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Legalization of organ sales means regulation

A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs by making the sale of human organs legal in the United States The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed. The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold

proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs by making the sale of human organs legal in the U S The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed. The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold

(A TV and radio commercial spokesman, an actor, a freelance broadcast sports producer, and a marketing and public relations consultant. Following four years of service (1953-1957) as a Russian language technician in the U.S. Air Force, Diamond studied foreign affairs at George Washington University in the late 1950’s. He then accepted a number of assignments working for Maryland state senator Newton I. Steers, Jr: as congressional and state senatorial campaign manager; as executive assistant and deputy commissioner in the Maryland Insurance Department; and as legislative assistant in the state capitol in Annapolis. David F., as quoted in “A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs,” August 31, http://bobsnewheart.wordpress.com/2013/08/31/a-proposal-to-sell-human-organs/) ***NOTE -- The “Federal Organ Transplant Law refers to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 Enter David Diamond and his proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs. I met David on the internet. We share backgrounds in politics and broadcasting and in trying to save lives through organ transplantation. The David Diamond Plan to increase the supply of transplantable organs by making the sale of human organs legal in the United States. The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed. The Federal Organ Transplant Law enacted in 1984 provides that only donated organs may be used. The following plan to increase the supply of organs for transplant was developed in subsequent years by David F. Diamond of Memphis, Tennessee. ======0====== The shortage of organs is taking the lives of almost 7,000 people unnecessarily each year. Donation is good. It is the highest altruistic step that a person can contemplate. However, for a number of reasons, many people are not willing to donate. The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold as follows: A. A contract can provide that when a person has decided, for whatever reasons, not to donate organs, he or she (hereafter: the provider) can commit to a plan to have the organs sold if and when the provider is brain dead. This contract will also be signed by the next of kin, spouse or nearest living relative so that that party understands the purpose of the contract and agrees that they will not oppose its implementation when the provider dies. A provider’s option to cancel the contract at any time prior to the provider’s death will be included in the contract. The use of this contract will allow the provider to leave an estate to his heirs or a designated charity. A provider, with few or no assets, might otherwise have none to leave when he or she passed. B. The sale of organs can be conducted by a broker, attorney or individual (hereafter: an agent) designated by the provider. A licensing procedure would establish that the agent would be certified as fiscally responsible and having financial integrity. Upon determination of brain death, the agent selected by the provider, using email, fax or phones, would immediately advise interested buyers of an organ’s availability and condition, etc. Time would be of the essence, of course. Appropriate compensation to the agent, such as a commission for services provided, would be set forth in the contract. Buyers whose bids were accepted would send payment by wire transfer, cashier’s check or other means approved in the law. C. The party designated by the provider must maintain a public record (like a broadcaster’s log which is available for public viewing) specifying the individual who gets the organs, how much is being paid and the identification of the provider. The purpose of this transparency is to eliminate the need for a black market, and to stimulate public awareness. If there is a public record, as soon as organ sales begin, the news media will undoubtedly write about it pointing out how much money was involved in the transactions and stressing how much money goes to the heirs. This will persuade a lot of additional people to agree to such a contract, thus increasing supply exponentially. Through the action of the law of supply and demand, the increased supply will cause prices to decrease to a level most people will consider reasonable. Unless you allow prices to be set by the market process you put a limit on the number of organs that might become available. Any fixed price, set by government or a special agency, would diminish the supply which would defeat the goal of making the most organs available. That would cause some individuals to decide not to participate. But if they knew that the organs they might provide are going to bring whatever the market process allows, they’ll have every incentive to take part. D. The organs would have to be sold only for transplant to U. S. citizens in order to avoid foreigners from bidding up the price and reducing the supply to Americans. Of course, if other countries should adopt model legislation such as ours then we could reciprocate and become partners with them since their organ supply could be shared with ours. E. The poor will not be discriminated against. They will have access to organs because the law will provide that, just as in Medicare or Medicaid presently, the government will pay for any medical procedure or supplies that the patient needs, upon a doctor’s certification that it is medically necessary. The government would buy organs on the market for those with Medicare or Medicaid unless donated organs were available. The same principle will apply for those with health insurance. And the wealthy, who may choose to be self insured, would be free to arrange for organs in the same market. Of course, people would still be free to donate organs. And participation by providers in the futures contracts would be entirely voluntary. F. Presently those uninsured or poor, not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, have to raise tens of thousands of dollars before hospitals or transplant surgeons will help them. The added cost of an organ can also be raised in the same way, or the law can require our government to cover that cost, since it will be less costly over time than dealing with whatever the patient’s medical expenses would be otherwise. G. The plan will require providers to have their medical records maintained by their doctors beginning at least as soon as a futures contract is signed. It would be made available immediately to any parties potentially buying an organ from that cadaver. The purpose, and the result, would be to assure a better, safer organ supply. This plan does not contemplate any sale of kidneys or parts of livers from a living person. There are risks in having such surgery and for that reason and others, we set that aside and take no position on that question. Sometimes, under current law, it is the right thing to do, depending on the circumstances. But in point of fact, the need for such organs will be adequately supplied with adoption of my plan.

