported that the national formulary was “better” or “considerably better” than previous formularies. About half (48 percent) indicated that the current formulary was “about the same” as the one it replaced. Seven percent reported that it was “worse” or “considerably worse” than previous formularies. Few veterans have complained about not being able to obtain the drugs they believe they need. At the VA medical centers we visited, patient advocates told us that veterans made very few complaints concerning their prescriptions. In its analysis of the patient advocates’ complaint databases, IOM found that less than one-half of one percent of veterans’ complaints were related to drug access. IOM further reported that complaints involving specific identifiable drugs often involved drugs that are marketed directly to consumers, such as sildenafil (Viagra), which is used to treat erectile dysfunction. Fifty-one percent of the prescribers in our survey reported that over the past 3 years, an increasing number of their patients have requested a drug they have seen or heard advertised in the media. Our review also indicated that the few prescription complaints made were often related to veterans’ trying to obtain “lifestyle” drugs or refusals by VA physicians and pharmacists to fill prescriptions written by non-VA health care providers. VA officials told us that VA does not fill prescriptions written by non-VA-authorized prescribers, in part to ensure that one practitioner manages a patient’s care. Over the past 3½ years, VA has made significant progress in establishing its national formulary, which has generally met with prescriber acceptance. Prescribers reported that veterans are generally receiving the drugs they need and that veterans rarely register complaints concerning prescription drugs. VA has not provided sufficient oversight, however, to ensure that VISNs and medical centers comply with formulary policies and that the flexibility given to them does not unduly compromise VA’s goal of formulary standardization. Contrary to VA formulary policy, some facilities omitted national formulary drugs or modified the closed drug classes. While adding a limited number of drugs to supplement the national formulary is permitted, as more drugs are added by VISNs, formulary differences among facilities are likely to become more pronounced, decreasing formulary standardization. While VA recognizes the trade-off between local flexibility and standardization, it lacks criteria for determining the appropriateness of adding drugs to supplement the national formulary. Consequently, VA cannot determine whether the resulting decrease in standardization is acceptable. Not all VISN directors have met their responsibilities for implementing national formulary policy. Inefficiencies that exist in the nonformulary drug approval processes across the system can cause delays in making final treatment decisions. In addition, the processes require health care provider time and energy that might be better used for direct patient care. We believe a more efficient nonformulary drug approval process could enable facilities to benefit from lessons learned in other locations. Finally, VISNs lack the data needed to analyze nonformulary drug requests to determine whether all approved requests met approval criteria and all denied requests were appropriate. In order to ensure more effective management of the national formulary, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following actions: Establish a mechanism to ensure that VISN directors comply with national formulary policy. Establish criteria that VISNs should use to determine the appropriateness of adding drugs to supplement the national formulary and monitor the VISNs’ application of these criteria. Establish a nonformulary drug approval process for medical centers that ensures appropriate and timely decisions and provides that veterans for whom a nonformulary drug has been approved will have continued access to that drug, when appropriate, across VA’s health care system. Enforce existing requirements that VISNs collect and analyze the data needed to determine that nonformulary drug approval processes are implemented appropriately and effectively in their medical centers, including tracking both approved and denied requests. In commenting on a draft of this report, VA agreed with our findings and concurred with our recommendations. VA highlighted key improvements planned or already in progress that should further enhance the process. VA’s actions to address our recommendations are summarized below. VA plans to improve oversight at all organizational levels to help facilitate consistent compliance with national formulary policy. In its comments, VA discussed important components of improving compliance with the national formulary, including examining data to identify outliers. However, VA did not articulate a mechanism for ensuring that its oversight results in consistent compliance, which may reduce the effectiveness of its planned actions. VA plans to establish criteria for VISNs to use to determine the appropriateness of adding drugs to supplement the national formulary. VA plans to establish steps for its nonformulary drug approval process that all medical centers and VISNs must follow. However, in its comments, VA did not specifically address how veterans would have continued access to previously approved nonformulary drugs across VA’s health care system. We believe such access is important. VA plans to establish steps for reporting its nonformulary approval activities. In its comments, VA did not explicitly include tracking of denied requests as part of the nonformulary approval activities. We expect that its nonformulary approval activities will include tracking denied requests, as well as approved nonformulary drug requests, to determine the appropriateness of all medical center prescribing decisions. VA plans to implement these corrective actions by June 2001. Its comments are included in appendix II. We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Anthony J. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs; appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. Please call me at (202) 512-7101 if you or your staff have questions about this report or need additional assistance. Another contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix III. To obtain policies and procedures from the 22 Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), we mailed a questionnaire to each of the 22 VISN formulary leaders—pharmacists or physicians who serve on the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Pharmacy Benefits Management advisory board. To determine the extent to which VA health care providers write prescriptions for national formulary drugs, we analyzed data from VA’s national outpatient prescription database. To assess the implementation of the national formulary and obtain firsthand opinions about it, we interviewed medical and administrative staff at three VA medical centers located in three different VISNs. To obtain VA health care providers’ views on VA’s formulary, including whether or not it is restrictive, we mailed a questionnaire to a nationally representative sample of 2,000 VA health care prescribers. We also used information contained in the Institute of Medicine’s Description and Analysis of the VA National Formulary, issued in June 2000. To obtain policies and procedures from the 22 VISNs, we mailed a questionnaire to VISN formulary leaders. We asked if there were VISN- wide policies for several areas, including adding drugs to the VISN formulary, requesting nonformulary drugs, converting patients from one drug to another, and tracking requests for nonformulary drugs. In addition, we sought information on the number of drugs added to and dropped from the VISN formulary, the number of requests for nonformulary drugs, and the number of requests that were approved and denied. All 22 VISN formulary leaders completed and returned questionnaires. VA’s national database on outpatient prescriptions contains information for each outpatient prescription filled at each VA medical center, including the drug prescribed, date of the prescription, patient and prescriber identifiers, medical center responsible for filling the prescription, and whether the prescribed drug is a national formulary drug. We used this database to develop a sample of VA health care providers who wrote prescriptions, determine the total number of outpatient prescriptions filled at VISNs and VA medical centers, determine the number of filled outpatient prescriptions written for national formulary drugs within a certain time frame, and determine how many VISN formulary drug prescriptions were filled in the three VISNs where we performed site visits. We interviewed PBM headquarters officials who had either oversight or maintenance responsibility for the database to help assess the validity and reliability of the outpatient prescription data. We also performed our own analytic checks of the data. We found that data critical to our analysis—the data field indicating whether a prescription had been written for a national formulary drug—contained errors. We worked with PBM officials to correct the data, and they implemented a monthly routine to detect and correct these errors in the future. We reran our data checks, verified that the database had been corrected, and concluded that the data were acceptable for the purposes of our work. To assess formulary implementation at the local level, we interviewed medical and administrative staff at three different VA medical centers—one located in Biloxi, Mississippi (VISN 16); one in Gainesville, Florida (VISN 8); and one in Omaha, Nebraska (VISN 14). We selected these VISNs and medical centers on the basis of formulary drug use from October through December 1999, the period for which the most recent and complete data were available at the time we did our work. For example, VISN 8 had the highest percentage of prescriptions for national formulary drugs (93 percent), VISN 16’s percentage of national formulary drug prescriptions was at the national average (90 percent), and VISN 14 had the lowest percentage of prescriptions filled using national formulary drugs (88 percent). We mailed questionnaires to a representative sample of 2,000 VA health care prescribers whose prescriptions had been dispensed from October 1 through December 31, 1999, to obtain their opinions and experiential data on various aspects of VA’s national formulary. We drew this random sample from VA’s most recent national outpatient prescription database—a data file that contains information, including a prescriber identifier, on all outpatient prescriptions filled in the VA health care system. We mailed questionnaires to the entire sample of prescribers on April 17, 2000, with follow-up mailings on May 17 and June 21 to those who had not responded by those dates. We accepted returned questionnaires through September 1, 2000. Some prescribers’ responses indicated that they did not write prescriptions for drugs; their prescription privileges were limited to medical and surgical supplies, such as diabetic strips and food supplements. Other returned questionnaires indicated that the addressee had either left or retired from VA. These providers were thus considered ineligible for our purposes and were removed from the sample. Approximately 11 percent of the questionnaires were returned as undeliverable, and we received no response from approximately 16 percent of those to whom we mailed questionnaires. After adjusting the sample accordingly, we determined the number of useable returned questionnaires to be 1,217—a response rate of about 69 percent. (See table 5.) Because this was a simple random sample, we believe that our results are projectable to all of VA’s health care providers who have outpatient drug prescribing privileges. Surveys based on a sample are subject to sampling errors. Sampling error represents the extent to which a survey’s results differ from what would have been obtained had everyone in the universe of interest received and returned the same questionnaire—in this case, all VA health care providers who have outpatient drug prescribing privileges. Sampling errors have two elements: the width of the confidence interval around the estimate (sometimes referred to as the precision of the estimate) and the confidence level at which the confidence interval is computed. The confidence interval reflects the fact that estimates actually encompass a range of possible values, not just a single value, or a “point estimate.” The interval is expressed as a point, plus or minus some value. For example, in our questionnaire, we asked prescribers, “To what extent does your VA formulary contain the drugs you believe your patients need?” The percentage of respondents who reported a “great extent” or “very great extent” was 69.1. This particular question had a confidence interval of plus or minus 2.6 percentage points. Thus, the “true” answer