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Embargo prevents access to tech and medicine

The embargo restricts the export of medicines and medical equipment from the U.S. and from any U.S.-owned company abroad the embargo has a sweeping effect on Cuban healthcare "Doctors in Cuba always worry that an international supplier will be bought out by a U.S. company, leaving medical equipment without replacement parts and patients without continuity of medications," Reed said. although medicines and medical supplies can be licensed for export to Cuba, the conditions governing the process make their export virtually impossible.

An Amnesty report examines the effects of the sanctions, which have been in place since 1962. Amnesty International Secretary-General Irene Khan called the U.S. embargo immoral and said it should be lifted. "It's preventing millions of Cubans from benefiting from vital medicines and medical equipment essential for their health," Khan said. The embargo restricts the export of medicines and medical equipment from the U.S. and from any U.S.-owned company abroad. Amnesty also called on President Obama to not renew the Trading with the Enemy Act, which is due for renewal on September 14. The Act has been reviewed by U.S. presidents on an annual basis since 1978. Amnesty said that while not renewing the Act would not in itself end the embargo against Cuba, it would send a clear message that the U.S. is adopting a new policy toward Cuba. In April this year President Obama lifted restrictions that had prevented U.S. citizens from visiting relatives in Cuba, and sending them remittances. A U.S. State Department spokeswoman would not comment on the report because she hadn't read it. However, she said, "The president believes it makes strategic sense to hold on to some inducements we can use in dealing with a Cuban government if it shows any signs of seeking a normalized relationship with us and begins to respect basic human rights." The Amnesty report also cites United Nations data that says Cuba's inability to import nutritional products for schools, hospitals and day care centers is contributing to a high prevalence of iron deficiency anemia. In 2007, the condition affected 37.5 percent of Cuba's children under three years old, according to UNICEF. Cuba can import these products from other countries, but there are major shipping costs and logistical challenges to contend with. Gail Reed is international director of MEDICC (Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba), a non-profit organization that encourages cooperation among U.S., Cuban and global health communities. She told CNN, "In general, the embargo has a sweeping effect on Cuban healthcare. Over the past decades, I would say the people most affected have been cancer and HIV-AIDS patients." She also said the embargo affects the way doctors think about the future. "Doctors in Cuba always worry that an international supplier will be bought out by a U.S. company, leaving medical equipment without replacement parts and patients without continuity of medications," Reed said. Gerardo Ducos, an Amnesty researcher for the Caribbean region, told CNN that although medicines and medical supplies can be licensed for export to Cuba, the conditions governing the process make their export virtually impossible.

<h4>Embargo prevents access to tech and medicine </h4><p><strong>CNN</strong> 9/02/<strong>2009</strong> “Report: U.S. sanctions put Cubans' health at risk” http://edition.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/01/amnesty.cuba.health/ </p><p>LONDON, England (CNN) -- <u><strong>The U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is endangering the health of millions by limiting Cubans' access to medicines and medical technology,</u></strong> human rights group Amnesty International alleged Wednesday.</p><p>An Amnesty report examines the effects of the sanctions, which have been in place since 1962. Amnesty International Secretary-General Irene Khan called the U.S. embargo immoral and said it should be lifted.</p><p>"It's preventing millions of Cubans from benefiting from vital medicines and medical equipment essential for their health," Khan said.</p><p><u><strong>The embargo restricts the export of medicines and medical equipment from the U.S. and from any U.S.-owned company abroad</u></strong>.</p><p>Amnesty also called on President Obama to not renew the Trading with the Enemy Act, which is due for renewal on September 14. The Act has been reviewed by U.S. presidents on an annual basis since 1978. Amnesty said that while not renewing the Act would not in itself end the embargo against Cuba, it would send a clear message that the U.S. is adopting a new policy toward Cuba.</p><p>In April this year President Obama lifted restrictions that had prevented U.S. citizens from visiting relatives in Cuba, and sending them remittances.</p><p>A U.S. State Department spokeswoman would not comment on the report because she hadn't read it. However, she said, "The president believes it makes strategic sense to hold on to some inducements we can use in dealing with a Cuban government if it shows any signs of seeking a normalized relationship with us and begins to respect basic human rights."</p><p>The Amnesty report also cites United Nations data that says Cuba's inability to import nutritional products for schools, hospitals and day care centers is contributing to a high prevalence of iron deficiency anemia. In 2007, the condition affected 37.5 percent of Cuba's children under three years old, according to UNICEF.</p><p>Cuba can import these products from other countries, but there are major shipping costs and logistical challenges to contend with.</p><p>Gail Reed is international director of MEDICC (Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba), a non-profit organization that encourages cooperation among U.S., Cuban and global health communities.</p><p>She told CNN, "In general, <u><strong>the embargo has a sweeping effect on Cuban healthcare</u></strong>. Over the past decades, I would say the people most affected have been cancer and HIV-AIDS patients."</p><p>She also said the embargo affects the way doctors think about the future. <u><strong>"Doctors in Cuba always worry that an international supplier will be bought out by a U.S. company, leaving medical equipment without replacement parts and patients without continuity of medications," Reed said.</p><p></u></strong>Gerardo Ducos, an Amnesty researcher for the Caribbean region, told CNN that <u><strong>although medicines and medical supplies can be licensed for export to Cuba, the conditions governing the process make their export virtually impossible.</p></u></strong>

CNN 9/02/2009 “Report: U.S. sanctions put Cubans' health at risk” http://edition.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/01/amnesty.cuba.health/ LONDON, England (CNN) -- The U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is endangering the health of millions by limiting Cubans' access to medicines and medical technology, human rights group Amnesty International alleged Wednesday.

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: CNN 9/02/2009 “Report: U.S. sanctions put Cubans' health at risk” http://edition.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/01/amnesty.cuba.health/ LONDON, England (CNN) -- The U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is endangering the health of millions by limiting Cubans' access to medicines and medical technology, human rights group Amnesty International alleged Wednesday. fulltext: An Amnesty report examines the effects of the sanctions, which have been in place since 1962. Amnesty International Secretary-General Irene Khan called the U.S. embargo immoral and said it should be lifted. "It's preventing millions of Cubans from benefiting from vital medicines and medical equipment essential for their health," Khan said. The embargo restricts the export of medicines and medical equipment from the U.S. and from any U.S.-owned company abroad. Amnesty also called on President Obama to not renew the Trading with the Enemy Act, which is due for renewal on September 14. The Act has been reviewed by U.S. presidents on an annual basis since 1978. Amnesty said that while not renewing the Act would not in itself end the embargo against Cuba, it would send a clear message that the U.S. is adopting a new policy toward Cuba. In April this year President Obama lifted restrictions that had prevented U.S. citizens from visiting relatives in Cuba, and sending them remittances. A U.S. State Department spokeswoman would not comment on the report because she hadn't read it. However, she said, "The president believes it makes strategic sense to hold on to some inducements we can use in dealing with a Cuban government if it shows any signs of seeking a normalized relationship with us and begins to respect basic human rights." The Amnesty report also cites United Nations data that says Cuba's inability to import nutritional products for schools, hospitals and day care centers is contributing to a high prevalence of iron deficiency anemia. In 2007, the condition affected 37.5 percent of Cuba's children under three years old, according to UNICEF. Cuba can import these products from other countries, but there are major shipping costs and logistical challenges to contend with. Gail Reed is international director of MEDICC (Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba), a non-profit organization that encourages cooperation among U.S., Cuban and global health communities. She told CNN, "In general, the embargo has a sweeping effect on Cuban healthcare. Over the past decades, I would say the people most affected have been cancer and HIV-AIDS patients." She also said the embargo affects the way doctors think about the future. "Doctors in Cuba always worry that an international supplier will be bought out by a U.S. company, leaving medical equipment without replacement parts and patients without continuity of medications," Reed said. Gerardo Ducos, an Amnesty researcher for the Caribbean region, told CNN that although medicines and medical supplies can be licensed for export to Cuba, the conditions governing the process make their export virtually impossible. [/INST] <h4>Embargo prevents access to tech and medicine </h4><p><strong>CNN</strong> 9/02/<strong>2009</strong> “Report: U.S. sanctions put Cubans' health at risk” http://edition.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/01/amnesty.cuba.health/ </p><p>LONDON, England (CNN) -- <u><strong>The U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is endangering the health of millions by limiting Cubans' access to medicines and medical technology,</u></strong> human rights group Amnesty International alleged Wednesday.</p><p>An Amnesty report examines the effects of the sanctions, which have been in place since 1962. Amnesty International Secretary-General Irene Khan called the U.S. embargo immoral and said it should be lifted.</p><p>"It's preventing millions of Cubans from benefiting from vital medicines and medical equipment essential for their health," Khan said.</p><p><u><strong>The embargo restricts the export of medicines and medical equipment from the U.S. and from any U.S.-owned company abroad</u></strong>.</p><p>Amnesty also called on President Obama to not renew the Trading with the Enemy Act, which is due for renewal on September 14. The Act has been reviewed by U.S. presidents on an annual basis since 1978. Amnesty said that while not renewing the Act would not in itself end the embargo against Cuba, it would send a clear message that the U.S. is adopting a new policy toward Cuba.</p><p>In April this year President Obama lifted restrictions that had prevented U.S. citizens from visiting relatives in Cuba, and sending them remittances.</p><p>A U.S. State Department spokeswoman would not comment on the report because she hadn't read it. However, she said, "The president believes it makes strategic sense to hold on to some inducements we can use in dealing with a Cuban government if it shows any signs of seeking a normalized relationship with us and begins to respect basic human rights."</p><p>The Amnesty report also cites United Nations data that says Cuba's inability to import nutritional products for schools, hospitals and day care centers is contributing to a high prevalence of iron deficiency anemia. In 2007, the condition affected 37.5 percent of Cuba's children under three years old, according to UNICEF.</p><p>Cuba can import these products from other countries, but there are major shipping costs and logistical challenges to contend with.</p><p>Gail Reed is international director of MEDICC (Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba), a non-profit organization that encourages cooperation among U.S., Cuban and global health communities.</p><p>She told CNN, "In general, <u><strong>the embargo has a sweeping effect on Cuban healthcare</u></strong>. Over the past decades, I would say the people most affected have been cancer and HIV-AIDS patients."</p><p>She also said the embargo affects the way doctors think about the future. <u><strong>"Doctors in Cuba always worry that an international supplier will be bought out by a U.S. company, leaving medical equipment without replacement parts and patients without continuity of medications," Reed said.</p><p></u></strong>Gerardo Ducos, an Amnesty researcher for the Caribbean region, told CNN that <u><strong>although medicines and medical supplies can be licensed for export to Cuba, the conditions governing the process make their export virtually impossible.</p></u></strong> </s>

Extend 2AC Yates- Chinese influence in Cuba is low due to resentment of their actions after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Cuba is trying to play China off against Taiwan- takes out Uniqueness to the DA-

<h4>Extend 2AC Yates- Chinese influence in Cuba is low due to resentment of their actions after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Cuba is trying to play China off against Taiwan- takes out Uniqueness to the DA-</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Extend 2AC Yates- Chinese influence in Cuba is low due to resentment of their actions after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Cuba is trying to play China off against Taiwan- takes out Uniqueness to the DA-</h4> </s>

Climate change results in multiple scenarios for extinction – it’s try or die

As early as 1988 scientists cautioned that human tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war." hundreds of scientific studies have documented ever-mounting evidence that human activities are altering the climate climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism. Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security Droughts, famines, and weather-related disasters could claim thousands or even millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions within and among nations, fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems elevate rising sea levels threaten destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears glaciers are shrinking threatening water supplies for millions sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces if average global temperatures increase more than two degrees Celsius which will occur if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change threats to security will be amplified as climate change has increasing impacts on regional water supplies agricultural productivity, human and ecosystem health, infrastructure, financial flows and economies, and patterns of international migration. Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor. This, could lead to military confrontations over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime Rising temperatures, increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply Even modest warming has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability The parallels with terrorism are compelling By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th it could be too late to respond.

As early as 1988, scientists cautioned that tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to uncontrolled consequences second only to a global nuclear war scientific studies have documented that human activities are altering the climate Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security Droughts, famines, and weather-related disaster claim millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions among nations fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems elevate rising sea levels threaten destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears glaciers are shrinking threatening water supplies for millions sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters if temperatures increase which will occur if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return threats to security will be amplified climate change has increasing impacts on water supplies, agricultural productivity infrastructure, financial flows and economies This, could lead to military confrontations Even modest warming has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. The parallels with terrorism are compelling By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th it could be too late to respond.

Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 (Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF As early as 1988, scientists cautioned that human tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to "an unintended, uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war." Since then, hundreds of scientific studies have documented ever-mounting evidence that human activities are altering the climate around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that climate change is, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism." Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security. Droughts, famines, and weather-related disasters could claim thousands or even millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions within and among nations, fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes. In the worst case, further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems and elevate already-rising sea levels, which could threaten the very survival of low-lying island nations, destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears. Mountain glaciers are shrinking at ever-faster rates, threatening water supplies for millions of people and plant and animal species. Average global sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters (8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces." It warns that if average global temperatures increase more than two degrees Celsius—which will likely occur in a matter of decades if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return," where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change. Existing threats to security will be amplified as climate change has increasing impacts on regional water supplies, agricultural productivity, human and ecosystem health, infrastructure, financial flows and economies, and patterns of international migration. Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor. This, in turn, could lead to military confrontations over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime. ► Rising temperatures, droughts, and floods, and the increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. Even the modest warming experienced to date has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. The parallels with terrorism are compelling. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, it could be too late to respond.

<h4><strong>Climate change results in multiple scenarios for extinction – it’s try or die </h4><p>Sawin, 12</p><p></strong>Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 </p><p>(Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF</p><p><u><strong><mark>As early as 1988</u></strong>, <u><strong>scientists cautioned that </mark>human <mark>tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to </u></strong></mark>"an unintended, <u><strong><mark>uncontrolled </mark>globally pervasive experiment whose </u></strong>ultimate <u><strong><mark>consequences</mark> could be <mark>second only to a global nuclear war</mark>."</u></strong> Since then, <u><strong>hundreds of <mark>scientific studies have documented </mark>ever-mounting evidence <mark>that human activities are altering the climate</u></strong> </mark>around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that <u><strong>climate change is</u></strong>, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "<u><strong>the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism.</u></strong>" <u><strong><mark>Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Droughts, famines, and weather-related disaster</mark>s could <mark>claim</mark> thousands or even <mark>millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions </mark>within and <mark>among nations</mark>, <mark>fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes</u></strong></mark>. In the worst case, <u><strong><mark>further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems </u></strong></mark>and <u><strong><mark>elevate</u></strong></mark> already-<u><strong><mark>rising sea levels</u></strong></mark>, which could <u><strong><mark>threaten</u></strong></mark> the very survival of low-lying island nations, <u><strong><mark>destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict</u></strong></mark>. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And <u><strong><mark>these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears</u></strong></mark>. Mountain <u><strong><mark>glaciers are shrinking</u></strong> </mark>at ever-faster rates, <u><strong><mark>threatening water supplies for millions</u></strong> </mark>of people and plant and animal species. Average global <u><strong><mark>sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters</u></strong> </mark>(8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. <u><strong>A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce</u></strong>, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, <u><strong>concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces</u></strong>." It warns that <u><strong><mark>if </mark>average global <mark>temperatures increase </mark>more than two degrees Celsius</u></strong>—<u><strong><mark>which will</u></strong> </mark>likely <u><strong><mark>occur</u></strong> </mark>in a matter of decades <u><strong><mark>if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change</u></strong>. Existing <u><strong><mark>threats to security will be amplified</mark> as <mark>climate change has increasing impacts on</mark> regional <mark>water supplies</u></strong>, <u><strong>agricultural productivity</mark>, human and ecosystem health, <mark>infrastructure, financial flows and economies</mark>, and patterns of international migration.</u></strong> Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. <u><strong>Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This,</u></strong> </mark>in turn, <u><strong><mark>could lead to military confrontations </mark>over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime</u></strong>. ► <u><strong>Rising temperatures,</u></strong> droughts, and floods, and the <u><strong>increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply</u></strong>, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. <u><strong><mark>Even</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>modest warming</u></strong> </mark>experienced to date <u><strong><mark>has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity</u></strong></mark>, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► <u><strong><mark>Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources.</u></strong></mark> It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► <u><strong>Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability</u></strong>. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. <u><strong><mark>The parallels with terrorism are compelling</u></strong></mark>. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. <u><strong><mark>By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th</u></strong></mark>, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, <u><strong><mark>it could be too late to respond.</u></strong></mark> </p>

Sawin, 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Sawin, 12 fulltext: Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 (Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF As early as 1988, scientists cautioned that human tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to "an unintended, uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war." Since then, hundreds of scientific studies have documented ever-mounting evidence that human activities are altering the climate around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that climate change is, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism." Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security. Droughts, famines, and weather-related disasters could claim thousands or even millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions within and among nations, fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes. In the worst case, further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems and elevate already-rising sea levels, which could threaten the very survival of low-lying island nations, destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears. Mountain glaciers are shrinking at ever-faster rates, threatening water supplies for millions of people and plant and animal species. Average global sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters (8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces." It warns that if average global temperatures increase more than two degrees Celsius—which will likely occur in a matter of decades if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return," where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change. Existing threats to security will be amplified as climate change has increasing impacts on regional water supplies, agricultural productivity, human and ecosystem health, infrastructure, financial flows and economies, and patterns of international migration. Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor. This, in turn, could lead to military confrontations over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime. ► Rising temperatures, droughts, and floods, and the increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. Even the modest warming experienced to date has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. The parallels with terrorism are compelling. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, it could be too late to respond. [/INST] <h4><strong>Climate change results in multiple scenarios for extinction – it’s try or die </h4><p>Sawin, 12</p><p></strong>Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 </p><p>(Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF</p><p><u><strong><mark>As early as 1988</u></strong>, <u><strong>scientists cautioned that </mark>human <mark>tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to </u></strong></mark>"an unintended, <u><strong><mark>uncontrolled </mark>globally pervasive experiment whose </u></strong>ultimate <u><strong><mark>consequences</mark> could be <mark>second only to a global nuclear war</mark>."</u></strong> Since then, <u><strong>hundreds of <mark>scientific studies have documented </mark>ever-mounting evidence <mark>that human activities are altering the climate</u></strong> </mark>around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that <u><strong>climate change is</u></strong>, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "<u><strong>the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism.</u></strong>" <u><strong><mark>Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Droughts, famines, and weather-related disaster</mark>s could <mark>claim</mark> thousands or even <mark>millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions </mark>within and <mark>among nations</mark>, <mark>fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes</u></strong></mark>. In the worst case, <u><strong><mark>further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems </u></strong></mark>and <u><strong><mark>elevate</u></strong></mark> already-<u><strong><mark>rising sea levels</u></strong></mark>, which could <u><strong><mark>threaten</u></strong></mark> the very survival of low-lying island nations, <u><strong><mark>destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict</u></strong></mark>. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And <u><strong><mark>these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears</u></strong></mark>. Mountain <u><strong><mark>glaciers are shrinking</u></strong> </mark>at ever-faster rates, <u><strong><mark>threatening water supplies for millions</u></strong> </mark>of people and plant and animal species. Average global <u><strong><mark>sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters</u></strong> </mark>(8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. <u><strong>A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce</u></strong>, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, <u><strong>concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces</u></strong>." It warns that <u><strong><mark>if </mark>average global <mark>temperatures increase </mark>more than two degrees Celsius</u></strong>—<u><strong><mark>which will</u></strong> </mark>likely <u><strong><mark>occur</u></strong> </mark>in a matter of decades <u><strong><mark>if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change</u></strong>. Existing <u><strong><mark>threats to security will be amplified</mark> as <mark>climate change has increasing impacts on</mark> regional <mark>water supplies</u></strong>, <u><strong>agricultural productivity</mark>, human and ecosystem health, <mark>infrastructure, financial flows and economies</mark>, and patterns of international migration.</u></strong> Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. <u><strong>Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This,</u></strong> </mark>in turn, <u><strong><mark>could lead to military confrontations </mark>over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime</u></strong>. ► <u><strong>Rising temperatures,</u></strong> droughts, and floods, and the <u><strong>increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply</u></strong>, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. <u><strong><mark>Even</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>modest warming</u></strong> </mark>experienced to date <u><strong><mark>has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity</u></strong></mark>, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► <u><strong><mark>Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources.</u></strong></mark> It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► <u><strong>Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability</u></strong>. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. <u><strong><mark>The parallels with terrorism are compelling</u></strong></mark>. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. <u><strong><mark>By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th</u></strong></mark>, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, <u><strong><mark>it could be too late to respond.</u></strong></mark> </p> </s>

Embargo restricts health care – equipment & chemicals

health care has also suffered from the limitations and restrictions imposed by the embargo on the procurement of basic and specialized medical equipment and chemical components needed for the production of generic medicines

The provision of health care has also suffered from the limitations and restrictions imposed by the embargo on the procurement of basic and specialized medical equipment and chemical components needed for the production of generic medicines.

<h4>Embargo restricts health care – equipment & chemicals </h4><p><strong>Amnesty International 2009</strong> “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf</p><p>The provision of <u><strong>health care has also suffered from the limitations and restrictions imposed by the embargo on the procurement of basic and specialized medical equipment and chemical components needed for the production of generic medicines</u></strong>.</p>

Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf fulltext: The provision of health care has also suffered from the limitations and restrictions imposed by the embargo on the procurement of basic and specialized medical equipment and chemical components needed for the production of generic medicines. [/INST] <h4>Embargo restricts health care – equipment & chemicals </h4><p><strong>Amnesty International 2009</strong> “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf</p><p>The provision of <u><strong>health care has also suffered from the limitations and restrictions imposed by the embargo on the procurement of basic and specialized medical equipment and chemical components needed for the production of generic medicines</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Free trade solves disease: makes medicines affordable and increases accessibility of medicine- Africa proves

Consider another argument for free trade given by presidents of Uganda and Tanzania Malaria is a vicious disease that is common in Africa. Over 200 million people suffer from it, and it kills 800,000 a year, disproportionately children. During the past decade, new diagnostic tests, drugs, and mosquitoproof netting have been developed a lot of African nations still have high tariff and tax barriers to protect their domestic industries. When some of them eliminated trade barriers on antimalarial products, the cost of those products dropped, and usage correspondingly increased. So did the number of local entrepreneurs who create medical businesses producing antimalarial products

(Gary, teaches in the Department of Philosophy, California State University, Liberty, “The Case for Free Trade,” December 2010, accessed via ProQuest//wyo-mm) Consider another argument for free trade, one recently given by the presidents of Uganda and Tanzania (see Yoweri Museveni and Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, "Free Trade and the Fight Against Malaria," Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2010). Malaria is a vicious disease that is common in Africa. Over 200 million people suffer from it, and it kills 800,000 a year, disproportionately children. During the past decade, new diagnostic tests, drugs, and mosquitoproof netting have been developed. But as Kikwete and Museveni note, a lot of African nations still have high tariff and tax barriers to protect their domestic industries. When some of them eliminated trade barriers on antimalarial products, the cost of those products dropped, and usage correspondingly increased. So did the number of local entrepreneurs who create homegrown medical businesses producing antimalarial products.

<h4><strong>Free trade solves disease: makes medicines affordable and increases accessibility of medicine- Africa proves </h4><p>Jason 10</p><p></strong>(Gary, teaches in the Department of Philosophy, California State University, Liberty, “The Case for Free Trade,” December 2010, accessed via ProQuest//wyo-mm)</p><p><u><strong>Consider another argument for free trade</u></strong>, one recently <u><strong>given by</u></strong> the <u><strong>presidents of Uganda and Tanzania</u></strong> (see Yoweri Museveni and Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, "Free Trade and the Fight Against Malaria," Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2010). <u><strong>Malaria is a vicious disease that is common in Africa. Over 200 million people suffer from it, and it kills 800,000 a year, disproportionately children. During the past decade, new diagnostic tests, drugs, and mosquitoproof netting have been developed</u></strong>. But as Kikwete and Museveni note, <u><strong>a lot of African nations still have high tariff and tax barriers to protect their domestic industries. When some of them eliminated trade barriers on antimalarial products, the cost of those products dropped, and usage correspondingly increased. So did the number of local entrepreneurs who create</u></strong> homegrown <u><strong>medical businesses producing antimalarial products</u>.</p></strong>

Jason 10

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Jason 10 fulltext: (Gary, teaches in the Department of Philosophy, California State University, Liberty, “The Case for Free Trade,” December 2010, accessed via ProQuest//wyo-mm) Consider another argument for free trade, one recently given by the presidents of Uganda and Tanzania (see Yoweri Museveni and Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, "Free Trade and the Fight Against Malaria," Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2010). Malaria is a vicious disease that is common in Africa. Over 200 million people suffer from it, and it kills 800,000 a year, disproportionately children. During the past decade, new diagnostic tests, drugs, and mosquitoproof netting have been developed. But as Kikwete and Museveni note, a lot of African nations still have high tariff and tax barriers to protect their domestic industries. When some of them eliminated trade barriers on antimalarial products, the cost of those products dropped, and usage correspondingly increased. So did the number of local entrepreneurs who create homegrown medical businesses producing antimalarial products. [/INST] <h4><strong>Free trade solves disease: makes medicines affordable and increases accessibility of medicine- Africa proves </h4><p>Jason 10</p><p></strong>(Gary, teaches in the Department of Philosophy, California State University, Liberty, “The Case for Free Trade,” December 2010, accessed via ProQuest//wyo-mm)</p><p><u><strong>Consider another argument for free trade</u></strong>, one recently <u><strong>given by</u></strong> the <u><strong>presidents of Uganda and Tanzania</u></strong> (see Yoweri Museveni and Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, "Free Trade and the Fight Against Malaria," Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2010). <u><strong>Malaria is a vicious disease that is common in Africa. Over 200 million people suffer from it, and it kills 800,000 a year, disproportionately children. During the past decade, new diagnostic tests, drugs, and mosquitoproof netting have been developed</u></strong>. But as Kikwete and Museveni note, <u><strong>a lot of African nations still have high tariff and tax barriers to protect their domestic industries. When some of them eliminated trade barriers on antimalarial products, the cost of those products dropped, and usage correspondingly increased. So did the number of local entrepreneurs who create</u></strong> homegrown <u><strong>medical businesses producing antimalarial products</u>.</p></strong> </s>

And, China will never be respected by Cuba-

Latin American leaders are disappointed trends in their economic relationships with China there is growing concern that China’s cheap manufactures will hurt Latin America China’s investment in Latin America remains below the hemisphere’s expectations.20

(Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm However, at the moment, many Latin American leaders are disappointed with the trends in their economic relationships with China. First, although trade between China and Latin America has increased dramatically, it still comprises only about 5% of Latin America’s total trade.18 More importantly, there is growing concern that China’s cheap manufactures will hurt Latin America. This problem had been expected for Mexico and Central America, which compete with China to export manufactured goods to the U.S. market, but has now beset South American countries where, despite high commodity prices, in recent months imports from China have exceeded exports to the Asian country.19 Perhaps most importantly of all, at about $10 billion, China’s investment in Latin America remains well below the hemisphere’s expectations.20 It is also a fraction of an estimated $300 billion by U.S. companies.21

<h4><strong>And, China will never be respected by Cuba- </h4><p>McClintock 07</p><p></strong>(Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>However, at the moment, many<u><strong> Latin American leaders are disappointed</u></strong> with the<u><strong> trends in their economic relationships with China</u></strong>. First, although trade between China and Latin America has increased dramatically, it still comprises only about 5% of Latin America’s total trade.18 More importantly, <u><strong>there is growing concern that China’s cheap manufactures will hurt Latin America</u></strong>. This problem had been expected for Mexico and Central America, which compete with China to export manufactured goods to the U.S. market, but has now beset South American countries where, despite high commodity prices, in recent months imports from China have exceeded exports to the Asian country.19 Perhaps most importantly of all, at about $10 billion, <u><strong>China’s investment in Latin America remains</u></strong> well<u><strong> below the hemisphere’s expectations.20 </u></strong>It is also a fraction of an estimated $300 billion by U.S. companies.21</p>

McClintock 07

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McClintock 07 fulltext: (Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm However, at the moment, many Latin American leaders are disappointed with the trends in their economic relationships with China. First, although trade between China and Latin America has increased dramatically, it still comprises only about 5% of Latin America’s total trade.18 More importantly, there is growing concern that China’s cheap manufactures will hurt Latin America. This problem had been expected for Mexico and Central America, which compete with China to export manufactured goods to the U.S. market, but has now beset South American countries where, despite high commodity prices, in recent months imports from China have exceeded exports to the Asian country.19 Perhaps most importantly of all, at about $10 billion, China’s investment in Latin America remains well below the hemisphere’s expectations.20 It is also a fraction of an estimated $300 billion by U.S. companies.21 [/INST] <h4><strong>And, China will never be respected by Cuba- </h4><p>McClintock 07</p><p></strong>(Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>However, at the moment, many<u><strong> Latin American leaders are disappointed</u></strong> with the<u><strong> trends in their economic relationships with China</u></strong>. First, although trade between China and Latin America has increased dramatically, it still comprises only about 5% of Latin America’s total trade.18 More importantly, <u><strong>there is growing concern that China’s cheap manufactures will hurt Latin America</u></strong>. This problem had been expected for Mexico and Central America, which compete with China to export manufactured goods to the U.S. market, but has now beset South American countries where, despite high commodity prices, in recent months imports from China have exceeded exports to the Asian country.19 Perhaps most importantly of all, at about $10 billion, <u><strong>China’s investment in Latin America remains</u></strong> well<u><strong> below the hemisphere’s expectations.20 </u></strong>It is also a fraction of an estimated $300 billion by U.S. companies.21</p> </s>

Embargo hurts health care – hampers UN programs

increase in the costs for purchasing the necessary medicine or medical materials is hampering the implementation of UN development projects and programmes. beneficiaries of these programmes, face long delays before having access to adequate medicine or treatment.

The increase in the costs for purchasing the necessary medicine or medical materials is hampering the implementation of UN development projects and programmes. The repercussions of these difficulties are ultimately felt by the intended beneficiaries of these programmes, who face long delays before having access to adequate medicine or treatment.

<h4>Embargo hurts health care – hampers UN programs </h4><p><strong>Amnesty International 2009</strong> “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf</p><p>The <u><strong>increase in the costs for purchasing the necessary medicine or medical materials is hampering the implementation of UN development projects and programmes.</u></strong> The repercussions of these difficulties are ultimately felt by the intended <u><strong>beneficiaries of these programmes,</u></strong> who <u><strong>face long delays before having access to adequate medicine or treatment. </p></u></strong>

Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf fulltext: The increase in the costs for purchasing the necessary medicine or medical materials is hampering the implementation of UN development projects and programmes. The repercussions of these difficulties are ultimately felt by the intended beneficiaries of these programmes, who face long delays before having access to adequate medicine or treatment. [/INST] <h4>Embargo hurts health care – hampers UN programs </h4><p><strong>Amnesty International 2009</strong> “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf</p><p>The <u><strong>increase in the costs for purchasing the necessary medicine or medical materials is hampering the implementation of UN development projects and programmes.</u></strong> The repercussions of these difficulties are ultimately felt by the intended <u><strong>beneficiaries of these programmes,</u></strong> who <u><strong>face long delays before having access to adequate medicine or treatment. </p></u></strong> </s>

Stopping disease key to prevent extinction

changing conditions have enhanced the potential for widespread contagion The threat of infectious pathogens is not just an issue of public health, but a fundamental security problem for the species as a whole

changing conditions have enhanced the potential for widespread contagion. The threat of infectious pathogens is not just an issue of public health, but a fundamental security problem for the species as a whole.

(John D., Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, “Biological Weapons: A Plague Upon All Houses,” FOREIGN POLICY n. 109, Winter 1997/1998, pp. 85-96, ASP.) It is a considerable comfort and undoubtedly a key to our survival that, so far, the main lines of defense against this threat have not depended on explicit policies or organized efforts. In the long course of evolution, the human body has developed physical barriers and a biochemical immune system whose sophistication and effectiveness exceed anything we could design or as yet even fully understand. But evolution is a sword that cuts both ways: New diseases emerge, while old diseases mutate and adapt. Throughout history, there have been epidemics during which human immunity has broken down on an epic scale. An infectious agent believed to have been the plague bacterium killed an estimated 20 million people over a four-year period in the fourteenth century, including nearly one-quarter of Western Europe's population at the time. Since its recognized appearance in 1981, some 20 variations of the HIV virus have infected an estimated 29.4 million worldwide, with 1.5 million people currently dying of AIDS each year. Malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera - once thought to be under control - are now making a comeback. As we enter the twenty-first century, changing conditions have enhanced the potential for widespread contagion. The rapid growth rate of the total world population, the unprecedented freedom of movement across international borders, and scientific advances that expand the capability for the deliberate manipulation of pathogens are all cause for worry that the problem might be greater in the future than it has ever been in the past. The threat of infectious pathogens is not just an issue of public health, but a fundamental security problem for the species as a whole.

