Add new SentenceTransformer model.

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	---
	base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
	datasets: []
	language: []
	library_name: sentence-transformers
	metrics:
	- cosine_accuracy
	- dot_accuracy
	- manhattan_accuracy
	- euclidean_accuracy
	- max_accuracy
	pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
	tags:
	- sentence-transformers
	- sentence-similarity
	- feature-extraction
	- generated_from_trainer
	- dataset_size:10000
	- loss:TripletLoss
	widget:
	- source_sentence: 'question may well be considered: What is the particular characteristic
	of a philosophical position which, with whatever unique aspects it may include,
	yet unites it with others as an expression of idealism? In the reply which follows,
	it is my hope that many idealists will concur, but I shall assume no more than
	that it offers what, to one idealist, seems pertinent to the issues which Professor
	Pratt raises. If I analyze his article correctly, these are five in number: (1)
	the place of the esse est percipi principle in idealistic philosophy; (2) the
	idealistic conception of reality, and in particular, the status of the objective
	world; (3) the idealistic view of knowledge; (4) the significance of the self;
	(5) the relation of idealism to realism. This is an extensive program, and its
	treatment here must be fragmentary at many points. Furthermore, it will be limited
	to the point of view of objective idealism, since subjective idealism is considered
	elsewhere in this publication by Professor Bri(rhtman. Esse Est Percipi In sug(resting
	that idealism should be mentalistic, proclaiming the doctrine, esse est percipi,
	Professor Pratt is reiterating a belief that has been held by numerous realistic
	thinkers in recent years. Just thirty years ago, Professor G. E. Moore published
	his wellknown refutation of the Berkeleian principle. To not a few idealists these
	arguments appeared brilliant and on many points including the issue of the principle
	itself as he interpreted it, convincing. But the objective idealist must protest
	that the designation'
	sentences:
	- of the argument as a "Refutation of Idealism" seems a most regrettable misnomer.
	The misunderstandina has persisted not only in Professor Pratt's thought, but
	so frequently in realistic statements, that some attention must be directed towards
	it. Professor MIoore opened his essay by pointina out that the conclusion fundamentally
	characteristic of modern idealism is that the universe is spiritual. From this
	very acceptable statement, he proceeds to make a bewildering, hasty, and unconvincing
	passage to the position that if idealists think the world spiritual, they must
	regard it as having, its being in being consciously perceived. The assumption
	is made despite the fact that Professor Moore in the Principiac Ethica describes
	spiritual values as real parts of the objective world, to be discovered like the
	color yellow, merely by being, IS IDEALISMf REALISM? 423 observed. However, as
	we proceed with the "refutation," we discover that the error of idealists does
	not lie in their believingfl that the world is spiritual-Professor Moore "devoutly
	hopes" that it may be so. Their peculiar error lies in their reason for holding
	this belief, which is, we are told, the esse est percipi argument. The candid
	reply is that for objective idealists at least, and they constitute a generous
	percentage of idealists of both the present and past generations, it is not. The
	subjective idealist may hold, indeed, that all that is real must be a conscious
	mind or perceived by such a mind; that there can be "no object without a subject";
	that "mind creates
	- 'that this "mere fact" must not be allowed to weigh in our calculations, since
	it can not be investigated by the "method of agreement and difference." This is
	a startling instance 5"Principles of Human Knowledge," paragraphs 50, 58. t of
	readiness to sacrifice empirical fact-admittedly universal-to methodological theory.
	The method of agreement and difference is a way of studying the relations of such
	phenomena as are difficult of observation because they are not always present.
	And yet we are called upon to eliminate from our philosophy an ever-present fact,
	the ego, because just this, its ubiquity, prevents our studying it by a logical
	method invented as an aid in the investigation of inconstant phenomena. Thus,
	to sum up our reply to this criticism: idealism can not be contradictory to the
	fundamental laws of logic, for these are laws of mental self-consistency. And
	subsidiary logical "laws" and "methods" are neither sacrosanct nor axiomatic.
	2. We turn now to consider the alleged inconsistency of the idealistic position.
	It is urged by contemporary realists, as by those of Berkeley''s day, that the
	distinction actually made by idealists between subject and object, percept and
	image, is possible only on the supposition that non-mental reality exists.10 The
	idealist admits that he makes this distinction. He, like other men, recognizes
	a difference between present and external, and merely imagined, objects. But he
	distinguishes the two kinds of things, not as extramental and mental, but as objects
	respectively of his shared and of his unshared consciousness,'
	- actuality' signified, in the first instance, the social world, the nexus of interpersonal
	relationships among men, but it also included the realm of physical nature, as
	well as the instinctive drives and lower passions of the human soul itself. L
	Frank When Frank first succeeded in clothing this Romantic vision of human life
	in philosophical language, in the years 1904-1906, the language he employed was
	that of the Kantian or 'critical' tradition. On some level, the vision was undoubtedly
	prior to the Kantian clothing in which we find it draped in Frank's early philosophical
	writings; Frank would not have been attracted to Kantianism in the first place
	if the latter had not helped him articulate his own feelings and experience. But
	while conceding this, we must, at the same time, avoid exaggerating the independence
	of thought from concepts. It is doubtful whether the content of his own experience
	became fully explicit for Frank before he found, in the writings of Kant and his
	successors, the conceptual vocabulary with which to render it communicable. Although
	the works of Windelband were among the texts Frank read when he first launched
	his study of modern philosophy around 1900,9 it was not until a few years later
	that the influence of Windel band's ideas become manifest in Frank's own writings.
	In the intervening period, Frank was hired to produce a Russian transla tion of
	the German philosopher's best-known work, the collection of addresses and articles
	gathered together under the title of Pr?ludien [Preludes]. In his memoirs, Frank
	recalled having been
	- source_sentence: impression that evolutionary ecology began with G. E. Hutchinson's
	inspiration and Robert MacArthur and Richard Levins' theoretical formulations,
	and with G. C. Williams' urging of individual and genic selection ais the key
	to ecology's mysteries. But as James Collins stressed in the paper that opened
	this symposium, and as W. C. Allee and colleagues detailed in 1949, the association
	between ecology and evolution has as long and varied a separately The late 1950s
	and the 1960s saw not the birth of a new subject from the marriage of two others,
	but a renaissance and, most especially, a redirection of a long-standing interaction.
	Evolutionary ecology and its close ally, population biology became self-consciously
	defined in the 1960s, largely by raising new questions. But for much of the early
	history of ecology and evolution, the distinction between the fields was blurred
	or nonexistent. Darwin's pioneering ecological work and theorizing were, of course,
	integral to his evolutionary theory; the biogeography of Alfred Russel Wallace
	and Henry Walter Bates was as much a part of ecology as of evolution, and ecology
	remains part of the work of their successors such as William Matthew.Much of early
	ecology was in essence a physiological approach to adaptation, and if the physiological
	ecologists were vague about mechanisms or skeptical of natural selection, they
	were nonetheless concerned with a central concept in evolutionary biology. We
	must bear in mind, too, that many of the organismal biologists of preceding generations,
	like many today, were not concerned with whether they defined themselves as ecologists
	or
	sentences:
	- 'and time, and gave mathematical laws for its dynamical development. Mechanics
	dealt with mass particles and continuous ponderable media. Electro magnetics dealt
	with electric charges, magnetic dipoles and electro magnetic fields. Einstein
	noted the puzzling fact that mechanical and electromagnetic laws have different
	space-time properties. Mechanical laws, on the one hand, are covariant7 relative
	to Galilean frames8; electromagnetic laws, on the other hand, are covariant relative
	to 5 15 February 1963: Heisenberg said that the importance of observables in physics
	ity the picture that the real things are which observe and everything else is
	nothing, was, he assert , in the minds of the people at G ttingen at that time.
	6 AHQP February 1963: Heisenberg said about the discovery of the certain I tried
	to say what space meant and what velocity meant and so on. I just tried to turn
	around the question according to the example of Einstein. You know Einstein just
	reversed the question by saying ''We do not ask how we describe nature by mathematical
	structures, but we say that nature always makes so that the mathematical scheme
	can be fitted to it. That is, you find in nature only situations which can be
	described by means of the Lorentz transformation. Therefore, I just suggested
	to myself "Well! is it not so that I can only find in nature situations which
	can be described by quantum mechanics?'' Then I asked ''Well! what are these situations
	which you can define''. Then I found very soon that these are the situations in
	which there was this'
	- established the first ecological society and the first ecological journal both
	in 1913 the Americans (United States and Canada) established their ecological
	society two years later and were soon making a greater contribution to the advancement
	of ecology than were ecologists from anywhere else. Not that the American ecologists
	were individually more productive than those elsewhere; there were just more of
	them. How many more is not yet known. Today there are over 6000 members of the
	Ecological Society of America, and Robert L. Burgess has constructed a graph indicating
	the growth of this society since its founding.' It is to be hoped that Andrew
	G. Duff and Philip D. Lowe, who here contribute the chapter on Great Britain,
