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Is it legal to damage a vehicle that drives through a crosswalk while you're in it? If a vehicle travels through a crosswalk while a pedestrian is in the crosswalk (assuming the law in the applicable jurisdiction states that a vehicle must stop for pedestrians in the crosswalk), is it legal for the pedestrian to damage the vehicle, e.g. by hitting it with a part of his or her body or some other implement? It seems to me there's a fine line distinguishing between a circumstance where the vehicle hits the person and one where the person hits the vehicle, and it would seem that the law would favor the pedestrian.

No, it is generally not legal. In most (maybe all) states, this would be vandalism. For example, see California Penal Code Section 594(1)(a): Every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism: (1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material. (2) Damages. (3) Destroys. For another example, see Kansas Statutes 21-5813. In your hypothetical, the pedestrian absolutely hit the vehicle, not the other way around, so the "fine line" you mention doesn't effect this conclusion. The practicality of proving the case against the pedestrian is a separate matter but the law favours neither the pedestrian nor the driver. The standard is the same no matter who the charges are filed against: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The statute doesn't say much in detail (from the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law (unfortunately, the site works on javascript, so, you have to navigate by opening the "Laws" menu and then making your way from there): § 1128. Driving on roadways laned for traffic. Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply: (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. (b and c are not relevant) (d) When official markings are in place indicating those portions of any roadway where crossing such markings would be especially hazardous, no driver of a vehicle proceeding along such highway shall at any time drive across such markings. The last bit, (d), is of interest. Basically, you are allowed to change into the correct lane as long as the pavement markings permit it. The pavement markings at an intersection with a sign like the one you posted are generally solid white lines. These details are governed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, published by the Federal Highway Administration. Their information on pavement markings is available both in PDF and HTML format. Pertinently, it says: A double white line indicates that lane changes are prohibited. A single white line indicates that lane changes are discouraged. A dashed white line indicates that lane changes are allowed. Therefore, if the lines separating the lanes are, as usual, solid white lines, you are encouraged to get into the correct lane before the beginning of the solid white line, but you are permitted to change lanes across the solid lines. An example of such marking is in the right-hand example in the given image: One point of possible contention is that the New York State Driver's Manual describes the meaning of the solid white line somewhat differently: One solid line: You can pass other vehicles or change lanes, but you can only do so when obstructions in the road or traffic conditions make it necessary. I don't see any statutory basis for that description, but I may well have overlooked something. I suppose you know where the signs are specified, since you probably got the image from there, but for anyone reading this who does not know, they are specified in the publication Standard Highway Signs. This is available as a set of PDF files; the relevant file is the one containing regulatory signs; the sign in the question is 1-33, and it is in the midst of several similar signs. If a police officer ticketed you for getting into the lane too late, I suppose you should find a lawyer who specializes in fighting traffic tickets, and ask whether there really is such a thing as "too late." By my reading of the law, there isn't. (Of course, if it's dangerous to change lanes because of other vehicles, you shouldn't change lanes, but if you had, I would suppose the officer should have written a ticket for some other violation, like reckless driving.)

The NHTSA gives rules for the United States. Right of way goes to the first person to stop. So if a line of cars were at both stop signs, and all cars wanted to make the same conflicting turns, they would alternate. If the opposing cars stop at the same time then the one turning right has the right of way. (This is because a right turn falls under the "Straight Traffic Goes First" rule.)

First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat.

This seems to be the relevant code: https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2016/321L.pdf (8 pages). The permit is supposed to be returned to DMV if the person to whom it was issued dies or moves out of state (321L.3(1)(a) and (b)), but I see no requirement that the vehicle in which it is displayed must be tagged in Iowa. It is also plausible that the jeep owner is driving a handicapped person around, since a placard may be used by a passenger. On the other hand, the Colorado tags themselves may be illegal since people are supposed to register within 30 days of moving to Iowa (http://www.iowadot.gov/mvd/vehicleregistration/register.htm). Iowa is a rather long commute from Colorado.

The rules about use of lights, and keeping hands on the steering wheel are not new, but they may have been rephrased. It has always been the case that you should be in proper control of the vehicle (both hands on the wheel), and not to use the lights for thanking, or for inviting. Here are two extracts from the 1999 edition of The Highway Code. Flashing headlights. Only flash your headlights to let other road users know that you are there. Do not flash your headlights in an attempt to intimidate other road users. If another driver flashes his headlights never assume that it is a signal to go. Use your own judgement and proceed carefully. Once moving you should keep to the left, unless road signs or markings indicate otherwise. The exceptions are when you want to overtake, turn right or pass parked vehicles or pedestrians in the road keep well to the left on right-hand bends. This will improve your view of the road and help avoid the risk of colliding with traffic approaching from the opposite direction keep both hands on the wheel, where possible. This will help you to remain in full control of the vehicle at all times The recent changes concern vulnerable road users, and their priority.

This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas).

I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with.

Can an employer change its pension for existing employees? Can an employer change the terms and conditions of benefits, vacation, or pension after an employee accepts an offer in which those are listed?

In general: If the contract specifies some term (or "duration"), then it can only be modified in accordance with its own terms. When the employment contract expires any future employment term is subject to negotiation, and benefits could certainly be modified at that time. There are exceptions to this in labor law, but those vary by jurisdiction and won't be addressed here. Generally "vested" benefits like accrued vacation time or pension balances are treated like the property of the employee: They cannot be unilaterally reduced by the employer. One notable exception would be bankruptcy of the employer. I don't know where employee claims rank in Canadian bankruptcy law, but they are one of the debts that might not be paid in full.

Does this mean that if the employee leaves the company, and then creates or gain an intellectual property right, does the company own that right ? No. The reference to "the future" pertains only to the IPRs of inventions that ensued in the course of his employment. Even if the employer alleged that the clause also encompasses post-employment creations and/or post-employment acquisitions of IPR, such extension would be unconscionable (and therefore null and void).

In the US, persons with a disability are entitled to a reasonable accommodation for their disability. There is no requirement to tell an employee everything about their working conditions before a hire, in fact it would be illegal for the employer to ask "Do you have a disability that would prevent you from working underground?". Once hired, you can request an accommodation for your disability.

You need a lawyer There is no magic phrase to do what you want. The company will care about defending their assets, while you will want to defend yours. Only a lawyer will be able to tailor the condition that makes sense based on what your job's domain covers and your side projects. It is entirely possible that your personal projects conflict with your employer's, and you must then put your personal projects on hold or risk getting sued. e.g.) developing two pieces of software that does the same thing. Your lawyer will be able to advise on how that looks and what to do. No random strangers on the internet can give you accurate advice.

Get a lawyer. That employer is skating on very, very thin ice. You can’t have a non-compete agreement in Germany at all without the employer paying reasonable compensation. What is reasonable is decided by courts, but half your last regular salary is not “reasonable”. Especially if this would endanger your status of being allowed to work in Germany. If you were a non-German EU citizen, any non-compete agreement would be immediately invalid because it violates the right of free movement; how nonEU citizens are affected, I don’t know. The rest of the agreement seems quite illegal to me. I would think that any good employment lawyer would love to take your case.

This is covered by the page Job Applicants and the ADA from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. There it is said: I have a disability and will need an accommodation for the job interview. Does the ADA require an employer to provide me with one? Yes. Employers are required to provide "reasonable accommodation" -- appropriate changes and adjustments -- to enable you to be considered for a job opening. Reasonable accommodation may also be required to enable you to perform a job, gain access to the workplace, and enjoy the "benefits and privileges" of employment available to employees without disabilities. An employer cannot refuse to consider you because you require a reasonable accommodation to compete for or perform a job. The page mentions as plausible required reasonable accomodations: providing written materials in accessible formats, such as large print, braille, or audiotape providing readers or sign language interpreters ensuring that recruitment, interviews, tests, and other components of the application process are held in accessible locations providing or modifying equipment or devices adjusting or modifying application policies and procedures. The page goes on to say that: You must inform the employer that you need some sort of change or adjustment to the application/interviewing process because of your medical condition. You can make this request orally or in writing, or someone else might make a request for you (e.g., a family member, friend, health professional, or other representative, such as a job coach). A letter from a doctor is not automatically required. But in some cases a prospective employer might reasonably insist on nsuch a letter. The page says: If your disability and need for accommodation are not obvious, the employer may ask you for reasonable documentation explaining the disability and why an accommodation is needed. There is no specified evidence or form that an employer need provide in rejecting a request for an accommodation. The employer is only required to provide "reasonable" accommodation, and is not required to provide any accommodation if it would cause "undue hardship" to the employer. If several possible accommodations would reasonably allow the potential employee to apply the employer may choose which one or ones to offer. It need not offer the one preferred by the prospective employee. All this also applies to accommodations for an employee after s/he has been hired or has a job offer.

This is not an NDA (non-disclosure agreement), it is a non-compete agreement. An NDA would tell you that you cannot disclose anything you did or saw at your old employer's place. A non-compete agreement is what you have here, an agreement that limits your ability to get work. If what you say is correct, then your employer is not exactly the brightest. You stay that you haven't been given a written notice, and your contract says that a "Notice of termination will only be valid if it is given in writing". So you haven't been given valid notice. There is no reason why you would sign the non-compete agreement. If they plan to fire you without notice if you don't agree, they have a problem: Your contract doesn't allow them to do that. And they have apparently not given any written notice yet. So what they can do is as soon as they decide that you are not signing, they can give you one month written notice.

In general, in the US, Bob may do this. If the second company is a competitor of the first and Bob has access to confidential information from his first employer, then there could be an issue. Some employers require their employees, or some of them, to agree to "exclusive employment", that is to agree not to accept any other employment while employed by the company. If Bob has agreed to such a contract, he would be in breach of it if he took a second job and could be fired if his main employer learns of this. This is not a problem if Bob gets permission for the vacation work from his usual employer. In any case, Bob is not committing a crime, even if he is violating his contract.

What rules apply to searches of a private college dorm room by university police? In the United States, private colleges often have campus police, who are employed by the school but are sworn law enforcement officers with full police power in a certain jurisdiction (which can easily extend beyond the campus). Colleges also have living areas for students, which are the home of the student while they're at school (if anywhere has a reasonable expectation of privacy, it seems like a dorm room would), although these are typically not leases. Now: From what I can tell, US law says that if you have a reasonable expectation of privacy on some property, the owner of that property can't just give police permission to search it, nor can police ask the owner to search it. For instance, a hotel manager can't consent to search of a hotel room while the occupant is paying to rent the room. However, without a lease, the property owner can enter and search if they got the idea to do that. In a university context, this seems to imply that a school administrator could search a dorm room for evidence of violation of school rules, but that city police would need a warrant or consent from the student. What's the rule for university police? Do they wear a "school employee" hat, which lets them search school property with permission from the school? Or do they wear a "police officer" hat, which (presumably) requires them to have a warrant? Or does it depend what they're looking for (so looking for drugs might need a warrant, while looking for space heaters might not)?

I did not perform a complete survey but The Jurisdictional Limits of Campus Police reports that, "subject to jurisdictional constraints, campus police officers had virtually the same powers as their municipal counterparts." (Internal quotes omitted.) Generally speaking, police are police not administration. Here are some statutes: ILLINOIS HIGHER EDUCATION (110 ILCS 1020/) Private College Campus Police Act. The Board of Trustees of a private college or private university, may appoint persons to be members of a campus police department.... Members of the campus police department shall have the powers of municipal peace officers and county sheriffs. MASSACHUSETTS General Laws PART I TITLE II CHAPTER 22C Section 63. The colonel may... at the request of an officer of a college, university, other educational institution... appoint employees of such college, university, other educational institution or hospital as special state police officers. Such special state police officers shall... have the same power to make arrests as regular police officers for any criminal offense committed in or upon lands or structures owned, used or occupied by such college, university, or other institution or hospital. Oklahoma 74-360.17 ...certified campus police officer shall have the authority to enforce... State criminal statutes. Campus police departments formed by private institutions of higher education pursuant to this act shall be deemed to be public agencies in the State of Oklahoma Here is a case: People v. Boettner, 362 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y.Sup., 1974) is a case where school officials at a private school tried to get the cops to come execute a search. While the cops were dragging their feet obtaining a warrant, the school officials did their own search, found marijuana which they turned over to the police. Suspect was arrested and convicted. When the cops can't go into the room, send in the administration. Sort of. present search and seizure was conducted by college officials in a private capacity without government knowledge or participation and concludes that as such it is not subject to fourth amendment constraints. While it is true that a student does not lose his constitutional rights at the school house door or at the entrance to the college campus neither does he become cloaked with greater protection than any non-student who is the subject of a seizure of evidence by a private citizen. BUT the judge makes sure we understand that "State Police had no knowledge of and did not participate, directly or indirectly, in the search conducted by RIT officials on the 15th." So "it cannot be said that the RIT officials who decided on their own to search defendants' rooms were acting as agents, either actual or implied, of law enforcement.... Nor can it be said that the present search was only one incident in a close and continuing relationship between RIT and local law enforcement officers.... In the final analysis, RIT acted on its own, for its own reasons, and to further its own purposes." Regarding a written policy: The fact that the rules of the college regarding room searches were not complied with is of no consequence in determining the admissibility of the evidence for purposes of a criminal proceeding. Public schools are an entirely different animal. In those cases the university staff are public employees and their searches can be fourth amendment violations but they ARE allowed to conduct searches subject to the "reasonable exercise of University supervisory duties." "Even though the special relationship that existed between these petitioners and Troy University officials conferred upon the University officials the right to enter and search petitioners' dormitory rooms, that right cannot be expanded and used for purposes other than those pertaining to the special relationship." Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F.Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala., 1970) Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284 F.Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala., 1968)

You were trespassing The community college is a public institution but they can decide what part of their land you can walk on and in what circumstances. Just like the military is a public institution but they don’t let you walk across their shooting ranges. To be clear, in the absence of clear “no dogs allowed” signage, you were not trespassing until you were told about the policy. At that point, you were legally obliged to remove yourself (or more precisely, your dog) from the campus as soon as possible. When you refused to do so, you became a trespasser. It’s trivially easy to find out who you are. One photograph, one reverse image search they’ll know everything about you right down to your shoe size. Even if you don’t use social media, I’m sure some of your family and friends do. In most US states, trespass is a misdemeanour and also in most states members of the public can arrest someone who is committing a misdemeanour in their presence. They can use reasonable force to do so and can hold the arrestee until they can transfer them to the custody of a law enforcement officer. Admittedly, this seems unlikely but it is possible. If you have caused damage, you can be sued. It seems that your discussion with the college staff was somewhat protected so the loss of productivity of those staff members is a loss that the college suffered and that they could sue you for. Again, not likely but possible. Alternatively, they could just report you to the police who may or may not bring charges. Note: this assumes the dog is a pet. If it’s a disability assistance animal, it can’t be excluded. See: Are sidewalks on a university public or private property? Can a local government charge a fee to enter a public downtown area during an event? Trespassing or Public Property? Is a mall considered a "public place" for copyright purposes?

Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?

There is no hard rule that a strip search cannot be performed by a different-gendered officer. The hard rule is that the search must be reasonable (as required by the 4th Amendment) , which means that there have to be sufficient reasons for the search. Depending on the circumstances, a search of a male by a female, or in view of a female, could be reasonable – and in other circumstances it could be unreasonable. As the court in Cookish v. Powell, 945 F. 2d 441 said, In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted There are trends in the law which speak in favor of inmates right to privacy from cross-gender strip searches. Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors is a recent decision where given the circumstances, a cross-gender search was found to be unreasonable. Cookish v. Powell is one where it wasn't unreasonable. This resource file assembles numerous court rulings, classifying them for judicial circuit, gender of staff vs. gender of inmate, sorting according to who prevails. The "rule" would be that the more intrusive the staff conduct is, the less reasonable the search is: but the more of an emergency there is, the more reasonable the search is.

A private college or university is allowed to grant preferential treatment to anyone they please, except for oen of the reasons prohibited by relevant anti-discrimination law. Such laws vary by state, but generally prohibit preferences based on race, national origin, or gender. Some also include sexual preference or other categories. But I have never heard of a law preventing discrimination based on wealth, or specific donations. None of the Federal civil rights acts have such a provision. Preferences for so-called "legacy" students -- that is students whose parent or parents (or possibly more remote ancestors) are alumni of the school are common, and I am not aware of any case in which they have been seriously challenged as unlawful discrimination. Preferences for military veterans are also common, and may be mandated for public schools. For public schools justifying discrimination might be harder, and any relevant legislative polices will need to be considered, but even they can be free to make "rational" distinctions at least. Not all discrimination is unlawful discrimination -- far from it.

An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all?

Being disabled has nothing to do with it. If he is harassing students then after there is a complaint and investigation, then he can be banned from campus, and arrested for trespassing if he returns. But there would have to be a formal complaint made to the authorities first.

Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease.

Does the renter/owner of the home have to be present for a search warrant? Does a home owner or renter on the lease have to be present when police come with a warrant to search the home?

Of course not. If the owner/tenant needed to be home I could rent a house in my name, and then never occupy it (my associates live there) the cops could never enter. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) - Cops executing a warrant need to knock. If no one answers they must wait a reasonable time for an occupant to let them in. It's the knock and announce rule. By implication it might lend authority to what is an obvious answer.

In RI it appears that two days notice and a reasonable purpose is enough. There are states that list the reasons a landlord can access a unit; RI is not one of those states. http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/title34/34-18/34-18-26.HTM

Owners can't be evicted from their own property. That's one of the fundamental rights of real estate ownership. You may have a contractual basis for a lawsuit that either leads to payment or provides for forfeiture of their share, but that relies on the details of your specific case and will require specific legal advice from your own lawyer.

I overdosed on an illegal drug and called an ambulance. I was honest and told them what I took. [emphasis added] You stated that you had possession, and had recently used a notable amount, of an illegal substance. That is reasonable cause (or "probable cause" in some jurisdictions) for a search, regardless of a warrant, and they do not need permission. For example, as FindLaw.com explains, in the USA. [p]olice may use firsthand information, or tips from an informant to justify the need to search your property. If an informant's information is used, police must prove that the information is reliable under the circumstances.

The police performed an "open air sniff". Federal and Pennsylvania law differ on this. Under Federal law, this is not considered a search and can be done on any vehicle- usually to get cause for a more invasive search. (Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005).) Under Pennsylvania law, an open air sniff requires reasonable suspicion. This is lower than probable cause- all it requires is that a reasonable person could suspect from the facts that a crime may have or could be committed. Being overly nervous during a routine traffic stop driving someone else's car could potentially be considered reasonable suspicion- as I only have your second-hand account, I won't speculate further. If there was no reasonable suspicion, any evidence found by that search, or evidence found by a search justified by it would be suppressed. Fourth Ammendment rights also apply here. The police cannot detain someone solely for the purpose of waiting for a sniffer dog. They have ways and techniques to waste time for this purpose, but if the stop was concluded before the dog arrived, your husband would be free to leave. Again, I have only your second-hand account so I won't speculate on whether this happened. He should speak to his lawyer about specifics of the case.

Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).

There is a state law that requires you to obey the police: ORC 2917.13, which says you may not Fail to obey the lawful order of any law enforcement officer engaged in the law enforcement officer's duties at the scene of or in connection with a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind. If you do, misconduct at an emergency is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. If a violation of this section creates a risk of physical harm to persons or property, misconduct at an emergency is a misdemeanor of the first degree. You also cannot Hamper the lawful operations of any law enforcement officer, firefighter, rescuer, medical person, emergency medical services person, or other authorized person, engaged in the person's duties at the scene of a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind "Hamper" is not defined statutorily, but the plain meaning of "hamper" is not the same as "fail to assist". We have not established that the order is lawful, however, which is crucial. The police cannot just freely search a residence without permission. If they have permission from the occupant, they can search and seize. If they have probable cause to believe that a crime exists and the circumstances make a warrant impractical, they can search and seize. I don't know what you mean by "wellness check", but that seems plainly to be unlawful entry. However, if the resident calls 911 and reports that he is having an issue, that is sufficient consent for entry. In the case of a fire alarm, the fire code authorizes a fire department official in charge of an actual emergency response incident to order the evacuation of a building, and occupants are required to comply. If we suppose that the smoke detector in a room has gone off, the fire department is authorized to inspect for fire, and there is a provision under the law about failure to obey a lawful command (to open the door so that they can look for fire). Problem: you cannot know whether the order is lawful. The officer doesn't decide what is lawful, the courts do (after the fact), and typically a command is found to be lawful unless it is clearly unlawful. The order from your supervisor is not "enforceable" in the sense that you cannot be arrested, imprisoned, or fined for disobeying your boss. However, there is a potential club they can use against you, namely firing you for disobeying the order. Normally, you can be fired for wearing the wrong shirt. But there are laws about employers doing illegal things, such as ORC 4113.52, which provides recourse when the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety etc. In which case you report this to the supervisor, they have 24 hours after getting the report to correct the situation, and after that you would report the situation to the county prosecutor. (Read all of the details in the linked law, don't just skip steps: this is an executive summary). Having done this, you are protected from being fired, demoted. reassigned etc. The employer will be strongly motivated to not incur the penalties for violating the whistle blower statute. Additionally, you can sue the employer if they fire you for refusing to violate the law (termination in violation of public policy).

The statute of limitations sets out the period of time after a crime has been within which formal criminal proceedings must be commenced. If the police or DA were to request and receive an arrest warrant that met the requirements of the Fourth Amendment then the person would be a fugitive and time spent as a fugitive does not count. From Groh v Ramirez: The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The requirement is that the person to be seized must be "particularly described" - that is unambiguously identified. A name will do that but so will a commonly used alias.

60 days tenant notice in Ontario I've rented an apartment for 1 year, now I already lived here for 11 month and I have one more month left. I called my landlord yesterday to give a 60 days notice and said that I will be moving out in 60 days, which is October and November. Now, my notice was refused and I was told that I will have to live for another month and only then give a 60 days notice, which doesn't really make sense for me, because it actually becomes a 90 days notice. What can I do in this situation? The landlord got checks from me for another couple months and said that they will be cashing them out no matter what.

What the landlord is doing is forcing you to abide by the terms of your lease agreement. You most likely agreed to a 1 year lease on a signed document, which means you're pretty much screwed because if he wanted to, he could force you to fulfill the lease and pay him anyway. However, his remarks about when you can notify to terminate are wrong. See end of answer. About Terminating Your Lease Early However, there are a few loopholes you can exploit. The easiest one is to get him to increase your rent. Ask about it, tell him that you're considering staying but tell him you want to know if he's going to increase the rent by much. If he declares that he is going to increase the rent, perfect. Get him to send it to you in writing (which he is legally required to do). Just in case though, have him on speaker phone and record every conversation you have from now on without telling him. This is legal (see this answer) and is a powerful form of evidence, so exploit the hell out of it. If you can get him to tell you that he's going to increase your rent, then you can legally submit a notice to terminate tenancy on the grounds that you do not wish to pay the increase. In this case, the amount of notice that you have to give is capped to the day that the rent increase is to take place. If you try this, do everything you can to get it in writing. Don't feel proud of snaring him and immediately announce that you're leaving because of this as soon as he says it on the phone, because you're screwing yourself out of going through the proper channels to make sure you not only win, but you've made your case air tight. Also, feel free to let you landlord know that he owes you money. Landlords in Ontario have to repay you a capped interest rate on your last months' deposit every 12 months. This rate is decided annually and for 2015 is capped at 1.6%. If your landlord wants to be anal about the rules and stick the letter of the law to you, do it back. Becoming a pain your landlords ass is a great way to get them to either become more flexible, or make a mistake that will give you an out. Notice that if he does increase the rent, he can demand that you increase your last months deposit and force you to pay it. You could "accidently" make him aware of this right in a conversation where you are concerned about a rent increase immediately after letting him know that he owes you money for the interest. "I'm concerned about the rent increase because I have to increase my deposit by law too." This way, he'll hopefully have the thought "I can avoid having to give him any money by increasing his rent by the same interest rate, so he'll owe me what I owe him, therefore I owe nothing. I'm so smart!" Then he cheerfully gives you a notice to increase rent, at which time you invoke your right to terminate tenancy on short notice due to an increase in rent. Your Landlord Is Wrong All that aside, your landlord committed an illegal act when they refused your notice to terminate, because he's denying you your rights under the RTA. From the Residential Tenancies Act: A tenant may terminate a tenancy at the end of a period of the tenancy or at the end of the term of a tenancy for a fixed term by giving notice of termination to the landlord in accordance with section 44. 2006, c. 17, s. 47 The details adjust a little bit depending on your circumstances, but the conditions in section 44 are basically to ensure the following: You are giving 60 days notice. You are not giving 60 days notice where the termination date you provide is less than the previously agreed term, except in special cases like the one I mention about increased rent. There is nothing in section 44 that can be confused to mean that you must wait until you have passed the end of your term before you can decide to leave. I suspect your landlord is deliberately interpreting the use of wording like "may terminate at the end of" to imply you have to wait to give your notice. A notice of termination is not a termination. It is a notice that in the future, you are going to terminate. Let's remove the confusion by replacing the word "terminate" with "vacating the premises and not paying another cent". That should remove any ambiguity that could be abused. So frankly you can simply go straight to the board, file the appropriate form with them and just pack up and leave when you've reached the date specified in the notice to terminate. Your final month is covered by your deposit. File the form immediately, let them know about the conversation you had with your landlord, then go to your bank and cancel the cheques you've already written (except for your deposit cheque) and simply ignore the landlord, carrying on with your moving plans. You should ask the Board if this illegal act has any ramifications. Perhaps because he has done this, this gives you an immediate out or something else. Call the Board and tell them what happened and ask them. They have an obligation to inform you correctly. Sources: Landlord Tenant Board of Ontario FAQ Final Note The Board is there to serve you, free of charge. They have a duty, as it is their explicit directive, to assist you in all matters regarding being a tenant. Phone them, talk to them at length, demand assistance. They are to inform you of your rights and guide you on the appropriate action, forms and procedure to assist you in resolving any issues you have. Note that I wrote the whole bit about getting out of your lease early legally before I refreshed my memory on the fact that you can/should give your 60 days notice before the end of your lease period. That makes the case much simpler as a I note in my answer. I left the information I already wrote however because it could be applicable or at least be of some help to others. Also note that if you're saying that the landlord came to get more cheques on the basis of his lie that he used to refuse your attempt to legally leave, then you'll need to cancel those cheques. That costs money. That alone is enough of a case to take him before the Tribunal and force him to repay the cost of those cancelled cheques. You may even successfully claim further damages or the Tribunal may voluntarily award you money for the actions your landlord is deliberately taking to deprive you of your rights. Talk to the Board.

Being Evicted Is Not A Crime It is not a crime to be evicted. So, you will not get a criminal record if you fail to pay your rent and are evicted. Failing to pay rent is merely a breach of contract, and eviction is a remedy for this breach of contract. Damage To Your Credit Rating Being evicted will absolutely hurt your credit rating, however. In the U.S., a bad credit rating can be considered by prospective employers and for many other purposes (e.g. as grounds to charge you higher insurance premiums, or to refuse to rent property to you, or to refuse to extend you credit). I am not familiar with all of the purposes for which a credit rating may be legally used in the U.K. and that would probably need to be the subject of a separate question in any case. At a minimum, a bad credit rating makes it harder to get loans in the future. For example, an eviction could result in your application for a mortgage when you want to buy a house being denied, or could cause you to pay a much higher interest rate on a car loan. Other Negative Consequences Of An Eviction There are other negative consequences of being evicted in addition to harm to your credit rating, which may seem obvious but also bear mentioning. These consequences are all very good reasons to voluntarily leave the premises from which your landlord is trying to evict you and to move to a new residence of some kind before a court order evicting you is carried out if it is at all possible to do so. Homelessness First, if you don't have a place to live immediately, when you are evicted, you become homeless and being homeless is not a good thing. The U.K. has a decent safety net, so eventually you may be able to find public housing if you are evicted, but that often doesn't happen immediately, and in the meantime, you are literally on the street. Even if you can't find any place else that you can afford to rent, you can try to find friends and family that can take you in temporarily, attempt to locate places you can legally camp for a while, and can save up enough money to pay for a motel for a few days at least while you are looking for alternative places to live. Your Stuff Is Tossed On The Street Second, if your stuff is in the property you are being evicted from, then when you are evicted, your stuff will be tossed out on the street and in all likelihood it will be damaged or stolen or otherwise lost. Among the things that can be lost or damaged in an eviction are documents that you need which are hard to replace like birth certificates, passports, professional licenses, college applications, report cards for children, health records, financial records, family photos, immigration documents, etc. Even if you can't afford to rent a new place, you can avoid this harm to your property by putting as much of it as you can in a storage unit. At a minimum, try to find some place (maybe friends or family or work) where you can store your most valuable property before you are evicted. Lost Security Deposits And Money Damages Third, if you are evicted, you will almost certainly lose your security deposit and will probably also have a money judgment entered against you by the landlord for any amounts owed to the landlord for damage to the property, back rent, late fees, interest, lost rent while the property is rerented, attorneys' fees, court costs, etc. to the extent that it exceeds the security deposit which it usually will. This money judgment will further hurt your credit rating and could cause your wages and bank accounts to be garnished and your cars and/or other personal property to be seized to collect this debt. Usually people are evicted because they can't afford to pay rent, so there are limits to what you can do to prevent this, but at a minimum, try not to damage the premises which can result in additional amounts owed. Disruption Of Postal Service Fourth, until you can get change of address arrangements made, you will not receive any postal service, including bills you owe on loans and credit cards (or even worse, demands to respond to small claims court lawsuits up to 100,000 pounds). Failing to pay these bills or to respond to notices can lead to more damage to your credit, late payment penalties, default judgments in court cases, and other problems like disrupted efforts to apply to universities or to meet requirements to obtain scholarships. You can avoid this by obtaining a post office box and redirecting your mail there before you vacate the premises.

When the fixed term ends, you have two options if you want to stay. The first option is that you and the landlord can sign a new tenancy agreement, with a new fixed term. This new agreement replaces the old one at the end of the current fixed term, so the landlord is free to make changes, including proposing any number for the rent - and you are free to reject it. Alternatively, when the fixed term ends, if you don't sign a new agreement, and you don't leave, the tenancy automatically* becomes a Statutory Periodic Tenancy - often called a rolling contract. This has no fixed term, which means that if you want to leave, you have to give 1 month's notice, while if the landlord wants you to leave, they must give 2 months' notice. Apart from that, the terms of the existing contract, including the rent review clause mentioned in the question, remain in force. The rent review clause suggests that the landlord can unilaterally impose a rent increase after the fixed term ends, but only up to the amount specified. Hence, without signing a new agreement, any increase beyond that would not be allowed. Also, it doesn't appear to make any mention of future rent increases, which suggests that the default rules for rolling contracts will apply, in that the landlord can propose a rent increase, which you can accept or reject. Failing that, the landlord can impose one via a Section 13 Notice, but only once a year. If you feel the requested rent is unreasonable, you can challenge this, and a tribunal will make a ruling based on the state of the property and the rents for similar properties in the area. (* If the tenancy has any provisions relating to what happens once the fixed term ends, then the tenancy may become a Contractual Periodic Tenancy. However, unless those provisions relate to rent, then they may not be relevant here.)

Typically the landlord will have a preexisting clause in the lease that says the landlord may choose to amend the lease at a later date. While that may be in contracts, I don't see that holding up in court. You can't unilaterally amend contracts to add new terms without acceptance on part of the lessee. Any clause in the contract like that will require notification of the lessee of the change and a chance for the lessee to terminate the contract without recourse on part of the lessor. Generally this must be done in the same format as the original lease (written). Most jurisdictions don't allow for a verbal amendment to a written lease. So in a way, yes, it is legal for a landlord to require payment via a certain method (like a direct debit from a bank account). They cannot however change the payment terms unilaterally without notification and acceptance. They can use language such as sending the notification (via registered mail) and then saying that a failure to respond is acceptance (because you are, by actions, accepting the terms by continuing to live there).

My questions are, where does this put me legally and what are my options? . . . Also, if I want to keep the tenants, how should I proceed? And if I don't want to keep them, do I have that option? Your Rights With Respect To The Tenants If the agency is telling the truth and the agreement made with the agent was for four tenants but their records and document only listed three by accident, you probably can't insist on additional rent or evicting the fourth tenant because if your agent does something on your behalf, that is binding on you just as much as if you had signed them up personally in that manner. This is true even if the agent didn't actually have the authority to rent the place to four people based upon your communications with the agent, because the agent has "apparent authority" to bind you in your agent's dealings with the prospective tenants. You probably have the right to insist that the fourth tenant sign the lease to conform to the actual agreement that was reached (four tenants in exchange for the rent stated in the lease). If the fourth tenant refuses to do so, that would be a repudiation of the lease/contract and would prevent him from claiming that he is a valid tenant of the property pursuant to the agreement reached with landlord through his agent. If the fourth tenant refused to sign, you could therefore insist that the fourth tenant pay additional rent or be evicted if you wanted to. On the other hand, if the agent is not accurately relating the facts, and there was never any agreement to have more than three tenants (as your communications with them and the written lease suggest), then you would have the right to evict the fourth tenant or insist on additional rent from that tenant. But, it might be hard to prove that the agent is not being accurate because it sounds like the agent and the tenants will testify consistently with each other and there were probably no other witnesses to the discussions between them. The Fourth Tenant Might Have Liability Anyway Also, at common law, you could sue the fourth person for unpaid rent during the period that the tenant was actually there anyway, since the fourth tenant was in "privity of estate" with you. (If someone actually signs the lease then they are in "privity of contract" with you.) England abolished the doctrine of privity of estate in most circumstances for residential tenancies in 1995. But, it is possible that this fact pattern is one of the situations in which the privity of estate doctrine remains in force since the 1995 reforms largely apply to assignments of leases by people who are tenants on the original lease, rather than occupants of a rented property who never signed a lease and never received a formal assignment. I don't have the legal research tools to confirm that accurately. But, none of the U.K. Landlord and Tenant Acts currently in force that I could locate addressed that issue, so the common law rule may still apply in this situation. If the doctrine of privity of estate does allow a suit against the fourth tenant based on occupancy without signing a lease, the incentive to even try to get the fourth tenant to sign a lease is very small indeed - you get no benefit at all from it other than slightly easier proof in an unpaid rent collection lawsuit if the agent's story is believed. If it doesn't the considerations earlier in this answer still apply. Practical Considerations All of this being said, there is also a practical consideration to consider. It you try to kick out the fourth tenant or impose additional rent on the fourth tenant, if the fourth tenant refuses to sign the lease, or if you believe that the original agreement did not include the fourth tenant, you still have to weigh the pros and cons of bringing an eviction or unpaid rent lawsuit. The lawsuit will cost you money (requiring you to advance money even if you are awarded attorneys' fees which may be impossible to collect from the tenants). You won't get your attorneys' fees for the lawsuit if you lose and will also have to pay their attorneys' fees if you lose. Tenants whom you are suing are unlikely to be cooperative on any other matter upon which you want their cooperation, and may bad mouth you, for example, in online consumer reviews. Unlike a typical eviction where the rent is not paid, it is very likely that the eviction will be contested, and if it is, the court could order the fourth tenant to sign the lease, but provide you with no other remedy if the court believes the story put forward by the tenant and the agent. If you don't sue, you won't incur attorneys' fees, you can still evict everyone if the rent isn't paid, you can still try to collect unpaid rent from three other people, and you are much less likely to have a dispute with or non-cooperation from the tenants. The only benefit you get from having a fourth person on the lease if that was the original deal (or if you can't prove that it wasn't the original deal) is that you have one more person you can sue for back rent if the rent isn't paid. If I decide to break my agreement with the agency, do I have grounds to do that? Terminating The Agent Often you can terminate an agreement with an agency without cause. If the agency agreement says that you can, you are free to do so and probably should because at a minimum they are sloppy and poor communicators. Generally speaking, even if you can't terminate the agreement without cause, you can terminate the agreement for cause, and the contradiction between their prior communications with you and their current communications with you probably constitute good cause to terminate the agreement both if they are telling the truth not, and if they are not accurately recounting the facts now. But, to be clear, terminating the agent won't affect the rights of the tenant. Suing The Agent If you clearly do lose money because the three tenants on the lease don't pay rent and for example, you get a judgment against them which can't be collected due to bankruptcy or them moving abroad to a place where it is not economical to collect a money judgment from them, or just not having any assets or income (or some combination thereof), and it turns out that the law does not allow you to sue the fourth tenant, and the fourth tenant was not judgment proof, you would probably have a right to sue the agent for the lost rent caused by the agent's negligence in failing to get all four tenants to sign the lease. But, the cost of proving that in a typical case would not be worth the money since this would be much harder to prove than simply proving that someone signed a lease agreeing to pay rent and didn't pay rent as agreed. If the agent didn't agree to pay for your losses voluntarily it might not be worth the time, trouble and risk of not prevailing in that lawsuit to pursue, even if you could get attorneys' fees for your suit against the agent if you won (which you probably could in England). The risks of doing that include paying the agent's attorneys' fees is you lose.

In general, the words "due on" take on their ordinary meaning - that is, that the performance of a contract is required on or before the date specified. If it is not specified in the contract, a court will look to what is reasonable in the circumstances. For instance, if payment is due to a company that trades 24 hours a day including the day payment was due, then payment up until midnight may be found acceptable. However, if it is not known to the person making the payment that the business has such extended hours, and especially if it is known that the business has normal hours, then payment after close of business would likely not be reasonable. To your question, and having reviewed some Canadian residential rent legislation, although none define due on specifically - and I would not expect them to do so - most have clauses which provide for termination, and they only refer to serving notice either a certain number of days after rent falls due, or the day after rent falls due. This would tend to support my assertion that rent is payable on or before the specified date, unless the contract says otherwise, in line with the above considerations. NB: While rent is usually payable in advance, this simply means that you are paying for the occupancy during that follows, or substantially follows, rather than the period that has elapsed.

The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement).

It's hard to imagine a jurisdiction where this would be legal, assuming that the facts are as you present them. Mainly, it comes down to what the lease actually says. If the lease says something that implies that landlord permission is required, then the tenant has to get permission. You can call it a "dog permit", it just boils down to "landlord permission". Unless the lease also states "permission for a pet can be withdrawn at any time, sor any reason" or something to that effect, then the dog is permitted. At the end of the lease term, the landlord can refuse to renew the lease and/or can instead offer a no-dogs lease. The landlord's only recourse would be to petition the court for breaking the lease, in having a dog without permission, at which point the tenant would present whatever evidence they have that there was permission (hopefully something more substantial than a statement "I asked if I could bring my dog and the landlord said 'hmmmm' with an approving tone"). The courts will not give any credence to "Yeah but I rescinded the permission" unless there is a clause that explicitly allows it.

What are the legal implications if a borrower gets a loan through reporting "illegal" income? Suppose a borrower applied for, and got a mortgage from a bank, by reporting an income for several years of say, $100,000 a year. Suppose this borrower had zero legal income during this time, but had income from illegal sources of over $100,000 a year? Could the borrower be found guilty of lying on the loan application about his income? Could the bank be found negligent for not verifying if the income was legal, even thought it was actually in excess of the reported $100,000 a year? Would the answers change if the illegal income was of a kind that can be reverted or "clawed back" because of conversion or other charges (such as drug dealing)?

The financial institution is only likely to run afoul of anti-money laundering laws. The Bank Secrecy Act (1970) and the USA PATRIOT Act deal with anti-money laundering in the United States. Now, this may not necessarily be the financial institution that funds the loan. However, a financial institution will verify the income as part of the lending process. For example, these are some of the ways a bank may verify your income (this isn't exhaustive): 1040 Tax return (Federal or state). Wages and tax statement (W-2 and/ or 1099, including 1099 MISC, 1099G, 1099R, 1099SSA, 1099DIV, 1099SS, 1099INT). Pay stub. Self-employment ledger documentation (can be a Schedule C, the most recent quarterly or year-to-date profit and loss statement, or a self-employment ledger). Social Security Administration Statements (Social Security Benefits Letter). Unemployment Benefits Letter. Now, really, only the last two forms of verification would not be accepted by a financial institution. In the event that a financial institution completes its due diligence and verifies the income, the financial institution that funds the loan is unlikely to be found negligent. However, if this income passes through any single financial institution, they may have obligations under the BSA to report the transactions, either through a Suspect Activity Report or a Currency Transaction Report. Failure to comply with these obligations can result in sanctions placed on the bank. The borrower, on the other hand, is only likely to be subject to the laws that outlaw whatever criminal activity the funds were a proceed of, and/or perhaps money laundering laws.

Normally the statute of limitations is five or six years (I think it's different between Scotland and the rest of the UK). The reason for the limitation is that if your employer asks for money back, you obviously should be able to defend yourself, for example by proving that you never received that money. After five or six years it is assumed that you wouldn't be able to provide any such evidence, so nobody can ask for the money back anymore. That's not specific to overpaid wages but quite general. In addition there is the question whether the pilots should have known they were overpaid. For example, I'm quite happy with my salary, but if it was less, I would look for and find a different job that pays better. If the company claimed in five years time that I had been overpaid all the time, then I would say that if they had given me the "correct" lower payment, I would have found a better job elsewhere, so asking me to repay the money seems quite unfair. (Why do you need to defend yourself? Maybe your salary was £3,000 per month. Someone in the right position records that they are paying you £4,000 but puts £3,000 into your account and £1,000 into their own. Then that person has an accident and their replacement finds that you were overpaid according to their records.)

No. Your evidence of registration of the car would suffice to show that you are not receiving stolen property, although you are correct that not informing the police that it has been recovered could get you pulled over if the car has been reported as stolen. Given the circumstances of the question, I don't address the means by which the car is repossessed. Not every use of force would be justified to secure the return of the stolen car. Reporting the theft and recover to the police would also make it easier for you to make an insurance claim. Repossession of a car stolen by fraud (tricking you into signing over the car title to them in exchange for Monopoly money in an envelope that you don't check until after they are gone, or for a forged check), which is then sold to a bona fide third party individual for value, however, might constitute car theft.

A car loan is technically called a "secured debt" and some states have a law called "defrauding a secured creditor", or something similar, that can cause mere failure to pay a debt or to voluntarily deliver the collateral to the creditor to become a type of theft or another crime in some circumstances. Usually, even then, there must be evidence of an intent to defraud the creditor and not merely an intent to fail to perform a promise to a creditor. For example, in Colorado there is a criminal offense entitled "Concealment or removal of secured property" at Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-5-504 which states: If a person who has given a security interest in personal property, as security interest is defined in section 4-1-201(b)(35), C.R.S ., or other person with actual knowledge of the security interest, during the existence of the security interest, knowingly conceals or removes the encumbered property from the state of Colorado without written consent of the secured creditor, the person commits a class 5 felony where the value of the property concealed or removed is one thousand dollars or more. Where the value of the property concealed or removed is less than one thousand dollars, the person commits a class 1 misdemeanor. But, the default position at common law and under the Uniform Commercial Code, is that merely passively not paying a debt or passively not turning over collateral for debt to a creditor is not a crime.

There is no prohibition on lying in general. Misrepresentation If you misrepresent a fact and that misrepresentation is a material inducement to someone entering into a contract with you then there are a number of problems that follow: The (mis)representation may become a term of the contract and if not complied with can allow the aggrieved party to either sue for damages or rescind the contract. If the misrepresentation led to the contract being entered into by mistake then the contract is void for mistake The misrepresentation may have become a collateral contract an innocent or negligent misstatement may give rise to the tort of negligent misstatement misrepresentation may put you in breach of trade practices statutes. Fraud If you knowingly tell a lie with the intention of receiving a benefit then this is both the tort and crime of fraud. You receiving employment or your company securing a contract probably qualifies as intending to receive a benefit.

A receipt is just a written proof that money was taken. It is hard to imagine a place on Earth where the legality of giving such a proof would be questionable at all so that you would need to talk about an "authority to issue receipts". Only if you find a place where money itself is illegal. Now, the real question here is whether such receipts (issued by private persons not registered as businesses) can be used for accounting purposes, e.g. to claim that your business, which transacted with those persons, incurred expenses. The mere fact that sole traders need to be registered to do business does not outlaw the use of receipts issued by non-registered persons. For example, your business could be buying old stuff from the public (used cars, electronics etc.) and refurbishing it. Provided that this activity itself is not illegal, receiving receipts from those one-off private sellers, and using them in your bookkeeping would be perfectly legal too.

None First, only cash transactions are reportable: electronic and cheque transactions aren't. The only ones that will be reported are your single withdrawal and deposit. As you say $10,000 is not a lot of money. What law enforcement is looking for a people who frequently have large cash transactions: they use data matching algorithms to identify these people. Your single transaction will not be noticed.

According to the United States Treasury Department: Money laundering is the process of making illegally-gained proceeds (i.e. "dirty money") appear legal (i.e. "clean"). Typically, it involves three steps: placement, layering and integration. First, the illegitimate funds are furtively introduced into the legitimate financial system. Then, the money is moved around to create confusion, sometimes by wiring or transferring through numerous accounts. Finally, it is integrated into the financial system through additional transactions until the "dirty money" appears "clean." I have no idea if the $10m are proceeds of crime so we apply the duck test - "If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck and swims like a duck; its probably a duck" A person has gifted another person $10m - there is nothing illegal about giving someone a gift, however, this is a pretty substantial gift. I am calling it a gift because there is no enforceable contract that requires repayment. There is an expectation that the receiver will invest this money for a period of time, hey, if I had $10m I'd probably invest it too. And then return it to the giver; with or without the earnings (you do not say). Again there is nothing wrong with reciprocating a gift; reciprocity is a cornerstone of most societies, however, this is a pretty detailed understanding of what reciprocity means. Quack, quack, quack - its money laundering. Many jurisdictions in the world have "unexplained wealth" laws which basically require a person to explain their unexplained wealth or have it confiscated. If it isn't money laundering it is certainly at risk of this.

Are there surveys on the share of class action settlement that actually goes to the plaintiffs? I am interested in links to scholarly papers with actual comprehensive and preferably up-to-date statistics. I have done some search on Google Scholar but failed to find wide-ranging surveys (the ones I found were either very old (1980) or narrow, dealing with security class action suits (from 2002)).

Although it's difficult to find exact numbers on class action settlements, there are some studies that suggest that the settlements are often of little value to plaintiffs. A Mayer-Brown paper was only able to obtain data on six settlements - in these cases, claims rates were 0.000006%, 0.33%, 1.5%, 9.66% and 12%. The same paper found that in one case of an $8 million settlement fund made available to 13,500 members, counsel received $5.5 million. Appendices A and B of this paper provide further examples where class action settlements are either a negligible amount, or benefited a negligible number of class members. Although the scope of this paper is somewhat narrow, its findings suggest that it is representative of many class actions.

No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.

It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.

You reach a settlement instead of a judge deciding a court case if both sides agree that a settlement is better for them than paying court costs, lawyers cost, the risk of losing, having embarrassing details published, distraction for a business, waste of time, and the stress of a court case. If the plaintiff wants to be able to publish details of the case, there is a lot less reason for the defendant to enter a settlement agreement. You complain that third parties miss out on possible information. That’s exactly why it isn’t there, because the defendant doesn’t want it to be there. The defendant might offer “I’ll give you $ 1,000 if you agree not to say a word about the case.” If the plaintiff says “I want $ 1,000 and tell the world about what happened”, then the defendant will likely say “take our offer, or take us to court and our lawyers will do their best so you get nothing”. The defendant will just not offer the kind of settlement you are looking for. And the plaintiff will do what is best for them, not what is best for anyone else. You have to remember that a settlement cannot be forced upon both sides, it must be something that both sides agree on. It's easiest to agree if you give the other side what they want if it doesn't cost you much, and then get things that you value more in return. As a plaintiff, not telling the world about the case is something that costs me nothing, but may have high value for the defendent. On the other hand, I value cash from the defendent a lot, while the defendent may be rich and can easily afford it. Because both sides have to agree, the terms are likely to incorporate something that both sides want.

This probably isn't a ground for an appeal. While a party arguing to reverse a trial court's decision must show that the argument that they are making on appeal was "preserved" by that party at trial by making that argument in the trial court, the converse is not true. Indeed, one of the rules of appellate practice is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld for any reason supported by the evidence even if it wasn't made by any party at trial. Generally speaking, a trial court isn't supposed to try a pro se party's case for them, but once the evidence is in, the court is free to do original legal research and come to a conclusions contrary to the arguments made by either of the parties. A judge is supposed to correctly apply the actual law to the facts notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to lead it astray. This doesn't systemically happen in favor of one party or the other in my experience, but is more common when one or both parties is relatively inexperienced in the relevant legal field. Appellate courts also come to conclusions about the law not advanced by either party on a regular basis. If anything, this is even more common in the area of administrative law, where the judge is likely to be a subject area specialist, than in ordinary civil litigation. It is also more common in administrative law because a judge in that context is more focused on the institutional implications of a bad precedent than trial court judges in ordinary courts. (PS is there a technical term for the rules concerning the "role" of the judge in a court, what they supposed to do, and not supposed to do?) Probably, but there isn't any term that comes readily to mind. If I can think of one, I will update this answer.

No, there is no general publicly accessible directory of lawsuits against private individuals, even if it concerns yourself. The complaint must identify you as the defendant indicating a ladungsfähige Anschrift, § 253 Ⅱ, Ⅳ, 130 ZPO. Commencing an action requires service of process, § 253 Ⅰ ZPO. I presume you are not a De-Mail user. So you will get a hardcopy. You may not know that, but such mail in Germany is usually sent in yellow envelopes. The mailman will carefully compare the mailbox label and in case of a match record the date and time of successful delivery on the envelope as well as a slip of paper returned to the sender, the court in this case. Now this will obviously fail in your case (unless the landlord maliciously attached a corresponding label to a mailbox). In a civil action the court “pretends” to be dumb regarding facts. The landlord must try to track you down. Evidently he knew your email address, so he had some contact details. If he was evil, the next option would be to ask the court for an öffentliche Zustellung, § 185 ZPO. If the court agreed, this means there will be, for instance, in the city hall a paper on a bulletin board “To the attention of Coala, last known address …: There is mail for you to pick up at my office.” Two weeks later the letter is automatically considered to be delivered.Some cities (example: Cologne, NRW) also publish these documents on the internet, but due to GDPR considerations delete them after a certain period now. If there was a lawsuit, there will have been a default judgment by now, i.e. you will have lost just by being a no‑show. However, you said you have never received the bill. This means the landlord must have produced false evidence, claim to have sent the bill and a subsequent warning notice, but there was none. But this is an entirely different issue.

Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority.

I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.

Can my lease co-signer sublet to someone without my consent? I live in an apartment in Austin, TX, with a roommate. We're both co-signed on the lease and the lease doesn't expire until next year. My roommate told me this morning that he is moving out and someone I have never met is moving in to take his place. But I didn't co-sign a lease with a stranger. Since the sub-lessee is not himself a co-signer can I call the police and have him removed as an unwanted guest? When the end of month comes, if no suitable roommate has been found and my ex-roommate (and still current co-signer) refuses to pay his share of the rent, can I sue him in small claims court? Might it be worth my while to hire a lawyer to sue him? Rent is ~$1,600 so $800 is definitely within the limits of small claims, but I don't want to pay my rent late either. I'd like this resolved as quickly as possible, so if hiring a lawyer can expedite things I'm willing to do so. Update: Here is the relevant section of the lease: Replacing a resident, subletting, or assigning a resident‘s rights is allowed only when we consent in writing. If a departing or remaining resident finds a replacement resident acceptable to us before moving out and we expressly consent to the replacement, subletting, or assignment My (old) roommate says that he got this new person added on the lease but can they do that without my signature? Can my (old) roommate and the apartment go behind my back like this?

There's a lot of variables here, as many leases are built in different ways within the leeway allowed by law. You will want to contact a local lawyer to see how you can mitigate the damage to yourself, and contact your landlord and see if you can re-negotiate the lease. If the landlord doesn't want to re-negotiate, you're probably facing eviction if you can't come up with the full rent by yourself; many leases don't allow non-related adults to live on the premises if they're not on the lease (this can also result in eviction). However, your roommate will also get an eviction record and be responsible for any damages if the lease survives long enough to cause an eviction. Actually having a random person move in from Craigslist might also cause your roommate to suffer additional liability if they're not allowed to sublet their lease agreement, which many leases do not allow (landlords like knowing who's living on their properties). Having them move in might cause both you and your roommate to be evicted. You probably don't have any rights to sue your roommate until actual damages occur (in other words, after you've already been evicted). You should speak with your landlord as soon as possible to get a new lease. An eviction record will cause problems for your roommate as well, so you might urge them to consider staying long enough to get things sorted out legally. When you ask your landlord, simply ask something like, "My roommate wants to move out. What are my options?" They will tell you what they are willing to accept.

renting a single room with three other guys each renting their own rooms means exactly what it says. What you are paying for is that room, plus shared access to the common areas. Without knowing exactly what your lease says, especially with respect to the common areas, it's difficult to give a proper answer. I suspect that the lease for your room says nothing about who can live in the other rooms. Unless the lease says otherwise, the landlord has full control of the common areas. (Compare with a large apartment building, with hallways, stairwells, lobbies, etc., which must be maintained by the landlord.) This isn't an unusual arrangement, but I've never understood why anyone, landlord or tenant, would want it. There's far too much potential for conflict. You, yourself, could be a totally obnoxious person that the other three guys can't stand, but they'd have to put up with you. Their only alternatives are to move out or to ask the landlord to evict you. Moving out would be a lot of trouble for everyone. But, depending upon jurisdiction, as long as you're paying the rent on time and not causing damage to the property, eviction could be a very difficult and long process. And eviction is hardly in the landlord's interest. It costs a lot of money and time, and might not be granted even if she did apply. Why might a landlord spend so much time at the house they're renting? I'd be concerned about the implications of a woman going out of her way to do yoga in an area rented to four men. That is the part that sounds most strange in this situation. How do I resolve this? I'd start looking for a room somewhere else.

Joint tenancy means that you both have equal (full) rights to the entire property, so just as you don't his permission to live there or to invite guests, he doesn't either. Unless they threaten you in some way (and you get a court order barring them from entering), there is no legal means to deprive an owner of their property rights, while they are still an owner.

My answer would be different if either Alice or Bob was the landlord, or the landlord had a separate agreement with Alice and Bob. If a single lease is written, per the comment, that Alice and Bob are components of "the tenants", and "the tenants" have rented the named premises, then they all have equal rights to occupy the whole premises under the lease. If the landlord is professional I will further presume they all have joint and several liability for the whole rent; it would be inequitable to alienate Alice with joint and several liability from any part of the premises without her consent. If there is a separate roommate agreement that allocates rooms and expected share of rent or controls behaviors, then that is a contract that can form as a meeting of the minds of the roommates where they each trade something of value, such as exclusive use of a room. The narrative suggests an original verbal agreement that Bob would like to change. That's nice but Alice doesn't have to agree; or can agree with other changes of value to her such as the ratio of expected rent reflecting the ratio of use and access to the space Alice would have.

There are two distinct questions here. One is what happens when a lease expires and you don't vacate and the landlord doesn't try to evict you. Generally, in the absence of holdover tenant provisions expressly in the existing lease, the lease becomes a month to month lease on the same terms as previously in force. If the lease does provide for holdover tenant provisions, that lease remains in force. The second issue is what happens when the landlord transfers ownership of the property. Basically, the lease runs with the land, regardless of who owns it, and the legal analysis is no different from what it would have been if the landlord had remained the same. So, if a lease with no holdover provision expires, no new renewal of the lease is signed, and a new owner buys the property from the old one, you have a month to month lease with then new owner on the same terms as the old lease, until the tenant and landlord agree otherwise, even in the absence of an express agreement with the new owner.

You did not specify a country or the specific contracts that might rule your condominium. At least in some jurisdictions indeed the repair cost of private portions cannot be shared. Moreover, you may not be required to pay some costs for common portions if you refuse to do so and won't make use of them. Do I have to sue them to fix this issue? A lengthy law-suit is too costly for me. If I refuse to pay $2k and only pay 1.2k, will I be facing any legal troubles? You will probably manage to continue paying just 1.2k, and have them have to sue you if they want to collect that supposedly owned money from you. However, there might be some requirements about providing notification of your refusal in a certain way or before some time elapses. I would recommend you to consult a local lawyer, it will be well-spent money. Plus, that refusal is actually sent by your lawyer (rather than just telling you how/what to say), should make your "law-understanding neighbor" think twice about going forward with their attempt of having you pay for it.

Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony.

Charlie is not a party to the contract between Alice and Bob Alice and Charlie have no contractural relationship and Alice cannot require him to do anything nor is he liable to Alice in any way. Alice’s issue is with Bob who has clearly breached his contract. Alice can sue Bob for damages and may be able to end the lease. There is no trespass because Charlie is there with the permission of the leaseholder. From Charlie’s position there is no reason to believe that Bob does not have the authority to give this permission so Charlie is not in breach of the law. The police will see this as a civil matter and won’t intervene.

Legal to treat customers differently based on where they live? I work at a hotel in the United States (Georgia). Some of our rooms are pretty nice while others are in desperate need of maintenance, pest control, etc. The owner of the hotel regularly tells me not to rent the nice rooms to locals. If we only have nice rooms left, I'm supposed to tell them that we have no vacancies. Even though I understand his reasoning to some extent (locals often will not treat the rooms as well as out of town guests, so give them the rooms that are already beat up) it still feels wrong to discriminate this way. I was just wondering, is it legal to do this?

I'm not going to comment on what your manager is doing specifically, since I don't know all the facts. But in general: As a general rule, businesses have freedom of contract. This means they can choose to do business with, or not do business with, anyone they want. There are specific laws that create exceptions to this freedom of contract. The most important are federal and state civil rights laws, which prohibit many businesses from discriminating on the basis of certain protected classes, such as race, sex, religion, etc. In general, "locals vs. out-of-towners" is not a protected class, and therefore no law explicitly prohibits this type of discrimination. However, it's possible a court could find that "locals" is a proxy for some actual protected class--for example, if the hotel is in a city and the "locals" are predominantly Black.

The right to adequate housing is a political question, the content of which is unclear in the UN's fact sheet. What they say is: All beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, clean drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, food storage facilities, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services. Sanitation facilities are not completely ignored, so there is a theoretical basis to start from. However, that list of desiderata is not legally enforceable, so it would depends on the laws of the particular jurisdiction. In the state of Washington (US), a rental that lacked any sanitary facility (toilet) would be a violation of the health code: even hot water is required by law. In other countries, esp. where running water is not ubiquitous, there may be no legal obligation for a landlord to provide a toilet with running water. Whether legal action could be taken against the landlord depends on local law. A property owner can evict a tenant, subject again to local law. Usually, it requires a legal process where the owner petitions the court to evict the tenant, and in case the tenant has a contractual right to be there, the owner has to show cause (tenant breached the terms of the lease). A landlord does not generally have an obligation to find alternative housing for a tenant, but perhaps there is such a law somewhere, related to tenant tenure. The mention of a co-owner is a bit confusing. If A is the sole owner of a property, A can exercise landlord rights. If A and B both own the property, either of them can exercise landlord rights. However, if they disagree, i.e. A wants to evict tenant C and B wants to let C stay, the dispute between A and B must be resolved, and if they cannot come to an agreement then B can cause a delay of the eviction until the dispute is resolved in court. Again, the details on this would depend on the jurisdiction, and in part whatever landlord-tenant laws there are.

If it were me, I would leave. Who wants to rent a room in a home where you are not wanted? However, there should be concessions. I would ask for 1.5 months rent refunded, but would happily settle for one month. I am sure there are many nice rooms, close by, where you are welcomed. Given additional information commented by the OP, the landlord is looking to increase his rents. Evidentially this municipality has strict rent controls. In this case, I would enter negotiations with the landlord. I would offer him a percentage of his anticipated rent increase and probably start at 50%. If the OP has been a good tenant (always paid on time, and low maintenance) the landlord might see this as a bargain. No need to find a new tenant and no need to vet one that might pay poorly. The better the tenant has been, and the more strict the renter protection laws the more appeal this offer will have to the landlord. The benefit for the OP is they don't have to move, or find a new place with its associated costs and inconvenience. If the landlord is just a mindless corporate drone with no decision making power, this will not work.

If you are in Florida, the notion that this is "the only store around" is simply not accurate. I doubt that there is any place in Florida that is not within 15-20 miles of at least two stores. In any case, the store is within its rights to ban you from the store even if you acted lawfully.

I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify.

No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.

It is the terms of the lease that govern what you may and may not do, so if pets are not disallowed, they are allowed. You are not a party to the contract between the landlord and the agent, so whatever the landlord may have told the agent is technically irrelevant to you. However, this may be an indication that the landlord plans to change policy; it might also mean that the agent misunderstood something. That is where you stand legally.

This could be a violation of the Fair Housing Act, but Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 says that we find that the FHA doesn’t apply to the sharing of living units The crux of the argument is that a room in a house is not a "dwelling", since it is not a complete living unit. Whether or not courts outside the 9th Circuit follow suit remains to be seen. Florida state law (760.29) states exceptions to its anti-discrimination laws, covering for instance Any single-family house sold or rented by its owner, provided such private individual owner does not own more than three single-family houses at any one time. If that is the case, then the exemption exists if the rental a. Without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate licensee or such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such licensee or person; and b. Without the publication, posting, or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice in violation of s. 760.23(3) Another exemption exists if Rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his or her residence. Your attorney (hint) will be able to interpret that complicated section of the law.

Prove my work is not a trade secret violation I have recently developed a medical software application. One of my previous employers X (from 4 years ago) sells a similar application. (You can see where this is going.) X is now alleging that I might have stolen the code and created my own version but that is truly not the case: Every line of code has been written from scratch, and is entirely different from that of X. X is also alleging trade secret violation (without even looking at the software) but everything this software does is based on public domain knowledge. Managing patients, Exams, Bills, etc. are all public knowledge. Specific tests that go in each exam have been made based on material read from books that I can prove. My software simply provides a different way of managing practice that has not borrowed anything from X's software. I did sign a confidentiality agreement with X. But my system employs a non-secret process, and every feature in my system is based on knowledge generally available to all. The agreement also has a non-compete that states I cannot work for a competitor while I am employed with X. The agreement was signed in year 2001 in Oregon. I am now in Canada and my company is registered in Canada, trying to sell software in United States. Anyone has experience going through a similar scenario who can help me prepare a good reply? This is essentially what the letter from X says: X has recently learned that you are marketing a software product competitive with X’s software product which incorporates concepts, ideas, layouts, and designs from X’s software product. Similarities between your product and X’s product suggest that you have misappropriated confidential information from X, including software source code, as well as failed to return all confidential information to X upon your termination. To the extent you have created products using X's confidential information, those products are owed solely by X. Moreover, you are hereby notified that under your Confidentiality Agreement, you are prohibited from using or disclosing confidential information obtained and retained from X. Failure to comply with this obligation will result in immediate legal action against you and any persons acting in concert with you to seek injunctive relief, compensatory and treble damages, and attorney fees. X hereby reserves all rights, claims, and causes of action.

Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word.

"Wholly unconnected with your employment" means exactly that. Anything that is not connected to your functions or processes that you use in the course of your employment that your employer would have an interest in either protecting or marketing. Writing a book about software development If you are just a software developer, this would be fine unless you were talking about a process unique to your employer. If you worked in a publishing house that wrote software development books, this would be connected and must be disclosed to your employer. Releasing an open source piece of software not specifically aimed at the industry the company is in Again, this probably fine not to disclose since it would not be something you would develop as part of your employment, or under the umbrella of your company focus market. Release a commercial piece of software not specifically aimed at or competing with the industry the company is in Same as above. Honestly though the best policy is being open. If you come to your company with your idea and tell them that it doesn't have any applications in your industry and would like to develop it in your own time, they would have a much harder leg to stand on in a court case when they finally figured out how to apply it.

The exact laws will vary by region and country, but the laws will range anywhere between illegal and almost illegal. If you want to operate as legal as possible then you will have to disclose to the buyer that the software is malware or a crypter and you should require for the buyer to sign an agreement to only use the software for legal and educational purposes. Hiding the disclosure in a long Terms of Service agreement will likely not be sufficient. You will have to explicitly advertise that the software is malware and a crypter and that you are looking for reputable tech firms to buy your software in order to improve their software. If you sell software without disclosing to the customer that the software contains malware or a crypter then you are exposing yourself to a lawsuit for products liability, invasion of privacy, fraud and misrepresentation, the cost of damages, and possibly criminal liability.

The fact that a developer is showing off work that he/she has done for other another company doesn't imply that that developer owns any copyright to the work. In Canada, see the Copyright Act, § 13 (3): Where the author of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person, the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright and § 13 (4): The owner of the copyright in any work may assign the right... In the US, see 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b): In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. and § 201 (d): The ownership of a copyright may be transferred... "What rights should and should not be attributed to the developer?" That is a business decision to be made on a case-by-case basis. Advice about the prudent balance of copyright between an employer/client and employee/contractor is legal advice. "Is it okay to use this projects as part of the developer's portfolio?" If the developer can link to public use of a product that he/she developed for a company, then the developer is not violating copyright by simply advertising that they worked on the product and linking to, without reproducing, the work. If the developer for whatever reason maintained copyright ownership in the code and other assets, it would not be copyright infringement to reproduce those as part of the portfolio. If the developer did not maintain copyright ownership in the code or assets, reproducing those may be copyright infringement, dependent on whether the copyright owner allowed the developer to reproduce those elements, or if the reproduction is fair use. There may be other laws or contracts implicated, though: non-disclosure agreements, trademark law, among others.

This can't be right. If I modify open source code as part of the work done, by nature of the open source license that code can not become intellectual property of the client. Certainly it can. That which is "developed or produced" would be the modifications to the pre-existing code, i.e the copyright on the derivative work so created. If the base code was under a share-alike or copy-left license, then the client can only distribute it under the same license (or a compatible one, perhaps). But nothing compels the client to distribute it, and for the client's use, the client owns the copyright, without fear of any future claims by the contractor. If I have my own code/scripts/settings/templates/etc that I use as a contractor, and I modify those in the interest of coding efficiency in the interest of serving the client, it hardly seems correct that these assets become property of the Client. Those are your work, and you can choose whether to sell the copyrights to the client or not. Again, only the work done for that client would be covered under the wording quoted above, unless there is another provision that grants the client a license to use the pre-existing work which you modified for the job, which there probably ought to be. Or I suppose the agreement could assign copyrights in pre-existing work to the client, but that seems an odd choice, and the language in the question would not do that. You and the client could agree on a different provision such as: The contractor grants to the client a fully-paid, non-exclusive permanent license to use all intellectual property developed under this agreement, and any pre-existing works that may be incorporated therein. The contractor warrants that s/he is entitled to grant such license, without infringing on the intellectual property of any other person or entity. That wording would have the contractor retain all copyrights and other IP, but provide a license to the client to use it without further payment or expiration. Many other ways to structure such a provision are possible, dividing the rights up however the contractor and client can agree. The price for the work might vary depending on what rights the client obtains. Both forms, and many others, are perfectly legal, it is just a question of what the contractor chooses to sell, and what th4e client chooses to buy.

"Pastiche" is a literary, not a legal term, and as a professional coder, I would not use it to describe code that to some extent imitated other code. The legal question here is: is your code a derivative work of the code it is based on, and if it is, did you have permission to make that work. Copyright, in an Berne Convention country, which includes the EU, does not protect ideas and concepts, it protects expression. It protects the choices of words and symbols, and other forms of expression. If all you did was study example code, presented for educational purposes, and then write code that performs a similar function, using the same general techniques, then I don't think you have infringed copyright. That, after all, is why people post code to Stack Overflow and similar sites, to allow them to learn how to use specific coding techniques, including in commercial projects. I have used techniques posted to SO to do coding as part of my paid job. The usual test for copying under US law is "substantial similarity". This takes into account cases where there is essentially only one way to say or code something. I don't know the exact tests under the various laws of various EU countries, and they will not all be the same. But I suspect that on this point they are, well, substantially similar :). I can't advise on your specific situation. But if it is as described, I don't think you have a problem.

This supposes that the patentable concept can’t be learned form the operation of the whole program and hiding the invention while making use of the invention in public is not a disclosure. However, in the US there is a famous case In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 783, 113 USPQ 289, 292 (CCPA 1957); Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1882); Ex parte Kuklo, 25 USPQ2d 1387, 1390 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) that concluded a public demonstration that didn’t expose the inner workings did start the clock on a bar to patentability. See previous question https://patents.stackexchange.com/questions/20886/would-the-demonstration-of-an-invention-be-considered-public-disclosure The answer (from me) has the caveat that this is a pre-AIA case and courts might come to a different answer under that current law. The U.S. has viewed public use, especially commercial public use, as disqualifying (after a grace period) but the rest of the world puts its emphasis on actual disclosure of the inventive concept so this result might be different elsewhere. One thought experiment would be to analogize with an article in a widely available journal with the words Don’t read the article that starts on page 19 on the cover. From a disclosure point of view I do not think that is different from it being possible, but illegal, to read.

Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.

Effect of Multiple Names on Bank Account Background: I learned recently that multiple account holders on a bank account keep that account out of probate if one person dies. Or, in other words, if one person dies then the other account holders (such as children) keep the account funds–creditors have no claim. Note: I saw a news story today where a state was going after a couple's assets (home, accounts, etc.) to cover a fine. A huge fine for a relatively benign offense I add as an aside. Theoretical question: If I put my children's names on my accounts (savings, checking, etc.), then later authorities fine me for something, and I did not pay the fine, could the account funds be seized by authorities? Or are they treated in the same way as an estate (such as held by the children)? (I emphasize: theoretical Q, but I'm estate planning, and this is of interest to me.)

You are talking about "joint tenancy." I am familiar with bank accounts having multiple owners characterized as "Joint tenants with rights of survivorship" (JTWROS). This keeps the account out of probate: a death certificate simply removes the name of any owner who dies. But a probate court afraid that a deceased may not have enough assets to satisfy debts can still freeze the account for the duration of probate. These really are not tools for estate planning. For example, you can't use them to avoid gift or estate taxes. Also a JTWROS account is fully exposed to the liability/creditors of every owner. So no, a JTWROS does not shield assets from creditors. Finally, encumbrance of or distribution from a JTWROS account requires the consent of every owner. Any unresolved disputes are probably headed to court.

Given that you're centrally keeping customer financial assets, you're looking at a banking license. At that point, the question is not whether you need a lawyer, but how many. "Note that the issuer/bank would not itself offer currency exchange". Neither the Fed nor the ECB do, and quite a few smaller commercial banks also do not offer currency exchange. Doesn't matter, still banks. How many of the banking laws apply would depend on the customers, and services offered to these customers. So far you've only excluded currency exchange, which means that pretty much every banking law might still apply. You seem slightly hung up on the digital part. That's not how the law works. You'll need a banking license where you're operating your bank, not where its infrastructure is located. And yes, not meeting the requirements for registering a bank (whether financially, regulatory, or legally) will stop your idea in its tracks. This is one of the cases where "talk to a lawyer" might not be the appropriate response, but "hire a legal team".

No Once a state has accused a person and tried that person for a particular act or set of acts, the state can't later hold a different trial for the same act or acts. That is the Double Jeopardy rule (or the basics of it at least). Some limited exceptions: If a person is convicted and appeals, and the conviction is overturned, the appellate court may order a new trial. *If there is a mistrial, such as a hung jury (jury cannot agree) then there can be a new trial. If an act is both a state and a Federal crime (in the US) then both can have separate trials, and possibly two convictions. If the accused bribes the judge or jury, that trial will not count, and there may be a new trial. If an act is a crime in two different countries, each can have its own trial (but often they don't). If it is later discovered that the accused committed a quite different act than the one s/he was tried for, a new trial for that act may be possible. But otherwise, whether the accused is acquitted or convicted, only one trial for a given alleged crime. The state cannot later change its mind on what to charge the accused with for the act.

The will is overridden by the new law. Suppose the owner had not died: then he would have to comply with the change in the law. When a person inherits property, they gain the right to that property which the originally had, and they do not gain any additional immunity to the usual obligation to obey the law.

In a typical divorce proceeding, both sides are required to provide a sworn statement of their finances, and to respond to written interrogatories, produce documents (e.g. financial statements made in loan applications, balance sheets, tax returns, bank statements, and copies of deeds and certificates of title and stock certificates) and be deposed in pre-trial discovery proceedings. Divorce lawyers have the authority to subpoena third-party records custodians and to take a small number of depositions of third-party witnesses prior to a permanent orders hearing and can usually get permission to take more if there is evidence suggesting that it would be fruitful to do so. There are a variety of sanctions that may be imposed for failure to cooperate, including adverse inferences regarding the facts that would have been disclosed if there had been disclosures in the discovery process. Still, it behooves a client to know as much as possible before commencing the process, since having lawyers gather this information during the course of divorce litigation is expensive and isn't always perfect. Where misconduct is suspected, a spouse's lawyer will typically retain forensic accountants and/or private investigators and will compare bank and accounting and tax records with other public records such as real property records, corporate records and tax filings. Unless an asset has produced no income or expenses flowing through a personal or business account, it will usually show up somewhere. Spouses will also often have familiarity with where to look based upon living with a spouse and often will have obtained copies of relevant correspondence or documents to provide a lead - perhaps a letter asking a spouse to fill out corporate paperwork or receipt from a foreign bank account. This investigation process (collectively called discovery) usually takes place between the filing for a divorce and the half year or more later when a permanent orders hearing is held. Often, in complex cases and cases where there is a likelihood that assets have been hidden, the final hearing will be set later after the original filing than it would otherwise be, and the planned hearing will be longer in light of the evidence that will need to be produced at that time. In my state, a spouse has up to five years after a divorce to reopen a proceeding is undisclosed assets are discovered. It isn't impossible to hide assets in a divorce, but it isn't easy either.

Your bank is not discriminating against you. Your reasons for not having the required amount of funds pass thru your account has nothing to do with your marital status. In general, it's problematic to make a chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination. For example. Your argument is analogous to the following. My boss fired me for being late to work. But I was late to work because my child woke up late and missed the school bus; so I had to drive her to school. Therefore, my boss fired me for having children. That type of chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination just doesn't hold water. It is non sequitur and a requires a leap of logic.

Good news: it behaves like a legal entity. An estate is a collection of assets and liabilities that belonged to the deceased. The collection behaves a great deal like an LLC or other legal entity, although states don't call it that. The collection is isolated from anyone else's collection of assets and liabilities. For instance, it's not part of the executor's personal assets, nor liabilities. That's very important because... If the collection is sued e.g. by a creditor, the suit can only make claims against assets in the "collection". That is to say, the executor's own assets are not at risk. That's very important if you're thinking about volunteering to become an executor or manager of a trust. You can do so without fear of personal liability. Asterisk here *, but don't panic, it's a harmless asterisk. The collection can buy and sell goods and services (more the latter generally). A typical service purchased by an estate is storage unit rental. The collection can hire, fire and generally do business. Consider an estate which owns an apartment building. Life goes on: rent must be collected, utilities paid, leaky toilets fixed, contractors and managers hired and fired. In this case, the estate is a going-concern business behaving a lot like an LLC. The collection/estate could potentially do business indefinitely, if the will of the heirs is to continue doing so. This might happen if splitting the assets equitably amongst the heirs wasn't possible (e.g. the estate of Leonard Cohen collects a lot of royalties)... or too complex to easily back out of (say: the deceased owned 5 McDonalds franchises and had bet the farm on opening two more; backing out now would bankrupt the estate, so the estate might oddly open two McDonalds.) The collection can also sue, and proceeds from the suit or settlement go into the collection. Asterisk again. * The collection has its own Taxpayer Identification Number (aka SSN or EIN). The collection files its own 1040 tax form, and may do so for years or even decades. The point of all these practical examples is that an estate looks, walks and quacks like a "legal entity". To the point where the IRS even calls it one. And to a boots-on-ground executor, manager or trustee, the reality is it handles like a legal entity, and the experience you have managing legal entities will largely apply, almost in full. Almost. * Now, that asterisk. Due to state court rules in many states, if you attempt to sue an estate, you have to use the right name. And that's what this question is all about. It's a naming convention, and that is all. And courts treat it as such. Take Roe v. Wade. "Roe" is an adaption of "Doe" as in "John Doe". Wade, however, was the district attorney of Dallas County at the time of filing. Wade wasn't being sued personally. It's just the quirky naming convention the court uses. What you have identified is a similar quirk in court rules, where instead of suing Estate of John Q. Example, the syntactically correct thing is to sue Jane Doe, in the capacity of, Executor of John Q Example's estate. And the italic parts are optional, because the court knows that. Why is this important? It's not important, and that's what the Florida Court of Appeals said in florida Spradley v Spradley 213 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017. The plaintiff had made exactly the above error: suing "the estate of" instead of suing "Derreck Spradley et.al. (implied: in their capacity as executor)". The judge threw out the case, saying in essence "You forgot to "dot an i". The appeals court said no, the distinction is trivial and the court should have simply let the brother "dot their i" and continue with an entirely valid case. In other words, it was a distinction without a difference. So if sued, the executor should not panic about being "named personally" in the suit - you're not personally liable. And it is a waste of time to pick nits over how the name of the defendant is spelled, so says the Florida court at least... and in my humble opinion that precedent would be well received in other state courts, as it avoids wasting docket time and citizen filing fees on an action that will simply be re-filed correctly the next day. Not a license to cheat, however. One way an executor can manage to create personal liability is to abuse or mishandle the role with extreme negligence. In that case, yes, the executor's personal assets could come under fire, basically as punishment for misdeeds. An executor who is careful, honest and gets help when needed won't have any trouble at all.

The default choice of law rule is that intestate succession is governed by the law of the place of domicile of the decedent at death (i.e. by the law of the state where someone resides in the U.S. in this case), if there is no will and if no other consideration applies. Incidentally, the citizenship of the decedent is pretty much irrelevant. You don't need to be a a citizen of a place to be domiciled there. Similarly, where you happen to be when you die is also irrelevant to succession although other post-mortem processes like inquests are affected. Real property, however, is generally governed by the laws of intestate succession in the place where it is located. This requires a separate Mexican succession process, which would be called an ancillary probate in U.S. practice, but probably has a different name in Mexico because Mexico has a civil law legal system that follows the Spanish tradition for succession at death rather than the common law procedural process concept of a probate proceeding, and is often handled by a legally trained Mexican notary outside the court system. At the same time, common law legal systems give near absolute discretion to the testator in how they make their bequests subject to minimum immediate family support rules, while civil law legal systems are usually more limiting. Intangible personal property (e.g. a bank account) is usually deemed to be governed by the law of the place of domicile. Whether tangible personal property is governed by the law of the place of domicile, or by the law of the place where it is located at death, isn't an issue that is resolved uniformly in all jurisdictions. It would depend upon how the issue presented itself and in what legal forum it presented itself. Often, the reality that "possession is 9/10th of the law" and that tangible personal property often has little significant economic value, means that these issues are resolved without resort to the courts or formal legal process. (In England, in the early modern era, succession to tangible personal property was vested in the clergy and courts only handled succession to real property and intangible property.) Also, in terms of choice of law, in the U.S., probate is a matter of state law and is subject to a case law exception to federal jurisdiction that prevents it from being litigated in federal courts. Mexico also has a federal system, but I don't know whether Mexico's laws on intestate succession are state laws or federal laws (I believe that it is governed by state law but that there isn't much interstate variation).

Does attorney-client privilege protect a client who lies about his attorney? In many legal conflicts the fact that a defendant acted on the advice of competent legal counsel is considered an affirmative defense, or at least a mitigating factor. Can such a defendant hide behind attorney-client privilege to lie about advice his attorney provided? I.e., does an attorney have an obligation to object to such a lie if made aware of it (even though that would amount to accusing his client of perjury)? Or, can an attorney be put under oath and compelled to testify against his client in such an event? Clarification: This is not pertaining to a situation in which the Client is antagonizing the Attorney. Suppose, rather, that the Client at some point asked of the Attorney, "Give me your professional advice on X." The Attorney responds with, "My advice is Y." The Client instead does Z, gets into legal trouble, and in his defense claims, "My Attorney advised in scenario X to do Z."

It's no fantastic legal source, and rules may vary in different countries, but from the Wikipedia article on Attorney client privilege: Lawyers may also breach the duty where they are defending themselves against disciplinary or legal proceedings. A client who initiates proceedings against a lawyer effectively waives rights to confidentiality. This is justified on grounds of procedural fairness—a lawyer unable to reveal information relating to the retainer would be unable to defend themselves against such action. In other words, if the client's lie is related to one of the lawyer's interests (for example, if the client sues the attorney for malpractice based on the advice he was given), the lawyer can break privilege on his own behalf, thus testifying that his client lied. As to the specific case you brought up, I would say that privilege wouldn't protect the client from the lawyer discussing things never brought up. In other words, we could force the attorney to testify, since one of two things is true: The attorney really did give him that advice, in which case the client has already voluntarily given up his right to confidentiality by describing what was said between them, or The lawyer never gave him that advice, and privilege wouldn't protect a conversation between the two that never transpired.

The best course would be to contact the public defenders office and explain the situation to their intake or consultation services. Remember, you don't have to be going to trial to avail yourself of their services and sometimes, helping cops makes the cops suspicious about you (it would not be the first killer who cozies up to the police to learn what they know about his crime). If the Public Defender thinks you're rich enough not to need their services, you should call criminal defense attorney practices. Most law offices will offer consultation free of charge as part of client intake, so they will be willing to hear your case and offer advice. In either case, check with the lawyer that attorney client privilege is in effect. If they say yes, explain in detail to them, everything you know and want to discuss, even if some of it could criminally implicate you in this or another crime. Treat it as your deathbed confession and you know full well which circle of hell you're going to if the priest doesn't absolve you of sins (okay, too Catholic... but the Lawyer is not going to turn you in if the privilege is in effect... he could lose his license to practice law over it... we can make all the evil lawyer jokes we want, but this is one of the few sacred tenants of their profession.). Listen to his advise. Also see if you can find a second opinion. It's not that the first guy gave bad advice, but the next guy might give you something different. If you still do not feel comfortable, then keep your mouth shut. If they arrest you for the murder, do not talk until you have an attorney present and prepare to tell him exactly what you did. Especially if you did do it. Always answer your attorney truthfully.

A standard common law fraud analysis applies to the person to whom the representation was made. Is it a misrepresentation of a material fact, made with the intent that it be relied upon, which is justifiably relied upon, and the reliance causes damages? Usually, the answer will be "no." Being represented is not a material fact to a disputed issue. In the case of criminal mail and wire fraud in the U.S actual reliance and damages are generally not necessary. But materiality is still required. Arguably there is a Lanham Act violation for deceptively using the tradename or trademark of a firm in a manner that is misleading. The trouble here is "use the information for what?" This said, it is a bad idea as a tactic to use. For example, I was a lawyer in a fraud case where a defendant we were suing for fraud did something very similar to this (not as an email cc, but representing that they had a lawyer when they didn't). The misrepresentation that they were represented by counsel (for reasons similar to those described) wasn't itself actionable. But being forced to go on the stand and testify under oath that you lied about someone being your lawyer in the middle of a fraud case where you are also accused of lying about other things powerfully destroys your credibility in general with a jury.

What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles.

You would think so, but no While at first glance, President Trump sending a staff member to testify under oath in his place (to nullify any personal risk of perjury?) appears to epitomize the concept of "hearsay"-- a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement --there are some subtle but important distinctions and exceptions in play. I'm going to list them off in increasing order of relevance. FOIA penalties are civil, not criminal The official DOJ website lists off the penalties for Freedom of Information Act violations: The court may award reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs against the government when the complainant substantially prevails. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(E). Action Against Individual Employees: Sanctions may be taken against individual agency employees who are found to have acted arbitrarily or capriciously in improperly withholding records. Additionally, the court must award attorney fees and other litigation costs against the government. When the statutory requirements are found by the Court to have been met, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) must promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted against the office or employee who is primarily responsible for the withholding. The MSPB, after investigating and considering the evidence, submits its findings and recommendations to the agency concerned which then is required to take the corrective action recommended by the Board. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(F). Additionally, there now exists independent jurisdiction for such MSPB investigations under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1206(e)(1) (1982). Failure to comply with a court order to produce the records in question may also result in punishment for contempt for the responsible employee. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(G). So the strongest penalty against any individual government official who violated FOIA would be losing their job, or civil contempt of court. In principle the prohibition against hearsay applies equally to civil cases as criminal ones; in practice, because the stakes are lower, courts may take a somewhat looser attitude towards hearsay in civil cases than they would in a similar criminal case. Rule 807(a), "Residual Exceptions" Rule 807(a) gives courts large latitude to determine whether or not to admit hearsay evidence: (a) In General. Under the following conditions, a hearsay statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not admissible under a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: (1) the statement is supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness–after considering the totality of circumstances under which it was made and evidence, if any, corroborating the statement; and (2) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts. In this situation, the presiding judge, Reggie Walton of the D.C. District Court, clarified what he would consider "sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness": U.S. District Court Judge Reggie Walton issued the rare order to the White House last week after expressing dissatisfaction with a previous explanation submitted by the Justice Department’s top career official, Associate Deputy Attorney General Bradley Weinsheimer. Weinsheimer said he had checked with an unidentified official in the White House counsel’s office and determined that no new declassification was triggered by Trump’s latest tweets. However, Walton said given Trump’s suggestions of a rogue element undercutting his orders, some assurance directly from the president or someone who had spoken to the president was necessary. As Meadows had, one presumes, literally spoken to the president, this satisfied the presiding judge's own explicit standard of "sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness" for when hearsay may be admitted into evidence. Rule 807(a)(2) is also relevant here, in its caveat that hearsay may be accepted into evidence when it is "more probative...than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts". Arguably, forcing the POTUS to neglect his duties running the country and "ending the pandemic" long enough to testify in what is, in many ways, a run-of-the-mill FOIA case, would take too much effort to be "reasonable". Which brings me to the next point: Rule 804(a)(1) and Rule 804(b)(5), "Unavailability of the Declarant" Rule 804(a)(1) discusses a specific exception to the hearsay rule when the declarant can't or won't personally testify: (a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant: (1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant’s statement because the court rules that a privilege applies As POTUS, it makes sense that Trump would have some degree of privilege or immunity from being deposed. If a sitting President could be dragged into court at will over any government litigation, no matter how mundane, to personally testify, it would be impossible to perform the functions of their office. Think about all of the live issues winding their way through the courts right now that Trump has tweeted about. Now, imagine the demands on his time if he was dragged into court to testify regarding every single one: "Sorry Angela Merkel, I have to cancel our international summit this year, I'm giving a live deposition in 50 different court cases in the next three weeks and I don't have time to do 'foreign policy' right now. Hope no new World Wars break out! Good luck!" Of necessity, a POTUS has to be permitted to delegate 99.9% of legal representation on matters of public policy to other Executive Branch officials, when it comes to who actually needs to be physically present in court. And since he is privileged from personally testifying, that means exception 804(b)(5) applies: (b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: .... (5) [Other Exceptions .] [Transferred to Rule 807.] We discussed how Rule 807 applies in this circumstance up above. But I want to circle back to the idea that the President has to be able to delegate statements of official policy to other authorized government representatives, such as Meadows, because of the clinching exception: Rule 803(8)(A)(i): Public records of governmental policy aren't excluded by the hearsay rule Rule 803(8)(A)(i) tells us that: statements of public policy (such as, whether the government is going to declassify, or has already declassified, every document relating to the Russia investigation, specifically including Mueller report and FBI interview redactions) made by public offices or their official representatives (such as the POTUS's chief of staff, authorized to speak on behalf of the POTUS, clarifying the Executive Branch's stance on declassification) are not excluded by the hearsay rule: The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: .... (8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if: (A) it sets out: (i) the office’s activities This makes sense given the purpose of the rule against hearsay. It's supposed to prevent innuendo and rumor from sneaking into the factual record when the facts are in dispute: "I heard the defendant's mom say the defendant said he did it," related by the defendant's mom's bingo buddy, would deservedly raise some eyebrows around the bingo table, but isn't the kind of solid evidence an impartial trial requires. Statements of public policy and government action by public officials, on the other hand, have a lot more authority and credibility than what a friend of a friend of the defendant heard the friend say the defendant said. Meadows isn't (just) some random golf buddy of the President who overheard what the President was thinking when he made these tweets; he's the President's official delegate to the court, conveying the Executive Branch's official position on declassification. Such official statements are ordinarily presumed maximally trustworthy and reliable, at least partly for logistical reasons. Similar to how we can't ask Trump to cancel all the COVID task force meetings to clear his schedule and testify about some tweets, we can't drag every government officer who makes an out-of-court official public statement or record into court to certify it--at least, not every single time. The judicial branch of the government takes the word of other branches of the government mostly at face value†, and does not consider public records or statements in an official capacity as "hearsay" to be excluded from evidence. So the TL;DR version is: No, Meadows coming into court to convey this statement on behalf of his boss would not be excluded by the hearsay rule. †Significantly, statements or records regarding policy might be excluded as hearsay, per 803(8)(B), if the opposition demonstrates that the statement or record is somehow fishy or unreliable: "(B) the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness." But in this instance, in order to demonstrate a "lack of trustworthiness", the plaintiffs in the case--BuzzFeed, CNN, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center--would have to show that the government was actually declassifying and unredacting all material related to the Russia investigation, contrary to what Meadows claimed in court. Since the government is not actually doing this, the President's social media rants notwithstanding, the plaintiffs would be unlikely to prevail if they tried to use 803(8)(B) to get Meadows' testimony excluded as hearsay.

The term "lawyer up" usually refers to a person asserting their right to silence and counsel, which means that police interrogation must stop. A lawyer would "lawyer up" in that sense if he was being interrogated by the law. Michael Cohen, on the other hand, retained an attorney because of the threat of legal interrogation. As a general rule, absolutely everyone who is the subject of a legal investigation should seek legal counsel, to protect their rights. Although lawyers are broadly trained in many aspects of the law, they aren't experts in all such aspects, so it would probably not be wise for a tax attorney to defend himself in a criminal trial, and a family law expert might not be the best guy to hire to advise you on a complex real estate matter. Since the particular case is highly political, added insulation in the form of an attorney between you and the investigators is to be expected.

Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals.

Ethical rules for lawyers are enforced by a separate committee or board or department (states vary) to which complaints can be made by lawyers and members of the public. If a complaint appears to have merit, the board has someone prosecute the case in a quasi-criminal manner, which the board hears like a court, subject to an appeal at some point. The consequences range from an order to attend an ethics course, to publicly or privately scolding the lawyer, to suspending the lawyer's license, to disbarring a lawyer, depending upon the severity of the offense. The board interprets the rule in course of the deciding the case. This doesn't provide any relief to the aggrieved party. It merely protects the general public from bad lawyers. There are many interpretive principles and precedents for interpreting what violates Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1. if a client makes false written statements about key dates (say a week long period) in matters of fact and the lawyer knows they are false, what are their ethical responsibilities? If statements are made to the Court, Rule 3.3 (candor to the tribunal) applies, not Rule 4.1. Another example, in matters of divorce and custody, is a lawyer expected to make truthful statements in court regarding the nature of custodial interference? It would be unusual for an attorney to make a statement of fact to a court on any issue. Usually that is reserved for witnesses.

Can the UN Security Council authorize states to violate international humanitarian law? Chapter 7 to the United Nations charter gives the Security Council (UNSC) the power to authorize states to use force in some particular case (for example, in the first gulf war the UNSC authorized the use of force against Iraq). Now, normally any use of force by a state is subject to international humanitarian law (IHL – the laws of war). However, since the Security Council can authorize specific uses of force and not just blanket statements such as "force can be used," the question arises as to whether or not it can override IHL. In theory, it would seem a little strange, particularly if we decide IHL counts as Jus Cogens (a peremptory norm of international law), but the charter explicitly states that Security Council decisions are binding on any state that is a member of the United Nations, and that any obligations a state has arising from the charter supersede other obligations under international law. So, to make up a case for clarity, say the UNSC were to pass a resolution saying that because of the power of the Islamic State in Syria, not only is it legal for states to use force against them, but they no longer have to worry about killing civilians, since only by killing large numbers of people will the world be able to deter the terrorists. Would this decision be legal (and binding)?

The answer to your question, strictly in terms of whether they have the capacity to authorize states to violate international humanitarian law is yes. However, it is highly unlikely. It takes only one permanent member to veto such a resolution. Moreover, UN Charter Article 24(2) states that: ... the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations ... and International Humanitarian Law would certainly be considered a principle of the United Nations. So, are they capable of passing a resolution in violation of International Humanitarian Law? Sure. Is it likely to happen? Almost certainly not. Having said that, if this happened, it would be a novel area of law, and while currently, international law suggests it would be binding and legal, it is possible that sanctions could be imposed if such a resolution were passed by the Security Council.

Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide).

The existence of a law/legal system is the province of sovereign states. We do not have a world government so there is no world legal system. There is such a thing as international law, however, that is based on what the sovereign nations of the world agree is international law (usually in a treaty) and the degree to which they have implemented them in domestic law. For example, the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over US nationals because the United States of America has refused to ratify the treaty that created it. There are also supra-national entities like the EU whose directives are binding on their member states and such states are required, as a condition of their membership, to enforce such directives domestically. A sovereign state's courts will decide when a person and their activities falls within their jurisdiction based on the circumstances of the particular case. For example, an Australian citizen can be prosecuted in Australia for paying a bribe to a foreign official in a foreign country even while working on behalf of a foreign company even if such activity is locally lawful. Why? Because Australia is a sovereign nation and it says it can. Sometimes it is impossible for a person to comply with the laws of multiple nations. For example, if the EU requires that certain data about their citizens is to be made confidential but the laws of the USA require a US corporation to disclose this information then it is impossible to comply with both. A person in such a position must decide which laws they will break. It is partly for that reason that multi-national corporations are usually multiple corporations i.e. they have a different corporate subsidiary in each jurisdiction (tax is another reason). For example, if all EU citizens do business with Google (Europe) then Google (USA) can rightfully claim that it has no data about European citizens to disclose.

Space Force appears to have been specifically included on Dec 27, 2021. "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, or the Space Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Public Law 117-81, Sec. 1045 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1385

Civilians taking active part in hostilities are legitimate targets This is enshrined in Rule 6 of customary International Humanitarian Law. Rule 6. Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

Any country is free to decide what actions are considered to be crimes, and what crimes are prosecuted depending on whether you perform the action in the country, outside the country, and depending on whether you are a citizen, a resident, both, or neither. They can also decide what are accepted defences in court and which are not. Any other country is free to decide under which circumstances they will ever extradite someone to that first country. Now you have to check the laws of the individual countries.

Separation of powers means that the judiciary can't pass laws or executive orders. It doesn't mean that the judiciary can't interfere with their passage and enforcement. Quite the opposite -- the checks and balances inherent in the system ensure that the judiciary can interfere in some cases. One of the checks is the concept of judicial review: the courts' power to review each branch's actions for compliance with the constitution -- and more importantly, to strike down actions that are unconstitutional. When a court strikes down part of a law, though, they aren't writing a new law, or even repealing a law. They are overturning parts of the existing law -- basically declaring the unconstitutional parts of it void, to be treated as if they didn't exist. In India's constitution, Article 13 provides the main basis for this power. Article 13.(2) (in Part III) states: (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. This article, aside from making it clear that laws passed by the State can be void, also gives the Supreme Court the inroads it needs to do the overturning. The catch is, the Court can not overturn most laws passed by Parliament, just the ones that Part III can be construed to prohibit. (While the judiciary is not explicitly named, it's the only branch that can officially say whether or not a law is constitutional. It'd be a conflict of interest anyway for Parliament to do it. Parliament, in passing the law, presumably wanted it to be enforced, and thus has an interest in avoiding too much scrutiny.) So the Court can already declare an unconstitutional law void, because it already is...and that's before we even get to Article 142. Let's take a look at the article anyway: (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. Note that (2) explicitly grants the power to issue subpoenas, contempt citations, etc. So we can't claim that's what (1) was intended for, and have to ask what it means. The Court decided that the article gives it the power to order the government not to violate your rights, as such an order is "necessary for doing complete justice". And as the final arbiter of the meaning of the very text that defines it into existence, it has that prerogative. And due process is one of the rights protected. Article 21 (also in Part III): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. "Procedure established by law" is a much weaker phrase than "due process", and technically meant that anything that the government scribbled into law was good enough. But case law has all but removed the distinction. (See Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India.) Basically, any procedure for depriving someone of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. (Otherwise a law declaring you a criminal, to be arrested on sight, would be constitutional.) "Someone filed a complaint" simply wasn't gonna fly.

Why do other countries, like America, not allow this? It is the way that U.S. courts have interpreted the constitutional amendment requirement and reflects a policy judgment that letting someone go free now and then is better than frequently forcing someone to be tried more than once. That value judgment flowed from concerns about and fear and skepticism of the British colonial criminal justice system and the Star Chamber in England with which they were familiar. The U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand didn't have an independence revolution in their history to create the same kind of deep distrust of authority, especially in the criminal justice area. The U.S. was founded by terrorists. Few other former British colonies were. Quoting Dale: "As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States." Is that really true and can someone expand on this? When the courts determine that the constitution requires something it can't be changed with ordinary legislation. Either the constitution needs to be amended to change it (which is very hard), or the courts can change their interpretation (which is unlikely in an area so settled in the law and which is relatively uncontroversial between liberals and conservatives in the U.S.). If it is, this is a big problem in my opinion. The powers that be in the U.S. don't agree. This kind of case is exceedingly rare. And, there are much bigger problems with the system that obscure that one. Also, the dual sovereignty doctrine allows federal prosecutions in some wrongful acquittals that really matter (e.g. for civil rights violations by law enforcement).

Is the owner of a company responsible for people getting injured on their premises? To frame my question: Someone I know, who is retired and over 70 years old, went to a new health center (baths, jacuzzis, etc.). The floor was very slippery, and had no warning signs or handles. They slipped and severely injured their arm (shattered humerus). The treatment and care are intensive, and traumatic for the patient, who needs to cancel all their plans for the next three months and get in-house help for a long time, as well as psychologic trauma help. The owner of the health center admits that people fall all the time, although no one has ever fallen and injured themselves so severely, and also claims that everything has been certified as safe by an organization. Could the manager of the health center be liable for this injury (and its consequences for the victim)? On what legal grounds? Is the safety of your customers / clients part of the civil code in this particular situation? This happens in France, under French legislation, and I would need the right Code Pénal and Code du Travail's references.

Tortious liability in France Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it occurred to repair it. We are responsible not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but also by our own negligence or imprudence. Note that my French isn't good enough to read the code and translate it myself; I'm relying on this translation. French Civil Code Articles 1382 and 1383 provide for damages to be awarded for tortious acts, and specifically, liability for negligence. French Civil Code Article 1384 provides for vicarious liability: We are responsible not only for the damage caused by our own act, but also for that which is caused by the acts of persons for whom we are responsible, of by things that are in our custody. ... Masters and employers, for the damage occasioned by their servants and employees in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed. Based on my reading of this, it would seem that the owner of the business would be liable for damages caused by their neglecting to keep their premises safe. It's possible, however, that there is provision for a claim to be dismissed if it can be show that the plaintiff was unusually susceptible or fragile unless the defendant is aware of this fact - for instance, if a normally-capable person would not have slipped on the floor, it might affect the outcome of the claim. However, this is a principle of common law, not civil law, so I'm unsure of this will apply here. However, in short: it appears that a business would have a general duty not to cause harm to its patrons.

In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source.

You have asked about "United Kingdom", but I can only answer about England and Wales; the law in Scotland is very different (rather more different in some respects than the difference between E&W and the State of New York). There is no time limit per se on manslaughter charges; if the police find evidence for a manslaughter charge after 80 years, there is no difficulty (in principle) in bringing a charge against the now-centenarian (provided they are competent to stand trial, and they can get a fair trial, and so on). However, in the case you mentioned I would have thought the major problem would be a defence of autrefois convict - in other words, the defendant can (usually) only be charged once with charges arising from a particular set of facts. It is just possible that the subsequent death constitutes a new fact which allows a new prosecution. On the other hand, the rule for murder used to be that if the victim survived a year and a day then it wasn't murder (even if they then died of their injuries). Finally, the case certainly would not be reopened with a charge of manslaughter. It would be "causing death by dangerous driving", which is a very different offence. Edit My thanks to ohwilleke whose comment about the "year and a day" rule prompted me to do a little research, and discover the Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996. Section 2(2) clearly covers the present case (in both legs), and says that the perpetrator can be re-prosecuted, but only with the permission of the Attorney General. The act is very brief, and I encourage you to read it all. (And incidentally, does not apply to Scotland.)

I would let the hotel know about it. If the injury requires a hospital visit that resulted in costs then, I would contact your travel (and/or personal) insurances and ask them how to deal with it. The main question you have to ask yourself, is it worth it to spend the time and effort (which equals money in the end) to try to "gain" something from the hotel ?

If I may paraphrase the scenario: The customer has a contract with the insurer The customer is contemplating undergoing a certain procedure and is unsure if it is covered under the contract The customer calls the insurer to ask this specific question The insurer says "yes" The customer undergoes the procedure The insurer refuses to pay on the ground that it is not covered under the contract. Let's put aside issues of evidence and what can be proved and assume these facts are not in dispute. There is no question that the contract has been renegotiated; it hasn't. This avoids the necessity of considering if the insurer's employee has the authority to do this or it the customer can rely that they do even if they don't. There are two possibilities: The procedure is covered and the insurer must pay under contract The procedure isn't covered and the insurer must pay under the tort of negligent misstatement. The insurer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The insurer owes a duty of care to a customer who asks such a question to answer it correctly. It is foreseeable that the customer would act on the insurer's advice and incur costs that they may have avoided if the correct advice had been given. Nothing is ever certain in the law but this is as close as you can get.

It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.

I've gone through this enough times in Pennsylvania to paraphrase the law in this state: If a tree falls it's nobody's fault, unless the tree's owner was given credible advance notice that the tree posed an exceptional risk of failure, in which case the owner is liable for damage it causes if it fails. (For purposes of liability, a tree is "owned" by the owner of the ground where the trunk of the tree enters earth.) In the scenario you describe: A tree owned by your neighbor has not yet caused significant damage, but has been so structurally compromised that it poses an exceptional risk to your property. The standard course of action in such a circumstance is to promptly and formally notify the owner of that fact, and for the owner to remedy the risk. (In this case, it sounds like the only practical remedy is removal of the tree.) As a practical matter, the owner might be able to get an insurer to cover the cost of removal before it does more damage. But that's their problem. As a matter of expedience, you might also notify your insurer, since if the tree does end up causing significant damage to your property, you could subrogate your claim through your insurer. As a further matter of expedience: The township may have codes requiring landowners to address hazardous trees. Thus, if the owner does not promptly remedy the peril you could also notify the township.

Can anyone help me understand who's liable for any damages that occur? Yes, a judge. Seriously, in almost all cases in a collision between a turning car and a straight traveling cyclist, the car will be held responsible on the basis that the turn should not be commenced unless and until it can be completed safely. If the car has to stop during the turn, the turn shouldn't have been commenced. The only exception would be if evidence could be provided that the cyclist collided deliberately. Does it matter if it's the car that's damaged or the bicycle that's damaged? No

R. v. Ojibway: impact of the "pony bird" on case law? In Regina v. Ojibway (8 Criminal Law Quarterly 137 (1965-66)), a Canadian case, a member of the First Nations of Canada had relieved a wounded pony of his suffering by gunshot and was accused pursuant section 2 of the Small Birds Act (R.S.O.). The case was initially dismissed and went on appeal. Blue, J., delivers the opinion for the court, granting the appeal, saying: For the purpose of the Small Birds Act, all two-legged, feather-covered animals are birds. This, of course, does not imply that only two-legged animals qualify, for the legislative intent is to make two legs merely the minimum requirement. The statute therefore contemplated multi-legged animals with feathers as well. Counsel submits that having regard to the purpose of the statute only small animals “naturally covered” with feathers could have been contemplated. However, had this been the intention of the legislature, I am certain that the phrase “naturally covered” would have been expressly inserted just as “Long” was inserted in the Longshoreman’s Act. Therefore, a horse with feathers on its back must be deemed for the purpose of this Act to be a bird, a fortiori, a pony with feathers on its back is a small bird. You see, the impoverished accused had traded his saddle for a downy pillow... Some 15 years later, the case is cited in a footnote in U.S. v. Byrnes (644 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981)), a case about rare birds smuggling. The note is referenced at the end of this part of the judgment (Mulligan, J., N.Y): Therefore, the point [registration] was made and her conceded ignorance of the Migratory Bird regulations hardly establishes that she didn't possess the swans which she didn't consider birds in any event. [footnote 9]. The note begins with the following introduction: ' For a liberal construction of the term "birds," by a Canadian court see [Ojibway] ' and goes on to quote the case as I did above. The case doesn't rely on/follow Ojibway; it simply says in a note, that a statute on birds can receive a liberal construction elsewhere. But still, the issue is that Regina v. Ojibway is not a real case: it is a parody (Pomerantz & Breslin, The Canada Law Book Company, 1965-66), yet a clever(2) and convincing one as history shows. One could say the "case" is an educational tool exploring the canons of statutory construction; and the impact of legal language, expectations about the adjudication process and authority, on perception. Primeaux J. (Mississippi) discussed the joke some years ago (Revenge of the Pony Bird, 2013); someone told him a book from 1997 about wildlife law seriously referenced the case (as being cited in Byrnes) in its introduction, albeit to mention it as a bizarre result from trying to ascertain what is wildlife. In his discussion, however, he does not say whether he thinks Mulligan J., who did not label the case as fiction in 1981, actually went through the "whoosh" himself like he says. Hence this question about sources and damage control, some 50 years after the pony bird: Is Regina v. Ojibway (or Ojibway v. R.) referenced without mention of it being fictional in any other case law (in the U.S. or elsewhere i.e. U.K)? Are there any other such fictional cases which are notorious for having been seriously referenced (by courts, legal scholars) like Ojibway was in Byrnes? What mechanisms (rules of practice, institutional), if any, are in place to prevent reliance on such (fictional) cases? Why has peer review seemingly been unable to outdo the authority of legal reporting/law reviews in this case (as surely there is no trace of the case at the courthouse)? Or is it common knowledge in the field that Ojibway is fiction at this point?