<h4><strong>Legalization of organ sales means regulation</h4><p>Diamond ‘13 </p><p></strong>(A TV and radio commercial spokesman, an actor, a freelance broadcast sports producer, and a marketing and public relations consultant. Following four years of service (1953-1957) as a Russian language technician in the U.S. Air Force, Diamond studied foreign affairs at George Washington University in the late 1950’s. He then accepted a number of assignments working for Maryland state senator Newton I. Steers, Jr: as congressional and state senatorial campaign manager; as executive assistant and deputy commissioner in the Maryland Insurance Department; and as legislative assistant in the state capitol in Annapolis. David F., as quoted in “<u><strong>A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs</u></strong>,” August 31, http://bobsnewheart.wordpress.com/2013/08/31/a-proposal-to-sell-human-organs/)</p><p>***NOTE -- The “Federal Organ Transplant Law refers to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 </p><p>Enter David Diamond and his <u><strong><mark>proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs</u></strong></mark>. I met David on the internet. We share backgrounds in politics and broadcasting and in trying to save lives through organ transplantation. The David Diamond Plan to increase the supply of transplantable organs <u><strong><mark>by making the sale of human organs legal in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed.</mark> </u></strong>The Federal Organ Transplant Law enacted in 1984 provides that only donated organs may be used. The following plan to increase the supply of organs for transplant was developed in subsequent years by David F. Diamond of Memphis, Tennessee. ======0====== The shortage of organs is taking the lives of almost 7,000 people unnecessarily each year. Donation is good. It is the highest altruistic step that a person can contemplate. However, for a number of reasons, many people are not willing to donate. <u><strong><mark>The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold</u></strong></mark> as follows: A. A contract can provide that when a person has decided, for whatever reasons, not to donate organs, he or she (hereafter: the provider) can commit to a plan to have the organs sold if and when the provider is brain dead. This contract will also be signed by the next of kin, spouse or nearest living relative so that that party understands the purpose of the contract and agrees that they will not oppose its implementation when the provider dies. A provider’s option to cancel the contract at any time prior to the provider’s death will be included in the contract. The use of this contract will allow the provider to leave an estate to his heirs or a designated charity. A provider, with few or no assets, might otherwise have none to leave when he or she passed. B. The sale of organs can be conducted by a broker, attorney or individual (hereafter: an agent) designated by the provider. A licensing procedure would establish that the agent would be certified as fiscally responsible and having financial integrity. Upon determination of brain death, the agent selected by the provider, using email, fax or phones, would immediately advise interested buyers of an organ’s availability and condition, etc. Time would be of the essence, of course. Appropriate compensation to the agent, such as a commission for services provided, would be set forth in the contract. Buyers whose bids were accepted would send payment by wire transfer, cashier’s check or other means approved in the law. C. The party designated by the provider must maintain a public record (like a broadcaster’s log which is available for public viewing) specifying the individual who gets the organs, how much is being paid and the identification of the provider. The purpose of this transparency is to eliminate the need for a black market, and to stimulate public awareness. If there is a public record, as soon as organ sales begin, the news media will undoubtedly write about it pointing out how much money was involved in the transactions and stressing how much money goes to the heirs. This will persuade a lot of additional people to agree to such a contract, thus increasing supply exponentially. Through the action of the law of supply and demand, the increased supply will cause prices to decrease to a level most people will consider reasonable. Unless you allow prices to be set by the market process you put a limit on the number of organs that might become available. Any fixed price, set by government or a special agency, would diminish the supply which would defeat the goal of making the most organs available. That would cause some individuals to decide not to participate. But if they knew that the organs they might provide are going to bring whatever the market process allows, they’ll have every incentive to take part. D. The organs would have to be sold only for transplant to U. S. citizens in order to avoid foreigners from bidding up the price and reducing the supply to Americans. Of course, if other countries should adopt model legislation such as ours then we could reciprocate and become partners with them since their organ supply could be shared with ours. E. The poor will not be discriminated against. They will have access to organs because the law will provide that, just as in Medicare or Medicaid presently, the government will pay for any medical procedure or supplies that the patient needs, upon a doctor’s certification that it is medically necessary. The government would buy organs on the market for those with Medicare or Medicaid unless donated organs were available. The same principle will apply for those with health insurance. And the wealthy, who may choose to be self insured, would be free to arrange for organs in the same market. Of course, people would still be free to donate organs. And participation by providers in the futures contracts would be entirely voluntary. F. Presently those uninsured or poor, not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, have to raise tens of thousands of dollars before hospitals or transplant surgeons will help them. The added cost of an organ can also be raised in the same way, or the law can require our government to cover that cost, since it will be less costly over time than dealing with whatever the patient’s medical expenses would be otherwise. G. The plan will require providers to have their medical records maintained by their doctors beginning at least as soon as a futures contract is signed. It would be made available immediately to any parties potentially buying an organ from that cadaver. The purpose, and the result, would be to assure a better, safer organ supply. This plan does not contemplate any sale of kidneys or parts of livers from a living person. There are risks in having such surgery and for that reason and others, we set that aside and take no position on that question. Sometimes, under current law, it is the right thing to do, depending on the circumstances. But in point of fact, the need for such organs will be adequately supplied with adoption of my plan.</p>

