metadata

base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
datasets: []
language: []
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
  - cosine_accuracy
  - dot_accuracy
  - manhattan_accuracy
  - euclidean_accuracy
  - max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags:
  - sentence-transformers
  - sentence-similarity
  - feature-extraction
  - generated_from_trainer
  - dataset_size:10000
  - loss:TripletLoss
widget:
  - source_sentence: >-
      question may well be considered: What is the particular characteristic of
      a philosophical position which, with whatever unique aspects it may
      include, yet unites it with others as an expression of idealism? In the
      reply which follows, it is my hope that many idealists will concur, but I
      shall assume no more than that it offers what, to one idealist, seems
      pertinent to the issues which Professor Pratt raises. If I analyze his
      article correctly, these are five in number: (1) the place of the esse est
      percipi principle in idealistic philosophy; (2) the idealistic conception
      of reality, and in particular, the status of the objective world; (3) the
      idealistic view of knowledge; (4) the significance of the self; (5) the
      relation of idealism to realism. This is an extensive program, and its
      treatment here must be fragmentary at many points. Furthermore, it will be
      limited to the point of view of objective idealism, since subjective
      idealism is considered elsewhere in this publication by Professor
      Bri(rhtman. Esse Est Percipi In sug(resting that idealism should be
      mentalistic, proclaiming the doctrine, esse est percipi, Professor Pratt
      is reiterating a belief that has been held by numerous realistic thinkers
      in recent years. Just thirty years ago, Professor G. E. Moore published
      his wellknown refutation of the Berkeleian principle. To not a few
      idealists these arguments appeared brilliant and on many points including
      the issue of the principle itself as he interpreted it, convincing. But
      the objective idealist must protest that the designation
    sentences:
      - >-
        of the argument as a "Refutation of Idealism" seems a most regrettable
        misnomer. The misunderstandina has persisted not only in Professor
        Pratt's thought, but so frequently in realistic statements, that some
        attention must be directed towards it. Professor MIoore opened his essay
        by pointina out that the conclusion fundamentally characteristic of
        modern idealism is that the universe is spiritual. From this very
        acceptable statement, he proceeds to make a bewildering, hasty, and
        unconvincing passage to the position that if idealists think the world
        spiritual, they must regard it as having, its being in being consciously
        perceived. The assumption is made despite the fact that Professor Moore
        in the Principiac Ethica describes spiritual values as real parts of the
        objective world, to be discovered like the color yellow, merely by
        being, IS IDEALISMf REALISM? 423 observed. However, as we proceed with
        the "refutation," we discover that the error of idealists does not lie
        in their believingfl that the world is spiritual-Professor Moore
        "devoutly hopes" that it may be so. Their peculiar error lies in their
        reason for holding this belief, which is, we are told, the esse est
        percipi argument. The candid reply is that for objective idealists at
        least, and they constitute a generous percentage of idealists of both
        the present and past generations, it is not. The subjective idealist may
        hold, indeed, that all that is real must be a conscious mind or
        perceived by such a mind; that there can be "no object without a
        subject"; that "mind creates
      - >-
        that this "mere fact" must not be allowed to weigh in our calculations,
        since it can not be investigated by the "method of agreement and
        difference." This is a startling instance 5"Principles of Human
        Knowledge," paragraphs 50, 58. t of readiness to sacrifice empirical
        fact-admittedly universal-to methodological theory. The method of
        agreement and difference is a way of studying the relations of such
        phenomena as are difficult of observation because they are not always
        present. And yet we are called upon to eliminate from our philosophy an
        ever-present fact, the ego, because just this, its ubiquity, prevents
        our studying it by a logical method invented as an aid in the
        investigation of inconstant phenomena. Thus, to sum up our reply to this
        criticism: idealism can not be contradictory to the fundamental laws of
        logic, for these are laws of mental self-consistency. And subsidiary
        logical "laws" and "methods" are neither sacrosanct nor axiomatic. 2. We
        turn now to consider the alleged inconsistency of the idealistic
        position. It is urged by contemporary realists, as by those of
        Berkeley's day, that the distinction actually made by idealists between
        subject and object, percept and image, is possible only on the
        supposition that non-mental reality exists.10 The idealist admits that
        he makes this distinction. He, like other men, recognizes a difference
        between present and external, and merely imagined, objects. But he
        distinguishes the two kinds of things, not as extramental and mental,
        but as objects respectively of his shared and of his unshared
        consciousness,
      - >-
        actuality' signified, in the first instance, the social world, the nexus
        of interpersonal relationships among men, but it also included the realm
        of physical nature, as well as the instinctive drives and lower passions
        of the human soul itself. L Frank When Frank first succeeded in clothing
        this Romantic vision of human life in philosophical language, in the
        years 1904-1906, the language he employed was that of the Kantian or
        'critical' tradition. On some level, the vision was undoubtedly prior to
        the Kantian clothing in which we find it draped in Frank's early
        philosophical writings; Frank would not have been attracted to
        Kantianism in the first place if the latter had not helped him
        articulate his own feelings and experience. But while conceding this, we
        must, at the same time, avoid exaggerating the independence of thought
        from concepts. It is doubtful whether the content of his own experience
        became fully explicit for Frank before he found, in the writings of Kant
        and his successors, the conceptual vocabulary with which to render it
        communicable. Although the works of Windelband were among the texts
        Frank read when he first launched his study of modern philosophy around
        1900,9 it was not until a few years later that the influence of Windel
        band's ideas become manifest in Frank's own writings. In the intervening
        period, Frank was hired to produce a Russian transla tion of the German
        philosopher's best-known work, the collection of addresses and articles
        gathered together under the title of Pr?ludien [Preludes]. In his
        memoirs, Frank recalled having been
  - source_sentence: >-
      impression that evolutionary ecology began with G. E. Hutchinson's
      inspiration and Robert MacArthur and Richard Levins' theoretical
      formulations, and with G. C. Williams' urging of individual and genic
      selection ais the key to ecology's mysteries. But as James Collins
      stressed in the paper that opened this symposium, and as W. C. Allee and
      colleagues detailed in 1949, the association between ecology and evolution
      has as long and varied a separately The late 1950s and the 1960s saw not
      the birth of a new subject from the marriage of two others, but a
      renaissance and, most especially, a redirection of a long-standing
      interaction. Evolutionary ecology and its close ally, population biology
      became self-consciously defined in the 1960s, largely by raising new
      questions. But for much of the early history of ecology and evolution, the
      distinction between the fields was blurred or nonexistent. Darwin's
      pioneering ecological work and theorizing were, of course, integral to his
      evolutionary theory; the biogeography of Alfred Russel Wallace and Henry
      Walter Bates was as much a part of ecology as of evolution, and ecology
      remains part of the work of their successors such as William Matthew.Much
      of early ecology was in essence a physiological approach to adaptation,
      and if the physiological ecologists were vague about mechanisms or
      skeptical of natural selection, they were nonetheless concerned with a