Here are the opinions I found which do not explicitly state that Regina is fictitious. University of Utah Hospital and Medical Center v. Bethke, 611 P.2d 1030, 101 Idaho 245 (Idaho, 1980) ...in my judgment, the majority seriously errs in using an esoteric, artificial and strained construction of the phrase "in Idaho" to hold that the legislature intended that phrase to mean "outside Idaho." When confronted with such linguistic legerdemain, I cannot but recall the unreported case of Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim.L.Q. 137 (Toronto 1965), wherein the court converted a pony, fortuitously saddled with a feather stuffed blanket, into a small bird, thus falling within the provisions of the Ontario Small Birds Act. Midland Management Co. v. Helgason, 630 N.E.2d 836, 158 Ill.2d 98, 196 Ill.Dec. 671 (Ill., 1994) Justice HEIPLE, dissenting: This case illustrates the resourcefulness of the judicial mind when confronted with the application of a rule of law which produces a result deemed to be undesirable. The straightforward approach to such a dilemma offers but two possibilities. The first option is to apply the law to the case and let the painful result occur. The second option, available to a court of last resort at least, is to change the rule of law. Make a new one. However, if neither of these two options is attractive, the resourceful judicial mind has yet a third option. It can redefine the terms so that the rule does not apply to the case at hand. This approach was chosen by the majority in the instant case. The application of this technique is well illustrated and perhaps reached its zenith in the Canadian case of Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Criminal Law Quarterly 137 (Toronto, 1965) in an opinion rendered by Blue, J. Doe v. See, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir., 2009) We hierophants of the law are adept at redefining ordinary concepts, but it is no more appropriate to declare that religious services are commercial activities than it would be to declare that ponies are small birds. See Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim. L.Q. 137 (Oct. 1965). Retail Flooring Dealers v. Beaulieu of America, 339 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir., 2003) Again, this creation of an intracircuit split is obscured with a fuliginous cloud made up of the conceit that the attorney here (allegedly unlike the attorneys in Estate of Bishop and Cabrera) is truly a party. It comes as no surprise to me that the legal mind is perfectly capable of reaching a result by declaring a non-party to be a party, just as it can declare a pony to be a small bird. See Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim. L.Q. 137 (Oct. 1965). While I am often taken by, sometimes even filled with admiration for, manifestations of scholastic mental agility, I think that agility is frequently misdirected. It is here. Thus, I respectfully dissent. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 531 S.W.2d 507 (Ky., 1975) This one is different because the asterisk points to another case which identifies Regina as "entirely fictional." It is readily apparent that the meaning of the equal protection clause cannot be ascertained from what it says, nor even from what the Supreme Court has said about it. As in Regina v. Ojibway* a pony was found to be a small bird, so under the 14th Amendment an illegitimate child may be either a speckled bird or a jackass, depending on its current aspect as (and when) viewed by the keeper of the royal secrets of the Constitution. Indeed it appears that here is a corner of the world Alice in Wonderland would not find unfamiliar. Here is a case which refers to Regina and acknowledges that the case's fictitious nature is not always understood. U.S. v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636 (C.A.7 (Ill.), 1990) See also Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim.L.Q. 137 (1965), convicting a person under the Small Birds Act, despite the fact that the animal involved was a horse and the defendant was unaware that Ontario defines horses as birds. (The horse in question was an animal "covered with feathers" because its rider used a pillow as a saddle. Although it is a tour de force of statutory "construction", Ojibway is mercifully fictitious, something not always understood. United States v. Byrnes, 644 F.2d 107, 112 n. 9 (2d Cir.1981).

LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision.

In the United States, I would strongly expect that an accurate depiction of historical fact (even if uncomfortably graphic) would be protected under the First Ammendment. Otherwise, the government could functionally censor the worst parts of history (as being too awful to discuss or depict), which is exactly the kind of thing the First Amendment is designed to prevent. There are three important categories of speech that are not protected: (1) "fighting words" directed at a person intended to provoke a fight, (2) words that infict emotional distress such that it qualifies as a tort, and (3) speech that court finds to qualify as "obscenity". Of these three, your game probably will not qualify for the first, since it generally requires speech directed at a specific person or people. I also suspect (less confidently) that an emotional-distress tort would not succeed since your game is not directed at any particular living people. Even if the game caused emotional distress to someone, your public release of the game probably could not qualify as a tort against that specific player who happens to experience emotional distress. The Miller test is used to determine if a work is obscenity. Wikipeida summarizes its three parts, all of which must be satisfied to constitute obscenity: Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards", would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law, Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The first two are explicitly sexual in nature. I don't know if there is any similar prohibition against hyper-violence, but even if there were, as long as your game does not run afoul of the "lacks serious artistic value" condition, you will be on the safe side of the line. Note that none of this stops anyone from initiating legal action against you (which may cause headaches for you); it only stops those legal actions from succeededing.

I can think of three ways that your hypothetical bill could fail to become enforceable law. The Canadian Constitution contains unwritten constitutional principles. Among other things, in Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, the Supreme Court recognized that protection of minorities is an independent and fundamental part of the Constitution: Canadians have long recognized the existence and importance of unwritten constitutional principles in our system of government. [...] the preamble invites the courts to turn those principles into the premises of a constitutional argument that culminates in the filling of gaps in the express terms of the constitutional text. [...] the protection of minority rights is itself an independent principle underlying our constitutional order [...] The Supreme Court of Canada could rule such a law unconstitutional in order to protect minority rights. The Queen of Canada via her Governor General could decline to give such a bill royal assent, preventing it from becoming law. The Queen/Governor General can dissolve Parliament at any time to trigger an election.

Some interesting reasoning about standing aside (which antivaxxers etc. will love though, because it stipulates that the FDA refusing to collect all side effects statistics [even starting 16 years later] gives standing to sue on the original approval), the Texas' judge estimation of success on the merits is essentially relying on the finding that "Pregnancy is not an illness" (p. 40) and essentially repeated on p. 44 as "Chemical Abortion Drugs do not provide a Meaningful Therapeutic Benefit", so that in the Judge's estimation drugs for terminating pregnancy can be held to a [much] higher safety standard than the FDA decided by itself. This ultimately phrased as (p. 57): The Court does not second-guess FDA's decision-making lightly. But here, FDA acquiesced on its legitimate safety concerns in violation of its statutory duty based on plainly unsound reasoning and studies that did not support its conclusions. It's followed by another finding that there was likely political interference by the Clinton administration with the FDA's decision. This a rather partial summary since the order involves several FDA decisions, the details of which which I'm glossing over here (like the fact that the decision to not collect all side effects stats for mifepristone is rather more recent, being taken in 2016--but nonetheless the judge found that consequently the original 2000 decision was reopened as well, and can the object of the suit too.)

Ducks are ducks, not people. It might surprise you, but even a hypothetical duck that could talk is a type of bird and is considered a waterfowl and wild game but not a person or human. As such, you can not commit any crime such as assault against it. In fact, provided that the lemonade stand owner has a hunting license and this is not in a zone where you can not hunt, such as inside a town, he could have shot the bird without repercussions - because a duck can be hunted. Threatening game birds is not covered by any law. Only would the lemonade stand owner have glued the bird to a tree he would have committed a crime, because gluing birds somewhere would be considered animal cruelty in most jurisdictions. As the duck is a bird and not a person, it can not commit any crimes, such as harassment. If a duck is a person... Assuming that there is such a place where duck is a slang term for a person, or where ducks are considered people, then the pattern is different: Such as duck would indeed perform a repeated action that is very much aimed at annoying the lemonade stand owner. But that is not necessarily legally harassment: In Germany, § 238 StGB is aimed at stalking and requires the aim of inciting fear, § 185 StGB is for insulting speech, including harassing speech, § 186 StGB is for defamation, and § 240 StGB for coercion through harassment. A charge under those would be tedious. In the United Kingdom, the English Protection from Harassment Act 1997, does not define harassment as any specific pattern. Scotland's variant reads a little simpler, and makes harassment for harassment's sake illegal. These laws might be applied to the duck. Many of the United States federal laws will simply not apply to the situation. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is about sexual harassment in the workplace, Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 is for schools, and the Fair Housing Act does deal with home purchases and renting. All seem inapplicable. If the threat of gluing someone to a tree is a real threat under the law depends very much again. In Germany, it might be interpreted as too hilarious to be considered a true threat, but humiliating enough to constitute one of the insult laws, but the lyrics do not offer enough facts to make a proper analysis for this part.

I think you misunderstand some of the relationships between laws, decisions, and justifications, and you're conflating two separate areas of jurisprudence. The linked real-world example you provide is happening in the employment context, but also in a government context (since it is a public school). But all the examples in your list have nothing to do with employment law and would be purely statutory/regulatory prohibitions. I will attempt to answer broadly enough to cover both domains. Laws and regulations can be challenged as discriminatory The things you have listed under "decency law" would be criminal or regulatory matters. A preliminary question would be whether the laws as written even capture the behaviours you've described. To the extent that they result in discrimination, the laws could be challenged as breaches of s. 15 (right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There may be other Charter arguments too, if the laws affect expression or life, liberty, or the security of the person. (Public decency / nudity laws are more frequently challenged on grounds of free expression.) Decisions of school boards are subject to the Charter The Charter almost certainly applies to decisions of public school boards and schools. See Elementary Teachers Federation of Ontario v. York Region District School Board, 2022 ONCA 476, paras. 39-41. These decisions could be challenged by judicial review (i.e. court review of an administrative decision-maker's decisions) and would be analyzed for reasonableness, including whether the decision strikes a proportionate balance between the Charter right and the statutory objectives (Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12). Even if there is an infringement, the government gets a chance to justify it If you're looking for some sort of a "line" it is found in the justification or reasonableness analysis. Where a law or regulation is challenged, and if a breach of s. 15 is established, then the onus is on the government to justify the breach as a reasonable limit as allowed by s. 1 of the Charter. This will depend on the importance of the government objective, whether there is a rational connection between the objective and the law, whether the law is minimally impairing, and whether the impact on the claimant is proportional to the salutary effects of the law. When a court reviews an administrative decision for reasonableness, it is "engaged in balancing somewhat different but related considerations, namely, has the decision-maker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right. In both cases, we are looking for whether there is an appropriate balance between rights and objectives, and the purpose of both exercises is to ensure that the rights at issue are not unreasonably limited" (Doré, para. 6). In each of your examples, the judgments would be highly fact-based and it is fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. Relevance of association with minors You ask whether it would matter "if the person in question was primarily associating with minors." This likely would not matter if a law was challenged, because such challenges are about the validity of the law, not the factors that might render its applicability to a particular person to be more or less justified. But if the law itself had the purpose of protecting children, or if the law itself was targetted solely at those associating with minors or those in positions of authority over minors, this would be a factor weighing in favour of justification of the infringing law (Irwin Toy, R. v. Sharpe). Whether the person in question was primarily associating with minors would matter in the context of an administrative decision, because these decisions are case-specific. Some anti-discrimination statutes provide more protections Ontario's Human Rights Code potentially contains even further protections. Section 5 says that every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and other enumerated factors. Section 24 provides for exceptions to that right in educational settings (and some others) where what would otherwise be discrimination is actually a bona fide qualification of the employment and if it cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the employer. These judgments are also highly fact-based and it would be fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show.

Ultimately this raises a question of balancing two fundamental rights: The right of the accused to a fair trial within due process of law & the right to freedom of expression (or in the case of press publications as in most of the cases cited by this answer, the very related freedom of the press). Both the US & Canada safeguard these rights in their constitutions (Amendments I, V, XIV & Charter ss. 2(b), 11(d) respectively) so any differences would be in their approaches to balancing these rights. United States I've found Some Aspects of the Law of Contempt of Court in Canada, England, and the United States (Jacob S. Ziegel, 1960) to be highly informative on the historical development of contempt of court and provided a good baseline understanding. In reference to Bridges v. California 314 U.S. 252 (1941), it states Although the Court recognized that "free speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization" and that "it would be a trying task to choose between them", it held nevertheless that an abridgment on the freedom of the press was only permitted by the Constitution when there was "a clear and present danger" that the offending publication would actually interfere with a fair and impartial trial. The majority opinion rejected the "reasonable tendency" test which had been applied by the lower courts, and still is the yardstick by which such publications are measured in England and Canada. I'd also like to quote the following paragraph from Bridges as it raises two points I'd like to comment on: What finally emerges from the "clear and present danger" cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious, and the degree of imminence extremely high, before utterances can be punished. Those cases do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow. The first point is that due to its broad language, the court gives a certain priority to the First Amendment. The second point involves the age of my citations: the "clear and present danger" test is from Schenck v. United States, largely considered to be overruled by the more stringent Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969) "immediate lawless action" test. This does raise the question of whether Bridges can then be considered good law. I unfortunately can't find any good references discussing Bridges in a post-Brandenburg context, however, I would argue it is still valid. While the Schenck test has been overruled, the Bridges citation I gave in fact foreshadows the Brandenburg test by using the language of "imminence" and stating the Schenck test was not necessarily the limit of the First Amendment, but just a minimum bar. I would then argue that Bridges can quite easily be considered good law by simply substituting the Schenck test with the Brandenburg one without really affecting the court's ratio decidendi. Canada Ziegel's article is even more out-of-date when it comes to Canada as it is pre-Charter. For a modern Canadian overview of out-of-court contempt of court I've found A Comment on "No Comment": The Sub Judice Rule and the Accountability of Public Officials in the 21st Century (Lorne Sossin & Valerie Crystal, 2013). The article cites Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. [1994] 3 SCR 835 as directly tackling the balance of these rights. In it the court acknowledged the pre-Charter common law of giving deference to the accused's right to a fair trial, but noting that the Charter now requires a balancing of these rights The traditional common law rule governing publication bans -- that there be a real and substantial risk of interference with the right to a fair trial -- emphasized the right to a fair trial over the free expression interests of those affected by the ban and, in the context of post-Charter Canadian society, does not provide sufficient protection for freedom of expression. When two protected rights come into conflict, Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully respects the importance of both rights. A hierarchical approach to rights must be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the common law. The common law rule governing publication bans must thus be reformulated in a manner that reflects the principles of the Charter and, in particular, the equal status given by the Charter to ss. 2(b) and 11(d). Ultimately, the court concluded that a balance of these rights was the following test: A publication ban should only be ordered when: (a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. While Dagenais more clearly explains the balancing of these two rights, the article also cites R. v. Vermette [1988] 1 SCR 985 which is a much more similar situation to Maxine Waters commenting on an ongoing trial. The article summarizes as follows: While the trial was ongoing, the premier of Quebec, René Lévesque, denounced one of the defence witnesses in the National Assembly, despite warnings by the Speaker that such comments would be prejudicial to the accused. The trial decision even contains the following comment from the judge: When speaking in the National Assembly, however, the Premier enjoyed the privilege of Parliamentary immunity. Had it not been for this immunity, he could have been cited for contempt of court. Comparison At a constitutional level, it can be seen that the balancing of these two rights are not the same in the US and Canada. The US gives much greater weight to freedom of speech, while Canada allows restriction of speech if doing so more greatly benefits another Charter right and there is no reasonable alternative. On a practical level, there are also differences in how jury trials are run, maybe even as a direct result of the constitutional differences. In Dagenais, the court quotes the following: Generally speaking, however, the approach taken in the United States seems to be to allow for the widest possible latitude in media reporting of events transpiring prior to and during the course of the trial of an accused person. This is counterbalanced, in the interests of ensuring an impartial and unbiased jury, in a number of ways including, during the jury selection process, by an often searching examination into the attitudes, biases and even the personal and financial affairs of potential jurors and, after the jury selection process has been completed, by the sequestration of the members of the jury while the trial is in progress to reduce the risk of their exposure to the media and other publicity generated by it. In Canada, by contrast, the process of jury selection is neither as prolonged nor as exhaustive as a general rule; indeed the kind of questioning and probing into the affairs of potential jurors that is sometimes seen in the United States would be unlikely to be permitted under our system. Moreover, in Canada the sequestration of jurors throughout a trial occurs only exceptionally. The strong bias of our system is to prevent the dissemination before the conclusion of the trial of media publicity that might be prejudicial to the accused's fair trial. The US & Canada simply follow different constitutional approaches here and have slightly different priorities when it comes to balancing rights.

Mobile app Collects Children's Data We are working on a medical app for children. (Of course parents will access the application.) Is it lawful to store children's health records on a webserver? My client says it's illegal; that we should always store the data on a remote local server to protect the minor's protected information. Is this the case?

In the United States, the main statute governing the use of health care information is HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. HIPAA and its related statutes and regulations detail what you can and can't do with medical information. You can't always collect it; if you do, you can't always share it, and you can't always delete it. This is a complex field of law and it's easy to screw up in a way that would cause big, serious, company-destroying, job-ending problems for everyone involved. To put this another way: this is absolutely, positively, not something you want to get advice on from strangers on the internet. You don't just need a lawyer; you need a HIPAA specialist--or the equivalent in whatever other countries you plan to operate in--before you push anything out to real-life patients, especially children.

How does GDPR work with insurers in relation to refusing information about pre-existing medical conditions? Due to it being special category data. As in, which of the "conditions for processing special category data" would apply? As far as I see, Article 9 (a) ("explicit consent") would apply. So the insurer would have to ask the customer for consent. My first thought was it would be consent-based (condition a), but under consent, it is noted that you should avoid making consent a precondition of service. Yes, that is often noted, but that is only partially true. The GDPR actually says (Article 7, emphasis mine): When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. So making consent a precondition of service can be ok, provided that the data is "necessary for the performance of that contract". Whether knowing about preexisting conditions is "necessary" for an insurance provider is something a court would have to decide, but on the face it does not seem unreasonable. Source: General Data Protection Regulation

Your kid is not in trouble; he's a minor. You're in trouble. A criminal case for the charges a prosecutor would bring, i.e. destruction of property (the data) or for a relevant cyber or computer crime (malware, etc.), and/or a civil case for damages due to the destruction of the data would both hinge on one point: the concept of intent. See intent - Wex Legal Information Institute and Civil Law vs. Criminal Law: The Differences | Rasmussen College. Did you knowingly intend to cause damage or data loss with the structure of the name? It's pretty clear you did. The structure of a name that can invoke an SQL command is not in any sense a standard name in spelling or format or punctuation. So how would you convince the jury or judge that you had no intent when you named your kid? The possible poor design of a data system that didn't sanitize inputs is no defense. Saying the door was unlocked so I assume the homeowners didn't care if I trashed their house will get you laughed into jail or on the hook for a stiff civil judgement.

Yes in general Generally, almost all western jurisdictions (be they civil law or common law) have some way to get medical records into evidence, be that via subpoenaing, or by discovery requests or court orders. In most cases, the party that brings the suit is also the patient or their legal representative, and they give (or imply) consent to the use of the records. And in cases where the defendant's medical records are required, usually, the defense wants those in too to prove some condition. And then there are cases where the state or their representatives brings the charge. They usually can bring a warrant or court order to obtain the documents. Then there are Medical records that had been made specifically on the behest of the state. Here, the warrant is usually filed to obtain the samples or access to the body to be investigated, the record itself forms the basis for the investigators to proceed - and is not under client-doctor confidentially in the first place. It had been made specifically for the state and it is a state-owned medical record, be they made on request of the executive power (police) with a warrant signed by a judge or on behalf of the judicative after a court order to evaluate capacity (see below). However, medical records can generally only be obtained if the records are relevant to the case at hand and only to the degree necessary: You can't request the medical records about a person's fertility status in a case that discusses damages for his broken arm. As a result, the medical record available in court might be only an extract from the original, with irrelevant passages sealed or redacted. Unlike many people think, it's quite common to get some medical records into court in some way or another: As the basis of injury cases If you have a case of physical injury, the injuries themselves need to be proven in court. This is done generally by getting the medical records - thus they can be subpoenaed by a party, usually the injured party here. Then a medical expert can discuss them, be they a court-appointed one or paid by either of the parties. In this category also fall mandatory reports of certain types of wounds or situations. As such, the treating doctor has to provide a medical report with enumerated types of injuries, like bullet wounds or where child abuse might be the reason. Very necessarily in malpractice cases Malpractice is pretty much injury on steroids: the injuring party made the records and would never want to give them up to the one suing them - if they could. Alice shall remove Appendix. It goes haywire and the day after Charly needs to cut Bob open again. Now Bob sues Alice for malpractice. Bob needs medical records from both Alice, the doctor who botched it, and Charly, who was fixing Alice's error. Generally, both records are subpoena-able to the degree relevant and necessary, and indeed the opposing medical opinions on the operation and records form the very basis of the case for either side. Without the ability to subpoena the - in this case unmodified - records from the injuring doctor, proving - or defending - a case of malpractice would be impossible: the very truth of the allegation should be in the medical records. It's routine in cases around death What is the very last medical record a person can ever get? An autopsy record! That's a very sensitive medical record, but they routinely are used in homicide cases. Oftentimes, the investigators also subpoena the medical records of the victim from their doctors to corroborate the autopsy record, while the defense might subpoena them to try and disprove it. Even in civil cases, like the OJ-Simpson civil damages case, autopsy and medical records from an accompanying criminal case can and will be "pulled" (copied over) from the other trial's docket. Regularly in child protection cases Whenever child protection is on the line, be them protective orders or who a child will live with after the child protection service (whatever its name is) is in on a case, then medical records are often required to bolster one side. Those records could be medical records from quite many doctors, be they physicals or psychological evaluations... Sometimes the medical records required here are only created due to court-ordered medical or psychological evaluation by a doctor. Whenever incompetence defense is called When the lawyer claims temporary incompetence or insanity, courts generally order a psychological evaluation. These medical records are evidence, but usually don't need to be subpoenaed: they have a waiver form to be disclosed to the court almost built-in. Are they available to the public? Medical records are part of truth-finding, but they are also quite sensitive. As a result, most medical records can not be gotten from the court and enter the dockets under seal. Another option is, that they enter the docket partially or even mostly redacted, with passages blackened.

I understand that storing any hash or IP that can identify "user uniquely" is against GDPR. That is not correct. However any data which is identifiably associated with a an individual human, including any data which could be used to identify that human, is generally "Personal data", and may not be processed (which includes storing it) without a lawful basis, if the GDPR applies. Any of the six lawful bases allowed by the GDPR may be used, including consent, and the legitimate interest of the data controller. The GDPR does not generally specify that particular technological solutions are permitted or forbidden. If this usage pattern could reasonably be used to identify a particular person, or to single out a person from among a group of people, it is probably personal data, and a lawful basis would be required. Otherwise, not. As for whether such a person is "identifiable" if use of this technique permits the Data Controller to identify two visits at separate times as having been made by the same person, when the later visit is still in progress or is recent, the IP for that visit will still be available, and thus could be associated with the first visit as well. And even if that is not done, such a technique could permit building a profile of such a person, including the actions taken on different visits. I think that would be enough to make this "personal data".

You are missing something. The fact that you have a tick box and its state is saved in the database is enough. The burden of proof is only "on a balance of probabilities", so someone arguing that they didn't consent would have to demonstrate that you falsified the database entry somehow. In terms of GDPR requirements in general you don't need a greater level of proof than this, the key thing is that you have a robust system in place to obtain proof (such as not allowing data into the database without a tick in the box).

What Big Tech is doing is spending a lot of money on lawyers and appeals – doesn't matter if it costs millions if you can make money in the meanwhile. Facebook stores a lot of user data in the US. Initially, this was allowed because the US was recognized as offering an adequate level of data protection under the Safe Harbor and later the Privacy Shield Framework. Then Schrems I and Schrems II happened and the adequacy recognition was ruled to be invalid. Does Facebook pull back their user data? No. The GDPR offers alternative reasons why you might process data in foreign countries, such as “standard contractual clauses” (SCCs) or “binding corporate rules” (BCRs). Now, Facebook claims that they are using SCCs. Is this valid? Almost certainly not due to the issues of US law analyzed in the Schrems II case, but it can take years for the next round of court cases to work its way through the system. And when Facebook's use of SCCs is ruled invalid they will probably try BCRs next, and once that is over a decade will have passed and the US might actually have achieved an adequate privacy level by then. You do not have Facebook-style money to spend on lawyers and endless rounds of appeals, so you should avoid legally risky things such as outsourcing data processing activities to companies in the US (this doesn't mean you can't be compliant if you are a US entity). I mentioned adequacy decision previously. There is a list of countries that the EU considers to be sufficiently safe. Currently, the more notable countries involve Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, in addition to EU/EEA countries of course. If you want to process data in a location that is OK for both the UK and the US, then looking at companies in one of these countries is a good idea. For example, if most of your users are in the US but you would like your servers to be in a country with an EU adequacy decision, then looking at Canada could make sense. Even outside of this list, you can process data if you implement additional safeguards via SCCs. However, this requires a case by case analysis of the legal environment in that country. One problem with the US is that it has national security laws that impose requirements on companies in a manner that is incompatible with SCCs. A company bound by these US laws cannot enter into such a contract where it guarantees the privacy of your user's data. Countries other than the EU have much more tedious data residency laws. The GDPR does not impose any data residency requirements in the sense that data must not leave a particular country – you just have to ensure that the data is properly protected. In contrast, Russia and China have real data residency requirements that are fundamentally incompatible with the GDPR.

My remarks pertain only to US Law. Laws vary in other countries. Subject matter eligible for copyright protection in the US must be expressive and creative. To the extent data are merely measurements of observable fact in the world, they are not copyrightable. It may be that the presentation or interpretation of data is eligible for copyright protection (for example, artwork used in charts, graphs, graphics, etc., that is expressive and creative), subject to various equitable use provisions (in particular Fair Use, which is still a legal grey area). The methods by which data are gathered can be considered IP, but is the domain of patents. Methods are not copyrightable (17 USC 102(b)).

How might this use of the Star Wars logo and universe be legal? A French book about Star Wars recently came out, giving a psychological approach on the films and characters. The book doesn't contain images, but on the cover, the Star Wars logo is visible, and there's a drawing of Sigmund Freud holding Darth Vader's helmet. I believe the names of the characters are used throughout the book, as well as names of planets, spaceships, or other fictional elements from the films. I believe the author thinks they are in their own right to use these elements, and I assume the publishing company also did some research before putting out this book. But I also know that Lucasfilms and Disney love suing all sorts of people, from their own former employees to Ronald Reagan. To me, the line isn't clear between the two. So I am wondering if this use of the Star Wars universe respects copyright and trademarks regulations, and on what legal grounds. (I am asking because I would like to write and sell derivative works as well, and I don't know how I could be sure to never break a law). EDIT: I asked the author yesterday if they had to pay to use the trademarked logo, derivative visuals, etc, and he said "Copyrights for Star Wars only applies to images taken from the film. Not on the logo, font or drawing inspired from". JURIDICTION: France & USA

You are confusing two separate concepts: trademark and copyright. I'll give you a broad overview of both of these, although the details will differ depending on what country's law we're talking about. A copyright is held by the creator of a work of artistic expression. It gives the creator certain exclusive rights, including the right to create copies of the work and to prepare derivative works. For example: The movie "Star Wars" is a work of artistic expression. You cannot copy "Star Wars," or any significant part of it--including the script, the music, etc.--without the permission of the copyright owner, unless your use fits into one of the exceptions to copyright in your jurisdiction. Likewise, you cannot write your own book featuring the Star Wars characters: that would be a derivative work, a work based on the original work, and would violate the rights of the copyright holder. Without having read the book in question, I'm not going to comment on whether it does or doesn't infringe the film's copyright. But ideas can't be copyrighted. A film review, for instance, isn't a copyright violation--and a longer work discussing the ideas involved in a film isn't necessarily a copyright violation, either. Copyright only protects the expression itself--the language, the images. You are very limited in how much of that you can copy, but as long as you're using your own words, copyright protection is less of a concern. Trademarks, on the other hand, are intended to protect a business from customer confusion. Trademarks are not protected in the same way as copyrights; the key analysis of a trademark infringement lawsuit is: does it create confusion about the origin of the goods? For example: if you slap a swoosh on a shoe, Nike will sue you. If you use a swoosh in a political cartoon criticizing Nike, they won't, because nobody is going to think Nike wrote the political cartoon. So: If you write a book and call it: "Ewoks Gone Wild: A Star Wars Story," Disney will sue you, because it would be reasonable for someone who saw that book in a store to think that Disney authorized that book. If you wrote a book called "Forcing the Issue: The Hermeneutics of Science Fiction Movies from Star Wars to Inception", the case would be less clear-cut. But the important thing to understand is that these issues are complicated. There are exceptions to these rules; there are applications that may not be obvious to the non-lawyer ("initial interest confusion" is one minefield in U.S. trademark law), there are national and EU-specific considerations, there are safe harbors, and there are practical considerations, like whether you can afford to fight a lawsuit even if you're in the right. Therefore, I'm not going to tell you whether your hypothetical work would infringe anyone's copyright or trademark, and I'm not going to give you a set of rules on how to avoid it. The only person you should be listening to that sort of advice from is a real, non-anonymous-internet lawyer, licensed to practice in your jurisdiction, who is familiar with the specific details of your specific situation.

Copyright Issues There are several issues here. The Original Rose Image and its Derivatives The image was apparently first posted to Stack Exchange as part of this question by user "Ongky Denny Wijaya". That user did not say where the image came from. If that user created the image, whether by taking a photograph, or in an image drawing program (or in any other way), then s/he owns the copyright, and licensed it under the CC-BY-SA (4.0) free license by posting it to SE. However, if that user did not create the image but got it from somewhere else, it was quite probably protected by copyright and used without permission. If "Ongky Denny Wijaya" did not have the rights to the image, then s/he could not license them, and all uses on SE and deriving from SE are copyright infringements, and the copyright holder, whoever that is, could sue for damages. The first two answers to your SE question give LaTeX code for rose images only slightly resembling the original rose image. They are not derivatives of the original image. The third seems to be a transformation of the original, and so is a derivative work. It may not lawfully be used without the permission of the original copyright holder whoever that may be. Unless you can reliably determine who that is, and seek permission, you may not lawfully use that image, nor LaTeX code for it. Original SE Content When a user posts original contest to SE, it is automatically released under the CC-BY-SA (4.0) Creative Commons free license. That license allows anyone to reuse the content, and to create modified (derivative) versions of the content, but under some conditions. The most important of these are 1) that the content must be attributed properly to the copyright holder, and any copyright notice must be preserved. (That is the "BY" part.) And 2) the reused or modified work must be provided to others under exactly the same license. (That is the "SA" part.) The first part can be done by listing the user name of the original SE poster, and providing a link to the post. The second part is potentially trickier. If the modified work is "merged into" a new work, the entire new work must be released under CC-BY-SA, which would hinder any commercial publication. If the re-used or modified work is kept separate, at the very least it needs to have a separate license statement, making it clear that anyone can re-use or further modify the work, and making it clear just what is included in that release. That should be associated with the credit or attribution statement mentioned above. That would apply both to an image, and to LaTex code for generating the image. If this is not done, reuse of any such content is an infringement of copyright, and could be the subject of a lawsuit. Fair Use Use of the whole or the majority of an SE question or answer, or of the whole of an original image posted to SE, would probably not constitute fair use in the US, although that would depend on the rest of the facts. If such use did not qualify as fair use, that it must be used in accordance with the stated license, as described above.

Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation.

No, this is not true. Copyright can be enforced selectively. You are confusing copyright with trademark. Company can lose its trademark if they aren't protecting it. All the meanwhile they can choose to ignore some copyright infringement while enforcing their rights on others with no legal problems what-so-ever. In order to illustrate the difference: for example, if someone would make a clone of Super Mario and would call their clone as well "Super Mario" and maybe even would call themselves "Nintendo", even if they have programmed the whole game by themselves from scratch and the art and music would be all different, they wouldn't be infringing the copyright but challenging protected trademarks. In your case, the naming was identical, the art and everything was too similar to the original and therefore the clone was challenging the trademark that needs constant protecting.

Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.

Can a system include such information? it is surely technically possible. Would it be a violation of copyright? That depends. First of all, any such information can be included if the copyright holder has granted permission, probably in the form of a license. But in that case this question would probably not have been asked. I therefore assume that no permission has been granted. (It doesn't matter if a request was made and the answer was "no", a request was made but ignored, or no request was ever made. No permission is still no permission.) The names of fictional locations are nor protected by copyright. Including, say, "Rivendell" or "Hobbiton" in the selection list for a timezone setting would not infringe the copyrights held by the Tolkien estate. But a map is a different thing. If the OS includes and can display a map of a fictional region, one that is copied from or based on a map published with the fiction, or by some third party, then that would almost surely be copyright infringement, and the copyright holder could choose to sue for infringement. S/he might choose not to sue, but that is a risky gamble to take. If this is in the US, statutory damages could be awarded, and could intheory go as high as $150,000, although they are not likely to be as high as that, that is just the maximum legal limit (per work infringed, not per copy). The standard is whatever amount the court thinks "just", up to the maximum. (If proof of willful infringement is not made, the upper limit is $30,000, still a sizable sum.) If the OS designer created the map independently, using names from the fiction, but not otherwise basing it on the fiction, and in particular not imitating any map created by anyone else, then it may well not be infringement, but it would still be wise to consult a copyright lawyer. The question would be more helpful if it made clear just what would be hypothetically included in the OS, and to what extent it would be based on someone else's work. There is also the question of why someone would want to include fictional places, but that really doesn't change the legal issue.

It's not fair use. Fair use is when you do something that normally only the copyright holder can do. Playing a video game is the ordinary, intended use of the work. In the United States, ordinary use is not protected by copyright. 17 USC 106 sets out the rights protected by copyright. The include copying the work, producing derivative works, distributing the work, and so on. None of these are ordinary use. Someone could perhaps argue that you are creating a derivative work. I doubt that argument would work because you are not taking any protectable elements from the work. But if anyone did argue that, it would make sense to also argue that if that's so, your use would still be covered under fair use because it's transformative, does not substitute for the original work in any way, and takes very little of the work.

Using the setting and characters of an existing and current book would probably, indeed almost surely, make it a derivative work. Creating a derivative work from a work protected by copyright requires permission from the copyright holder, unless an exception to copyright applies. In US law 17 USC 101 defines a derivative work as: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. and 17 USC 106 provides in pertinent part that: Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: ... to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; This means that creating such a fanfic without permission would be copyright infringement, and Rowling could sue for damages. Fair use In the US the primary exception to copyright available is fair use. Whether a work is a fair use of another is always a case-by-case decision, and often a complex one. There have not been many published US cases on whether fanfiction is or may be fair use. This depends on the details, but from the description I do not think such a fanfic as the question describes would be likely to be held to be a case of fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? In general fanfiction has not fared very well under US copyright law. See this Wikipedia article. A recent Law Review article on this topic, one of the few available, is The Better Angels of Our Fanfiction: The Need for True and Logical Precedent, 33 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 159](https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol33/iss2/1) by Stacey M. Lantagne. [Footnotes in the original shown here in {braces}.] On pages 168-9 Lantagne wrote: Although fanfiction is a flourishing medium, there has been no true case evaluating it under a fair use analysis. For instance, Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books 575 F.Supp.2d 513 (SDNY 2008) involved a work created by a fan, but the work in question was an encyclopedic reference book about the original copyrighted material, not a piece of fiction spun off from the original copyrighted work in some way. The fan work's inconsistently transformative character swayed the court's fair use analysis{The court noted that at times the fan work lapsed into mere verbatim copying of the original copyrighted material, which detracted from its transformative nature}, and the fact that it used more of the original copyrighted work than was necessary.{The court found it telling that the fan work contained a great deal of verbatim copying of "highly aesthetic expression," which tipped this factor away from a finding of fair use} These two factors would necessarily dictate a different analysis when a work of fiction is involved as opposed to a reference work.{Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 544. The court found troubling the excessive copying of "distinctive original language from the Harry Potter works," using "Rowling's original expression," in the work's entries. Id. Presumably, much less direct copying of original language would happen in a work of fiction. A similar implication occurs when considering the "verbatim copying" of whole sentences from the Harry Potter books. Id. at 547. Works of fanfiction seldom copy verbatim language, focusing on characters, settings, and plots.} Lantagne next discussed mthe case of Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 70. That case dealt with a novel called 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, whose protagonist, "Mr. C", is a 76-year-old Holden Caulfield, (the protagonist of the J.D. Salinger novel The Catcher in the Rye. Lantagne wrote: The defendant's novel embodies typical fanfiction activity: taking a recognizable character and re-imagining them at a different stage of life." The court determined that the work was not permissible fair use and enjoined its publication.{This case [on appeal] recently settled, with Colting agreeing not to publish the book in the United States or Canada until the copyright on The Catcher in the Rye expires, but being able to publish it in other international territories, as long as it was not marketed using reference to Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye, or the litigation between the parties.} First, the court concluded that 60 Years Later was not a parody because it "contain[ed] no reasonably discernible rejoinder or specific criticism of any character or theme of Catcher. Rather than commenting on Holden Caulfield as a character, the purpose of 60 Years Later was to "satisfy Holden's fans' passion" for his character. The insertion of J.D. Salinger as a character in 60 Years Later was possibly, the court conceded, a criticism and commentary of Salinger, but not of The Catcher in the Rye. While the court admitted that there was some transformative element in the Salinger character in 60 Years Later, it was limited by the character's minor role in a work that was largely not transformative. The court concluded that merely aging the main character of a novel and altering the novel's setting was not sufficient to make the use transformative. Finally, because 60 Years Later was to be sold for profit, the court found that the first factor weighed against a finding of fair use. After finding The Catcher in the Rye to be an expressive work, which weighed the second factor against a finding of fair use, the court then concluded that 60 Years Later took much more from The Catcher in the Rye than was necessary for whatever transformative commentary it was trying to make. The court disapproved mainly of the use of the main character of The Catcher in the Rye. 60 Years Later also was similar to The Catcher in the Rye in structure, in a way that was not necessary to offer a commentary on Salinger (the only transformative purpose the court had found the work to have). Finally, the court found that 60 Years Later harmed the potential market for any permissible The Catcher in the Rye sequels. The court found that fair use should not protect the ability to publish unauthorized sequels: [B]ecause some artists may be further incentivized to create original works due to the availability of the right not to produce any sequels. This might be the case if, for instance, an author's artistic vision includes leaving certain portions or aspects of his character's story to the varied imaginations of his readers, or if he hopes that his readers will engage in discussion and speculation as to what happened subsequently." Although 60 Years Later may be classified as fanfiction, the overtly commercial purpose of the work makes it an imperfect representation of the genre because most fanfiction is not-for-profit.{See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 664. A recent development in fanfiction that has led to clashes is the rise of the use of fanfiction for charitable purposes. "Fanfic auctions" in which readers bid for the services of fanfiction authors to write a story based on their specifications, with the proceeds to benefit charity, are becoming more common. See Gabaldon, supra note 7 ("Recently, a couple of people have drawn my attention to a person who's been posting on various boards about fund-raising for an uninsured friend named Stacie who has breast cancer. Her (the poster's) idea for fund-raising is to auction off a customer-written piece of fan-fic. . . ."). Fanfiction written for such a commercial purpose may change the analysis. But see Tushnet, supra note 16, at 672-73 (quoting Gene Rodenberry).} Because the court weighed the novel's commercial nature against a finding of fair use, Salinger is not an ideal fanfiction precedent Lantagne goes on to discuss the case of Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001). In that case a novel The Wind Done Gone, retelling Gone With the Wind from the PoV of the black characters, was held to be a parody as well as a sequel, to be "highly transformative", and allowable as fair use. Sequels as Derivative Works A sequel uses the characters and/or setting of an existing work of fiction. It often constitutes a derivative work. The more distinctive and original the setting and characters are, and the more of those distinctive characteristics that are used in the sequel, the more likely the sequel is to be treated as a derivative work. On the matter of sequels, see the case of Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989). In that case, a Mr. Timothy Anderson prepared a sequel to the film Rocky III which he hoped would become Rocky IV. He presented it to MGM and Stallone. They eventually declined to buy it, and Anderson sued, claiming that the film Rocky IV that was made infringed his script. The district court held that Anderson's script was an infringing work not entitled to copyright protection. The court, citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), ruled that the characters in a copyrighted work are protected when they are "developed with enough specificity to constitute protect able expression." Holding that the Rocky III characters met this standard, the court ruled that the Anderson script was a derivative work created without permission, and thus was not entailed to any copyright protection at all. Anderson appealed, and the case was settled out of court while this appeal was in progress. Details of the settlement were not disclosed. An unauthorized sequel to Harry Potter would probably face the same rule and reach the same result as in the Anderson case.It would depend on how much of the "distinctive" nature of JKR's characters and settings were used in the fanfic sequel. The Ethical and Emotional Arguments against Fan Fiction In This comment on the question user "RedSonja" writes: I know this is Law and you are looking for legal answers. But what you are proposing is plagiarism by the back door. JKR went to a lot of trouble inventing her universe. Why should you be able to just plug in and milk someone else's cow? If you are that highly original, write your own universe. Leaving aside the point that if the source is acknowledged it cannot be plagiarism, although it may be copyright infringement, this is essentially an ethical argument that the law should be different than it currently is. Some authors make an essentially emotional argument, saying that their works or their characters are in effect "children of the mind" and that others should not touch them without permission, whatever the law may say. Some find such arguments persuasive or powerful.. I disagree with these arguments. Lantagne on pages 172-179 of the law review article linked above, responds to such arguments, writing [Some footnotes omitted, others in {braces}]: Fanfiction is frequently devalued as not being "real" writing. This is closely related to the aesthetic argument. Copyright only protects creative expression.{See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2002)} If the fanfiction is not creative expression, then it is not copyrightable. That, however, is a different question from whether it is infringing.{See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 681 ("Fan fiction may not be copyrightable, but that does not make it an infringing use....").} It could be that the "not real writing" argument, translated into legalese, really expresses the idea that the work of fanfiction is not transformative enough.{See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) ("If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another's work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger."). Importantly, however, a work does not have to be transformative to be protected under fair use. See id. at 579. The fair use test is not forgiving of shortcuts.} However, this alone does not automatically make the work a copyright infringement because other fair use factors remain. Many authors frequently describe fanfiction as being the equivalent of an affront against their relatives.{See Gabaldon, supra note 7 ("[L]et us just say that there's a difference between someone dating red-haired men, and the same someone trying to seduce my husband.... I wouldn't like people writing sex fantasies for public consumption about me or members of my family-why would I be all right with them doing it to the intimate creations of my imagination and personality?"); Someone Is Angry on the Internet, supra note 11 ("My characters are my children, I have been heard to say. I don't want people making off with them, thank you."); Hobb, supra note 7 (comparing fanfiction to PhotoShopping a family photo).} While the artistic protectiveness for one's creation is understandable, it is not a valid argument in U.S. copyright law. Artists have the right to control derivative works of their creations. If the fair use factors come out the wrong way [for the reuser], artists can prevent that use of their work. However, the purpose of copyright is not to prevent all use by others of an artistic work.{See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574-77 ("From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose ...)} It never has been. The very character of the fair use test illustrates this, as it protects most strongly those uses of an artist's creation that the artist would never permit.{See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282-83 (11th Cir.2001) (Marcus, J., concurring) ("To the extent the Suntrust [sought to impose editorial restrictions] to preserve Gone With the Wind's reputation, or protect its story from 'taint,' however, it may not now invoke copyright to further that goal. Of course, Suntrust can choose to license its derivative however it wishes and insist that those derivatives remain free of content it deems disreputable. Suntrust may be vigilant of Gone With the Wind's public image-but it may not use copyright to shield Gone With the Wind from unwelcome comment, a policy that would extend intellectual property protection 'into the precincts of censorship,' in Pat Conroy's words.")} Arguably, the more that a fanfiction work criticizes or parodies the original work, the more that fanfiction is a fair use. Thus, the argument that fanfiction should not be permitted because it transforms the original authors' characters mirrors the argument for exactly why fanfiction should be permitted under copyright law. ... The arguments that authors advance when they argue against copyright belong in a regime without fair use-a regime that would ignore the central purpose of U.S. copyright."' Such a conclusion is not only potentially untenable under the Constitution, but is also undesirable."' "The public's interest in free expression . . . is significant."" There is no question that courts have, throughout the history of copyright law, sought to protect that public interest. However, there is also no question that courts are inevitably swayed by value arguments. This should not be the case, but such influence is inevitable. ' Furthermore, value is a chicken-and-egg argument: Campbell did not base its decision on the popularity of music sampling, but surely the popularity informed Campbell's understanding of the critical commentary value of "Pretty Woman." ... [T]he use of the word "fair" in "fair use" does not mean that it is fair to the author's wishes. Rather, it means that it is fair to the purposes of copyright. None of the emotional arguments frequently raised against fanfiction support a blanket proclamation that none of it is fair use. Truthfully, much of fanfiction may very well not be fair use. However, a true test case of fanfiction, logically evaluating each factor, would be invaluable in moving the fanfiction debate past the emotions of the participants. The argument should focus not on the emotions of the author or the quality of the writing, but on the fair use factors: on the purpose, character, and possible transformative nature of the work, on the amount of the original copyrighted work used, on the nature of the original copyrighted work, and on the effect on the market of the original copyrighted work. These are the factors that best protect the advancement of the twin goals of U.S. copyright. I agree with Lantagne here, it is often exactly those uses that a copyright owner will not want to approve that should be permitted as an exception to copyright. The limited statutory monopoly is granted in return for a contribution to the clutural fabric, and such work should therefore be available for use in further developing that fabric where it does not deprive the copyright holder of financial rewards, and where such uses in general are of public benefit. I take it thatr current US copyright law follows that goal, more or less. Non-US Law The rule on derivative works is also contained in the Berne Copyright Convention and the WTO's TRIPPS Agreement, and so applies in almost every country. Exceptions to copyright, however, vary widely. The concept of Fair Use is originally a purely US concept, although it has been adopted by Israel, and in part by a few other countries. Other countries generally have more specific and narrower exceptions, but often have several different exceptions. India has some 28 different exceptions in its copyright law. Few of these seem likely to be any more favorable to a fanfiction sequel than the US concept of fair use.

Implied insults What are the legal differences between an explicit insult, that qualifies as slander, and an implication of the same insult? I am a German citizen, so I'd prefer answers applicable to Germany. But any other jurisdiction is fine also.

If I understand your question, you're asking the difference between something like this: "You shouldn't do business with Bob; he's a child molester. Raped a whole bunch of kids. Everyone knows about it." and this: "You're thinking of doing business with Bob? Huh. That's your call, of course. I won't say anything against Bob. But Bill is in the same business, and I happen to know that Bill has never molested any kids." or this: "There are three people you could do business with. There's me. I've never molested any kids. There's Bill; he's a little expensive, but he's never molested any kids either. Then there's Bob. I don't have anything to say about Bob." I don't know the answer under German law, but under U.S. law, it's surprisingly complicated, and varies by jurisdiction. Here is a thorough but somewhat dated article on the subject. New York has recently established an explicit test for defamation by implication: To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication where the factual statements at issue are substantially true, the plaintiff must make a rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference. Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 03940 (App. Div. May 29, 2014). That opinion also discusses the other approaches used in other U.S. states. Under that standard, it seems clear that my example statements would be defamatory; any juror would immediately understand both the factual implication and that it was 100% intentional. In practical terms, I doubt any court in the United States would not consider them defamatory. In general, defamation is harder to prove in the United States than in other jurisdictions, because of the strong protections afforded to speech under the First Amendment--but I don't know enough about German law to speak to that issue.

That is happening all the time. Accusations of historic child abuse are often made, often investigated, and often punished. Where the victim is from doesn't make a difference in most countries. Most crimes are prosecuted in the country where they happen. Some crimes, especially sexual abuse of children, will often also be prosecuted in the country that the offender is a citizen of, especially if the country where it happened is hesitant to prosecute. In your example, if the abuse happened in Switzerland, Switzerland will try to get the offender extradited from Italy, and will ask witnesses to come to Switzerland to make statements in court. Italy might prosecute the alleged offender if he is Italian, they might even prosecute an Italian resident, but I don't know their laws.

While @jqning is absolutely correct in stating that truth is always an "absolute defense" to a claim of defamation, keep in mind that truth can be a subjective thing. What is one person's version of the truth, may not be another's, even with regard to the same exact experience. Also, while "statements of opinion are not defamation" is typically regarded as true, it has very broad exceptions and is not something that can be relied on in isolation. Defamation is generally defined as a false, published statement that is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. An online posting, even on an obscure website, will likely be seen by a few people, thus satisfying the publication requirement. A plaintiff cannot succeed in his or her online defamation claim if the defendant's defamatory statement is true. So, for example, if a customer posts a review of your restaurant on Trip Advisor claiming that there were roaches crawling around, you may sue them for defamation. You would then have to prove that there was no roach infestation, and thus, the defendant's statement was false. However, what if there was only one? What if he has a witness who saw it? His truth may be different from yours, and it is up to the trier of fact to decide. Also, getting sued, whether or not you prevail, is at minimum a pain and can be a very expensive ordeal. Opinions are exempt? OK: Following that line of reasoning, restaurant owner shows he's had monthly inspections and prophylactic measures to ensure against pests and the exterminator testifies. The defendant, fearing he's in trouble now, claims that his assertion of roach infestation was just his opinion based on his experience. Opinions are privileged under the law of defamation, right? Not always! Importantly, an opinion may be viewed, generally, as a statement of fact (employing the "reasonable person" standard) if it is something that is either provable or disprovable. What this means is that if the reasonable person would construe your statement to be factual, and not mere opinion, it will be deemed as such and if untrue then you're liable for defamation. The courts may interpret, "I think that [restaurant] has a roach infestation problem," as a statement of fact. This has occurred in numerous cases where people think they can say what they want as long as they couch it as an opinion, with words like "I think..." or "In my opinion...". But when someone says something that factual in opinion form, that is not protected. So, if Jane says, "In my opinion Joe Schmoe is a pedophile..." without absolute proof that Joe is, in fact, a pedophile, then this is libelous (defamation if published or spoken to another). This is because the statement in and of itself is one of "verifiable fact couched in opinion" and it is so damaging to Joe's reputation that if it's not true it is libel per se (defamatory if published – meaning shared). A statement of verifiable fact is a statement that conveys a provably false factual assertion, such as someone has committed murder or has cheated on his spouse. While the law varies some, and sometimes substantially, from state to state, here are some often used examples arising from California courts. Libelous (when false): Charging someone with being a communist (in 1959) Calling an attorney a "crook" Describing a woman as a call girl Accusing a minister of unethical conduct Accusing a father of violating the confidence of son Not-libelous: Calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar" in chance encounter (because hyperbole in context) Calling a TV show participant a "local loser," "chicken butt" and "big skank" Calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch" Changing product code name from "Carl Sagan" to "Butt Head Astronomer" Since libel is considered in context, do not take these examples to be a hard and fast rule about particular phrases. Generally, the non-libelous examples are hyperbole or opinion, while the libelous statements are stating a defamatory fact. Modified photos that can be shown to scandalize persons or businesses are clearly defamation, and are quite popular on social media. So, for example, if you threw the flyers (I assume you didn't but as an example) all over, and then photographed and published your opinion about the business littering neighborhoods, this would be libelous. The less obvious and absurd the modification, the more likely it is that a court will find it defamatory. So, a picture of a woman with a man's naked torso photoshopped on will not be defamatory, a version photoshopped showing what is to be purported to be her naked body, is. In your case, you face two issues that you should ask yourself: Is your opinion really verifiable (or non-verifiable) facts couched in words that try to make it opinion, or is it truly just your opinion. If fact, is it absolutely true? If the answer is yes, it's fact and yes, it's absolutely true, you're OK. Keep in mind though what I mentioned about truths differing: What if the business didn't know they were put there, or, what if they were placed on cars in a public place and blew in the wind? That could be a problem. While you are most likely fine, you may want to just say, X business's fliers are all over the place, littering the neighborhood and (assuming you called and asked them to pick them up, or wrote them) they refuse to pick up the litter. It sounds like the statements you made are fine, because you don't say that the business littered, or that they put them there; you say they are "plastered" all over, but you don't accuse them openly. That isn't to say it wouldn't be found to suggest fact that they would have to show isn't true (or that they didn't get permission from the property owner). My point is only that, in general, be careful. If he felt that you misrepresented what he did by way of distributing fliers, or if he thought you doctored the photo or set it up, he could sue you if he felt it damaged his business's reputation.

Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives.

Hate whoever you want The law doesn’t care who you hate, who you love and who you don’t give a rat’s behind about, nor does it care about your reasons for doing so. Similarly, the law in most advanced countries doesn’t care if you express your hatred in words. Write as many social media posts as you like decrying the imagined depredations of your hated groups. Record music and videos expressing that hate. Stand on a soapbox in an area set aside for such purposes and shout your hate to the world. Just remember, no one is obliged to supply you with the soapbox (actual or metaphorical). As an aside, there are some countries, which because of their history, have particular laws about what can and can’t be said about Nazis and Fascists (note the capital F). What the law does care about Violence - you can’t hurt people just because you hate them Harassment and abuse - you can express your hate but you can’t get in someone’s face to do it ”Hate speech” - which is not speech where you express hatred. It’s speech that incites or promotes violence against the hated group. Jurisdictions differ about where this line is. The United States requires the violence to be “imminent” meaning the speech has to be targeted to affect the audience to commit violence straight away. Other countries will crack down before that. Anti-discrimination law - which only protects certain groups in certain situations. For example, it is perfectly legal to exclude non-Catholics from taking Holy Communion. Similarly, the Labour Party convention is a ticketed event and they are perfectly free not to issue invitations to Tories.

The term "racism" is a political one, not a legal one, which refers to a belief. It is not illegal in the US, and it is a belief that is protected under the First Amendment. There is a legal construct, "discrimination on the basis of race", which enters into laws. For example, you may not discriminate in employment on the basis of race: but those law don't distinguish discrimination in favor and discrimination against. Hate crimes are crimes which additionally discriminate on the basis of some protected class (see "discrimination"). Assaulting a person because they are white, black, Catholic, atheist, male or female is a hate crime. Everybody falls into one or more protected categories (everybody has some race, religion including lack, and sex) – hate crime laws add "because of", for those extra penalties. Assalting a white, black, male or female person is not a hate crime, by itself. The government is not the only source of reigning in of speech that you don't like, in fact, it isn't way of suppressing speech that you don't like at all, at least as long as we have the First Amendment. An employer has the right to hire a racist, or to fire a racist, at least until the law changes.

Hate Speech is not a crime in the United States. Rather, they have "Hate Crimes" which are charged only when the prosecution wishes to show that the crime was motivated by hatred of a protected class of people (I.E. the killer shouts a slur at his victim.). They cannot be charged in absence. Spoken word, advocacy for policies that favor one protected class over another, and other signs of hatred are not in and of themselves crimes. Unless a content provider is physically within Australia's borders, their is little legal recourse. The United States does not extradite anyone to a country to face charges for crimes that are not criminal offenses in the United States. Since the site promotes these ideas but has not used the ideas as a motivation to engage criminal activity, they would not extradite the accused individual(s).

See this working paper by Silvia Ferreri for an excellent write-up of this issue. The key point is that because each linguistic version of legislation is equally authentic, none can be taken as the authentic version. The court then resolves this by applying two principles: comparing the linguistic versions and giving deference to legislative intent. This is necessarily a case-by-case analysis. The paper calls attention to Case C‑445/09 arising from the Netherlands, where 9 different linguistic versions are compared and shows that the straightforward Dutch reading of the legislation in question isn't compatible with the other linguistic versions or legislative intent. In paragraph 25, the decision also contains a concise summary of the general principle of interpreting laws in multiple languages: According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim which the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Joined Cases C‑261/08 and C‑348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera [2009] ECR I‑10143, paragraph 54; and Case C‑473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).

Multi nationality couple, which nationality the baby would have? How can I know which nationality would have a baby born from parents from different nationalities? The baby would have the nationality of the mother. The baby would have the nationality of the father. The baby would have the nationality of both mother and father. The baby would have the nationality of the country where he or she born. It depends on the laws of each country. I think that the correct answer is the last one but I'm not sure; I suppose that in order to a baby to be acknowledged as a new born citizen in the country of the mom or the dad she or he should be registered in each country. Where I can get more information about this? (I'm interested in the laws of UK and Spain). EDIT. To make things more complicated, one of the parents is from Catalonia. Now the relations between Catalonia (a Spanish region) and Spain are tense, and Catalonia would try to move towards independence from Spain... I don't know how this would affect to the nationality of the newborn.

The short answer, is "it's complicated". I can think of situations where any of the above options you listed might be true. (Another possible option is "The baby has no nationality at birth", and would therefore be considered stateless, and would fall under the birth country's rules regarding statelessness). To find a definitive answer for your specific situation, I would start with Wikipedia: British nationality law Spanish nationality law Although Wikipedia is not authoritative, it does give you a good overview of the situation for both countries. There are then links to authoritative sources in each article. In the case of a British and Spanish couple, their baby would probably be both British and Spanish at birth. Additionally, if the baby is born in a country (such as the US) which follows the jus soli rules, then the baby would also acquire the citizenship of their birth country.

There are a couple of flaws in your hypothetical. Nobody, certainly not the state, represents the birth records as inerrant or complete. Birth records frequently have to be corrected. In fact the point of many paternity suits is to correct the official birth record. Sometimes the father, or even the mother will be listed as "unknown" on the birth record, so the absence of a birth record naming a person as a father is not dispositive. No government official would ever issue a legal document declaring that the man is not any child's legal father because the records don't establish that. At best they could issue a document stating that the man was not the father of record for any child in the state. Anyway, the exercise would be pointless. The only birth record the court would be interested in would be that for the child before them. None of the other birth records would be relevant to the case at hand. The court in a paternity case would ask for evidence, such as birth certificates, or statements acknowledging paternity. If the two parties continued to dispute paternity, the court would order a paternity test. Older blood typing tests sometimes left paternity ambiguous, but modern DNA paternity testing is can achieve 99.99% certainty, baring fraud or laboratory error.

No. While twins are 'natural clones', pregnancy with identical twins naturally or as a result of infertility treatment is not a form of reproductive cloning. Reproductive cloning involves a deliberate biomedical technique - transplanting the nucleus of the donor somatic cell into the host egg cell or reprogramming adult cells into induced pluripotent stem cells ("iPSCs"). Such a clone has one parent - unlike twins who have two parents. The law I'm aware of pertains to and prohibits the reproductive cloning of human beings. Article 3(2)(d) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union prohibits "the reproductive cloning of human beings." At the national level, reproductive cloning is banned in EU member states, Switzerland, and many other countries. Also consider that there are many clinics that openly provide fertility treatment with such drugs, some funded by the public purse (e.g. via the UK's NHS), so either they operate illegally and the authorities turn a blind eye or what they do isn't illegal where they operate.

When the person has been naturalised, that is, when the US government officially recognises them as a US citizen. There are many pathways to citizenship and the ones on the linked page are pretty typical across the world although the details vary: residence for a period with or without marriage to a citizen service descent.

It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin Tobacco use or non-use doesn't make the list. That's the legal position; if you want advice on how to handle the workplace stuff post your question on the Workplace Stack Exchange.

Does the said law (or any other law or treaty) prohibit Indians to get the pre-natal gender screening test done outside India (in any country where this is legal)? YES, in theory but I cannot find any relevant case law where this has been considered by the court. Section 23(3) of the Pre-Conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act 1994 (PCPNDT) creates the offence for non-medical practitioners etc: Any person who seeks the aid of any [medical practioner etc] or any other person for sex selection or for conducting pre-natal diagnostic techniques on any pregnant women for the purposes other than those specified in sub-section (2) of section 4, he shall, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees for the first offence and for any subsequent offence with imprisonment which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. And section 4(1) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction for any offences committed by: any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India... Normally, criminal justice action would only be considered once the parties returned to India, but note that section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 allows for trials in absentia. However I cannot find any relevant case law to say whether this has actually happened in this type of scenario.

To quote Wikipedia: In theory anyone who is at least 16 and resident in the United Kingdom can call themselves whatever they wish. In practice, however, some form of documentary evidence is required when changing your name on bank accounts, passport, etc: Documentary evidence of a change of name can be in a number of forms, such as a marriage certificate, decree absolute, civil partnership certificate, statutory declaration or deed of change of name. While it seems likely that a certified translation of your marriage certificate would probably be sufficient, it may be quicker (and cheaper) to use a deed of change of name. (See also the government advice on the subject.)

Statelessness is a very serious condition. It is quite likely that a person such as you describe may be required to board an aeroplane to that country but will not be permitted to pass through immigration on arrival - Mehran Karimi Nasseri lived in Charles de Gaulle airport for 18 years in this condition. There are many people in the world who are stateless and this may or may not affect their lives. Citizenship is generally only an issue when crossing international borders or in employment situations, the latter is significant in advanced countries but less of an issue in countries with less-developed economies.

Does copyrighted code protect intellectual property rights on novel algorithms it implements? Imagine you have come up with a novel algorithm to solve a problem, and have implemented it in, e.g., javascript, and have put its src, along with an appropriate copyright, on a publicly available code repository, e.g, bitbucket. Can the copyright alone be enough to keep another entity (let's call it Evilsoft) from copying the algorithm or integrating it with software it produces (which might not be written in the same programming language)? If it isn't the answer, what else is?

No, copyright absolutely does not protect anything "novel" or anything related to algorithms or generally anything functional at all. Copyright only protects your "expressed representation of a creative work". Other people can duplicate your work with a different "expression" and not be infringing on copyright. And if there is nothing creative in your work then it's not even eligible for copyright in the first place. For example, if you figure out how to sort an array with fewer computational steps than what anybody else is doing then that is functional code, not creative code, and anybody can reverse engineer/duplicate your sorting algorithm. However, patents do provide the protection you're looking for. If you want to protect your fancy algorithm then apply for a patent. Patents expire an order of magnitude sooner than copyright, but they are the only means of legally protecting this type of intellectual property. Unlike copyright, patent protection is only available if you apply for it, and it has to be approved by the relevant government department in your country (although you can start using the patented technology before approval has gone through).

united-states You are protected by copyright as a matter of law, even if you don't post a copyright notice, although you have slightly more procedural rights if you do post a copyright notice and there would need to be a filing with the copyright registrar (a division of the Library of Congress) before you brought suit. You can't really get any other intellectual property protections for it except possibly a trademark if you have a distinctive mark or name or logo for the app.

There is no IP in ideas Any code would by subject to copyright (who owns that copyright is itself a convoluted and separate question), however, if the 4 of you abandoned any existing code, notes and images and start over you would have no legal impediment.

Addressing the question of programmer liability, generally speaking, a person who creates something that others use to infringe on copyright is not liable is liable if there are non-infringing uses for the thing (Sony). They can be liable if they intentionally contribute to infringement, viz Grokster one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. End-user liability is different. In order to legally download (watch) anything, you have to have permission from the rights-holder, and from the site operator. The site operator will have terms of service according to which you can access material: if you violate those terms, you are infringing on copyright (you didn't do what the permission to copy required of you). If the site-owner knowingly distributes material without permission, he is an infringer and you have no legal license to copy (watch) that content, so you too are an infringer. If the site-owner unknowingly distributed material without permission and generally complies with the DMCA safe harbor requirements, he is not an infringer but you the user are. Congress has not created an innocent-infringement defense where you can defend yourself against an accusation of infringement by proving that you didn't know that the material was distributed without permission (there is an option to reduce liability for statutory damages to $200 in case of unknowing infringement, but not make all liability go away).

Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy.

As far as I can tell, whenever GitHub redistributes code, it adheres to all of the requirements of the GPL/BSD etc. For example, it never gives away code without including the license text, and it doesn't claim to add unpermitted restrictions to the code. The section you're concerned about is this: That means you're giving us the right to do things like reproduce your content (so we can do things like copy it to our database and make backups); display it (so we can do things like show it to you and other users); modify it (so our server can do things like parse it into a search index); distribute it (so we can do things like share it with other users); and perform it (in case your content is something like music or video). That section isn't worded very precisely, but I understand this to mean they want to reproduce your content in full, not just the code without the license text attached. They want to display your content in full, as you provided it. They want to modify it internally (i.e. they are not redistributing this modified form) in order to allow searching. To the extent that they display code-snippets as search results, that is likely defensible as fair use (search engines are frequently cited as examples of successful fair use defenses). GitHub appears to be acting consistently with the GPL when it reproduces, displays, modifies, and distributes code that you upload. If I'm correct about these facts then nothing that GitHub does with the code goes beyond what the many contributors to a GPL project have explicitly permitted, or what is otherwise permitted by fair use law. If you had some code with a more restrictive license, you might not be able to simultaneously comply with that restrictive license and GitHub's License Grant. Consider the scenario where you have some code that is licensed exclusively to you, and you are not given permission to reproduce or distribute it. In that scenario, the code's license prevents you from agreeing to GitHub's request for a license grant.

This is going to depend on several things. First of all, do you have a lawful, licensed copy of the SDK? My understanding is that Nintendo only licensed the SDK to selected game companies. If what you have is an unauthorized copy, you do not have the legal right even to use it. If what you have is properly licensed, then you do. Or is what you have an unofficial SDK created by someone other than Nintendo? Secondly, what does the license agreement that comes with the SDK provide? Does it require developers to register with Nintendo? If it does, you will need to comply. Nintendo cannot prevent others from writing programs designed to run on their hardware. But they can control who uses their development software, if they choose to. You cannot reproduce in your game any of Nintendo's copyrighted software (or anyone else's) without permission. That applies even more strongly if you intend to sell the software. But you can use any development software for which you have a valid license in whatever ways its license permits. I would expect this includes creating games. It would include selling games that you create that do not use any of Nintendo's code, unless there is a specific provision forbidding that in the license agreement.

There are two processes that go on all the time, and are generally considered legal: Encryption algorithms are attacked by cryptographers and weaknesses identified. In most cases this results in a gradual reduction of the work required to break the algorithm by a few orders of magnitude at a time. The history of SHA-1 is a good example of this. People identify security holes in software and follow responsible disclosure rules. This means that they notify the vendor and give them an opportunity to fix the bug before going public. Note that this is merely considered good practice; immediate publication would be legal too. Your scenario sits at the intersection of these two processes: an attack (process 1) which completely destroys the security of many systems (process 2). Responsible disclosure occupies a legal grey area: someone who finds a bug might have had to exploit it to at least some degree to demonstrate it, and there have been cases where vendors have used police or courts to retaliate. However this wouldn't apply to your scenario. In America the First Amendment makes it unconstitutional to use the legal system to stop people saying true things (copyright excepted, and untrue things are often legal too). If your Wunderkind lives in America then a widely published factual description of their solution would therefore be legal. Legal problems only start if they provide the details in secret to people they should reasonably suspect of intending to use them for crime.

Can I sue Volkswagen for damage to my health? Hypothetically, what legal standing would an individual who does not own a Volkswagen car have to sue Volkswagen for damage to health? As someone who suffers from respiratory issues, it seems that Volkswagen has likely contributed to the decline in my health in some way by having its cars emit 40x the legal limit of some pollutants known to damage human health. What laws cover this kind of injury and is there any precedence in UK law, e.g. for injury from other passive sources such as tobacco smoking or environmental damage?

You can sue anyone you want. But if you are talking about suing VW because they are one of the thousands of entities that contribute to the overall degeneration of our atmospheric quality, then you would lose. You'd have to be able to show that VW itself caused your respiratory problem to either exist or that their diesel cars exacerbated a pre-existing condition. The type of testimony this would require would be expert testimony, and you would have the burden of showing that VW was the root cause. This would be impossible. You could show negligence (maybe even gross negligence or intentional misrepresentation), but you could never show causation and likely not even damage (attributable to them). These are the three elements you would need to prove. I would wager you could not even hire an expert that would testify to this, because they would lose all credibility in their field if they said that one car manufacturer had a measurable/quantifiable negative effect on your health. Even if you could, the judge would probably not certify the testimony as expert as it's likely junk science, or, the expert would just be disbelieved. There is no way to accurately measure their complicity in having their cars automatically pass emissions tests. It may be that their cars were still low E, just not to the extent they claimed.

It’s illegal to modify the exhaust system to make a vehicle noisier after it has been ‘type approved’ (checked it meets environmental and safety standards). The police can also take action if your vehicle’s silencer doesn’t work in the way it was designed or if you’re driving in a way that creates too much noise. https://www.gov.uk/noise-pollution-road-train-plane

As a lawsuit, it doesn't make sense in U.S. law unless you have suffered significant injuries. Your damages are likely to be, at most, nominal ($1) if you discovered it before you were hurt, so you'd only lose the money spent replacing the jar of peanut butter with a non-defective one and the nominal $1 damages. You would not generally have a right to any of your attorneys' fees and personal time spent on a lawsuit like that which would likely cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars on an hourly basis (no attorney would take a case like that on a contingency basis), and would take hundreds of hours of your own personal time.

Colorado statute 42-6-206 imposes disclosure requirements on the sale of vehicles with salvage titles. That you didn't know it was a salvage does not seem to be of concern to this particular statute. This means that you are potentially entitled to redress against the people who sold you the car as well, provided the sale occurred in Colorado and they failed to disclose it to you (i.e., you didn't just forget about it in the intervening years). Given the presence of a law specifically covering your circumstances, it may be worth consulting with a local attorney to see what your obligations are. There may be mitigating circumstances, but they are not currently obvious to me if they're there. (conventional wisdom in the industry is that all private sales are "as-is" with no implied warranty of merchantibility and no recourse for a buyer who doesn't do due diligence -- I was shocked to find a statute specifically protecting buyers of salvage vehicles)

The state health codes applicable to food are here esp. ch. V and here. The primary focus of those health codes is preventing the introduction of toxic substances or pathogens. There is obviously no law against serving meat, nor is there any law against half-and-half pizza. The only possible prospect for a health law addressing your interest would be via the allergy avenue (yes, you do not allege to be allergic to anything – my point is that even if you did, this would not help your cause). There are some provisions regarding training and informing when it comes to "major food allergens", which however is defined as Milk, EGG, FISH (such as bass, flounder, cod, and including crustacean shellfish such as crab, lobster, or shrimp), tree nuts (such as almonds, pecans, or walnuts), wheat, peanuts, and soybeans or proteins derived from the above. Note that mammal meat is not included (it may be an individual allergen, but it is not a statutory major food allergen). Even if you wanted to sue, you would have a very hard time establishing that you were damaged. First you would have to establish that they have a legal obligation to serve you "vegetarian food" (crucially undefined). You might be able to establish that they made such a promise. Now we have to determine whether a reasonable person would conclude that a pie with half-meat and half non-meat is clearly not vegetarian food. I do not believe that there is secular case law addressing this, so the courts would resolve this by determining whether there is a reasonable means for a vegetarian to eat part of such a pizza – obviously, yes, only eat the cheese part (leave wide margins). So there is no legal recourse for getting what you want: there are still ample political options.

Bob can certainly "engage" a personal injury lawyer, but it is highly unlikely that they would take the case... Let's take a look at the facts... In Texas, you are required to register every vehicle unless it is damaged beyond repair or destroyed (it's intended to be scrapped). Bob did not do this In Texas, every registered vehicle must be insured, at a minimum, for liability insurance. Bob did not do this But, because of the insurance requirement you can get the information from TxDOT about the other vehicle's registration and insurance. It's more likely than not that the other vehicle is also uninsured, but if it is, Bob should contact Ted's insurance company. Because Bob did not register or insure the car that was parked on the street, Bob assumed liability that the insurance company would typically cover. If Bob had properly insured the vehicle, including uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (which must be declined in writing in Texas), Bob would be whole (minus the deductible). Bob's total liability should be the deductible on the vehicle. Another not-small contributing factor is that this is a self-proclaimed "project vehicle", meaning it has low current value despite a possible high future value. Without insurance, the entire liability would amount to the actual current value of the vehicle, the amount it would take to buy another in exactly the same condition. Now back to the PI lawyer, they make money by suing insurance companies for personal injury (damage to your car is not a "personal injury") because they have the ability to pay. Private individuals, especially those without insurance, typically do not have the ability to pay. The PI can typically recover all the attorneys fees + up to half the judgement. So even if the PI agreed to take the case, and they won some amount (let's say $50,000 which includes attorneys fees and judgement), Ted would probably not be able to pay for this. The PI goes back to the client for the fees and now Bob is in even worse condition, since a majority of the $50,000 judgement would be attorneys fees. Really the best remedy Bob has in this case is to sue Ted in small claims for the value of the vehicle up to the maximum of the court (in Texas, this is a generous $20,000). Small claims courts have a lower burden of proof and Bob can use Alan as a witness.

Your right to have your horse not be killed is not a consumer right. "Consumer rights" are rights that you only have because you are a consumer. The issue described in the question is not about consumer rights. The sign tells you that there are risks connected to using the car park (obviously because there are lots of cars driving around, there might even be car thieves), and you accepted these risks. It doesn't give the shop permission to do anything they like. Instead of a horse, imagine a shop worker walking around with a hammer and smashing windscreens of cars; that sign isn't going to protect them. But a shop worker collecting trolleys might accidentally bump into your car, and the sign might protect them in such a case. I'd say spraying chemicals strong enough to kill a horse shouldn't happen at all (I suppose these chemicals could also kill a human), and definitely not when there is actually a horse present. To me, it's closer to the employee with a hammer than to the employee with shopping trolleys, so a court should find the shop liable.

Although the local mechanic was suggested by you he was paid by the dealer, and hence was acting as the dealer's agent in the repair. If the dealer did not want to accept this then they could have simply insisted on doing the repair themselves. The dealer is responsible for the actions of their agent, and they cannot run out the clock on the warranty simply by failing to repair the fault. You could write to the dealer saying that you will accept their third repair on the understanding that the fault and two attempts to repair it predate the expiration of the warranty and hence you retain the right to return the car if this third attempt at repair does not remedy the problem. Or you could simply insist on returning the car for a refund. If they won't take it, write a letter stating that either they agree to take it back or you will take action in the county court to recover your money. Most businesses will conceed at this point because spending time in court is expensive even if you win. I say "write" because that means they can't deny agreeing later on. You can of course hand them the letter yourself rather than sending it by post.

Are pictures that don't have model releases protected under the DMCA? Let's say a user of my website posted a picture. I know that as long as my website and the picture satisfies the conditions of the DMCA, I have a safe harbor against copyright claims by the individual who owns the rights to the image. But if it's a picture of a person, and the person never signed a model release form, do they have a claim against me for infringing their Rights of Publicity? Basically what I'm asking is: in the DMCA, are copyright and right-of-publicity issues essentially treated as the same thing?

Copyright vests in the photographer that takes the photograph, or their employer. If the subject of a photograph does not own copyright over the photograph, then they can't bring a claim of copyright infringement against you. The DMCA safe harbors only protect you against copyright infringement claims. Further, personality rights are recognised at state level through statute or common law. On the matter of whether copyright and right of publicity are treated as the same, the seventh circuit has said in Toney v. L'OREAL USA, INC., 406 F. 3d 905 at [911]: ... the bottom line is that Toney's claim under the Illinois right of publicity statute is not preempted by federal copyright law.

No. The Creative Commons license seeks to promote recognition of the original author's work through attribution, but does not provide the same framework for enforcement that the DMCA would. The proper approach in cases such as the deleted Wikipedia article and subsequent reuse would be to provide a courteous notice to Wikipedia of your original publication and ask to be listed as the original author or be provided attribution. In the absence of relief there, then what rights you have would be determined by the Wikipedia Terms of Service. Since, and I am assuming here, that you are not generating billions of dollars on the original publication in royalties, seeking to bring a DMCA type enforcement on a Wikipedia article dispute would be like trying to swat a fly with a sledgehammer. (or more commonly in divorce, two people having hearing and spending thousands of dollars on attorney's fees fighting over a blender -- they are free to do it, but they would have been much better off buying 500 new blenders...) Keeping perspective and providing a courteous letter is probably your most cost efficient first step in situations like this. And in all areas of law, just remember, you catch more flies with honey than you do with salt. (meaning taking the courteous approach usually affords better results than a scalding letter breathing hell-fire and brimstone) In followup to earlier comment: Presuming you would be covered by the World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty on Copyright of 1996 (as a U.S. Citizen you would be), and your copyright is on file with the United States Copyright Offices (same presumption) as prerequisite to suit, then there is nothing that prevents you from invoking the protections under general copyright law and under the DMCA (inlcuding the Takedown provisions). Note: these are not the only prerequisites to taking action, but instead the minimum critera to qualify, and note this does not pass on the wisdom of doing so (there are often significant consequences to improperly invoking previsions of certain acts).

Copyright, No US Copyright does not protect names, images, or "personas". The US Copyright Office Circular 33 ("Works Not Protected by Copyright") states, on pages 2-3: Words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans, are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of authorship. The Office will not register individual words or brief combinations of words, even if the word or short phrase is novel, distinctive, or lends itself to a play on words. Examples of names, titles, or short phrases that do not contain a sufficient amount of creativity to support a claim in copyright include: The name of an individual (including pseudonyms, pen names, or stage names) The title or subtitle of a work, such as a book, a song, or a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work The name of a business or organization The name of a band or performing group The name of a product or service A domain name or URL The name of a character Catchwords or catchphrases Mottos, slogans, or other short expression An image, including a portrait, is usually protected by copyright (unless it is old enough that the protection has expired). But the copyright most often belongs to the creator of the image, such as the photographer or artist, not by the subject represented. If Bob draws or paints or otherwise creates an image of Alice, from seeing her in person or from multiple publicly available likenesses of her, not clearly based on any one such image, Bob will hold the copyright in that image unless he sells or otherwise transfers the copyright. Alice will not have any copyright in such an image. Right of Publicity, Yes Some but not all US states, and some but not all countries, recognize a "right of publicity". In Ohio, the "Right of publicity" is protected by Chapter 2741 of the Ohio Revised Code. This right extends to various aspects of a person's "persona", and may be enforced by a civil suit. These rights do not depend on a person's status as a "public figure" or "celebrity" or not. These rights are separate from any copyrights involved. These rights may be limited by the rights granted by the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. Section 2741.01 (Defnitions) provides, in relevant part, that: (A) "Persona" means an individual's name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, or distinctive appearance, if any of these aspects have commercial value. (B) "Commercial purpose" means the use of or reference to an aspect of an individual's persona in any of the following manners: (B) (1) On or in connection with a place, product, merchandise, goods, services, or other commercial activities not expressly exempted under this chapter; (B) (2) For advertising or soliciting the purchase of products, merchandise, goods, services, or other commercial activities not expressly exempted under this chapter; (B) (3) For the purpose of promoting travel to a place; (B) (4) For the purpose of fundraising. (C) "Name" means the actual, assumed, or clearly identifiable name of or reference to a living or deceased individual that identifies the individual. (D) "Right of publicity" means the property right in an individual's persona to use the individual's persona for a commercial purpose. Section 2741.02 (Using individual's persona for commercial purpose without authorization.) provides that: (A) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not use any aspect of an individual's persona for a commercial purpose: (A) (1) During the individual's lifetime; (A) (2) For a period of sixty years after the date of the individual's death; or (A) (3) For a period of ten years after the date of death of a deceased member of the Ohio national guard or the armed forces of the United States. (B) A person may use an individual's persona for a commercial purpose during the individual's lifetime if the person first obtains the written consent to use the individual's persona from a person specified in section 2741.05 of the Revised Code. If an individual whose persona is at issue has died, a person may use the individual's persona for a commercial purpose if either of the following applies: (B) (1) The person first obtains the written consent to use the individual's persona from a person specified in section 2741.05 of the Revised Code who owns the individual's right of publicity. (B) (2) The name of the individual whose persona is used was the name of a business entity or a trade name at the time of the individual's death. (C) Subject to the terms of any agreement between a person specified in section 2741.05 of the Revised Code and a person to whom that person grants consent to use an individual's right of publicity, a consent obtained before the death of an individual whose persona is at issue remains valid after the individual's death. (D) For purposes of this section: (D) (1) A use of an aspect of an individual's persona in connection with any news, public affairs, sports broadcast, or account does not constitute a use for which consent is required under division (A) of this section. (D) (2) A use of an aspect of an individual's persona in connection with any political campaign and in compliance with Title XXXV of the Revised Code does not constitute a use for which consent is required under division (A) of this section. (E) The owners or employees of any medium used for advertising, including but not limited to, a newspaper, magazine, radio or television network or station, cable television system, billboard, transit ad, and global communications network, by whom any advertisement or solicitation in violation of this section is published or disseminated are not liable under this section or section 2741.07 of the Revised Code unless it is established that those owners or employees had knowledge of the unauthorized use of the persona as prohibited by this section. Section 2741.03 states that these rights apply only to the use of the persona of a person resident in the state of Ohio, or who was so resident when that person died on or after January 1, 1998. Section 2741.04 states that the rights of publicity can be livened, transferred by contract, or left as an inheritance. Section 2741.05 defines who may grant written consent for use of a persona, including the person whose persona it is, a person who owns more than 50% of the rights, and a person explicitly authorized to grant such consent (such as an agent). Sections 2741.06 and 2741.07 authorize a civil suit for violation of rights of publicity. The plaintiff may receive any or all of: actual damages; statutory damages in an amount between $2,500.00 and $10,000.00; and in an appropriate case punitive or exemplary damages. Awards of legal costs add attorney fees are authorized. Injunctions to halt further violations are authorized. Triple damages are authorized against certain parties. Products, merchandise, and goods made in violation of these rights may be seized, and after a final judgemetn, destroyed orm otherwise disposed of. Section 2741.09 (Exceptions) provides that: (A) This chapter does not apply to any of the following: (A) (1) (a) A literary work, dramatic work, fictional work, historical work, audiovisual work, or musical work regardless of the media in which the work appears or is transmitted, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt under division (A)(1)(d) of this section; (A) (1) (b) Material that has political or newsworthy value; (A) (1) (c) Original works of fine art; (A) (1) (d) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted by division (A)(1)(a), (b), or (c) of this section. < (A) (2) The use of an individual's name to truthfully identify the individual as the author of or contributor to a written work or the performer of a recorded performance under circumstances in which the written work or the recorded performance is otherwise lawfully reproduced, exhibited, or broadcast; (A) (3) The use of an aspect of an individual's persona in connection with the broadcast or reporting of an event or topic of general or public interest; (A) (4) The use of the persona of an individual solely in the individual's role as a member of the public if the individual is not named or otherwise singled out as an individual; (A) (5) A use of an individual's persona by an institution of higher education if all of the following apply: (A) (5) (a) The individual is or was a student at, or a member of the faculty or staff of, the institution of higher education. (A) (5) (b) The use of the individual's persona is for educational purposes or for the promotion of the institution of higher education and its educational or institutional objectives. (A) (6) A use of the persona of an individual that is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as long as the use does not convey or reasonably suggest endorsement by the individual whose persona is at issue. (B) This chapter does not affect rights or privileges recognized under the Ohio Constitution or United States Constitution.

No, one cannot safely assume that because some people have done a thing without being sued, that it is OK to do a similar thing and no suit is possible. It is possible that people who upload a video, or a section of it, have permission. It is perhaps more likely that the copyright owner does not choose to sue, for whatever reason. But a different owner of a different video might make a different choice. Uploading a video, or even a section of a video, without permission, will be copyright infringement, unless an exception to copyright such as fair use or fair dealing applies. Such an infringement gives the copyright owner valid grounds to bring a suit. But the owner can choose whether or not to sue. An owner can sue in one case of infringement but not in another, for any reason or none. If the expected damages are small, it many not be worth the time, trouble, and costs to sue. In the US, one must register a copyright before bringing suit for infringement of that copyright, and there is a fee for registration. Some owners feel strongly about the use of their work, and will sue on any pretext. Some may prefer to tacitly support uses that they approve of by not bringing suit. One cannot tell the attitude of a particular owner unless that owner has stated what his or her view is. Short films are just as protected as full-length feature films, and suit can be filed for infringing the copyright on a short film. But the more expensive a film was to make, and the more money the owner expects it to earn, the more likely it is that the owner will choose to sue. Many people infringe by uploading short films or videos, gambling that the copyright owners will never learn of this, or will not trouble to sue. Sometimes such infringers are correct, and sometimes they get sued. I do not understand what the OP means by the part of the question that reads "There should be more detail and complex lines over here" What additional detail is wanted? Who does the OP expect to provide it? What sort of "lines" does this refer to?

Person A has to have created the data to hold copyright; for most kinds of data this has no legal effect because facts are not protected by copyright. A mineable database probably does not have the necessary creative elements for copyright. An algorithm is not protected by copyright (it might be patented). Person C's program is copyrighted. The product created by D is probably copyrighted, depending on what degree of creativity is involved in their transformation. If the transformation is automatic then no, but if creative judgments are applied to the output of the program then maybe. Though the resulting product is another database of facts, and the facts cannot be protected. In terms of "using the model", only C and possibly B have any control. If it is necessary to validate the software using A's data and A has kept the data secret, C might negotiate with A to use the data, in order to complete his program, and that could give A some interest in the program.

What real human teeth look like is a fact, and not subject to copyright. But some particular designer's or artist's image of human teeth would be protected by copyright, unless it is too old -- (prior to 1923 under US law), or unless it lost copyright in some other way. To create a derivative work based on such a copyrighted work would require permission from the copyright holder. Otherwise it is copyright infringement, and the holder could sue. As to the car models, the original designs would be protected by copyright, and a maker of a model should have permission in some form, or again the copyright holder could sue. Of course, a copyright holder is not required to sue, and if the value of the work is too small a suit might not pay. But that is not a matter of legal right, but of the holder's choice and business decision. A copyright holder could always change such a decision at a later time, when perhaps the value had increased. The exact laws on how to file copyright suits, and exceptions that might apply, vary by country. The question does not indicate what county it applies to.) But the basic principals are the same in all countries that adhere to the Berne Copyright Convention, which is all but a very few countries in the world. See this Wikipedia article for more details.

Both Bob and Charles are liable for infringement in the US. The fact that Charles had no idea that Bob was an infringer is not a defense, but it mitigates the statutory damages consequences for him. Either party can negotiate with Alice after the fact for a license, and Alice can grant either party but not the other permission to copy. The terms of the license that Alice gives Bob could either allow CCo reposting, or some more restrictive redistribution right. If the license requires a notice prohibiting further redistribution and Bob omits that notification, Bob will have breached the terms of the license in omitting the notification, so we're back to square 1. If Alice fails to specify a no-redistribution notification condition on Bob's reposting, Alice may have granted an implied license to the world, a matter which has to be determined by the courts.

united-states In US law this is covered by 17 USC 512 (c) which was added to the US copyright law by the Digital Millineum Copyright Act (DMCA) Under that law, the service provide is not liable if The service provider does not actually know that content posted is infringing; and The provider does not have good reason to belive that content is infringing; and The provider promptly removes or makes inaccessible infringing content once the provider knows or has reason to believe that content is infringing; and The provider complies with the DMCA take down procedure; and The provider has and publishes the contact info of a designated agent to receive complaints and takedown notices. (The above is a paraphrase of the actual text of the law, rewritten for clarity.) The above is all true no matter how short or long the videos or music selections may be. The length is not relevant, except as it may affect a claim fgor fair use, where length is only one of the factors to be considered. The above would also apply if the video, as opposed to the music, was a copyright infringement. Note that the individual poster can still be liable for copyright infringement, and the service provider may be required to respond to a subpoena for information identifying posters. Note also that a service provider must warn posters not to post content protected by copyright to which the poster has no rights, and must have some procedure in place to limit or cancel the access of posters who persistently post infringing content.

Copyright for one 2D character I'm having trouble understanding the copyright law when registering one 2D character. I understand that a 2D character is an illustration, so it falls under "Work of the Visual Arts." But I'm confused on the part that says "Are you registering one work (one song, one poem, one illustration, etc.)? Check '' NO '' to this question if the work is one of the following: a collection of works (such as: book of poetry, CD of songs, multiple photographs and illustrations), a collective work, website or database because these works do not qualify for the Single Application." I can submit one illustration of a character, but since a character has multiple expressions, can wear different clothes, etc., would one character still be considered as ONE work?

A character can not be copyrighted. Only a work (picture, text, movie etc.) featuring that character can. However, a character can be registred as a trademark (more specifically, its name and its appearance).

Generally speaking, it is illegal for you to do this. Copyright gives the creator of the image the exclusive right to copy it, and just making copies to send to other people is probably not going to be fair use. Making copies without a license from the copyright holder would therefore be copyright infringement. Are there likely to be any consequences for doing this? Probably not.

germany I am reasonably sure that works like this would be Public Domain, i.e. not copyrighted in the first place. In Germany, copyright (or more precisely, Author's Right) can only be held by a natural person, which is a legal term of art that essentially means "human being". There are two groups of natural persons involved here: the programmers and the creators of the works which are part of the training set. However, I can't see how either group could have a reasonable claim of copyright. Note: there have been similar discussions about GitHub Copilot, an AI that writes code for you. It is my understanding that the process used by GitHub Copilot is roughly comparable to the process used here. With GitHub Copilot, there have been instances where significant snippets which are part of the training set have appeared in the output with only minor alterations. In this case, it is likely that the original author will have copyright over that portion of the output. However, IFF a human being were actually involved in selecting specific works, then there is probably a copyright based on the creative decision of selecting this particular work and rejecting all the others. This is similar to the classic textbook example of a driftwood sculpture: the creative process here is not creating the sculpture but choosing to pick up this particular piece of driftwood instead of the hundreds of others on the beach. So, if you simply generate these works and publish all of them, there is no copyright. If you generate a large batch and then select a certain number, then the person who made the selection might hold a copyright.

The book teaches you how to draw horses. Once you learned how to do it, and you draw a really nice horse, you have drawn it yourself. You have the copyright. You use it any way you like. Of course it's different if instead of drawing the horse yourself you just make a copy of an image in the book. That would be the author's copyrighted drawing. Added since the question reappeared: One way to learn drawing horses is to start by making copies by hand of others' good drawings, practicing, practicing more, until eventually you can draw your own horses, which was the purpose of the book. So these copies made as part of the learning process might be treated differently. And the might not actually be copies, just your best attempt at making a copy. On the other hand, taking this book, making ten copies using a scanner, framing and selling them, is obvious copyright infringement.

A book (or any other creative work) published in the 1800s is now in the public domain everywhere in the world (excepting odd cases like Peter Pan where a special rule applies in some jurisdictions.) Anyone may legally quote from such a work at any length with no legal requirement for permission. In fact there is no legal requirement to attribute the quote to the author (although there is an ethical requirement). In fact one may publish a new edition of such a work, unchanged or modified in any way one chooses, with no legal need to obtain permission from anyone or to pay any royalties or fees. If the work were recent enough to still be protected by copyright, a limited quote could be used under fair use, fair dealing or another exception to copyright under the laws of most countries. The exact rules vary by country, and are often highly fact-dependent, so the exact details will matter. If one wanted to quote enough from a recent work that permission is required, the copyright holder, who is often not the publisher, would need to grant permission. That is often the author or the author's heir, but it can be a person or firm to which the author transferred the rights. Sometimes the rights-holder can be hard to identify. Update: it would be possible for a work published in, say, 1890 by an author then young who lived to a fairly old age, dying in, say 1960, to still be protected in some countries, although not in the US. (Anything published before 1925 is now PD in the US.) But Charlotte Bronte died in 1855, and all of her work has long been in the public domain

Under US law, and I believe under the laws of most countries, each of the various photographs of the apple would be protected by copyright. Thew initial owner would be the photographer, or perhaps the photographer's employer, in each case. Copyright protects expression, including both words and image. It does not protect ideas. The idea of an apple is not protected. The specific representation of a particular apple would be. If the painter imitates the specific feature of the apple shown in the photographs, to the extent that the painting is a derivative work of one or more of the photos, then the painter needs the permission of the copyright holder(s). Without that permission, creating the painting is infringement of copyright. However, if the painter merely took the general idea of an apple, and created a new expression of that idea, without using any of the specifics of the photos, there there would be no infringement. If the photos were instead images of an imaginary thing, perhaps a dragon, or some invented machine of building perhaps, with the images created by perhaps a compute animation program, or by photographing a model, the legal rules would be the same. If the painter simply used the idea from the photos, there is no infringement. If the painter used sufficient specific detail so that the painting is a derivative work, then permission is required. Exactly how much detail must be used for a work to be considered "derivative" is a matter of judgement -- ultimately the judgement of a court if the matter is disputed. There is no clear bright line making that distinction. That C has commissioned the painter T to create the painting is not relevant, unless C is the copyright owner of the photos, or has secured permission from the copyright owner(s). If C validly grants permission, then there is no copyright issue even if the painting is a derivative work. It does not matter what technique or technical means T uses to create the painting. T may use a brush, a pallet knife, a toy car, drips of paint, or a compute drafting program. If, by whatever means, T creates a derivative work, then permission is needed or else it is an act of infringement merely to create the work. If the work is not derivative, then no permission is needed. Copyright law applies no matter what specific technique the creator of an image uses, provided that human creativity is involved.

You don't need the copyright. You need a license that allows you to use the artwork. If there was no agreement in writing or verbally about a payment, then she owns the copyright on all the artwork she created, and you have no license. Publishing your app without copyright or license would be legally very dangerous; it would actually be copyright infringement. You have no right to demand the copyright or a license. You can persuade the designer, usually by paying money, or by paying some percentage of the income from the app, to give you the copyright or a license to use the graphics. And you definitely want things in writing. How to get a license? You find the person, send her a letter asking for a license, which would be for example a letter saying "I hereby grant s1ddok the non-exclusive right to include the artwork listed below, to which I hold the copyright, in the applications XXX and YYY, and to sell copies of those applications including the artwork, in exchange for a payment of $ZZZ" or something similar. She may do this if offered an appropriate amount money, or a percentage of the sales or profits, or some amount per application downloaded. A copyright transfer is a bit more complicated (especially if she is abroad) and will also cost you more, because copyright transfer means she loses the right to her own works.

You likely have no legal recourse Your copyright claim is irrelevant and your title claim is likely statute barred. It is a little unclear exactly what is going on here so I will state my understanding and answer on this basis. There is a historic artifact (the notebook) that contains words and possibly pictures made by someone, now deceased, who was a relation of yours. You believe that in the normal course of inheritance, that notebook should have become a possession of yours or others in your near family. At some point in the (distant?) past the notebook came into the possession of another family. The museum acquired the item from someone in this family; I will assume in good faith - that is, without knowing about your claim to it. Copyright You say you have "copyright of a precious notebook" - this is not true. Any copyright you might have is in the words and drawings in the notebook - they give you no claim to the notebook itself. The distinction here might be illustrated by considering the words of the Declaration of Independence (which are available for the Googling) and the actual engrossed copy held in the National Archives. Copyright is a bundle of exclusive rights that attach to literary and artistic expression once placed in a tangible form. The notebook is the tangible form but it is the words and pictures that the copyright subsists in. Assuming that you own the copyright that does not give you any right over the physical notebook; it only gives you rights to prevent or allow copies or derivative works to be made and only to the extent that those uses are not permitted by copyright law. Based solely on copyright, you could not prevent the museum from displaying the notebook (as an artifact without displaying the copyrighted words), including photographs of it in catalogues or on their website, or even reproducing small parts of it for educational purposes. In any event, copyright only lasts for a set period of time. The exact details depend on which nation's law the copyright was originally created and sometimes when. The US is particularly tricky here but other nations can also make things challenging. In addition, when suing for copyright infringement, the laws of the nation where the infringing copy is produced are also relevant. Title Title is the legal term for the bundle of rights that we commonly think of as ownership of property. For our purposes we are going to limit ourselves to just these: possession: who physically has the property whether they have a right to it or not. right of possession: who has the legal right to be in possession, whether they presently have it or not right or property: is the right which, if all relevant facts are known (and allowed), defeats all other claims These exist in a hierarchy - 3 beats everyone, 2 beats everyone but 3, and 1 beats everyone but 2 or 3. Often these rights are possessed by a single person - when I'm driving my car I have possession, I have the right of possession, and I have the right of property. When I take my car to the mechanic and it gets stolen - the thief has possession, the mechanic has the right of possession, and I have the right of property. Here the museum has possession of the notebook - which gives them the best claim so far. To defeat that, you would need to be able to prove that you either have a right of possession or a right of property. This is not as easy as it sounds. To do this thoroughly, you would need to prove that the original author had one of these rights in the notebook - that he didn't steal it, or buy it from somebody who stole it, or that it wasn't made with stolen paper, or stolen glue etc. This could be presumed unless someone had evidence to contest it. Then you would need to prove that the notebook should have come to you through gift or purchase. This is particularly troublesome. Let's assume that this notebook originally belonged to your great-grandfather (that is he had all three rights above) and, when he passed, he had three surviving children. Unless he specifically willed it to one of those children (or the cat's home) then the three children will inherit the right of property and the right of possession collectively. Of course, unless they share a house, only one of those children can actually possess it. Then each of those children has 3 surviving children; when all three pass on, those 9 will own it collectively - and so on. Now, because this becomes such a bloody mess, governments have passed statutes of limitations that draw a line in how far back people can go in pursuing these claims against the person in possession. These limits vary by jurisdiction but ranges of 2-10 years are typical; they may sometimes be extended in exceptional circumstances by the courts. So, when the other family took possession of the notebook, the clock started running for your family to file a claim to get it back. Unless this happened within say, the last half-decade, you basically have no legal recourse.

Who is Liable for the Satisfaction of the Mortgage Debt Pursuant to Deed of Gift when Grantor Dies - Estate of Grantor or Beneficiary? In a situation where: John takes out a mortgage on a house at 55 Main Street by himself (i.e., only John appears on the mortgage). John puts Mike (one of his grandchildren) on a Deed of Gift for the house so that it transfers to him upon death. John dies while still owing 80% of the mortgage. Does the estate of John have an obligation to pay off the mortgage on 55 Main Street and give the house to Mike?

Whether or not the estate has an obligation to pay the mortgage is really dependent on the terms of the estate plan and the solvency of the estate. The fact that someone is on the deed to a property (whether a deed of gift or a transfer on death instrument) that automatically passes upon death of the original owner to a relative has little or nothing, really, to do with the estate plan. While it may have been part of the person's ultimate plan for the disposal of their assets in life and at death, that is different than being part of the actual estate plan, which deals with the disposition of assets upon death, setting out the wishes of the deceased as it pertains to all property. There are lots of people who end up in this position, even though the original person on the deed did not intend to purchase or leave the other any property. It happens a lot when say a child does not have adequate credit to secure a mortgage to buy a home, but has the money to pay a mortgage. So, in that scenario usually a parent or grandparent will put the mortgage in their name (the other will live there and pay the mortgage) and then in the event the "helper" dies, they have it pass to the other at death, either thru a "TOD" or a "joint tenancy", so that in the event they die intestate, or if the will is challenged, there will be no question who owns the house...the equity in it, anyway. It (the instrument) is its own separate entity, not subject to the will except to the extent the deceased makes it subject (I'm getting to that part). Like a life insurance policy, that pays on death but is not subject to any terms of the will, it can stand alone since deed is its own instrument, separate from any wills or trusts. Under federal law, the mortgage must be allowed to remain in effect without changes when it passes from one person to another because of a death. This negates any due-on-sale clause in the mortgage. Who pays for the remainder of what is owed, however, generally depends on the deceased's will. The will might stipulate, for example, that the heir receive the home, free and clear, with the estate to pay all monies due. In this case, the executor will either use liquid assets, or sell other non-liquid assets in the estate to pay off the mortgage. Other times, it will say that the heir get the equity, plus X amount of dollars, which the heir can put toward the home's mortgage or not. If the will is silent on the issue, it is the responsibility of the heir/person to whom the property transfers (they needn't even be an heir) to pay the mortgage upon its normal term due, or sell the property to satisfy the debt. In the event the property is worth less than the remaining mortgage, the bank will usually take the house in "deed in lieu of foreclosure" rather than seek overage from the estate.

Even in a community property state like Washington, a person is not liable for the premarital debts of a spouse (but is responsible for postmarital debts). During the marriage, jointly-owned property is accessible to creditors, but after divorce, there is no risk to the non-debtor. Though, you would be responsible if you were a co-signer on the loan.

Insurance doesn't work the way you think it does Insurance indemnifies Bob from any liability he has towards Mary up to the value of the insurance. So, if a court finds that Bob must pay Mary $200k then Bob must pay Mary $200k. Bob can then turn to his insurer to indemnify him and, under the terms of the policy, they will pay out $100k for personal liability leaving Bob to find the other $100k wherever he can. The insurance company would not be a party to the litigation (although it would handle the defence on behalf of the insured) so a court cannot order it to do anything. Further there are many, many cases where the insured is found liable for something which the policy (allegedly) doesn’t cover - this often leads to litigation between the insured and the insurer. In parallel, the policy will cover the property damage in accordance with its terms. Assuming the house is adequately insured then the insurer will pay for the demolition, design & reconstruction. It is possible that by agreement or at the insurer's discretion that the insurance can cut Bob a check and leave him to do what he likes with the money: rebuild the home, go on a holiday, or pay a debt he might owe to someone. If the house is not adequately insured then Bob is a co-insurer and the cost of rebuilding is split. For example, if the cost of rebuilding is actually $150k and the total damage amounts to $90k then the insurer will pay $60k and Bob will have to pay the remaining $30k. Co-insurance terms usually have an error factor built in.

Given that Bob has no obligation to pay anything to Charles, who has no legal duty to do anything, I don't see how Charles could have liability to Bob. If Charles wants to, he can decline to pay a reward to Bob or can pay an amount smaller than Charles hoped for as a reflection of Charles' delay.

If you had an agreement that amounts to a contract, it is binding even if it was informal. However, if your agreement was not in writing, it might be hard to prove. You can easily prove that you transferred money to the other party. But can you prove that it was a loan an not a gift? And even if it is agreed to be a loan, if no repayment time was specified, what says that the debt is due now? Was the agreement really for a loan repayable on demand? The court would have to determine what your real contract was, or what contract can be implied from the actions of the parties. Also, if you are in a common-law jurisdiction, there could be a question of what consideration there was for the loan. Without consideration, there is no valid contract in such a jurisdiction. Perhaps a promise to repay could be treated as sufficient consideration. Small-claims courts do deal with unclear verbal contracts on a regular basis, but the outcome will depend on the facts of the case, and on the details of local law. It might be wise to consult a local lawyer with small-claims experience. A single consultation should not be too expensive. In response to comment If the "written binding agreements" include a statement from the other person that this is a loan, and a promise to repay it, you are in a stronger position than I had thought from the original question. The question for the court would be, since there was no due date agreed, what is a reasonable date to impose. The court might treat it as a loan repayable on demand, or specify some particular date for repayment.

If three people inherited a house in equal shares, then a new deed should have been prepared and filed with the appropriate governmental authority (the county in most US states) before probate is closed. When that is done the authority of the executors over the house as executors has ended. However, if I understand you correctly, the two former executors are also two of the three heirs to the house. Thus they own a 2/3rds interest in the house. At least they can sell their interests without your consent, leaving you a minority owner with the purchaser owner a majority. In some jurisdictions they may be able to force a sale, paying you your share of the purchase price. But this would be because of their majority ownership, not because of their former status as executors. Addition: In some states co-owners who are joint tenants may not sell their interests without the consent of the other co-owners, but this is jnot true in North Carolina According to the site of the Hutchens Law office: ownership as tenants in common provides each party with the right to sell, gift, devise, or otherwise convey their interest in the property without the permission of the other owners. This means that the ownership interest is freely alienable or transferable. As a result, an owner may sell or give their interest in the property to anyone they want, or they may willingly or by judgment use their interest in the property to secure or satisfy a debt with a creditor. Therefore, parties entering into an agreement to purchase property as tenants in common should be aware that they may ultimately end up owning the property with a stranger. If this were to happen, there is a way out, but it may be costly. At any time, if the parties can't agree, any owner may petition the court for a partition of the property. The court could require one owner to buy another out or force the sale of the property. The court will decide the ultimate outcome based on equity. ... [I]f the intent of co-owners holding interest as joint tenants is to automatically transfer their interest at death to the survivor, the language must be on the conveying instrument as right of survivorship is not automatic with joint tenancy in North Carolina and if the language in not included, the decedent's interest will pass to his heirs. ... However, any owner has the right to convey their ownership interest during their life; and if they do, the survivorship agreement ends, and owners simply become joint tenants by operation of law. In North Carolina there seems to be little practical difference between co-owners who are tenants in common, and those who are joint tenants without a right of survivorship. But whichever form of co-ownership is chosen: tenants in common, joint tenants without a right of survivorship, or joint tenants with a right of survivorship, each of the co-owners has a right during his or her lifetime to sell, give away, or use as collateral on a loan his or her share of the property, without consulting the other co-owners. They cannot force the other co-owner(s) to sell, except by starting an action of partition in a court, when a judge would decide. An unrelated buyer might be unwilling to purchase only a 1/3 or 2/3rds interest, because the remaining co-owner(s) would still have full rights to use and occupy the house, can could sell to a different buyer. All co-owners are responsible for their proportionate shares of all expenses, including mortgage payments, repairs, and taxes.