Diamond ‘13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Diamond ‘13 fulltext: (A TV and radio commercial spokesman, an actor, a freelance broadcast sports producer, and a marketing and public relations consultant. Following four years of service (1953-1957) as a Russian language technician in the U.S. Air Force, Diamond studied foreign affairs at George Washington University in the late 1950’s. He then accepted a number of assignments working for Maryland state senator Newton I. Steers, Jr: as congressional and state senatorial campaign manager; as executive assistant and deputy commissioner in the Maryland Insurance Department; and as legislative assistant in the state capitol in Annapolis. David F., as quoted in “A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs,” August 31, http://bobsnewheart.wordpress.com/2013/08/31/a-proposal-to-sell-human-organs/) ***NOTE -- The “Federal Organ Transplant Law refers to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 Enter David Diamond and his proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs. I met David on the internet. We share backgrounds in politics and broadcasting and in trying to save lives through organ transplantation. The David Diamond Plan to increase the supply of transplantable organs by making the sale of human organs legal in the United States. The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed. The Federal Organ Transplant Law enacted in 1984 provides that only donated organs may be used. The following plan to increase the supply of organs for transplant was developed in subsequent years by David F. Diamond of Memphis, Tennessee. ======0====== The shortage of organs is taking the lives of almost 7,000 people unnecessarily each year. Donation is good. It is the highest altruistic step that a person can contemplate. However, for a number of reasons, many people are not willing to donate. The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold as follows: A. A contract can provide that when a person has decided, for whatever reasons, not to donate organs, he or she (hereafter: the provider) can commit to a plan to have the organs sold if and when the provider is brain dead. This contract will also be signed by the next of kin, spouse or nearest living relative so that that party understands the purpose of the contract and agrees that they will not oppose its implementation when the provider dies. A provider’s option to cancel the contract at any time prior to the provider’s death will be included in the contract. The use of this contract will allow the provider to leave an estate to his heirs or a designated charity. A provider, with few or no assets, might otherwise have none to leave when he or she passed. B. The sale of organs can be conducted by a broker, attorney or individual (hereafter: an agent) designated by the provider. A licensing procedure would establish that the agent would be certified as fiscally responsible and having financial integrity. Upon determination of brain death, the agent selected by the provider, using email, fax or phones, would immediately advise interested buyers of an organ’s availability and condition, etc. Time would be of the essence, of course. Appropriate compensation to the agent, such as a commission for services provided, would be set forth in the contract. Buyers whose bids were accepted would send payment by wire transfer, cashier’s check or other means approved in the law. C. The party designated by the provider must maintain a public record (like a broadcaster’s log which is available for public viewing) specifying the individual who gets the organs, how much is being paid and the identification of the provider. The purpose of this transparency is to eliminate the need for a black market, and to stimulate public awareness. If there is a public record, as soon as organ sales begin, the news media will undoubtedly write about it pointing out how much money was involved in the transactions and stressing how much money goes to the heirs. This will persuade a lot of additional people to agree to such a contract, thus increasing supply exponentially. Through the action of the law of supply and demand, the increased supply will cause prices to decrease to a level most people will consider reasonable. Unless you allow prices to be set by the market process you put a limit on the number of organs that might become available. Any fixed price, set by government or a special agency, would diminish the supply which would defeat the goal of making the most organs available. That would cause some individuals to decide not to participate. But if they knew that the organs they might provide are going to bring whatever the market process allows, they’ll have every incentive to take part. D. The organs would have to be sold only for transplant to U. S. citizens in order to avoid foreigners from bidding up the price and reducing the supply to Americans. Of course, if other countries should adopt model legislation such as ours then we could reciprocate and become partners with them since their organ supply could be shared with ours. E. The poor will not be discriminated against. They will have access to organs because the law will provide that, just as in Medicare or Medicaid presently, the government will pay for any medical procedure or supplies that the patient needs, upon a doctor’s certification that it is medically necessary. The government would buy organs on the market for those with Medicare or Medicaid unless donated organs were available. The same principle will apply for those with health insurance. And the wealthy, who may choose to be self insured, would be free to arrange for organs in the same market. Of course, people would still be free to donate organs. And participation by providers in the futures contracts would be entirely voluntary. F. Presently those uninsured or poor, not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, have to raise tens of thousands of dollars before hospitals or transplant surgeons will help them. The added cost of an organ can also be raised in the same way, or the law can require our government to cover that cost, since it will be less costly over time than dealing with whatever the patient’s medical expenses would be otherwise. G. The plan will require providers to have their medical records maintained by their doctors beginning at least as soon as a futures contract is signed. It would be made available immediately to any parties potentially buying an organ from that cadaver. The purpose, and the result, would be to assure a better, safer organ supply. This plan does not contemplate any sale of kidneys or parts of livers from a living person. There are risks in having such surgery and for that reason and others, we set that aside and take no position on that question. Sometimes, under current law, it is the right thing to do, depending on the circumstances. But in point of fact, the need for such organs will be adequately supplied with adoption of my plan. [/INST] <h4><strong>Legalization of organ sales means regulation</h4><p>Diamond ‘13 </p><p></strong>(A TV and radio commercial spokesman, an actor, a freelance broadcast sports producer, and a marketing and public relations consultant. Following four years of service (1953-1957) as a Russian language technician in the U.S. Air Force, Diamond studied foreign affairs at George Washington University in the late 1950’s. He then accepted a number of assignments working for Maryland state senator Newton I. Steers, Jr: as congressional and state senatorial campaign manager; as executive assistant and deputy commissioner in the Maryland Insurance Department; and as legislative assistant in the state capitol in Annapolis. David F., as quoted in “<u><strong>A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs</u></strong>,” August 31, http://bobsnewheart.wordpress.com/2013/08/31/a-proposal-to-sell-human-organs/)</p><p>***NOTE -- The “Federal Organ Transplant Law refers to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 </p><p>Enter David Diamond and his <u><strong><mark>proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs</u></strong></mark>. I met David on the internet. We share backgrounds in politics and broadcasting and in trying to save lives through organ transplantation. The David Diamond Plan to increase the supply of transplantable organs <u><strong><mark>by making the sale of human organs legal in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed.</mark> </u></strong>The Federal Organ Transplant Law enacted in 1984 provides that only donated organs may be used. The following plan to increase the supply of organs for transplant was developed in subsequent years by David F. Diamond of Memphis, Tennessee. ======0====== The shortage of organs is taking the lives of almost 7,000 people unnecessarily each year. Donation is good. It is the highest altruistic step that a person can contemplate. However, for a number of reasons, many people are not willing to donate. <u><strong><mark>The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold</u></strong></mark> as follows: A. A contract can provide that when a person has decided, for whatever reasons, not to donate organs, he or she (hereafter: the provider) can commit to a plan to have the organs sold if and when the provider is brain dead. This contract will also be signed by the next of kin, spouse or nearest living relative so that that party understands the purpose of the contract and agrees that they will not oppose its implementation when the provider dies. A provider’s option to cancel the contract at any time prior to the provider’s death will be included in the contract. The use of this contract will allow the provider to leave an estate to his heirs or a designated charity. A provider, with few or no assets, might otherwise have none to leave when he or she passed. B. The sale of organs can be conducted by a broker, attorney or individual (hereafter: an agent) designated by the provider. A licensing procedure would establish that the agent would be certified as fiscally responsible and having financial integrity. Upon determination of brain death, the agent selected by the provider, using email, fax or phones, would immediately advise interested buyers of an organ’s availability and condition, etc. Time would be of the essence, of course. Appropriate compensation to the agent, such as a commission for services provided, would be set forth in the contract. Buyers whose bids were accepted would send payment by wire transfer, cashier’s check or other means approved in the law. C. The party designated by the provider must maintain a public record (like a broadcaster’s log which is available for public viewing) specifying the individual who gets the organs, how much is being paid and the identification of the provider. The purpose of this transparency is to eliminate the need for a black market, and to stimulate public awareness. If there is a public record, as soon as organ sales begin, the news media will undoubtedly write about it pointing out how much money was involved in the transactions and stressing how much money goes to the heirs. This will persuade a lot of additional people to agree to such a contract, thus increasing supply exponentially. Through the action of the law of supply and demand, the increased supply will cause prices to decrease to a level most people will consider reasonable. Unless you allow prices to be set by the market process you put a limit on the number of organs that might become available. Any fixed price, set by government or a special agency, would diminish the supply which would defeat the goal of making the most organs available. That would cause some individuals to decide not to participate. But if they knew that the organs they might provide are going to bring whatever the market process allows, they’ll have every incentive to take part. D. The organs would have to be sold only for transplant to U. S. citizens in order to avoid foreigners from bidding up the price and reducing the supply to Americans. Of course, if other countries should adopt model legislation such as ours then we could reciprocate and become partners with them since their organ supply could be shared with ours. E. The poor will not be discriminated against. They will have access to organs because the law will provide that, just as in Medicare or Medicaid presently, the government will pay for any medical procedure or supplies that the patient needs, upon a doctor’s certification that it is medically necessary. The government would buy organs on the market for those with Medicare or Medicaid unless donated organs were available. The same principle will apply for those with health insurance. And the wealthy, who may choose to be self insured, would be free to arrange for organs in the same market. Of course, people would still be free to donate organs. And participation by providers in the futures contracts would be entirely voluntary. F. Presently those uninsured or poor, not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, have to raise tens of thousands of dollars before hospitals or transplant surgeons will help them. The added cost of an organ can also be raised in the same way, or the law can require our government to cover that cost, since it will be less costly over time than dealing with whatever the patient’s medical expenses would be otherwise. G. The plan will require providers to have their medical records maintained by their doctors beginning at least as soon as a futures contract is signed. It would be made available immediately to any parties potentially buying an organ from that cadaver. The purpose, and the result, would be to assure a better, safer organ supply. This plan does not contemplate any sale of kidneys or parts of livers from a living person. There are risks in having such surgery and for that reason and others, we set that aside and take no position on that question. Sometimes, under current law, it is the right thing to do, depending on the circumstances. But in point of fact, the need for such organs will be adequately supplied with adoption of my plan.</p> </s>

The affirmative must legalize all or nearly all—they legalize ZERO sales of live organs

The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two

The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two

Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example the term ‘around half’ is used to describe 50% plus or minus one interview, and ‘nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two interviews.