<h4><strong>Stopping disease key to prevent extinction</h4><p>Steinbruner 98</p><p></strong>(John D., Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, “Biological Weapons: A Plague Upon All Houses,” FOREIGN POLICY n. 109, Winter 1997/1998, pp. 85-96, ASP.)</p><p>It is a considerable comfort and undoubtedly a key to our survival that, so far, the main lines of defense against this threat have not depended on explicit policies or organized efforts. In the long course of evolution, the human body has developed physical barriers and a biochemical immune system whose sophistication and effectiveness exceed anything we could design or as yet even fully understand. But evolution is a sword that cuts both ways: New diseases emerge, while old diseases mutate and adapt. Throughout history, there have been epidemics during which human immunity has broken down on an epic scale. An infectious agent believed to have been the plague bacterium killed an estimated 20 million people over a four-year period in the fourteenth century, including nearly one-quarter of Western Europe's population at the time. Since its recognized appearance in 1981, some 20 variations of the HIV virus have infected an estimated 29.4 million worldwide, with 1.5 million people currently dying of AIDS each year. Malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera - once thought to be under control - are now making a comeback. As we enter the twenty-first century, <u><strong><mark>changing conditions have enhanced the potential for widespread contagion</u></strong>.</mark> The rapid growth rate of the total world population, the unprecedented freedom of movement across international borders, and scientific advances that expand the capability for the deliberate manipulation of pathogens are all cause for worry that the problem might be greater in the future than it has ever been in the past. <u><strong><mark>The threat of infectious pathogens is not just an issue of public health, but a fundamental security problem for the species as a whole</u></strong>.</mark> </p>

Steinbruner 98

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Steinbruner 98 fulltext: (John D., Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, “Biological Weapons: A Plague Upon All Houses,” FOREIGN POLICY n. 109, Winter 1997/1998, pp. 85-96, ASP.) It is a considerable comfort and undoubtedly a key to our survival that, so far, the main lines of defense against this threat have not depended on explicit policies or organized efforts. In the long course of evolution, the human body has developed physical barriers and a biochemical immune system whose sophistication and effectiveness exceed anything we could design or as yet even fully understand. But evolution is a sword that cuts both ways: New diseases emerge, while old diseases mutate and adapt. Throughout history, there have been epidemics during which human immunity has broken down on an epic scale. An infectious agent believed to have been the plague bacterium killed an estimated 20 million people over a four-year period in the fourteenth century, including nearly one-quarter of Western Europe's population at the time. Since its recognized appearance in 1981, some 20 variations of the HIV virus have infected an estimated 29.4 million worldwide, with 1.5 million people currently dying of AIDS each year. Malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera - once thought to be under control - are now making a comeback. As we enter the twenty-first century, changing conditions have enhanced the potential for widespread contagion. The rapid growth rate of the total world population, the unprecedented freedom of movement across international borders, and scientific advances that expand the capability for the deliberate manipulation of pathogens are all cause for worry that the problem might be greater in the future than it has ever been in the past. The threat of infectious pathogens is not just an issue of public health, but a fundamental security problem for the species as a whole. [/INST] <h4><strong>Stopping disease key to prevent extinction</h4><p>Steinbruner 98</p><p></strong>(John D., Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, “Biological Weapons: A Plague Upon All Houses,” FOREIGN POLICY n. 109, Winter 1997/1998, pp. 85-96, ASP.)</p><p>It is a considerable comfort and undoubtedly a key to our survival that, so far, the main lines of defense against this threat have not depended on explicit policies or organized efforts. In the long course of evolution, the human body has developed physical barriers and a biochemical immune system whose sophistication and effectiveness exceed anything we could design or as yet even fully understand. But evolution is a sword that cuts both ways: New diseases emerge, while old diseases mutate and adapt. Throughout history, there have been epidemics during which human immunity has broken down on an epic scale. An infectious agent believed to have been the plague bacterium killed an estimated 20 million people over a four-year period in the fourteenth century, including nearly one-quarter of Western Europe's population at the time. Since its recognized appearance in 1981, some 20 variations of the HIV virus have infected an estimated 29.4 million worldwide, with 1.5 million people currently dying of AIDS each year. Malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera - once thought to be under control - are now making a comeback. As we enter the twenty-first century, <u><strong><mark>changing conditions have enhanced the potential for widespread contagion</u></strong>.</mark> The rapid growth rate of the total world population, the unprecedented freedom of movement across international borders, and scientific advances that expand the capability for the deliberate manipulation of pathogens are all cause for worry that the problem might be greater in the future than it has ever been in the past. <u><strong><mark>The threat of infectious pathogens is not just an issue of public health, but a fundamental security problem for the species as a whole</u></strong>.</mark> </p> </s>

Extend 2AC Cerna- China and US both have a growing presence in Cuba in different economic sectors proving that relations aren’t zero sum- takes out the link

<h4>Extend 2AC Cerna- China and US both have a growing presence in Cuba in different economic sectors proving that relations aren’t zero sum- takes out the link</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Extend 2AC Cerna- China and US both have a growing presence in Cuba in different economic sectors proving that relations aren’t zero sum- takes out the link</h4> </s>

Embargo hurts health care – infrastructure

The impact of economic sanctions on health and health services is not limited to difficulties in the supply of medicine. Health and health services depend on functioning water and sanitation infrastructure, on electricity and other functioning equipment The financial burden and commercial barriers have led to shortages or intermittent availability of drugs, medicines, equipment and spare parts. It has also hindered the renovation of hospitals, clinics and care centres

The impact of economic sanctions on health and health services is not limited to difficulties in the supply of medicine. Health and health services depend on functioning water and sanitation infrastructure, on electricity and other functioning equipment such as X-ray facilities or refrigerators to store vaccines. The financial burden and commercial barriers have led to shortages or intermittent availability of drugs, medicines, equipment and spare parts. It has also hindered the renovation of hospitals, clinics and care centres for the elderly.64

<h4>Embargo hurts health care – infrastructure </h4><p><strong>Amnesty International 2009</strong> “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf</p><p><u><strong>The impact of economic sanctions on health and health services is not limited to difficulties in the supply of medicine. Health and health services depend on functioning water and sanitation infrastructure, on electricity and other functioning equipment</u></strong> such as X-ray facilities or refrigerators to store vaccines. <u><strong>The financial burden and commercial barriers have led to shortages or intermittent availability of drugs, medicines, equipment and spare parts. It has also hindered the renovation of hospitals, clinics and care centres</u></strong> for the elderly.64</p>

Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf fulltext: The impact of economic sanctions on health and health services is not limited to difficulties in the supply of medicine. Health and health services depend on functioning water and sanitation infrastructure, on electricity and other functioning equipment such as X-ray facilities or refrigerators to store vaccines. The financial burden and commercial barriers have led to shortages or intermittent availability of drugs, medicines, equipment and spare parts. It has also hindered the renovation of hospitals, clinics and care centres for the elderly.64 [/INST] <h4>Embargo hurts health care – infrastructure </h4><p><strong>Amnesty International 2009</strong> “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf</p><p><u><strong>The impact of economic sanctions on health and health services is not limited to difficulties in the supply of medicine. Health and health services depend on functioning water and sanitation infrastructure, on electricity and other functioning equipment</u></strong> such as X-ray facilities or refrigerators to store vaccines. <u><strong>The financial burden and commercial barriers have led to shortages or intermittent availability of drugs, medicines, equipment and spare parts. It has also hindered the renovation of hospitals, clinics and care centres</u></strong> for the elderly.64</p> </s>

More ev,

economics is not a zero-sum game In trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating gains for Latin America: as China sucks in mass quantities of raw materials gains from rising price of natural resources demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices

(Richard, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacifi c Studies University of California, San Diego, Review Essays, “China, Latin America, and the United States: Congruent Interests or Tectonic Turbulence?,” 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf) /wyo-mm In China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributors—World Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international trade—come down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually benefi cial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast to the security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, economics is not a zero-sum game! In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices).

<h4><strong>More ev,</h4><p>Feinberg 11</p><p></strong>(Richard, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacifi c Studies University of California, San Diego, Review Essays, “China, Latin America, and the United States: Congruent Interests or Tectonic Turbulence?,” 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>In China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributors—World Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international trade—come down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually benefi cial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast to the security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, <u><strong>economics is not a zero-sum game</u></strong>! <u><strong>In</u></strong> the arena of<u><strong> trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating</u></strong> both direct and indirect<u><strong> gains for Latin America: </u></strong>direct gains <u><strong>as China sucks in mass</u></strong>ive<u><strong> quantities of raw materials</u></strong> (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) and indirect <u><strong>gains from</u></strong> the <u><strong>rising price of natural resources</u></strong> (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., <u><strong>demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which</u></strong> in turn <u><strong>can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices</u></strong>).</p>

Feinberg 11

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Feinberg 11 fulltext: (Richard, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacifi c Studies University of California, San Diego, Review Essays, “China, Latin America, and the United States: Congruent Interests or Tectonic Turbulence?,” 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf) /wyo-mm In China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributors—World Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international trade—come down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually benefi cial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast to the security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, economics is not a zero-sum game! In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices). [/INST] <h4><strong>More ev,</h4><p>Feinberg 11</p><p></strong>(Richard, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacifi c Studies University of California, San Diego, Review Essays, “China, Latin America, and the United States: Congruent Interests or Tectonic Turbulence?,” 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>In China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributors—World Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international trade—come down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually benefi cial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast to the security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, <u><strong>economics is not a zero-sum game</u></strong>! <u><strong>In</u></strong> the arena of<u><strong> trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating</u></strong> both direct and indirect<u><strong> gains for Latin America: </u></strong>direct gains <u><strong>as China sucks in mass</u></strong>ive<u><strong> quantities of raw materials</u></strong> (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) and indirect <u><strong>gains from</u></strong> the <u><strong>rising price of natural resources</u></strong> (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., <u><strong>demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which</u></strong> in turn <u><strong>can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices</u></strong>).</p> </s>

No water wars – best studies

debates on whether scarcity of food or water will lead to conflict comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between resources and population growth most empirical studies do not support these arguments. Tech and capital have dramatically increased productivity the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because humankind has breached resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. alarmist scenarios linked use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. In the Middle East foreign ministers have used this bellicose rhetoric. The evidence seems quite weak. none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited to governmental rhetoric more than two-thirds of 1800 water events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale organized political bodies signed more than 3600 water-related treaties There is no correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Water rich countries have been involved in disputes with other water rich countries perceptions of the amount of available water drives co-operation among riparians the threat of water wars does not make sense in the light of the recent historical record. debates over climate change popularised water wars. Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin

empirical studies do not support these arguments Tech and capital have increased productivity humankind has breached resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. alarmist scenarios linked water and food insecurity with wars. In the Mid East foreign ministers used this rhetoric. None of the various and extensive databases on causes of war show water 80% of incidents were limited to rhetoric two-thirds fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale perceptions of water drives co-operation threat of water wars does not make sense in the light of the historical record

(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January) The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

<h4><strong>No water wars – best studies</h4><p>Allouche 11</strong>, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, </p><p>(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)</p><p>The question of resource scarcity has led to many <u><strong>debates on whether scarcity</u></strong> (whether <u><strong>of food or water</u></strong>) <u><strong>will lead to conflict</u></strong> and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars <u><strong>comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between</u></strong> the economic availability of natural <u><strong>resources and population growth</u></strong> since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that <u><strong>most <mark>empirical studies do not support</u></strong></mark> any of <u><strong><mark>these</u></strong></mark> neo-Malthusian <u><strong><mark>arguments</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Tech</u></strong></mark>nological change <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> greater inputs of <u><strong><mark>capital have</mark> dramatically <mark>increased</u></strong></mark> labour <u><strong><mark>productivity</u></strong></mark> in agriculture. More generally, <u><strong>the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because</u></strong> during the last two centuries <u><strong><mark>humankind has breached</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.</strong></mark> </u>Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of <u><strong><mark>alarmist scenarios</u></strong></mark> have <u><strong><mark>linked</u></strong></mark> the increasing <u><strong>use of <mark>water</mark> resources <mark>and food insecurity with wars.</u></strong></mark> The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. <u><strong><mark>In the Mid</mark>dle <mark>East</u></strong></mark>, presidents, prime ministers and <u><strong><mark>foreign ministers</mark> have</u></strong> also <u><strong><mark>used this</mark> bellicose <mark>rhetoric.</u></strong></mark> Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. <u><strong>The evidence seems quite weak.</u></strong> Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, <u><strong>none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.</strong> </u>The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. <u><strong><mark>None of the various and extensive databases on</mark> the <mark>causes of war show water</mark> as a casus belli.</u></strong> Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, <u><strong>Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause</u></strong> for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about <u><strong><mark>80% of</mark> the <mark>incidents</mark> relating to water <mark>were limited</u></strong></mark> purely <u><strong><mark>to</mark> governmental <mark>rhetoric</u></strong></mark> intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, <u><strong>more than <mark>two-thirds</mark> of</u></strong> over <u><strong>1800 water</u></strong>-related ‘<u><strong>events’ <mark>fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale</u></strong></mark> (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), <u><strong>organized political bodies signed</u></strong> between the year 805 and 1984 <u><strong>more than 3600 water-related treaties</u></strong>, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. <u><strong>There is</u></strong> however <u><strong>no</u></strong> direct <u><strong>correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. </u></strong>Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). <u><strong>Water rich countries have been involved in</u></strong> a number of <u><strong>disputes with other</u></strong> relatively <u><strong>water rich countries</u></strong> (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, <u><strong><mark>perceptions of</mark> the amount of available <mark>water</u></strong></mark> shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity <u><strong><mark>drives</u></strong></mark> the process of <u><strong><mark>co-operation</mark> among riparians</u></strong> (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006). In terms of international relations, <u><strong>the <mark>threat of water wars</u></strong></mark> due to increasing scarcity <u><strong><mark>does not make</u></strong></mark> much <u><strong><mark>sense in the light of the</mark> recent <mark>historical record</mark>.</u></strong> Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The <u><strong>debates over</u></strong> the likely impacts of <u><strong>climate change</u></strong> have again <u><strong>popularised</u></strong> the idea of <u><strong>water wars.</u></strong> The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). <u><strong>Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin</u></strong> ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane<strong> and Gray, 2008).</p></strong>

Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT,

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, fulltext: (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January) The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008). [/INST] <h4><strong>No water wars – best studies</h4><p>Allouche 11</strong>, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, </p><p>(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)</p><p>The question of resource scarcity has led to many <u><strong>debates on whether scarcity</u></strong> (whether <u><strong>of food or water</u></strong>) <u><strong>will lead to conflict</u></strong> and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars <u><strong>comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between</u></strong> the economic availability of natural <u><strong>resources and population growth</u></strong> since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that <u><strong>most <mark>empirical studies do not support</u></strong></mark> any of <u><strong><mark>these</u></strong></mark> neo-Malthusian <u><strong><mark>arguments</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Tech</u></strong></mark>nological change <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> greater inputs of <u><strong><mark>capital have</mark> dramatically <mark>increased</u></strong></mark> labour <u><strong><mark>productivity</u></strong></mark> in agriculture. More generally, <u><strong>the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because</u></strong> during the last two centuries <u><strong><mark>humankind has breached</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.</strong></mark> </u>Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of <u><strong><mark>alarmist scenarios</u></strong></mark> have <u><strong><mark>linked</u></strong></mark> the increasing <u><strong>use of <mark>water</mark> resources <mark>and food insecurity with wars.</u></strong></mark> The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. <u><strong><mark>In the Mid</mark>dle <mark>East</u></strong></mark>, presidents, prime ministers and <u><strong><mark>foreign ministers</mark> have</u></strong> also <u><strong><mark>used this</mark> bellicose <mark>rhetoric.</u></strong></mark> Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. <u><strong>The evidence seems quite weak.</u></strong> Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, <u><strong>none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.</strong> </u>The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. <u><strong><mark>None of the various and extensive databases on</mark> the <mark>causes of war show water</mark> as a casus belli.</u></strong> Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, <u><strong>Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause</u></strong> for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about <u><strong><mark>80% of</mark> the <mark>incidents</mark> relating to water <mark>were limited</u></strong></mark> purely <u><strong><mark>to</mark> governmental <mark>rhetoric</u></strong></mark> intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, <u><strong>more than <mark>two-thirds</mark> of</u></strong> over <u><strong>1800 water</u></strong>-related ‘<u><strong>events’ <mark>fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale</u></strong></mark> (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), <u><strong>organized political bodies signed</u></strong> between the year 805 and 1984 <u><strong>more than 3600 water-related treaties</u></strong>, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. <u><strong>There is</u></strong> however <u><strong>no</u></strong> direct <u><strong>correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. </u></strong>Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). <u><strong>Water rich countries have been involved in</u></strong> a number of <u><strong>disputes with other</u></strong> relatively <u><strong>water rich countries</u></strong> (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, <u><strong><mark>perceptions of</mark> the amount of available <mark>water</u></strong></mark> shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity <u><strong><mark>drives</u></strong></mark> the process of <u><strong><mark>co-operation</mark> among riparians</u></strong> (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006). In terms of international relations, <u><strong>the <mark>threat of water wars</u></strong></mark> due to increasing scarcity <u><strong><mark>does not make</u></strong></mark> much <u><strong><mark>sense in the light of the</mark> recent <mark>historical record</mark>.</u></strong> Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The <u><strong>debates over</u></strong> the likely impacts of <u><strong>climate change</u></strong> have again <u><strong>popularised</u></strong> the idea of <u><strong>water wars.</u></strong> The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). <u><strong>Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin</u></strong> ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane<strong> and Gray, 2008).</p></strong> </s>

Extend 2AC Nolte- China will be careful not to arouse suspicion in the Cuban region and sees Cuba included in US sphere of influence- takes out the internal link-

<h4>Extend 2AC Nolte- China will be careful not to arouse suspicion in the Cuban region and sees Cuba included in US sphere of influence- takes out the internal link- </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Extend 2AC Nolte- China will be careful not to arouse suspicion in the Cuban region and sees Cuba included in US sphere of influence- takes out the internal link- </h4> </s>

Alt cause to water wars (political allocation), and trade would solve the impact

Although resource scarcity has been linked to international wars, the current data shows that most conflict over water and food are much more local But there again, although resource scarcity can be linked to malnutrition, hunger and water insecurity water and food insecurity are rarely about competition over resources but rather reflect the politics of allocation and inequality the global level, food security has considerably improved and provides the means to address these insecurities. Trade can certainly be seen as a way to address access for countries that are under severe stress in terms of food and water and provides logical grounds for questioning the various water and food wars scenarios.

current data shows that most conflict over water are local water insecurity rarely about competition over resources but rather reflect the politics of allocation and inequality food security has considerably improved and provides the means to address these insecurities Trade can be seen as a way to address access for countries that are under severe stress

This article has provided an overview of the current and future challenges in terms of global food and water systems. The major focus of the argument has been on how resource scarcity is a contested and subjective concept which cannot fully explain conflict, political instability or food insecurity. The politics of inequality and allocation are much more important variables in explaining water and food insecurity. This is particularly true for conflicts. Although resource scarcity has been linked to international wars, the current data shows that most conflict over water and food are much more local. But there again, although resource scarcity can be linked to malnutrition, hunger and water insecurity, in the majority of cases, water and food insecurity are rarely about competition over resources but rather reflect the politics of allocation and inequality. In this respect, war and conflicts aggravate these insecurities not just on the short term but also on the long term. At the global level, food security has considerably improved and provides the means to address these insecurities. Trade can certainly be seen as a way to address access for countries that are under severe stress in terms of food and water and provides logical grounds for questioning the various water and food wars scenarios. Although global trade and technological innovation are key drivers in providing stable and resilient global systems, the most destabilizing global water-related threat is increasing food prices and hunger. Overall, decision-makers should show greater concern for the human beings who make their living in agriculture, so that those at risk of livelihood and food-security failures, especially under anticipated scenarios of climate change, will be less deprived. Current debates linked to global food security and climate fail to address the political dimension of resource scarcity which is primarily linked to the politics of inequality, gender and power.

<h4><strong>Alt cause to water wars (political allocation), and trade would solve the impact</h4><p><u>Allouche 11</u></strong>, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January), accessed 11/4/12,WYO/JF</p><p>This article has provided an overview of the current and future challenges in terms of global food and water systems. The major focus of the argument has been on how resource scarcity is a contested and subjective concept which cannot fully explain conflict, political instability or food insecurity. The politics of inequality and allocation are much more important variables in explaining water and food insecurity. This is particularly true for conflicts. <u><strong>Although resource scarcity has been linked to international wars, the <mark>current data shows that most conflict over water</mark> and food <mark>are</mark> much more <mark>local</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>But there again, although resource scarcity can be linked to malnutrition, hunger and water insecurity</u></strong>, in the majority of cases, <u><strong><mark>water</mark> and food <mark>insecurity</mark> are <mark>rarely about competition over resources but rather reflect the politics of allocation and inequality</u></strong></mark>. In this respect, war and conflicts aggravate these insecurities not just on the short term but also on the long term. At <u><strong>the global level, <mark>food security has considerably improved and provides the means to address these insecurities</mark>. <mark>Trade can</mark> certainly <mark>be seen as a way to address access for countries that are under severe stress</mark> in terms of food and water and provides logical grounds for questioning the various water and food wars scenarios.</u></strong> Although global trade and technological innovation are key drivers in providing stable and resilient global systems, the most destabilizing global water-related threat is increasing food prices and hunger. Overall, decision-makers should show greater concern for the human beings who make their living in agriculture, so that those at risk of livelihood and food-security failures, especially under anticipated scenarios of climate change, will be less deprived. Current debates linked to global food security and climate fail to address the political dimension of resource scarcity which is primarily linked to the politics of inequality, gender and power.</p>

Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January), accessed 11/4/12,WYO/JF

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January), accessed 11/4/12,WYO/JF fulltext: This article has provided an overview of the current and future challenges in terms of global food and water systems. The major focus of the argument has been on how resource scarcity is a contested and subjective concept which cannot fully explain conflict, political instability or food insecurity. The politics of inequality and allocation are much more important variables in explaining water and food insecurity. This is particularly true for conflicts. Although resource scarcity has been linked to international wars, the current data shows that most conflict over water and food are much more local. But there again, although resource scarcity can be linked to malnutrition, hunger and water insecurity, in the majority of cases, water and food insecurity are rarely about competition over resources but rather reflect the politics of allocation and inequality. In this respect, war and conflicts aggravate these insecurities not just on the short term but also on the long term. At the global level, food security has considerably improved and provides the means to address these insecurities. Trade can certainly be seen as a way to address access for countries that are under severe stress in terms of food and water and provides logical grounds for questioning the various water and food wars scenarios. Although global trade and technological innovation are key drivers in providing stable and resilient global systems, the most destabilizing global water-related threat is increasing food prices and hunger. Overall, decision-makers should show greater concern for the human beings who make their living in agriculture, so that those at risk of livelihood and food-security failures, especially under anticipated scenarios of climate change, will be less deprived. Current debates linked to global food security and climate fail to address the political dimension of resource scarcity which is primarily linked to the politics of inequality, gender and power. [/INST] <h4><strong>Alt cause to water wars (political allocation), and trade would solve the impact</h4><p><u>Allouche 11</u></strong>, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January), accessed 11/4/12,WYO/JF</p><p>This article has provided an overview of the current and future challenges in terms of global food and water systems. The major focus of the argument has been on how resource scarcity is a contested and subjective concept which cannot fully explain conflict, political instability or food insecurity. The politics of inequality and allocation are much more important variables in explaining water and food insecurity. This is particularly true for conflicts. <u><strong>Although resource scarcity has been linked to international wars, the <mark>current data shows that most conflict over water</mark> and food <mark>are</mark> much more <mark>local</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>But there again, although resource scarcity can be linked to malnutrition, hunger and water insecurity</u></strong>, in the majority of cases, <u><strong><mark>water</mark> and food <mark>insecurity</mark> are <mark>rarely about competition over resources but rather reflect the politics of allocation and inequality</u></strong></mark>. In this respect, war and conflicts aggravate these insecurities not just on the short term but also on the long term. At <u><strong>the global level, <mark>food security has considerably improved and provides the means to address these insecurities</mark>. <mark>Trade can</mark> certainly <mark>be seen as a way to address access for countries that are under severe stress</mark> in terms of food and water and provides logical grounds for questioning the various water and food wars scenarios.</u></strong> Although global trade and technological innovation are key drivers in providing stable and resilient global systems, the most destabilizing global water-related threat is increasing food prices and hunger. Overall, decision-makers should show greater concern for the human beings who make their living in agriculture, so that those at risk of livelihood and food-security failures, especially under anticipated scenarios of climate change, will be less deprived. Current debates linked to global food security and climate fail to address the political dimension of resource scarcity which is primarily linked to the politics of inequality, gender and power.</p> </s>

No impact to terrorism – too hard to pull off post 9/11, not enough personnel to carry out an attack, too much pressure because of security restrictions

http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/opinion-why-arent-there-more-times-square-style-terrorist-attacks/19463843) Terrorism sounds easy Putting together the people, the plot and the materials is hard. It's hard to sneak terrorists into the U.S. It's hard to grow your own inside the U.S. It's hard to operate; the general population, even the Muslim population, is against you. Even 9/11, which was planned before the climate of fear that event engendered, just barely succeeded. Today, it's much harder to pull something like that off without slipping up and getting arrested. But even more important than the difficulty of executing a terrorist attack, there aren't a lot of terrorists out there. Al-Qaida isn't a well-organized global organization Despite the post-9/11 rhetoric, there isn't a terrorist cell in every major city. If you think about the major terrorist plots we've foiled in the U.S. -- the JFK bombers, the Fort Dix plotters -- they were mostly amateur terrorist wannabes with no connection to any sort of al-Qaida central command, and mostly no ability to effectively carry out the attacks they planned. The successful terrorist attacks were largely nut cases operating alone Terrorism doesn't occur without terrorists, and they are far rarer than popular opinion would have it.

Putting together the people, the plot and the materials is hard. It's hard to sneak terrorists into the U.S Even 9/11, which was planned before the climate of fear that event engendered, just barely succeeded even more important than the difficulty of executing a terrorist attack, there aren't a lot of terrorists out there Al-Qaida isn't a well-organized global organization the major terrorist plots foiled

(Bruce, a security technologist and author of "Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.", “Opinion: Where Are All the Terrorist Attacks?”, March 2010, http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/opinion-why-arent-there-more-times-square-style-terrorist-attacks/19463843) Hard to Pull Off Terrorism sounds easy, but the actual attack is the easiest part. Putting together the people, the plot and the materials is hard. It's hard to sneak terrorists into the U.S. It's hard to grow your own inside the U.S. It's hard to operate; the general population, even the Muslim population, is against you. Movies and television make terrorist plots look easier than they are. It's hard to hold conspiracies together. It's easy to make a mistake. Even 9/11, which was planned before the climate of fear that event engendered, just barely succeeded. Today, it's much harder to pull something like that off without slipping up and getting arrested. Few Terrorists But even more important than the difficulty of executing a terrorist attack, there aren't a lot of terrorists out there. Al-Qaida isn't a well-organized global organization with movie-plot-villain capabilities; it's a loose collection of people using the same name. Despite the post-9/11 rhetoric, there isn't a terrorist cell in every major city. If you think about the major terrorist plots we've foiled in the U.S. -- the JFK bombers, the Fort Dix plotters -- they were mostly amateur terrorist wannabes with no connection to any sort of al-Qaida central command, and mostly no ability to effectively carry out the attacks they planned. The successful terrorist attacks -- the Fort Hood shooter, the guy who flew his plane into the Austin IRS office, the anthrax mailer -- were largely nut cases operating alone. Even the unsuccessful shoe bomber, and the equally unsuccessful Christmas Day underwear bomber, had minimal organized help -- and that help originated outside the U.S. Terrorism doesn't occur without terrorists, and they are far rarer than popular opinion would have it.

<h4><strong>No impact to terrorism – too hard to pull off post 9/11, not enough personnel to carry out an attack, too much pressure because of security restrictions </h4><p>Schneier 10</p><p></strong>(Bruce, a security technologist and author of "Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.", “Opinion: Where Are All the Terrorist Attacks?”, March 2010, <u>http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/opinion-why-arent-there-more-times-square-style-terrorist-attacks/19463843<strong>)</p><p></u></strong>Hard to Pull Off <u><strong>Terrorism sounds easy</u></strong>, but the actual attack is the easiest part. <u><strong><mark>Putting together the people, the plot and the materials is hard. It's hard to sneak terrorists into the U.S</mark>. It's hard to grow your own inside the U.S. It's hard to operate; the general population, even the Muslim population, is against you. </u></strong>Movies and television make terrorist plots look easier than they are. It's hard to hold conspiracies together. It's easy to make a mistake. <u><strong><mark>Even 9/11, which was planned before the climate of fear that event engendered, just barely succeeded</mark>. Today, it's much harder to pull something like that off without slipping up and getting arrested. </u></strong>Few Terrorists <u><strong>But <mark>even more important than the difficulty of executing a terrorist attack, there aren't a lot of terrorists out there</mark>. <mark>Al-Qaida isn't a well-organized global organization</u></strong></mark> with movie-plot-villain capabilities; it's a loose collection of people using the same name. <u><strong>Despite the post-9/11 rhetoric, there isn't a terrorist cell in every major city. If you think about <mark>the major terrorist plots</mark> we've <mark>foiled</mark> in the U.S. -- the JFK bombers, the Fort Dix plotters -- they were mostly amateur terrorist wannabes with no connection to any sort of al-Qaida central command, and mostly no ability to effectively carry out the attacks they planned. The successful terrorist attacks</u></strong> -- the Fort Hood shooter, the guy who flew his plane into the Austin IRS office, the anthrax mailer -- <u><strong>were largely nut cases operating alone</u></strong>. Even the unsuccessful shoe bomber, and the equally unsuccessful Christmas Day underwear bomber, had minimal organized help -- and that help originated outside the U.S. <u><strong>Terrorism doesn't occur without terrorists, and they are far rarer than popular opinion would have it.</p></u></strong>

Schneier 10

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Schneier 10 fulltext: (Bruce, a security technologist and author of "Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.", “Opinion: Where Are All the Terrorist Attacks?”, March 2010, http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/opinion-why-arent-there-more-times-square-style-terrorist-attacks/19463843) Hard to Pull Off Terrorism sounds easy, but the actual attack is the easiest part. Putting together the people, the plot and the materials is hard. It's hard to sneak terrorists into the U.S. It's hard to grow your own inside the U.S. It's hard to operate; the general population, even the Muslim population, is against you. Movies and television make terrorist plots look easier than they are. It's hard to hold conspiracies together. It's easy to make a mistake. Even 9/11, which was planned before the climate of fear that event engendered, just barely succeeded. Today, it's much harder to pull something like that off without slipping up and getting arrested. Few Terrorists But even more important than the difficulty of executing a terrorist attack, there aren't a lot of terrorists out there. Al-Qaida isn't a well-organized global organization with movie-plot-villain capabilities; it's a loose collection of people using the same name. Despite the post-9/11 rhetoric, there isn't a terrorist cell in every major city. If you think about the major terrorist plots we've foiled in the U.S. -- the JFK bombers, the Fort Dix plotters -- they were mostly amateur terrorist wannabes with no connection to any sort of al-Qaida central command, and mostly no ability to effectively carry out the attacks they planned. The successful terrorist attacks -- the Fort Hood shooter, the guy who flew his plane into the Austin IRS office, the anthrax mailer -- were largely nut cases operating alone. Even the unsuccessful shoe bomber, and the equally unsuccessful Christmas Day underwear bomber, had minimal organized help -- and that help originated outside the U.S. Terrorism doesn't occur without terrorists, and they are far rarer than popular opinion would have it. [/INST] <h4><strong>No impact to terrorism – too hard to pull off post 9/11, not enough personnel to carry out an attack, too much pressure because of security restrictions </h4><p>Schneier 10</p><p></strong>(Bruce, a security technologist and author of "Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.", “Opinion: Where Are All the Terrorist Attacks?”, March 2010, <u>http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/opinion-why-arent-there-more-times-square-style-terrorist-attacks/19463843<strong>)</p><p></u></strong>Hard to Pull Off <u><strong>Terrorism sounds easy</u></strong>, but the actual attack is the easiest part. <u><strong><mark>Putting together the people, the plot and the materials is hard. It's hard to sneak terrorists into the U.S</mark>. It's hard to grow your own inside the U.S. It's hard to operate; the general population, even the Muslim population, is against you. </u></strong>Movies and television make terrorist plots look easier than they are. It's hard to hold conspiracies together. It's easy to make a mistake. <u><strong><mark>Even 9/11, which was planned before the climate of fear that event engendered, just barely succeeded</mark>. Today, it's much harder to pull something like that off without slipping up and getting arrested. </u></strong>Few Terrorists <u><strong>But <mark>even more important than the difficulty of executing a terrorist attack, there aren't a lot of terrorists out there</mark>. <mark>Al-Qaida isn't a well-organized global organization</u></strong></mark> with movie-plot-villain capabilities; it's a loose collection of people using the same name. <u><strong>Despite the post-9/11 rhetoric, there isn't a terrorist cell in every major city. If you think about <mark>the major terrorist plots</mark> we've <mark>foiled</mark> in the U.S. -- the JFK bombers, the Fort Dix plotters -- they were mostly amateur terrorist wannabes with no connection to any sort of al-Qaida central command, and mostly no ability to effectively carry out the attacks they planned. The successful terrorist attacks</u></strong> -- the Fort Hood shooter, the guy who flew his plane into the Austin IRS office, the anthrax mailer -- <u><strong>were largely nut cases operating alone</u></strong>. Even the unsuccessful shoe bomber, and the equally unsuccessful Christmas Day underwear bomber, had minimal organized help -- and that help originated outside the U.S. <u><strong>Terrorism doesn't occur without terrorists, and they are far rarer than popular opinion would have it.</p></u></strong> </s>

US-China too closely linked to raise tensions

the Chinese and American economies are too tightly linked to permit a serious military rivalry both are likely to hedge against the possibility of future trouble they will worry about their relative power and geopolitical position

(Stephen M., Foreign Policy, “Explaining Obama’s Asia Policy,” November 18, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/explaining_obamas_asia_policy) /wyo-mm Or one could argue, as some have done in the past, that the Chinese and American economies are too tightly linked to one another to permit a serious military rivalry to emerge. Unfortunately, economic interdependence has never been a completely reliable barrier to security competition. Even if an intense rivalry would harm both countries, economics is not the only thing that matters to states and neither Washington nor Beijing can be sure that prudence and cool heads will always prevail. And this means that both are likely to hedge against the possibility of future trouble, even if this response may be somewhat self-fulfilling. And that means they will worry about their relative power and their geopolitical position and they will compete for influence in Asia. Obviously, 2,500 Marines won't make an objective difference to the balance of power, but they are an obvious a sign of the U.S. commitment to stay. (insert applicable impact defense extension)

<h4><strong>US-China too closely linked to raise tensions</h4><p>Walt 11</p><p></strong>(Stephen M., Foreign Policy, “Explaining Obama’s Asia Policy,” November 18, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/explaining_obamas_asia_policy) /wyo-mm</p><p>Or one could argue, as some have done in the past, that <u><strong>the Chinese and American economies are too tightly linked</u></strong> to one another<u><strong> to permit a serious military rivalry</u></strong> to emerge. Unfortunately, economic interdependence has never been a completely reliable barrier to security competition. Even if an intense rivalry would harm both countries, economics is not the only thing that matters to states and neither Washington nor Beijing can be sure that prudence and cool heads will always prevail. And this means that <u><strong>both are likely to hedge against the possibility of future trouble</u></strong>, even if this response may be somewhat self-fulfilling. And that means <u><strong>they will worry about their relative power and </u></strong>their<u><strong> geopolitical position</u></strong> and they will compete for influence in Asia. Obviously, 2,500 Marines won't make an objective difference to the balance of power, but they are an obvious a sign of the U.S. commitment to stay.</p><p>(insert applicable impact defense extension)</p>

Walt 11

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Walt 11 fulltext: (Stephen M., Foreign Policy, “Explaining Obama’s Asia Policy,” November 18, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/explaining_obamas_asia_policy) /wyo-mm Or one could argue, as some have done in the past, that the Chinese and American economies are too tightly linked to one another to permit a serious military rivalry to emerge. Unfortunately, economic interdependence has never been a completely reliable barrier to security competition. Even if an intense rivalry would harm both countries, economics is not the only thing that matters to states and neither Washington nor Beijing can be sure that prudence and cool heads will always prevail. And this means that both are likely to hedge against the possibility of future trouble, even if this response may be somewhat self-fulfilling. And that means they will worry about their relative power and their geopolitical position and they will compete for influence in Asia. Obviously, 2,500 Marines won't make an objective difference to the balance of power, but they are an obvious a sign of the U.S. commitment to stay. (insert applicable impact defense extension) [/INST] <h4><strong>US-China too closely linked to raise tensions</h4><p>Walt 11</p><p></strong>(Stephen M., Foreign Policy, “Explaining Obama’s Asia Policy,” November 18, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/explaining_obamas_asia_policy) /wyo-mm</p><p>Or one could argue, as some have done in the past, that <u><strong>the Chinese and American economies are too tightly linked</u></strong> to one another<u><strong> to permit a serious military rivalry</u></strong> to emerge. Unfortunately, economic interdependence has never been a completely reliable barrier to security competition. Even if an intense rivalry would harm both countries, economics is not the only thing that matters to states and neither Washington nor Beijing can be sure that prudence and cool heads will always prevail. And this means that <u><strong>both are likely to hedge against the possibility of future trouble</u></strong>, even if this response may be somewhat self-fulfilling. And that means <u><strong>they will worry about their relative power and </u></strong>their<u><strong> geopolitical position</u></strong> and they will compete for influence in Asia. Obviously, 2,500 Marines won't make an objective difference to the balance of power, but they are an obvious a sign of the U.S. commitment to stay.</p><p>(insert applicable impact defense extension)</p> </s>

Asymmetry from economic interdependence fosters multiple scenarios for war.

asymmetries occasioned by making alliance enhances the eventuality of war get the asymmetries enhancing warfare, we have several scenarios we may have an alliance of 3 countries against one country. After war bursts, either the alliance wins and countries share the prize, or the country in isolation wins, and the game ends we may also have an alliance of two countries which decides to initiate war with only one country when asymmetry is stringent countries have no choice but making war

(N.M., University of Laval, Quebec, DEPOCEN, “War and Peace: an Economic Liberalist Assessment,” 2009,http://depocenwp.org/upload/pubs/NguyenManhHung_Canada/War%20and%20Peace%20an%20Economic%20Liberalist_DEPOCENWP.pdf//wyo-mm) The possibility of forming alliances affects naturally the matter of war and peace. Consider 3 countries identical in all respects. At the start, there is neither gain from trading nor the incentive to initiate war for any country. If two among them decide to pool their resources and efforts against the third in case of unrest, this alliance amounts to get back to the 2-country framework with one is having now a double size. Moreover, there might also be some scale effect with regard to the Conflict Technology: synergy created by alliance may, for instance, allow a higher efficiency in warfare. The asymmetries occasioned by the possibility of making alliance, therefore, enhances the eventuality of war. When the number of countries increases but is still finite, alliance - or coalition - is multiple. Consider the case of 4 countries and assume again that they are identical. If two countries form an alliance, and if the other 2 countries do the same, we end up with the framework of 2 countries of double size. Perfect symmetry excludes the possibility of war making. So, to get the asymmetries enhancing warfare, we have several scenarios. First, we may have an alliance of 3 countries against one country. After war bursts, either the alliance wins and countries at stake share equally the war prize, or the country in isolation wins, and the game ends. Second, we may also have an alliance of two countries which decides to initiate war with only one country, leaving the other country in peace. The war game, as before, ends up with one winner. This latter is having different endowment than that of the country left in peace. Trading is now feasible for some cooperative gain if the asymmetry of endowment allows for it. Otherwise, when the asymmetry so far created is sufficiently stringent that the condition for war outburst in Section 3 is satisfied, these countries would have no choice but making war . Of course, the number of all possible alliances and feasible scenarios increases when we introduce more and more countries. The peaceful - or war free - environment envisaged by the classical liberalist will be restored only when each country is atomistic and their number large enough. In this case, the core exists and shrinks into the competitive equilibrium under free trade.