      central concept in evolutionary biology. We must bear in mind, too, that
      many of the organismal biologists of preceding generations, like many
      today, were not concerned with whether they defined themselves as
      ecologists or
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        and time, and gave mathematical laws for its dynamical development.
        Mechanics dealt with mass particles and continuous ponderable media.
        Electro magnetics dealt with electric charges, magnetic dipoles and
        electro magnetic fields. Einstein noted the puzzling fact that
        mechanical and electromagnetic laws have different space-time
        properties. Mechanical laws, on the one hand, are covariant7 relative to
        Galilean frames8; electromagnetic laws, on the other hand, are covariant
        relative to 5 15 February 1963: Heisenberg said that the importance of
        observables in physics ity the picture that the real things are which
        observe and everything else is nothing, was, he assert , in the minds of
        the people at G ttingen at that time. 6 AHQP February 1963: Heisenberg
        said about the discovery of the certain I tried to say what space meant
        and what velocity meant and so on. I just tried to turn around the
        question according to the example of Einstein. You know Einstein just
        reversed the question by saying 'We do not ask how we describe nature by
        mathematical structures, but we say that nature always makes so that the
        mathematical scheme can be fitted to it. That is, you find in nature
        only situations which can be described by means of the Lorentz
        transformation. Therefore, I just suggested to myself "Well! is it not
        so that I can only find in nature situations which can be described by
        quantum mechanics?' Then I asked 'Well! what are these situations which
        you can define'. Then I found very soon that these are the situations in
        which there was this
      - >-
        established the first ecological society and the first ecological
        journal both in 1913 the Americans (United States and Canada)
        established their ecological society two years later and were soon
        making a greater contribution to the advancement of ecology than were
        ecologists from anywhere else. Not that the American ecologists were
        individually more productive than those elsewhere; there were just more
        of them. How many more is not yet known. Today there are over 6000
        members of the Ecological Society of America, and Robert L. Burgess has
        constructed a graph indicating the growth of this society since its
        founding.' It is to be hoped that Andrew G. Duff and Philip D. Lowe, who
        here contribute the chapter on Great Britain, will in their forthcoming
        history of British ecology include information comparable to that which
        Burgess has provided for the British Ecological Society. One thing they
        tell us in their present chapter (p. 143) is that Arthur G. Tansley,
        Britain's leading plant ecologist in the first half of this century,
        actively discouraged students from majoring in his subject because there
        were practically no jobs for them after they graduated. While this may
        have been the responsible thing to do, it must have had an adverse
        effect on the growth of the society. The organization of science in the
        USSR differs in several respects from that in America and Britain. For
        one thing, many (probably most) of its scientists work in research
        institutes and/or academies, which apparently reduce the need or desire
        for scientific
      - >-
        not. They were naturalists, often more specifically ornithologists,
        entomologists, botanists, or ichthyologists, and in this role
        contributed to as the occasion arose or demanded of speciation, ography,
        . The American Society ists was just that. I can remember Bates
        remarking with his endearing chuckle that "ecology" was just Greek for
        natural history. Dissolution Of The Bonds Nevertheless, ecology as a
        self-conscious discipline did develop considerable autonomy throughout
        the first half of this century, so that its conjunction with
        evolutionary biology in the 1960s was a real event. We have been
        reminded during this conference that the forgers of the neo-Darwinian
        synthesis in the 1930s and 1940s included geneticists, paleontologists,
        and systematists, but not ecologists a curious fact indeed, considering
        the role of ecology in Darwin's work. In the early 1960s graduate
        students at major centers of ecological research could find little
        instruction on how to shape a dissertation that might combine ecology
        with population genetics. The contributors to this conference have
        suggested several reasons for this state of affairs. One reason, it
        appears, was the attempt of some early ecologists to define ecology as
        distinct from evolutionary areas such as systematics and as directed
        toward the definition of phenomena and units of study that might be its
        special province. Sharon Kingsland and William Kimler in particular have
        discussed the perceived need to acquire status for ecology as an
        autonomous, respectable science.4 In this regard some ecologists, as
        Joel Hagen has demonstrated, emphasized the need for rigor
  - source_sentence: >-
      act on his conclusion or on his being prevented from doing so, is to
      construe ability or prevention so broadly as to make Aris totle's position
      on the connection between practical reasoning and action vacuous.
      Therefore, Aristotle cannot allow the akrat?s to reach a right conclusion
      (about an action to be performed at once) in cases of akratic action; and,
      consequently, he must insist that the akrat?s is epistemically deficient
      with respect to one or more of his premises. The element of the first
      answer on which I shall concentrate is the claim that the conclusion of a
      practical syllogism is an action. Aristotle does, to be sure, say of one
      of the syllogisms discussed in De Motu Animalium 7 that its conclusion "is
      an action" (701a20), and he asserts two lines later that "the action is
      the conclusion."4 But these claims should be interpreted in the light of
      the following points, (i) The example in question reads as follows: I need
      a covering, a coat is a covering; I need a coat. What I need I ought to
      make, I need a coat: I make a coat. And the conclusion I must make a coat
      is an action. (701al8-20) Here we see that there are propositional
      conclusions of practical syl logisms (e.g., "I must make a coat") which,
      precisely because they are propositional, are distinguishable from the
      ensuing (external) action (cf. [71, p. 230). (ii) There are two syllogisms
      and two conclusions in the preceding example, and the first conclusion, "I
      need a coat," does not specify an action
    sentences:
      - >-
        demand separate virtues. He argues that this situation is typical of
        much modern life and produces a fragmentation of character into a set of
        roles and a corresponding fragmentation of agency and moral life, to
        which, however, moral philosophy has remained largely blind. The
        fragmentation of modern moral life has made it possible to overlook the
        mutual incompatibility of distinct moral outlooks and theories. 'In both
        theory and practice the different conceptual schemes are mutually
        exclusive alternatives. But it is quite other with contemporary
        corporate existence. . . . a certain kind of moral eclecticism seems to
        reign . . . each view has its own segregated sphere of application; no
        one point of view is allowed to invade the sphere of another. But just
        this will remain invisible to the moral philosopher if moral philosophy
        remains at the level of analysis of moral language.' In Maclntyre's view
        moral philosophy which ignores the historical and sociological features
        of modern life is in danger of relying on conceptions of agency, self
        and character abstracted from obsolete social forms, and so may lack
        application. Indeed 'the methods of modern moral philosophy render it
        incompetent even to identify' this conflict between modernity and
        traditional modes of life. Much of what Maclntyre argues so forthrightly
        surfaces fleetingly in other contributions; and many of his claims about
        modern moral philosophy are borne out by these contributions, which seek
        after all to practice modern moral philosophy rather than to query its