	will in their forthcoming history of British ecology include information comparable
	to that which Burgess has provided for the British Ecological Society. One thing
	they tell us in their present chapter (p. 143) is that Arthur G. Tansley, Britain's
	leading plant ecologist in the first half of this century, actively discouraged
	students from majoring in his subject because there were practically no jobs for
	them after they graduated. While this may have been the responsible thing to do,
	it must have had an adverse effect on the growth of the society. The organization
	of science in the USSR differs in several respects from that in America and Britain.
	For one thing, many (probably most) of its scientists work in research institutes
	and/or academies, which apparently reduce the need or desire for scientific
	- not. They were naturalists, often more specifically ornithologists, entomologists,
	botanists, or ichthyologists, and in this role contributed to as the occasion
	arose or demanded of speciation, ography, . The American Society ists was just
	that. I can remember Bates remarking with his endearing chuckle that "ecology"
	was just Greek for natural history. Dissolution Of The Bonds Nevertheless, ecology
	as a self-conscious discipline did develop considerable autonomy throughout the
	first half of this century, so that its conjunction with evolutionary biology
	in the 1960s was a real event. We have been reminded during this conference that
	the forgers of the neo-Darwinian synthesis in the 1930s and 1940s included geneticists,
	paleontologists, and systematists, but not ecologists a curious fact indeed, considering
	the role of ecology in Darwin's work. In the early 1960s graduate students at
	major centers of ecological research could find little instruction on how to shape
	a dissertation that might combine ecology with population genetics. The contributors
	to this conference have suggested several reasons for this state of affairs. One
	reason, it appears, was the attempt of some early ecologists to define ecology
	as distinct from evolutionary areas such as systematics and as directed toward
	the definition of phenomena and units of study that might be its special province.
	Sharon Kingsland and William Kimler in particular have discussed the perceived
	need to acquire status for ecology as an autonomous, respectable science.4 In
	this regard some ecologists, as Joel Hagen has demonstrated, emphasized the need
	for rigor
	- source_sentence: 'act on his conclusion or on his being prevented from doing so,
	is to construe ability or prevention so broadly as to make Aris totle''s position
	on the connection between practical reasoning and action vacuous. Therefore, Aristotle
	cannot allow the akrat?s to reach a right conclusion (about an action to be performed
	at once) in cases of akratic action; and, consequently, he must insist that the
	akrat?s is epistemically deficient with respect to one or more of his premises.
	The element of the first answer on which I shall concentrate is the claim that
	the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action. Aristotle does, to be sure,
	say of one of the syllogisms discussed in De Motu Animalium 7 that its conclusion
	"is an action" (701a20), and he asserts two lines later that "the action is the
	conclusion."4 But these claims should be interpreted in the light of the following
	points, (i) The example in question reads as follows: I need a covering, a coat
	is a covering; I need a coat. What I need I ought to make, I need a coat: I make
	a coat. And the conclusion I must make a coat is an action. (701al8-20) Here we
	see that there are propositional conclusions of practical syl logisms (e.g., "I
	must make a coat") which, precisely because they are propositional, are distinguishable
	from the ensuing (external) action (cf. [71, p. 230). (ii) There are two syllogisms
	and two conclusions in the preceding example, and the first conclusion, "I need
	a coat," does not specify an action'
	sentences:
	- demand separate virtues. He argues that this situation is typical of much modern
	life and produces a fragmentation of character into a set of roles and a corresponding
	fragmentation of agency and moral life, to which, however, moral philosophy has
	remained largely blind. The fragmentation of modern moral life has made it possible
	to overlook the mutual incompatibility of distinct moral outlooks and theories.
	'In both theory and practice the different conceptual schemes are mutually exclusive
	alternatives. But it is quite other with contemporary corporate existence. . .
	. a certain kind of moral eclecticism seems to reign . . . each view has its own
	segregated sphere of application; no one point of view is allowed to invade the
	sphere of another. But just this will remain invisible to the moral philosopher
	if moral philosophy remains at the level of analysis of moral language.' In Maclntyre's
	view moral philosophy which ignores the historical and sociological features of
	modern life is in danger of relying on conceptions of agency, self and character
	abstracted from obsolete social forms, and so may lack application. Indeed 'the
	methods of modern moral philosophy render it incompetent even to identify' this
	conflict between modernity and traditional modes of life. Much of what Maclntyre
	argues so forthrightly surfaces fleetingly in other contributions; and many of
	his claims about modern moral philosophy are borne out by these contributions,
	which seek after all to practice modern moral philosophy rather than to query
	its credentials. The first three papers are grouped together under
	- to be done nor an action-type to be instantiated.5 (iii) Given Aristotle's definition
	of a protasis (proposition or premise) in the Prior Analytics as "a sentence affirming
	or denying one thing of another" (24al6-17), it is difficult to believe that he
	could think that a proposition is an action, (iv) As we have already seen, Aristotle
	asserts in NE, VII.3 that "when a single opinion results" from the premises of
	a practical syllogism, an appropriate action must be performed at once (if the
	agent "can act and is not prevented"). But if the immediate result of one's practical
	premises is an opinion, then the appropriate action is preceded by a conclusion
	(or result), (v) Similarly, we are told in De Motu An., 8 that "thinking that
	one ought to go and going are virtually simultaneous (hama has eipein), unless
	there be something else to hinder" (702al5-17). Here, only sixty some lines after
	our initial example, Aristotle clearly distinguishes between an opinion of the
	sort which could be the conclusion of a practical syllogism and a corresponding
	action.6 (vi) Furthermore, if the proximate conclusions "reached" from practical
	premises are opinions, and an agent's forming a "concluding" opinion is virtually
	simultaneous with his performing the relevant action, then there is an extended
	sense of Conclusion' in which an (external) action is characteristically a conclu
	sion of a practical syllogism. It is not an immediate conclusion; for it is mediated
	by a concluding
	- tries to show that, in general, when Aristotle speaks of particulars (ra Kad9
	enaara) in connection with action he is referring to specific types rather than
	individuals.10 But this general claim seems to be refuted by the following passage
	which comes just a page after (1). (2) An indication of the truth what has been
	said is the fact that while the young can become geometers and mathematicians
	and wise in matters like these, it is thought that they cannot be prac tically
	wise. The reason is that practical wisdom is concerned [not only with universals,
	but] also with particulars {ra Kad' eKaara) which become known through experience
	(yvcopL/ia e% e/i7r tptas), and a young person is inexperienced for experience
	re quires a good deal of time. . . .Further, error in deliberation may be either
	about the universal or about the particular (ro Kad' Kao~rov); we may fail to
	know either that all water that is heavy This point is an important element in
	his interpretation of the re lationship between deliberation and the practical
	syllogism. Cooper tries to show that the role of the practical syllogism for Aristotle
	is to link a piece of deliberation to a concrete situation. The result of successful
	de liberation is a decision to perform a specific type of action; the practical
	syllogism links this decision (through perception) to a particular situation in
	which the agent can implement his decision. According to this inter pretation,
	deliberation never reaches the
	- source_sentence: 'who are forcing healthy change on a conservative campus, or (b)
	unbalanced zealots and neurotic rebels who, when they are not smoking pot or shacking
	up with one another, are frittering away time on spurious issues. As a culture,
	we must be fond of dualisms or we would not persist in thinking this way. To talk
	about "students" who are creating a "problem" on college campuses is to ignore
	the obvious: that there are many different types of students and many different
	problems. It is simply not true that "they" are all waiting in the wings of the
	administration building, ready to seize it at the drop of a distasteful edict.
	There is sufficient empirical information to show that there is a wide range of
	attitudes, personalities and factions. At one extreme there would appear tobe
	ultra-leftwingers, heirs apparent to 1930 Marxists. These, says Kenneth Keniston
	in PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, are regarded by the New Left as dull and uninspired, competent
	only to crank the handle of a mimeo machine. There are several other shades of
	leftist positions. Another seemingly distinct group are liberal idealists who
	seem JOURNAL OF THOUGHT 187 to galvanize around only selected issues. These may
	be the University''s alleged culpability in allowing Dow Chemical or the FBI to
	recruit on campus or it may be the University commitment in matters related to
	civil rights or racial justice. Many such idealists are not believers in a cleansing
	revolution; they are, rather, descendants of Old Testament prophets who possess
	strong'
	sentences:
	- know u ... in most nearby possible worlds, that agent only believes that p when
	p is true' (p. 71). This principle not only allows us to retain closure while
	avoiding reference to conversational contexts, but also to obtain `... knowledge
	of everyday propositions [and] knowledge of denials of sceptical hypotheses as
	well' (p. 71). So one need not have internalistic (i.e. reflectively accessible)
	evidence that one is not a brain in a vat to know that one is not a brain in a
	vat. Interestingly, `neo- reanism' is not Moore's position; after all, by ascribing
	knowledge to himself CI know that I have two hands') in a context of discussing
	sceptical hypotheses, Moore (inappropriately) conversationally implied that he