<h4><strong>Asymmetry from economic interdependence fosters multiple scenarios for war.</h4><p>Hung 9</p><p></strong>(N.M., University of Laval, Quebec, DEPOCEN, “War and Peace: an Economic Liberalist Assessment,” 2009,http://depocenwp.org/upload/pubs/NguyenManhHung_Canada/War%20and%20Peace%20an%20Economic%20Liberalist_DEPOCENWP.pdf//wyo-mm) </p><p>The possibility of forming alliances affects naturally the matter of war and peace. Consider 3 countries identical in all respects. At the start, there is neither gain from trading nor the incentive to initiate war for any country. If two among them decide to pool their resources and efforts against the third in case of unrest, this alliance amounts to get back to the 2-country framework with one is having now a double size. Moreover, there might also be some scale effect with regard to the Conflict Technology: synergy created by alliance may, for instance, allow a higher efficiency in warfare. The <u><strong>asymmetries occasioned by</u></strong> the possibility of <u><strong>making alliance</u></strong>, therefore, <u><strong>enhances the eventuality of war</u></strong>. When the number of countries increases but is still finite, alliance - or coalition - is multiple. Consider the case of 4 countries and assume again that they are identical. If two countries form an alliance, and if the other 2 countries do the same, we end up with the framework of 2 countries of double size. Perfect symmetry excludes the possibility of war making. So, to <u><strong>get the asymmetries enhancing warfare, we have several scenarios</u></strong>. First, <u><strong>we may have an alliance of 3 countries against one country. After war bursts, either the alliance wins and countries</u></strong> at stake <u><strong>share</u></strong> equally <u><strong>the</u></strong> war <u><strong>prize, or the country in isolation wins, and the game ends</u></strong>. Second, <u><strong>we may also have an alliance of two countries which decides to initiate war with only one country</u></strong>, leaving the other country in peace. The war game, as before, ends up with one winner. This latter is having different endowment than that of the country left in peace. Trading is now feasible for some cooperative gain if the asymmetry of endowment allows for it. Otherwise, <u><strong>when</u></strong> the <u><strong>asymmetry</u></strong> so far created <u><strong>is</u></strong> sufficiently <u><strong>stringent</u></strong> that the condition for war outburst in Section 3 is satisfied, these <u><strong>countries</u></strong> would <u><strong>have no choice but making war</u></strong> .<strong> Of course, the number of all possible alliances and feasible scenarios increases when we introduce more and more countries. The peaceful - or war free - environment envisaged by the classical liberalist will be restored only when each country is atomistic and their number large enough. In this case, the core exists and shrinks into the competitive equilibrium under free trade. </p></strong>

Hung 9

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Hung 9 fulltext: (N.M., University of Laval, Quebec, DEPOCEN, “War and Peace: an Economic Liberalist Assessment,” 2009,http://depocenwp.org/upload/pubs/NguyenManhHung_Canada/War%20and%20Peace%20an%20Economic%20Liberalist_DEPOCENWP.pdf//wyo-mm) The possibility of forming alliances affects naturally the matter of war and peace. Consider 3 countries identical in all respects. At the start, there is neither gain from trading nor the incentive to initiate war for any country. If two among them decide to pool their resources and efforts against the third in case of unrest, this alliance amounts to get back to the 2-country framework with one is having now a double size. Moreover, there might also be some scale effect with regard to the Conflict Technology: synergy created by alliance may, for instance, allow a higher efficiency in warfare. The asymmetries occasioned by the possibility of making alliance, therefore, enhances the eventuality of war. When the number of countries increases but is still finite, alliance - or coalition - is multiple. Consider the case of 4 countries and assume again that they are identical. If two countries form an alliance, and if the other 2 countries do the same, we end up with the framework of 2 countries of double size. Perfect symmetry excludes the possibility of war making. So, to get the asymmetries enhancing warfare, we have several scenarios. First, we may have an alliance of 3 countries against one country. After war bursts, either the alliance wins and countries at stake share equally the war prize, or the country in isolation wins, and the game ends. Second, we may also have an alliance of two countries which decides to initiate war with only one country, leaving the other country in peace. The war game, as before, ends up with one winner. This latter is having different endowment than that of the country left in peace. Trading is now feasible for some cooperative gain if the asymmetry of endowment allows for it. Otherwise, when the asymmetry so far created is sufficiently stringent that the condition for war outburst in Section 3 is satisfied, these countries would have no choice but making war . Of course, the number of all possible alliances and feasible scenarios increases when we introduce more and more countries. The peaceful - or war free - environment envisaged by the classical liberalist will be restored only when each country is atomistic and their number large enough. In this case, the core exists and shrinks into the competitive equilibrium under free trade. [/INST] <h4><strong>Asymmetry from economic interdependence fosters multiple scenarios for war.</h4><p>Hung 9</p><p></strong>(N.M., University of Laval, Quebec, DEPOCEN, “War and Peace: an Economic Liberalist Assessment,” 2009,http://depocenwp.org/upload/pubs/NguyenManhHung_Canada/War%20and%20Peace%20an%20Economic%20Liberalist_DEPOCENWP.pdf//wyo-mm) </p><p>The possibility of forming alliances affects naturally the matter of war and peace. Consider 3 countries identical in all respects. At the start, there is neither gain from trading nor the incentive to initiate war for any country. If two among them decide to pool their resources and efforts against the third in case of unrest, this alliance amounts to get back to the 2-country framework with one is having now a double size. Moreover, there might also be some scale effect with regard to the Conflict Technology: synergy created by alliance may, for instance, allow a higher efficiency in warfare. The <u><strong>asymmetries occasioned by</u></strong> the possibility of <u><strong>making alliance</u></strong>, therefore, <u><strong>enhances the eventuality of war</u></strong>. When the number of countries increases but is still finite, alliance - or coalition - is multiple. Consider the case of 4 countries and assume again that they are identical. If two countries form an alliance, and if the other 2 countries do the same, we end up with the framework of 2 countries of double size. Perfect symmetry excludes the possibility of war making. So, to <u><strong>get the asymmetries enhancing warfare, we have several scenarios</u></strong>. First, <u><strong>we may have an alliance of 3 countries against one country. After war bursts, either the alliance wins and countries</u></strong> at stake <u><strong>share</u></strong> equally <u><strong>the</u></strong> war <u><strong>prize, or the country in isolation wins, and the game ends</u></strong>. Second, <u><strong>we may also have an alliance of two countries which decides to initiate war with only one country</u></strong>, leaving the other country in peace. The war game, as before, ends up with one winner. This latter is having different endowment than that of the country left in peace. Trading is now feasible for some cooperative gain if the asymmetry of endowment allows for it. Otherwise, <u><strong>when</u></strong> the <u><strong>asymmetry</u></strong> so far created <u><strong>is</u></strong> sufficiently <u><strong>stringent</u></strong> that the condition for war outburst in Section 3 is satisfied, these <u><strong>countries</u></strong> would <u><strong>have no choice but making war</u></strong> .<strong> Of course, the number of all possible alliances and feasible scenarios increases when we introduce more and more countries. The peaceful - or war free - environment envisaged by the classical liberalist will be restored only when each country is atomistic and their number large enough. In this case, the core exists and shrinks into the competitive equilibrium under free trade. </p></strong> </s>

Chinese influence in Cuba down now- Cuban resentment

it could be difficult sledding for China in Cuba. There is still resentment that China did little to help the island nation after the collapse of the Soviet Union the reduction of support from The Kremlin. there is competition among Latin American nations to play China off against Taiwan as each vie for greater influence: Cuba is guilty of this

(Jonathan, The Motley Fool, “ The Castros of Cuba are the Kardashians of the Caribbean,” July 21, 2012, http://beta.fool.com/jonathanyates13/2012/07/21/castros-cuba-are-kardashians-caribbean/7303/?ticker=KO) /wyo-mm Last year, China National Petroleum Corp signed a $4.5 billion agreement with Cuba to upgrade the Cienfuegos refinery. But it could be difficult sledding for China in Cuba. There is still resentment that China did little to help the island nation after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the reduction of support from The Kremlin. In addition, there is competition among Latin American nations to play China off against Taiwan as each vie for greater influence: Cuba is guilty of this, too.

<h4><strong>Chinese influence in Cuba down now- Cuban resentment</h4><p>Yates 12</p><p></strong>(Jonathan, The Motley Fool, “ The Castros of Cuba are the Kardashians of the Caribbean,” July 21, 2012, http://beta.fool.com/jonathanyates13/2012/07/21/castros-cuba-are-kardashians-caribbean/7303/?ticker=KO) /wyo-mm</p><p>Last year, China National Petroleum Corp signed a $4.5 billion agreement with Cuba to upgrade the Cienfuegos refinery. But <u><strong>it could be difficult sledding for China in Cuba. There is still resentment that China did little to help the island nation after the collapse of the Soviet Union</u></strong> in 1991 and <u><strong>the reduction of support from The Kremlin.</u></strong> In addition, <u><strong>there is competition among Latin American nations to play China off against Taiwan as each vie for greater influence: Cuba is guilty of this</u></strong>, too.</p>

Yates 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Yates 12 fulltext: (Jonathan, The Motley Fool, “ The Castros of Cuba are the Kardashians of the Caribbean,” July 21, 2012, http://beta.fool.com/jonathanyates13/2012/07/21/castros-cuba-are-kardashians-caribbean/7303/?ticker=KO) /wyo-mm Last year, China National Petroleum Corp signed a $4.5 billion agreement with Cuba to upgrade the Cienfuegos refinery. But it could be difficult sledding for China in Cuba. There is still resentment that China did little to help the island nation after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the reduction of support from The Kremlin. In addition, there is competition among Latin American nations to play China off against Taiwan as each vie for greater influence: Cuba is guilty of this, too. [/INST] <h4><strong>Chinese influence in Cuba down now- Cuban resentment</h4><p>Yates 12</p><p></strong>(Jonathan, The Motley Fool, “ The Castros of Cuba are the Kardashians of the Caribbean,” July 21, 2012, http://beta.fool.com/jonathanyates13/2012/07/21/castros-cuba-are-kardashians-caribbean/7303/?ticker=KO) /wyo-mm</p><p>Last year, China National Petroleum Corp signed a $4.5 billion agreement with Cuba to upgrade the Cienfuegos refinery. But <u><strong>it could be difficult sledding for China in Cuba. There is still resentment that China did little to help the island nation after the collapse of the Soviet Union</u></strong> in 1991 and <u><strong>the reduction of support from The Kremlin.</u></strong> In addition, <u><strong>there is competition among Latin American nations to play China off against Taiwan as each vie for greater influence: Cuba is guilty of this</u></strong>, too.</p> </s>

Trade incentivizes conflicts-history proves

asymmetric economic interdependence could lead to negative consequences in a country such as exploited concession and threatened national autonomy creating interstate tensions and conflicts Many conflicts in the mercantilist era evolved out of trade disputes

While the ―liberal peace‖ view is convincing, there are numerous counter-arguments. For instance, the dependency theorists (Wallerstein, 1974) and neo-Marxists (Emmanuel, 1972), argue that asymmetric economic interdependence could lead to negative consequences in a country—such as exploited concession and threatened national autonomy—thereby creating interstate tensions and conflicts (Dos Santos, 1970 and Keohane and Nye, 1973). Many conflicts in the mercantilist era evolved out of trade disputes. 1

<h4><strong>Trade incentivizes conflicts-history proves</h4><p>Pyun and Lee 11</p><p></strong>(Ju Hyun and Jong-Wha, UC Davis, Korea University, UC Davis Department of Economics Working Paper Series, “Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace?” September 27, 2011, http://economics.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/11-7.pdf//wyo-mm) </p><p>While the ―liberal peace‖ view is convincing, there are numerous counter-arguments. For instance, the dependency theorists (Wallerstein, 1974) and neo-Marxists (Emmanuel, 1972), argue that <u><strong>asymmetric economic interdependence could lead to negative consequences in a country</u></strong>—<u><strong>such as exploited concession and threatened national autonomy</u></strong>—thereby <u><strong>creating interstate tensions and conflicts</u></strong> (Dos Santos, 1970 and Keohane and Nye, 1973). <u><strong>Many conflicts in the mercantilist era evolved out of trade disputes</u></strong>. 1</p>

Pyun and Lee 11 (Ju Hyun and Jong-Wha, UC Davis, Korea University, UC Davis Department of Economics Working Paper Series, “Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace?” September 27, 2011, http://economics.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/11-7.pdf//wyo-mm)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Pyun and Lee 11 (Ju Hyun and Jong-Wha, UC Davis, Korea University, UC Davis Department of Economics Working Paper Series, “Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace?” September 27, 2011, http://economics.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/11-7.pdf//wyo-mm) fulltext: While the ―liberal peace‖ view is convincing, there are numerous counter-arguments. For instance, the dependency theorists (Wallerstein, 1974) and neo-Marxists (Emmanuel, 1972), argue that asymmetric economic interdependence could lead to negative consequences in a country—such as exploited concession and threatened national autonomy—thereby creating interstate tensions and conflicts (Dos Santos, 1970 and Keohane and Nye, 1973). Many conflicts in the mercantilist era evolved out of trade disputes. 1 [/INST] <h4><strong>Trade incentivizes conflicts-history proves</h4><p>Pyun and Lee 11</p><p></strong>(Ju Hyun and Jong-Wha, UC Davis, Korea University, UC Davis Department of Economics Working Paper Series, “Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace?” September 27, 2011, http://economics.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/11-7.pdf//wyo-mm) </p><p>While the ―liberal peace‖ view is convincing, there are numerous counter-arguments. For instance, the dependency theorists (Wallerstein, 1974) and neo-Marxists (Emmanuel, 1972), argue that <u><strong>asymmetric economic interdependence could lead to negative consequences in a country</u></strong>—<u><strong>such as exploited concession and threatened national autonomy</u></strong>—thereby <u><strong>creating interstate tensions and conflicts</u></strong> (Dos Santos, 1970 and Keohane and Nye, 1973). <u><strong>Many conflicts in the mercantilist era evolved out of trade disputes</u></strong>. 1</p> </s>

Chinese influence low and not respected by Latin American countries

many Latin American leaders are disappointed with the trends in their economic relationships with China although trade between China and Latin America has increased dramatically, it still comprises only about 5% of Latin America’s total trade there is growing concern that China’s cheap manufactures will hurt Latin America China’s investment in Latin America remains well below the hemisphere’s expectations.20 It is also a fraction of an estimated $300 billion by U.S. companies

(Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm However, at the moment, many Latin American leaders are disappointed with the trends in their economic relationships with China. First, although trade between China and Latin America has increased dramatically, it still comprises only about 5% of Latin America’s total trade.18 More importantly, there is growing concern that China’s cheap manufactures will hurt Latin America. This problem had been expected for Mexico and Central America, which compete with China to export manufactured goods to the U.S. market, but has now beset South American countries where, despite high commodity prices, in recent months imports from China have exceeded exports to the Asian country.19 Perhaps most importantly of all, at about $10 billion, China’s investment in Latin America remains well below the hemisphere’s expectations.20 It is also a fraction of an estimated $300 billion by U.S. companies.21

<h4><strong>Chinese influence low and not respected by Latin American countries</h4><p>McClintock 07</p><p></strong>(Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>However, at the moment, <u><strong>many Latin American leaders are disappointed with the trends in their economic relationships with China</u></strong>. First, <u><strong>although trade between China and Latin America has increased dramatically, it still comprises only about 5% of Latin America’s total trade</u></strong>.18 More importantly, <u><strong>there is growing concern that China’s cheap manufactures will hurt Latin America</u></strong>. This problem had been expected for Mexico and Central America, which compete with China to export manufactured goods to the U.S. market, but has now beset South American countries where, despite high commodity prices, in recent months imports from China have exceeded exports to the Asian country.19 Perhaps most importantly of all, at about $10 billion, <u><strong>China’s investment in Latin America remains well below the hemisphere’s expectations.20 It is also a fraction of an estimated $300 billion by U.S. companies</u></strong>.21</p>

McClintock 07

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McClintock 07 fulltext: (Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm However, at the moment, many Latin American leaders are disappointed with the trends in their economic relationships with China. First, although trade between China and Latin America has increased dramatically, it still comprises only about 5% of Latin America’s total trade.18 More importantly, there is growing concern that China’s cheap manufactures will hurt Latin America. This problem had been expected for Mexico and Central America, which compete with China to export manufactured goods to the U.S. market, but has now beset South American countries where, despite high commodity prices, in recent months imports from China have exceeded exports to the Asian country.19 Perhaps most importantly of all, at about $10 billion, China’s investment in Latin America remains well below the hemisphere’s expectations.20 It is also a fraction of an estimated $300 billion by U.S. companies.21 [/INST] <h4><strong>Chinese influence low and not respected by Latin American countries</h4><p>McClintock 07</p><p></strong>(Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>However, at the moment, <u><strong>many Latin American leaders are disappointed with the trends in their economic relationships with China</u></strong>. First, <u><strong>although trade between China and Latin America has increased dramatically, it still comprises only about 5% of Latin America’s total trade</u></strong>.18 More importantly, <u><strong>there is growing concern that China’s cheap manufactures will hurt Latin America</u></strong>. This problem had been expected for Mexico and Central America, which compete with China to export manufactured goods to the U.S. market, but has now beset South American countries where, despite high commodity prices, in recent months imports from China have exceeded exports to the Asian country.19 Perhaps most importantly of all, at about $10 billion, <u><strong>China’s investment in Latin America remains well below the hemisphere’s expectations.20 It is also a fraction of an estimated $300 billion by U.S. companies</u></strong>.21</p> </s>

Trade increases GHG emissions and is killing the climate due to the transport sector’s overuse of fossil-fuels

trade liberalization has consequences on the emission of GHGs, which affect climate change. Trade increase global production and consumption of goods and services, generate increases in countries’ incomes, and fuel economic growth. Higher trade volumes are correlated with increased transport activities and demand for energy According to the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research The transport sector is responsible for a large share of gas and particle emissions that affect the climate. These emissions threaten human health, crops, and the material infrastructure Current means of transportation use fossil fuels whose burning generates around 21.2 billion tons of CO2 per year, a GHG that enhances radiative forcing contributing to climate change transport is one of the major causes of environmental erosion in industrial countries. This is attributed to the depletion of non-renewable energy resources, noise and the development of infrastructure

(Nicolas, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, and Anca Monika Voicu, University of Goettingen, University Jaume I, Rollins College Florida, Climate Change-Socioeconomic Effects, InTech, “Is Free Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? New Empirical Evidence,” http://cdn.intechweb.org/pdfs/19627.pdf//wyo-mm) The literature presented in this section focuses on sectors where trade liberalization has consequences on the emission of GHGs, which, in turn, affect climate change. Trade and trade liberalization increase global production and consumption of goods and services, generate increases in countries’ incomes, and fuel economic growth. Higher trade volumes and increased trade in general are directly correlated with increased transport activities and increased demand for energy. How can these affect climate change? According to the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, Norway, “The transport sector is responsible for a large share of gas and particle emissions that affect the climate. These emissions also threaten human health, crops, and the material infrastructure. Higher standards of living and increased travel are largely to blame.” Current means of transportation use fossil fuels whose burning generates around 21.2 billion tons of CO2 per year, a GHG that enhances radiative forcing, thus contributing to climate change. McConnell (1999) points out that emissions of carbon monoxide (70 percent of which are produced by the transport sector) and carbon dioxide (25 percent of which are also produced by the transport sector) are destabilizing the earth’s climate. Landis Gabel (1994) notes that transport is one of the major causes of environmental erosion in industrial countries. This is attributed to the depletion of non-renewable energy resources, noise and the development of infrastructure.

<h4><strong>Trade increases GHG emissions and is killing the climate due to the transport sector’s overuse of fossil-fuels</h4><p>Korves et al 10</p><p></strong>(Nicolas, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, and Anca Monika Voicu, University of Goettingen, University Jaume I, Rollins College Florida, Climate Change-Socioeconomic Effects, InTech, “Is Free Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? New Empirical Evidence,” http://cdn.intechweb.org/pdfs/19627.pdf//wyo-mm) </p><p>The literature presented in this section focuses on sectors where <u><strong>trade liberalization has consequences on the emission of GHGs, which</u></strong>, in turn, <u><strong>affect climate change. Trade</u></strong> and trade liberalization <u><strong>increase global production and consumption of goods and services, generate increases in countries’ incomes, and fuel economic growth. Higher trade volumes</u></strong> and increased trade in general <u><strong>are </u></strong>directly<u><strong> correlated with increased transport activities and</u></strong> increased <u><strong>demand for energy</u></strong>. How can these affect climate change? <u><strong>According to the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research</u></strong> in Oslo, Norway, “<u><strong>The transport sector is responsible for a large share of gas and particle emissions that affect the climate. These emissions</u></strong> also <u><strong>threaten human health, crops, and the material infrastructure</u></strong>. Higher standards of living and increased travel are largely to blame.” <u><strong>Current means of transportation use fossil fuels whose burning generates around 21.2 billion tons of CO2 per year, a GHG that enhances radiative forcing</u></strong>, thus <u><strong>contributing to climate change</u></strong>. McConnell (1999) points out that emissions of carbon monoxide (70 percent of which are produced by the transport sector) and carbon dioxide (25 percent of which are also produced by the transport sector) are destabilizing the earth’s climate. Landis Gabel (1994) notes that <u><strong>transport is one of the major causes of environmental erosion in industrial countries. This is attributed to the depletion of non-renewable energy resources, noise and the development of infrastructure</u>.</p></strong>

Korves et al 10

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Korves et al 10 fulltext: (Nicolas, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, and Anca Monika Voicu, University of Goettingen, University Jaume I, Rollins College Florida, Climate Change-Socioeconomic Effects, InTech, “Is Free Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? New Empirical Evidence,” http://cdn.intechweb.org/pdfs/19627.pdf//wyo-mm) The literature presented in this section focuses on sectors where trade liberalization has consequences on the emission of GHGs, which, in turn, affect climate change. Trade and trade liberalization increase global production and consumption of goods and services, generate increases in countries’ incomes, and fuel economic growth. Higher trade volumes and increased trade in general are directly correlated with increased transport activities and increased demand for energy. How can these affect climate change? According to the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, Norway, “The transport sector is responsible for a large share of gas and particle emissions that affect the climate. These emissions also threaten human health, crops, and the material infrastructure. Higher standards of living and increased travel are largely to blame.” Current means of transportation use fossil fuels whose burning generates around 21.2 billion tons of CO2 per year, a GHG that enhances radiative forcing, thus contributing to climate change. McConnell (1999) points out that emissions of carbon monoxide (70 percent of which are produced by the transport sector) and carbon dioxide (25 percent of which are also produced by the transport sector) are destabilizing the earth’s climate. Landis Gabel (1994) notes that transport is one of the major causes of environmental erosion in industrial countries. This is attributed to the depletion of non-renewable energy resources, noise and the development of infrastructure. [/INST] <h4><strong>Trade increases GHG emissions and is killing the climate due to the transport sector’s overuse of fossil-fuels</h4><p>Korves et al 10</p><p></strong>(Nicolas, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, and Anca Monika Voicu, University of Goettingen, University Jaume I, Rollins College Florida, Climate Change-Socioeconomic Effects, InTech, “Is Free Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? New Empirical Evidence,” http://cdn.intechweb.org/pdfs/19627.pdf//wyo-mm) </p><p>The literature presented in this section focuses on sectors where <u><strong>trade liberalization has consequences on the emission of GHGs, which</u></strong>, in turn, <u><strong>affect climate change. Trade</u></strong> and trade liberalization <u><strong>increase global production and consumption of goods and services, generate increases in countries’ incomes, and fuel economic growth. Higher trade volumes</u></strong> and increased trade in general <u><strong>are </u></strong>directly<u><strong> correlated with increased transport activities and</u></strong> increased <u><strong>demand for energy</u></strong>. How can these affect climate change? <u><strong>According to the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research</u></strong> in Oslo, Norway, “<u><strong>The transport sector is responsible for a large share of gas and particle emissions that affect the climate. These emissions</u></strong> also <u><strong>threaten human health, crops, and the material infrastructure</u></strong>. Higher standards of living and increased travel are largely to blame.” <u><strong>Current means of transportation use fossil fuels whose burning generates around 21.2 billion tons of CO2 per year, a GHG that enhances radiative forcing</u></strong>, thus <u><strong>contributing to climate change</u></strong>. McConnell (1999) points out that emissions of carbon monoxide (70 percent of which are produced by the transport sector) and carbon dioxide (25 percent of which are also produced by the transport sector) are destabilizing the earth’s climate. Landis Gabel (1994) notes that <u><strong>transport is one of the major causes of environmental erosion in industrial countries. This is attributed to the depletion of non-renewable energy resources, noise and the development of infrastructure</u>.</p></strong> </s>

Chinese influence inevitable- US accepts it and will work to prevent hostilities

US policymakers realized it is impossible to stop China's growing influence in Latin America. Therefore, it chooses to shape Chinese policy in the region. In 2006, China and the US held their first ever dialogue over Latin America affairs and this year they held their fifth This could ensure China and the US jointly play constructive roles in the region and avoid misunderstanding and confrontation

US policymakers have already realized that it is impossible to stop China's growing influence in Latin America. Therefore, it chooses to instead shape Chinese policy in the region. In 2006, China and the US held their first ever dialogue over Latin America affairs and this year they held their fifth one. This kind of dialogue mechanism could help ensure China and the US jointly play constructive roles in the region and avoid misunderstanding and confrontation.

<h4><strong>Chinese influence inevitable- US accepts it and will work to prevent hostilities</h4><p>People’s Daily 12</p><p></strong>(People’s Daily Online, article based on speech on "China-Latin America-US relations" at Tsinghua University by Gonzalo Sebastian Paz, a professor at Elliot School of International Affairs of George Washington University, “China wary of stepping into US backyard,” July 4, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7864764.html) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>US policymakers</u></strong> have already <u><strong>realized</u></strong> that <u><strong>it is impossible to stop China's growing influence in Latin America. Therefore, it chooses to</u></strong> instead <u><strong>shape Chinese policy in the region. In 2006, China and the US held their first ever dialogue over Latin America affairs and this year they held their fifth</u></strong> one. <u><strong>This</u></strong> kind of dialogue mechanism <u><strong>could</u></strong> help <u><strong>ensure China and the US jointly play constructive roles in the region and avoid misunderstanding and confrontation</u></strong>.</p>

People’s Daily 12 (People’s Daily Online, article based on speech on "China-Latin America-US relations" at Tsinghua University by Gonzalo Sebastian Paz, a professor at Elliot School of International Affairs of George Washington University, “China wary of stepping into US backyard,” July 4, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7864764.html) /wyo-mm

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: People’s Daily 12 (People’s Daily Online, article based on speech on "China-Latin America-US relations" at Tsinghua University by Gonzalo Sebastian Paz, a professor at Elliot School of International Affairs of George Washington University, “China wary of stepping into US backyard,” July 4, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7864764.html) /wyo-mm fulltext: US policymakers have already realized that it is impossible to stop China's growing influence in Latin America. Therefore, it chooses to instead shape Chinese policy in the region. In 2006, China and the US held their first ever dialogue over Latin America affairs and this year they held their fifth one. This kind of dialogue mechanism could help ensure China and the US jointly play constructive roles in the region and avoid misunderstanding and confrontation. [/INST] <h4><strong>Chinese influence inevitable- US accepts it and will work to prevent hostilities</h4><p>People’s Daily 12</p><p></strong>(People’s Daily Online, article based on speech on "China-Latin America-US relations" at Tsinghua University by Gonzalo Sebastian Paz, a professor at Elliot School of International Affairs of George Washington University, “China wary of stepping into US backyard,” July 4, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7864764.html) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>US policymakers</u></strong> have already <u><strong>realized</u></strong> that <u><strong>it is impossible to stop China's growing influence in Latin America. Therefore, it chooses to</u></strong> instead <u><strong>shape Chinese policy in the region. In 2006, China and the US held their first ever dialogue over Latin America affairs and this year they held their fifth</u></strong> one. <u><strong>This</u></strong> kind of dialogue mechanism <u><strong>could</u></strong> help <u><strong>ensure China and the US jointly play constructive roles in the region and avoid misunderstanding and confrontation</u></strong>.</p> </s>

the environment is at the tipping point- Collapse will be fast and catastrophic

The paper by 22 top researchers said a “tipping point” by which the biosphere goes into swift and irreversible change, with cataclysmic impacts for humans, could occur as early as this century. The study appears ahead of the June 20-22 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, The factors in today’s equation include a world population that is set to rise from seven billion to around 9.3 billion by mid-century and global warming that will outstrip the UN target of two degrees Celsius The team determined that once 50-90 percent of small-scale ecosystems become altered, the entire eco-web tips over into a new state, characterised especially by species extinction Once the shift happens, it cannot be reversed.

22 top researchers said a “tipping point” by which the biosphere goes into swift and irreversible change, with cataclysmic impacts for humans could occur this century. The factors in today’s equation include a world population that is set to rise and global warming that will outstrip the UN target of two degrees Celsius once 50-90 percent of small-scale ecosystems become altered, the entire eco-web tips over especially by species extinctions Once the shift happens, it cannot be reversed

(Agence France-Presse, citing UN study, “Environmental collapse now a serious threat: scientists,” Raw Story, http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/06/06/environmental-collapse-now-a-serious-threat-scientists/) The paper by 22 top researchers said a “tipping point” by which the biosphere goes into swift and irreversible change, with potentially cataclysmic impacts for humans, could occur as early as this century.¶ The warning contrasts with a mainstream view among scientists that environmental collapse would be gradual and take centuries.¶ The study appears ahead of the June 20-22 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, the 20-year followup to the Earth Summit that set down priorities for protecting the environment.¶ The Nature paper, written by biologists, ecologists, geologists and palaeontologists from three continents, compared the biological impact of past episodes of global change with what is happening today.¶ The factors in today’s equation include a world population that is set to rise from seven billion to around 9.3 billion by mid-century and global warming that will outstrip the UN target of two degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit).¶ The team determined that once 50-90 percent of small-scale ecosystems become altered, the entire eco-web tips over into a new state, characterised especially by species extinctions.¶ Once the shift happens, it cannot be reversed.¶ To support today’s population, about 43 percent of Earth’s ice-free land surface is being used for farming or habitation, according to the study.