The executor must follow the will The executors legal duty is to execute the testator’s intent as detailed in their will. While I have no doubt that you understand the testators verbal wishes as expressed to you on a particular day - how do you know they didn’t change their mind some time after that? As others have said, with the beneficiaries’ agreement you can override the express written wishes but if one or more don’t agree, you will have to follow the will. To do otherwise exposes you to personal liability if a disgruntled beneficiary sues. The will is your shield, you step out from behind it at your peril. Now, the beneficiaries may be perfectly happy with the verbal intent now but … when there is money on the table, they may see it differently. Do yourself a favour, have the difficult conversation and get the will changed or refuse to be the executor.

What happens when a person dies intestate is that the court appoints someone to be the executor. That person is supposed to settle the decedent's debts, and divide the remainder equally among the siblings. It is virtually guaranteed that the mortgage-holder will get their share – you can't just sell a house with a mortgage and run. In the meantime, the estate has to keep paying the mortgage and property taxes. The executor has wide latitude to dispose of the estate, and clearing out personal possessions is a necessary part of liquidating the estate. Those possessions being part of the estate, they "count", therefore that mink coat worth $10,000 can't just be "taken" by the executor in order to tidy things up. But that broken weed-eater worth $1 can just be thrown away and not stored for some months, waiting for the final reckoning. The executor is entitled to compensation for his work and reimbursement for his expenses, so nickle and diming the small possessions is probably economically counterproductive. The executor has the legal power to determine how the legally required distribution is carried out, that is, the law doesn't require a majority vote of the heirs in order to dispose of each and every item of property. If there is an actual legal dispute, if you believe that the executor is improperly carrying out the job, you can hire a lawyer to have him removed, or otherwise put pressure on him to get a change in how things are. This will probably cost you more than you might get from the estate. It is possible that the real estate market will not support the current sale price and therefore a lower asking price is necessary (i.e. the executor needs a reality check). A combination real estate agent + lawyer could help you figure out what to do with the house to make it sell.

Can fiction "fail" to be defamatory if it is "less bad" than the actual facts? In the year 2000, Fox TV produced a rather embarrassing show called "Who Wants to Marry a Multimillionaire." Insiders know who did what within the show, but suppose someone produced a fictionalized version of how the show came about, and referred to Mr. X and Mr. Y, or Executive 1 and Executive 2. I would imagine that this would protect one from a lawsuit by the executives themselves. Would it protect one against a lawsuit by Fox? I read somewhere that a fictitious (and presumably false) statement will not be considered defamatory if the "sting" of the actual facts is greater than the false statement. Put another way, a false statement is not considered "defamatory" if it does "less damage" than the facts. How does this work?

The people on the show would be considered public figures, so if there was information that the fictitious writing was actually based on/about them, defamation must be proven to a different standard for public figures. Public figures, including officeholders and candidates, actors or musicians successful enough to be held in "the public eye," have to show that the defamation was made with malicious intent, which is a greater burden than defamation for the average person. Also, damages may be limited to actual (special) damages unless there is actual malice. Special damages being lost income or some other quantifiable measure of loss. If one cannot tell who it (the fictional story) is about because the name is changed, then Fox, or whomever, couldn't sue anyway because they need standing, which they wouldn't have if you called the person X, unless the story was so exact that it is obvious who you are talking about. For instance, the show Law and Order is often based on famous stories in the news, or criminal cases they dig up. Those fictional story lines often add or delete details. The case may be more or less damaging to the actual person it was based on. However, they make a statement before the show airs that says something like "Any similarity to real people or events is strictly coincidental. This show is not based on any real person or event, but is a work of fiction." If I were going to make a fictional account of a big network show, I would use some sort of disclosure like that to be safe. That said, if the statements or storyline is less damaging than the facts themselves, as revealed on the show, it isn't defamatory at all: Defamation necessarily must include the act of making untrue statements about another that damage their reputation. If it doesn't damage their "good character or reputation," than it's not defamatory. Keep in mind, however, that what you may consider less or more damaging may not be the same view held by the person it's loosely based on. That is why I'd use the disclosure. As to the question "would it protect you against a lawsuit?", if you mean would it protect you from being sued, the answer is always, anyone can sue file a lawsuit. That doesn't mean they'll win but it still means you have to defend. It may likely protect you in your defense.

If I understand your question, you're asking the difference between something like this: "You shouldn't do business with Bob; he's a child molester. Raped a whole bunch of kids. Everyone knows about it." and this: "You're thinking of doing business with Bob? Huh. That's your call, of course. I won't say anything against Bob. But Bill is in the same business, and I happen to know that Bill has never molested any kids." or this: "There are three people you could do business with. There's me. I've never molested any kids. There's Bill; he's a little expensive, but he's never molested any kids either. Then there's Bob. I don't have anything to say about Bob." I don't know the answer under German law, but under U.S. law, it's surprisingly complicated, and varies by jurisdiction. Here is a thorough but somewhat dated article on the subject. New York has recently established an explicit test for defamation by implication: To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication where the factual statements at issue are substantially true, the plaintiff must make a rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference. Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 03940 (App. Div. May 29, 2014). That opinion also discusses the other approaches used in other U.S. states. Under that standard, it seems clear that my example statements would be defamatory; any juror would immediately understand both the factual implication and that it was 100% intentional. In practical terms, I doubt any court in the United States would not consider them defamatory. In general, defamation is harder to prove in the United States than in other jurisdictions, because of the strong protections afforded to speech under the First Amendment--but I don't know enough about German law to speak to that issue.

The word for a false statement of fact that is used most often is a "misrepresentation" or "false representation of fact" or more generally, an inaccurate quotation. A statement is a libel only if it damages the reputation of the person about whom one makes a misrepresentation and is communicated in writing to a third-party. Making a false statement of fact about what someone said to the person who said it is frequently a form of "gaslighting."

does a reference for a candidate employee have liability for what they say about the candidate? To my understanding lying isn't illegal. Lying is unlawful to the extent that the liar's deliberate intent to mislead other(s) causes or is likely to cause unwarranted harm. This is regardless of whether "the person acting as a reference isn't under obligation not to be a reference". Lies can directly harm the candidate and/or the company, and others indirectly. The harm to the candidate is known as, or comes in the form of, defamation. Depending on the jurisdiction, an intent to mislead might not even be a prerrequisite for liability. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 600.2911(7) allows suits for libel or slander if "the defamatory falsehood concerns the private individual and was published negligently" (emphasis added). The liar's intent to mislead and his knowledge of the falsehood of his statements can only worsen the harm inflicted and his liability therefor. Likewise, the liar can be liable to the company for inducing it to hire a candidate the company would not have hired had it known the truth. Liability ensues when the hired candidate makes the company incur losses which would be prevented by relying on a truthful reference. If the reference is truthful, the chances for liability are significantly narrower. These scenarios typically involve matters of privacy or disclosures that are protected/sanctioned by law.

In your example, nobody said anything false. The list does include movies from 2003. The movie studio admits this. The person says it too. The person doesn't say the studio tried to hide it. Nothing is wrong with what the person has said in your example.

It is allowed to introduce evidence that impeaches the credibility or reliability of a witness, which could include his previous 5 convictions for perjury. This does not constitute "character assassination", so I'm not sure what you mean by that. A felony conviction can be admissible (assuming he was not exonerated). There are limits; for example, evidence of religious belief would be inadmissible, likewise holding an unpopular political belief. The evidence has to be connected to the witness's honesty.

Fun one! First on the question of whether it matters if the agreement is written, I don't imagine it would make a difference in most of the US. We only require written contracts for agreements that meet certain requirements, those include contracts over a certain dollar amount, contracts involving the sale of land and contracts that cannot be completed within the year. Depending on the facts of your hypo, the writing requirement may be in play, but either way, it doesn't really make the situation more or less interesting; it's not a unique issue to this sort of contract. Second, the baseline assumption is that people can form legally binding contracts. The question is, whether something forbids the sort of contract you have in mind. I can think of a few things: It would be reasonably challenging to define what conduct is forbidden by the agreement. But that is merely a challenge not a road block. You could easily come up with a laundry list of forbidden acts to accomplish your result. Two people cannot contract to force the behavior of a third person, barring special circumstance. But again this isn't important since it's just a matter of drafting. In other words the contract probably would not say Juliet cannot go to the movies with Romeo, rather it would say Romeo cannot go the movies with Juliet. Even drafted in the less ideal way, he operative concept is whether the father could enforce a breach. So, the contract COULD be worded to say "If Juliet attends a movie while Romeo is present, Romeo must pay the father $xx dollars." Most importantly a party cannot form a contract that violates public policy. This is sometimes referred to "legality of objects", as in the object/goal of the contract must be legal. Contracts for prostitution, or the sale of a child (i.e. certain adoption contracts), or illegal products, would likely trip over this category. Here however, I can't readily think of a public policy basis to challenge the contract. Surely (some) states have stated a public policy favoring marriage, but it would likely be a challenge to contend the contract to not date (or not marry) was void because of such a policy. I can't think of any reason that the father couldn't enforce this sort of agreement. Finally, even if the contract was not enforceable, it's highly likely that Romeo could not simply take the money and breach. There are basis to demand return of the money even if no enforceable agreement exists. I am not your lawyer. Seek counsel from a lawyer in your area before taking any action. This answer is provided without research and for purely academic reasons. I have no special knowledge of this area of law.

Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.

Has a verdict of 'not proven' ever had a different effect to one of 'not guilty'? In Scotland there are three verdicts available in criminal trials: guilty, not guilty, and not proven. In modern use there is no practical difference between not guilty and not proven: the defendant is acquitted in both cases. Has there ever been a case where a verdict of not proven ended up having a different practical effect on the defendant than if he had been found not guilty?

There actually is a practical effect to a "not proven" v. "not guilty" verdict in Scotland, but it is mostly sociological or social in nature rather than legal. If your question is, are there future legal concerns, than no. Not proven is, to be sure, an acquittal. However, it is an acquittal that the tells the public something important: that the trier(s) of fact thought the person likely guilty. That's a fairly substantial distinction. In Scotland, a criminal case may be decided either "in solemn procedure", which is simply the Scot term for a jury trial v. "in summary" or in "summary procedure" which is the U.S. equivalent of a bench trial. The difference between the two (and the divergence from the U.S. procedural vehicle) is that for lesser crimes the accused doesn't have an automatic right of a jury trial for any criminal matter. In some ways this lesser included makes up for the fact that the Scottish accused is without absolute right to choose jury or bench trial, which in the U.S. can be very meaningful from a tactical perspective. Think of how important the make-up and emotional proclivities of juries are to both convictions and acquittals. A bench trial can be beneficial to the truly unlikable defendant, or in especially brutal crimes, where juries may convict out of fear or sympathy for the victim, even if the case is weak. At the same time, they may nullify the conviction for the sympathetic defendant. Juries are notoriously emotional and bias driven. Being able to choose a bench trial where the judge will follow the evidence and avoid the emotional response of a jury can be invaluable. Just as a sympathetic defendant can appeal to the emotions of the jury for acquittal or jury nullification, on the opposite spectrum. In Scotland, lesser crimes are always (with limited exclusions) tried by a judge, while more serious allegations always (again w/ limited exclusions) get a jury trial, automatically. The defendant does not choose the type of trial he is afforded. Hence, a defense or a prosecution cannot fiddle with the balance of proof based on emotion or lack there of. They get what they get. There are various rules procedurally that differ in comparison, but since this isn't the question that is the general rule and should suffice for background. Also hugely important is the fact that in Scotland, jurors decide a case by majority vote (like a civil trial in the U.S.); hence, there are no hung juries and they don't need a consensus. So, one way or another the verdict will be given in a Scottish criminal action. Scots also get comparatively huge juries to any other country (15 jurors) and they only need 8 in agreement to reach a verdict. Tactically, the "not proven" is a lesser included verdict (like U.S. uses lesser included charges in cases that are weaker for the prosecution). This lesser included finding can be used by choice when the Prosecution has a sympathetic defendant or when the defendant is probably guilty or unlikable. If the jury thinks the defendant (called "accused") probably did the crime, but the prosecution has failed to prove the elements, they can/will issue a "not proven" verdict. This sends a big message. This, again, is typically only reserved for those cases when there is strong but not conclusive proof that someone committed a crime. They don't want to profess their innocence with a not guilty verdict, so they are still acquitted, but with he stigma of the "not proven" verdict attached. Some estimates have from 1/5 to a full 1/3 of all acquittal verdicts by Scottish juries as "not proven" as opposed to "not guilty". Not proven can also be used by judges in the bench trial (summary procedure), however it's much less common. The proportion of 'not proven" acquittals in general is higher in the more severe cases; but so then are the proportion of acquittals versus convictions. These would likely be hung juries in the U.S.. Both in the "solemn" and the "summary" acquittals, not proven is interpreted as indicating that the jury or judge, respectively, is not convinced of the innocence of the accused; in fact, they may be morally or even factually convinced that the accused is guilty, but do not find the proofs sufficient for a conviction under the elements of the crime on the jury instruction/verdict form. I look at this as similar to the adage oft used in the U.S., which is an acquittal, despite the fact that the verdict is termed "not guilty" does by no means indicate the person is in fact "not guilty", it just means the prosecution couldn't prove its case. Sociologists in the U.S., as well as legal scholars, have studied the phenomenon, and it appears that most not guilty verdicts in fact let go a guilty person. This can be intuited by the evidence the jury never saw, either by suppression from bad searches, by the exclusion of witness testimony due to procedural rules like hearsay, privilege, etc., and other forms of keeping relevant evidence from the jury to protect the rights of the accused. But in the U.S. the person can go forth and say, "Hey, I was proven not guilty!" Scotland also has another interesting rule of criminal procedure, whereby a criminal can't be convicted without corroborated evidence. What this means is that if all the prosecution has is the victim witness, by way of proof, testifying, and no physical or corroboration testimony, Scottish law requires acquittal, but often will be so by the verdict "not proven". This is huge, if you think about it. Use, for example, a rape trial. A woman testifies, saying that Joe Schmoe climbed through her window and raped her. She knows Joe - he's her neighbor. Nobody saw him climb in. But she knows it's him. He leaves no physical evidence, having shaved his entire body and used appropriate protection (gloves, condemn, etc.). She has a rape kit done. Rape is obvious, but the only proof is her testimony. Joe goes free. But in Scotland, he goes free with a stigma attached. He's found "not proven" rather than "not guilty". I think this corroboration rule has a lot to do with why this verdict system still exists. In the U.S. the trier of fact would weigh the testimony and decide if one person was substantially more believable than the other, and a verdict would issue. That is a substantial difference, procedurally. Since Scotland doesn't have the hung jury because there is no consensus required they use the "not proven" in the same way a U.S. jury uses the hung jury when one or more jurors thinks the prosecution didn't prove their case but it's fairly clear the defendant is, in fact guilty. Then, you will often get a "hold out" juror, and since the U.S. requires a unanimous verdict, the hold out hangs the jury. It's sort of the opposite of jury nullification. The person knows that the evidence fell short, but their conscience can't reconcile letting the person go free, so they will vote guilty to hang the jury, almost ensuring the prosecution gets another shot. There has been a lot of debate about this three verdict system in comparative law circles, with many legal scholars saying it's antiquated. But I think it serves an important purpose. It carries the stigma of likely guilt for those people who probably committed the crime but got off. Further, the hung jury cost tax payers millions of dollars in the U.S., and this is often the side effect of people not wanting there to be absolutely no recognition of the fact that the accused probably committed (especially serious) crime(s). The Scots, on the other hand, have found away to accomplish this without the cost and emotional toll multiple trials takes on all the players involved, from witnesses and victims, their families, the accused, and even the lawyers and the prosecutions, who have to put in all the work of a trial just to start anew. Here is a really good scholarly article that deals with this interesting phenomenon not seen in (I don't believe) any other country: https://journals.iupui.edu/index.php/iiclr/article/viewFile/17848/18019

These charges aren't the same offense. They are three different offenses, all of which arise from the same conduct. Imagine throwing a grenade in a building because you saw a police officer about to discover evidence connecting you to a crime. I think most people would agree that there's no reason you could not be charged with murder, arson, and tampering with evidence under those circumstances. Likewise, Chauvin committed multiple distinct offenses when he kneeled on George Floyd's neck -- for instance, murder charges are based on the act of causing a death, while manslaughter charges are based on the act of creating a risk of death -- and the state is free to seek punishment for all of those offenses. Double jeopardy doesn't have any application to the case at this point. The Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't say you can't face multiple charges for the same conduct; it says you can't face multiple trials for the same charges.

This probably isn't a ground for an appeal. While a party arguing to reverse a trial court's decision must show that the argument that they are making on appeal was "preserved" by that party at trial by making that argument in the trial court, the converse is not true. Indeed, one of the rules of appellate practice is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld for any reason supported by the evidence even if it wasn't made by any party at trial. Generally speaking, a trial court isn't supposed to try a pro se party's case for them, but once the evidence is in, the court is free to do original legal research and come to a conclusions contrary to the arguments made by either of the parties. A judge is supposed to correctly apply the actual law to the facts notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to lead it astray. This doesn't systemically happen in favor of one party or the other in my experience, but is more common when one or both parties is relatively inexperienced in the relevant legal field. Appellate courts also come to conclusions about the law not advanced by either party on a regular basis. If anything, this is even more common in the area of administrative law, where the judge is likely to be a subject area specialist, than in ordinary civil litigation. It is also more common in administrative law because a judge in that context is more focused on the institutional implications of a bad precedent than trial court judges in ordinary courts. (PS is there a technical term for the rules concerning the "role" of the judge in a court, what they supposed to do, and not supposed to do?) Probably, but there isn't any term that comes readily to mind. If I can think of one, I will update this answer.

What are the legal consequences of substantive factual errors in an opinion? None. I assume that this specific ruling is not affected in any way by the text of the opinion? Correct. I assume that even an opinion of the form "We got high and decided to rule wrongly for fun" wouldn't actually negate the ruling? Probably not, but it might precipitate a constitutional crisis or lead to an impeachment. How does this affect the precedent? It doesn't. Will courts in the future consider the true facts of the case (whatever they perceive them to be), No. will they accept as legal fiction that the facts were as the Court describes them? Yes. Could it be legal for the district to repeat exactly the same set of actions in exactly the same set of true circumstances as before, since those won't be the same circumstances that the Court claimed to rule on? In such a case, is the lower court bound by the Supreme Court's characterization of the facts of the case, Generally speaking the lower courts are bound by characterizations of the facts made by the appellate court. But, it depends to some extent on the procedural posture of the case. In most cases, the findings of fact made by the trial court following an evidentiary hearing are binding on appellate courts in the U.S. unless they are not supported by any admissible evidence presented at trial, but there are some exceptions to this rule and there is considerable art as well as science that goes into properly characterizing the evidence presented at trial. But, for example, many appellate cases are appeals from a dismissal of a case on a motion to dismiss at the outset of a case, in which all allegations of the Plaintiff's complaint in a civil matter are taken as true for sake of argument, and the legal issue presented is whether the Plaintiff can prevail if all of those facts are true. In a case in that procedural posture, assuming that the appellate court reversed the trial court and found that the facts alleged state a claim upon which relief can be granted, then the remand would be to move forward with discovery and other pre-trial procedures in the case and ultimately a trial, if necessary, to determine the actual facts of the case as opposed to the facts as alleged by the Plaintiff in the complaint or petition. Not infrequently, when appellate courts are divided over what happened in the trial court, one side of the debate, looking at the raw testimony and exhibits presented at trial, will conclude that the admissible evidence presented at trial did not support the findings of fact in a mixed question of fact and law made by a trial court judge, while another side of the debate will accept the trial court judge's findings of fact uncritically. It often isn't easy to know, from reading an appellate court opinion alone, which side is which in this regard. can it use the true facts of the case as long as it obeys the ruling itself? Usually not. Usually, facts relied upon by an appellate court are by definition the correct facts (apart from clerical errors - e.g., an appellate court once misspelled my name in a court opinion, and the lower court wasn't bound by that mistake). This said, as noted above, the precise procedural posture of the case, nature of the court's opinion, and scope of the remand order is highly relevant to what a court can do on remand.

A jury verdict does not have any effect as legal precedent. Only appellate court opinions (that are not mere de novo bench trials of a court not of record) have effect as legal precedent outside the dealings of the actual parties to the case in future litigation with each other. Even then, an appellate court ruling is binding precedent only over the courts inferior to the appellate court issuing the opinion.

Police continue to investigate Following an acquittal, there are two possible positions for the police: they are certain the acquitted person performed the act but they were not guilty (for all sorts of reasons). The investigation is closed because although the police know who did it, there was no criminality due to the not guilty verdict. The evidence in the court shows that the accused did not commit the act. Ergo, someone else did. The police will keep looking for that someone else. Note that the proposed scenario is highly dangerous for you. First, the exculpatory evidence may be inadmissible, particularly if it is an alibi (see Can I surprise the prosecution with an alibi defense at trial?). To rely on an an alibi defence, it must be raised with the prosecution before the trial. You would have to have said that you were where the phone footage was shot before the trial starts and the police may have therefore discounted you as a suspect from the get go. Second, you are now committing a crime, usually called an attempt to pervert the course of justice and this action may also make you an accomplice to the murder after the fact. You beat the rap on the murder and then spend a lot of time in prison for those two.

On the contrary, it is unethical for a prosecutor to bring a case where there is no reasonable prospect of conviction. The prosecutor is an officer of the court and as a representative of the state, their primary concern is the guilty are convicted and the not guilty are not.

Double Jeopardy This is an ancient right that dates back to the jurisprudence of the Roman Republic when it was called non bis in idem (approximately - an issue once raised must not be raised again). In its common law manifestation it applies to both civil and criminal trials and is an example that one of the functions of a judicial system is to bring finality to a dispute. This is often in conflict with the other aims of a judicial system which include justice and efficiency. A speech to the NSW Bar Association in 2013 by the then Chief Justice of Australia, AM Gleeson AC QC focused on finality and the following quotations illustrate why it is important: An acquittal by a jury is generally conclusive. This is explained in terms of double jeopardy. Autrefois acquit is a plea which, if made out, defeats a prosecution. For a number of reasons an acquittal may be regarded as erroneous. Later evidence, such as a confession, or information based on developments in technology, may suggest that an acquittal was unsound. Double jeopardy is entrenched in the US Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. The exact meaning varies: in many countries an acquittal at trial brings finality but others allow the prosecution to appeal an acquittal - this is not considered double jeopardy but rather a continuation of the same case. That said, some countries (notably Australia and the UK) allow retrials after acquittal for serious crimes (murder, violent gang rape etc.) where there is "fresh and compelling" [NSW] evidence of guilt. These are 21st century changes and are a direct result of cases where advances in technology would impact the verdict. As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States. Geoffrey Robertson AO, QC in his 1998 book The Justice Game says "these rules are ordained by the State: whether they are just depends on whether they provide for the possibility of beating the State at its own game." His thesis is that, compared to any individual, the state wields unfettered power and has unlimited resources. If the state were allowed to repeatedly bring charges against an individual then they would eventually gain a conviction. The state gets one shot - they need to bring their A game.

Is there a "lemon law" that applies to product lines? I have a gadget that I purchased ($150), and it's in warranty. I like the item's concept, but it's defective (occasional electronics failure). After doing some research I realized it's a widespread problem due to a move in manufacturing to China. (I don't really have a major issue with items made in China, as long as they work). My options are: Get a warranty replacement and hope that I get one without the issue. Return it to the place I purchased it, and don't get a replacement (they most likely have a replacement from the same unstable batch). I'm considering #1 since I'd like to give the product another chance. However if I go #1, route #2 will soon be out of the picture since the standard return period will expire. My concern has to do with whether they will replace it with another defective item. I'm willing to send it in once, maybe twice, but that's about it. Is there any consumer protection against the manufacturer repeatedly replacing items with known or high defect rates until the warranty period expires? Something like a lemon law for a product line rather than a specific item? I'm in Texas, if that makes any difference.

Is there any consumer protection against the manufacturer repeatedly replacing items under warranty until the customer simply gives up? There are two implied warranties that people should knno about - fitness for a particular purpose and merchantabilty. You are concerned with merchantability. The implied warranty of merchantability basically says that goods are reasonably fit for the general purpose for which they are sold. If something keeps breaking it is not merchantable (generally). The warranty of merchantability is found in the Uniform Commerical Code and in Texas' Business and Commerce Code. Both at Section 2.314. You can read it, it is not very long, but one important part is, "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." This is an implied warranty, which means it is automatic unless disclaimed. Some states prohibit sellers from disclaiming implied warranties; Texas is not one of them (no surprise there). 2.316 is where we find out how to disclaim the warranty. This is how to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous 2.316 also says Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof." So a buyer needs to see if the seller and the manufacturer both disclaimed the implied warranties. If so the buyer is going to be limited to the expressed warranties. If they did not disclaim then the remedy is to return the item and get the money back. So yeah, this is like a lemon law for stuff. There is a requirement that the seller be a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind." That just means that the buyer didn't buy shoes at a car dealer. That it was the seller's business to sell the thing. A last note on this. Implied warranties differ from state to state as to who they can be applied against. 2-318 offers three options. Texas chose option 3 - which means that the courts decide if the buck stops at the retailer or if it extends to the manufacturer. This chapter does not provide whether anyone other than a buyer may take advantage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to the buyer or whether the buyer or anyone entitled to take advantage of a warranty made to the buyer may sue a third party other than the immediate seller for deficiencies in the quality of the goods. These matters are left to the courts for their determination. In other words, unless the implied warranties were disclaimed by both the retailer and the manufacturer, the buyer can go after either for the refund. And what is cool1 is that a 2013 Texas Supreme Court case found that a buyer of a used engine has a claim against the manufacturer. MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows. This is different because some states require privity of contract - meaning that only the original buyer can exercise the warranty and they can only exercise against the seller. EDIT 2.316(c)(2) says when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him This basically says that if you know about the defect you waive the implied warranty. There are two ways to look at this. The first way is that the first defective item is the "the goods or the sample or model" that you have now inspected, so you now know about the defect, and if you buy another you are buying it with defects revealed which waives the warranty. The other way to look at it is that you do not know that the first one is representative of all the products so it is not until you get the second, or third, that the defect with the goods or the sample or model is representative of all the products, and that it is not until you have this knowledge that the defect is "revealed." In other words, it depends. 1Cool for consumers, not manufacturers.

Unless you have a legally valid IP right related to the specification that statement is meaningless. When a software license is granted it is based on the copyright of the code. The copyright of the spec. just stops people from copying the spec - it does not protect the information in it. You can restrict copying of the spec. under copyright, you can make up a name for the spec (like USB or Bluetooth) and get a trademark and only allow the trademark use in limited cases(doesn’t stop implementation of the spec), or get a patent that would be necessarily infringed if something complying with the spec was created and used, sold, made, etc. or you can keep it secret and only show it to people who contractually agreed with your terms.

Of course you'd be in legal trouble, the contract is still valid. I also don't know why you don't consider virtual goods to be goods. Take this example: You buy a 1 year subscription for (example) netflix. The next day they cancel your subscription but don't give you the money back because its not a "real good". This should make it clear that virtual goods are goods too in the eyes of the law. Question is if police/lawyers care about it as much as for "real" goods.

Assuming USA law: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2315 If you accept or buy goods that are knowingly stolen you may be fined or imprisoned. If you buy goods and later find out they were stolen you can sue for a refund. However, I'd say the likelihood of getting your money back is incredibly low.

I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B).

Are online stores supposed to state the true “order cost”/value of an order on the package/envelope for the customs? Yes Is it common practice to slash 10x off of the price for the customs to not add various fees? Common? Probably no. Uncommon? Also, probably no. Isn't that illegal? Yes Of course, they can claim it was a mistake if ever found out, but if they do it consistently, that seems difficult... Not to mention there must be electronic proof of how much each order actually cost the customer? Yes Look, robbing banks is illegal but people still rob banks. Similarly, ripping off HM Revenue & Customs is illegal but people still do that too. In fact, far more people do that than rob banks.

What would be the most reasonable thing to do? Live with it. Oh, and stop breaking the law with your automated emails. Illegality on their part does not justify illegality on your part. Also, it’s likely that this activity has caused your email address to be blocked automatically which may explain why they aren’t contacting you. From a legal point of view, that’s the only reasonable option. You do have valid grounds for a lawsuit for the value of the watermelon but the cost of filing will be a couple of orders of magnitude greater than the value of the melon so doing so isn’t “reasonable”. If you want to vent, the internet offers a wide variety of social media platforms for which that seems to be their primary focus. But that’s got nothing to do with the law.

I assume this is a used car, and that your sales agreement doesn't have a 'time is of the essence' clause that specifies a specific deadline. In that case, they will have 'reasonable time' to perform the work. Unfortunately, there is no legal definition of what would be reasonable (the time necessary to repair a locomotive is much longer than the time needed to repair a torn screen door). Rather, the question would be, given the nature of the time, what you be typical, what would be surprising or shockingly long, and what extenuating factors are there. If you happen to know a lot of mechanics, you can get a ballpark figure. Let's say that it has been 3 weeks, then that is probably unreasonably long, so you could sue them for breach of contract. If it has less than a week, it's not so clear. You might simply ask then when they will get the problem fixed.

Which jurisdiction applies to copyright violations on the internet? A person residing in country A takes a work by an artist in country B and puts it onto a website they own but which is hosted in country C which is intended for an audience of people in country D. The artist in country B did not give permission for this and wants to pursue legal actions. Which countries copyright laws apply to this case? Let's assume that A, B, C and D all signed and ratified the Berne Convention, but their implementations in local laws differ in ways which are relevant to this case.

Jurisdiction is generally a matter for courts to decide. For example, in Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F. 3d 1294 (2012), the plaintiff, having had their work published in Sweden, had filed a claim there, and lost. They then took the claim to the United States. Copyright infringement is generally actionable per se - no damage needs to actually be proven or sustained. Typically, the rule is that the proper law will apply. This is the state that seems to have the closest and most real connection to the facts of the case. Now, where there is more than one jurisdiction in which a claim may be brought - as in your example - a plaintiff may research the relevant statutes to determine which jurisdiction is most likely to afford them the most favourable outcome. It's called forum shopping. It is likely that the proper law will be that of A or C. This depends on a number of factors: Whether the infringing party profited from the infringement. If the infringing party profited from the act, then you are likely to want to bring the matter in A, so that you can recover damages. Whether the infringing party has any presence in B. If the party has a presence in B, then a claim in B is likely to be more cost-effective. Again, depending on the laws of the country, it may not be possible for the artist to bring a claim against the infringing party if they have no local presence. Some countries have laws that explicitly allow extraterritorial service. Whether the hosting service was aware of the copyright infringement. If the hosting service was aware of the infringement and failed to prevent it, then you may be able to claim for contributory infringement - they could then, depending on their contract/agreement with the infringing party, be able to claim for damages. The Napster case may be somewhat relevant to this, but it's hard to say anything concrete when working with hypothetical countries. At the very least, a claim against the hosting service - which may just be an injunction ordering the removal of the content - could be fruitful. The actual laws of the countries involved. If the artist has sufficient money, they can just choose the forum that is most favourable to them. In short, private international law is a tricky subject and there are so many factors that need to be accounted for.

When you file a DMCA notice, what it really means is that you are saying: "Dear website, there is some copyright infringement going on against my works, and I'm willing to take someone to court. You have the choice of removing these materials, which means I cannot sue you, or you can leave copyright infringement on your website and you will be part of the court case". When the purported infringer gives a counter notice, what it really means is that they are saying: "Bring it on. Take my to court. I'm not afraid of you. By the way, dear website, because you followed the DMCA procedures and I gave you the counter notice, you can't be sued for copyright infringement if you restore these materials, even if they are infringing on copyright. " And the website tells you politely "we played by the rules of the DMCA. So now it's between you and the purported infringer, you can't sue us for showing the contents. " So yes, if you don't take the copyright infringer to court, nothing will happen.

http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/dk/dk091en.pdf is the Copyright Law in English for Denmark. You should probably try to find a Danish version to ensure the translation is accurate. Chapter 2 lists the exemptions from the general rule that you need the copyright owner's permission to use their IP. Unfortunately, the usage you have made does not meet the requirements for private use (s12): digital copies may only be shared among the members of one household, placing them on the web extends beyond your household. It may meet the requirements of educational use (s13) providing that your school has met the requirements for Extended Collective Use (s50). For photographs, this seems unlikely, such arrangements are usually limited to songs and television works. Under Chapter 6b, you are permitted to use "orphaned works", however, this requires that you have made a diligent search for the owners and have been unable to either identify or locate them. Copyright violation is subject to both penal sanctions (fines and in egregious violations imprisonment) (s76) and damages (s83). TL;DR Yes, you could be sued. Yes, the copyright holder would probably be successful. No, it is extremely unlikely they would bother.

The UN has a copy of the extradition treaty between the US and Brazil, the short version of it is that the treaty lays out in Article II an exhaustive list of crimes that are extraditable, skimming the list I don't see defamation (since of course in real life it's not a federal crime). As a general principle, Country A won't extradite someone to Country B if the conduct they are accused of in Country B is not a crime in Country A, if Country A does not think Country B would provide a fair trial, or if the person is convicted if the punishment likely to be imposed by Country B would be illegal under the laws of Country A (this comes up a lot with extradition from Europe to the US if a possible punishment for the crime is death). So in your hypothetical Brazil would probably be unwilling to extradite its own citizen for the crime the US accuses them of. I think another part of your question is whether the US or Brazil would have jurisdiction over this defamation. In theory, both could claim jurisdiction over it. In practice most criminal conduct is criminal relatively universally, especially among similarly geolocated countries, so the rest of this paragraph is assuming both countries did consider the defamation criminal and extraditable. As a matter of judicial effectiveness an Internet crime would probably be prosecuted in the country where the person resides. There would likely be a language barrier too, if the US court would have to employ a Portuguese translator. However, this is all largely a political question more than a legal one, if the US really wanted to make an example of this person in their own country the US could try to use political leverage to get Brazil to extradite them. The US could also wait until the person travelled abroad and petition the third country to imprison and extradite them. That's something that happens more commonly for citizens of a country that the US does not have an extradition treaty with.

A thing needs to be original in order for it to get copyright protection. 17 USC §102: "Copyright protection subsists [...] in original works of authorship" Copyright Act Section 5 (1): "copyright shall subsist in Canada [...] in every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work..." In the US, originality requires "a modicum of creativity" (Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In Canada, originality requires an "exercise of skill and judgment" and that "not be so trivial that it could be characterized as a purely mechanical exercise" (CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 SCR 339). Text transcribed from a public domain source would not be given copyright protection.

But while some libraries allow unrestricted use of their Public Domain content, others do not and limit the use of their copies to Non-Commercial use. It is my understanding that NC only applies to the digital copy, not the work itself. Your understanding is correct. An ancient text, or one long out of copyright, does not get new protection by creating an image of the text. At most the image itself is protected, not the underlying text. In the US, and other jurisdictiosn that follow the rule of the 1999 Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp case there is no copyright protection on the image because it has no original content. Some EU courts have indicated that they will be following the logic of bridgeman. To the best of my knowledge no EU decision grants copyright protection to an otherwise out-of-copyright work because of its presence in a digital library or collection. However, if a person gained access to a digital library or collection subject to a TOS agreement which includes "no commercial use" terms and then published a text from it commercially, that person might be subject to a breech of contract or similar suit by the library. Such a suit would need to include proof of damages.

With these facts, assuming Mr Y was charged with involuntary manslaughter (like in MA v. Carter) or aiding a suicide, based solely or almost solely on the messages, under which jurisdiction would he be charged? Applicable Law States have jurisdiction both over crimes that are committed in the state and over crimes that cause harm in a state. The classic law school example is a murder committed by shooting someone with a gun across a state line. Both the state where the gun is fired and the state where the person is shot have jurisdiction over the crime. Jurisdiction generally requires a purposeful act directed at someone or something in the state where the harm is suffered in most cases. But that isn't a hard and fast rule of constitutional law in other contexts, and there are few cases on point. I would consider this to be an open question. Certainly, however, the mere fact that the victim of a crime is transported to another state for medical treatment, where that victim then dies from causes relate to the crime, does not give the state where the death ultimately occurs in the hospital jurisdiction over the offense. Double Jeopardy Indeed, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not prohibit both states from independently convicting and punishing the same defendant for the same crime in this situation under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. As background, the Colorado Supreme Court decided a dual sovereignty double jeopardy case today. Application To Facts (The application to the facts has been revised upon closer examination of them.) The line about "Ms X, who is, at this point, still in Nevada," is confusing because she was in California before and isn't described as ever being in Nevada. I presume that "still in California" was really meant. Mr. Y could be charged (at least) in Nevada or New Jersey from which the continuing course of communications was sent (undue emphasis on the final communication is probably inappropriate), and Wyoming, to which the bulk of the communications were directed and where the bulk of the harm was suffered. California and Nebraska do not seem to be places to which the communications were really directed or where the greatest harm was suffered. Momentary presence in Nebraska air space is probably insufficient. There are also a set of statutes that specifically address crimes committed during an airplane flight (see also here) that has been discussed in other answers at this website. To the extent that this is treated as a homicide committed while in flight, 49 USC § 46506, might also allow for a federal criminal prosecution. I'm not sure that this is really a crime committed in flight, however, as it involved a course of conduct. A single email or a single moment of death doesn't really capture it. It is more analogous to a poisoning taking place in many doses over a period of time. Is Mr Y's speech in this case protected by the First Amendment? No. First Amendment considerations do apply to crimes involving communications between people that are not false, but if there is sufficient intent to cause suicide or other harm, the First Amendment yields to other considerations. The freedom of speech is not absolute. The exact place that the line is drawn is a matter of ongoing litigation. This specific issue is explored in depth in Clay Calvert, "The First Amendment and Speech Urging Suicide: Lessons from the Case of Michelle Carter and the Need to Expand Brandenburg Application" 94 Tulane Law Review 79 (November 2019). This article is responsive to that case of Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). The article explains in its introduction that: In February 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Carter' affirmed Michelle Carter's conviction for involuntary manslaughter as a youthful offender based on her urging Conrad Roy to commit suicide.' In doing so, the court rejected Carter's claim that her conviction violated her First Amendment' right of free speech. Specifically, it reasoned that Carter's words with Roy immediately before and while he died were "integral to a course of criminal conduct and thus [did] not raise any constitutional problem." In brief, Massachusetts's high court concluded that Carter's speech caused Roy's death' and that the First Amendment provided her no refuge.'

Links are in French. As the author of a work, you would generally hold copyright unless there's a contract otherwise. L113 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle determines who is the rights holder of a given work and I don't see anything there that changes things for you as a contractor. Even if you assigned some rights to your employer through a contract, France has moral rights which can never be ceded. In fact, even if you were a salaried employee, you still hold the rights by default, unlike the US. There are a few exceptions to that though: software, inseparable joint works, and works where the creative process was purely directed by your superiors.

Landlord refuses to do anything about tenants who do a lot of drugs If other tenants in a rental home (roommates) are breaking the law and the landlord has been informed but refuses to do anything about it, is the landlord breaking the law or does a tenant (who's not involved in the illegal activity) have any special power? In particular if you move into a house and find the other tenants do a lot of drugs (and have photos/videos proving it) but most of the drugs are "light" such as marijuana. However they trash the house and make loud noise at 4am, house is filled with smoke, always intoxicated etc. If relevant the tenants signed a lease saying they wouldn't do anything illegal.

Your landlord has an obligation to allow "quiet enjoyment" of the premises. Essentially this means that, unless they are damaging his or her property, the tenants are entited to act as though it were their own property. Many people take drugs at home. Between the tenants and the landlord this is not something the landlord is allowed to get involved in. If you believe there is criminal activity going on, you can but are not obliged to report it to the police.

It means that if one party breaks the lease and the other party chooses not to enforce their rights in relation to the breach, it doesn't mean that they won't enforce their rights the next time that provision is breached unless they agree that in writing thereby changing the agreement. Which may just be the longest coherent sentence I have ever written.

It depends on where you are. Typically, rodents inside a rental must be removed by the landlord. In Tukwila, ch. 6.16.030 under health and sanitation says It is unlawful for the owner or occupant to fail to reconstruct or repair [buildings of various types, controlling in various ways] for the purpose of preventing rats, mice, or other rodents from gaining entrance thereto; and it is also unlawful for the owner of [things rats eat] to fail to adequately protect the same to prevent such rodents from gaining access to or coming in contact therewith. This does not govern rodent "outside" (either on private property or on public lands): the city has absolutely no responsibility for rat control. A similar ordinance exists in Kirkland, except that 21.41.302(e) says "The owner or occupant of real property shall keep buildings and premises free from rats, mice and other rodents", where "premises" includes the land (thus, it is the land-owner's responsibility). The "owner" is defined as any person, agent, operator, firm or corporation having a legal or equitable interest in the property; or recorded in the official records of the state, county or municipality as holding title to the property; or otherwise having control of the property, including the guardian of the estate of any such person, and the executor or administrator of the estate of such person if ordered to take possession of real property by a court so Kirkland must eliminate rats in its parks. But there is an exception that The provisions of this section shall not apply to wetlands, unimproved parks, greenbelts or other unimproved property if the property owner or occupant has not committed any acts or omissions that increase the likelihood of rat, mice or other rodent infestation and it's not clear whether there are any improved property owned by the city that has rats. King County (which contains Tukwila and Kirkland) does not appear to have any rodent control ordinances apart from one pertaining to kennels, not surprisingly since most of the county is out in the woods. There are often municipal agencies that provide "assistance" in rodent control (not that they do it, but they may tell you what to do), but generally the responsibility is on the property owner.

Laws and regulations often limit or restrict remedies in various ways that may not be intuitive or correspond to popular ideas of legal rights. In the case of the recent US eviction moratorium, the obligation to pay rent was not changed. The only effect is that no action for eviction could be brought for a residential property during the effective period of the order, in situation to which the ordeer applied. The order says (see link above): This Order does not relieve any individual of any obligation to pay rent, make a housing payment, or comply with any other obligation that the individual may have under a tenancy, lease, or similar contract. Nothing in this Order precludes the charging or collecting of fees, penalties, or interest as a result of the failure to pay rent or other housing payment on a timely basis, under the terms of any applicable contract. To invoke the order a resident must sign a statement declaring under penalty of perjury that: I am unable to pay my full rent or make a full housing payment due to substantial loss of household income, loss of compensable hours of work or wages, lay-offs, or extraordinary [38] out-of-pocket medical expenses; I am using best efforts to make timely partial payments that are as close to the full payment as the individual's circumstances may permit, taking into account other nondiscretionary expenses; If evicted I would likely become homeless, need to move into a homeless shelter, or need to move into a new residence shared by other people who live in close quarters because I have no other available housing options. as well as various other declarations. The order's justification section says in part: Evicted renters must move, which leads to multiple outcomes that increase the risk of COVID-19 spread. Specifically, many evicted renters move into close quarters in shared housing or other congregate settings The order later specifies that: This Order shall be enforced by Federal authorities and cooperating State and local authorities through the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3559, 3571; 42 U.S.C. 243, 268, 271; and 42 CFR 70.18. However, this Order has no effect on the contractual obligations of renters to pay rent and shall not preclude charging or collecting fees, penalties, or interest as a result of the failure to pay rent or other housing payment on a timely basis, under the terms of any applicable contract. ... While this order to prevent eviction is effectuated to protect the public health, the States and units of local government are reminded that the Federal Government has deployed unprecedented resources to address the pandemic, including housing assistance. It would seem that civil suits for payment of debts arising from unpaid rent are in no way prevented, only a remedy of eviction is blocked. That block would apply to any state or local courts, as well as any federal courts. Eviction cases are not normally brought in federal courts. But seizure of bank accounts or garnishment of wages could be obtained, if permitted by state law in a particular case. So might other remedies authorized by state or federal law.

This law sounds likely to be unconstitutional and/or invalid because it is pre-empted by state or federal laws. Among other things it probably violates the First Amendment right to petition the government, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws (by depriving people who have had previous police calls of the right to call the police without penalty) and due process (by imposing a penalty based upon a call, without a presumption of innocence, rather than a finding of wrongdoing that overcomes a presumption of innocence). It could also implicate a tenant's right as a Fourth Amendment seizure without probable cause, or a Fifth Amendment taking of property without just compensation. It is probably also pre-empted by state law which establishes the grounds for which someone may be lawfully evicted, which almost certainly do not include this condition. Likewise, the conditions under which liability for police injuries is imposed are also probably pre-empted by state law. California has an express statutory prohibition on this kind of rule at Cal.Civ.Code § 1946.8(c) which provides that: A landlord cannot punish, or threaten to punish, you or another resident for exercising your right to request law enforcement or emergency assistance on behalf of a: victim of abuse; victim of crime; or person in an emergency. Your landlord also cannot put any penalties in place if a person who is not a resident or tenant calls law enforcement or emergency assistance to your residence. To be protected under this law, the person who calls the police must believe that law enforcement or emergency assistance is needed to prevent or deal with an act of abuse, or the heightening or worsening of an act of abuse, a crime, or an emergency. The American Civil Liberties Union is currently actively attempting to identify cases where these laws (often called nuisance laws) are being used in this manner for the purposes of bringing litigation to invalidate the laws or restrain their use. Litigation is in process in Seattle, Washington and East Rochester, New York. The ACLU also notes that: In situations where an alleged "nuisance" offense is related to an incident of domestic violence, landlords may choose to evict all the residents to avoid future incidents or police calls that could result in a fine. Yet, these evictions violate federal law. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has made it clear that tenants who are denied or evicted from housing because they have suffered domestic violence can file sex discrimination complaints with HUD under the federal Fair Housing Act. Thus, there would often be pre-emption of the local law by federal law as well. An op-ed piece in the New York Times reviews similar issues in Lakewood, Ohio and Milwaukee, Wisconsin, pointing out that the U.S. Constitution and federal housing laws are likely to be violated by these statutes. In at least two instances, one included in an edited question in Norristown, Pennsylvania, and one mentioned in another answer, the case of Somai v. City of Bedford in Bedford, Ohio, the ACLU has concluded favorable settlements after litigation to have these ordinances repealed and to win compensation for aggrieved parties, although, because they are settlements, neither case establishes a binding appellate precedent. We don't intend to challenge the laws at this time - they make it easier for us to evict problem tenants whose visitors damage our property - but were wondering if there are examples of similar laws that have either gone unchallenged for a long period of time or that have been challenged and judged to be legal. As landlords, you are in a difficult position. These laws have not gone unchallenged for a long period of time nor have they been challenged and judged to be legal. Instead, in all likelihood, a legal challenge to these newly enacted laws is likely to be imminent. And, while you face violations of local laws in these cases by not taking action, you may face federal housing law liability if you do utilize these laws and these laws are found to be invalid.

You need absolute written buy in from the landlord. His agreement is with you, not this new person. If the new person stops paying for whatever reason, then landlord is coming after you.

Is it legally possible for a tenant to replace their landlord? Generally not. The landlord-tenant relationship flows from the landlord's ownership of the property and the tenant can do nothing to change that (short of buying the land from the landlord in a voluntary transaction). If the landlord were a government agency, the tenant could petition the government to put a different employee in charge of managing the lease, and if the landlord were a trust it is barely conceivable that the tenant could assist some other party in removing the trustee and replacing the trustee with another trustee (particularly if the trust was a charitable trust or the tenant was also a beneficiary of the trust). But, generally speaking, this is not possible.

I am sympathetic to your problem but there is probably not a legal solution: at least not an easy or cheap one. To help you clarify a whole mish-mash of issues I will address each of your points. frequently calls false noise complaints on neighbors resulting in police action. If the person genuinely believes that these complaints are valid, even if they do not end up being substantiated, he is within his rights to make such complaints. If you can document an ongoing pattern of unproven complaints this might amount to harassment and you could then seek a court order that he stop the harassing behaviour. However, if even a few of these complaints are proven this would become much harder. stands in front of the building in a menacing way as people enter/exit. He is entitled to stand wherever he likes in whatever "way" he likes. This is only an issue if the person entering/exiting has a reasonable fear that he will he will visit actual harm upon them, o, of course, if he actually does visit physical harm upon them. If so, then this is assault and can be reported to the police or be the basis of a civil action. hates black people. So, he's a bigot - this is not actually illegal. Discriminating against someone on the basis that they are black is illegal, hating them on that basis isn't. hates Middle Eastern people and Muslims. Ditto. constantly pounds on the floor/walls/ceilings. It can't be "constantly" - it might be often or even frequently, if you intent to take legal action hyperbolic language is not going to aid your case. To make a real complaint about this you would need to diarise each occurrence. Notwithstanding, unless he is damaging someone else's property or is violating a noise ordinance this is not illegal. screams curses at children. Clearly reprehensible behaviour: not clearly illegal. Unless this is assault (see above) or qualifies as offensive behavior under the criminal code wherever you are (unlikely) then he can scream whatever he wants at whoever he likes. Again, a pattern of such behavior may constitute harassment. Continues to park in handicap parking despite not being handicap, and receiving very expensive parking tickets. This is illegal and he is being punished for it. Unfortunately the expression Don't do the crime, if you can't do the time. has a corollary: if you are willing and able to take the punishment then you do as much crime as you want. And to add to the list, I suspect he's been putting nails in my car tire, always on the same tire, on the inside wall of the tire; I just replaced my 5th tire in 3 months. This is a crime. If you can get evidence to prove it then you can report him to the police and/or sue him for the damage. You have stated in your comments that you will be asking another question specifically about filming him, so I won't address this here. Is there some sort of legal incentive I've not clearly communicated to management to evict him? That depends on if any of his actions are actually grounds for terminating his lease and, if they are, the landlord wants to do so. A remote landlord who is getting his rent on time and not having their property damaged has no incentive to evict a tenant: no matter how annoying they are to others. It is possible, that you have a case for breaking your lease and/or suing your landlord for damages as you are not getting "quiet enjoyment" of the property. A suit along those lines may resolve the matter because either you or he will be evicted. Consult a lawyer. If he actually is insane, what sort of liability for his actions does he have? The same as anybody else. Liability for civil wrongs is an objective test of what a reasonable person would be liable for: it is not based on the specific characteristics of the person.

Can a person plead the fifth to refuse to acknowledge his identity? The answer to my earlier question here: Can you plead the fifth to avoid revealing the identity of someone you were accused of being? ended up with a side debate I wanted to determine the answer to. Say that The Green Goblin has been terrorizing Gotham and is accused of many crimes, but no one knows his real identity and thus they do not know who to prosecute. Eventually Harry Osborn is accused of being the Green Goblin and put on trial. Can Harry plead the fifth to refuse to admit that he is, in fact, the Goblin? If "the green goblin" is accused of a crime which was not yet proven can Harry still refuse to admit his identity as the alter ego to avoid being able to be prosecuted for the crime at all? I had assumed the answer was yes he could, but the above answer seems to imply otherwise...

This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.

Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them.

A self-represented person, as a practical matter, has no choice but to engage with the court when an oral argument is conducted. A person present in a courtroom likewise has an obligation to acknowledge a judge addressing them. Usually it wouldn't be contemptuous to fail to appear at oral arguments of a fully briefed matter (e.g. a motion for summary judgment, or an appeal), but it would generally be viewed negatively. One could respond to a question from the court with "I don't really have anything more to say, my brief speaks for itself." And, sometimes a court would leave it at that, but if the court insists there is really no other option than to clarify and explain yourself. Most often, this helps more than hurts a pro se party, although I've certainly seen cases with ghost written pleadings (which are authorized if disclosed in many jurisdictions) where this isn't the case. A fairly common tactic in civil litigation is the take a deposition of a party, or to call a party to the witness stand, and to ask them if they really want the relief that their filed legal documents says that they do, as a way to narrow the scope of the claims brought against the questioning lawyer's client. But, this is less of an issue with a pro se party when the person who drafted the legal documents and the person engaging in oral arguments are the same person. This can't be done in criminal litigation, but I could see a prosecutor trying to do something similar in oral argument, although usually in that context, the judge and not the prosecutor, is asking the questions.

The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.

Is it possible for a witness to backtrack and claim that their previous statements were wrong because they misremembered? ... Is the witness now allowed to say something along the lines: "Huh. That's odd. I clearly remember it differently. But it's such a small detail and it was so long ago..."? Yes. Or is it now considered a deliberate lie? A judge's assessment of a witness's credibility and reliability is much more nuanced. See "How is a judge to evaluate a witness's credibility?"

This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer.

§145d StGB makes it illegal to pretend that a crime did happen or will happen, but only if one deceives the police or a similar agency. It is also a crime to deceive about the participants of a crime. Pretending to have been sentenced and presumably to have been released after serving a sentence does not quite fit that law.

Yes, Defendant may compel Plaintiff to appear and may cross-examine Plaintiff personally. The right to counsel does not include the right to have an attorney testify for you at trial. At trial or deposition, Plaintiff's lawyer generally has no business testifyng at all, and his statements would not be evidence. If the attorney's testimony is necessary for trial, he would likely be disqualified from representing Plaintiff. Defendant is unlikely to persuade the judge to question Plaintiff for him. The judge might ask questions to clarify answers that Defendant elicits himself, but he might also just rule based on whatever information he receives, regardless of how clear it is.

How can one prove they rented a house with no receipts/contract? Where I live the law doesn't require a renter to fill out a contract. If a renter paid the damage deposit, and rent, and upon leaving the landlord refuses to return the damage deposit, how can the renter prove that he did in fact live there in court? Even if rent and damage deposit was paid through internet etransfer, it doesn't necessarily show it was for rent. I know a person this happened to and he had to move out because the other tenants were doing drugs and the landlord refused to kick them out. So I doubt the other tenants would attest to the fact he was in fact living there.

Essentially, if there is no written agreement or receipt of payment, the only records that exist will be in the payment itself. If it was paid by cash, there's probably no recourse without additional facts. However, if it was paid electronically, then even if there's no narration (description) that claims that the payment was for rent, it is still possible that you would be able to file a summons requiring the recipient bank to produce the information relating to the entity that holds the account the money was sent to. The information they have may be limited, but generally this would include: Name Address Date of birth (for natural persons) Phone number The above information is typically required under anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist funding legislation. Additionally, if it was paid electronically, the regularity of the payments and the regular amounts may be persuasive. Finally, it's not proof, but you can swear an affidavit or a statutory declaration attesting to the truth of your assertions, but without additional evidence (the aforementioned transaction information), it doesn't really hold weight on its own.

You understand the business of landlording before you get started. You don't landlord for the purpose of evicting someone. You landlord for the purpose of exchanging keys for a duration for money, specifically by creating a leasehold estate that you sell to your tenant. Your tenant has the leasehold, you don't have the money, in part because it sounds like you didn't collect any before you handed over the keys or confirm your tenants' ability and history of paying. You now want to nullify the leasehold. In general this is the eviction you ask about. You are now reliant on a court in your jurisdiction to enforce the contract law with respect to the lease language and prevailing local ordinances. I cannot speak specifically to NY courts but they have a reputation as tenant friendly so you need to demonstrate your professional approach and locally required paperwork such as a certificate of occupancy, business license, etc. All lined up to make it easy for a judge to agree with you. You have an uphill battle. Turning off utilities (as mentioned in another post of yours) is not a professional move and will bias many judges against you. No certificate of occupancy may mean your original lease contract created a leasehold contrary to a public policy of NY which could put a judge in a bind if they found your case compelling. If a competent lawyer would cost $15k then it sounds like it might be cheapest to offer the tenant a couple thousand for the keys and a signed release to walk away–spend a couple hundred on the lawyer for this. Do not give them the money until they are out and give you the keys. This is called cash for keys.

This likely comes down to contract law (note: I'm not a lawyer; this isn't legal advice). If his rental contract is not with you, you'll need to refer this to the property owner's representative. I don't see why just sharing the house would give tenants any eviction rights over other tenants. Even if you are the owner (cf “my house”), it would be unusual for independent tenants to be party to each other’s rental contracts. The other tenants are irrelevant to any eviction attempt, except perhaps as witnesses in court.

This is not theft, this is a contract dispute. You gave them money, they promised to do certain things, the contract says what that is. I surmise that they wanted a deposit to cover their costs in further dealing with you (moving is more complicated and costly than buying a loaf of bread), so in walking away from the deal, you've economically damaged them to some amount. The deposit is "liquidated damages". Your recourse is to sue them for that amount, because... Perhaps you didn't understand why you were giving them this deposit (an act that constitute some level of agreement), but any time you hand over a deposit, there is a circumstance under which you will not get that money back, and you have to understand what that circumstance is.

The onus lies on the landlord The landlord is the one asserting a right (to evict), therefore, they bear the onus of proving that they have that right. The court will look at the evidence both parties have that the notice was served. For the tenant this is likely to be brief testimony that they never received it. For the landlord, they will testify as to how it was served (personal service, mail etc.) and provide evidence that supports that testimony (photos of them handing it to the tenant, receipts for mail etc.). Please note that only some types of service are valid and laws around service are highly technical. The court will give weight to the evidence (decide what they believe and what they don’t, who they find reliable and who they don’t). The onus in a civil case is “the balance of probabilities” which means if they find the landlord’s version more likely then the notice was served. If they find the tenant’s more likely or both equally likely, it wasn’t.

a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself.

Section 11(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 says In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair. There is also an absolute right to enter in an emergency (such as fire). Note that the law does not require tenant permission (a landlord may obviously enter for any reason with permission): the law says when he may do so without permission. If the "viewing" is related to repairs, then you just have to accept it. However, "viewing" usually means "showing prospective new tenants". In that case, there is the 28 day end-of-tenancy entry right which, if you didn't omit anything, is not relevant. In light of the common law right to quiet enjoyment, you have the right to exclude the landlord (or anyone else) absent a statutorily expressed override. Permission can be inferred by word or action under common law, for example if a person appears at the door and you open it wide and step aside, you have implicitly granted permission even if you didn't say "I hereby permit". Explicitly denying permission (even once) eliminates any reasonable possibility of inferring permission. If you had gotten an email saying "we'll come by at 4:30" and you reply "Alrighteo, see you then", that can reasonably be interpreted as permission. If you do not reply, they cannot infer permission (obviously: X sending a message to Y does not entail that Y received or read the message). If a person does not have a right to enter property, then doing so by force constitutes trespass, which is plainly against the law.

Is something considered stolen if it possibly could have been lost? Something is considered stolen if it was stolen. You don't have your passport + Someone entered the room where it was ≠ They stole it Can this be brought to small claims court? What damage did you suffer that could be remedied by a monetary settlement? Sure, the landlord entering your room without your permission is probably unlawful but it's not clear that it did you any damage. No damage; no case. Should the police or some other government agency care? Here is a ranking of government cares: Getting reelected National security Economic Management ... 42,567. Murder ... 421,762. Passport Fraud ... 7,656,232. Passport theft ... 58,432,546. Passports that might have been stolen but probably weren't

Can I use a mangaka's work as my tumblr blog icon/background? I know quite a number of people who do this, but I just want to know for sure. The blog is non-commercial and dedicated to a manga. It's for sharing and other fans to browse.

Do you have an explicit permission by the artist? Does the artist give a blanket permission to anyone which covers this kind of use of their work (a license)? If no, then you commit a copyright violation when you use their work for your blog. This applies to practically any country which signed the Berne convention which is almost everywhere in the world. Having no commercial interest is usually not an excuse to violate copyright. Regarding which jurisdiction applies when you, your website and the copyright holder are in different countries: I opened a new question about this.

A matter of terminology, what you want is not the copyright, but a license to use the copyright, presumably a non-exclusive license. You would probably need to approach a licensing department at Disney. They will ask lots of questions, and if they are open to the possibility, will quote a fee, which will, i would think, be sizable. Anyone should be able to ask, but I suspect that most requests are refused. It would probably be well to have a business plan laid out, and exactly how the images would be used in your plan. Disney can refuse any license, or offer one on whatever terms it pleases.

As for plagiarism, that is not a legal concept, so he can define plagiarism however he wants. It certainly isn't, under any definition I have ever seen on Earth and I have seen many (it has to do with "claiming someone else's work as your own"). As for copyright, a set of questions is (potentially) protected by copyright. If they are copied from somebody else's book of questions, then the book author (or publisher) holds copyright. Let's say that QM invented the questions, such as "What is the Turkish word for Janissary?", "What is the most prominent feature of Jannissary garb?" and so on. Then that set of questions, when put down in fixed form, are protected by copyright, and cannot be copied without permission.

The board is more complicated than you describe. It is a somewhat stylized world map, broken up into regions that do not necessarily correspond to countries. They have names that don't necessarily express what the region is geographically (particularly Ukraine, which extends far to the north of real-world Ukraine). There are defined water routes between certain regions that do not touch. Someone else starting from a world map would be very unlikely to duplicate the Risk board. I believe your friend's board would count as a derivative work. Now, the copyright holder is highly unlikely to come after your friend. I've seen stories of people who made their own X boards, publicized them, and the game company did nothing about it. The company (Hasbro? they own most of those games) would likely consider it as an extra bit of publicity.

You can’t use pictures You can’t use any of these, nor can you make your own art that is derived from these. That’s copyright infringement and there is no fair use defence because you are specifically trying to do something Nintendo already does. You can reproduce that stats of the Pokémon because stats are facts (even if they are facts about fictional things) and facts are not protected by copyright.

Such an image is copyrighted, as part of the movie. You cannot legally use it without permission from the copyright holder, unless the use of the image falls under fair use (note that fair use is a strictly US legal concept. It does not apply anywhere else) or a similar exception to copyright, such as "fair dealing". There are multiple factors which must be considered in making a fair use judgement. No one factor ever totally controls the decision. It is a case-by-case decision. But several things about your proposed use suggest to me that it will not qualify as a fair use. The image is part of a creative work, not a work of non-fiction such as a news report or a textbook. That weighs against fair use. You seem to be using the whole image, although it is only part of the movie. That probably weighs against fair use to some extent. A use in "a social media post regarding a sales vacancy" sounds commercial to me. If so, that would weigh against fair use. The copyright owner might well wish to market images from the film. If so, and if many people used images from the film as you propose to use this one, that might harm the market. This weighs against fair use. You don't seem to be making any comment on the image, or using it in any significantly transformational way. That weighs against fair use. Use of the image does not seem vital or even important to the message you intend to communicate. That also weighs against fair use. In short, I think you would be wiser to use an image that you have or can get permission to use in this way. If you use this image, it is possible that the copyright holder would sue for copyright infringement, or issue a DMCA take-down notice, or both.

If the "Pokeball" image is copyrighted and/or a trademark of Nintendo/whoever makes the Pokemon games, then whoever put that image out there under CC 3.0 BY is in violation and can be sued and will probably lose, and you would be in violation and can be sued and will probably lose. Your penalty would almost certainly be less since your violation was "innocent", that is, you had no way of knowing that the "Pokeball" imagery was somebody's protected intellectual property. ... Except you kind of maybe should know that, unless whoever made the Pokemon games (Nintendo or other) put the image out there and you can verify that, that maybe this license could be bogus and you should consult with who you imagine the owner of that IP may be or an impartial professional who could tell you for sure. I'm thinking if it were me I would do a little more research - and maybe get a paid opinion - if I was really thinking about using this for any but private purposes.

Copyright almost certainly exists in the images, since presumably someone took those pictures and so they would own the copyright of those images. However, that doesn't mean you don't own the film, you just that don't own the copyright. You can have it developed to see what's there without copying the images. Just tell the developer you only want the film developed and for no prints to be made. If there's child pornography you could end up in a lot of hot water. While you'd be innocent of any crime, if the developer reports the images to the police you'll have to convince them that you had no idea what was on the film. It's extremely unlikely that there's anything untoward on the film however. I'd note however that unless the film is only a couple years old then it's likely the pictures have faded significantly. If it's ten or more years old, there might not be anything recognizable.

Does Wassenaar Arrangement on the transfers of arms and dual-use goods and technologies apply to security training? Does the Wassenaar Arrangement on the transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies apply to IT security training? Does it apply to IT security training on exploitation techniques? Is it applicable to institutions or individuals?

Yes, it arguably includes technical training according to the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List (Wa-List (14) 2). Exploitation, as used in your question, can take many forms of course. First, take a look at the definition of technology for GTN and both lists1: Technology is defined as information. The information can take the form of technical assistance. Technical assistance may take the form of training. Now we need to look to see if "exploitation" is on any of the lists and then if technology for exploitation is included. The best I can find is at on the Dual Use List - Category 4 - Computers: 4.E.1.c "Technology" for the "development" of "intrusion software". Note that technology appears in quotes. This means that the term takes on the meaning defined in the List of Definitions (found on p. 201 of Wa-List (14) 2). I also think that "Intrusion software" as defined (page 212) comports with what you call exploitation. There are probably others, but we need to know more about what you mean by exploitation. For now I think this is enough. If you need more, I think that more answers will come from really understanding the definitions and how the defined words and phrases are used in the Wa-List. 1Technology Specific information necessary for the "development", "production" or "use" of a product. The information takes the form of 'technical data' or 'technical assistance'. Controlled "technology" for the Dual-Use List is defined in the General Technology Note and in the Dual-Use List. Controlled “technology” for the Munitions List is specified in ML22. Technical Notes. 1. 'Technical data' may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories. 2. 'Technical assistance' may take forms such as instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services. 'Technical assistance' may involve transfer of 'technical data'.

No, it does not. There is indeed a 2-year guarantee for all goods, but "goods" is defined to be a "tangible movable item" according to Directive 1999/44/EC Article 1, subsection 2(b). In less legalese, a physical item; software doesn't count. While there has been discussion about extending this protection to software, I'm not aware of this having been done yet. Even if it were, determining whether goods are "faulty" ultimately comes down to whether it conforms to the contract of sale (Article 2). I think it's likely that vendors in this area would put a disclaimer for unforeseen security vulnerabilities, or something to that effect.

I can't comment on tactical considerations, but legally there is nothing preventing submitting a Subject Access Request to support litigation. The case law has developed (and been somewhat inconsistent) over the years, culminating with the "no other purpose" rule being clarified by the Court of Appeal in Dawson-Damer v. Taylor Wessing LLP, [2017] EWCA Civ 74 by saying that... ...a SAR would not be invalid if it had been made with the collateral purpose of assisting with litigation. Delivering the leading judgment, Arden LJ noted (at paragraph 107) that the EC Data Protection Directive “makes it clear that the rights given by the Directive are to protect fundamental rights conferred by EU law. We have been shown nothing in the DPA or the Directive which limits the purpose for which a data subject may request his data, or provides data controllers with the option of not providing data based solely on the requester’s purpose”. Source and further reading

To answer the last part of the question: Jurisdiction would be where the copied media is being producted and where it is being consumed/sold. Moving media from one jurisdiction with ineffectual protections to another jurisdiction is part of product piracy. The scheme you suggest might shield the company producing the counterfeit goods, leaving the importers holding the bag. If the importers and manufacturers are controlled by the same person, courts in jurisdictions with strong protection might hold that person liable for the whole criminal enterprise. There is a widespread assumption that the internet is 'beyond national laws.' That is wrong. Enforcement may be difficult in some cases, but the laws apply. If you try to make profits by skirting the edges of law, you need really good, really professional legal advice.

As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine.

In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.

It seems that your friend is taking part in a multi-level marketing scheme. However, this does not necessarily exclude a pyramid or snow ball scheme. Both can be illegal in Germany and Switzerland under the respective unfair business practices codes, because the systems do not rely on the sales of goods and services, but on the continuous recruitment of further sales persons. To clarify whether your friend's system is illegal, you could report the scheme to the competent watchdogs. In Germany the "Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs" in Bad Homburg is recommendable. As the company is operating from Switzerland, German law not be applicable without more. Therefore also contacting the Swiss authorities may be advisable. This seems to be the "Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft SECO" in Bern.

There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order.

Can building inspection obtain warrant to inspect suspected non-permited construction? Most of illegal construction fines I have heard of were under circumstances when the work performed was visible from the outside in plain sight. Of course, many renovations that are purely interior also need permits, such as electrical or plumbing work, or anything involving structural support. If a remodeler chooses not to obtain proper building permits (for reasons of the bureaucratic burden etc) and (s)he never manifests signs of construction visible on the outside of the building, can municipal building inspectors obtain a court (or other form of legal) warrant to enter the property and find evidence of illegal construction for the purposes of issuing fines or injunction to cease all work? Also, upon sale of the property, what legal channels exist whereby the illegal builder can be audited by the building inspection? I think home inspection is done by private inspectors and not municipal agents. This is in the U.S. I understand building codes vary across the country but I'm also thinking that warrants for inspection are somehow related to the 4th Amendment.

Yes, they can. There was a time when no warrant was required at all. There was a time when it was thought that the Fourth Amendment requirement for a search warrant only applied to criminal cases. It was expected that administrative and civil cases did not require a warrant. For example, in 1959 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Frank v. Maryland that the conviction of a Baltimore City person who refused a warrantless search by a Baltimore City health inspector was valid. However, in 1967 the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion in Camara V. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco which held: ...that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such search, when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's protections. The standard for issuing such a warrant, the court ruled, is probable cause. Further: Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g, a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. The court also held that nothing in their ruling requiring warrants would preclude a warrantless inspection in an emergency situation. Portland, Oregon describes on their web site their process for obtaining such a warrant.

A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws.

It isn't precisely clear which jurisdiction you are located in (recall that this website handles matters from everywhere in the world). But, generally speaking, in the United States, you have no right to limit someone's existing tree on their property merely because it casts a shadow on your solar panels. The installer should have known better. A minority of U.S. states, including California, consider new construction that blocks the view of existing structures a form of "nuisance" that can be abated if it unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of the existing property. But, that protects existing structures, rather than new ones. In Japan, there are building code requirements designed to insure that key portions of every home get natural sunlight daily. Again, this only applies to the construction of new buildings. I know of no law that gives someone who newly installs a solar panel a right to remove or trim a neighbor's tree simply by virtue of doing so. And, without knowing whose law is involved it would be impossible to determine with any reliability. The property with the solar panel could seek to buy the right to an unobstructed view from the property with the tree, in what would probably be called a "view easement", but that would only happen if the terms were such that both consented and it was written up in a legal document to that effect.

You have to take the General Notes part in its full context. The relevant clause says The term “Common Area” as used herein means all portions of the Project except the Units, and without limiting the generality of the forgoing, all structural projections within a Unit which are required for the support of a Condominium, gas, water pipes, all sewers, all ducts, chutes, conduits, wires and other utility installations of the structures wherever located (except the outlets thereof when located within the Units)… The most proximal expression is "wires and other utility installations", so construing "outlets" as covering gas, water, sewers, ducts etc. would be contrary to the interpretive principle known as the Last Antecedent rule. Nothing in the context requires a broad-scope interpretation of the "outlet" exception. This being in the US, courts would use ordinary English usage to understand what an "outlet" is, that is, even if "you could argue" that something is an outlet, the term "outlet" is used in the context of buildings to refer to an electrical outlet. The way this works is that you would need to get an expert witness to testify as to the common meaning of "outlet" in this context. There are two approaches to doing that. One is to get testimony of a contractor, as to what they mean when they say "outlet". However, contractors speak a special language (and not consistently so), and it's dubious that either party of a contract could have understood "outlet" in a special way shared by contractors. So the other approach (exemplified by Heller) is to call on a language and usage expert. A DIY approach is to google things like "sewer outlet", "electrical outlet" and so on, to see if you get many hits. You do not have a sewer outlet in your unit. You might have a water outlet if you work on cars and brought one inside the unit, but clearly context dictates that that is not relevant. The way courts resolve these matters is to determine what the ordinary meaning of a term is, and set aside specilized and technical meanings. See for example Nix v. Hedden where SCOTUS ruled that a tomato is not a legal fruit, because scientific definitions notwithstanding, a tomato is clearly a vegetable in common usage. Note that I am specifically addressing the question you posed, about "outlets". IO believe that attention to "outlets" is misguided. Focus should be on the regulation about "the HOA not being responsible for water leaks between units or interior damage", which is what they are invoking. By your description, the hole in the pipe which constitutes the source of the leak was behind the wall. The problem is that "between units" can have two very different meanings, one being "from one unit to another", and the other is "which takes place in the area that exists between units". Since you do not own the area behind the walls (presumably: property descriptions can be less than totally clear), there was no leak from one unit to the other. There was a leak which took place in the space between units. The definitions for the project clearly indicate that such behind-the-wall stuff is "common area". If a breech in the drain pipe occurs outside the wall and leaked into the unit below, that would be a leak outside the common are, and would be a leak between units in the "from one to the other" sense, although the water would have to pass through the common area. But if it originated on the other side of the wall, it originated in the common area which is always present between units. Suppose, being devil's advocate, that you own not just the stuff inside the walls but also the stuff behind the walls, up to the next unit's walls. But if you apply that analysis of property boundaries, then the adjacent unit's property is the stuff inside his walls and between, up to your walls, so unless you are very special, you don't own the area between the walls. So to reiterate, "outlet" is a irrelevant. What matters is the interpretation of "leak between". Under neither interpretation of that expression is a leak behind the wall the responsibility of the person "upstairs".

First off, you cannot booby trap your property, period. It is both illegal and tortious. But, as you noted, there are already questions/answers that deal with this issue. Sure enough, if the police get a no-knock search warrant, that in and of itself is the Court order allowing entry by any means necessary. When the officers, there by right of law, breach the outer perimeter and stop at the warnings, they will not be seeking any other court orders to have you allow them "safe entry". Their warrant gives them all the right they need, as probable cause of crime and violent intent or intent to destroy evidence was already presented to a judge. If, in real life, you actually put up signage or state explicitly that they're being forewarned that you intend to harm, trap, maim, or otherwise make it unsafe to enter; or that doing so will result in an attempt to destroy evidence, that is something they have already assumed (hence the seeking and granting of the no-knock vs. a regular search warrant). However, the signs in and of themselves are not protected speech, but rather overt threats, and that would put you in a very precarious position indeed. If the police get a "no knock" warrant (the most invasive, difficult to get warrants, whereby there is a grave risk of destruction of evidence or injury to persons), the police will ensure they have safe passage – they've come prepared for dangerous entry long before your signs, but once they see them, you could rest assured they will take them as they are intended: as a direct threat to their safety, and they will deploy a SWAT or other heavily armed entry team (who is usually there anyway for these dangerous entries). You could expect things like smoke/out canister and teargas, flash bangs, and heavily armed and well armored officers attempting to force you from your dwelling. Presumably, if you need to disarm traps to escape the situation, they can enter. Assuming you're home when they invade with chemical weapons, whether you come out or not, they will force you to disarm whatever booby trapping you may have in place that may destroy evidence, likely walking you in as their human shield in the event you're lying about any dangerous ones. That is probably your best case scenario. They may just decide to throw you through the perimeter once they get their hands on you, just to see what happens! If you don't exit and are home or if you are lucky enough to be out, the bomb squad, ATF, and SWAT will converge on your property in less than typical means. Because from your warning they can assume some incendiary or explosive device exists, bringing it into the jurisdiction of other agencies. If they cannot disarm the trap, they would send a robot in first to set it off, or cut through your roof, or knock down a wall – whatever it takes to get in without using a typical means of ingress/egress, so as not to chance your trap. Regardless, you can rest assured that they will get in, and you will pay for the trap you set for law enforcement. Further, to whatever charges you'd have been faced with from evidence flowing from the original warrant will now be added additional charges like attempted murder of a peace officer; if you have any roommates or known associates: conspiracy to do those things; attempted destruction of evidence, criminal interference with a police investigation ... all at a minimum. If anyone is actually harmed, your signage offers you no shield from criminal or tort liability, and you will be lucky to live through the experience once they get their hands on you. Police tend to not like being the targets of intentional maiming, dismemberment or death. You have to understand that, according to this hypothetical, you are intentionally trying to harm law enforcement, or destroy evidence of your dangerous criminal activity. These are not invaders, or intruders according to the law; they are the people whose job it is to enforce the laws, collect the evidence (if you weren't getting arrested pursuant to the fruits of the warrant, you certainly would be at that point). The signs themselves would make excellent exhibits in the coming case of State v. you. BTW: The only reason they have left John Joe Gray alone is that he knows the Henderson County Sheriff Ronny Brownlow, who has been told that the ATF, FBI, and State SWAT, would all be happy to enter and get or kill Mr. Gray if need be. Since the Sheriff never filed any federal charges, and has determined that he doesn't want to breach (and it's in his jurisdiction to determine this), the Sheriff, aware that Gray's entire family is holed up in the "compound", decided it's not worth going in. It's as well known as it is anomalous. When the police want in, and have the right to get in, they will get in. That Sheriff just decided it's not worthwhile.

While at times the Capitol building is open to the public, as the answer by hszmv mentions, at other times it is not, particularly when "an event designated as a special event of national significance" is in progress. Breaking open a door or window, or entering through a door or window that someone else has broken open, could not be thought of by a reasonable person as a legitimate entry. During any period when the Capitol Police were admitting people, those people were allowed to enter, but the question speaks of one who "follows the crowd to the Senate building and even into the building itself" which sounds like one who entered via one of the forced openings, although possibly not. In any case my understanding is that the Capitol Police and other security troops made announcements instructing people to leave the building. Once this was done, reaming in the building willingly would have been a violation of law. That a person was holding a camera, or indeed had press credentials, would not be a defense to such a charge, although it might be seen as a mitigating factor. In general Press credentials do not give a person greater rights of access anywhere. In recent years with the rise of armature or semi-pro journalism via the net, courts have been more careful to treat uninvolved citizens as potential journalists. In addition to ordinary trespassing charges, 18 U.S. Code § 1752 - Restricted building or grounds is applicable, and according to news reports has been used to charge various people who were filmed in the Capitol. 18 USC § 1752 imposes penalties on anyone who: (a)(1) knowingly enters or remains in any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority to do so; (a)(2) knowingly, and with intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, engages in disorderly or disruptive conduct in, or within such proximity to, any restricted building or grounds when, or so that, such conduct, in fact, impedes or disrupts the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions (a)(3) knowingly, and with the intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, obstructs or impedes ingress or egress to or from any restricted building or grounds (a)(4) knowingly engages in any act of physical violence against any person or property in any restricted building or grounds (a)(5) knowingly and willfully operates an unmanned aircraft system with the intent to knowingly and willfully direct or otherwise cause such unmanned aircraft system to enter or operate within or above a restricted building or grounds It would seem that (a)(1) would apply to a person acting as described in the question, or at least it might. Several of the other sections would apply to at least some of the intruders, but not to an amateur photographer as described in the question. A "restricted building" is defined by 18 USC § 1752 as: (c) (1) the term “restricted buildings or grounds” means any posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area— ... (c) (1) (B) of a building or grounds where the President or other person protected by the Secret Service is or will be temporarily visiting; or (c) (1) (C) of a building or grounds so restricted in conjunction with an event designated as a special event of national significance This would seem to apply to most, if not all of the Capitol Building during the counting of Electoral votes, due to the presence of the Vice President, particularly to any area behind locked doors or to any area at all once police had instructed people to leave. Possible penalties under 18 USC § 1752 include a fine and up to 1 year of imprisonment, or up to 10 years for anyone who "uses or carries a deadly or dangerous weapon or firearm" or whose offense "results in significant bodily injury". A person acting as described in the the question would presumably not have either aggravating factor apply.

The legal standard for an indictment is "probable cause". This is the same as the standard for an arrest, an arrest warrant, a wiretap, or a search warrant. A conviction, of course, is subject to the much more demanding, proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Access logs along could provide probable cause for an indictment, even though they would probably not, standing alone, constitute sufficient evidence to convict. Also, the existence of the search warrant shows that a judge already found that there was probable cause that a crime was committed before the access logs were even reviewed, so there has to be some other evidence beyond the access logs out there and the access logs are corroborating the probable cause that was already found to exist against someone. It bears noting that federal grand juries almost without fail indict, although in some local state court systems, especially in rural areas (mostly in the Southeast U.S. since the West rarely uses grand juries and the North has higher standards of professionalism, especially in urban areas), where the quality of the law enforcement and prosecutorial work is lower, near automatic indictments are not a reality.

"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.

Does Germany offer refugees a path to citizenship? Refugees have been flooding into Germany. Under German law do these refugees have a path to citizenship? Or if their situation is temporary would they be expected to leave the country when asked?

German asylum law is codified in the "Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet" (English translation: "Act on the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory Residence Act"), or short AufenthG. The paragraphs in this answer all apply to this law unless noted otherwise. This is a very, very long and complex law and the explanations here are grossly oversimplified. I am not a lawyer. This is all my personal interpretation of the laws as a layman. When you want to know it exactly, please read the full law or ask a lawyer to explain it. A foreigner who requests asylum in Germany has permission to stay in the country until their request for asylum has been processed (§25). When the request is denied (for example, because they come from a country considered safe or because there is insufficient evidence that they are in danger in their home-country), they become illegal immigrants and will have to leave the country as soon as possible (§50), if necessary by force (§58). The foreigner can even be imprisoned until a deportation is possible (§62). When the request is accepted, they get a time-limited permission to stay in the country for up to 3 years (§26) which can be extended for another 2 years afterwards. During that extension process it is reconfirmed if they still are in danger in their home-country. When the situation has changed, the extension might not get granted and they have to leave the country. When the asylum extension was granted, the refugee can apply for a permanent settlement permit. Such a permit allows the foreigner to stay in Germany indefinitely. However, this does not make them a German citizen yet. To become a German citizen with full access to social security, a German passport, voting rights etc., a foreigner needs not only a permanent settlement permit but also to go through the process of "Einbürgerung" (naturalization) according to § 10 Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (Nationality Act). There are several personal requirements for this, like living in Germany for several years, having a permanent employment, not committing any crimes and also passing a written citizenship test.

Yes this is possible, no this is not simple. You are eligible to work as a Freelancer in Germany if you're from an EU/EEA member state. Your nationality is not relevant beyond that. When you start your freelancing, you must inform your employer/university. This is important for two reasons: you may not compete with your employer, and your effective tax rate depends on your predicted total income for the year, which they need in order to withhold the correct amount. (Don't worry, any discrepancies will be resolved with the tax declaration.) In Germany, self-employed work is either gewerblich or freiberuflich which has numerous consequences. This depends on the type of activity. Consulting and activities that require a completed 5-year diploma are generally freiberuflich. But e.g. software development has unclear status. This is ultimately the decision of the tax authority. You might have activities of both kind, but this complicates your accounting. When you start a gewerbliche activity you must register with the Gewerbeamt, and list your fields of activity. Make sure to register as a part-time freelancer, not full-time. In any case you must notify the tax authority through the Fragebogen zur steuerlichen Erfassung, which you should fill through the online Elster system. This will include your income projections and offers some important choices. If your income from freelancing is below a certain threshold, or if you are purely freiberuflich, your (now mandatory) tax declaration is simplified (EÜR). You will not have to do professional accounting. If your activities are gewerblich and your income is below a certain threshold, you do not have to pay business tax. Kleinunternehmer-Regelung: If your income is below a certain threshold, you can opt-out from collecting VAT within Germany. You can always give up Kleinunternehmer-status, but you can't easily return to it. Otherwise, you may request a VAT-ID (UstId). You will then have to regularly pay advance VAT, typically monthly. You can offset any VAT from business expenses that you paid. Tax rules are complex, and depend on the country where the service is rendered – generally, the location of your client. For your services in other countries, you may have to register in that country, or you may fall below their thresholds. The following cases can be discussed more specifically: You can only list VAT on your invoices if you have a VAT-ID. If you have a VAT-ID, you must collect VAT within Germany and for B2C sales within EU. For sales of digital items to consumers in other member states, you may have to use the MOSS system. For sales within the EU where both parties have a VAT-ID, the reverse-charge mechanism is used and the recipient is responsible for paying VAT. For sales in non-EU countries no VAT applies, but you have to follow the local rules. For sales in the US, the tax agreement between the US and Germany exempts professional services from US income tax as long as you perform the services remotely. You will have to send your client's accountants IRS form W8-BEN to document this. However, state-level taxes can still apply. For any income that you get, you should have issued an invoice. The exact details are documented elsewhere, but important aspects are: Your and your client's identity Your VAT number if you have one, your tax number otherwise (but not your personal tax-ID!) A sequential invoice number that will stay unique during your business, e.g. just count from 1 or restart yearly like 2019-1 A date VAT payment if you have a VAT ID, otherwise a notice why no VAT is due. In your tax declaration, you will list income from self-employed work separately from income from employed work, even though it is taxed together. You will have to prove your freelance income, generally through form EÜR. The tax authority may request your invoices and your bank statements and receipts for any expenses. It is therefore recommended but not necessary to open a separate account for your business activities. If you are freiberuflich then most banks welcome you, for gewerbliche activities only one or two banks offer free accounts. Besides tax issues, you must also consider health insurance and retirement plans. As long as your freelancing is only a side job (Nebenerwerb) this is fairly simple. You will have to inform your health insurance about your freelancing. They will need an income projection to calculate your premiums. If your total income fluctuates a lot, you should try to get your premiums calculated individually for each month. This generally doesn't matter if you have private health insurance as they use a flat rate. At this point it should be clear that freelancing is not necessarily trivial, mostly because VAT is a concern. You should therefore look for help: a tax advisor can help you navigate the German tax system, at least for your first tax declaration. dealing with tax issues might require professional help from an accountant, e.g. how to manage VAT and how to correctly apply a tax treaty. most universities have things like founder-workshops. While geared towards first-time full-time self-employed people or startups, there's still a lot of valuable information there.

What should and shouldn't happen isn't going to do a damn thing about your passport situation. Your passport isn't being 'held', it's in processing at a place that is currently not operational due to an unprecedented virus outbreak. No one is acting like a criminal or treating you like one, you are just unlucky. If your situation is that dire, you have no choice but to get a temporary passport. I seriously doubt an Indian court is going to side with you on this one. Just because the passport office is legally allowed to operate, doesn't mean that they are actually able to. If, for example, COVID-19 hit enough of their workforce, they won't have enough people to operate properly and they'll have no choice but to close. And no, '2 or 3 people' is not enough to operate such a large scale, sensitive operation with high security requirements, even just to return passports .

Following the links in the article you quoted, you find that it is indeed illegal in Germany to insult a foreign head of state. For a prosecution to happen, the foreign government has to ask for prosecution, and it would be a criminal case. It's not clear to me whether a TV station could be sued as well. Where Mr. Böhmermann lives would be irrelevant, what would be relevant is whether the insult happened in Germany.

The answer is "it depends," of course. An asylum application may be considered less credible if the applicant entered as a tourist. The applicant would have to explain what changed between the time of entry and the time of the asylum application. (Perhaps a change of government at home? The start of a civil war?) Many countries expect applications for a work permit to be made from outside. Such an application may take much longer to process than a tourist visa, which makes the stay as a tourist problematic. On the other hand, there are countries which allow some tourists to file immigration applications. For instance, Canadian citizens and some others can apply for a German residence permit while they are in Germany.

Choice of jurisdiction: You’re pretty much free to choose your jurisdiction. You don’t have to contract under German law. The German state will intervene though if you’re doing criminal stuff. Legally, the best is of course to draft a written agreement. You’re completely free in the terms (unless it becomes immoral, § 138 BGB), but a loan, § 488 BGB (Darlehensvertrag), with a 0% interest rate (if it’s meant as a short-term aid) is standard. The next level is to collateralize your loan, specifically with a pledge, §§ 1204 ff. BGB, i. e. your friend gives you a valuable item which you may (and actually have to) sell for profit if he doesn’t return the loan. However, unlike contract law, in property law you are not completely free regarding the terms (numerus clausus of property law, Typenzwang des Sachenrechts). Here it becomes too difficult though for the layman, so I wouldn’t recommend that unless you know what you’re doing. Ultimately, I/we think it’s nice of you to consider helping out your friend, but as Nike Dattani already portrayed it can get really nasty if you intend to legally enforce such matters. Trish mentioned the saying: Friendship ends where business begins. I, too, suggest to refer your friend to a pawnshop, research (third-party) microloan opportunities, and help him without directly giving him cash, dine together and offer company (i. e. address the psychological dimension financial troubles entail). PS: § 9 SGB Ⅰ: Germany is (to some degree) a welfare state. Maybe your friend is eligible for some kind of assistance. However, and probably typical of Germany, if you want to get money, you have to fill in forms.

The US doesn't do exit immigration checks, so if your hypothetical Israeli overstayer can board a flight out of the US, they'll most likely be allowed to go without detention or other punishment. The US sees no value in spending government money to detain someone who is ready to leave of their own accord. I'm not sure why such a person should have "no valid documentation". Maybe you're confused by the common term "undocumented" for people without legal immigration status, but it usually doesn't literally mean they have no documentation at all. Most such people would still have their passport and other identification from their home country, and the passport is enough to board a flight back home. You say your hypothetical Israeli overstayer had a visa; so they must have had an Israeli passport when they entered the US. Under normal circumstances, they've still got it. If it expired, they could have renewed it at an Israeli consulate within the US; the consulate will issue passports to all Israeli citizens without regard to their immigration status in the US. Even if somehow they lost their Israeli passport and all other identity documents, the consulate would have the ability to verify their identity from Israeli government records (e.g. the photo and biometrics from their previous passport, which would still be in the Israeli government's database), and process their application for a replacement passport.

I'm very sorry to hear about your situation. Unfortunately, this is too important to trust advice from strangers over the Internet. You should talk to an attorney familiar with Bulgarian immigration law. @jwh20 is correct; entering another country is not a human right. If they are not allowing you to return to your home country despite your following all laws, that is likely a human rights issue. This does not necessarily mean you won't be able to get into Bulgaria; if one person is preventing you from entering, an attorney may be able to get that person's decision overturned.

What is the point of website Terms and Conditions? I was considering answering How prominent must terms of service be?; when I was struck by a thought: what is the point of website Terms and Conditions anyway? Clearly, if they form a contract and they are properly brought to the attention of and agreed to by the user then they are binding (knowledge of and agreement by the provider could safely be assumed). However, one of the fundamental requirements of a contract is that both parties must provide valuable consideration. If the user is paying to access the service then this requirement is satisfied (e.g., a pay wall on a news site or a purchase agreement on an auction site). If they are not then they provide no consideration and there is therefore no contract. For example, participation on this website is putatively subject to the agreement you can read by following the legal link below. How prominent must terms of service be? is the appropriate place to address whether the terms are prominent enough to constitute agreement (IMO it's arguable), so take it that they are. It is possible, that what we post is valuable consideration but I think that is worth a question on its own so I did Are the Q&A posted on Stack Exchange websites valuable consideration?, so take it that it isn't. In the absence of its users providing valuable consideration then there is no contract: What then is the point of the terms and conditions? Clearly, such terms and conditions could be to draw the users' attention to legal obligations that exist as a matter or law without a contract (e.g., Copyright and other IP obligations). They could also be used to create rules that would allow users to be denied service, however, since anyone can be denied service for any reason so long as that reason is not unlawfully discriminatory, it seems pretty pointless.

A web site's Terms of Service are not a contract but, rather, a license. law.washington.edu has an interesting discussion of contracts vs. licenses and asks the question, "Does it matter?" In the case of a web site, the owner of the web site is granting you a license, subject to certain terms, to access the web site and use it. No consideration is required for a license. From the linked article, which discusses copyright, "In the context of copyright law, a 'license' is a permission to do an act that, without the permission, would be unlawful." In the case of a web site's terms and conditions, the owner is granting permission to you to access and use the web site subject to the terms of the license. Typically, such a license will require you to release any liability that may accrue because of your use of the site. The Stack Exchange license, in fact, grants certain permissions related to copyright, "Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content." The Stack Exchange license also places requirements on those who contribute to discussion including a requirement to "perpetually and irrevocably [license] to Stack Exchange" anything we post. In this case, by pressing the "Post Your Answer" question, I have agreed to license my creation, this answer, to Stack Exchange.

You agreed to this On Stackexchange, there are Terms of Service. These tell you to follow the Code of conduct and explicitly allow SO to throw you out if they don't want you to write here. Stack Overflow reserves the right to refuse, suspend or terminate your access to the public Network if it determines, in its sole discretion, that you have in any way violated these Public Network Terms or are otherwise ineligible to access or use the Network or Services. If your actions are determined by us to violate these Public Network Terms, Stack Overflow may, in its sole discretion, try to remediate that violation by working with you individually, but is under no obligation to do so, and if any such remediation efforts are unsuccessful (in Stack Overflow’s sole discretion), then Stack Overflow may revoke your rights to the Network. You agreed to follow the rules, and the code of conduct spells out that if you don't, then you face action.

What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal.

Contracts are a relationship between two or more people Just as it is meaningless to speak of marrying yourself, it is equally meaningless to speak of a contract with yourself. Even if you were to draft such a thing, you would not have standing to sue because you can’t sue yourself. Your example probably isn’t a “one person contract” It’s a contract between the car owner (person 1) and the car yard (person 2) - probably a corporation. The fact that person 1 is representing both parties to the contract doesn’t make it a “one person contract”. There are potential conflicts of interest with this but they are not necessarily ones that can’t be overcome. However, if the car owner runs a business as a car dealer as a sole trader, then, no, they cannot make this kind of contract.

This is a large question, so I'll only put a spotlight on some misconceptions. Why can't Google use legitimate interest instead of consent to serve ads? A data controller such as Google must choose an appropriate legal basis per Art 6(1). But if the legal basis is consent, and the data subject declines or retracts consent, you can't do the processing anyway under legitimate interest instead. It seems that the issue is not that consent was an inappropriate legal basis, but that they decided to use consent and did not collect it properly (see below). However, Google's analysis that they need consent is likely correct. There is an good argument that a website can show first-party ads under a legitimate interest. Google does so as well. But the consent in question is for ad personalization, i.e. on creating detailed profiles on users in order to show more “relevant” ads. For that purpose, Google's legitimate interest would likely not outweigh the data subject's rights and freedoms (compare Art 6(1)(f)). Why might consent be invalid? The GDPR defines consent in Art 4(11) and specifies further requirements in Art 7. The EDPB has issued guidelines 05/2020 and previously WP259 on consent. A core requirement, in addition to the general Art 5(1)(a) transparency principle, is that consent is specific and informed. The user must be informed about the specific purpose for which consent is being asked, and must be able to control consent individually for each purpose. Additionally, consent requires an affirmative action, consent is never the default. The EDPB recommends a layered information approach: in the first information layer, at the point where consent is being asked, the proposed processing activities are summarized. Full details (including all information per Art 13) are provided in a second layer that can be reached via a link. Consent will not be informed if the data subject is required to read the entire privacy policy first. How does the CNIL see Google's approach to consent and transparency? The CNIL asserts that Google failed at every step of a layered information design and failed to obtain valid consent: consent controls were hidden by default, i.e. there was no first information layer consent controls were pre-checked, thus requiring opt-out. That's not how you ask for consent (but might have been alright if Google had used legitimate interest instead). consent is all-or-nothing and not sufficiently granular Google's main information layer is its privacy policy, but it is very general and does not provide sufficiently specific information Google only provides specific information spread across further documents, often 5 or 6 levels deep Could Google rely on Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract? If a data subject enters a contract about Google using their data for ads, yes. Otherwise, no. But in practice, necessity for a contract is very similar to consent because the data subject can freely decide whether or not to enter a contract. Even when the legal basis is a contract, the data controller still has an obligation to provide transparent information. Depending on the structure of the contract, a layered approach could be used as well. However, the purposes of processing are ultimately given by the contents of the contract. What about the Ads Data Processing Terms? These terms are not part of the terms of service or the privacy policy that end users agree to. The ads terms are instead part of their B2B offerings.

For a contract (including ToS) to be valid, one of the things it must have is "legality of objects". That is, if the contract purports to require anything that is unlawful in the jurisdiction then (barring a severance clause) it is not a contract. In common law countries, the starting point is that people are free to contract for and about anything they like - a contract is simply a mechanism for exchanging value between the parties on whatever terms they wish. However, judges and legislatures have decided that there are some things you cannot trade and some terms that are unconscionable or against the public interest and these vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction*. For example, a contract is not legal in any jurisdiction if its terms seek to exclude the intervention of the courts - this is against public policy. So for example, a binding arbitration clause requiring the parties to accept a private arbitrator's decision as final excludes the courts, yes? Well, in Australia, yes, such clauses if used in a contract between parties with different bargaining power (like a Telco and its customers) are invalid because they prevent the weaker party pursuing a class action. However, they are perfectly legal in the United States because the SCOTUS has determined that the customer can persue litigation after arbitration is finished so this doesn't impede the courts. These are essentially the same laws interpreted by the courts so that they have totally opposite effects. So this might lead you to think that you'll put one in - it'll be OK in the US and Australians will represent such a tiny share of your market that you don't care if I can't enforce my ToS there. Except, if your website is visible by Australians, you have just exposed yourself to a government fine of up to AUD 5,000,000 (say USD 3,000,000) per day for breach of Australian Consumer Law. As a general guide (which is very stereotypical), US jurisdictions are the most permissive in the rights they will allow their citizens to give up: the US attitude is that everyone is free to make the best deal they can. European jurisdictions are the least permissive in this regard: most European countries follow a more social welfare state model and the citizen needs protecting from themselves. Commonwealth countries tend to be more in the middle.

To expand on Dale's answer, the general principle applying to acceptance are as follows: The offeree's clear and absolute expression of intention and assent must be made in response to, and must exactly match, the terms of the offer. This expression must be communicated with the offeror in order to be effective. This means that a verbal contract is just as binding as a written one, with or without initial or signature. The importance of the initial or signature, as correctly identified by Dale is to be able to hold the offeree to account if a breach of the contract follows. Importantly, a contract can stipulate in what form the expression of acceptance must take. In the case of unilateral contracts, such as in adverts (see Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893], for a relevant item of UK case law), no expression of acceptance is needed to be received by the offeror - merely attempting to perform the act has been held as adequate acceptance.

If you do not get anything from this "contract", and all it says is that you will pay someone a sum of money "on demand", it does not meet the basic requirements to form a contract, and in particular, there is no consideration being received by you. It would therefore not be a contract and would have zero legal force. If you do receive consideration, demonstrating that you signed the contract under duress will require specific legal advice, and you need a practicing lawyer in your jurisdiction.

Are there any laws in the US against pedophilia stories hosted on a website? I run a publicly editable website where users can post up stories a various sort. Some are pretty normal, some are sexual, some are a bit perverted, and recently some have drifted into the pedophilia realm. No images or videos can be uploaded to this site. Are there any laws that I might be breaking by hosting this content?

Two questions, here: Can a text story be obscene under the law? As one who hosts a website, can you be held liable for the content of a site? Can a text story be legally obscene The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit published their opinion on United States of America v. Frank Russell McCoy on March 12, 2015. Mr. McCoy maintained a website, young-stuff.com, from his home. He authored or edited more than 200 graphic stories detailing "sexual abuse, rape, and torture of young children." Mr. McCoy was indicted in June, 2007 and found guilty. The appeals court affirmed the conviction. Both the initial trial court and the appeals court found Mr. McCoy's stories "lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Can a web site's host be held liable for the content of a site? Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act says that No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. It also states that no internet entity has immunity from federal criminal law. Section 230 has been found to apply to intermediaries of third-party content. Generally, most assume that when the content is simply hosted and not moderated by the web site then there is no liability for the provider. That's not always the case and is determined by whether the host of the web site is considered a provider of interactive computer services or an information content provider. Any person responsible "in whole or in part...for the creation or development of information" is an information content provider. Which are you? In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that roommates.com was not immune under Section 230 because they asked questions of their users that helped facilitate a potentially illegal search under the Fair Housing Act. They, therefore, helped create the content the site hosted. The question will ultimately rest on whether someone decides the content is obscene enough to be prosecuted and then if you, the site's host, aided in creating the content. This definitely requires the assistance of competent legal counsel.

This was attributed to Dumblaws.com, which is now mercifully nonexistent. It is false, as is the supposed law against fishing for whales on Sunday (seriously? Whales in Ohio?). If someone makes such a claim and gives a specific citation like "ORC 1533.02", you can look that law up. Otherwise, you can go to the state's repository of laws, which is searchable (not all states are as enlightened). No laws mention "whale" or "housefly", and only 23 address "fly", only referring to insects in a couple of cases where e.g. bakery showcases must keep out dust and flies. You might take on this collection, hosted by a law firm. I haven't bothered to check if "It is illegal to drive a camel on the highway" in Nevada – that a least verifiably refers to a law that did exist.

I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire!

Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful.

You've really got two questions here: 1) "Is it an invasion of privacy to know that I'm using an ad blocker?", and 2) "Is it discrimination to refuse service based on what software I'm running?". Taking them in order: Because of how HTTP/HTML works, there are essentially two ways for a server operator to know what software you are running. Your browser announces that it's running something. This usually takes the form of a modified User-Agent header. I'm not aware of any privacy laws that consider "Person A told me something" to be an invasion of Person A's privacy. They guess it based on the actions your browser takes. For example, if the website gets a request for a page, and the site's ad network does not get a matching request for an ad, the server deduces that the user is running an ad blocker. Since this is based on things that the server operator could reasonably be expected to be informed of, it isn't an invasion of privacy under any law I'm aware of. Is it discrimination? Yes. But not all discrimination is illegal. In general, only discrimination based on protected categories (race, sex, etc.) is prohibited, and I can't imagine a jurisdiction making "choice of browser add-ons" to be one of those categories, not least because it's something the person being discriminated against can easily change.

Using Tor is not illegal. Nor is hiding your IP address, which is - among other things - what Tor does. Going to .onion links is not illegal. What you find and interact with at those .onion sites may be illegal. See Law StackExchange Is it legal to host a directory of .onion urls? Running a Tor Relay is not illegal. That could change. Running an Exit Relay could expose your IP address as the Relay, so that could lead investigators of illegal activity to you. Read https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en As always, check your state laws http://statelaws.findlaw.com/criminal-laws/computer-crimes.html And do your own research with the links above and at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(anonymity_network) and at https://www.torproject.org/

That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) | HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act | Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money.

First I should point out that the Google question is about a different situation, the "snippet" issue where a tiny part of a web page is redistributed, where the issue of resolved in the US by appeal to the "fair use" defense. The proposed scenario as written here is broader since it would go beyond a couple of lines, and goes up to the limit of copy an entire web page. That is copyright infringement, with or without an associated link. Copyright protection is not just about attribution, it is about control. If you can limit your copying appropriately, you may survive under a fair use analysis; but you need to hire a lawyer with experience in copyright litigation to vet your notions of what is "a small amount" etc.

Short 1099 gig between FT job and unemployment I work for a contracting agency (call it Foo) and there is a team of us at a client's site. Due to a funding/budget issue, the client has to let us all go by the end of the month, we just found out about it today. My boss wants me to stay and work a few more days for which they cannot pay my contracting agency (due to some irrelevant logistical issues) but they procured another "vendor" (call it Bar) who the client can pay and they can cut me a paycheck for those few days. I would be strictly 1099 with "Bar", so they wouldn't be paying me any benefits, just my hourly rate times the number of hours. I was a FT W-2 employee with "Foo" and they were paying my benefits, including unemployment. I plan to file for unemployment once I finish the three day mini gig extension. However, I am confused as to what I should tell my unemployment office what my last day was and who my employer was. I had to deal with them once before in the past with a similarly unusual case scenario and the weirdness of the case postponed my request processing while I was strapped for cash (but was eventually approved) so I am hesitant to present anything but a clean cut scenario out of a fear of the same thing happening (they don't know how to process my request). Should I tell them about the three day gig at all because I am afraid they will take "Bar" as my last employer (even though it's just 1099) or should I skip it altogether? The employment commission will not know about it because it is just 1099, almost as though you paid a contractor to paint your house. At the same time, I would like to do it legally and not break any law. The ideal scenario is if I could tell them: My last employer was "Foo" where I finished at time T0 but I earned income in T1-T3 through an undisclosed source and I do not wish to claim unemployment on those days. At the same time I do not want you to consider "Bar" as my last employer. So the complication comes in the form of a discrepancy between when my employment with the proper company ("Foo") ended and when my last day of work is (three days after the "Foo" job ended). How do I account for that transition period for the purposes of unemployment?