        credentials. The first three papers are grouped together under
      - >-
        to be done nor an action-type to be instantiated.5 (iii) Given
        Aristotle's definition of a protasis (proposition or premise) in the
        Prior Analytics as "a sentence affirming or denying one thing of
        another" (24al6-17), it is difficult to believe that he could think that
        a proposition is an action, (iv) As we have already seen, Aristotle
        asserts in NE, VII.3 that "when a single opinion results" from the
        premises of a practical syllogism, an appropriate action must be
        performed at once (if the agent "can act and is not prevented"). But if
        the immediate result of one's practical premises is an opinion, then the
        appropriate action is preceded by a conclusion (or result), (v)
        Similarly, we are told in De Motu An., 8 that "thinking that one ought
        to go and going are virtually simultaneous (hama has eipein), unless
        there be something else to hinder" (702al5-17). Here, only sixty some
        lines after our initial example, Aristotle clearly distinguishes between
        an opinion of the sort which could be the conclusion of a practical
        syllogism and a corresponding action.6 (vi) Furthermore, if the
        proximate conclusions "reached" from practical premises are opinions,
        and an agent's forming a "concluding" opinion is virtually simultaneous
        with his performing the relevant action, then there is an extended sense
        of Conclusion' in which an (external) action is characteristically a
        conclu sion of a practical syllogism. It is not an immediate conclusion;
        for it is mediated by a concluding
      - >-
        tries to show that, in general, when Aristotle speaks of particulars (ra
        Kad9 enaara) in connection with action he is referring to specific types
        rather than individuals.10 But this general claim seems to be refuted by
        the following passage which comes just a page after (1). (2) An
        indication of the truth what has been said is the fact that while the
        young can become geometers and mathematicians and wise in matters like
        these, it is thought that they cannot be prac tically wise. The reason
        is that practical wisdom is concerned [not only with universals, but]
        also with particulars {ra Kad' eKaara) which become known through
        experience (yvcopL/ia e% e/i7r tptas), and a young person is
        inexperienced for experience re quires a good deal of time. . .
        .Further, error in deliberation may be either about the universal or
        about the particular (ro Kad' Kao~rov); we may fail to know either that
        all water that is heavy This point is an important element in his
        interpretation of the re lationship between deliberation and the
        practical syllogism. Cooper tries to show that the role of the practical
        syllogism for Aristotle is to link a piece of deliberation to a concrete
        situation. The result of successful de liberation is a decision to
        perform a specific type of action; the practical syllogism links this
        decision (through perception) to a particular situation in which the
        agent can implement his decision. According to this inter pretation,
        deliberation never reaches the
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      who are forcing healthy change on a conservative campus, or (b) unbalanced
      zealots and neurotic rebels who, when they are not smoking pot or shacking
      up with one another, are frittering away time on spurious issues. As a
      culture, we must be fond of dualisms or we would not persist in thinking
      this way. To talk about "students" who are creating a "problem" on college
      campuses is to ignore the obvious: that there are many different types of
      students and many different problems. It is simply not true that "they"
      are all waiting in the wings of the administration building, ready to
      seize it at the drop of a distasteful edict. There is sufficient empirical
      information to show that there is a wide range of attitudes, personalities
      and factions. At one extreme there would appear tobe ultra-leftwingers,
      heirs apparent to 1930 Marxists. These, says Kenneth Keniston in
      PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, are regarded by the New Left as dull and uninspired,
      competent only to crank the handle of a mimeo machine. There are several
      other shades of leftist positions. Another seemingly distinct group are
      liberal idealists who seem JOURNAL OF THOUGHT 187 to galvanize around only
      selected issues. These may be the University's alleged culpability in
      allowing Dow Chemical or the FBI to recruit on campus or it may be the
      University commitment in matters related to civil rights or racial
      justice. Many such idealists are not believers in a cleansing revolution;
      they are, rather, descendants of Old Testament prophets who possess strong
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        know u ... in most nearby possible worlds, that agent only believes that
        p when p is true' (p. 71). This principle not only allows us to retain
        closure while avoiding reference to conversational contexts, but also to
        obtain `... knowledge of everyday propositions [and] knowledge of
        denials of sceptical hypotheses as well' (p. 71). So one need not have
        internalistic (i.e. reflectively accessible) evidence that one is not a
        brain in a vat to know that one is not a brain in a vat. Interestingly,
        `neo- reanism' is not Moore's position; after all, by ascribing
        knowledge to himself CI know that I have two hands') in a context of
        discussing sceptical hypotheses, Moore (inappropriately)
        conversationally implied that he had internal evidence for the denial of
        sceptical hypotheses. Neo-Mooreanism's victory over scepticism is
        fleeting, though. For chapter four argues that all externalist positions
        misconstrue the real threat posed by scepticism. Roughly speaking, the
        closure-based argument masks the internalist and evidentialist nature of
        the sceptical challenge, which is more adequately revealed by casting
        the sceptical argument in terms of an underdetermination principle.
        Pritchard promises in the remainder of the book to pile onto the fading
        fortunes of externalist responses to closure-based scepticism by showing
        how they misunderstand how luck can affect knowledge. Chapters five and
        six kick off the second half of the book with Pritchard proposing a
        partial account and typology of epistemic luck. Clearly some types of
        epistemic luck are compatible with knowledge, but not all. For example,
        he argues that one can have 'lucky' knowledge in a variety of scenarios,
      - >-
        convictions learned from their liberal parents, the liberal mass media
        or to acknowledge that Bill Buckley is right on at least one
        point-liberal college professors. A third entity, seemingly pivotal,
        consists of a large group of students who are not radical, liberal or
        even especially committed to righting wrongs. These are the students who
        are apparently aware of issues but who do not themselves initiate
        action. They can, however, be moved to action by the sight of
        clubswinging cops and arbitrary deans, or, on the other hand, by le ft
        wing manipulators who occasionally overstep the bounds of fair play to
        reveal themselves for what they are: fanatics absolutely persuaded their
        ends are so sanctified that any means is acceptable. In point of fact,
        the vast majority of students are what they have always been: plodding,
        upwardly mobile nursing, education and engineering majors who could care
        less about alienation, social justice, Viet Nam, sexual expression, the
        House Un American Committee, dormitory hours or "grass. " These are not
        especially liberal and not particularly conservative. They are earnest,
        hard-working, gregarious, unimaginative souls who wish aBA, a spouse or
        a recommendation to medical or law school. They are not especially happy
        with the University as it is but they are not willing to risk their
        grade point averages or reputations to do much about it. They are
        generally happy with the status quo and do not experience a generation
        gap: indeed, they seem to admire their parents and wish to be
      - >-
        works. This college, with its community of faculty, students, alumni,
        and friends, was founded as an act of faith. Your presence here a
        century later may have the flavor of an act of faith on your part