	had internal evidence for the denial of sceptical hypotheses. Neo-Mooreanism's
	victory over scepticism is fleeting, though. For chapter four argues that all
	externalist positions misconstrue the real threat posed by scepticism. Roughly
	speaking, the closure-based argument masks the internalist and evidentialist nature
	of the sceptical challenge, which is more adequately revealed by casting the sceptical
	argument in terms of an underdetermination principle. Pritchard promises in the
	remainder of the book to pile onto the fading fortunes of externalist responses
	to closure-based scepticism by showing how they misunderstand how luck can affect
	knowledge. Chapters five and six kick off the second half of the book with Pritchard
	proposing a partial account and typology of epistemic luck. Clearly some types
	of epistemic luck are compatible with knowledge, but not all. For example, he
	argues that one can have 'lucky' knowledge in a variety of scenarios,
	- 'convictions learned from their liberal parents, the liberal mass media or to
	acknowledge that Bill Buckley is right on at least one point-liberal college professors.
	A third entity, seemingly pivotal, consists of a large group of students who are
	not radical, liberal or even especially committed to righting wrongs. These are
	the students who are apparently aware of issues but who do not themselves initiate
	action. They can, however, be moved to action by the sight of clubswinging cops
	and arbitrary deans, or, on the other hand, by le ft wing manipulators who occasionally
	overstep the bounds of fair play to reveal themselves for what they are: fanatics
	absolutely persuaded their ends are so sanctified that any means is acceptable.
	In point of fact, the vast majority of students are what they have always been:
	plodding, upwardly mobile nursing, education and engineering majors who could
	care less about alienation, social justice, Viet Nam, sexual expression, the House
	Un American Committee, dormitory hours or "grass. " These are not especially liberal
	and not particularly conservative. They are earnest, hard-working, gregarious,
	unimaginative souls who wish aBA, a spouse or a recommendation to medical or law
	school. They are not especially happy with the University as it is but they are
	not willing to risk their grade point averages or reputations to do much about
	it. They are generally happy with the status quo and do not experience a generation
	gap: indeed, they seem to admire their parents and wish to be'
	- works. This college, with its community of faculty, students, alumni, and friends,
	was founded as an act of faith. Your presence here a century later may have the
	flavor of an act of faith on your part because its curriculum promises you no
	certain way to a particular occupation or profession. Perhaps you calculated the
	advantages of this or that kind of institution in the process of your choice.
	If so, you have discovered that the liberal arts college, known best and criticized
	most for the intangibility of its aims and purposes, has been condemned to extinction
	by educational prophets at least once each year for more than half of the past
	century. Money alone does not assure the life of an institution, though I am sure
	we would all agree that it helps. But founders, donors, and faculty without faith
	and a spirit of adventure can turn the wealthiest institution into a mere occupational
	outlet, devoid of teaching value. Examine in your own thoughts the experiences
	you cherish most in the days you have spent upon this campus. Some of you may
	remember instances of mere moments when the touch of a phrase or an act of a friend
	or teacher-and these are not mutually exclusive terms-imparted a sense of insight
	and sheer clarity to your mind. Or you may have been the beneficiary of the constant
	disciplinary effects of a toughminded professor whose impatient faith in your
	mental growth tantalized and provoked you into a stubborn contest of
	- source_sentence: 'compare the remarks in On Habituations (Eth.: this does not appear
	in the Kuhn edition; it is edited by Muller in SM 2 9-31): As the hegemonic soul
	has capabilities (dunameis) directed towards all the technai, it is necessary
	that there is one (sc. dunamis) with which we understand consequence and conflict,
	and another with which we remember; and we are cleverer in respect of the first
	mentioned, but more retentive in respect of the second. (Eth. 4, = SM 2 25) The
	distinction between intellectual sharpness and retentive ability is an ancient
	commonplace: see in particular the Hippocratic text On Regimen 1 35. 12 PHP V
	601; cf. Symp.Diff. VII 55-6; and see MM X 635-6: a second part of the soul belongs
	to us not in virtue of our growing or being alive, but because we are animals,
	it is located in the heart and is the source of the innate heat; the arteries
	are the conduits for this source, which has many names: it is called the living
	power (dunamis z6tike), the spirited power (dunamis thumoeides), the living soul,
	and the spirited soul. 200 So Galen draws on a diverse range of previous theories
	in order to construct his own account; but it is important to stress that the
	theory that results is no mere haphazard porridge of badly-digested and ill-assorted
	scraps from the table of his predecessors. He is not afraid to take issue with
	them on matters of substantial importance, and to take issue with them in his'
	sentences:
	- 'own characteristically, indeed uniquely, polemical style. For instance, he will
	not say, as Plato does, that any part of the soul is demonstrably immortal. Indeed,
	in his pronouncements on the matter he exhibits an admirable caution, unwilling
	to commit himself with any degree of certainty on matters which he views as being
	by their very nature resistant to secure demonstration."3 Thus at PHP V 791-2,
	Galen writes: Plato said that the cause who made us, the demiurge who fashioned
	the universe, commanded his children to make the human race by taking . .. the
	substance (ousia) of the immortal soul from him and adding it to what was generated.
	But we must realise that there is no formal similarity between proving and positing
	the fact that we were made in accordance with the providence of some god . . .,
	and knowing the substance of the maker or even of our own soul ... [T]he statements
	of the most divine Plato about the substance of our soul . .. and still more all
	that he says about our whole body, extend only to plausibility and reasonableness
	(achri tou pithanou kai eikotos). That last remark is important (indeed Galen,
	perhaps excessively charitably, takes Plato himself to be committed to it by his
	remarks about the eikos muthos [Tim. 29c-d]). There is a class of things about
	which we can at best speculate, and most particularly these are the preserve of
	the philosophers: In philosophy it is not surprising'
	- Hippocrates and Plato but in spite of its title, this has virtually nothing in
	common with the placita of Aëtius, nor, one presumes, with the phusikai doxai
	of Theophrastus. Galen's avowed aim is to show, by means of selective quotation
	and juxtaposition, the fundamental agreement between his two great masters of
	his title, in particular in regard to the structure and function of the soul,
	and at the expense in particular of the Stoics and Peripatetics. Mario Vegetti
	contributes a lucid and learned piece,5 which seeks to understand the work in
	terms of its intended audience avowedly not the sectarians of either medicine
	or philosophy, but rather generally educated and interested men of good will competent
	in the rudiments of logic; and he supposes that the wealth of quotation in which
	Galen indulges, even from works which he himself says are still readily available,
	indicates that his audience is not supposed to be made up of specialists. This
	may be right; but Galen loved to quote and to parade his learning, and while it
	is true that in this work the citations are longer than usual, this may simply
	be due (as Galen himself says) to the verbosity of those (principally Chrysippus)
	he intends to refute. Sooner or later, everyone who reads Galen (or even simply
	makes use of him as a source for other writers) has to get to grips with the question
	of how careful and trustworthy a reporter of other people's views he is and different
	scholars have proposed rather different
	- 'dissertation, published as Li Zhi: Philosophe maudit (1527-1602) (Billeter 1979),
	is, according to a reviewer, "essentially a chronological account of Li interspersed
	with lengthy translations from Li''s writings and biographical material" (Wu 1
	981 , p. 304). Billeter''s main publications are three books on Zhuang Zi: Leçons
	sur TchouangTseu (Lessons on Zhuang Zi) (2002), Études sur Tchouang-Tseu (Studies
	on Zhuang Zi) (2004), and Notes sur Tchouang-Tseu (Notes on Zhuang Zi) (201 0),
	in addition to Chine trois fois muette. The three books on Zhuang Zi complement
	each other, one of them containing Billeter''s own translations of classical texts
	with comments. In English he published The Chinese Art of Writing (1990), and
	his most recent Un Paradigme contains personal reflections. The Debate At least
	four points, all of them developed in Contre François Jullien, need to be distinguished
	in this debate. 1. Billeter criticizes Jullien''s "conceptual approach," which
	formulates the ideas of Chinese philosophers in terms of highly abstract ideas
	and subsequently inserts them into East-West philosophical discussions. According
	to Billeter, this approach "instrumentalizes" Chinese culture to the point of
	"remolding" it and uses Thorsten Botz-Bornstein 219 it as the basis for entirely
	new systems (p. 18). Billeter states that "everything that passes today as specifically
	Chinese in the realm of thought is part of this system" (p. 19). 2. Billeter affirms
	that Jullien''s conceptualization necessarily leads to the synthetic creation
	of an "ideal China" that will be called "Chinese Civilization." 3. The necessary
	result is that Jullien will designate'
	model-index:
	- name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
	results:
	- task:
	type: triplet
	name: Triplet
	dataset:
	name: nomic
	type: nomic
	metrics:
	- type: cosine_accuracy
	value: 0.974
	name: Cosine Accuracy
	- type: dot_accuracy
	value: 0.026
	name: Dot Accuracy
	- type: manhattan_accuracy
	value: 0.964
	name: Manhattan Accuracy
	- type: euclidean_accuracy
	value: 0.974
	name: Euclidean Accuracy
	- type: max_accuracy
	value: 0.974
	name: Max Accuracy
	- type: cosine_accuracy
	value: 0.9755
	name: Cosine Accuracy
	- type: dot_accuracy
	value: 0.0245
	name: Dot Accuracy
	- type: manhattan_accuracy
	value: 0.976
	name: Manhattan Accuracy
	- type: euclidean_accuracy
	value: 0.9755
	name: Euclidean Accuracy
	- type: max_accuracy
	value: 0.976
	name: Max Accuracy
	---

	# SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1

	This is a [sentence-transformers](https://www.SBERT.net) model finetuned from [nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1](https://huggingface.co/nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1). It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

	## Model Details

	### Model Description
	- Model Type: Sentence Transformer
	- Base model: [nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1](https://huggingface.co/nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1) <!-- at revision ec7a86b7066613e0a8acf87e1fcaaf23f8733dd6 -->
	- Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
	- Output Dimensionality: 768 tokens
	- Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity
	<!-- - Training Dataset: Unknown -->
	<!-- - Language: Unknown -->
	<!-- - License: Unknown -->

	### Model Sources

	- Documentation: [Sentence Transformers Documentation](https://sbert.net)
	- Repository: [Sentence Transformers on GitHub](https://github.com/UKPLab/sentence-transformers)
	- Hugging Face: [Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models?library=sentence-transformers)

	### Full Model Architecture

	```
	SentenceTransformer(
	(0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel
	(1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
	(2): Normalize()
	)
	```

	## Usage

	### Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

	First install the Sentence Transformers library:

	```bash
	pip install -U sentence-transformers
	```

	Then you can load this model and run inference.
	```python
	from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

	# Download from the 🤗 Hub
	model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v9")
	# Run inference
	sentences = [
	'compare the remarks in On Habituations (Eth.: this does not appear in the Kuhn edition; it is edited by Muller in SM 2 9-31): As the hegemonic soul has capabilities (dunameis) directed towards all the technai, it is necessary that there is one (sc. dunamis) with which we understand consequence and conflict, and another with which we remember; and we are cleverer in respect of the first mentioned, but more retentive in respect of the second. (Eth. 4, = SM 2 25) The distinction between intellectual sharpness and retentive ability is an ancient commonplace: see in particular the Hippocratic text On Regimen 1 35. 12 PHP V 601; cf. Symp.Diff. VII 55-6; and see MM X 635-6: a second part of the soul belongs to us not in virtue of our growing or being alive, but because we are animals, it is located in the heart and is the source of the innate heat; the arteries are the conduits for this source, which has many names: it is called the living power (dunamis z6tike), the spirited power (dunamis thumoeides), the living soul, and the spirited soul. 200 So Galen draws on a diverse range of previous theories in order to construct his own account; but it is important to stress that the theory that results is no mere haphazard porridge of badly-digested and ill-assorted scraps from the table of his predecessors. He is not afraid to take issue with them on matters of substantial importance, and to take issue with them in his',
	'own characteristically, indeed uniquely, polemical style. For instance, he will not say, as Plato does, that any part of the soul is demonstrably immortal. Indeed, in his pronouncements on the matter he exhibits an admirable caution, unwilling to commit himself with any degree of certainty on matters which he views as being by their very nature resistant to secure demonstration."3 Thus at PHP V 791-2, Galen writes: Plato said that the cause who made us, the demiurge who fashioned the universe, commanded his children to make the human race by taking . .. the substance (ousia) of the immortal soul from him and adding it to what was generated. But we must realise that there is no formal similarity between proving and positing the fact that we were made in accordance with the providence of some god . . ., and knowing the substance of the maker or even of our own soul ... [T]he statements of the most divine Plato about the substance of our soul . .. and still more all that he says about our whole body, extend only to plausibility and reasonableness (achri tou pithanou kai eikotos). That last remark is important (indeed Galen, perhaps excessively charitably, takes Plato himself to be committed to it by his remarks about the eikos muthos [Tim. 29c-d]). There is a class of things about which we can at best speculate, and most particularly these are the preserve of the philosophers: In philosophy it is not surprising',
	"Hippocrates and Plato but in spite of its title, this has virtually nothing in common with the placita of Aëtius, nor, one presumes, with the phusikai doxai of Theophrastus. Galen's avowed aim is to show, by means of selective quotation and juxtaposition, the fundamental agreement between his two great masters of his title, in particular in regard to the structure and function of the soul, and at the expense in particular of the Stoics and Peripatetics. Mario Vegetti contributes a lucid and learned piece,5 which seeks to understand the work in terms of its intended audience avowedly not the sectarians of either medicine or philosophy, but rather generally educated and interested men of good will competent in the rudiments of logic; and he supposes that the wealth of quotation in which Galen indulges, even from works which he himself says are still readily available, indicates that his audience is not supposed to be made up of specialists. This may be right; but Galen loved to quote and to parade his learning, and while it is true that in this work the citations are longer than usual, this may simply be due (as Galen himself says) to the verbosity of those (principally Chrysippus) he intends to refute. Sooner or later, everyone who reads Galen (or even simply makes use of him as a source for other writers) has to get to grips with the question of how careful and trustworthy a reporter of other people's views he is and different scholars have proposed rather different",
	]
	embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
	print(embeddings.shape)
	# [3, 768]

	# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
	similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
	print(similarities.shape)
	# [3, 3]
	```

	<!--
	### Direct Usage (Transformers)

	<details><summary>Click to see the direct usage in Transformers</summary>

	</details>
	-->

	<!--
	### Downstream Usage (Sentence Transformers)

	You can finetune this model on your own dataset.