I can only speak from experience for Pennsylvania, but this is how it works there: When you are working as a 1099 contractor you are "unemployed" for purposes of claiming unemployment. As you learned the hard way: you should apply for unemployment as soon as you lose your W-2 job. Every time you go to claim unemployment compensation the agency will ask if you have any earned income for the period you are claiming. That's where you would declare your 1099 income. Your unemployment compensation for the period will be adjusted accordingly. Basically you want to keep your unemployment claim "open" until either you secure full-time W-2 employment, or until you have exhausted your unemployment benefits. The system isn't setup to deal with any other scenario very gracefully. Of course, never omit or falsify information provided to the unemployment agency!

You sue BOTH the contractor AND his insurance company. Your interest is in being made whole. It doesn't matter who pays you — whether the contractor pays or the insurance company pays. As long as you are made whole. One scenario you want to avoid is holding a judgment against a contractor who doesn't have the money to pay you then turns around and claims bankruptcy or skips town. That's why you sue both. You want to have a judgment against the insurance company too in case the contractor can not or does not pay you. Also, check your jurisdiction but you might need to sue in Circuit Court because the limit of jurisdiction for small claims court might be set at $5,000 as it is in many jurisdictions. You should sue for the highest amount possible. Then negotiate downward if warranted. Your invoices for materials and labor from your recent renovations and any photographs you might have taken would be your evidence to support your claim exceeding the ACV. If you sue them, they will negotiate.

It's probably not unlawful to ask, but an answer cannot be required immediately. Per the Department of Labor, Susan has 60 days to elect COBRA coverage (the qualifying event here being the termination of Susan's employment): Your plan must give you at least 60 days to choose whether or not to elect COBRA coverage, beginning from the date the election notice is provided or the date you would otherwise lose coverage under your group health plan due to the qualifying event, whichever is later. It would be unlikely for an employer to discourage an employee from electing COBRA coverage due to costs to the employer, as you suggest: Susan is still employed and thus could be treated differently in her last two weeks depending on how she responds because the company is struggling financially and is looking for every opportunity to save money. Susan electing to use COBRA coverage is unlikely to cost the company money, because the employer is permitted to charge her the entire cost of the coverage, plus 2 percent to cover the cost of administering it (additional DoL source). As far as privacy goes, I don't think anything illegal has occurred here. The most prevalent law regarding privacy of health information, HIPAA, generally does not apply to employers. Susan could, of course, request a private discussion, and any response from Emily could not rise to the level of illegal harassment or create a hostile work environment.

united-states If they have a contract with the employee which specifies that such IP is assigned to the company at creation, such a contract is valid until and unless a court holds that it is void. It might be held void as against public policy,. or as being "unconscionable", but it might well not be so held. An even broader contract, which claimed any and every kind of IP created by an employee, even if crated during off hours and not at the work site nor with company resources is more likely to be held void, but even this is not certain to be held void. In the absence of a contract explicitly assigning such IP to the company, the company might attempt to apply the rule that makes works created by an employee within the scope of employment works-made-for-hire (WFH). This is in 17 USC 101 (the definitions section of the copyright law). This would affect copyrights, but not patents or other IP. There is very little US case law interpreting the "scope of employment". But there seems some reason to believe that work that was not assigned by the employer, not intended to benefit the employer, not used by the employer, not done within usual working hours nor using company resources, and not of the specific type normally assigned to or carried out by the employee, is probably not "within the scope" of the employee's employment. If that is so, the work would not be WFH, and only an explicit written contract, signed by the employee (or the employee's authorized agent) could transfer the copyright.

The EU-wide 48 hour limit and the German Arbeitszeitgesetz only apply to employees, not to self-employed persons or freelancers. Thus, it would in principle be legal to have a full-time job and do any amount of freelancing on the side. I'm not sure whether your PhD student position factors into this since it is unpaid. If you have multiple employers, the sum of working time matters – this is one reason why you have to notify your employers about additional jobs. One employer cannot check your time with another employer, so you should inform them when your shifts change (while employers can assign you shifts, they must consider your personal circumstances). But self-employment is not employment. If you take this offer, you would act as a German business, perform work in Germany, pay taxes in Germany, but have an UK client. (Assuming your work would be done remotely rather than travelling to the UK to perform your work there). Freelancing would also mean that you'll meet the wonderful world of German bureaucracy, including registering with the Finanzamt, writing invoices, doing accounting, filing taxes, dealing with VAT, and trying to navigate a no-deal Brexit. At least your work likely counts as freiberuflich rather than gewerblich, which would free you from a Gewerbeanmeldung. Your don't have to seek permission from your employer when taking up a side job, but you must notify them. They can object if your side job would impact your work. This would clearly be the case when working for a competitor, or when your side job would bring you over the working time limit. Since you work in the public sector, there may be additional rules (parts of Beamtenrecht apply to your employment relationship). While the working time limit does not apply to freelancing, this might still impact your job if you get too little rest, or if you would become unavailable for your main job during normal working hours. Taking up a side job despite an objection could be cause for immediate termination. Note also that you cannot generally use vacation days to work a side job since vacation is intended for recuperation. To summarize: you would not work an UK job, but be employed in Germany and be self-employed in Germany the working time limit only relates to employed work, not self-employed work your employer may nevertheless be able to object to you taking up another job if it would affect your work

It is not illegal to treat the employees differently. As long as nobody is being paid for less than the time worked, this is legal. Treating employees differently because of protected characteristics is unlawful discrimination. However, the duration you have worked there is not a protected characteristic. It is perfectly legal for the employer not to mandate new employees clock in and out. It would even be legal (if not a great idea) to hire new employees for twice as much.

Can my accountant bill me for previous work he agreed to perform for free? No. The difficult part will be for you to prove that he agreed to do the job for free. Hence the importance of having this kind of "gentlemen's" agreements in writing. You have the burden of outweighing --even by means of circumstantial evidence-- the common presumption that professional work is done for compensation, not for free. However, just like it might be hard for you to prove the aforementioned "gentlemen's agreement", it would also be hard for him to prove that you agreed to (or knew, or should have known, you would have to) pay the amount he is billing now. In the event that you are unable to prove he agreed to work for free, you might want to dispute the reasonableness of the amounts he is pursuing so belatedly. It is noteworthy that the work at issue being "really simple" would not be the only factor for assessing how much he may recover. Other factors such as the accountant's qualifications or the market rate for similar services would be weighed in awarding recovery (if any). Can I legally ignore these invoices? It does not make any sense that he sends me invoices for work done 4 years ago. You may ignore the invoices regarding older work, that is, those for which the period of limitations has elapsed. For most cases, section 4 of the Ontario Limitations Act provides a two-year period to bring a claim. Since the accountant himself did the job, and most likely he was --or should have been-- aware of the payments due for his services, he would be unable to prove that his "discovery" of claims (see section 5 of Limitations Act) regarding older tax filings meets the period of limitations. Equivalently, see here the paragraph starting with "For example, if the courts determine that [...]".

If you are given a paid job, and you do the work, then "consideration has been provided", and 1682 will not apply. As to "referral fees" those sound more like kickbacks, but it depends on what, if anything, the person gets for the fee.

Does handing keys to police under duress constitute consent to search? Suppose a police officer demands, through a closed window, to search your car or dwelling. Knowing your rights you say, "I do not consent to a search." The officer then declares, "I don't care whether you consent, I am going to search, and if you don't open this door, I will break the window to get access." You know two things: There's no reason for the officer not to make good on his threat. Regardless of whether he has probable cause, you're going to have a broken window if he does, and you will probably never be compensated for that. If at that point you open the door, or give the officer the keys, even while saying, "I do not consent to your search," does that provide any basis for a future claim that you did consent to the search? Or can you always say, "I complied under duress and protest" to have the search ruled non-consensual in any judicial proceeding? I suspect the answer is that latter, but I'm wondering: is there any case law to support that answer? (Or is there any case that refutes it?)

The answer is somewhat similar to the "corollary" question, in that this wouldn't be the only information taken into account at a motion to suppress and one would need know why the officer requested (in your scenario demanded) to search you in the first place. There are scenarios whereby he could search you without benefit of a warrant. Was he chasing you from a crime scene? Were you attempting to flee? Did he see something illegal before demanding the search that may have made it legal despite you thinking it not? The analysis is different if you are in the car versus in your house. That said, regardless of where, a consent search is just not likely to happen in this way. In your car, the officer has the right to take your keys to "secure the scene," or if there is a reasonable suspicion that you may attempt to flee. Typically, the officer will say "turn off your car" without taking your keys. Despite what's typical, though, they certainly can take your keys if circumstances make it necessary and that (the mere taking of keys) does not constitute a search. Keep in mind that the police can search a car without a warrant in a number of circumstances, without your consent, that would not be available to them with a dwelling. Courts will typically give police much more latitude to search a vehicle than a home. Under the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement, individuals have less of an expectation of privacy when driving a car and there is also a much greater chance of losing the evidence in a car vs. a dwelling, since it's mobile. Generally, the police can search your car if: You have given the officer consent (in this scenario you've not – unless you hand them the keys without protesting – and then this would be considered implied consent); The officer has probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in your car; The officer reasonably believes a search is necessary for their own protection (e.g., they can search for a weapon, if they have reasonable suspicion); You have been arrested and the search is related to that arrest (such as for drunk driving or for drugs, they can search for alcohol or drugs). There are tons of contextually specific rules that dictate when each of these situations is OK, and when they're not, as well as where they can search under what scenarios. It is not a one size fits all analysis. In fact, warrantless and consent searches may be some of the most variable analyses criminal attorneys and judges undertake to explore. The law on these topics is voluminous. Searching your car after you've given the officer the keys, assuming there was no basis and you actually said "you're not consenting," can result in suppression, but not necessarily as the fight is a lot tougher when it comes to a car. (E.g., if you said no earlier, but then handed the cop the keys later without renewing the objection, this could be considered an implied consent.) Similar to the other question, there is also going to be a whole other side to the story, with evidence aside from your testimony dictating what the ruling will be. A dwelling is different from a car, although your question makes some assumptions here that I would find very hard to see happening in real life (having represented both police, municipalities, and defendants to criminal searches).... It would be highly unlikely for an officer to threaten to break in like this ... especially in a dwelling where neighbors and passersby can see what's happening and would not only watch, but would probably video it. This is not to suggest that threats and actual wrongdoing doesn't happen, it's just not typically in this way. Police know the law. They rarely do things so blatantly unlawful that not only will nearly ensure that any evidence is inadmissible, but (in a case like this) where they will also probably lose their job. Short of a pursuit where the police are chasing someone into a house, I have never heard of a forced entry in a situation like you're describing. While we don't know the circumstances leading to the encounter, I am assuming that the search isn't pursuant to a chase, since you're having a discussion with the officer and if you're chased from the scene of a crime and run into your house, they're coming in. They are not having discussions. However, since we don't know what the circumstances are that lead to you being approached in the first place, it's difficult to analyze whether he has the right to enter warrantlessly. What we do know is that with a dwelling, it is much less likely to be lawful. As with the other question, the analysis as to whether consent was given or not is far from simple. Suspects are much less likely to give consent to search a dwelling as they are a car, and if they do, the search is often limited to a certain area, so chances of suppression are much better. That said, others will often give consent to the police when requested of them (spouses, kids, landlords, hotel owners, etc). Just imagine ... there are literally thousands of warrantless searches done every single year in the U.S., nearly all of which are alleged to be based on some form of consent. Assume every one of those people has a lawyer; that means nearly every one of those cases is arguing the consent was bad, some way, some how. Duress is one of the most common arguments when someone gives permission; either explicitly (like what you are proposing), implicitly (they came with 10 grimacing cops, so the guy thought he didn't have a choice). Most of the time, however, there is no duress, people just simply didn't know they can say no, or they think the cops won't find what they're hiding. Cops can do a lot of things to get you to allow for a warrantless search. They can even lie to people to get them to consent, and officers are not required to notify the suspect that he has a right to refuse to consent (however, telling the suspect they have the right to refuse is helpful to rebut the coercion argument). In United States v. Mendenhall, "The fact that the officers themselves informed the respondent that she was free to withhold her consent substantially lessened the probability that their conduct could reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive." Keep in mind, a big part of the reason why these scenarios are unlikely is not just that the police can find a way in that won't be so challengeable, if they really can't get a legitimate warrant and need to find a deleterious way in. It's also because 9 in 10 times when a police officer does a consent search, the suspect signs a consent form. That's not to say that people don't get coerced or get searched due to duress, they do. But typically not in so blatant a way. There are shades of grey in most of these cases. So, to answer whether you can get the search suppressed if it leads to an arrest under these facts; the only answer that is definite, is that nobody can be sure. If consent searches, their exceptions, and all ways the evidence gets in and the evidence is kept out interests you ... read these two law review articles. There are probably 200 cases footnoted between them! http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/MaclinT011508.pdf http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-81-6-Sutherland.pdf

was the idea that all searches and seizures, reasonable or otherwise, require a warrant? No. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. This means that unreasonable searches are prohibited. A prohibited search can't require a warrant because the search is prohibited. If a warrant was issued for an unreasonable search then the warrant was issued in error.

Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.

As the previous reply says, you can't steal something if it was yours already. That's by definition – stealing can only be of something that isn't your possession. However there are three ways you can have a problem despite this, partly referred to in another answer: If there is a law or other legal basis for the other person to have control and keep that object, either for a while or indefinitely. So if your phone is legitimately taken by a police officer, you can't "steal" it but you may still not have the right to take it. But this would be treated as some other crime, not "theft." If you cannot gain legal access it, and would have to commit another kind of crime to get it back. So you can't legally get back money by hacking someone's bank account, or defrauding them, or get back an object by breaking down their front door or using illegal force, or by making unlawful threats and blackmail.On the other hand, if you were invited by them to visit their house (or persuaded them to let you visit) and you found it and took it back while visiting under their consent, or they gave you a lift and while in the car you rummaged in the glove compartment and saw your property there, then the issue of legal consent for access is potentially a non-issue, meaning that taking it back under those conditions (even against their objections when they realised) may well be technically legal in many cases, depending on the exact facts of the case and applicable law. (less likely) If something has happened that means, technically, it isn't yours any more, or never was yours. For example, you accidentally give or throw your valuable phone away in error and someone else legitimately (in law) assumes ownership afterwards, or sign away or renounce something without realising it, or allow someone to use something in a way that gives them some ownership-like rights over it, so that by law you are deemed to have relinquished or waived some/all of your rights as an owner (the other person was honest and didn't defraud you), and you later try to take it back without consent, then in principle you could now be seen as stealing it back.You might also believe something is absolutely yours but in fact legally you don't own it and never did. For example you 'bought' some music or software, or a right to use something under license, and believe you actually own it or that you have a moral right to own it. So, later on, you sell it, dispose of it to someone else, or treat it as yours, when in law, it never was yours to do these things. Technically depending on the situation and exact wording of the law, this might be construed as stealing, in some cases and some jurisdictions. Between these legal limits, there is a grey area where you can get it back in practice despite an illegality. For example if the unlawful access is so minor you are sure it won't be a criminal issue, or you're sure it wouldn't be reported, you might chance it. But that's not a legal issue as much as a personal one. An interesting variant of this applies in English law, although I doubt it has any legal relevance in US law. In English law, "theft" was defined by the Theft Act 1968 as, "A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with intention to permanently deprive the other of it". This meant that a person who could show a court that they did not "intend" to "permanently deprive", or did not act "dishonestly" or "appropriate" the property (treat it as if they were its owner), might in fact have a strong legal defence against a charge of theft. Update from comment below "If you saw it in a shop would you be able to take it and run away?" You wouldn't have to. In almost all cases if something isn't legally yours, you can't legally pass ownership to anyone else, such as a store, whether for money or not, because it wasn't ever yours to pass good (legal) title. So the item is still owned by its original legitimate owner, meaning the exact same legal position still applies as above, if you had discovered it was in someone's house. It could change hands many times (not just once) from thief to fence to store to shopper to friend as a gift, and even so, the same would still apply - it would remain yours in law. If anything it's a bit easier if you saw it in a shop. A shop usually consents to members of the public entering - they don't have to ask normally! - and you might ask to see the item or look closely (if it's locked in the window). You now have it with consent and without any crime. If confident, you can walk out completely legally with your possession. (Tracking down the "rogue" or recovering any money paid for it, is their problem not yours in the eyes of the law). That said, realistically you wouldn't do it that way. This is slipping into personal view rather than law, but this is how I'd do it instead of "grab and run." Assuming a "typical" store and store staff, you would ask them to fetch the manager, and you would explain firmly that you claim this is your stolen property, and therefore not owned by them (nor do they have any rights to make any decisions about it), and you are taking it back. You would offer sight of ID or some means of contact, telling them this is so that they have a means to contact you, if they wish to dispute it via lawyers or police. You would offer to wait for the police if they wish, but maintain that you are not parting with it and they may call the police if they disagree; when they arrive, tell the police exactly the same, and that you have given your ID and waited there, as a mark of good faith, and invite them to come back with you to see where you live or proof of purchase or anything else, if relevant. You would tell the police that if they think you have committed a crime according to the law then they must of course arrest you for it, but if not, you now wish to go. You would meet any police request to give it to the police or store by asserting that it is your property and you would rather not, or by asking if you will be committing a criminal offence (if so which) if you refuse, and refuse if you feel able to do so. Then follow whichever way it goes. You would do these things because they are fair, reasonable, and they mark you out as someone asserting a right, not a thief yourself, and they reduce the odds that you will be taken for a thief, or meet with violence in their efforts to recover it. After all, the storekeeper and police can claim "reasonable belief" for any of their actions afterwards, so it's best that you reduce their likelihood of something nasty.

First off, you cannot booby trap your property, period. It is both illegal and tortious. But, as you noted, there are already questions/answers that deal with this issue. Sure enough, if the police get a no-knock search warrant, that in and of itself is the Court order allowing entry by any means necessary. When the officers, there by right of law, breach the outer perimeter and stop at the warnings, they will not be seeking any other court orders to have you allow them "safe entry". Their warrant gives them all the right they need, as probable cause of crime and violent intent or intent to destroy evidence was already presented to a judge. If, in real life, you actually put up signage or state explicitly that they're being forewarned that you intend to harm, trap, maim, or otherwise make it unsafe to enter; or that doing so will result in an attempt to destroy evidence, that is something they have already assumed (hence the seeking and granting of the no-knock vs. a regular search warrant). However, the signs in and of themselves are not protected speech, but rather overt threats, and that would put you in a very precarious position indeed. If the police get a "no knock" warrant (the most invasive, difficult to get warrants, whereby there is a grave risk of destruction of evidence or injury to persons), the police will ensure they have safe passage – they've come prepared for dangerous entry long before your signs, but once they see them, you could rest assured they will take them as they are intended: as a direct threat to their safety, and they will deploy a SWAT or other heavily armed entry team (who is usually there anyway for these dangerous entries). You could expect things like smoke/out canister and teargas, flash bangs, and heavily armed and well armored officers attempting to force you from your dwelling. Presumably, if you need to disarm traps to escape the situation, they can enter. Assuming you're home when they invade with chemical weapons, whether you come out or not, they will force you to disarm whatever booby trapping you may have in place that may destroy evidence, likely walking you in as their human shield in the event you're lying about any dangerous ones. That is probably your best case scenario. They may just decide to throw you through the perimeter once they get their hands on you, just to see what happens! If you don't exit and are home or if you are lucky enough to be out, the bomb squad, ATF, and SWAT will converge on your property in less than typical means. Because from your warning they can assume some incendiary or explosive device exists, bringing it into the jurisdiction of other agencies. If they cannot disarm the trap, they would send a robot in first to set it off, or cut through your roof, or knock down a wall – whatever it takes to get in without using a typical means of ingress/egress, so as not to chance your trap. Regardless, you can rest assured that they will get in, and you will pay for the trap you set for law enforcement. Further, to whatever charges you'd have been faced with from evidence flowing from the original warrant will now be added additional charges like attempted murder of a peace officer; if you have any roommates or known associates: conspiracy to do those things; attempted destruction of evidence, criminal interference with a police investigation ... all at a minimum. If anyone is actually harmed, your signage offers you no shield from criminal or tort liability, and you will be lucky to live through the experience once they get their hands on you. Police tend to not like being the targets of intentional maiming, dismemberment or death. You have to understand that, according to this hypothetical, you are intentionally trying to harm law enforcement, or destroy evidence of your dangerous criminal activity. These are not invaders, or intruders according to the law; they are the people whose job it is to enforce the laws, collect the evidence (if you weren't getting arrested pursuant to the fruits of the warrant, you certainly would be at that point). The signs themselves would make excellent exhibits in the coming case of State v. you. BTW: The only reason they have left John Joe Gray alone is that he knows the Henderson County Sheriff Ronny Brownlow, who has been told that the ATF, FBI, and State SWAT, would all be happy to enter and get or kill Mr. Gray if need be. Since the Sheriff never filed any federal charges, and has determined that he doesn't want to breach (and it's in his jurisdiction to determine this), the Sheriff, aware that Gray's entire family is holed up in the "compound", decided it's not worth going in. It's as well known as it is anomalous. When the police want in, and have the right to get in, they will get in. That Sheriff just decided it's not worthwhile.

First, no, given the wording of the question: "by demanding identity first". US courts have never held that citizens must immediately comply with non-emergency orders free of back-talk. Let's assume that the refusal is conditional: "I won't comply until you show me your ID". In most (?) jurisdictions, there is no obligation imposed on police to show ID, though I am excluding home searches. There is a policy requirement in Seattle (§7) that Employees may use a Department-issued business card that contains their name and serial number to satisfy the request for the information. Employees will also show their department identification card and badge (sworn) when specifically requested to do so. Exception: Employees are not required to immediately identify themselves if: An investigation is jeopardized A police function is hindered There is a safety consideration Massachusetts has a law saying that "Such identification card shall be carried on the officer's person and shall be exhibited upon lawful request for purposes of identification". In the domain of search and seizure law, the court reasoned in Doornbos v. Chicago, regarding a seizure by plainclothes police that Absent reasonable grounds to think that identification would present an unusual danger, it is generally not a reasonable tactic for plainclothes officers to fail to identify themselves when conducting a stop. The tactic provokes panic and hostility from confused civilians who have no way of knowing that the stranger who seeks to detain them is an officer... it is usually unreasonable for a plainclothes officer to fail to identify himself when conducting a stop or frisk As you can see, this identification requirement is tied to constitutional search and seizure limits for which there is voluminous case law regarding what is "reasonable". The scenario that you propose is fairly far from the kind of case identified in Doornbos: is the order from a uniformed officer in a police vehicle? That seems to be what you're describing. Now we must inquire as to the legality of the order. Picking on Washington state law, RCW 46.61.015 requires that No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any duly authorized flagger or any police officer or firefighter invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. RCW 46.61.021 requires a person driving to stop for a LEO, and to identify himself: failure to comply is a misdemeanor. There is no statutory provision that a person can refuse to obey these (or similar sections in the motor vehicle title) until the officer provides ID. A police officer (in Washington: and I suspect any other state) does not have unrestricted authority to give people orders, there are specific statutory circumstances giving police the power to order people to do things. Obstructing a police officer is a crime, but obstructing an officer is where one "willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties", and not "doesn't cooperate". There is a provision, RCW 9a.76.030 where A person is guilty of refusing to summon aid for a peace officer if, upon request by a person he or she knows to be a peace officer, he or she unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such peace officer and the "knows to be a peace officer" clause implies either that the officer is uniformed, or has provided identification. Finally, we have "failure to disperse" when a person congregates with a group of three or more other persons and there are acts of conduct within that group which create a substantial risk of causing injury to any person, or substantial harm to property; and (b) He or she refuses or fails to disperse when ordered to do so by a peace officer or other public servant engaged in enforcing or executing the law. These laws are attuned to emergency needs, thus outside the penumbra of your scenario. In short, the primary question must be, when can police lawfully give you an order that you must obey, which narrows the matter down to traffic-related matters. The seizure must be reasonable: it is reasonable to require a person to stop for a uniformed officer. Reasonability does not entail that all officers must produce ID when effecting a seizure, but this may be the case with plain-clothes officers. Even when in Seattle with a departmental policy requiring officers to identify themselves, an officer's failure to identify does not render the seizure illegal.

You give no jurisdiction but in general: First, police have no obligation to be honest. So, yes they can collect this without consent by e.g. taking hair from your hairbrush (with a warrant) or giving you a glass of water while interviewing you and getting it from your fingerprint oils (which may not actually be technically possible but never mind that). No, they can't take it by "force" by sticking a swab in your mouth. Yes, it will almost certainly go into a database. Of course, there are some jurisdictions where police are entitled to decide you are guilty based on the fact that you didn't pay them a bribe.

Law enforcement officers can obtain information with a search warrant, which is a document issued by a judge or magistrate that authorizes them to search for specific information or evidence based on "probable cause" to believe that it will inform the investigation or prosecution of a crime. A court can also issue a subpoena at the request of a party to a proceeding before it. Since in most cases only the state can bring criminal charges before a court, an individual would have to bring a civil complaint before a court in order to even request a subpoena related to his complaint. Also, it is up to the court to enforce its subpoenas: It's not like a warrant where you can then pursue the items subpoenaed through force. If the subject of a subpoena doesn't respond you have to ask the court to compel the party, which means you have to bring your complaint before a court that has jurisdiction over the party you wish to subpoena. This can be difficult when it involves a third party – especially a third party that would rather ignore or object to the subpoena than hand over the information. I.e., if you can't convince law enforcement to investigate the crime, and you can't convince the company in possession of the data that it's in its interest to help you, then you would most likely be facing a steep legal bill to get an attorney to successfully obtain the information through civil process.

What can a network service disclose to law enforcement if they claim they don't keep any logs? After reading this question I was wondering about the legal applications of the terms-of-service of Privateinternetaccess.com (PIA): a VPN provider. What's a VPN provider? If you have one, all your internet traffic goes through it. One of the largest claims PIA makes is that it doesn't keep any logs so that theoretically even if a government issues a warrant they would be unable to disclose any information on the activities of its users. According to this article PIA claims "We absolutely do not maintain any VPN logs of any kind." Is it legal not to keep any logs? Did they just "pull a legal fast one" by saying VPN logs so if they were to hand over information about a user they would just say it was from a non-VPN log? From the first linked page: Failure to comply with the present Terms of Service constitutes a material breach of the Agreement, and may result in one or more of these following actions: Issuance of a warning; Immediate, temporary, or permanent revocation of access to Privateinternetaccess.com with no refund; Legal actions against you for reimbursement of any costs incurred via indemnity resulting from a breach; Independent legal action by Privateinternetaccess.com as a result of a breach; or Disclosure of such information to law enforcement authorities as deemed reasonably necessary. When they say "Disclosure of such information," to what information could they refer? They claim they don't keep any information. Is the statement saying, "they will comply with the law, by showing their (empty) logs"?

There is not necessarily a contradiction. Information that they may keep may be: Account information Subscriber information Information on breaches of the Terms of Service or Agreement So yes, they might certainly not keep any logs – although that claim is doubtful, since they almost certainly keep at least error-level logs of their services – but that doesn't mean that they have no information to disclose to law enforcement. It's also questionable what "logs" refers to – would aggregate statistics be considered a log, by law? Would your last known IP address be considered a log, provided they don't keep any other history?

This is a good question, although it discusses crimes. This answer generalizes the question by giving a response for civil violations. In the united-states, where federal civil-procedure is followed and provided the tape isn't solely for impeachment purposes (i.e. it also documents other elements), there are certain disclosures required at the beginning of discovery governed by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). If a party withholds one of these disclosures, under Rule 37(c)(1), the court is able to take a number of actions, including throwing the evidence out. This could, of course, result in the withholder's conviction. Yet, if the court does not go to that extreme, it may impose the sanctions in Rule 37(b). So the withholder's attorney might try to make a case that the evidence is, indeed, solely for impeachment purposes.

There is nothing in the GDPR requiring you to collect individual personally identifiable information. If the website has no need, and the website owner no desire, to collect such information, there is no requirement to do so. The GDPR requires that if such information is collected, that there is a lawful basis, and that it be handled appropriately and stored securely, and deleted when there is no longer a need to retain it, or on a proper request. If no such information is collected in the first place, all the rules about how to handle it do not apply. It is possible that some law of an individual country in the EU might mandate collection of some particular information, but I have not heard of any such requirement.

This would probably constitute illegal wiretapping and would certainly constitute a 4th Amendment search if conducted by law enforcement. Normally, the definition of whether something is "public" for purposes of an expectation of privacy is whether it could be detected by a human being unaided by technological enhancements from a place where someone could lawfully be to make that kind of observation. Some of the relevant cases are Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. (1967) (tape recorder outside a public telephone booth was a search violating the expectation of privacy) and U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. (1984) (tracking device placed in barrel by authorities violated expectation of privacy). RFID signals are not "public" even if they are not encrypted with a private code because a device, such as the ones identified in the question, is necessary to receive them. The Wiretap Act, codified by 18 U.S. Code § 2511, is a federal law aimed at protecting privacy in communications with other persons. Typically, when you think of a "wiretap," the first thing that comes to mind is someone listening to your telephone calls. But the Act protects more than that. Under the Act, it is illegal to: intentionally or purposefully intercept, disclose, or use the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication through the use of a "device." The Act provides criminal and civil penalties for violations, although it creates various exceptions to when interceptions and disclosures are illegal. From here. In this circumstance, despite being passive, one is intentionally intercepting the contents of electronic communications through the use of a device. The fact that there was not in all cases an intent to communicate through, for example, an RFID chip, on a specific occasion probably does not suffice to render it not a communication.

What are the reasons/ legal requirements that the police might need my personal information, given that I had not been able to provide any further information/ witness testimony to the incident that they were investigating? The police in england-and-wales have a duty to undertake reasonable lines of enquiry and to carry out a proportionate investigation in to allegations of crime. No-one is legally obliged to answer house to house questions but, notwithstanding the honesty and integrity of the majority of members of the public, any information held by the police may need to be corroborated to identify or eliminate suspects, witnesses, evidential opportunities or other lines of enquiry. Also, if it is established that someone has no information that may assist the investigation this is recorded to prevent duplication of effort thus enabling the police to focus their resources accordingly. All the while complying with the relevant privacy and data retention legislation.

In addition to compelling a store to produce evidence such as video footage, via a search warrant as described by bdb484, police can request access to information in the possession of such information. The store may voluntarily comply with the request, or not. Especially in the case of online transactions, there may be a privacy guarantee that information about a customer's transaction will not be revealed to a third party unless required by law (ergo, a warrant), but security camera recordings are not protected by such guarantees.

One way in which it holds legal water is that if you use the website in violation of the terms, then you may forfeit your right to take civil action against the company. Analogous language especially regarding the age of the user may protect the site against actions by third party governmental entities (COPPA-like laws), though nothing patently obvious springs to mind (insofar as this deals with firearms and there is also an age 21 restriction both on the web site and in terms of US firearms law, this is not a totally crazy idea). The citation of 18 USC 1030 non-probatively points to an issue which may be disposed of by SCOTUS in US v. van Buren, that knowingly violating the terms of service is a crime (a proposition rejected by lower courts, see US v. Valle). Facebook v. Power Ventures in particular clarifies how "being put on notice" may make such unauthorized access indeed "unauthorized access" in the statutorily-relevant sense. This does not prevent a legally-authorized law enforcement investigation, pursuant to para (f), but if the "violation of TOS = unauthorized access" theory is upheld, it limits how LEOs can legally access the website (and the limitations extend past LEOs). It is a separate and potentially interesting question whether there actually are any legal limits on the investigative powers of the government – if any law enforcement officer has the liberty to investigate anyone they want, with no supervision or requirement of justification, then this would be a rather gaping loophole in their legal strategy. Web pages involve massive copying of copyright-protected data, and the function of terms of use is in part to conditionally grant access to that copyright-protected content. When a person copies protected material from someone's web page having been explicitly denied permission to copy, they run the risk of an infringement lawsuit.

(As there are cases that remain sub judice, I will give only a general answer describing the disclosure process.) How does discovery disclosure work for financial crimes? Disclosure for all criminal investigations in England and Wales, including those in to financial crime, are carried out in accordance with Parts 1 and 2 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and its accompanying Code of Practice. A full explanation is given in the Code, but put briefly: the police appoint a Disclosure Officer whose role includes reviewing and assessing everything held by the police, called "material", and passing details of all "relevant material" to the CPS appointed prosecutor. There are four stages in the police disclosure process, called the 4Rs: Record Retain Review Reveal These 4Rs overlap with three questions that require answering in order: Record and Retain: Q1: Is it "relevant material" to the investigation? If No, nothing further need be done. If Yes then Record and Retain it in a "durable and retrievable format" - write it down, save it to disc etc, keep it safe and in a place where it can be found. Review: Q2: Is it "sensitive material"? e.g. does it relate to informants, covert tactics, information given in confidence etc? Either way, two seperate schedules of relevant material according to its "sensitivity" are created. Reveal: The Disclosure Officer passes both schedules (and the actual material if necessary) to the CPS prosecutor who provides the defence with a copy of the non-sensitive schedule. The prosecutor also asks: Q3: Does the material "undermine the case for the prosecution or assist the defence with theirs"? If No, nothing further need be done. If Yes, the prosecutor must disclose the material to defence, unless it sensitive and giving it to the defence is not, for example, in the public interest as it may jeopardise life, covert operations etc. The prosecutor and police then has to decide whether to drop the case or not in order to protect the reason for the sensitivity. (They may also apply to the Crown Court judge for a Public Interest Immunity certificate which - in very, very rare cases - allows a trial to go ahead in the interests of justice without the defence being made aware of material that may assist their case as long as the whole trial process is fair to the defendant.) The defence, in addition to their copy of the non-sensitive schedule, can apply for sight or copies of and any material that they consider also undermines or assists but has not been disclosed to them by the prosecutor, and is necessary for their case. In the first instance this application is to the CPS prosecutor, but if it is refused the defence may apply to the trial judge for a ruling on whether it must be disclosed or not. The overriding principle is ensuring a fair trial. ETA: It it possible for a party to such a suit to bring evidence to the court without providing the underlying data to the other party? It is possible but the principles of a fair trial, disclosure and the continuity of evidence (what some call the chain of custody) coupled with challeges by the defence are supposed to ensure that the provenance and accuracy of evidence is properly tested and accountable at a Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing (PTPH) before a trial opens. Unfortunately, especially in highly complex investigations, this does not always seem to be the case.

Is there any recourse for costs and consequences of police detention? Police can detain a suspect for 48-72 hours (depending on the state) without filing charges. Note that this is before any judicial scrutiny occurs: I.e., not only are you (supposedly) presumed innocent, but you have not even been indicted and the prosecutor has not even decided whether to seek an indictment. So the standards for detention are extremely low. Furthermore, there appears to be no consistent right to communicate with anyone during detention. You can demand a lawyer if you are interrogated, but the police could instead choose to simply detain you without questioning. It seems that the consequences of this to the detainee could be disastrous: Imagine you're a single working mother snatched by the police during your lunch break. Your employer and/or clients don't hear from you for 3 days. Your babysitter can't reach you when you fail to return home at the usual hour. You may miss deadlines for financial matters that could incur enormous direct costs. Do all of these costs have to be born by the innocent individual? Does the state have any obligation to care for your dependents while you are detained?

No, there is no recourse. An yes, the potential "costs", both personal, financial, social, can be high and are not compensable under an investigatory hold scenario; however, it doesn't usually happen like that. There is no investigatory hold that long without arrest. If the police want to talk to you but don't have enough to arrest you, you can leave any time. If you call your lawyer, he/she will come to the police station and tell the cops to release or arrest you. If the police really want you to stay, likely there is probable cause and they can keep you anyway. The police can arrest you and keep you, without a warrant so long as there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed (by you). Once arrested without a warrant, this is what is usually referred to as an investigatory hold, where the law says you must be arraigned within 72 hours (some states it must be 48 hours, 1 day less than supreme court says is reasonable). During this time they can investigate their case against you and decide what, if any, charges they will bring. There is no recourse for this, (in the event they bring no charges) unless you can establish that you were held for no reason (including not being falsely identified) and that it was only to intentionally deprive you of your right to liberty. This is nearly impossible to prove, unless you really did nothing and the cop was just messing with you (for instance in a personal vendetta) and you can show that.

An accused would be arrested for the purposes of arraignment ("even a scheduled arrest is still an arrest"). That does not entail that the accused would be held in custody pending or during trial. Many commenters are of the view that Mr. Trump would be released under his own recognizance without bail. Reference: AP News.

The answer is somewhat similar to the "corollary" question, in that this wouldn't be the only information taken into account at a motion to suppress and one would need know why the officer requested (in your scenario demanded) to search you in the first place. There are scenarios whereby he could search you without benefit of a warrant. Was he chasing you from a crime scene? Were you attempting to flee? Did he see something illegal before demanding the search that may have made it legal despite you thinking it not? The analysis is different if you are in the car versus in your house. That said, regardless of where, a consent search is just not likely to happen in this way. In your car, the officer has the right to take your keys to "secure the scene," or if there is a reasonable suspicion that you may attempt to flee. Typically, the officer will say "turn off your car" without taking your keys. Despite what's typical, though, they certainly can take your keys if circumstances make it necessary and that (the mere taking of keys) does not constitute a search. Keep in mind that the police can search a car without a warrant in a number of circumstances, without your consent, that would not be available to them with a dwelling. Courts will typically give police much more latitude to search a vehicle than a home. Under the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement, individuals have less of an expectation of privacy when driving a car and there is also a much greater chance of losing the evidence in a car vs. a dwelling, since it's mobile. Generally, the police can search your car if: You have given the officer consent (in this scenario you've not – unless you hand them the keys without protesting – and then this would be considered implied consent); The officer has probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in your car; The officer reasonably believes a search is necessary for their own protection (e.g., they can search for a weapon, if they have reasonable suspicion); You have been arrested and the search is related to that arrest (such as for drunk driving or for drugs, they can search for alcohol or drugs). There are tons of contextually specific rules that dictate when each of these situations is OK, and when they're not, as well as where they can search under what scenarios. It is not a one size fits all analysis. In fact, warrantless and consent searches may be some of the most variable analyses criminal attorneys and judges undertake to explore. The law on these topics is voluminous. Searching your car after you've given the officer the keys, assuming there was no basis and you actually said "you're not consenting," can result in suppression, but not necessarily as the fight is a lot tougher when it comes to a car. (E.g., if you said no earlier, but then handed the cop the keys later without renewing the objection, this could be considered an implied consent.) Similar to the other question, there is also going to be a whole other side to the story, with evidence aside from your testimony dictating what the ruling will be. A dwelling is different from a car, although your question makes some assumptions here that I would find very hard to see happening in real life (having represented both police, municipalities, and defendants to criminal searches).... It would be highly unlikely for an officer to threaten to break in like this ... especially in a dwelling where neighbors and passersby can see what's happening and would not only watch, but would probably video it. This is not to suggest that threats and actual wrongdoing doesn't happen, it's just not typically in this way. Police know the law. They rarely do things so blatantly unlawful that not only will nearly ensure that any evidence is inadmissible, but (in a case like this) where they will also probably lose their job. Short of a pursuit where the police are chasing someone into a house, I have never heard of a forced entry in a situation like you're describing. While we don't know the circumstances leading to the encounter, I am assuming that the search isn't pursuant to a chase, since you're having a discussion with the officer and if you're chased from the scene of a crime and run into your house, they're coming in. They are not having discussions. However, since we don't know what the circumstances are that lead to you being approached in the first place, it's difficult to analyze whether he has the right to enter warrantlessly. What we do know is that with a dwelling, it is much less likely to be lawful. As with the other question, the analysis as to whether consent was given or not is far from simple. Suspects are much less likely to give consent to search a dwelling as they are a car, and if they do, the search is often limited to a certain area, so chances of suppression are much better. That said, others will often give consent to the police when requested of them (spouses, kids, landlords, hotel owners, etc). Just imagine ... there are literally thousands of warrantless searches done every single year in the U.S., nearly all of which are alleged to be based on some form of consent. Assume every one of those people has a lawyer; that means nearly every one of those cases is arguing the consent was bad, some way, some how. Duress is one of the most common arguments when someone gives permission; either explicitly (like what you are proposing), implicitly (they came with 10 grimacing cops, so the guy thought he didn't have a choice). Most of the time, however, there is no duress, people just simply didn't know they can say no, or they think the cops won't find what they're hiding. Cops can do a lot of things to get you to allow for a warrantless search. They can even lie to people to get them to consent, and officers are not required to notify the suspect that he has a right to refuse to consent (however, telling the suspect they have the right to refuse is helpful to rebut the coercion argument). In United States v. Mendenhall, "The fact that the officers themselves informed the respondent that she was free to withhold her consent substantially lessened the probability that their conduct could reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive." Keep in mind, a big part of the reason why these scenarios are unlikely is not just that the police can find a way in that won't be so challengeable, if they really can't get a legitimate warrant and need to find a deleterious way in. It's also because 9 in 10 times when a police officer does a consent search, the suspect signs a consent form. That's not to say that people don't get coerced or get searched due to duress, they do. But typically not in so blatant a way. There are shades of grey in most of these cases. So, to answer whether you can get the search suppressed if it leads to an arrest under these facts; the only answer that is definite, is that nobody can be sure. If consent searches, their exceptions, and all ways the evidence gets in and the evidence is kept out interests you ... read these two law review articles. There are probably 200 cases footnoted between them! http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/MaclinT011508.pdf http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-81-6-Sutherland.pdf

In the U.S. there is no law that requires you to ever say a word to a law enforcement officer, and lawyers generally encourage you to minimize what you communicate to them anyway. I can't think of any situation where a request for information could not be demanded in writing. As a practical matter, in some situations you will probably be subject to some extra scrutiny and inconvenience: E.g., in a stop-and-identify situation, you could hand the officer a note saying, "Please make any requests for information from me in writing." The officer may infer that you have some disability, but if he does not (or discovers you don't) he may get irritated enough to subject you to harassment for "contempt of cop". Of course, if you can understand him, you are still required to obey an officer's lawful orders no matter how they are communicated. But "speak" is not a lawful order.

In the US, detention does not add anything: we can generalize the principle to any time when a student is in the custody of the teacher (classroom, field-trip, sporting event...). One question, for the scenario that you describe, is whether the injury was foreseeable. Suppose the injury is an abdominal aortic aneurysm – this is not foreseeable. The question that the court would ask is whether a person exhibiting reasonable caution and care would know that there is a possibility that the child has some condition. The details regarding this condition "not being easily noticeable" are essential to the outcome of the case. A child coughing up blood should be immediately treated medically, it is not reasonable to assume that a child who sneezes (once) is in imminent danger. The teacher's response is also important, and again this is a very fact-intensive inquiry. A child who has a heart attack should not be told "go talk to the nurse" (let's assume that the teacher correctly notices that this is a heart attack happening), 911 is the correct (minimal) remedy. Perhaps using the auto-defibrillator also part of the reasonable standard of care for a teacher (assuming there is one, and that the teacher has been trained how to use it). Then finally, the teacher is not liable if their actions / inactions don't cause the injury. In the case where a student suddenly dies, the fact that the teacher didn't somehow prevent the death doesn't make the teacher liable. But if the child is bleeding and the teacher decides "We can deal with this when detention is over" and the child bleeds to death in the interim, we would conclude that the teacher's lack of care caused the child's death. The school might also be liable on various grounds, for example if the school has no nurse and has no practical way for the teacher to contact emergency medical services. Some school policy which unreasonably restricts the teachers exercise of reasonable care could make the school liable. At any rate, "the child died" does not cause absolute liability, what confers liability is the actions and inactions of a party.

It's exactly the opposite. All arrests are public record under California Government Code 6254(f): Notwithstanding any other provision of this subdivision, state and local law enforcement agencies shall make public the following information, except to the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation: (1) The full name and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency, the individual’s physical description including date of birth, color of eyes and hair, sex, height and weight, the time and date of arrest, the time and date of booking, the location of the arrest, the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount of bail set, the time and manner of release or the location where the individual is currently being held, and all charges the individual is being held upon, including any outstanding warrants from other jurisdictions and parole or probation holds. Other than the "endanger the safety" exception, which could be applied case-by-case, there is no general exemption for refugees or asylum seekers. Trials are also public, see What does it mean that a trial in a US court is "Public"?. Members of the public cannot be excluded from a trial, and the defendant can't "opt out" of this. This is considered to be a central feature of US justice systems and an important check on possible abuses of the criminal judicial process.

If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.") If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.") The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves.

This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate."

Do I lose my rights as a British citizen when I travel to an other country for tourism? A friend of mine got detained at the airport in Jordan because his name matches a name of someone who has issues with the Jordanian authorities. My friend is British and he only was passing through Jordan. They forced him to stay there for 24 hours with no food and he had to sleep on the floor before they determined that he is not the man they were after. Does this incident mean that when you travel to a foreign country – even for a short time – that you give up your rights as a British citizen?

Your rights1 in a country depend on that country's laws with respect to aliens (foreigners). While you may expect some standards where countries have obligations under international law, a sovereign state is free to legislate with respect to aliens as it wishes. The short answer? You don't have British rights when you travel abroad, and the same is true for any person who travels internationally. But each country may afford certain rights and privileges to foreigners, especially those who are in the country legally. 1. Let's call them effective rights, because there's been a lot of (accurate) talk about you retaining your UK rights when you travel. Though this may be true, your experience overseas is going to really come down to the rights that the country that you are in recognises. Your responsibilities as a UK citizen, however, may continue even if not recognised by the country you are in by virtue of extraterritorial legislation.

If i have am served a claim form by the claimant, can I travel overseas? Yes Also, if I am overseas and receive the claim form whilst overseas, can I ignore it if I am not a citizen of the country which the claimant is from? You can always ignore a civil summons - the likely effect is that judgement will be entered against you and the plaintiff can then take further action to enforce the judgement. This can include having your property seized, garnisheeing your bank accounts or wages, or requiring you to attend court - failure to answer this summons is contempt and can lead to your arrest. A judgement in a UK court can, subject to treaties, be enforced in foreign jurisdictions under the relevant local law.

The territorial scope of the GDPR is defined in Article 3. It covers "personal data of data subjects who are in the Union", whether they are EU citizens or not. So to answer your questions: 1) are EU users, but moved to USA a few years ago, and signed-up on my website? They are not in the EU, so are not covered. You don't need to know if someone is an EU citizen, just if they are currently in the EU. 2) went for holidays in USA, signed-up on my website, and then came back to EU? (note - potentially skipped any Consent questions at sign-up, because IP was from USA) If someone moves into the EU while using your service then they fall under the GDPR for the time they are in the EU. If their home address is in the EU then that is covered, and monitoring of their behaviour while in the EU is also covered. Your other two questions are about VPNs. If a VPN is used to evade IP address geolocation and you have no other clue about where someone is then you can't be blamed for not knowing where they are (although I'm not aware of any actual case law on this topic). But if someone with a USA IP address gives a home address in the EU then you should probably treat them as being in the EU to be on the safe side. Basically, if you don’t know if they are in the EU or not, you should treat them as if they were.

As I said in my comments, "It was your choice to ask for a refund because you chose to assess the events as a safety risk to yourself and the airline." The airline did not assess a risk and as a result cancel the flight and issue refunds. The airline did not disregard advisories or laws pertaining to the terrorist acts that took place and result in legal triggers that mandated the airline cancel the flight and give refunds. If a city or country is classified as a war zone - by that country itself or some international body, or by the US State Department - then there are triggers that either suggest or mandate flight closures, through a myriad of laws and jurisdictions. It is solely your perception of the risk to yourself and the airline that you are using as a reason to ask for a refund. You have made a decision on your own and simply don't have a case for a refund. http://www.turkishairlines.com/en-int/travel-information/legal-notice/terms-amp-conditions/cancellation-refund

The way "with intent to lose citizenship" works in US law is extremely demanding; it is very hard to establish it by doing anything short of appearing before a consular officer and formally renouncing citizenship. Other ways include serving in the military of a country at war with the US, being convicted of treason for committing one of the specified potentially expatriating acts (serving in an army at war with the US is sort of a trial-less special case of that, because engaging in a war against the US is treason), or serving in a "policy-level position" in a foreign government. The State Department says as much in the link. Obtaining citizenship is listed as a case where the administrative premise applies; so is swearing allegiance to a foreign state, serving in the military of a state at peace with the US, and serving in lower-level government posts of a foreign state. In those cases, the person retains US citizenship but at some point in the future may be asked by the State Department if they wanted to renounce it. Intent to renounce citizenship is established only by explicit declaration if you've only obtained citizenship in another country. With "policy-level posts" the premise doesn't apply, but then the State Department just decides on a case-by-case basis. You may well lose US citizenship (although the King of Thailand was born in the US, and I'm not sure if he's considered to have lost citizenship), but it's not automatic. Your senior ministers may lose citizenship, but it is likewise not automatic. But the normal citizens? The link explicitly says that the administrative premise covers that.

You are a British citizen: Born in the UK between 1 January 1983 and 1 October 2000 Whether you’re a British citizen depends on where your parents were from and their circumstances. There are different rules if, when you were born: at least one of your parents was a British or Irish citizen at least one of your parents was a citizen of an EU or EEA country neither of your parents was a British, Irish, EU or EEA citizen You’re automatically a British citizen if you were adopted by a British citizen in a UK court. If at least one of your parents was a British or Irish citizen when you were born You’ll be a British citizen if when you were born at least one of your parents was either: a British citizen an Irish citizen living in the UK If the parent that meets these conditions is your father, he must have been married to your mother when you were born. Source: https://www.gov.uk/check-british-citizenship/born-in-the-uk-between-1-january-1983-and-1-october-2000 Anyway, to live and work in the UK, you don't need British citizenship, because Irish citizens automatically have that right independent of European Union law (which is why children of Irish citizens born in the UK gain British citizenship). When I answered her question about my parents, and told her neither of them are English, she was instantly dismissive. Did you tell her that they were Irish? If so, she shouldn't have been so dismissive. If she was, then she was wrong. But I just want to know for sure what my rights are regarding the following: getting an English passport As a British citizen, you are generally entitled to a British passport. getting dual citizenship Legally speaking, you already have it. was the lady being truthful She was probably not lying. She probably said what she said because she misunderstood the facts or the law. if I were from a 3rd country, would my birth cert be enough to allow me to live and work in the UK? (Ex. common travel area) Ireland has different rules, but the UK does not have, as others have noted, absolute _jus soli _ If you had been from a third country, you would have been a British citizen only if your parents had had indefinite leave to remain.

In summary: Statute law allows Ireland to revoke your naturalisation on the grounds of acquiring another citizenship. But this law has recently been found unconstitutional. In practice, the government does not do this anyway. In the case of the UK, it is particularly unlikely. As an Irish citizen, there is no particular reason to pursue UK naturalisation. The law As of now, the possibility deprivation of Irish nationality for any reason is unclear, because of a ruling of the Supreme Court (Damache v Minister for Justice [2020] IESC 63) that declared the statute allowing for this to be unconstitutional. That was because the law (section 19 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956) did not provide enough procedural safeguards. The Minister would initiate the process and make the final decision after expert advice, but was not an "independent and impartial decision-maker". It is now for the legislature to replace section 19 so as to cure the defect. Under section 19, the grounds for revoking a certificate of naturalisation include: (b) that the person to whom it was granted has, by any overt act, shown himself to have failed in his duty of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State and (e) that the person to whom it is granted has by any voluntary act, other than marriage or entry into a civil partnership, acquired another citizenship. The issue in Damache was (b) following the appellant's conviction for terrorism offences in the United States. Regarding (e), it would seem on its face that acquiring UK nationality might trigger the possibility of revocation. However, in the scenario envisaged, that would leave you without any EU nationality, and in the Tjebbes case of 2019 (ECLI:EU:C:2019:189) the European Court of Justice found that such deprivation would only be possible after consideration of the specific consequences for the person concerned and their family. This point was not reached in Damache but would also tend to rule out any "automatic" loss of nationality; it would have to be the result of some longer and more involved process. Whatever replaces section 19 would have to be of this kind. Special considerations also apply if loss of Irish nationality would leave you stateless, but that is not the issue in question. The policy Aside from cases of immigration fraud and terrorism, the State has rarely initiated processes under section 19. In fact, official guidance on immigration and nationality admits a policy of dual nationality being allowed. For the United Kingdom, there are many people who are dual British and Irish nationals. The understanding between the governments with respect to the Common Travel Area, the Good Friday Agreement, and the general historic situation, would make it very unlikely that Ireland would treat acquisition of British nationality as a problem. The British-Irish Agreement of 1998 includes that both governments respect the "right to hold both British and Irish citizenship" for the people of Northern Ireland. Even if you are not a person of Northern Ireland, any action by the government of Ireland that would be seen as potentially touching on this right is politically untenable. Irish citizens have full rights in the UK anyway Under UK law, an Irish citizen can enter without a visa, live there as long as they want, get a job, claim benefits, vote in elections, be elected as an MP, and do everything that a UK citizen can normally do. There may be a vanishingly few exceptions for national security jobs. Because of this, there isn't much reason why being naturalised in the UK would be worthwhile. You could do so for sentimental reasons but as far as the UK's concerned, you already hold a status that's just as good. Extra note: UK honours (In response to a comment below.) The British Crown does grant honours, including knighthoods, to non-UK citizens and dual/multiple citizens, in some circumstances. It depends on whether the other nationality has King Charles III as head of state, and the attitude of the foreign government. Therefore, Canadians do not get knighthoods (Charles is King but the Canadian government would rather not), Belizians do (Charles is King and the government is fine with it), and Americans can get it as an honorary award that does not come with the Sir/Dame title. For Ireland, Terry Wogan is an example of how this works. He was an Irish citizen who lived and worked in the UK for many years. In order to receive a British knighthood, he had to take up British citizenship (which was granted on an expedited basis), becoming Sir Terry. On the other hand, Bob Geldof is an Irish citizen (only) who holds an honorary British KBE, and is not formally entitled to be Sir Bob - much like American recipients such as Rudy Guiliani. The Irish government does not object to either possibility, although some individuals do. An American-Irish-British triple citizen would be able to receive a UK knighthood and use the title Sir, assuming that the British government was willing to grant it, and unless there were some foreign legal blocker (e.g. the U.S. government does not allow federal officeholders to receive overseas decorations).

Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it.

Which US laws would webcam spying break? In the United States, which laws would spying on someone using their computer's webcam, without their permission and in private areas, break?

A creative prosecutor could probably come up with a raft of charges. But you could start with the federal wiretapping statute, 18 USC 2511, and the anti-hacking statute, 18 USC 1030. Here is an indictment brought in 2012 under the anti-hacking statute against someone who distributed and used this kind of software. Depending on the facts and the jurisdiction, this may also constitute the tort of intrusion on privacy or seclusion, a tort recognized by the Restatement (Second) and actionable in many jurisdictions. The most common test is whether the invasion would be "offensive to a reasonable person." And no, contrary to the commenter's view, a "click to accept" license is not a get out of (literal) jail free card here. Courts interpret adhesion contracts liberally to favor the signer, and outrageous terms hidden in small print are not guaranteed to be enforceable, especially if the software is clearly designed to trick people into installing it. The license terms might even hurt you, by providing evidence of your intent to use the software for perving rather than its ostensible use. This is not an exhaustive list, and there may be additional state-level statutes that apply. Bottom line: yes, this is clearly illegal, and the courts will be reluctant to let you trick people into getting away with it.

No law change AFAIK - a technology change LED TVs don’t flicker at frequencies that can cause seizures like cathode ray tubes could.

In England and Wales, in general it is legal to make a recording in one's own home without the knowledge or consent of the other participants. In general the law with regard to recordings is more strict in non-domestic contexts than it is in domestic contexts. For example, a business must "make all reasonable efforts" to inform a caller that their telephone call may be recorded. A business has obligations under data protection law that the householder does not have. Depending on the circumstances the homeowner might commit a civil tort (breach of confidence) or criminal offence if he discloses or publishes the recording made without the consent of the other participants. E.g. submitting it as evidence to court is OK, sharing it with friends or publishing it on the internet is likely not OK. In the specific context of the homeowner making a recording of a sexual act with another person and the other person has not consented to the making of the recording: if the homeowner shares the recording they might be investigated/prosecuted for the criminal offence of voyeurism (s67(3) Sexual Offences Act 2003) in R. v Richards the Court of Appeal ruled that the making of the recording for one's own sexual gratification amounts to the criminal offence of voyeurism (s67(3) Sexual Offences Act 2003)

The First Amendment states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. It thus protects such videos. An analogous situation is that there is network news coverage of riots, bank robberies, terrorist attacks and assaults. Backpage was seized because it facilitated prostitution, not just reported or even encouraged it. That is basically where the line exists.

Video surveillance is not necessarily illegal, but you do need a very solid legal basis. You should not install a camera in your lab without going through your department's usual processes, likely involving the data protection officer and the Betriebsrat/Personalrat which MUST sign off on such workplace surveillance measures. I don't quite see how a vote among colleagues could authorize this surveillance. Your organization's data protection officer should be able to help you to place the video surveillance on safer footing, or to find better alternatives. Implementing video surveillance could first require a written data protection impact assessment (Datenschutz-Folgeabschätzung). Some pointers below. GDPR/DSGVO compliance starts with three questions: What is the purpose for which personal data is being processed? What is the legal basis for this processing? What means can be used to achieve the purpose, collecting the minimal amount of data necessary? You need to think further about the purpose for which surveillance is necessary. In particular, a camera does not prevent accidents and there might be less invasive ways to prevent intrusion (such as locking the door). Cameras are a fairly extreme measure, and are typically only used as a deterrent to crime, e.g. to deter robbers at a bank counter. The legal basis (GDPR Art 6) you choose is quite relevant because consent (opt-in, Einwilligung) is not generally possible in an employment context, and legitimate interest(berechtigtes Interesse) is not available to public authorities. While companies could use a legitimate interest, this interest must be compelling enough to outweigh the rights and freedoms of the affected data subjects even if they object (try to opt-out). In its guidelines to video devices, the EDPB (EDSA) has also mentioned that the legitimate interest must be non-speculative. The mere concern that equipment could be damaged by an anonymous co-worker is not enough, but past incidents could make this interest legitimate – the amount of surveillance must be proportionate to the actual risks. The disgruntled co-worker could escalate by contacting the data protection officer, lodging a complaint with your state's supervisory authority, or by suing your employer. It is not guaranteed that they would succeed, but it doesn't seem like this instance of surveillance is entirely proper. I would deactivate the cameras until you are sure that the camera surveillance is being performed legally.

In New South Wales it is entirely legal to film police (or anyone else). However, as discussed (What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?) audio recording is more restricted: you must either have the permission of all the participants in a conversation or be a party to the conversation. I do not imagine the law is any different in Victoria.

Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this.

The site's owners would likely be immune from any civil action based on its users' conduct, under Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act: No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. The users, though, could still face liability. Although it would be libel rather than slander (because it is published rather than spoken), any damaging falsehoods could be actionable. The emotional distress component would also be a possibility, but it would probably be a tougher case. The laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but generally speaking an emotional-distress case requires really outrageous behavior and and very serious emotional damage.

Is it legal for me to buy a book and resell bits and pieces of it (artwork or poems for example)? For example, I take a poetry book and cut out the poems, frame them, and sell them individually. Or I take a book with Star Wars™ art and cut out the pictures and decoupage a dresser and offer it for sale. What intellectual property principles are implicated?

This question has been addressed directly, with very similar facts, by the federal courts, and the answer, based on those decisions, is: Maybe. The most famous case in this area is Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). In that case, the defendant had bought a copy of plaintiff's art book, cut out the pages, and affixed them to ceramic tiles, which it sold. The defendant relied on the first sale doctrine, codified in 17 U.S.C. 109. The first sale doctrine says that if you own a copy of a copyrighted work, you can resell it without the copyright holder's permission. The plaintiff argued that, by altering the original artwork, the defendant had created a new derivative work. The first sale doctrine gives you the right to sell the book to someone else, but not the right to create derivative works, whether by writing and publishing an unauthorized sequel or, they argued, cutting and pasting and tiling and kilning the physical pages. The Mirage Editions court agreed with the plaintiff that the tiles were a derivative work outside the scope of the first sale doctrine, and therefore the defendants had infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights. However, other courts faced with similar facts have disagreed, and to date I'm not aware of any Supreme Court decision resolving the issue. The bottom line is: you are allowed to sell what you bought; you aren't allowed to transform it into something new and sell that. Where the line gets drawn is muddy and likely to remain so at least until the Supreme Court addresses the issue.

You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license.

Yes. The copyright owner of a work has the exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted work" or to make "derivative works" of it. 17 USC 106. Copyright law is older than the photocopier, and it applies to copies made by means of any technology. If your intent is to duplicate the protected work, whether you do it by tracing, photocopying, or even freehand, you are infringing that right. It is possible that you could squeeze into one of the copyright exceptions, such as fair use, but these are much narrower than people tend to assume they are (especially outside of the U.S.), and they boil down to: "Well, yes, I copied your copyrighted work, but..." The bottom line is: is it copyrighted? Did you copy it, in whole or in part? Then, unless you have a very good reason, you've infringed the copyright. Whether you do it by means of tracing paper, jellygraph, or iPhone doesn't matter.

Broadly speaking, the difference is the "sharealike" clause of CC-BY-SA. Any derivative of a CC-BY-SA work must itself be licensed CC-BY-SA, whereas a derivative of an "MIT with attribution" work can be under any license the author wants. There are a number of other differences in the fine print (eg. CC forbids DRM, where MIT doesn't), but that's the big one.

There is nothing illegal with doing this (absent specific contractual terms or industry regulations to the contrary in particular cases, e.g. in the case of export controlled high technology products). This is called operating a wholesale business or operating as a broker. Lots of legitimate legal businesses have this business model.

In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.

Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.

A copyright can be divided into as many pieces as the owners choose. Initially, all authors have a share m(an equal share unless they have an agreement on some other share arrangement), But each author (or later owner) can leave the copyright to multiple heirs, in equal or unequal shares. Each owner can sell all or part of the copyright (or usage rights) to one or more new owners. Under US law, any co-owner may permit a copy (or copies) to be made, or may grant a non-exclusive license. However, the co-owner doing this must account to the other co-owners for any profits made, and share them according to whatever agreement the co-owners may have (by share if there is no other agreement). But to grant an exclusive license, all co-owners must agree. The law in many other countries is different. In some countries, a majority of owners (by share usually) must agree to grant even a non-exclusive license. The co-owners may make an agreement to limit granting of licenses to some particular owner or representative or to require wider consent than a single co-owner.

Chances of theft of new invention during the screening process to get a patent Suppose I invented something and need to patent it. So, I submit all the documents to the patent office. So, the officers who examine my documents containing new invention at the patent office, could rob the idea and sell it a other big company and get the money from them and help them to file a patent while delaying my submission. So, they will tell me that there is a previous submission of the same invention and reject mine. Is this a possibility to happen? what kind of measures have taken or can be taken to eliminate such activities? Is there any law to help the inventor?

You don't say what jurisdiction's patent laws you're interested in, and priority dates can differ in different schemes. I'm answering as to U.S. law only. In the United States, under the current hybrid "first-inventor-to-file" system, the priority date--the date that determines who "wins" if there are multiple claims to a specific invention--is, with some exceptions that I won't go into, the date of your first application. In other words, the date that the PTO got it in the mail. Once your application is submitted, it is--again, with some limitations I won't get into--prior art for the purposes of any later-submitted application. They can't get another application later, grant it first, and then deny your application based on the later-submitted application. Your application date would still win out. Could someone in the USPTO slip your application out of the stack, fudge the dates, and convince some other company to submit a similar application to get priority over you? Not as a practical matter, no. The USPTO isn't one guy in a room; it's a large organization, and the person who opens the mail, types in your application details, and sends you a receipt, isn't the same guy who knows whether your invention is any good or not. And, frankly, very few patentable inventions are going to be worth someone risking their job and/or jail time over--especially when there would be significant evidence of the misconduct--for example, your patent agent's files. So what are the chances that the examiner on your patent: 1) Is a nefarious character who has lived a life of public service long enough and wants to go rogue; 2) Has a friend in the mailroom who is also an expert in the field of your invention; and 3) Has a conduct in industry who is willing to break the law for the rights to your invention? Slim to none. And if you have an invention that is really so revolutionary that it's going to be worth so many people risking so much to steal it, odds are there will be other evidence that you were the inventor.

To successfully sue for patent infringement, you need to hold a valid patent. An issued patent is not irrefutable proof that you have a valid patent; patents are presumed valid, but the defendant can raise invalidity as a defense in an infringement suit. One of the conditions for a patent is that the invention is novel (details vary depending on filing date). Even if the USPTO doesn't think there was prior art, that doesn't mean the defendant can't try to convince the court there was prior art. If the defendant proves that the invention was not novel (or any other reason the patent is invalid), the defendant wins the infringement suit. There are a couple ways to challenge the patent for lack of novelty, which can lead to a challenge before the USPTO or before a federal court. If it's challenged before the PTO and found invalid, the holder loses the patent. If it's challenged in a lawsuit and the holder loses, they can never again assert that the patent is valid in any US court (except when appealing that decision or in a few other special cases). So if it's challenged in court and the challenger wins, the patent is also effectively invalid.

I don't know the specifics of this invention, but it's important to remember that the novelty and non-obviousness of an invention is made as of the date of the patent application (or earlier priority date, not applicable here). In this case, that would be September 5, 1979. So you'd have to look specifically at what art existed as of that date (actually, one year prior to that date) and show that the invention was obvious and not novel in light of that prior art. It would take more than a general claim that it's obvious, for example. The practices followed by the PTO in determining novelty and obviousness in accordance with the law is set out in the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure, chapter 700 ("Examination of patents"). You might find that an interesting read. The current release (Ninth Edition, Revision 07.2015) is here; the edition in effect in 1979 would have been the Fourth Edition, here. As an aside, the term of the patent is not 20 years from publication. The term under today's law is 20 years from initial filing date, not from publication. Had that law been in effect for this patent, it would have expired in September 5, 1999 (which it actually did, as noted below). Prior to June 8, 1995, US patent term was based on the date of issue plus 17 years; in this case to January 5, 1999. But under terms of the 1995 law, any patent applied for prior to June 8, 1995 got the greater of those two terms; so we're back to September 5, 1999 again. (And just for completeness, there is also the matter of periodic maintenance fees that today need to be paid to keep a patent in force; but that didn't start until December 1980, and wouldn't have applied to this patent, which was filed prior to the institution of maintenance fees.)

How to send a document restricting its spread? In theory you could have the company sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) prior to sharing the details of your project. However, your chances of enforcing the NDA seem negligible except maybe for George White's suggestion about a patent application. It is otherwise in your best interest to think of another way of showcasing your skills set. Assuming that the company signs your NDA, you have no realistic way to prevent the company from misappropriating (i.e., stealing) your idea(s). You will have no access to the company's systems to ensure that it has deleted all copies and records that could result in unauthorized disclosure. Even if you find out that the company misappropriated your information, it could be too late because the statute of limitations expired, and/or too costly --not just in terms of money-- to bring court proceedings for misappropriation.

If you copy copyrighted material without permission or another exemption, you are at risk It doesn’t matter if you know the material is subject to copyright, it doesn’t matter if you think you have permission but don’t, it doesn’t even matter if you knowingly make the copy or if it is some background process you don’t know about. Copyright law is really simple: if you make an unlawful copy, you broke it. If this seems unduly harsh, remember you are dealing with a law with its roots in the 18th century that was internationalised at the beginning of the 20th century. Making copies then was a hard, deliberate process - you couldn’t “accidentally” or “inadvertently” make a copy of a literary or artistic work. Now you can - the world has changed, the law hasn’t.

"become yours" - Which court are you in? The court of the schoolyard? If you're in real court, then You would need to sue, to quiet title When a bona-fide dispute as to ownership exists, a case can be brought before a judge to resolve ownership definitively. The axiom of a quiet title action is that you must notify all parties who could possibly have an interest. Really, notification is 7/8 of it, because by the time you arrive at a "quiet title" action, most likely they either lost interest or are gone. And the crux of "Notify" is that your efforts to notify the party are to the standards of the court. You are a hostile party, noting your interests are in conflict with theirs. (we must fairly assume they want their iPad back; you want to take the iPad). Thus, it is obvious you will prefer to fail in your efforts at contact, and you will do a bad job of it, possibly on purpose. Since parties in a lawsuit are responsible to serve all documents on each other, courts have very high standards for that. And these standards are tested and gamed all the time. I even had a clever plaintiff do it to me! (we were expecting both the appeal and the dis-service). The crux of document service is you hire a licensed, third-party independent process server. A process server is naturally good at skip-tracing (think "Dog: the Process Server") and is accustomed to finding people who are actively hiding. (because some people think they can avoid consequences by evading service. That's a loser's game generally.) So, when you show up in court and they aren't there, the judge will ask "did you serve them?" And then you say "yes", name the company, and if needed call the process server to the stand, and the server reads out of their notebook all the things they did to search for the counterparty.

To answer the specific questions you asked: Can I use the publication to perform ECC without being under patent protection? Can an academic publication be under patent protection? The answers are: No, that academic paper does not provide any protection from patent litigation. Yes, an academic paper can publish the details of an invention, and that in no way voids the patent. The issue is the timing of the publication; the patent was filed in 1998; the academic paper was published in 2002. Once a patent is filed, the inventors (or anyone else, for that matter) can publish the patent, and that in no way invalidates the patent. To provide any protection against a patent, the prior art needs to be "prior", that is, earlier than the filing date of the patent. Now, this particular issue is made a bit tricky because there does appear to be prior citations of this invention. The whole reason this invention is called the "Montgomery ladder" (not Montgomery multiplication - that's something else) was because it was first published by Peter Montgomery in 1987. One would think that would invalidate the patent. However, I'm not an attorney; I cannot advise you to proceed under that assumption. Instead, I would suggest you follow the advice of Joao; there are plenty of elliptic curve routines out there; use one of them.

No Let’s assume the most generous interpretation: you came up with a fully fleshed-out idea for a television show - name, characters, plot, scene-setting - the lot. You told this idea over the phone to someone else who made this show incorporating every single part of your idea. Here’s the rub: nobody owns ideas. Unless you had them sign a non-disclosure agreement before you told them (which you didn’t), they are free to use your ideas however they like.

Has a food donor been sued for giving away spoiled food? Regarding food waste, on John Oliver's series "Last Week Tonight" he states: That's a common misconception. We all think that if someone gets sick you could get sued. I thought that until earlier this week. But we looked into and couldn't find a single case where a food donor has been sued. It doesn't happen. While this may be a better question for the skeptics, is this a true statement? Is it true that there has never been a single case where a food donor has been sued acting in good faith after the 1996 Emerson Act?

Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.

As I read the hypothetical facts in the linked question Bob has not filed a suit against Big Co, because no law firm is willing and able to handle such a suit (which I find unlikely). BigCo has not filed a suit against Bob, perhaps because it does not want to draw attention to Bob's claims. So there is no suit in progress. If this is true, no court has jurisdiction of the case, indeed there is no case in a legal sense. No US Court will reach out to take a case that no one has filed, and if one attempted to do so, I strongly suspect this would be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth amendments, depending on whether it was a Federal or State court. If it were a Federal court, this would also violate the "Case or controversy" provision. I can't find any report of any US court that has tried to do anything of the sort, so there is no case law to cite about the outcome of such an attempt. If i have misunderstood the question, and either Bob or BigCo has in fact filed a suit, and some court has jurisdiction of it, then the situation is quite different. In that case a court can restrict publication of statements that might be likely to result in jury prejudice and deny one party's right to a fair trial. However such orders are strongly disfavored. A court must demonstrate by findings of fact in the gag order that impairment to a fair trial is likely, and that he proposed order is the narrowest possible means of ensuring a fair trial, and that less restrictive methods, such as change of venue, a sequestered jury, or careful examination of potential jurors, cannot achieve this goal. It must also show that the order is the least restrictive order that will achieve the goal. If such findings are not included with the order, they order may be overturned promptly by a higher court on motion of either party, or of any third party (such as a news organization) affected by it. The situation as described seems implausible.

Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you.

I believe that you have misinterpreted the case, not least because the Hudgins v I.R.S case involves this only peripherally. The original case Diviaio v Kelly was dealing with a request for the number of photographs taken of the plaintiff and if these had been disseminated outside the CIA. This is in no way shape or form a request for records (the records were found to be legitimately exempt). I see no problem in your FOI request. In fact, I can foresee the response: These, http://www.maine.gov/legis/ros/meconlaw.htm, are the laws we use to justify these actions. In a common law jurisdiction, a person (including the government) does not have to prove they are abiding by the law. The onus is on you to prove they aren't; they do not have to help you make your case.

LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision.

It appears you would need to contact the Calgary courts directly to discover more about the case(s) as any case files will likely be held with them. It's possible that the case was dropped, or that they were found "not guilty" which would explain the lack of further news on them. I searched the Canadian Legal Information Institute's website for you but wasn't able to find any criminal cases involving them — only some civil cases around bankruptcy and creditor claims.

Yes The directors of a company have a fiduciary duty to act within the law for the benefit of their shareholders - not to their customers, not to the government, not to the environment and not to the public. A lawsuit against the company will incur financial loss irrespective of if it is won or lost. It is difficult to see how it is in the shareholder's interest for the company to be enabling the funding of a lawsuit against it.

The situation is that Executive Order 2020-33 is no more, and a new order, 2020-68 exists. The old orders to stay home are now copied under this order, but it may be necessary for her to re-issue (a subset of) the orders so that they are pursuant to #68 and not #33 (live by the technicality, die by the technicality). If she does not do that quickly, I expect there to be legal challenges. The law (30-403) doesn't say that orders issued pursuant to a declaration of a state of disaster expire when the authorizing declaration expires, but one can reasonably infer that that is what the legislature had in mind when this law was passed. But that is a matter for the courts to decide. Deference to the executive, which is the usual way that courts operate, would favor an interpretation where saying "All previous orders that rested on Executive Order 2020-33 now rest on this order" counts as re-issuing the same orders with a new number in the text. The law does not say that the circumstances authorizing an emergency order have to be completely different. Perhaps the legislature will revise the law in the future, but it is what it is right now.

Are law enforcement officers obliged to apprehend a subject committing a crime at the earliest possible opportunity? Inspired in part by this question: if a person is committing crimes of increasing severity, are law enforcement personnel obliged to apprehend them at the earliest opportunity? Specifically, are they obliged to prevent a crime at the stage where it is a conspiracy, or attempt, to commit it? If so, in what circumstances? For the sake of simplicity, let's consider only US cases.

The circuits all over the place on this one but in short, no, police are not obliged to apprehend a suspect at the earliest opportunity. It is within the discretion of the police to decide whether delaying the arrest of the suspect will help ensnare co-conspirators, as exemplified by this case, will give the police greater understanding of the nature of the criminal enterprise, or merely will allow the suspect enough "rope to hang himself." U.S. V. Garcia 79 F.3d 74 (7th Cir. 1996) See also Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293 (1966) A suspect has no constitutional right to be arrested when the police have probable cause. The police are not required to guess, at their peril, the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.

In Connecticut, this is covered by the firefighter's rule. Police and fire personnel entering a property as part of their official duties are considered licensees, which limits the duties of the landowner. The rules are as follows: You can't intentionally hurt or lay a trap for the licensee. If you know or should know the licensee is there, you need to exercise due care with them. You don't have to worry about obvious hazards (but keep in mind that it's harder to see stuff at night). If you're doing something dangerous, you need to watch out for them. If you know about a hidden hazard, you must warn them. I'm not sure how in-depth you need to go with the warnings; various things I find suggest the duty to warn might only be there when you know or should know the licensee is present, but signs are a good idea regardless. On the other hand, if you do need to warn them, you might need to mention the specific locations of the pits you actually know about. However, there's no duty at all to proactively look for possible hazards. This rule originated as a rule for professional firefighters responding to a negligently-started fire: the idea is that professional firefighters sign up to do a dangerous job, and letting them sue for hazards inherent in their job (they aren't called without a fire) is a bad idea. Also, since they cannot be denied entry, go in places not open to the public, and can arrive at any hour, needing to keep the property safe for them is an unreasonable burden. Of course, there's an exception if a law is passed to protect their safety, because statutes override common law. The rule has since been extended in some states to police, and to situations besides the very problem they were called for. Other states have abolished it. In any event, this is for civil liability only: this is when cops can sue for injuries caused to them.

In the United States, there is no potential liability for the municipality or the police department. There is no legally enforceable duty of police to act to prevent either violations of the law, or apprehend criminals, or to prevent suicide of people who are not in police custody. Other countries have different laws on this subject.

There is a good amount of case law addressing this question going back two centuries. Legally, as soon as you are subject to "excessive force," you are allowed to defend yourself as you would against any assault, even if that force is being used in the course of an otherwise lawful arrest. Furthermore, in some states you are still allowed to resist unlawful arrest. Unfortunately, the matter is no longer as clear as it used to be. (There is a lot of material on this subject; just search for resisting unlawful arrest.) For example, police reflexively invoke a virtual safe harbor by shouting, "Stop resisting!" while battering arrest subjects. Video evidence has uncovered a plethora of examples in which this was done to subjects who were not only not resisting, but even later determined to have been incapable of resisting. If you intend to defend yourself against police, even when justified by law, you need to realize that the system is stacked against you. Police carry the means of escalating to lethal force. So, for example, if you are being beaten but you are potentially able to physically overpower and restrain an officer, you will likely then be met with baton blows or tasers. Since a baton is a deadly weapon, you would be (in theory) justified in shooting an officer attacking you with one. But as soon as any officer shouts "gun!" you will be shot, and most likely killed. Police seem to be given the benefit of the doubt by prosecutors and grand juries when they claim, "I feared for my life." You (even if you survive) will likely have any such claim subject to a full criminal trial. So even though you can legally defend yourself against excessive police force, these days you will almost certainly be unable to in practice.

If the conditions at s.17 and s.24 PACE 1984, and PACE Code G are satisfied for the offence of rape then there is no requirement for a warrant. Once the suspect is in police custody he may be further arrested for suspected harrassment if any of the necessity criteria are met - this will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. An either way offence is, for these purposes, regarded as an indictable offence. A constable does not need to physically see an offence being committed, but he must have (a) reasonable grounds to suspect an offence has been committed (b) reasonable grounds to believe an arrest is necessary (c) the requesit belief to satisfy s.17 PACE 1984. All this will come from conducting a proportionate investigation in to the allegations.

In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest.

The General Rule In practice, the only time when self-defense against a police officer is legal is when you do not know and have no reasonable way that you could have known that the person attacking you is a police officer. (And arguably, a police officer acting in an official capacity in furtherance of his or her duties, rather than in a personal capacity as an individual.) For example, if the police do a no knock raid in the dark of night, and don't announce themselves, and you shoot police officers reasonably believing them to be home invasion burglars, you would not have criminal or civil liability for doing so. A similar valid self-defense claim might arise when someone has an objectively reasonable reason to think that someone claiming to be a police officer is really just a criminal impersonating a police officer, even if that belief is, in fact, mistaken. In almost all other circumstances, you need to submit to the officers, and you are pretty much required by law to bear the risk that excessive force by the officer will harm you. If you don't, you will probably be guilty of the crime of resisting arrest and will not be entitled to a self-defense defense. The fact that you are not actually guilty of a crime is irrelevant. This is often the case and police officers are not omniscient. If the officer lacked probable cause for an arrest (which there is often no way that the person being arrested or attacked can know at the time), the remedy is a civil rights suit after the fact, not self-defense. In theory, there might be other isolated circumstances where self-defense against a police officer is legal, but they involve fact patterns so quirky that they would almost never happen in real life, or would almost never be possible to prove in a manner that the courts would believe. Officer Liability For Harming Someone Legitimately Acting In Self Defense Whether the officers had civil liability to you if you were harmed by the officers while exercising your right to self-defense would depend upon their state of mind, even if you were rightfully using self-defense. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in January of 2017 (White v. Pauly) involved this fact pattern. In White v. Pauly an officer arrived late on the scene and had no reason to believe that the officers who arrived there before him and were being shot at by citizens in a house that they were approaching, lacked probable cause, or had not announced themselves. The court held that as a result, he had no civil liability to a citizen he shot, even if the person who the late arriving officer shot while that citizen was shooting back at the police officers on the scene was actually engaging in good faith self-defense. The citizen's self-defense in the case had a valid defense to criminal or civil liability for firing on the officers, because the citizen shooting back didn't actually know that the people approaching his house were police officers. But, because the late arriving officer reasonably believed under the circumstances that the citizen had no right to engage in self-defense, because he thought that the early arriving officers had probable cause and had announced themselves, the late arriving officer had no civil liability to the citizens he shot.

The advantages are: police officers, like all enforcement officers, have discretion on how they treat what they perceive to be transgressions of the law they enforce. If you are cooperative and helpful they may exercise that discretion to your benefit, if you are obstructive and difficult they may exercise it to your detriment: this may be the difference between a warning, a ticket and an arrest. one of the things that judges are allowed to take into consideration when sentencing is remorse. While the linked podcast indicates that this is not an easy thing to objectively define, it includes accepting that what you did was wrong and mitigating the harm that was done which would include cooperating with law enforcement. The disadvantages are: you may reveal information that is not known to the officer. This may or may not be admissible evidence but, notwithstanding, it may serve as a basis for further investigations which can discover things you would rather the police officer did not discover. For example Officer: "Do you know why I stopped you?" You: "I assume because of the dead body I have in the boot."

Discriminatory practices for tobacco use? This is kind of a tricky question, or situation rather. (TLDR-skip to bold) I am a clerk at a retail establishment that sales cigarettes, as well as food and home products. My main job duty is cashier. In between customers I also stock and do other retail related tasks. The cigarettes are in a cabinet that requires a key to open. When I first started working there a few months ago the key for the cabinet was on a set of keys which had other keys for retail displays like cell phones as well. Since then there has been a change in management. And one of the changes was that only key-holders and managers can open the cigarette cabinet. This change has been very inconvenient for customers and the store has lost many sales over people not wanting to wait for a key holder to come open the cabinet. It's very frustrating for me to stand there and wait for them to come up especially since customers generally ask for cigarettes after I have scanned the items so it's all wait time. I have to page them on the in store phone and wait for them to finish what they are doing in the back of the store and come up and then the customer has to repeat what they wanted again. I've continually complained about the change to the assistant manager and lead key holder but they always kind of change the subject. I asked the assistant manager one day if the change was because of missing cigarettes and he said that wasn't it and alluded to knowing what it was but wouldn't say. At that point I began to realize it was probably because I am a cigarette smoker. I wasn't sure though. Then a few days later talking to another employee and I found out that he and I are the only regular clerks without any key-holder status and he also smokes and came to the same conclusion as me independently. I've never stolen cigarettes or had any mishaps with cigarettes or lost any cigarettes or anything at this job or any other. Now unless the other guy has had some shadiness with the cigarettes or something in his past and they are just using this general rule to keep him from using it but it's affecting me then I could kind of understand but nobody has told me anything along the lines that it's because of the other employee. I think I need to talk to that guy a little bit more. Is it discrimination if they have revoked me of a responsibility because I smoke? If that is the reason for the change it doesn't make any sense to me. They sell all kinds of things that I use. I'm more addicted to food than cigarettes. Why do they let me stock food? I'm nearly 30, I'm an adult, I'm a serious man. Why would they regard me as a thief. I've never felt so demoralized and I was previously a dishwasher. What's odd about this whole situation is I rarely interact with the manager that has been making these changes. So it's like these invisible webs pulling at me from a distance.

It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin Tobacco use or non-use doesn't make the list. That's the legal position; if you want advice on how to handle the workplace stuff post your question on the Workplace Stack Exchange.

The employer might be liable for a discrimination claim, under the doctrine of disparate impact. See Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc and references cited therein. The idea is that an employer can be liable absent proof of intentional discrimination when a practice disproportionately affects protected classes of individuals, and the practice is not justified by reasonable business considerations. So it would depend on why this particular state of affairs in employment came about. There is a test known as the 80% rule which attempts to quantify the notion of "under-representation" as evidence of discrimination. This test (not widely respected by the courts these days) might constitute evidence of discrimination, if a protected class is demonstrably under-represented. The current standard seems to be by comparison to random selection. In EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, the court found that a grooming policy had a disparate impact on members of a religion (Sikhism), and was thus contrary to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although a requirement to shave does not obviously discriminate on the basis of religion. This points to an important element of a successful disparate impact claim, that there has to be a policy with a causal effect. In the above scenario, there is no proposed policy that has this effect. Note that the burden of proof is on the person suing for relief – they must have a theory of something the company does that causes this hiring pattern, a practice that is discriminatory. The identified policy (whatever it might be) could be justified by a business necessity defense (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424), by showing that the practice has a demonstrable relationship to the requirements of the job. That, b.t.w., would not excuse a racially or religiously discriminatory hiring policy for a factory manufacturing menorahs or kinaras. If a company recruiting locally in Boise ID had a 75% black work force, it would be reasonable to suspect that something was up. But legally, without showing that this results from a unjustified policy of the company, mere statistically anomalous distribution is does not sustain a claim of discrimination.

I'm not going to comment on what your manager is doing specifically, since I don't know all the facts. But in general: As a general rule, businesses have freedom of contract. This means they can choose to do business with, or not do business with, anyone they want. There are specific laws that create exceptions to this freedom of contract. The most important are federal and state civil rights laws, which prohibit many businesses from discriminating on the basis of certain protected classes, such as race, sex, religion, etc. In general, "locals vs. out-of-towners" is not a protected class, and therefore no law explicitly prohibits this type of discrimination. However, it's possible a court could find that "locals" is a proxy for some actual protected class--for example, if the hotel is in a city and the "locals" are predominantly Black.

There are no small sexual assaults Indecent assault/sexual assault/sexual touching Different jurisdictions have different definitions but, wherever you are, the behavior you describe is a criminal offense and the appropriate course of action is to report it to both your employer and the police. The fact that the perpetrator is under the professional care of the victim does not change this although, if the positions were reversed, this would be an aggravating factor. That is, assuming you are willing to make a statement to the police and, ultimately, testify before a court. It may not come to that - the police may not press charges. You can also civilly sue for the damage you have suffered. Work Health and Safety Your employer has an obligation to provide a reasonably safe workplace. If this is a not uncommon occurrence then they should have analyzed the risk and determined appropriate mitigation strategies and trained you in these. Have they?

One path would be to get compliance, by demonstrating that it is legally required. The best evidence that he is legally required to wear a mask is this recent mandate from the Department of Public Health. However, I cannot find a corresponding executive order, which may be in a generic form empowering CDPH to issue orders. Any imposition of penalties for violation must be publicly announced and rest on legislative authority. The mandate is not generally enforced, except in a few cases regarding bars and restaurants. There are various persuasive avenues that you could pursue, such as asking CDPH to come talk to him (unlikely, but you could try), complaining to the property owner, appealing to local social media to apply pressure (possibly putting yourself at legal risk for defamation, if you make a false statement). There are two more involved legal actions to contemplate. One is to terminate the lease and move elsewhere. This would likely result in an action to collect the remainder of the rent, but the strategy would be to argue that the manager has interfered with your private enjoyment of the premise. A second, highly improbable, is to sue the manager and get an enforceable court order requiring him to wear a mask. Courts have a prejudice against ordering people to take actions when other options exist (terminating the lease, monetary compensation). It could be an interesting but expensive test case to see if you could get a judge to order the manager to wear a mask. So yes they are obligated to wear masks, but legal enforcement is going to be difficult at best.

There is no hard rule that a strip search cannot be performed by a different-gendered officer. The hard rule is that the search must be reasonable (as required by the 4th Amendment) , which means that there have to be sufficient reasons for the search. Depending on the circumstances, a search of a male by a female, or in view of a female, could be reasonable – and in other circumstances it could be unreasonable. As the court in Cookish v. Powell, 945 F. 2d 441 said, In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted There are trends in the law which speak in favor of inmates right to privacy from cross-gender strip searches. Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors is a recent decision where given the circumstances, a cross-gender search was found to be unreasonable. Cookish v. Powell is one where it wasn't unreasonable. This resource file assembles numerous court rulings, classifying them for judicial circuit, gender of staff vs. gender of inmate, sorting according to who prevails. The "rule" would be that the more intrusive the staff conduct is, the less reasonable the search is: but the more of an emergency there is, the more reasonable the search is.

Why would this be a concern? The adults have some duty in an elementary school setting to monitor the children in the restroom in any case. Separate restrooms are an employee perk, not a liability driven decision.

There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card.

Do pawn shops have third-party consent authority for pawned items? In Phoenix, Arizona, Leslie Merritt Jr. has been arrested and charged in relation to a series of shootings that occurred along the I-10 corridor in Phoenix. In court filings, the Arizona Department of Safety (DPS) alleges that a firearm pawned by Mr. Merritt was forensically linked to the shootings. When taking property to a pawn shop one can either sell the item to the pawn shop or pawn it. Pawning (also known as hocking) an item creates a relationship between the owner of the item and the shop. The owner of the item is giving the item to the shop to be used as collateral for a loan. Pawn shops in the state of Arizona are required to report to police on a daily basis all property that is delivered to their custody. It was based on these reports that Arizona DPS visited the pawn shop, took control of the gun pawned by Mr. Merritt and conducted forensic tests. In United States v. Matlock, a case involving joint access to a home, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that someone with "common authority" had the ability to provide consent for a search. In a footnote, the Court stated that common authority meant mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched It seems that a pawn shop does not have the "use of the property" as they are holding the property as collateral for a loan. Nor does it seem that Mr. Merritt would recognize that the pawn shop would be turning his property over to the police. Assuming that Arizona DPS did not have a warrant to examine the firearm, does the relationship between Mr. Merritt and the pawn shop satisfy the requirements of third-party consent as outlined in United States v. Matlock? Is there any case law that would seem to allow the pawn shop to grant consent for a forensic examination of property they hold as collateral? What if that forensic examination resulted in the destruction of or damage to pawned property as it seems that the pawn shop has a fiduciary responsibility to safeguard the owner's property? EDITED TO PROVIDE FURTHER CLARIFICATION: The transactional records of a pawn shop have long been available to the government. There is no expectation of privacy for the customer of the pawn shop for any information related to the transaction. The transaction record is a record owned by the business and, as an industry with a history of government oversight, those records can be inspected by the government. Those inspection powers only go so far. The United States District Court of the Southern District of New York held in 5 Borough Pawn, LLC v. City of New York that there are limits to the intrusion: Must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers. There is no doubt that Mr. Merritt has no expectation of privacy regarding the record of his pawning his gun. This question, though, is whether or not Mr. Merritt has an expectation of privacy concerning what remains his property that happens to be in the possession of the pawn shop. In United States v. Timothy Sanders, the United States District Court in the Eastern District of Tennessee found that a defendant, Timothy Sanders, did not have an expectation of privacy regarding firearms he had sold to a pawnshop. In that case the testimony highlights the issue of sold v. pawn: He stated the purchase receipts show that the guns were sold, not pawned, to the pawn shop. In the case of Mr. Merritt, he reportedly pawned his property. The gun was pledged as collateral for a loan and the pawn shop possessed that collateral though, until Mr. Merritt defaulted on the loan, ownership of the property remained with Mr. Merritt. The pawn shop has a duty to protect that property. If that property becomes damaged, lost or stolen then the pawn shop will owe damages to the owner. The pawn shop acts as a bailee of the property and Mr. Merritt is the bailor. Are there other situations where a bailor has sufficient authority to consent to a search of property they don't own, e.g. an automobile located in a private for-pay parking lot? What about pawn shops would allow the government to extend their examination beyond the records of the pawn shop without probable cause that a particular item was used in the commission of a crime?

The pawn shop has the "use of property" of their own premises. The pawn shop has obviously the right to examine the gun to determine its value, for example, or to clean it if it needs cleaning to avoid damage, or to show it to a potential customer. And the pawn shop is allowed to let the police onto their own premises, even without a search warrant.

Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.

The police would still be able to get a warrant even if there was no suspicion against the current owners, provided that there was reasonable evidence to suggest that the body was in the garden. In the event that the police enter the garden and see something like the marijuana plants, plain sight doctrine would allow the police to charge the owners with growing marijuana. If there was something like a green house, separate from the garden area that the body may be located in, the search warrant, if limited in scope, may not apply to the greenhouse. This depends on how specific the location of the body is believed to be: anywhere in the garden? or right behind the house against the wall? The odds are good the police would bring in a cadaver dog (included in the warrant) and patrol the garden to see if the dog finds anything.

In colorado, it appears that the kidnapping statutes do not apply if the act is not "knowing" or if the perpetrator lacks intent. § 18-3-301 Any person who does any of the following acts with the intent thereby to force the victim or any other person to make any concession or give up anything of value in order to secure a release of a person under the offender's actual or apparent control commits first degree kidnapping: (a) Forcibly seizes and carries any person from one place to another; or (b) Entices or persuades any person to go from one place to another; or (c) Imprisons or forcibly secretes any person. § 18-3-302 Any person who knowingly seizes and carries any person from one place to another, without his consent and without lawful justification, commits second degree kidnapping. 2. Any person who takes, entices, or decoys away any child not his own under the age of eighteen years with intent to keep or conceal the child from his parent or guardian or with intent to sell, trade, or barter such child for consideration commits second degree kidnapping. § 18-3-303 Any person who knowingly confines or detains another without the other's consent and without proper legal authority commits false imprisonment. As @ohwilleke pointed out in this answer, this means that as soon as the hypothetical car thief becomes aware that the child is in the car and doesn't then act to return the child to their parents, it becomes second-degree kidnapping. (It's also possible that CO case law has interpreted the statutes differently than I'm interpreting them here, but the plain language seems to require the actual intent to take and/or confine a person illicitly.)

Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo!

It depends on the jurisdiction (naturally). The answer for Washington is "No, not exactly". RCW 9a.83.030 states that "The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney may file a civil action for the forfeiture of proceeds". The police can seize real property, but must file a lis pendens regarding the property. The bar that has to be cleared for forfeiture is "probable cause". The Institute for Justice has an extensive analysis of civil forfeiture, especially with a state by state summary (they aren't positionally neutral on forfeiture, but they are legally respectable). Then after a inevitable judgment (90 days if the judgment is sooner), the property is transferred. Notice is to be "served within fifteen days after the seizure on the owner of the property seized and the person in charge thereof and any person who has a known right or interest therein, including a community property interest", so they would notify Bob (assuming they know Bob is the real owner). Or, if Bob learns of the seizure that "If a person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of property within forty-five days of the seizure in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the person or persons shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the claim or right". It is possible that Bob's property could be taken (nothing prevents it), especially if Bob's hands are unclean.

There is no legal obligation of the police or any of its officers to reimburse you. It comes within a police powers exception to the 5th Amendment obligation to provide compensation for takings. Sometimes a government will compensate someone even though it has no legal obligation to do so, but this is unlikely to happen. A petition for certiorari from 10th Circuit decision of Lech v. City of Greenwood Village (10th Cir. October 29, 2019) recaps a lot of the relevant law and arguments for changing it (the petition was subsequently denied by the U.S. Supreme Court). The question presented in the petition was: Using explosives and a battering ram attached to an armored personnel carrier, the Greenwood Village Police Department intentionally destroyed Petitioners’ house. Afterwards, they offered the family $5,000 “to help with temporary living expenses.” The family sued, arguing that they were entitled to Just Compensation under the Fifth Amendment for the intentional destruction of their house. The Tenth Circuit, however, held that no compensation was due because the home was destroyed pursuant to the police power rather than the power of eminent domain. The question presented is whether there is a categorical exception to the Just Compensation Clause when the government takes property while acting pursuant to its police power. (To be clear, Texas is in the 5th Circuit and not the 10th Circuit, but there is not a circuit split on this particular issue between any U.S. Court of Appeals Circuits, and the Texas Supreme Court has not taken a contrary position.) Needless to say, that fact pattern was even worse for the innocent citizen, because law enforcement had more discretion and time to make a conscious decision about how to respond to the "bad guy" (an armed man wanted for shoplifting and resisting arrest) in the house to which the suspect had no connection. You could sue the "bad guys" who were involved in the shootout (if known) for causing an incident that foreseeably damaged your car, or you could make a first party insurance claim with your own car insurance.

Chain of custody and testimony in this regard. Say there is a murder victim, with DNA of the suspect under the fingernails and a knife with the suspect's bloody fingerprints stuck in the chest. There would be testimony what happened to the knife. If a paramedic removed it to attempt first aid, the paramedic would testify. So would the officer who bagged it, and the forensic analyst who took the fingerprints. A pathologist would testify if the knife was consistent with the stab wound (a careful pathologist could never swear that the knife was the cause of death, just that it matches). The pathologist would also testify how DNA was collected under the fingernails, and how it was sent to the lab. The defense may claim that the suspect also tried first aid, or that a corrupt cop forced the suspect to hold the knife. The court or jury then draw their conclusions from this and other testimony. Same here. A lifelike picture found on the web proves nothing. A witness who takes the stand to testify that he or she took a certain picture would be more credible. So would a forensic officer who testifies how she or he removed the data from a surveillance camera, checked for common signs of tampering, and then signed a copy of the data with a private key. (The signing shows no third-party tampering after collection, it is not evidence of integrity before that.) Years ago, in germany, there was the case of a bank robber who claimed that a fleeing suspect had handed him a bag of money in the forest and then vanished. "Prove it wasn't so," he demanded. "You can't. So there is reasonable doubt." Well, the court found that the statement merely created unreasonable doubt, and the sentence was upheld on appeal.

Wet & Reckless vs DUI What is the exact difference between a Wet Reckless vs a DUI? Moreover the financial and penal implications? I am in California.

A California "wet reckless" is not something for which you can be arrested. It is the first-level under a DUI that prosecutors will offer as a plea-bargain. It may be offered for a number of reasons, e.g., breathalyzer right at or just above the legal limit, first offense, attitude when dealing with the police, etc. The maximum penalties for a wet reckless conviction are lighter than those for a DUI. $1,000 fine and no jail for wet reckless vs. $3,000 and possible jail for DUI. The probationary period for wet reckless is shorter. However, a wet reckless conviction will still count as a prior conviction when weighing penalties for future DUI convictions and a DUI program will still have to be completed. While there is no court-imposed suspension of your license, your license can still be suspended at the DMV administrative hearing for up to 4 months. While there is a lot of information on the web related to this plea-bargain, it is critical to get a competent attorney to provide counsel on how to deal with such a charge and whether or not to accept a wet reckless plea offer.

This is manslaughter of the vehicular variety Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:... (c) Vehicular— (1) ... driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. This is what they call a wobbler, and could be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor. In the latter case, the maximum penalty is a year in county jail and in the former it is six years in state prison. If the cause was ordinary negligence, it is just a misdemeanor. The details of gross negligence are set forth in the jury instruction CALCRIM 592 A person acts with gross negligence when: He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury; AND A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act. The "absent-mindedness" defense seems a bit far fetched, but still not everybody who drives inattentively is prosecuted for a felony, or even a misdemeanor. However, it is really hard to imagine not being acutely aware of the fact that people drive on the right side of the road here. Without a more-detailed story, I don't see a basis for deciding what level of negligence a prosecutor is likely to argue for, and what the prosecutor's agenda is: somewhere between no prosecution, and (most likely) misdemeanor manslaughter.

We are talking about larceny and larceny & destruction of property in the two cases. So at the minimum, there are more laws that apply. But what are the laws? Florida names its Larceny statute... Theft: 812.014 Theft.— (1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently: (a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property. Destroying someone's else property in Florida is in the statute on Criminal Mischief: 806.13 Criminal mischief; penalties; penalty for minor.— (1)(a) A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he or she willfully and maliciously injures or damages by any means any real or personal property belonging to another, including, but not limited to, the placement of graffiti thereon or other acts of vandalism thereto. So, yes, you would additionally get the criminal mischief charge, but... that only grants monetary damages of 250 USD plus the damages done to the items for first timers, but it can become upgraded to a felony in the third degree - which has a maximum limit of 5 years. Note that damaging items in the course of theft is specifically an aggravating factor for the theft charge, if grand theft is combined with property damage of 1000 USD and more. A bicycle costing between 750 and 5000 USD is grand theft, felony in the third degree according to 812.014.(2)(c)1. This is also the 5 years limit. One could get both sentences... but still only sit 5 years, because often sentences are served concurrently, only rarely consecutively. So, no, you do not necessarily commit a higher offense just for breaking the lock - you'd need to have a 1000 USD damage for that - but you most certainly commit additional offenses that can result in a higher verdict in the end.

This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough.

What is the correct way to handle this situation? Strictly speaking, each driver exceeding the speed limit is in violation of the traffic sign even if everybody else also infringes it. Thus it is completely valid for the police to pull & fine anyone from among those drivers. Statutes like the one you mention are intended for scenarios where a driver departs significantly --and for no apparent [lawful] reason-- from the speed limit, such as driving at 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. Typically a driver would not get pulled over in the scenario you mention (driving at 62 mph where everybody else drives at 65 mph). The exception would be some police department(s) requiring its cops to meet a quota of fines per week, but that would be quite a questionable practice having nothing to do with the legislative intent. Speed limits are supposed to represent normal and reasonable movement of traffic. If informed consensus is that a particular speed limit is inconsistent with that principle (for instance, where limit is artificially low and raising it would not compromise safety), then a request could be submitted to the Oregon Department of Transportation.

You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.

As a linguist who reads laws for a hobby, I would say that "and" legally means what it was intended to mean. There are often interpretive statutes which say that "and" can be read as "or" or vice versa, when necessary (as in ORC 1.02 "And" may be read "or," and "or" may be read "and" if the sense requires it. Delaware doesn't have that as a rule, but it is a rule employed by courts "as required". One approach to interpretation is to discern intent from surrounding text, so we would look at the whole code. The general context is the rule that "A building or land shall be used only for the following purposes". Following Article XXVII of the code, other uses could be permitted because "§115-32. Special use exceptions may be permitted by the Board of Adjustment and in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVII of this chapter and may include...". That section ends with "C:Other special use exceptions as follows", and includes "Private garages for more than four automobiles and with floor area of more than 900 square feet in a residential district". From the list of things enumerated in §115-32, there is no coherent pattern – some things are in the list of special exceptions, some things are in this list, some not. So the "surrounding text" approach doesn't help in this case. Scrutiny of legislative debate is sometimes invoked, especially at the federal level, but there is negligible chance that there is any such evidence here. The almost-final approach is to spell out the competing interpretations, and see if anything jumps out as ridiculous (because it is assumed that lawmakers do not pass ridiculous laws). The two interpretations are "both must be true", versus "one must be true". Since the general rule is that you can go ahead unless it is restricted, then with the "both" interpretation, you need a special exception permit if you simultaneously plan to have more than 4 automobiles (which means, 5+, so 4 is allowed) and floor area greater than 900 sf. Thus if you plan for only 4 cars, or can fit the 5 cars into 900 sf, then you would not require a permit (on the "both" interpretation). Which btw is the literal interpretation of "and". This is not an absurd scenario (using a generous 10'x18' space, which I derived from parking slot regulations in Danbury CT). So it is reasonable to think they meant "both". The "either of these" interpretation says that they are being even more restrictive – you need permission to have a 5+ car garage (regardless of size), and you need permission to have a garage larger than 800 sf (even if there were only 1 car in it). This seems a bit specific since there isn't generally a size restriction on structures in the code – except that playhouses are limited to 150 sf. and can't be tall enough for an adult to stand up. Since the literal meaning of "and" is "both at once", and since no facts about the code say otherwise (i.e. that interpretation does not result in an absurd nullification of some other provision), an objective court should interpret this rule to mean "both at once", thus the government imposes the fewest restrictions on your property. No way to know what they will do.