for this question may or may not be 69.1 percent, but it has a high probability of falling between 66.5 and 71.7 percent (69.1-percent point estimate, plus or minus 2.6 percentage points). Confidence intervals vary for individual questions (depending upon how many of the individuals who could have answered a question actually did so), but, unless otherwise noted, all percentages presented in this report are within a range of plus or minus 3.5 percentage points. The confidence level is a measure of how certain we are that the “true” answer lies within a confidence interval. We used a 95-percent confidence level, which means that if we repeatedly took new samples of prescribers from the October through December prescription database and performed the same analysis of their responses each time, 95 percent of these samples would yield estimates that would fall within the confidence interval stated. In the previous example, this means that we are 95-percent certain that between 66.5 and 71.7 percent of prescribers believe that the VA formulary contains to a “great extent” or “very great extent” the drugs they believe their patients need. Surveys can also be subject to other types of systematic error or bias that can affect results, known as nonsampling errors. One potential source of nonsampling error can be the questionnaire itself. To ensure that questions were clear and unbiased, we consulted with subject matter and questionnaire experts within GAO and obtained comments from individuals representing VA’s PBM and medical advisory panel, a working group of 11 practicing VA physicians and 1 practicing Department of Defense physician who help manage VA’s national formulary, as well as individuals representing the Institute of Medicine. Finally, the questionnaire was tested with 14 VA prescribers in VA medical centers in four locations: Phoenix, Arizona; Washington, D.C.; Hampton, Virginia; and Cincinnati, Ohio. Prescribers were asked to provide demographic and VA employment information as well as opinions about the relevance and usefulness of VA’s formulary. On average, VA prescribers in our sample have worked for VA for 11 years, with most of those years at their current medical facility. Physicians and nurses constitute the largest groups of prescribers (65 and 15 percent, respectively), followed by physician assistants (7 percent) and other allied health professionals, such as dentists (14 percent). Most of the prescribers’ time working in VA is spent treating patients—on average, 26 hours each week. According to the national prescription file from which we drew our sample, VA prescribers who completed our questionnaire averaged 849 prescription fills from October through December 1999, the 3- month period we chose as the basis of our survey. The median number of filled prescriptions was relatively low—252—because a few prescribers had a large number of prescriptions filled during the period, while many prescribers had only a few prescriptions filled. George Poindexter, Stuart Fleishman, Mike O’Dell, and Kathie Kendrick made key contributions to this report. State Pharmacy Programs: Assistance Designed to Target Coverage and Stretch Budgets (GAO/HEHS-00-162, Sept. 6, 2000). Prescription Drug Benefits: Applying Private Sector Management Methods to Medicare (GAO/T-HEHS-00-84, Mar. 22, 2000). VA Health Care: VA’s Management of Drugs on Its National Formulary (GAO/HEHS-00-34, Dec. 14, 1999). Prescription Drug Benefits: Implications for Beneficiaries of Medicare HMO Use of Formularies (GAO/HEHS-99-166, July 20, 1999). Defense Health Care: Fully Integrated Pharmacy System Would Improve Service and Cost-Effectiveness (GAO/HEHS-98-176, June 12, 1998). The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders by mail: U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013 Orders by visiting: Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders by phone: (202) 512-6000 fax: (202) 512-6061 TDD (202) 512-2537 Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. Web site: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm e-mail: [email protected] 1-800-424-5454 (automated answering system)

During the last three years, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has made significant progress in establishing its national drug formulary, which has generally met with the prescriber acceptance. Most veterans are receiving the drugs the need and rarely register complaints about prescription drugs. However, VA has not been sufficient to ensure that the Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) and medical centers comply with formulary policies and that the flexibility given to them does not compromise VA's goal of formulary standardization. Contrary to VA formulary policy, some facilities omitted national formulary drugs or modified the closest drug classes. Although a limited number of drugs to supplement the national formulary is permitted, formulary differences among facilities are likely to become more pronounced, as more drugs are added by VISNs, decreasing formulary standardization. VA recognizes the trade-off between local flexibility and standardization, but it lacks criteria for determining the appropriateness of adding drugs to supplement the national formulary and therefore may not be able to determine whether the decrease in standardization is acceptable.

Tweet with a location You can add location information to your Tweets, such as your city or precise location, from the web and via third-party applications. You always have the option to delete your Tweet location history. Learn more ||||| Update: Three hours after the publication of this story, Schneiderman resigned from his position. “While these allegations are unrelated to my professional conduct or the operations of the office, they will effectively prevent me from leading the office’s work at this critical time,” he said in a statement. “I therefore resign my office, effective at the close of business on May 8, 2018.” Eric Schneiderman, New York’s attorney general, has long been a liberal Democratic champion of women’s rights, and recently he has become an outspoken figure in the #MeToo movement against sexual harassment. As New York State’s highest-ranking law-enforcement officer, Schneiderman, who is sixty-three, has used his authority to take legal action against the disgraced film mogul Harvey Weinstein, and to demand greater compensation for the victims of Weinstein’s alleged sexual crimes. Last month, when the Times and this magazine were awarded a joint Pulitzer Prize for coverage of sexual harassment, Schneiderman issued a congratulatory tweet, praising “the brave women and men who spoke up about the sexual harassment they had endured at the hands of powerful men.” Without these women, he noted, “there would not be the critical national reckoning under way.” Now Schneiderman is facing a reckoning of his own. As his prominence as a voice against sexual misconduct has risen, so, too, has the distress of four women with whom he has had romantic relationships or encounters. They accuse Schneiderman of having subjected them to nonconsensual physical violence. All have been reluctant to speak out, fearing reprisal. But two of the women, Michelle Manning Barish and Tanya Selvaratnam, have talked to The New Yorker on the record, because they feel that doing so could protect other women. They allege that he repeatedly hit them, often after drinking, frequently in bed and never with their consent. Manning Barish and Selvaratnam categorize the abuse he inflicted on them as “assault.” They did not report their allegations to the police at the time, but both say that they eventually sought medical attention after having been slapped hard across the ear and face, and also choked. Selvaratnam says that Schneiderman warned her he could have her followed and her phones tapped, and both say that he threatened to kill them if they broke up with him. (Schneiderman’s spokesperson said that he “never made any of these threats.”) A third former romantic partner of Schneiderman’s told Manning Barish and Selvaratnam that he also repeatedly subjected her to nonconsensual physical violence, but she told them that she is too frightened of him to come forward. (The New Yorker has independently vetted the accounts that they gave of her allegations.) A fourth woman, an attorney who has held prominent positions in the New York legal community, says that Schneiderman made an advance toward her; when she rebuffed him, he slapped her across the face with such force that it left a mark that lingered the next day. She recalls screaming in surprise and pain, and beginning to cry, and says that she felt frightened. She has asked to remain unidentified, but shared a photograph of the injury with The New Yorker. In a statement, Schneiderman said, “In the privacy of intimate relationships, I have engaged in role-playing and other consensual sexual activity. I have not assaulted anyone. I have never engaged in nonconsensual sex, which is a line I would not cross.” Manning Barish was romantically involved with Schneiderman from the summer of 2013 until New Year’s Day in 2015. Selvaratnam was with him from the summer of 2016 until the fall of 2017. Both are articulate, progressive Democratic feminists in their forties who live in Manhattan. They work and socialize in different circles, and although they have become aware of each other’s stories, they have only a few overlapping acquaintances; to this day, they have never spoken to each other. Over the past year, both watched with admiration as other women spoke out about sexual misconduct. But, as Schneiderman used the authority of his office to assume a major role in the #MeToo movement, their anguish and anger grew. In February, four months after the first stories about Weinstein broke, Schneiderman announced that his office was filing a civil-rights suit against him. At a press conference, he denounced Weinstein, saying, “We have never seen anything as despicable as what we’ve seen right here.” On May 2nd, at the direction of Governor Andrew Cuomo, Schneiderman launched an investigation into the past handling of criminal complaints against Weinstein by the Manhattan District Attorney, Cyrus Vance, Jr., and the New York City Police Department. (In 2015, Vance declined to bring criminal charges against Weinstein, saying that he lacked sufficient evidence—a decision criticized by activist groups.) In a speech, Cuomo explained that “sexual-assault complaints must be pursued aggressively, and to the fullest extent of the law.” The expanding investigation of the Weinstein case puts Schneiderman at the center of one of the most significant sexual-misconduct cases in recent history. Schneiderman’s activism on behalf of feminist causes has increasingly won him praise from women’s groups. On May 1st, the New York-based National Institute for Reproductive Health honored him as one of three “Champions of Choice” at its annual fund-raising luncheon. Accepting the award, Schneiderman said, “If a woman cannot control her body, she is not truly equal.” But, as Manning Barish sees it, “you cannot be a champion of women when you are hitting them and choking them in bed, and saying to them, ‘You’re a fucking whore.’ ” She says of Schneiderman’s involvement in the Weinstein investigation, “How can you put a perpetrator in charge of the country’s most important sexual-assault case?” Selvaratnam describes Schneiderman as “a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” figure, and says that seeing him lauded as a supporter of women has made her “feel sick,” adding, “This is a man who has staked his entire career, his personal narrative, on being a champion for women publicly. But he abuses them privately. He needs to be called out.” Manning Barish notes that many of her friends attended the N.I.R.H. luncheon. “His hypocrisy is epic,” she says. “He’s fooled so many people.” Manning Barish includes herself among them. She says that she met Schneiderman in July, 2013, through mutual friends. She had become a blogger and political activist after opposing her younger brother’s deployment to Iraq and working with groups such as MoveOn.org. Amicably divorced from Chris Barish, a hospitality-industry executive, she was a single mother with a young daughter and socially prominent friends. Schneiderman, who was rising in Democratic politics after being elected attorney general, in 2010, was also divorced. His ex-wife, Jennifer Cunningham, a lobbyist and political strategist at the firm SKDKnickerbocker, currently serves as one of his political consultants. They have a grown daughter. Manning Barish says that she fell quickly for Schneiderman and was happy to be involved with someone who seemed to share her progressive idealism and enjoy her feistiness. Page Six chronicled the romance, calling her a “ravishing redhead” and noting that, at a fund-raiser, the television producer Norman Lear had introduced her as Schneiderman’s “bride-to-be.” But Manning Barish began to see signs of controlling and abusive behavior. Soon after she started dating Schneiderman, he told her to remove a small tattoo from her wrist; it wasn’t appropriate, he said, if she were to become the wife of a politician. The process of having it removed was painful and expensive. In retrospect, she says, it was the first step in trying to control her body. “Taking a strong woman and tearing her to pieces is his jam,” she says. About four weeks after they became physically involved, she says, Schneiderman grew violent. One night, they were in the bedroom of his Upper West Side apartment, still clothed but getting ready for bed, and lightly baiting each other. As she recalls it, he called her “a whore,” and she talked back. They had both been drinking, and her recollection of their conversation is blurry, but what happened next remains vivid. Schneiderman, she says, backed her up to the edge of his bed. “All of a sudden, he just slapped me, open-handed and with great force, across the face, landing the blow directly onto my ear,” Manning Barish says. “It was horrendous. It just came out of nowhere. My ear was ringing. I lost my balance and fell backward onto the bed. I sprang up, but at this point there was very little room between the bed and him. I got up to try to shove him back, or take a swing, and he pushed me back down. He then used his body weight to hold me down, and he began to choke me. The choking was very hard. It was really bad. I kicked. In every fibre, I felt I was being beaten by a man.” She finally freed herself and got back on her feet. “I was crying and in shock,” she says. She recalls shouting, “Are you crazy?” To her astonishment, Schneiderman accused her of scratching him. At one point—she can’t remember if it was at this moment or in a later conversation—he told her, “You know, hitting an officer of the law is a felony.” After the incident, Manning Barish left the apartment, telling him that she would never come back. “I want to make it absolutely clear,” she says. “This was under no circumstances a sex game gone wrong. This did not happen while we were having sex. I was fully dressed and remained that way. It was completely unexpected and shocking. I did not consent to physical assault.” In the following days, Manning Barish confided to three close female friends that Schneiderman had hit her. All of them have confirmed this to The New Yorker. “She was distraught,” one of the friends, a high-profile media figure, says. “She was very, very upset. This wasn’t a gentle smack. He clocked her ear. I was shocked.” She notes, “Michelle had mentioned that he drank a lot, and that he changed under the influence of alcohol, but I’d never anticipated that he would be violent.” The friend describes Manning Barish as having seemed “sad” and “torn,” because “she’d really wanted the relationship to work.” The novelist Salman Rushdie, who dated Manning Barish before Schneiderman did, and who has been her close friend for nearly fifteen years, says that she confided in him as well. “She called me and told me he had hit her,” Rushdie recalls. “She was obviously very upset. I was horrified.” In his view, Schneiderman’s behavior does not fall into the kind of gray area that should remain private. “It was clear to me that it crossed a line,” he says. Rushdie, who describes Manning Barish as “a very truthful person, in my experience,” advised her to stay away from Schneiderman. But Manning Barish went back to him, a decision that she regrets. After the attack, she says, Schneiderman “called and called” her. A few days later, on a weekday afternoon, his security detail drove him to her apartment, and he showed up at her door with an armload of flowers and a case of wine. She found the wine surprising, given the fact that alcohol had fuelled his violent behavior. She recalls saying over and over, “You hit me! You hurt me! You should never hit a woman!” But he didn’t want to talk about having hit her. “The hitting was not an issue for him,” she says. Before long, they reconciled. Manning Barish says that her ear bothered her for months. It often felt painful and clogged, and she kept hearing odd gurgling sounds. Once, blood trickled out, reaching her collarbone. Eventually, Manning Barish sought medical help from Dr. Gwen Korovin, an ear, nose, and throat specialist. Manning Barish shared her medical records with The New Yorker. They confirm that, on September 13, 2014, Korovin found and removed “dried bloody crust” from Manning Barish’s ear. Manning Barish thought that the slap might have caused the injury, but when Korovin asked her what had happened she said that she might have injured herself with a Q-tip. “I was protecting Eric,” Manning Barish says. “And I was ashamed. For victims, shame plays a huge role in most of these stories. I want people to know that.” Korovin was asked by The New Yorker if the injury could have been caused by a slap. “Yes, it could be consistent with a slap,” she said. “You could perforate an eardrum in a lot of ways, with a Q-tip or with a slap.” Manning Barish and Schneiderman were together, off and on, for nearly two years. She says that when they had sex he often slapped her across the face without her consent, and that she felt “emotionally battered” by cruel remarks that he made. She says that he criticized how she looked and dressed, and “controlled what I ate.” Manning Barish, who is five feet seven, lost thirty pounds, falling to a hundred and three. In a photograph from the period, she looks emaciated; her hair, she recalls, started to fall out. Nevertheless, he squeezed her legs and called them “chubby.” Manning Barish says that Schneiderman pressed her to consume huge amounts of alcohol. She recalls, “I would come over for dinner. An already half-empty bottle of red wine would be on the counter. He had had a head start. ‘Very stressful day,’ he would say.” Sometimes, if she didn’t drink quickly enough, she says, he would “come to me like a baby who wouldn’t eat its food, and hold the glass to my lips while holding my face, and sweetly but forcefully, like a parent, say, ‘Come on, Mimi, drink, drink, drink,’ and essentially force me—at times actually spilling it down my chin and onto my chest.” Schneiderman, she recalls, “would almost always drink two bottles of wine in a night, then bring a bottle of Scotch into the bedroom. He would get absolutely plastered five nights out of seven.” On one occasion, she recalls, “he literally fell on his face in my kitchen, straight down, like a tree falling.” Another evening, he smashed his leg against an open drawer, cutting it so badly that “there was blood all over the place.” She bandaged it, but the next day she went to his office to change the dressing, because the bleeding hadn’t stopped. Manning Barish says that Schneiderman also took prescription tranquillizers, and often asked her to refill a prescription that she had for Xanax, so that he could reserve “about half” the pills for himself. (Schneiderman’s spokesperson said that he has “never commandeered anyone’s medications.”) Sometimes in bed, she recalls, he would be “shaking me and grabbing my face” while demanding that she repeat such things as “I’m a little whore.” She says that he also told her, “If you ever left me, I’d kill you.” Evan Stark, a forensic social worker and an emeritus professor at Rutgers, is the author of a landmark book, “Coercive Control,” in which he argues that domestic abuse is just as often psychological as it is physical. Abusive men, he writes, often “terrorize” and “control” their partners by demeaning them, particularly about the traits or accomplishments of which they are proudest. Manning Barish says that Schneiderman often mocked her political activism. When she told him of her plan to attend an anti-gun demonstration with various political figures and a group of parents from Sandy Hook Elementary School, he dismissed the effort, calling the demonstrators “losers.” He added, “Go ahead, if it makes you feel better to do your little political things.” When she was using her computer, he’d sometimes say, “Oh, look at little Mimi. So cute—she’s working!” He told Manning Barish that, because she had childcare, she wasn’t “a real single mother.” Manning Barish broke up with Schneiderman a second time, and then got back together with him. He’d been talking about marrying her, she says, and she somehow convinced herself that the real problem between them was her fear of commitment. In January, 2015, she ended the relationship a third time, feeling degraded. After that, they got together romantically a few more times, but since 2016 she has been in touch with him only sporadically. Since the #MeToo movement began, Manning Barish has been active on social-media platforms, cheering on women who have spoken out, including those whose accusations prompted the resignation of the Minnesota senator Al Franken, a widely admired Democrat. Once, she made an oblique reference to Schneiderman on social media, in connection with a political issue. He called her and, in a tone that she describes as “nasty,” said, “Don’t ever write about me. You don’t want to do that.” Manning Barish says that she took his remarks as a threat, just as she took seriously a comment that he’d once made after she objected to him “yanking” her across a street. She recalls saying to him, “Jaywalking is against the law,” and him responding, “I am the law.” Manning Barish says, “If there is a sentence that sums him up, it’s that.” Schneiderman was elected to the New York State Senate in 1998, and served for twelve years. He wrote many laws, including one that created specific penalties for strangulation. He introduced the bill in 2010, after chairing a committee that investigated domestic-violence charges against the former state senator Hiram Monserrate, a Democrat, who was expelled from the legislature after having been convicted of assaulting his girlfriend. During the hearings, the legislators learned that New York State imposed no specific criminal penalty for choking, even though it is a common prelude to domestic-violence homicides. Not only did Schneiderman’s bill make life-threatening strangulation a grave crime; it also criminalized less serious cases involving “an intent to impede breathing” as misdemeanors punishable by up to a year in prison. “I’m just sorry it took us so long in New York State to do this,” Schneiderman declared at the time. “I think this will save a lot of lives.” Jennifer Friedman, a legal expert on domestic violence, says that she cannot square Schneiderman’s public and private behavior. Anyone knowledgeable about intimate-partner violence, she says, knows that choking is “a known lethality indicator.” She adds, “I cannot fathom that someone who drafted the legislation on strangulation is unfamiliar with such concepts.” She also says, “A slap is not just a slap—it reverberates through the rest of the relationship, making her afraid of setting him off.” She adds, “People aren’t usually prosecuted for it, but, in the state of New York, slapping is assault when it results in pain or physical injury.” In the summer of 2016, the attorney general may have crossed this line again. He went to a party in the Hamptons, where he drank heavily, and invited another guest—a woman he’d known for some time—to join him at an after-party. An accomplished Ivy League-educated lawyer with government experience, she had worked closely with his office in the past, and supported him politically. She says that she agreed to let a man in Schneiderman’s security detail drive them to the next destination. But, when they arrived at the house, there was no party; it was where Schneiderman was staying. The security officer left the property. The lawyer and Schneiderman began making out, but he said things that repelled her. He told the woman, a divorced mother, that professional women with big jobs and children had so many decisions to make that, when it came to sex, they secretly wanted men to take charge. She recalls him saying, “Yeah, you act a certain way and look a certain way, but I know that at heart you are a dirty little slut. You want to be my whore.” He became more sexually aggressive, but she was repulsed by his talk, and pulled away from him. She says that “suddenly—at least, in my mind’s eye—he drew back, and there was a moment where I was, like, ‘What’s happening?’ ” Then, she recalls, “He slapped me across the face hard, twice,” adding, “I was stunned.” Schneiderman hit her so hard, she says, that the blow left a red handprint. “What the fuck did you just do?” she screamed, and started to sob. “I couldn’t believe it,” she recalls. “For a split second, I was scared.” She notes that, in all her years of dating, she has never been in a situation like the one with Schneiderman. “He just really smacked me,” she says. When she told him that she wanted to leave, she recalls, he started to “freak out,” saying that he’d misjudged her. “You’d really be surprised,” he claimed. “A lot of women like it. They don’t always think they like it, but then they do, and they ask for more.” She again demanded to be taken home. They got into his car, and it quickly became apparent how intoxicated he was. As he drove, weaving along back roads, she was terrified that he’d kill not just her but another driver. She says that Schneiderman “broke the law at least once that night.” (“This is untrue,” Schneiderman’s spokesperson said.) The next day, she told two friends, and sent them a photograph of the mark on her face. (Both women corroborate this.) Another photograph of the lawyer, taken later that day at a family birthday party, shows faint raised marks splayed on her cheek. One of the friends says of Schneiderman, “He seemed not to know what the word ‘consent’ means.” Given the woman’s prominence in the legal sphere, Schneiderman’s actions had exposed him to tremendous risk. Yet she took no official action against him. “Now that I know it’s part of a pattern, I think, God, I should have reported it,” she says. “But, back then, I believed that it was a one-time incident. And I thought, He’s a good attorney general, he’s doing good things. I didn’t want to jeopardize that.” She notes that he did not hit her again, after she protested. Nevertheless, she says of the assault, “I knew it was wrong,” adding, “Our top law officer, this guy with a platform for women’s rights, just smacked away so much of what I thought he stood for.” Tanya Selvaratnam is the author of “The Big Lie: Motherhood, Feminism, and the Reality of the Biological Clock,” which explores infertility issues; she is also an actor and a film producer, as well as a supporter of feminist and progressive social causes. She, too, is divorced. In 2016, she attended the Democratic National Convention, in Philadelphia, where Schneiderman introduced himself to her. She says that their first encounter felt “like kismet.” They had both gone to Harvard: she as an undergraduate and a graduate student, he as a law student. She was impressed when he expressed an interest in meditation and Buddhism. They had both studied Chinese, and, when he asked, in Mandarin, if she spoke the language, she answered, “Wo shuo keshi bu tai liuli”—“Yes, but not fluently.” They began dating, and appeared to be a happy couple. Selvaratnam all but lived in his apartment, attending political functions and dinners with his friends and donors, and brainstorming with him on speeches and projects. But, as she puts it, “it was a fairy tale that became a nightmare.” Although Schneiderman often doted on her, he demanded that she spend more and more time with him, and he began physically abusing her in bed. “The slaps started after we’d gotten to know each other,” she recalls. “It was at first as if he were testing me. Then it got stronger and harder.” Selvaratnam says, “It wasn’t consensual. This wasn’t sexual playacting. This was abusive, demeaning, threatening behavior.” When Schneiderman was violent, he often made sexual demands. “He was obsessed with having a threesome, and said it was my job to find a woman,” she says. “He said he’d have nothing to look forward to if I didn’t, and would hit me until I agreed.” (She had no intention of having a threesome.) She recalls, “Sometimes, he’d tell me to call him Master, and he’d slap me until I did.” Selvaratnam, who was born in Sri Lanka, has dark skin, and she recalls that “he started calling me his ‘brown slave’ and demanding that I repeat that I was ‘his property.’ ” The abuse escalated. Schneiderman not only slapped her across the face, often four or five times, back and forth, with his open hand; he also spat at her and choked her. “He was cutting off my ability to breathe,” she says. Eventually, she says, “we could rarely have sex without him beating me.” In her view, Schneiderman “is a misogynist and a sexual sadist.” She says that she often asked him to stop hurting her, and tried to push him away. At other times, she gave in, rationalizing that she could tolerate the violence if it happened only once a week or so during sex. But “the emotional and verbal abuse started increasing,” she says, and “the belittling and demeaning of me carried over into our nonsexual encounters.” He told her to get plastic surgery to remove scars on her torso that had resulted from an operation to remove cancerous tumors. He criticized her hair and said that she should get breast implants and buy different clothes. He mocked some of her friends as “ditzes,” and, when these women attended a birthday celebration for her, he demanded that she leave just as the cake was arriving. “I began to feel like I was in Hell,” she says. Like Manning Barish, Selvaratnam says that Schneiderman routinely drank heavily—a bottle and a half of wine, or more. He also took sedatives, she says, and pushed her to drink with him, saying, “Drink your bourbon, Turnip”—his nickname for her. In the middle of the night, he staggered through the apartment, as if in a trance. “I’ve never seen anyone that messed up,” she recalls. “It was like sleeping next to a monster.” The next morning, she says, he’d seem fine, but often berated her for not having kept him away from the alcohol. His emotional state seemed to worsen after the 2016 Presidential election. He had counted on forging an ambitious partnership with a White House led by Hillary Clinton. Instead, the Presidency had gone to Donald Trump. Earlier, Schneiderman’s office had sued Trump University for civil fraud, and Trump had countersued Schneiderman personally. On the morning of January 19, 2017, the day before Trump’s Inauguration, Schneiderman called Selvaratnam from a hospital emergency room. She recalls, “He told me that he’d been drinking the night before, and he fell down. He didn’t realize he’d cut himself, and got into bed, and when he woke up he was in a pool of blood.” Selvaratnam rushed to the hospital. Schneiderman had several stitches above his left eye; his face was puffy and bruised. He had her send his press secretary a photograph of the injury, and they agreed to cancel a public appearance. In the image, which was shared with The New Yorker, Schneiderman has a black eye and a bandage across the left side of his forehead. Schneiderman then called Cunningham, his ex-wife and political consultant, and they agreed that he and Selvaratnam should tell anyone who asked about the injury that he had fallen “while running.” (A spokesperson for Schneiderman said, “One morning, Mr. Schneiderman fell in the bathroom while completely sober, hit his head, and had to go the E.R. for stitches. Because he was embarrassed to tell his staff he fell in the bathroom, he told them he fell while running.” Cunningham, in a statement issued shortly after this story was published online, said, “I’ve known Eric for nearly thirty-five years as a husband, father, and friend. These allegations are completely inconsistent with the man I know, who has always been someone of the highest character, outstanding values, and a loving father. I find it impossible to believe these allegations are true.”) Selvaratnam understands how incomprehensible it may seem that she stayed in such an abusive relationship for more than a year. But, she says, “now I see how independent women get stuck in one.” The physical abuse, she notes, “happens quickly”: “He’s drunk, and you’re naked and at your most vulnerable. It’s so disorienting. You lose a little of who you are.” She kept telling herself that she could help him change, and tried to get him to see a therapist. At times, she blamed herself for his behavior. “I was scared what he might do if I left him,” she says. “He had said he would have to kill me if we broke up, on multiple occasions. He also told me he could have me followed and could tap my phone.” It’s unclear if Schneiderman was serious when he made such remarks, but Selvaratnam says that she felt intimidated. Jacquelyn Campbell, a professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Nursing, is the author of a danger-assessment checklist that helps authorities gauge the likelihood of homicide in domestic-violence situations. She says, “It’s often true that women don’t know whether to take threats to kill seriously. But we should always take threats seriously. It’s categorized as a violent act, and you can report someone to the police for it.” Selvaratnam began to spend more time apart from Schneiderman, and last fall she ended the relationship. She’d been suffering from ringing in her ears, and sometimes had vertigo. After the breakup, she, like Manning Barish, sought medical help from an ear, nose, and throat specialist. The doctor could find no specific cause for her ailments. The writer Danzy Senna, a close friend of Selvaratnam’s, recalls, “She was thin, fragile, and shaky.” Selvaratnam confided to Senna about the abuse, and Senna was so shocked that she wrote down the details and e-mailed the account to her husband, so that there would be a dated copy of it should any harm come to her friend. Senna’s document, which she shared with The New Yorker, is dated September 16, 2017, and says, in part, “She told me that her boyfriend of a year, Eric Schneiderman, the Attorney General of New York, has been choking, beating, and threatening her for the entirety of their relationship, and that several times he threatened to have her killed if she ever tried to leave him. She said he knows that she has a lot of really damning information about him, his alcoholism, sexual deviance, and drug use, and she worries about her safety.” Senna advised Selvaratnam to retrieve her belongings from his apartment. On November 3, 2017, she did so, with another friend—Jennifer Gonnerman, a staff writer at this magazine. As they carried her things outside, they talked about the fact that Selvaratnam couldn’t possibly be the only woman who had seen this side of Schneiderman. Gonnerman asked her who else he had dated. Selvaratnam knew of one former girlfriend—not Manning Barish—and described where she had worked. The next day, Gonnerman happened to run into a male friend who had once worked with the former girlfriend. Gonnerman asked him if he’d ever known anyone who had dated Schneiderman. He said yes: a close friend of his had. Without divulging anything, Gonnerman asked, “So how did that work out?” He answered, “He used to spit on her and slap her during sex.” Gonnerman told Selvaratnam about the other victim. “She was very traumatized,” Gonnerman recalls. “On the one hand, she was relieved to learn it had happened before, but on the other it was, like, ‘Why hasn’t anyone stopped him?’ ” Selvaratnam says, “I wished someone had warned me. And I wondered, Who’s next?” She notes, “I was not planning to come forward, until I found out there was another woman. The silence of women before me meant that I’d suffered, too. I felt, I will not be able to live with myself if I hear of him doing this to another woman years or months from now.” Selvaratnam reached out to the former girlfriend, and they agreed to meet. In February, Selvaratnam recalls, they sat outside on a bench for ninety minutes, and their stories came flooding forth. Selvaratnam says that she was astounded to discover how similar their experiences had been. Selvaratnam kept notes about her exchanges with the former girlfriend, and she described them to The New Yorker. According to these notes, the former girlfriend told Selvaratnam that she had been in love with Schneiderman, but that in bed he had routinely slapped her hard across the ear and the face, as tears rolled down her cheeks. He also choked her and spat at her. Not all the abuse had taken place in a sexual context. She said that Schneiderman had once slapped her during an argument they’d had while getting dressed to go out. The blow left a handprint on her back; the next day, the spot still hurt. When the former girlfriend objected to this mistreatment, he told her that she simply wasn’t “liberated” enough. Just as Schneiderman had done with the other women, he had pushed her to drink with him and to set up a threesome, and he had belittled her work and appearance, saying in her case that she had fat legs and needed Botox. After the former girlfriend ended the relationship, she told several friends about the abuse. A number of them advised her to keep the story to herself, arguing that Schneiderman was too valuable a politician for the Democrats to lose. She described this response as heartbreaking. And when Schneiderman heard that she had turned against him, she said, he warned her that politics was a tough and personal business, and that she’d better be careful. She told Selvaratnam that she had taken this as a threat. The former girlfriend told Selvaratnam she found it “shameless” that Schneiderman was casting himself as a leading supporter of the #MeToo movement. She promised to support Selvaratnam if she spoke out, but she wasn’t sure that she could risk joining her. The former girlfriend told Selvaratnam she’d once been so afraid of Schneiderman that she’d written down an extensive account of the abuse, locked the document in a safe-deposit box, and given keys to two friends.