<h4><strong>the environment is at the tipping point- Collapse will be fast and catastrophic</h4><p>AFP, 12</p><p></strong>(Agence France-Presse, citing UN study, “Environmental collapse now a serious threat: scientists,” Raw Story, http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/06/06/environmental-collapse-now-a-serious-threat-scientists/)</p><p><u><strong>The paper by <mark>22 top researchers said a “tipping point” by which the biosphere goes into swift and irreversible change,</u></strong> <u><strong>with</u></strong> </mark>potentially <u><strong><mark>cataclysmic impacts for humans</mark>, <mark>could occur </mark>as early as <mark>this century.</u></strong></mark>¶ The warning contrasts with a mainstream view among scientists that environmental collapse would be gradual and take centuries.¶ <u><strong>The study appears ahead of the June 20-22 UN Conference on Sustainable Development,</u></strong> the 20-year followup to the Earth Summit that set down priorities for protecting the environment.¶ The Nature paper, written by biologists, ecologists, geologists and palaeontologists from three continents, compared the biological impact of past episodes of global change with what is happening today.¶ <u><strong><mark>The factors in today’s equation include a world population that is set to rise </mark>from seven billion to around 9.3 billion by mid-century <mark>and global warming that will outstrip the UN target of two degrees Celsius</u></strong> </mark>(3.6 degrees Fahrenheit).¶ <u><strong>The team determined that <mark>once 50-90 percent of small-scale ecosystems become altered, the entire eco-web tips over </mark>into a new state, characterised <mark>especially by species extinction</u></strong>s</mark>.¶ <u><strong><mark>Once the shift happens, it cannot be reversed</mark>.</u>¶ To support today’s population, about 43 percent of Earth’s ice-free land surface is being used for farming or habitation, according to the study.</p></strong>

AFP, 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: AFP, 12 fulltext: (Agence France-Presse, citing UN study, “Environmental collapse now a serious threat: scientists,” Raw Story, http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/06/06/environmental-collapse-now-a-serious-threat-scientists/) The paper by 22 top researchers said a “tipping point” by which the biosphere goes into swift and irreversible change, with potentially cataclysmic impacts for humans, could occur as early as this century.¶ The warning contrasts with a mainstream view among scientists that environmental collapse would be gradual and take centuries.¶ The study appears ahead of the June 20-22 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, the 20-year followup to the Earth Summit that set down priorities for protecting the environment.¶ The Nature paper, written by biologists, ecologists, geologists and palaeontologists from three continents, compared the biological impact of past episodes of global change with what is happening today.¶ The factors in today’s equation include a world population that is set to rise from seven billion to around 9.3 billion by mid-century and global warming that will outstrip the UN target of two degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit).¶ The team determined that once 50-90 percent of small-scale ecosystems become altered, the entire eco-web tips over into a new state, characterised especially by species extinctions.¶ Once the shift happens, it cannot be reversed.¶ To support today’s population, about 43 percent of Earth’s ice-free land surface is being used for farming or habitation, according to the study. [/INST] <h4><strong>the environment is at the tipping point- Collapse will be fast and catastrophic</h4><p>AFP, 12</p><p></strong>(Agence France-Presse, citing UN study, “Environmental collapse now a serious threat: scientists,” Raw Story, http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/06/06/environmental-collapse-now-a-serious-threat-scientists/)</p><p><u><strong>The paper by <mark>22 top researchers said a “tipping point” by which the biosphere goes into swift and irreversible change,</u></strong> <u><strong>with</u></strong> </mark>potentially <u><strong><mark>cataclysmic impacts for humans</mark>, <mark>could occur </mark>as early as <mark>this century.</u></strong></mark>¶ The warning contrasts with a mainstream view among scientists that environmental collapse would be gradual and take centuries.¶ <u><strong>The study appears ahead of the June 20-22 UN Conference on Sustainable Development,</u></strong> the 20-year followup to the Earth Summit that set down priorities for protecting the environment.¶ The Nature paper, written by biologists, ecologists, geologists and palaeontologists from three continents, compared the biological impact of past episodes of global change with what is happening today.¶ <u><strong><mark>The factors in today’s equation include a world population that is set to rise </mark>from seven billion to around 9.3 billion by mid-century <mark>and global warming that will outstrip the UN target of two degrees Celsius</u></strong> </mark>(3.6 degrees Fahrenheit).¶ <u><strong>The team determined that <mark>once 50-90 percent of small-scale ecosystems become altered, the entire eco-web tips over </mark>into a new state, characterised <mark>especially by species extinction</u></strong>s</mark>.¶ <u><strong><mark>Once the shift happens, it cannot be reversed</mark>.</u>¶ To support today’s population, about 43 percent of Earth’s ice-free land surface is being used for farming or habitation, according to the study.</p></strong> </s>

Uniqueness overwhelms the link- new relations between US-China defying zero-sum logic

the China-US relationship is currently at a new crossroads with the recent completion of government reshuffles in both countries. China's newly-elected President and Obama both adopted the idea of seeking a new type of relationship that defies the traditional zero-sum theory, which holds that an emerging power is destined to confrontation with the existing one rapid growth of the China-US relationship in the past decades has well demonstrated that such a goal is not only feasible but attainable Despite differences China and the U S share a broad range of interests in promoting world economic growth, maintaining regional and global peace, fighting global warming, combating terrorism -- just to name a few

With China completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition and the Obama administration officially kicking off its second term, the China-US relationship is currently at a new crossroads with the recent completion of government reshuffles in both countries. China's newly-elected President Xi Jinping and his US counterpart Barack Obama have both adopted the idea of seeking a new type of relationship that defies the traditional zero-sum theory, which holds that an emerging power is destined to confrontation with the existing one. The rapid growth of the China-US relationship in the past decades has well demonstrated that such a goal is not only feasible but attainable, if the two nations continue to respect each other's core interests and major concerns and to properly patch up their differences. Despite the differences on issues concerning trade, human rights, Taiwan, Tibet, cybersecurity and territorial disputes in Asia, China and the United States share a broad range of interests in promoting world economic growth, maintaining regional and global peace, fighting global warming, combating terrorism -- just to name a few.

<h4><strong>Uniqueness overwhelms the link- new relations between US-China defying zero-sum logic</h4><p>China Daily 13</p><p></strong>(The China Daily, “Better China-US ties need difference management,” April 14, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-04/12/content_16396453.htm) /wyo-mm</p><p>With China completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition and the Obama administration officially kicking off its second term, <u><strong>the China-US relationship is currently at a new crossroads with the recent completion of government reshuffles in both countries. China's newly-elected President</u></strong> Xi Jinping <u><strong>and </u></strong>his US counterpart Barack <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> have <u><strong>both adopted the idea of seeking a new type of relationship that defies the traditional zero-sum theory, which holds that an emerging power is destined to confrontation with the existing one</u></strong>. The <u><strong>rapid growth of the China-US relationship in the past decades has well demonstrated that such a goal is not only feasible but attainable</u></strong>, if the two nations continue to respect each other's core interests and major concerns and to properly patch up their differences. <u><strong>Despite</u></strong> the <u><strong>differences</u></strong> on issues concerning trade, human rights, Taiwan, Tibet, cybersecurity and territorial disputes in Asia, <u><strong>China and the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>share a broad range of interests in promoting world economic growth, maintaining regional and global peace, fighting global warming, combating terrorism -- just to name a few</u></strong>.</p>

China Daily 13 (The China Daily, “Better China-US ties need difference management,” April 14, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-04/12/content_16396453.htm) /wyo-mm

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: China Daily 13 (The China Daily, “Better China-US ties need difference management,” April 14, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-04/12/content_16396453.htm) /wyo-mm fulltext: With China completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition and the Obama administration officially kicking off its second term, the China-US relationship is currently at a new crossroads with the recent completion of government reshuffles in both countries. China's newly-elected President Xi Jinping and his US counterpart Barack Obama have both adopted the idea of seeking a new type of relationship that defies the traditional zero-sum theory, which holds that an emerging power is destined to confrontation with the existing one. The rapid growth of the China-US relationship in the past decades has well demonstrated that such a goal is not only feasible but attainable, if the two nations continue to respect each other's core interests and major concerns and to properly patch up their differences. Despite the differences on issues concerning trade, human rights, Taiwan, Tibet, cybersecurity and territorial disputes in Asia, China and the United States share a broad range of interests in promoting world economic growth, maintaining regional and global peace, fighting global warming, combating terrorism -- just to name a few. [/INST] <h4><strong>Uniqueness overwhelms the link- new relations between US-China defying zero-sum logic</h4><p>China Daily 13</p><p></strong>(The China Daily, “Better China-US ties need difference management,” April 14, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-04/12/content_16396453.htm) /wyo-mm</p><p>With China completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition and the Obama administration officially kicking off its second term, <u><strong>the China-US relationship is currently at a new crossroads with the recent completion of government reshuffles in both countries. China's newly-elected President</u></strong> Xi Jinping <u><strong>and </u></strong>his US counterpart Barack <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> have <u><strong>both adopted the idea of seeking a new type of relationship that defies the traditional zero-sum theory, which holds that an emerging power is destined to confrontation with the existing one</u></strong>. The <u><strong>rapid growth of the China-US relationship in the past decades has well demonstrated that such a goal is not only feasible but attainable</u></strong>, if the two nations continue to respect each other's core interests and major concerns and to properly patch up their differences. <u><strong>Despite</u></strong> the <u><strong>differences</u></strong> on issues concerning trade, human rights, Taiwan, Tibet, cybersecurity and territorial disputes in Asia, <u><strong>China and the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>share a broad range of interests in promoting world economic growth, maintaining regional and global peace, fighting global warming, combating terrorism -- just to name a few</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Climate change results in multiple scenarios for extinction – it’s try or die

As early as 1988 scientists cautioned that human tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war." hundreds of scientific studies have documented ever-mounting evidence that human activities are altering the climate climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism. Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security Droughts, famines, and weather-related disasters could claim thousands or even millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions within and among nations, fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems elevate rising sea levels threaten destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears glaciers are shrinking threatening water supplies for millions sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces if average global temperatures increase more than two degrees Celsius which will occur if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change threats to security will be amplified as climate change has increasing impacts on regional water supplies agricultural productivity, human and ecosystem health, infrastructure, financial flows and economies, and patterns of international migration. Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor. This, could lead to military confrontations over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime Rising temperatures, increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply Even modest warming has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability The parallels with terrorism are compelling By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th it could be too late to respond.

As early as 1988, scientists cautioned that tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to uncontrolled consequences second only to a global nuclear war scientific studies have documented that human activities are altering the climate Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security Droughts, famines, and weather-related disaster claim millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions among nations fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems elevate rising sea levels threaten destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears glaciers are shrinking threatening water supplies for millions sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters if temperatures increase which will occur if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return threats to security will be amplified climate change has increasing impacts on water supplies, agricultural productivity infrastructure, financial flows and economies This, could lead to military confrontations Even modest warming has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. The parallels with terrorism are compelling By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th it could be too late to respond.

Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 (Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF As early as 1988, scientists cautioned that human tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to "an unintended, uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war." Since then, hundreds of scientific studies have documented ever-mounting evidence that human activities are altering the climate around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that climate change is, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism." Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security. Droughts, famines, and weather-related disasters could claim thousands or even millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions within and among nations, fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes. In the worst case, further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems and elevate already-rising sea levels, which could threaten the very survival of low-lying island nations, destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears. Mountain glaciers are shrinking at ever-faster rates, threatening water supplies for millions of people and plant and animal species. Average global sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters (8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces." It warns that if average global temperatures increase more than two degrees Celsius—which will likely occur in a matter of decades if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return," where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change. Existing threats to security will be amplified as climate change has increasing impacts on regional water supplies, agricultural productivity, human and ecosystem health, infrastructure, financial flows and economies, and patterns of international migration. Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor. This, in turn, could lead to military confrontations over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime. ► Rising temperatures, droughts, and floods, and the increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. Even the modest warming experienced to date has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. The parallels with terrorism are compelling. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, it could be too late to respond.

<h4><strong>Climate change results in multiple scenarios for extinction – it’s try or die </h4><p>Sawin, 12</p><p></strong>Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 </p><p>(Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF</p><p><u><strong><mark>As early as 1988</u></strong>, <u><strong>scientists cautioned that </mark>human <mark>tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to </u></strong></mark>"an unintended, <u><strong><mark>uncontrolled </mark>globally pervasive experiment whose </u></strong>ultimate <u><strong><mark>consequences</mark> could be <mark>second only to a global nuclear war</mark>."</u></strong> Since then, <u><strong>hundreds of <mark>scientific studies have documented </mark>ever-mounting evidence <mark>that human activities are altering the climate</u></strong> </mark>around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that <u><strong>climate change is</u></strong>, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "<u><strong>the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism.</u></strong>" <u><strong><mark>Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Droughts, famines, and weather-related disaster</mark>s could <mark>claim</mark> thousands or even <mark>millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions </mark>within and <mark>among nations</mark>, <mark>fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes</u></strong></mark>. In the worst case, <u><strong><mark>further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems </u></strong></mark>and <u><strong><mark>elevate</u></strong></mark> already-<u><strong><mark>rising sea levels</u></strong></mark>, which could <u><strong><mark>threaten</u></strong></mark> the very survival of low-lying island nations, <u><strong><mark>destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict</u></strong></mark>. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And <u><strong><mark>these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears</u></strong></mark>. Mountain <u><strong><mark>glaciers are shrinking</u></strong> </mark>at ever-faster rates, <u><strong><mark>threatening water supplies for millions</u></strong> </mark>of people and plant and animal species. Average global <u><strong><mark>sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters</u></strong> </mark>(8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. <u><strong>A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce</u></strong>, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, <u><strong>concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces</u></strong>." It warns that <u><strong><mark>if </mark>average global <mark>temperatures increase </mark>more than two degrees Celsius</u></strong>—<u><strong><mark>which will</u></strong> </mark>likely <u><strong><mark>occur</u></strong> </mark>in a matter of decades <u><strong><mark>if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change</u></strong>. Existing <u><strong><mark>threats to security will be amplified</mark> as <mark>climate change has increasing impacts on</mark> regional <mark>water supplies</u></strong>, <u><strong>agricultural productivity</mark>, human and ecosystem health, <mark>infrastructure, financial flows and economies</mark>, and patterns of international migration.</u></strong> Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. <u><strong>Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This,</u></strong> </mark>in turn, <u><strong><mark>could lead to military confrontations </mark>over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime</u></strong>. ► <u><strong>Rising temperatures,</u></strong> droughts, and floods, and the <u><strong>increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply</u></strong>, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. <u><strong><mark>Even</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>modest warming</u></strong> </mark>experienced to date <u><strong><mark>has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity</u></strong></mark>, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► <u><strong><mark>Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources.</u></strong></mark> It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► <u><strong>Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability</u></strong>. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. <u><strong><mark>The parallels with terrorism are compelling</u></strong></mark>. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. <u><strong><mark>By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th</u></strong></mark>, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, <u><strong><mark>it could be too late to respond.</u></strong></mark> </p>

Sawin, 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Sawin, 12 fulltext: Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 (Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF As early as 1988, scientists cautioned that human tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to "an unintended, uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war." Since then, hundreds of scientific studies have documented ever-mounting evidence that human activities are altering the climate around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that climate change is, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism." Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security. Droughts, famines, and weather-related disasters could claim thousands or even millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions within and among nations, fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes. In the worst case, further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems and elevate already-rising sea levels, which could threaten the very survival of low-lying island nations, destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears. Mountain glaciers are shrinking at ever-faster rates, threatening water supplies for millions of people and plant and animal species. Average global sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters (8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces." It warns that if average global temperatures increase more than two degrees Celsius—which will likely occur in a matter of decades if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return," where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change. Existing threats to security will be amplified as climate change has increasing impacts on regional water supplies, agricultural productivity, human and ecosystem health, infrastructure, financial flows and economies, and patterns of international migration. Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor. This, in turn, could lead to military confrontations over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime. ► Rising temperatures, droughts, and floods, and the increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. Even the modest warming experienced to date has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. The parallels with terrorism are compelling. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, it could be too late to respond. [/INST] <h4><strong>Climate change results in multiple scenarios for extinction – it’s try or die </h4><p>Sawin, 12</p><p></strong>Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 </p><p>(Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF</p><p><u><strong><mark>As early as 1988</u></strong>, <u><strong>scientists cautioned that </mark>human <mark>tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to </u></strong></mark>"an unintended, <u><strong><mark>uncontrolled </mark>globally pervasive experiment whose </u></strong>ultimate <u><strong><mark>consequences</mark> could be <mark>second only to a global nuclear war</mark>."</u></strong> Since then, <u><strong>hundreds of <mark>scientific studies have documented </mark>ever-mounting evidence <mark>that human activities are altering the climate</u></strong> </mark>around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that <u><strong>climate change is</u></strong>, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "<u><strong>the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism.</u></strong>" <u><strong><mark>Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Droughts, famines, and weather-related disaster</mark>s could <mark>claim</mark> thousands or even <mark>millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions </mark>within and <mark>among nations</mark>, <mark>fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes</u></strong></mark>. In the worst case, <u><strong><mark>further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems </u></strong></mark>and <u><strong><mark>elevate</u></strong></mark> already-<u><strong><mark>rising sea levels</u></strong></mark>, which could <u><strong><mark>threaten</u></strong></mark> the very survival of low-lying island nations, <u><strong><mark>destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict</u></strong></mark>. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And <u><strong><mark>these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears</u></strong></mark>. Mountain <u><strong><mark>glaciers are shrinking</u></strong> </mark>at ever-faster rates, <u><strong><mark>threatening water supplies for millions</u></strong> </mark>of people and plant and animal species. Average global <u><strong><mark>sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters</u></strong> </mark>(8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. <u><strong>A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce</u></strong>, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, <u><strong>concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces</u></strong>." It warns that <u><strong><mark>if </mark>average global <mark>temperatures increase </mark>more than two degrees Celsius</u></strong>—<u><strong><mark>which will</u></strong> </mark>likely <u><strong><mark>occur</u></strong> </mark>in a matter of decades <u><strong><mark>if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change</u></strong>. Existing <u><strong><mark>threats to security will be amplified</mark> as <mark>climate change has increasing impacts on</mark> regional <mark>water supplies</u></strong>, <u><strong>agricultural productivity</mark>, human and ecosystem health, <mark>infrastructure, financial flows and economies</mark>, and patterns of international migration.</u></strong> Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. <u><strong>Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This,</u></strong> </mark>in turn, <u><strong><mark>could lead to military confrontations </mark>over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime</u></strong>. ► <u><strong>Rising temperatures,</u></strong> droughts, and floods, and the <u><strong>increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply</u></strong>, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. <u><strong><mark>Even</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>modest warming</u></strong> </mark>experienced to date <u><strong><mark>has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity</u></strong></mark>, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► <u><strong><mark>Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources.</u></strong></mark> It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► <u><strong>Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability</u></strong>. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. <u><strong><mark>The parallels with terrorism are compelling</u></strong></mark>. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. <u><strong><mark>By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th</u></strong></mark>, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, <u><strong><mark>it could be too late to respond.</u></strong></mark> </p> </s>

No link- relations not zero-sum

With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is room for each side to grow; which implies that trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the U S but that is not bad The U.S more diversified than China and does not need to enter into direct competition

(Michael, China Research Center, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin-America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region,” April 15, 2011, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/) /wyo-mm With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences – primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem.

<h4><strong>No link- relations not zero-sum</h4><p>Cerna 11</p><p></strong>(Michael, China Research Center, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin-America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region,” April 15, 2011, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is</u></strong> seemingly <u><strong>room for each side to grow; which implies that</u></strong>, in fact, <u><strong>trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong>but that is not</u></strong> necessarily a <u><strong>bad</u></strong> thing. <u><strong>The U.S</u></strong>. is much <u><strong>more diversified than China</u></strong> at the moment <u><strong>and</u></strong> therefore <u><strong>does not need to enter into direct competition</u></strong>. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences – primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem.</p>

Cerna 11

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Cerna 11 fulltext: (Michael, China Research Center, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin-America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region,” April 15, 2011, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/) /wyo-mm With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences – primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem. [/INST] <h4><strong>No link- relations not zero-sum</h4><p>Cerna 11</p><p></strong>(Michael, China Research Center, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin-America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region,” April 15, 2011, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is</u></strong> seemingly <u><strong>room for each side to grow; which implies that</u></strong>, in fact, <u><strong>trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong>but that is not</u></strong> necessarily a <u><strong>bad</u></strong> thing. <u><strong>The U.S</u></strong>. is much <u><strong>more diversified than China</u></strong> at the moment <u><strong>and</u></strong> therefore <u><strong>does not need to enter into direct competition</u></strong>. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences – primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem.</p> </s>

Relations over Latin-America not zero-sum

In contrast to security realists economics is not a zero-sum game In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources ( demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices

(Richard, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacifi c Studies University of California, San Diego, Review Essays, “China, Latin America, and the United States: Congruent Interests or Tectonic Turbulence?,” 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf) /wyo-mm In China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributors—World Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international trade—come down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually benefi cial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast to the security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, economics is not a zero-sum game! In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices).

<h4><strong>Relations over Latin-America not zero-sum</h4><p>Feinberg 11</p><p></strong>(Richard, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacifi c Studies University of California, San Diego, Review Essays, “China, Latin America, and the United States: Congruent Interests or Tectonic Turbulence?,” 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>In China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributors—World Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international trade—come down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually benefi cial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. <u><strong>In contrast to</u></strong> the <u><strong>security</u></strong> games <u><strong>realists</u></strong> imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, <u><strong>economics is not a zero-sum game</u></strong>!<u><strong> In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials</u></strong> (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) <u><strong>and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (</u></strong>commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., <u><strong>demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices</u></strong>).</p>

Feinberg 11

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Feinberg 11 fulltext: (Richard, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacifi c Studies University of California, San Diego, Review Essays, “China, Latin America, and the United States: Congruent Interests or Tectonic Turbulence?,” 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf) /wyo-mm In China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributors—World Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international trade—come down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually benefi cial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast to the security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, economics is not a zero-sum game! In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices). [/INST] <h4><strong>Relations over Latin-America not zero-sum</h4><p>Feinberg 11</p><p></strong>(Richard, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacifi c Studies University of California, San Diego, Review Essays, “China, Latin America, and the United States: Congruent Interests or Tectonic Turbulence?,” 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>In China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributors—World Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international trade—come down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually benefi cial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. <u><strong>In contrast to</u></strong> the <u><strong>security</u></strong> games <u><strong>realists</u></strong> imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, <u><strong>economics is not a zero-sum game</u></strong>!<u><strong> In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials</u></strong> (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) <u><strong>and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (</u></strong>commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., <u><strong>demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices</u></strong>).</p> </s>

Trade policies negatively impact access to water supplies causes water scarcity and long-term ecological damage- high-yield crop technology, chemicals, and intensive pesticides.

-mm) trade policies negatively impact not only local water supplies, but access to clean water by local populations A good example is the Green Revolution of the 50s which increased food production in India and elsewhere using mechanized high-yield crop technology, intensive pesticides and chemical fertilizers, and expanded irrigation infrastructure it became clear the negative impact of the Green Revolution on local aquifers and rivers more than outweighed the benefits of increased crop production not only did local watersheds suffer, so too did the local people dependent upon them. Ecological stress and an inequitable impact on the poor were the dual legacy of bad policy.

(Maude, head of the Council of Canadians and co-founder of the Blue Planet Project, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, “The Growing Movement to Protect the Global Water Commons,” Fall 2010, accessed via ProQuest//wyo-mm) Faced with this bleak portrait of global water resources, many affected communities, water justice groups, and some legislators are now working hard to address the growing ecological water crisis in order to improve human access to water. They realize that fighting for equitable water access in a world running out of it means taking better care of the water we have, not just trying to find new sources. At the same time, some environmentalists and scientists are newly open to the critique that poor economic, food, and trade policies negatively impact not only local water supplies, but also access to clean water by local populations. A good example is the Green Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, which increased food production in India and elsewhere using mechanized high-yield crop technology, intensive pesticides and chemical fertilizers, and expanded irrigation infrastructure. Over time, however, it became clear that the negative impact of the Green Revolution on local aquifers and rivers more than outweighed the benefits of increased crop production. Ironically, not only did local watersheds suffer, so too did the local people dependent upon them. Ecological stress and an inequitable impact on the poor were the dual legacy of bad policy.

<h4><strong>Trade policies negatively impact access to water supplies causes water scarcity and long-term ecological damage- high-yield crop technology, chemicals, and intensive pesticides.</h4><p>Barlow 10</p><p></strong>(Maude, head of the Council of Canadians and co-founder of the Blue Planet Project, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, “The Growing Movement to Protect the Global Water Commons,” Fall 2010, accessed via ProQuest//wyo<u><strong>-mm) </p><p></u></strong>Faced with this bleak portrait of global water resources, many affected communities, water justice groups, and some legislators are now working hard to address the growing ecological water crisis in order to improve human access to water. They realize that fighting for equitable water access in a world running out of it means taking better care of the water we have, not just trying to find new sources. At the same time, some environmentalists and scientists are newly open to the critique that poor economic, food, and <u><strong>trade policies negatively impact not only local water supplies, but</u></strong> also <u><strong>access to clean water by local populations</u></strong>. <u><strong>A good example is the Green Revolution of the</u></strong> 19<u><strong>50s</u></strong> and 1960s, <u><strong>which increased food production in India and elsewhere using mechanized high-yield crop technology, intensive pesticides and chemical fertilizers, and expanded irrigation infrastructure</u></strong>. Over time, however, <u><strong>it became clear</u></strong> that <u><strong>the negative impact of the Green Revolution on local aquifers and rivers more than outweighed the benefits of increased crop production</u></strong>. Ironically, <u><strong>not only did local watersheds suffer, so too did the local people dependent upon them. Ecological stress and an inequitable impact on the poor were the dual legacy of bad policy.</p></u></strong>

Barlow 10

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Barlow 10 fulltext: (Maude, head of the Council of Canadians and co-founder of the Blue Planet Project, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, “The Growing Movement to Protect the Global Water Commons,” Fall 2010, accessed via ProQuest//wyo-mm) Faced with this bleak portrait of global water resources, many affected communities, water justice groups, and some legislators are now working hard to address the growing ecological water crisis in order to improve human access to water. They realize that fighting for equitable water access in a world running out of it means taking better care of the water we have, not just trying to find new sources. At the same time, some environmentalists and scientists are newly open to the critique that poor economic, food, and trade policies negatively impact not only local water supplies, but also access to clean water by local populations. A good example is the Green Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, which increased food production in India and elsewhere using mechanized high-yield crop technology, intensive pesticides and chemical fertilizers, and expanded irrigation infrastructure. Over time, however, it became clear that the negative impact of the Green Revolution on local aquifers and rivers more than outweighed the benefits of increased crop production. Ironically, not only did local watersheds suffer, so too did the local people dependent upon them. Ecological stress and an inequitable impact on the poor were the dual legacy of bad policy. [/INST] <h4><strong>Trade policies negatively impact access to water supplies causes water scarcity and long-term ecological damage- high-yield crop technology, chemicals, and intensive pesticides.</h4><p>Barlow 10</p><p></strong>(Maude, head of the Council of Canadians and co-founder of the Blue Planet Project, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, “The Growing Movement to Protect the Global Water Commons,” Fall 2010, accessed via ProQuest//wyo<u><strong>-mm) </p><p></u></strong>Faced with this bleak portrait of global water resources, many affected communities, water justice groups, and some legislators are now working hard to address the growing ecological water crisis in order to improve human access to water. They realize that fighting for equitable water access in a world running out of it means taking better care of the water we have, not just trying to find new sources. At the same time, some environmentalists and scientists are newly open to the critique that poor economic, food, and <u><strong>trade policies negatively impact not only local water supplies, but</u></strong> also <u><strong>access to clean water by local populations</u></strong>. <u><strong>A good example is the Green Revolution of the</u></strong> 19<u><strong>50s</u></strong> and 1960s, <u><strong>which increased food production in India and elsewhere using mechanized high-yield crop technology, intensive pesticides and chemical fertilizers, and expanded irrigation infrastructure</u></strong>. Over time, however, <u><strong>it became clear</u></strong> that <u><strong>the negative impact of the Green Revolution on local aquifers and rivers more than outweighed the benefits of increased crop production</u></strong>. Ironically, <u><strong>not only did local watersheds suffer, so too did the local people dependent upon them. Ecological stress and an inequitable impact on the poor were the dual legacy of bad policy.</p></u></strong> </s>

Water wars go nuclear

in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, tram North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint A that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some at the 60.000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled

Prof. Princeton, The Next 100 Years p.270 If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. And in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, tram North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint A climate shift in that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some at the 60.000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled since Trinity.

<h4><strong>Water wars go nuclear</h4><p>Weiner 90</p><p></strong>Prof. Princeton,<strong> </strong>The Next 100 Years p.270</p><p>If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. And <u>in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, tram North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint A</u> climate shift in <u>that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some at the 60.000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled </u>since Trinity. </p>

Weiner 90

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Weiner 90 fulltext: Prof. Princeton, The Next 100 Years p.270 If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. And in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, tram North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint A climate shift in that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some at the 60.000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled since Trinity. [/INST] <h4><strong>Water wars go nuclear</h4><p>Weiner 90</p><p></strong>Prof. Princeton,<strong> </strong>The Next 100 Years p.270</p><p>If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. And <u>in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, tram North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint A</u> climate shift in <u>that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some at the 60.000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled </u>since Trinity. </p> </s>

No link- China perceives Latin America as in the US sphere of influence

In terms of China’s growing economic clout in Latin America, it hardly constitutes a threat to U.S. interests, which are both deep and extensive Chinese economic activities, concentrated mostly in imports of commodities and exports of consumer goods do not compete directly against U.S which specialize in other sectors Chinese influence is modest at best and cannot compete effectively with the U S China’s political regime hardly appeals to the region China has also cautiously avoided encroaching upon U.S. security interests or needlessly antagonizing the U.S. by befriending Cuba

(Connie, Don Hanna, Luis Fleischman, and Minxin Pei, America’s Quarterly, “Ask The Experts: China's Global Rise,” 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254) /wyo-,, In terms of China’s growing economic clout in Latin America, it hardly constitutes a threat to U.S. interests, which are both deep and extensive in the region. Chinese economic activities, concentrated mostly in imports of commodities and exports of consumer goods (with modest investments in natural resources and infrastructure), do not compete directly against U.S. firms, which specialize in other sectors (services, hi-tech, automotive, and banking). In the political realm, Chinese influence is modest at best and cannot compete effectively with the United States. China’s political regime, a one-party dictatorship, hardly appeals to the region, where democratization since the early 1980s has discredited authoritarian rule. China has also cautiously avoided encroaching upon U.S. security interests or needlessly antagonizing the U.S. by befriending Cuba and Venezuela—the two countries disliked most by the United States. Based on Chinese national interests, Beijing has no incentive to compete against the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere. Such competition would be costly and have meager geopolitical benefits. It will divert precious resources from China’s efforts to defend its interests closer to home—in East Asia.

<h4><strong>No link- China perceives Latin America as in the US sphere of influence</h4><p>Mack et al 12</p><p></strong>(Connie, Don Hanna, Luis Fleischman, and Minxin Pei, America’s Quarterly, “Ask The Experts: China's Global Rise,” 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254) /wyo-,,</p><p><u><strong>In terms of China’s growing economic clout in Latin America, it hardly constitutes a threat to U.S. interests, which are both deep and extensive</u></strong> in the region. <u><strong>Chinese economic activities, concentrated mostly in imports of commodities and exports of consumer goods</u></strong> (with modest investments in natural resources and infrastructure), <u><strong>do not compete directly against U.S</u></strong>. firms, <u><strong>which specialize in other sectors</u></strong> (services, hi-tech, automotive, and banking). In the political realm, <u><strong>Chinese influence is modest at best and cannot compete effectively with the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates. <u><strong>China’s political regime</u></strong>, a one-party dictatorship, <u><strong>hardly appeals to the region</u></strong>, where democratization since the early 1980s has discredited authoritarian rule. <u><strong>China has also cautiously avoided encroaching upon U.S. security interests or needlessly antagonizing the U.S. by befriending Cuba</u></strong> and Venezuela—the two countries disliked most by the United States. Based on Chinese national interests, Beijing has no incentive to compete against the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere. Such competition would be costly and have meager geopolitical benefits. It will divert precious resources from China’s efforts to defend its interests closer to home—in East Asia.</p>

Mack et al 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Mack et al 12 fulltext: (Connie, Don Hanna, Luis Fleischman, and Minxin Pei, America’s Quarterly, “Ask The Experts: China's Global Rise,” 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254) /wyo-,, In terms of China’s growing economic clout in Latin America, it hardly constitutes a threat to U.S. interests, which are both deep and extensive in the region. Chinese economic activities, concentrated mostly in imports of commodities and exports of consumer goods (with modest investments in natural resources and infrastructure), do not compete directly against U.S. firms, which specialize in other sectors (services, hi-tech, automotive, and banking). In the political realm, Chinese influence is modest at best and cannot compete effectively with the United States. China’s political regime, a one-party dictatorship, hardly appeals to the region, where democratization since the early 1980s has discredited authoritarian rule. China has also cautiously avoided encroaching upon U.S. security interests or needlessly antagonizing the U.S. by befriending Cuba and Venezuela—the two countries disliked most by the United States. Based on Chinese national interests, Beijing has no incentive to compete against the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere. Such competition would be costly and have meager geopolitical benefits. It will divert precious resources from China’s efforts to defend its interests closer to home—in East Asia. [/INST] <h4><strong>No link- China perceives Latin America as in the US sphere of influence</h4><p>Mack et al 12</p><p></strong>(Connie, Don Hanna, Luis Fleischman, and Minxin Pei, America’s Quarterly, “Ask The Experts: China's Global Rise,” 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254) /wyo-,,</p><p><u><strong>In terms of China’s growing economic clout in Latin America, it hardly constitutes a threat to U.S. interests, which are both deep and extensive</u></strong> in the region. <u><strong>Chinese economic activities, concentrated mostly in imports of commodities and exports of consumer goods</u></strong> (with modest investments in natural resources and infrastructure), <u><strong>do not compete directly against U.S</u></strong>. firms, <u><strong>which specialize in other sectors</u></strong> (services, hi-tech, automotive, and banking). In the political realm, <u><strong>Chinese influence is modest at best and cannot compete effectively with the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates. <u><strong>China’s political regime</u></strong>, a one-party dictatorship, <u><strong>hardly appeals to the region</u></strong>, where democratization since the early 1980s has discredited authoritarian rule. <u><strong>China has also cautiously avoided encroaching upon U.S. security interests or needlessly antagonizing the U.S. by befriending Cuba</u></strong> and Venezuela—the two countries disliked most by the United States. Based on Chinese national interests, Beijing has no incentive to compete against the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere. Such competition would be costly and have meager geopolitical benefits. It will divert precious resources from China’s efforts to defend its interests closer to home—in East Asia.</p> </s>

Trade fuels terrorist networks by spurring economically based anti-American sentiment that close off non-violent alternatives to terrorism.