<h4>The affirmative must legalize <u>all or nearly all</u><strong>—they legalize ZERO sales of live organs</h4><p>Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professors of counseling at Strathclyde University </p><p></strong>(Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/2767391/Proposed_Scoring_Scheme_for_Qualitative_Thematic_Analysis_Mick_Cooper.pdf)</p><p>Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). <u><strong><mark>The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence.</mark> For example</u></strong> the term ‘around half’ is used to describe 50% plus or minus one interview, and ‘<u><strong><mark>nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two</mark> </u></strong>interviews.</p>

Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professors of counseling at Strathclyde University (Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/2767391/Proposed_Scoring_Scheme_for_Qualitative_Thematic_Analysis_Mick_Cooper.pdf)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professors of counseling at Strathclyde University (Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/2767391/Proposed_Scoring_Scheme_for_Qualitative_Thematic_Analysis_Mick_Cooper.pdf) fulltext: Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example the term ‘around half’ is used to describe 50% plus or minus one interview, and ‘nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two interviews. [/INST] <h4>The affirmative must legalize <u>all or nearly all</u><strong>—they legalize ZERO sales of live organs</h4><p>Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professors of counseling at Strathclyde University </p><p></strong>(Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/2767391/Proposed_Scoring_Scheme_for_Qualitative_Thematic_Analysis_Mick_Cooper.pdf)</p><p>Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). <u><strong><mark>The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence.</mark> For example</u></strong> the term ‘around half’ is used to describe 50% plus or minus one interview, and ‘<u><strong><mark>nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two</mark> </u></strong>interviews.</p> </s>

Violation -- the aff is decrim, the plan merely removes the prohibition of organ sales and doesn’t create a regulated market AND it only decrims part of the area.

<h4>Violation -- the aff is decrim, the plan merely removes the prohibition of organ sales and doesn’t create a regulated market AND it only decrims part of the area.</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Violation -- the aff is decrim, the plan merely removes the prohibition of organ sales and doesn’t create a regulated market AND it only decrims part of the area.</h4> </s>

Vote negative on predictable ground -- all of the controversy comes from the regulations portion of the debate -- they jack the decrim counterplan, all of our regs disads and all of our positive state action kritik links AND we lose cadaveric only CPs from nearly all

<h4>Vote negative on predictable ground -- all of the controversy comes from the regulations portion of the debate -- they jack the decrim counterplan, all of our regs disads and all of our positive state action kritik links AND we lose cadaveric only CPs from nearly all</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Vote negative on predictable ground -- all of the controversy comes from the regulations portion of the debate -- they jack the decrim counterplan, all of our regs disads and all of our positive state action kritik links AND we lose cadaveric only CPs from nearly all</h4> </s>

Courts won’t recognize property rights for bodily sale in the status quo

As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in human tissues Matthews observed that where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that as with blood, hair and the like that person had the first and best right to possession, though presumably one might transfer that right Unfortunately, the courts have not generally treated kidneys and other non-renewable organs as property. The Colavito line of cases is illustrative There, the court held that no property right existed in a kidney Where human tissues are destined for research the courts are more likely to deny the property rights of sources against those of the users. This judicial inclination is evident in Moore and Greenberg A more recent example is Washington University v. Catalona

judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in tissues where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that person had possession the courts have not treated non-renewable organs as property Colavito cases is illustrative the court held no property right existed in a kidney Where tissues are destined for research the courts are likely to deny the rights of sources This is evident in Moore and Greenberg more recent example is Catalona

As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in human tissues. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, Matthews (1983) observed that where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that as with blood, hair and the like that person had the first and best right to possession, though presumably one might transfer that right, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). Unfortunately, the courts have not generally treated kidneys and other non-renewable organs as property. The Colavito line of cases is illustrative.27 There, the court held that no property right existed in a misdirected, but histo-compatible, kidney.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ Where human tissues are destined for research or employed in the research process, the courts are more likely (probably on policy grounds) to deny the property rights of sources as against those of the users. This judicial inclination is evident in Moore and Greenberg above. A more recent example is Washington University v. Catalona,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994).

<h4>Courts won’t recognize property rights for bodily sale in the status quo</h4><p>Remigius N. <strong>Nwabueze 11</strong>, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books</p><p><u><strong>As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, <mark>judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in </mark>human <mark>tissues</u></strong></mark>. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, <u><strong>Matthews</u></strong> (1983) <u><strong>observed that <mark>where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought </mark>that as with blood, hair and the like</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>that person had </mark>the first and best right to <mark>possession</mark>, though presumably one might transfer that right</u></strong>, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). <u><strong>Unfortunately, <mark>the courts have not</mark> generally <mark>treated</mark> kidneys and other <mark>non-renewable organs as property</mark>. The <mark>Colavito </mark>line of <mark>cases is illustrative</u></strong></mark>.27 <u><strong>There, <mark>the court held</mark> that <mark>no property right existed in a</u></strong></mark> misdirected, but histo-compatible, <u><strong><mark>kidney</u></strong></mark>.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ <u><strong><mark>Where </mark>human <mark>tissues are destined for research</u></strong></mark> or employed in the research process, <u><strong><mark>the courts are </mark>more <mark>likely</u></strong></mark> (probably on policy grounds) <u><strong><mark>to deny the </mark>property <mark>rights of sources</u></strong></mark> as <u><strong>against those of the users. <mark>This </mark>judicial inclination <mark>is evident in Moore and Greenberg</mark> </u></strong>above.<u><strong> A <mark>more recent example is</mark> Washington University v. <mark>Catalona</u></strong></mark>,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994).</p>

Remigius N. Nwabueze 11, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Remigius N. Nwabueze 11, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books fulltext: As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in human tissues. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, Matthews (1983) observed that where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that as with blood, hair and the like that person had the first and best right to possession, though presumably one might transfer that right, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). Unfortunately, the courts have not generally treated kidneys and other non-renewable organs as property. The Colavito line of cases is illustrative.27 There, the court held that no property right existed in a misdirected, but histo-compatible, kidney.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ Where human tissues are destined for research or employed in the research process, the courts are more likely (probably on policy grounds) to deny the property rights of sources as against those of the users. This judicial inclination is evident in Moore and Greenberg above. A more recent example is Washington University v. Catalona,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994). [/INST] <h4>Courts won’t recognize property rights for bodily sale in the status quo</h4><p>Remigius N. <strong>Nwabueze 11</strong>, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books</p><p><u><strong>As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, <mark>judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in </mark>human <mark>tissues</u></strong></mark>. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, <u><strong>Matthews</u></strong> (1983) <u><strong>observed that <mark>where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought </mark>that as with blood, hair and the like</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>that person had </mark>the first and best right to <mark>possession</mark>, though presumably one might transfer that right</u></strong>, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). <u><strong>Unfortunately, <mark>the courts have not</mark> generally <mark>treated</mark> kidneys and other <mark>non-renewable organs as property</mark>. The <mark>Colavito </mark>line of <mark>cases is illustrative</u></strong></mark>.27 <u><strong>There, <mark>the court held</mark> that <mark>no property right existed in a</u></strong></mark> misdirected, but histo-compatible, <u><strong><mark>kidney</u></strong></mark>.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ <u><strong><mark>Where </mark>human <mark>tissues are destined for research</u></strong></mark> or employed in the research process, <u><strong><mark>the courts are </mark>more <mark>likely</u></strong></mark> (probably on policy grounds) <u><strong><mark>to deny the </mark>property <mark>rights of sources</u></strong></mark> as <u><strong>against those of the users. <mark>This </mark>judicial inclination <mark>is evident in Moore and Greenberg</mark> </u></strong>above.<u><strong> A <mark>more recent example is</mark> Washington University v. <mark>Catalona</u></strong></mark>,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994).</p> </s>

The plan reverses that – necessitates bodily property rights

Compensation systems people may be more willing to provide organs if they receive compensation Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals Additionally, a compensation system could only go into effect if NOTA and the 1987 UAGA amendments are repealed or amended A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death. This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body allowing incentives to donors can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in live tissue and organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as common law and statutory law do not prohibit sales.

people provide organs if they receive compensation Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals compensation could only go into effect if NOTA and are repealed or amended This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body. allowing incentives to donors can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as law do not prohibit sales.