The New Yorker published its story alleging that New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman physically abused four women at 6:47pm Eastern on Monday, and Schneiderman announced his resignation at 9:46pm, not quite three hours later, notes CNN media writer Brian Stelter. It was a "stunning" turn of events, he writes, given that Schneiderman has been a leading voice in the #MeToo movement and his office is suing Harvey Weinstein. Schneiderman "strongly contests" the allegations that he hit and choked the women without their consent during relationships, but his last day on the job is Tuesday. Critics pounce: Schneiderman's enemies are reveling in the news, particularly allies of President Trump, notes the Washington Post. Donald Trump Jr. and Kellyanne Conway both called attention to Schneiderman's statement last year that "no one is above the law, and I’ll continue to remind President Trump and his administration of that fact everyday." Conway tweeted "Gotcha" and Trump Jr. tweeted "You were saying?"

Romanian authorities have said they caught the Romanian hacker known as Guccifer, who allegedly broke into the email accounts of several high level individuals including former US secretary of state Colin Powell. Caught in the Romanian city of Arad, where he lived, Marcel Lazăr Lehel is believed to have also hacked the email accounts of several Romanian individuals, including the head of the Romanian Intelligence Service SRI, George Maior. He is also believed to have hacked into the accounts of US public figures such as Colin Powell, members of the Bush and Rockefeller families, and officials of the Obama administration. Romanian authorities collaborated with US services to catch him. The man, who was taken from his home in Arad, has had previous convictions for similar deeds, including a three-year jail sentence with parole, issues in 2012. The 40-year old had a similar conviction in 2011, after having hacked the Facebook accounts of several employees of a media group, and made public some of the private contents. He is also believed to have hacked the accounts of actors Steve Martin and Mariel Hemingway, as well as of a former CIA analyst Laura Manning Johnson. Among the most famous of his actions was hacking the e-mail of former state secretary Colin Powell, and revealing an alleged affair with Romanian MEP Corina Cretu. Powell denied the affair with the former presidential spokesman. The 76-year old Powell, who left the State Department in 2005, stayed in touch with the Romanian woman after leaving his post. Guccifer published a few email exchanges, as well as pictures Cretu had sent Powell. [email protected] ||||| 1/22 UPDATE: "Guccifer" has been arrested, according to Romanian officials JANUARY 6--The hacking spree by “Guccifer,” the online outlaw who has bedeviled Colin Powell, members of the Bush and Rockefeller families, Obama administration officials, and assorted other public figures, has been far more extensive than previously known, The Smoking Gun has learned. A large cache of documents reveals that the illegal “Guccifer” incursions have victimized scores of other high-profile victims both in the U.S. and overseas during the past year. The hacker has accessed e-mail correspondence, contact lists, phone records, personal photos, online storage sites, and a wide range of confidential financial documents, including credit card, banking, and investment statements. The newest roster of “Guccifer” victims includes entertainers, industrialists, academics, diplomats, financiers, government and military officials, and journalists--most of whom likely have no idea that the hacker has illegally prowled through their online accounts. With few discernible patterns, “Guccifer” has hopscotched between the accounts of victims like comedian Steve Martin; editor Tina Brown (seen below); ex-Nixon aide John Dean; author Kitty Kelley; actress Mariel Hemingway; three members of the UK’s House of Lords; a former Air Force secretary; the CEO/chairman of MetLife, the $60 billion insurance conglomerate; a Pulitzer Prize winner; the director of Romania’s domestic intelligence service; and a Gibson Dunn partner with the improbably Dickensian name Cantwell F. Muckenfuss III. Along the way, “Guccifer” has also gathered the cell phone numbers of Robert Redford and Warren Beatty, the private e-mail addresses for Nicole Kidman, Leonardo DiCaprio, and other celebrities, and even the script for the fourth-season finale of “Downton Abbey” (which the hacker swiped six months before the TV episode first aired in England). The material detailing Guccifer’s felonious escapades was provided to TSG by the hacker himself, whose identity, location, and gender remains unknown (though for narrative purposes we’ll refer to the hacker as a “he”). “i don’t know what near future hold for me,” the hacker stated, adding that the thousands of documents were being provided to a reporter “in case I disappear.” Aware that a platoon of federal agents is hunting for him (or her or them), “Guccifer” facetiously claimed to be having dreams “in which a woman is steping up to me saying that she is from Federal Bureau and I am busted.” He added, “meanwhile me trying desperately to erase my files on my computer at my desk or on my smartphone which btw I don”t have because I can”t afford one.” Included in the archive are documents amounting to the hacker’s work product, such as text files recording an individual victim’s name, e-mail address, original account password, and the replacement password used by “Guccifer.” For instance, when the hacker broke into Powell’s e-mail account, the password was changed to “ASSHOLEANON.” After breaching the Comcast e-mail account of John Negroponte, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, “Guccifer” reset the password to “hondbabykill1,” an apparent reference to Negroponte’s prior role as U.S. ambassador to Honduras, where American officials supported a military dictatorship suspected of killing and torturing dissidents. While “Guccifer” has declined to discuss how he has been able to hack so many e-mail accounts--spanning an array of providers like Comcast, Cox, Gmail, Yahoo, AOL, Earthlink, Verizon, and the British-based Btinternet--it appears he compromised some accounts by correctly guessing security questions. Work files show that the hacker reviewed the Wikipedia pages of prospective victims, obtained the names of a target’s relatives, and even referred to a list containing the most popular names for dogs and cats. Last spring, “Guccifer” hacked a Yahoo account maintained by an assistant to Brown, then editor of The Daily Beast web site. Along with reading correspondence and stealing family photos, the hacker copied Brown’s address book, which contained nearly 900 names and corresponding e-mail addresses. He then exported Brown’s contacts into an Excel spreadsheet and began reviewing the lengthy list for possible new targets, a standard "Guccifer" M.O.. While the hacker routinely copies an address book following a break-in, some contact lists--like those of Brown, Powell, and former White House adviser Sidney Blumenthal--have proven to be target-rich environments for “Guccifer” to exploit. For example, armed with Brown’s contact list, “Guccifer” highlighted dozens of names--most with either AOL or Earthlink accounts--for illegal scrutiny. The hacker’s spreadsheet memorialized his hacking of the e-mail accounts of journalist Carl Bernstein, “Sex and the City” author Candace Bushnell, actor Rupert Everett, BBC broadcaster Jeremy Paxman, and others. The color-coded Excel file also shows that “Guccifer” eyed the e-mail accounts of Lorne Michaels, Candice Bergen, Eric Idle, Whoopi Goldberg, Padma Lakshmi, Mike Nichols, and Isaac Mizrahi (though it is unclear if these accounts were breached). The hacker’s archive also reveals that he was researching Martin Amis in preparation for an assault on the author’s Yahoo account. “Guccifer” used Brown’s account to obtain the e-mail address of Julian Fellowes (seen above), the British actor/writer who created “Downton Abbey,” and is also a member of the House of Lords. Somehow, the hacker subsequently broke into Fellowes’s Btinternet account and copied a variety of correspondence as well as confidential records related to the 64-year-old’s writing and political careers. One of the documents stolen last May by “Guccifer” was Fellowes’s script for the finale of the latest season of “Downton Abbey.” The hacker, however, apparently did not seek to disseminate the script for the last episode (which aired in England two months ago). Fellowes is not the only House of Lords member to be victimized by “Guccifer.” Documents show that the hacker also raided the e-mail accounts of Sir Francis Brooke and Patricia Scotland, who served previously as the UK’s Attorney General. Scotland’s SkyDrive online storage account was also breached. In an interview, Brown said that she had been unaware that her account had been breached by "Guccifer," adding that it was upsetting to learn that some of her contacts had been hacked as a result. A Brown assistant, who recalled getting notices that the Yahoo account’s password had been changed, forwarded an e-mail that was sent from the account in May to a second Brown aide. The subject line read “i will fuck u an you wiil never know.” The aide told TSG, “Nice email from Mr. Guccifer, huh?” The “Guccifer” archive includes documents memorializing the hacking of the e-mail accounts of dozens of other individuals. These victims include: * Hemingway, whose AOL account was broken into early last year. That incursion yielded passwords to the 52-year-old star’s web site and Facebook page (which “Guccifer” defaced in late-February). In a note to her followers, a disgusted Hemingway (pictured above) reported being hacked, noting that she “changed everything UGH makes you feel violated.” * Steven Kandarian, the MetLife chief executive, had his Comcast account raided by “Guccifer,” who stole the 60-year-old businessman’s contact list, divorce records, phone logs, and a variety of personal financial records. * George-Cristian Maior, head of the Romanian Intelligence Service, had his Yahoo account breached. * George Roche, a former Secretary of the Air Force, was one of more than a dozen former U.S. military officials who had their accounts illegally accessed by “Guccifer.” Most of these victims, Roche included, had e-mail accounts with Comcast, a company the hacker seems to have little trouble compromising. * Kelley had her