We find increases in U.S. exports and a larger U.S. share of global trade results in more anti‐American terrorism expansion of American economic and cultural influence results in anti‐American terrorism unfavorable economic effects make it easier for terrorist organizations to find support unfavorable socioeconomic outcomes due to inflow of U.S. goods may lower opportunity costs of terrorism by closing non‐violent alternatives to terrorism

Globalization, and Anti‐American Terrorism,” September 2011, http://www.pubchoicesoc.org/papers_2012/Meierrieks_Gries.pdf//wyo-mm) ¶ By and large, these findings tend to support H3a and H4a. We find that increases in U.S. exports and a larger U.S. share of global trade results in more anti‐American terrorism. Also, more U.S. cultural exports seem to incite anti‐American violence. There is also some evidence that U.S. FDI outflows are positively associated with terrorism, while U.S. economic power (U.S. share of global GDP) seems to weakly negatively correlate with anti‐U.S. terrorism. 18 That is, the expansion of American economic and cultural influence results in more anti‐American terrorism. Potentially, this is ¶ because this growing influence produces unfavorable socioeconomic outcomes and is by accompanied by sociocultural changes (e.g., the import of Western values concerning capitalism, consumerism, or the role of women in society) in the target countries of U.S. exports and investment. These unfavorable economic and cultural effects seem to make it easier for terrorist organizations to find support. For instance, unfavorable socioeconomic outcomes due to inflow of U.S. goods and capital (e.g., unemployment, increased pressures of competition) may lower the opportunity costs of terrorism by closing non‐violent alternatives to terrorism (e.g., Li and Schaub 2004; Freytag et al. 2011). Also, a growing cultural influence of the U.S. seems to produce a backlash, where anti‐U.S. terrorism emerges as a means to limit U.S. influence and protect a local identity (religion, language, culture).

<h4><strong>Trade fuels terrorist networks by spurring economically based anti-American sentiment that close off non-violent alternatives to terrorism.</h4><p>Gries and Meierrieks 11</p><p></strong>(Thomas and Daniel, University of Paderborn [Department of Economics], University of Paderborn [Department of Economics], “Forces of Good and Evil: U.S. Economic and Politico‐Military Power,</p><p>Globalization, and Anti‐American Terrorism,” September 2011, http://www.pubchoicesoc.org/papers_2012/Meierrieks_Gries.pdf//wyo-mm) </p><p>¶ By and large, these findings tend to support H3a and H4a. <u><strong>We find</u></strong> that <u><strong>increases in U.S. exports and a larger U.S. share of global trade results in more anti‐American terrorism</u></strong>. Also, more U.S. cultural exports seem to incite anti‐American violence. There is also some evidence that U.S. FDI outflows are positively associated with terrorism, while U.S. economic power (U.S. share of global GDP) seems to weakly negatively correlate with anti‐U.S. terrorism. 18 That is, the <u><strong>expansion of American economic and cultural influence results in</u></strong> more <u><strong>anti‐American terrorism</u></strong>. Potentially, this is ¶ because this growing influence produces unfavorable socioeconomic outcomes and is by accompanied by sociocultural changes (e.g., the import of Western values concerning capitalism, consumerism, or the role of women in society) in the target countries of U.S. exports and investment. These <u><strong>unfavorable economic</u></strong> and cultural <u><strong>effects</u></strong> seem to <u><strong>make it easier for terrorist organizations to find support</u></strong>. For instance, <u><strong>unfavorable socioeconomic outcomes due to inflow of U.S. goods</u></strong> and capital (e.g., unemployment, increased pressures of competition) <u><strong>may lower</u></strong> the <u><strong>opportunity costs of terrorism by closing non‐violent alternatives to terrorism</u></strong> (e.g., Li and Schaub<strong> 2004; Freytag et al. 2011). Also, a growing cultural influence of the U.S. seems to produce a backlash, where anti‐U.S. terrorism emerges as a means to limit U.S. influence and protect a local identity (religion, language, culture).</p></strong>

Gries and Meierrieks 11 (Thomas and Daniel, University of Paderborn [Department of Economics], University of Paderborn [Department of Economics], “Forces of Good and Evil: U.S. Economic and Politico‐Military Power,

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Gries and Meierrieks 11 (Thomas and Daniel, University of Paderborn [Department of Economics], University of Paderborn [Department of Economics], “Forces of Good and Evil: U.S. Economic and Politico‐Military Power, fulltext: Globalization, and Anti‐American Terrorism,” September 2011, http://www.pubchoicesoc.org/papers_2012/Meierrieks_Gries.pdf//wyo-mm) ¶ By and large, these findings tend to support H3a and H4a. We find that increases in U.S. exports and a larger U.S. share of global trade results in more anti‐American terrorism. Also, more U.S. cultural exports seem to incite anti‐American violence. There is also some evidence that U.S. FDI outflows are positively associated with terrorism, while U.S. economic power (U.S. share of global GDP) seems to weakly negatively correlate with anti‐U.S. terrorism. 18 That is, the expansion of American economic and cultural influence results in more anti‐American terrorism. Potentially, this is ¶ because this growing influence produces unfavorable socioeconomic outcomes and is by accompanied by sociocultural changes (e.g., the import of Western values concerning capitalism, consumerism, or the role of women in society) in the target countries of U.S. exports and investment. These unfavorable economic and cultural effects seem to make it easier for terrorist organizations to find support. For instance, unfavorable socioeconomic outcomes due to inflow of U.S. goods and capital (e.g., unemployment, increased pressures of competition) may lower the opportunity costs of terrorism by closing non‐violent alternatives to terrorism (e.g., Li and Schaub 2004; Freytag et al. 2011). Also, a growing cultural influence of the U.S. seems to produce a backlash, where anti‐U.S. terrorism emerges as a means to limit U.S. influence and protect a local identity (religion, language, culture). [/INST] <h4><strong>Trade fuels terrorist networks by spurring economically based anti-American sentiment that close off non-violent alternatives to terrorism.</h4><p>Gries and Meierrieks 11</p><p></strong>(Thomas and Daniel, University of Paderborn [Department of Economics], University of Paderborn [Department of Economics], “Forces of Good and Evil: U.S. Economic and Politico‐Military Power,</p><p>Globalization, and Anti‐American Terrorism,” September 2011, http://www.pubchoicesoc.org/papers_2012/Meierrieks_Gries.pdf//wyo-mm) </p><p>¶ By and large, these findings tend to support H3a and H4a. <u><strong>We find</u></strong> that <u><strong>increases in U.S. exports and a larger U.S. share of global trade results in more anti‐American terrorism</u></strong>. Also, more U.S. cultural exports seem to incite anti‐American violence. There is also some evidence that U.S. FDI outflows are positively associated with terrorism, while U.S. economic power (U.S. share of global GDP) seems to weakly negatively correlate with anti‐U.S. terrorism. 18 That is, the <u><strong>expansion of American economic and cultural influence results in</u></strong> more <u><strong>anti‐American terrorism</u></strong>. Potentially, this is ¶ because this growing influence produces unfavorable socioeconomic outcomes and is by accompanied by sociocultural changes (e.g., the import of Western values concerning capitalism, consumerism, or the role of women in society) in the target countries of U.S. exports and investment. These <u><strong>unfavorable economic</u></strong> and cultural <u><strong>effects</u></strong> seem to <u><strong>make it easier for terrorist organizations to find support</u></strong>. For instance, <u><strong>unfavorable socioeconomic outcomes due to inflow of U.S. goods</u></strong> and capital (e.g., unemployment, increased pressures of competition) <u><strong>may lower</u></strong> the <u><strong>opportunity costs of terrorism by closing non‐violent alternatives to terrorism</u></strong> (e.g., Li and Schaub<strong> 2004; Freytag et al. 2011). Also, a growing cultural influence of the U.S. seems to produce a backlash, where anti‐U.S. terrorism emerges as a means to limit U.S. influence and protect a local identity (religion, language, culture).</p></strong> </s>

Trade opens up possibilities for trilateral cooperation

Washington frets that China is supportive of the two Latin American nations, Cuba Yet, if one stands back and considers hemispheric relations in a non-zero-sum perspective, a possibility for a synergy of U.S.-Chinese interests emerges. China’s Recent Economic Role in Latin America For both Washington and Beijing, Latin America’s economic development increases its potential as an economic partner, and for Washington it enhances the possibility of its success with the liberal-democratic, free-market model that the U.S. is seeking to promote Trade volume has multiplied

(Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm At the moment, the outlook for cooperation between the eagle and the dragon in Latin America is bleak. U.S. and Latin American hopes that China would make a major contribution to Latin American economic development are not being realized. Also, Washington frets that China is supportive of the two Latin American nations, Cuba and Venezuela, which oppose Washington. Yet, if one stands back and considers hemispheric relations in a non-zero-sum perspective, a possibility for a synergy of U.S.-Chinese interests emerges. China’s Recent Economic Role in Latin America For both Washington and Beijing, Latin America’s economic development increases its potential as an economic partner, and for Washington it enhances the possibility of its success with the liberal-democratic, free-market model that the U.S. is seeking to promote globally. Latin America’s robust recent economic growth (GDP growth reached 5.3% in 2006 and has surpassed 4% for three consecutive years) has been attributed in part to the explosion of Chinese demand for raw materials, in particular oil, gas, metals, soybeans, and other foodstuffs.16 Trade volume has multiplied from $200 million in 1975 to $2.8 billion in 1988 to $40 billion in 2004— and then in two years almost doubled to an estimated $70 billion in 2006; Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Panama, and Peru are China’s top six trading partners in the region (in that order).17 Also, in November 2004, while President Hu Jintao was visiting Brazil, he was interpreted to promise that China would invest $100 billion in Latin America over the next decade.

<h4><strong>Trade opens up possibilities for trilateral cooperation</h4><p>McClintock 07</p><p></strong>(Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>At the moment, the outlook for cooperation between the eagle and the dragon in Latin America is bleak. U.S. and Latin American hopes that China would make a major contribution to Latin American economic development are not being realized. Also, <u><strong>Washington frets that China is supportive of the two Latin American nations, Cuba </u></strong>and Venezuela, which oppose Washington. <u><strong>Yet, if one stands back and considers hemispheric relations in a non-zero-sum perspective, a possibility for a synergy of U.S.-Chinese interests emerges. China’s Recent Economic Role in Latin America For both Washington and Beijing, Latin America’s economic development increases its potential as an economic partner, and for Washington it enhances the possibility of its success with the liberal-democratic, free-market model that the U.S. is seeking to promote</u></strong> globally. Latin America’s robust recent economic growth (GDP growth reached 5.3% in 2006 and has surpassed 4% for three consecutive years) has been attributed in part to the explosion of Chinese demand for raw materials, in particular oil, gas, metals, soybeans, and other foodstuffs.16 <u><strong>Trade volume has multiplied</u></strong> from $200 million in 1975 to $2.8 billion in 1988 to $40 billion in 2004— and then in two years almost doubled to an estimated $70 billion in 2006; Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Panama, and Peru are China’s top six trading partners in the region (in that order).17 Also, in November 2004, while President Hu Jintao was visiting Brazil, he was interpreted to promise that China would invest $100 billion in Latin America over the next decade. </p>

McClintock 07

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McClintock 07 fulltext: (Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm At the moment, the outlook for cooperation between the eagle and the dragon in Latin America is bleak. U.S. and Latin American hopes that China would make a major contribution to Latin American economic development are not being realized. Also, Washington frets that China is supportive of the two Latin American nations, Cuba and Venezuela, which oppose Washington. Yet, if one stands back and considers hemispheric relations in a non-zero-sum perspective, a possibility for a synergy of U.S.-Chinese interests emerges. China’s Recent Economic Role in Latin America For both Washington and Beijing, Latin America’s economic development increases its potential as an economic partner, and for Washington it enhances the possibility of its success with the liberal-democratic, free-market model that the U.S. is seeking to promote globally. Latin America’s robust recent economic growth (GDP growth reached 5.3% in 2006 and has surpassed 4% for three consecutive years) has been attributed in part to the explosion of Chinese demand for raw materials, in particular oil, gas, metals, soybeans, and other foodstuffs.16 Trade volume has multiplied from $200 million in 1975 to $2.8 billion in 1988 to $40 billion in 2004— and then in two years almost doubled to an estimated $70 billion in 2006; Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Panama, and Peru are China’s top six trading partners in the region (in that order).17 Also, in November 2004, while President Hu Jintao was visiting Brazil, he was interpreted to promise that China would invest $100 billion in Latin America over the next decade. [/INST] <h4><strong>Trade opens up possibilities for trilateral cooperation</h4><p>McClintock 07</p><p></strong>(Cynthia, George Washington University, “Third Dialogue on US-China Relations in a Global Context,” March 13, 2007, http://www.iberoasia.org/articulos/McClintock_US_LA_Cn.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>At the moment, the outlook for cooperation between the eagle and the dragon in Latin America is bleak. U.S. and Latin American hopes that China would make a major contribution to Latin American economic development are not being realized. Also, <u><strong>Washington frets that China is supportive of the two Latin American nations, Cuba </u></strong>and Venezuela, which oppose Washington. <u><strong>Yet, if one stands back and considers hemispheric relations in a non-zero-sum perspective, a possibility for a synergy of U.S.-Chinese interests emerges. China’s Recent Economic Role in Latin America For both Washington and Beijing, Latin America’s economic development increases its potential as an economic partner, and for Washington it enhances the possibility of its success with the liberal-democratic, free-market model that the U.S. is seeking to promote</u></strong> globally. Latin America’s robust recent economic growth (GDP growth reached 5.3% in 2006 and has surpassed 4% for three consecutive years) has been attributed in part to the explosion of Chinese demand for raw materials, in particular oil, gas, metals, soybeans, and other foodstuffs.16 <u><strong>Trade volume has multiplied</u></strong> from $200 million in 1975 to $2.8 billion in 1988 to $40 billion in 2004— and then in two years almost doubled to an estimated $70 billion in 2006; Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Panama, and Peru are China’s top six trading partners in the region (in that order).17 Also, in November 2004, while President Hu Jintao was visiting Brazil, he was interpreted to promise that China would invest $100 billion in Latin America over the next decade. </p> </s>

Terrorism risks extinction

Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic [* development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.

Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.

(Yonah, Professor and Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism, “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses,” DEPAUL BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL v. 12, Fall 1999/Spring 2000, p. 66-67.) ¶ More specifically, present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of terror violence in terms of both threats and responses that has made clear that we have entered into an Age of Terrorism with all of its serious implications to national, regional, and global security concerns. n25 Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic [*67] development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.

<h4><strong>Terrorism risks extinction</h4><p>Alexander 2k</p><p></strong>(Yonah, Professor and Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism, “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses,” DEPAUL BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL v. 12, Fall 1999/Spring 2000, p. 66-67.)</p><p>¶ More specifically, present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of terror violence in terms of both threats and responses that has made clear that we have entered into an Age of Terrorism with all of its serious implications to national, regional, and global security concerns. n25 <u><strong><mark>Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic</mark> [*</u></strong>67] <u><strong><mark>development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.</p></u></strong></mark>

Alexander 2k

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Alexander 2k fulltext: (Yonah, Professor and Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism, “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses,” DEPAUL BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL v. 12, Fall 1999/Spring 2000, p. 66-67.) ¶ More specifically, present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of terror violence in terms of both threats and responses that has made clear that we have entered into an Age of Terrorism with all of its serious implications to national, regional, and global security concerns. n25 Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic [*67] development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself. [/INST] <h4><strong>Terrorism risks extinction</h4><p>Alexander 2k</p><p></strong>(Yonah, Professor and Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism, “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses,” DEPAUL BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL v. 12, Fall 1999/Spring 2000, p. 66-67.)</p><p>¶ More specifically, present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of terror violence in terms of both threats and responses that has made clear that we have entered into an Age of Terrorism with all of its serious implications to national, regional, and global security concerns. n25 <u><strong><mark>Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic</mark> [*</u></strong>67] <u><strong><mark>development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

No internal link- China sees Latin America as US territory and will cooperate

While the U S tries to shape the behavior of China, the behavior of the US government also infl uences China’s perceptions of the U S China recognizes Latin America as a US sphere of infl uence and is keen not to produce suspicion in the U S with regard to Chinese motives and intentions. Both governments are interested in avoiding misunderstandings

(Detlef, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, “The Dragon in the Backyard: US Visions of ChinaMay 2013, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1305.pdf) /wyo-mm While the United States tries to shape the behavior of China, the behavior of the US government also infl uences China’s perceptions of the United States’ intentions. In the view of most US specialists, China implicitly recognizes Latin America as a US sphere of infl uence (Ellis 2012a; Paz 2012) and is keen not to produce suspicion in the United States with regard to Chinese motives and intentions. Both governments are interested in avoiding misunderstandings. With the visit of then US assistant secretary for Western Aff airs, Thomas Shannon, to Beijing in April 2006, both sides start-ed a dialogue on Latin America. The last round of dialogue took place in Washington in March 2012 between then interim assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere Aff airs, Roberta S. Jacobson, and Chinese counterpart Yan Wanming. The sixth round of dialogue is being organized for the current year; it will be the fi rst of the Xi Jinping administration and the fi rst of Obama’s second term in offi ce (communication by Gonzalo Paz March 7, 2013). There could be more cooperation in Latin America between the countries in the future.

<h4>No internal link- <strong>China sees Latin America as US territory and will cooperate</h4><p>Nolte 13</p><p></strong>(Detlef, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, “The Dragon in the Backyard: US </p><p>Visions of ChinaMay 2013, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1305.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>While the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>tries to shape the behavior of China, the behavior of the US government also infl uences China’s perceptions of the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates’ intentions. In the view of most US specialists, <u><strong>China</u></strong> implicitly <u><strong>recognizes Latin America as a US sphere of infl uence</u></strong> (Ellis 2012a; Paz 2012) <u><strong>and is keen not to produce suspicion</u></strong> <u><strong>in the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>with regard to Chinese motives and intentions. Both governments are interested in avoiding misunderstandings</u></strong>. With the visit of then US assistant secretary for Western Aff airs, Thomas Shannon, to Beijing in April 2006, both sides start-ed a dialogue on Latin America. The last round of dialogue took place in Washington in March 2012 between then interim assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere Aff airs, Roberta S. Jacobson, and Chinese counterpart Yan Wanming. The sixth round of dialogue is being organized for the current year; it will be the fi rst of the Xi Jinping administration and the fi rst of Obama’s second term in offi ce (communication by Gonzalo Paz March 7, 2013). There could be more cooperation in Latin America between the countries in the future.</p>

Nolte 13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Nolte 13 fulltext: (Detlef, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, “The Dragon in the Backyard: US Visions of ChinaMay 2013, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1305.pdf) /wyo-mm While the United States tries to shape the behavior of China, the behavior of the US government also infl uences China’s perceptions of the United States’ intentions. In the view of most US specialists, China implicitly recognizes Latin America as a US sphere of infl uence (Ellis 2012a; Paz 2012) and is keen not to produce suspicion in the United States with regard to Chinese motives and intentions. Both governments are interested in avoiding misunderstandings. With the visit of then US assistant secretary for Western Aff airs, Thomas Shannon, to Beijing in April 2006, both sides start-ed a dialogue on Latin America. The last round of dialogue took place in Washington in March 2012 between then interim assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere Aff airs, Roberta S. Jacobson, and Chinese counterpart Yan Wanming. The sixth round of dialogue is being organized for the current year; it will be the fi rst of the Xi Jinping administration and the fi rst of Obama’s second term in offi ce (communication by Gonzalo Paz March 7, 2013). There could be more cooperation in Latin America between the countries in the future. [/INST] <h4>No internal link- <strong>China sees Latin America as US territory and will cooperate</h4><p>Nolte 13</p><p></strong>(Detlef, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, “The Dragon in the Backyard: US </p><p>Visions of ChinaMay 2013, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1305.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>While the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>tries to shape the behavior of China, the behavior of the US government also infl uences China’s perceptions of the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates’ intentions. In the view of most US specialists, <u><strong>China</u></strong> implicitly <u><strong>recognizes Latin America as a US sphere of infl uence</u></strong> (Ellis 2012a; Paz 2012) <u><strong>and is keen not to produce suspicion</u></strong> <u><strong>in the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>with regard to Chinese motives and intentions. Both governments are interested in avoiding misunderstandings</u></strong>. With the visit of then US assistant secretary for Western Aff airs, Thomas Shannon, to Beijing in April 2006, both sides start-ed a dialogue on Latin America. The last round of dialogue took place in Washington in March 2012 between then interim assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere Aff airs, Roberta S. Jacobson, and Chinese counterpart Yan Wanming. The sixth round of dialogue is being organized for the current year; it will be the fi rst of the Xi Jinping administration and the fi rst of Obama’s second term in offi ce (communication by Gonzalo Paz March 7, 2013). There could be more cooperation in Latin America between the countries in the future.</p> </s>

Intervening actors check disease impact

After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered the usual seasonal influenza Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases Why did predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated there is a mistake in the way we look at the world. we rarely anticipate the human response to that crisis. Takeswine flu. The virushad crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast But it did not go unchecked In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly The noted expert on this subject, Garrett, says, " 'Gracias, Mexico They really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected officials bring up the Spanish influenza of 1918 But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system

predictions turn out exaggerated we rarely anticipate human response to crisis swine flu was met by vigorous response at its epicenter The Mexican government brought transmission to a halt the world looks nothing like 1918 health-care systems are better

Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? Why did the predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But we can rarely anticipate the human response to that crisis. Takeswine flu. The virushad crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The noted expert on this subject, Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century.

<h4><strong>Intervening actors check disease impact </h4><p>Zakaria 9—</strong>Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935)</p><p>Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize</p><p>It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. <u>After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered</u> something more like <u>the usual seasonal influenza</u>. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. <u>Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected</u> by the disease. <u>But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases</u> of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? <u>Why did</u> the <u><mark>predictions</mark> of a pandemic <mark>turn out </mark>to be so <mark>exaggerated</u></mark>? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think <u>there is a</u> broader <u>mistake in the way we look at the world.</u> Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But <u><strong><mark>we</u></strong></mark> can <u><mark>rarely <strong>anticipate</mark> the <mark>human response to</mark> that <mark>crisis</strong></mark>. Takeswine flu. The virushad crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast</u>. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. <u>But it did not go unchecked</u>. <u>In fact, <mark>swine flu was met by</mark> an extremely <mark>vigorous response at its epicenter</u></mark>, <u>Mexico. <mark>The Mexican government</mark> reacted quickly</u> and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. <u>The noted expert on this subject,</u> Laurie <u>Garrett, says, "</u>We should all stand up and scream, <u>'Gracias, Mexico</u>!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. <u>They</u> basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby <u>really <mark>brought transmission to a halt</mark>." Every time one of these viruses is detected</u>, writers and <u>officials bring up the Spanish influenza</u> epidemic <u>of 1918</u> in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. <u>But <mark>the world</mark> we live in today <mark>looks nothing like 1918</mark>. Public <mark>health-care systems are </mark>far <mark>better</u></mark> and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. <u>Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system</u><strong>—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century. </p></strong>

Zakaria 9—Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Zakaria 9—Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935) fulltext: Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? Why did the predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But we can rarely anticipate the human response to that crisis. Takeswine flu. The virushad crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The noted expert on this subject, Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century. [/INST] <h4><strong>Intervening actors check disease impact </h4><p>Zakaria 9—</strong>Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935)</p><p>Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize</p><p>It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. <u>After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered</u> something more like <u>the usual seasonal influenza</u>. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. <u>Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected</u> by the disease. <u>But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases</u> of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? <u>Why did</u> the <u><mark>predictions</mark> of a pandemic <mark>turn out </mark>to be so <mark>exaggerated</u></mark>? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think <u>there is a</u> broader <u>mistake in the way we look at the world.</u> Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But <u><strong><mark>we</u></strong></mark> can <u><mark>rarely <strong>anticipate</mark> the <mark>human response to</mark> that <mark>crisis</strong></mark>. Takeswine flu. The virushad crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast</u>. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. <u>But it did not go unchecked</u>. <u>In fact, <mark>swine flu was met by</mark> an extremely <mark>vigorous response at its epicenter</u></mark>, <u>Mexico. <mark>The Mexican government</mark> reacted quickly</u> and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. <u>The noted expert on this subject,</u> Laurie <u>Garrett, says, "</u>We should all stand up and scream, <u>'Gracias, Mexico</u>!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. <u>They</u> basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby <u>really <mark>brought transmission to a halt</mark>." Every time one of these viruses is detected</u>, writers and <u>officials bring up the Spanish influenza</u> epidemic <u>of 1918</u> in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. <u>But <mark>the world</mark> we live in today <mark>looks nothing like 1918</mark>. Public <mark>health-care systems are </mark>far <mark>better</u></mark> and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. <u>Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system</u><strong>—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century. </p></strong> </s>

China won’t risk US relations over Cuba- Venezuela proves

As much as Beijing has advanced in Cuba it won't pursue matters there at the risk of its far more lucrative economic ties with the U S That approach mirrors China's dealings in places such as Venezuela, where Chavez regularly hurls invective at Washington. "They will seek as much political and economic advantage as they can get without jeopardizing their relationship with the U S

(Tom, McClatchy Newspapers, “'Old friends' Cuba, China strengthen ties,” September 16, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/09/16/75560/old-friends-cuba-china-strengthen.html#.UcD9F_mThSQ) /wyo-mm As much as Beijing has advanced in Cuba, though, it won't pursue matters there at the risk of its far more lucrative economic ties with the United States, according to observers in Beijing and Washington. That approach mirrors China's dealings in places such as Venezuela, where President Hugo Chavez regularly hurls invective at Washington. "They will seek as much political and economic advantage as they can get without jeopardizing their relationship with the United States,'' Erikson said in a phone interview.

<h4><strong>China won’t risk US relations over Cuba- Venezuela proves</h4><p>Lasseter 09</p><p></strong>(Tom, McClatchy Newspapers, “'Old friends' Cuba, China strengthen ties,” September 16, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/09/16/75560/old-friends-cuba-china-strengthen.html#.UcD9F_mThSQ) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>As much as Beijing has advanced in Cuba</u></strong>, though, <u><strong>it won't pursue matters there at the risk of its far more lucrative economic ties with the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, according to observers in Beijing and Washington. <u><strong>That approach mirrors China's dealings in places such as Venezuela, where</u></strong> President Hugo <u><strong>Chavez regularly hurls invective at Washington. "They will seek as much political and economic advantage as they can get without jeopardizing their relationship with the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates,'' Erikson said in a phone interview.</p>

Lasseter 09

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Lasseter 09 fulltext: (Tom, McClatchy Newspapers, “'Old friends' Cuba, China strengthen ties,” September 16, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/09/16/75560/old-friends-cuba-china-strengthen.html#.UcD9F_mThSQ) /wyo-mm As much as Beijing has advanced in Cuba, though, it won't pursue matters there at the risk of its far more lucrative economic ties with the United States, according to observers in Beijing and Washington. That approach mirrors China's dealings in places such as Venezuela, where President Hugo Chavez regularly hurls invective at Washington. "They will seek as much political and economic advantage as they can get without jeopardizing their relationship with the United States,'' Erikson said in a phone interview. [/INST] <h4><strong>China won’t risk US relations over Cuba- Venezuela proves</h4><p>Lasseter 09</p><p></strong>(Tom, McClatchy Newspapers, “'Old friends' Cuba, China strengthen ties,” September 16, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/09/16/75560/old-friends-cuba-china-strengthen.html#.UcD9F_mThSQ) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>As much as Beijing has advanced in Cuba</u></strong>, though, <u><strong>it won't pursue matters there at the risk of its far more lucrative economic ties with the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, according to observers in Beijing and Washington. <u><strong>That approach mirrors China's dealings in places such as Venezuela, where</u></strong> President Hugo <u><strong>Chavez regularly hurls invective at Washington. "They will seek as much political and economic advantage as they can get without jeopardizing their relationship with the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates,'' Erikson said in a phone interview.</p> </s>

Alt Causes to Disease Spread

In the latter half of the 20th century, almost 30 new human diseases were identified. The spread of several of them has been expedited by the growth of drug resistance. Globalization, modern medical practices, urbanization, climate change, sexual promiscuity, intravenous drug use, and bioterrorism further increase the likelihood that people will come into contact with fatal diseases.

In the latter half of the 20th century, almost 30 new human diseases were identified. The spread of several of them has been expedited by the growth of drug resistance. Globalization, modern medical practices, urbanization, climate change, sexual promiscuity, intravenous drug use, and bioterrorism further increase the likelihood that people will come into contact with fatal diseases.

In the latter half of the 20th century, almost 30 new human diseases were identified. The spread of several of them has been expedited by the growth of antibiotic and drug resistance. Globalization, modern medical practices, urbanization, climate change, sexual promiscuity, intravenous drug use, and acts of bioterrorism further increase the likelihood that people will come into contact with potentially fatal diseases.

<h4><strong>Alt Causes to Disease Spread</h4><p>Bower & Chalk, ‘3</p><p><u></strong>[Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, Jennifer Brower is a science and technology policy analyst. Peter Chalk is a political scientist, “Vectors Without Borders The Spread of Global Pathogens Can Imperil Us All,” RAND, Summer 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/vectors.html]</p><p><strong><mark>In the latter half of the 20th century, almost 30 new human diseases were identified. The spread of several of them has been expedited by the growth of</u></strong></mark> antibiotic and <u><strong><mark>drug resistance. Globalization, modern medical practices, urbanization, climate change, sexual promiscuity, intravenous drug use, and</u></strong></mark> acts of <u><strong><mark>bioterrorism further increase the likelihood that people will come into contact with</u></strong></mark> potentially <u><strong><mark>fatal diseases.</p></u></strong></mark>

Bower & Chalk, ‘3 [Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, Jennifer Brower is a science and technology policy analyst. Peter Chalk is a political scientist, “Vectors Without Borders The Spread of Global Pathogens Can Imperil Us All,” RAND, Summer 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/vectors.html]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Bower & Chalk, ‘3 [Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, Jennifer Brower is a science and technology policy analyst. Peter Chalk is a political scientist, “Vectors Without Borders The Spread of Global Pathogens Can Imperil Us All,” RAND, Summer 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/vectors.html] fulltext: In the latter half of the 20th century, almost 30 new human diseases were identified. The spread of several of them has been expedited by the growth of antibiotic and drug resistance. Globalization, modern medical practices, urbanization, climate change, sexual promiscuity, intravenous drug use, and acts of bioterrorism further increase the likelihood that people will come into contact with potentially fatal diseases. [/INST] <h4><strong>Alt Causes to Disease Spread</h4><p>Bower & Chalk, ‘3</p><p><u></strong>[Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, Jennifer Brower is a science and technology policy analyst. Peter Chalk is a political scientist, “Vectors Without Borders The Spread of Global Pathogens Can Imperil Us All,” RAND, Summer 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/vectors.html]</p><p><strong><mark>In the latter half of the 20th century, almost 30 new human diseases were identified. The spread of several of them has been expedited by the growth of</u></strong></mark> antibiotic and <u><strong><mark>drug resistance. Globalization, modern medical practices, urbanization, climate change, sexual promiscuity, intravenous drug use, and</u></strong></mark> acts of <u><strong><mark>bioterrorism further increase the likelihood that people will come into contact with</u></strong></mark> potentially <u><strong><mark>fatal diseases.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

US-China too closely linked to raise tensions

the Chinese and American economies are too tightly linked to one another to permit a serious military rivalry to emerge economics is not the only thing that matters and neither Washington nor Beijing can be sure that prudence and cool heads will always prevail this means that both are likely to hedge against the possibility of future trouble they will worry about their relative power and their geopolitical position and they will compete for influence in Asia

(Stephen M., Foreign Policy, “Explaining Obama’s Asia Policy,” November 18, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/explaining_obamas_asia_policy) /wyo-mm Or one could argue, as some have done in the past, that the Chinese and American economies are too tightly linked to one another to permit a serious military rivalry to emerge. Unfortunately, economic interdependence has never been a completely reliable barrier to security competition. Even if an intense rivalry would harm both countries, economics is not the only thing that matters to states and neither Washington nor Beijing can be sure that prudence and cool heads will always prevail. And this means that both are likely to hedge against the possibility of future trouble, even if this response may be somewhat self-fulfilling. And that means they will worry about their relative power and their geopolitical position and they will compete for influence in Asia. Obviously, 2,500 Marines won't make an objective difference to the balance of power, but they are an obvious a sign of the U.S. commitment to stay.

<h4><strong>US-China too closely linked to raise tensions</h4><p>Walt 11</p><p></strong>(Stephen M., Foreign Policy, “Explaining Obama’s Asia Policy,” November 18, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/explaining_obamas_asia_policy) /wyo-mm</p><p>Or one could argue, as some have done in the past, that <u><strong>the Chinese and American economies are too tightly linked to one another to permit a serious military rivalry to emerge</u></strong>. Unfortunately, economic interdependence has never been a completely reliable barrier to security competition. Even if an intense rivalry would harm both countries, <u><strong>economics is not the only thing that matters</u></strong> to states <u><strong>and neither Washington nor Beijing can be sure that prudence and cool heads will always prevail</u></strong>. And <u><strong>this means that</u></strong> <u><strong>both are likely to hedge against the possibility of future trouble</u></strong>, even if this response may be somewhat self-fulfilling. And that means <u><strong>they will worry about their relative power and their geopolitical position and they will compete for influence in Asia</u></strong>. Obviously, 2,500 Marines won't make an objective difference to the balance of power, but they are an obvious a sign of the U.S. commitment to stay.</p>

Walt 11

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Walt 11 fulltext: (Stephen M., Foreign Policy, “Explaining Obama’s Asia Policy,” November 18, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/explaining_obamas_asia_policy) /wyo-mm Or one could argue, as some have done in the past, that the Chinese and American economies are too tightly linked to one another to permit a serious military rivalry to emerge. Unfortunately, economic interdependence has never been a completely reliable barrier to security competition. Even if an intense rivalry would harm both countries, economics is not the only thing that matters to states and neither Washington nor Beijing can be sure that prudence and cool heads will always prevail. And this means that both are likely to hedge against the possibility of future trouble, even if this response may be somewhat self-fulfilling. And that means they will worry about their relative power and their geopolitical position and they will compete for influence in Asia. Obviously, 2,500 Marines won't make an objective difference to the balance of power, but they are an obvious a sign of the U.S. commitment to stay. [/INST] <h4><strong>US-China too closely linked to raise tensions</h4><p>Walt 11</p><p></strong>(Stephen M., Foreign Policy, “Explaining Obama’s Asia Policy,” November 18, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/explaining_obamas_asia_policy) /wyo-mm</p><p>Or one could argue, as some have done in the past, that <u><strong>the Chinese and American economies are too tightly linked to one another to permit a serious military rivalry to emerge</u></strong>. Unfortunately, economic interdependence has never been a completely reliable barrier to security competition. Even if an intense rivalry would harm both countries, <u><strong>economics is not the only thing that matters</u></strong> to states <u><strong>and neither Washington nor Beijing can be sure that prudence and cool heads will always prevail</u></strong>. And <u><strong>this means that</u></strong> <u><strong>both are likely to hedge against the possibility of future trouble</u></strong>, even if this response may be somewhat self-fulfilling. And that means <u><strong>they will worry about their relative power and their geopolitical position and they will compete for influence in Asia</u></strong>. Obviously, 2,500 Marines won't make an objective difference to the balance of power, but they are an obvious a sign of the U.S. commitment to stay.</p> </s>

No mutation to a more virulent strain – more likely to develop into a less dangerous strain

when a new or novel influenza virus makes an appearance on the world stage, the concern is that over time it will mutate to a more formidable viral foe. Mutating is, what viruses do despite the stigma attached to the word`mutation’, viruses can also mutate into less dangerous strains. we are seeing public reassurances from some public health agencies that the swine flu virus has not `mutated’ into a more virulent strain. scientists from the UK’s HPA stated that: so far no unique mutations have been associated with severe or fatal cases of influenza none of these changes is viewed by these HPA researchers as particularly alarming, linked to fatal cases, or indicative of a fundamental change in the H1N1 virus.

when a virus makes an appearance concern is it will mutate viruses mutate into less dangerous strains

Invariably, when a new or novel influenza virus makes an appearance on the world stage, the concern is that over time it will mutate to a more formidable viral foe.   Mutating is, after all, what viruses do. And influenza viruses are particularly adept at acquiring changes – either through small incremental changes (called `drift’), or via a reassortment or swapping of genetic material with another virus, called `shift’. And as any virologist will tell you, Shift Happens. Yet, despite the stigma attached to the word`mutation’, viruses can also mutate into a less dangerous strains. Over the past few days we are seeing public reassurances from some public health agencies that the swine flu virus has not `mutated’ into a more virulent strain.   Last week, scientists from the UK’s  HYPERLINK "http://www.hpa.org.uk/" \t "_blank" HPA, writing in HYPERLINK "http://www.eurosurveillance.org/" \t "_blank" Eurosurveillance (see  HYPERLINK "http://afludiary.blogspot.com/2011/01/eurosurveillance-analysis-of-fatal-h1n1.html" \t "_blank" Eurosurveillance: Analysis Of Fatal H1N1 Cases In The UK) stated that: so far no unique mutations have been associated with severe or fatal cases of influenza A(H1N1)2009, but further comprehensive analysis is required.   That isn’t to say that mutations haven’t shown up.  They have, and will no doubt continue to do so.     But so far, none of these changes is viewed by these HPA researchers as particularly alarming, linked to fatal cases, or indicative of a fundamental change in the H1N1 virus.