Compensation systems would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that people may be more willing to provide organs if they receive compensation. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals after death. Additionally, a compensation system could only go into effect if NOTA and the 1987 UAGA amendments are repealed or amended. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death. n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body. This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, allowing incentives to donors is a sound idea. This can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in live tissue and organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as common law and statutory law do not prohibit sales.

<h4>The plan reverses that – necessitates bodily property rights</h4><p>Laurel R. <strong>Siegel 2K<u>, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis</p><p>Compensation systems</u></strong> would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that <u><strong><mark>people </mark>may be more willing to <mark>provide organs if they receive compensation</u></strong></mark>. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. <u><strong><mark>Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals</u></strong></mark> after death. <u><strong>Additionally, a <mark>compensation</mark> system <mark>could only go into effect if NOTA and</mark> the 1987 UAGA amendments <mark>are repealed or amended</u></strong></mark>. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. <u><strong>A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death.</u></strong> n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ <u><strong><mark>This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body</u></strong>.</mark> This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, <u><strong><mark>allowing incentives to donors</u></strong></mark> is a sound idea. This <u><strong><mark>can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in </mark>live tissue and <mark>organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as </mark>common law and statutory <mark>law do not prohibit sales.</p></u></strong></mark>

Laurel R. Siegel 2K, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Laurel R. Siegel 2K, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis fulltext: Compensation systems would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that people may be more willing to provide organs if they receive compensation. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals after death. Additionally, a compensation system could only go into effect if NOTA and the 1987 UAGA amendments are repealed or amended. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death. n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body. This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, allowing incentives to donors is a sound idea. This can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in live tissue and organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as common law and statutory law do not prohibit sales. [/INST] <h4>The plan reverses that – necessitates bodily property rights</h4><p>Laurel R. <strong>Siegel 2K<u>, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis</p><p>Compensation systems</u></strong> would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that <u><strong><mark>people </mark>may be more willing to <mark>provide organs if they receive compensation</u></strong></mark>. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. <u><strong><mark>Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals</u></strong></mark> after death. <u><strong>Additionally, a <mark>compensation</mark> system <mark>could only go into effect if NOTA and</mark> the 1987 UAGA amendments <mark>are repealed or amended</u></strong></mark>. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. <u><strong>A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death.</u></strong> n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ <u><strong><mark>This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body</u></strong>.</mark> This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, <u><strong><mark>allowing incentives to donors</u></strong></mark> is a sound idea. This <u><strong><mark>can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in </mark>live tissue and <mark>organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as </mark>common law and statutory <mark>law do not prohibit sales.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

That wrecks the biomedical research

Because biomedical research is a costly and financially risky endeavor Congress must consider carefully whether according human research participants property rights in their tissue will diminish the incentives to invest in this industry if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical scientists would face a significant increase in their transaction costs scientists would be obliged to compensate research participants for their genetic material, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. This obligation to remunerate research participants presents a particular risk to scientists in the nonprofit sector, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings researchers would face significant transaction costs in locating and then negotiating compensation arrangements with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide such negotiations could prove quite complex and protracted bargaining among scientists and research participants could prove impossible in cases where the identities of these participants are unknown the problems of increased financial and transaction costs reach their apex in the case of the potential holdout who refuses to participate in research unless she is compensated at a very high rate recognizing the research participant's right to share in the revenues may imply some right to control the products of that research research participants may demand widespread and affordable licensing of the intellectual property developed from their tissue thereby further decreasing the scientists' profits All of these factors combined would present significant disincentives to researchers, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise

Because biomedical research is financially risky according participants property rights in their tissue will diminish incentives to invest scientists would face significant transaction costs scientists would be obliged to compensate for genetic material This presents a particular risk in the nonprofit sector researchers would face significant costs in locating and negotiating arrangements negotiations could prove complex bargaining could prove impossible where identities are unknown the problems reach their apex in the holdout who refuses to participate unless she is compensated recognizing the right may imply some right to control research participants may demand licensing further decreasing profits these factors would present significant disincentives to researchers

Because biomedical research is a costly and financially risky endeavor,86 Congress must consider carefully whether according human research participants property rights in their tissue will diminish the incentives to invest in this industry. Certainly, if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical scientists would face a significant increase in their transaction costs. First, scientists would be obliged to compensate research participants for their genetic material, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. This obligation to remunerate research participants presents a particular risk to scientists in the nonprofit sector, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings. 87 Second, researchers would face significant transaction costs88 in locating and then negotiating compensation arrangements with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide,89 such negotiations could prove quite complex and protracted. Furthermore, bargaining among scientists and research participants could prove impossible in cases where the identities of these participants are unknown, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, the problems of increased financial and transaction costs reach their apex in the case of the potential holdout who refuses to participate in research unless she is compensated at a very high rate.92 Finally, recognizing the research participant's right to share in the revenues may imply some right to control the products of that research; for example, research participants may demand widespread and affordable licensing of the intellectual property developed from their tissue, thereby further decreasing the scientists' profits.93 All of these factors combined would present significant disincentives to researchers, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation.