Yahoo and Earthlink accounts compromised early last year. “Guccifer,” who apparently found the biographer’s e-mail address in Blumenthal’s contact list, read through her e-mails and took months worth of Kelley’s cell phone bills, which listed numbers she dialed as well as calls she received. Kelley told TSG she was unaware of the hacking, but recalled that “Earthlink changed my password twice, I think, without explanation.” * Laura Manning Johnson, a top Department of Homeland Security official and former CIA analyst. “Guccifer” breached her Comcast account in mid-2013. * Pulitzer Prize-winning author Diane McWhorter, whose Earthlink, Gmail, and Dropbox storage accounts were raided. “Guccifer” apparently found McWhorter’s e-mail among Blumenthal’s contacts. * Dean’s Earthlink account was hacked early last year, and “Guccifer” took family photos, assorted correspondence, and personal financial records. * Fitness instructor Denise Austin was hacked early last year. Her Comcast account was broken into shortly after “Guccifer” illegally accessed the e-mail account of Dorothy Bush Koch, sister of George W. Bush (and daughter of George H.W. Bush). Austin’s e-mail address was in Koch’s contact list, which the hacker copied. * Oceanographer Robert Ballard, who was part of the team that located the Titanic’s wreck, had his Comcast e-mail and Dropbox accounts hacked by “Guccifer.” Ballard, seen below, was apparently targeted because his name appears on a roster of members of Bohemian Grove’s Mandalay Camp. The hacker found the list in the AOL account of Powell, who is also a Mandalay member (along with Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, both of whom are also former Secretaries of State. In e-mails last year, “Guccifer” asserted that attendees at Bohemian Grove’s northern California retreats were part of the shadowy Illuminati/New World Order conspiracy “leading this fucked up world!!!!!!” * Muckenfuss, a Washington, D.C. attorney and Yale Law School lecturer, had two of his e-mail accounts breached by “Guccifer.” It appears the hacker found the 68-year-old lawyer’s Comcast e-mail address in the Gmail contact list of Joshua Gotbaum, director of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. After hacking Gotbaum’s account last May, “Guccifer” took the Obama appointee’s address book and used it to victimize several of Gotbaum’s acquaintances. The “Guccifer” archive shows that he also accessed the e-mail accounts of numerous members of the Council on Foreign Relations. The hacker obtained the e-mail addresses of hundreds of CFR figures after he broke into the account of one member and accessed private contact lists. Additionally, the hacker’s work product reveals that he illegally accessed the e-mail of a New York company that handles security matters for corporations and wealthy individuals. “Guccifer” took a variety of reports detailing confidential work done by the firm, including a $40,000 security review commissioned by a hedge fund billionaire who wanted assurances that a duplex apartment his daughter, a college student, planned to rent while studying in Paris was safe. While “Guccifer” has repeatedly declined to discuss how he breaks into accounts--he has dismissed these TSG queries as “irrelevant extraneous technical questions”--some targets have eased his path through their online lives. For example, two victims--a writer and an ex-FBI agent--each kept Word files containing numerous password and PIN numbers they used. Combined, the two documents (which were found in the “Guccifer” archive) offered free access to accounts with eBay, Netflix, PayPal, Xbox, Amazon, Sprint, Etsy, Facebook, Dropbox, Time Warner, and Skype. Not to mention credit card, banking, insurance, retirement, and frequent flyer accounts. The former G-man’s list even included a three-digit password for a “Gun Lock.” The illegal incursions into these two accounts emanated from IP addresses in Greece and the Russian Federation, according to the victims. Other records show that “Guccifer” has sought to monitor, albeit to a limited degree, the federal criminal probe targeting him. For instance, after TSG reported the hacking of several Bush family e-mail accounts--most notably the AOL account of Dorothy Bush Koch--“Guccifer” lost control over those accounts. He still, however, was able to monitor the hacked account of Koch’s friend Patricia Legere. Which allowed him to read an e-mail from Koch informing friends and family that her account had been compromised and that Secret Service agents were en route to her residence to collect her computer for analysis. Similarly, after “Guccifer” hacked the e-mail and Facebook accounts of an Obama administration appointee, he somehow maintained access to the victim’s telephone records. Those documents, “Guccifer” discovered, revealed that the FBI contacted the federal official immediately after the hacking was reported by TSG. Though publicizing his continuing criminal activity could provide federal agents with new leads and investigative avenues to pursue, “Guccifer” professed to be carefree despite his status as one of America’s most wanted hackers: “NO I am not concerned, i think i switch the proxies go to play some backgammon on yahoo watch tv, play with my family and daughter.” The hacker wrote of buying a “new powerful computer” to help continue his illegal activities. Noting that he would be “back in business,” “Guccifer” closed one e-mail with a one-word declaration: “HAAAACKKKK!” In other correspondence, “Guccifer” has written of living overseas, though that could be a feint from a hacker who has spent more than a year using proxy servers, fake IP addresses, burner e-mail accounts, anonymizing software, and other methods to evade pursuing law enforcement authorities. “Guccifer” wrote of turning over his archive “just in case I am busted,” but he has not offered a rationale for the crime spree detailed in those documents. While referring to his distaste for the “new ukusa empire,” the hacker claims to be operating from “the cloud of Infinite Justice.” Still, it is hard not to view many of his break-ins as crimes of opportunity. Hacking for hacking’s sake, with a simple goal of disruption, havoc, and embarrassment. Which, of course, does not make his frenzied rampage any less felonious. In fact, two files in the “Guccifer” archive appear to show the hacker researching possible criminal charges in a United States court. A 76-page Congressional Research Service report explores the “Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law,” while the other file includes the section of the U.S. Code detailing the country’s extradition law and treaties. Perhaps these documents indicate that “Guccifer” thinks the end is near. Or maybe he just stole them from somebody’s Inbox. ||||| The infamous hacker Guccifer has reportedly been arrested in Romania, a bit of early-morning gossip that startled fans of George W. Bush’s pet portraits and left everyone else wondering who, exactly, this Guccifer guy is. Romanian media report that Guccifer is 40-year-old Marcel Lazar Lehel, a resident of Arad who was convicted of several other computer crimes in 2012. But it’s Guccifer’s online identity that’s caught the public imagination — as a hacker of celebrities and politicos, an espouser of conspiracy theories, and the original broadcaster of the 43rd president’s much-discussed artwork, which he found when he hacked Bush family e-mails. One of G.W. Bush’s famous pet portraits. The Bush family released this one themselves. (Bush family) It’s an impressive career for a hacker who wasn’t even known in the U.S. at this time last year. That changed last Feb. 7, when Guccifer broke into the accounts of several Bush friends and relatives — including George W.’s sister and brother-in-law — and passed dozens of e-mails and photos to the Smoking Gun, a Web site that collects incriminating public documents, mugshots and other miscellanea. The e-mails included intimate details on George H.W. Bush’s health problems and vacation plans. They also included one of the world’s first titillating glimpses of George W. Bush’s creative work (pictured here): two self-portraits of him in the shower and bathtub, and a landscape with a church in Maine. The Secret Service promptly launched an investigation. Since then, Guccifer has claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks on high-profile e-mail accounts, including those of Colin Powell, Clinton aide Sidney Blumenthal and even “Arrested Development’s” Jeffrey Tambor. In some cases, it’s difficult to tell if he’s bluffing: While the Powell, Blumenthal and Tambor cases were well-documented and widely publicized, some of the attacks have never been reported outside of Guccifer’s own accounts. In either case, Guccifer told the Smoking Gun that he has hacked the e-mails of: Actor Steve Martin Editor Tina Brown Ex-Nixon aide John Dean Biographer Kitty Kelley Actress Mariel Hemingway Former U.S. ambassador John Negroponte Journalist Carl Bernstein “Sex and the City” author Candace Bushnell Actor Rupert Everett “Downton Abbey” writer Julian Fellowes MetLife chief excecutive Steven Kandarian Oceanographer Robert Ballard … among many others. Guccifer’s victim list also suspiciously included George-Cristian Maior, the head of Romania’s Intelligence Service, and came with the cryptic warning that Guccifer knew law enforcement was watching and that he could “disappear” soon. Why he continued publicizing his hacks, despite those fears, remains a bit of a mystery — as does the reasoning behind Guccifer’s targets. It seems he sometimes chose his victims after chancing upon their e-mail addresses elsewhere. (According to the Smoking Gun, he found Everett, Bushnell and Bernstein’s information in Tina Brown’s address book.) But outside of that, there’s no discernible pattern — Guccifer hacked everyone from high-level military officials to C-list actresses with equal gusto. Then again, maybe there’s a pattern only Guccifer could see: He espoused conspiracy theories on the Illuminati and New World Order that were eagerly seized upon by other fringe theorists. “Guccifer e-mails link Tony Blair to top-secret Bohemian Grove gathering,” crowed a headline on Infowars and Russia’s RT — referring to the annual California retreats that have become a favorite fascination of Alex Jones and his ilk. Admittedly, a New World Order planned by Candace Bushnell and Julian Fellowes is one I’d be interested in hearing more about. Too bad Guccifer never found those files.