        because its curriculum promises you no certain way to a particular
        occupation or profession. Perhaps you calculated the advantages of this
        or that kind of institution in the process of your choice. If so, you
        have discovered that the liberal arts college, known best and criticized
        most for the intangibility of its aims and purposes, has been condemned
        to extinction by educational prophets at least once each year for more
        than half of the past century. Money alone does not assure the life of
        an institution, though I am sure we would all agree that it helps. But
        founders, donors, and faculty without faith and a spirit of adventure
        can turn the wealthiest institution into a mere occupational outlet,
        devoid of teaching value. Examine in your own thoughts the experiences
        you cherish most in the days you have spent upon this campus. Some of
        you may remember instances of mere moments when the touch of a phrase or
        an act of a friend or teacher-and these are not mutually exclusive
        terms-imparted a sense of insight and sheer clarity to your mind. Or you
        may have been the beneficiary of the constant disciplinary effects of a
        toughminded professor whose impatient faith in your mental growth
        tantalized and provoked you into a stubborn contest of
  - source_sentence: >-
      compare the remarks in On Habituations (Eth.: this does not appear in the
      Kuhn edition; it is edited by Muller in SM 2 9-31): As the hegemonic soul
      has capabilities (dunameis) directed towards all the technai, it is
      necessary that there is one (sc. dunamis) with which we understand
      consequence and conflict, and another with which we remember; and we are
      cleverer in respect of the first mentioned, but more retentive in respect
      of the second. (Eth. 4, = SM 2 25) The distinction between intellectual
      sharpness and retentive ability is an ancient commonplace: see in
      particular the Hippocratic text On Regimen 1 35. 12 PHP V 601; cf.
      Symp.Diff. VII 55-6; and see MM X 635-6: a second part of the soul belongs
      to us not in virtue of our growing or being alive, but because we are
      animals, it is located in the heart and is the source of the innate heat;
      the arteries are the conduits for this source, which has many names: it is
      called the living power (dunamis z6tike), the spirited power (dunamis
      thumoeides), the living soul, and the spirited soul. 200 So Galen draws on
      a diverse range of previous theories in order to construct his own
      account; but it is important to stress that the theory that results is no
      mere haphazard porridge of badly-digested and ill-assorted scraps from the
      table of his predecessors. He is not afraid to take issue with them on
      matters of substantial importance, and to take issue with them in his
    sentences:
      - >-
        own characteristically, indeed uniquely, polemical style. For instance,
        he will not say, as Plato does, that any part of the soul is
        demonstrably immortal. Indeed, in his pronouncements on the matter he
        exhibits an admirable caution, unwilling to commit himself with any
        degree of certainty on matters which he views as being by their very
        nature resistant to secure demonstration."3 Thus at PHP V 791-2, Galen
        writes: Plato said that the cause who made us, the demiurge who
        fashioned the universe, commanded his children to make the human race by
        taking . .. the substance (ousia) of the immortal soul from him and
        adding it to what was generated. But we must realise that there is no
        formal similarity between proving and positing the fact that we were
        made in accordance with the providence of some god . . ., and knowing
        the substance of the maker or even of our own soul ... [T]he statements
        of the most divine Plato about the substance of our soul . .. and still
        more all that he says about our whole body, extend only to plausibility
        and reasonableness (achri tou pithanou kai eikotos). That last remark is
        important (indeed Galen, perhaps excessively charitably, takes Plato
        himself to be committed to it by his remarks about the eikos muthos
        [Tim. 29c-d]). There is a class of things about which we can at best
        speculate, and most particularly these are the preserve of the
        philosophers: In philosophy it is not surprising
      - >-
        Hippocrates and Plato but in spite of its title, this has virtually
        nothing in common with the placita of Aëtius, nor, one presumes, with
        the phusikai doxai of Theophrastus. Galen's avowed aim is to show, by
        means of selective quotation and juxtaposition, the fundamental
        agreement between his two great masters of his title, in particular in
        regard to the structure and function of the soul, and at the expense in
        particular of the Stoics and Peripatetics. Mario Vegetti contributes a
        lucid and learned piece,5 which seeks to understand the work in terms of
        its intended audience avowedly not the sectarians of either medicine or
        philosophy, but rather generally educated and interested men of good
        will competent in the rudiments of logic; and he supposes that the
        wealth of quotation in which Galen indulges, even from works which he
        himself says are still readily available, indicates that his audience is
        not supposed to be made up of specialists. This may be right; but Galen
        loved to quote and to parade his learning, and while it is true that in
        this work the citations are longer than usual, this may simply be due
        (as Galen himself says) to the verbosity of those (principally
        Chrysippus) he intends to refute. Sooner or later, everyone who reads
        Galen (or even simply makes use of him as a source for other writers)
        has to get to grips with the question of how careful and trustworthy a
        reporter of other people's views he is and different scholars have
        proposed rather different
      - >-
        dissertation, published as Li Zhi: Philosophe maudit (1527-1602)
        (Billeter 1979), is, according to a reviewer, "essentially a
        chronological account of Li interspersed with lengthy translations from
        Li's writings and biographical material" (Wu 1 981 , p. 304). Billeter's
        main publications are three books on Zhuang Zi: Leçons sur TchouangTseu
        (Lessons on Zhuang Zi) (2002), Études sur Tchouang-Tseu (Studies on
        Zhuang Zi) (2004), and Notes sur Tchouang-Tseu (Notes on Zhuang Zi) (201
        0), in addition to Chine trois fois muette. The three books on Zhuang Zi
        complement each other, one of them containing Billeter's own
        translations of classical texts with comments. In English he published
        The Chinese Art of Writing (1990), and his most recent Un Paradigme
        contains personal reflections. The Debate At least four points, all of
        them developed in Contre François Jullien, need to be distinguished in
        this debate. 1. Billeter criticizes Jullien's "conceptual approach,"
        which formulates the ideas of Chinese philosophers in terms of highly
        abstract ideas and subsequently inserts them into East-West
        philosophical discussions. According to Billeter, this approach
        "instrumentalizes" Chinese culture to the point of "remolding" it and
        uses Thorsten Botz-Bornstein 219 it as the basis for entirely new
        systems (p. 18). Billeter states that "everything that passes today as
        specifically Chinese in the realm of thought is part of this system" (p.
        19). 2. Billeter affirms that Jullien's conceptualization necessarily
        leads to the synthetic creation of an "ideal China" that will be called
        "Chinese Civilization." 3. The necessary result is that Jullien will
        designate
model-index:
  - name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
    results:
      - task:
          type: triplet
          name: Triplet
        dataset:
          name: nomic
          type: nomic
        metrics:
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.974
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.026
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.964
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.974
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.974
            name: Max Accuracy
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.9755
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.0245
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.976
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.9755
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.976
            name: Max Accuracy

SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1

This is a sentence-transformers model finetuned from nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

Model Details

Model Description

Model Type: Sentence Transformer
Base model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
Output Dimensionality: 768 tokens
Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity

Model Sources

Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face

Full Model Architecture

SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
  (2): Normalize()
)

Usage

Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

pip install -U sentence-transformers

Then you can load this model and run inference.

from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v9")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    'compare the remarks in On Habituations (Eth.: this does not appear in the Kuhn edition; it is edited by Muller in SM 2 9-31): As the hegemonic soul has capabilities (dunameis) directed towards all the technai, it is necessary that there is one (sc. dunamis) with which we understand consequence and conflict, and another with which we remember; and we are cleverer in respect of the first mentioned, but more retentive in respect of the second. (Eth. 4, = SM 2 25) The distinction between intellectual sharpness and retentive ability is an ancient commonplace: see in particular the Hippocratic text On Regimen 1 35. 12 PHP V 601; cf. Symp.Diff. VII 55-6; and see MM X 635-6: a second part of the soul belongs to us not in virtue of our growing or being alive, but because we are animals, it is located in the heart and is the source of the innate heat; the arteries are the conduits for this source, which has many names: it is called the living power (dunamis z6tike), the spirited power (dunamis thumoeides), the living soul, and the spirited soul. 200 So Galen draws on a diverse range of previous theories in order to construct his own account; but it is important to stress that the theory that results is no mere haphazard porridge of badly-digested and ill-assorted scraps from the table of his predecessors. He is not afraid to take issue with them on matters of substantial importance, and to take issue with them in his',
    'own characteristically, indeed uniquely, polemical style. For instance, he will not say, as Plato does, that any part of the soul is demonstrably immortal. Indeed, in his pronouncements on the matter he exhibits an admirable caution, unwilling to commit himself with any degree of certainty on matters which he views as being by their very nature resistant to secure demonstration."3 Thus at PHP V 791-2, Galen writes: Plato said that the cause who made us, the demiurge who fashioned the universe, commanded his children to make the human race by taking . .. the substance (ousia) of the immortal soul from him and adding it to what was generated. But we must realise that there is no formal similarity between proving and positing the fact that we were made in accordance with the providence of some god . . ., and knowing the substance of the maker or even of our own soul ... [T]he statements of the most divine Plato about the substance of our soul . .. and still more all that he says about our whole body, extend only to plausibility and reasonableness (achri tou pithanou kai eikotos). That last remark is important (indeed Galen, perhaps excessively charitably, takes Plato himself to be committed to it by his remarks about the eikos muthos [Tim. 29c-d]). There is a class of things about which we can at best speculate, and most particularly these are the preserve of the philosophers: In philosophy it is not surprising',
    "Hippocrates and Plato but in spite of its title, this has virtually nothing in common with the placita of Aëtius, nor, one presumes, with the phusikai doxai of Theophrastus. Galen's avowed aim is to show, by means of selective quotation and juxtaposition, the fundamental agreement between his two great masters of his title, in particular in regard to the structure and function of the soul, and at the expense in particular of the Stoics and Peripatetics. Mario Vegetti contributes a lucid and learned piece,5 which seeks to understand the work in terms of its intended audience avowedly not the sectarians of either medicine or philosophy, but rather generally educated and interested men of good will competent in the rudiments of logic; and he supposes that the wealth of quotation in which Galen indulges, even from works which he himself says are still readily available, indicates that his audience is not supposed to be made up of specialists. This may be right; but Galen loved to quote and to parade his learning, and while it is true that in this work the citations are longer than usual, this may simply be due (as Galen himself says) to the verbosity of those (principally Chrysippus) he intends to refute. Sooner or later, everyone who reads Galen (or even simply makes use of him as a source for other writers) has to get to grips with the question of how careful and trustworthy a reporter of other people's views he is and different scholars have proposed rather different",
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 768]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]

Evaluation

Metrics

Triplet

Dataset: nomic
Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.974
dot_accuracy	0.026
manhattan_accuracy	0.964
euclidean_accuracy	0.974
max_accuracy	0.974

Triplet

Dataset: nomic
Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.9755
dot_accuracy	0.0245
manhattan_accuracy	0.976
euclidean_accuracy	0.9755
max_accuracy	0.976