Q: Why don't US prosecutors press for imprisonment for crime in the banking industry? Q. Why aren't US prosecutors (and UK prosecutors for that matter) not pressing for imprisonment in such cases? Is this because there are no such laws under bankers can be so indicted (notably, in the case reported on above, there is the additional complication of extradition) . . . ? Prosecutors have the legal authority to prosecute bankers for crimes, and not infrequently do press charge bankers with crimes and press for imprisonment for crimes in the banking industry, and have obtained many very long prison sentences in cases like these. For example, "following the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers of all stripes were jailed for their transgressions." And, in 2008, the laws involved were, if anything, easier to prosecute and had stricter penalties than they did in the 1980s. There were 35 bankers convicted and sent to prison in the financial crisis, although arguably only one of them was really a senior official. This said, the real question is not why they don't do this at all, but why prosecutors exercise their discretion to refrain from seeking imprisonment or lengthy imprisonment, in cases where they either have a conviction or could easily secure a conviction. A former justice department prosecutor (in the Enron case) argues in an Atlantic article that it is harder than it looks. But, he ignores the fact that a lot of people looking at the very Enron case he prosecuted after the fact has concluded that the criminal prosecution may have done more harm than good, leading to significant harm to innocent people (for example by destroying the careers and wealth of Arthur Anderson accountants who had no involvement with the case, due to a conviction that was ultimately overturned on appeal). This changed the pro-prosecution of corporations attitude that had prevailed before then (corporations are easier to prosecute than individuals since you don't have to figure out exactly who in the corporation committed the wrong). This time, regulators and securities law enforcers sought mostly civil fines against entities with some success: 49 financial institutions have paid various government entities and private plaintiffs nearly $190 billion in fines and settlements, according to an analysis by the investment bank Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. That may seem like a big number, but the money has come from shareholders, not individual bankers. (Settlements were levied on corporations, not specific employees, and paid out as corporate expenses—in some cases, tax-deductible ones.) The same link also points out the two very early criminal prosecutions against individuals resulted in acquittals by juries at trial, for reasons that may have been very specific to those trials, undermining the willingness of prosecutors to press even strong cases for almost three years and undermining the credibility of their threat to prosecute criminally. Also, this is not a universal rule. For example, China routinely executes people who are convicted in summary trials of banking law violations and corruption charges. Q. Is this due to the principle of limited liability? No. Banking officials in a limited liability entity (and all banks are limited liability entities) can have criminal liability for acts in violation of banking and fraud laws, notwithstanding limited liability. Is this because . . . powerful vested interests prevents the actual execution of the law as it is intended? If so - how exactly are they prevented? This does happen but not often. Sometimes this happens, but not very often. The corruption angle is a popular narrative on the political very progressive left of American politics, but as I explain below (as you note "Chomsky, the formation of Western capitalism was in large part by due to "radical judicial activism".", and Chomsky is a very left wing social and economic historian almost to the point of Marxist analysis), this visceral narrative isn't really accurate most of the time. First, for what it is worth, the prosecutors play a much larger role in this than "activist" judges do. Secondly, the decision making process is more nuanced and less blatantly corrupt and self-interested than his attempt at "legal realist" analysis would suggest. There are legitimate reasons for someone in a prosecutor's shoes to focus less on these cases, even if in the end analysis you think that they have made the wrong choices in these cases. The case for prosecuting banking fraud severely is basically a utilitarian one, but criminal prosecution is guided by norms beyond utilitarian norms. There are certainly cases where an elected prosecutor or high level elected official is persuaded not to bring criminal charges or to be lenient due to pressure from powerful vested interest. When this is done, a white collar criminal defense attorney, or a "fixer" who deals with political sensitive cases (sometimes on an elected official's staff and sometimes not), or an elected official or political party official contacts the prosecutor or the prosecutor's boss or is the prosecutor's boss, and based upon the plea from the powerful interests (direct or indirect) urges the prosecutor to back off and the prosecutor complies. At the most extreme level, a Governor or President or parole board can pardon someone facing prison for banking crimes, which has happened, but is extremely rare. But, this sort of direct intervention in an individual case is not terribly common. My guess would be that 1% to 10% of banking prosecutions are affected by this kind of influence particular to a given case. This is far too small a number of cases to reflect the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal bank fraud cases that we observe. More Often Policy Decisions Are Involved Budgets And Institutional Case Prioritization Much more common would be for the elected prosecutor or the administration that employs an appointed prosecutor to decide to deprioritize a particular kind of case and/or to reduce funding (both at the law enforcement/regulatory agency level and at the subdepartment of the prosecuting attorney's organization level) for prosecution of these kinds of cases as a matter of broad policy. Every prosecutor's office and law enforcement office on the planet has more crimes that it could prosecute and pursue than it has resources to do so, so it is always necessary to have some kind of priorities to decide which of those cases will be pursued. For example, perhaps the Justice Department funds a white collar crime enforcement office with the resources to prosecute only 750 cases a year, and there are 7,500 strong cases that the offices could prosecute. The white collar crime prosecution office has to then prioritize which of the 7,500 strong cases is chooses to pursue. It might, for example, in good faith, decide the focus on white collar crime cases that harm "widows and orphans" and other large groups of people who can't afford to hire their own lawyers to bring civil cases to sue the wrongdoers themselves to mitigate the harm that they suffer. More specifically, a policy set in place by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in the Justice Department in 1999 was followed: The so-called Holder Doctrine, a June 1999 memorandum written by the then–deputy attorney general warning of the dangers of prosecuting big banks—a variant of the “too big to fail” argument that has since become so familiar. Holder’s memo asserted that “collateral consequences” from prosecutions—including corporate instability or collapse—should be taken into account when deciding whether to prosecute a big financial institution. That sentiment was echoed as late as 2012 by Lanny Breuer, then the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, who said in a speech at the New York City Bar Association that he felt it was his duty to consider the health of the company, the industry, and the markets in deciding whether or not to file charges. This was a top level policy choice made a decade before the Financial Crisis arose, not an individualized act of corrupt interference. Advocacy From Representatives Of Victims Another common voice for leniency are lawyers on behalf of victims of white collar crimes (I've been in this spot myself on behalf of clients). Why? Mostly for two reasons: People in prison don't make future income to compensate the victims out of. People prosecuted criminally pay fines and court costs that don't go to the victims and reduce the pool of available funds for the victims. The private lawyers representing victims recognize that not prosecuting a white collar criminal leaves that person at large to commit future economic crimes (white collar criminals are rarely a physical threat to the people in the community around them or to anyone who doesn't do business with them) and that it fails to strongly discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Institutional victims of banking crimes and other white collar crimes may also urge prosecutors not to prosecute the crimes that victimized them, because they fear that the publicity would harm them more than the criminal penalties for the offender (whom they have ample means to sue in a civil action) would benefit them. The fact that victims seek leniency more often in white collar crime cases than in almost any kind of case (other than domestic violence cases, where victims also often urge leniency out of love and as a result of their economic dependency on the perpetrator), often causes prosecutors to determine that criminal prosecutions seeking long prison sentences are not a priority for the victims of these crimes and to prioritize their case loads accordingly. To get the $190 billion of settlement money that was paid from individuals would have required convictions of 1900 people capable of paying $100,000,000 each in 1900 very hard fought individual criminal cases, instead of 49 civil cases. This may or may not have been possible, as the most culpable figures were often in upper management, while the most affluent potential defendants were in top management and would have been harder to pin with personal criminal liability. Many top managers are relatively hands off in their management style and didn't get into the culpable criminal details. There are plenty of very influential and powerful bankers who were highly culpable who would have had less than $10,000,000 of net worth, much of which wasn't tainted with improper conduct, which isn't to say that prosecutors couldn't have seized it from them for fines and restitution, but it does make the moral case for doing so less clearly compelling. Evaluating Priorities For Limited And Expensive Prison Resources Prosecutors sometimes reason in white collar crime cases that keeping a white collar criminal in prison is very expensive to the state (up to $70,000 per person per year), and doesn't change the risk of physical harm to the general public, and that a felony conviction itself and fines and publicity and probation conditions are often sufficient to mitigate the risk that the convicted person will reoffend and to discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Parole boards, in systems that have them, often release white collar criminals as early as possible, applying the same reasoning. Also, white collar criminals tend to be model prisoners. An incarcerated white collar defendant is also depriving the public of tax revenues on income that person would otherwise receive if out of prison. A long prison sentence can victimize the public economically in amounts comparable to a moderate magnitude economic crime. Crudely speaking, prosecutors reason: "Why spend huge amounts of scarce prison money to lock someone up when we have murders and rapists and people who steal things at gun point and violent criminals who seriously injure people without justification who really need to be our priority to get off the streets? The devious and dishonest banker doesn't present the same sort of risk to the general public and his conviction and probation conditions should suffice to prevent him from having the ability to do this in the future." Social Class Bias Yet another reason is that often prosecutors and the people who set policy for prosecutors don't see white collar crimes as culpable in the same way that they do blue collar crimes. Most prosecutors spend the vast majority of their careers prosecuting blue collar criminals, terrorists and the like. These are people from a different social class, who live lives very unlike their own, and the people who are victimized by these crimes tend to be middle class or more affluent people and businesses. Banks, for example, are routinely victims of armed robberies which prosecutors prosecute, and of embezzlement by low level employees, which prosecutors prosecute. Bankers socio-economically and culturally are a lot like the prosecutors themselves (who are lawyers), their peers, and the victims they usually defend, and are rarely like the people that they usually prosecute (lower class, often minority people, who have never worked in an office, failed in school, are quick to anger and hurt others, etc.). At an individual case level, a white collar criminal defense lawyer can often marshal very impressive character witnesses to say that the defendant is basically a good guy who messed up once, while this is frequently very difficult for blue collar criminal defendants to do in a way that really reaches prosecutors and judges. The bottom line is that prosecutors (and judges, many of whom are former prosecutors) sympathize with, understand and relate to white collar criminals far more than they do with ordinary blue collar criminals. And, this colors their judgments about what kinds of punishments (criminal or non-criminal) are appropriate for the kind of conduct that these people commit. Their instinct is that a crime that might be committed by someone like me is probably not as serious as a crime that a judge or prosecutor would never dream of committing like an armed robbery of a bank, even though economically, the banking fraud crime may have caused $500,000,000 of harm while the armed bank robbery may have caused only $5,000 of harm.

Is my bond (employee contract) legal in India? I live in India and I have signed a contract of one year with my employer. But now I want to leave my company. However when I sent my resignation email they told me to take legal actions on me. About the bond: It is written on my company's letter head. It doesn't contain any stamp paper. It doesn't contain any company seal It doesn't mention anything about what actions will be taken, they just wrote "legal actions will be taken" if I break the bond. Can someone please help me by telling whether this bond is legal or not. What actions will be taken on me. My HR scared me by saying that they wont give me Experience letter and Releasing letter. They also said that no other company will give me a job and I will never be able to go to any other country because my Visa will never get approved.

Bonded labor is illegal in India, but enforcement is lax. Read Right against exploitation in Fundamental rights in India. The right against exploitation, given in Articles 23 and 24, provides for two provisions, namely the abolition of trafficking in human beings and Begar (forced labour)... As per law, they cannot make the contract binding if it relates to bonding of the laborer. But a general contract may stand in court if they have made you sign the contract and paid the duty to government for the contract. This contract will be mild form of Bonds/begar-contracts. As per the requirements of the contract, usually they will ask you to give them your original documents and degree certificate. Do not do that. That will give them control, and it's illegal. From personal experience, such companies are phonies and they want to exploit you. Visa thing is a scare. As per they wont give me Experience letter and Releasing letter; they might do that, and so you will not be able to show experience. You can file a lawsuit against them. (But you know it's a waste of time in Indian courts) As per first three things you mentioned: It is written on my company's letter head. It doesn't contain any stamp paper. It doesn't contain any company seal. It's not a contract. Do not provide them your actual signatures. Make a strange signature so that you can later argue that it's not your signature. But think about the consequences: You are going to that (probably shady) company, do you think they will hold any of their promises later, at all. Think: Will the company stay in business until your bond is over? Then how will you get an Experience certificate? That ends the answer. A few suggestions I'd suggest finding a different job. I'd suggest talking to a lawyer. It's cheaper than your life being screwed up. I'd suggest talking to your family about it. Nothing written here constitutes legal advice. Talk to a lawyer to get a legal opinion on the matter.

On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.

if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate.

The question of whether a person was acting on their own behalf or that of a company would generally be a question of fact, so if such a case came to court it would be for both sides to present evidence and argue for their interpretation of it. In most cases the context makes it clear. You mention having a company email domain and associated email signature; that is certainly good practice and would go a long way towards creating a presumption that you were acting for a company. Also signing yourself with your job title or role (e.g. "Joe Bloggs, Chief Bottlewasher") makes it clear that you are speaking in your role as an employee. The content of the communication also matters; if you use your company email address to order goods from a supplier that the company has used before then the recipient can reasonably assume that you are ordering on behalf of the company and a court is likely to agree. OTOH if you use the company address to send libellous emails then the recipient would have a much higher bar to claim that this was the company view rather than a personal one.

Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy).

First Part OR 324 is quite the right article for this. If the employer doesn't want that you work (because he has nothing to do for you) it's his problem, not yours. He still has to pay if you are there and ready to do work. This is for instance also mentioned in this article. The meaning of this is obvious if having a contract with a fixed number of work hours per day/month/year. Second part Prove that you have a fixed work contract. If the shift plans are made in advance you have a proof that you have a certain number of hours to work (and thus an expected income). If I interpret this here correctly, this is "echte Arbeit auf Abruf" (true work on request), because if your employer wants your work, you have to be there according to the shift plan, as opposed to your employer asking "who is ready to work tonight?". So your employer must pay you the hours agreed on in the shift plan, regardless of whether he has work for you or not (but you must explicitly tell him that you are willing to take work). Third part Can the employer change the shift plan, and to what extent? The employer must announce changes to work hours as soon as possible, and changes on short notice are only acceptable in emergency cases. A reduction in work hours due to not enough work shall not reduce the employee's salary. The business risk is entirely with the employer and he must not shift that responsibility to his employees. (That was common in the late 19th and early 20th century, with all the officially self-employed home workers in the textile industry). Here is a federal court decision that affirms this (BGE 125 III 65 S. 66).

In the UK, you would need a new contract, because the old company will not be able to pay you and will possibly cease to exist, but that contract must not put you at any disadvantage. Basically, all terms would have to be the same, and the time at the previous company would have to count as continuous employment.

Yes, it also applies. However, an employment implies they agree to having employment related data stored and processed (e.g., to be paid). When there are performance related bonuses in the contract, this will likely (but IANAL) imply they agree to performance data being collected and stored appropriately. Furthermore I would assume most of such data processing (such as knowing who is responsible for a certain change, who created a file, modified it etc.) falls into "legitimate interests" of the employer, as this information may be necessary for operations. I'd assume (still IANAL) that much of the consequence wrt. GDPR is the right to have your data erased. So a company should be prepared to remove such data when an employee leaves the company, e.g., by clearing the responsible person fields upon request. At least for data where there is no legal requirement to have such data provenance. But: consult your lawyer for a proper legal opinion!

What does a "Notice requiring possession" letter mean? I am renting a house in the UK. My contract is for a year, started in December last year and will expire in December 2015. In the tenancy agreement says Landlord can cancel the contract with 2 months notice period and I can with one month. I have paid every month with no problem. Last payment was this morning. I had an argument with my Landlord 1 week ago because he doesn't want to fix some defects in the house. To be more accurate he says he wants to do it but is delaying it. (First time we reported the problems was in March and still not fixed.) After the argument I have decided to move to another place of course. I am looking for houses now. But several days later she came home and gave me this letter in hand. My questions are: Does it mean that she wants to use her right to cancel the contract after 2 months? It looks like that to me but I am not 100% sure. What does it mean "after 16/11/2015"? After can mean anything... even end of contract in December. Is this a legal document or just something she made up? What happens if I want to leave the house later because I don't find alternative?

Inferring from the question, it appears that: The tenancy is an Assured Shorthold Tenancy. The tenancy agreement started on 16 December 2014. The initial fixed term was for 12 months. (Please comment below if any of this is incorrect). A Section 21 order gives notice that, unless the tenant leaves by the date given in the document, the landlord will begin legal proceedings against the tenant, in order to obtain a court order forcing the tenant to leave. To answer the OP's questions: Does it mean that she wants to use her right to cancel the contract after 2 months? It looks like that to me but I am not 100% sure. Yes - but if this is before the end of the fixed term (which I'm assuming is 15 December) there must be a clause in the tenancy agreement (normally called a "break clause") allowing the fixed term to be terminated early. If there is no break clause, then you cannot be asked to leave before the end of the fixed term. What does it mean "after 16/11/2015"? After can mean anything... even end of contract in December. Yes. The landlord would like you to leave before the date shown - but if you don't, the landlord can begin legal proceedings any time after that. Is this a legal document or just something she made up? It is a legal document. Section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 allows a landlord to ask a tenant to leave without having to give a reason. The landlord must meet certain conditions in order for the notice to be valid. What happens if I want to leave the house later because I don't find alternative? You'll need to discuss that with the landlord. However, if you don't leave by the end of the fixed term, you are entitled to stay (and pay rent!) until a court (not the landlord) orders your eviction. EDIT: This website goes into a lot more detail about the whole Section 21 procedure.

When I signed up over 5 years ago, I signed a contract agreeing to a specific service at a specific price and I was locked-in for 24 months, lest I be charged a penalty for early breach of contract As the original 24-month fixed term has expired long ago, the service provider is no longer obliged to provide the service at the original terms. They may terminate the contract at any time, and equally you are allowed to quit any time as well. The notice you have now got is essentially a termination notice combined with an offer for a new contract. You can accept it, or give them a counteroffer, or walk away to another ISP.

Your boss is totally wrong. Legally, there is no such thing as a "probation period" in the UK. You have the right to your holiday payment, according to the days that you worked. What can happen: The legal minimum is I think 28 days per year including bank holidays, but most companies give 23 or 24 days PLUS eight days bank holiday. Your contract may say that the first three months are called probation period, and during that time you only get the legal minimum, and after that the much more common higher amount. That would be legal. But even so, you would be entitled to seven days, minus any bank holidays where you didn't work.

The wording of the original lease and the renewal form are vital here. The Texas Property code, Title 8, chapter 92 is the relevant state law for residential tenancies. It neither forbids nor guarantees a right of renewal. That is left up to the lease agreement. However, it does require a landlord to provide a tenant with a copy of any signed lease promptly. Specifically Sec. 92.024. LANDLORD'S DUTY TO PROVIDE COPY OF LEASE provides that: (a) Not later than the third business day after the date the lease is signed by each party to the lease, a landlord shall provide at least one complete copy of the lease to at least one tenant who is a party to the lease. ... c) A landlord's failure to provide a complete copy of the lease as described by Subsection (a) or (b) does not invalidate the lease or, subject to Subsection (d), prevent the landlord from prosecuting or defending a legal action or proceeding to enforce the lease. (d) A landlord may not continue to prosecute and a court shall abate an action to enforce the lease, other than an action for nonpayment of rent, only until the landlord provides to a tenant a complete copy of the lease if the tenant submits to the court evidence in a plea in abatement or otherwise that the landlord failed to comply with Subsection (a) or (b). (e) A landlord may comply with this section by providing to a tenant a complete copy of the lease: (1) in a paper format; (2) in an electronic format if requested by the tenant; or (3) by e-mail if the parties have communicated by e-mail regarding the lease. Sec. 92.003 provides that: (a) In a lawsuit by a tenant under either a written or oral lease for a dwelling or in a suit to enforce a legal obligation of the owner as landlord of the dwelling, the owner's agent for service of process is determined according to this section. (b) If written notice of the name and business street address of the company that manages the dwelling has been given to the tenant, the management company is the owner's sole agent for service of process. (c) If Subsection (b) does not apply, the owner's management company, on-premise manager, or rent collector serving the dwelling is the owner's authorized agent for service of process unless the owner's name and business street address have been furnished in writing to the tenant. Dallas municipal law prohibits retaliating against a tenant who complains about improper conditions or requests maintenance, but says nothing about lease renewals. Under ordinary contract law, an offer and acceptance makes a contract, unless the parties have previously agreed otherwise. Moreover, demonstrable practice can make or confirm a contract. If the tenant has paid rent for either March or April in reliance on the renewal agreement, and at the specified renewal rate, and that rent has been accepted, that may well constitute ratification (and thus execution) of the renewed lease. This is if the new lease would hav started before the April rent was due. So the tenant may well have the right to enforce the terms specified in the February renewal form. However, this will depend on what those terms are, and also what renewal provisions, if any, were in the original lease. It might be a good idea to send a letter to the landlord and manager, saying that the renewal form that you signed constitutes an acceptance of their offer, and thus a binding contract, and asking for a signed copy as per section 92.024, mentioning the section number. If it were me, I would send such a letter by both email and USPS certified mail, to both the manager and the landlord, if I had both addresses. I would keep a copy of any communications, and make them all in writing from now on (email is writing, legally). In any case the tenant would be wise to continue to pay rent on time in the amount specified on the renewal form, by some traceable means such as a check, money order, or credit card. I would be sure to use a method the original lease listed as acceptable, or that had been used in the past, except for cash. If I used a check, I would write "payment in full for rent of {address} for {month}" on the back The tenant would be wise to consult a local lawyer who specializes in tenant's cases, there seem to be quite a few. There is a local housing crisis center. It offers regular (twice a month) legal clinics with volunteer lawyers, and can be reached at 214-828-4244 or [email protected]. Such a center might be able to recommend local lawyers. Often an initial consultation with a lawyer on such a matter is free or at a low charge. It would probably be a good idea for the tenant to take some action fairly promptly. 15 U.S. Code Chapter 96 (the federal e-sign act) (section 7001) provides that: (a) In general -- Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law (other than this subchapter and subchapter II), with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce— (1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and (2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation. Also the UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999), which has been adopted by Texas, allows but does not require the use of electronic signatures. Thus the tenant;s email response ought to be a vald means of forming a contract.

The fact that you're not a native speaker of English doesn't alter the legal situation. If you literally had no understanding of English but for some reason you signed a piece of paper, then you might argue that there was no agreement in the first place, but obviously you do speak some English. Most people don't actually understand what contracts mean (on both sides). Contracts are still enforced, based on what the contract says. The move-in data is proposed, not firm, and it even indicates what the charges are if your circumstances change and the dates have to change (whereas is their circumstances change, they wouldn't have a basis for charging extra). It also does say that there will be no refund if you change your mind. So the piece of paper says "No refund". The problem seems to be that there's an "agent" whose statements you relied on, who is ultimately responsible for this problem, and s/he implied that you could get a refund. It's not clear what kind of "agent" this is (is he working for you, or for the owners?). You'd have a somewhat different legal basis depending on which it is, but you could sue someone in either event, assuming that you could actually persuade the court that you were given false information which you relied on. The statement "they will refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is false; the statement "they may refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is true. If the latter was the statement that you relied on, then you knew (or should have known) that that isn't a promise, it's just a guess, and if you read the piece of paper you know that it's a promise with no basis. So I would say it comes down to establishing what promise was made to you. Arguing that the agent "made" you sign isn't going to get you anywhere (unless you can prove actual coersion).

If you are prevented from entering the property on the day the contract says the tenancy begins that is a breach of the contract. If you suffer a loss as a result of the breach, you are entitled to be restored to the position you'd be in had the loss not occurred. For example, if you had additional removal fees and a hotel bill resulting from this breach, you'd be entitled to claim those costs. Generally the landlord would be liable for this. It is no defence that the agent is unavailable to give you the keys - they should have accounted for the day being a Sunday or started the term on a day when someone would be available. I suggest getting in touch with the landlord in the first instance, civilly explain the situation and ask if they can arrange for you to enter the property on the given date - they might not know what is going on. Keep a log/diary of your communications with the agent and the landlord. Make sure you have a plan B for somewhere to stay. Call Shelter too, for free advice.

Section 8 of the Housing Act 1988 provides that (2) The court shall not make an order for possession on any of the grounds in Schedule 2 to this Act unless that ground and particulars of it are specified in the notice under this section; but the grounds specified in such a notice may be altered or added to with the leave of the court. Section 7 of the same Act also provides that (1) The court shall not make an order for possession of a dwelling-house let on an assured tenancy except on one or more of the grounds set out in Schedule 2 to this Act; [...]

The possession is not adverse during the tenancy, so the clock does not run. If the tenancy contract ends or is violated for [appropriate length depending on location] with no reaction from the landlord, that is grounds for adverse possession.

My rights in India I have read in Indian newspapers and seen in news channels about some misbehavior with the citizens when they go to police station to complain about some issue. Could you provide some resources, online, book etc. that sheds more light on my constitutional rights in India.

For starters you might want to read fundamental rights in India. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS General Definition. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights. Right to Equality Equality before law. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Abolition of Untouchability. Abolition of titles. Right to Freedom Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. Protection in respect of conviction for offences. Protection of life and personal liberty. 21A. Right to education. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. Right against Exploitation Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour. Prohibition of employment of children in factories, etc. Right to Freedom of Religion Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. Freedom to manage religious affairs. Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion. Freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in certain educational institutions. Cultural and Educational Rights Protection of interests of minorities. Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. [Repealed.] Saving of Certain Laws 31A. Saving of Laws providing for acquisition of estates, etc. 31B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations. 31C. Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles. 31D. [Repealed.] Right to Constitutional Remedies Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part. 32A. [Repealed.] Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this Part in their application to Forces, etc. Restriction on rights conferred by this Part while martial law is in force in any area. Legislation to give effect to the provisions of this Part. Then read this PDF for above mentioned topics. The eight fundamental rights recognised by the Indian constitution are: 1. Right to equality: Which includes equality before law, prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, gender or place of birth, and equality of opportunity in matters of employment, abolition of untouchability and abolition of titles. 2. Right to freedom: Which includes speech and expression, assembly, association or union or cooperatives, movement, residence, and right to practice any profession or occupation (some of these rights are subject to security of the State, friendly relations with foreign countries, public order, decency or morality), right to life and liberty, right to education, protection in respect to conviction in offences and protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. 3. Right against exploitation: Which prohibits all forms of forced labour, child labour and traffic of human beings 4. Right to freedom of religion: Which includes freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion, freedom to manage religious affairs, freedom from certain taxes and freedom from religious instructions in certain educational institutes. 5. Cultural and Educational rights: Preserve the right of any section of citizens to conserve their culture, language or script, and right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 6. Right to constitutional remedies: Which is present for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. 7. Right to life: Which gives the right to live with human dignity. This includes rights such as right to education, health, shelter and basic amenities that the state shall provide. 8. Right to education: It is the latest addition to the fundamentals rights. 9. Right to Information:RTI stands for Right To Information and has been given the status of a fundamental right under Article 19(1) of the Constitution. Remember - you will have to keep updating your knowledge on Laws India's parliament and state governments pass. One such place is PRSIndia. Read this question on Quora. Google search "Police laws and acts, india" - you will get lucky. About beating and mistreating, any body can do that. You do not have to be in police for doing so. You do not have to be weak, old or poor for getting beaten. Examples: Poor people beat their kids and wives. Frustrated wives beat their husbands. Salman Khan slapped Aishwarya Rai. And so on. All you can do is read about the law, gain information and use it. Edit: Adding an image (for visual stimulation) None of this constitutes a legal advice. These are opinions.

The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal.

What appears to be the controlling case is DC v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570. In Heller, the meaning of "Right of the People" is relevant, and the court finds that in three instances in The Constitution, these instances unambiguously refer to individual rights, not 'collective' rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body" However, Art. 1 Sec 2 of The Constitution says that "the people" will select members of The House, and then there is the 10th: Heller says that Those provisions arguably refer to 'the people' acting collectively—but they deal with the exercise or reservation of powers, not rights In other words, "the people" can act collectively, but "the people" have individual rights. In the remaining cases of "the people", the expression "unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset". We are then directed to US v. Verdugo-Urquidez 494 U.S. 259, which is a warrantless search case involving a Mexican citizen and a search in Mexico, and the part that Heller finds relevant is that ‘[T]he people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution… . [Its uses] sugges[t] that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community." In other case law, Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia, F.3d 361 which cites US v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087 it is likewise said that constitutional rights expressly limited to the "people," such as those created by the Fourth Amendment, are held only by "a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community" "The People" thus starts from identifying "a national community", and then if the context is about rights, each such individual has the right, but in the context of powers, the collective has it.

I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.

Can someone suggest me how to deal with such coercive tactics of begging? One option is to report it to the police as begging in either a public or private place in madhya-pradesh is an arrestable offence under section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Bhiksha Vritti Nivaran Adhiniyam, 1973: 4. Power to require person found begging to appear before Court. (1) Any police officer or other person authorised in this behalf in accordance with rules made by the State Government may arrest without a warrant any person who is found begging... The Madhya Pradesh police have on-line reporting for lodging complaints. (my ability to read Hindi is very limited but that page seems relevant, if not try searching for "First Information Report".)

In the US, there are a number of non-government organizations which take on such cases, such as the ACLU or the Institute for Justice; individual law firms may also take such cases pro bono. There is no automatic right to free representation in case a constitutional issue is alleged, so if IJ doesn't like your case they won't take it. These are private organizations: there is no general government agency that one can call on, other than the Public Defender's office in case you are charged with a crime and can't afford legal defense. (A constitutional issue may arise in a case that a PD might handle, but you can't e.g. call on the public defender to sue the government for infringing your 2nd Amendment rights.) A state attorney general could file suit against the US government over a constitutional issue, as Washington's AG did in the case of the Trump travel executive order, where the underlying issues were constitutional. An individual might inspire a state AG to take on an issue, but the AG would be representing the interests of the state, broadly, and not individual interests.

This question and many related ones are analysed in detail by Eugene Volokh, in a long paper that is worth reading in its entirety if you are interested in the topic. The [Supreme] Court has offered “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” as one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” excluded from First Amendment protection. But if this exception is indeed to be well defined and narrowly limited, courts need to explain and cabin its scope. This Article — the first, to my knowledge, to consider the exception in depth — aims to help with that task. On threats, he says: Companies are generally barred from firing employees for voting for a union, and unions are generally barred from retaliating against employees for their speech. The Court therefore concluded that speech that threatens unlawful retaliation is itself unlawful. On blackmail, he says: [...] telling black citizens “stop shopping at white-owned stores or we’ll publicize your behavior to your neighbors and fellow church members” is similarly constitutionally protected. On the other hand, “vote for this civil rights bill or I’ll disclose that you cheated on your wife” is likely unprotected. In general the line where the First Amendment protections end and criminal speech begins is surprisingly vague. General advice to avoid self-incrimination by not answering questions from the police is clearly protected. Threatening a witness with violence is clearly not. In between are shades of grey.

I am sympathetic to your problem but there is probably not a legal solution: at least not an easy or cheap one. To help you clarify a whole mish-mash of issues I will address each of your points. frequently calls false noise complaints on neighbors resulting in police action. If the person genuinely believes that these complaints are valid, even if they do not end up being substantiated, he is within his rights to make such complaints. If you can document an ongoing pattern of unproven complaints this might amount to harassment and you could then seek a court order that he stop the harassing behaviour. However, if even a few of these complaints are proven this would become much harder. stands in front of the building in a menacing way as people enter/exit. He is entitled to stand wherever he likes in whatever "way" he likes. This is only an issue if the person entering/exiting has a reasonable fear that he will he will visit actual harm upon them, o, of course, if he actually does visit physical harm upon them. If so, then this is assault and can be reported to the police or be the basis of a civil action. hates black people. So, he's a bigot - this is not actually illegal. Discriminating against someone on the basis that they are black is illegal, hating them on that basis isn't. hates Middle Eastern people and Muslims. Ditto. constantly pounds on the floor/walls/ceilings. It can't be "constantly" - it might be often or even frequently, if you intent to take legal action hyperbolic language is not going to aid your case. To make a real complaint about this you would need to diarise each occurrence. Notwithstanding, unless he is damaging someone else's property or is violating a noise ordinance this is not illegal. screams curses at children. Clearly reprehensible behaviour: not clearly illegal. Unless this is assault (see above) or qualifies as offensive behavior under the criminal code wherever you are (unlikely) then he can scream whatever he wants at whoever he likes. Again, a pattern of such behavior may constitute harassment. Continues to park in handicap parking despite not being handicap, and receiving very expensive parking tickets. This is illegal and he is being punished for it. Unfortunately the expression Don't do the crime, if you can't do the time. has a corollary: if you are willing and able to take the punishment then you do as much crime as you want. And to add to the list, I suspect he's been putting nails in my car tire, always on the same tire, on the inside wall of the tire; I just replaced my 5th tire in 3 months. This is a crime. If you can get evidence to prove it then you can report him to the police and/or sue him for the damage. You have stated in your comments that you will be asking another question specifically about filming him, so I won't address this here. Is there some sort of legal incentive I've not clearly communicated to management to evict him? That depends on if any of his actions are actually grounds for terminating his lease and, if they are, the landlord wants to do so. A remote landlord who is getting his rent on time and not having their property damaged has no incentive to evict a tenant: no matter how annoying they are to others. It is possible, that you have a case for breaking your lease and/or suing your landlord for damages as you are not getting "quiet enjoyment" of the property. A suit along those lines may resolve the matter because either you or he will be evicted. Consult a lawyer. If he actually is insane, what sort of liability for his actions does he have? The same as anybody else. Liability for civil wrongs is an objective test of what a reasonable person would be liable for: it is not based on the specific characteristics of the person.

Referring to Software Engineering in a US state that licenses engineers This is strictly hypothetical for the moment and I will retain qualified legal counsel before making any real-world decisions. This question is only to get a general idea of what to expect. Suppose I live in a state that licenses the practice of professional engineering, and I want to start up an LLC to do freelance computer programming work. Suppose there is in force and effect, as there is in the state of Alabama (not where I live, but my state's statute looks similar - see http://www.bels.alabama.gov/pdf/laws/LawCode-July2014.pdf) a law which stipulates, roughly, the following: In order to safeguard life, health, and property, and to promote the public welfare, the practice of engineering in this state is a learned profession to be practiced and regulated as such, and its practitioners in this state shall be held accountable to the state and members of the public by high professional standards in keeping with the ethics and practices of the other learned professions in this state. It shall be unlawful for any person to practice or offer to practice engineering in this state, as defined by this chapter, or to use in connection with his or her name or otherwise assume, use, or advertise any title or description including, but not limited to, the terms engineer, engineers, engineering, professional engineer, professional engineers, professional engineering, or any modification or derivative thereof, tending to convey the impression that he or she is a professional engineer unless the person has been duly licensed or is exempt from licensure under this chapter. A person whose firm name shall have contained the word “engineer,” “engineers,” or “engineering,” or words of like import, for more than 15 years before September 12, 1966, shall not be prohibited from continuing the use of such word or words in his or her firm name. Suppose that my undergraduate college degree is in Computer Science and the program is regionally accredited and accredited by the ABET-CAC standards before I enrolled and that the program has continuously maintained that accreditation. Suppose further that I received a Master's degree in "Computer Science and Software Engineering" the accreditation status of which w.r.t. ABET is not given. Finally, suppose I have not taken or passed Fundamentals of Engineering (FE) or Principles and Practice of Engineering (PE) exams and have neither applied for nor obtained professional licensure in my current state. Finally, my questions: Can the name of my LLC include the phrases "Software Engineer", "Software Engineering", or similar derivations thereof? Can my resume, curriculum vitae, or my advertising or promotional materials accurately report the subjects I studied in college as the subject matter of "Software Engineering", to the extent that this information is true and accurate? If asked directly by a client, am I even allowed to divulge my area of study accurately, or would it be a violation of the law to claim I had engineering knowledge since I have studied (and practiced) software engineering in the past (for instance, at previous places of work in states which did not have these kinds of limitations, or for corporations which did not offer my services to the general public)? My intuition says that I can't be penalized simply for speaking the truth, but clearly there is some behavior the law is intending to prevent. Would the use of he phrase "Software Engineering", generally speaking, be a way to skirt these kinds of regulations in states that might typically only think of engineering licensure as applying to, e.g., civil/mechanical/etc. kinds of engineers? Note that until very recently (and perhaps even now) there's not really a realistic option for most practicing software professionals to pass the FE, as it covers topics not typically required of computer science or software engineering students (at least at the time I was in school). EDIT: Follow-up question: Am I even allowed to practice "Software Engineering" in such a state if I call it, for instance, "Computer Programming" or "Software Development" instead? Or is the very activity of practicing something that could be called "engineering" restricted? This is a possibility that also occurred to me but I would find this somewhat harder to believe.

Can the name of my LLC include the phrases "Software Engineer", "Software Engineering", or similar derivations thereof? No. Not based on what you've posted. Go to the definitions to see how engineer is defined. It may be they are talking about actual structural engineers or environmental engineers, where if you're wrong people die. But based on above, you can't use the word engineer unless you're licensed as such. Is there even a license for computer engineer? This seems more like it could be a term of use but not actually descriptive of what you're doing. IDK. You'd have to see the definitions and exceptions. Can my resume, curriculum vitae, or my advertising or promotional materials accurately report the subjects I studied in college as the subject matter of "Software Engineering", to the extent that this information is true and accurate? Yes, your CV is supposed to say what you have done, and learned and especially published (lest it's just a resume), but the answer as far as promotional materials, is NO. This, because you don't post your cv on your ad's and if you put that, you will likely be found to be trying to pose as a licensed professional based on a technicality. If that happens the licensing authority will probably censure you by disallowing a license when your qualify. If asked directly by a client, am I even allowed to divulge my area of study accurately,(of course, but you'd also have to divulge the fact that you are not licensed and cannot act in that capacity) Would it be a violation of the law to claim I had engineering knowledge since I have studied (and practiced) software engineering in the past (for instance, at previous places of work in states which did not have these kinds of limitations, or for corporations which did not offer my services to the general public)? It could be if the person reports that you are soliciting work as an engineer w/out a license. It's like a person who went to law school, passed the bar, but never got sworn in. They cannot solicit business as a lawyer. Unless there is a license for being a computer programer, there is nothing barring you from using that terminology. You could be, that if you look up the definition prior to the statue, that it says something like "for the purposes of this section the term engineer means…", In which case it doesn't even apply to you.

The Organization Does Not Own the Copyright As you were clearly not an employee of the organization, and did not have a specific contract with them, this was not a "work-made-for-hire" (WFH). Therefore, the copyright initially belonged to the author, in this case the programmer, that is you. That being so, it would require a written document to transfer the copyright to another during your lifetime. In future there should be a written agreement in such a case, spelling out just what rights are to be retained by whom. It can save lots of trouble. The organization would have an implied license to use the software. The terms of this would be defined by the conduct of the parties, and might be a matter of dispute. Probably there would be a non-exclusive license without any fee or ending date. Probably there would be no license to distribute to others unless you explicitly grant one. Specific US Laws 17 USC 101 defines a WFH: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. (emphasis added) 17 USC 201 provides that: (a) Initial Ownership. — Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work. (b) Works Made for Hire. — In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. ... (d) Transfer of Ownership.— (d) (1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession. (d) (2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title. 17 USC 204 provides that: (a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.

Provided you are in one of the 170+ countries signatory to the Berne Convention (the current 10 non-signatories are, exhaustively: Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan), then copyright comes into existence at the moment a work is fixed in a tangible medium, not when it is published. The initial copyright owner is the author of the work. In cases of employment, the "author" might be the natural person who authored the work, or the corporate person who employed the natural author. To clarify your thinking about registration: copyright registration is a public record of authorship (or copyright ownership). Registration does not create a copyright, but is merely a recording of the copyright that was automatically created at the moment of original authorship. Depending on circumstances and jurisdiction, Alan might have a legitimate claim to copyright on his own work. However, he will be quite hard-pressed to find a convincing theory of law that allows him to publish the unpublished copyrighted work of other people without their permission. This leaves him either to admit defeat -- he cannot possibly own the copyright of his coworkers' code, so he cannot have legally reproduced it -- or else make the baldfaced lie that the code has no other authors other than Alan himself. For your company to disprove such a claim, you may employ sworn testimony of your coworkers, you may employ code analysis to show differing coding styles (suggestive of multiple authors), or you may show code backups or version control history showing the progressive authorship of the work over time by many people. (Sure, a Git history is possible to fake, but a realistic history with feature branches, "whoops, undid the typo in the last commit" messages, etc. would lend significant weight to your company being the original authors.)

Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.

This is commonplace in many jurisdictions across many profession, trades and businesses The authorisation of the register and the amount of any fee (which can be zero) is spelled out in the legislation. As is who is authorised to collect it and maintain the register: sometimes it’s a government authority, sometimes it’s a professional association. Sometimes the title is protected and sometimes it isn’t. Off the cuff, the following is an incomplete list for australia. Some of these are Federally regulated and some are State based. Some of the State based ones are nationally recognised, meaning if you register in one state you are registered in all, and some aren’t. Some states require registration that other states don’t. Architect Engineer Doctor Nurse Physiotherapist Nutritionist Veterinarian Solicitor Barrister Anyone working with children Plumber Drainer Gasfitter Roofer Electrician Waterproofer Builder Real Estate Agent Used Car Dealer Bus driver Truck driver Taxi/ride-share driver Train driver Ship’s master Second-hand goods dealer Security guard Bartender Forklift operator Crane operator Builder’s hoist operator

A noncompete clause is a section of a contract whereby one party agrees not to compete with another party. These agreements are usually (always) limited as to time, geography, and scope. In other words, if you had a dog-walking business in your neighborhood you might like to hire someone to help walk some dogs. You'd like this person to agree not to compete with you. You charge people $10 per walk and you pay this person $5 per walk so you want to stop them from walking your customers' dogs for $7. In order to get the $5 per walk from you, your employees agree to not go into the dog walking business in your neighborhood for one year. Cat-sitting? Fine. Walking dogs in other neighborhoods? Fine. Walking dogs in your neighborhood 12 months and one day after they stop working for you? Fine. The reason for the limitations is that judges throw out agreements which are too restrictive. You could not require that a person agree to never walk a dog ever again. You could not stop a person from from walking a dog anywhere in the world. You could not stop a person from working any job for any of your customers. The laws about restrictiveness are unique to each state so that's why people recommend that you talk to a lawyer. Judges honor the work you've done to build a customer base and will allow you to protect it, but they're not going to let you keep your people from ever working in the same business again. The non compete describes the limits of the protection. You need to make sure that the code that others create for you in your employment is yours. It's always a good idea to get the specifics in writing just in case something wacky happens where it looks like someone other than you might own work created while working on one of your projects. The water gets pretty muddy when people are working on their own time with their own tools, it could be very easy for them to argue that they created a thing for their own use and provided it to you for your limited use but that they otherwise own it. This is not a noncompete. It's an ownership clause, aka an IP clause.

Ideally a specific contract for the limited purpose of the interview would determine this. Such a contract could assign such "test" works to either the prospective employer or to the prospective employee, as the parties choose. In the absence of a specific written agreement (to effect a transfer of copyright, an agreement must be in writing and signed) the copyright on such a work will belong to the prospective employee under 17 USC 201 (a) unless the work counts as a work made for hire. 17 USC 201 reads in relevant part: (a) Initial Ownership.—Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work. (b) Works Made for Hire.—In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. According to 17 USC 101 A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned ... if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. ... Since we are assuming the absence of a written agreement, only part (1) of this applies. Thus the status of the work depends entirely on whether the programmer is an "employee". The mere fact that a person recessives compensation does not make that person an employee. For copyright purposes, agency law applies. Specifically: The US Copyright office Circular 09 "Works Made for Hire" states: To help determine who is an employee, the Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed identified factors that make up an “employer-employee” relationship as defined by agency law. The factors fall into three broad categories. Control by the employer over the work. For example, the employer determines how the work is done, has the work done at the employer’s location, and provides equipment or other means to create the work. Control by employer over the employee. For example, the employer controls the employee’s schedule in creating the work, has the right to have the employee perform other assignments, determines the method of payment, or has the right to hire the employee’s assistants. 3 Status and conduct of employer. For example, the employer is in business to produce such works, provides the employee with benefits, or withholds tax from the employee’s payment. These factors are not exhaustive. The Court left unclear which of these factors must be present to establish the employment relationship under the work-for-hire definition. Moreover, it held that supervision or control over creation of the work alone is not controlling. However, all or most of these factors characterize a regular, salaried employment relationship, and it is clear that a work created within the scope of such employment is a work made for hire (unless the parties involved agree otherwise). Examples of works made for hire created in an employment relationship include: A software program created by a staff programmer within the scope of his or her duties at a software firm [Emphasis added] ... The closer an employment relationship comes to regular, salaried employment, the more likely it is that a work created within the scope of that employment will be a work made for hire. But because no precise standard exists for determining whether a work is made for hire under part 1 of the definition in section 101 of the copyright law, consultation with a lawyer may be advisable. If a work is made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is the author and should be named as the author on the application for copyright registration. Respond “yes” to the question on the application about whether the work is made for hire The Wikipedia article aboutCommunity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed 490 U.S. 730 (1989) describes the case, in whioh a charity hired a sculptor to produce " statue that depicted the plight of homeless people for a Christmas pageant in Washington DC". CCNV claimed that the statute's copyright was theirs as a work made for hire (WMFH). Sculptor Reid claimed the copyright as being the author Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in the majority opinion [Footnotes omitted]: The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that copyright ownership "vests initially in the author or authors of the work." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). As a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection. § 102. The Act carves out an important exception, however, for "works made for hire." < ... [Page 490 U. S. 740] In the past, when Congress has used the term "employee" without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common law agency doctrine. See, e.g., Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U. S. 318, 419 U. S. 322-323 (1974); Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 359 U. S. 227, 359 U. S. 228 (1959) (per curiam); Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U. S. 84, 237 U. S. 94 (1915). Nothing in the text of the work for hire provisions indicates that Congress used the words "employee" and "employment" to describe anything other than "the conventional relation of employer and employe.'" Kelley, supra, at 419 U. S. 323, quoting Robinson, supra, at 237 U. S. 94; ... On the contrary, Congress' intent to incorporate the agency law definition is suggested by § 101(1)'s use of the term, "scope of employment," a widely used term of art in agency law. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958) (hereinafter Restatement). ... We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that the term "employee" should be understood in light of the general common law of agency. ... [Page 490 U. S. 751-2] In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. See Restatement § 220(2) (setting forth a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to determining whether a hired party is an employee). No one of these factors is determinative. See Ward, 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 400; Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 321 (CA2 1982). Conclusion An applicant being given a "test project" as part of an employment interview is probably not an employee under agency law. Thus the work is not a WMFH, an, in the absence of a written agreement to assign the work created as part of the test to the prospective employer, the copyright would belong to the prospective employee. I have not found a case specifically relating to this interview fact pattern, and it could be that a court would rule otherwise in this specific pattern.

This is all outlined at Terms of Service - Stack Exchange When you ask a question, and/or comment on or answer a question, or otherwise participate on an SE site, you license your content to SE. You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. In turn, (emphasis mine) Subscriber acknowledges that Stack Exchange has no control over, and no duty to take any action regarding: which users gains access to the Network; which Content Subscriber accesses via the Network; what effects the Content may have on Subscriber; how Subscriber may interpret or use the Content; or what actions Subscriber may take as a result of having been exposed to the Content. Much of the Content of the Network is provided by and is the responsibility of the user or subscriber who posted the Content. Stack Exchange does not monitor the Content of the Network and takes no responsibility for such Content. Subscriber releases Stack Exchange from all liability for Subscriber having acquired or not acquired Content through the Network. ... This doesn't mean someone can't sue you anyway, notwithstanding that disclaimer. Anyone can sue anyone in civil court. That's the way the system works. Someone could track you down and sue you for the (bad) advice you gave that cooked their Macbook, even though they got that advice on SE and SE states that SE is not responsible for any damages resulting from the use of the information. The TOS of all SE site(s) shows that anyone who uses SE sites is bound by this click-through agreement, even if they didn't read it. And that should suffice in a court if it gets that far. It should suffice for any attorney thinking of taking the case of someone who wants to sue you. Again, someone could sue you; but chances are really great that it will never go very far due to the legal nature of SE and your contributions. This SE site - Law SE - has more of a specialized TOS, as practicing law without a license is illegal, and giving legal information as a layperson (or even as an attorney, of which there are some who particpiate here) needs special terms; see the sidebar for this disclaimer and link: Law Stack Exchange is for educational purposes only and is not a substitute for individualized advice from a qualified legal practitioner. Communications on Law Stack Exchange are not privileged communications and do not create an attorney-client relationship. General Disclaimer - Law Stack Exchange So, if you do get sued by someone who cooked their Macbook by following your bad advice, you can ask about the lawsuit here on Law SE. But, unless your question is about general legal procedures, terms, case law, etc. (as outlined at What topics can I ask about here? - Law SE), your question will be closed because this site is not for giving specific legal advice in specific legal situations, especially active lawsuits. You will be advised to talk to an attorney.

Can a repair business sell goods that haven't been picked up for over a year? A friend has an upholstery shop in Buffalo, NY. A customer brought her a set of seats to re-do more than a year ago. The project was completed and several attempts have been made to contact the customer to pick them up and pay for work done, to no avail. Can she sell the seats at this point to recoup her investment without running into a problem, should the customer resurface down the road?

A person who repairs property has a lien on the property and can sell the property to satisfy the lien. There are notice requirements and the property must be sold at auction if it is worth more than $100. I pulled this off of FindLaw, I have no idea of this law is current. http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/LIE articles 8 and 9 N.Y. LIE. LAW § 180 : NY Code - Section 180: Artisans' lien on personal property A person who makes, alters, repairs or performs work or services of any nature and description upon, or in any way enhances the value of an article of personal property, at the request or with the consent of the owner, has a lien on such article, while lawfully in possession thereof, for his reasonable charges for the work done and materials furnished, and may retain possession thereof until such charges are paid. N.Y. LIE. LAW § 200 : NY Code - Section 200: Sale of personal property to satisfy a lien A lien against personal property... if in the legal possession of the lienor, may be satisfied by the sale of such property according to the provisions of this article. N.Y. LIE. LAW § 201 : NY Code - Section 201: Notice of sale Before such sale is held the lienor shall serve a notice on the owner... or mail ( certified mail, return receipt requested, and by first-class mail)the notice if the property is of a value of less than one hundred dollars. The following must be included in the notice. The nature of the debt or agreement which gave rise to the lien. Description of the property Estimated value of the property Amount of the lien and the date of the notice Give them ten days to pay, tell them when and where the sale is happening, and tell them they can bring as action under section 201a within ten days. N.Y. LIE. LAW § 202 : NY Code - Section 202: Sale to be advertised; exception Each sale of personal property of a value of one hundred dollars or more, or of any security, to satisfy a lien thereon shall be at public auction to the highest bidder, and shall be held in the city or town where the lien was acquired. Each sale of personal property of a value of less than one hundred dollars, other than a security, to satisfy a lien thereon, shall be made pursuant to the provisions of subdivision one hereof (auction), or at a bona fide private sale in the city or town where the lien was acquired. A bona fide private sale pursuant to this section shall not be made until the expiration of six months after the time for the payment of the amount of the lien specified in the notice required to be served by section two hundred one or two hundred one-a of this article. Section 204 - keep the money to cover the lien but hang onto the balance. Serve notice on the owner and then in six months if the owner does not claim the money deposit it with the treasurer or chamberlain of the city or village, or the commissioner of finance in the city of New York, or the supervisor of the town, where such sale was held. You don't get this money back, it goes to the owner or to the town eventually.

Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal.

Neighbors(including us) around the property started to mow the part in front of their yard(the weeds grew very high) and continue to do so(is it illegal for us to mow this overgrown land?). There are probably city codes around maintenance of lawns, cutting grass and clearing weeds. You should alert the relevant authorities and they will make sure that the maintenance occurs. You should probably not do it yourself since (a) you don't owe the owner any favors and (b) you might cause trouble for yourself. Recently there was some mowing by large tractors but very little was cut and most of it grew back. The question is really whether their activities bring them into compliance with applicable city codes or not. If they are compliant and you simply don't like how they maintain their property, that is tough luck. If they are not compliant, you are well within your rights to vigorously report them to relevant code enforcement authorities. This overgrown golf course is home to many wild animals(coyotes, snakes, foxes, alligators, etc..) See above 1) Is there any legal action that we can take to force the land owner to maintain the land? See above 2) Could this land somehow under some law be divided and given to the maintainers. This is an interesting question. Technically there are circumstances wherein you could take what's called adverse possession of part or all of the property. This would probably include doing things like actually residing on some piece of that land and establishing a residence there - perhaps getting mail or paying taxes there or paying utilities or operating a business - for a certain period of time without any interference from the technical owner. If you can meet the requirements of adverse possession then you might be able to become a legal owner. Unless you have little to lose, however, actually doing it might be difficult. 3) Is it legal to walk/drive on this land. (I see people walking their dogs, and driving atv's and motor bikes on the golf course) Unless you have been given notice otherwise, it is perfectly legal to walk wherever you like. It is the owner's responsibility to provide reasonable notice and take reasonable precautions against unwanted trespass; e.g., putting up a wall or fence, closing and/or locking a door or gate, posting signs and/or hiring security to patrol the property and enforce property rights - or occasionally checking to make sure their property isn't overrun with squatters.

There is nothing illegal about selling used bikes online. Importing goods is subject to legal regulation such as customs duties. These goods might even be subject to punitive steel and aluminum tariffs since bike metal could easily be converted to metal for other purposes. And, if the bikes have fake trademarks, they might be interdicted, although the "first sale rule" makes import of bikes with real trademarks legal. There is nothing remotely related to copyright at issue in your proposal.

Although the local mechanic was suggested by you he was paid by the dealer, and hence was acting as the dealer's agent in the repair. If the dealer did not want to accept this then they could have simply insisted on doing the repair themselves. The dealer is responsible for the actions of their agent, and they cannot run out the clock on the warranty simply by failing to repair the fault. You could write to the dealer saying that you will accept their third repair on the understanding that the fault and two attempts to repair it predate the expiration of the warranty and hence you retain the right to return the car if this third attempt at repair does not remedy the problem. Or you could simply insist on returning the car for a refund. If they won't take it, write a letter stating that either they agree to take it back or you will take action in the county court to recover your money. Most businesses will conceed at this point because spending time in court is expensive even if you win. I say "write" because that means they can't deny agreeing later on. You can of course hand them the letter yourself rather than sending it by post.

I would argue that no, there is no copyright for the restored work. Independent copyright is only possible for any original material added, as previously discussed on this site. In this case, the added work was a technical process rather than a creative process, and technical processes cannot be protected by copyright. Copyright licenses would therefore be ineffective. However, I believe one could still impose a license based on owning the copy as opposed to the copyright (contract might be a better term in this case). However, if a third party managed to obtain a copy through some other avenue, any such contract would not be binding on them and nothing could be enforced against them unlike with copyright laws. Another way a license might be imposed is through patent protections, as technical processes can be protected via patents. However, I'm not as familiar with patent law, and this doesn't appear to be the claim being made.

We have made a complaint about this decision to the local administrative and highest courts of Finland. Both of these courts rejected our complaint (the highest court rejected our right to even file a complaint!) without even looking into the details of the matter at hand. Did you hire a lawyer? If the court rejected your complaint without even considering it, it may have been procedurally improper. Generally speaking, once your complaint is rejected by a court with proper jurisdiction, the matter is resolved and you lost. End of story, too bad. You have no recourse but to accept the action of the local government as lawful even though you believe that your case was wrongfully decided. In any case, I doubt that the local government's action in your context is illegal. This is an issue of "condemnation" and not zoning. Generally speaking, the government has a power of eminent domain to seize property for a public use so long as a process is in place for the owner to obtain compensation for the seizure. A government owned recreation center would generally be considered a public use. Certainly, nothing you have described would violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, Article 17. As you note: No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. This is a case where the deprivation is in the public interest, in which the Finnish courts have decided that the conditions provided by law for doing so have been met, and in which you acknowledge that you have a right to compensation. Since it appears that the compensation has not yet been determined, it is premature to say that the compensation you receive will not be fair or paid in good time, and you need to participate actively and vigorously in the compensation process to make sure that you do make the best case you can for fair compensation. Also, as you note, this has happened many times in Finland. This strongly support the conclusion that this action is legal under Finnish law, even if you would prefer to interpret its laws in another manner. Of course the compulsory purchase will not be paid with a fair market price but with a much lower price, which is technically a legalized robbery as it has many times occurred in similar cases in Finland. My next step is to file a complaint to the European Union Fundamental Rights commission in hopes that they can help me. An appeal to the European Union sounds futile to me, as everything you have said suggests that your rights under the E.U. Charter have not been violated. Call it robbery if you will from a moral perspective, but as you note, it is legalized robbery in much the same way that taxes are "legalized theft." Your efforts would be better sent hiring a lawyer to help you negotiate with the local government over the price. If you make a strong evidentiary case that the land is worth more than you have been offered, you have a decent chance of getting more than you have been offered, even if it is less than what you believe it is worth. You also have a better case of winning on appeal on the issue of an unfair price in a second instance court in Finland, than you would on the issue of whether the condemnation was legal, on which the settled law in Finland and under international law is that it generally is legal in your circumstances.

Don't trivialize this because it appears to be minor and inexpensive. If something goes wrong, you could be liable for damage. You should have an idea of what a reasonable cost should be based on the rent and condition of the property. Discuss it with the landlord. If the landlord chooses to fix it, you should have something in writing, signed by both you and the landlord, acknowledging that you aren't responsible for reimbursing the landlord for the cost or acknowledging receipt by the landlord of any contribution from you and a statement that the contribution fulfills your lease requirement. If you're going to fix it, you should have something in writing, signed by both you and the landlord, agreeing to the choice of replacement parts and the choice of anyone you hire to do the work. It might be nice to think you can save money by doing it yourself. But if anything happens and there's damage, you could be liable. You should have renter's insurance. You should check your renter's insurance policy to see what, if anything, it says about tenant responsibility for repairs. Your insurance might pay for it. More importantly, will your insurance protect you if something goes wrong and there's damage? I recommend you copy this and modify it as you see fit or, if you don't this is correct, make up something that you think is correct. Keep an electronic copy on your computer. But also have a notebook in which you keep how-to papers, so you don't have to figure it out all over again at some time in the future and to use the how-tos you accumulate to help you make new how-tos as necessary. Also keep documentation, especially warranties. Scan receipts (receipt ink is notorious for fading over time) and warranties, keep them the electronic copies on your computer and print the receipts and put the printed receipts and original receipts with the warranty papers in the notebook. Keep a manilla envelope with receipts, warranties, instructions, and any papers you receive from anyone you hire to do the work. When you move out, you should give the envelope to the landlord so the landlord will be able to maintain what was installed and obtain warranty service if necessary.

Is it illegal to create a mobile app which tracks a user for some purpose? Can a mobile app track a user using GPS/location services running in the background, and do something when a user is found in a particular location? Assuming that the app clearly tells the user that it will do this? A colleague said that this is illegal because there is a court ruling that no one (software/app) can track a user's location in the background, but rather can only use location when the user is actively using the app. Is this correct? After googling I found one ruling that "warrantless tracking is not allowed." Is this applicable?

It is hard to prove a negative, but no - there is not rule that an app cannot track a user while the app is in the background. Almost every GPS-function app on every smart phone does the very thing you are talking about.

The Facebook Pixel analytics solution does not seem to support access or erasure for data subjects. While there are some GDPR compliance features, these focus on collecting consent prior to collecting data. The relationship between the pixel user and Facebook is also murky. For certain kinds of data, Facebook acts as the data processor only, and the user has all the responsibility as the data controller. For other kinds of data, Facebook and the Pixel user are joint controllers, and therefore jointly responsible. This lack of features doesn't necessarily mean that Facebook Pixel is in violation of the GDPR, since the GDPR Right to Erasure only applies under certain circumstances. However, it is really difficult to argue that a website or app that integrates Facebook Pixel would be compliant. It is also rather dubious that Facebook could be compliant themselves, since their pixels will also collect data about persons who are not Facebook members. While these problems are most apparent with the Facebook Pixel since it's explicitly intended for tracking, this problem also applies to any other embeds provided by Facebook, such as like buttons. This was the subject of the Fashion ID case, in which the ECJ determined (in 2019) that the site operator is a joint controller with regards to data collection on the website by the Facebook embed. This effectively means that third party embeds can only be loaded after the website visitor has given consent for sharing data with Facebook. The tracking of non-users by Facebook was seen as especially problematic in Belgium, where Facebook had been banned from collecting such data already in 2015 (which was upheld in 2018). Since this was pre-GDPR, FB is currently litigating whether Belgium can continue enforcing their ban. I expect that Belgium will prevail with their ban. While this has no immediate consequences for Pixel users, this would make it more likely that Pixel users could be sued or fined successfully. From an advertiser perspective, Facebook does have valuable data that make the integration of Facebook Pixel an attractive proposition. However, other analytics solutions are much easier to bring into compliance. This is ultimately a business decision: will the better understanding of your ad spend on Facebook outweigh the risk and effort of integrating the Pixel?

In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?

You tag the question with "criminal law", suggesting that by "illegal" you mean "is it a crime" -- that would depend on jurisdiction, but in the US or my state, it is not a crime. There are crimes that you could commit with such an account, but violating the TOS is not itself a crime. However, it is illegal, a breach of contract, as you can see from the TOS "You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission".

It depends on the device identifier. For example, if you distribute your application through Apple's App Store, there is no way for you to get any identifier for the device. You can get an identifier that is unique for the combination of the device + your application, so you can verify that the same user doesn't use the application on four devices. But if I have another application, we can't combine our data to see who has purchased both applications, because we get different device identifiers for the same device. So that device identifier is totally meaningless to anyone other than you. (Years ago Apple supplied real device identifiers. They stopped for privacy reasons, and because some developers were just stupid - they didn't consider that I could sell my phone to you and buy a new one. So if I sold you my phone, you reset it completely and purchased a certain game, you would get my high scores because your phone has same device identifier that I used for ages).

They aren’t treated differently In most jurisdictions, law enforcement requires a warrant to intercept/open/read the contents of physical or electronic correspondence. Similarly, in most jurisdictions, a warrant is not required to read the metadata: who is communicating with whom, how and when but not what. That is they can read what’s written on the outside of the envelope or the routing information of the email/SMS. Telephony is not correspondence because it is not the intent of the parties to create a permanent record. It is usually treated as any other conversation - if it carried out in a place and manner that the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy it’s usually illegal to record it (electronically or by writing it down). If it’s said publicly, it isn’t illegal.

The university has a legal obligation to collect certain data from attendees, including employees an visitors. It has decided to keep these records in digital form, and offers a smartphone app as a convenience. The university has outsourced the data processing activity to a third party. This is perfectly legal under the GDPR, if that third party is contractually bound to only process the data as instructed, and not for their own purposes. Whereas the university acts as a data controller (Verantwortlicher), the third party would be a data processor (Auftragsverarbeiter). I have some doubts though whether an app or a website is indeed the solution that offers the best data protection, especially taking into account the GDPR's data minimization principle. Requiring updates when entering or leaving any room is potentially excessive. Given the sensitivity of the data, the university should have performed a data protection impact assessment to weigh the consequences of this measure. At least for employees, the measure would likely have to be approved by the union (Personalrat) as well.

I think that one cannot answer a question such as "Will the personal use exception in the GDPR apply to personal blogs?", because it is unclear if you refer to: personal information published on the blog pages personal information collected from the Website, by way of forms, cookies, server logs, strictly collected and processed for the purpose of operating the Website for your own personal purposes as a blogger (by yourself of through a subcontractor in the sense of GDPR) and not personal information collected from the Website's operation, transferred or provided to third parties for their own purposes (this would include cookies used to identify and track users across multiple domains) Regarding 1., a personal blog wanting to benefit from the exemption should not publish third party's personal information without their consent or another legal basis, and C-101/01 certainly applies here. About 2., if the information is strictly collected and used for the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog, I would tend to agree that it should benefit from the exemption. I feel that C-212/13 would not necessarily be an indication that because the blog is publicly accessible it is then "directed outwards from the private setting" in the sense of this ruling, and should not be considered as "purely ‘personal or household’ activity". C-212/13 case was relating to a camera installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes which was also monitoring a public space. The persons filmed on this public space had absolutely no direct connexion with the person collecting their images. In case of a blog, the visitors of the blog interact with the blog for fulfilling the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog of the publisher of the blog. Another argument is given by the Recital 18 which you quote: a personal blog can be viewed as a type of social networking or related online activity. Finally, about 3., there is no doubt for me that, in this case, the publisher of the blog is engaged in an activity which is not personal, since it willingly provides personal information to third parties which they use for their own purposes (and not as subcontractors in the sense of GDPR). There may be other approaches apart from these 3, but that's a start for your considerations.

College tuition includes room and board, what happens with child support? If New York State declares that college tuition includes room and board, how does that affect child support while the kid is not living at home while at college? This is child-support from the students' parent for the benefit for the student. If the child is no longer living with me and I still receive child support, would I have to go to family court or speak with a lawyer to disclose this information and/or find out if I can still receive benefits for the child (student) while in college?

It depends. Many child support orders include a stipulation that it ends at 18 or if the child goes to college, can extend until graduation or at a latest age 22. It really depends on what the order says. If you are still receiving support and your (the) child is in college, it is likely you are eligible to get that support, assuming it is going to the child for living expenses, or is going toward tuition that you are either paying or are liable for (the loans are in your name). You cannot keep it if the child is getting aid and loans that they are personally liable for after matriculation. If that is the case, you need to contact the court and they will forward the money directly to the child. If your question is, can you still use the money toward rent or bills so the child has a place to stay during breaks, then the answer is, it depends on how much you are supporting the child while away. What is clear, is that you cannot keep it to put toward rent and bills like you could when the child lived with you, unless you're paying the tuition/room/board (or some portion equaling it least 2x the amount of support).

The official judgements do not reveal the funding for these lawyers; so where can I find this information? Nowhere. The commercial arrangements between lawyers and their clients are private and confidential like any other business transactions. You have no more right to know this then you do to know how your neighbour pays their mortgage. how could she have funded litigation in the EWHC and then EWCA before the UKSC? She may have rich parents or another benefactor who has in interest in her or the outcome of the case. She may have won the lottery. She may be the heiress of a dead rich uncle. By the way, "having" student loans does not mean you "need" student loans. Interest rates on student loans are cheap - if I need to pay $10,000 for a course and have $10,000 earning 5%, I would be nuts to use that if I could take out a loan at 3%.

I assume this is "Managed Payment to Landlord" (MPTL) for the tenant's Universal Credit and/or Discretionary Housing Payment, as opposed to for "Housing Benefit" per se, since most people are now on UC instead of HB. But in any case the period of imprisonment is long enough to affect Bob's eligibility. Under the Universal Credit Regulations 2013, Schedule 3, Bob is no longer occupying the property since their absence is expected to be for more than six months; in fact, they lose UC entirely and are meant to reapply when they get out. If this is Housing Benefit then the entitlement ends for being expected to be in prison for 13 weeks or more; see the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, regulation 7. That's a generic rule for absence, whereas there's a 52-week allowance for pre-trial custody, and some variations for release on probation. DHP top-ups from the local authority follow the same rules. In any event, 2.5 years, even taking into account the anticipated release at the halfway point, is more than any of those thresholds. The claimant is meant to report changes of this kind, but since Alice are receiving the money directly, she is also responsible for informing the government of any relevant changes. See guidance at 10.2, Whilst a MPTL is in place the landlord must notify the department of any changes which a landlord can be reasonably expected to know which might affect the claimant’s entitlement to Universal Credit and the amount awarded. For example, the claimant changes address. When a claimant changes address the MPTL APA will cease from the end of the assessment period before the claimant changed address. If your tenant moves home and you need to end a MPTL, please contact the service centre immediately on 0800 328 5644. As noted below, and following the Social Security Administration Act 1992, sections 71 and 75, If the MPTL is overpaid due to a change that has not been reported by either the claimant or the landlord, the landlord may be asked to repay the overpaid benefit. Universal Credit payments are made every calendar month and take account of changes during that month. It may be that Bob has already done their side of things but the system hasn't caught up yet. In any case, Alice is not entitled to continuing payments and the government has various means to get the money back. Sections 111A and 112 of the 1992 Act (which applies to UC as well) make it a criminal offence for Alice to fail to notify the government about a change of circumstances that affects her right to receive payments. (Simplifying the statutory language a little - Alice is "the recipient" in the context of the full text and Bob is "the claimant", and there are various other conditions about your state of knowledge and intention.) This is not to say that it would necessarily be pursued as a criminal matter, but that possibility exists in principle.

There are statutory guidelines that are based upon the gross income of each parent, the number of children, the extraordinary expenses of the children, and number of nights a child spends with each parent, which are adopted by states in order for the states to be eligible for federal welfare programs; although standards vary somewhat. Income can be imputed if a party has an ability to earn income but does not exercise it. But, assets owned aren't considered unless they produce or could produce income. In the absence of a showing of unfitness sufficient to terminate the parental rights of a parent for abuse or neglect, or some extremely unique circumstance (e.g., one parent is on the space station 365 days a year), no parent ever has 100% of the nights with the children. Without having a more realistic estimate of the number of nights with each child, and a fair guess of the capacity of mom to earn income including income from stock trades, it isn't possible to make a realistic estimate. To get the correct estimate, you would need to do a full fledged child support guidelines calculation, but this question doesn't have enough information to do that. A good rule of thumb is that child support for two children is typically about 25% of the difference in income of the couple times the number of days that one parent has a child more than the the parent, divided by the number of days in the year. For a pretty typical parenting time division, that would work out to about 10% of the difference in income between the parties paid by the higher income party to the less high income party within a normal range. But this is strictly a rule of thumb. However, in a case like the one you describe, the rental value of one of the houses would probably be imputed as income to the wife, as would the profits she makes in an average year from stock trades. The rental value of a $1.25 million house is probably about $72,000 a year. It is hard to value stock trades which depend upon the size of the portfolio and the skill of the trader. If the stock trades generated $28,000 of income a year and the wife has the kids 5 nights a week, and there were no extraordinary expenses, child support might typically be on the order of $416 a month. If wife made $78,000 from stock trades, child support would be nominal (they would have equal incomes, but she would have a few more days a year). But, that involves some very specific assumptions. Also, in situations like this one where the facts are so extraordinary relative to a typical divorced couple and the family is very affluent on a combined basis, the judge has wide discretion to deviate from the guidelines on a case by case basis. In reality, no case like this has a clear fair or typical resolution and it would depend a great deal upon how the case was argued and how the facts were developed by the parties and their counsel.

Either party can petition the appropriate court for an adjudication of paternity (if this has not already been established in connection with the issuance of the birth certificate), and for a parental responsibility and child support order, at any time, if no such order is in place (assuming that Pennsylvania is the "home state" of the child and venue is proper). Child custody and visitation rights are determined based upon the "best interests of the child" with very little other formal guidance from the statute or even case law which also affords a judge very broad, although not unlimited discretion in resolving the issue if the parents don't reach an agreement. Any parent who is not adjudicated to be "unfit" (whose parental rights would then be terminated), is entitled to some reasonable visitation under the circumstances at a minimum. In practice, courts tend to prefer to enter an order that preserves the pre-litigation status quo is one was established for any reasonable length of time. Once a custody and visitation schedule are established (logically, this is actually done contemporaneously), a child support award is also entered based upon the number of nights per year that the child spends with each parent, the income of each parent, and the extraordinary expenses, if any of the child, pursuant to guidelines that exist under state law but are federally mandated. Generally speaking, child support payments are quite small relative to the incomes of the parties. If a parent is willfully refusing to work or underemployed so as to reduce child support, in some circumstances, income that could have been earned is imputed to that parent for purposes of determining the appropriate amount of child support. There is a small body of civil procedure that goes to the nitty gritty of how this is handled after a petition is filed, but that really goes beyond the scope of the question. In the simplest case, only the two parents are involved in the litigation. But, there are circumstances in which there can be other parties. For example, if the child has been supported by welfare, a representative of the state is a party to make sure that child support is paid reducing the need for welfare payments or repaying welfare payments already made by the state. Guardians of an un-empancipated minor or disabled parent might participate. Grandparents can sometimes have standing to participate. A non-parent who has physical custody of the child would usually have standing to participate. This all gets a little technical, and since the question doesn't suggest any facts that would call for additional parties, I will leave it at that. In the event of a substantial change of circumstances after a statutory period after the last order was entered, a court may start over, more or less from scratch, and establish a modified child custody, visitation and child support order that reflects the changed circumstances. As a practical matter, for parents who are separated from shortly after the birth of a child and can't work things out between themselves, there will probably be several to half a dozen modification proceedings until the child is an adult.

For the record, the requirement says: The board of education or trustees of the school district or the state agency responsible for providing education to students with disabilities shall have the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion and burden of production, in any such impartial hearing, except that a parent or person in parental relation seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral parental placement shall have the burden of persuasion and burden of production on the appropriateness of such placement. To understand "burden of proof", think in terms of what claim is being made, by whom: this is different from understanding what you want to happen. To get the outcome you want, you have to make the right claims. Assume that the law requires the school to accommodate a student's learning disability, then the plaintiff (parent) would claim that the school failed to accommodate. The school would then be required to prove that they did accommodate. In other words, all you have to do (initially) is allege a failure to follow the law, and it is up to the school to provide the evidence that your allegation is incorrect (by providing records, also indicating standards that students are held to; the presumption that the panel is supposed to adopt is that the plaintiff's allegation is true, unless facts are introduced that show that it is false). It's not clear what action of the school is alleged to be at variance with the law. It sounds like a simple correctable bureaucratic error, so a hearing should not be necessary, but that doesn't mean that one isn't (e.g. if they have a policy of not admitting to making mistakes).

Who in the fraternity would be prosecuted if this became an issue? A lot of people could be held liable for this, including people who are not even in the fraternity. Anyone who has knowledge of the machine or the fact that it was possible for minors to access alcohol through it could technically be held liable if a prosecutor wanted to make that case. Presumably the building is owned by someone else and just leased out to fraternity members, and they very well could be held liable for sale to minors also. Would the machine be safer if it just accepted cash (so that no electronic paper trail was created), with a big warning sign WINK WINK that anyone under the age of 21 was strictly prohibited from purchasing from it? No. Payment method is irrelevant here. There are a number of states that legally allow vending machines to sell alcohol, but vendors are required to verify the age of any person accessing them and ensure that those cards aren't being used by people not authorized. What you describe is an extremely relaxed environment where admittedly no one is attempting to verify identities. The "accepting cash" scenario is no different than a liquor store selling alcohol to anyone that comes in just because they're willing to pay with cash instead of a credit card. Sales to minors laws are not "as long as you warn them, you're safe" laws. They require vendors to actively check IDs and ensure that alcohol is not landing in the hands of minors. Accepting cash just to erase the evidence doesn't meet that burden. There are a lot of legal troubles with the situation that could get a lot of people charged with multiple offenses. That you have underage fraternity members living there suggests you should not have alcohol readily accessible in the house at all, as most state laws expressly forbid providing access to alcohol, not just serving or selling. Them being there provides access to it, even if it's just a case in the fridge with a note on it. Not to mention, you technically cannot sell alcohol, as I highly doubt your fraternity has a liquor license to be able to do so. There's a big difference between asking everyone to pitch in to buy the case versus actively selling individual cans through a vending machine. The vending machine itself is violating liquor laws in your state merely by existing.

That is, if my mom is sued by somebody for some reason, does that mean I am being sued, and my personal assets are at risk, rather than just hers'? Having power of attorney doesn't mean that you become "one and the same" person, it just means that you can stand in their place legally. If somebody sues your mother, you are authorized to act on your mother's behalf, but that doesn't mean that you are liable for any judgement. Of course there is a fiduciary responsibility to act in your mothers best interest, and violating that can open you up to suits that you are responsible for (because the suit would be against you, not your mother). And, what if she runs out of money, would I be personally financially liable for covering her expenses? No, you wouldn't be. Debts would be settled the same way as if she didn't have anybody acting as PoA. She (you) could declare bankruptcy on her behalf and have the debts discharged. This doesn't obligate you to pay them. And then, what if I simply don't have time to deal with her affairs, that is where I am being put in a position where I have to choose between keeping my job and my personal relationships at home versus going to deal with things over there, would having POA force me to do the latter? This is a personal decision for you. You could alternatively pursue having her declared as an "adult ward of the State". You need to consult a lawyer if you take on full power of attorney, to both protect you, your assets, and your responsibilities. This is something that you really need a lawyer to draft so that the lines are clear, and the expectations are as well. You may need to get a court involved if she is not of clear mind to sign these papers.

How do I read an Australian case citation and find the text of the judgement? I want to know more about a particular case. I've seen it referred to a couple of different ways: Tame v New South Wales [2002] HCA 35 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 How can I access information about these cases?

The quickest way to get the text of Australian judgements is through AustLII. Reading the citation Parties: Tame v New South Wales In this case, the parties are (Clare Janet) Tame and (the State of) New South Wales. Year: [2002] or (2002) There is a subtle distinction between the above years: in brackets [] is generally (but not always) the year that the judgement was made, which may or may not be the year that the case was reported, which appears in parentheses (). This case was both decided in, and reported in this law report, in 2002. Court HCA Where the citation includes brackets - [] - the abbreviation that follows is the unique court identifier of the court where the judgement occurred. This case was decided in the High Court of Australia. For a list of courts and abbreviations, see AustLII's table of Australian case law. This is called a medium-neutral citation. Some reports are organised by year - unfortunately, there is no pattern to this - and they will have the year in brackets also. If more than one volume of a report of this kind is produced in this year, the volume number will appear between the year and the abbreviation as below. Report number and series 211 CLR Where the year appears in parentheses - () - and a number, then an abbreviation follows, these are the volume and abbreviation of the law report. In this case, it is the 221st volume of the Commonwealth Law Reports. Pinpoint reference Tame v New South Wales [2002] HCA 35 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 The final number is the pinpoint reference. In a medium-neutral citation, this is the judgement number - the nth judgement that year. In all other cases, it is the page on which the judgement commences in the law report. Authorised and authoritative law reports All law reports are authoritative and can be employed in court, however the authorised law reports of a court are the official law reports - there is only one for each court. Judgements that highlight a novelty or a particular point of law are generally reported in the authorised law report. How to use a citation The practical upshot of this is that AustLII provides LawCite, which is a free case citator - you can search for cases. All you need is either: The year, court abbreviation, and judgement number, or The volume, report abbreviation, and page number In the above examples, these would be 2002 HCA 35, and 211 CLR 317 ... respectively. This is referred to in the citator as the citation (which is confusing because the entire thing is a citation). LawCite provides, for your convenience, a table of: Cases that cite the case your case, Law reform reports referring to your case, Law journals referring to your case Legislation cited in the case your case, and Cases and articles cited in your case. These are extremely useful in finding related cases during your research.

This is not a quote, per se, rather, it is a meme. It is attributed to Gilbert Gray, and according to The Independent Saturday 7 March 1998 was originally: "I take it, Mr Gray, that your client is familiar with the maxim: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" "Indeed my lord, responded the QC drily. "In Barnsley they speak of little else." However, according to the Fortune Newsletter two years later, it was attributed to a different barrister, Charles Gray, who is reported to have recounted a story about a barrister in Reading who was asked by the judge whether his client was aware of the principle of Res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself), to which the barrister replied: "In the Irish village from which my client comes, M'Lud, they speak of little else". It is also attributed in 2005 to some unnamed judge referring to sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. As Tim Lymington notes, the Irish res ipsa loquitur version is attributed to Marshal Hall apparently was on the air in the BBC production The Trials of Marshall Hall originally from 1996, and is cited in a recent book review. The book review and Wiki versions of that statement differ slightly in the wording of the text, to wit Wiki: "Is your client not familiar with the maxim res ipsa loquitur?” replied, "My lord, on the remote hillside in County Donegal where my client hails from they talk of little else." vs. book review Judge: “Mr Marshall Hall, is your client familiar with the doctrine res ipsa loquitur? Marshall: “My Lord, in the remote hills of County Donegal from where my client hails they speak of little else.” Without a copy of the book, I can't say whether the reviewer mis-copied the quote, but at least we can believe that the linked quote represents the review author's wording. There is a much earlier work on the life of Marshall Hall, Marjoribanks, Edward For the Defence. The Life of Sir Edward Marshall Hall K.C. (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1929), which might contain the quote in question. At this point, I am inclined to take the Hall res ipsa loquitur quote as being original and the others as being derivative works.

Judicial review As always, Inigo Montoya, is correct - declaring a law unconstitutional is not judicial review in Australia, although it may be a consequence of a judicial review. Judicial review is the power of the courts (the judiciary) to review decisions of executive government e.g. a decision of a council in a development application or the decision of the Minister in an immigration case. Of course, in American English, which is not the kind the High Court of Australia uses, judicial review does mean what you think it means - so you’re only wrong in most of the World rather than all of it. Unconstitutionality The High Court of Australia, like all common law courts, cannot veto legislation nor does it give advisory opinions. It exists only to decide controversies between litigants or in criminal cases, either as part of its original jurisdiction or as the final appellate court (since 1975) for all Federal, State and Territory law. In deciding a case it can decide that Parliament has exceeded its Constitutional power and deem legislation ultra vires. This Parliament House web page gives the following representative list: Petroleum and Minerals Authority case—The High Court ruled that the passage of the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Bill through Parliament had not satisfied the provisions of section 57 of the Constitution and was consequently not a bill upon which the joint sitting of 1974 could properly deliberate and vote, and thus that it was not a valid law of the Commonwealth. McKinlay’s case—The High Court held that (1) sections 19, 24 and 25 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, as amended, did not contravene section 24 of the Constitution and (2) whilst sections 3, 4 and 12(a) of the Representation Act 1905, as amended, remained in their present form, the Representation Act was not a valid law by which the Parliament otherwise provides within the meaning of the second paragraph of section 24 of the Constitution. McKellar’s case—The High Court held that a purported amendment to section 10 of the Representation Act 1905, contained in the Representation Act 1964, was invalid because it offended the precepts of proportionality and the nexus with the size of the Senate as required by section 24 of the Constitution. Postal allowance case—The High Court held that the operation of section 4 of the Parliamentary Allowances Act 1952 and provisions of the Remuneration Tribunals Act 1973 denied the existence of an executive power to increase the level of a postal allowance—a ministerial decision to increase the allowance was thus held to be invalid. Roach’s case—The High Court found in 2007 that amendments to section 93 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, to remove the entitlement to vote from all persons serving a sentence of imprisonment, were invalid, being inconsistent with the system of representative democracy established by the Constitution. Rowe’s case—During the 2010 general election campaign, the High Court declared invalid amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 which had reduced the time available for updating the electoral rolls after the issue of writs. Cases involving Commonwealth expenditure—in Combet (2005) the High Court rejected arguments that the broad terms of statements in an Appropriation Act were such that the Parliament could not be said to have authorised certain expenditure. The effect was that it was recognised as a matter for the Parliament, and not the courts, to determine the level of detail in such provisions. In Pape (2009) the Court held that a parliamentary appropriation was a prerequisite for the lawful availability of money for expenditure, but not in itself authority for expenditure; and that authority for Commonwealth expenditure must be found in the executive power or in legislation under a head of power in the Constitution. In this case the Court upheld the validity of the Tax Bonus for Working Australians Act (No. 2) 2009, but in Williams (2012) and Williams (No. 2) (2014) the Court held that the Commonwealth did not have the power to make payments under funding agreements (in this instance in relation to school chaplaincy) without the legislative authority to do so.

The appellate court gets the trial transcript which includes all the testimony (and exhibits or descriptions/photos of them) and the trial court's rulings. Also, each side presents an appeal brief, which will generally include a statement of facts, pointing out ones it thinks favorable to its views. In civil cases a jury may be asked/instructed to give yes/no answers to a series of questions, but this is not normal in criminal cases. An appellate court can (and sometimes does) rule that there was not sufficient evidence to permit any reasonable jury to convict; to that extent it can rule on questions of fact. But, as the comment by ohwilleke mentions, an appellate court does not hear new evidence. It can overturn the conviction and send the case back for a new trial, and in such a new trial additional evidence may be introduce at the trial court level.

Yes The Browne-Fitzpatrick Privilege Case in 1955 resulted in the two being gaoled for 90 days for breaching the privilege of the Australian Parliament. They were, respectively, the owner and editor of the Bankstown Observer and the breach was an article in that paper that alleged that a then sitting MP, Charles Morgan, had been involved in immigration malfeasance as a lawyer prior to being elected. The men were grilled by the Privileges Committee of Parliament during which they were denied legal representation. The Committee determined that they had infringed privilege and the House, on the motion of the Prime Minister Robert Menzies, voted to gaol them. The High Court of Australia refused to hear an appeal as did the UK Privy Council (which was the highest court with Australian jurisdiction at the time). So, for things printed 300km from Parliament, Parliament decided that these men had broken Parliamentary rules and should be imprisoned. There is doubt, both then and now, that this was a political hatchet job. There is also no doubt that what was done was legal then, however, given that the High Court has since discovered an implied right to political communication in the Constitution, it may not be possible today.

I cannot find any relevant judgements from June 2007 that were published by the Irish High Court using the judgement finder. However, over 50 similar cases were issued at the High Court regarding this matter, and all but 10 were settled prior to a bundle of four cases being issued before the High Court which ultimately referred the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This bundle of four cases was Metock & Ors. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IEHC 77 which ultimately became Case C-127/08 at the ECJ. It's unclear why the 15 June 2007 judgement hasn't been uploaded, or why it took until 14 March 2008 for the High Court to refer the matter to the ECJ. In conclusion, Ireland was ruled to have wrongly interpreted the relevant Directive and the Court held that non-EU family members of an EU citizen can move to an EU Member State without needing to have resided in another EU Member State prior to that. Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC precludes legislation of a Member State which requires a national of a non-member country who is the spouse of a Union citizen residing in that Member State but not possessing its nationality to have previously been lawfully resident in another Member State before arriving in the host Member State, in order to benefit from the provisions of that directive. Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as meaning that a national of a non-member country who is the spouse of a Union citizen residing in a Member State whose nationality he does not possess and who accompanies or joins that Union citizen benefits from the provisions of that directive, irrespective of when and where their marriage took place and of how the national of a non-member country entered the host Member State.

Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on.

This judgment (R. v. H.E., 2017 ONSC 4277) was overturned on appeal (2018 ONCA 879): [2] After accepting the complainant’s testimony that both she and Mr. E. believed that, as his wife, she did not have the right to refuse to have sex with him, the trial judge explained the acquittal by expressing a reasonable doubt about whether Mr. E. had the required mens rea for the offence. ... [3] Mr. E. concedes that the trial judge committed reversible errors in this reasoning. He acknowledges that to the extent the trial judge based his acquittal on Mr. E.’s and the complainant’s shared belief that the complainant could not refuse to have sex with him, that belief would be a mistake of law that cannot form the foundation for an honest but mistaken belief in consent defence. He is correct. To avoid conviction based on an honest but mistaken belief in consent, the accused must believe in a state of facts that amount to consent according to law... ... [6] The parties therefore agree that the appeal must be allowed and the verdict of acquittal set aside.... [7] We would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and order a new trial.

If someone is cybersquatting myname.com, can I claim it back? According to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Cybersquatting on a trademark is illegal. However, someone registered myfirstname.com. Do I have any legal right to ask them to sell it to me at a reasonable price ($10)?

Under the ACPA, a trademark owner may bring a cause of action against a domain name registrant who Has a bad faith intent to profit from the mark Registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that is Identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive mark Identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of a famous mark Is a trademark protected by 18 U.S.C. § 706 (marks involving the Red Cross) or 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (marks related to the “Olympics”) A trademark is famous if the owner can prove that the mark “is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner”. “Trafficking” in the context of domain names includes, but is not limited to “sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration”. The ACPA also requires that the mark be distinctive or famous at the time of registration. In determining whether the domain name registrant has a bad faith intent to profit, a court may consider many factors, including nine that are outlined in the statue: Registrant’s trademark or other intellectual property rights in the domain name; Whether the domain name contains the registrant’s legal or common name; Registrant’s prior use of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of goods or services; Registrant’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible by the domain name; Registrant’s intent to divert customers from the mark owner’s online location that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark; Registrant’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner or a third party for financial gain, without having used the mark in a legitimate site; Registrant’s providing misleading false contact information when applying for registration of the domain name; Registrant’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others; and Extent to which the mark in the domain is distinctive or famous. The ACPA does not prevent the fair use of trademarks or any use protected by the First Amendment, which includes gripe sites. In Mayflower Transit, L.L.C. v. Prince, 314 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D.N.J 2004), the court found that the first two prongs of Mayflower's ACPA claim were easily met because (1) their registered trademark was distinctive and (2) Defendant’s “mayflowervanline.com” was confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s Mayflower trademark. However, when the court was examining the third prong of Plaintiff’s ACPA claim, whether Defendant registered its domain name with the bad faith intent to profit from Plaintiff, the court found Defendant had a bona fide noncommercial use of the mark, therefore, the ACPA claim failed. “Defendant’s motive for registering the disputed domain names was to express his customer dissatisfaction through the medium of the Internet.” The domain name registrar or registry or other domain name authority is not liable for injunctive or monetary relief except in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard. While § 1125 protects trademark owners, 15 U.S.C. § 1129 protects any living person from having their personal name included in a domain name, but only when the domain name is registered for profitable resale.

are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright.

No. The Creative Commons license seeks to promote recognition of the original author's work through attribution, but does not provide the same framework for enforcement that the DMCA would. The proper approach in cases such as the deleted Wikipedia article and subsequent reuse would be to provide a courteous notice to Wikipedia of your original publication and ask to be listed as the original author or be provided attribution. In the absence of relief there, then what rights you have would be determined by the Wikipedia Terms of Service. Since, and I am assuming here, that you are not generating billions of dollars on the original publication in royalties, seeking to bring a DMCA type enforcement on a Wikipedia article dispute would be like trying to swat a fly with a sledgehammer. (or more commonly in divorce, two people having hearing and spending thousands of dollars on attorney's fees fighting over a blender -- they are free to do it, but they would have been much better off buying 500 new blenders...) Keeping perspective and providing a courteous letter is probably your most cost efficient first step in situations like this. And in all areas of law, just remember, you catch more flies with honey than you do with salt. (meaning taking the courteous approach usually affords better results than a scalding letter breathing hell-fire and brimstone) In followup to earlier comment: Presuming you would be covered by the World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty on Copyright of 1996 (as a U.S. Citizen you would be), and your copyright is on file with the United States Copyright Offices (same presumption) as prerequisite to suit, then there is nothing that prevents you from invoking the protections under general copyright law and under the DMCA (inlcuding the Takedown provisions). Note: these are not the only prerequisites to taking action, but instead the minimum critera to qualify, and note this does not pass on the wisdom of doing so (there are often significant consequences to improperly invoking previsions of certain acts).

This is similar to giving a hammer and needing to state to one is not responsible if the taker uses it to hit their head with. I believe this is the wrong analogy to use here. It would be more like giving somebody a hammer and saying you are not responsible if the head flies off and injures you. There is a concept in "things" you obtain called "fitness for purpose", so if you download open-source software like a registry cleaner, and it deletes your entire registry, the "WTFPL" doesn't absolve the authors of liability. Explicitly denying any kind of "fitness for purpose" or warranty helps shield the author from legal claims (even if they are meritless) because it kills it out of the gate. It's possible that the WTFPL license granter/author could still be sued and have to defend themselves in court because it isn't explicitly stated that there is no warranty or fitness for purpose. Open source does not mean that it's "use at your own risk", which is why there are so many types of licenses and disclaimers. From comments: Thank you for this very clear answer. Does the fact that someone willingly retrieves free code with no control of the provider changes anything? (vs a software vendor which provides code suitable for A and B, in exchange for money) I think closer to your hammer analogy where I would sue the producer of hammer XXX, a hammer I found on the street or which was given to me without involvement of vendor XXX. No, this doesn't change anything. The software vendor here is the person who writes the code, even if they don't charge for it. They are the ones who license the software and they are the ones who take some level of responsibility for it. In this case, the software author is the "hammer producer" that you would sue... If you buy "Registry Cleaner XL" from Best Buy and it bricks your computer, you don't sue Best Buy, you sue the person who authored the software. In pretty much every case, the author is the responsible party, not the vendor, and it is the author who licenses it, not the vendor (the vendor just acts as an intermediary).

Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.

In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage.

No This summarizes the situation with Disney specifically. The Disney trademarks are so ubiquitous and recognizable as being Disney's and not, for example, yours that your use is bound to create confusion in the minds of the public that your business is in some way associated with Disney. That is the essence of trademark infringement. In particular, where your business has nothing to do with the characters it is clear that you are only using them for the cachet of the Disney reputation. Disney will defend their trademarks - this is not at all unlikely.

Can I sue someone for publicly calling me a sex offender if I'm not one? Yes. However, in this particular case you need to take a preliminary step regardless of your jurisdiction, which I assume is somewhere in the U.S. Prior to filing any complaint (and I will repeat this below), it is in your best interest that you demand a retraction and removal of the defamatory falsehood. Be sure to show the prospective defendant(s) some proof that supports your pre-suit demand. You need to secure your ability to prove in court that you made that demand. For that reason, your requests should be in writing (email, and certified mail if practicable). If it is not by email, you should have the addressee at least sign a receipt copy of your demand letter. A demand of retraction is prerequisite in jurisdictions such as Texas and Florida. If you [or your lawyer] omit that step, the court will easily dismiss your complaint altogether. In other jurisdictions, such as Michigan, the request of retraction is a requirement only if you intend to pursue exemplary and punitive damages. See MCL 600.2911(2)(b). Regardless of the jurisdiction, your request or demand to each prospective defendant needs to be made prior to filing the corresponding complaint/pleadings in court. Even if your jurisdiction does not have that prerequisite, failing to request a retraction and removal of the defamatory falsehoods would allow the defendant to justify itself and/or obtain leniency on the basis that it was not aware that the registry information turned out to be disproved/inaccurate. In your complaint(s), you will pursue injunctive relief that consists of ordering the removal [from each website or post] of the defamatory falsehoods. It is also reasonable for you to also ask for monetary relief. You certainly have a claim of defamation per se, but a ruling granting you an award of substantive damages is doubtful unless the defendant refuses --or neglects-- to remove the inaccurate records. If the website owners/authors promptly remove the false records, it is going to be difficult or impossible to prove actual malice: that is, that they published the falsehoods (1) despite knowing them to be false, or (2) with reckless disregard of their truth. Without the ability to prove actual malice or that you suffered special damages (whether it is a loss of employment or other economic damages), the court would only grant you nominal damages, which is the negligible amount of one dollar. Lastly, beware that even the granting of injunctive relief might be ineffective. I [vaguely] recall a case where federal court ordered a removal from sex offender registry, but apparently the defendant ignored the order. I have no idea how much the plaintiff's lawyer charged him for the futile representation, but the last time I checked neither the problem was fixed nor did it appear that the attorney pushed any further to ensure compliance with the order. I will not disclose the name of the lawyer, since that would facilitate the unintended consequence of identifying the defamed plaintiff.

What is the legal meaning of "related to"? I'm filling out a paternity affidavit right now. The instructions say, The parents of this child or anyone related to the parents cannot be witnesses to any of these affidavits. This cannot be interpreted literally, as all human beings are distantly related to each other. Surely in order to claim paternity of my child I do not have to rustle up two extraterrestrials (or an extraterrestrial notary public). Even if it is taken to mean "provably related to," that seems problematic. Birth records go back a long way, and I've certainly met people and only later coincidentally learned that they were my fifth or sixth cousin; it would be unreasonable if I used a notary who happened to be my fifth cousin and that fact could later be used to invalidate my paternity. How closely-related to me or my partner does someone have to be in order to be considered "related to" us for this sort of purpose? (I'm in the United States — Missouri, to be precise.)

My interpretation would be: As related to the parents... Immediate family (e.g., brothers, sisters, etc.) First and second cousins, aunts and uncles Any direct ancestors (i.e., parents, grand-parents, great-grandparents, etc.) Any direct decendants (i.e., children, grandchildren, etc.) Any extended family members who have a close emotional relationship or frequent day-to-day interactions. Unfortunately, the vagueness of the requirement leaves the interpretation subjective — as you have noted. The interpretation of this requirement might be the reasonable person standard — i.e., what a reasonable person would consider related to to mean. However, IMHO, any future challenge would have a higher likelihood of success if any of the above family members were used as witnesses. Disclaimer: I am not an attorney. So don't follow my advice. Hire a real attorney if you need one.

Your kid is not in trouble; he's a minor. You're in trouble. A criminal case for the charges a prosecutor would bring, i.e. destruction of property (the data) or for a relevant cyber or computer crime (malware, etc.), and/or a civil case for damages due to the destruction of the data would both hinge on one point: the concept of intent. See intent - Wex Legal Information Institute and Civil Law vs. Criminal Law: The Differences | Rasmussen College. Did you knowingly intend to cause damage or data loss with the structure of the name? It's pretty clear you did. The structure of a name that can invoke an SQL command is not in any sense a standard name in spelling or format or punctuation. So how would you convince the jury or judge that you had no intent when you named your kid? The possible poor design of a data system that didn't sanitize inputs is no defense. Saying the door was unlocked so I assume the homeowners didn't care if I trashed their house will get you laughed into jail or on the hook for a stiff civil judgement.

That really sucks. I've had similar experiences when handling the probate proceedings of lawyers who were not good about returning original wills to clients. I am providing an answer under general principles without researching Oregon specific accounting, record retention and probate laws, to at least give you a start although I recognize that a better answer would research these questions. The accounts/clients from her business were sold to another woman. Is it legal for us to transfer everything to her possession? Probably yes. There should be a government agency in Oregon that regulates accountants that has rules regarding that question. The linked rule seems to govern this situation. It says in Rule 801-030-0015(d) that: (d) Custody and disposition of working papers. (A) A licensee may not sell, transfer or bequeath working papers described in this rule to anyone other than one or more surviving partners or stockholders, or new partners or stockholders of the licensee, or any combined or merged organization or successor in interest to the licensee, without the prior written consent of the client or the client’s personal representative or assignee. (B) A licensee is not prohibited from making a temporary transfer of working papers or other material necessary to the conduct of peer reviews or for the disclosure of information as provided by section (1)(b) of this rule. (C) A licensee shall implement reasonable procedures for the safe custody of working papers and shall retain working papers for a period sufficient to meet the needs of the licensee’s practice and to satisfy applicable professional standards and pertinent legal requirements for record retention. (D) A licensee shall retain working papers during the pendency of any Board investigation, disciplinary action, or other legal action involving the licensee. Licensees shall not dispose of such working papers until notified in writing by the Board of the closure of the investigation or until final disposition of the legal action or proceeding if no Board investigation is pending. So, a transfer to a successor firm appears to be permitted. What if she refuses to take the documents? Her probate estate could retain them and stay open, they could be returned to clients, or there could be a rule established by the Oregon body that regulates accountants that authorizes a central depository of such records. In Colorado, for example, in the case of law practices with no successors, original wills and estate planning documents can be deposited in the records of the court with probate jurisdiction that has jurisdiction over the territory where the decedent's practice was located. But, I could not locate any provision of this kind in Oregon law. Is it legal for us to destroy/shred/etc. the documents? In many cases, yes. Some states, by statute or regulation, and others by custom, allow business records to be destroyed as a matter of course, normally one year after the longest statute of limitations that could apply to a dispute where the records would be relevant (often seven years since the longest normally applicable tax statute of limitations is six years). Destroying tax returns is usually not a big concern because a transcript of the old tax returns can be ordered from the tax collection agency where they were filed. But, business records related to purchases of property and capital improvements and depreciation, and related to divorces, can be relevant for decades after they were created, so the more honorable course of action would be to make at least a cursory effort (such as a postcard sent to a last known address of each client with a deadline for requesting a return of their file) to return the files of clients that include original business records as opposed to mere copies of tax returns. Oregon has a seven year retention rule for most purposes pursuant to Rule 801-030-0015(e) which is linked above: (e) Retention of attest and audit working papers. (A) Licensees must maintain, for a period of at least seven years, the working papers for any attest or compilation services performed by the licensee together with any other supporting information, in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in such services. (B) The seven-year retention period described in paragraph (A) of this subsection is extended if a longer period is required for purposes of a Board investigation as provided in paragraph (d)(D) of this rule and OAR 801-010-0115(3). The referenced rule in that rule states: (3) Requirements upon resignation. Upon resignation, a former licensee is required to: (a) Surrender the CPA certificate or PA license to the Board; (b) Take all reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm to any client, including but not limited to providing written notice of resignation under this section to all clients and inform all clients of where client records and work papers will be stored and of the clients’ right to secure copies of all such records and work papers at no cost to the client; (c) Maintain client records for a period of at least six years, or return such records to the client; and (d) Continue to comply with the requirements of OAR Chapter 801 Division 030 pertaining to confidential information and client records. (e) For the purpose of subsection (b) above and unless otherwise required by the Board, a resigning licensee of a registered firm is required to give written notice to only those firm clients for which the resigning licensee was the sole or primary CPA on an engagement, an engagement leader, or the client relationship manager. In practice, the consequences of destroying a record that shouldn't have been destroyed are likely to be minimal, because any recovery would be limited to the assets of the estate and there is a time limit for making claims against estates which is quite strict, and your grandma has no license to revoke. But, again, the honorable thing to do in order to honor her legacy and do right by her former clients would be to either transfer the records to a successor firm or to attempt to return them, as she would be required to do if she had surrendered a license during life.

There are cases out there like Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, State v. Unnamed Defendant, Williams v. Unnamed Defendant; there have been indictments of John Doe who was only identified via a DNA profile. Not knowing the actual name of a person wouldn't pose a problem per se, and it seems that when the name is not known, John or Jane Doe is generally filled in. There was in instance a year ago in the UK where rioters who refused to identify themselves, and prosecution decided to drop the case.

No law in the US requires that parent and child have the same last name. It is usual that a child's name match that of at least one parent, but not required. A parent can change his or her name, without changing the names of any existing children. Also, when a child is adopted, the child's name need not be changed to match the name of the parents, or either of them. I have read of cases where a widow remarries, and takes the name of her new husband, but an adolescent child retains his or her birth surname. I suppose this would also be possible legally if it is the husband who changes name on remarriage, but i have not read of such a case. I think, but I am not sure, that a child's name could be changed to a different name than the name of either parent. It may be that this would only be done if the child is old enough to understand and agree to the change.

would it be interpreted in favor of the person who did not draft the terms? Yes, provided that the interpretation is reasonable. That is known as the doctrine of contra proferentem. Here, the term "deliverables and associated documents" might entail a contradiction if that term [allegedly or literally] encompasses "source code or content". That depends on what definition(s) of "deliverables and associated documents" can be adduced from the contract. The term could refer to items that are not "source code or content", such as the binary files (i.e., executables and DLLs), instructions & documentation on how to operate and troubleshoot the application, and so forth. In that case, there would be no contradiction because there is no overlap between these items and the source code. if term A) is written on line 10 and term B) is written on line 11, is it resonable to assume term B) takes precedence or modifies term A? No. The sequence of clauses/terms itself does not determine which one outweighs or qualifies the other. Instead, the language used in the contract is indicative of the parties' intent and therefore how the terms of that contract relate to each other.

Can Alice still get child support, or will she be denied because she can not definitively prove which man is the child's biological father? The legal standard is a preponderance of the evidence (i.e. more likely than not) and there is plenty of evidence that can be offered in addition to DNA evidence, such as testimony under oath from people in a position to know who was having sex with whom at the relevant times. Contrary to a common misconception, testimony under oath is still solid evidence that can support a verdict on appeal. Alice had neither a long standing romantic relationship with Bob nor anyone that was a witness to the sexual act, thus making the question of who she slept with difficult to prove. It isn't that hard to prove. Q to Alice's physician: Based upon an ultrasound, when did Alice conceive? A: April 5-8, 2021. Q to DNA expert: Based upon the DNA test, who could the father be? A: Billy or Bob. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Billy between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Bob between April 5-8, 2021? A: Yes. Q to Billy: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Billy: Why not? A: I was at the Shuffleboard World Cup in Tibet, I have time stamped pictures. Q to Bob: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: -- if Yes, judge says he believes Bob and Alice and the case is over. -- if No, the judge decides who among Bob, Billy, and Alice the judge believes based upon other evidence. Ultimately, the judge has to rule between the two based upon non-genetic evidence and resolve credibility disputes just as in any other case that doesn't involve DNA evidence (which is the vast majority of cases). Also, the edge cases are few are far between. Identical twins are rare to start with, and few women have sex with more than one identical twin in the several day period when she could have conceived or didn't know which twin she had sex with. It has happened at least once in history (post-DNA testing), but you can probably count the number of times that it has ever happened on one hand. For example, presumptions from cohabitation, marriage, and claims of paternity often resolve paternity disputes without DNA evidence. Further, to the extent that there is good faith uncertainty (perhaps everyone agrees that the mother has sex with both twins on the only possible day of conception and nobody really knows), the downsides to a mistake in the larger cosmic sense of the overall paternity law system are minimal, as identical twins very rarely become deeply alienated from each other and instead tend to be close and intensely cooperative once they discover each other, and tend to be similar to each other in almost every respect depriving the child of little if the court gets it wrong. Realistically, identical twins are particularly likely to settle out of court so the judge doesn't have to decide. In one of the only two actual cases I could locate that went to trial (in Brazil), both twins were ordered to pay child support because the evidence showed that they actively conspired with each other to confound the mother and the court regarding who the father was, and conspiracies can support joint and several liability. The other case reported in a news story had convincing circumstantial evidence supporting one identical twin over the other that probably establish a presumption of paternity for one twin and not the other. One of the twins, who cannot be named for legal reasons, went to court last summer in the hope of forcing the mother to grant him access to the child. Although his name is not on the birth certificate, he claims he is the only father the boy has known, cared for him every other weekend, provided financial support and was even known to him as 'papa'. But then the man's relationship with his girlfriend broke down and the visits halted. When he began legal proceedings to prove his paternity, the mother made her claim that she had been sleeping with his twin at around the same time. The twins have said they knew they were both having sex with the woman, but argue that only one had sex during the period of conception. Both refused to undergo a DNA test: the complainant refused to pay the £335 charge while his brother, who has since married and fathered children, does not consider himself involved in the dispute. Now, however, Judge Jolin has asked the complainant to take a DNA test by 1 December to ensure he can claim even possible paternity, while his brother may also be tested. (The second case is in Quebec and the cost of the test in pounds is apparently a currency conversion value.) (It is possible in principle to distinguish even identical twins from each other with high coverage whole genome tests that would reveal a few random mutations in each twin out of billions of possible mutations, but it is currently prohibitively expensive to do so.) Can she even get a paternity test given that it would not be definitive proof which man was the father? Yes. This rules out all 4 billion men in the world minus two of them. It has great probative value, narrowing the list of possible fathers down to two.