<h4><strong>No mutation to a more virulent strain – more likely to develop into a less dangerous strain</h4><p>Avian Flu Diary 11</strong>, 1/10/11, “Egyptian MOH:`No<u> Mutation’ Of Flu”, <http://afludiary.blogspot.com/2011/01/egyptian-mohno-mutation-of-flu.html></p><p></u>Invariably, <u><mark>when a</mark> new or novel influenza <mark>virus makes an appearance</mark> on the world stage, the <mark>concern is</mark> that over time <mark>it will mutate</mark> to a more formidable viral foe.</u>   <u>Mutating is,</u> after all, <u>what viruses do</u>. And influenza viruses are particularly adept at acquiring changes – either through small incremental changes (called `drift’), or via a reassortment or swapping of genetic material with another virus, called `shift’. And as any virologist will tell you, Shift Happens. Yet, <u>despite the stigma attached to the word`mutation’, <mark>viruses</mark> can also <mark>mutate into</u></mark> a <u><strong><mark>less dangerous strains</strong></mark>.</u> Over the past few days <u>we are seeing public reassurances from some public health agencies that the swine flu virus has not `mutated’ into a more virulent strain.</u>   Last week, <u>scientists from the UK’s </u> HYPERLINK "http://www.hpa.org.uk/" \t "_blank" <u>HPA</u>, writing in HYPERLINK "http://www.eurosurveillance.org/" \t "_blank" Eurosurveillance (see  HYPERLINK "http://afludiary.blogspot.com/2011/01/eurosurveillance-analysis-of-fatal-h1n1.html" \t "_blank" Eurosurveillance: Analysis Of Fatal H1N1 Cases In The UK) <u>stated that: so far no unique mutations have been associated with severe or fatal cases of influenza</u> A(H1N1)2009, but further comprehensive analysis is required.   That isn’t to say that mutations haven’t shown up.  They have, and will no doubt continue to do so.     But so far, <u><strong>none of these changes is viewed by these HPA researchers as particularly alarming, linked to fatal cases, or indicative of a fundamental change in the H1N1 virus.</p></u></strong>

Avian Flu Diary 11, 1/10/11, “Egyptian MOH:`No Mutation’ Of Flu”, <http://afludiary.blogspot.com/2011/01/egyptian-mohno-mutation-of-flu.html>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Avian Flu Diary 11, 1/10/11, “Egyptian MOH:`No Mutation’ Of Flu”, <http://afludiary.blogspot.com/2011/01/egyptian-mohno-mutation-of-flu.html> fulltext: Invariably, when a new or novel influenza virus makes an appearance on the world stage, the concern is that over time it will mutate to a more formidable viral foe.   Mutating is, after all, what viruses do. And influenza viruses are particularly adept at acquiring changes – either through small incremental changes (called `drift’), or via a reassortment or swapping of genetic material with another virus, called `shift’. And as any virologist will tell you, Shift Happens. Yet, despite the stigma attached to the word`mutation’, viruses can also mutate into a less dangerous strains. Over the past few days we are seeing public reassurances from some public health agencies that the swine flu virus has not `mutated’ into a more virulent strain.   Last week, scientists from the UK’s  HYPERLINK "http://www.hpa.org.uk/" \t "_blank" HPA, writing in HYPERLINK "http://www.eurosurveillance.org/" \t "_blank" Eurosurveillance (see  HYPERLINK "http://afludiary.blogspot.com/2011/01/eurosurveillance-analysis-of-fatal-h1n1.html" \t "_blank" Eurosurveillance: Analysis Of Fatal H1N1 Cases In The UK) stated that: so far no unique mutations have been associated with severe or fatal cases of influenza A(H1N1)2009, but further comprehensive analysis is required.   That isn’t to say that mutations haven’t shown up.  They have, and will no doubt continue to do so.     But so far, none of these changes is viewed by these HPA researchers as particularly alarming, linked to fatal cases, or indicative of a fundamental change in the H1N1 virus. [/INST] <h4><strong>No mutation to a more virulent strain – more likely to develop into a less dangerous strain</h4><p>Avian Flu Diary 11</strong>, 1/10/11, “Egyptian MOH:`No<u> Mutation’ Of Flu”, <http://afludiary.blogspot.com/2011/01/egyptian-mohno-mutation-of-flu.html></p><p></u>Invariably, <u><mark>when a</mark> new or novel influenza <mark>virus makes an appearance</mark> on the world stage, the <mark>concern is</mark> that over time <mark>it will mutate</mark> to a more formidable viral foe.</u>   <u>Mutating is,</u> after all, <u>what viruses do</u>. And influenza viruses are particularly adept at acquiring changes – either through small incremental changes (called `drift’), or via a reassortment or swapping of genetic material with another virus, called `shift’. And as any virologist will tell you, Shift Happens. Yet, <u>despite the stigma attached to the word`mutation’, <mark>viruses</mark> can also <mark>mutate into</u></mark> a <u><strong><mark>less dangerous strains</strong></mark>.</u> Over the past few days <u>we are seeing public reassurances from some public health agencies that the swine flu virus has not `mutated’ into a more virulent strain.</u>   Last week, <u>scientists from the UK’s </u> HYPERLINK "http://www.hpa.org.uk/" \t "_blank" <u>HPA</u>, writing in HYPERLINK "http://www.eurosurveillance.org/" \t "_blank" Eurosurveillance (see  HYPERLINK "http://afludiary.blogspot.com/2011/01/eurosurveillance-analysis-of-fatal-h1n1.html" \t "_blank" Eurosurveillance: Analysis Of Fatal H1N1 Cases In The UK) <u>stated that: so far no unique mutations have been associated with severe or fatal cases of influenza</u> A(H1N1)2009, but further comprehensive analysis is required.   That isn’t to say that mutations haven’t shown up.  They have, and will no doubt continue to do so.     But so far, <u><strong>none of these changes is viewed by these HPA researchers as particularly alarming, linked to fatal cases, or indicative of a fundamental change in the H1N1 virus.</p></u></strong> </s>

No impact to Warming- Mitigation and adaptation will solve

These statements are alarmist and misleading society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences science and economics is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences severe impacts require a century (or two of no mitigation predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks

These statements are alarmist and misleading science and economics is quite clear that emissions will lead to mild consequences severe impacts require a century (or two the more severe impacts will take more than a millennium to unfold and these ” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not apparent that immediate policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

<h4>No impact to Warming- Mitigation and adaptation will solve </h4><p>Robert O. <strong>Mendelsohn 9</strong>, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf</p><p><u><strong><mark>These statements are</u></strong></mark> largely <u><strong><mark>alarmist and misleading</u></strong></mark>. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, <u><strong>society’s immediate behavior has an</strong> <strong>extremely low probability</strong> <strong>of leading to</strong> <strong>catastrophic consequences</u></strong>. The <u><strong><mark>science and economics</u></strong></mark> of climate change <u><strong><mark>is quite clear that emissions</mark> over the next few decades <mark>will lead to</mark> only</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>mild consequences</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>severe impacts</u></strong></mark> predicted by alarmists <u><strong><mark>require a century (or two</u></strong></mark> in the case of Stern 2006) <u><strong>of no mitigation</u></strong>. Many of the <u><strong>predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation</u></strong>. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of <u><strong><mark>the more severe impacts will take more than</mark> a century or even <mark>a millennium to unfold and</mark> many of<mark> these</u></strong></mark> “<u><strong>potential<mark>” impacts</u></strong> <u><strong>will never occur because people will adapt.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>It is not</mark> at all <mark>apparent that immediate</mark> and dramatic <mark>policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks</u></strong></mark>. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.</p>

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf fulltext: These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses. [/INST] <h4>No impact to Warming- Mitigation and adaptation will solve </h4><p>Robert O. <strong>Mendelsohn 9</strong>, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf</p><p><u><strong><mark>These statements are</u></strong></mark> largely <u><strong><mark>alarmist and misleading</u></strong></mark>. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, <u><strong>society’s immediate behavior has an</strong> <strong>extremely low probability</strong> <strong>of leading to</strong> <strong>catastrophic consequences</u></strong>. The <u><strong><mark>science and economics</u></strong></mark> of climate change <u><strong><mark>is quite clear that emissions</mark> over the next few decades <mark>will lead to</mark> only</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>mild consequences</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>severe impacts</u></strong></mark> predicted by alarmists <u><strong><mark>require a century (or two</u></strong></mark> in the case of Stern 2006) <u><strong>of no mitigation</u></strong>. Many of the <u><strong>predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation</u></strong>. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of <u><strong><mark>the more severe impacts will take more than</mark> a century or even <mark>a millennium to unfold and</mark> many of<mark> these</u></strong></mark> “<u><strong>potential<mark>” impacts</u></strong> <u><strong>will never occur because people will adapt.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>It is not</mark> at all <mark>apparent that immediate</mark> and dramatic <mark>policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks</u></strong></mark>. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.</p> </s>

Advances in Technology Will Solve Diseases

can we cure all diseases in the future? as long as we don’t stop researching and we have fair eyes on everything, we will have ability to cure most diseases in the future now we have ability to expand the great results of stem cell research, we will use them perfectly in the coming years, believe we will have enough ability to cure all disease in the future.

as long as we don’t stop researching and we have fair eyes on everything, we will have ability to cure most diseases in the future now we have ability to expand the great results of stem cell research, we will use them perfectly in the coming years we will have ability to cure all disease in the future.

Now let’s be back to the title, can we cure all diseases in the future? This is a complicated question, it is difficult to make an definite answer for it, but one thing is sure, as long as we don’t stop researching and we have fair eyes on everything, we will have ability to cure most diseases in the future. And now we have ability to expand the great results of stem cell research, we will use them perfectly in the coming years, this will be a great news in medical industry. So now we have enough faith to believe we will have enough ability to cure all disease in the future.

<h4><strong>Advances in Technology Will Solve Diseases</h4><p>Dingchao, 2008</p><p></strong>[Han Dingchao, writer, “Can We Cure All Diseases In The Future?”,<u><strong> http://www.handingchao.com/can-we-cure-all-diseases-in-the-future/]</p><p></u></strong>Now let’s be back to the title, <u><strong>can we cure all diseases in the future?</strong> </u>This is a complicated question, it is difficult to make an definite answer for it, but one thing is sure, <u><strong><mark>as long as we don’t stop researching and we have fair eyes on everything, we will have ability to cure most diseases in the future</u></strong></mark>. And <u><strong><mark>now we have ability to expand the great results of stem cell research, we will use them perfectly in the coming years</strong></mark>,</u> this will be a great news in medical industry. So now we have enough faith to <u><strong>believe <mark>we will have</mark> enough <mark>ability to cure all disease in the future.</p></u></strong></mark>

Dingchao, 2008 [Han Dingchao, writer, “Can We Cure All Diseases In The Future?”, http://www.handingchao.com/can-we-cure-all-diseases-in-the-future/]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Dingchao, 2008 [Han Dingchao, writer, “Can We Cure All Diseases In The Future?”, http://www.handingchao.com/can-we-cure-all-diseases-in-the-future/] fulltext: Now let’s be back to the title, can we cure all diseases in the future? This is a complicated question, it is difficult to make an definite answer for it, but one thing is sure, as long as we don’t stop researching and we have fair eyes on everything, we will have ability to cure most diseases in the future. And now we have ability to expand the great results of stem cell research, we will use them perfectly in the coming years, this will be a great news in medical industry. So now we have enough faith to believe we will have enough ability to cure all disease in the future. [/INST] <h4><strong>Advances in Technology Will Solve Diseases</h4><p>Dingchao, 2008</p><p></strong>[Han Dingchao, writer, “Can We Cure All Diseases In The Future?”,<u><strong> http://www.handingchao.com/can-we-cure-all-diseases-in-the-future/]</p><p></u></strong>Now let’s be back to the title, <u><strong>can we cure all diseases in the future?</strong> </u>This is a complicated question, it is difficult to make an definite answer for it, but one thing is sure, <u><strong><mark>as long as we don’t stop researching and we have fair eyes on everything, we will have ability to cure most diseases in the future</u></strong></mark>. And <u><strong><mark>now we have ability to expand the great results of stem cell research, we will use them perfectly in the coming years</strong></mark>,</u> this will be a great news in medical industry. So now we have enough faith to <u><strong>believe <mark>we will have</mark> enough <mark>ability to cure all disease in the future.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

Extend 2AC Mendelsohn- warming impacts are just alarmist fear mongering. No global disasters will happen because people can adapt and at best there could only be mild consequences

<h4>Extend 2AC Mendelsohn- warming impacts are just alarmist fear mongering. No global disasters will happen because people can adapt and at best there could only be mild consequences</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Extend 2AC Mendelsohn- warming impacts are just alarmist fear mongering. No global disasters will happen because people can adapt and at best there could only be mild consequences</h4> </s>

Energy security disruptions won’t destabilize the econ= causes diplomatic tensions at best

China’s energy policies are not significant enough to cause significant disruptions in global energy markets. The greatest casualty of Chinese energy policies is that they provide diplomatic protection to countries such as Iran, and diplomatic problems for the U S energy policy and competition over resources is just one manifestation

(John, The Washington Quarterly, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” Summer 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerLee.pdf) /wyo-mm Nevertheless, China’s energy policies are not significant enough to cause significant disruptions in global energy markets. The greatest casualty of Chinese energy policies is that they provide diplomatic protection to countries such as Iran, and cause diplomatic problems for the United States, the West, and those seeking to reinforce the liberal international order more broadly. Even if the best we can hope for is Chinese pragmatism, the journey will still be a turbulent one. And energy policy and competition over resources is just one manifestation, albeit an important one, of this troubling reality. (insert impact Defense from Econ)

<h4><strong>Energy security disruptions won’t destabilize the econ= causes diplomatic tensions at best</h4><p>Lee 12</p><p></strong>(John, The Washington Quarterly, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” Summer 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerLee.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>Nevertheless, <u><strong>China’s energy policies are not significant enough to cause significant disruptions in global energy markets. The greatest casualty of Chinese energy policies is that they provide diplomatic protection to countries such as Iran, and</u></strong> cause <u><strong>diplomatic problems for the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, the West, and those seeking to reinforce the liberal international order more broadly. Even if the best we can hope for is Chinese pragmatism, the journey will still be a turbulent one. And <u><strong>energy policy and competition over resources is just one manifestation</u></strong>, albeit an important one, of this troubling reality.</p><p>(insert impact Defense from Econ)</p>

Lee 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Lee 12 fulltext: (John, The Washington Quarterly, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” Summer 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerLee.pdf) /wyo-mm Nevertheless, China’s energy policies are not significant enough to cause significant disruptions in global energy markets. The greatest casualty of Chinese energy policies is that they provide diplomatic protection to countries such as Iran, and cause diplomatic problems for the United States, the West, and those seeking to reinforce the liberal international order more broadly. Even if the best we can hope for is Chinese pragmatism, the journey will still be a turbulent one. And energy policy and competition over resources is just one manifestation, albeit an important one, of this troubling reality. (insert impact Defense from Econ) [/INST] <h4><strong>Energy security disruptions won’t destabilize the econ= causes diplomatic tensions at best</h4><p>Lee 12</p><p></strong>(John, The Washington Quarterly, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” Summer 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerLee.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p>Nevertheless, <u><strong>China’s energy policies are not significant enough to cause significant disruptions in global energy markets. The greatest casualty of Chinese energy policies is that they provide diplomatic protection to countries such as Iran, and</u></strong> cause <u><strong>diplomatic problems for the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, the West, and those seeking to reinforce the liberal international order more broadly. Even if the best we can hope for is Chinese pragmatism, the journey will still be a turbulent one. And <u><strong>energy policy and competition over resources is just one manifestation</u></strong>, albeit an important one, of this troubling reality.</p><p>(insert impact Defense from Econ)</p> </s>

Economic decline doesn’t cause war- empirics

Nor can economic crises explain bloodshed Germany started war after its economy recovered Not all countries affected by the Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all start wars no relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole Some wars came after growth, others were causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe and severe economic crises were not followed by wars

Nor can economic crises explain bloodshed Germany started war after its economy recovered Not all countries affected by the Depression were taken over by fascist regimes nor start wars no relationship between economics and conflict is discernible Some wars came after growth others were causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and severe economic crises were not followed by wars

(Niall, Professor of History – Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, 85(5), September / October, Lexis) Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

<h4>Economic decline doesn’t cause war<strong>- empirics</h4><p>Ferguson 6</p><p></strong>(Niall, Professor of History – Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, 85(5), September / October, Lexis)</p><p><u><mark>Nor can economic crises explain</u></mark> the <u><mark>bloodshed</u></mark>. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi <u><mark>Germany started</u> </mark>the <u><mark>war</u></mark> in Europe only <u><mark>after its economy</u> </mark>had <u><mark>recovered</u></mark>. <u><mark>Not all</u> </mark>the <u><mark>countries affected by the</u> </mark>Great <u><mark>Depression</u></mark> <u><mark>were taken over by fascist regimes</mark>, <mark>nor</mark> did all</u> such regimes <u><mark>start wars</u> </mark>of aggression. In fact, <u><strong><mark>no</u></strong></mark> general <u><strong><mark>relationship between economics and conflict is discernible</u></strong> <u></mark>for the century as a whole</u>. <u><mark>Some wars came after</u> </mark>periods of <u><mark>growth</mark>, <mark>others were</u> </mark>the <u><mark>causes</mark> <mark>rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe</u>, <u>and</u></mark> some <u><strong><mark>severe economic crises were not followed by wars</u></strong></mark>.</p>

Ferguson 6

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ferguson 6 fulltext: (Niall, Professor of History – Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, 85(5), September / October, Lexis) Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars. [/INST] <h4>Economic decline doesn’t cause war<strong>- empirics</h4><p>Ferguson 6</p><p></strong>(Niall, Professor of History – Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, 85(5), September / October, Lexis)</p><p><u><mark>Nor can economic crises explain</u></mark> the <u><mark>bloodshed</u></mark>. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi <u><mark>Germany started</u> </mark>the <u><mark>war</u></mark> in Europe only <u><mark>after its economy</u> </mark>had <u><mark>recovered</u></mark>. <u><mark>Not all</u> </mark>the <u><mark>countries affected by the</u> </mark>Great <u><mark>Depression</u></mark> <u><mark>were taken over by fascist regimes</mark>, <mark>nor</mark> did all</u> such regimes <u><mark>start wars</u> </mark>of aggression. In fact, <u><strong><mark>no</u></strong></mark> general <u><strong><mark>relationship between economics and conflict is discernible</u></strong> <u></mark>for the century as a whole</u>. <u><mark>Some wars came after</u> </mark>periods of <u><mark>growth</mark>, <mark>others were</u> </mark>the <u><mark>causes</mark> <mark>rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe</u>, <u>and</u></mark> some <u><strong><mark>severe economic crises were not followed by wars</u></strong></mark>.</p> </s>

Studies prove

Do wars spring from economic crisis According to a study there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis they concluded that the conventional wisdom may be wrong The severity of economic crisis bore no relationship to an outbreak of violence

Do wars spring from economic crisis there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis After studying they concluded that conventional wisdom may be wrong economic crisis bore no relationship to violence

(Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273) The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis thatexacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

<h4>Studies prove</h4><p><strong>Miller 2K</p><p></strong>(Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273)</p><p>The question may be reformulated. <u><mark>Do wars spring from</u> </mark>a popular reaction to a sudden <u><mark>economic crisis</u> </mark>thatexacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. <u>According to a study</u> undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <u><mark>there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis</u></mark>. <u><mark>After studying </mark>ninety-three episodes of</u> <u>economic crisis</u> in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War <u><mark>they concluded that</u></mark>:19 Much of <u>the <mark>conventional wisdom</u> </mark>about the political impact of economic crises <u><mark>may be wrong</u> </mark>... <u>The severity of <mark>economic crisis</u> </mark>– as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - <u><mark>bore</u> <u><strong>no relationship</u></strong> </mark>to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) <u><mark>to </mark>an outbreak of <mark>violence</u> </mark>... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).</p>

Miller 2K

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Miller 2K fulltext: (Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273) The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis thatexacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another). [/INST] <h4>Studies prove</h4><p><strong>Miller 2K</p><p></strong>(Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273)</p><p>The question may be reformulated. <u><mark>Do wars spring from</u> </mark>a popular reaction to a sudden <u><mark>economic crisis</u> </mark>thatexacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. <u>According to a study</u> undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <u><mark>there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis</u></mark>. <u><mark>After studying </mark>ninety-three episodes of</u> <u>economic crisis</u> in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War <u><mark>they concluded that</u></mark>:19 Much of <u>the <mark>conventional wisdom</u> </mark>about the political impact of economic crises <u><mark>may be wrong</u> </mark>... <u>The severity of <mark>economic crisis</u> </mark>– as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - <u><mark>bore</u> <u><strong>no relationship</u></strong> </mark>to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) <u><mark>to </mark>an outbreak of <mark>violence</u> </mark>... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).</p> </s>

No impact- global economy’s resilient

(Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483) The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the U S which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility. in recent years the Fed has been particularly adept at crisis management, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy. Bernanke spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth.

The global economies were able to withstand blows tsunamis hurricanes and highest energy prices without missing a beat the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks What explains this resistance good macroeconomic policies and microeconomic flexibility the Fed has been adept at crisis management, cutting interest rates in response to weakness in the economy no shock will derail expansion

(Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483) The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck at the very end of 2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the United States, which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility. Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, in recent years the Fed has been particularly adept at crisis management, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy. The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. At the same time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth.

<h4>No impact- global economy’s<strong> resilient</h4><p>Behravesh 06</p><p><u></strong>(Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483) </p><p><mark>The</mark> U.S. and <mark>global economies were able to withstand </mark>three body <mark>blows</mark> in 2005--one of the worst <mark>tsunamis</mark> on record </u>(which struck at the very end of 2004), <u>one of the worst <mark>hurricanes</mark> on record <mark>and</mark> the <mark>highest</mark> <mark>energy</mark> <mark>prices</mark> after Hurricane Katrina--<mark>without missing a beat</mark>. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the</u> <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. </u>Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but <u>recent events do suggest that <mark>the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks </mark>that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn.</u> In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. <u><mark>What explains this </mark>enhanced recession <mark>resistance</mark>? The answer: a combination of <mark>good macroeconomic policies and </mark>improved <mark>microeconomic flexibility</mark>. </u>Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, <u>in recent years <mark>the Fed has been </mark>particularly <mark>adept at crisis management,</mark> aggressively <mark>cutting interest rates in response to</mark> stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and <mark>weakness in the economy</mark>. </u>The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben <u>Bernanke</u>, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, <u>spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. </u>At the same time, <u><mark>no</mark> single <mark>shock</mark> <mark>will</mark> likely be big enough to <mark>derail</mark> the <mark>expansion</mark>.</u> What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but <u>an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth.</p></u>

Behravesh 06

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Behravesh 06 fulltext: (Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483) The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck at the very end of 2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the United States, which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility. Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, in recent years the Fed has been particularly adept at crisis management, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy. The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. At the same time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth. [/INST] <h4>No impact- global economy’s<strong> resilient</h4><p>Behravesh 06</p><p><u></strong>(Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483) </p><p><mark>The</mark> U.S. and <mark>global economies were able to withstand </mark>three body <mark>blows</mark> in 2005--one of the worst <mark>tsunamis</mark> on record </u>(which struck at the very end of 2004), <u>one of the worst <mark>hurricanes</mark> on record <mark>and</mark> the <mark>highest</mark> <mark>energy</mark> <mark>prices</mark> after Hurricane Katrina--<mark>without missing a beat</mark>. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the</u> <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. </u>Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but <u>recent events do suggest that <mark>the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks </mark>that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn.</u> In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. <u><mark>What explains this </mark>enhanced recession <mark>resistance</mark>? The answer: a combination of <mark>good macroeconomic policies and </mark>improved <mark>microeconomic flexibility</mark>. </u>Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, <u>in recent years <mark>the Fed has been </mark>particularly <mark>adept at crisis management,</mark> aggressively <mark>cutting interest rates in response to</mark> stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and <mark>weakness in the economy</mark>. </u>The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben <u>Bernanke</u>, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, <u>spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. </u>At the same time, <u><mark>no</mark> single <mark>shock</mark> <mark>will</mark> likely be big enough to <mark>derail</mark> the <mark>expansion</mark>.</u> What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but <u>an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth.</p></u> </s>

Economy resilient- empirics

During the past 25 years, the economy has been resilient in the face of adverse shocks economists attribute stability to less regulation competition in labor and product markets and effective monetary policy the economy has become flexible, able to respond to shocks because prices can adjust quickly the economy has coped with severe shocks of the past year well

During the past 25 years, the economy has been resilient in the face of shocks economists attribute stability to less regulation competition and monetary policy the economy has become flexible because prices adjust quickly the economy has coped with the past year well

(Reporting the Congressional Budget Office Summer Report on Economic Assessments, “FOMC Seen Hiking FFR Through '09,'10”, 9-9, Lexis) However, the economic outlook could also improve sooner than CBO is currently forecasting. During the past 25 years, the economy has been resilient in the face of adverse shocks; since 1983, it has experienced only two relatively mild recessions, and inflation has been much more contained than in earlier years. Some economists attribute that long period of relative stability to a number of developments -- for example, less economic regulation, greater competition in labor and product markets (including globalization), and more-effective monetary policy. They argue that the economy has become more competitive and more flexible, able to respond to shocks because prices can adjust more quickly to reflect relative scarcities. (According to that view, scarce goods and services can be quickly redirected to their most valued uses, and a price shocks negative effect on output will be muted.) The current turbulence in the financial markets is testing that argument, but up to now, the economy has coped with the severe shocks of the past year relatively well. In particular, in a distinct contrast to events following the shocks of the 1970s, the lack of a steady surge in core inflation and unit labor costs, and the degree to which the consumption of petroleum products has declined, indicate an efficient response by businesses and households to skyrocketing oil prices. (For example, initial estimates indicate that the consumption of petroleum products during the second quarter of this year was about 4 percent lower than it was a year ago, even though real GDP was 1.8 percent higher. In contrast to responses to earlier oil price shocks, the reduction in the use of petroleum per unit of GDP has occurred without causing major disruptions.) Moreover, the apparent restraint in core inflation has given the Federal Reserve more latitude to try to mitigate the downturn in the economy. Also, some of the negative effects that the shortage of credit has had on businesses' investment spending may have been alleviated by the relatively healthy balance sheets of nonfinancial corporations.

<h4>Economy resilient<strong>- empirics</h4><p>Main Wire 8 </p><p></strong>(Reporting the Congressional Budget Office Summer Report on Economic Assessments, “FOMC Seen Hiking FFR Through '09,'10”, 9-9, Lexis)</p><p>However, the economic outlook could also improve sooner than CBO is currently forecasting. <u><mark>During the past 25 years, the economy has been <strong>resilient in the face of</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>adverse</u> <u><mark>shocks</u></strong></mark>; since 1983, it has experienced only two relatively mild recessions, and inflation has been much more contained than in earlier years. Some <u><mark>economists</u> <u>attribute</u> </mark>that long period of relative <u><mark>stability to</u> </mark>a number of developments -- for example, <u><mark>less</u> </mark>economic <u><mark>regulation</u></mark>, greater <u><mark>competition </mark>in labor and product markets</u> (including globalization), <u><mark>and</u> </mark>more-<u>effective</u> <u><mark>monetary policy</u></mark>. They argue that <u><mark>the economy has become</u> </mark>more competitive and more <u><mark>flexible</mark>, able to respond to shocks <mark>because prices </mark>can <mark>adjust</u> </mark>more <u><mark>quickly</u> </mark>to reflect relative scarcities. (According to that view, scarce goods and services can be quickly redirected to their most valued uses, and a price shocks negative effect on output will be muted.) The current turbulence in the financial markets is testing that argument, but up to now, <u><mark>the economy has coped with</u> </mark>the <u>severe shocks of <mark>the past year</u> </mark>relatively <u><mark>well</u></mark>. In particular, in a distinct contrast to events following the shocks of the 1970s, the lack of a steady surge in core inflation and unit labor costs, and the degree to which the consumption of petroleum products has declined, indicate an efficient response by businesses and households to skyrocketing oil prices. (For example, initial estimates indicate that the consumption of petroleum products during the second quarter of this year was about 4 percent lower than it was a year ago, even though real GDP was 1.8 percent higher. In contrast to responses to earlier oil price shocks, the reduction in the use of petroleum per unit of GDP has occurred without causing major disruptions.) Moreover, the apparent restraint in core inflation has given the Federal Reserve more latitude to try to mitigate the downturn in the economy. Also, some of the negative effects that the shortage of credit has had on businesses' investment spending may have been alleviated by the relatively healthy balance sheets of nonfinancial corporations.</p>

Main Wire 8

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Main Wire 8 fulltext: (Reporting the Congressional Budget Office Summer Report on Economic Assessments, “FOMC Seen Hiking FFR Through '09,'10”, 9-9, Lexis) However, the economic outlook could also improve sooner than CBO is currently forecasting. During the past 25 years, the economy has been resilient in the face of adverse shocks; since 1983, it has experienced only two relatively mild recessions, and inflation has been much more contained than in earlier years. Some economists attribute that long period of relative stability to a number of developments -- for example, less economic regulation, greater competition in labor and product markets (including globalization), and more-effective monetary policy. They argue that the economy has become more competitive and more flexible, able to respond to shocks because prices can adjust more quickly to reflect relative scarcities. (According to that view, scarce goods and services can be quickly redirected to their most valued uses, and a price shocks negative effect on output will be muted.) The current turbulence in the financial markets is testing that argument, but up to now, the economy has coped with the severe shocks of the past year relatively well. In particular, in a distinct contrast to events following the shocks of the 1970s, the lack of a steady surge in core inflation and unit labor costs, and the degree to which the consumption of petroleum products has declined, indicate an efficient response by businesses and households to skyrocketing oil prices. (For example, initial estimates indicate that the consumption of petroleum products during the second quarter of this year was about 4 percent lower than it was a year ago, even though real GDP was 1.8 percent higher. In contrast to responses to earlier oil price shocks, the reduction in the use of petroleum per unit of GDP has occurred without causing major disruptions.) Moreover, the apparent restraint in core inflation has given the Federal Reserve more latitude to try to mitigate the downturn in the economy. Also, some of the negative effects that the shortage of credit has had on businesses' investment spending may have been alleviated by the relatively healthy balance sheets of nonfinancial corporations. [/INST] <h4>Economy resilient<strong>- empirics</h4><p>Main Wire 8 </p><p></strong>(Reporting the Congressional Budget Office Summer Report on Economic Assessments, “FOMC Seen Hiking FFR Through '09,'10”, 9-9, Lexis)</p><p>However, the economic outlook could also improve sooner than CBO is currently forecasting. <u><mark>During the past 25 years, the economy has been <strong>resilient in the face of</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>adverse</u> <u><mark>shocks</u></strong></mark>; since 1983, it has experienced only two relatively mild recessions, and inflation has been much more contained than in earlier years. Some <u><mark>economists</u> <u>attribute</u> </mark>that long period of relative <u><mark>stability to</u> </mark>a number of developments -- for example, <u><mark>less</u> </mark>economic <u><mark>regulation</u></mark>, greater <u><mark>competition </mark>in labor and product markets</u> (including globalization), <u><mark>and</u> </mark>more-<u>effective</u> <u><mark>monetary policy</u></mark>. They argue that <u><mark>the economy has become</u> </mark>more competitive and more <u><mark>flexible</mark>, able to respond to shocks <mark>because prices </mark>can <mark>adjust</u> </mark>more <u><mark>quickly</u> </mark>to reflect relative scarcities. (According to that view, scarce goods and services can be quickly redirected to their most valued uses, and a price shocks negative effect on output will be muted.) The current turbulence in the financial markets is testing that argument, but up to now, <u><mark>the economy has coped with</u> </mark>the <u>severe shocks of <mark>the past year</u> </mark>relatively <u><mark>well</u></mark>. In particular, in a distinct contrast to events following the shocks of the 1970s, the lack of a steady surge in core inflation and unit labor costs, and the degree to which the consumption of petroleum products has declined, indicate an efficient response by businesses and households to skyrocketing oil prices. (For example, initial estimates indicate that the consumption of petroleum products during the second quarter of this year was about 4 percent lower than it was a year ago, even though real GDP was 1.8 percent higher. In contrast to responses to earlier oil price shocks, the reduction in the use of petroleum per unit of GDP has occurred without causing major disruptions.) Moreover, the apparent restraint in core inflation has given the Federal Reserve more latitude to try to mitigate the downturn in the economy. Also, some of the negative effects that the shortage of credit has had on businesses' investment spending may have been alleviated by the relatively healthy balance sheets of nonfinancial corporations.</p> </s>

Extend 2AC Ferguson- empirically proven economic decline doesn’t cause war and that some wars have come after periods of growth

<h4>Extend 2AC Ferguson- empirically proven economic decline doesn’t cause war and that some wars have come after periods of growth</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Extend 2AC Ferguson- empirically proven economic decline doesn’t cause war and that some wars have come after periods of growth</h4> </s>

No resources

declining living standards cause war this scenario has major flaws it is based on unsound economic theory economic decline does not produce conflict as people get poorer, they become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones depressions may be irrelevant

declining living standards cause this scenario has major flaws. it is based on unsound economic theory economic decline does not produce conflict as people get poorer, they become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones depressions may be irrelevant

(Daniel, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society – Princeton University, “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April) Poverty wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil, then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups, class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are war-prone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modern era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930s increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem.