Training Details

Training Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 10,000 training samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 271 tokens mean: 331.92 tokens max: 584 tokens	min: 265 tokens mean: 331.75 tokens max: 565 tokens	min: 267 tokens mean: 330.76 tokens max: 518 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
a mutual belief among all the pushers that I also am taking part in the pushing. This kind of joint activity should be regarded as a case of coaction (or a very weak kind of joint action) rather than "proper" joint action (see Tuomela, 1992, Chapter 2 for discussion). 3. Joint Intention As is generally accepted, a (mere) personal intention involves making up one's mind. Similarly, joint intentions such as we-intentions (to be discussed below) involve the participants' having jointly resolved or made up their minds or made a joint plan concerning what to do jointly. As was remarked above, "proper" joint actions are based on (at least mutually believed) agreement, either explicit or implicit. It should be obvious that if we-intentions are to have proper joint actions as their "satisfiers", they must also be based on agreement-making. But, as WHAT IS COOPERATION? 89 said, we will accept below that joint intentions can concern also joint actions in a wider sense. In joint-intention formation each agent accepts for himself: "I ought to participate in our doing X together". This acceptance here means that the agent (at least dimly) recognizes the existence of a joint plan to perform X and accordingly commits himself to performing X together with the others. A joint intention on conceptual grounds leads to each agent's acceptance of "I will participate in, or contribute to, our doing X", based on his acceptance of "We will do X" (the standard ex? pression for	joint intentions or "group-intentions", viz, we-intentions and standing group-intentions, as argued in Tuomela, 1992). Let us consider the central notion of we-intention in some more detail. We-intentions are action-generating joint intentions that agents have in situations of joint action, e.g., when they jointly intend to carry a table jointly. The content of a we-intention can be taken to be something like "to do X jointly" or "we to do X jointly". A we intention involves the intention to perform one's part of the joint action. We can say roughly that a member A? of a collective G ("we" for At) we-intends to do X if and only if At (i) intends to do his part of X (as his part of X), (ii) has a belief to the effect that the joint action opportunities for an intentional performance of X will obtain; and, furthermore, (iii) believes that there is (or will be) a mutual belief among the participating members of G or at least among those participants who do their parts of X intentionally as their parts of X to the effect that the joint action opportunities for an intentional performance of X will ohtain.1 Next consider a schema of practical reasoning that a we-intending agent is required to satisfy. This schema also serves to account for the commitments the participants of a joint action have towards other participants (cf. Tuomela, 1984, Chapter 2, Tuomela and Miller, 1988, and Tuomela, 1992, Chapter 3): (W)(i) We will do X (ii) X cannot be performed by us	action is to give a central place to the appropriate kind of intention that is relevant to collective action. This kind of intention is commonly called a 'collective', 'joint', or 'group' intention, and accounts of this form of intention have been offered by Michael Bratman [5], Margaret Gilbert [13, 12, 14], Raimo Tuomela [24, 25, 30, 23, 28, 27, 26], John Seaxle [19, 18], Seamus Miller [16], J. David Velleman [32], and others.3 Those who follow the strategy of analyzing collective action by giving an analysis of collective intention4 typically assume that once the analysis of collective intention is in place, the analysis of collective action will follow immediately.5 One challenge facing an account of collective intention is that there is an extremely wide variety of collective intentions, which may have various necessary and sufficient conditions, depending upon the specific circumstances. For example, we may correctly say that 'Russell and Whitehead had the intention to write the Principia Mathematics and that 'the angry mob had the intention to storm the Bastille'. But the level of coordination, planning, and 3Elsewhere, we have offered a game-theoretic characterisation of the concept of collective intention [9]. 4 In what follows, we shall use the term 'collective intention' neutrally to refer to the entire range of intentions attributable to groups. Such intentions have been called 'group intentions', 'joint intentions', and 'we-intentions'. 5 The strategy of analyzing collective action by giving an account of collective
unrestrictedly into its service. Characteristic of him was a certain harshness and a dogmatism rooted in a sense of personal righteousness and moral integrity; characteristic also was his sense of a high calling, a selfconsciousness suffused with pride and "heroism", and, along therewith, a certain lack of social imagination such as is requisite for an understanding of other people and for happy relations with them. Thus he was frequently unheeding whether of the feelings or of the 'Theodor Fritsch, Handbuch der Judenfrage: Die wichtigsten Tatsachen zur Beurteilung des jfidischen Volkes, 39th ed. (I8I to 200 thousand), Leipzig, Hammer-Verlag, 1935, pp. io and 5V8, respectively. (In view of recent political events in Germany it should be noted that, while the 39th edition of Fritsch's work was printed in 1935, the author died on September 8, 1933.) No. I.] Discussion rightful claims of others, and insensitive to the real value of their ideas and points of view.Jn consequence his exaggerations could reach a degree all but incredible. Those of his statements which were made in moments of emotional fervor or of an overpowering moral zeal must not be centered upon as crucial if one would acquire genuine knowledge as to that most comprehensive and tightly organized body of ideas and values which represent the real Fichte and constitute the soul of his philosophy. In interpreting Fichte it is important to remember also that his career was as turbulent as was his temperament. Moreover, the intellectual and cultural	influences that came in turn to play upon him during the years of his intense life were very diverse, and during this period epochal political and social events reached a culmination in the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests. Not strange, then, that even after the transformation which a study of the philosophy of Kant effected in Fichte's thought and objectives, there came further changes throughout the whole range of his ideas, whether social, political, ethical, religious, or metaphysical. To be sure it has been said of Fichte that the man "aus einem Gusz" inevitably propounded a philosophy "aus einem Stuck". If this means that Fichte, in comparison, for example, with Kant, was prompted by his very temperament, as well as by his conception of the requirements of reason, to exhibit the whole range of human thought and values as a single system, the statement is essentially true. Nevertheless it should be remembered that such unity as prevails in the Fichtean writings characterizes them severally rather than as a whole; and also that the unity in question is of the sort generated by a deep moral and religious passion rather than that issuing from a speculative imagination deployed by "cold thought" or the semblant activities of play or art. The earliest intimation we have of Fichte's attitude toward Jews and Judaism is in a sermon preached by him in Dubrenski on March 25, 1786, and thus in the twenty-fourth year of his life.4 After having contended that "God gives to all men certain incentives to	in that work. The essays have all the brilliance and learning that one associates with all of Professor Cassirer's work, and the English of the translation bears no marks of the German source. This doctoral dissertation undertakes to expound in some seventy pages the conception of God or the Absolute in the philosophy of Fichte. "Fichte has often been thought to have expressed himself so loosely that his precise meanings were hidden in vague generalities," Dr. Stine remarks. "A careful study of the works of Fichte, however, reveals that while the terminology varies, he was constantly seeking to express the same fundamental thoughts." There can be little doubt, on the evidence supplied in this thesis, that Dr. Stine has made a careful study of the works of Fichte. But while he may have succeeded in discerning the same fundamental thoughts behind the vague generalities, he has not succeeded in communicating them, to this reviewer at least. This is partly no doubt because the Idea of God, or the Absolute, is so central to Fichte's whole tortuously conceived philosophy that the attempt to expound it systematically in this brief compass was hazardous at best. A further difficulty is found in the method of exposition employed. Dr. Stine depends far too extensively on long quotations from Fichte to make his meaning plain, and these quotations are frequently more puzzling than illuminating. The terminology does indeed vary, and no effective attempt is made to chart any clear path through the tangled
To see why societies found it necessary to develop IP laws, consider property rights with respect to a book. In a world without copyright laws, if an author produces a book manuscript, he can only own the actual pages of the manu script and has no property rights to the text itself. When the author sells his book manuscript to the publisher, he has transferred all of his rights to the publisher with respect to the book. Likewise, if the publisher sells a copy of the book, he has transferred all of his rights to the buyer. Similar problems would arise for inventions in a world without patent laws and trademarks in a world without trademark laws. It would seem that people have important interests worth protecting that extend beyond their interests in tangible things; they also have interests in intangible things, such as the ideas written on paper or the information embodied in inventions. In order to recognize these interests in ideas and infor mation, it became necessary to create a new category of property, intellectual property.5 Intellectual properties, unlike tangible proper ties, require special legal protection because they are non-exclusive: two people can possess and use the same item of intellectual property without preventing each other from possessing or using it (Hettinger, 1989). For example, two people can both use and possess the Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property same computer program, poem, manufacturing method, or the same song at the same time. IP laws allow people to gain exclusive control over objects that are non-exclusive (May, 1998). The reason why intellectual	properties are non exclusive is that information and ideas have no particular location in time and space: they are abstract objects.6 Although some writers, such as Barlow (1994), believe that it is impossible to protect IP in the information age, due to its ease of transmission, businesses and governments have developed many technological and legal methods for protecting IP, such as access restrictions, encryption, water-marking, licensing agreements, and infringement lawsuits (NAS, 2000). The most common legally recognized forms of IP are copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets (Miller and Davis, 2000; Foster and Shook, 1993). Many different countries have enacted laws and signed international treaties that define these rights and their scope. All of these laws distinguish between privately owned infor mation and information that is in the public domain. Copyrights give authors of original works the right to exclude others from copying those works without the author's permission; patents give inventors the right to exclude others from making, using, or commercializing their inventions without the inventor's permission; trademarks give the trademark holder the right to exclude others from using a symbol that he uses to distinguish his business or its products; and trade secrecy laws allow businesses to protect confidential business information (Paine, 1991). There are other types of IP in addition to these four traditional categories. Confidential, personal information, such as medical records or psychiatric records, financial data, credit reports, or purchasing data also can	on the analogy with tangible property and that recognizes the role of ideas in defining personality and social relationships. The combined effect of these assumptions is that trade secret law comes in for particularly serious criticism. It restricts methods of acquiring ideas (p. 35); it encourages secrecy (p. 36); it places unacceptable restrictions on employee mobility and technology transfer (p. 52); it can stifle competition (p. 50); it is more vulnerable to socialist objections (p. 52). In light of these deficiencies, Hettinger recommends that we consider the possibility of "eliminating most types of trade secrets entirely and letting patents carry a heavier load" (p. 49). He believes that trade secrets are undesirable in ways that copyrights and patents are not (p. 36). 6. Hettinger mentions trademark as another of our intellectual property institutions, along with our social sanction on plagiarism, but his central discussion focuses on copyright, patent, and trade secret concepts. Neither trademark principles nor the prohibition on plagiarism fits comfortably with his justification in terms of increasing the dissemination and use of ideas. Both are more closely related to giving recognition to the source or originator of ideas and products. 7. It may be helpful to think of two levels of justification: (i) an intermediate level consisting of objectives, purposes, reasons, and explanations for an institution or practice; and (2) an ultimate level linking those objectives and purposes to our most basic legitimating ideas such as the general good or individual liberty. Philosophers generally tend to be concemed with the

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
    "triplet_margin": 0.05
}