<h4>That wrecks the biomedical research</h4><p><strong>Gitter 4</strong> (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Because biomedical research is</mark> a costly and <mark>financially risky</mark> endeavor</u></strong>,86 <u><strong>Congress must consider carefully whether <mark>according</mark> human research <mark>participants property rights in their tissue will diminish </mark>the <mark>incentives to invest</mark> in this industry</u></strong>. Certainly, <u><strong>if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical <mark>scientists would face</mark> a <mark>significant </mark>increase in their <mark>transaction costs</u></strong></mark>. First, <u><strong><mark>scientists would be obliged to compensate</mark> research participants <mark>for </mark>their <mark>genetic material</mark>, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. <mark>This</mark> obligation to remunerate research participants <mark>presents a particular risk </mark>to scientists <mark>in the nonprofit sector</mark>, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings</u></strong>. 87 Second, <u><strong><mark>researchers would face significant</mark> transaction <mark>costs</u></strong></mark>88 <u><strong><mark>in locating and</mark> then <mark>negotiating</mark> compensation <mark>arrangements </mark>with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide</u></strong>,89 <u><strong>such <mark>negotiations could prove</mark> quite <mark>complex</mark> and protracted</u></strong>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>bargaining</mark> among scientists and research participants <mark>could prove impossible</mark> in cases <mark>where</mark> the <mark>identities</mark> of these participants <mark>are unknown</u></strong></mark>, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, <u><strong><mark>the problems</mark> of increased financial and transaction costs <mark>reach their apex in the </mark>case of the potential <mark>holdout who refuses to participate </mark>in research <mark>unless she is compensated</mark> at a very high rate</u></strong>.92 Finally, <u><strong><mark>recognizing the</mark> research participant's <mark>right</mark> to share in the revenues <mark>may imply some right to control</mark> the products of that <mark>research</u></strong></mark>; for example, <u><strong>research <mark>participants may demand</mark> widespread and affordable <mark>licensing </mark>of the intellectual property developed from their tissue</u></strong>, <u><strong>thereby</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>further decreasing</mark> the scientists' <mark>profits</u></strong></mark>.93 <u><strong>All of <mark>these factors</mark> combined <mark>would present significant disincentives to researchers</mark>, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise</u></strong>. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation.</p>

Gitter 4 (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Gitter 4 (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz fulltext: Because biomedical research is a costly and financially risky endeavor,86 Congress must consider carefully whether according human research participants property rights in their tissue will diminish the incentives to invest in this industry. Certainly, if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical scientists would face a significant increase in their transaction costs. First, scientists would be obliged to compensate research participants for their genetic material, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. This obligation to remunerate research participants presents a particular risk to scientists in the nonprofit sector, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings. 87 Second, researchers would face significant transaction costs88 in locating and then negotiating compensation arrangements with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide,89 such negotiations could prove quite complex and protracted. Furthermore, bargaining among scientists and research participants could prove impossible in cases where the identities of these participants are unknown, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, the problems of increased financial and transaction costs reach their apex in the case of the potential holdout who refuses to participate in research unless she is compensated at a very high rate.92 Finally, recognizing the research participant's right to share in the revenues may imply some right to control the products of that research; for example, research participants may demand widespread and affordable licensing of the intellectual property developed from their tissue, thereby further decreasing the scientists' profits.93 All of these factors combined would present significant disincentives to researchers, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation. [/INST] <h4>That wrecks the biomedical research</h4><p><strong>Gitter 4</strong> (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Because biomedical research is</mark> a costly and <mark>financially risky</mark> endeavor</u></strong>,86 <u><strong>Congress must consider carefully whether <mark>according</mark> human research <mark>participants property rights in their tissue will diminish </mark>the <mark>incentives to invest</mark> in this industry</u></strong>. Certainly, <u><strong>if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical <mark>scientists would face</mark> a <mark>significant </mark>increase in their <mark>transaction costs</u></strong></mark>. First, <u><strong><mark>scientists would be obliged to compensate</mark> research participants <mark>for </mark>their <mark>genetic material</mark>, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. <mark>This</mark> obligation to remunerate research participants <mark>presents a particular risk </mark>to scientists <mark>in the nonprofit sector</mark>, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings</u></strong>. 87 Second, <u><strong><mark>researchers would face significant</mark> transaction <mark>costs</u></strong></mark>88 <u><strong><mark>in locating and</mark> then <mark>negotiating</mark> compensation <mark>arrangements </mark>with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide</u></strong>,89 <u><strong>such <mark>negotiations could prove</mark> quite <mark>complex</mark> and protracted</u></strong>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>bargaining</mark> among scientists and research participants <mark>could prove impossible</mark> in cases <mark>where</mark> the <mark>identities</mark> of these participants <mark>are unknown</u></strong></mark>, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, <u><strong><mark>the problems</mark> of increased financial and transaction costs <mark>reach their apex in the </mark>case of the potential <mark>holdout who refuses to participate </mark>in research <mark>unless she is compensated</mark> at a very high rate</u></strong>.92 Finally, <u><strong><mark>recognizing the</mark> research participant's <mark>right</mark> to share in the revenues <mark>may imply some right to control</mark> the products of that <mark>research</u></strong></mark>; for example, <u><strong>research <mark>participants may demand</mark> widespread and affordable <mark>licensing </mark>of the intellectual property developed from their tissue</u></strong>, <u><strong>thereby</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>further decreasing</mark> the scientists' <mark>profits</u></strong></mark>.93 <u><strong>All of <mark>these factors</mark> combined <mark>would present significant disincentives to researchers</mark>, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise</u></strong>. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation.</p> </s>

Ensures environmental pathogens

The key difference between environmental pathogens and other human pathogens is their ability to survive and thrive outside the host a great deal more research is needed. By grouping together the environmental pathogens," it is hoped that the topic can gain the critical mass needed for sustained progress The development of improved diagnostic techniques is critical for accurate assessment of health risks and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens. If these diseases are to be effectively controlled, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and vaccines— require improvement

The key difference between environmental pathogens and other s is their ability to thrive outside the host more research is needed. By grouping together the pathogens," the topic can gain critical mass for progress development of improved techniques is critical for assessment of health risks If these diseases are to be effectively controlled vaccines— require improvement

The key difference between environmental pathogens and other human pathogens is their ability to survive and thrive outside the host. Their widespread occurrence in the environment makes them difficult to monitor and control. Inroads have been made to understand the persistence of these organisms in the environment, the reservoirs they inhabit, the ways they exchange virulence factors, and their diversity, but a great deal more research is needed. By grouping together phylogenetically diverse organisms under the umbrella of "environmental pathogens," it is hoped that the topic can gain the critical mass needed for sustained progress. ¶ Colloquium participants examined other research needs for the field, including the diagnostic and environmental technologies that will be necessary for taking the next steps. It was agreed that because of the complex nature of studying organisms that can exist in the environment and in human hosts, work in this area is best carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion with coordinated input from medical, molecular, and environmental microbiologists, specialists in host responses, epidemiologists, ecologists, environmental engineers, and public health experts. The development of improved diagnostic techniques is critical for accurate assessment of health risks and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens. ¶ If the impacts of these diseases are to be effectively controlled, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and vaccines— require improvement. The processes surrounding drug and vaccine development must be tailored to the special problem of environmental pathogens, which often strike small numbers of individuals or individuals in less developed areas of the world and, therefore, offer less potential for drug development profit than more common diseases. A challenge exists, therefore, in meeting the need for targeted, specific interventions, including development of drugs and vaccines for infections by environmental agents, in the face of a lack of financial incentive for development of these tools.