It is probably illegal in all of the jurisdictions in the US where a fetus is legally declared to be a person and where the murder statutes are written to not explicitly exclude abortion: that is, in no jurisdictions. No law existing or proposed for Georgia specifically addresses "travel for the purpose of getting an abortion". The underlying theory behind the claim (advocated by some Georgia attorneys) is that a person may be open to a conspiracy charge for taking a woman to another state to get an abortion, which would be a crime if committed in Georgia. If a conspiracy exists in Georgia to do something illegal (in Georgia), that is a violation of OCGA 16-4-8 ("when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy"). The substantially same law exists in Washington, and most if not all other states. The theory is apparently that "conspire to commit a crime" means something like "conspire to perform an act which would be a crime if performed in in this jurisdiction", e.g. "purchase marijuana, or take a job at certain payday loan companies". No state has successfully claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction, where a Georgia resident can be prosecuted in Georgia for a legal act carried out in another state, so this theory is a bit of a stretch.

Creating an image derived from a stock image I have created two images of a horse and an elephant from scratch based on Shutterstock images. I have changed some colors and added some more details but at the bottom line it looks very much the same. I want to use those images in my website, can I do it without risking being sued for copyrights violations?

Check your license from shutterstock what you are allowed to do with these images. They allow you, for appropriate payment, to publish their original images on your website. There is no reason why you couldn't ask them for a license to create an image derived from their original and publish it on your website. Anyway, according to your description, you created a derived work of the shutterstock images. Which is copyright infringement unless your license from shutterstock allows this. You have of course copyright on your modifications, but shutterstock also has a copyright on your work, because it is derived from theirs. If you have no license to create a derived work, then publishing it makes the situation worse. To answer your question: Legally, by getting an appropriate license. Illegally, by creating a work with so little similarity that you are not suspected.

Unless you hire your friend cameraman, he will own the copyright. So sign a contract with him: you give him $1, he disclaims and/or grants all the copyright to you. Make sure this is actually in writing because, otherwise, presumption of no intention to create legal relations applies as you are friends.

A character can not be copyrighted. Only a work (picture, text, movie etc.) featuring that character can. However, a character can be registred as a trademark (more specifically, its name and its appearance).

From the perspective of US law: Scenario 1: Removing the watermark is perfectly legal, obviously. You own the copyright. Scenario 2: Abandonware is not really a thing in the US when it comes to copyright (and the Wikipedia article you linked says this.) Even if the company went out of business, the copyright almost certainly went to somebody - the former owners, the creditors, etc. As far as the Internet Archive goes, they are taking advantage of an exemption in the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions, along with the copyright exemption found in 17 USC § 108. But both of these exemptions require you to be a "library or archive" to take advantage of them, and you are not a library or archive, so you cannot take advantage of either. As a practical matter, if the software is really abandoned it's unlikely that anyone will actually come after you for infringement, but that's not quite the same as it being legal - you could be on the hook for up to $150,000 in statutory damages per work infringed, if the owner does sue you. You could attempt to claim fair use, of course. If the image is abandoned you might get a favorable result on factor 4 of the fair use test (the effect on the market for the original) since there's no market if nobody can find the owner. But it would depend on the other factors; that alone wouldn't get you fair use. Scenario 3: I'm not sure where you get the idea that downloading a copyrighted image to your desktop is somehow protected. It isn't automatically legal to save a copy of something just because it's on the Internet. And the existence of a watermark may indicate that someone wanted to prevent the file from being copied. The website containing the image will likely have terms of use, which may indicate whether or not you're allowed to make a copy. For example, Stack Exchange's TOS says in part: Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content.

The UK copyright Act has the concept of "fair dealing" which is more restricted that the US concept of "fair use". For your purposes, Section 30 appears to be applicable: 30 Criticism, review and news reporting. (1) Fair dealing with a work for the purpose of criticism or review, of that or another work or of a performance of a work, does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement and provided that the work has been made available to the public. (1A) For the purposes of subsection (1) a work has been made available to the public if it has been made available by any means, including— (a) the issue of copies to the public; (b) making the work available by means of an electronic retrieval system; (c) the rental or lending of copies of the work to the public; (d) the performance, exhibition, playing or showing of the work in public; (e) the communication to the public of the work, but in determining generally for the purposes of that subsection whether a work has been made available to the public no account shall be taken of any unauthorised act. For your reviews, you would need to properly attribute the source of the image that you were using and that source must be legitimate. If you can't find a clear legal pathway from the image you have to the actual copyright holder you could be in trouble (e.g. an image from someone else's blog where that image may have been uploaded illegally). Your best bet is to go to the studio concerned and use images from their official public releases with proper attribution.

No. The images are copyrighted, and you are using them in a way that would leave you with virtually no argument for fair use. The factors for fair use are set out in 17 USC 107, and they indicate that the courts would reject your use: The purpose and character of the use, including whether it is of a commercial nature or for nonprofit educational purposes: There's no indication that your use would be for nonprofit or educational purposes. The nature of the copyrighted work: Works of fiction and art are highly creative works at the heart of the policy for copyright protection. The amount of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: You are apparently copying entire images, though I suppose you could argue that each image is just one small portion of a larger book or website. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: You are trying to create a board game, putting yourselves basically in direct competition with the makers of D&D. I generally prefer a pretty liberal interpretation of what constitutes fair use, but this just has virtually nothing that would make me comfortable arguing in your favor.

Simply admitting that the images are not yours does not give you the right to use them. The fact that you are not profitting from them does not change this. There is no magical statement or disclaimer that will change this. If your use of the images constitutes Fair Use (since you're not mentioning how you're using them, it probably doesn't), you can include a fair use disclaimer. Sample dislaimers can be found online. A disclaimer should include the following: A statement that the work in question is not yours That the use falls under Fair Use and why Section 107 of the copyright act

The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture.

Offering money to potential witnesses in criminal proceedings A friend of mine was involved in a confrontation with a police officer in the UK, in which the officer basically accused him of assault. While the officer was arresting him, a bystander shouted something like, "Officer, you touched him first!" My friend immediately shouted back, "Come in and testify, there's two hundred pound in it for you." The man spoke with the head at the police station, the charges were dropped, and my friend paid the man £200 as promised. In the US, it would seem that situations often arise in which potential witnesses refuse to take the time to testify (loose use of the term), and those falsely accused suffer. If an American accused of a crime offered money to a verifiable witness, would his or her testimony be admissible in a court? How about in a police station? Would it not be considered bribery?

In many jurisdictions, there is a "witness fee" that one is required to pay, as a token recognition of the value of a person's time. Fact witnesses can often be obligated to appear and testify, for minimal compensation, but not against themselves. In federal cases, Rule 17(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the defendant to apply to ask the government to pay the witness fee if they cannot afford it and the presence of the witness is necessary for an adequate defense. The other side of a case (in this example, the prosecutor) could try to impeach the witness's testimony (i.e. make him seem less credible in the eyes of the jury) by demonstrating that the witness is a "professional witness" (i.e. fees from saying things in court are a major part of the witness's regular income). That doesn't seem to apply to the facts you've listed, where the witness just happened to be in that place and time to observe what happened and (assuming for this question) accurately testified as to what he saw. Personally paying the police officer or judge for a favorable result is a different question with a different answer.

We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.

In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded.

It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial.

There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement.

Bribery is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty. 1 The money was offered to influence the actions of the official: it is irrelevant if the actions were influenced or not - its a bribe and, in most jurisdictions, accepting a bribe is a crime. The ethically correct behavior for the official (and the one that affords them the greatest legal protection) is to refuse the bribe if this is a safe thing to do (many bribes come with an implicit threat) or accept the money and then ASAP turn it over to the relevant law enforcement as proceeds of crime, report the bribery to relevant law enforcement, and recuse themselves from the decision: the fact that a bribe was offered raises the perception that the decision they make will be biased against the briber, that is, it will not be an impartial decision.

In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe).

Let's break it apart: The police has an union or charity. That's legal in most jurisdictions. The union or charity accepts donations from non-police. Also legal in most jurisdictions. The union communicates who the donors are. Generally legal in most jurisdictions. Keeping it secret would be just as problematic. Police officers have some discretion if and how they charge incidents. That's just common sense. Otherwise you get cases like 8-year-olds being arrested. (You get those anyway when the police don't use their discretion, or if the laws are too rigid.) Police officers let themselves be influenced by the donor card in how they apply their discretion. That's usually illegal on the part of the police officer. The Brits use the catchphrase 'without fear or favour.' But it is difficult to prove, even if it is systematic. The union issues donor cards to facilitate the effects of the previous bullet point. That sounds at the very least unethical. Some might argue that it is organized corruption. On the other hand, you can assume that the police unions have some decent lawyers on staff, and that they made sure that the words on their cards are not blatantly illegal in the jurisdiction in question. It might take something like a whistleblower, a sting operation, or an internal affairs investigation to prove corruption.

Illegally crossing Hungarian border Recently I read this article with the following quote: But Hungary acted this week to stop the huge flow of people, sealing off its border with Serbia with a razor-wire fence and making it a crime to enter the country illegally. I'm wondering why it was not a crime previously to cross the borders illegally. If this was not a crime, doesn't this made crossing the borders illegally an "empty box"?

In the US it is not a crime to be in the country illegally. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States. Arizona v US So it's illegal, you get a state induced consequence (deportation) but it doesn't make you a criminal e.g. you don't go to jail for it. I have no idea if that's what's going on over there but it's a plausible explanation.

It is almost certainly illegal. I was unable to find UK provisions but the penalties for stealing an Australian passport are 10 years imprisonment or a fine of up to 1,000 penalty units (at time of writing a penalty unit was $170 so, $170,000) (Section 32(4) of the Australian Passports Act 2005). Under this law, the crime is knowingly having it in your possession when you know it isn't yours. Obviously, normal familial relationships would not be prosecuted (i.e. one member of the family carrying all the family's passports). Certainly, if the true owner asked for it and the possessor refused, that would trigger the crime. Furthermore, it is completely pointless - all the original owner has to do is report it stolen and apply for another one.

Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway.

The State Department is mischaracterizing the law, which requires only that the US citizen "bear" a valid US passport, not that the US citizen "use" the passport. This law, 8 USC 1185(b), used to have a fairly stiff penalty, and it used to apply only in time of war. When the wartime element was removed in 1978, so was the penalty. It now reads Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport. If a US citizen attempts to leave the US without a valid US passport, there is a very small chance that the departure could be prevented by a CBP officer, but in the normal course of affairs the traveler would not even encounter a CBP officer, so the possibility is very remote indeed. There is nothing, however, that prevents a US citizen who also holds a passport issued by another country from using the other passport while also carrying a valid US passport. See also What is the penalty for US citizens entering/leaving the US on a foreign passport? at Travel and Can someone be penalized for an "unlawful" act if no penalty is specified? on this site.

So each government has jurisdiction of the crime if and only if it occurs within their borders. In addition, the Federal Government can take a crack at any crime any where in the United States, though typically they only do so if the crime involves crossing state lines (kidnapping over state lines, ect). At the maximum, suppose for arguments sake Alice fatally shoots Bob while Bob is standing at dead center of the Four Corners Monument (the only place in the United States where four states meet). This means that one act of Murder has been committed in four seperate states, so Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona can all claim jurisdiction over the case and each prosecute Alice for First Degree Murder. Additionally, the Federal Government may step in and also prosecute Alice for First Degree Murder (though they are more likely not too. The Feds rarely prosecute crimes after the State UNLESS the State did something horribly wrong... I.E. Utah let her go because Utah is crazy). Additionally, the monument marks the dividing line between the Navajo Nation and the Ute Tribe, both semi-autonomous Native American Tribes that have their own recognized court systems, so they could conceivably charge Alice with First Degree Murder. So in total, the most amount of times someone can be charged for the same crime due to cross-jurisdiction is 7 times (Four States, 2 Tribal Governments, and one Federal Government). In likely hood, a few of these guys will pass because it's a waste of effort. If Alice gets the death penalty in Arizona, Colorado can't kill her a second time. It's important to note that each government gets exactly one trial so Alice can't be convicted twice in Arizona. A more realistic example occurred in the D.C. Beltway Sniper Case, where the perpetrators were tried in both Virginia and Maryland but only for the crimes committed within those states. VA got first crack because they had (and eventually carried out) the Death Penalty. Maryland tried both for insurance in case the VA cases got thrown out for reasons. The Feds found this satisfying and decided not to press their charges.

The US doesn't do exit immigration checks, so if your hypothetical Israeli overstayer can board a flight out of the US, they'll most likely be allowed to go without detention or other punishment. The US sees no value in spending government money to detain someone who is ready to leave of their own accord. I'm not sure why such a person should have "no valid documentation". Maybe you're confused by the common term "undocumented" for people without legal immigration status, but it usually doesn't literally mean they have no documentation at all. Most such people would still have their passport and other identification from their home country, and the passport is enough to board a flight back home. You say your hypothetical Israeli overstayer had a visa; so they must have had an Israeli passport when they entered the US. Under normal circumstances, they've still got it. If it expired, they could have renewed it at an Israeli consulate within the US; the consulate will issue passports to all Israeli citizens without regard to their immigration status in the US. Even if somehow they lost their Israeli passport and all other identity documents, the consulate would have the ability to verify their identity from Israeli government records (e.g. the photo and biometrics from their previous passport, which would still be in the Israeli government's database), and process their application for a replacement passport.

What should and shouldn't happen isn't going to do a damn thing about your passport situation. Your passport isn't being 'held', it's in processing at a place that is currently not operational due to an unprecedented virus outbreak. No one is acting like a criminal or treating you like one, you are just unlucky. If your situation is that dire, you have no choice but to get a temporary passport. I seriously doubt an Indian court is going to side with you on this one. Just because the passport office is legally allowed to operate, doesn't mean that they are actually able to. If, for example, COVID-19 hit enough of their workforce, they won't have enough people to operate properly and they'll have no choice but to close. And no, '2 or 3 people' is not enough to operate such a large scale, sensitive operation with high security requirements, even just to return passports .

No, this would be a huge issue because there are many many treaties, institutions and other agreements which are tied to the EU itself, which would then basically be owned and fully controlled by Hungary. The nation states leaving via Article 50 would have zero claim to those EU-owned assets, and would basically (in the case of the European Central Bank for example) be handing huge amounts of power and wealth over to Hungary. Talk about cutting your nose off to spite your face...

Is it legal to let sister-in-law drive my vehicle in another state and have her on my insurance? This is about my wife's sister who is a single parent mom and lives in a different state. Not sure if it matters but I live in Massachusetts and she lives in Georgia. Because of her life situation she has not been able to afford car payments and I for this reason have allowed her to use one of the two cars that are in my name. In this case this means I make the monthly payments on these cars and I also pay for the car insurance for both of them. Both of my cars are insured from the same company. On the insurance, she is listed as a driver for the car that she has with her in Georgia, and that car is also listed as garaged in Georgia. Can the car insurance company legally deny insuring the vehicle she is driving in this kind of case? Update: The reason for my question is that the car was in an accident where parts of the body (side front bumper, and side rear panel) got scratched. This happened when the car was parked outside a shopping center (someone tried to squeeze into a parking space next to it), meaning that she was not driving the car, or even inside it, at the time. A police report was made about this incident but it is not yet known if the driver of that other car had insurance, as they had left the scene after bumping into this car (some passerby got the tag# of that other car and gave it to my sister-in-law). When we asked the insurance company about this, we eventually received the reply that the insurance company "is not going to insure the [car] that is garaged in Georgia, they are going to issue legal notice to cancel the insurance since [my sister-in-law's] residence is there." The insurance policy has listed her as the driver on the car garaged in Georgia for 3 years. So if there was an issue with this setup, I would have thought that we had been informed about it. I am not particularly concerned about whether they are willing to cover the damage, as it is not major and the insurance in any case has a $500 deductible. The concern and question I have is about the "legal notice" from the insurance company, because that implies that this setup has been somehow illegal.

The insurer can absolutely deny paying any claims if they discover that you misrepresented something in obtaining your policy, or you failed to notify them of relevant changes in accordance with the policy's terms. In fact, even changing the "garage" location within a state can affect your premium. You should call your insurer and provide them an honest and complete description of the regular use of the car. It is up to their underwriters whether they will continue to provide insurance for that use, and whether they will change your premium accordingly. Update regarding the question update: The insurer could not legally deny a claim for any insured damage prior to notice of cancellation, so long as there was no misrepresentation and you had paid your premiums. As to when an insurer can legally cancel a policy: This is first a contractual question, and their policy should include terms and conditions that address this. (E.g., they might reserve the right in the policy to cancel it for any reason at any time, in which case it's almost certainly legal.) Note that all policy terms must be approved by a state's insurance commission. I happen to remember that Massachusetts has some very unusual terms and restrictions for car insurance, so I wouldn't be surprised if the Massachusetts entity discovered that their policy on the out-of-state car was non-compliant and they had to cancel it. The great thing about the tight regulation of auto insurance is that if a claim on a policy is denied, or if a policy is improperly cancelled, then you can file a complaint with the state regulator, and those tend to get resolved quickly and in the insured's favor. Therefore, you should simply review your policy terms and the cancellation notice. If anything seems out-of-order you can call both the insurer and your state regulator.

Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy).

It is almost certainly legal for the sitter to keep the money. She was ready to provide the service, and it is not her fault she couldn't (and she may have turned down other opportunities because she had this one). I think your fiance's claim would be against the firm providing the security service (they are the ones that frustrated the contract). I foresee the following problems: What are her losses? She was prepared to pay $315 (which she has paid), and the dog has been looked after. Where is the loss? (She may be able to argue that it was worth $315 to her, not to have to owe her mother a favour. I don't know if that will fly.) The contract with the security firm almost certainly waives liability for this sort of thing. She would have to convince the court that the contract terms were unreasonable/unconscionable (or whatever the term is in the local jurisdiction). There are two obvious options here: a) see if there is legal cover on her household insurance (or her pet insurance); b) forget it (it's only $175 all told).

Whoever signed the loan owes the money to the bank for the truck. So, in this case it is probably both your husband and his ex girlfriend. Whoever is listed on the title of the vehicle as the registered owner has the full exclusive use of the vehicle. That is probably your husband. Any person who co-signed for a loan owns nothing and has rights to nothing. Co-signing a loan just means that the signer agrees to pay off the loan. In this case the girlfriend does not, nor has ever owned the vehicle. If payments are not made on the vehicle, the owner of the loan (probably a bank) will repossess the vehicle and take ownership of it. At that point they will become the registered owner. Your main options are: Refinance the car. You take your own loan and buy out your husband and his girlfriend. Both of them and the bank would have to agree to this. You would become the registered owner of the car. Make a set-off agreement. In this case, you offer your husband a deal: you will make the payments on the car, if you get the use of the car and a percentage of the sale price in the event the car is sold. Try to get a judge to award you the car in the divorce. In this scenario, the judge would order that you become the registered owner of the car, but the girlfriend and your husband would still be responsible for paying the loan. The risk here is that both will default on the loan and the car will get repossessed.

Sounds a lot like a bad-luck, move-on situation. I can't imagine any reason why the complex would have any duty to watch your bike for you or otherwise ensure that no one steals it. The fact that you bought it knowing that the bike shed had not yet been built and that the security gates were broken would probably count against you. If you know who stole your bike, you'd have a much better case against them, but it doesn't sound like that's the case. If you're looking for a typical contingency-fee arrangement, in which the attorney takes a fee from your winnings, I'd imagine you're going to be especially out of luck, based on two hard facts: The total damages you can collect is probably going to be equal to the price of your bicycle: £400. The average hourly rate at national firms for the most junior lawyer is already more than £200. If you sat down with such a lawyer, explained your situation, discussed your options, and then tasked the lawyer to write a threatening letter to the apartment complex, you'd already have incurred more fees than the value of the bicycle. Probably no attorney is interested in that arrangement -- especially since it's highly unlikely the complex would pay. So unless you're actually willing to pay hourly rates, I can't imagine any lawyer taking this case. Even if you were, no one may take it just because lawyers don't like taking cases that they're going to lose.

I can't speak directly to South African law. I am an American (but not a lawyer). Much of the relevant American law is derived from English common law, and I will assume for the purposes of this answer that this is true for South African law as well. In this example, you lent a car to a friend, and from the sound of it, primarily for the friend's benefit. (If it had been an "exchange of favors," and s/he let you use a beach house in return, a different "standard of care" would apply.) Because of this fact, your friend owes you a high standard of care for your car. Even "ordinary" wear and tear would be too much. Basically, your friend was responsible for the car's "upkeep," and was supposed to return it to you in as nearly the "original" condition as possible. Not having done so, s/he could be liable to you for getting you a "new" car of the same make, or at least a car that was no older, and had no more miles that yours had, when you lent it.

No Auto insurance covers loss or damage to the vehicle - the vehicle is neither lost nor damaged. The risk you describe is called title insurance and is normally bought for real estate.

Damaging someone else's property is not protected free speech in the US. Nor is using someone else's property without permission and against the owner's wishes. Scenario 3 would surely be vandalism or "Malicious Mischief" or some similar offense, even if the paint can be fairly easily removed. The same would be petty surely true of scenario 2, as it would take at least some effort to remove the sticker, and it could be a safety hazard until it is removed (obstructed vision). Scenario 1 would probably not be even a minor crime, unless perhaps the person trespassed to attach the string. But the person has no right to insist that the car's owner not remove the sign. I am assuming that the car is owned by someone else, and the the person placing the sign, sticker or paint acted without permission from the owner or any authorized person.

Was I forced into a mental hospital legally? If, after an accidental Xanax overdose, a person went to the ER to be safe, is it legal for the hospital to force them into a psychiatric hospital for three days? What if the person told the nurses it was an accident? This scenario occurs in Florida.

Every State in the union has some form of involuntary mental health hold. Regardless of whether or not the patient claims it was an accident, it is incumbent upon the hospital or facility where the individual is held (which is typically at least 72 hours) to do an in-depth analysis of whether the person is a danger to themselves or others. While in this scenario it may've been an inadvertent overdose, the empirical evidence suggests it could have been intentional as the practitioner cannot see into the thoughts and motivations behind the patient's actions. Even taking the patient at face-value, addiction to the extent of overdose is also a mental health issue, which may cause a person to be a danger to themselves. From a clinical perspective, it is much more likely than not that one of the two scenarios occurred, versus a truly mistaken overdose. One would need to mistake their actions numerous times in a day to take so much as to overdose. If you look at it from the inverse perspective, if the facility failed to keep a person who'd just overdosed, or the first responder failed to initiate a hold and the person later died, minimally they would be liable if sued by the family in an action for wrongful death. The unfortunate facts are that if a person was set on committing suicide, it unlikely they would be forthcoming with that fact, for this very reason (the mandatory hold), so a person's word cannot be the determining factor. Even if someone was not intentionally trying to take their life, having taken enough Xanax to cause medical overdose would suggest the potential that even if not suicidal, the individual was at a minimum abusing the medication by taking much more than prescribed (or in a way that is contraindicated - such as with alcohol or other depressants) and potentially suffering from benzodiazepine addiction. Either way, if the hold was not initiated or cut short - and then someone ended up dying from an overdoes - the responsibility and potential liability is the same. A person who is suicidal can reassess what may be a snap decision, or have a chemical imbalance stabilized, or a severe addiction identified in that amount of time. For the person who ctually takes so much medication as to mistakenly cause overdose, this is certainly inconvenient; however, 72 hours is a short time in the grand scheme of things to potentially save a life. The law will nearly always err on the side of safety and prevention.

Intent matters here, but yes. Alice could be considered guilty of either Second-Degree Murder or Manslaughter, though the latter is far more likely. Texas has no laws condoning assisted suicide that could absolve Alice. Second-degree murder requires the following: The defendant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of another person The defendant intended to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act that was clearly dangerous to human life and this act caused the death of an individual This is tenuous, but it could be argued this way if Alice intended to cause Bob's death. It certainly meets the second criteria: shooting oneself constitutes serious harm and giving a firearm to someone who has stated an intent to kill themself is reckless. It's more likely that Alice would be charged with manslaughter. The only definition is: A person commits an offense if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. As discussed above, giving someone who has announced an intent to kill themself a loaded gun is reckless. Alice's actions resulted in Bob's death.

The main source of liability would be "for injuries caused by the act 'of things that he has under his guard'" (this article). As stated in Art. 1383. of the 1804 Civil Code, "Everyone is liable for the injury he has caused not only by his act, but also by his negligence or imprudence". Then the question is whether the teacher was negligent in allowing a poisoning to happen. It is much more difficult to judge French standards, since court rulings do not generally create legal principles. To take two extremes, suppose on the one hand that a teacher were to store a bottle of sulfuric acid on the table where anyone could take it. Knowing that some rapscallion might take the bottle and prank someone with it, the teacher might have neglected her duty as a teacher to safeguard students. However, if it is safely locked up and yet someone manages to get into the locker (e.g. they have a safe-cracking device that nobody expects a student to have access to), then she probably would not be liable. The difference comes from whether there is fault in the teacher's choices of action, that is, is that choice something that a reasonable person would know is wrong. It's not clear from the description how Bob got the substance: finding a means of preventing students from accessing dangerous materials should be the main goal, and probably does not require stopping experimentation. But facts about the school might imply that the risk is not practically controllable (e.g. no locks on the chemical cabinet).

You aren't liable unless you do something stupid with them. Possessing keys doesn't make you the owner, it makes you someone with keys. That said, we could probably come up with negligent things you could do that would be a problem. Like have a huge heroin party (let's assume this is a thing) filled with minors in the back yard. The family of an overdosed kid would have a good action against you personally for being so negligent, and also probably against the homeowner and their insurance as the property owner. If the party turned wild and the house burned down, the owner would likely have good action against you as well. I doubt this is really a problem for you, so there's no need to worry.

would this be illegal in the U.S.A.? This would almost certainly fail under the US Constitutions 8th Amendment as being a "cruel and unusual punishment": Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted While the inmate has been sentenced to execution, they are still afforded a lot of protection and are entitled to a stay of execution at any point (which is why there is typically an open telephone line to the state governor etc right up to the point at which the execution starts). Being deliberately put in harms way to catch a killer just because they have been sentenced to execution would be both a cruel and an unusual punishment.

How is the Mental Health Act relevant? It sets out the law relating to removing a person’s decision making ability over their own life and placing it in the hands of a guardian and, possibly, confine them to an institution against their will. The question is not whether a person is mentally ill, it’s whether that illness prevents them from making decisions about their life.

The tort for this kind of activity is called public disclosure of private facts, and almost every U.S. state recognizes that this tort is invalid under the First Amendment in the absence of a legal duty not to disclose of the type existing between an attorney and client, or a psychotherapist and a patient, or a contractual non-disclosure agreement, that does not exist between roommates. There is nothing illegal about your roommate's conduct. Your best move at this point is to take responsibility for your own conduct, to repent and to convince the world that you're doing your best to get on the straight and narrow going forward. If your former roommate insisted on payment for not disclosing the information, that would be extortion, but there is nothing wrong with going ahead and disseminating it without trying to obtain something of value from you for not doing so.

If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear.

Renewing copyright for an artistic work Scenario: A British artist dies and the 70 years pma rule comes into effect. However, his daughter sits on the board for the artist's foundation and does not want copyright to expire after 70 years. Can she renew copyright for his works somehow and if so, what are the limitations on this?

The duration of copyright is specified in the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988: 12 (2) Copyright expires at the end of the period of 70 years from the end of the calendar year in which the author dies The only provision for extending the copyright is where is some doubt about authorship. If an unknown author is identified within that 70-year period, then the copyright expires seventy years after the death of the last-surviving author (ibid.) In the case of an artistic work which is presumably verified as being the work of the artist and protected as such, it would be very difficult to suddenly "discover" an unknown contributor who would cause the copyright to be extended.

What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.

There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.

After some research, you can IF: The trademark is NOT used in trade, per example, if Apple failed to renew the trademark but is activelly using on products, they can always renew filling a new application. As said on Trademark Now: The risk comes from the Lanham Act. Through this act, a mark is not abandoned until it’s been discontinued without intent to resume use. While the USPTO will not track the mark in their registry as active because the paperwork has not been filed, this doesn’t mean that the mark isn’t still being used by a business who has an acceptable reason for not maintaining it in the registry. If you can prove in court that the original owner had no intent to continue its use, then have at it. Understand, however, that the subjectivity of the process will give you problems if the previous owner pushes back. 2. The expired trademark is NOT in the 6-month grace period after expiration in wich, the original owner can renew. I learned also that you could always ask(And is the best course of action), i spoke with some companies who had expired trademarks and they usually are willing grant the trademark, since the product/brand has been long dead.

Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.

Copyright is automatic: when you write something original, it is thereby copyrighted. Thus there is no act of "copyrighting". The only important act is registering. All versions of a work are covered by copyright protection. When you revise a work, the existing copyright still exists, and you have created a derivative work. If copyright is held by a known person, the expiration date is author's death + 70 years. In a work made for hire (the company owns the copyright), it is the earlier of is 95 years from first publication or the shorter of 120 years from creation. A revision does not generally affect the duration of copyright: however, if a joint work is created, the copyright on the underlying work expires relative to the death of the original author and the copyright on later parts created by a second (added) author is relative to the second author's death. So if A writes ch. 1-4 of a book, then adds ch. 5-8 subsequently with a new co-author B, duration of copyright for ch. 5-8 is determined relative to the death of B. None of that matters for a company web page.

You cannot create derivative works without permission of the copyright holder (even if you create it and keep it to yourself). Further, you cannot distribute derivative works without permission of the copyright holder. That's a general principle that always applies. Since there is a license, you need to read that license carefully and determine under which conditions you have permission to create derivative works, and to distribute them. Your book would be considered a derivative work. In some situations, like commenting on a work, parody and some others, you would have a defense if you are quoting tiny parts of the work. But generally, if you find it unfair that your 200 page needs to be licensed because you used two pages from an open source source, you either do without those two pages, or you find the author and ask for permission under a different license. Note that facts are not copyrightable. So if the wikipedia page contains facts and isn't just made up, you can read it ten times, memorise all the facts, and maybe tell the facts to someone who you pay to write a similar article.

The comment is incorrect; creating a derivative work without permission is still disallowed, even for private use. In US copyright law 17USC 106 defines the exclusive rights that the copyright holder has, the right "to do and to authorize". The second of these is: (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; Note that the right is the right to "prepare" a derivative work, not the right to "distribute" or "sell" the work. US copyright law defines a derivative work in 17 USC 101 which reads: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. The laws of other countries are similar to US law on this point. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (3) Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. However, it should be noted that if a person creates a derivative work in private, and never shows it to anyone else, the copyright owner would never learn of it, and so could never sue for infringement. But if it were shown or described to anyone, and the owner did learn, then he owner could in theory sue. Whether the owner would choose to sue over a derivative work never circulated is a different matter. The real effect of this law is that when an infringing derivative work is distributed and the owner wants to sue, the owner need not prove distribution. Proving creation of the derivative work is enough. The quoted comment asks about whether such a rule is "unconstitutional or something" and says that "You should be allowed to do whatever you want with your own stuff in your own home." The US constitution does not grant any such broad right. There are lots of things one might do in own's own home that are illegal: building a bomb for example. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution, sometimes called the Copyright Clause or the IP clause, grants Congress the power: To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. See the LII page "Intellectual Property Clause" and the page Nature and Scope of the Right Secured for Copyright where it is written that: Congress was within its powers in giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works. Even as applied to pantomime dramatization by means of silent motion pictures, the act was sustained against the objection that it extended the copyright to ideas rather than to the words in which they were clothed. {Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). For other problems arising because of technological and electronic advancement, see, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).} See also the Wikipedia article "Copyright Clause".

Is it legal to work without pay - Australia? Inspired by Is it legal to work without pay - Canada?; I figured I would ask the same question for a different jurisdiction. In what circumstances is it legal to work without pay in Australia?

There are circumstances in Australia where it is legal to work unpaid. Unpaid Trials A work trial is okay when: it involves no more than a demonstration of the person’s skills, where they are directly relevant to a vacant position it's only for as long as needed to demonstrate the skills required for the job. This will be dependent on the nature and complexity of the work, but could range from an hour to one shift the person is under direct supervision for the entire trial. Any period beyond what is reasonably required to demonstrate the skills required for the job must be paid at the appropriate minimum rate of pay. If an employer wants to further assess a candidate's suitability, they could employ the person as a casual employee and/or for a probationary period and pay them accordingly for all hours worked. Student Placements Under the FW Act, a vocational placement is lawfully unpaid if it meets all the following criteria: There must be a placement There must be no entitlement to pay for the work the student undertakes The placement must be done as a requirement of an education or training course The placement must be one that is approved by the training institution When all of the above criteria are satisfied, hosts are not required to pay students entitlements under the FW Act. However, a host can choose to pay the student at their own discretion if they wish. If the placement doesn't meet all of the above criteria, it won’t be a vocational placement under the FW Act. However, this doesn't automatically mean that the person is an employee and entitled to payment. The relationship may be a ... Work Experience & Internships A work experience placement is an unpaid internship only if it meets a number of criteria; if it doesn't it is an employment relationship and the worker is required to be paid. The criteria are: the person must not be doing “productive” work the main benefit of the arrangement should be to the person doing the placement, and it must be clear that the person is receiving a meaningful learning experience, training or skill development. Volunteering Key characteristics of a genuine volunteering arrangement include: the parties did not intend to create a legally binding employment relationship the volunteer is under no obligation to attend the workplace or perform work the volunteer doesn't expect to be paid for their work. The more formalised that volunteer work arrangements become (for instance if the volunteer is expected to work according to a regular roster) the greater the possibility that an employment relationship will be found. It is less likely that an employment relationship will be found to exist where the volunteer work is undertaken for selfless purposes or for furthering a particular belief in the not-for-profit sector. Large not-for-profits (e.g. Red Cross) consist of a mix of paid employees and volunteers; smaller not-for-profits (e.g. a local rugby league club) may consist entirely of volunteers. In this context it is important to note that if there is an expectation of payment (other then reimbursement of expenses) like a stipend for officials then the arrangement is an employment arrangement and all relevant employment law (e.g. minimum wage, workers compensation etc.) kicks in. As an aside a not-for-profit that has even a single employee loses its exemption under Work Health and Safety laws for all their workers; both employees and volunteers.

The law says don't drive an unsafe vehicle on the road. You disobeyed the law. There were methods of having your tyres fixed without driving on the road (e.g. taking the tyres to the mechanic in a different vehicle, calling a mobile mechanic etc.) so you have no defence of necessity. In all likelihood you will be convicted and penalised. You need legal advice. Whether it's fair or not is a philosophical consideration, not a legal one.

If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability.

Can he/lawyer try to use the payment to me as leverage, for example, offer to give me that payment only if I agree to sign a non-compete or other document? The employer ultimately ought to comply with the written agreements between you two. The employer is not allowed to belatedly impose conditions that alter (to your detriment) the contract(s), let alone when you are no longer his employee. The clause "You will be paid on X and Y when/if they close" does not reflect whatsoever that payment is contingent on your acceptance of a non-compete agreement. Your description does not reflect any legal merits that would justify your employer to further withhold the compensation to which you are entitled pursuant to the deal/sale that got closed. The employer and his lawyer are just being vexatious.

Asking as such is hardly ever illegal. Any stranger can ask you to pick up their kids from school, like you always can tell them where to go. What I guess you are actually asking is whether the PI can require you to do it. No they probably cannot: it would have nothing to do with the matter of your contract or nature of your professional relationship with them. However, if they are in the position of power, they will have discretion in making decisions that will affect you. Whereas you legally can tell them where to get off, it might be good idea to attempt some interpersonal workplace tactics first.

In Texas, as in most of the US, the law is "Employment at Will". This means that an employer is free to fire people at any time, for any reason, or none, as long as it is not for one of the few reason forbidden by law, such as racial or age discrimination. Hourly employees are entitled to overtime pay in such cases, but "exempt" employees are not. Nor are they entitled to comp-time as a matter of law, that is at the option of the employer. (The question seems to imply that the employee in question was "exempt" but does not actually say so.) The only really effective recourse against that sort of "death march" is to quit and find a better job, or to threaten to do so while they still need you, unless the conditions return to acceptable ones. I have heard of people in such a situation who "get sick" every day at 5:30pm, because local law forbid requiring ill employees to work. But that is pretty much inviting an arduous and possibly expensive administrative and/or legal battle, and will depend on the specifics of the state/local law. In any case, it is too late for the person in question to try that. On the facts as stated, there might be a valid claim of age discrimination. But additional facts would be needed to establish this, and it would be in my view unwise to try it without consulting a good employment lawyer. Such a lawyer could advise exactly what must be proved and how, and what the probable chances of any recovery would be.

Being outside of IR35 means one is considered a (self-employed) contractor, not an employee, and as such will not have income tax and national insurance contributions deducted under PAYE. HMRC require the NINO and Ltd Co details to cross-reference the payments declared in the public sector's accounts with the Ltd Co's accounts to ensure (a) they match, (b) the correct tax and NIC is paid by the relevant entities, and (c) to confirm the identity and/or status in the Ltd Co of the recipient of the payments.

> What does that last sentence mean? It means that federal law does not provide premium pay on Sundays and Holidays the way MA does. > Should I be getting paid more than I am? No. Check out G.L. c. 151, § 1A: the hours so worked on Sunday or certain holidays shall be excluded from the calculation of overtime pay In other words, take your eight hours on Sunday and subtract that from the total hours for the week. That number minus 40 is how many OT hours you get. This calculation is called crediting - basically the employer credits your time-and-a-half Sunday work against your total hours for the week. Crediting is allowed and it is why you do not get the Sunday pay on top of your overtime. If you want to get in the weeds take a look at Swift v Autozone where the MA Supreme Court describes why crediting is allowed. Also see 29 U.S.C. 207(h)(2) which tells us that extra compensation is creditable..

What if someone's testimonial account changes and contradicts itself? I am curious to know what happens if someone gives testimony in Court 2 times, and there are contradictions or discrepancies between the two statements. As an example, how might the following two statements be reconciled or handled in Court? Statement #1: I was jogging along a trail when all of a sudden in became foggy, I was able to see a man who threatened a lady and punched her. The other 3 people with me couldn't see anything, but they did hear the lady yell. Once the man ran away, I fainted and within a few minutes I woke up. Statement #2: I was jogging along a trail when all of a sudden in became foggy, I was able to see a man who threatened a lady and punched her. The other 3 people could see what I saw, but they didn't hear anything. Once the man ran away, I fainted and after 1 hour I woke up. Assume this is the only testimony of the event. Would this witness's testimony still hold up in court?

Yes. It will hold up in court. IMHO, there is no difference in the admissible portions of the two testimonies. "Few minutes" vs. "One hour" is immaterial The difference between "a few minutes" and "one hour" IMHO is immaterial given: the witness was unconscious and say, between 45 and 60 minutes would match both descriptions of the time interval. What other people saw and heard is hearsay Testimony about what other people saw and heard (with a few notable exceptions) is hearsay and not allowed into evidence because it is generally unreliable and not subject to cross-examination. So after the rejection of the hearsay portions, there is no difference in the admissible portions of the two versions. Qualification By "hold up in court," I mean it will be allowed as evidence. The weight and veracity of the testimony would be determined by the (judge or) jury after cross-examination.

Yes. This is very common. A persnickety lawyer or judge could insist on an actual "yes," but generally speaking, everyone expects witnesses to talk like normal people.

Will he break any laws by saying that (assuming the actual truth cannot be found out)? The statement made outside the courtroom is not itself perjury, since it is not made under oath. But that doesn't mean that there wouldn't be legal consequences. It would be powerful evidence in a perjury prosecution (surely enough for a conviction even standing alone long after the trial is over but within the statute of limitations for perjury in the jurisdiction from the date of the sworn statement, if any), and would be a waiver of 5th Amendment rights against self-incrimination, generally, in the perjury case. It might also be strong evidence (enough to convict standing alone) in a timely obstruction of justice prosecution. This statute of limitations could also run from the date of the sworn statement, or from the date of a false unsworn statement that caused a conviction to be reopened. If the statement made in court was favorable to the prosecution, it might bring these charges after the conviction in the underlying case is final. But, the out of court statement would probably be grounds for the party benefitting from the original statement to seek a mistrial or to have a judgment set aside if the verdict or judgment is consistent with the sworn statement. If the out of court statement was made before the trial was over, the witness could be recalled and the out of court statement could be used to impeach the in court statement. It might constitute a probation or parole violation. If the witness were testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement, the out of court statement would probably breach the deal and deny the witness the benefit of the cooperation deal. The out of court statement might constitute contempt of court if made while the proceeding in which the statement was made was still pending. Depending on the nature of the statement, the out of court statement might constitute defamation for which some one whose reputation was tarnished might sue for money damages. (There is immunity from civil liability for in court statements.) It would violate the ethical rules of many professions. For example, an attorney would probably be disbarred for doing that. Arguably, in this situation, the statute of limitations could run from the later unsworn statement date rather than the date of the sworn statement. If the witness is a state or federal government employee, this could lead to impeachment proceedings, in the state legislature, or Congress, respectively. The aftermath of the Lewinsky Scandal (link below) involving Bill Clinton touches on many of these possibilities: Further investigation led to charges of perjury and to the impeachment of President Clinton in 1998 by the U.S. House of Representatives. He was subsequently acquitted on all impeachment charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in a 21-day Senate trial. Clinton was held in civil contempt of court by Judge Susan Webber Wright for giving misleading testimony in the Paula Jones case regarding Lewinsky and was also fined $90,000 by Wright. His license to practice law was suspended in Arkansas for five years; shortly thereafter, he was disbarred from presenting cases in front of the United States Supreme Court. Easier and Harder Cases The easier cases are those where it is undeniably clear from other evidence that the witness lied under oath, and the out of court statement merely puts the cherry on top of an already solid perjury case. The hard cases aren't the cases where "the actual truth cannot be found out". Instead, the hard cases are the cases where there is strong evidence that the statement made in court, under oath was true. For example, suppose Ted Cruz is asked in court: "Were you the Zodiac killer?" (A crime ridiculously attributed to him despite the fact that it is something that happened when he was a small child who live many hundreds of miles away.) And he says, "No" in court, but then leaves the courtroom and says in a press conference on the court house steps: "I am the Zodiac killer, I lied about that under oath in court today." Similarly, suppose that a DNA test on a certain blue dress shows a perfect match to President Bill Clinton and Bill Clinton says under oath in court, that the substance tested came from him on a certain day, in a certain place, when a certain person was wearing it, in a certain way (also confirmed by a witness and surveillance video). Then, he leaves the courtroom and says in a press conference on the court house steps: "Someone else was the source of that genetic material. I never met that person, and I was in Kenya on the day alleged and I've never set foot in the White House. I lied about all of this under oath in court today." In these cases, there is no plausible way to make an obstruction of justice or perjury charge stick, or to upset a verdict or judgment consistent with the truthful sworn statement. Contempt of court is still possible, as would professional ethics violations, but other consequences would be less obvious, because the act would come across more as absurd instead of something that genuinely confounds the truth. The legal consequences associated with the conduct in the original post are mostly aimed at sanctioning genuinely fraudulent conduct. Our legal system is more confused about how to respond to lies so blatant that they only amount to feeble and ineffectual gaslighting that no reasonable person familiar with the circumstances would believe (but that might incite crazy conspiracy theory thinking supporters). The harder case would lie in the uncanny valley between a bad joke and a pathetically weak attempt to mislead people, even though the law is clear about how to deal with clear sarcasm and convincing attempts to lie that can't be clearly proven or disproven with other evidence.

Your translation of the first statement is not correct. Saying that one promises to tell the truth is not saying that one promises to not tell a falsehood. If telling truth and telling falsehood are items labeled T and F, then this is a logical statement ~(T > ~F) for ~ negation and > implication. The combination of the first and third statements is necessary to obtain what you have called Statement 1, while the combination of the first and second statements is necessary to obtain what you call Statement 2. It could also be argued that the first statement is not even necessary, as it is just a less strict version of the second statement (and a less desirable one at that, if one values the honest sharing of complete knowledge), but the redundancy does not harm the meaning or impact of the following statements.

“Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all.

The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available.

It happens all of the time, even though it is mildly improper. Usually, the lawyer can get away with it until the judge sternly warns the lawyer not to try it again, in which case the lawyer risks being held in contempt of court. This is riskier for a prosecutor (who risks this conduct causing a conviction to be overturned on appeal resulting in a new trial), than for a criminal defense attorney. This is because an acquittal, if obtained by these methods, is still not subject to appeal. Indeed, for a criminal defense attorney, even if it results in a mistrial followed by a new trial (which can be allowed if the mistrial is caused by the conduct of the defense), the mistrial will often count as a win if the trial was going badly on the merits.

Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).

Can U.S. border guards do warrantless searches? If I am a U.S. citizen entering the United States by car from Canada or Mexico can border guards legally search my car without a warrant?

Yes. At international borders and international airports (because those are the equivalent of a border), US customs officers may do searches of people and belongings without a warrant and without any particular reason to think they'll find contraband. This includes the authority to do some level of disassembly of the car, if they then reassemble it. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149. This is known as the "border search exception." Moreover, police normally don't need warrants to search your car if it was mobile when they found it and if they have probable cause to believe they'll find contraband. This is known as the "automobile exception" or the "motor vehicle exception." It was established in Carroll v. US, 267 U.S. 132. Individual states may have stricter requirements on police searches, but the Fourth Amendment doesn't require police to get a warrant to search your car if, say, you drove it up to a checkpoint and they have probable cause. The difference at a border is that they don't need probable cause and the car never had to be mobile: they can search you on a hunch.

Texas and California are actually what are called Presumed Speeding states, unlike most others which are Absolute Speeding states. (There is a little known third category called Basic, but this is uncommon). In a presumed speeding state, a speed-limit violation offers someone in your shoes far more flexibility in building your defense than the more common absolute state. In states that use this presumed system, such as California and Texas, it is not illegal to drive over the posted limit as long as you are driving safely and this can be established. For example, if you are driving 50 mph in a 40-mph zone, you are "presumed" to be speeding, yes. However, despite this prima facie evidence (meaning "on its face") of speed in excess of the posted limit, if you can show you were driving safely you may be able to mount a pretty decent defense. Just because you got a ticket is not prima facie evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that you were speeding. You are presumed innocent. If they prove you were speeding this is all they need to make their case, unless you rebut it. But there is a lot of room to rebut this presumption – and that is if they prove it. They must (as with all criminal cases) prove you did what you are accused of beyond a reasonable doubt – the highest standard of proof in the U.S. So, if everyone was going 80 MPH in a 70MPH zone, you would argue that the road was (I'm assuming) dry, unmarred, you were traveling in heavy enough traffic that to slow your speed to the posted limit would actually be less safe than traveling with the flow of traffic. You can talk about the state of your vehicle (repair, handling, etc.), how you stayed in one lane, and you can describe your skill at driving – especially if you have no other tickets and you have been driving for a long time. If you were weaving in and out of traffic, riding someone's bumper, if it was pouring rain, the road was bumpy or under construction, or if you admitted speeding (if you did this you can still rebut with a showing of safe driving, but ignore all info regarding challenging radar or other means of determining speed), or if any other evidence exists that the officer would testify to that shows you were not driving safely, this will not be successful. A successful example of a speeding defense in Texas: on a clear, dry morning with no other cars on a wide, straight road, a man is pulled over for being clocked going 50 mph in a 40 MPH zone. He had a perfect record and had been driving 22 years. He was driving a 2-year-old car. He convinced a judge that this was driving safely given those conditions and was acquitted. That's because facts presented were sufficient to "rebut the presumption" that by going over the posted limit he was driving at an unsafe speed. NOTE: Never bring up your driving record unless it is spotless. Unless you are a habitual offender it cannot be used against you or be brought into evidence at all, unless you open the door. You can also mount a defense based on the radar detection device, if one was used. You can seek records as to when the calibration fork was last checked, when the last time it was professionally calibrated (rather than self calibrated). You can ask, in a leading way (only if you know) how close the car behind and in front of you were (you don't want to be too close to the car in front of you, however if the cars were tightly grouped it is more likely the radar detector could have read another vehicle): e.g., "Isn't it true that the car behind me was only 1.5 car lengths behind me?" Only do this if you know, but if you can get the officer to admit that the car behind you was close, that can be used to rebut the radar detection and goes to the argument that driving slower would have been dangerous and you were driving safely with the flow of traffic. You should be prepared to put on an entire trial if you fight the ticket. In Texas, I believe speeding is considered a Class C criminal offense (rather than a civil offense as in most absolute states); hence, they have to build the prima facie case against you and prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If you can afford one, get a good traffic violation attorney. Always choose a jury in this type of case. Everyone speeds a little and you are far more likely to be acquitted by a jury than a judge. You should also ask to have the case assigned to the county seat; request this in writing ASAP. If you are trying the case, be prepared to go after the officer. Note any distinguishing marks on your car (if any), recall what you wore, what time of day, the lighting, all that. Even go back to the scene at the same day and time and take video showing the flow of traffic, (hopefully) the straightness of the road, etc. Cross-examine him on all facts with confidence and in a leading manner. Always ask for the calibration reports and you will get all evidence against you in discovery. This thing about 10mph being the minimum they can give a ticket for: ignore that, it's rubbish! It's meant to get you to admit to him that "you were only going 8 or 9 over." Also, that whole percentile argument is not relevant and will not work at all. You must show that you were driving safely given all the facts and circumstances to rebut the presumption that you were driving unsafely by speeding. It is worth fighting as you will also incur surcharges, increased insurance rates, and points on your license that are cumulative and stay for 3 years – a certain amount of which gets you suspended if you get (or have) more violations.

The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.

In most U.S. states, a citizen's arrest using proportionate non-deadly force is authorized when the citizen has witnessed the crime or has been asked by a law enforcement officer to assist in making an arrest. The U.S. Constitution is not violated by this authorization. For example, in Colorado, citizens arrests (not made at the direction of a law enforcement officer) are authorized by Section 18-1-707(7) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which states that: A private person acting on his own account is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person who has committed an offense in his presence; but he is justified in using deadly physical force for the purpose only when he reasonably believes it necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. Generally speaking it is illegal in the context of a citizen's arrest to use: disproportionate force, force applied to punish rather than detain someone, or deadly force, although there are times when deadly force is authorized for reasons similar to those that would apply for self-defense in the absence of a citizen's arrest. Deadly force is generally not authorized to protect tangible personal property or most forms of real property, but some places authorize the use of deadly force to protect a residence. I've heard before that a thief have "right" to flee, and trying to knock him out is not justified because you can only use violence to protect your self, instead of your money. While it is understandable that you might think this based upon U.S. Supreme Court cases like Tennessee v. Garner (1985), the law is actually more nuanced and that case held that: when a law enforcement officer is pursuing a fleeing suspect, the officer may not use deadly force to prevent escape unless "the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others." It was found that use of deadly force to prevent escape is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, in the absence of probable cause that the fleeing suspect posed a physical danger. Thus, it is illegal to shoot to kill a fleeing thief or shoplifter, even though it is not illegal to restrain a shoplifter physically to prevent that shoplifter from fleeing the scene prior to the arrival of the police.

Short answer: tinted windows are banned in most of Mexico, and rolling down the windows (at least the front windows) should keep you out of trouble in >99% of cases. Long answer: First, the law (mirror) seems to say that tinted windows are forbidden in most (all?) Mexico: [In all] Mexico, tinted windows are prohibited. They are banned. Except some tinted windows made by manufacturers. http://forums.bajanomad.com/viewthread.php?tid=46637: This article says the Mexican federal highway police will now be confiscating cars with tinted windows so dark that they cannot see inside, until the owners remove the polarizing paper. This is in accordance with Article 13 of the federal tranportation rules. It does not say what will happen with cars with factory tinting, since that cannot be removed. Second, on the enforcement of this law, it is sometimes enforced: TIJUANA – Hundreds of drivers have been stopped in Tijuana and ordered to remove after-market tint from the windows of their vehicles this week after a new law intended to help reduce crime went into effect. More sources. The enforcement seems very random. I did witness it myself that it is still currently enforced, at least in Tijuana. Regarding the effectiveness of rolling down one's windows to avoid triggering the police, http://www.city-data.com/forum/san-diego/321508-warning-message-those-who-driving-their.html says: I talked with the Police at the Ocho Street station last week. When driving in Tijuana, rolling down your front windows is OK for a tourist. Do it as you approach the border and while in Tijuana. It is only a ban in Tijuana, Rosarito and south is OK. https://www.tripadvisor.ca/ShowTopic-g150774-i256-k1967450-Dark_window_tint_banned_in_Tijuana-Rosarito_Baja_California.html: I went to the 8th street Police station (Tijuana) to find out what was up. I was told that the ban applies to only the front side windows. Rear side and back are OK (as in California). NO tint (other than factory) is permitted, even my light tint. They told me that, as a tourist, when in Tijuana just keep the front windows down, no problem. It's what I do, and -- no problem. https://www.reddit.com/r/tijuana/comments/92grg1/tijuana_window_tint_info/ When I get lit up, I immediately roll down all four windows in the car and when I pull over, I turn on the interior lights for them if it's at night. In the very unlikely event one gets pulled over despite having rolled down one's windows, one can use this trick: And while I have not had to do this, several of my Amigos have had great luck with not speaking Spanish to the cop (whether or not they know Spanish) and then saying they don't understand the cop's accent or why they were pulled over - being polite the entire time - and say they are going to call 078 to get help translating (078 is the Baja California tourist help line - it is staffed by English speaking operators). Invariably, the cops all the sudden get a more important call and have to leave immediately and let you off with a verbal warning. https://www.bajanorte.com/en/assistance-078/ Note that, from the same source: if you have Cali plates, you are at a higher likelihood for being pulled over, regardless of tint or actions.

You give no jurisdiction but in general: First, police have no obligation to be honest. So, yes they can collect this without consent by e.g. taking hair from your hairbrush (with a warrant) or giving you a glass of water while interviewing you and getting it from your fingerprint oils (which may not actually be technically possible but never mind that). No, they can't take it by "force" by sticking a swab in your mouth. Yes, it will almost certainly go into a database. Of course, there are some jurisdictions where police are entitled to decide you are guilty based on the fact that you didn't pay them a bribe.

You will still have to pay A ticket can be ammended if the state so chooses (they can look up what color and model your car is). The car is probably on video. The officer can testify if they wrote your car info down somewhere else. And if they identified you inside the car as the violator, the car's color hardly matters. The idea that minor mistakes or omissions on tickets can get you off is a myth. From an actual lawyer

Main Question: Most likely not under Magnuson-Moss or U.C.C.. Question 1: If a charge payable before hand was not set forth in any written warranty, it is most likely not legal to deny remedy to the consumer. However, even if it was, it is possible that it would not meet the federal minimum standards for warranties as, per paragraph (d) a warranty has to provide for remedy without a charge. If there is absolutely no way for you to obtain the information to prove that a remedy is due — for e.g. no third party has legal or technical capacity to diagnose the vehicle — that is likely also a term to be found unconscionable and void, and may be found fraudulent, malicious and/or oppressive which may entitle one to collect punitive damages. (It is worth obtaining written confirmation of whether this decision is made in accord with their policies or on a line that they announce to be recorded) Question 2: Most likely same as Question 1. Question 3: Most likely same as Question 2. According to 15 U.S.C., subsection (a) of Section 2302 entitled "Full and conspicuous disclosure of terms and conditions; additional requirements for contents: "In order to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products, any warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer by means of a written warranty shall, to the extent required by rules of the Commission, fully and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily understood language the terms and conditions of such warranty. (4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such written warranty—at whose expense—and for what period of time." (5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear. (6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty. (7) The step-by-step procedure which the consumer should take in order to obtain performance of any obligation under the warranty, including the identification of any person or class of persons authorized to perform the obligations set forth in the warranty. (12) The characteristics or properties of the products, or parts thereof, that are not covered by the warranty. (13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases which would not mislead a reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the warranty. It may, in addition to any or all of the above, be a violation of paragraph (8), (9), (10) and/or (11) based on specific fact patterns. To the 2nd point added: If the manufacturer stated that the vehicle would run at least a certain number of miles on a full charge for a certain number of miles driven or number of years, and did not stipulate it otherwise, they would have to remedy this. It is highly likely that they tried to evade making such written statement (if not written, it's not a warranty under Magnuson-Moss). If they did, and they did not define the scope of what they would have to do in the case of a defect or malfunction, they would have to remedy it by repairs within a reasonable time; if they fail, they would have to refund or replace. This does not mean that it is likely worth pursuing the matter in court other than maybe in small claims (See: ohwilleke's reply to this question for a general explanation). Moreover, most auto manufacturers put arbitration provisions in their sale contracts and/or their warranties and generally it may be required of one to opt out of it within 30 days of entering into the agreement. If that took place, first the dispute would likely need to be disputed through a qualified dispute resolution mechanism of the manufacturer, dealer, distributor and/or sellers choice depending on who gave the warranty. The specific State's lemon laws may provide for civil penalties for willful violations which may or may not be a very high bar to meet depending on the State's case law, and which is more likely to make it worth for "lemon" lawyers to take the case, but generally they are not a great deal more like hyenas of this segment of the law. It may still be worth considering for one depending on the specific facts, including State jurisdiction and the impeding nature of the nonconformity. (Please specify a State for the State's lemon laws applicable in this hypo)

Can a dark web site exempt itself from prosecution with an immunity agreement? Is it possible in the United States for a dark web site operator (or potentially anyone involved in an illegal activity) to create a contract that legally binds a law enforcement organization to grant preemptive immunity against any illegal activities that might occur? For example, upon sign-up the site might present a EULA or similar that says something to the effect of: "By signing in to this site, you, as a representative of any law enforcement agency, acting as a representative of and on behalf of your respective agency, do hereby grant the site operator and any affilates of this site perpetual immunity from civil or criminal prosecution for any and all activities associated with this site, including indemnification against damages for ..." Is there any legal predent anywhere in the United States where a person has been encouraged by a law enforcement organization to commit a crime under protection of immunity, possibly in pursuit of some greater good (justification: it takes a criminal to catch a criminal)? Could such a precent be used as a defense in conjunction with this agreement ("They signed the agreement Your Honor, just like they did with Homer vs. The City of Springfield, 1985")? If it isn't possible, what law(s) prevent it? If it is possible, what would such a contract look like (note, I won't be the one to test this, just curious...)?

Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings.

Bob appears to have committed "attempted larceny" by extortion, contrary to § 155.05(2)(e)(v): (e) By extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: ... (v) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; See § 110.00: Attempt to commit a crime. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime. And see § 110.10 which covers the "impossibility" that Bob actually had compromising images from Alice's non-existent webcam: Attempt to commit a crime; no defense. If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime pursuant to section 110.00, it is no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as such person believed them to be. (NB Bob's sentence, if found guilty, would depend the value of his attempted extortion)

I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.

Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol.

There are some problems with this kind of vandalism, one of them clearly that the internet is international and vandalism can be performed from everywhere on servers everywhere in the world. And so it may be (both technically and legally) difficult to get hold of the vandal. Therefore, most wikis primarily focus on blocking offending accounts or their IPs and hope that this helps at least for a while. Only if it doesn't and the vandalism continues for extended time periods, legal measures are considered. Legally speaking though, vandalism is prohibited by many jurisdictions and of course by the terms of use of the wiki operators. For instance, the Swiss criminal code Art 147 explicitly puts "abusing of data processing equipment" under penalty and hence gives website operators a legal backup for setting up rules for the use of their services. Computer fraud Art. 147 1 Any person who with a view to his own or another's unlawful gain, by the incorrect, incomplete or unauthorised use of data, or in a similar way, influences the electronic or similar processing or transmission of data and as a result causes the transfer of financial assets, thus occasioning loss to another, or immediately thereafter conceals such a transfer shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. 2 If the offender acts for commercial gain, he shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding ten years or to a monetary penalty of not less than 90 daily penalty units. Technically, the law even requires prosecution ex officio, even though without a hint from the operator, the police won't start an investigation. I'm sure the US has a similar law. The problem is, as with all internet crimes, it's practical application, particularly because often website operator and offender are not living in the same country. Edit After reading the exact text again (it was unavailable yesterday) Art 147 is mostly about fraud performed by computers (classical "hacking") but it shouldn't be difficult to argue that fighting and reverting vandalism requires significant (technical and personal) effort and hence the operator looses money. Additionally, there's Art 144bis which matches even better for the scenario here: Damage to data Art. 144bis Any person who without authority alters, deletes or renders unusable data that is stored or transmitted electronically or in some other similar way shall be liable on complaint to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender has caused major damage, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed. The offence is prosecuted ex officio. Any person who manufactures, imports, markets, advertises, offers or otherwise makes accessible programs that he knows or must assume will be used for the purposes described in paragraph 1 above, or provides instructions on the manufacture of such programs shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender acts for commercial gain, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed.

does the individual have a legal case against the company? Unfortunately, no. Some details and terms you use are unclear (e.g., "phantom" equity, "manifest" core technology, and so forth), but your overall description reflects that the individual sabotaged himself by signing a contract that does not mention the promise of equity through which he was persuaded to engage. A written contract usually supersedes any prior agreement --regarding the subject matter of that contract-- between the parties. That superseding effect means that the contract formalizes or overrides, accordingly, said agreements or promises. Since the initial promises of equity are not reflected in the "interim" contract, the investor's subsequent silence upon individual's reproach/reminders is from a legal standpoint irrelevant. At that point only the terms of the contract matter. The individual might consider alleging mistake in the sense of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 151-154 such that would make the contract voidable and perhaps "make room" for other theories of law. However, that seems futile unless the interim contract contains language that (1) provides specific conditions for its expiration, or (2) reflects the company's [mis-]representations that induced the individual to sign it. Neither seems to have occurred in the situation you describe. There is always a possibility that the contract might favor the individual's position and he just has not noticed it. But the only way to ascertain that is by reading the contract itself.

You've really got two questions here: 1) "Is it an invasion of privacy to know that I'm using an ad blocker?", and 2) "Is it discrimination to refuse service based on what software I'm running?". Taking them in order: Because of how HTTP/HTML works, there are essentially two ways for a server operator to know what software you are running. Your browser announces that it's running something. This usually takes the form of a modified User-Agent header. I'm not aware of any privacy laws that consider "Person A told me something" to be an invasion of Person A's privacy. They guess it based on the actions your browser takes. For example, if the website gets a request for a page, and the site's ad network does not get a matching request for an ad, the server deduces that the user is running an ad blocker. Since this is based on things that the server operator could reasonably be expected to be informed of, it isn't an invasion of privacy under any law I'm aware of. Is it discrimination? Yes. But not all discrimination is illegal. In general, only discrimination based on protected categories (race, sex, etc.) is prohibited, and I can't imagine a jurisdiction making "choice of browser add-ons" to be one of those categories, not least because it's something the person being discriminated against can easily change.

They can still be sued - they just can’t be found liable For example, as an adjudicator, I have immunity for acts and omissions done in good faith as an adjudicator. A suit could be brought alleging lack of good faith and/or acting as other than an adjudicator. If these were proved (and barring corruption it’s a very high bar) the adjudicator would be liable. However, adjudicators are often joined with the claimant (usually the Respondent is the plaintiff) and the ANA (Authorised Nominating Authority - the organisation that appointed the adjudicator, who also have immunity) not so they can be held liable but so that they can be subpoenaed and forced to give evidence - if they aren’t parties to the suit they can refuse to do this. My standard response when this happens is to write to the court saying “I submit to the decision of the court save as to costs” meaning I am not going to contest anything unless you try to make me pay costs - which I don’t have immunity from.

If an FBI or some law enforcement agent is on the Dark Web posing as a user, does this constitute entrapment? If an FBI or some law enforcement agent is on the Dark Web posing as a user, does this constitute entrapment? They do not inform you of their status. Sharing personal information is not very frequent there, but if it does come up and they directly do not mention occupation if asked, will you be able to avoid future charges initiated with this contact because they were not honest?

A law enforcement officer not telling you they are a law enforcement officer is not entrapment; it's just undercover police work. Entrapment involves the law enforcement officer inducing the perpetrator to commit a crime that they otherwise would not. Will you be able to avoid future charges initiated with this contact because they were not honest? Of course not, there is no obligation on a law enforcement officer to be honest if being dishonest is in accordance with their job requirements at the time. For example, it is perfectly legal for a male 45-year-old police officer to pretend to be a 14-year-old female on the web in an attempt to catch pedophiles. If the officer induced the perpetrator to request a meeting for the purposes of sex or to request child abuse material then that would be entrapment; if they simply play the role and respond without crossing that line that is OK.

Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.

In colorado, it appears that the kidnapping statutes do not apply if the act is not "knowing" or if the perpetrator lacks intent. § 18-3-301 Any person who does any of the following acts with the intent thereby to force the victim or any other person to make any concession or give up anything of value in order to secure a release of a person under the offender's actual or apparent control commits first degree kidnapping: (a) Forcibly seizes and carries any person from one place to another; or (b) Entices or persuades any person to go from one place to another; or (c) Imprisons or forcibly secretes any person. § 18-3-302 Any person who knowingly seizes and carries any person from one place to another, without his consent and without lawful justification, commits second degree kidnapping. 2. Any person who takes, entices, or decoys away any child not his own under the age of eighteen years with intent to keep or conceal the child from his parent or guardian or with intent to sell, trade, or barter such child for consideration commits second degree kidnapping. § 18-3-303 Any person who knowingly confines or detains another without the other's consent and without proper legal authority commits false imprisonment. As @ohwilleke pointed out in this answer, this means that as soon as the hypothetical car thief becomes aware that the child is in the car and doesn't then act to return the child to their parents, it becomes second-degree kidnapping. (It's also possible that CO case law has interpreted the statutes differently than I'm interpreting them here, but the plain language seems to require the actual intent to take and/or confine a person illicitly.)

Defamation requires communication to a third-party I can say (or write) anything I want about a person directly to that person and, unless it is a threat, they have no recourse at all. I can call them a liar, a thief, a Nazi, or a goat fornicator. Of course, I have to be careful – calling them a “bastard” might be a slur on their mother communicated to a third-party (them) which would give her a right to sue although that would require a literal and largely archaic use of the term. That said, you do need to check with your lawyer if you can redact names in the face of a subpoena - complying with a legal obligations is a legitimate use of personal data under GDPR.

This would probably constitute illegal wiretapping and would certainly constitute a 4th Amendment search if conducted by law enforcement. Normally, the definition of whether something is "public" for purposes of an expectation of privacy is whether it could be detected by a human being unaided by technological enhancements from a place where someone could lawfully be to make that kind of observation. Some of the relevant cases are Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. (1967) (tape recorder outside a public telephone booth was a search violating the expectation of privacy) and U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. (1984) (tracking device placed in barrel by authorities violated expectation of privacy). RFID signals are not "public" even if they are not encrypted with a private code because a device, such as the ones identified in the question, is necessary to receive them. The Wiretap Act, codified by 18 U.S. Code § 2511, is a federal law aimed at protecting privacy in communications with other persons. Typically, when you think of a "wiretap," the first thing that comes to mind is someone listening to your telephone calls. But the Act protects more than that. Under the Act, it is illegal to: intentionally or purposefully intercept, disclose, or use the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication through the use of a "device." The Act provides criminal and civil penalties for violations, although it creates various exceptions to when interceptions and disclosures are illegal. From here. In this circumstance, despite being passive, one is intentionally intercepting the contents of electronic communications through the use of a device. The fact that there was not in all cases an intent to communicate through, for example, an RFID chip, on a specific occasion probably does not suffice to render it not a communication.

This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as "a computer". Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your "obtains information" element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be "without authorization or exceeds authorized access". The law doesn't explain with "without authorization" means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of "prohibited access", meaning "express denial of permission", and if the computer owner had set the computer to "prohibited access" by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. "Unauthorized" can also mean "has not been explicitly authorized", i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes "unauthorized access". Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has "obtained information", since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result ("damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information"), and how printing would be "reckless". It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law.

Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act explicitly protects computer service providers from such charges. A driver is not a computer service provider, and the US legislature has never voted to offer similar protection to drivers picking up hitchhikers. You say that an email can easily be classified as fraudulent, but that's not true. Spam detection has gotten pretty sophisticated, but they still get plenty of false positives. They were a lot less sophisticated back in 1996 when the Communications Decency Act was passed.

Intent would greatly factor into the case. As mentioned, possession of child pornography is illegal. There was a case, where a man had inadvertently downloaded such images. In the case, it was shown that there was sufficient evidence that it was accidental and without his knowledge. Presumably, if you by happenstance created an identical code through encryption/compiling, there would be a lack of evidence of intent or evidence of your intended use. For example, your stored password manager file happens to store data identical to an illegal image. The password manager output is provable and repeatable to show that it was simply circumstantial. If you have hundreds of such outputs that all "just happen to be illicit images" you would probably fall on the wrong side of reasonable doubt. As to whether you can keep the data, the programmers for the password manager would probably update their system to modify the output to avoid bad press. The general idea is that the "illegal number" is so incredibly specific that accidental cases are very unlikely to occur, and if it did, that there would be forensic evidence indicating intent and use.

Can a landlord dictate where I can park when moving in/out of an apartment? I recently moved out of a room that I rented in a house in Oakland, California. In my lease it under terms of vacating the premise my landlord added a clause stating: "All moving must be done in rear of driveway or pay $250 (near basement door)" However, my parent's truck was too large to fit in his driveway and back up to place designated, so my parents parked in the street and we packed everything up in the street (taking about 45 minutes). The landlord showed up on the premise during the last ~10-15 minutes of moving and cleaning the room. He told me that I was not supposed to park there, and stated that he told me this the day before. However, I told him (person-to-person) two days prior to moving out, that I was moving out Friday morning and requested the driveway clear, which he obliged; however, he stated nothing about where I could or couldn't park. I also asked him if he would do a walk-through of the room with me, to verify any damages, after I moved and cleaned the room out, which he did not do while I was present and simply stated "I'm sure it's fine" -- he also refused to do a pre-move-out inspection that's in written as a Right in my lease. My question: Is this actually enforceable, since I did park in a public space and not necessarily on his property? I had trouble with this landlord since I moved into the house. I have a brief write up of my concerns posted here on Reddit prior to my move. I did follow through with what was suggested in the thread (take photos, document, save texts, etc.), but I've yet to talk to a lawyer, as I don't think it's quite that time It will be three weeks since I moved out on the August 21st. I'm going to wait a week until the 28th to send him a certified letter requesting my full deposit be returned if it already hasn't, and if I don't hear anything back I'll probably be taking him to small claims court.

Agreement You say: my landlord added a clause stating: "All moving must be done in rear of driveway or pay $250 (near basement door)" Was this addition made at the time you signed the lease or subsequently? This matters because the terms of a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, they must be agreed. If the change happened after the lease was signed then , unless you agreed to it, it has no effect whatsoever. Since that resolution is boring; I will assume that it was always there. Enforcability Is this actually enforceable, since I did park in a public space and not necessarily on his property? Yes, it is enforceable. People can agree in a contract to do (or not do) anything so long as that thing is not illegal - that is what a contract is; a legally enforceable agreement for two people to do certain things. You agreed "All moving must be done in rear of driveway ... (near basement door)" and you didn't do what you agreed to do. Therefore you broke a term of the contract. It doesn't matter that you don't know why he wanted you to do this or if it was reasonable or if it meant that you couldn't use your parent's truck - if these were issues for you they should have been raised before you agreed to do it. If the clause said "When moving out you will wear a blue double breasted suit with a yellow and purple bow tie" then that is what you must do. Consequences There are a number of options open to the wronged party when the other party breaches a term of a contract. The most relevant in these circumstances is to sue for damages. So how much are damages? Well, they are an amount to restore the wronged party to the position they would have been in if you hadn't broken the agreement. In situations where damages can be hard to calculate, contracts can make a provision for liquidated damages; a pre-agreed amount of what the damage will be: in this case "$250". However: In the United States, Section 2-718(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that, in contracts for the sale of goods: Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty. This largely mirrors the common law rule, which applies to other types of contracts under the law of most US states. On the face of it, it would appear that $250 may be "unreasonably large" given the nature of the breach where it appears that the landlord has actually suffered no damage.

he is jointly liable for the remaining 3 months, even though he never signed anything. Is this true? That seems unlikely. The lease is between Adam and the landlord. Although the lease might have language making all tenants jointly and severally liable, it would affect Bob only if it can be proved that he was aware of those terms when he moved in. Your description does not elaborate on any agreement(s) between Adam and Bob. But Adam is not allowed to impose on Bob any obligations merely because relations between them broke down. Absent a contract between Adam and Bob, the question of whether Adam is entitled to any recovery from Bob could only be assessed on equitable grounds.

If you have an actual lease under which you reside at your parents' place, they must abide by the terms of that lease – presumably that sets the rent that you pay and states how long the lease is good for, Otherwise, if you're just living there, and have been living there for some time, then the courts may treat you as a month-to-month tenant. That means that they can end the tenancy with 30 days notice. Or, they can initiate an eviction proceeding. The less optimal outcome is that the court may treat you as a house guest, in which case no formal eviction proceeding is necessary. One way or the other, it is illegal to physically give a person the heave-ho from their residence, even if it is a family member. One recourse then is to hire an attorney to persuade your parents of at least that aspect of the law, if it is really in doubt. This gent addresses the matter for parents whose children have moved back home. He also mentions hiring a mediator, which could put the situation on a clearer legal ground. As for psychiatrists, anybody can see a psychiatrist; and anybody is free to hire a lawyer to try to force another person to see a psychiatrist. The prospects of getting a court order to force a child or a parent to see a psychiatrist because they are at loggerheads over some matter is extremely remote. The courts only force psychiatric treatment in extreme cases (e.g. threats of violence, actual delusions).

she immediately stated that I need to provide 60 days notice She is wrong. See Minnesota statute 504B.135(a). Absent any agreement that supersedes the statute, the landlord cannot unilaterally stretch the notice period to 60 days. Is it legal for a landlord to say my rent is due 5 days earlier than we had verbally agreed? Is it legal for a landlord to do this right after I tell them that I am planning on moving out? No. The lanlord cannot unilaterally alter the implied contract that exists between you two, including the pattern of you paying rent on the 6th of the month. To prove in court that this was indeed the pattern, it suffices to show the receipts your landlord has the statutory obligation to provide to you immediately upon making each one of your payments. See 504B.118. The landlord is just "making sure" you will not recommend her to other prospective tenants.

Under an AST agreement the landlord is not permitted to evict you on a whim - if you refuse to leave, in order to 'take possession' the landlord must persuade a court to give him a court order. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/applying_for_possession_assured_tenancies In the fixed term the landlord must first serve the tenant a 'section 8 notice' with a 'ground for possession' (there are 20). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/50/schedule/2 http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies Were you to refuse or fight it a court would determine whether the landlord may take possession on the ground in the section 8 notice. That particular clause you are concerned about is common to the AST agreements I've seen. See for example the government's model agreement: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695944/Model_Agreement_for_an_Assured_Shorthold_Tenancy_and_Accompanying_Guidance.docx The guidance isn't specific about "illegal, immoral, disorderly or anti-social purposes" but examples elsewhere include prostitution in the property (doing it yourself or allowing it to be done) or it being used to store stolen goods. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies/discretionary_grounds_assured_tenancies#7 I'm just curious to know if there are any laws protecting me as a tenant from the landlord abusing that i.e immoral is certainly subjective and realistically he could find anything he doesn't like immoral? It is unrealistic to assume the landlord can take possession based on saying anything he doesn't like is immoral. Do any laws exist to ensure there is a limit on what can be considered reasonable? Statute isn't specific about what's "reasonable". Ultimately what's reasonable is what the court says is reasonable. You can look at case law. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies/discretionary_grounds_assured_tenancies#1 If not, am I within my rights to ask the landlord to expand on that clause to ensure there is no doubt between the two parties? You are free to ask the landlord what that clause means and to define it specifically - the landlord is free to do so or walk away from the deal. Consider that landlords tend to want tenants who will pay on time, keep the property clean and warn them about maintenance problems - I doubt the majority have any interest in their tenants' private lives that the landlord comes to know about unless the landlord anticipates an economic impact.

It is usual for a lease to specify for what purposes and on what notice the landlord is entitled to access. Often there is a provision allowing the landlord access on no notice in an "emergency" which is often not specifically defined. Access for purposes of repair, and for purposes of inspection may be on 24 hours notice, or 48 hours, or some other period, or on "reasonable notice" with no specific period specified. Access for a reasonable purpose (such as inspection) on reasonable notice that does not actually inconvenience the tenant, and that is not demanded with unreasonable frequency will probably not constitute such a breach as to justify ending the tenancy, and may well not justify sizable damages in the absence of other breaches. Much will depend on the wording of the lease or rental agreement, and on the practice of the local courts. One might well ask oneself "what actual harm will an inspection with insufficient notice do me" because a court might ask a similar question if an action is brought. If the inspection does cause a problem, then that should be addressed.

My questions are, where does this put me legally and what are my options? . . . Also, if I want to keep the tenants, how should I proceed? And if I don't want to keep them, do I have that option? Your Rights With Respect To The Tenants If the agency is telling the truth and the agreement made with the agent was for four tenants but their records and document only listed three by accident, you probably can't insist on additional rent or evicting the fourth tenant because if your agent does something on your behalf, that is binding on you just as much as if you had signed them up personally in that manner. This is true even if the agent didn't actually have the authority to rent the place to four people based upon your communications with the agent, because the agent has "apparent authority" to bind you in your agent's dealings with the prospective tenants. You probably have the right to insist that the fourth tenant sign the lease to conform to the actual agreement that was reached (four tenants in exchange for the rent stated in the lease). If the fourth tenant refuses to do so, that would be a repudiation of the lease/contract and would prevent him from claiming that he is a valid tenant of the property pursuant to the agreement reached with landlord through his agent. If the fourth tenant refused to sign, you could therefore insist that the fourth tenant pay additional rent or be evicted if you wanted to. On the other hand, if the agent is not accurately relating the facts, and there was never any agreement to have more than three tenants (as your communications with them and the written lease suggest), then you would have the right to evict the fourth tenant or insist on additional rent from that tenant. But, it might be hard to prove that the agent is not being accurate because it sounds like the agent and the tenants will testify consistently with each other and there were probably no other witnesses to the discussions between them. The Fourth Tenant Might Have Liability Anyway Also, at common law, you could sue the fourth person for unpaid rent during the period that the tenant was actually there anyway, since the fourth tenant was in "privity of estate" with you. (If someone actually signs the lease then they are in "privity of contract" with you.) England abolished the doctrine of privity of estate in most circumstances for residential tenancies in 1995. But, it is possible that this fact pattern is one of the situations in which the privity of estate doctrine remains in force since the 1995 reforms largely apply to assignments of leases by people who are tenants on the original lease, rather than occupants of a rented property who never signed a lease and never received a formal assignment. I don't have the legal research tools to confirm that accurately. But, none of the U.K. Landlord and Tenant Acts currently in force that I could locate addressed that issue, so the common law rule may still apply in this situation. If the doctrine of privity of estate does allow a suit against the fourth tenant based on occupancy without signing a lease, the incentive to even try to get the fourth tenant to sign a lease is very small indeed - you get no benefit at all from it other than slightly easier proof in an unpaid rent collection lawsuit if the agent's story is believed. If it doesn't the considerations earlier in this answer still apply. Practical Considerations All of this being said, there is also a practical consideration to consider. It you try to kick out the fourth tenant or impose additional rent on the fourth tenant, if the fourth tenant refuses to sign the lease, or if you believe that the original agreement did not include the fourth tenant, you still have to weigh the pros and cons of bringing an eviction or unpaid rent lawsuit. The lawsuit will cost you money (requiring you to advance money even if you are awarded attorneys' fees which may be impossible to collect from the tenants). You won't get your attorneys' fees for the lawsuit if you lose and will also have to pay their attorneys' fees if you lose. Tenants whom you are suing are unlikely to be cooperative on any other matter upon which you want their cooperation, and may bad mouth you, for example, in online consumer reviews. Unlike a typical eviction where the rent is not paid, it is very likely that the eviction will be contested, and if it is, the court could order the fourth tenant to sign the lease, but provide you with no other remedy if the court believes the story put forward by the tenant and the agent. If you don't sue, you won't incur attorneys' fees, you can still evict everyone if the rent isn't paid, you can still try to collect unpaid rent from three other people, and you are much less likely to have a dispute with or non-cooperation from the tenants. The only benefit you get from having a fourth person on the lease if that was the original deal (or if you can't prove that it wasn't the original deal) is that you have one more person you can sue for back rent if the rent isn't paid. If I decide to break my agreement with the agency, do I have grounds to do that? Terminating The Agent Often you can terminate an agreement with an agency without cause. If the agency agreement says that you can, you are free to do so and probably should because at a minimum they are sloppy and poor communicators. Generally speaking, even if you can't terminate the agreement without cause, you can terminate the agreement for cause, and the contradiction between their prior communications with you and their current communications with you probably constitute good cause to terminate the agreement both if they are telling the truth not, and if they are not accurately recounting the facts now. But, to be clear, terminating the agent won't affect the rights of the tenant. Suing The Agent If you clearly do lose money because the three tenants on the lease don't pay rent and for example, you get a judgment against them which can't be collected due to bankruptcy or them moving abroad to a place where it is not economical to collect a money judgment from them, or just not having any assets or income (or some combination thereof), and it turns out that the law does not allow you to sue the fourth tenant, and the fourth tenant was not judgment proof, you would probably have a right to sue the agent for the lost rent caused by the agent's negligence in failing to get all four tenants to sign the lease. But, the cost of proving that in a typical case would not be worth the money since this would be much harder to prove than simply proving that someone signed a lease agreeing to pay rent and didn't pay rent as agreed. If the agent didn't agree to pay for your losses voluntarily it might not be worth the time, trouble and risk of not prevailing in that lawsuit to pursue, even if you could get attorneys' fees for your suit against the agent if you won (which you probably could in England). The risks of doing that include paying the agent's attorneys' fees is you lose.

Under the Residental Tenancies Act of 2004, the landlord is obligated to carry out necessary repairs to both the structure and interior of the dwelling. The Act provides that this obligation (as with others) cannot be "varied, modified, or restricted" by a rental contract. Meanwhile, the tenant is obligated to not do any act that would cause a deterioration in the condition the dwelling was in at the commencement of the tenancy (with "normal wear and tear" explicitly disclaimed from the tenant's responsibilities). The landlord is not obligated to repair damages caused by the tenant violating that obligation. So the landlord is generally responsible for repairs (and, in fact, if the tenant had needed to arrange for the door to be repaired themself, they would have been able to deduct the cost from rent). If the tenant had broken the door, it would have been a breach of their responsibilities. But if a neighbor, or even the tenant's partner, had broken the door, it would not have violated the tenant's obligation and so the landlord would remain responsible for the repair.

Can Apple be found in violation of antitrust laws for Apple Music? Spotify, Rdio, Pandora and certainly others that I haven't heard of are all competing for a spot on iOS while Apple's Music software is both bundled and cannot be uninstalled. Are there parallels here to Microsoft and Internet Explorer? Is there something I am missing otherwise?

In United States v. Microsoft, Microsoft was accused of abusing its monopoly power by bundling. A prerequisite for this type of Sherman Act Section 2 claim is that the company must have monopoly power to abuse. Market share is one of the primary measures courts use to determine if a company has monopoly powers, and therefore can be punished for abusing them. At the time of the Microsoft case, its market share was over 80% of all PCs and over 95% of Intel PCs. In United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, Learned Hand considered three possible market share numbers. He wrote that market share of more than 90% "is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not." Worldwide, iOS has about 15% of the smartphone OS market. In the US, it's about 40%. According to Judge Hand, that's well below "doubtful" and awfully close to "certainly not" a monopoly. No monopoly equals no monopoly power equals no Sherman Act Section 2 violation.

They wouldn't need to keep samples, just the fingerprint. So they could send a guy with a laptop to Japan, download all the songs, fingerprint them, and take the fingerprints back home. It's not a problem, but it would be expensive. I suspect that US and European record companies will make the music available to them for free, otherwise they'd have to pay 20-30 million dollars for 20-30 million songs. The Japanese record companies wouldn't, so while it is technically and legally possible to collect the fingerprints, it would be expensive. And what is the benefit? We are talking here about music that you cannot legally own, that you cannot legally buy after the software recognised it, so there is very little incentive to spend that money.

It’s tricky. I’ll talk about the general then the specific. In general, your notion of "didn't get permission" doesn't really reflect how the music industry works. Generally, a venue pays for a universal license to use recorded music. There are three major licensors: ASCAP, BMI and SESAC. If you get an ASCAP license, you can play any ASCAP music in your licensed venue without limit. I don't know if you have any records or CDs, but look carefully at the disc or the liner notes, and you'll see ASCAP or BMI next to each song. That tells you whether you can play it on your license. Licenses go to the venue or application, not to the person. So for instance if you have a bar and grill, of course you get an ASCAP and/or BMI license, and that covers the bar's normal activities as agreed in the contract. If you then create a Youtube channel, you would need to negotiate a separate ASCAP license to use music there. Each one is negotiated and priced separately, and you are negotiating with ASCAP, BMI and SESAC. Keep in mind a blanket license for the venue, say a baseball park, is not enough, as they exclude political events specifically. Political campaigns have to get the same blanket license as everyone else. But for political campaigns, particularly, ASCAP etc. provide an “opt-out”, by which an artist can exclude themselves from the license. Of course the artist usually has failed to do this when they hear their music on coverage of the event. The artist still has some recourses in the area of false endorsement and a few other legal theories, but they’re complicated. However a campaign will usually honor the artist's wishes. In theory, the artist’s legal options would take years winding through the courts, and the campaign would be long over by then. But in practice, the artist would likely team up with the opposition, and now the campaign is squared off against two different experts at using media - the other campaign, and the artist, who got where they are by playing the media well. The campaign doesn’t want to fight that fight, because a knock-down drag-out media palaver with a universally beloved musician is not a good look. Now there is something called a "compulsory license", but that is about a performer's right to use a song someone else has written. (But they must still pay for the use; and ASCAP/BMI/SESAC handle that too). That would come up if the campaign's house band was playing Fleetwood Mac songs.

There seems, to my ear, to be a degree of similarity between the first two works. The third does not sound, to me, very similar to either of the first two. That is not a legal question, and I am no expert. However, all of these seem to be simple themes of only a few notes, repeated, in one case with some variations. The history of music is replete with examples of short themes or figures duplicated without intentional copying. Generally, to win a copyright suit over a claimed infringement of a musical copyright one must show either proven direct copying, or identity of melody over a long enough passage that independent invention is not plausible. Normally access of the alleged infringer to the claimed source is also shown. How much identity is needed is a judgement call for the court involved, often based on expert testimony, but I rather doubt if the short themes linked in the question would be found to infringe one another. In any case, even if identity is proved, it is possible that both are copying some earlier source, perhaps one in the public domain, or one properly licensed. It is also possible that one of thee has obtained a license from another and so is perfectly legal. There is no way to know without the records of those involved.

Your friend's relationship with the game company is one of contract. You don't say what the contract terms are, so it's impossible to say whether they were breached by your friend or the company. In any case, it is likely that the only remedy your friend could seek is damages, probably limited to whatever outstanding portion of the subscription they have not had the benefit of. It seems unlikely that it will be a large enough amount to be worth pursuing. As a private company the game provider can choose to contract with who they wish, or not as the case may be (unless they can be shown to be discriminating against protected characteristics).

it would violate law? It would be very dependent of what your jurisdiction is and what the software does. I would expect most software that would be lawful to install at your home would be lawful to install at your company, but there may be exceptions. To put an hyperbolic example, if you work at the CIA and you install some remote access software that allows you to access your workstation from a non-secure PC through non-secure methods, I am pretty sure that would be illegal, even if you had the best of intentions. A recent scenario taken from real life involves some members an organization who are required to use official e-mail servers for FOIA purposes setting up their own private mail servers. Of course, YMMV. can I purchase it for myself, and then use at workplace Even if the software is legal it does not mean that it is ok to use it at the workplace. Most business have rules about what software may be installed in the PCs, who may install it and how to manage it. Your software could introduce security vulnerabilities that your IT team may need to be aware of, or incompatibilities with other software. It may introduce legal liabilities (you install a "home edition" licence in a corporate environment where that licence is invalid). Your company may discipline you if you breaking those guidelines and install software without authorization, even if there is no harm for them for this action. On top of that, if your actions cause some damage to the company, it can sue you to get you to pay for those damages. Before taking any action you should inquiry about your company's IT policy and, if your company does not have one or if the policy is not clear about allowing you to install the software, ask the people in charge (preferably in writting).

The EU has established rules about member governments subsidising industries. The intention is to ensure that trade in the EU is not distorted by government incentives, so that factories get built in the most efficient location rather than where a government offers the biggest subsidy. This is the mirror image of the rules which prohibit tariffs; governments cannot protect their own industry from competition either by imposing tariffs on imports or by providing subsidies to exports. The Irish government was found to have provided an illegal subsidy to Apple in the form of a tax reduction made especially for Apple. Hence the tax break was invalid and effectively did not exist. Legally Apple therefore had to pay their back taxes. As to why Apple had to pay after being assured that they would not have to, its a basic principle that civil servants cannot change the law merely by saying something. If a civil servant tells you that you don't need to pay tax when you do, then the civil servant is simply wrong. You could use their opinion as a defence against criminal charges of tax evasion, but you would still have to pay the tax.

I've found Commission Decision 2003/675/EC which sheds light on what exactly happened here (more digestable press release here). Basically, there was a dispute involving Nintendo and its various independent distributors who had exclusive distribution rights in their respective territories, Bergsala AB for Sweden. Note this wasn't simply a matter of Bergsala's rights being violated, but rather a scheme to reduce parallel imports/exports which the Commission found to be anti-competitive. For most parties, this was brought to an end in December 1997 (see section 2.2.11 on pgs. 54-55). So no, there was no change in the law, but the anti-competitive scheme stopped in late 1997. Weirdly this should have resulted in the possibility for more imports, but since those imports would no longer have artificially higher prices, perhaps the advertisements and/or imports were no longer worth economically worth it. Or perhaps Bergsala pivoted to greater enforcement the exclusive rights it did have, even if this didn't include the ability to block parallel imports according to EU competition law. In any case, trade of Nintendo products in Europe was greatly altered in late 1997. Please take my summary with a grain of salt, I'm not very well versed in the field of commerce and I've already misunderstood the decision at least once; check the cited decision for proper details.

Is crypto legal in a weapon-free zone? To expand on Is the right to keep and bear crypto protected by the Second Amendment?, since in the U. S. of A. crypto is considered munition (Bernstein v. United States http://export.cr.yp.to/), is it legal to use crypto in an area marked by a parking-like sign that reads "THIS IS A WEAPON FREE ZONE"? For example, there's some sitting rest area at Austin Seminary in Austin, TX, that has such a sign, should you enter it from the sidewalk on 27th St. Would the legality of the prohibition in regards to crypto depend on the location of the sign, or on property type? E.g., would it the term "weapon" include crypto only if the sign is erected by the federal government?

The definition of munitions includes weapons but is not restricted solely to weapons. From dictionary.com: noun Usually, munitions. materials used in war, especially weapons and ammunition. material or equipment for carrying on any undertaking. verb (used with object) to provide with munitions. Just because cryptographic technology is listed as a munition doesn't mean it's a weapon. Further, the list of restricted munitions is related to the definition created within the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Part 21 of ITAR, the part that lists and defines munitions for purposes of the regulations, lists "cryptographic devices" under Category XIII - Materials and Miscellaneous Articles. Further, Texas defines weapons, for purposes of a "Weapons Free School Zone", in Texas Penal Code, Title 10, Chapter 46. A "Weapons Free School Zone", by itself, doesn't prohibit weapons. It increases the penalty for committing an offense described in the above chapter. Note: it may still be illegal to take a weapon into a "Weapons Free School Zone" depending on other statutes - both federal and local. However, the definition of the "Weapons Free School Zone" does not, by itself, prohibit the weapon.) Summary: The definition of cryptographic equipment being a munition is one created as part of ITAR. A munition does not always mean weapon The definition of weapons for Texas "Weapons Free School Zones" is provided by Texas law, not federal law or regulation (ITAR) The application of the ITAR definition of munitions does not apply to the Texas "Weapons Free School Zones" law

There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.

I'd take the city council's advice and realize that you could be charged with a crime. Their job is to know the local laws and put them into place, as well as know how those laws relate to state law. As for state law, the Revised Statutes of Missouri, RSMo Section 574.115 Making a terrorist threat says: 574.115. Making a terrorist threat, first degree — penalty. — 1. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree if such person, with the purpose of frightening ten or more people or causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation, knowingly: (1) Communicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (2) Communicates a false report of an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. 2. The offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree is a class D felony. 3. No offense is committed under this section by a person acting in good faith with the purpose to prevent harm. A fake gun turret on a porch in the public view that tracks people who walk by could be interpreted as making a terrorist threat because it (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. And, it's probably safe to assume your turret has the "the purpose of frightening ten or more people." The fact that the gun turret is on private property doesn't mean much; it is in view of the public and your intent is for it to be seen by the public and you want to invoke fear in the public members who walk by. And it's not going to be seen by the council as some sort of security; threats are not security. If you did put up such a turret, and the state didn't take action under 574.115, and there is no local law on the books that applies, the council can easy put one in place at their regular council meeting with a simple motion and vote. Since you already asked the council, they may already be considering such a law. And, depending on the county, the council could invoke a law addressing threats to the public that has more severe penalties that the state law, because Missouri is a home rule (Wikipedia) state.

As long as what you are posting is factual, public knowledge then you shouldn't be in violation of any SEC rules. Short-selling in-and-of itself is perfectly legal, so is exercising your right to free speech, in so far as the things you say are true and known. Now if you made up some story about Musk and it caused the stock to fall where you gain, this could be a violation. Likewise if you have come to be in possession of private knowledge and blog about that, you could be in violation of SEC rules.

There is no such law in the US, although there many laws prohibiting specific forms of harm, for example laws against murder, theft, assault, arson. All laws are predicated on the idea that an illegal act causes harm, but I don't get to deem, for example, that you are harming society by opposing Satan. There are no laws prohibiting any belief in the US, and such a law would be unconstitutional (in violation of the First Amendment). So being a Satanist could not possibly be illegal.

Zoning is controlled by the municipality (and possibly state, given where KC is) so you would have to check the rules for the municipality of interest and look at the specific zoning designation (e.g. RP-OE, R-2, MXD). Here for example is a page of code from Overland Park, which tells you that RP-4 land can be used for a private park, but agriculture is not a listed permitted use. You might argue with city hall over whether a giant garden is agriculture, and you might even win the argument (if it is a garden where you don't harvest product). Private / non-commercial is not likely to be the controlling factor over agricultural use.

The First Amendment states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. It thus protects such videos. An analogous situation is that there is network news coverage of riots, bank robberies, terrorist attacks and assaults. Backpage was seized because it facilitated prostitution, not just reported or even encouraged it. That is basically where the line exists.

You are not obliged to say anything to a police officer during a traffic stop, in fact you are generally better off staying silent. This is your Fifth Amendment right to silence. The only exception to this is that the officer could ask for your name and you are obliged to give it under Arizona Laws 13-2412, but the answer to that is language-independent and is usually already answered with your driver's license in a traffic stop. If you did choose to communicate only in German, this may have the effect of frustrating the officer's investigation but if you only make truthful statements in German it is unlikely to be obstruction of their investigation. Arizona Laws 13-2409 is I believe the relevant section (emphasis mine): A person who knowingly attempts by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation or force or threats of force to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or testimony relating to a violation of any criminal statute to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury or who knowingly injures another in his person or property on account of the giving by the latter or by any other person of any such information or testimony to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury is guilty of a class 5 felony, except that it is a class 3 felony if the person commits the offense with the intent to promote, further or assist a criminal street gang. In general, a law that required you to give answers to a police officer during an investigation in English if you understand English and have waived your right to silence would violate your First Amendment right to free speech (as it is in effect "forced speech"). However, you would need to be careful not to tell the police officer that you do not understand English if that is not true, as it could be misrepresentation. Police officer training likely includes instructions for detaining someone that cannot understand them and the police can detain you and wait for an interpreter to continue their investigation if they determine that is necessary. You may actually be shooting yourself in the foot by doing this, because the time it takes for them to get an interpreter likely extends the amount of time the detainment can last while remaining "reasonable," so you may be waiting by the side of the road longer than you would have if you had simply told the officer that you were invoking your right to silence and followed the officer's instructions without speaking. As an aside, as more people are educated on their rights via the Internet and understand why they should always invoke their right to silence when detained, police officers will get more used to people they pull over immediately and politely telling them that they are going to invoke their right to silence. I doubt most police officers will hold it against you as long as you are otherwise cooperative and don't yell at them or berate them.

What are the laws on showing another company's logo in commercial photos? On a webpage we would like to have a background image demonstrating our product on different devices. The current images we have contain an Intel logo and an iPad (logo not visible but clearly an iPad). Is it OK to use these images without permission?

Generally speaking, you must be Licensed, or enter a written agreement, in order to use any logos from any company, especially any time the reference is referenced commercially. There are exceptions to the rule, and some are more lenient than others, but you should always check before showing any company's trademarks or brand icons. For example, Intel® allows third parties to refer to them by name, but displaying a logo requires a license or written permission, per their Trademarks and Brands guideline. You'll find that most companies are probably willing to overlook violations of Licensing as long as the product is placed in a favorable light, since's that's basically free advertising, but you'll want to take the extra few moments and simply call them and ask. A ten minute call could save you tons in legal fees and/or fines. From what I've seen, most companies will allow use of their company name for most commercial and non-commercial uses, but reserve some logos only for licensed partners, and others still only for themselves. They will also generally specify appearance guidelines, such as rendering ® and ™ only the first time on each page of printed material, as well as a specific guideline for sentences and phrases that the name may or may not appear in. They also usually specify that such phrases may not imply that the company is a partner or representative of the company, etc. You can see Intel's Trademark Symbols and Acknowledgements page for an example of what you'd expect to be required to do. This page also gives some example sentences of acceptable and unacceptable phrases. For example: Correct Usage Look for PCs with Intel® Core™ processors. Incorrect Usage Look for PCs with Intel® Core. Mostly, they're concerned about making sure ™ is used correctly, as well as specifying that they make processors, not entire systems. You'll want to try and stay on the good side of their legal department, and represent fairly.

It depends. Symbols which are not entitled to trademark protection in a market, usually because they are merely descriptive or generic or functional, are in the public domain and may be used by anyone, but a person using a descriptive or generic symbol can't prevent someone else from using the same symbol to promote their own business. For example, I can use the scales of justice symbol to promote my law practice on my law firm website. But, since that symbol is a generic one in the law firm market, I can't sue a competing law firm from using the same symbol on their website. The essence of a protectable trademark that an owner of can legally exclude competing firms in the same market from using, is that your firm manages to infuse into the distinctive affectation for which trademark protection is claimed with what is called "secondary meaning" to the words or image or other manifestation of the trademark when it is used in the market where the owner of the mark wants to obtain trademark protection. For example, descriptive trademarks are not eligible for trademark protection and are instead in the public domain and can be used by anyone in a market where the mark is descriptive. You can't gain a legally protected right to use the word "liquor" to describe a business that is engaged in selling liquor, and you can't gain a legally protected right to use the words "doughnut shop" for a business that sells doughnuts. But, if you use the words "doughnut shop" to describe a business that sells liquor or bras, rather than doughnuts, and those words come to be associated in the mind of the public with your particular chain of liquor stores or lingerie stores, then the words "doughnut shop" have acquired a "secondary meaning" which can be legally protected by trademark law allowing you to deny other businesses the right to use that trademark in the economic market where it has acquired a secondary meaning. (The scope of an economic market can be both geographic and conceptual related to the nature of the products sold. The manner in which an economic market is determined for a mark is beyond the scope of this answer or the original question.) The analysis with respect to symbols is analogous. You can't gain legal protections for using a common symbol in a manner that merely conveys its pre-existing common meaning. For example, if you use the hashtag sign # to mean "number" or "pound", that probably cannot be legally protected by trademark law. But, suppose that one particular firm (e.g. Twitter) uses the hashtag sign in a novel sense associated exclusively with a service that this particular firm provides, in a manner that is not semantically derived from its pre-existing meanings. In that situation, the firm might very well be permitted to claim trademark protection for the use of that common symbol in this new sense that has a "secondary meaning", which associates that symbol in a certain context exclusively with that firm, in the market where that firm does business. Similarly, you could probably not gain trademark protection for the common highway "yield sign" design to mean "yield" or be careful or some other similar semantic meaning. But, if you used the common highway yield sign to sell spaceships, and people came to associate that symbol with the spaceships sold by your particular firm, rather than with spaceships in general, you might be able to secure trademark protection for the yield sign symbol in that marketplace. It is easier to develop a "secondary meaning" for a distinctive and particular stylized presentation of either words in a particular script, or a variation on what would otherwise be a common symbol, than it is to develop a "secondary meaning" for generic words or a generic symbol that is has an existing meaning in other contexts. For example, while Apple could probably not have claimed trademark protection for an image of a clock spinning clockwise while the user has to wait while the computer is thinking about something, Apple's distinctive variant of this image (which some people call the "pinwheel of death") might very well be eligible for trademark protection.' The AppleOS pinwheel of death

Do you have permission of the person? In general, product names fall under trademark law, not copyright. And while it's possible to use the name of a non-employee as a trademark, doing so without the permission of that person is rather dangerous. That person may sue you for a number of different reasons, with different demands - chiefly financial compensation or a rename of your product.

The licence does not allow you to do this However, copyright law may. You work is (probably) an adaptation within the terms of the licence and these are not allowed. So, put the licence aside and consider if your use is fair use or fair dealing; if it is, you are allowed to do it notwithstanding the licence.

Working a mobile car cleaner now, my manager asked me to take some pictures before cleaning and after clearing, privacy issue of the car owner California law creates an expectation of consent for taking photographs of people for purposes of commercial distribution of the image to the public. California Civil Code § 3344. But, absent copyright or design patent issues (which would only very rarely come up since most people don't own the copyrights or patents to the designs of their cars, and the owner of the copyrights generally grants an implied license for the owners of the cars to display the copyrighted or patented designs), there is no parallel requirement of consent for taking photographs of things. Furthermore there is no common law expectation of privacy in anything that someone you do business with must necessarily see with their own eyes. So, if you must see the car to clean it, then taking photographs before and after the work is done does not violate any expectation of privacy to which the customer has not implicitly consented and does not violate any California or federal statute. Better practice would be for the business to explicitly have the customers consent in writing to the photographs, to remove all doubt. But the implied consent to having someone see your car when they are cleaning it would be unreasonable to deny in almost all circumstances. A company might voluntarily have an agreement to keep any photographs taken confidential and to have its employees sign non-disclosure agreements not to reveal what they see while working. If it did, this would create a legally enforceable expectation of privacy for the customer. For some VIP clients, this contractually enforceable discretion might be something that would induce them to pay a higher price for the same services. But those kind of protections are not the default standards of law that apply in the absence of an agreement. And, even then, taking photographs for purposes of internal use only would probably not violate an agreement of this kind. The work still requires that people inside the business, including remote supervisors, be able to see the cars to do their work.

If the photos are exact or "slavish" reproductions of flat (2D) art, then under Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) the photos are not original, and have no copyrights of their own. If the art was not under copyright (for example published before 1924) then neither are the photos. If the art is still under copyright, the photos are "copies" and the permission of the copyright holder (of the original art) is required unless they fall under the fair use exception, which photos taken for and used in classroom instruction, and for no other purpose, might well fall under. However, if the photos are so taken that angle, lighting, filters, and other aspects under the control of the photographer make a difference to the photo, then they will generally constitute new works, and if the art is under copyright protection, will be derivative works of the originals, and both the copyright holder on the original art, and the photographer will hold rights. One rule of thumb is if the photo shows the frame of the painting, it probably has original elements of lighting and viewing angle. The more the photo approximates a scan of a flat work of art, the less original it is. Photos of sculpture, architecture, and other non-flat (3D) art works (and objects) inherently involve artistic decisions about viewing angle, lighting, etc, and will pretty much automatically be original enough for copyright protection. If the original art is out of copyright but the photo is an original work the photographer will hold rights, but no one else will (unless the photographer sells or transfers the rights). In that case it does not make much sense to call the photos "derivative works" as that term is intended to indicate that the works are subject to another's copyright, which these are not, because there is no copyright on the original. Or one could call them derivatives of a public domain work -- the effect is the same. Under the case of Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), a work must have a certian minimum degree of originality to be protected by copyright under US law. Both Bridgeman and Feist are US cases, but many other countries have followed their logic and apply similar rules to copyright issues. It is not uncommon for those who have taken photos of art to assert copyright protection which a court would not uphold, but this will not be judged unless someone copies these photos, and the photographer (or someone claiming through the photographer) sues, and then defense challenges the validity of the asserted copyright. The statements in the text quoted by the OP may be based (in part) on such untested assertions of copyright.

united-states If the computer is in fact a HAL-9001 (no doubt running the Clarke-68 OS) then the reseller can so describe it without trademark infringement. This is a case of nominative use, where the trademark is used as the name of the thing, to describe and/or refer to it. In addition, under US law, an attempt to prohibit the reseller from using that term would run into first amendment issues, and would be subject to strict scrutiny. If the term were used in such a way as to disparage the brand, there could possibly be an action for tarnishment of the trademark. but such actions are now limited in the US on first amendment grounds, following the case of Matal v. Tam. See What is trademark tarnishment or dilution under US law? for more details.