Evaluation Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 500 evaluation samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 278 tokens mean: 331.45 tokens max: 489 tokens	min: 279 tokens mean: 332.39 tokens max: 468 tokens	min: 280 tokens mean: 330.43 tokens max: 471 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
with accepted beliefs, provided only there is enough of sentimental satisfaction in it to -compensate. If all the values which ideas may have are to count for truth and be simply summed and subtracted, then in any given .ease disproof by scientific or logical methods may be overbalanced by positive values of " subsequential utility " or tonic emotionality. On this precise point Dr. Schiller has nothing to say. He simply reiterates the " biological necessity " that all the idea = values shall determine the idea's "survival". This, so far as I know, has never been denied. The question is whether an idea that was ,contrary to sensible experience might not survive because its emotional, value outweighed the dissatisfaction at its contrariety to sensible experience; and whether therefore such an idea might not be " true " on Dr. Schiller's theory. Dr. Schiller accuses me of having attempted to " read a metaphysical meaning into a number of, pragmatic pronouncements which are clearly methodological ". But the texts from which I have cited in arguing that pragmatism of the Schiller type is subjectivistic bear such titles as The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics, 1 MIN, No. 86. Philosophy -and the Scientific TIzvestigation of a Future Life, and The Making of Reality. No pragmatist that I have ever read has confined either himself or his pragmatism to "methodological" considerations; and it is perfectly clear that Dr. Schiller himself does not mean to do	so, for he proceeds at once to present a third alternative which may save him from the necessity of deciding between idealism and realism.' This third possibility which I am accused of " ignoring " is "'the correlation of a mind-with-objects and objects-for-a-mind ". I have not ignored this possibility. I have recognised it as a very common formulation of idealism.2 The reader will observe that in the above formula the only constant is mind, or a relationship distinguished by the fact that mind must always be one of its terms. But waiving this point, how is one to discover the real importance of this " correlation " to whatever may take the place of object in it. How is one to determine the real, as distinguished from the methodological place of mind in the world? This is a fairly important question and it is the question at issue between idealism and realism. I cannot believe that it is "merely academic " and must therefore crave Dr. Schiller's indulgence further. Now as to "the Ego-centric Predicament ". Dr. Schiller admits that I give "much prominence " to it. But he must have discovered that fact by consulting the Index or the Table of Contents. 3 For he has not in the least understood the point, and most of what he attributes to me is flatly contradicted by the text. He suggests that I infer realism from the Ego-centric Predicament, whereas I. have invariably asserted that nothing can be argued from it. My central point is that it is	the name of idealism; it is also evident that they have really adopted the form and presuppositions of empirical realism, in spite of the 'mental' categories in which they have been expressed. Idealism has no more to do with 'ideas' interpreted merely as mental states than it has with any other type of 'independent' particulars; and the essence of idealism does not consist in the peculiar spiritual or mental character of what it regards as real, so much as in the element of universality which the real must exhibit whether it be mental or material, or whatever may be the subjective and particularist characters that may belong to it. A certain degree of 'independence' of abstract mind is therefore the condition of an element's being real, in the sense that its reality implies the possession of the character of objectivity upon which the truth of any judgment with respect to it rests. But this independence is not so much a matter of unique disparateness, as the author seems to imply, as of its embodying certain aspects of universality. But this merely suggests that, in the order of the real, the peculiarly mental fact, the state of consciousness in its particularist and subjective sense, holds a not very important place. Professor Moore's refutation would therefore have been important if it had relegated the mental state to its properly obscure place; but that would have contributed, not to a refutation of idealism, but to the necessity of a re-examination of
to Hesse therefore, must argue for this alternative descriptions thesis. Her strategy for establishing both conditions for realism is straightforward. She argues that neither competing theories nor alternative formalizations need be interpreted as being about different entities. With respect to the historical challenge, it is always possible, she claims, to translate a large number of the statements of an earlier theory into the statements of its historical successor ([2], p. 299). Similarly, with respect to the conceptual challenge, she claims that the statements of one formalization can be translated into the statements of the alternative formalization ([2], p. 296). The claim in both cases, however, is that partial or complete translation between theories or alternative formalizations indicates that the opposing theories are about the same world and that, rather than being ontologically incompatible, they are much like alternative natural languages which describe the same world. Inter-translatability is thus a mark of identity of reference. Translation is clearly the cornerstone of Hesse's realism and she exerts a strong effort in explaining the sense in which the statements within both historical theories and alternative formalizations can be translated. In both cases, she claims that the translation is achieved by recognizing certain identities of intensional reference ([2], pp. 296, 299) (henceforth IR) within the respective theories or formalizations. Her realism presupposes this translational concept and I will argue that despite the care that she spends in constructing it, there are enough	problems within it to justify its rejection. In the light of these problems, I will then attempt to redesign the concept so that it will allow for a realistic attitude toward science. The notion of IR is complex. One tempting method for explicating it would be to first lay out Hesse's definition of it and then clarify the concept via a detailed analysis of this definition. This route, however, is not a fruitful one; for although she states that Intensional reference is the relation which subsists between a descriptive predicate in a given language and a property of 446 REALISM AND INTENSIONAL REFEREN an object when the statement ascribing that predicate to that object is true. ([2], p. 62) she does nothing to clarify the myriad of epistemological and metaphysical problems imbedded within this definition. Furthermore, her own presentation of the concept of IR does not focus around this definition. Instead she begins by employing the via negativa; i.e., she distinguishes IR from a number of other classically semantic concepts. For although IR captures the meaning of many general terms used within science, she claims that this meaning cannot be identified either with the extension or the sense of those general terms. According to Hesse, IR cannot be identified with extension. For despite the fact that scientific theories do discriminate objects into classes, these classes are not adequately described as extensional, for they are not defined merely by the objects contained in them. They involve also what I shall call intensional reference, that is, they depend on recognitions of similarities and differences	the instrumental reliability of the methodology which scientists actually employ. 7 and According to the realist, existing theories provide approximate knowledge not only of relations between observables, but also of the unobservable structures which underlie obserbable phenomena. 8 The crucial link between the "unobservable structures" which the instrumentalist or strict empiricist does not want to buy and Boyd's insistence that one is forced into buying them is, I argue, a theory of reference. For Boyd seems to believe that the referent of a key term in a scientific theory is seldom or never ( ] , and, more importantly, that vocabularies employing different terms are employing the terms co-referentially despite what may appear, to the casual observer, to be differences in meaning. Now it seems clear that what Boyd has in mind as a theory of reference is, baldly, a causal theory of reference. Crudely speaking, a causal theory of reference would allow for the retention of extension over a period of time for natural kind terms, and would do the kind or work that Boyd would need to preserve the epistemic access which he claims to be a condition for epistemic success. At this point one would do well to remind oneself of the salient differences between causal theories of reference and what is referred to in the literature as the "classical" view. The latter is generally regarded as the direct descendant of a view associated with Frege and to some extent with Russell. On this view
the logicistic crusade for clarity are revealed in the writings of Whitehead's former colleague and co-author of Principia Mathematica, Bertrand Russell, whose theory of logical atomism directly confronts the problem of vagueness. Russell goes a step beyond Frege and argues that the vagueness of general terms can be conquered using the symbolic methods of Principia Mathematica and the established results of exact science.3 But the upshot of his frontal assault on vagueness merely underscores a crucial question: just what do the precise symbolic structures of logic and mathematics, and the formal calculations of the exact sciences, actually contribute to the rationality of explanations? Russell's treatment of vagueness does, however, help bring out one important point. He says, for example, that . . . what we believe ourselves to know in philosophy is more doubtful than the detail of science, though perhaps not more doubtful than its most When one compares this remark with his claim that it would be a great mistake to suppose that vague knowledge must be false. On the contrary, a vague belief has a much better chance of being true than a precise one, because there are more possible facts that would verify it, (Russell 1923, p. 91) the question arises whether there are any instances of precise knowledge that do not embrace any extremely vague ideas. Perhaps the greatest degree of certainty and truth that so-called exact science proffers philosophy comes only in the form of very general, and hence extremely vague, facts about	nature. Russell does not pursue this line of thought, however, for he chooses to tie all the tricky questions associated with the big question of what logic and science really do for philosophy into one neat logicistical package. He thus begs the primary question of what an ideally rational explanation ought to look like. Logical reconstructions of certain fundamental notions, such as matter and mind, are required, he maintains, just because these vague notions are not amenable to the methods of exact science. Apart from the circularity of this move, it is also worth noting that despite his suspicion of ordinary concepts Russell enlists the general idea of event here, thus forcing into the open the question whether this fundamental notion may be intrinsically vague. As quantum mechanics (which is often touted as one of the most successful of modern physical theories) now assures us, it is not possible to achieve a precise, purely objective description of any physical event.4 Hence in so far as the notion of event is fundamental both to science and philosophy, the principal lesson for the rationalistic philosopher who wishes, like Russell, to take science seriously may be that vagueness is an inescapable element of every rational account of anything whatever, and not a disease of the understanding in need of a rigorous logicistical therapy. That it may be both simplistic and misleading to view the chief aim of philosophy as primarily a quest for perfect clarity and definiteness in fundamental concepts and their modes of	phenomena as "understood". In this way I argue that the quantum revolution should not be seens as implying an "endgame for understanding" but as an opening move in a process of axiological revision which would allow the rational inquirer to discourse on the understanding of quantum phenomena without "merely redefining terms to paper over our ignorance". (Cushing, 1991, p. 337) Thus to be a realist is to take up a certain stand with respect to the axiology of inquiry: the realist upholds the cognitive goal of "understanding". The pursuit of any cognitive goal is rational or irrational only against the context of other beliefs held by a rational inquirer. Thus, the goals it is rational for a scientist to pursue are at least partially a function of that inquirer's conception of the physical world. Thus axiological revision may well entail ontological reconstruction, a task that falls in what I call the "philosophy of nature". The analysis presented here will be organized around three central ontological reference points: properties, individuals, and relations, to each of which a section of this paper is dedicated. However, before turning to these topics, a few general points about the relation of ontology to natural science are in order. Realism , And The Philosophy Of Nature The scientist's felt need for an understanding of quantum phenomena is akin to the philosopher's well-known need to be delivered from puzzlement; some philosophers seek to solve the problem, while others try to dissolve it. The realist administers therapy by attempting to satisfy the yearning