	<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>

	</details>
	-->

	<!--
	### Out-of-Scope Use

	List how the model may foreseeably be misused and address what users ought not to do with the model.
	-->

	## Evaluation

	### Metrics

	#### Triplet
	* Dataset: `nomic`
	* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)

	\| Metric \| Value \|
	\|:-------------------\|:----------\|
	\| cosine_accuracy \| 0.974 \|
	\| dot_accuracy \| 0.026 \|
	\| manhattan_accuracy \| 0.964 \|
	\| euclidean_accuracy \| 0.974 \|
	\| max_accuracy \| 0.974 \|

	#### Triplet
	* Dataset: `nomic`
	* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)

	\| Metric \| Value \|
	\|:-------------------\|:----------\|
	\| cosine_accuracy \| 0.9755 \|
	\| dot_accuracy \| 0.0245 \|
	\| manhattan_accuracy \| 0.976 \|
	\| euclidean_accuracy \| 0.9755 \|
	\| max_accuracy \| 0.976 \|

	<!--
	## Bias, Risks and Limitations

	What are the known or foreseeable issues stemming from this model? You could also flag here known failure cases or weaknesses of the model.
	-->

	<!--
	### Recommendations

	What are recommendations with respect to the foreseeable issues? For example, filtering explicit content.
	-->

	## Training Details

	### Training Dataset

	#### Unnamed Dataset


	* Size: 10,000 training samples
	* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
	* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
	\| \| anchor \| positive \| negative \|
	\|:--------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|
	\| type \| string \| string \| string \|
	\| details \| <ul><li>min: 271 tokens</li><li>mean: 331.92 tokens</li><li>max: 584 tokens</li></ul> \| <ul><li>min: 265 tokens</li><li>mean: 331.75 tokens</li><li>max: 565 tokens</li></ul> \| <ul><li>min: 267 tokens</li><li>mean: 330.76 tokens</li><li>max: 518 tokens</li></ul> \|
	* Samples:
	\| anchor \| positive \| negative \|
	\|:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|
	\| <code>a mutual belief among all the pushers that I also am taking part in the pushing. This kind of joint activity should be regarded as a case of coaction (or a very weak kind of joint action) rather than "proper" joint action (see Tuomela, 1992, Chapter 2 for discussion). 3. Joint Intention As is generally accepted, a (mere) personal intention involves making up one's mind. Similarly, joint intentions such as we-intentions (to be discussed below) involve the participants' having jointly resolved or made up their minds or made a joint plan concerning what to do jointly. As was remarked above, "proper" joint actions are based on (at least mutually believed) agreement, either explicit or implicit. It should be obvious that if we-intentions are to have proper joint actions as their "satisfiers", they must also be based on agreement-making. But, as WHAT IS COOPERATION? 89 said, we will accept below that joint intentions can concern also joint actions in a wider sense. In joint-intention formation each agent accepts for himself: "I ought to participate in our doing X together". This acceptance here means that the agent (at least dimly) recognizes the existence of a joint plan to perform X and accordingly commits himself to performing X together with the others. A joint intention on conceptual grounds leads to each agent's acceptance of "I will participate in, or contribute to, our doing X", based on his acceptance of "We will do X" (the standard ex? pression for</code> \| <code>joint intentions or "group-intentions", viz, we-intentions and standing group-intentions, as argued in Tuomela, 1992). Let us consider the central notion of we-intention in some more detail. We-intentions are action-generating joint intentions that agents have in situations of joint action, e.g., when they jointly intend to carry a table jointly. The content of a we-intention can be taken to be something like "to do X jointly" or "we to do X jointly". A we intention involves the intention to perform one's part of the joint action. We can say roughly that a member A? of a collective G ("we" for At) we-intends to do X if and only if At (i) intends to do his part of X (as his part of X), (ii) has a belief to the effect that the joint action opportunities for an intentional performance of X will obtain; and, furthermore, (iii) believes that there is (or will be) a mutual belief among the participating members of G or at least among those participants who do their parts of X intentionally as their parts of X to the effect that the joint action opportunities for an intentional performance of X will ohtain.1 Next consider a schema of practical reasoning that a we-intending agent is required to satisfy. This schema also serves to account for the commitments the participants of a joint action have towards other participants (cf. Tuomela, 1984, Chapter 2, Tuomela and Miller, 1988, and Tuomela, 1992, Chapter 3): (W)(i) We will do X (ii) X cannot be performed by us</code> \| <code>action is to give a central place to the appropriate kind of intention that is relevant to collective action. This kind of intention is commonly called a 'collective', 'joint', or 'group' intention, and accounts of this form of intention have been offered by Michael Bratman [5], Margaret Gilbert [13, 12, 14], Raimo Tuomela [24, 25, 30, 23, 28, 27, 26], John Seaxle [19, 18], Seamus Miller [16], J. David Velleman [32], and others.3 Those who follow the strategy of analyzing collective action by giving an analysis of collective intention4 typically assume that once the analysis of collective intention is in place, the analysis of collective action will follow immediately.5 One challenge facing an account of collective intention is that there is an extremely wide variety of collective intentions, which may have various necessary and sufficient conditions, depending upon the specific circumstances. For example, we may correctly say that 'Russell and Whitehead had the intention to write the Principia Mathematics and that 'the angry mob had the intention to storm the Bastille'. But the level of coordination, planning, and 3Elsewhere, we have offered a game-theoretic characterisation of the concept of collective intention [9]. 4 In what follows, we shall use the term 'collective intention' neutrally to refer to the entire range of intentions attributable to groups. Such intentions have been called 'group intentions', 'joint intentions', and 'we-intentions'. 5 The strategy of analyzing collective action by giving an account of collective</code> \|
	\| <code>unrestrictedly into its service. Characteristic of him was a certain harshness and a dogmatism rooted in a sense of personal righteousness and moral integrity; characteristic also was his sense of a high calling, a selfconsciousness suffused with pride and "heroism", and, along therewith, a certain lack of social imagination such as is requisite for an understanding of other people and for happy relations with them. Thus he was frequently unheeding whether of the feelings or of the 'Theodor Fritsch, Handbuch der Judenfrage: Die wichtigsten Tatsachen zur Beurteilung des jfidischen Volkes, 39th ed. (I8I to 200 thousand), Leipzig, Hammer-Verlag, 1935, pp. io and 5V8, respectively. (In view of recent political events in Germany it should be noted that, while the 39th edition of Fritsch's work was printed in 1935, the author died on September 8, 1933.) No. I.] Discussion rightful claims of others, and insensitive to the real value of their ideas and points of view.Jn consequence his exaggerations could reach a degree all but incredible. Those of his statements which were made in moments of emotional fervor or of an overpowering moral zeal must not be centered upon as crucial if one would acquire genuine knowledge as to that most comprehensive and tightly organized body of ideas and values which represent the real Fichte and constitute the soul of his philosophy. In interpreting Fichte it is important to remember also that his career was as turbulent as was his temperament. Moreover, the intellectual and cultural</code> \| <code>influences that came in turn to play upon him during the years of