The mall is a privately owned public space At least while it’s open to the public. A photograph of architecture taken from within it would not violate copyright. However, photographs of other things (like art) do not have the public space exemption. Additionally, the owner can limit or restrict photography. This has nothing to do with copyright, just that an owner has the right to control what happens on their property (within legal limits).

Is it legal to post a photograph that I captured of a stranger in the street? I captured a photograph in the street. The photograph includes people who I don't know. There is nothing in the photograph that I believe can offend anybody (e.g. no nude or illegal act). I just like this photograph. Is it legal to publish the photograph for commercial use without permissions from the subjects appear in the photograph? The photo was taken in Australia. I want to publish it as a demo-photo as part of a photo-editing App (distributed internationally). Edit: Please note that the question marked as possible duplicate does not relate specifically about someone captured in Australia, and does not specific to my commercial usage context.

OK, the prohibition on commercial use stems from either: The tort of passing off; this is a private civil matter between the model and the publisher, or Breach of s18 of the Australian Consumer Law which involve misleading or deceptive conduct; this is a public civil matter with strict liability (i.e. intention or negligence is irrelevant) between the ACCC and the publisher with fines of up to $1,100,000 for a body corporate and $220,000 for an individual. In both cases the cause of action arises from the possible presumption by a person who views the photograph that the model in it is endorsing the goods or services that you are selling. The standard is: Would a reasonable person, viewing the photograph in context, come to the conclusion that the model is endorsing the goods or services (either because they really like it or they were paid to show they really liked it). Context is everything here. Some examples: If you a photo studio selling the actual photograph then there is no endorsement. If you are using the photograph to promote the studio there is. If you are showing a crowd scene (e.g. at a football match) there is no endorsement. If you are showing a building and the people are incidental there is no endorsement. If you are showing individuals or small groups in a way that promotes your goods or services there is endorsement. So, look at the photograph and the purpose you are using it for: could a reasonable person draw the conclusion that the people in it are endorsing your application?

It doesn't make a difference if the product is free or commercial use, if it's initiated by a company or an individual. What you are considering would be a "derivative work" and without explicit permission from the copyright holder, it is considered a violation.

As far as I am aware both these answers are incorrect, but as I am not a lawyer let me quote the World Intellectual Property Organization (part of the UN): Photos of trademarks Unlike copyright law, trademark law as such does not restrict the use of a trademark in a photograph. What it does forbid is the use of a trademark in a way that can cause confusion regarding the affiliation of the trademark owner to the image. If consumers are likely to mistakenly believe that the trademark owner sponsored a photograph, then there may be trademark infringement. For example, if a Nike logo was visible on the t-shirt worn by the boy in our photo-shoot scenario, this could be seen as an attempt to appropriate consumer goodwill associated with the Nike trademark. So, caution is required if photographing someone wearing or consuming a trademarked product. Source: IP and Business: Using Photographs of Copyrighted Works and Trademarks (emphasis mine) So the basic idea is that if the Washington Redskins would not want to be associated with the Biden campaign, they could file a lawsuit claiming that the photo suggests there might be an affiliation between the campaign and the sport organization. In other words, the question one has to ask is: Is there a chance we might benefit in any way from the goodwill associated with the trademark? The way it was explained in a copyright course1 I watched was that: you don't need to worry about a McDonald's in the background of your photo you need to be careful where you use a general photo of a specific McDonald's and taking a photo of a political candidate in front of a McDonald's is not acceptable without permission2 The verdict The biden campaign claimed that A campaign aide told Fox News the logo was removed from the photo because it is "copyrighted" and claimed that such a step is "a very common practice on campaigns." To my knowledge that are no actual copyright concerns here, but - just like with the aforementioned course - trademark matters often get covered in the same setting as copyright laws, so I have a very easy time believing that this is 'a very common practice on campaigns'. It's incredibly unlikely that for this specific photo the Washington Redskins would have actually claimed that Biden was benefiting from the goodwill associated with their brand (especially considering all the controversy surrounding them), but it's a completely believable general policy. The interesting thing is that they didn't care as much about postings on social media compared to more traditional channels, but this is in line with what I have seen in many companies and organizations. 1 - This course was trying to generalize international law in a way that content producers won't get in trouble anywhere rather than exclusively explain US law. 2 - The example didn't use a 'political candidate' explicitly, but something along the lines of a recognizable public figure who is not just getting a burger

This sounds like it would fall under the "extreme pornography" part of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Section 63: (7) An image falls within this subsection if it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, any of the following— (b) an act which results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a person's anus, breasts or genitals, and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that any such person or animal was real. (7A) An image falls within this subsection if it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, either of the following— (b) an act which involves the non-consensual sexual penetration of a person's vagina or anus by another with a part of the other person's body or anything else, and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that the persons were real. What you describe would likely result in serious injury to the victim, and the video appears to be non-consensual. Note that the actual origin is not relevant; if the videos were actually a brilliant piece of special effects and no anuses were harmed that gets you nowhere. The only thing that matters is what a "reasonable person" looking at the videos would have thought. Context might make a difference; if the videos were made by an identifiable company then a reasonable person might assume the producers would have at least obtained consent and complied with their local laws about safety. OTOH if they look like they were filmed on someone's phone and downloaded from some sketchy file-sharing site then a jury is likely to see this as suggesting to the "reasonable person" that the acts shown were real and non-consensual. Edit in response to comment: The law in question says 'An image is “pornographic” if it is of such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal'. So it can still be porn even if it wasn't filmed consensually. If "pornography" could only refer to consensual images then the prosecution would need to obtain evidence of the consent or otherwise of the participants. This might be impossible if a participant is dead or cannot be identified. Also the definition above matches both the dictionary definition and most people's idea of what makes something "porn"; the point of porn is sexual arousal.

In Australia at least I am not sure that the usage you describe has ever been legal. The University of Melbourne Copyright Office sets out when you may copy a television program for personal use and fair dealing for research and study. In short for personal use, you may: use any format you like - if you can find a working VCR; go for it. Not lend or sell the material; it must be for your own private use. This means you must be there when it is displayed and it must be in a private place. For example, you can invite friends to your place or go to a friends place and watch it together. The thing you are copying must be legal - you must have bought the original, have a current pay TV subscription (at time of recording) or it must be a free-to-air broadcast.

There is nothing illegal about the child asking for nude images, but, depending on jurisdiction and circumstances, there is quite likely to be a serious legal problem with the adult providing such nudes. The exact laws that might be violated would depend a lot on the jurisdiction. The detailed facts would also be significant. But such a situation is fraught with danger, for the adult. Even if there is no ill-intent, such actions could easily be misinterpreted, and might be technically unlawful regardless of intent. Of course, not all nudes are obscene, or even "inappropriate for children". Which are so classified depends on the laws of the particular jurisdiction.

Will you be in legal trouble for child pornography? No. The legal definition of child pornography generally requires things such as "sexually explicit conduct" or "lewd and lascivious display". Mere nudity does not rise to this standard; photographic documentation of suspected physical abuse comes nowhere near it. Will you get in trouble for not reporting the suspected abuse? Almost certainly not. People with certain jobs are "mandatory reporters" of suspected abuse, but it's very hard to become a mandatory reporter without being aware of it (and even mandatory reporters generally aren't required to report members of their immediate family). I'm not surprised that Walmart reported the photos to the police. For various reasons, commercial photo processors are utterly paranoid about child pornography, and will report anything that might even remotely indicate the potential for such. (Strongly related: Is it legal to take naked non-abusive pictures of my child?)

This may well be infringement, but I agree that you should start by reaching out to the instructor. You don't want to pay a lawyer if the matter can be be adjusted peacefully. In the US there is a special limited exemption to copyright for "use in classroom instruction" which might apply in such a case. I am not sure if there is a similar provision in Canadian copyright law. But the instructor is likely to change his practice if you notify him of your objection, even if he has the technical right to use the photo. At least it is worth finding out. If he won't, then you can always consult a lawyer.

Right to privacy at place of work In the United States, is one's workplace generally considered to be a place where an employee can assume a relative level of privacy from hidden surveillance? For example, suppose that I had a private office at work. Can I legally assume a reasonable level of privacy in my "private" office. Or can my employer record, without my knowledge, conversations I have with my wife on my personal cell phone during my lunch break? Can my employer just have a live mic hooked up in my office 24-7 to see if I say anything they do not like? Legal disclaimer: This is a hypothetical question and I am not under the suspicion of my employer recording my conversations with my wife. I am not seeking personal legal advice for me or my agents.

You are right that this is probably a private space; you are wrong in thinking it is your private space; it isn't. The space belongs to your employer and they can do whatever they want with their space unless there is a law that says they can't. As to what type of "hidden surveillance" is allowed that depends on your particular circumstances including what state and federal laws apply and the employment contract you are covered by. As a starting point, if this was happening in Australia then: If you gave permission, all would be legal If you did not give permission: it would be illegal to record anything taking place across a public telecommunications system (i.e. phone tapping) it would be legal for anyone to make an audio recording (not phone tapping) of any conversation to which they were a party it would be legal to make a video recording without sound.

I did not write "confidential" on my letter, but I assumed a business proposal is automatically considered as a confidential material. An incorrect assumption unfortunately. Unless you have a confidentiality agreement (NDA) with the first company, they and their agents are not under any legal obligation to keep information you share with them confidential. How is the legal situation here? There is none on your side. You lied about a direct question asked and were caught in the lie. Company A had no obligation to keep what you sent confidential. Even if they did, that may not (depending on how the confidentiality agreement is worded) keep the employee of company A stating that they had received the same proposal. Chalk this one up to a lesson on confidentiality and honesty in business. There are no reasonable assumptions of confidentiality in business unless you specifically state that they are confidential or are provided as part of a confidentiality agreement.

The UK Government released an article last year that explains some of the issues relating to ownership of copyright This article is informative. The headline point: Ownership of literary, dramatic, musical, artistic and film works created by an employee during the course of their employment, automatically vests in their employer by virtue of section 11(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The meaning of during the course of their employment has been interpreted by the courts to mean during the course of normal or specifically assigned duties, and that these duties include the creation of intellectual property for the employer. Patents are similarly affected - if the role does not specify or would not imply the creation of patents and other IP, it may not vest in the company automatically. This is a standard clause and is designed to protect the interests of the company, in the event that you create intellectual property as part of your role. Bear in mind here that there's no real need for this property to be created during work hours. That is, if part of your role is to design new software, ownership of that software vests in the company, whether you spent substantial amounts of work hours making it or not. Conversely, if your role does not include, or would be expected to include, the creation of intellectual property, then if you do so - even if it is during work hours - ownership may not necessarily vest in the company. IP you create in the course of your employment will vest in the company in the course of your employment will probably mean: if you are employed to create IP generally, all any IP resulting from your work, or; if you are employed to create a specific work, that work and possibly related works. This is a fairly standard clause, for most companies - I have had several jobs (though none of them technology-related) and they all include some clause to this effect

The employee must, during and after employment, without limitation in time, observe a duty of confidentiality regarding [...] the Company's internal affairs such as business plans, profitability, pricing, employees, methods, processes, routines, code and the like as well as other information that the Company typically wants to keep secret The pure information that the company had at some time a security problem with their product is internal knowledge you only gained through working there. By what is written here, you are indeed prohibited from speaking about it. If it were public knowledge, you could point to a press release and say "I did that, that was me fixing the problem". That would work. Because it doesn't share anything that isn't public anyway. But you cannot share things the company wants to keep secret. Finding out whether that contract is legally enforcable in your country and juristiction is the job of a real lawyer, but just as written, they are right. You signed a contract to not do that, not talk about it an certainly not publish it on the internet. So you should not do that, unless a good lawyer you trust tells you otherwise. That said, "I found a security flaw" is about as impressive as "I found a dollar on the floor". Maybe you can talk about your knowledge to prevent something like it happening. That says nothing about whether or not it happened in your old company, and for me as an employer it is much more valuable to have you on board with structured knowledge you can apply, than with your memories of being lucky once.

The recording is not illegal because you've been told it would happen, and by not hanging up, you've agreed to have a conversation that can be recorded. This was determined in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. applying the exception of Penal Code 632 that communications are not considered confidential if there is a reasonable expectation that the call will be overheard or recorded - being explicitly told that the call will be recorded makes this true. It would not be illegal for them to only record their own statements during the call, nor for you to record only your statements, either. In particular, the company is allowed to record the part of the call where they make this statement, as they are not recording a conversation, only their own (likely pre-recorded) statement (again?). Indeed, including their statement about the recording in the recording is common practise partly for protection against claims that the other party was not informed of the recording occurring.

Washington State is an "At Will" employment state meaning that, with exception to some protected classes and bargaining, the employer may terminate the employee for any reason the employer can cite, or no reason at all. If the firm used it as a benefit of the job but it wasn't agreed upon on the contract, its not a deception as if you can hold the job to the down season, you have less work to do. If a promise was made for employment into the down season during the negotiating of the job, and this was documented, it could be. It could be that he did all the work required of him, but another higher went above and beyond and he got the ax because he was the newest and the lesser performer. Either way, the employer is well within their right to fire an employee for any reason they choose absent discrimination based on protected class status.

Let's put to bed the myth of privacy that is at the heart of your question: in R v Sotheren (2001) NSWSC 204 Justice Dowd said “A person, in our society, does not have a right not to be photographed" So they can ask you to stop; its bad manners if you don't but it is not illegal. If they are the controller of the property then they can stop you filming from their property but they cannot stop you filming into their property from outside (either public land or land where you do have permission). See How do laws affect photography of non-humans in public when people may be in the frame?

Yes, phone numbers would generally qualify as Personal Data under GDPR. It would be so irrespective of whether you have also stored other information along with the phone numbers or not, since also information that indirectly could identify a natural person is Personal Data (provided that there are, somewhere else, public or not public, a register of who holds the specific phone number). See Article 4(1) GDPR. (One could possibly argue that the phone numbers would not be considered personal data if there is no actual register of who owns a specific phone number with any other party. Or if such register is in practice not available for anyone. It might be so in some cases, although I would not rely on it.) Whether you have the right to process the phone numbers must be assessed based on its lawfulness (see Article 6 GDPR). It could be based on consent, performance of contract, legitimate interest or any other ground set out therein.

Is there a legal duty to inform a caller claiming official business that they have the wrong number? I recently changed my phone number. Today, I received a number of phone calls from an unknown entity claiming they had to make contact with the individual who last had the number, pertaining to legal documents or some other official purpose. Some of the message is unclear, but I originally assumed the caller was an attorney, because the voicemail included the name, last four digits of the SSN, case number, two last known addresses, and a number at which the call could be returned. Since that time, I've come to believe it is a phishing scam due to the repetitive nature of the calls as well as a family member telling me they received a similar, yet unrelated call, not too long ago. In the event the call is legitimate, do I have a legal duty to inform the caller that they have the wrong number?

You have no legal duty to inform callers they have the wrong number. Official business is not carried out by telephone, despite the fact that some collection agencies commonly use the tactic that there is service of process forthcoming, or some other legal jargon, to entice a callback. From a non-legal perspective, you may want to call and tell them to take you off their call list and that they have the wrong number; otherwise, they are likely to continue to bother you day and night. It appears to be either a scam or a collections attempt.

Generally speaking, fraud in connection with an affirmative statement, in both criminal and civil cases, is limited to false statements of a presently existing material fact. Future income is not a presently existing fact. So, simply incorrectly stating your future income is not fraud. But, you are affirming when you make such a statement that you presently sincerely believe that you will have a future income of approximately the amount stated. And, if you make a statement about your future income when you do not actually believe that you will have that future income, then you have still committed fraud. In practice, there are lots of gray areas where a judge or jury considering the case would have to weigh the facts and your credibility. If you represented that you predicted that you would have an income of $1,000,000 in the next year, when you had never done so before and didn't even have any plausible plan other than playing the lottery for doing so, this would almost surely be credit card application fraud. On the other hand, if you represented that you predicted that you would have an income of $50,000 in the next year, when your income in past years had ranged from $30,000 to $45,000 from self-employment, and you believed sincerely that improvements in your marketing efforts and current economic trends were going to make the coming year your best year ever for income from self-employment that would give you a $50,000 income in the coming year, that would not be fraud. Where exactly the line between not fraud and fraud is drawn would be for the tier of fact to decide when and if the case went to trial.

A text message is just as legally binding as a letter, and the lion's share of the cases have held that a text message from a known sending phone number is equivalent to a signed letter. One would have to carefully parse the exchange of communications to see if they amounted to a binding offer and acceptance, but the fact that it was in a text message, rather than on a piece of paper is irrelevant. Indeed, generally speaking, such an offer and acceptance, if the words exchange show that, could be binding even if made orally, if it could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Procedurally, however, once a judgment has been entered, as is the case here, the process of proving that you have complied with a stipulation regarding what is to constitute payment in full may be challenging. I'll leave the question of civil procedure in Connecticut small claims court to someone more knowledgable about it than I am as that could vary a lot from state to state, or even from court to court based upon local practice within the state.

No, this is not an acknowledgement of guilt or liability. It offers a "discount" some sort of reduction in price. This could be an offer of settlement without admission of liability, or even just advertising for repeat business (unlikely as that may seem). Without the rest of the communication, there is no way to tell. Unless there are specific admissions, this statement alone is not likely to have much significance in such a case. Edit: There is still not enough context to tell exactly what the sender of this communication wanted to accomplish with the offer of the discount, but since the OP now says "the party does not take the responsibility" this is not an admission of guilt, whatever else it is. It sounds like some sort of backdoor form of settlement offer without admission, but that is far from clear to me. My original answer is not significantly hanged here.

No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.

A litigant could issue a subpoena to you demanding the information on your phone relevant to their case. If your employer or you are parties to a lawsuit, you can also be required to provide information through what is a called a "request to produce" issued by one party to another party without a subpoena, and under general information disclosure requirements in some lawsuits that apply to parties and people affiliated with them. For purposes of this answer, a subpoena, a request to produce, and a disclosure obligation of some other kind are all basically equivalent in the ways that matter. The search warrant process in criminal investigations, however, is quite different, but this is rarely used in the contexts that you are concerned about in your question. Usually, the obligation would be to provide a copy of the relevant data (e.g. emails and text messages and phone call history and metadata related to the case), rather than to turn over the phone itself, and this would usually involve a couple of weeks notice or more. Absent extreme circumstances (e.g. you are a flight risk defendant, or only technical means can get access to secret malware not accessible to an ordinary user on it), you are usually allowed to participate in sorting out what is and is not responsive to the request and they cannot just demand "everything on your phone." If the subpoena demand is overbroad, you (or perhaps your employer's attorney), can move to quash the subpoena or limit its scope before you have to comply in the court that issued the subpoena. You could also make objections based on, for example, attorney-client privilege or the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination, in an effort to object to the subpoena's demands for information. Absent a criminal case where you are a suspect, it would be very rare to actually seize the entire phone itself or to search all of its contents without your involvement. Note that this is a risk that almost everyone who communicates about business by phone faces. For that matter, even people who don't communicate about business by phone face this risk. For example, suppose you see a plane crash into a house while you are on the phone with your brother talking about last night's baseball game, and then mention that fact when interviewed by police investigating the crash that you witnessed. You and your brother's metadata from your calls with each other from that afternoon could be subpoenaed, in connection with a wrongful death or property damage lawsuit arising out of the crash, to help determine precisely when the plane crashed. It doesn't matter who owns the phone. Usually the subpoena will apply to all accounts and devices within your possession, custody and control. So, even if you don't have the phone in your possession when you are served with the subpoena (e.g. your son borrowed it for the week), and even if you made a call on your spouse's phone, if you have the legal right or practical ability to get the information, you must provide it. The apps installed on the phone don't matter. What matters is whether there is information relevant to the case (or potentially relevant to the case) that can be accessed with your phone, and whether the subpoena has asked for it.

The short answer is that there are many different ways that different countries regulate lawyers, and thus, many different ways to go about confirming the legitimacy of a lawyer. There is also considerable variation by country and by the type of legal situation involved, regarding the effect of a good faith reliance on inaccurate advice from a lawyer. The fact that there is so much variation in this is one of the reasons that fraud and corruption in international transactions involving people who are, or who claim to be, lawyers is fairly common. My office gets dubious communications involving people who claim to be lawyers (sometimes hijacking the names, photos, and trade dress of legitimate law firms and lawyers with subtly spoofed contact information) several times a week. One option is to proactively seek out firms using recognized and well-established legal directories with multinational operations and ratings of each lawyer's competence and ethics, rather than responding to cold call style advertising or online commentary and essays. Historically, the leading publication in this niche was Martindale Hubbell, but there are now multiple competitors that use this business model. Another option is to rely on word of mouth referrals and/or corroboration from people in a good position to know, such as embassy staff from your country in the country in question, or from professional employees of large multinational businesses in the country in question. Ideally, rely on more than one source for each law firm you consider retaining.

It is a false statement to claim to live in one county when you actually live in a different one. It becomes perjury (a crime) when you falsely swear to that statement on your status report, and you are required to report changes in "household situation" within 10 days. There isn't an exception allowing you to give a false address "in case it costs more to report truthfully". The only legal solutions are to report truthfully and pay more, or move again, report truthfully, and not pay more.

Is my client free from obligation to pay an unpaid invoice under contract? I created a contract between myself and a client. The contract states that I will provide service A to the client. I provided service A. A third party is blocking the use of the end product of service A to be used for my client. My client no longer returns my emails or texts and has failed to respond to my invoices (sent certified mail and with return receipt).

This depends on the representations that were made at the time of forming the contract, the prior knowledge of possible interference, and the nature of the interference by the third party. If the interference, or likely interference was known: To you, the vendor, and you made representations that your service would work despite this, or you did not disclose this, then you may have sold a product that was not fit for purpose and the client may be entitled to statutory relief, or may not be required to fulfil their contractual obligations To you and the client, and you notified them that this may prevent use of your service, and despite your advice they decided to enter into the contract, then the client is unlikely to be entitled to relief and must fulfil their contractual obligations To only the client, then they are unlikely to be entitled to relief and must fulfil their contractual obligations If the interference is of a nature such that the third party was aware of your contractual relationship, caused such an interference resulting in a breach of contract, and was not entitled to create such a breach, then the third party may have committed the tort of economic interference (generally known as tortious interference) and either you or your client may be entitled to seek damages, if any.

No, you're not required to sign any contracts. But since you're offering a service, you do have to manage some compliance tasks. You are a data controller under the UK GDPR, regardless of whether you have a company. This brings with it various compliance requirements. For example, you MUST post a privacy notice in accordance with Art 13 GDPR that explains how you process user's information. You must sign data processing agreements with your data processors, such as your server providers. And you should reconsider transfers of data to the US, since such transfers are illegal or at least quite questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. You now have prospective users that are asking you for an Art 28 data processing agreement (DPA). These are likely other organizations that are data controllers of their own. For them to use your browser extension, they either need to find a legal basis that allows them to share their user's/employee's data with you (controller to controller transfer), or they need you to act as their data processor (controller to processor transfer). The third alternative is not to use your plugin at all. Of these, a C2P arrangement is most convenient for these other orgs, but involves a bit of paperwork to set up first. If you want to act as their processor, this doesn't mean you'd have to create a company (though a corporation might be very desirable as a liability shield). Being a processor means that you're contractually bound to only use the personal data as instructed by the controller, and not for your own purposes. This restricts what you can do, and has some special compliance requirements. For example, you cannot engage new subprocessors without your controller's approval. However, processor status can also be convenient for you because you're not responsible for interacting with the controller's data subjects, e.g. you're not responsible for handling their data subject access requests. Note that it's possible to simultaneously be a controller for some users, and a processor for others. E.g. Google Docs is offered directly to users as a B2C product so that Google is a controller, but also as a B2B product as Google Workspace, where Google acts as a data processor. Personally, I'd rather not sign any contracts unless I'm doing it as a business, and adequately compensated for providing this service. GDPR is only one compliance aspect out of many, making it unwise to offer a SaaS product as a hobby. For example, copying other people's web content has copyright implications… A potential alternative for some of the organizations asking you might be to make it possible for them to self-host your backend, so that they are not required to rely on you as a data processor. If you have no plans to commercialize your software, making it Open Source could be a solution. But you're in no way required to do that if you don't want to.

What does the contract say? If it says that they have the right to unilaterally alter the terms by providing you with notice by email, then they have the right to unilaterally alter the terms by providing you with notice by email. These types of service contracts typically have such terms.

The Facebook forum doesn't prevent a contract from being formed. But, for a contract to be formed there must be an affirmative agreement, not silence (at least in cases that aren't between merchants). If they later decide to work together without reaching an agreement on the details, the draft contact could be considered, but the Facebook forum for its delivery and that fact that it wasn't expressly assented to might reduce its weight as part of the evidence in an attempt to determine what the terms of their oral or implied agreement to work together involved. It would be very unusual for a broker not to get a signed agreement in writing to pay his fees, although an oral or unsigned agreement to pay a broker is not necessarily barred by a statute of frauds. A finder of fact would be quite skeptical of a broker's claim to have an agreement in those circumstances and often the professional regulatory provisions related to brokerages would require that fee agreement must be signed and in writing even if contract law does not require that this be done.

Since you are 17 years old, any contract that you sign is according to US law voidable by you or your guardian until some time after you are 18. So if he tries to sue you, you can just void the contract and he has no leg to stand on. The money he paid you is just bad luck for him. He won’t have any copyright or license to use your code in that case. BTW. You have a verbal contract which is quite valid. With no other evidence, any court would assume that the contract was that you delivered what you delivered, that he has a license to use the code, and he paid the money that he paid. If you void the contract, he has nothing.

Ignoring morals, is there legal obligation for him to attempt to return the refund? No, but he must pay for the goods if the supplier asks. Does this fall under unjust enrichment? No. This is simply a contract law issue. The person is contractually obliged to pay for the goods and, in the present circumstances, they haven’t done so. If so, to what extent must he try? He doesn’t have to make an active effort to pay but he can if he likes. However, if and when the vendor realises their mistake and asks for payment, it must be made in a reasonable time.

No You can outsource if you don't disclose Confidential Information (as defined in the agreement), or if you have the principal's permission to disclose it to the third-party contractor. The clause only applies to confidential information - a subset of all information. I know that independent contractors should have the freedom to complete the work in whatever way they want Not at all. George Clooney, the actor, is an independent contractor - he can't outsource. Of course, this is an example of a personal services contract but, more generally, while the starting position in contracting is that either party may delegate their obligations (although they remain responsible for them) the parties are free to structure their contract however they like. If they want to prohibit outsourcing, they can. If they want to specify that certain personnel must be used (or not used), they can.

It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst.

Scraping factual data off the web and re-organize to release under proprietary license? Lots of bits and pieces of information and chaotic data spread across the web and it does cost an arm and a leg to gather them together to form something larger and consistent that would prove to be much more useful. Is it legally viable to scrape these factual data / information from different websites, compile and re-organize them as databases / data sets that will then be licensed under a proprietary license? Thus far after some research, I find factual data can't be copyrighted, but the particular compilation / structure of data can. Does this mean I can do whatever with the scraped factual data as long as I have my own unique data organization / compilation / structure? For example, I want to make a business information database off hundreds of different websites and then radically re-organize / re-structure / re-index these different data sets into one database that is better than any of the sources. Can I proprietorially license this particular database I made? I know I can never own the data as they are straight facts. Right? But can I OWN the particular data organization and legally profit from it? We are operating in US, but the data could be from websites on other continents.

From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end.

These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information.

You Own The Code To answer your question on whether or not it is copyright infringement: Yes, you do own the rights to the written code but posting it on Github gives Github the right to store, archive, parse, and display Your Content, and make incidental copies, as necessary to provide the Service, including improving the Service over time. This license includes the right to do things like copy it to our database and make backups; show it to you and other users; parse it into a search index or otherwise analyze it on our servers; share it with other users; and perform it. To simply put it, no matter what license you use, you give GitHub the right to host your code and to use your code to improve their products and features. This license does not grant GitHub the right to sell Your Content. It also does not grant GitHub the right to otherwise distribute or use Your Content outside of our provision of the Service, except that as part of the right to archive your Content. So with respect to code that’s already on GitHub, I think the answer to the question of copyright infringement is fairly straightforward. Things aren’t quite as clear-cut in a scenario where Copilot is trained on code that is hosted outside of GitHub. In that situation, the copyright infringement question would hinge largely on the concept of fair use. If Copilot is being trained on code outside of GitHub, we accept that at least some of what they’re looking at is copyrightable work. So, the question then becomes if it’s fair use. Now, you ultimately can’t conclude definitively that something is fair use until you go to court and a judge agrees with your assessment. But I think there’s a strong case to be made that Copilot’s use of code is very transformative, a point which would favor the fair use argument. There is precedent for this sort of situation. Take the case of Google Books, for example. Google scanned millions of books, provided people who were doing research with the ability to search the book, and provided the user a small snippet of the text that the user was searching for in the book itself. The court did in fact find that was fair use. The use was very transformative. It allowed people to search millions of books. It didn’t substitute for the book itself. It didn’t really take away anything from the copyright holders; in fact, it made it easier for readers to access the work and actually opened a broader market for book authors. And, it was a huge value add on top of the copyrighted corpus. In the latter scenario, a lot depends on the thoroughness and the length of Copilot’s suggestions. The more complex and lengthy the suggestion, the more likely it has some sort of copyrightable expression. If a suggestion is short enough, the fact that it repeats something in someone else’s code may not make it copyrightable expression. There’s also the question of whether what’s being produced is actually a copy of what’s in the corpus. That’s a little unclear right now. GitHub reports that Copilot is mostly producing brand-new material, only regurgitating copies of learned code 0.1% of the time. But, we have seen certain examples online of the suggestions and those suggestions include fairly large amounts of code and code that clearly is being copied because it even includes comments from the original source code.

In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.

Question 1. Are technical identifiers personal data? Yes. If they identify a person. For example an IP Address is considered personal data, because a person or household can be identified by an IP. Yes, I know that technically there are a lot of exceptions. But in general, if you have an IP, you can identify the subscriber given the right databases. So if your identifier, lets say a generated GUID, identifies a customer or something the customer can be linked to, it is personal data. Question 2. Can technical identifiers be stored in measurement devices? Just because something is personal data, does not mean you are forbidden from using it. As long as you need it to do your job, you can store it. The internet would not work, if everybody was forbidden from storing any IP address. So to summarize it: yes, it is personal data since it identifies a subscriber. However, it is needed for the job your subscriber asked you to do. So for as long as the job takes, it is legal to store it. Once your job is done, you would be required to delete it. But consent trumps everything. If your subscriber consents to you keeping all data of such incidents to improve your network and handle future incidents better, then it's legal. Just let them sign it with your other legal paperwork. Done. No problem. You could just periodically delete all records that have no consent for long term storage beyond the current incident. Lets say every 24h or 48h. You should get the details on the wording of the paperwork and the period that it is legal to keep the data as "current incedent related" from your data protection officer or legal department.

Maybe, but probably not The geographic location of the organisation is immaterial: under Article 3.2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: ... (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. Posts anyone (not just EU citizens) make to Reddit (or anywhere else) while they are physically located in the EU or UK engage the GDPR. Pushift.io is therefore captured by the GDPR and any denial of that is just plain wrong. Given the denial, it is likely right out of the gate that they are non-complient. For example, they are unlikely to provided the required information under Article 14. More importantly, it seems that they have not determined the lawful basis for processing the data under Article 6 - they can possibly rely on the public interest basis (preserving deleted publication is arguably a public interest) or a legitimate interest but that requires a balancing of their interest against the data subject's. That said, the right to be forgotten is not absolute, the reasons that might be applicable here are: The data is being used to exercise the right of freedom of expression and information. The data is being used to perform a task that is being carried out in the public interest or when exercising an organization’s official authority. The data represents important information that serves the public interest, scientific research, historical research, or statistical purposes and where erasure of the data would likely to impair or halt progress towards the achievement that was the goal of the processing.

As far as I can tell, whenever GitHub redistributes code, it adheres to all of the requirements of the GPL/BSD etc. For example, it never gives away code without including the license text, and it doesn't claim to add unpermitted restrictions to the code. The section you're concerned about is this: That means you're giving us the right to do things like reproduce your content (so we can do things like copy it to our database and make backups); display it (so we can do things like show it to you and other users); modify it (so our server can do things like parse it into a search index); distribute it (so we can do things like share it with other users); and perform it (in case your content is something like music or video). That section isn't worded very precisely, but I understand this to mean they want to reproduce your content in full, not just the code without the license text attached. They want to display your content in full, as you provided it. They want to modify it internally (i.e. they are not redistributing this modified form) in order to allow searching. To the extent that they display code-snippets as search results, that is likely defensible as fair use (search engines are frequently cited as examples of successful fair use defenses). GitHub appears to be acting consistently with the GPL when it reproduces, displays, modifies, and distributes code that you upload. If I'm correct about these facts then nothing that GitHub does with the code goes beyond what the many contributors to a GPL project have explicitly permitted, or what is otherwise permitted by fair use law. If you had some code with a more restrictive license, you might not be able to simultaneously comply with that restrictive license and GitHub's License Grant. Consider the scenario where you have some code that is licensed exclusively to you, and you are not given permission to reproduce or distribute it. In that scenario, the code's license prevents you from agreeing to GitHub's request for a license grant.

First off: Legally, everything is copyrighted anyway. Licensing is not at all necessary. Hence, even if a court would disagree with # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0, that would just make it closed source. Having said that, the law generally doesn't bother with trivialities such as "file headers". Any commonly accepted way to state the copyright and license terms is OK. Your LICENSE is such a common convention. If you want to avoid all doubt what is covered under that license, put a reference to that LICENSE in each header. If you have just five files in one directory that are all licensed the same, I wouldn't even bother with that. Again, the default position is that everything is closed source.

To what degree do I have to comply to COPPA in this scenario? The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) is designed to restrict sites collecting information about children under the age of 13 years of age. If I am operating a general purpose web service that has, in its End User License Agreement (EULA) or Terms and Conditions/Terms of Use a clause that prohibits children under the age of 13 from registering on the site, am I still obligated to take action if they disregard this requirement?

COPPA is filled with references to "websites directed towards children or with actual knowledge the data was collected from a child." Actual knowledge means you actually did know; it's OK if you honestly and unreasonably thought the child was over 13, as that means you don't have actual knowledge. To quote the FTC (emphasis added): COPPA covers operators of general audience websites or online services only where such operators have actual knowledge that a child under age 13 is the person providing personal information. The Rule does not require operators to ask the age of visitors. However, an operator of a general audience site or service that chooses to screen its users for age in a neutral fashion may rely on the age information its users enter, even if that age information is not accurate. In some circumstances, this may mean that children are able to register on a site or service in violation of the operator’s Terms of Service. If, however, the operator later determines that a particular user is a child under age 13, COPPA’s notice and parental consent requirements will be triggered.

What is emancipation of a minor? As I understand it, in some states in the US, a minor (i.e. younger than 18) who is at least 16 years old, can petition the state for emancipation; i.e. legal separation from their parents, and allowed to enter the world as a legal adult, despite being younger than 18. However, in order to be granted this, the minor must prove that they are capable of supporting themselves financially, that they have somewhere to live, and a few other things. This is true in some places, but not others. There are two different concepts for emancipation under U.S. law, and most states follow one or the other. One concept is that emancipation is a factual reality that exists when a minor is self-supporting or supported by a spouse or significant other, and not living in the household of a parent. In states that follow this concept, such as Colorado, a court ruling that a minor is emancipated is simply a finding of fact about what is, rather than a grant of permission. Another concept is that a minor is, as a matter of law, not emancipated until a court grants minor permission to deviate from the status implied by their age. My understanding that this is the concept used in California. In these jurisdictions, emancipation is granted only after an good faith attempt to give notice to the parents and a hearing, and involves an assessment of the capacity of the minor to be self-supporting without parental assistance and involvement. The question is focused on this concept, but it is not the only one and it is probably a close call as to which approach is the majority rule in U.S. states. Even in "permission" states, however, entering military service or marriage usually results in emancipation as a matter of law without any formal court proceeding. Common fact patterns There are certainly cases in which the fact that a minor is married or living in the household of a significant other as a stay at home parent would establish emancipation. Another fairly common fact pattern would be a employee whose employer also provides housing. Another fairly common fact pattern is a situation in which the whereabouts of the minor's parents are unknown and the minor has, somehow, been managing. Sometimes you see this when a minor's parents die and the minor goes on in an isolated wilderness area, for example. Adoption is indeed not an option Adoption is not possible without a termination of the rights of the parents (or at least one of them in the case of a stepparent adoption). The legal guardianship option The preferred arrangement when living basically as a child in a supportive adult's household would usually be a guardianship, to the detriment of the parent's role in most decision-making for the minor, rather than emancipation. Here are some quotes from a recent case from Colorado (In re Interest of A.D., 2023 COA 6 (January 19, 2023)), with that fact pattern: ¶ 2 L.D. is the sole living parent of A.D., one of her three children. A.D. was sixteen at the time of the guardianship proceeding. Although L.D. and A.D. once shared a healthy relationship, it deteriorated dramatically during the summer and fall of 2021. This deterioration gave rise to Petitioners’ request for — and the district court’s grant of — an unlimited guardianship over A.D. We turn to that history now. ¶ 3 In June 2021, A.D.’s car was vandalized while parked in front of the family home. A.D. and his mother had a heated argument about why it happened and who was responsible for cleaning it. Upset by this conversation, A.D. went to stay at his girlfriend’s house. Although he soon returned home, A.D. ran away from home five more times following disagreements with L.D. ¶ 4 In early July 2021, L.D. gave A.D. an ultimatum: he could (1) go to military school, (2) attend therapeutic boarding school, or (3) abide by her house rules. A.D. ran away again that night, but this 2 time he spent over a month away from home, staying with his girlfriend, couch surfing at friends’ homes, or sleeping in public parks. ¶ 5 On August 7, 2021, A.D. was taken to the emergency room after appearing to overdose while partying with friends at a park. The hospital made a mandatory report to the Department of Human Services (DHS). Once A.D. was stable, L.D. and V.T. (L.D.’s longtime colleague and family friend) met with a DHS representative to discuss next steps. L.D. agreed that, given the hostility between A.D. and herself, and between A.D. and his two siblings (who both lived with L.D.), it was in his best interest to stay with Petitioners. ¶ 6 On September 8, 2021, A.D. drove Petitioners’ car to L.D.’s house for his first night back since early July. When he arrived, L.D. became extremely upset that he had driven there. In her mind, A.D.’s operation of a car — and Petitioners’ facilitation of it — violated their agreement that he not drive until certain conditions were met. The next morning, without notice to Petitioners or her son, L.D. called the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and withdrew her permission for A.D.’s driver’s license. The DMV revoked his license the next day. ¶ 7 A.D. became enraged when he learned that his mother had revoked her consent and subsequently sent a series of angry texts to her. L.D. then blocked A.D.’s number, thus preventing A.D.’s calls or texts from coming through to L.D.’s phone (though texts came through on her computer). ¶ 8 On September 24, 2021, DHS facilitated an “adults only” meeting with L.D., Petitioners, and DHS representatives. That meeting resulted in three shared priorities: (1) Petitioners were to provide regular updates about A.D. to L.D., who would, in turn, communicate with Petitioners before making decisions affecting A.D.; (2) A.D.’s license would be reauthorized within thirty days once to-be-defined conditions were met; and (3) A.D. would be allowed to be on the high school wrestling team, which all parties agreed was good for him. ¶ 9 Over the next month, Petitioners regularly emailed L.D. updates on A.D. L.D. provided few, if any, responses to these updates. Petitioners also sent L.D. a proposed plan for A.D. to get his license back, but L.D. did not respond. ¶ 10 On October 20, 2021, Petitioners filed their petition for appointment as A.D.’s guardians. L.D. objected to the petition, sought dismissal of the action, and requested attorney fees. ¶ 11 On November 8, 2021, Petitioners requested that the court appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent A.D.’s interests. Over L.D.’s objection, the court appointed a GAL pursuant to section 15-14-115, C.R.S. 2022, after concluding that, owing to their disagreement over the guardianship, the parties could not represent A.D.’s best interest in the guardianship proceedings. The GAL represented A.D.’s best interest throughout the litigation, and the court also instructed the GAL to provide a report about whether L.D. was “unable to exercise her parental rights.” ¶ 12 On November 14, 2021, before Petitioners filed their reply, L.D. — without consulting Petitioners or A.D. — revoked her permission for A.D. to wrestle the day before the first day of practice. Why she took this sudden action is unclear: L.D. testified it was because A.D. was not maintaining passing grades, while another witness testified that she wanted “leverage” over him to participate in family therapy. Regardless, A.D. was devastated by the timing and nature of this action. ¶ 13 While these motions were pending, Petitioners continued to care for A.D. Petitioners asked L.D. for permission to talk to A.D.’s teachers, coaches, and doctors about how to better care for him. Yet from August to early December 2021, L.D. refused to grant Petitioners permission to engage with these individuals. She ignored or outright refused to allow such communications until December 8, 2021, when, after repeated requests from a DHS representative, she allowed Petitioners to attend — but not participate in — a meeting with A.D.’s teachers. ¶ 14 L.D. also resisted Petitioners’ requests for financial support for A.D.’s care. To her credit, L.D. provided A.D. with $25 per week for groceries. These funds came from A.D.’s $1,800 monthly survivorship benefit, which was established following the death of A.D.’s father when A.D. was three. Petitioners knew the benefit existed and requested more financial support. L.D. did not respond to these requests. ¶ 15 Except for the text exchange between L.D. and A.D. following the revocation of L.D.’s consent for A.D.’s license, L.D. and A.D. never communicated directly. Instead, all such communications went through Petitioners or DHS. ¶ 16 Consistent with section 15-14-205(1), C.R.S. 2022, the district court conducted a hearing on Petitioners’ guardianship motion. The hearing spanned two days, with both sides calling numerous witnesses. ¶ 17 In a written order, the court granted Petitioners an unlimited guardianship over A.D. In so doing, the court concluded that Petitioners had proved by clear and convincing evidence that L.D. was, consistent with section 15-14-204(2)(c), “unwilling or unable” to care for A.D. and that the guardianship was in A.D.’s best interest notwithstanding his mother’s opposition to it. The linked appellate court decision then goes on to conduct legal analysis and affirms the trial court's ruling as correct. The official syllabus of the case summarizes that part of the opinion as follows: A division of the court of appeals reviews the guardianship appointment for a minor under section 15-14-204(2)(c), C.R.S. 2022. In so doing, the division adopts the analytical framework outlined in In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.J., 242 P.3d 1128 (Colo. 2010). Applying that framework to section 15-14- 204(2)(c), the division concludes that the moving party must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is (1) “unable or unwilling” to exercise their parental rights, and (2) the guardianship is in the best interest of the minor notwithstanding the parent(s)’ opposition to the guardianship. Moreover, in entering such an order, the court must articulate the “special factors” it relies upon to justify this interference with parental rights. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Utilizing that framework here, the division concludes that the court did not err in appointing a guardian for the minor.

There was no actual child who was caused to view the material, so there was no offense under that provision. By contrast, inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity is an inchoate offense, so it is not necessary for any harm to an actual victim to have occurred. Note that the relevant section of the Sexual Offenses Act 2003 concerns "causing or inciting," and that the charge was "inciting." The section concerning watching a sexual act, by contrast, only inludes "causing."

No, you're not required to sign any contracts. But since you're offering a service, you do have to manage some compliance tasks. You are a data controller under the UK GDPR, regardless of whether you have a company. This brings with it various compliance requirements. For example, you MUST post a privacy notice in accordance with Art 13 GDPR that explains how you process user's information. You must sign data processing agreements with your data processors, such as your server providers. And you should reconsider transfers of data to the US, since such transfers are illegal or at least quite questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. You now have prospective users that are asking you for an Art 28 data processing agreement (DPA). These are likely other organizations that are data controllers of their own. For them to use your browser extension, they either need to find a legal basis that allows them to share their user's/employee's data with you (controller to controller transfer), or they need you to act as their data processor (controller to processor transfer). The third alternative is not to use your plugin at all. Of these, a C2P arrangement is most convenient for these other orgs, but involves a bit of paperwork to set up first. If you want to act as their processor, this doesn't mean you'd have to create a company (though a corporation might be very desirable as a liability shield). Being a processor means that you're contractually bound to only use the personal data as instructed by the controller, and not for your own purposes. This restricts what you can do, and has some special compliance requirements. For example, you cannot engage new subprocessors without your controller's approval. However, processor status can also be convenient for you because you're not responsible for interacting with the controller's data subjects, e.g. you're not responsible for handling their data subject access requests. Note that it's possible to simultaneously be a controller for some users, and a processor for others. E.g. Google Docs is offered directly to users as a B2C product so that Google is a controller, but also as a B2B product as Google Workspace, where Google acts as a data processor. Personally, I'd rather not sign any contracts unless I'm doing it as a business, and adequately compensated for providing this service. GDPR is only one compliance aspect out of many, making it unwise to offer a SaaS product as a hobby. For example, copying other people's web content has copyright implications… A potential alternative for some of the organizations asking you might be to make it possible for them to self-host your backend, so that they are not required to rely on you as a data processor. If you have no plans to commercialize your software, making it Open Source could be a solution. But you're in no way required to do that if you don't want to.

What you're asking about is extraterritorial jurisdiction, and it will depend on the country and crime(s) involved. As an example, under Australian law, it is a crime to engage in sexual activities with minors barring specific exemptions, which are not relevant to this example. There are countries where the age of majority is less than that in Australia. If you were to travel to this country, you are not necessarily committing a crime there. However, Australia's sex tourism laws make it a crime to do this anywhere in the world. This is enacted (I believe) under the foreign affairs power of the Commonwealth Government. It will largely depend on the legal system of your country, as to whether laws have extraterritorial effect. In general, however, laws do not have extraterritorial effect unless explicitly stated.

Is this limitation enforceable? Sure it is; you agree to a TOS or EULA with the company to use the API, and that's a legally binding contract. If the contract stipulates limits to caching, that's enforceable in civil court by lawsuit (possibly criminal court, which will depend on jurisdiction). What if the end-user is the one caching the data on their end? If your end users might be caching, that's something you may need to outline in your own TOS/EULA to adhere to the API's stipulations. And, the API may not allow you to serve API data to your own users; read it and see. the information provided by the API is not proprietary,... That doesn't matter; you're using their API and service. If you don't like that, you need to write your own API or develop your own queries for the information. I'm designing a web application that will make use of a (non-free) third-party API. If that App is going to be distributed and used by others, talk to a lawyer about the API and have them write a TOS/EULA for your App; you run the risk of significant legal liability with a publicly distributed App that uses someone else's API, paid or free.

One way in which it holds legal water is that if you use the website in violation of the terms, then you may forfeit your right to take civil action against the company. Analogous language especially regarding the age of the user may protect the site against actions by third party governmental entities (COPPA-like laws), though nothing patently obvious springs to mind (insofar as this deals with firearms and there is also an age 21 restriction both on the web site and in terms of US firearms law, this is not a totally crazy idea). The citation of 18 USC 1030 non-probatively points to an issue which may be disposed of by SCOTUS in US v. van Buren, that knowingly violating the terms of service is a crime (a proposition rejected by lower courts, see US v. Valle). Facebook v. Power Ventures in particular clarifies how "being put on notice" may make such unauthorized access indeed "unauthorized access" in the statutorily-relevant sense. This does not prevent a legally-authorized law enforcement investigation, pursuant to para (f), but if the "violation of TOS = unauthorized access" theory is upheld, it limits how LEOs can legally access the website (and the limitations extend past LEOs). It is a separate and potentially interesting question whether there actually are any legal limits on the investigative powers of the government – if any law enforcement officer has the liberty to investigate anyone they want, with no supervision or requirement of justification, then this would be a rather gaping loophole in their legal strategy. Web pages involve massive copying of copyright-protected data, and the function of terms of use is in part to conditionally grant access to that copyright-protected content. When a person copies protected material from someone's web page having been explicitly denied permission to copy, they run the risk of an infringement lawsuit.

It is neither legal nor illegal, but would depend on the circumstances. For example, such use of a smart assistant might be perfectly fine if the childcare provider could demonstrate a legitimate interest for using the smart assistant, and gave reasonable notice about audio being recorded. Parental permission is likely not necessary. In practice, doing this right would be far too much effort. For example: Has the necessary information per GDPR Art 13 been provided, taking into account the EDPB guidelines on transparency? Under what legal basis are conversations sent to Amazon, an US-based provider, taking into account the Schrems II ruling? How will data subject rights be satisfied, in particular the right to access to these recordings, the right to erasure, and the right to object to further processing? Having discovered such processing of personal data that isn't necessarily kosher, a parent/guardian might start by objecting (GDPR Art 21) to further processing. This could be satisfied by powering off the Alexa devices in all rooms where the child is expected to be. The childcare should respond within one month. If no satisfactory response has been received, one option would be to lodge a complain with the supervisory authority, which would be the ICO in the UK.

How to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? (This is a follow-up question from How to make sure my website complies with things like COPPA?) COPPA stands for Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule. In their FAQ they say "yes, you can block children under 13 from visiting your website if you choose to" (assuming the website is not directed to children - and for the sake of this question, indeed it is not). Great! But later on they say that I should ask their age in a certain manner that confuses me. Quoting FTC's COPPA FAQ: G. GENERAL AUDIENCE, TEEN, AND MIXED-AUDIENCE SITES OR SERVICES 3. Can I block children under 13 from my general audience website or online service? Yes. COPPA does not require you to permit children under age 13 to participate in your general audience website or online service, and you may block children from participating if you so choose. By contrast, you may not block children from participating in a website or online service that is directed to children as defined by the Rule. See FAQ D.2 above. If you choose to block children under 13 on your general audience site or service, you should take care to design your age screen in a manner that does not encourage children to falsify their ages to gain access to your site or service. Ask age information in a neutral manner at the point at which you invite visitors to provide personal information or to create a user ID. In designing a neutral age-screening mechanism, you should consider: Making sure the data entry point allows users to enter their age accurately. An example of a neutral age-screen would be a system that allows a user freely to enter month, day, and year of birth. A site that includes a drop-down menu that only permits users to enter birth years making them 13 or older, would not be considered a neutral age-screening mechanism since children cannot enter their correct ages on that site. Avoiding encouraging children to falsify their age information, for example, by stating that visitors under 13 cannot participate or should ask their parents before participating. In addition, simply including a check box stating, “I am over 12 years old” would not be considered a neutral age-screening mechanism. In addition, consistent with long standing Commission advice, FTC staff recommends using a cookie to prevent children from back-buttoning to enter a different age. Note that if you ask participants to enter age information, and then you fail either to screen out children under age 13 or to obtain their parents’ consent to collecting these children’s personal information, you may be liable for violating COPPA. See, e.g., the FTC’s COPPA cases against Path, Inc., Playdom, Inc. and Sony BMG Music Entertainment. This is looking weird to me. So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? Please re-read this part: In addition, consistent with long standing Commission advice, FTC staff recommends using a cookie to prevent children from back-buttoning to enter a different age. Note that if you ask participants to enter age information, and then you fail either to screen out children under age 13 or to obtain their parents’ consent to collecting these children’s personal information, you may be liable for violating COPPA. Their suggestion about using a cookie can be easily bypassed. For example: if a child tries to register and gets blocked for being too young, the child can use another computer and then claim to be older (this was just an example, there are thousands of ways to bypass that). Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? Note: I have read this question, and I think its answer might be incomplete, considering my question here.

So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? You can tell them after they fail, you cannot tell them on the asking screen. Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? I agree with you that it is odd that they recommend using a cookie but they do!* So you have a entry page with a simple question, "Please indicate your age" and then block based on the response. That's it. Note that the rule is neutral. This means that you do not need to disguise your purpose or try to trick people into entering their correct age. *I think that what is happening here is that any parent who wants to complain to their legislator can be met with the response, "If your kid is so sneaky that they are using different computers to lie about their age what do you want us to do about it?" The fact is, this scheme keeps innocent kids from seeing stuff they shouldn't; the sneaky ones are going to find a way.

Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details.

Yes, a site may check for a cookie indicating past consent before prompting for consent to read and store cookies When people speak of the "Cookie law" they usually mean the ePrivacy Directive, (ePD) more formally the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/EC. The full text of the directive is here First of all, being a directive and not a regulation, the ePD is not itself legally binding. Instead it instructs the legislatures of member states to implement it, which they generally have done. So the actual binding law is the law of a particular country, which could vary from the wording of the directive. However, in this case, my understanding is that the implementations do not vary significantly. An updated and revised ePrivacy Regulation (ePR) has been proposed, which would replace the ePD and complement the GDPR. But there has been dispute over the proposed terms of the ePR, and it has not yet been passed. Article 5 section (3) of the ePD reads: Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user. Notice that this covers both writing (storing) and reading (gaining access to) cookies and other information stored on a user's device. Cookies ar one form of such locally stored information (LSI). Note that the GDPR, which replaces Directive 95/46/EC, is used to define "consent" in the ePD. In general, one must have consent to read or store, and consent must be sought only when the user has been given "clear and comprehensive information ... about the purpose" of the stored information. The relevant exception for this question is that information (including cookies) which is "strictly necessary" to provide a service specifically requested by the user. Here the user has requested access to the web site, and may have previously agreed to accept cookies. The site must prompt for consent if the user has not previously consented (and the site will store cookies not strictly needed), and should not if the user has. Therefore, it is strictly necessary to check for and read if present a cookie indicating that such consent has previously been granted. If such a cookie is not found, no consent has been granted. Strictly required LSI should not have a dual purpose where one purpose is not strictly needed. For example, an "I accept cookies" cookie should not also be used for tracking. That should be done (if at all) with a separate cookie, and only after consent is received. Note that there should be an easily found and easily used method or link on the site (preferably on each page of the site) to review the purposes of stored or accessed LSI, and to withdraw previous consent. If consent is withdrawn, the cookie indicating that consent has been granted should be erased, as should any cookies or other LSI not strictly needed to provide the services requested by the user. Keep in mind that the legal distinction is not between cookies that contain "technical" information and those that do not. That is not relevant. Nor is the distinction between cookies that might be used to identify a person and those that do not. The legal distinction is between cookies (or other LSI) that are strictly needed to provide the services requested by the user, and all other LSI. Strictly needed LSI does not require consent, all other LSI does. For example, a random string, used to determine the number of unique visitors, but not linked to any identifying info about the user, does not help to identify an individual user. But it is not strictly needed, so it can only be stored with consent. Data that are associated with an identifiable natural person (human being, not a firm or organization), are governed by the GDPR (where it applies). There must be a lawful basis for processing such data, which includes reading them from LSI, and storing them. Consent is one of the six possible bases for such processing, but consent need not be obtained if another lawful basis applies. When consent is the basis, it must be easily withdrawn by the user. Note that this applies to all data (PI) that is associated with a person, not just data that can readily be used to identify the person (PII). Note that other workflows are also lawful. For one example, if a site is a strictly membership site, it could prompt for a login before reading or storing any LSI, and then read previous preferences stored on the server by that user to determine whether consent for cookies has been granted. Conclusion A cookie indicating that consent to access and store cookies hs previously been given by a particular user can lawfully be read before a user is prompted for consent, under the ePD and its implementing laws.

Does Amazon prohibit a family of adults from sharing a single Amazon account? No, or at least it seems unlikely. As outlined in my answer & comments on Law Meta, a domestic or family-oriented character is palpable in the clause. That weakens the notion that Amazon's intent is to preclude scenarios which are of a personal-domestic nature and short of commercial/sublicensed use. The language "You are responsible for [...] restricting access to your account" seems more permissive than something akin to "only you are allowed to access your account". The former language is consistent with the term "non-exclusive", which otherwise seems to have no relevance or purpose in the clause. Users' ability (if any) to enter multiple payment methods with different names (i.e., card holder name) could be an additional indication that the scenario you have in mind is acceptable to Amazon. It is easy for a company to implement a validation for the purpose of identifying significant discrepancies of holder names and/or to have the user confirm that all payment methods refer to one same owner. The latter approach is more conclusive for scenarios where a woman has changed names as a result of getting married or divorced. The fact (?) that Amazon declined to include that simple validation weakens the notion that the company is genuinely interested in sticking to a rule of one-person per account.

It is neither legal nor illegal, but would depend on the circumstances. For example, such use of a smart assistant might be perfectly fine if the childcare provider could demonstrate a legitimate interest for using the smart assistant, and gave reasonable notice about audio being recorded. Parental permission is likely not necessary. In practice, doing this right would be far too much effort. For example: Has the necessary information per GDPR Art 13 been provided, taking into account the EDPB guidelines on transparency? Under what legal basis are conversations sent to Amazon, an US-based provider, taking into account the Schrems II ruling? How will data subject rights be satisfied, in particular the right to access to these recordings, the right to erasure, and the right to object to further processing? Having discovered such processing of personal data that isn't necessarily kosher, a parent/guardian might start by objecting (GDPR Art 21) to further processing. This could be satisfied by powering off the Alexa devices in all rooms where the child is expected to be. The childcare should respond within one month. If no satisfactory response has been received, one option would be to lodge a complain with the supervisory authority, which would be the ICO in the UK.

You have to serve the defendant Unless and until you do, you aren’t going to court. If you can’t find the defendant, you can’t sue the defendant. Rules of service vary by jurisdiction but under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) implemented in all jurisdictions in australia they are (for an individual): hand it to the defendant leave it in the presence of the defendant and explain what it is leave it with a person at the defendant's home address who appears to be over the age of 16 years and living at that address leave it at the defendant's work address, with a person who appears to be over the age of 16 years, if the defendant is a sole trader ask the Local Court to post it to the defendant either at the defendant's work address if they are a sole trader, or the defendant's residential address. So, it is really not that hard. However, if this proves too difficult, you can apply to the court for substituted service. Courts will generally allow any method where you can prove that the Statement of Claim came to the defendant’s attention. For example, service by Facebook has been acceptable.

You need a privacy notice for any website (if you're subject to GDPR). Having a PayPal button alone does not trigger such an requirement, since any website is already processing personal data such as IP addresses even if there's no third party content. But it's good that you think about issues for including third party content. As rulings such as the Fashion ID case and the more recent Google Fonts judgement have clarified, you are responsible having a suitable legal basis when you cause visitor's personal data to be disclosed to third parties. Even just embedding/loading a button or logo can cause personal data such as IP addresses to be disclosed to the recipients. You might have a legal basis if earlier, the user already opted in to payment with PayPal (could be consent per Art 6(1)(a) GDPR, or necessity for performing the contract per Art 6(1)(b)). Loading the embedded content just because the user might want to use it is probably not compliant though. For example, the common PayPal donation button is problematic. Thus, instead of linking a PayPal SDK, you might want to host the code + assets for the PayPal payment functionality on your own servers, or only load the PayPal content after the user unambiguously indicated that they want to use this content. I've discussed the PayPal donate button previously, as well as background on the Fashion ID case and click-to-consent wrappers for embedded content. What the Fashion ID case made very clear though is that you're only responsible for compliance for those data processing activity where you can actually influence the “purposes and means” of processing. You have no control over what PayPal does with the data on their servers, so they are solely responsible for that. And if the PayPal button navigates to a PayPal website, you're not responsible for what cookies PayPal sets on its own website. It is thus correct that the PayPal popup has its own cookie banner – you are not responsible for the contents of the popup. You also don't need to collect consent for cookies and similar technologies that are strictly necessary to provide a service that was explicitly requested by the user. For example, session cookies, XSRF protection cookies, and cookies containing a shopping cart are often such strictly necessary cookies. You must still be transparent about the use of such cookies, but you probably don't need a banner to announce this. So I think that you can probably go without a cookie banner, though you should probably get consent before loading PayPal content into your page, and you will likely want to be transparent about cookies as part of your privacy notice.

Summary: there's no minimum age; rather, you must use the seat in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Instructions for reversible seats typically do not depend on age but on the child's weight and height. Arkansas law (AR Code § 27-34-104 (2020)): (a) While operating a motor vehicle on a public road, street, or highway of this state, a driver who transports a child under fifteen (15) years of age in a passenger automobile, van, or pickup truck, other than one operated for hire, shall provide for the protection of the child by properly placing, maintaining, and securing the child in a child passenger restraint system properly secured to the vehicle and meeting applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards in effect on January 1, 1995. (b) A child who is less than six (6) years of age and who weighs less than sixty pounds (60 lbs.) shall be restrained in a child passenger safety seat properly secured to the vehicle. (c) If a child is at least six (6) years of age or at least sixty pounds (60 lbs.) in weight, a safety belt properly secured to the vehicle shall be sufficient to meet the requirements of this section. The key passage is "properly placing, maintaining, and securing the child in a child passenger restraint system properly secured to the vehicle." This implies that you can put the seat in the forward-facing position only if it is designed to be used that way and then only when the manufacturer's instructions say that it's acceptable. In my experience this typically depends on the child's height and weight rather than on the age. For example, one manufacturer says of its seats [Convertible seats] in the rear-facing mode should be used for children weighing 5-40 lbs, with a height of less than 49 in. and whose head is 1 in. or more below the top of the car seat. [Convertible seats] in the forward-facing mode should be used for children weighing 22-65 lbs. and height less than 49 in. and can walk unassisted and whose top of the ears are below the top of the car seat. So if the instructions for your seat have the same criteria then you can turn it around when the child reaches 22 lbs. CDC weight data for boys shows that virtually every 21-month-old boy is heavier than this (note that the data are in kilograms and that 22 lbs is 9.979 kg). Therefore, the legal answer is that there is no minimum age; the requirement is to use the device "properly." Follow the manufacturer's instructions. (Aside: the incorrect belief about the 2-year threshold could be a widespread misconception among Arkansas police. If this is so, and if they are therefore in the habit of ticketing people for having children under 2 in a forward-facing seat, then you could get a ticket. You might be able to convince the officer of the reasoning in this answer, but you might not, in which case you would have to take it to court to show that you were following the manufacturer's instructions and therefore the law. You will have to weigh the potential hassle of having to do this, including the likelihood of its happening or not, against the benefit of letting your child see the back of your head while you're driving. My guess is that you're unlikely to get a ticket for several reasons, and that your child is likely to be significantly happier facing forward, but I don't know Arkansas police and I don't know your child.) If you do not have the instructions for your seat, you should be able to find them online. Some seats are not designed to be used facing forward. If yours is such a seat, you will need to get one that is. Remember that complying with the law may seem more important because you're more likely to get pulled over by a police officer than to be in a collision. But in fact the most important consideration is safety. If you are in a collision you will want your child to have the greatest protection possible.

Can I post edited comedy images of Indian politician in social website I edited an image of an Indian politician. Added some comedy picture taken from a Tamil movie. And also wrote some thing funny about that politicians. Is that legal. Can I post that image to a social website.. Do I face any problem in future for posting such images. What does the law say.

Legally you face no problem. The section 66A of the Indian IT Act, which used to be previously misused for penalizing anyone who dared insult a politician, has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India. But the police could still detain you for 48 hours (legally) without giving any grounds; they are required to do that, but the police are seldom held accountable. The supporters of the said politician can vandalize your home and office without fear of legal action. I am not a lawyer. Whatever is posted above is my opinion and data that I believe to be true to the best of my knowledge and resources available to me. Please contact a lawyer for professional advice.

No. Twitter is traditionally a platform, not a distributor or a publisher. Blocking linking is not editorializing like in a publisher. They don't act as an editor in mounting warnings or deleting posts, they enforce their rights under the Communications Decency Act, Section 230 (emphasis mine): No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.

At least as of 2011, when regulations under the Information Technology Act related to privacy and data security were issued (some of the relevant statute sections and regulations are linked in this answer at Law.SE), there was no non-contractual right to have your data destroyed, although a terms of service for a site could give you that right contractually. Instead, usually, a term of service agreement will do exactly the opposite and give a site owner an irrevocable right to keep your data forever. I am not aware of any subsequent statutory, regulatory or case law developments in India which have changed this situation, but that kind of tweak of IT Act regulations in India wouldn't necessary make headlines outside of the local IT industry press coverage in obscure trade journals. The EU is the only place of which I am aware that has any individual right to have data destroyed or suppressed even if it doesn't violated copyright, wasn't obtained illegally and isn't fraudulent or defamatory. Even then, as I understand it, in the EU this is not a unilateral right that applies in all circumstances and is instead a specific remedy for certain situations that have a particularly intense privacy aspect to them.

This sucks. It is also legal. It's a private school, they can admit who they like (provided they don't discriminate on the grounds of protected characteristics like "religion" or "caste").

If there is a trade mark and if Polaroid owns it and if you infringed it then yes they can force you to remove it. In addition, they could sue you for either damages (i.e. what they lost because of your infringement) or an account of profits (i.e. what you made because of your infringement). That is what trade mark law is for! If the trade mark is registered then this is trivially easy for them to demonstrate. If it is unregistered then it becomes a question of if the mark is clearly recognisable as Polaroid's; IMO they could probably show that it is - those particular border dimensions were distinctive of Polaroid instant cameras for many years. If you want to republish the app, you could probably avoid trade mark issues by allowing users to set the dimensions of the photograph and border, the colour of the border and the location of the caption.

There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement.

Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability.

Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.

Religious Freedom, Housing, and Apostasy I was raised in the LDS (Mormon) church and am an official member. I am currently attending college and rooming in an apartment complex owned by said church. To make a long story short, I am now seriously considering formally resigning from the church and am worried about how this will affect my living situation. One practically has to be a church member for an application to reside in this complex to be considered: 98% of the tenants are members. If being a non-member is hard enough, I can't imagine how it would be for a former member (culturally referred to as an apostate, with the term practically being a curse word in Mormon theology). It's no secret that organizations cannot discriminate against individuals on religious basis. But when the time to renew my contract arrives, and I'm denied, or they terminate my residency immediately, do I have legal recourse? Also, I live in Michigan, with a state-level reinforcement of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Is enforcing religious neutrality in a housing complex owned by a church a 'compelling governmental interest'? I'm also generally unaware of the LDS church's handling of legal affairs or how they'd react to this situation. Any research I've attempted to do has lead me to extremely biased sites. Any solid information is appreciated, as I may just be worried over nothing. I also have the option to just fly under the radar and remain 'inactive' (but still on the records) until my economic situation changes and I can move out. However, I really don't want to feel like my hand is being forced. Amendment: Apparently students at BYU (one of the church's largest universities) are expelled if they apostatize. How is this even legal?

What that church is doing is legal. There is a statutory exception in the Fair Housing Act for religious and non-profit organizations. 42 U.S. Code § 3607 - Religious organization or private club exemption Nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society, from limiting the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion, or from giving preference to such persons, unless membership in such religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national origin. Nor shall anything in this subchapter prohibit a private club not in fact open to the public, which as an incident to its primary purpose or purposes provides lodgings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose, from limiting the rental or occupancy of such lodgings to its members or from giving preference to its members.

Standing requirements are different in state and federal courts, and from one state to the next. A random individual would not have standing to object to a stranger's abortion in federal court, and likely not in any state court, under normal circumstances, as they are not injured in any meaningful way by the abortion. I don't know what the normal rules of standing are in Texas, but it is likely perfectly acceptable for the Legislature to wave its wand to grant standing to whomever it wants regarding any violation of the law it sees for. That seems to be what is happening here.

Both Title VII of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended), and the Americans with Disabilities Act(ADA) as amended, provide that employer mandates are subject to "reasonable accommodations" for "sincere religious beliefs". If any mandate was based on or subject to either of those laws, requests for accommodation would need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. The belief does not have to be a tenant of any church or organized religious group, but may be purely individual. State laws granting religious exemptions might also apply. However, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) the US Supreme court wrote: Thus, he [a parent] cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243. Prince was a case of a child labor law (selling religious pamphlets in the streets) not an actual vaccination case, so the above statement was not strictly binding precedent. Whether it would now be considered good law I cannot say unless it coems up oin a current case. To the best of my knowledge, no major religion or denomination objects to vaccines as such, although some do object to vaccines developed using fetal stem cells. I believe that at one time the Jehovah's Witnesses did so object (one of them was the appellant in Prince) but they no longer hold that view. At least some individuals have expressed such objections, but most expressed objections to vaccines or vaccine mandates have not been on religious grounds.

As stated, this is not a reasonable restriction and runs afoul of the Fair Housing Act. You cannot discriminate based on family status, with an exemption for "housing for older persons", and the act "does not limit the applicability of reasonable local, state, or federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling" (let's leave aside HOA restrictions for a moment). The number of occupants can legally be restricted in terms of a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest such as parking availability, safety, noise or securing the property. A restriction based on square footage or number of bedrooms might be reasonable: a blanket rule "no more than 4 people" is not reasonable. This article notes some of the state complication in interpreting "marital status", in terms of "not being married to each other".

You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over.

There are several reasons people wish to get a marriage annulled. I'll try to list them in order of frequency -- though I'm unaware of any statistics that confirm that my ordering is correct. Money. As per Nij's comment, when people are divorced, their property is subdivided 50-50. If one person can get away with an annulment, and keep the property which he earned, then it will be in his interests to do so. Religious reasons. As per SJuan76's comments, several churches, including Catholic, Mormon, and Russian Baptist, do not allow a person to marry if his previous spouse is still alive. An annulment is a way around that. Fraud marriages. This is rare, but under Trump it happens more often then you might think. People (usually women) come to the US illegally, marry someone (generally significantly older), and after the wedding day they are never again seen by their spouse. They use their marriage certificate to ensure permission to stay in the US -- but, they were never interested in marrying that person in the first place. When found, often such people are living with another illegal alien "as a boyfriend", with kids born before the fraud marriage even took place. It is in such cases, that their new spouse often tries to attain an annulment of the marriage -- to make sure that the illegal alien doesn't get rewarded for cheating them. Personal reasons. For some people, having never been married means it's easier to get a spouse who also has never been married -- and being able to check the "Single -- Never married" box on a form is always a plus in such cases. Now, don't ask me why people prefer to marry someone who's never been married, over someone who's been divorced. :) Incest. Under the US law, if you marry someone who's your close relative, then you are guilty of a felony -- even if you didn't know they're your close relative at the time of marriage. However, if you annul the marriage, then you can avoid prosecution.

united-states Since "lying" is not a clearly-defined legal concept, we need to look at a specific kind of (non)statement. Some lies are plainly illegal, for instance saying in the context of a sale that "this column is made of pressure-treated lumber" when in fact it is make of sand and Elmer's glue is fraud. A receptionist being told to say "Mr. Smith is at a conference in New York" when he is actually drunk in Chicago is a legal lie. Now the question is, who can refuse to tell this lie (without suffering employment consequences), and on what grounds? Generally, in the US you can be ordered to tell such a legal lie as part of your employment duties. If I refuse, I can be fired. If you refuse, you can request a reasonable accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since you proffer that your religion requires you to tell the truth / forbids you from telling a falsehood. If you make a claim for a religious accommodation, then the issue becomes whether there is a reasonable alternative. Such an accommodation might be that you instead say "Mr. Smith is not available"; or perhaps someone else who does not have a religious objection will be forced to act as receptionist for the day. This is specifically about religion. "I don't want to" or any similar idea does not provide protection against being fired. However, bear in mind that there is no official list of approved religions and their beliefs which the courts will refer to in determining whether your refusal was protected. If you claim "As a Pastafarian, I can't lie", the courts will not accept the premise that declaring yourself to be Pastafarian (a parody "religion") is valid. The available governmental resources on the fine line between general moral code and religious beliefs are quite sparse.

The First Amendment essentially prohibits the establishment of a list of approved vs. not-approved religions. There is a large body of First Amendment case law that relates to claimed religious beliefs, and the restriction that the government cannot prohibit a person from exercising their religious beliefs. The courts therefore avoid bright-line answers to the question. You can look at Friedman v. Southern Cal. Permanente for an example where a court found that a belief is not a religious belief, finding that veganism is not a "religious creed" within the meaning of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Plaintiff was told to get a mumps vaccination (which involves chicken embryo) as a condition of employment, refused, and the offer of employment was refused. The law, §12940a makes it unlawful "because of the religious creed of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person...". Subdivision (l) says that Religious belief or observance, as used in this section, includes, but is not limited to, observance of a Sabbath or other religious holy day or days, reasonable time necessary for travel prior and subsequent to a religious observance, and religious dress practice and religious grooming practice as described in subdivision (q) of Section 12926. §12296(q) further contributes a definition of religious terms: “Religious creed,” “religion,” “religious observance,” “religious belief,” and “creed” include all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice, including religious dress and grooming practices. “Religious dress practice” shall be construed broadly to include the wearing or carrying of religious clothing, head or face coverings, jewelry, artifacts, and any other item that is part of an individual observing a religious creed. “Religious grooming practice” shall be construed broadly to include all forms of head, facial, and body hair that are part of an individual observing a religious creed. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission then created a regulation California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 7293.1 that defines "religious creed" ‘Religious creed’ includes any traditionally recognized religion as well as beliefs, observations, or practices which an individual sincerely holds and which occupy in his or her life a place of importance parallel to that of traditionally recognized religions. The court notes that religious creed extends beyond traditionally recognized religions to encompass beliefs, observations, or practices occupying a parallel place of importance “to that of traditionally recognized religions” in an individual's life. The court then points to the leading cases from the Supreme Court related to deciding what a religion is: US v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 and Welsh v. US, 398 U.S. 333. And the court points out that government agencies are granted wide latitude in interpreting enabling legislation (under which the government might allow or disallow an action). It us noted that as of 2002, there were no California cases deciding what constitutes a religious creed w.r.t. FEHA and that regulation. The court then recited various statements from other California cases regarding the characterization of a religion – the main relevant point is that a religion does not have to be theistic to be a "religion". The court also reviews federal employment discrimination laws, and again considers the difference between traditional and non-traditional religions. There are many snippets in the review of the law section saying things such as that the court should find beliefs to be a religion if they ‘occupy the same place in the life of the [individual] as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified.’ We can now move to the question in §6, Is Veganism a Religious Creed For Purposes of the FEHA. This court states that The test we apply is that set forth in Judge Adams's concurring opinion in Malnak which has been adopted by the Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits which they say presents the best objective method for answering the question whether a belief plays the role of a religion and functions as such in an individual's life At this point, we can't reasonably guess how some individual would object on religious grounds to the vaccination mandate, but we do at least know what aspects of the law would be relevant and where the "rules" are laid down. Until someone actually alleges that they have a religious belief that prohibits vaccination, we can't analyze those arguments. The gist of the "veganism is not a religion" is it is too narrow a belief to constitute a religious belief. The court found that did not find that it is a "belief system (which) addresses fundamental or ultimate questions", and that it does not a address fundamental questions such as "the meaning of human existence; the purpose of life; theories of humankind's nature or its place in the universe; matters of human life and death; or the exercise of faith".

What are the limits on police "qualified immunity"? When the police seize property in the course of their official duties, they have "qualified immunity." How is that immunity qualified? I.e., what are the minimal conditions under which they could be stripped of that immunity and subject to criminal charges like Theft? To take the most extreme example I can think of: A police officer encounters you during the investigation of a crime. You happen to be moving that day, so all of your belongings are in "plain view" between the yard, open house, and open moving truck. The cop decides he really doesn't like you and so, even though there is no nexus between you or your property and the crime he is investigating he decides to seize all of your property as "evidence." Because it's in "plain view" he doesn't need a warrant. He properly logs your property into evidence, and then lets you know you won't see it until the case has been adjudicated. (What case, and when will that be? He won't tell you because it's an open investigation, but he notes that these things can drag on for years. I.e., he articulates an intent to deprive you of your property for so long a period as to satisfy the requirements of Theft.) Is this cop immune to any criminal charge for this action? What if you, as the victim, can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not follow proper procedures. E.g., he took something that was provably exempt from the "plain view" doctrine and therefore should have not been taken without a warrant, which he did not have?

Qualified immunity is a doctrine that protects government officials (including police) from civil liability in §1983 suits. Anderson v. Creighton describes the legal standard - objective legal reasonableness. There is no condition that would strip an officer of civil immunity and open him up to criminal liability because the criminal charges could attach regardless of the disposition of civil liability. I say "could" because who is going to charge and prosecute the crime? The CATO Institute tracks police misconduct. Not all misconduct is criminal, but reading through their site will give you an idea of why it is difficult to determine when and why cops are charged with crimes. Only a small fraction of the 17,000 law enforcement agencies actually track their own misconduct in a semi-public manner, and even when they do, the data they provide is generic and does not specify what misconduct occurred, who did it, and what the end result was.

There is no hard and fast rule to determine what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the first instance, the judge (or jury, when there is a jury trial) decides this on a case by case basis. If the officer testifies that the matters recorded in the ticket are true because it was the officer's practice to always record accurately what happened in a ticket, this would ordinarily not be grounds for reversal of a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, unless other evidence somehow put the officer's testimony in serious doubt (e.g. a social media post clearly putting the officer in another location at the time that the ticket was allegedly issued). Normally, the only kind of evidence that would not result in a ticket being upheld on appeal would be the failure of the officer to testify at all.

In the Hicks case, police entered the premise, reasonably, pursuant a bullet having been fired from Hicks' apartment into a person in the apartment below. There were expensive stereo components in plain sight, which raised a reasonable suspicion. But that reasonable suspicion did not justify a further search, which police nevertheless conducted: they turned the stereo to get the serial numbers. Having phoned in the numbers and learning that the items were stolen, they then had probable cause for a seizure. That cause was, however, obtained via an illegal search. Suppose that the serial numbers had been visible from the front: then because they would have been in plain view and since the police were there for a reasonable search related to the shooting, then could have legally seized the stereo, since no additional search was required. There is no distinction between search and seizure w.r.t. 4th Amendment protection ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"). Police could not confiscate the stereo without probable cause, nor could they confiscate cash, or any other thing, again, unless they had probable cause. And they could not search for evidence that would give them probable cause to take stuff. As SCOTUS said, regarding searches versus seizures, We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in the particular circumstances before us here.

The police would still be able to get a warrant even if there was no suspicion against the current owners, provided that there was reasonable evidence to suggest that the body was in the garden. In the event that the police enter the garden and see something like the marijuana plants, plain sight doctrine would allow the police to charge the owners with growing marijuana. If there was something like a green house, separate from the garden area that the body may be located in, the search warrant, if limited in scope, may not apply to the greenhouse. This depends on how specific the location of the body is believed to be: anywhere in the garden? or right behind the house against the wall? The odds are good the police would bring in a cadaver dog (included in the warrant) and patrol the garden to see if the dog finds anything.

The general rule is that a warrant is required to enter private property (absent constitutional case law exceptions to the warrant requirement such as exigent circumstances and consent), and that a warrant is available only when there is probable cause that a crime has been committed. Whether the neglect or abuse of an animal constitutes a crime within the meaning of this 4th Amendment requirement could potentially be seen as a gray area, since historically, in the absence of statutory authority in early common law, an owner of an animal had absolute authority to deal with his or her property (the animal) as the owner of the animal saw fit. The purpose of the statute is to clarify that this conduct by an animal owner constitutes a crime for 4th Amendment search and seizure purposes by making a state law determination that it is a crime, which states can do, even though they can't change the constitutional requirement under the 4th Amendment. Also, just because a state can authorize law enforcement to get a warrant for any search authorized by the U.S. Constitution, that doesn't mean it has to allow law enforcement to do so in every case where it is constitutional for the state to do so. The duty to get a warrant for law enforcement to enter onto private property at all arises not only from other state statutes, but also from the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (as incorporated to apply against state and local governments though the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). But, the constitutional requirement has case law exceptions, so it isn't required in all circumstances. In particular, exigent circumstances, and the consent to entry exceptions, which are allowed by constitutional criminal procedure case law, could apply to the requirement to get a warrant in the first place. But, law enforcement needs to have the authority to search at all with a warrant under state law, for an exception to the warrant requirement to be relevant. This statute appears to carry out that purpose by authorizing searches for this particular purpose. For what it is worth, it is not the best drafted possible statute to achieve this objective, and it could have been written to be more clear, but it still gets the job done. So, in answer to the top-line question, no, I wouldn't read this statute as requiring a warrant in every possible circumstance in order to go onto private property to check on an animal, although a warrant would be required in every case where an exception to the warrant requirement under 4th Amendment case law does not apply. Section 578. Is an animal related statute rather than people. The people involved are the property owners. The property owner's rights in their real property are potentially infringed if there is a warrantless entry. The human beings owning the animals are potentially violating a law which the State of Missouri wants law enforcement officers to be able to enforce (the relevant laws are the state animal cruelty and agricultural laws expressly referenced in the statute, so, it is irrelevant that "Barry County Missouri has no animal control laws or leash laws"). Among other things these statutes make it a crime if a person "Has custody or ownership of an animal and fails to provide adequate care[.]" As the question claims that: "The definition "Adequate care" is vague as well." But the question also notes that: "The 578 statute has been challenged for being unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary which was overruled but that was serious abuse case." The state has a right to decide what is and is not illegal. It is not prohibited from banning treatment of animals that is not serious abuse. The state has every right to make it a crime to fail to provide adequate care for an animal, even if that failure to provide adequate car does not constitute severe abuse. Also, keep in mind that a lawful search requires only probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and a good faith belief that an exception to the warrant requirement is present. If the law enforcement officer has a good faith belief that the animal will die or seriously suffer or be hidden by the owner in the time that the law enforcement officer reasonably thinks that it will take to get a warrant, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies. The fact that the lawful search later reveals that a crime was no committed does not mean that the search was improper. A mere belief that an animal was abused or neglected and that exigent circumstance were present with a reasonable factual basis (e.g. a tip from a neighbor who seems credible and claims to have personal knowledge of the facts) will usually suffice to establish probable cause. So warrant needed or not? and if so, what legal action can be taken for trespass, rights violations under color of law etc. if any? If there is a search without a warrant or probable cause was not present, and an exception to the warrant requirement does not apply, and the property owner believes that their 4th Amendment rights were intentionally violated by law enforcement in the warrantless search in violation of clearly established law to the contrary, a civil lawsuit against the law enforcement officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be brought in state or federal court. The employer of the law enforcement officer can be sued as well, under the same statute, if the warrantless search in violation of the clearly established constitutional right was made pursuant to an express policy of the law enforcement officer's employer. But the fact that the law enforcement officer violated someone's rights does not automatically make the law enforcement officer's employer civilly liable for the wrong. In most U.S. states, law enforcement officers are protected by state law governmental immunity from common law trespass lawsuits for their conduct while carrying out their official duties, but I haven't checked specifically to see if that is the case in Missouri. A claim of a 4th Amendment violation can also be a ground for suppressing evidence obtained with an unlawful search when defending a prosecution under some ordinance or statute that relies upon that evidence.

There is a lot of confusion over the difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause. They are not the same thing. Reasonable suspicion is any justifiable belief that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Probable cause requires an officer to have actual, tangible evidence that you have committed a crime. Only after probable cause has been established can an officer arrest you (with limited ability to search your immediate person and effects). Reasonable suspicion only requires some articulatable justification that you did something wrong. The police can detain you on reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you why. This is called a Terry stop (after Terry v. Ohio where the Supreme Court ruled this was legal). However, they can only detain you long enough to ascertain whether or not they have probable cause to arrest you. If after conducting a preliminary investigation they can't find probable cause to make an arrest, they have to let you go. In that video, we have a guy walking around in Texas with a shotgun and some shells. We never see what this guy looks like or how he's carrying himself, but he appears to be a troll. The cops received a call, so they investigated. They had all the reasonable suspicion they needed to detain him. Texas is an open carry state (a person can walk around openly with a gun), and it is not a stop-and-identify state (the police cannot demand that you ID yourself). Therefore the man did not break any laws. But neither did the police officers. They were doing their job by asking questions, and after failing to find any evidence, they let him go. If he had run before the officers had cleared him to leave, they could have chased him down and arrested him. That is, after all, what a detention is. You don't get to run away because you don't recognize a cop's authority to stop you. And fleeing a law enforcement officer is a crime. But you do have the right not to answer any questions, including (in some states) what your name is.

england-and-wales No. The only1 requirement is for the officer serving the warrant to show the occupier the original and provide a copy or, if there's no one in, to leave it in a prominent position as per section 15 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: ... (5)Where the occupier of premises which are to be entered and searched is present at the time when a constable seeks to execute a warrant to enter and search them, the constable— (a)shall identify himself to the occupier and, if not in uniform, shall produce to him documentary evidence that he is a constable; (b)shall produce the warrant to him; and (c)shall supply him with a copy of it. (6)Where— (a)the occupier of such premises is not present at the time when a constable seeks to execute such a warrant; but (b)some other person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises is present,subsection (5) above shall have effect as if any reference to the occupier were a reference to that other person. (7)If there is no person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises, he shall leave a copy of the warrant in a prominent place on the premises. Delaying entry in order to read out the entire warrant could result with evidence being lost or destroyed, or suspects absconding. 1 there's also going to be some other paperwork depending on the particular circumstances.

If the victim is unable to prove who the culprit was, then it will be impossible to prosecute that person criminally or sue them for civil damages. Incidents like these are rarely enough to cause a police department to throw sufficient investigative resources at it to crack the case without some reason to believe that it is part of something bigger. An unfortunate fact of life is that most perpetrators of crimes and torts get away with it and are not caught. And, if the only available witness is willing to lie to cover up the name of the guilty party (probably out of a desire to not have the dog put down), it is that much harder. A private investigator might be able to solve the case, but the cost of hiring a PI would probably exceed the benefit that could be obtained if the PI was successful.

Can I teach those careless kids a lesson and destroy their ball? As we learned from the hypothetical In California, if a baseball lands in my yard, is it legally mine? I could face detinue for not returning the baseball upon request. But what if: I accidentally destroy the baseball, without knowledge whatsoever that it was on my property, by running over it with my lawnmower before its return is requested? I intentionally destroy the baseball before its return is requested? Is there a common law tort that clearly applies to either of these scenarios?

Actions in common law tort exist for both scenarios. Potential torts are negligence, trespass to chattel, and/or conversion. Putting the largely apparent tort of negligence aside, since that is nearly always available when something and/or someone is damaged by another (requiring only the [negligent] act, causation and damages) I'll focus on the other tort potentially applicable to scenario 1. The minority rule concerning trespass to chattel can be established even when the interference is negligent, whereas the majority rule requires intent to deprive. Interestingly, when the Restatement 2d of Torts talks about minority rule vs. majority rule, it really means "least often applied" vs. "most often applied", rather than merely "in some (fewer or greater) defined jurisdiction(s)". With these type of uncommonly pled torts, you could find a huge jurisdiction like California having lower courts (especially small claims or district courts) applying both the minority rule in some courts and the majority rule in others. This, all within one judicial jurisdiction if that state's law court has not weighed in on their interpretation of preference. The Restatement 2d (Second) of Torts § 217 and §218 define liability in trespass to chattel as "intentionally (negligently - minority rule ): (a) dispossess(ing) the other of the chattel, or; (b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or; (c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or; (d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest. Trespass to chattel can consist of mere "intermeddling with or the limited use of the possession" and no damage need occur to the property, as damage is per se; however in your scenario, actual liability would occur in the destruction of the possession. The 2nd scenario would lie in the more serious tort of conversion. The tort of conversion will always requires intent to deprive the owner of his property, and the majority view is that the deprivation is intended to be total or forever (whether by continued deprivation or by destruction). There are 3 elements required to establish conversion: plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the alleged conversion; defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff's property rights; damage(s). While anticipating the follow-up question to either scenario, being "what about the fact that you didn't take the ball, but rather it ended up on your land, and shouldn't that count for something"...the answer (to the unasked question :~) is no. The act of taking possession over property to satisfy the necessary prong in both torts may take any number of forms, but need not be wrongful to begin with. All that is required to establish possessory control over the chattel in a tortious manner is merely interfering with the plaintiff's right of possession, which is a wrongful deprivation of something the owner was entitled to possess (so in other words, even if you didn't go and take it, once you know it's there, it's not yours, and you seek to keep it, either temporarily, permanently – the act of wrongful possession has occurred. The way the property was acquired is not at issue. Conversion and Trespass in Chattel are often spoken of interchangeably despite the fact that they are different. The difference between a cause of action for conversion and one for trespass against chattel is measured only by the degree of interference with the plaintiff's rights in their chattel. While the distinction seems subtle in a vacuum, in the old English cases where these torts were typically decided, conversion was one small step from criminal activity, whereas today conversion may be the civil adjunct to a criminal suit. *for those not familiar: chattel is any possession that is not real estate.

Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.

The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience.

Short Answer In real life, can the owner of the house be held civilly or criminally liable in this situation? No. Long Answer On one hand, the pool did not have a fence despite it being legally required. On the other, they did enter the property illegally. Negligence Per Se And Attractive Nuisance The doctrine you are considering first is called "negligence per se" and states that failure to follow a penal statute or other law or regulation is negligent as a matter of law if the harm caused by failing to take the action it mandates is the kind of harm that the statute was intended to prevent. It isn't perfectly clear, but the answer to that is probably "no, this is not a negligence per se" case. Laws requiring pools to be fenced are largely directed at a particular type of tortious conduct called an "attractive nuisance" that could cause, for example, children who can't swim to be attracted to a pool that is dangerous to them without supervision. These laws are not intended to protect adult robbers (if the person engaged in robbery were an armed seven years old, that might be another story). California, however, has discarded the attractive nuisance doctrine that used to be part of its law, in 1970, in the case of Beard v. Atchison. Common Law Premises Liability In California The common law duty that a property owner owes to trespassers is to keep it free of deadly traps. You have liability if you turn your lawn into a literal mine field full of explosive land mines. But, you did not at common law owe a duty of reasonable care to prevent foreseeable accidental injury to trespassers such as robbers. So, there would be no common law duty here. But, California has abandoned the strict common law distinction in premises liability between invitees, licensees, and trespassers in lieu of a general duty to use reasonable care that is fairly tailored to the precise circumstances of the accident. California Civil Jury Instruction No. 1001 (2000) citing Ann M. v.Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 6 Cal.4th 666, 674-675, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207 (1993). California, rather than focusing on the nature of the duty that the landlord owes to a trespasser, focuses more on this factor as part of the question of issues like whether the harm was foreseeable. A Statute That Is On Point And Controlling Here Despite this evolution in California's common law of premises liability, however, California does have a statute that singles out felons who are injured on someone else's property in the course of a felony, specifically, California Civil Code § 847, which states (emphasis added): (a) An owner, including, but not limited to, a public entity, as defined in Section 811.2 of the Government Code , of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, shall not be liable to any person for any injury or death that occurs upon that property during the course of or after the commission of any of the felonies set forth in subdivision (b) by the injured or deceased person. (b) The felonies to which the provisions of this section apply are the following: (1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter; (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; (5) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; (6) lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years; (7) any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life; (8) any other felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or any felony in which the defendant uses a firearm; (9) attempted murder; (10) assault with intent to commit rape or robbery; (11) assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on a peace officer; (12) assault by a life prisoner on a noninmate; (13) assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate; (14) arson; (15) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to injure; (16) exploding a destructive device or any explosive causing great bodily injury; (17) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to murder; (18) burglary; (19) robbery; (20) kidnapping; (21) taking of a hostage by an inmate of a state prison; (22) any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; (23) selling, furnishing, administering, or providing heroin, cocaine, or phencyclidine (PCP) to a minor; (24) grand theft as defined in Sections 487 and 487a of the Penal Code ; and (25) any attempt to commit a crime listed in this subdivision other than an assault. (c) The limitation on liability conferred by this section arises at the moment the injured or deceased person commences the felony or attempted felony and extends to the moment the injured or deceased person is no longer upon the property. (d) The limitation on liability conferred by this section applies only when the injured or deceased person's conduct in furtherance of the commission of a felony specified in subdivision (b) proximately or legally causes the injury or death. (e) The limitation on liability conferred by this section arises only upon the charge of a felony listed in subdivision (b) and the subsequent conviction of that felony or a lesser included felony or misdemeanor arising from a charge of a felony listed in subdivision (b). During the pendency of any such criminal action, a civil action alleging this liability shall be abated and the statute of limitations on the civil cause of action shall be tolled. (f) This section does not limit the liability of an owner or an owner's agent which otherwise exists for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct, or for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity. (g) The limitation on liability provided by this section shall be in addition to any other available defense. This statute is controlling and would probably immunize the property owner from liability in the fact pattern of the question. My initial review suggests that originally, it contained only parts (a) to (c) and (g) which are more emphatic. But, later, parts (d) to (f), which created narrow exceptions to this general rule, were added.

If it’s your pizza, yes The civil equivalent of theft is the tort of conversion, “consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability.”

There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf

No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.

From a comment on the question: They did damage the trailer door and headlight is smashed This seems like the best thing to focus on, especially if you can show that it was not damaged before they towed it. The unusual method of towing (with video evidence) may be a factor in whether they are considered negligent. If the damage to the door looks like they caused it directly by breaking in, that would also help your case. You also asked in your comment if you should go to the police or to a lawyer first. Might as well go to the lawyer and see what they tell you to do. I'm not sure what the police would do if there is no clear crime that has been committed. (The lawyer should have better advice about whether/why to go to the police.)

Who would be responsible for returning the damage deposit if landlords changed but no contract was made If the damage deposit was paid to one person, who was going to be the acting landlord, but the situation changed and the money was given to the actual landlord, who would be responsible to returning it to a tenant in the end? Order of events Several roommates move into a house owned by Bob. The initial (verbal) agreement was Joe was supposed to be the acting landlord who would sign the lease for the whole house and collect rent from everyone else and give it to the landlord. Jane paid her portion of the damage deposit to Joe. Joe gives Bob everyone's damage deposit The actual owner (Bob) comes by a few days after everyone moved in and has everyone cosign a lease (which is unclear whether it's tenants in common or cotennancy). Joe moves out of the house and the landlord returns his portion of the damage deposit to him. A new roommate takes over Joe's place and no new contract is written. The lease comes to an end but Jane never gets her damage deposit returned. Does Bob or Joe owe Jane the damage deposit? If relevant, another tenant, named Steward, always collected the rent and made the lump sum payments to the landlord.

If I can summarise: Jane gave money to Joe on the understanding that he would give it to Bob, Joe kept the money. This is matter between Jane and Joe, Bob is not involved. Edit The OP has stated that Joe did give the money to Bob. In that case, Joe was acting as Jane's agent and he discharged his agency. This is a matter between Jane and Bob, Joe is involved only so far as he was a witness to what happened.

There are no squatters Neither Bob nor Sue are squatters: Bob was there with the owner's permission and Sue was there with Bob's. Adverse possession requires possession that is, well, adverse: against the wishes of the true owner. Bob was almost certainly a tenant, paying rent in services rather than cash. Clearly, the terms of that tenancy are unclear and may not be legal but that is more likely to rebound against the landlord rather than the tenant. So long as the rent (whatever it is) continues to be paid the estate’s tenancy should continue. However, the landlord could start procedures to end the tenancy (probably requiring 1 months notice) at any time.

As a general rule, legal language is interpreted loosely with respect to singular versus plural, or male versus female (in interpreting pronouns). A clause that uses the word "tenant" can thus be construed as referring to multiple tenants, and "tenants" can also refer to a single tenant. Likewise, "he, him" refers to a third person, regardless of gender. If the intent of an agreement is that only a single person shall reside in a place, then the wording of the contract would have to say that, and you can't derive that from using "tenant" rather than "tenant or tenants". I don't think the issue comes down to "treating y'all as one person", it comes down to whether the obligation is joint, a series of several obligations, or a joint and several obligation. You would look for expressions like "We and each of us agree...", vs. "Each of us agree...", or "We agree..." to sort that out: I assume that the language just says "Tenant agrees...", that is, there is nothing at all in the wording of the lease that resolves the matter. Tenant (whoever that is) has an obligation to Landlord to pay rent. It doesn't matter if Tenant is 1 person or 10: you have to pay the rent. If 5 out of 10 of those people mysteriously disappear, the other 5 still have to pay a now-doubled rent per person. Each person is fully responsible for all of the lease obligations, and if you are the only reliable person in a lease with 10 parties, you could get stuck with the entire obligation. If Tenant needs to go away for some reason, Tenant can normally negotiate with another person to assume their obligations, so Tenant would come up with an arrangement with a new person, and the new person would have an obligation to (old) Tenant – this is basically a private arrangement that doesn't involve the Landlord. However: it is pretty standard that landlords get a say in letting in new tenants, and you have a clause in your agreement that says that. There are two ways for the old tenant to "go away". One is to completely terminate the old agreement, and the landlord signs a new lease with the new person: the old tenant is completely free of any subsequent obligations, and if the new tenant fails to pay rent, the landlord has to go after the new tenant. The other way is by assigning his obligation (as described above): the agreement is between the old tenant and the new tenant (with the landlord's consent). The question now is, what is the meaning of the clause "the assignee shall sign a separate written agreement with Landlord and Tenant"? (Earlier, I missed the significance of "Landlord and Tenant"). The core question is whether the new arrangement is a novation, or is it an assignment? A novation requires agreement between all parties, and that is what seems to be implied here. California landlord law then tells you that this "makes the new tenant (rather than the original tenant) solely responsible to the landlord". In contrast, "Like a sublease, an assignment is a contract between the original tenant and the new tenant (not the landlord)". Since this involves the landlord, the conclusion is inescapable that this is not actually an assignment (despite the use of the word "assignee"). All of the parties to the agreement would have to agree to these new terms, if in fact there is an agreement that substitutes D for C in this agreement with the landlord (a notation). If C remains on the hook and this is just a personal arrangement between C and D (with Landlords consent) – which is not what the clause says – then you don't get a vote in the C-D arrangement.

Here is the Illinois Landlord and Tenant Act, and here are the Chicago Residential Landlords and Tenants ordinances. Neither set of law addresses application fees. So it would have to be covered in whatever agreement you have with the agent (assuming you paid the agent), or with the landlord (if you paid the landlord). Fees for a credit history check are generally not refundable since they are actual costs incurred by someone, no matter what the outcome is. Check the forms you signed, like this one, to see whether they explicitly say that the fee is not refundable.

Unfortunately, your relative is more in the wrong here First, the COVID situation does not change anyone's rights and obligations under a contract (see What effect does an event like the current Covid-19 pandemic have on contractural obligations?). So the landlord (through their agent) is obliged to provide the property and your relative is obliged to pay the rent and to occupy the premises (most residential leases contain a requirement for the tenant to live in the premises and not leave it empty). Your relative (through you) has indicated that she will be in breach of her contract. The agent has considered her position and has offered two (IMO generous) alternatives: Allow her to continue with the lease without taking possession providing the rent is paid. To release her from her obligations under the contract and return the rent. To put it in perspective, if your relative simply "walked away", she would be liable for the rent until a new tenant was found and, if that new tenant was paying less rent than she was, the difference for the duration of the lease plus the costs of finding a new tenant - advertising, agent's fees (usually 1 month's rent) etc. Now, the landlord has an obligation to minimise your costs so advertising the property could just be prudent. However, if they lease it when your relative's contract has not been properly terminated then it is they who are in breach. Surely they can't take the rent and offer to re-let the property at the same time? Surely they can. What they can't do is relet the property without properly terminating your relative's lease. Would they even be entitled to retain the deposit under these circumstances? Absolutely. The deposit is to cover their losses if your relative breaks the lease - as she has indicated she is going to do (this is called anticipatory breach). Finally, I'd rather not go down this route but is there any protection for my relative for not being forcefully 'evicted' - since she's paid the deposit, rent - and those haven't been returned? Having never taken possession, she is not being evicted.

Rob is responsible. No Bull! Around the world, the law of wandering cattle depends on the details. New Zealand is no different. This case is covered by s 26 of the Impounding Act of 1955, Damages for Trespass. As you said, S 26(1)(d) says Bob is entitled to damages whenever his "land (whether fenced or unfenced) is situated in a city." This is different to the rest of the country, where animals must be fenced out. S 26(2) of the Impounding Act says the damage is owed by Rob, as the owner of the stock: (2) In any case where damages are payable under this section the amount of any damage shall be recoverable by action from the owner of the stock. It may be that Rob and Alice have some arrangement that Alice will indemnify Rob against any trespass damages. But that agreement does not change the underlying law; it only allows him to recoup his loses (by suing his mother, if necessary!). Added: Something fun to read Law professor Robert Ellickson studied how people actually resolve disputes over wandering cattle in Shasta county in northern California. There's a readable summary of what he found here. (The title of his book, "Order without law," sums up his main finding -- there are rules that are enforced, but those rules have little to do with the formal law or law enforcement.)

I am an Ontario-licensed lawyer. The following is a general information about the law and not specific legal advice. You are not my client and I have not given you advice related to your circumstances. First, even when you ask a generic question, define the jurisdiction of interest. For the purpose of your question, Canada is a collection of different jurisdictions with different rules. My answer relates to Ontario, Canada. Other Canadian jurisdictions have different rules. The Law The applicable Section 109 of Ontario's Residential Tenancies Act http://canlii.ca/t/33p is reproduced below for your convenience. EMPHASES MINE. Receipt for payment 109 (1) A landlord shall provide FREE OF CHARGE to a tenant or former tenant, on request, a receipt for the payment of any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent or any other amount paid to the landlord. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (1). Former tenant (2) Subsection (1) applies to a request by a FORMER TENANT only if the request is made within 12 months after the tenancy terminated. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (2). Regulation Ontario Regulation 516/06 http://canlii.ca/t/sjx dictates minimal form: Receipt A document constitutes a receipt for the purposes of section 109 of the Act if it includes, at a minimum, (a) the address of the rental unit to which the receipt applies; (b) the name of the tenants to whom the receipt applies; (c) the amount and date for each payment received for any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent, or any other amount paid to the landlord and shall specify what the payment was for; (d) the name of the landlord of the rental unit; and (e) the signature of the landlord or the landlord’s authorized agent. O. Reg. 516/06, s. 9. Landlord Compliance A good landlord will provide receipts immediately upon payment, and keep a copy. An very good landlord will provide additionally a summary of payments for the year, in tabulated form, and keep a copy of the yearly receipt instead of the multiple receipts for each payment. An excellent landlord will keep the tabulated information in a computer system and will issue a receipt for the whole tenancy period on termination. Keep a copy. Tenant's Application If your Ontario landlord refuse to comply with the above, file a T2 http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Tenant%20Applications%20&%20Instructions/T2.pdf *A T2 can also be filed online. Remember to ask for cost http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Interpretation%20Guidelines/03%20-%20Costs.html

Your rights and responsibilities in this realm are a matter of local law, sometimes down to the level of the city, plus whatever is stipulated in the lease. In San Francisco, for example, No Person shall have upon any premises or real property owned, occupied or controlled by him, or her, or it any public nuisance [which includes] Any visible or otherwise demonstrable mold or mildew in the interiors of any buildings or facilities This does not say whether the owner or the occupant is liable for remediating the situation. Shower mold is gross but not a health hazard (the SF ordinance just lumps all mold into one category). Since you have no written lease, there is no automatic clean-up requirement. There might be a law requiring a tenant to clean the premise to its original condition, for instance in Washington, tenant must Upon termination and vacation, restore the premises to their initial condition except for reasonable wear and tear or conditions caused by failure of the landlord to comply with his or her obligations under this chapter. Landlord duties are here: there is no duty to provide ventilation. However, the bathtub appears to be in a common area and not your particular unit. The landlord duties also require the landlord to Keep any shared or common areas reasonably clean, sanitary, and safe from defects increasing the hazards of fire or accident so in Washington, it's his problem and not yours. In general, even if a tenant is responsible for some form of cleanup, that does not constitute legal license for a facility upgrade. It might cost a couple hundred dollars to hire a person to wash ordinary mold accumulation, and does not justify getting a $5,000 new tub. Since this is in a common area, you would not be solely liable for whatever the damage was. The part where you say "crack in a common bath tub" is a large red flag: it suggests to me that somebody negligently broke the bathtub, and then caused behind-the-wall damage by letting water infiltrate without notifying the landlord. If you broke the tub and let it rot, you could be liable. If the tub was broken already and the landlord didn't bother to do anything about it, that is his negligence. The three questions that you should try to answer are: (1) what are the duties of landlord and tenant in my jurisdiction, (2) what was the actual harm done, and who did it, (3) what is the ordinary cost of whatever repair was done.

Proving Theft From a Store If the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff, how could the plaintiff prove the defendant didn't pay for an item removed from a store. From what I understand a negative can't be proven. In this case isn't it always possible that the item was paid for, but the record of it isn't brought forward? How are we to take the word of the plaintiff on this matter that they aren't withholding evidence when no evidence exists? I'm not actually concerned with the specifics here, but more so on how a case like this where everything lies in the absence of some event occurring is the cause of a crime is handled.