It appears that the run of Guccifer, hacker of the rich and famous, has come to an end. Police in Romania say they arrested 40-year-old Marcel Lazar Lehel this morning at his home in Arad, reports Romania-Insider. Guccifer is probably best known in the US for hacking into the emails of the Bush family and showing the world George W. Bush's paintings (including one of himself in the shower.) Media reports in Romania say "US services" helped with the arrest. The Bush family was far from the only target. Think Colin Powell, Tina Brown, Steve Martin, Mariel Hemingway, the Rockefeller family, and Carl Bernstein, to name but a few. He "hacked everyone from high-level military officials to C-list actresses with equal gusto," notes the Washington Post. Guccifer even snagged the script for the finale of the fourth season of Downton Abbey well before it aired in the UK, the Smoking Gun reported earlier this month. He also got into the account of the head of Romania's intelligence service.

The United States Army is involved in a total organizational redesign of its combat and support units to better meet current and future operational requirements. This redesign effort, as well as associated rebalancing, stabilization, and cyclical readiness initiatives are deemed important by proponents as they are intended to sustain both the active and reserve Army through a potentially long term, manpower and resource intensive war on terror. The overall issue facing Congress is how well the Army's modularity program is progressing and what are some of the issues affecting this major redesign effort. Also of critical importance is the Army's ability to fund both the Future Combat System (FCS) program and its modularity program concurrently. Key potential oversight questions for the 110 th Congress can be summarized as follows: How will the Administration's proposed increase of 65 thousand soldiers impact the modularity program? Are some Brigade Combat Teams vulnerable to enemy armor? Is the Army's overly-optimistic in its ability to fully fund modularity and the Future Combat System (FCS)? How are the Army's rebalancing, stabilization, and cyclical readiness efforts progressing and what are their associated costs? How does the Army's Force Generation Model impact the manning and equipping of Army modular forces? The 110 th Congress's decisions on these and other related issues could have significant implications for U.S. national security, Army funding requirements, and future congressional oversight activities. This report addresses the U.S. Army's redesign of its current force structure, based on large divisions, into one based on smaller brigade-level modular brigade combat teams (BCTs). The Army maintains that by organizing around BCTs and Support Brigades, it will be able to "better meet the challenges of the 21 st century security environment and, specifically, jointly fight and win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)." Accordingly, the Army hopes that modularization will result in: At least a 30% increase in the combat power of the Active Component of the force; An increase in the rotational pool of ready units by at least 50%; Army operating forces that require less augmentation when deployed—reducing the requirement for ad hoc organizations; Creation of a deployable joint-capable headquarters and improvement of joint interoperability across all Army units; Force design upon which the future network centric developments [Future Combat System] can be readily applied; Reduced stress on the force through a more predictable deployment cycle: One year deployed and two years at home station for the Active Component; One year deployed and four years at home station for the Reserve Force; One year deployed and five years at home station for the National Guard Force; and Reduced mobilization times for the Reserve Component as a whole. With the Department of Defense's (DOD) January 19, 2007 announcement on increasing the size of the Army and Marine Corps the Army currently plans to create the following numbers and types of BCTs in the active Army and Army National Guard (ANG): In 2005, the Army defined the roles, designs and numbers of support brigades to be developed. The modular support brigades consist of both single function and multi-functional designs. The Army's Multi-Functional Support Brigades include Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB): Consisting of between 2,600 to 2,700 personnel and a variety of Army aviation assets; Fires Brigade: Consisting of between 1,200 and 1,300 personnel, the Fires Brigade is to have a mix of cannon, rocket, and missile artillery systems and is to be able to employ Joint fires (Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) as well; Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) (CSB (ME)): Consisting of 435 personnel, the CSB (ME) is to have engineer, military police, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense, and air defense units assigned to it. In addition, the brigade could also have explosive ordnance disposal and civil affairs units assigned to it; Battlefield Surveillance Brigade: Consisting of 997 personnel, the Battlefield Surveillance Brigade is to consist of an intelligence battalion, support troops, and a long-range surveillance detachment. In addition, the brigade can be augmented with special forces units as well as additional unmanned aerial vehicles; and Sustainment Brigade: Consisting of 487 personnel, the Sustainment Brigade is to have medical, finance, human resources, ammunition, transportation, maintenance, and supply and service units. The Army currently plans to field the following numbers of Active, National Guard, and Reserve Multi-Functional Support Brigades as indicated in Table 2 . The Army also plans to create the following types of Functional Support Brigades in the active and reserve components: Air Defense; Engineer; Military Police; Chemical; Military Intelligence; Signal; Explosive Ordnance Disposal; Quartermaster; Medical; Logistics Regional Support Groups; Civil Affairs; and Psychological Operations. The Army has compiled a number of "lessons learned" about modular units in combat. Commanders maintain that modular BCTs are better in interacting with other service's tactical elements and that the permanent task organization of critical core components has eliminated "multiple bosses" thereby simplifying command and control. Modular BCTs have also exhibited a "significant increase in situational awareness for brigade commanders based on increased battle command systems." Commanders also provided favorable comments on the enhanced BCT staffs and organic combat support and service support elements within modular BCTs. Commanders also identified areas in need of improvement. Additional earthmoving capability was identified as a need as was more capability in the BCT's armed reconnaissance squadron to "fight for information." Commanders also maintain that additional intelligence analysis capability is needed in the BCTs and that BCTs lack organic engineer assault breaching and gap crossing capability. Of critical concern to commanders was the need for greater bandwidth capacity to support battle command systems. The Army plans to continue to evaluate lessons learned from combat experiences and to make changes to personnel, equipment, and force structure when appropriate. The Army has initiated changes for both the BCTs and modular support units in terms of force protection, navigational capability, physical site protection, as well as convoy security and improvised explosive device (IED) protection based on these "lessons learned" as well as independent analysis by other Army organizations. An Army study, conducted by the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), reportedly concludes that modular infantry BCTs (IBCTs) and Stryker BCTs (SBCTs)—which constitute over 60% of the Army's combat brigades—lack tactical lethality during the early deployment phase of expeditionary operations. The Army Study—"Close-Combat Lethality Line-of-Sight Capabilities-Based Assessment"—supposedly maintains that IBCTs and SBCTs as currently organized and equipped are unable to: Achieve desired effects against main battle tanks equipped with active protection systems; Achieve desired effects against main battle tanks with or without explosive reactive armor at extended ranges out to 6,600 meters; Identify vehicle targets up to 5,500 meters from the shooting platform; and Achieve desired effects against other armored vehicles with active protection systems. Proposed solutions to these deficiencies include modifying tactics such as employing volley fires to overwhelm active protection systems and developing better equipment to increase the lethality of IBCTs and SBCTs. According to the Army, by the end of FY2006 they had converted 31 active BCTs and during the year, another four active BCTs began modular conversion. The Army National Guard (ARNG) continued the modular conversion of seven BCTs begun in FY2005 and started the conversion of nine additional BCTs in FY2006 for a total of 16 BCTs converting. During FY2006, a total of 45 multi-functional support brigades and 86 functional support brigades were converting in the active and reserve components. During FY2007, the active Army will have 35 BCTs and another three BCTs converting. On January 19, 2007, DOD announced that the modularization of two BCTs would be accelerated, bring the number of BCTs undergoing modular conversion in FY2007 to five. These two accelerated BCTs are expected to be ready to deploy to Iraq in FY2008 if required. In FY2007, the ARNG will begin the modular conversion of nine more BCTs and by the end of FY2007, an additional 13 multi-functional support brigades will be converted. During FY2007, the functional support brigades will increase by four in the active component and 6 in the ARNG. From FY2008-FY2013, the Army plans to convert the following units to the modular design: The President's FY2007 Budget Request included $6.6 billion for modularity in FY2007 and an additional $34 billion between FY2008 and FY2001 but modularity costs are spread among a wide variety of Army programs, which makes it difficult for many to characterize an exact figure for Army modularity. The FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 109-364 ) added $548.9 million for Army modularity, and directed it to be spent on M-1 Abrams, M-2 and M-3 Bradley, and M-113 armored personnel carrier refurbishment. In addition, the Army was directed to develop a multi-year procurement strategy for the Abrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle and to also provide Congress with the full costs of Army modularity. Army cost estimates have increased significantly since January 2004 when the Army initially estimated that it would cost $20 billion from FY2004-FY2011 to increase the number of active Army brigade combat teams from 33 to 48. According to GAO in July 2004, the Army added $ 8 billion to reorganize the reserve component—bringing the estimated cost for the entire force to $28 billion. In March 2005, the Army revised their figures and estimated that modularity would cost at total of $ 48 billion from FY2005-FY2011—a 71% increase over the earlier $28 billion estimate. In April 2006, the Army once again revised its modularity cost estimate to $52.5 billion - $ 41 billion for equipment, $5.8 billion for military construction and facilities, and $5.7 billion for sustainment and training. This most recent total does not reflect requirements for creating modular forces for the Army's recently announced 65 thousand soldier endstrength increase. There has been long-standing concern that the Army will be unable to afford modularity and the Future Combat System (FCS)—the Army's $230 billion modernization program. Also competing for Army resources are equipment reset and the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Program cost growth in both the modularity and FCS programs has also contributed to skepticism that the Army will be able to afford both programs, given current and projected budgetary pressures. The Army contends that modularity, FCS, and equipment reset are affordable. While the Army has made a variety of program adjustments to continue funding modularity and FCS, the Army's main argument is based on the Army receiving a larger share of programmed defense resources, noting that during World War II, defense spending was 38% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but in FY2007, defense spending was only 3.9% of GDP. While it is likely the Army will receive additional resources for modularity, FCS, and equipment reset, there do not appear to be any advocates to increase military spending as a greater percentage of GDP. This apparent lack of support calls into question the Army's underlying argument on the concurrent affordability of modularity and FCS. Prior to DOD's January 2007 announcement that it would increase the size of the active Army by 65 thousand soldiers, there were concerns that it would be difficult to fully man modular forces. The Army's decision to convert to a modular force structure significantly changed the requirement for Army officers. The Army's previous plan to convert to 42 modular BCTs increased the Army's requirement for officers by 4,131. Approximately 88% of this increase—3,635—represent requirements for captains and majors. This requirement for captains and majors has resulted in a projected shortage of 2,708 in FY2007 and an additional shortage of 3,716 in FY2008 in these grades. The recent announcement that the Army would now create 48 BCTs and additional modular support brigades will undoubtedly exacerbate these