his intense life were very diverse, and during this period epochal political and social events reached a culmination in the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests. Not strange, then, that even after the transformation which a study of the philosophy of Kant effected in Fichte's thought and objectives, there came further changes throughout the whole range of his ideas, whether social, political, ethical, religious, or metaphysical. To be sure it has been said of Fichte that the man "aus einem Gusz" inevitably propounded a philosophy "aus einem Stuck". If this means that Fichte, in comparison, for example, with Kant, was prompted by his very temperament, as well as by his conception of the requirements of reason, to exhibit the whole range of human thought and values as a single system, the statement is essentially true. Nevertheless it should be remembered that such unity as prevails in the Fichtean writings characterizes them severally rather than as a whole; and also that the unity in question is of the sort generated by a deep moral and religious passion rather than that issuing from a speculative imagination deployed by "cold thought" or the semblant activities of play or art. The earliest intimation we have of Fichte's attitude toward Jews and Judaism is in a sermon preached by him in Dubrenski on March 25, 1786, and thus in the twenty-fourth year of his life.4 After having contended that "God gives to all men certain incentives to</code> \| <code>in that work. The essays have all the brilliance and learning that one associates with all of Professor Cassirer's work, and the English of the translation bears no marks of the German source. This doctoral dissertation undertakes to expound in some seventy pages the conception of God or the Absolute in the philosophy of Fichte. "Fichte has often been thought to have expressed himself so loosely that his precise meanings were hidden in vague generalities," Dr. Stine remarks. "A careful study of the works of Fichte, however, reveals that while the terminology varies, he was constantly seeking to express the same fundamental thoughts." There can be little doubt, on the evidence supplied in this thesis, that Dr. Stine has made a careful study of the works of Fichte. But while he may have succeeded in discerning the same fundamental thoughts behind the vague generalities, he has not succeeded in communicating them, to this reviewer at least. This is partly no doubt because the Idea of God, or the Absolute, is so central to Fichte's whole tortuously conceived philosophy that the attempt to expound it systematically in this brief compass was hazardous at best. A further difficulty is found in the method of exposition employed. Dr. Stine depends far too extensively on long quotations from Fichte to make his meaning plain, and these quotations are frequently more puzzling than illuminating. The terminology does indeed vary, and no effective attempt is made to chart any clear path through the tangled</code> \|
	\| <code>To see why societies found it necessary to develop IP laws, consider property rights with respect to a book. In a world without copyright laws, if an author produces a book manuscript, he can only own the actual pages of the manu script and has no property rights to the text itself. When the author sells his book manuscript to the publisher, he has transferred all of his rights to the publisher with respect to the book. Likewise, if the publisher sells a copy of the book, he has transferred all of his rights to the buyer. Similar problems would arise for inventions in a world without patent laws and trademarks in a world without trademark laws. It would seem that people have important interests worth protecting that extend beyond their interests in tangible things; they also have interests in intangible things, such as the ideas written on paper or the information embodied in inventions. In order to recognize these interests in ideas and infor mation, it became necessary to create a new category of property, intellectual property.5 Intellectual properties, unlike tangible proper ties, require special legal protection because they are non-exclusive: two people can possess and use the same item of intellectual property without preventing each other from possessing or using it (Hettinger, 1989). For example, two people can both use and possess the Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property same computer program, poem, manufacturing method, or the same song at the same time. IP laws allow people to gain exclusive control over objects that are non-exclusive (May, 1998). The reason why intellectual</code> \| <code>properties are non exclusive is that information and ideas have no particular location in time and space: they are abstract objects.6 Although some writers, such as Barlow (1994), believe that it is impossible to protect IP in the information age, due to its ease of transmission, businesses and governments have developed many technological and legal methods for protecting IP, such as access restrictions, encryption, water-marking, licensing agreements, and infringement lawsuits (NAS, 2000). The most common legally recognized forms of IP are copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets (Miller and Davis, 2000; Foster and Shook, 1993). Many different countries have enacted laws and signed international treaties that define these rights and their scope. All of these laws distinguish between privately owned infor mation and information that is in the public domain. Copyrights give authors of original works the right to exclude others from copying those works without the author's permission; patents give inventors the right to exclude others from making, using, or commercializing their inventions without the inventor's permission; trademarks give the trademark holder the right to exclude others from using a symbol that he uses to distinguish his business or its products; and trade secrecy laws allow businesses to protect confidential business information (Paine, 1991). There are other types of IP in addition to these four traditional categories. Confidential, personal information, such as medical records or psychiatric records, financial data, credit reports, or purchasing data also can</code> \| <code>on the analogy with tangible property and that recognizes the role of ideas in defining personality and social relationships. The combined effect of these assumptions is that trade secret law comes in for particularly serious criticism. It restricts methods of acquiring ideas (p. 35); it encourages secrecy (p. 36); it places unacceptable restrictions on employee mobility and technology transfer (p. 52); it can stifle competition (p. 50); it is more vulnerable to socialist objections (p. 52). In light of these deficiencies, Hettinger recommends that we consider the possibility of "eliminating most types of trade secrets entirely and letting patents carry a heavier load" (p. 49). He believes that trade secrets are undesirable in ways that copyrights and patents are not (p. 36). 6. Hettinger mentions trademark as another of our intellectual property institutions, along with our social sanction on plagiarism, but his central discussion focuses on copyright, patent, and trade secret concepts. Neither trademark principles nor the prohibition on plagiarism fits comfortably with his justification in terms of increasing the dissemination and use of ideas. Both are more closely related to giving recognition to the source or originator of ideas and products. 7. It may be helpful to think of two levels of justification: (i) an intermediate level consisting of objectives, purposes, reasons, and explanations for an institution or practice; and (2) an ultimate level linking those objectives and purposes to our most basic legitimating ideas such as the general good or individual liberty. Philosophers generally tend to be concemed with the</code> \|
	* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
	```json
	{
	"distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
	"triplet_margin": 0.05
	}
	```