<h4>No resources</h4><p><strong>Duedney 91</strong> </p><p>(Daniel, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society – Princeton University, “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April)</p><p>Poverty wars. In a second scenario, <u><mark>declining living standards</u> </mark>first <u><mark>cause</u></mark> internal turmoil, then <u>war</u>. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups, class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are war-prone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, <u><mark>this scenario has major flaws</u>. </mark>One is that <u><mark>it is</u> </mark>arguably <u><mark>based</mark> <mark>on unsound economic theory</u></mark>. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, <u><strong><mark>economic decline does not</u></strong> </mark>necessarily <u><strong><mark>produce conflict</u></strong></mark>. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And <u><mark>as people get poorer, they </u></mark>may <u><mark>become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces</u></mark>. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modern era, “<u><mark>The</mark> <mark>predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones</u></mark>.” The experience of economic <u><mark>depressions</u></mark> over the last two centuries <u><mark>may be irrelevant</u></mark>, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930s increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem.</p>

Duedney 91

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Duedney 91 fulltext: (Daniel, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society – Princeton University, “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April) Poverty wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil, then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups, class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are war-prone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modern era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930s increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem. [/INST] <h4>No resources</h4><p><strong>Duedney 91</strong> </p><p>(Daniel, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society – Princeton University, “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April)</p><p>Poverty wars. In a second scenario, <u><mark>declining living standards</u> </mark>first <u><mark>cause</u></mark> internal turmoil, then <u>war</u>. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups, class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are war-prone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, <u><mark>this scenario has major flaws</u>. </mark>One is that <u><mark>it is</u> </mark>arguably <u><mark>based</mark> <mark>on unsound economic theory</u></mark>. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, <u><strong><mark>economic decline does not</u></strong> </mark>necessarily <u><strong><mark>produce conflict</u></strong></mark>. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And <u><mark>as people get poorer, they </u></mark>may <u><mark>become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces</u></mark>. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modern era, “<u><mark>The</mark> <mark>predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones</u></mark>.” The experience of economic <u><mark>depressions</u></mark> over the last two centuries <u><mark>may be irrelevant</u></mark>, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930s increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem.</p> </s>

Taiwan war unlikely – economic ties and improving relations

, all of East Asia has recently become a Chinese sphere of influence. China is the most important destination of Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese exports—ahead of the United States. Although Taiwanese politicians rejected the idea of reunification , and although some of them were attracted to the idea of declaring the legal independence of Taiwan, economic and social ties across the Taiwan Strait grew vigorously at the same time. Since the lateral escalation of a military conflict between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan constitutes the most plausible scenario whereby the U.S. and China might get into a war, economic interdependence between China and Taiwan contributes to the preservation of peace. Recently, political relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan have improved fast.

Although Taiwanese politicians rejected reunification economic and social ties across the Taiwan Strait grew vigorously economic interdependence between China and Taiwan contributes to peace. Recently, political relations between China and Taiwan have improved

From an international trade perspective, all of East Asia has recently become a Chinese sphere of influence. China is the most important destination of Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese exports—ahead of the United States. Although Taiwanese politicians around the turn of the millennium rejected the idea of reunification on the Mainland’s terms, and although some of them were attracted to the idea of declaring the legal independence of Taiwan, economic and social ties across the Taiwan Strait grew vigorously at the same time. Taiwanese companies employ millions of people on the mainland. About a million people from Taiwan live on the Chinese mainland. Mainland China has been the preferred destination of Taiwan’s foreign investment. Since the lateral escalation of a military conflict between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan constitutes the most plausible scenario whereby the U.S. and China might get into a war, economic interdependence between China and Taiwan contributes to the preservation of peace. Recently, political relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan have improved fast. Given the record of Sino-Japanese wars in the past and the power of these neighboring states, the extent of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation provides another reason for optimism. The capitalist peace stands a chance to apply between China and its neighbors and competitors.

<h4><u><strong>Taiwan war unlikely – economic ties and improving relations</h4><p></u><mark>Weede</strong></mark>, Former Professor of Sociology at the University of Bonn<u><strong>, </u>20<mark>10</p><p></strong></mark>(Erich, retired in 2004, current member of the Mont Pelerin Society, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence”, International Interactions 36:2, 206-213, 5/18/10, accessed 6/20/11) JDB</p><p>From an international trade perspective<u><strong>, all of East Asia has recently become a Chinese sphere of influence. China is the most important destination of Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese exports—ahead of the United States. <mark>Although Taiwanese politicians</u></strong></mark> around the turn of the millennium <u><strong><mark>rejected </mark>the idea of <mark>reunification</mark> </u></strong>on the Mainland’s terms<u><strong>, and although some of them were attracted to the idea of declaring the legal independence of Taiwan, <mark>economic and social ties across the Taiwan Strait grew vigorously</mark> at the same time.</u></strong> Taiwanese companies employ millions of people on the mainland. About a million people from Taiwan live on the Chinese mainland. Mainland China has been the preferred destination of Taiwan’s foreign investment. <u><strong>Since the lateral escalation of a military conflict between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan constitutes the most plausible scenario whereby the U.S. and China might get into a war, <mark>economic interdependence between China and Taiwan contributes to </mark>the preservation of <mark>peace.</mark> <mark>Recently, political relations between</mark> the People’s Republic of <mark>China and</mark> the Republic of China on <mark>Taiwan have improved </mark>fast.</u></strong> Given the record of Sino-Japanese wars in the past and the power of these neighboring states, the extent of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation provides another reason for optimism. The capitalist peace stands a chance to apply between China and its neighbors and competitors.</p>

Weede, Former Professor of Sociology at the University of Bonn, 2010 (Erich, retired in 2004, current member of the Mont Pelerin Society, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence”, International Interactions 36:2, 206-213, 5/18/10, accessed 6/20/11) JDB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Weede, Former Professor of Sociology at the University of Bonn, 2010 (Erich, retired in 2004, current member of the Mont Pelerin Society, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence”, International Interactions 36:2, 206-213, 5/18/10, accessed 6/20/11) JDB fulltext: From an international trade perspective, all of East Asia has recently become a Chinese sphere of influence. China is the most important destination of Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese exports—ahead of the United States. Although Taiwanese politicians around the turn of the millennium rejected the idea of reunification on the Mainland’s terms, and although some of them were attracted to the idea of declaring the legal independence of Taiwan, economic and social ties across the Taiwan Strait grew vigorously at the same time. Taiwanese companies employ millions of people on the mainland. About a million people from Taiwan live on the Chinese mainland. Mainland China has been the preferred destination of Taiwan’s foreign investment. Since the lateral escalation of a military conflict between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan constitutes the most plausible scenario whereby the U.S. and China might get into a war, economic interdependence between China and Taiwan contributes to the preservation of peace. Recently, political relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan have improved fast. Given the record of Sino-Japanese wars in the past and the power of these neighboring states, the extent of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation provides another reason for optimism. The capitalist peace stands a chance to apply between China and its neighbors and competitors. [/INST] <h4><u><strong>Taiwan war unlikely – economic ties and improving relations</h4><p></u><mark>Weede</strong></mark>, Former Professor of Sociology at the University of Bonn<u><strong>, </u>20<mark>10</p><p></strong></mark>(Erich, retired in 2004, current member of the Mont Pelerin Society, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence”, International Interactions 36:2, 206-213, 5/18/10, accessed 6/20/11) JDB</p><p>From an international trade perspective<u><strong>, all of East Asia has recently become a Chinese sphere of influence. China is the most important destination of Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese exports—ahead of the United States. <mark>Although Taiwanese politicians</u></strong></mark> around the turn of the millennium <u><strong><mark>rejected </mark>the idea of <mark>reunification</mark> </u></strong>on the Mainland’s terms<u><strong>, and although some of them were attracted to the idea of declaring the legal independence of Taiwan, <mark>economic and social ties across the Taiwan Strait grew vigorously</mark> at the same time.</u></strong> Taiwanese companies employ millions of people on the mainland. About a million people from Taiwan live on the Chinese mainland. Mainland China has been the preferred destination of Taiwan’s foreign investment. <u><strong>Since the lateral escalation of a military conflict between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan constitutes the most plausible scenario whereby the U.S. and China might get into a war, <mark>economic interdependence between China and Taiwan contributes to </mark>the preservation of <mark>peace.</mark> <mark>Recently, political relations between</mark> the People’s Republic of <mark>China and</mark> the Republic of China on <mark>Taiwan have improved </mark>fast.</u></strong> Given the record of Sino-Japanese wars in the past and the power of these neighboring states, the extent of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation provides another reason for optimism. The capitalist peace stands a chance to apply between China and its neighbors and competitors.</p> </s>

No nuclear escalation and outside powers will stay out

if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region,

Taiwan would be confined to the use of conventional weapons and it would not likely escalate countries in Asia regard relations with Beijing as outweighing concerns about China having used force This logic would apply strongly to countries outside the region

This situation would occur if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy. With the exception of Japan, most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region, which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force.

<h4><u><strong>No nuclear escalation and outside powers will stay out</h4><p></u></strong>Roger <u><strong>Cliff,</u></strong> Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and David A. <u><strong>Shlapak</u></strong>, Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report, 200<u><strong>7</p><p></u></strong>This situation would occur <u><strong>if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened</u></strong>, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 <u><strong>Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over <mark>Taiwan would</mark> likely <mark>be confined to the use of conventional weapons</mark>, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, <mark>and </mark>that <mark>it would not likely escalate</mark> into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time.</u></strong> Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, <u><strong>even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War</u></strong>. <u><strong>Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy</u></strong>. With the exception of Japan, <u><strong>most <mark>countries in Asia</mark> would likely <mark>regard</mark> the importance of maintaining good <mark>relations with Beijing as outweighing </mark>any <mark>concerns about China having used force </mark>against Taiwan</u></strong>. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. <u><strong><mark>This logic would apply</mark> even more <mark>strongly to countries outside the region</mark>, </u></strong>which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force. </p>

Roger Cliff, Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and David A. Shlapak, Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report, 2007

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Roger Cliff, Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and David A. Shlapak, Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report, 2007 fulltext: This situation would occur if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy. With the exception of Japan, most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region, which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force. [/INST] <h4><u><strong>No nuclear escalation and outside powers will stay out</h4><p></u></strong>Roger <u><strong>Cliff,</u></strong> Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and David A. <u><strong>Shlapak</u></strong>, Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report, 200<u><strong>7</p><p></u></strong>This situation would occur <u><strong>if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened</u></strong>, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 <u><strong>Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over <mark>Taiwan would</mark> likely <mark>be confined to the use of conventional weapons</mark>, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, <mark>and </mark>that <mark>it would not likely escalate</mark> into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time.</u></strong> Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, <u><strong>even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War</u></strong>. <u><strong>Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy</u></strong>. With the exception of Japan, <u><strong>most <mark>countries in Asia</mark> would likely <mark>regard</mark> the importance of maintaining good <mark>relations with Beijing as outweighing </mark>any <mark>concerns about China having used force </mark>against Taiwan</u></strong>. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. <u><strong><mark>This logic would apply</mark> even more <mark>strongly to countries outside the region</mark>, </u></strong>which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force. </p> </s>

Extend 2AC Weede- economic interdependence between China and Taiwan is improving relations and prevents conflict-

<h4>Extend 2AC Weede- economic interdependence between China and Taiwan is improving relations and prevents conflict-</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Extend 2AC Weede- economic interdependence between China and Taiwan is improving relations and prevents conflict-</h4> </s>

And, war in the Taiwan Strait won’t escalate

US security commitment to Taiwan is  ambiguous and hard to predict, it is safe to say that the greater the potential cost of  intervention to the US, the less likely the US will be to intervene first, China believes it is more resolved than the  US in a conflict over the status of Taiwan second once China builds nuclear force the US will be reluctant to intervene or escalate in Taiwan

China believes it is more resolved than the  US in a conflict over the status of Taiwan US will be reluctant to intervene or escalate

Whether the US will help defend Taiwan is the key question to the study of  security issues in the Taiwan Strait. Although the US security commitment to Taiwan is  ambiguous and hard to predict, it is safe to say that the greater the potential cost of  intervention to the US, the less likely the US will be to intervene. China’s strategic  reasoning then follows straightforwardly from its assessment of its resolve and  capabilities relative to those of the US: first, China believes it is more resolved than the  US in a conflict over the status of Taiwan; second, once China builds up its nuclear force,  the US will be reluctant to intervene or threaten to escalate in the next Taiwan Strait crisis. Russia’s revision of its nuclear strategy and, concomitantly, US and NATO inaction in  Chechen serve as an inspiration for China. Thus, to demonstrate its resolve to confront  the US for the sake of defending its territorial sovereignty, China has reactivated its  dormant nuclear program in the mid 1990s and is slowly but surely taking steps to  modernize its nuclear force. In this paper, I show that China has already deployed eight  ICBM missile brigades in only a few years. Moreover, according to the Cox Report,  China’s nuclear program is expected to make even greater technological progress in  coming years and thus will become an even greater nuclear threat to the US in the near future. In the following, I briefly discuss three policy options the US can take to deal  with China’s increasing nuclear threat

<h4>And, w<strong>ar in the Taiwan Strait won’t escalate</h4><p>Niou 03</p><p></strong>[Emerson Niou, Department of Political Science Duke University, July 21 2003.”Nuclear Deterrence over Taiwan” <u>http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:_Tud2BeFPUQJ:www.duke.edu/~niou/teaching/Nuclear%2520Deterrence%2520Over%2520Taiwan.pdf+taiwan+conflict+won%27t+escalate&hl=en</u>]</p><p>Whether the US will help defend Taiwan is the key question to the study of  security issues in the Taiwan Strait. Although the <u><strong>US security commitment to </strong>Taiwan<strong> is  ambiguous</u></strong> <u><strong>and hard to predict, it is safe to say that the greater the potential cost of  intervention to the US, the less likely the US will be to intervene</u></strong>. China’s strategic  reasoning then follows straightforwardly from its assessment of its resolve and  capabilities relative to those of the US: <u><strong>first, <mark>China believes it is more resolved than the  US in a </strong>conflict<strong> over the status of </strong>Taiwan</u></mark>; <u><strong>second</u></strong>, <u><strong>once China</u></strong> <u><strong>builds</u></strong> up its <u><strong>nuclear</u></strong> <u><strong>force</u></strong>,  <u><strong>the <mark>US will be reluctant</u></strong> <u><strong>to</u></strong> <u><strong>intervene</u></strong> <u><strong>or</u></strong></mark> threaten to <u><strong><mark>escalate</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>in</u></strong> the next <u><strong>Taiwan</u></strong> Strait crisis. Russia’s revision of its nuclear strategy and, concomitantly, US and NATO inaction in  Chechen serve as an inspiration for China. Thus, to demonstrate its resolve to confront  the US for the sake of defending its territorial sovereignty, China has reactivated its  dormant nuclear program in the mid 1990s and is slowly but surely taking steps to  modernize its nuclear force. In this paper, I show that China has already deployed eight  ICBM missile brigades in only a few years. Moreover, according to the Cox Report,  China’s nuclear program is expected to make even greater technological progress in  coming years and thus will become an even greater nuclear threat to the US in the near future. In the following, I briefly discuss three policy options the US can take to deal  with China’s increasing nuclear threat</p>

Niou 03 [Emerson Niou, Department of Political Science Duke University, July 21 2003.”Nuclear Deterrence over Taiwan” http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:_Tud2BeFPUQJ:www.duke.edu/~niou/teaching/Nuclear%2520Deterrence%2520Over%2520Taiwan.pdf+taiwan+conflict+won%27t+escalate&hl=en]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Niou 03 [Emerson Niou, Department of Political Science Duke University, July 21 2003.”Nuclear Deterrence over Taiwan” http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:_Tud2BeFPUQJ:www.duke.edu/~niou/teaching/Nuclear%2520Deterrence%2520Over%2520Taiwan.pdf+taiwan+conflict+won%27t+escalate&hl=en] fulltext: Whether the US will help defend Taiwan is the key question to the study of  security issues in the Taiwan Strait. Although the US security commitment to Taiwan is  ambiguous and hard to predict, it is safe to say that the greater the potential cost of  intervention to the US, the less likely the US will be to intervene. China’s strategic  reasoning then follows straightforwardly from its assessment of its resolve and  capabilities relative to those of the US: first, China believes it is more resolved than the  US in a conflict over the status of Taiwan; second, once China builds up its nuclear force,  the US will be reluctant to intervene or threaten to escalate in the next Taiwan Strait crisis. Russia’s revision of its nuclear strategy and, concomitantly, US and NATO inaction in  Chechen serve as an inspiration for China. Thus, to demonstrate its resolve to confront  the US for the sake of defending its territorial sovereignty, China has reactivated its  dormant nuclear program in the mid 1990s and is slowly but surely taking steps to  modernize its nuclear force. In this paper, I show that China has already deployed eight  ICBM missile brigades in only a few years. Moreover, according to the Cox Report,  China’s nuclear program is expected to make even greater technological progress in  coming years and thus will become an even greater nuclear threat to the US in the near future. In the following, I briefly discuss three policy options the US can take to deal  with China’s increasing nuclear threat [/INST] <h4>And, w<strong>ar in the Taiwan Strait won’t escalate</h4><p>Niou 03</p><p></strong>[Emerson Niou, Department of Political Science Duke University, July 21 2003.”Nuclear Deterrence over Taiwan” <u>http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:_Tud2BeFPUQJ:www.duke.edu/~niou/teaching/Nuclear%2520Deterrence%2520Over%2520Taiwan.pdf+taiwan+conflict+won%27t+escalate&hl=en</u>]</p><p>Whether the US will help defend Taiwan is the key question to the study of  security issues in the Taiwan Strait. Although the <u><strong>US security commitment to </strong>Taiwan<strong> is  ambiguous</u></strong> <u><strong>and hard to predict, it is safe to say that the greater the potential cost of  intervention to the US, the less likely the US will be to intervene</u></strong>. China’s strategic  reasoning then follows straightforwardly from its assessment of its resolve and  capabilities relative to those of the US: <u><strong>first, <mark>China believes it is more resolved than the  US in a </strong>conflict<strong> over the status of </strong>Taiwan</u></mark>; <u><strong>second</u></strong>, <u><strong>once China</u></strong> <u><strong>builds</u></strong> up its <u><strong>nuclear</u></strong> <u><strong>force</u></strong>,  <u><strong>the <mark>US will be reluctant</u></strong> <u><strong>to</u></strong> <u><strong>intervene</u></strong> <u><strong>or</u></strong></mark> threaten to <u><strong><mark>escalate</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>in</u></strong> the next <u><strong>Taiwan</u></strong> Strait crisis. Russia’s revision of its nuclear strategy and, concomitantly, US and NATO inaction in  Chechen serve as an inspiration for China. Thus, to demonstrate its resolve to confront  the US for the sake of defending its territorial sovereignty, China has reactivated its  dormant nuclear program in the mid 1990s and is slowly but surely taking steps to  modernize its nuclear force. In this paper, I show that China has already deployed eight  ICBM missile brigades in only a few years. Moreover, according to the Cox Report,  China’s nuclear program is expected to make even greater technological progress in  coming years and thus will become an even greater nuclear threat to the US in the near future. In the following, I briefly discuss three policy options the US can take to deal  with China’s increasing nuclear threat</p> </s>

Turn- expanding China influence kills US-trade agreements and democracy

China’s growing economic presence in the Americas provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with additional trade and investment options that reduce US leverage to promote open market, democratic values. US efforts to promote labor and environmental reforms through trade agreements are undermined when other nations have the ability to sign similar agreements with China that do not include similar provisions

(Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm) A trade agenda also has important foreign policy implications. China’s growing economic presence in the Americas provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with additional trade and investment options that reduce US leverage to promote open market, democratic values. US efforts to promote labor and environmental reforms through trade agreements are undermined when other nations have the ability to sign similar agreements with China that do not include similar provisions.10 For example, China’s FTAs with Chile and Peru liberalize agriculture and markets for lower value-added manufactured goods but do not include deregulation and liberalization of services and investment and stronger protection of intellectual property rights.11 US FTAs seek to raise the economic competitiveness of both signatories through the harmonization and modernization of services and investment.12

<h4>Turn- expanding China influence <strong>kills US-trade agreements and democracy</h4><p>Brandt et al. 12</p><p></strong>(Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren</p><p>Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm)</p><p>A trade agenda also has important foreign policy implications. <u><strong>China’s growing economic presence in the Americas provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with additional trade and investment options that reduce US leverage to promote open market, democratic values. US efforts to promote labor and environmental reforms through trade agreements are undermined when other nations have the ability to sign similar agreements with China that do not include similar provisions</u></strong>.10 For example, China’s FTAs with Chile and Peru liberalize agriculture and markets for lower value-added manufactured goods but do not include deregulation and liberalization of services and investment and stronger protection of intellectual property rights.11 US FTAs seek to raise the economic competitiveness of both signatories through the harmonization and modernization of services and investment.12</p>

Brandt et al. 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Brandt et al. 12 fulltext: (Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm) A trade agenda also has important foreign policy implications. China’s growing economic presence in the Americas provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with additional trade and investment options that reduce US leverage to promote open market, democratic values. US efforts to promote labor and environmental reforms through trade agreements are undermined when other nations have the ability to sign similar agreements with China that do not include similar provisions.10 For example, China’s FTAs with Chile and Peru liberalize agriculture and markets for lower value-added manufactured goods but do not include deregulation and liberalization of services and investment and stronger protection of intellectual property rights.11 US FTAs seek to raise the economic competitiveness of both signatories through the harmonization and modernization of services and investment.12 [/INST] <h4>Turn- expanding China influence <strong>kills US-trade agreements and democracy</h4><p>Brandt et al. 12</p><p></strong>(Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren</p><p>Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm)</p><p>A trade agenda also has important foreign policy implications. <u><strong>China’s growing economic presence in the Americas provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with additional trade and investment options that reduce US leverage to promote open market, democratic values. US efforts to promote labor and environmental reforms through trade agreements are undermined when other nations have the ability to sign similar agreements with China that do not include similar provisions</u></strong>.10 For example, China’s FTAs with Chile and Peru liberalize agriculture and markets for lower value-added manufactured goods but do not include deregulation and liberalization of services and investment and stronger protection of intellectual property rights.11 US FTAs seek to raise the economic competitiveness of both signatories through the harmonization and modernization of services and investment.12</p> </s>

And loss of democracy causes extinction-

Promoting Democracy in the 1990s in the coming years and decades nationalist aggression could easily spread powerful international crime syndicates have made common cause with authoritarian regimes Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered these threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness

(Larry; senior fellow Hoover Institute) Promoting Democracy in the 1990s p. 6 http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

<h4><strong>And loss of democracy causes extinction- </h4><p>Diamond 95</p><p></strong>(Larry; senior fellow Hoover Institute) <u>Promoting Democracy in the 1990s</u> p. 6 http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm</p><p>This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being <u><strong>in the coming years and decades</u></strong>. In the former Yugoslavia <u><strong>nationalist aggression</u></strong> tears at the stability of Europe and <u><strong>could easily spread</u></strong>. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly <u><strong>powerful international crime syndicates</u></strong> that <u><strong>have made common cause with authoritarian regimes</u></strong> and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. <u><strong>Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate</u></strong>. <u><strong>The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered</u></strong>. Most of <u><strong>these</u></strong> new and unconventional <u><strong>threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness</u></strong>.</p>

Diamond 95

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Diamond 95 fulltext: (Larry; senior fellow Hoover Institute) Promoting Democracy in the 1990s p. 6 http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. [/INST] <h4><strong>And loss of democracy causes extinction- </h4><p>Diamond 95</p><p></strong>(Larry; senior fellow Hoover Institute) <u>Promoting Democracy in the 1990s</u> p. 6 http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm</p><p>This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being <u><strong>in the coming years and decades</u></strong>. In the former Yugoslavia <u><strong>nationalist aggression</u></strong> tears at the stability of Europe and <u><strong>could easily spread</u></strong>. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly <u><strong>powerful international crime syndicates</u></strong> that <u><strong>have made common cause with authoritarian regimes</u></strong> and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. <u><strong>Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate</u></strong>. <u><strong>The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered</u></strong>. Most of <u><strong>these</u></strong> new and unconventional <u><strong>threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Turn- expanding China economic influence causes Latin American dutch disease that collapses the global trade-

the long-term projection of this commodity trading is risky. Latin American countries are dependent on sustained commodity prices to uphold an economy that has yet to develop into a more modern, dynamic level. If Latin American countries are lulled into ‘Dutch disease’, they run the risk of not advancing socio-economically and putting continued strain on the primary commodity sector to perform This socio-economic concern is of the US national interest as future trade, research and development is contingent on the strength of the Latin American economy. As the emerging markets drive the highest rates of growth in the world economy, Latin America plays a crucial role in the consumption of goods and services that the U S supplies. If Dutch disease impedes the Latin American economy, it could have enormous longterm implications for hemispheric trade

Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm) However, the long-term projection of this commodity trading is risky. Latin American countries are dependent on sustained commodity prices to uphold an economy that has yet to develop into a more modern, dynamic level. If commodity prices fall, countries could fall back into chronic debt. Furthermore, many Latin American countries have not used the influx of capital from China to invest in manufacturing, research and development and other value-added stages of production to elevate the quality of economic output. If these Latin American countries are lulled into ‘Dutch disease’, they run the risk of not advancing socio-economically and putting continued strain on the primary commodity sector to perform year in and year out. This socio-economic concern is of the US national interest as future trade, research and development is contingent on the strength of the Latin American economy. As the emerging markets drive the highest rates of growth in the world economy, Latin America plays a crucial role in the consumption of goods and services that the United States supplies. If Dutch disease impedes the development of the Latin American economy, it could have enormous longterm implications for hemispheric trade and development initiatives.

<h4>Turn- expanding China economic influence causes Latin American dutch disease that collapses the global trade- </h4><p>(Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren</p><p>Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm)</p><p>However, <u><strong>the long-term projection of this commodity trading is risky. Latin American countries are dependent on sustained commodity prices to uphold an economy that has yet to develop into a more modern, dynamic level.</u></strong> If commodity prices fall, countries could fall back into chronic debt. Furthermore, many Latin American countries have not used the influx of capital from China to invest in manufacturing, research and development and other value-added stages of production to elevate the quality of economic output. <u><strong>If </u></strong>these <u><strong>Latin American countries are lulled into ‘Dutch disease’, they run the risk of not advancing socio-economically and putting continued strain on the primary commodity sector to perform</u></strong> year in and year out. <u><strong>This socio-economic concern is of the US national interest as future trade, research and development is contingent on the strength of the Latin American economy. As the emerging markets drive the highest rates of growth in the world economy, Latin America plays a</u></strong> <u><strong>crucial role</u></strong> <u><strong>in the consumption of goods and services that the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>supplies. If Dutch disease impedes </u></strong>the development of <u><strong>the Latin American economy, it could have enormous longterm implications for hemispheric trade</u></strong> and development initiatives.</p>

(Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: (Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren fulltext: Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm) However, the long-term projection of this commodity trading is risky. Latin American countries are dependent on sustained commodity prices to uphold an economy that has yet to develop into a more modern, dynamic level. If commodity prices fall, countries could fall back into chronic debt. Furthermore, many Latin American countries have not used the influx of capital from China to invest in manufacturing, research and development and other value-added stages of production to elevate the quality of economic output. If these Latin American countries are lulled into ‘Dutch disease’, they run the risk of not advancing socio-economically and putting continued strain on the primary commodity sector to perform year in and year out. This socio-economic concern is of the US national interest as future trade, research and development is contingent on the strength of the Latin American economy. As the emerging markets drive the highest rates of growth in the world economy, Latin America plays a crucial role in the consumption of goods and services that the United States supplies. If Dutch disease impedes the development of the Latin American economy, it could have enormous longterm implications for hemispheric trade and development initiatives. [/INST] <h4>Turn- expanding China economic influence causes Latin American dutch disease that collapses the global trade- </h4><p>(Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren</p><p>Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm)</p><p>However, <u><strong>the long-term projection of this commodity trading is risky. Latin American countries are dependent on sustained commodity prices to uphold an economy that has yet to develop into a more modern, dynamic level.</u></strong> If commodity prices fall, countries could fall back into chronic debt. Furthermore, many Latin American countries have not used the influx of capital from China to invest in manufacturing, research and development and other value-added stages of production to elevate the quality of economic output. <u><strong>If </u></strong>these <u><strong>Latin American countries are lulled into ‘Dutch disease’, they run the risk of not advancing socio-economically and putting continued strain on the primary commodity sector to perform</u></strong> year in and year out. <u><strong>This socio-economic concern is of the US national interest as future trade, research and development is contingent on the strength of the Latin American economy. As the emerging markets drive the highest rates of growth in the world economy, Latin America plays a</u></strong> <u><strong>crucial role</u></strong> <u><strong>in the consumption of goods and services that the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>supplies. If Dutch disease impedes </u></strong>the development of <u><strong>the Latin American economy, it could have enormous longterm implications for hemispheric trade</u></strong> and development initiatives.</p> </s>

Global trade key to check war

Although war in the nuclear age threatens to be much worse than any previous world war, fear of nuclear war itself might exert some pacifying impact Such fear need not be our only protection against future wars. Economic interdependence itself makes war less likely One finding of quantitative research is that military conflict becomes less likely if a pair of nations—say China and the U S or China and India, or China and Japan—trade a lot with each other Fortunately, all of them do. One may label this peace by free trade economic freedom reduces involvement in military conflict, and financial market openness reduces the risk of war, Quantitative research demonstrated there is a capitalist peace

(Erich, University of Bonn, International Interactions, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence,” April 1, 2010, accesed via Academic Search Premiere//wyo-mm) Although war in the nuclear age threatens to be much worse than any previous world war, fear of nuclear war itself might exert some pacifying impact. Such fear, however, need not be our only protection against future wars. Economic interdependence itself makes war less likely. One finding of quantitative research is that military conflict becomes less likely if a pair of nations—say China and the United States, or China and India, or China and Japan—trade a lot with each other (Hegre 2009; Oneal and Russett 2005; Russett and Oneal 2001). Fortunately, all of them do. One may label this effect “peace by free trade”. Foreign investment has some beneficial impact, too (Souva and Prins 2006). Moreover, economic freedom reduces involvement in military conflict, and financial market openness reduces the risk of war, too (Gartzke 2005, 2007, 2009). Quantitative research has demonstrated that there is something like a capitalist peace.

<h4><strong>Global trade key to check war</h4><p>Weede 10</p><p></strong>(Erich, University of Bonn, International Interactions, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: </p><p>Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence,” April 1, 2010, accesed via Academic Search Premiere//wyo-mm) </p><p><u><strong>Although war in the nuclear age threatens to be much worse than any previous world war, fear of nuclear war itself might exert some pacifying impact</u></strong>. <u><strong>Such fear</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>need not be our only protection against future wars. Economic interdependence itself makes war less likely</u></strong>. <u><strong>One finding of quantitative research is that military conflict becomes less likely if a pair of nations—say China and the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong>or China and India, or China and Japan—trade a lot with each other</u></strong> (Hegre 2009; Oneal and Russett 2005; Russett and Oneal 2001). <u><strong>Fortunately, all of them do. One may label this</u></strong> effect “<u><strong>peace by free trade</u></strong>”. Foreign investment has some beneficial impact, too (Souva and Prins 2006). Moreover, <u><strong>economic freedom reduces involvement in military conflict, and financial market openness reduces the risk of war,</u></strong> too (Gartzke 2005, 2007, 2009). <u><strong>Quantitative research</u></strong> has <u><strong>demonstrated</u></strong> that <u><strong>there is</u></strong> something like <u><strong>a capitalist peace</u></strong>.</p>

Weede 10

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Weede 10 fulltext: (Erich, University of Bonn, International Interactions, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence,” April 1, 2010, accesed via Academic Search Premiere//wyo-mm) Although war in the nuclear age threatens to be much worse than any previous world war, fear of nuclear war itself might exert some pacifying impact. Such fear, however, need not be our only protection against future wars. Economic interdependence itself makes war less likely. One finding of quantitative research is that military conflict becomes less likely if a pair of nations—say China and the United States, or China and India, or China and Japan—trade a lot with each other (Hegre 2009; Oneal and Russett 2005; Russett and Oneal 2001). Fortunately, all of them do. One may label this effect “peace by free trade”. Foreign investment has some beneficial impact, too (Souva and Prins 2006). Moreover, economic freedom reduces involvement in military conflict, and financial market openness reduces the risk of war, too (Gartzke 2005, 2007, 2009). Quantitative research has demonstrated that there is something like a capitalist peace. [/INST] <h4><strong>Global trade key to check war</h4><p>Weede 10</p><p></strong>(Erich, University of Bonn, International Interactions, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: </p><p>Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence,” April 1, 2010, accesed via Academic Search Premiere//wyo-mm) </p><p><u><strong>Although war in the nuclear age threatens to be much worse than any previous world war, fear of nuclear war itself might exert some pacifying impact</u></strong>. <u><strong>Such fear</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>need not be our only protection against future wars. Economic interdependence itself makes war less likely</u></strong>. <u><strong>One finding of quantitative research is that military conflict becomes less likely if a pair of nations—say China and the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong>or China and India, or China and Japan—trade a lot with each other</u></strong> (Hegre 2009; Oneal and Russett 2005; Russett and Oneal 2001). <u><strong>Fortunately, all of them do. One may label this</u></strong> effect “<u><strong>peace by free trade</u></strong>”. Foreign investment has some beneficial impact, too (Souva and Prins 2006). Moreover, <u><strong>economic freedom reduces involvement in military conflict, and financial market openness reduces the risk of war,</u></strong> too (Gartzke 2005, 2007, 2009). <u><strong>Quantitative research</u></strong> has <u><strong>demonstrated</u></strong> that <u><strong>there is</u></strong> something like <u><strong>a capitalist peace</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Strong China-Cuba relations undermines US Heg-

The burgeoning Chinese involvement in Latin America, the backyard of the U S aroused new concerns in the U.S. policy circles. This development could challenge American primacy in the Western Hemisphere. Beijing’s engagement with “problematic regimes,” such as Cuba directly opposed the policies of the U S and has put Beijing at odds with Washington. China is viewed as a potential threat to the long-standing pillar of the U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere

(LI, EAI Background Brief, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America: Challenges and Opportunities,” October 30, 2008, http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB411.pdf) /wyo-mm The burgeoning Chinese involvement in Latin America, the backyard of the United States, has aroused new concerns in the U.S. policy circles. This development could challenge American primacy in the Western Hemisphere. Beijing’s engagement with “problematic regimes,” such as Cuba and Venezuela, directly opposed the policies of the United States and has put Beijing at odds with Washington. China is viewed as a potential threat to the long-standing pillar of the U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine.