<h4>Ensures environmental pathogens</h4><p>Gerard A. <strong>Cangelosi 5</strong>, Prof of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and Adjunct Prof of Epidemiology and of Global Health at the University of Washington, PhD in Microbiology from UC Davis, Nancy E. Freitag, PhD, Prof in the Dept of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Medicine, and Merry R. Buckley, Ph.D. in environmental microbiology at Michigan State University, “From Outside to Inside: Environmental Microorganisms as Human Pathogens,” http://academy.asm.org/index.php/environmental-microbiology-ecology-evolution/553-from-outside-to-inside-environmental-microorganisms-as-human-pathogens</p><p><u><strong><mark>The key difference between environmental pathogens and other</mark> human pathogen<mark>s is their ability to</mark> survive and <mark>thrive outside the host</u></strong></mark>. Their widespread occurrence in the environment makes them difficult to monitor and control. Inroads have been made to understand the persistence of these organisms in the environment, the reservoirs they inhabit, the ways they exchange virulence factors, and their diversity, but <u><strong>a great deal <mark>more research is needed. By grouping together</u></strong></mark> phylogenetically diverse organisms under <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> umbrella of "<u><strong>environmental <mark>pathogens," </mark>it is hoped that <mark>the topic can gain</mark> the <mark>critical mass</mark> needed <mark>for </mark>sustained <mark>progress</u></strong></mark>. ¶ Colloquium participants examined other research needs for the field, including the diagnostic and environmental technologies that will be necessary for taking the next steps. It was agreed that because of the complex nature of studying organisms that can exist in the environment and in human hosts, work in this area is best carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion with coordinated input from medical, molecular, and environmental microbiologists, specialists in host responses, epidemiologists, ecologists, environmental engineers, and public health experts. <u><strong>The <mark>development of improved </mark>diagnostic <mark>techniques is critical for </mark>accurate <mark>assessment of health risks</mark> and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens.</u></strong> ¶ <u><strong><mark>If</u></strong></mark> the impacts of <u><strong><mark>these diseases are to be effectively controlled</mark>, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and <mark>vaccines— require improvement</u></strong></mark>. The processes surrounding drug and vaccine development must be tailored to the special problem of environmental pathogens, which often strike small numbers of individuals or individuals in less developed areas of the world and, therefore, offer less potential for drug development profit than more common diseases. A challenge exists, therefore, in meeting the need for targeted, specific interventions, including development of drugs and vaccines for infections by environmental agents, in the face of a lack of financial incentive for development of these tools. </p>

Gerard A. Cangelosi 5, Prof of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and Adjunct Prof of Epidemiology and of Global Health at the University of Washington, PhD in Microbiology from UC Davis, Nancy E. Freitag, PhD, Prof in the Dept of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Medicine, and Merry R. Buckley, Ph.D. in environmental microbiology at Michigan State University, “From Outside to Inside: Environmental Microorganisms as Human Pathogens,” http://academy.asm.org/index.php/environmental-microbiology-ecology-evolution/553-from-outside-to-inside-environmental-microorganisms-as-human-pathogens

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Gerard A. Cangelosi 5, Prof of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and Adjunct Prof of Epidemiology and of Global Health at the University of Washington, PhD in Microbiology from UC Davis, Nancy E. Freitag, PhD, Prof in the Dept of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Medicine, and Merry R. Buckley, Ph.D. in environmental microbiology at Michigan State University, “From Outside to Inside: Environmental Microorganisms as Human Pathogens,” http://academy.asm.org/index.php/environmental-microbiology-ecology-evolution/553-from-outside-to-inside-environmental-microorganisms-as-human-pathogens fulltext: The key difference between environmental pathogens and other human pathogens is their ability to survive and thrive outside the host. Their widespread occurrence in the environment makes them difficult to monitor and control. Inroads have been made to understand the persistence of these organisms in the environment, the reservoirs they inhabit, the ways they exchange virulence factors, and their diversity, but a great deal more research is needed. By grouping together phylogenetically diverse organisms under the umbrella of "environmental pathogens," it is hoped that the topic can gain the critical mass needed for sustained progress. ¶ Colloquium participants examined other research needs for the field, including the diagnostic and environmental technologies that will be necessary for taking the next steps. It was agreed that because of the complex nature of studying organisms that can exist in the environment and in human hosts, work in this area is best carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion with coordinated input from medical, molecular, and environmental microbiologists, specialists in host responses, epidemiologists, ecologists, environmental engineers, and public health experts. The development of improved diagnostic techniques is critical for accurate assessment of health risks and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens. ¶ If the impacts of these diseases are to be effectively controlled, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and vaccines— require improvement. The processes surrounding drug and vaccine development must be tailored to the special problem of environmental pathogens, which often strike small numbers of individuals or individuals in less developed areas of the world and, therefore, offer less potential for drug development profit than more common diseases. A challenge exists, therefore, in meeting the need for targeted, specific interventions, including development of drugs and vaccines for infections by environmental agents, in the face of a lack of financial incentive for development of these tools. [/INST] <h4>Ensures environmental pathogens</h4><p>Gerard A. <strong>Cangelosi 5</strong>, Prof of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and Adjunct Prof of Epidemiology and of Global Health at the University of Washington, PhD in Microbiology from UC Davis, Nancy E. Freitag, PhD, Prof in the Dept of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Medicine, and Merry R. Buckley, Ph.D. in environmental microbiology at Michigan State University, “From Outside to Inside: Environmental Microorganisms as Human Pathogens,” http://academy.asm.org/index.php/environmental-microbiology-ecology-evolution/553-from-outside-to-inside-environmental-microorganisms-as-human-pathogens</p><p><u><strong><mark>The key difference between environmental pathogens and other</mark> human pathogen<mark>s is their ability to</mark> survive and <mark>thrive outside the host</u></strong></mark>. Their widespread occurrence in the environment makes them difficult to monitor and control. Inroads have been made to understand the persistence of these organisms in the environment, the reservoirs they inhabit, the ways they exchange virulence factors, and their diversity, but <u><strong>a great deal <mark>more research is needed. By grouping together</u></strong></mark> phylogenetically diverse organisms under <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> umbrella of "<u><strong>environmental <mark>pathogens," </mark>it is hoped that <mark>the topic can gain</mark> the <mark>critical mass</mark> needed <mark>for </mark>sustained <mark>progress</u></strong></mark>. ¶ Colloquium participants examined other research needs for the field, including the diagnostic and environmental technologies that will be necessary for taking the next steps. It was agreed that because of the complex nature of studying organisms that can exist in the environment and in human hosts, work in this area is best carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion with coordinated input from medical, molecular, and environmental microbiologists, specialists in host responses, epidemiologists, ecologists, environmental engineers, and public health experts. <u><strong>The <mark>development of improved </mark>diagnostic <mark>techniques is critical for </mark>accurate <mark>assessment of health risks</mark> and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens.</u></strong> ¶ <u><strong><mark>If</u></strong></mark> the impacts of <u><strong><mark>these diseases are to be effectively controlled</mark>, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and <mark>vaccines— require improvement</u></strong></mark>. The processes surrounding drug and vaccine development must be tailored to the special problem of environmental pathogens, which often strike small numbers of individuals or individuals in less developed areas of the world and, therefore, offer less potential for drug development profit than more common diseases. A challenge exists, therefore, in meeting the need for targeted, specific interventions, including development of drugs and vaccines for infections by environmental agents, in the face of a lack of financial incentive for development of these tools. </p> </s>