projected shortages in the grades of captain and major and might also create additional shortages in both officer and enlisted grades. These potential shortages might significantly affect the ability of the Army to adequately man not only BCTs but also modular support units. If this is the case, the Army might be hard-pressed to create the additional 6 BCTs that it needs to relieve the stress on the Army. As previously stated, the Army is also faced with equipment shortages as it implements its modularity program. According to GAO, modular brigade combat teams will "require significant increases in the levels of equipment, particularly command, control, and communications equipment; wheeled vehicles; and artillery and mortars." Command, control, and communications equipment are of particular concern as they constitute what the Army considers the key enablers for the modular brigade combat teams. For example, by 2007, the Army expects to have only 62% of the heavy trucks that it needs for modular units and less than half of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) command and control systems that it requires. These shortages will likely be even more pronounced in the Army National Guard that could start their modular conversions with less and much older equipment than most active Army units. On July 27, 2005, the Army announced the stationing locations for its active duty BCTs: This stationing plan does not, however, reflect the proposed addition of 65,000 additional soldiers over the next five years. The Army has not yet announced the designation of the new units or where they might be stationed but given DOD's Global Basing Strategy and 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions, it is possible that there might be difficulties in finding adequate facilities, both at home and overseas, to station these additional units. The Army has three other concurrent initiatives underway which have been described as "critical enablers" in the Army's brigade-centric reconfiguration: rebalancing and stabilizing the force and cyclic unit readiness. These initiatives involve substantial policy, organizational, and personnel changes and some observers contend that these initiatives may be more be difficult to achieve than the creation of modular BCTs and support brigades as they require significant cultural changes for the entire Army. In what the Army describes as its "most significant restructuring in 50 years," the Army is presently converting a number of units deemed less relevant to current requirements into units more appropriate to the types of operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan. This change involves over 100,000 active and reserve personnel and involves decreasing certain types of units while increasing others as described in Table 5 , below. The Army maintains that rebalancing will increase its capabilities sufficiently to relieve the stress on high demand/low density units. This rebalancing is also intended to place more combat support and combat service support units back into the active component from the Reserves to improve overall deployability and sustainability, as well as to reduce requirements for immediate mobilization of reserve units. This initiative transitions the Army from an individual replacement manning system to a unit-focused system. This stabilization initiative is applicable only to Active Component forces. The objective is to keep soldiers in units longer in order to reduce historically high turnover rates of soldiers and their leaders and to foster unit cohesion and operational effectiveness. In addition, this initiative is intended to provide stability to Army families, and could ultimately save the Army money as it could result in fewer moves for soldiers and their families. In FY2006 the Army implemented a new readiness system—modeled on the cyclical readiness systems of the other Services—to replace its old "Tiered Readiness System" which, according to the Army, created a "Haves" and "Haves Not" culture - with most of the "Haves Not" consisting of Army National Guard and Reserve units. Under this readiness system, called the Army Force Generation Model, units will move through a structured progression of unit readiness over time intended to produce predictable periods of availability of trained, ready, and equipped units available for deployment. Under this model, units will fall into one of three pools: the reset/retrain pool; the ready pool; and the available pool. In the reset/retrain pool units will not be ready or available for major combat operations but could conduct homeland security and disaster relief operations. Units in the ready pool are conducting training and receiving additional personnel and equipment to bring them up to full strength and units in this pool can be deployed to meet "surge requirements" if need be. After passing the ready pool, units are assigned to the available pool for one year where they become eligible to deploy for combat and other operations. The Army hopes to maintain 20 BCTs (14 Active and 6 Reserve) in the available pool on a continuous basis. The Army maintains that the Army Force Generation Model for readiness will result in: A steady-state supply of 20 ready, fully-resourced, BCTs and supporting units; Stabilized personnel to join, train, deploy, and fight together in the same unit; Assured and predictable access to National Guard and Reserve units for operational requirements; Better ability to allocate constrained resources (particularly equipment) based on unit deployment schedules; More predictable unit deployments for soldiers, their families, and employers; and Opportunity to synchronize unit readiness with a wide variety of Institutional Army requirements such as professional schooling needed for promotion and military specialty-specific training. Congress may decide to examine how the proposed 65,000 soldier increase will impact the Army's modularity program. While there are few details available, DOD officials have proposed creating six additional active component BCTs (about 21,000 soldiers) which would leave 44,000 soldiers to be used for other purposes. Given personnel shortages in the existing BCTs and modular support units, it is reasonable to assume that an unspecified number of the remaining 44,000 soldiers will be used to fill these shortages. This scenario could result in the inability to create other types of units—either functional or multi-functional—that are needed to support the addition of six additional BCTs. Another consideration is the equipment issue. Reports suggest that current modular forces are significantly short of equipment in a wide variety categories. These shortages, combined with equipment loses from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, have compelled the Army to adopt the Army Force Generation Model, where units are only fully equipped when they deploy on operations. These circumstances call into question the Army's ability to even marginally equip new units. For example, a new heavy brigade combat team would require the procurement of 177 armored vehicles and 870 wheeled vehicles of all classes. If new Army units are less than optimally equipped, there is a potential for a significant increase in wear and tear on the Army's existing equipment, as more units use a disproportionally smaller amount of equipment. With this increase in equipment wear and tear will likely come an increased requirement for funds for reset and equipment replacement. An expansion of 65,000 soldiers might also have an impact on current and future basing plans. New units will likely require additional training areas, barracks, and motor pools as well as family housing. Even if funds are available today to accommodate these needs, the "real estate"—at home or overseas—may not be available and the requisite physical facilities may take many years to construct, thereby precluding the Army's ability to station these forces where intended. Infantry units historically have been vulnerable to enemy armored forces and, even when equipped with anti-tank systems, are considered to be at a disadvantage when attacking enemy armored units. These vulnerabilities, however, could be exacerbated when enemy armored forces are equipped with explosive reactive armor and active protection systems. Because Infantry and Stryker BCTs constitute "early entry forces" they might conceivably come up against these "enhanced" enemy armored forces (before the Heavy BCTs can be deployed) and find themselves at a distinct tactical disadvantage. Congress might decide to examine this issue of Infantry and Stryker BCT firepower vulnerabilities with the Army in greater detail. Such an examination could address potential organizational or weapons systems changes to provide enhanced lethality or changes to employment doctrine that might mitigate these BCT's vulnerabilities. The Army contends that it can afford both modularity and the FCS program but this affordability appears to be predicated on an increased Army budget more in line with historical precedents. While it is not unreasonable to assume that the Army may receive a greater share of the defense budget as it attempts to reorganize the Army and at the same time modernize, some consider it highly unlikely that the defense budget will increase relative to GDP to World War II levels as the Army suggests. Congress may wish to address the Army's apparent assumption to insure that the Army is not basing the funding of its modularity and FCS programs on what many believe are unrealistic expectations. Congress might act to review, in greater detail, the Army's rebalancing and stabilization initiatives. The Army has characterized these initiatives as "critical" to the modular transformation of the Army, but little is publically known as to how well they are progressing in terms of new units that have been created or how stabilization is affecting unit cohesion or family life for soldiers. Given that these two initiatives involve significant structural and cultural change for the Army, they also likely have significant budgetary implications that some feel are not adequately discussed as part of Army modularity. Congress may decide to examine the Army's Force Generation Model of cyclical readiness in greater detail. This new model - a departure from the long-standing tiered readiness system - will supposedly provide the Army with a trained and ready force pool of 20 active and reserve BCTs at all times. Such a change will likely have a significant impact on how the active and reserve Army staffs, equips, and trains its units and will almost certainly have budgetary and resource implications that Congress might decide to review. Some argue that while it is beneficial to reduce readiness standards in wartime, others maintain that it permits the Army to under resource units in terms of personnel and equipment while advertising a "48 brigade combat team Army" that, in reality, it does not have in terms of soldiers and equipment. CRS Report RL32888, The Army ' s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL33757, U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements: Background and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL32965, Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2006 and FY2007 Results for Active and Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL32238, Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS20787, Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21754, Military Forces: What Is the Appropriate Size for the United States? , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS20649, U.S. Military Dispositions: Fact Sheet , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL32924, Defense: FY2006 Authorization and Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed].

In what the Army describes as the "most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years," it is redesigning its current active duty division force to a 48 brigade combat team (BCT) force. The Army National Guard and Army Reserves will also redesign their forces in a similar fashion. The planned addition of active duty brigades and the conversion of Army National Guard brigades could provide a larger force pool of deployable combat units to ease the burden on units presently deployed, and possibly to shorten the length of time that units are deployed on operations. The Army has three other concurrent initiatives underway that it considers inextricably linked to its brigade-centric redesign: rebalancing to create new "high demand" units; stabilizing the force to foster unit cohesion and enhance predictability for soldiers and their families; and cyclical readiness to better manage resources and to ensure a ready force for operations. These initiatives involve substantial cultural, policy, organizational, and personnel changes. Some experts believe that modular redesign, selective rebalancing, stabilizing, and cyclical readiness are prudent actions that should provide the Army with additional deployable units and also eventually bring stability to soldiers and their families. As long as no additional significant long term troop commitments arise, many feel that these initiatives could help ease the stress on both the active and reserve forces. As the Army continues its modular conversion, it may have to contend with budget, personnel, and equipment shortages which could impede plans to build this new force as intended. Some also question if the Army can afford both its Future Combat System (FCS) program and its modularity program. The 110th Congress might decide to examine these and other concerns in greater detail. This report will be updated.