<h4><strong>Strong China-Cuba relations undermines US Heg-</h4><p>He 08</p><p></strong>(LI, EAI Background Brief, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America: Challenges and Opportunities,” October 30, 2008, http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB411.pdf) /wyo-mm </p><p><u><strong>The burgeoning Chinese involvement in Latin America, the backyard of the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, has <u><strong>aroused new concerns in the U.S. policy circles. This development could challenge American primacy in the Western Hemisphere. Beijing’s engagement with “problematic regimes,” such as Cuba</u></strong> and Venezuela, <u><strong>directly opposed the policies of the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>and has put Beijing at odds with Washington. China is viewed as a potential threat to the long-standing pillar of the U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere</u></strong>, the Monroe Doctrine.</p>

He 08

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: He 08 fulltext: (LI, EAI Background Brief, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America: Challenges and Opportunities,” October 30, 2008, http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB411.pdf) /wyo-mm The burgeoning Chinese involvement in Latin America, the backyard of the United States, has aroused new concerns in the U.S. policy circles. This development could challenge American primacy in the Western Hemisphere. Beijing’s engagement with “problematic regimes,” such as Cuba and Venezuela, directly opposed the policies of the United States and has put Beijing at odds with Washington. China is viewed as a potential threat to the long-standing pillar of the U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine. [/INST] <h4><strong>Strong China-Cuba relations undermines US Heg-</h4><p>He 08</p><p></strong>(LI, EAI Background Brief, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America: Challenges and Opportunities,” October 30, 2008, http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB411.pdf) /wyo-mm </p><p><u><strong>The burgeoning Chinese involvement in Latin America, the backyard of the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, has <u><strong>aroused new concerns in the U.S. policy circles. This development could challenge American primacy in the Western Hemisphere. Beijing’s engagement with “problematic regimes,” such as Cuba</u></strong> and Venezuela, <u><strong>directly opposed the policies of the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>and has put Beijing at odds with Washington. China is viewed as a potential threat to the long-standing pillar of the U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere</u></strong>, the Monroe Doctrine.</p> </s>

Collapse of US heg causes extinction

deep engagement prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment For one thing the U S overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action its core alliance commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure reducing incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas Mearsheimer forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. How do retrenchment advocates discount this benefit Their arguments are complicated but two capture most of the variation ) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences undermines core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability proliferation, and bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain Few doubt the U S could survive insecurity and conflict but at what cost overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Greater regional insecurity could feed proliferation as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia choose to create nuclear forces the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics could spin out of control acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement For supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy is separated from great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, and pivot to Asia the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere . Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up On top of all this, the U S formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking

deep engagement prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment the U S overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action its core alliance commitments deter states from expansion and make its partners more secure reducing incentive to adopt solutions to security problems that threaten others Mearsheimer forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, proliferation preventive war regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war Europe is incapable of securing itself from threats that could be destabilizing the Middle East begins to swing toward pessimists notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas East Asia the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences undermines core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability proliferation, and bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain Few doubt the U S could survive insecurity and conflict but at what cost overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Greater regional insecurity could feed proliferation as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia choose to create nuclear forces the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics could spin out of control acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement For supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy is separated from great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. including highly influential realist scholarship , switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the U S lowers security competition preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere . Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up On top of all this, the U S formidable military machine may deter entry by rivals. the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign post retrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decision makers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

<h4>Collapse of US heg causes extinction</h4><p><strong>Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13</strong> (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51), accessed 1/18/13,WYO/JF</p><p>A core premise of <u><strong><mark>deep engagement </u></strong></mark>is that it <u><strong><mark>prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>For one thing</u></strong>, as noted above, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates’ <u><strong><mark>overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners</u></strong> <u><strong>from taking provocative action</u></strong></mark>. Perhaps more important, <u><strong><mark>its</mark> <mark>core alliance commitments</u></strong> </mark>also <u><strong><mark>deter states </mark>with aspirations to regional hegemony <mark>from</mark> contemplating <mark>expansion and make</u></strong> <u><strong>its partners more secure</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>reducing</u></strong></mark> their <u><strong><mark>incentive to adopt solutions to </mark>their <mark>security problems that threaten others</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>and thus stoke</u></strong> <u><strong>security dilemmas</u></strong>. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John <u><strong><mark>Mearsheimer</u></strong></mark>, who <u><strong><mark>forecasts</u></strong> <u><strong>dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, </mark>nuclear <mark>proliferation</mark> and associated <mark>preventive war </mark>temptations, <mark>regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war</mark>. </u></strong>72 <u><strong>How do retrenchment advocates</u></strong>, the bulk of whom are realists, <u><strong>discount this benefit</u></strong>? <u><strong>Their arguments are complicated</u></strong>, <u><strong>but two capture most of the variation</u></strong>: (1<u><strong>) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or</u></strong> (2) <u><strong>prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest</u></strong>. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 <u><strong>Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. </u></strong>Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. <u><strong>Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal</u></strong>. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. <u><strong>Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition</u></strong> in a post-American Europe, <u><strong>but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays</u></strong>. 74 <u><strong>The result might be a <mark>Europe</mark> that <mark>is incapable of securing itself from </mark>various <mark>threats that could be destabilizing </mark>within the region and beyond</u></strong> (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? <u><strong>Regarding <mark>the Middle East</mark>, the balance <mark>begins to swing toward pessimists </mark>concerned that states currently backed by Washington— <mark>notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon </mark>U.S. <mark>retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas</mark>. And concerning <mark>East Asia</mark>, pessimism regarding <mark>the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced</mark>. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that <mark>Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase </mark>their <mark>military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States.</u></strong> 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. <u><strong><mark>Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>undermines</mark> </u></strong>that <u><strong><mark>core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives</u></strong></mark>. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. <u><strong>It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior.</u></strong> <u><strong>Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case</u></strong>. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign post retrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. <u><strong><mark>To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions.</u></strong></mark> We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that <u><strong><mark>the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with</u></strong> </mark>associated <u><strong><mark>insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability</u></strong></mark>, nuclear <u><strong><mark>proliferation, and</u></strong> </mark>the like, or <u><strong><mark>bids for regional hegemony,</u></strong> <u><strong>which</u></strong> <u><strong>may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain</u></strong> </mark>(and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. <u><strong><mark>Few doubt</u></strong> </mark>that <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>could survive</u></strong> </mark>the return of <u><strong><mark>insecurity and conflict</u></strong> </mark>among Eurasian powers, <u><strong><mark>but at what cost</u></strong></mark>? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decision makers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, <u><strong><mark>overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place.</u></strong></mark> Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. <u><strong><mark>Greater regional insecurity could</u></strong> </mark>well <u><strong><mark>feed proliferation</u></strong> </mark>cascades, <u><strong><mark>as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia</u></strong></mark> all might <u><strong><mark>choose to create nuclear forces</u></strong></mark>. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, <u><strong><mark>the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics</u></strong></mark>” that <u><strong><mark>could spin out of control</u></strong> </mark>is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, <u><strong><mark>acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>For</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy </u></strong></mark>for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and <u><strong><mark>is separated from </u></strong></mark>other <u><strong><mark>great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. </u></strong></mark>The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. <u><strong>The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term</u></strong>. As Mearsheimer notes, “<u><strong>The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves</u></strong>.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 <u><strong>It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan,</u></strong> reduce the presence in Europe, <u><strong>and pivot to Asia</u></strong>— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, <u><strong>the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, <mark>including highly influential realist scholarship</u></strong></mark>. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover<mark>, <u><strong>switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult</u></strong></mark>. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. <u><strong><mark>By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>lowers security competition</u></strong> </mark>in the world’s key regions, thereby <u><strong><mark>preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere</u></strong> </mark>for growing new military capabilities<u><strong><mark>. Alliance ties dissuade</u></strong> <u><strong>partners from ramping up</u></strong> </mark>and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. <u><strong><mark>On top of all this, the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates’ <u><strong><mark>formidable military machine may deter entry by </mark>potential <mark>rivals.</u></strong></mark> Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and <u><strong><mark>the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking</u></strong></mark>. 85</p>

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51), accessed 1/18/13,WYO/JF

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51), accessed 1/18/13,WYO/JF fulltext: A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign post retrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decision makers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85 [/INST] <h4>Collapse of US heg causes extinction</h4><p><strong>Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13</strong> (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51), accessed 1/18/13,WYO/JF</p><p>A core premise of <u><strong><mark>deep engagement </u></strong></mark>is that it <u><strong><mark>prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>For one thing</u></strong>, as noted above, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates’ <u><strong><mark>overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners</u></strong> <u><strong>from taking provocative action</u></strong></mark>. Perhaps more important, <u><strong><mark>its</mark> <mark>core alliance commitments</u></strong> </mark>also <u><strong><mark>deter states </mark>with aspirations to regional hegemony <mark>from</mark> contemplating <mark>expansion and make</u></strong> <u><strong>its partners more secure</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>reducing</u></strong></mark> their <u><strong><mark>incentive to adopt solutions to </mark>their <mark>security problems that threaten others</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>and thus stoke</u></strong> <u><strong>security dilemmas</u></strong>. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John <u><strong><mark>Mearsheimer</u></strong></mark>, who <u><strong><mark>forecasts</u></strong> <u><strong>dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, </mark>nuclear <mark>proliferation</mark> and associated <mark>preventive war </mark>temptations, <mark>regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war</mark>. </u></strong>72 <u><strong>How do retrenchment advocates</u></strong>, the bulk of whom are realists, <u><strong>discount this benefit</u></strong>? <u><strong>Their arguments are complicated</u></strong>, <u><strong>but two capture most of the variation</u></strong>: (1<u><strong>) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or</u></strong> (2) <u><strong>prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest</u></strong>. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 <u><strong>Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. </u></strong>Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. <u><strong>Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal</u></strong>. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. <u><strong>Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition</u></strong> in a post-American Europe, <u><strong>but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays</u></strong>. 74 <u><strong>The result might be a <mark>Europe</mark> that <mark>is incapable of securing itself from </mark>various <mark>threats that could be destabilizing </mark>within the region and beyond</u></strong> (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? <u><strong>Regarding <mark>the Middle East</mark>, the balance <mark>begins to swing toward pessimists </mark>concerned that states currently backed by Washington— <mark>notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon </mark>U.S. <mark>retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas</mark>. And concerning <mark>East Asia</mark>, pessimism regarding <mark>the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced</mark>. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that <mark>Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase </mark>their <mark>military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States.</u></strong> 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. <u><strong><mark>Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>undermines</mark> </u></strong>that <u><strong><mark>core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives</u></strong></mark>. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. <u><strong>It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior.</u></strong> <u><strong>Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case</u></strong>. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign post retrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. <u><strong><mark>To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions.</u></strong></mark> We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that <u><strong><mark>the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with</u></strong> </mark>associated <u><strong><mark>insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability</u></strong></mark>, nuclear <u><strong><mark>proliferation, and</u></strong> </mark>the like, or <u><strong><mark>bids for regional hegemony,</u></strong> <u><strong>which</u></strong> <u><strong>may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain</u></strong> </mark>(and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. <u><strong><mark>Few doubt</u></strong> </mark>that <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>could survive</u></strong> </mark>the return of <u><strong><mark>insecurity and conflict</u></strong> </mark>among Eurasian powers, <u><strong><mark>but at what cost</u></strong></mark>? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decision makers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, <u><strong><mark>overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place.</u></strong></mark> Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. <u><strong><mark>Greater regional insecurity could</u></strong> </mark>well <u><strong><mark>feed proliferation</u></strong> </mark>cascades, <u><strong><mark>as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia</u></strong></mark> all might <u><strong><mark>choose to create nuclear forces</u></strong></mark>. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, <u><strong><mark>the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics</u></strong></mark>” that <u><strong><mark>could spin out of control</u></strong> </mark>is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, <u><strong><mark>acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>For</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy </u></strong></mark>for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and <u><strong><mark>is separated from </u></strong></mark>other <u><strong><mark>great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. </u></strong></mark>The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. <u><strong>The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term</u></strong>. As Mearsheimer notes, “<u><strong>The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves</u></strong>.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 <u><strong>It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan,</u></strong> reduce the presence in Europe, <u><strong>and pivot to Asia</u></strong>— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, <u><strong>the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, <mark>including highly influential realist scholarship</u></strong></mark>. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover<mark>, <u><strong>switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult</u></strong></mark>. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. <u><strong><mark>By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>lowers security competition</u></strong> </mark>in the world’s key regions, thereby <u><strong><mark>preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere</u></strong> </mark>for growing new military capabilities<u><strong><mark>. Alliance ties dissuade</u></strong> <u><strong>partners from ramping up</u></strong> </mark>and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. <u><strong><mark>On top of all this, the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates’ <u><strong><mark>formidable military machine may deter entry by </mark>potential <mark>rivals.</u></strong></mark> Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and <u><strong><mark>the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking</u></strong></mark>. 85</p> </s>

US-involvement creates a trilateral cooperation on renewable energy that solves global warming

One area of trilateral cooperation is in renewable energy investment the U S has led the way in renewable energy investment, but China has made remarkable advances with investment and technology China is looking to expand its markets for renewable energy Latin America provides an attractive market for Asia in the renewable sector and there is great potential to foster increased cooperation in the energy security of both regions as they strive to become less dependent on expensive and dwindling hydrocarbons Beijing and Washington have similar concerns in their energy policies and face the same set of challenges as the two largest oil-consuming countries they are natural energy bedfellows in coping with similar challenges. They should cooperate, Both countries would win if they choose to cooperate rather than confront each other By partnering with capital-rich China and an innovative US, Latin America has the opportunity to expand its own knowledge and manufacturing base and grow its renewable energy market into one that can provide sustainable solutions for the region whose diverse climate should take full advantage of the benefits of renewable energy

(Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm) One area of potential growth and trilateral cooperation is in renewable energy investment. Historically speaking, the United States has led the way in renewable energy investment, but over the past several years, China has made remarkable advances with a surge of new investment in and emphasis on renewable energy technology. Investments in renewable energy reached new heights in 2011, topping $257 billion, up from only $39.4 billion in 2004 (552 percent increase in eight years).29 China has surpassed the US in the volume of renewable energy investment, is second behind the EU, and is looking to expand its markets for renewable energy. China and other Asian countries have set ambitious targets for renewable energy as part of their primary energy portfolios. Government grants, subsidies and other tax incentives have prompted a wave of Chinese manufacturing in wind turbines, solar photovoltaic panels and other renewable products. For example, Chinese solar panel production has actually outpaced demand globally and the Chinese are aggressively trying to develop Latin America’s market for solar panels. Latin America provides an attractive market for Asia in the renewable sector and there is great potential to foster increased cooperation in the energy security of both regions as they strive to become less dependent on expensive and dwindling hydrocarbons. Alternative energy provides a green platform to promote closer economic ties, ultimately helping to mitigate the all-inclusive threat of climate change. Beijing and Washington have similar concerns in their energy policies and face the same set of challenges: high dependency on foreign sources of energy, rising energy-related environmental impacts, how to achieve energy conservation and efficiency, and the effect on their economies of energy price spikes. Although China and the United States do not rely on each other for energy supplies, as the two largest oil-consuming countries they are natural energy bedfellows in coping with similar challenges. They should cooperate, through joint or parallel action, to keep global energy supplies open, secure, and at an affordable price level. Both countries would win if they choose to cooperate rather than confront each other in their pursuit of energy security and efficiency. If the US and China can promote the expansion of renewable energy in Latin America, it will help exporters and producers within the US and China by expanding trade and investment opportunities throughout the LAC region. By partnering with capital-rich China and an innovative US, Latin America has the opportunity to expand its own knowledge and manufacturing base and grow its renewable energy market into one that can provide sustainable solutions for the region whose diverse climate should take full advantage of the benefits of renewable energy. The US should take the lead in coordinating trilateral trade fairs and business forums, an initiative often pursued bilaterally or intra-regionally.

<h4><strong>US-involvement creates a trilateral cooperation on renewable energy that solves global warming</h4><p>Brandt et al 12</p><p></strong>(Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren</p><p>Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm)</p><p><u><strong>One area of</u></strong> potential growth and <u><strong>trilateral cooperation is in renewable energy investment</u></strong>. Historically speaking, <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>has led the way in renewable energy investment, but </u></strong>over the past several years, <u><strong>China has made remarkable advances with</u></strong> a surge of new <u><strong>investment</u></strong> in <u><strong>and</u></strong> emphasis on renewable energy <u><strong>technology</u></strong>. Investments in renewable energy reached new heights in 2011, topping $257 billion, up from only $39.4 billion in 2004 (552 percent increase in eight years).29 <u><strong>China</u></strong> has surpassed the US in the volume of renewable energy investment, is second behind the EU, and <u><strong>is looking to expand its markets for renewable energy</u></strong>. China and other Asian countries have set ambitious targets for renewable energy as part of their primary energy portfolios. Government grants, subsidies and other tax incentives have prompted a wave of Chinese manufacturing in wind turbines, solar photovoltaic panels and other renewable products. For example, Chinese solar panel production has actually outpaced demand globally and the Chinese are aggressively trying to develop Latin America’s market for solar panels. <u><strong>Latin America provides an attractive market for Asia in the renewable sector and there is great potential to foster increased cooperation in the energy security of both regions as they strive to become less dependent on expensive and dwindling hydrocarbons</u></strong>. Alternative energy provides a green platform to promote closer economic ties, ultimately helping to mitigate the all-inclusive threat of climate change. <u><strong>Beijing and Washington have similar concerns in their energy policies and face the same set of challenges</u></strong>: high dependency on foreign sources of energy, rising energy-related environmental impacts, how to achieve energy conservation and efficiency, and the effect on their economies of energy price spikes. Although China and the United States do not rely on each other for energy supplies, <u><strong>as the two largest oil-consuming countries they are natural energy bedfellows in coping with similar challenges. They should cooperate,</u></strong> through joint or parallel action, to keep global energy supplies open, secure, and at an affordable price level. <u><strong>Both countries would win if they choose to cooperate rather than confront each other </u></strong>in their pursuit of energy security and efficiency. If the US and China can promote the expansion of renewable energy in Latin America, it will help exporters and producers within the US and China by expanding trade and investment opportunities throughout the LAC region. <u><strong>By partnering with capital-rich China and an innovative US, Latin America has the opportunity to expand its own knowledge and manufacturing base and grow its renewable energy market into one that can provide sustainable solutions for the region whose diverse climate should take full advantage of the benefits of renewable energy</u></strong>. The US should take the lead in coordinating trilateral trade fairs and business forums, an initiative often pursued bilaterally or intra-regionally. </p>

Brandt et al 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Brandt et al 12 fulltext: (Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm) One area of potential growth and trilateral cooperation is in renewable energy investment. Historically speaking, the United States has led the way in renewable energy investment, but over the past several years, China has made remarkable advances with a surge of new investment in and emphasis on renewable energy technology. Investments in renewable energy reached new heights in 2011, topping $257 billion, up from only $39.4 billion in 2004 (552 percent increase in eight years).29 China has surpassed the US in the volume of renewable energy investment, is second behind the EU, and is looking to expand its markets for renewable energy. China and other Asian countries have set ambitious targets for renewable energy as part of their primary energy portfolios. Government grants, subsidies and other tax incentives have prompted a wave of Chinese manufacturing in wind turbines, solar photovoltaic panels and other renewable products. For example, Chinese solar panel production has actually outpaced demand globally and the Chinese are aggressively trying to develop Latin America’s market for solar panels. Latin America provides an attractive market for Asia in the renewable sector and there is great potential to foster increased cooperation in the energy security of both regions as they strive to become less dependent on expensive and dwindling hydrocarbons. Alternative energy provides a green platform to promote closer economic ties, ultimately helping to mitigate the all-inclusive threat of climate change. Beijing and Washington have similar concerns in their energy policies and face the same set of challenges: high dependency on foreign sources of energy, rising energy-related environmental impacts, how to achieve energy conservation and efficiency, and the effect on their economies of energy price spikes. Although China and the United States do not rely on each other for energy supplies, as the two largest oil-consuming countries they are natural energy bedfellows in coping with similar challenges. They should cooperate, through joint or parallel action, to keep global energy supplies open, secure, and at an affordable price level. Both countries would win if they choose to cooperate rather than confront each other in their pursuit of energy security and efficiency. If the US and China can promote the expansion of renewable energy in Latin America, it will help exporters and producers within the US and China by expanding trade and investment opportunities throughout the LAC region. By partnering with capital-rich China and an innovative US, Latin America has the opportunity to expand its own knowledge and manufacturing base and grow its renewable energy market into one that can provide sustainable solutions for the region whose diverse climate should take full advantage of the benefits of renewable energy. The US should take the lead in coordinating trilateral trade fairs and business forums, an initiative often pursued bilaterally or intra-regionally. [/INST] <h4><strong>US-involvement creates a trilateral cooperation on renewable energy that solves global warming</h4><p>Brandt et al 12</p><p></strong>(Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren</p><p>Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, Nav Aujla, and Kirsten Kaufman, American University School of International Service, December 2012, http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf) /wyo-mm)</p><p><u><strong>One area of</u></strong> potential growth and <u><strong>trilateral cooperation is in renewable energy investment</u></strong>. Historically speaking, <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>has led the way in renewable energy investment, but </u></strong>over the past several years, <u><strong>China has made remarkable advances with</u></strong> a surge of new <u><strong>investment</u></strong> in <u><strong>and</u></strong> emphasis on renewable energy <u><strong>technology</u></strong>. Investments in renewable energy reached new heights in 2011, topping $257 billion, up from only $39.4 billion in 2004 (552 percent increase in eight years).29 <u><strong>China</u></strong> has surpassed the US in the volume of renewable energy investment, is second behind the EU, and <u><strong>is looking to expand its markets for renewable energy</u></strong>. China and other Asian countries have set ambitious targets for renewable energy as part of their primary energy portfolios. Government grants, subsidies and other tax incentives have prompted a wave of Chinese manufacturing in wind turbines, solar photovoltaic panels and other renewable products. For example, Chinese solar panel production has actually outpaced demand globally and the Chinese are aggressively trying to develop Latin America’s market for solar panels. <u><strong>Latin America provides an attractive market for Asia in the renewable sector and there is great potential to foster increased cooperation in the energy security of both regions as they strive to become less dependent on expensive and dwindling hydrocarbons</u></strong>. Alternative energy provides a green platform to promote closer economic ties, ultimately helping to mitigate the all-inclusive threat of climate change. <u><strong>Beijing and Washington have similar concerns in their energy policies and face the same set of challenges</u></strong>: high dependency on foreign sources of energy, rising energy-related environmental impacts, how to achieve energy conservation and efficiency, and the effect on their economies of energy price spikes. Although China and the United States do not rely on each other for energy supplies, <u><strong>as the two largest oil-consuming countries they are natural energy bedfellows in coping with similar challenges. They should cooperate,</u></strong> through joint or parallel action, to keep global energy supplies open, secure, and at an affordable price level. <u><strong>Both countries would win if they choose to cooperate rather than confront each other </u></strong>in their pursuit of energy security and efficiency. If the US and China can promote the expansion of renewable energy in Latin America, it will help exporters and producers within the US and China by expanding trade and investment opportunities throughout the LAC region. <u><strong>By partnering with capital-rich China and an innovative US, Latin America has the opportunity to expand its own knowledge and manufacturing base and grow its renewable energy market into one that can provide sustainable solutions for the region whose diverse climate should take full advantage of the benefits of renewable energy</u></strong>. The US should take the lead in coordinating trilateral trade fairs and business forums, an initiative often pursued bilaterally or intra-regionally. </p> </s>

Warming results in multiple scenarios for extinction – it’s try or die

As early as 1988 scientists cautioned that human tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war." hundreds of scientific studies have documented ever-mounting evidence that human activities are altering the climate climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism. Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security Droughts, famines, and weather-related disasters could claim thousands or even millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions within and among nations, fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems elevate rising sea levels threaten destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears glaciers are shrinking threatening water supplies for millions sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces if average global temperatures increase more than two degrees Celsius which will occur if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change threats to security will be amplified as climate change has increasing impacts on regional water supplies agricultural productivity, human and ecosystem health, infrastructure, financial flows and economies, and patterns of international migration. Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor. This, could lead to military confrontations over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime Rising temperatures, increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply Even modest warming has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability The parallels with terrorism are compelling By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th it could be too late to respond.

As early as 1988, scientists cautioned that tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to uncontrolled consequences second only to a global nuclear war scientific studies have documented that human activities are altering the climate Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security Droughts, famines, and weather-related disaster claim millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions among nations fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems elevate rising sea levels threaten destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears glaciers are shrinking threatening water supplies for millions sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters if temperatures increase which will occur if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return threats to security will be amplified climate change has increasing impacts on water supplies, agricultural productivity infrastructure, financial flows and economies This, could lead to military confrontations Even modest warming has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. The parallels with terrorism are compelling By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th it could be too late to respond.

Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 (Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF As early as 1988, scientists cautioned that human tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to "an unintended, uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war." Since then, hundreds of scientific studies have documented ever-mounting evidence that human activities are altering the climate around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that climate change is, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism." Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security. Droughts, famines, and weather-related disasters could claim thousands or even millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions within and among nations, fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes. In the worst case, further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems and elevate already-rising sea levels, which could threaten the very survival of low-lying island nations, destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears. Mountain glaciers are shrinking at ever-faster rates, threatening water supplies for millions of people and plant and animal species. Average global sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters (8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces." It warns that if average global temperatures increase more than two degrees Celsius—which will likely occur in a matter of decades if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return," where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change. Existing threats to security will be amplified as climate change has increasing impacts on regional water supplies, agricultural productivity, human and ecosystem health, infrastructure, financial flows and economies, and patterns of international migration. Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor. This, in turn, could lead to military confrontations over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime. ► Rising temperatures, droughts, and floods, and the increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. Even the modest warming experienced to date has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. The parallels with terrorism are compelling. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, it could be too late to respond.

<h4><strong>Warming results in multiple scenarios for extinction – it’s try or die </h4><p>Sawin 8/12</p><p></strong>Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 </p><p>(Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF</p><p><u><strong><mark>As early as 1988</u></strong>, <u><strong>scientists cautioned that </mark>human <mark>tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to </u></strong></mark>"an unintended, <u><strong><mark>uncontrolled </mark>globally pervasive experiment whose </u></strong>ultimate <u><strong><mark>consequences</mark> could be <mark>second only to a global nuclear war</mark>."</u></strong> Since then, <u><strong>hundreds of <mark>scientific studies have documented </mark>ever-mounting evidence <mark>that human activities are altering the climate</u></strong> </mark>around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that <u><strong>climate change is</u></strong>, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "<u><strong>the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism.</u></strong>" <u><strong><mark>Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Droughts, famines, and weather-related disaster</mark>s could <mark>claim</mark> thousands or even <mark>millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions </mark>within and <mark>among nations</mark>, <mark>fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes</u></strong></mark>. In the worst case, <u><strong><mark>further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems </u></strong></mark>and <u><strong><mark>elevate</u></strong></mark> already-<u><strong><mark>rising sea levels</u></strong></mark>, which could <u><strong><mark>threaten</u></strong></mark> the very survival of low-lying island nations, <u><strong><mark>destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict</u></strong></mark>. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And <u><strong><mark>these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears</u></strong></mark>. Mountain <u><strong><mark>glaciers are shrinking</u></strong> </mark>at ever-faster rates, <u><strong><mark>threatening water supplies for millions</u></strong> </mark>of people and plant and animal species. Average global <u><strong><mark>sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters</u></strong> </mark>(8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. <u><strong>A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce</u></strong>, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, <u><strong>concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces</u></strong>." It warns that <u><strong><mark>if </mark>average global <mark>temperatures increase </mark>more than two degrees Celsius</u></strong>—<u><strong><mark>which will</u></strong> </mark>likely <u><strong><mark>occur</u></strong> </mark>in a matter of decades <u><strong><mark>if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change</u></strong>. Existing <u><strong><mark>threats to security will be amplified</mark> as <mark>climate change has increasing impacts on</mark> regional <mark>water supplies</u></strong>, <u><strong>agricultural productivity</mark>, human and ecosystem health, <mark>infrastructure, financial flows and economies</mark>, and patterns of international migration.</u></strong> Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. <u><strong>Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This,</u></strong> </mark>in turn, <u><strong><mark>could lead to military confrontations </mark>over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime</u></strong>. ► <u><strong>Rising temperatures,</u></strong> droughts, and floods, and the <u><strong>increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply</u></strong>, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. <u><strong><mark>Even</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>modest warming</u></strong> </mark>experienced to date <u><strong><mark>has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity</u></strong></mark>, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► <u><strong><mark>Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources.</u></strong></mark> It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► <u><strong>Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability</u></strong>. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. <u><strong><mark>The parallels with terrorism are compelling</u></strong></mark>. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. <u><strong><mark>By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th</u></strong></mark>, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, <u><strong><mark>it could be too late to respond.</p></u></strong></mark>

Sawin 8/12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Sawin 8/12 fulltext: Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 (Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF As early as 1988, scientists cautioned that human tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to "an unintended, uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war." Since then, hundreds of scientific studies have documented ever-mounting evidence that human activities are altering the climate around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that climate change is, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism." Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security. Droughts, famines, and weather-related disasters could claim thousands or even millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions within and among nations, fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes. In the worst case, further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems and elevate already-rising sea levels, which could threaten the very survival of low-lying island nations, destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears. Mountain glaciers are shrinking at ever-faster rates, threatening water supplies for millions of people and plant and animal species. Average global sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters (8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces." It warns that if average global temperatures increase more than two degrees Celsius—which will likely occur in a matter of decades if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return," where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change. Existing threats to security will be amplified as climate change has increasing impacts on regional water supplies, agricultural productivity, human and ecosystem health, infrastructure, financial flows and economies, and patterns of international migration. Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor. This, in turn, could lead to military confrontations over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime. ► Rising temperatures, droughts, and floods, and the increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. Even the modest warming experienced to date has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources. It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. The parallels with terrorism are compelling. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, it could be too late to respond. [/INST] <h4><strong>Warming results in multiple scenarios for extinction – it’s try or die </h4><p>Sawin 8/12</p><p></strong>Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute Aug. ’12 </p><p>(Janet, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism,” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77, accessed 9/30/12,WYO/JF</p><p><u><strong><mark>As early as 1988</u></strong>, <u><strong>scientists cautioned that </mark>human <mark>tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to </u></strong></mark>"an unintended, <u><strong><mark>uncontrolled </mark>globally pervasive experiment whose </u></strong>ultimate <u><strong><mark>consequences</mark> could be <mark>second only to a global nuclear war</mark>."</u></strong> Since then, <u><strong>hundreds of <mark>scientific studies have documented </mark>ever-mounting evidence <mark>that human activities are altering the climate</u></strong> </mark>around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that <u><strong>climate change is</u></strong>, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "<u><strong>the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism.</u></strong>" <u><strong><mark>Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Droughts, famines, and weather-related disaster</mark>s could <mark>claim</mark> thousands or even <mark>millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions </mark>within and <mark>among nations</mark>, <mark>fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes</u></strong></mark>. In the worst case, <u><strong><mark>further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems </u></strong></mark>and <u><strong><mark>elevate</u></strong></mark> already-<u><strong><mark>rising sea levels</u></strong></mark>, which could <u><strong><mark>threaten</u></strong></mark> the very survival of low-lying island nations, <u><strong><mark>destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict</u></strong></mark>. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And <u><strong><mark>these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears</u></strong></mark>. Mountain <u><strong><mark>glaciers are shrinking</u></strong> </mark>at ever-faster rates, <u><strong><mark>threatening water supplies for millions</u></strong> </mark>of people and plant and animal species. Average global <u><strong><mark>sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters</u></strong> </mark>(8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. <u><strong>A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce</u></strong>, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, <u><strong>concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces</u></strong>." It warns that <u><strong><mark>if </mark>average global <mark>temperatures increase </mark>more than two degrees Celsius</u></strong>—<u><strong><mark>which will</u></strong> </mark>likely <u><strong><mark>occur</u></strong> </mark>in a matter of decades <u><strong><mark>if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change</u></strong>. Existing <u><strong><mark>threats to security will be amplified</mark> as <mark>climate change has increasing impacts on</mark> regional <mark>water supplies</u></strong>, <u><strong>agricultural productivity</mark>, human and ecosystem health, <mark>infrastructure, financial flows and economies</mark>, and patterns of international migration.</u></strong> Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. <u><strong>Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This,</u></strong> </mark>in turn, <u><strong><mark>could lead to military confrontations </mark>over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime</u></strong>. ► <u><strong>Rising temperatures,</u></strong> droughts, and floods, and the <u><strong>increasing acidity of ocean waters, coupled with an expanding human population, could further stress an already limited global food supply</u></strong>, dramatically increasing food prices and potentially triggering internal unrest or the use of food as a weapon. <u><strong><mark>Even</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>modest warming</u></strong> </mark>experienced to date <u><strong><mark>has affected fisheries and agricultural productivity</u></strong></mark>, with a 10 percent decrease in corn yields across the U.S. Midwest seen per degree of warming. ► <u><strong><mark>Altered rainfall patterns could heighten tensions over the use of shared water bodies and increase the likelihood of violent conflict over water resources.</u></strong></mark> It is estimated that about 1.4 billion people already live in areas that are water-stressed. Up to 5 billion people (most of the world's current population) could be living in such regions by 2025. ► <u><strong>Widespread impacts of climate change could lead to waves of migration, threatening international stability</u></strong>. One study estimates that by 2050, as many as 150 million people may have fled coastlines vulnerable to rising sea levels, storms or floods, or agricultural land too arid to cultivate. Historically, migration to urban areas has stressed limited services and infrastructure, inciting crime or insurgency movements, while migration across borders has frequently led to violent clashes over land and resources. <u><strong><mark>The parallels with terrorism are compelling</u></strong></mark>. Traditional responses to security threats cannot address the root of such problems, and related impacts could persist even if global emissions are cut dramatically over coming decades because of the significant lag time between cause and effect. As with terrorism, we know that changes will occur, but not when or where they will strike, nor how damaging and costly they will be. Climate change already claims more lives than does terrorism: according to the World Health Organization, global climate change now accounts for more than 160,000 deaths annually. <u><strong><mark>By the time the world experiences the climate equivalent of September 11th</u></strong></mark>, or the 2004 Madrid bombings, <u><strong><mark>it could be too late to respond.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>