	### Evaluation Dataset

	#### Unnamed Dataset


	* Size: 500 evaluation samples
	* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
	* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
	\| \| anchor \| positive \| negative \|
	\|:--------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|
	\| type \| string \| string \| string \|
	\| details \| <ul><li>min: 278 tokens</li><li>mean: 331.45 tokens</li><li>max: 489 tokens</li></ul> \| <ul><li>min: 279 tokens</li><li>mean: 332.39 tokens</li><li>max: 468 tokens</li></ul> \| <ul><li>min: 280 tokens</li><li>mean: 330.43 tokens</li><li>max: 471 tokens</li></ul> \|
	* Samples:
	\| anchor \| positive \| negative \|
	\|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|
	\| <code>with accepted beliefs, provided only there is enough of sentimental satisfaction in it to -compensate. If all the values which ideas may have are to count for truth and be simply summed and subtracted, then in any given .ease disproof by scientific or logical methods may be overbalanced by positive values of " subsequential utility " or tonic emotionality. On this precise point Dr. Schiller has nothing to say. He simply reiterates the " biological necessity " that all the idea = values shall determine the idea's "survival". This, so far as I know, has never been denied. The question is whether an idea that was ,contrary to sensible experience might not survive because its emotional, value outweighed the dissatisfaction at its contrariety to sensible experience; and whether therefore such an idea might not be " true " on Dr. Schiller's theory. Dr. Schiller accuses me of having attempted to " read a metaphysical meaning into a number of, pragmatic pronouncements which are clearly methodological ". But the texts from which I have cited in arguing that pragmatism of the Schiller type is subjectivistic bear such titles as The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics, 1 MIN, No. 86. Philosophy -and the Scientific TIzvestigation of a Future Life, and The Making of Reality. No pragmatist that I have ever read has confined either himself or his pragmatism to "methodological" considerations; and it is perfectly clear that Dr. Schiller himself does not mean to do</code> \| <code>so, for he proceeds at once to present a third alternative which may save him from the necessity of deciding between idealism and realism.' This third possibility which I am accused of " ignoring " is "'the correlation of a mind-with-objects and objects-for-a-mind ". I have not ignored this possibility. I have recognised it as a very common formulation of idealism.2 The reader will observe that in the above formula the only constant is mind, or a relationship distinguished by the fact that mind must always be one of its terms. But waiving this point, how is one to discover the real importance of this " correlation " to whatever may take the place of object in it. How is one to determine the real, as distinguished from the methodological place of mind in the world? This is a fairly important question and it is the question at issue between idealism and realism. I cannot believe that it is "merely academic " and must therefore crave Dr. Schiller's indulgence further. Now as to "the Ego-centric Predicament ". Dr. Schiller admits that I give "much prominence " to it. But he must have discovered that fact by consulting the Index or the Table of Contents. 3 For he has not in the least understood the point, and most of what he attributes to me is flatly contradicted by the text. He suggests that I infer realism from the Ego-centric Predicament, whereas I. have invariably asserted that nothing can be argued from it. My central point is that it is</code> \| <code>the name of idealism; it is also evident that they have really adopted the form and presuppositions of empirical realism, in spite of the 'mental' categories in which they have been expressed. Idealism has no more to do with 'ideas' interpreted merely as mental states than it has with any other type of 'independent' particulars; and the essence of idealism does not consist in the peculiar spiritual or mental character of what it regards as real, so much as in the element of universality which the real must exhibit whether it be mental or material, or whatever may be the subjective and particularist characters that may belong to it. A certain degree of 'independence' of abstract mind is therefore the condition of an element's being real, in the sense that its reality implies the possession of the character of objectivity upon which the truth of any judgment with respect to it rests. But this independence is not so much a matter of unique disparateness, as the author seems to imply, as of its embodying certain aspects of universality. But this merely suggests that, in the order of the real, the peculiarly mental fact, the state of consciousness in its particularist and subjective sense, holds a not very important place. Professor Moore's refutation would therefore have been important if it had relegated the mental state to its properly obscure place; but that would have contributed, not to a refutation of idealism, but to the necessity of a re-examination of</code> \|
	\| <code>to Hesse therefore, must argue for this alternative descriptions thesis. Her strategy for establishing both conditions for realism is straightforward. She argues that neither competing theories nor alternative formalizations need be interpreted as being about different entities. With respect to the historical challenge, it is always possible, she claims, to translate a large number of the statements of an earlier theory into the statements of its historical successor ([2], p. 299). Similarly, with respect to the conceptual challenge, she claims that the statements of one formalization can be translated into the statements of the alternative formalization ([2], p. 296). The claim in both cases, however, is that partial or complete translation between theories or alternative formalizations indicates that the opposing theories are about the same world and that, rather than being ontologically incompatible, they are much like alternative natural languages which describe the same world. Inter-translatability is thus a mark of identity of reference. Translation is clearly the cornerstone of Hesse's realism and she exerts a strong effort in explaining the sense in which the statements within both historical theories and alternative formalizations can be translated. In both cases, she claims that the translation is achieved by recognizing certain identities of intensional reference ([2], pp. 296, 299) (henceforth IR) within the respective theories or formalizations. Her realism presupposes this translational concept and I will argue that despite the care that she spends in constructing it, there are enough</code> \| <code>problems within it to justify its rejection. In the light of these problems, I will then attempt to redesign the concept so that it will allow for a realistic attitude toward science. The notion of IR is complex. One tempting method for explicating it would be to first lay out Hesse's definition of it and then clarify the concept via a detailed analysis of this definition. This route, however, is not a fruitful one; for although she states that Intensional reference is the relation which subsists between a descriptive predicate in a given language and a property of 446 REALISM AND INTENSIONAL REFEREN an object when the statement ascribing that predicate to that object is true. ([2], p. 62) she does nothing to clarify the myriad of epistemological and metaphysical problems imbedded within this definition. Furthermore, her own presentation of the concept of IR does not focus around this definition. Instead she begins by employing the via negativa; i.e., she distinguishes IR from a number of other classically semantic concepts. For although IR captures the meaning of many general terms used within science, she claims that this meaning cannot be identified either with the extension or the sense of those general terms. According to Hesse, IR cannot be identified with extension. For despite the fact that scientific theories do discriminate objects into classes, these classes are not adequately described as extensional, for they are not defined merely by the objects contained in them. They involve also what I shall call intensional reference, that is, they depend on recognitions of similarities and differences</code> \| <code>the instrumental reliability of the methodology which scientists actually employ. 7 and According to the realist, existing theories provide approximate knowledge not only of relations between observables, but also of the unobservable structures which underlie obserbable phenomena. 8 The crucial link between the "unobservable structures" which the instrumentalist or strict empiricist does not want to buy and Boyd's insistence that one is forced into buying them is, I argue, a theory of reference. For Boyd seems to believe that the referent of a key term in a scientific theory is seldom or never ( ] , and, more importantly, that vocabularies employing different terms are employing the terms co-referentially despite what may appear, to the casual observer, to be differences in meaning. Now it seems clear that what Boyd has in mind as a theory of reference is, baldly, a causal theory of reference. Crudely speaking, a causal theory of reference would allow for the retention of extension over a period of time for natural kind terms, and would do the kind or work that Boyd would need to preserve the epistemic access which he claims to be a condition for epistemic success. At this point one would do well to remind oneself of the salient differences between causal theories of reference and what is referred to in the literature as the "classical" view. The latter is generally regarded as the direct descendant of a view associated with Frege and to some extent with Russell. On this view</code> \|
	\| <code>the logicistic crusade for clarity are revealed in the writings of Whitehead's former colleague and co-author of Principia Mathematica, Bertrand Russell, whose theory of logical atomism directly confronts the problem of vagueness. Russell goes a step beyond Frege and argues that the vagueness of general terms can be conquered using the symbolic methods of Principia Mathematica and the established results of exact science.3 But the upshot of his frontal assault on vagueness merely underscores a crucial question: just what do the precise symbolic structures of logic and mathematics, and the formal calculations of the exact sciences, actually contribute to the rationality of explanations? Russell's treatment of vagueness does, however, help bring out one important point. He says, for example, that . . . what we believe ourselves to know in philosophy is more doubtful than the detail of science, though perhaps not more doubtful than its most When one compares this remark with his claim that it would be a great mistake to suppose that vague knowledge must be false. On the contrary, a vague belief has a much better chance of being true than a precise one, because there are more possible facts that would verify it, (Russell 1923, p. 91) the question arises whether there are any instances of precise knowledge that do not embrace any extremely vague ideas. Perhaps the greatest degree of certainty and truth that so-called exact science proffers philosophy comes only in the form of very general, and hence extremely vague, facts about</code> \| <code>nature. Russell does not pursue this line of thought, however, for he chooses to tie all the tricky questions associated with the big question of what logic and science really do for philosophy into one neat logicistical package. He thus begs the primary question of what an ideally rational explanation ought to look like. Logical reconstructions of certain fundamental notions, such as matter and mind, are required, he maintains, just because these vague notions are not amenable to the methods of exact science. Apart from the circularity of this move, it is also worth noting that despite his suspicion of ordinary concepts Russell enlists the general idea of event here, thus forcing into the open the question whether this fundamental notion may be intrinsically vague. As quantum mechanics (which is often touted as one of the most successful of modern physical theories) now assures us, it is not possible to achieve a precise, purely objective description of any physical event.4 Hence in so far as the notion of event is fundamental both to science and philosophy, the principal lesson for the rationalistic philosopher who wishes, like Russell, to take science seriously may be that vagueness is an inescapable element of every rational account of anything whatever, and not a disease of the understanding in need of a rigorous logicistical therapy. That it may be both simplistic and misleading to view the chief aim of philosophy as primarily a quest for perfect clarity and definiteness in fundamental concepts and their modes of</code> \| <code>phenomena as "understood". In this way I argue that the quantum revolution should not be seens as implying an "endgame for understanding" but as an opening move in a process of axiological revision which would allow the rational inquirer to discourse on the understanding of quantum phenomena without "merely redefining terms to paper over our ignorance". (Cushing, 1991, p. 337) Thus to be a realist is to take up a certain stand with respect to the axiology of inquiry: the realist upholds the cognitive goal of "understanding". The pursuit of any cognitive goal is rational or irrational only against the context of other beliefs held by a rational inquirer. Thus, the goals it is rational for a scientist to pursue are at least partially a function of that inquirer's conception of the physical world. Thus axiological revision may well entail ontological reconstruction, a task that falls in what I call the "philosophy of nature". The analysis presented here will be organized around three central ontological reference points: properties, individuals, and relations, to each of which a section of this paper is dedicated. However, before turning to these topics, a few general points about the relation of ontology to natural science are in order. Realism , And The Philosophy Of Nature The scientist's felt need for an understanding of quantum phenomena is akin to the philosopher's well-known need to be delivered from puzzlement; some philosophers seek to solve the problem, while others try to dissolve it. The realist administers therapy by attempting to satisfy the yearning</code> \|
	* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
	```json
	{
	"distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
	"triplet_margin": 0.05
	}
	```

	### Training Hyperparameters
	#### Non-Default Hyperparameters

	- `eval_strategy`: steps
	- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
	- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
	- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
	- `weight_decay`: 0.01
	- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
	- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates

	#### All Hyperparameters
	<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>

	- `overwrite_output_dir`: False
	- `do_predict`: False
	- `eval_strategy`: steps
	- `prediction_loss_only`: True
	- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
	- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
	- `per_gpu_train_batch_size`: None
	- `per_gpu_eval_batch_size`: None
	- `gradient_accumulation_steps`: 1
	- `eval_accumulation_steps`: None
	- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
	- `weight_decay`: 0.01
	- `adam_beta1`: 0.9
	- `adam_beta2`: 0.999
	- `adam_epsilon`: 1e-08
	- `max_grad_norm`: 1.0
	- `num_train_epochs`: 3
	- `max_steps`: -1
	- `lr_scheduler_type`: linear
	- `lr_scheduler_kwargs`: {}
	- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
	- `warmup_steps`: 0
	- `log_level`: passive
	- `log_level_replica`: warning
	- `log_on_each_node`: True
	- `logging_nan_inf_filter`: True
	- `save_safetensors`: True
	- `save_on_each_node`: False
	- `save_only_model`: False
	- `restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint`: False
	- `no_cuda`: False
	- `use_cpu`: False
	- `use_mps_device`: False
	- `seed`: 42
	- `data_seed`: None
	- `jit_mode_eval`: False
	- `use_ipex`: False
	- `bf16`: False
	- `fp16`: False
	- `fp16_opt_level`: O1
	- `half_precision_backend`: auto
	- `bf16_full_eval`: False
	- `fp16_full_eval`: False
	- `tf32`: None
	- `local_rank`: 0
	- `ddp_backend`: None
	- `tpu_num_cores`: None
	- `tpu_metrics_debug`: False
	- `debug`: []
	- `dataloader_drop_last`: False
	- `dataloader_num_workers`: 0
	- `dataloader_prefetch_factor`: None
	- `past_index`: -1
	- `disable_tqdm`: False
	- `remove_unused_columns`: True
	- `label_names`: None
	- `load_best_model_at_end`: False
	- `ignore_data_skip`: False
	- `fsdp`: []
	- `fsdp_min_num_params`: 0
	- `fsdp_config`: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
	- `fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap`: None
	- `accelerator_config`: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
	- `deepspeed`: None
	- `label_smoothing_factor`: 0.0
	- `optim`: adamw_torch
	- `optim_args`: None
	- `adafactor`: False
	- `group_by_length`: False
	- `length_column_name`: length
	- `ddp_find_unused_parameters`: None
	- `ddp_bucket_cap_mb`: None
	- `ddp_broadcast_buffers`: False
	- `dataloader_pin_memory`: True
	- `dataloader_persistent_workers`: False
	- `skip_memory_metrics`: True
	- `use_legacy_prediction_loop`: False
	- `push_to_hub`: False
	- `resume_from_checkpoint`: None
	- `hub_model_id`: None
	- `hub_strategy`: every_save
	- `hub_private_repo`: False
	- `hub_always_push`: False
	- `gradient_checkpointing`: False
	- `gradient_checkpointing_kwargs`: None
	- `include_inputs_for_metrics`: False
	- `eval_do_concat_batches`: True
	- `fp16_backend`: auto
	- `push_to_hub_model_id`: None
	- `push_to_hub_organization`: None
	- `mp_parameters`:
	- `auto_find_batch_size`: False
	- `full_determinism`: False
	- `torchdynamo`: None
	- `ray_scope`: last
	- `ddp_timeout`: 1800
	- `torch_compile`: False
	- `torch_compile_backend`: None
	- `torch_compile_mode`: None
	- `dispatch_batches`: None
	- `split_batches`: None
	- `include_tokens_per_second`: False
	- `include_num_input_tokens_seen`: False
	- `neftune_noise_alpha`: None
	- `optim_target_modules`: None
	- `batch_eval_metrics`: False
	- `eval_on_start`: False
	- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates
	- `multi_dataset_batch_sampler`: proportional

	</details>

	### Training Logs
	\| Epoch \| Step \| Training Loss \| loss \| nomic_max_accuracy \|
	\|:------:\|:----:\|:-------------:\|:------:\|:------------------:\|
	\| 0 \| 0 \| - \| - \| 0.92 \|
	\| 0.04 \| 100 \| 0.0082 \| 0.0093 \| 0.926 \|
	\| 0.08 \| 200 \| 0.0078 \| 0.0083 \| 0.926 \|
	\| 0.12 \| 300 \| 0.0077 \| 0.0076 \| 0.934 \|
	\| 0.16 \| 400 \| 0.0055 \| 0.0067 \| 0.944 \|
	\| 0.2 \| 500 \| 0.0045 \| 0.0060 \| 0.954 \|
	\| 0.24 \| 600 \| 0.008 \| 0.0055 \| 0.956 \|
	\| 0.28 \| 700 \| 0.0044 \| 0.0048 \| 0.966 \|
	\| 0.32 \| 800 \| 0.0057 \| 0.0056 \| 0.958 \|
	\| 0.36 \| 900 \| 0.0033 \| 0.0053 \| 0.958 \|
	\| 0.4 \| 1000 \| 0.0038 \| 0.0051 \| 0.958 \|
	\| 0.44 \| 1100 \| 0.0033 \| 0.0062 \| 0.958 \|
	\| 0.48 \| 1200 \| 0.0032 \| 0.0057 \| 0.95 \|
	\| 0.52 \| 1300 \| 0.0038 \| 0.0055 \| 0.962 \|
	\| 0.56 \| 1400 \| 0.0038 \| 0.0048 \| 0.964 \|
	\| 0.6 \| 1500 \| 0.0048 \| 0.0047 \| 0.962 \|
	\| 0.64 \| 1600 \| 0.0026 \| 0.0047 \| 0.966 \|
	\| 0.68 \| 1700 \| 0.0033 \| 0.0051 \| 0.962 \|
	\| 0.72 \| 1800 \| 0.0039 \| 0.0054 \| 0.962 \|
	\| 0.76 \| 1900 \| 0.0028 \| 0.0048 \| 0.966 \|
	\| 0.8 \| 2000 \| 0.0042 \| 0.0046 \| 0.97 \|
	\| 0.84 \| 2100 \| 0.0043 \| 0.0044 \| 0.968 \|
	\| 0.88 \| 2200 \| 0.0038 \| 0.0044 \| 0.968 \|
	\| 0.92 \| 2300 \| 0.0032 \| 0.0040 \| 0.97 \|
	\| 0.96 \| 2400 \| 0.0034 \| 0.0042 \| 0.97 \|
	\| 1.0 \| 2500 \| 0.0041 \| 0.0045 \| 0.964 \|
	\| 1.04 \| 2600 \| 0.002 \| 0.0042 \| 0.966 \|
	\| 1.08 \| 2700 \| 0.0023 \| 0.0039 \| 0.97 \|
	\| 1.12 \| 2800 \| 0.0027 \| 0.0040 \| 0.968 \|
	\| 1.16 \| 2900 \| 0.0005 \| 0.0040 \| 0.972 \|
	\| 1.2 \| 3000 \| 0.0002 \| 0.0043 \| 0.968 \|
	\| 1.24 \| 3100 \| 0.0004 \| 0.0042 \| 0.966 \|
	\| 1.28 \| 3200 \| 0.0002 \| 0.0041 \| 0.964 \|
	\| 1.32 \| 3300 \| 0.0003 \| 0.0042 \| 0.97 \|
	\| 1.3600 \| 3400 \| 0.0004 \| 0.0040 \| 0.968 \|
	\| 1.4 \| 3500 \| 0.0002 \| 0.0040 \| 0.974 \|
	\| 1.44 \| 3600 \| 0.0005 \| - \| 0.976 \|


	### Framework Versions
	- Python: 3.10.12
	- Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
	- Transformers: 4.42.4
	- PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
	- Accelerate: 0.32.1
	- Datasets: 2.21.0
	- Tokenizers: 0.19.1

	## Citation

	### BibTeX

	#### Sentence Transformers
	```bibtex
	@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
	title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
	author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
	booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
	month = "11",
	year = "2019",
	publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
	url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
	}
	```

	#### TripletLoss
	```bibtex
	@misc{hermans2017defense,
	title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification},
	author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
	year={2017},
	eprint={1703.07737},
	archivePrefix={arXiv},
	primaryClass={cs.CV}
	}
	```

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