The need to prove a negative arises only from the way you've phrased the problem. In the UK, theft is defined as— dishonestly appropriating property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving its legitimate owner of it. All five elements must be proved in order to secure a conviction for theft. In the case of an item removed from a store, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that— the defendant had a dishonest intent; the defendant appropriated the item (treated it as his own); the item was 'property' (straightforward in this case); the item belonged to someone else (ditto); and the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of it. Clearly proving that the defendant left the shop without paying would be an important element in proving (2) and (5) above. Note that the prosecution must prove that he left without paying, not that he did not pay. In this example, the prosecution might adduce CCTV or witness evidence of defendant leaving without paying. If the defendant did pay for the item but doesn't have a receipt, he can still give witness testimony in his own defence. The prosecution is unlikely to have strong evidence to the contrary if payment was in fact made. The totality of evidence, put before a jury or summary court, will be considered in the round when establishing guilt.

The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time.

The appeals court has found that the county court judge made a decision that was consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial. As such, the decision is sound. It appears that the defendant tried to present additional/different evidence or different arguments about the law in the appeal than they did at trial - this is not permitted. As to responsibility, the defendant and their legal team were responsible for deciding how to run their case and what evidence to present and what arguments to run. What evidence to present and how to present it and what submissions to make on the law is a tactical decision for each party. You can get it wrong. That doesn't let you try again on appeal. If your barrister has been negligent, and that directly caused you to lose, you can sue your barrister. In terms of interpreting a particular paragraph of a judgement, the appeals court may or may not make comment on a particular paragraph but the reasons, while important, are not really subject to interpretation other than that. A judgement will give orders, these should be very precise and not open to interpretation - things like "the defendant will pay X to the plaintiff" or "the case is dismissed" etc.

Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.

We can assume there was a meeting of the minds when the contract was drafted, and both parties expected payments to me made based on product usage. Plaintiff alleges that this did not happen. Thus plaintiff is indeed alleging that the contract was breached. Now plaintiff alleges that defendant broke the contract, while defendant counters that plaintiff broke the contract. "[T]o be determined by tracking software" is woefully ambiguous. The court will want to know which party drafted the contract, as disputes arising from ambiguity are often resolved in favor of the non-drafting party.

You did not commit any crime, but that does not mean you cannot be charged with a crime. Up to the point where you take the item back out of your pocket, a police officer would have probable cause to believe you were attempting to steal the merchandise, and probable cause is all he would need to charge you. At trial, the government would have the burden of proving that you intended to actually steal the item, but it can satisfy that burden merely by showing that your actions were consistent with such an intention. You would have the option of testifying that you planned to pay for the item. From there, it would be up to a jury to decide whether it believes you. If so, you should be acquitted. If not, you would likely be convicted, and your conviction would likely be affirmed on appeal.

The person getting the item by fraud didn't get any ownership. Therefore when you bought it, you didn't get ownership either. It's still the company's property, and they can do with it what they like (within reason, they wouldn't be allowed to make it blow up in your face). If you sent back the item, good on you, because the item is now with its rightful owner. If you don't like it, you can sue the person who sold the item to you.

Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.

What type of organizations are exempt from EEOC regulations? What type of organizations are exempt from EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity) regulations? I know that very small businesses are usually exempt. How about non-profit organizations? How about federally funded non-profits?

From the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) website: An employer must have a certain number of employees to be covered by the laws we enforce. This number varies depending on the type of employer (for example, whether the employer is a private company, a state or local government agency, a federal agency, an employment agency, or a labor union) and the kind of discrimination alleged (for example, discrimination based on a person's race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information). All employers are covered, whether or not a particular regulation covers a particular employer is dependent on the number of employees. For example, age discrimination is covered by employers who have more than 20 employees and Equal Pay Act coverage is for virtually all employers. From the same web site: People who are not employed by the employer, such as independent contractors, are not covered by the anti-discrimination laws. Figuring out whether or not a person is an employee of an organization (as opposed to a contractor, for example) is complicated. If you aren't sure whether a person covered, you should contact one of our field offices as soon as possible so we can make that decision. The EEOC has regulations covering: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act The Equal Pay Act of 1963 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Sections 102 and 103 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 The EEOC is an agency responsible for creating rules and regulations and enforcing civil rights laws against workplace discrimination. The regulations and enforcement actions are based on a large number of laws, any one of which may or may not apply to a particular employer. Exemptions are based on a particular anti-discrimination law, not on the agency itself. Each anti-discrimination law has a different set of entities to which the law applies and different sets of exemptions.

(For a definitive answer, consult an employment attorney). According to the federal Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, in general, An employee cannot be forced to participate (or not participate) in a religious activity as a condition of employment. This requirement comes from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Answer 14 on this page elaborates: Some private employers choose to express their own religious beliefs or practices in the workplace, and they are entitled to do so. However, if an employer holds religious services or programs or includes prayer in business meetings, Title VII requires that the employer accommodate an employee who asks to be excused for religious reasons, absent a showing of undue hardship. Similarly, an employer is required to excuse an employee from compulsory personal or professional development training that conflicts with the employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. It would be an undue hardship to excuse an employee from training, for example, where the training provides information on how to perform the job, or how to comply with equal employment opportunity obligations, or on other workplace policies, procedures, or legal requirements. So the questions would be: Is the activity in question a "religious service or program"? This might be ambiguous, and you might have to consult an employment attorney for a more informed opinion. Does it "conflict with your sincerely held religious beliefs or practices"? Would it be an "undue hardship" for the employer to excuse you? Note that this law might not apply to employers with fewer than 15 employees. It also doesn't apply if you work for an employer such as a church, or a religiously affiliated hospital or educational institution, or the like.

Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...".

Taking California as an example, California Labor Code section 6314 (a) provides: To make an investigation or inspection, the chief of the division and all qualified divisional inspectors and investigators authorized by him or her shall, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the employer, have free access to any place of employment to investigate and inspect during regular working hours, and at other reasonable times when necessary for the protection of safety and health, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner. So, the only requirement is that the inspector has been authorized by the chief of the Division of Occupational Safety and Health. In principle the chief could limit this authority to those periods when the instructor has been assigned to work, but I don't see any evidence that this is the case. In particular, you can find here the policy manual on inspection procedures that inspectors are assigned to follow, and it says nothing about "only perform an inspection when you are on duty". (You might also note the discussion on page 2 about unprogrammed inspections and the criteria for performing them. One indication is "Complaint about, or observance by anyone of, an imminent hazard", which could include a hazard observed by the inspector himself.) So to your specific questions: Do any states provide legal authority by statute for an OSHA compliance officer to inspect a site when they are in their own words "not working"? Yes, California provides authority for an inspector to inspect a site "during regular working hours, and at other reasonable times when necessary for the protection of safety and health". That is the only time-related restriction in the statute. I don't think that the inspector's comment that he's "not working" has any legal significance. What is the test to determine if an individual is acting in their official capacity or acting in their individual capacity? I do not know of any reason to think that any such legal distinction exists. If Joe Smith has been authorized as an inspector by the Chief of the Division, then Joe Smith can perform inspections and is to be given free access to do so. End of story. What is the legal "bright line" for state administrative agency employment as to acting in their official capacity as an agent of the state? Based on what I said above, I think this question is meaningless.

This is not an NDA (non-disclosure agreement), it is a non-compete agreement. An NDA would tell you that you cannot disclose anything you did or saw at your old employer's place. A non-compete agreement is what you have here, an agreement that limits your ability to get work. If what you say is correct, then your employer is not exactly the brightest. You stay that you haven't been given a written notice, and your contract says that a "Notice of termination will only be valid if it is given in writing". So you haven't been given valid notice. There is no reason why you would sign the non-compete agreement. If they plan to fire you without notice if you don't agree, they have a problem: Your contract doesn't allow them to do that. And they have apparently not given any written notice yet. So what they can do is as soon as they decide that you are not signing, they can give you one month written notice.

Discrimination in employment is legal For example, you can discriminate to hire the more qualified or experienced candidate over less qualified ones. What you can’t do is discriminate on the basis of a protected category: The Alberta Human Rights Act (AHR Act) prohibits discrimination in employment based on the protected grounds of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religious beliefs, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, physical disability, mental disability, marital status, family status, source of income, and sexual orientation. If it’s not on the list (or a proxy for something on the list), you can discriminate on it.

Most limited liability companies (LLCs) are small, closely held firms that are owned entirely or in substantial part by active employee-manager-owners with modest capital contributions. LLCs with large numbers of owners typically have a large share of non-employee investor ownership and are most common in oil and gas firms and in real estate firms that either develop, or buy and hold, real estate. Most large accounting and law firms and many other professional service firms are organized as LLCs or LLP (limited liability partnerships), which are owned by the senior employees whose contributions as employees dwarfs their contributions as investors. (Non-lawyers and non-physicians aren't allowed to have ownership interests in law firms and medical practices, respectively). These are the largest firms in the world with significant employee ownership. Start up tech firms organized as LLCs also often give equity stakes to employees even below the senior-managerial employee level. Rank and file employees are sometimes given an ownership interests in firms, but this is more commonly done through an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) or certain other tax encouraged mechanisms for employee ownership in corporations (e.g., incentive stock options), or in the context of a firm organized as a cooperative (which is taxed essentially like a C-corporation but with an entity level deduction for cooperative dividends paid to members), than it is as an LLCs. One important reason for this is that pass-through taxation (which applies to LLCs not electing to be taxed as corporations) is not workable as a means of imparting ownership to large numbers of rank and file workers, because the compliance paperwork of sending out dozens or hundreds of K-1s to these workers is daunting, and because the prospect of a disconnect between allocated income and loss, and actual distributions (e.g. taxation on "phantom income" of the entity that is not distributed) is problematic.

This would seem to fall under "negative" freedom of association; that is, the freedom to not associate with certain other people. This article discusses the matter in the context of individuals who refused to join a trade union: the ECHR decided that the right to not join a union is just as much a part of freedom of association as the right to join one. By extension, if you decide to hold a meeting (which is also part of the freedom of association), then you have the right to exclude people that you don't want to associate with. You might have a problem if you want to demonstrate in a public place: the undesirable people have just as much right to turn up as you do. However if you have had to get police approval for your demonstration (there is a bunch of ECHR law covering that) then you might be able to tell the police that those people are not part of your demonstration, and ask that they be treated as an unauthorised demonstration. It would be up to the police to take appropriate action at that point.

Why do software licenses use passive voice? I've been researching user-readable software licenses, and it strikes me that even as they get simpler and cut words, they always start with a wordy passive-voice construction: MIT: Permission is hereby granted ... to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software") ISC: Permission ... is hereby granted BSD: Redistribution ... are permitted Zlib: Permission is granted to anyone Why do the licenses use this same sort of wording even as they simplify in other places? Is there a legal advantage to using it in favor of the more obvious you may?

Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..."

There's a few good reasons that spring to mind. Firstly, it's possible that Tesla or Microsoft have been themselves licensed something where the license is not sub-licenseable. This would prevent them from subsequently licensing you, but a promise/pledge is not a license and they can go right ahead and make promises. Secondly, a license is broadly an agreement between two parties. A promise doesn't require formal acceptance whereas a license does. To answer your question regarding a covenant not to sue - that's something else entirely. A covenant not to sue is a legal agreement between parties where the party seeking damages agrees not to sue the party it has cause against, whilst still preserving the existence of the cause (and conditions may have been set that must be met for the covenant to stand). For example, Party A still maintains that Party B used work that was not licensed to Party B, but Party A has agreed not to sue on the matter, provided that Party B advertises the fact that the work was used.

Interesting that they don't give a source and also don't link to anywhere (such as Wikimedia commons). So I assume that content is google's own. So generally speaking: No, when no license is provided, that means you can't use whatever it is in a project of yours (whether commercially or not), because the "default", when nothing is specified, is that no license is given. So unless you find a license that grants you a permission on google's own content, these sounds can't be used freely.

Just because newer versions of jQuery are available under one license doesn't indicate what license(s) older versions are available under. With permission of all copyright holders, the license can be modified. However, it does require the permission of all copyright holders. You would have to see the license terms distributed with jQuery 1.2.1 to see what license(s) that particular version is under. However, the GPL doesn't impact you in this case, since the library is dual licensed. As the recipient, get to choose the license that you wish to comply with. In this example, you can choose to comply with either the GPL license or the MIT license. Since the MIT license is easier for you to comply with, you simply need to conform to the terms of that license in your application.

You don't have to, but you probably want to for a couple of reasons: It's courteous, and in the spirit of open source It's someone else's work, and you're using it. The least you can probably say is "thank you." It will also probably help you stay in the clear: since you're using software in binary form, where the notice isn't immediately accessible, then by providing a copy of the license, you respect that licensing term in another way. It tells your users what's up with the program Let's admit it, having the license accessible to the users tells them what's in the program and so on. It's another way of providing attribution, like I listed in the first reason above. Many apps, desktop and mobile, have a screen or panel to indicate the projects and licenses that they use. They don't have to be straight in the user's face, they can be a little button in the "About" screen of the program. To answer a little confusion: the binaries are still a derived form from that source code. Analyse the heading: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. The software is still there, it's just there in a different form, a compiled form. Therefore, the copyright and permission notice should probably stick around, even if it's just a file somewhere.

Recall the basic principle of copyright law, as detailed in 17 USC 106: The copyright holder has the exclusive right to make copies; prepare derivative works; or distribute copies by sale, rental, lease, or lending. Other people can legally do these things only if they are given permission by the copyright holder, typically via a license. (Remember, the literal meaning of the word license is permission.) Often, the copyright holder will require a prospective licensee to accept various terms and conditions before the license will be granted. If there is "no EULA", or if there is one but the purchaser has not agreed to its terms, then the purchaser has not been granted any such license, hence does not have permission to do any of the things listed above. If they do so anyway, it is illegal copyright infringement and they will be liable for damages. To use a firewall analogy, copyright law is "default deny". So let's take your questions one by one: Do they own the software? US law has no concept of literally owning software. The closest thing is owning the copyright, which the purchaser certainly does not. It still belongs to the vendor that wrote the software (or whoever they may have later transferred it to). Can they legally alter the code of the program they purchased? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. The copyright holder has not granted them a license to do that. (There are some exceptions for purposes such as reverse engineering and interoperability, see 17 USC 1201(f)). Can they legally redistribute it No; again, that is the exclusive right of the copyright holder, and the purchaser has not received their permission. or transfer ownership? Maybe, if the first sale doctrine applies. Its application to software is complicated. The user has a better case for being able to sell the software if it exists as some tangible object which is transferred (physical media, pre-installed on hardware, etc). Can they legally modify the code of the program for others who have also purchased the same package? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. Can they take that software and install it on a secondary machine? No, that would be making a copy.

All Licenses are granted in the shape of contracts. Contracts contain clauses that allow or disallow their transferability. The typical way a License for a software is obtained is to buy a key that acts as proof of purchase, and then agreeing to an EULA. For example the Win10 one. very typical clauses from the Win10 EULA explicitly forbid to transfer of the license without the device it was installed on: Installation and Use Rights. a. License. The software is licensed, not sold. Under this agreement, we grant you the right to install and run one instance of the software on your device (the licensed device), for use by one person at a time, so long as you comply with all the terms of this agreement. Updating or upgrading from non-genuine software with software from Microsoft or authorized sources does not make your original version or the updated/upgraded version genuine, and in that situation, you do not have a license to use the software. c. Restrictions. The device manufacturer or installer and Microsoft reserve all rights (such as rights under intellectual property laws) not expressly granted in this agreement. For example, this license does not give you any right to, and you may not: (iii) transfer the software (except as permitted by this agreement); Transfer. The provisions of this section do not apply if you acquired the software in Germany or in any of the countries listed on this site (aka.ms/transfer), in which case any transfer of the software to a third party, and the right to use it, must comply with applicable law. a. Software preinstalled on device. If you acquired the software preinstalled on a device (and also if you upgraded from software preinstalled on a device), you may transfer the license to use the software directly to another user, only with the licensed device. The transfer must include the software and, if provided with the device, an authentic Windows label including the product key. Before any permitted transfer, the other party must agree that this agreement applies to the transfer and use of the software. b. Stand-alone software. If you acquired the software as stand-alone software (and also if you upgraded from software you acquired as stand-alone software), you may transfer the software to another device that belongs to you. You may also transfer the software to a device owned by someone else if (i) you are the first licensed user of the software and (ii) the new user agrees to the terms of this agreement. You may use the backup copy we allow you to make or the media that the software came on to transfer the software. Every time you transfer the software to a new device, you must remove the software from the prior device. You may not transfer the software to share licenses between devices Cincom Systems, Inc v Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. Sept 2009) held that you can not transfer software that was merely licensed, even as the part of your company that uses the software becomes part of another company through a merger. The licensor had put express language that forbids the transfer of the license by licensee into the contract: When Alcan Ohio merged with Alcan Texas, the license granted by Cincom solely to Alcan Ohio transferred to the surviving corporation, now known as Novelis. Because Novelis did not abide by the express terms of Cincom's license and gain Cincom's prior written approval, Novelis infringed Cincom's copyright. Likewise, the court in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) held that you can not re-sell an (installed) digital item as you create a new copy without the license for this. In a similar fashion, Disney recently changed the Terms of Service and contract on the digital codes that come with DVDs. The new terms explicitly forbid unbundling the code from the disk and forbid transferring the disk after using the code. This was what allowed Disney to gain an injunction in the case of Disney v RedBox. The end result is not out yet. In the EU, the ruling in one case fell different: UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp. held in 2012 that there is possibly a right to resell your used license... as long as it is a license forever (emphasis mine): in the event of the resale of a user licence entailing the resale of a copy of a computer program downloaded from the copyright holder’s website, that licence having originally been granted by that rightholder to the first acquirer for an unlimited period in return for payment of a fee intended to enable the rightholder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic value of that copy of his work, the second acquirer of the licence, as well as any subsequent acquirer of it, will be able to rely on the exhaustion of the distribution right under Article 4(2) of that directive As a result software licenses adapted and started to expressly sell the license as a license to obtain the service of a maintained software. To software as a service - which Windows and the Office suite are - this ruling does expressly not apply and you can not re-sell such a software license after it has been used. Signed License v. License Key That does not apply to the key, the representation of the payment. You can buy them in a store. They are a pretty tangible good. The principle is - in general - that you validate the license you sign by handing over the key to the supplier of the software. This usually voids the key. But... all those sites claim you can transfer?! not.... quite: once you agreed to the EULA and obtained the software service it can no longer be resold. Also, you just agreed you may not do that with transferable software. However, as long as you have the key unused the unused key for a license can be resold. That is a physical good that the first sale doctrine applies to. However, you may not retain a copy of the key to sell it, again and again, you would interfere with your customer's ability to contract as a used key often is rejected - you'd have defrauded the customer. Even in the EU, if you bought a perpetual license, you need to render your copy unusable under the ruling above: The CJEU held that the first purchaser needs to "make his own copy unusable at the time of its resale…in order to avoid infringing the exclusive right of reproduction of a computer program which belongs to its author“ The CJEU therefore briefly commented “to solve that problem, it is permissible for the distributor – whether ‘classic’ or ‘digital’ – to make use of technical protective measures such as product keys“. The key is a means to show you are entitled to a contract. It is the consideration Microsoft gets for signing the other side of the contract. Most software resellers deal with keys, the resale of keys is expressly possible. Some software companies mark a used-and re-sold key and require to contact the company to make sure that the software has been disabled on the other end. Since many companies can't render the software disabled on the seller's end, they refuse to acknowledge the sale on the same basis: the software was not disabled or rendered useless, and as a result, the sale did not happen in accordance with the judgment.

Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it.

Is it illegal to carry a baton? Is it illegal to carry an expandable/extendable baton in the state of Indiana?

Indiana has no state law against carrying an expandable baton, a.k.a. asp. (Hard to prove a negative, but here's one reference in support.) NB: Batons are considered deadly weapons. NBB: Laws on these weapons vary tremendously by state, and sometimes even by city, so this answer should not be construed to apply to any jurisdiction outside of Indiana!

Obviously, there are plenty of kitchen knives over 12 cm in length. A knife that is legal for home use be carried outside the home in an enclosed compartment (verschlossenes Behältnis) which prevents immediate access. So it is forbidden to carry the knife thrust through a belt, or in a jacket pocket, but it can carried in a locked tool box or the like. A shrink-wrapped package also qualifies. To carry it "unwrapped" is forbidden, but there are exceptions to that ban which come down to "reasonable use." A bread knife would be reasonable if it comes with a loaf of bread and all the other implements for a picnic. It is not reasonable in a nightclub. A number of knife styles or cutting implements are generally forbidden, no matter how they are carried or stored.

This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.

What is the correct way to handle this situation? Strictly speaking, each driver exceeding the speed limit is in violation of the traffic sign even if everybody else also infringes it. Thus it is completely valid for the police to pull & fine anyone from among those drivers. Statutes like the one you mention are intended for scenarios where a driver departs significantly --and for no apparent [lawful] reason-- from the speed limit, such as driving at 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. Typically a driver would not get pulled over in the scenario you mention (driving at 62 mph where everybody else drives at 65 mph). The exception would be some police department(s) requiring its cops to meet a quota of fines per week, but that would be quite a questionable practice having nothing to do with the legislative intent. Speed limits are supposed to represent normal and reasonable movement of traffic. If informed consensus is that a particular speed limit is inconsistent with that principle (for instance, where limit is artificially low and raising it would not compromise safety), then a request could be submitted to the Oregon Department of Transportation.

Although the question is different, the answer to the other question actually contains the answer to your question. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, "a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him". One occupier's clear objection based on Fourth Amendment interests cannot be overridden by the consent of another in this case. A disputed consent should not be resolved by the police, but by a judge.

The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed.

I will only offer a general answer as I have no desire to enter the quagmire of potential sub-judice bearing in mind the cited case seems to be under investigation according to the BBC article: The Metropolitan Police has apologised and referred itself to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC). The IOPC has since instructed the Met to conduct the investigation, but said if the complainant was unhappy with the outcome he would have the right of review. Beyond the requirements to pass various courses and achieving regular re-accreditation to carry a Taser - either as an Autorised Firearms Officer (AFO) or an Autorised Taser Officer (ATO) - there are no specific rules covering its use not already covered by the OP's links. The relevant legislation is no different from, say, using a baton, applying handcuffs, spraying PAVA, or just by getting hold of someone to stop them running away - it must be reasonable in the circumstances. There are three areas of law that permit a police officer to use force, Taser or otherwise: Section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Where any provision of this Act — (a) confers a power on a constable [e.g. to make and arrest]; and (b) does not provide that the power may only be exercised with the consent of some person, other than a police officer, the officer may use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of the power. Section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967: (1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. (2) Subsection (1) above shall replace the rules of the common law on the question when force used for a purpose mentioned in the subsection is justified by that purpose. Common Law allows a person to use reasonable force to: (a) Defend himself from an attack. (b) Prevent an attack on another person [..] (c) Defend his property. All officers are trained to use the National Decision Model to assist with "dynamic risk assessment" when considering using force. If an officer cannot reasonably justify its use as being necessary and proportionate to a perceived threat then, in all likelihood, it may well be at the very least unlawful assault. What offences an officer commits, if any, will depend on the particular circumstances.

YES in germany §23 StVO (1a) Wer ein Fahrzeug führt, darf ein elektronisches Gerät, das der Kommunikation, Information oder Organisation dient oder zu dienen bestimmt ist, nur benutzen, wenn hierfür das Gerät weder aufgenommen noch gehalten wird und [...] (1a) Whoever is driving a vehicle may only use an electrical device that is serving communication, information, or organization or destined to be used for this if... 1. they don't pick the device up or hold it and [...] That is plenty clear: holding the device is banned in any way, and implies using it under German legal precedent.

If someone's record has been expunged, can they legally say that they have not been arrested? If someone applies for a job and the application asks whether they've ever been arrested, can they legally say on the application that they have not been arrested before? Note: Case was dismissed with no finding of fact.

New York Criminal Procedure - Article 160.6 states, Upon the termination of a criminal action or proceeding against a person in favor of such person, as defined in subdivision two of section 160.5 of this chapter, the arrest and prosecution shall be deemed a nullity and the accused shall be restored, in contemplation of law, to the status he occupied before the arrest and prosecution. The arrest or prosecution shall not operate as a disqualification of any person so accused to pursue or engage in any lawful activity, occupation, profession, or calling. Except where specifically required or permitted by statute or upon specific authorization of a superior court, no such person shall be required to divulge information pertaining to the arrest or prosecution. From this short article you will note: As far as the law is concerned, the arrest never happened Except for specific occupations listed in statute (such as law enforcement) the arrest record can not be considered The person arrested can not be required to divulge information pertaining to the arrest This is why the employment guide posted in @jqning's answer states: Generally, an employer cannot ask about arrests during a job interview or on a job application If none of your arrests are open or led to any convictions, you are legally permitted to answer "no" to these questions. If a job application asks you to list any "crimes", "convictions of crimes," or "criminal offenses," you should list only misdemeanor and felony convictions - not arrests. Remember from this previous answer, open arrests are on the record. The New York statute linked in that article explains the process and timing for sealing an arrest record after a criminal proceeding goes in favor of the arrested person.

It seems you found out what happened. The police are wrong all the time and usually absolutely nothing happens from it. The police are not required to tell you why you are being arrested. See supreme court case Devenpeck v. Alford. The court merely considers that to be good police practice. They do have to justify probable cause for the arrest to the court.

It's exactly the opposite. All arrests are public record under California Government Code 6254(f): Notwithstanding any other provision of this subdivision, state and local law enforcement agencies shall make public the following information, except to the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation: (1) The full name and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency, the individual’s physical description including date of birth, color of eyes and hair, sex, height and weight, the time and date of arrest, the time and date of booking, the location of the arrest, the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount of bail set, the time and manner of release or the location where the individual is currently being held, and all charges the individual is being held upon, including any outstanding warrants from other jurisdictions and parole or probation holds. Other than the "endanger the safety" exception, which could be applied case-by-case, there is no general exemption for refugees or asylum seekers. Trials are also public, see What does it mean that a trial in a US court is "Public"?. Members of the public cannot be excluded from a trial, and the defendant can't "opt out" of this. This is considered to be a central feature of US justice systems and an important check on possible abuses of the criminal judicial process.

The 4th amendment protection against unreasonable searches is irrelevant, since it only relates to governmental searches. There may be "shopkeeper privilege" laws in your state that enable a detention. Ordinarily, you cannot be arrested by a person – that would be assault and false arrest. However, a state can enact an exception, such as Washington's RCW 4.24.220, which says In any civil action brought by reason of any person having been detained on or in the immediate vicinity of the premises of a mercantile establishment for the purpose of investigation or questioning as to the ownership of any merchandise, it shall be a defense of such action that the person was detained in a reasonable manner and for not more than a reasonable time to permit such investigation or questioning by a peace officer or by the owner of the mercantile establishment, his or her authorized employee or agent, and that such peace officer, owner, employee, or agent had reasonable grounds to believe that the person so detained was committing or attempting to commit larceny or shoplifting on such premises of such merchandise. As used in this section, "reasonable grounds" shall include, but not be limited to, knowledge that a person has concealed possession of unpurchased merchandise of a mercantile establishment, and a "reasonable time" shall mean the time necessary to permit the person detained to make a statement or to refuse to make a statement, and the time necessary to examine employees and records of the mercantile establishment relative to the ownership of the merchandise. Speaking of Walmart, here is a petition regarding a lawsuit against Walmart over such an event, where a shopper failed to stop to respond to exit security, resulting in her being physically stopped. A lawsuit (assault, unlawful imprisonment, outrage) ensued. The bottom line was that the shopkeeper's privilege is a valid defense against a lawsuit to the effect that a shopper does not want to comply with a request to prove that they are not stealing goods.

"Awaiting sentencing" either remanded in custody or on bail. "Sentence completed" which may, or may not, after time become "Spent" (see here) and note that: It is against the law for an organisation to obtain information about an individual’s spent cautions or convictions unless the law specifically states that they can ask an exempted question; usually when someone is applying for a job or role that is exempt from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 Source For completeness: checks are made with the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS).

If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment.

This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.

See the answer to this question. It is remotely possible that it will show up, but the new S.C. law also says that an employer cannot use that information. On the other hand, that law is not yet effective (it becomes effective Dec. 27 2018), so for the rest of the year, the information could be used, if an employer obtains is. There is a law-enforcement exception that arrests can always be used against you if you apply for a law-enforcement related job. Under the current law (has been in effect for a while), the record is "under seal", so revealing the record in the course of a background check would be a violation of the relevant court order. The law specifies a punishment for illegal disclosure: A person who intentionally violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both. however, accidental disclosure is not a crime. You might think that you could at least sue them for accidental disclosure, but the law also says Unless there is an act of gross negligence or intentional misconduct, nothing in this section gives rise to a claim for damages against the State, a state employee, a political subdivision of the State, an employee of a political subdivision of the State, a public officer, or other persons. If the government person who releases the information intentionally does so, you can sue. Perhaps an accidental release could be found to be grossly negligent: that would depend on the circumstances.

Worst realistic effect in the U.S. of JSLint license? The JSLint license specifies that code "shall be used for Good, not Evil". It's been a source of (what appears to be) alarmist and ridiculously overblown controversy for a while now. I've noticed this conversation tends to attract a lot of developers who really like open source, know next to nothing about the law, and reach the conclusion that this might have real legal implications. I'll freely admit I'm a developer who knows next to nothing about the law, but it seems obvious that since the license makes no attempt to precisely define either "good" or "evil", and they don't already have legal definitions (as far as I know), or even consistent definitions in common parlance, no sane judge would attempt to enforce that part of the license. Then again, my uninformed opinion is just as uninformed as all the uninformed opinions I'm disagreeing with, so I could be completely off base with my analysis. So what is the worst thing that could (realistically, legally) happen to someone using JSLint because of that specific section of the license?

Short Answer The entire license could be ruled invalid and therefore unenforceable. Explanation Two legal principles at play in jimsug's answer might be: Vagueness Doctrine Overbreadth Doctrine Either or both of which might be sufficient for a judge to waive enforcement of any provisions that relate to the terms "good" or "evil." An interesting side effect of this might be that unless the principle of severability were applied to the JSlint license, then the license could be considered completely invalid due solely to the addition of the words "good" and "evil." A judge would have to affirmatively impose severability because the license itself does not assert it.

Yep, you are. You still need to keep the LICENSE and NOTICE files in the repository, if there were any in your copy of the project. These files contain the terms and conditions for the project, and provide attribution to the original developers. If you're trying to attribute in the UI of your application, you probably should. It's considered courteous and in the spirit of open source as well. This is also related: Do I need to include the full text of the MIT license in the UI of my app?

It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law.

Yes, commercial use is allowed for the AGPLv3 license. You can charge for your use of the software so long as you provide a way for the public to download the source code in its entirety.

Per the comment, the applicable license term seems to be Licensee agrees to maintain in confidence the source code version of the Licensed Software by using at least the same physical and other security measures as Licensee uses for its own confidential technical information and documentation, but in no case less than reasonable measures. So if your own code is on a physically unconnected thumbprint-secured blah blah blah computer deep in a mountain, with files encrypted, so must theirs be. If yours is stored in "the cloud" with decent password protection, theirs must be as well. This seems to describe your Github use (I don't have any knowledge of the degree of hackability of private Github repositories). The legal judgment as to whether this is "reasonably secure" is based on whether a prudent person would know that it is practical to gain unauthorized access. Protecting a file with the password "password" would probably be found to be unreasonably insecure.

Just assuming for the sake of this particular answer that everything happens in the U.S.: I'm not sure about the particular example of Open ZFS. The registration in the USPTO Records is in Oracle's name. Using OpenZFS for distributing the same kind of software as the now closed-source ZFS would seem to be infringing to me absent a license. Maybe Oracle just tolerates the use of the "ZFS" component by third-parties since they decided at some point to license the software under an open source license. In that case, they may have a dilution (http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/TrademarkDilution.aspx) problem and the mark may be invalid. If the mark is invalid, anybody can pretty much do whatever they want with it. That said, assuming for sake of discussion that the mark is valid, there is indeed such a thing that is similar to the copyright fair use in trademarks (in the U.S. at least). It's called "nominative fair use". You can read more about it here: http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/FairUse.aspx Bottom line is that under the nominative fair use doctrine it's generally ok for party A to use party B's trademark to refer to whatever party B is doing, even to sell products and services related to whatever party B is doing. As per the INTA document I just linked above, its for example ok to "use “iPhone” in non-stylized form on packaging for phone cases to indicate that it is usable with iPhone 6." Having a website (even with third-party ads) that discuss ZFS-related matters is similar to the iPhone example in my mind. Having a domain name that contains the mark seems riskier, but it's not necessarily downright forbidden. See: http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Toyota_Motor_Sales,_U.S.A._v._Tabari

I see no reason to doubt your conclusion; since it's not allowed by the license it's forbidden by copyright. As you figured it, you gain the right to use these tools by obtaining one of those 3 Visual Studio licenses. A Visual Studio Code license is free, so it makes business sense that it doesn't include a license for Microsoft C++ Build Tools. I.e. you can't claim it's an "obvious oversight", as there's a justifiable business reason.

The difference between commercial and non-commercial software use is about as clear as it gets, outlined by the definitions in the license above. One makes money, the other doesn't. There is no gray area. Your intent or expectations for a project may seem to alter the difference between the two and add a gray area in your mind, but they don't. Once you are a commercial user, buy a commercial license and/or upgrade the non-commercial license to commercial. That's the legal angle; and what is illegal and what is unethical are not always the same. If you still feel like your intent does make a difference and you feel unethical about using a non-commercial license - because you are building a community and hoping/planning on making money - buy the commercial license to begin with.

How much "more" needs to be added to an abstract idea in order to pass the subject matter eligibility test for a patent? In Mayo v. Prometheous 566 U. S. ____ (2012), the Supreme Court said (regarding 35 U.S.C. §101 subject matter eligibility): a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an “inventive concept,” sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself. This was reiterated in Alice v. CLS Bank 573 U.S. ___ (2014): a court must first “identif[y] the abstract idea represented in the claim,” and then determine “whether the balance of the claim adds ‘significantly more.’” What is the standard for judging, as part of assessing subject matter eligibility, whether the claimed process contains "significantly more" such that it is not preempting entirely the use of the natural law (or abstract idea, or other ineligible concept) itself?

The USPTO has incorporated the test for "significantly more" in their subject matter eligibility test as follows (see step 2B): (Figure from 2014 Interim Guidance on Subject Matter Eligibility.) The USPTO says (ibid.): A claim directed to a judicial exception must be analyzed to determine whether the elements of the claim, considered both individually and as an ordered combination, are sufficient to ensure that the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than the exception itself. They say this several different ways: this has been termed a search for an inventive concept ... To be patent-eligible, a claim that is directed to a judicial exception must include additional features to ensure that the claim describes a process or product that applies the exception in a meaningful way, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception In section 2.B.1., they give a summary of Supreme Court jurisprudence on this point, listing examples of considerations that have been found relevant for this analysis of "whether a claim with additional elements amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself". Limitations that "may be enough to qualify as significantly more" (ibid.): Improvements to another technology or technical field Improvements to the functioning of the computer itself Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing Adding a specific limitation other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field, or adding unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular useful application Other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment Examples of limitations that are insufficient to qualify as significantly more (ibid.): Adding the words ‘‘apply it’’ (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer Simply appending well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception Adding insignificant extrasolution activity to the judicial exception Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use

There is no one answer, but here are some examples. India is famous for deriving general principles of more important constitutional law concepts that can be used to find constitutional amendments to be unconstitutional. The U.S. has not gone to that extreme but does derive constitutional protections for the overall scheme of the constitution and from the legal context of the nation when constitutional provisions were enacted that don't obvious flow from the text of the legislation (e.g. the 11th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) has been interpreted to establish state sovereign immunity that the text of that amendment does not expressly provide for). Another somewhat weird source of law in the U.S. (constitutional at the federal level and usually common law at the state level) is that the 21st century right to a jury trial in a civil case depends upon whether the claim would have been litigated in England in 1789 in the courts of law or the courts of chancery in England. Customary international law is a thing. It also often arises from international practices or diplomatic norms, rather than tribunal adjudications. In the jurisprudence of the legislative process and some aspects of federalism, historical practices that have not been litigated are frequently resorted to as a source of law. For example, the question of whether a legislature is in recess has been resolved based upon historical practice. Prior to the French Revolution, customary practice was an important source of law in France. Customary practice was an important source of the English common law. In many British colonies and former British colonies (e.g. South Africa and Kenya and Sudan), lower tribal or village courts were often expressly permitted to apply local custom in their decision making. In the U.S., a collection of secondary authority texts compiled by the American Law Institute, an affiliate of the American Bar Association, called the Restatements, which summarize in codified form, various subjects in common law, are often used by courts as a source of law where there is no case law on point in a jurisdiction. In civil law countries, the leading legal treatises of law professors are an important source of interpretive authority of the civil code and other major codification of the law. Most Islamic countries provide in their constitutions that Islamic law is the highest authority and supersedes any secular law including other provisions of the constitution to the contrary. In many parts of the United States, mostly in the west, but also in Florida and Louisiana, property rights arising under Spanish/Mexican law, or under Native American law continue in force even though they derived from legal systems other than U.S. statutes and common law. See, for example: Tribe: We have "aboriginal title" to these lands in New Mexico because we had exclusive occupation of them from around 1300 to 1650, and then still used them a lot since then. Further, the "sovereign" (the U.S.) has never properly taken them away, so they're still ours. District court: No. Tribe on motion to reconsider: How about just these bits of the lands? District court: Still no. Tenth Circuit: There's still a claim for one of the bits. Concurrence 1: No bits for you. Concurrence 2: Two bits. (Source)

You are correct that it is quite expensive to patent something in U.S. law. Under U.S. patent law, once an idea is publicly published, if no one else has a patent application for the same idea that is pending, the idea enters the public domain and no one can obtain a patent of that idea. The publication become "prior art" with respect to any future patent application which cannot be protected by patent law. Of course, if you publish an invention which you discovered independently, that someone else already has a patent application pending for that will be approved the following week, the fact that you published it after the patent was applied for doesn't prevent the person with the pending patent application from having it approved. The term "invention" rather than "idea" is what I will use for the remainder of this answer, because there are many ideas which may not be patented, while the lion's share of patentable ideas are appropriately described as "inventions." But, understand that as used in this answer, the term "invention" is being used to refer to the concepts and ideas necessary to make the invention, and not to a particular instance of a product made using those concepts and ideas. When an invention is in the public domain, anyone can utilize the invention free of charge without a license. People who use the invention are not even required to acknowledge that you invented or discovered it. An invention is also not eligible to be patented if more than a year has elapsed since the first sale of a product using it. But, in that case, the invention can still be protected as a trade secret until it is voluntarily disclosed in some fashion to someone who is not subject to a non-disclosure agreement. (I say voluntary, because the fact that, for example, an unauthorized corporate spy sees the trade secret doesn't end the status of the invention as a trade secret.) Some inventions, are effectively publicly disclosed and published the moment that anyone looks at it closely. The patentable element of other inventions are invisible to an end user, or to observer of an end user. For example, if the invention involves something in the interior of a device, or the invention involves something not visible to the naked eye (e.g. a process for synthesizing an industrial chemical from other chemicals where the chemical formula of the ingredients and end result can't be determined without a microscope or analytical chemistry tests), merely showing someone a product made using the invention will not put it in the public domain. It is generally legal to reverse engineer or independently come up with an invention which is merely a trade secret. It is not legal to use a patented invention or process, even if it is not directly copied and is instead reverse engineered or independently discovered, during the lifetime of the patent. There is no straightforward way to put an invention into the public domain while retaining any right to acknowledgement that you invented it or otherwise exercise control through a licensing agreement without patenting it.

For the record, the requirement says: The board of education or trustees of the school district or the state agency responsible for providing education to students with disabilities shall have the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion and burden of production, in any such impartial hearing, except that a parent or person in parental relation seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral parental placement shall have the burden of persuasion and burden of production on the appropriateness of such placement. To understand "burden of proof", think in terms of what claim is being made, by whom: this is different from understanding what you want to happen. To get the outcome you want, you have to make the right claims. Assume that the law requires the school to accommodate a student's learning disability, then the plaintiff (parent) would claim that the school failed to accommodate. The school would then be required to prove that they did accommodate. In other words, all you have to do (initially) is allege a failure to follow the law, and it is up to the school to provide the evidence that your allegation is incorrect (by providing records, also indicating standards that students are held to; the presumption that the panel is supposed to adopt is that the plaintiff's allegation is true, unless facts are introduced that show that it is false). It's not clear what action of the school is alleged to be at variance with the law. It sounds like a simple correctable bureaucratic error, so a hearing should not be necessary, but that doesn't mean that one isn't (e.g. if they have a policy of not admitting to making mistakes).

A thing needs to be original in order for it to get copyright protection. 17 USC §102: "Copyright protection subsists [...] in original works of authorship" Copyright Act Section 5 (1): "copyright shall subsist in Canada [...] in every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work..." In the US, originality requires "a modicum of creativity" (Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In Canada, originality requires an "exercise of skill and judgment" and that "not be so trivial that it could be characterized as a purely mechanical exercise" (CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 SCR 339). Text transcribed from a public domain source would not be given copyright protection.

We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games.

Patent law, especially patent prosecution (writing patent applications and working with the US Patent & Trademark Office to get those applications granted), is the most common area of law for scientists and engineers to enter. Patent prosecution does not require a law degree, but does require a science or engineering undergraduate degree. On the other hand, patent litigation (going to court over alleged infringement of granted patents) and other technology-focused areas of law (e.g., IP transactions) do generally require a law degree (and not a technical degree), and so you would have to spend a good deal of time and money on law school.

The power definitely exists, and it is also said by some (respectable persons) that they have a duty to do so. There are many schools of legal interpretation. One trend is to attempt to discern legislative intent, based on whatever facts there might be such as newspaper articles or legislative committee reports. A contrary trend is to look exclusively at the text enacted by the legislature – this school is known as the Textualist school, and is currently dominant in the US Supreme Court. There are also non-textualist "progressive" trends that seek justice according to some social principle, rather than the text of the law or the definitive intent of the original legislators, which may address the situation that you have in mind. In civil cases, statutory law tends to be rather unclear, allowing a judge to decide on the basis of their beliefs of what is fair, equitable or just. That is because in the common law, close to a millenium old, judgments were supposed to be "just". In the US, much of the common law has been re-coded as statutory law, and in that case, the intent of the legislature is really to "encode the sense of justice implicit in the common law". This does not mean that trial judges have unlimited power to set aside the words of existing laws. Their primary obligation is to apply the law literally, as interpreted by their superiors (appellate courts). When the higher courts are silent and when the legislature is not clear, the trial judge has some leeway to follow whichever jurisprudential philosophy they adhere to.

Are motions to censure opposing counsel used? Is it common, considered a good tactic, or even allowed, to move a court to censure – or even hold in contempt – the opposing counsel? If one has a reasonable argument for why the opposing counsel is out of line, and the judge hasn't called them on it, it seems to me like it would almost always be a good tactic. And it seems like it could occur with some frequency when the opposing counsel is a criminal prosecutor, since their duty is to truth and justice, and it's a fine line to walk between being a principled advocate for justice and a competent adversary to a defendant. But what is the reality? Are such motions allowed? Do judges take kindly to being encouraged to censure an officer of their court? Are there clear benefits or expected outcomes of such motions? Also, would such motions succeed by appealing to the principles espoused by courts and legal professional associations? Or does a lawyer really have to substantially neglect their duty or abuse their position before a motion to censure will be entertained?

The reality is that it is almost never an acceptable tactic to use in any jurisdiction where I ever have/or currently do practice. The bar is relatively small no matter where you are; even in bigger cities. Your reputation is your most valuable asset and it would be crippled if this became your M.O., or was used in anything but the most rare and egregious situations (e.g. withholding evidence, lying to the judge, tampering with jury). Small violations (which are seemingly big in the heat of trial) happen every day and if you even suggested this it would come back on you more times than not. This is exponentially true in the criminal arena where the Judges and prosecutors interact on a daily basis and have formed collegial relationships. If you practice criminal law you often need to form good working relationships with the ADAs or AAGs since most cases get disposed of through negotiations with these very individuals. I have been in situations where my colleagues and I discussed it, opined on how it would be appropriate, but in the end have never gone that far. One time things were so bad with opposing counsel on so many levels, I considered it; however, I was a newish lawyer and my mentor at the time told me that he had never seen anyone but a federal court judge issue a sanction and aside from that, had never even seen it requested by a lawyer in the local bar. And these were horribly bad violations of the rules of procedure, conduct unbecoming, etc. So, I would suggest avoiding this practice. My rule of thumb is that unless the offending practice is so egregious that one would be technically duty bound to report the conduct to the bar, it is not appropriate to ask for sanctions.

Yes, there is indeed a conflict, often described as a balancing act. Similarly, the principle of free speech protected by the First Amendment requires that the public tolerate lies in political rhetoric, and hateful public speech and insults, but can be balanced against an individual's interest in reputation in a libel case. See Near vs Minnesota and NY Times vs Sullivan for leading cases on this issue. There is also tension between the right of a newspaper to report on a current criminal case again under the First Amendment, and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial before an unbiased jury, which might be influenced by newspaper publicity. In these and similar situations, there is no way to fully serve both protected interests, and courts must strike a balance and prefer one right over another, or find some compromise. In the 5th vs 6th situation, courts have mostly favored the 5th. That is, the court will not require a witness to give up the right not to self-incriminate, and usually will not grant a defendant an acquittal because desired testimony is unavailable. It might be that a defendant expected to rely on the testimony of a witness who has since died, or has fled the country and cannot be brought before the court. The sixth does not and cannot assure perfect justice, and the courts do not attempt to make it do so. In the situation described, the defendant may compel the witness to appear and be asked the relevant questions. The jury will hear the answer, and may assume what it would have been without the invocation of the Fifth. The defendant's lawyer can try to find a question that the witness will answer, and can argue that the refusal to answer is consistent with a not-guilty verdict. That is all that the courts provide. When the prosecution calls a witness, knowing or having good reason to know that the witness will invoke the 5th on more or less every relevant question, the US Supreme Court in Namet v. United States 373 U.S. 179 (1963) has held that this may be error requiring overturning the conviction. This was confirmed and expanded in Douglas v. Alabama 380 U.S. 415 (1965). But neither of these are relevant when the defense calls the witness.

A case for negligence or some other tort would likely never reach the stage where we could answer this question, as lawyers are generally immune from suit for their litigation conduct. I don't know of any case with facts likey you've described, but my understanding is that the litigation privilege precludes virtually any tort action based on a lawyer's statements in the course of the proceedings. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, for instance, has specifically acknowledged that claims for defamation, extortion, fraud, perjury, forgery, slander of title, injurious falsehood are unavailable: The policy reasons for the privilege have often been repeated: In fulfilling their obligations to their client[s] and to the court, it is essential that lawyers, subject only to control by the trial court and the bar, should be free to act on their own best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of later having to defend a civil action for defamation for something said or written during the litigation. Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect.

Your silence can be used against you: this is known as an adoptive admission. It is an exception to the hearsay rule, and is based on the premise that if a person hears and understands an accusation against them (even framed very indirectly), and "adopts" the truth of the accusation by directly acting in a certain way or by failing to dispute the accusation, this can be introduced as a form of admitting to the accusation. For instance, B might say to A "I laughed when you shot Smith in the foot" and A might say "That was pretty funny, right", that can be admitted and interpreted as a confession. The same goes for A saying nothing. What's crucial is that the accusation has to be made in the defendant's presence, they must hear and understand it, they must be able to deny the accusation and it would be natural to deny the accusation. There is a relationship between this and the Fifth Amendment, see Salinas v. Texas (and prior law), that "To prevent the privilege against self-incrimination from shielding information not properly within its scope, a witness who “‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’". During a non-custodial interview, defendant was asked asked if his shotgun “would match the shells recovered at the scene of the murder”, and he said nothing (and actually gave non-verbal indicators that the accusation was true). He did not invoke his right to silence, thus the court reasoned that "Because he failed to do so, the prosecution’s use of his noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment".

Many times. See pages 4 and onward here. The 11th circuit (which includes FL) recognizes sentencing manipulation but not sentencing entrapment. The one example from the 11th circuit in that document (US v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264) was an unsuccessful claim of sentence manipulation, but it shows the analysis that goes into deciding these types of claims. They say: While our Circuit does not recognize sentencing entrapment as a viable defense, we do recognize the outrageous government conduct defense, and we have considered sentencing manipulation as a viable defense. ... Ciszkowski, however, has not met his burden of establishing that the government's conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to constitute sentencing factor manipulation. Government-created reverse sting operations are recognized and useful methods of law enforcement investigation. Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1413. The fact that law enforcement may provide drugs or guns essential to a willing and predisposed offender does not necessarily constitute misconduct. We have previously declined to find that the government engaged in prohibited sentencing factor manipulation in other similar contexts.

If no one objects to a leading question, then the judge does nothing. A judge does not generally pro-actively police the rules of evidence at trial. Also, there are circumstances when a judge has discretion to allow a leading question even when it wouldn't ordinarily be allowed to move the trial along on largely undisputed points or to allow in inarticulate witness to testify. The exception to judicial passivity in the absence of an objection at trial is "plain error" that is not "harmless error", which a judge has a duty to prevent or address even if no objection is raised by a party. But, offering a leading question when one is not allowed by the rules of evidence almost never constitutes plain error, and would almost always be considered "harmless error" even if it was objected to and the judge ruled incorrectly, unless the use of improper leading questions was pervasive and there was a contemporaneous objection by counsel. For example, allowing a prospective juror to serve as a juror, despite that juror saying in the jury selection process that he can't be impartial because the defendant committed adultery with his spouse, because neither the prosecution or the defense attorney moves to strike the juror for cause, rather than striking that juror for cause of the court's own accord, is the kind of conduct that would often be considered "plain error" that is not "harmless error."

In the United States, I would strongly expect that an accurate depiction of historical fact (even if uncomfortably graphic) would be protected under the First Ammendment. Otherwise, the government could functionally censor the worst parts of history (as being too awful to discuss or depict), which is exactly the kind of thing the First Amendment is designed to prevent. There are three important categories of speech that are not protected: (1) "fighting words" directed at a person intended to provoke a fight, (2) words that infict emotional distress such that it qualifies as a tort, and (3) speech that court finds to qualify as "obscenity". Of these three, your game probably will not qualify for the first, since it generally requires speech directed at a specific person or people. I also suspect (less confidently) that an emotional-distress tort would not succeed since your game is not directed at any particular living people. Even if the game caused emotional distress to someone, your public release of the game probably could not qualify as a tort against that specific player who happens to experience emotional distress. The Miller test is used to determine if a work is obscenity. Wikipeida summarizes its three parts, all of which must be satisfied to constitute obscenity: Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards", would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law, Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The first two are explicitly sexual in nature. I don't know if there is any similar prohibition against hyper-violence, but even if there were, as long as your game does not run afoul of the "lacks serious artistic value" condition, you will be on the safe side of the line. Note that none of this stops anyone from initiating legal action against you (which may cause headaches for you); it only stops those legal actions from succeededing.

Does Florida bankruptcy law apply to second homes? A New York couple filed for bankruptcy. In New York state, they have to surrender all their assets to the bankruptcy court except for $150,000 each of "exempt" assets. They own a "second" home in Florida worth about $250,000. If that was their primary residence, Florida law would cover their home to that amount (or more). But given that they lived in and filed for bankruptcy in New York, would the Florida home be part of the New York bankruptcy estate?

Yes, the second home will be part of the New York bankruptcy estate. Congress broadly defined property within the bankruptcy estate as all property, "wherever located and by whomever held," subject to limited exemptions. Florida's homestead exemption is among the broadest in the Unite dStates; the value of the property that can be protected is unlimited. See Florida Constitution, Article X, Section 5. As such, I have broken down your question into two parts: May the debtors use the Florida homestead exemption for their Florida home even if they are domiciled in New York? If not, may the debtors use either the Federal or New York state homestead exemptions to protect their Florida home? Exemption Eligibility The debtors can choose between either the federal exemptions of section 522(d) or the exemptions available under New York state and nonbankruptcy federal law; the debtors may not choose the exemptions available under Florida state law. Section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code is the operative statute. To take advantage of a state's exemption scheme, the debtor must either: Be domiciled in the state for the 730 days immediately prior to filing its petition; or If the debtor has not been domiciled in a single state for such period, the state in which the debtor was domiciled for the 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period (or for the longer portion of that 180 day period). 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)(A): . . . any property that is exempt under Federal law . . . or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition to the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 730 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a single State for such 730-day period, the place in which the debtor’s domicile was located for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place; As a result, the debtor may only utilize either the Federal or New York homestead exemptions. Federal Homestead Exemption Section 522(d)(1) provides a homestead exemption in the amount of $22,975 in value for the debtor's residence. (1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $ 22,975 in value, in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, in a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. (The linked statute says that the federal homestead exemption is capped at $15,000. But pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 104, the amount is adjusted every three years to account for changes in the cost of living. Effective April 1, 2013, the cap is $22,975). Essential to the right to a homestead exemption is designation and occupancy of the property as a residence. Residence and domicile are not necessarily the same thing. Courts seem to be split as to whether a debtor may hold multiple "residences" at the same time. For example, the court in In re Lawrence, 469 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) held: By choosing not to limit the residence qualified for exemption under § 522(d) to a principal or primary residence, Congress presumably intended to encompass a broader category than principal residences, namely any residence . . . . To sum up, on the date of their bankruptcy petition the [debtors] owned two residences, one in Massachusetts and one in Maine. They used them both. They were entitled to exempt either one, but only one, under § 522(d)(1). See also In re Demeter, 478 B.R. 281 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012); In re Gandy, 327 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2005). But the New Jersey Bankruptcy Court in In re Stoner, 487 B.R. 410 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013) read the term "residence" in a manner "requiring some measure of permanence." I couldn't find any cases from New York discussing this issue, making it difficult to determine whether a New York bankruptcy court would allow the debtors to apply the federal homestead exemption to their Florida home. But given that the exemption is capped at only $22,975, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on the bankruptcy. New York Homestead Exemption The New York homestead exemption is more generous than the federal exemption. It provides exemptions capped between $75,000 to $150,000. However, it is limited to property located within New York and used as a primary residence. As such, the Florida property is not subject to the exemption. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5206: Property of one of the following types, not exceeding one hundred fifty thousand dollars for the counties of Kings, Queens, New York, Bronx, Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, Westchester and Putnam; one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars for the counties of Dutchess, Albany, Columbia, Orange, Saratoga and Ulster; and seventy-five thousand dollars for the remaining counties of the state in value above liens and encumbrances, owned and occupied as a principal residence, is exempt from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment, unless the judgment was recovered wholly for the purchase price thereof: a lot of land with a dwelling thereon, shares of stock in a cooperative apartment corporation, units of a condominium apartment, or a mobile home.

Almost certainly the answer to this is no because SB.8 talks of the $10K as being (minimum) statutory damages. (The actual provision 171.208(b)(2) is for damages "not less" than $10K, i.e. the court can award more in the first suit.) If e.g. someone breaks the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by making spurious claims against a group of people, they are each entitled to up to $1,000 statutory damages each (and class action is specifically allowed/mentioned). Generally, you can't avoid paying damages to an injured party by paying them to someone unrelated (before). There's nothing in SB.8 to suggest otherwise, the wording is: a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed Only proof of payment (not even having lost another suit on the same incident in another county) precludes a judge from awarding the statutory damages. (Claimants can file suits in their county of residence per 171.210, which me not knowing the Texas civil procedure too well, seem to allow multiple parallel lawsuits to proceed.) Now SB.8 is special in that limits relief to the first who sues (or maybe the first who wins) while enabling a very large class to claim injured status and sue... which in itself doesn't make a lot of sense when speaking of statutory damages, but it's a novel kind of relief, so who knows what courts may decide. (It would be interesting if a court determined that that first-claimant limit in SB.8 is unconstitutional, under either Texas or federal constitutions. In some other state laws, there is sometimes a limit on the total amount of damages out of a single incident, but it's not awarded on a first-winner basis, instead there's a provision to "allocate to each claimant his equitable share of the total".) Granted a defendant could come with a legal strategy that look something like: when sued in Texas county arrange for a "friendly" organization (members) to immediately sue in another county. Fight the first lawsuit so as to delay judgement, but immediately concede the one from the "friendly" organization members, so that only the "friendlies" get the statutory damages (first), possibly e.g. donating them back to the defendant thereafter. Whether this would work really depends on details in the Texas civil procedure law, which I'm not too familiar with.

A lien is used to prevent sale of a property until a debt is paid. This has nothing to do with priority over a mortgage. The HOA agreed to release the lien for some payment. The negotiation of that payment doesn't matter to the new buyer. Once the lien is released, then it is no longer listed with the county on the property, so the property can now be sold. The former lienholder cannot now apply a new lien to the property because the new owner is not a debtor to the former lienholder. This would be a terrible way to manage property sales, and no mortgage company would allow a mortgage for a property that could not be sold in case of foreclosure, which is likely why the mortgage holder was a private individual. It is possible for a new owner to take on existing liens, but this would be clearly spelled out in purchase documents. There should be a statement on the title search results that no liens exist.

Bob has to sue in a court of competent jurisdiction To enliven jurisdiction, there has to be some connection between the parties or the event and the jurisdiction. Since Bob, the manufacturer and (presumably) the harmful incident all took place in County X, of State Y or Country A then they are the only jurisdictions that might be competent. The courts of County Z, State M or Country B are all going to say "not my problem". For the USA, there are only State courts and Federal courts. States may have courts that are called county courts but they are enlivened by the state sovereign - counties and cites are self-governing administrative districts, not sovereign states. Federal courts have jurisdiction where the subject matter is about a Federal Statute, the Constitution or a treaty. This dispute would appear to be based on tort or contract law which is a state matter. Federal courts can have jurisdiction if the parties are in different states and the amount in dispute is more than $75,000. This would not appear to be the case. So, as a state matter, the plaintiff can bring the case to any competent court. The defendant can apply to have it moved to a more convenient court. Arguments will be heard and, at some cost, you'll probably end up where you should have started.

Off the top of my head, unless there's a provision that says otherwise, no, they cannot do that. Obviously, I can't tell you if there's a provision that says otherwise. Consult a lawyer for more specific advice.

Could you insure yourself either given the fact that- you bought the property on mortgage? A mortgage does not generally have the legal effect of insurance. You owe the debt to the lender, which is a strict liability obligation, without regard to the value of the collateral. So, if the collateral is devalued, you still owe the debt, whether or not the lender forecloses. For example, if you sell the property for less than the amount of the debt (i.e. a short sale), you remain personally liable for the deficiency between the proceeds of the sale, and the amount owed on the debt, unless the lender consents. The exception to this is a "non-recourse mortgage", which is a mortgage in which the lender expressly agrees to accept the collateral as the sole means from which the debt can be repaid in a compulsory fashion. The financial crisis of 2009 was mostly a function of a handful U.S. states like California and Florida with economically important mortgage markets having residential mortgage loans that were as a matter of law, non-recourse debts (or nearly non-recourse debts) compounded by people making risky decisions knowing that they didn't face the risk of a deficiency judgment. But, non-recourse mortgage lending is very rare in the U.K. (the linked material inaccurately asserts that mortgages in "most of the United States" are non-recourse, however, when, in fact, that is true only in a small minority of U.S. states, probably not more than five state in all, although a couple of the states that are close to non-recourse for residential mortgages, like Florida and California, are economically important U.S. mortgage markets). Of course, even in the case of a debtor who is obligated on a full recourse mortgage, it may be in the interest of the lender to write off the deficiency judgment, rather than seeking to recovery the debt from the borrower, if the borrower is apart from the collateral, judgment-proof or very nearly so. The lender is taking the risk that both the collateral will be insufficient and that the borrower will also be unable to pay the debt, and when that happens the lender takes a loss. Or is there any insurance which could protect you against massive downfall in any Unforseen compulsory purchase situation. In the United States, lenders often buy what is called "mortgage insurance" at the expense of the buyer, when the down payment on the property is under 20% of the purchase price, that remains in force until 20% of the purchase price has been paid through a combination of a down payment and principal payments on the loan. But, this form of insurance is not generally available to property owners themselves as a matter of economic reality, possibly because it is an uninsurable risk, and possibly because there isn't enough economic demand for it at prices that would make it profitable to do so. Also, when a lender receives a payment on a mortgage insurance policy, the insurance company receives in exchange, all of the rights that the lender had to sue the borrower for a deficiency judgment, if any. These are called the insurance company's "subrogation rights." I have certainly also never seen any form of insurance for an unfavorably bad outcome in an eminent domain/condemnation proceeding for any reason. In a case like that the court determines as a matter of law (in one of the few proceedings where there is still a right to a jury in the U.K.) what the fair market value of the property is at the time of the condemnation, and that determination would complicate recovery on any insurance policy because you would need to have a proof of the loss. Generally speaking, a mere decline in the fair market value of real estate, in and of itself, it not considered to be an insurable loss, of the owner of the real estate, for insurance law purposes. Bonding A very close cousin of insurance contracts are bonding contracts. When a third party is unsure that you will be able to perform a contract or pay a debt, you can encourage them to do business with you by having a bonding company agree to meet your obligations up to a certain dollar amount if you are unable to do so, usually, in exchange for a fee, a right to sue you if they have to make a payment for the amount that they had to pay, and sometimes for some sort of collateral to protect them against the risk that they are taking. But, bonding companies don't generally provide bonds for residential mortgage customers at any price, because someone who needs a bond on a debt like that is unlikely to be able to ever repay the bonding company for its loss if it does have to pay the mortgage debt, and because bonding companies would need to set aside too much money as financial reserves against this risk to be prepared in the event that it had to pay a lot of claims due to collapsing real estate price bubble or something like that. Or is there any way to mitigate this risk / avoid this risk? Option To Sell Contracts On the buyer's side the primary "insurance-like" legal instrument would be for the buyer to purchase from a third-party a legal option to sell the property at a specific price that is lower than the current purchase price. Such an option would probably be legal to enter into, and, with the proper regulatory compliance and financial disclosures, a firm could sell such options to residential property buyers. But, as a matter of practical economic reality, I have never encountered a transaction in which someone actually did that with an unrelated third-party in an arms-length business transaction. In the financial crisis of 2009, secondary market mortgage debt buyers had purchased options to hedge against just this kind of risk, but the counterparties who were obligated to cover the losses pursuant to those options didn't have sufficient reserves and other assets to cover the losses that they were obligated to pay, and so the people who had purchased these options were stiffed anyway. This is because prominent credit rating firms for businesses (of which there were only three or four in the United States) failed to properly evaluate the fact that the risk of one claim under this kind of option was not independent of the risk of other claims under similar options happening at the same time, and in general, failed to accurately evaluate the risk of counterparties being unable to perform their sides of the contracts because the counterparties were be prominent financial companies that had never failed before. But, faced with this situation, almost every investment bank in the United States either went bankrupt or was acquired by another financial company that was not allowed to engage in this kind of derivatives transaction. Mortgage insurance companies, in contrast, paid all of the claims against them, because state insurance regulators had adequately evaluated the risks and forced the mortgage insurance companies to set aside adequate reserves to pay claims in the event of a situation like the 2009 financial crisis. But, because the need to set aside reserves made mortgage insurance (which also had premiums that were not tax deductible to the property owner) made mortgage insurance more expensive than having the same bank give someone both a first mortgage and a higher interest second mortgage on a residence, and then entering option contracts to control their risk of loss in the event of a real estate devaluation that made the second mortgage uncollectible, mortgage insurance companies had a pretty low market share of the financial services providers who were addressing the property devaluation risk for mortgage lenders. Long Term Leases In Lieu Of Purchasing With A Mortgage Another alternative would be to enter into a favorable long term lease of the property, which would be owned by somebody else, rather than actually buying it. If the lease had a term automatically terminating upon a compulsory purchase such as an eminent domain proceeding, the landlord and not the tenant, would bear the risk of loss in the event that the property bad massively devalued due to a change in prevailing market prices (although the landlord would also benefit in the event of massive appreciation at the termination of the lease, although that might be long in the future). This would be an extremely uncommon arrangement for someone to make with their own residence, but isn't unthinkable. For example, over in Ireland, the Guinness Brewing Corporation rents rather than owns most of the real estate that it used on long term 999 year leases (if I recall correctly), possibly out of concern for this possibility, which was a very real one at the time that those leases were put in place. Similarly, my childhood home in a university town was built on land leased from the university on a 99 year lease in the 1960s or 1970s, that was later converted to absolute ownership of the land by my faculty and administrator parents about fifty years into the original lease by mutual agreement between the university and the original home builder. But, that wouldn't really be strictly analogous, because the house was purchased by my parents subject to a full recourse mortgage secured by the building and their rights as tenants on the land lease, so they weren't really protected from a mass devaluation of the property. The transaction didn't really hedge against an economic downturn. Instead, it effectively gave the university the right to buy back the land at the cost of compensating my parents for the value of the residence built on that land, if it wanted to expand. But, it would still probably be possible and legal to enter into a long term lease whose terms did hedge against that possibility, possibly with an option to buy the premises after a certain number of years long in the future when devaluation relative to the purchase price was much less likely to due gradual annual appreciation and inflation over that time period (e.g. 40 years out), if you could find someone willing to serve as a landlord in that kind of deal. Caveat Regarding Taxation The way business transactions are structured is frequently heavily driven not just by the underlying economic effect of the transactions, but also by the tax implications of the transactions. But, I am not familiar enough with the tax laws of the United Kingdom to evaluate that piece of the puzzle. In the context of the question, the most viable alternative to limit risk downside devaluation risk would be to enter into a long term lease rather than buying the residence. But, that only makes sense if there are not big tax benefits to owning a residence with a mortgage as opposed to leasing one. In the United States, there are huge tax incentives to buy rather than lease. But, I don't know if there are similar tax incentives in the United Kingdom that might make a long term lease solution less attractive. For example, a large share of all businesses in the United States lease rather than own the real property that they use, and a large share of skyscrapers and other high rise buildings in the United States are built on leased land. But, those transactions are structured as long term leases, rather than purchase transactions, primarily for tax reasons. Under U.S. tax law, businesses can't treat money spent to purchase raw land or principal payments on mortgages as an expense for tax purposes, but can treat the full amount of any lease payment the business pays to a landlord as an expense for tax purposes. So, transactions are structured accordingly. For example, in a high rise transaction, the building owner pays the fully deductible long term land lease payment to the owner of the land (usually a non-profit that isn't worried about having taxable income not matched by an expense deduction), while the building owner can make up for not being able to deduct principal payment expense on the construction loan by being able to take depreciation deductions on the building itself as an expense in a similar amount. The non-profits usually don't borrow the money to buy the land that they lease to high rise owners. Instead, this is an investment option for cash rich, stable non-profits that need to find a way to get reliable, low risk, long term passively managed returns on their investments. And, the risk of devaluation is much lower for a long term investor with a forty year time horizon than it is for property owner with a shorter time horizon. But, without these tax incentives, there would be far less real estate leasing by businesses in the United States, and a desire to hedge against significant real estate devaluations is a far more secondary reason for businesses to lease of real estate in the United States.

Is this true? Yes. can someone explain how this might work? You can form an LLC, and then fund it with money that would be used to purchase the home, and buy the home in the name of the LLC. One minor exception is that a handful of rural U.S. states prohibit limited liability entities from owning farm land, so if the home is part of a farm or ranch, this could be prohibited in those states. If there is a mortgage, this is more difficult, but not impossibly so. The primary debtor on the mortgage would be the LLC. Ordinarily the owner of the LLC would be required by the bank to guarantee the mortgage, but loan guarantees do not necessarily have to be made a matter of public record. If the LLC has only one member, it is disregarded for income tax purposes, so that isn't a problem. There may be issues in this case of a house not qualifying for residential property tax treatment in some cases (which is often a lower rate than commercial real estate). There is also sometimes an issue that property owned by an LLC isn't eligible for a "homestead exemption" of equity in the home from creditor's claims. It may also be treated differently in terms of eligibility for means-tested benefits like Medicaid nursing home coverage. But, it is allowed. I ask the question, for it seems to me that it should not be difficult to find out who the owner of any given LLC is. In the U.S., the owners of a manager managed LLC are rarely disclosed in the public record (although about half of U.S. states require one or all of the members of a member managed LLC to be disclosed). But all U.S. states allow LLCs to be manager managed. Also, all U.S. states are required as a matter of constitutional law to all LLCs organized in a state other than the state where the LLC owns real property or operates to do business in that state. States can imposed regulations on out of state LLCs to some extent, however. The main exception to these general rules is California. Although the California Articles of Organization do not list the members of the LLC in the Artiles, California requires the LLC to file a Statement of Information within 90 days of the approval of the LLC. The Statement of Information does require a list of the LLC's members, and it does become public record. Records of LLC ownership are maintained in the private internal records of the LLC. A contact person, called a registered agent and sometimes the managers of the LLC with authority to act on its behalf must be publicly disclosed, but neither of these posts has anything to do with ownership. Many states also require the "organizer" of the LLC to be disclosed, but that doesn't have to be an owner of the LLC either. Often it is a lawyer or accountant for the LLC. It will be necessary to disclose the ownership to federal tax officials, and often also to state tax officials. Also, soon, under a newly enacted federal law that has not yet taken effect because regulations have not been written, to federal money laundering officials. But, both of these pieces of information are confidential and not available to the general public. This information can be obtained by subpoena in pertinent litigation, however, must often be disclosed when filing federal lawsuits, and is often required to be disclosed by counter-parties in business transactions. Footnote The U.S. practice is not the global norm. In most civil law countries, for example, ownership interests in entities need to be reflected in a notarized document kept in the custody of the notary involved. In recent times, interests in transparency and avoiding tax evasion and money laundering for terrorism and crime have promoted additional, less decentralized records of entity ownership.

It is a false statement to claim to live in one county when you actually live in a different one. It becomes perjury (a crime) when you falsely swear to that statement on your status report, and you are required to report changes in "household situation" within 10 days. There isn't an exception allowing you to give a false address "in case it costs more to report truthfully". The only legal solutions are to report truthfully and pay more, or move again, report truthfully, and not pay more.

Is it fair use to discuss a fictional work on a webpage? On my for-profit website, users can rate and comment on works of literature, film, and music, most of which are copyrighted. The only information I include is: 1.) Title 2.) Release date 3.) MPAA rating, if it is a movie 4.) Similar works Does this count as fair use of the work?

Titles can't be copyrighted. Meta-data like #2 aren't copyrighted. Not sure if the MPAA could protect its ratings, but I can't find anywhere that it has asserted restrictions on the use of those. If the list of "Similar works" is not somebody else's intellectual property then there's no problem. (If it is I'm not certain what protection it could be eligible for.)

I'm assuming that you are in the UK, as you are talking about the British Standards Institue. In general the truth cannot be copyrighted but an expression of that truth can be, provided that it is creative or original to at least some extent. In this case the equations and constants you want to use are descriptions of scientific truths. If you translate them into another form (e.g. a computer program) then you are not copying the creative bit (the layout and arrangement of those equations and explanatory text), so you are not violating the copyright. Edit: I should also have said for (3) that their descriptions of the constants and variables will be copyright. You would have to avoid copying their words. However given that these are going to be terse descriptions of facts your words can still be pretty similar without infringing on copyright, because there are only so many ways of describing the acceleration due to gravity, or whatever. Take a look at some alternative references to see what words they use.

I agree that you have a very strong copyright fair use case. Although the logo is creative and you're using the entire thing, your use is for a nonprofit educational purpose and does not affect the value of the work. The logo is also probably trademarked. But you aren't using the mark in commerce, so I don't think that will be a problem for you.

The images and text are copyright (if they are). What Google does with them is fair use/dealing. It works like this: if Google's bot can find them then you (the owner) have put them on the World Wide Web presumably because you want people to see them, effectively you have put them on public display. Google is assisting you in that endeavour by enabling people who are looking for what you are displaying to find it. Their use of your material enhances its value to you which is a rock solid defence. If you don't want your stuff on public display then a) don't put it on a public part of the web - there are plenty of private cloud storage facilities or B) stick a file in your website that tells bots not to index it.

You are clearly seeking legal advice. Answers on this site come from anonymous people on the internet and are not legal advice. You should not act based on information from this site. I am unaware of any lawsuit where one would be sued for merely storing and reading HTML for personal use. Downloading a webpage is probably not a copyright violation. Most things you create, including HTML source code, are protected by copyright and copyright includes the exclusive right to choose who can read what you created. I couldn't find any actual reference to this but I would hazard a guess that displaying an HTML webpage online is implicitly allowing others to read that code. I believe this guess is correct because all modern web browsers have the capability to view source that nobody considers illegal and browsers also include the capability to save webpages to disk. These browsers are made by companies with large legal departments, I doubt Internet Explorer would include this function if using it was a copyright violation. Here begins speculation: However, your expanded question says that not only you wish to read the HTML code but you also wish to process it, extract information from it and use what you learn this way. This could, I think, be prevented by the copyright holder. Still, what you are describing is commonly done in the world. Services such as Google, Bing or the Wayback Machine go far beyond what you are doing. In theory, I can see this as being a copyright violation but again, the fact that these big companies - without any kind of contract with the website owners - keep doing it is big evidence in favor of legality of storing webpages. You should be careful about how you use the stored data, though. For example, computer programs often have a stipulation in EULA that prevents you from reverse engineering the code. I could see that the use of some websites could be protected in such manner. Further (not authoritative) internet pages on this topic: https://stackoverflow.com/q/22819287/1580088 https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20120621055815AAvJPvN

Facts are not subject to copyright. Only a specific expression of a fact. When you describe a fact in your own words, then you are the sole copyright owner of that description, no matter who taught you that fact. But keep in mind that in the world of academia it is customary to always state your sources. But that's not a legal requirement. That's a topic for Academia Stack Exchange.

THE FOLLOWING OPINION IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE Based on your screenshot and description, I don't see anything infringing. If the data you are using is from your own sources, and what you show is not a scan or photo of their guide, and your layout is thus unique in specifics (not a direct copy), it wouldn't be an "infringement" as far as copyright law is concerned. Things you cannot copyright: A font (except as a computer font file but not as used in a document). A concept (a main issue here). A idea for a "way" or "order" to display data. Mere data or facts can not be copyrighted nor can ideas. Anything sourced from the US government (trail data, topos, etc.) Something not in printed, physical, or recorded form. That is, the copyright only extends to those things as they are realized in print, or as a recording for audio or video, or a physical statute, etc. A live performance is not copyrightable for instance, nor are ideas. The Law: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. For instance, an icon of a TENT is the common form (like a font) of indicating a camp ground. They may be able to copyright the specific instance of their tent icon, but they cannot prevent you from using some other triangle to represent a tent for a campground. And in facts yours is completely different. Displaying data a particular "way" like 1e for 1 mile east is not copyrightable when it is common for the type of guide. It's just data. CONCEPTS AND DATA ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE, only the ACTUAL specific page or work in total as rendered. More below, but your page seems totally different. OTHER FORMS OF IP PROTECTION Now, just because some intellectual property can't be protected by copyright, does not mean it is a free-for-all. For instance, a "way" of doing something can be PATENTED (process patent). And "ornamental design" can be given a design patent. A logo or brand name can be given a trademark. Here's an interesting court ruling on the subject of data display. Basically it can't be an abstraction/concept. It has to be in a definable, physical, novel form. NOTE: it has been possible to copyright a "look and feel" but that applies to software, not static printed media. And the courts have been reversing on that a lot as time goes on. BUT WAIT...THERE'S MORE So, I am going to GUESS that you are talking about AT Guide by David Miller? It's pretty rich of him to claim copyright over the "manner of the display of data" when APPARENTLY he is using concepts of data display as described by EDWARD TUFT So, LOL. Is this the guide they claim you are "copying"?? THESE AREN'T THE ICONS YOU'RE LOOKING FOR Okay, so let's go one by one and their claims against you: 1. The way of representing distances between shelters "The Way" of presenting something is not copyrightable, only an expressive or final form. Some forms of "organization or selection" that may make a work in total copyrightable, but not on their own in isolation. 2. The sideways orientation of the elevation profile Presenting some elements "sideways" is not copyrightable (WTF LOL OMG RUS) the same as number 1. Turning an element sideways does not, on it's own, rise to the level of "creative or non-obvious." 3. The icons Your icons are completely different. If you copied and used his ACTUAL icons, you might have had some issue, but your icons are not even remotely the same. Using icons to indicate services or features is COMMON. Not copyrightable. http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/works-not-covered-copyright In general, copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents. (However, copyright protection may be available, if the artwork of the symbol or design contains sufficient creativity.) 4. The convention of representing direction/distance for waypoints. Again, "The Way" of doing something is not copyrightable, nor is data or facts. 1.1E or 2.3NW are common are they not? I've seen similar treatments elsewhere. It's "obvious and not novel." FINAL FORM, EXPRESSIVE FORM is copyrightable NOT FORMATTING CONCEPTS. Basically, he is saying something along the lines of "I'm formatting paragraphs with a double space, so you can't." The "actual" icon drawings he used are copyrightable. Your icons are clearly different. I assume your mountain-top profile line is taken from some publicly available survey source? So long as you never used a scan of the actual line he uses (and even then?), because he cannot copyright the mountain top profiles themselves! DOES HE EVEN HAVE A VALID COPYRIGHT? For that question, I'd say yes with limitations. His work is a compilation of data. Data can not be copyrighted, but the unique arrangement can in context of the work in total. These three conditions must ALL be present (from http://www.rbs2.com/ccompile.pdf): The collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data. The selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials The creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement of an original work of authorship. So It seem to be that his guide meets these, but his copyright is for his work in total. You are NOT using his data. You are using your OWN data. Based on my reading of Key vs Chinatown Today you are not even close to infringing. You are doing your OWN selection, and your OWN arrangement. It does not matter that you may be using some similar typographic or charting conventions. Those cannot be copyrighted. You are doing your own thing, and "similarity is not infringement." SEARCH AND YOU WILL FIND On the subject of the copyright, here's the copyright on AT guide: https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=A.T.+Guide&Search_Code=TALL&PID=FgMjtJ244OxoFULrVoob_CEI8bc_M&SEQ=20190506230418&CNT=25&HIST=1 If the link doesn't work due to expiration or a cookie, it should look like this: It's a matter of using the USPTO search engine "its way" — it's not Google and requires specific search strings. Looks like the assignee or owner is https://antigravitygear.com ? Did THEY contact you or David Miller? Or did they claim to be an attorney? I'd love to see the email. Attorneys don't email dunning letters, by the way (though they may if it was a DMCA takedown request I suppose, but I still doubt it.) If it was an attorney it would be via US mail on attorney letterhead. To the best of my knowledge, you can't file proof of service on an email, it has to be USPS or trackable. This means the guy that made the other PDF is annoyed or whatever. If he claimed to be an attorney, that's VERY illegal if he's not. And one final note: Just being non-profit does not absolve you of copyright infringement. But as I said, I see no infringement here. The other answer that asserted these are covered under "works of art" is not withstanding. There is nothing "expressive" about Miller's guide. Also that other answer cited a source for AUSTRALIAN law, not US. Mere typographic elements do not rise to "an expressive work of art". A mountain profile that is nothing but a illustrative line based on data also does not.

The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.

Is debt a publicly tradeable commodity? Suppose I have debt – student loans or something. So the bank and I have a contract that says I owe them $500. From what I understand, the bank can sell the contracted debt to some other agency, and then assert that I owe that company the debt. Can I as the debtor also sell (trade, or transfer) my debt to another person or agency? Is that legally viable?

The debtholder is the person or entity that is owed the money. When you owe someone or something money you are the debtor. A debtholder holds the note or other instrument that identifies the terms of the debt. That note is an asset that, as you point out, can be traded on the market. The debtor owes the holder of the note according to its terms. As a debtor you have no say, unless specified in the note, who can own that note. One method of changing the holder of a debt would be to re-finance from another lender. Find a lender who is willing to lend you the money to pay off the current debt and then become a holder of the "new" debt. This assumes the current debt can be settled early; again, something that would be specified in the terms of the current debt.

According to the US Courts website, not all debts need to be paid in full in Chapter 13 proceedings: The plan need not pay unsecured claims in full as long it provides that the debtor will pay all projected "disposable income" over an "applicable commitment period," and as long as unsecured creditors receive at least as much under the plan as they would receive if the debtor's assets were liquidated under chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 1325. If they can't pay even this reduced amount, then they probably don't belong in Chapter 13. If the court declines to confirm the plan, the debtor may file a modified plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1323. The debtor may also convert the case to a liquidation case under chapter 7.

According to this Treasury Department web page refers the asker to the : ... Coinage Act of 1965, specifically Section 31 U.S.C. 5103, entitled "Legal tender," which states: "United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues." I take this to mean that taxing authorities must accept cash in payment of taxes. it doesn't say anything about use of coins, say pennies, to pay large tax bills. I had heard that coins were legal tender only up to a limiting amount, but could not find any citation for this. Then I found this Snopes page which says that pennies and nickels were legal tender only up to 25 cents under the Coinage Acts of 1873 and 1879 but the Coinage Act of 1965 (31 U.S.C. 5103) removed this limit, and made all circulating US coins legal tender for any amount. I have not found any source that seems to me reliable that contradicts this.

When does a CEO (or the investor or the board) have to notify employees they will be unable to pay them for work already done? Directors and officers (which includes executive officers like the CEO) but not investors have a duty to ensure that the corporation does not trade while insolvent. In this context, "trading" means incurring new debts and "insolvent" means being unable to pay their debts as and when they fall due. Unfortunately, it is a judgment call by those directors and officers and the exact point where it occurred is generally only clear with hindsight, if then. For example, you describe a "tumultuous week"; quite likely the company was urgently seeking additional sources of funds and until it was clear they had no prospect of getting those, they weren't insolvent. The director's duty is to act reasonably (a broad range of activities) and not be overly pessimistic nor optimistic about the company's prospects. As far as I know, they don't have a positive duty to inform their creditors that they can't pay. If that happens their obligation is to file for bankruptcy and their obligations cease - the bankruptcy trustee then invites creditors to prove their debts. Does an investor have a responsibility to ensure all employees are paid? No. That is pretty much the purpose of limited liability corporations: to shield the investor from the debts of the company. Do the employees have any recourse? Yes. Employees are typically priority creditors in Colorado and rank ahead of many other creditors. However, if the company is not based in Colorado different laws will apply. Of course, you must be an employee of the company - this priority doesn't apply to true independent contractors. Also, the liquidator's fees rank ahead of anyone and unless the bankrupt company has adequate realizable assets, even employees are unlikely to get a dividend. You also need to be clear who you work for as you say "that last Friday was paid for/fronted by the HR company". Do you work for the bankrupt company or this (non-bankrupt) HR company? If the latter then they owe you your wages and the bankruptcy of their principal is their problem, not yours. Is "secured debt" real? And does that reduce the likelihood of receiving a paycheck in a bankruptcy settlement? Yes. There is a priority in the payment of creditors in liquidations and it varies by jurisdiction but a typical arrangement might go like: Liquidator's Fees Employee wages and entitlement accrued within the last 6 months Certain taxes Secured creditors (who may have a ranking among themselves) Unsecured creditors (including employee entitlements more than 12 months old, other taxes, trade creditors etc.) Shareholders (who may have a ranking among themselves) Basically, the lower you rank, the less likely you are to see a dividend. Does any of this change if the company doesn't file for bankruptcy? Sure. Until the company does this it is still a going concern and it has to pay its debts. If it doesn't it's creditors can sue and recover their monies as best they can which may include forcing the company into bankruptcy.

This is not theft, this is a contract dispute. You gave them money, they promised to do certain things, the contract says what that is. I surmise that they wanted a deposit to cover their costs in further dealing with you (moving is more complicated and costly than buying a loaf of bread), so in walking away from the deal, you've economically damaged them to some amount. The deposit is "liquidated damages". Your recourse is to sue them for that amount, because... Perhaps you didn't understand why you were giving them this deposit (an act that constitute some level of agreement), but any time you hand over a deposit, there is a circumstance under which you will not get that money back, and you have to understand what that circumstance is.

Every lot on the subdivision is and always will be acquired “through the Developer” Unless the developer still owns it. Somebody is the heir or assignee of the Developer - that’s who you need to seek approval from. Even if the Developer was at some point a company that got liquidated, the right of being the Developer would transfer to the creditors of that company.

A contract need not be written to be valid and enforceable. However, if there is no written contract, then in a dispute the burden of proving (via a preponderance of evidence) a contractual obligation falls on the party asserting it. In the scenario you describe it sounds like that would be impossible for the processing company.

Would this be legal? Probably at this scale. Not necessarily extrapolated to a large commercial operation involving more parties. At some point it becomes a payment system and a financial enterprise that becomes subject to financial regulation. Could her transfer be viewed as a donation as well? This is not a donation transaction and efforts to characterize it in that fashion would probably be disregarded by authorities. Could they be viewed as money laundering? The core element of money laundering is an effort to conceal the source of the funds for some purpose. It isn't clear if that would or would not be a motive. Other considerations A fairly common way to handle this kind of situation that is similar to what you suggest is called correspondent banking. Each side has an account in Russia and an account in Germany. Most day to day transfers happen by directing that money go from one German account to another German account, or from one Russian account to another Russian account. The big benefit of correspondent banking, aside from being transparent, is that it avoids currency exchange risks, fees and considerations for small, ordinary transactions. Of course, it simply isn't difficult or expensive to simply wire money from Russia to Germany, and vice versa, now and then. There are not strict currency controls, although there are some potential disclosure requirements. One reason for you, or authorities to worry about characterization of the transactions as money laundering is that if you have nothing to hide, simple wire transfers would be the usual and ordinary way of handling matters.

Is it legally required for districts to be contiguous? I was reading about Shaw v. Reno, a case about a congressional district that was altered on the basis of the race of its voters. Is there a law (precedent or statutory) which requires congressional districts to be contiguous? I was thinking that you could gerrymander much more effectively if you could make up a district from multiple unconnected parts. The oddly shaped district in question:

No; only 23 states require their congressional districts to be contiguous. See Reapportionment and Redistricting in the West by Gary F. Moncrief: Only 23 states have [contiguity] requirements for their congressional districts, although as a practical matter most congressional districts will be contiguous; the relative dearth of legal limits is a manifestation of the fact that few states have provided any express legal constraints on congressional districting at all. But that's not to say more states don't have contiguous districts. On Profesor Justin Levitt's website, he observes that: Many states require contiguity only "to the extent possible," and courts generally accept anomalies that otherwise seem reasonable in context. I am having a difficult time finding a list of states with such requirements; I will update if I find it.

It is well established that the federal government has complete control over immigration. See especially Arizona v. US which holds that States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. De Canas v. Bica (1976), 424 U.S. 351 is also relevant to the application of field preemption to INA. In this case, the courts found that Congress had not (at that point) entered the field of employment of unauthorized workers, so state laws were not preempted by federal law. Laws can change, and with them, potential state powers. In Arizona the court held that Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where a “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject” and with respect to issues of immigration, Because Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 adds provisions to the Immigration and Nationality Act, including employment-related law, thus Congress has entered the field of regulating immigration with respect to employment. Current 8 USC §1324b arises from various amendments to the INA, where the present expression "protected individual" was inserted, by Public Law 101-649, to replace earlier "citizen or intended citizen". Congress also introduced Temporary Protected Status in §302 of the law, which has specific (more restricted) provisions regarding employment. The evidence clearly indicates that Congress intended to include employment issues w.r.t. their supreme power regarding immigration. These discrimination provisions are in the field of immigration, and not discrimination legislation (where Congress has not preempted the field). Congressional silence must, in the light of what Congress did say, be interpreted to mean that the US immigration policy only offers certain specific protections, and states cannot add to or subtract from those protections.

Yes, this is allowed. A famous example was the Rodney King beating, where police officers were acquitted at the state level but convicted federally. US v. Lanza formalized the rule, and it has survived the application of the double jeopardy rule to the states. It's called the separate sovereigns doctrine, and also applies to prosecutions by two states (see Heath v. Alabama) and by an Indian tribe and the feds (see US v. Wheeler). It does not apply between DC and the feds or territories and the feds, because DC and territorial laws are established under the power of the federal government. These prosecutions are uncommon. As far as the feds go, they normally consider a state prosecution to have satisfied the federal interest in the case (win or lose). But prosecution by multiple sovereigns is not barred by the Fifth Amendment.

A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends.

The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it.

From Roberts' dissenting opinion: Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition. (The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system.) In my opinion, this quote speaks as much to the second question as the first. Assume (hypothetically) for a moment that question one was not at issue. If a state defined marriage as only between opposite sexes, and the right to make a state change its definition of marriage is not in the Supreme Court's purview (in our hypo), then the state is as free to reject the validity of marriages abhorrent to its laws, performed elsewhere, as it is to deny the right to marry under its theory of marriage.

Widely accepted answer: no, state courts are not bound by circuit precedent The near-consensus is that state courts need not follow the rulings by federal courts of appeal.1 State courts are coordinate and coequal with the lower federal courts on matters of federal law.2 Only United States Supreme Court precedent binds state courts on matters of federal law. And state courts are supreme, even relative to the Supreme Court of the United States, on matters of state law.3 See this summary from the Georgetown Law Writing Centre (pp. 4-5). Amanda Frost says that the "conventional wisdom" is that "lower federal court precedent cannot bind state courts" ("Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?" (2015)): Most state courts assert that they are free to reach their own conclusions about the meaning of federal law, even when doing so creates a conflict with the federal court of appeals presiding over the geographic region in which they sit. Several federal circuits have conceded that their decisions are not binding on state courts... A number of federal courts scholars have declared that state courts need not follow lower federal court precedent because state courts are "coordinate" with lower federal courts and not "subordinate" to them. Frost presents several state-circuit splits. For example (as of 2015): In 2000, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Fifth Amendment requires only that law enforcement inform a suspect that he has a right to counsel prior to interrogation, without specifying that counsel may be present during the interrogation. That decision is in direct conflict with the 1968 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding that a suspect must be informed that he has a right to counsel before and during interrogation. Accordingly, the standard for Mirandizing a suspect in the state of Texas varies depending on whether the case would be tried in state or federal court. Frost goes on to argue for a change: that "under some circumstances," state courts should be mandated to "follow the precedent of the federal court of appeals for the geographic region in which that state is located" (at p. 62). The relationship between the federal circuits and state courts is also summarized by Wayne A. Logan in "A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts Disagree on Federal Constitutional Rights" (2014): ... state courts have long shared a concurrent obligation with lower federal courts to interpret the U.S. Constitution and protect the rights contained in it. Cricially important as well, state courts do so independently of their federal counterparts. They need not defer to the constitutional positions adopted by federal circuit courts, including those in which they are geographically situated, which lack direct appellate review authority over them. As a consequence, on all issues other than the comparatively narrow range of questions expressly addressed by the Supreme Court, state and lower federal courts are free to disagree... One of the citations within the above passage quotes from the Fourth Circuit: Though state courts may for policy reasons follow the decisions of the Court of Appeals whose circuit includes their state, they are not obliged to do so. But the Ninth Circuit says state courts are bound; California and the Supreme Court disagree However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is somewhat obstinate in its position that the state courts within its boundaries are bound by its precedent. California state courts disagree. And apparently, so does the United States Supreme Court. It commented on the Ninth Circuit's position in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), calling the Ninth Circuit's position "remarkable." See footnote 11: The Court of Appeals questioned the wisdom of the view expressed "in the academic literature," "by some state courts," and by "several individual justices" that state courts are "coordinate and coequal with the lower federal courts on matters of federal law." ... But c.f. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) ("state courts . . . possess the authority, absent a provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render binding judicial decisions on their own interpretations of federal law"); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S> 364, 375-376 (1993) (Thomas J. concurring) (Supremacy Clause does not require state courts to follow rulings by federal courts of appeals on questions of federal law). 1. Do not confuse state courts (which are entire judicial systems within each state) with federal district courts (which are the trial-level courts of the federal judiciary, necessarily distributed around the states within a circuit). Federal district courts, over which circuit courts of appeal have direct appellate review, are bound by their circuit precedent. 2. In this context, "lower federal courts" means federal courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States. Circuit precedent is set by their Courts of Appeals. 3. But see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Where the validity of a state law or the availability of a remedy for state action depends on the interpretation of federal law, including interpretation of the US Constitution, this is a question of federal law, reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States.

I assume you are asking about horizontal stare decisis: a court following its own previous holdings or those of courts of coordinate jurisdiction (e.g. courts at the same "level" in the judiciary). I say this because your incredulity does not seem to extend to the notion that appellate courts can bind lower courts. You ask: why are prior judges’ powers of interpretations automatically seen to be more capable and robust than, so as to bind and prevail over, subsequent judges’ interpretative abilities? This is not the rationale for horizontal stare decisis. The doctrine is not at all based on the premise that the first court or judge to answer got it correct. Justification was given in a concurring opinion in R. v. Kirkpatrick, 2022 SCC 33: Stare decisis promotes: (1) legal certainty and stability, allowing people to plan and manage their affairs; (2) the rule of law, such that people are subject to similar rules; and (3) the legitimate and efficient exercise of judicial authority (citations omitted). And horizontal stare decisis is not absolute. Common-law jurisdictions have developed limited avenues for departure. For example, in Canada, a lower court can depart from previous decisions of courts of coordinate jurisdiction when (R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19): The rationale of an earlier decision has been undermined by subsequent appellate decisions; The earlier decision was reached per incuriam (“through carelessness” or “by inadvertence”); or The earlier decision was not fully considered, e.g. taken in exigent circumstances. Even apex courts have developed a sense of internal obligation to follow their own precedents. But departure from previous decisions may be justified where (see the Kirkpatrick concurrence at para. 202): The Court rendering the decision failed to have regard to a binding authority or relevant statute (“per incuriam”); The decision has proven unworkable (“unworkability”); or The decision’s rationale has been eroded by significant societal or legal change (“foundational erosion”). This has been viewed to "strike the appropriate balance between the competing demands of certainty, correctness and the even-handed development of the law" (R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19). "Adherence to precedent furthers basic rule of law values such as consistency, certainty, fairness, predictability, and sound judicial administration."

Is rent acceleration legal in Texas? Texas Association of Realtors' Sample Lease has the following: B. If Tenant fails to timely pay all amounts due under this lease or otherwise fails to comply with this lease, Tenant will be in default and: ... (2) all unpaid rents which are payable during the remainder of this lease or any renewal period will be accelerated without notice or demand; However, the standard Texas Apartment Association (TAA) apartment lease contract is explicitly unforgiving and unconditional, to the point of being quite unreasonable and unconscionable about the application of acceleration, something I've hardly seen on any other lease anywhere: 11. UNLAWFUL EARLY MOVE-OUT; RELETTING CHARGE. You’ll be liable for a reletting charge of $____________ (not to exceed 85% of the highest monthly rent during the Lease Contract term) if you: (1) fail to move in, or fail to give written move-out notice as required in paragraphs 23 or 37; or (2) move out without paying rent in full for the entire Lease Contract term or renewal period; or ... 14. FAILING TO PAY FIRST MONTH’S RENT . If you don’t pay the first month’s rent when or before the Lease Contract begins, all future rent will be automatically accelerated without notice and immediately due. ... 32. DEFAULT BY RESIDENT. You’ll be in default if: (1) you don’t pay rent or other amounts that you owe on time; (2) you or any guest or occupant violates this Lease Contract, apartment rules, or fire, safety, health, or criminal laws, regardless of whether or where arrest or conviction occurs; (3) you abandon the apartment; ... Acceleration. All monthly rent for the rest of the Lease Contract term or renewal period will be accelerated automatically without notice or demand (before or after acceleration) and will be immediately due and delinquent if, without our written consent: (1) you move out, remove property in preparing to move out, or give oral or written notice (by you or any occupant) of intent to move out before the Lease Contract term or renewal period ends; and (2) you’ve not paid all rent for the entire Lease Contract term or renewal period. Such conduct is considered a default for which we need not give you notice. Remaining rent also will be accelerated if you’re judicially evicted or move out when we demand because you’ve defaulted. Acceleration is subject to our mitigation obligations below. ... 38. MOVE-OUT PROCEDURES. The move-out date can’t be changed unless we and you both agree in writing. You won’t move out before the Lease Contract term or renewal period ends unless all rent for the entire Lease Contract term or renewal period is paid in full. Early move-out may result in reletting charges and acceleration of future rent under paragraphs 11 and 32. Is this at all legal? For example, if someone signs a 15 month lease, but has to move after a couple of months, are they really supposed to shell out 13 × the monthly rent prior to being able to assign the lease to someone else, and/or until some such someone else is actually found and takes over the lease? If the provision is not actually enforceable in Texas, for example, due to damage mitigation provision, or due to the late fee statutes, why is it so prevalent in all residential leases in Texas, especially by all TAA members?

Yes, acceleration clauses in residential leases have been enforced by Texas courts. However, whether the acceleration clause quoted in your question will be enforced is an issue of fact for which there can be no definitive answer at this time. Acceleration Clauses are Valid in Texas Acceleration clauses have been recognized as valid by Texas courts. In Rem Servs. v. Zaheer, a Texas Court of Appeals upheld a judgment by the trial court "award[ing] the landlord $24,000 in damages, representing the four months of accelerated rents on his breach of contract claim." See Rem Servs., Inc. v. Zaheer, No. 14-12-00724-CV (Tex. App. Apr. 4, 2013). Also, in Williams v. Colthurst, the court implied that the damages given by the trial court included an accelerated rent provision: Additionally, the trial court had previously determined that the tenants owed unpaid rent and late fees of $8,850. The lease provided that the landlords could deduct unpaid or accelerated rent and late fees from the security deposit. Unfortunately I couldn't find the trial court opinion to ensure that accelerated rent was included in the $8,850. See Williams v. Colthurst, 253 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App. 2008). Limitations on Acceleration Clauses There are several sections of the Texas Property Code that may mitigate the use of an acceleration clause. First, a landlord cannot charge a tenant a fee for failure to pay rent unless the fee is a reasonable estimate of uncertain damages to the landlord that are incapable of precise calculation and result from late payment of rent." See § 92.019(a)(2) of the Texas Property Code: (a) A landlord may not charge a tenant a late fee for failing to pay rent unless: (1) notice of the fee is included in a written lease; (2) the fee is a reasonable estimate of uncertain damages to the landlord that are incapable of precise calculation and result from late payment of rent; and (3) the rent has remained unpaid one full day after the date the rent was originally due. Further, landlords have a duty to mitigate damages. See § 91.006 of the Texas Property Code: (a) A landlord has a duty to mitigate damages if a tenant abandons the leased premises in violation of the lease. (b) A provision of a lease that purports to waive a right or to exempt a landlord from a liability or duty under this section is void. This duty requires that the landlord use "objectively reasonable efforts to re-lease the premises when the tenant vacates in breach of the lease." See Rem Servs., Inc. v. Zaheer (citing Austin Hill County Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. 1997); White v. Harrison, 390 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App. 2012)). But it's important to note that the tenant bears the burden of proving both that the landlord did not mitigate his damages and the amount by which the landlord could have mitigated his damages. This is likely a difficult burden. In Rem Servs. v. Zaheer, the court decided that the landlord did not breach his duty to mitigate even though he did not list the property for rent during the four months remaining on the lease. Disclaimer This was the only case and statutory law on point that I found; I may have missed some. If you are referencing a real lease, I recommend that you discuss this matter with a real estate lawyer licensed to practice law in Texas.

In the lease agreement we stipulated that rent would be 50% off until the building received full services and then the full rent payment would be due. Ouch. I bet the lease agreement also says something like "no other agreements verbal or otherwise are in effect for this agreement." So what you did was release the landlord from the responsibility to make the building habitable. Pretty sure you will need a lawyer to unwind this.

Usual disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer. If you are serious about proceeding with this, talk to a lawyer who specialises in this kind of thing. I imagine that you will need to provide proof of the above incidents in order for any legal action to succeed. Accessing a tenant's room without notice or permission, and without a very good reason (e.g. a gas leak) is likely to be classed as harassment; specifically, "acts calculated to interfere with the peace or comfort of the residential occupier". Renting out your room and removing your belongings before the end of a tenancy is likely to be illegal eviction. Both of these are criminal offences under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. Shelter mentions that it's normally local authorities, rather than the police or individuals, who carry out prosecutions under this act (see also: Shelter articles, Landlord Law Blog articles), so you might want to start there. There is also the matter of civil action, including for breach of contract. For that, consider speaking to a lawyer.

The government of California has an extensive manual that says what you can and cannot do. To terminate a lease (a rental agreement for a year is a lease), there would have to be just cause for eviction (p. 65), such as failing to pay rent, violating terms of the agreement, cockfighting, and so on, and that does not include being a pain in the neck. Nor would the need to make repairs justify terminating a lease. On p. 79 they clarify that retaliatory eviction for exercising their legal rights is prohibited per California Civil Code 1942.5, and will result in fines. P. 35 ff. covers landlords entering: you may enter to make repairs, but must give 24 hour written notice (6 days if mailed), entering between 8am and 5pm business days, but you can also arrive at alternative times orally. If the local code-enforcers require you to do some modifications on the property, that is a separate matter and does not create a just cause for terminating the lease. For instance, if the electric service is not properly grounded and they require you to fix that, that does not constitute the structure "being destroyed". If the repairs make the building actually and certifiably uninhabitable, you might be on the hook for finding lodging for the tenant for the period of the repairs, so ask your attorney about that. Assuming that the tenant is not somehow responsible for the problem being repaired, then you will almost certainly have to keep the person for the duration of the lease.

I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right.

This (as always) depends on jurisdiction, but usually - No, just taking the money is not legal.. In most jurisdictions, if you have a claim (the rent, in your case) against a debtor , and the debtor does not pay, you are not allowed to take any enforcement action (taking property, coercing the debtor) yourself. Instead, you must obtain a court or administrative judgement confirming your claim. Even then, often only a court officer or the police may actually enforce payment of the debt. This is mostly to protect the debtor from unwarranted enforcement action (such as taking more than you are owed, or collecting a disputed debt). For example, in Germany, to enforce a debt the creditor must first obtain what is called a Vollstreckungstitel or just Titel (title) - an official document confirming that there is an outstanding claim. This is on top of any contracts already existing. A Titel is obtained either through a regular court judgment, or through an abbreviated, administrative process called Mahnverfahren (essentially, you ask the court to send the debtor a letter about your claim, and if the debtor does not file an objection, you get the Titel). Once you have a Titel, the creditor can enforce it any time they choose (with a Titel, the statute of limiation is extended from the usual three years to 30 years). However, actual enforcement must be performed by an officer of the court (Gerichtsvollzieher). Only they may do things such as collecting the debtors property, force open doors and even imprison uncooperative debtors. I don't know the exact situation in the USA, but I believe it is roughly similar. For example, the equivalent of a Vollstreckungstitel is a Writ of execution.

First of all, the amount involved is probably a few hundred dollars, maybe a thousand: if you do not pay it is extremely unlikely that your roommate will attempt to recover. Even if they do, they will probably fail - 30 days notice is 30 days notice: unless last month was February, the 8th to the 8th is either 30 or 31 days, you have complied with the terms of the lease. If the lease had said "one named months notice" then your roommate may have a case; as it is, they don't. Is he right? No. Is there ever a case where I'm liable for pro-rated rent beyond the 30 day notice period? Only if it says so in the lease. Do I owe him rent for each day in November that the room is vacant beyond the 8th? No Would a judge make an exception in his favor since I didn't tell him I was looking for a new place to live? Judges don't make exceptions, particularly not in anybody's favour. The role of a judge is to enforce the law - not to make exceptions to it. A judge would give effect to the terms of the contract except where those terms are prohibited or against public policy.

The law regarding landlords and tenants is Iowa Code Ch. 562A. Part 2 (§562A.27 et seq.) states the legal remedies available to a landlord. §562A.27 specifically spells out the remedies for material non-compliance with lease terms. The gist of that and related sections is that if a person is in violation of a lease, there is a legal process that has to be followed, and if successful, the sheriff will forcibly evict the tenant (though §562A.27A, the clear and present danger section, shortens the process – still, it's not immediate and it does require legal notice etc.). Under the law, you (apparently) have become a landlord and have an unwritten tenancy agreement with the tenant. I assume based on your description of the facts you have a long-term written agreement with the property owner. By allowing this person to live with you, you have entered into a landlord-tenant relationship, which limits your rights. The police will not respond to this situation – a legal squabble – whereas if someone broke into your residence and was trespassing (and you complain in a timely manner, not allowing the person to trespass), the police would respond and not require a court order. §562A.9(5) states that in lieu of a specific term of tenancy, in the case of a roomer paying weekly rent the tenanct period is a week, otherwise it is a month. §562A.6 defines "roomer": basically, if you are a "roomer", so is your sub-lessor. By agreeing to let the person stay with you, you have become a landlord and sub-lessor, thereby subject to the restrictions on landlord actions. That means you have to take the person to court to get rid of them. Failure to pay agreed-on rent is certainly sufficient legal cause, and any monthly lease can be terminated by the landlord after giving legal notice (30 days advance notice).