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
    "triplet_margin": 0.05
}

Training Hyperparameters

Non-Default Hyperparameters

eval_strategy: steps
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
learning_rate: 1e-05
weight_decay: 0.01
warmup_ratio: 0.1
batch_sampler: no_duplicates

All Hyperparameters

Click to expand

overwrite_output_dir: False
do_predict: False
eval_strategy: steps
prediction_loss_only: True
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
per_gpu_train_batch_size: None
per_gpu_eval_batch_size: None
gradient_accumulation_steps: 1
eval_accumulation_steps: None
learning_rate: 1e-05
weight_decay: 0.01
adam_beta1: 0.9
adam_beta2: 0.999
adam_epsilon: 1e-08
max_grad_norm: 1.0
num_train_epochs: 3
max_steps: -1
lr_scheduler_type: linear
lr_scheduler_kwargs: {}
warmup_ratio: 0.1
warmup_steps: 0
log_level: passive
log_level_replica: warning
log_on_each_node: True
logging_nan_inf_filter: True
save_safetensors: True
save_on_each_node: False
save_only_model: False
restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint: False
no_cuda: False
use_cpu: False
use_mps_device: False
seed: 42
data_seed: None
jit_mode_eval: False
use_ipex: False
bf16: False
fp16: False
fp16_opt_level: O1
half_precision_backend: auto
bf16_full_eval: False
fp16_full_eval: False
tf32: None
local_rank: 0
ddp_backend: None
tpu_num_cores: None
tpu_metrics_debug: False
debug: []
dataloader_drop_last: False
dataloader_num_workers: 0
dataloader_prefetch_factor: None
past_index: -1
disable_tqdm: False
remove_unused_columns: True
label_names: None
load_best_model_at_end: False
ignore_data_skip: False
fsdp: []
fsdp_min_num_params: 0
fsdp_config: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap: None
accelerator_config: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
deepspeed: None
label_smoothing_factor: 0.0
optim: adamw_torch
optim_args: None
adafactor: False
group_by_length: False
length_column_name: length
ddp_find_unused_parameters: None
ddp_bucket_cap_mb: None
ddp_broadcast_buffers: False
dataloader_pin_memory: True
dataloader_persistent_workers: False
skip_memory_metrics: True
use_legacy_prediction_loop: False
push_to_hub: False
resume_from_checkpoint: None
hub_model_id: None
hub_strategy: every_save
hub_private_repo: False
hub_always_push: False
gradient_checkpointing: False
gradient_checkpointing_kwargs: None
include_inputs_for_metrics: False
eval_do_concat_batches: True
fp16_backend: auto
push_to_hub_model_id: None
push_to_hub_organization: None
mp_parameters:
auto_find_batch_size: False
full_determinism: False
torchdynamo: None
ray_scope: last
ddp_timeout: 1800
torch_compile: False
torch_compile_backend: None
torch_compile_mode: None
dispatch_batches: None
split_batches: None
include_tokens_per_second: False
include_num_input_tokens_seen: False
neftune_noise_alpha: None
optim_target_modules: None
batch_eval_metrics: False
eval_on_start: False
batch_sampler: no_duplicates
multi_dataset_batch_sampler: proportional

Training Logs

Epoch	Step	Training Loss	loss	nomic_max_accuracy
0	0	-	-	0.92
0.04	100	0.0082	0.0093	0.926
0.08	200	0.0078	0.0083	0.926
0.12	300	0.0077	0.0076	0.934
0.16	400	0.0055	0.0067	0.944
0.2	500	0.0045	0.0060	0.954
0.24	600	0.008	0.0055	0.956
0.28	700	0.0044	0.0048	0.966
0.32	800	0.0057	0.0056	0.958
0.36	900	0.0033	0.0053	0.958
0.4	1000	0.0038	0.0051	0.958
0.44	1100	0.0033	0.0062	0.958
0.48	1200	0.0032	0.0057	0.95
0.52	1300	0.0038	0.0055	0.962
0.56	1400	0.0038	0.0048	0.964
0.6	1500	0.0048	0.0047	0.962
0.64	1600	0.0026	0.0047	0.966
0.68	1700	0.0033	0.0051	0.962
0.72	1800	0.0039	0.0054	0.962
0.76	1900	0.0028	0.0048	0.966
0.8	2000	0.0042	0.0046	0.97
0.84	2100	0.0043	0.0044	0.968
0.88	2200	0.0038	0.0044	0.968
0.92	2300	0.0032	0.0040	0.97
0.96	2400	0.0034	0.0042	0.97
1.0	2500	0.0041	0.0045	0.964
1.04	2600	0.002	0.0042	0.966
1.08	2700	0.0023	0.0039	0.97
1.12	2800	0.0027	0.0040	0.968
1.16	2900	0.0005	0.0040	0.972
1.2	3000	0.0002	0.0043	0.968
1.24	3100	0.0004	0.0042	0.966
1.28	3200	0.0002	0.0041	0.964
1.32	3300	0.0003	0.0042	0.97
1.3600	3400	0.0004	0.0040	0.968
1.4	3500	0.0002	0.0040	0.974
1.44	3600	0.0005	-	0.976

Framework Versions

Python: 3.10.12
Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
Transformers: 4.42.4
PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
Accelerate: 0.32.1
Datasets: 2.21.0
Tokenizers: 0.19.1

Citation

BibTeX

Sentence Transformers

@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}

TripletLoss

@misc{hermans2017defense,
    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
    year={2017},
    eprint={1703.07737},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.CV}
}