Extinction

it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats this writer can identify infectious disease recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for extinction of numerous amphibian species Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that pathogens required their hosts and some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as fungal pathogens. For those it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity

recent decades provide unequivocal evidence for pathogens to cause extinction Although disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by finding a single fungus responsible for extinction of numerous species Previously, the view that diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that pathogens required hosts that does not apply to microbes acquired directly from the environment such as fungal pathogens it is possible to kill off every last member without harm to itself from existential threats environmental microbes pose a much greater threat to humanity

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

<h4>Extinction </h4><p>Arturo <strong>Casadevall 12</strong>, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full</p><p>In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern <u><strong>it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats</u></strong>. At this time <u><strong>this writer can identify </u></strong>at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) <u><strong>infectious disease</u></strong>. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes <u><strong><mark>recent decades</mark> have <mark>provide</mark>d <mark>unequivocal evidence for</mark> the ability of certain <mark>pathogens to cause</mark> the <mark>extinction</mark> of entire species. <mark>Although </mark>infectious <mark>disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by</mark> the <mark>finding</mark> that <mark>a single</mark> chytrid <mark>fungus</mark> was <mark>responsible for</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>extinction of numerous</mark> amphibian <mark>species</u></strong></mark> (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). <u><strong><mark>Previously, the view that</mark> infectious <mark>diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>pathogens required </mark>their <mark>hosts</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong>some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant</u></strong>. However, <u><strong><mark>that </mark>calculation <mark>does not apply to microbes</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that are</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>acquired directly from the environment</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and have no need for a host, <mark>such as</u></strong></mark> the majority of <u><strong><mark>fungal pathogens</mark>. For those</u></strong> types of host–microbe interactions <u><strong><mark>it is possible</mark> for the pathogen <mark>to kill off every last member</mark> of a species</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>without harm to itself</mark>, since it would return to its natural habitat</u></strong> upon killing its last host. Hence, <u><strong><mark>from</mark> the viewpoint of <mark>existential threats environmental microbes</mark> could potentially <mark>pose a much greater threat to humanity</u></strong></mark> than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.</p>

Arturo Casadevall 12, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Arturo Casadevall 12, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full fulltext: In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering. [/INST] <h4>Extinction </h4><p>Arturo <strong>Casadevall 12</strong>, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full</p><p>In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern <u><strong>it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats</u></strong>. At this time <u><strong>this writer can identify </u></strong>at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) <u><strong>infectious disease</u></strong>. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes <u><strong><mark>recent decades</mark> have <mark>provide</mark>d <mark>unequivocal evidence for</mark> the ability of certain <mark>pathogens to cause</mark> the <mark>extinction</mark> of entire species. <mark>Although </mark>infectious <mark>disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by</mark> the <mark>finding</mark> that <mark>a single</mark> chytrid <mark>fungus</mark> was <mark>responsible for</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>extinction of numerous</mark> amphibian <mark>species</u></strong></mark> (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). <u><strong><mark>Previously, the view that</mark> infectious <mark>diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>pathogens required </mark>their <mark>hosts</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong>some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant</u></strong>. However, <u><strong><mark>that </mark>calculation <mark>does not apply to microbes</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that are</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>acquired directly from the environment</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and have no need for a host, <mark>such as</u></strong></mark> the majority of <u><strong><mark>fungal pathogens</mark>. For those</u></strong> types of host–microbe interactions <u><strong><mark>it is possible</mark> for the pathogen <mark>to kill off every last member</mark> of a species</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>without harm to itself</mark>, since it would return to its natural habitat</u></strong> upon killing its last host. Hence, <u><strong><mark>from</mark> the viewpoint of <mark>existential threats environmental microbes</mark> could potentially <mark>pose a much greater threat to humanity</u></strong></mark> than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.</p> </s>

The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.

<h4>The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.</h4> </s>

Mandated choice solves the case – the aff is super unpopular – the CP isn’t

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular many people consider it “repugnant,” they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission the First-Person Consent Law makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination

a market allowing the selling of organs The idea is spectacularly unpopular people consider it “repugnant,” they object to rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell kidneys a legal market for organs is a political nonstarter “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers When you renew your driver’s license you are required to answer Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state has a 60 percent donor signup rate much higher than the national rate of 38 the First-Person Consent Law makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding mandated choice may achieve a higher rate than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance. One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps. An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor. Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does. Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds. Fortunately, there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference. In Illinois, where I live, this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. Here is how it works: When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent reported by Donate Life America The Illinois system has another advantage. There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, the First-Person Consent Law, which created this system, makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding. Thus, mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination.

<h4>Mandated choice solves the case – the aff is super unpopular – the CP isn’t</h4><p><strong>Thaler 9</strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u><strong>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: <mark>a market allowing the</mark> buying and <mark>selling of organs</u></strong></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. <u><strong><mark>The idea</mark> may have some merit, but it <mark>is spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, <u><strong>many <mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>they object to</mark> the possibility of <mark>rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></strong></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><strong><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell</mark> their <mark>kidneys</u></strong></mark>. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, <u><strong>whether you think <mark>a legal market for organs is</mark> a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s <mark>a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance. One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps. An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor. Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does. Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds. Fortunately, <u><strong>there is another possibility, called <mark>“mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference</u></strong></mark>. In Illinois, where I live, <u><strong>this system has been in use since 2006 and <mark>doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers</mark>.</u></strong> Here is how it works: <u><strong><mark>When you</mark> go to <mark>renew your driver’s license</mark> and update your photograph, <mark>you are required to answer</mark> this question: “<mark>Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state</mark> now <mark>has a 60 percent donor signup rate</u></strong></mark>, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. <u><strong>That is <mark>much higher than the national rate of 38</mark> percent</u></strong> reported by Donate Life America The Illinois system has another advantage. <u><strong>There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission</u></strong>. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, <u><strong><mark>the First-Person Consent Law</u></strong></mark>, which created this system, <u><strong><mark>makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong><mark>mandated choice may achieve a higher rate</mark> of donations <mark>than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent</mark> for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination</u></strong>.</p>

Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz fulltext: Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance. One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps. An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor. Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does. Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds. Fortunately, there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference. In Illinois, where I live, this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. Here is how it works: When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent reported by Donate Life America The Illinois system has another advantage. There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, the First-Person Consent Law, which created this system, makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding. Thus, mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination. [/INST] <h4>Mandated choice solves the case – the aff is super unpopular – the CP isn’t</h4><p><strong>Thaler 9</strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u><strong>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: <mark>a market allowing the</mark> buying and <mark>selling of organs</u></strong></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. <u><strong><mark>The idea</mark> may have some merit, but it <mark>is spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, <u><strong>many <mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>they object to</mark> the possibility of <mark>rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></strong></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><strong><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell</mark> their <mark>kidneys</u></strong></mark>. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, <u><strong>whether you think <mark>a legal market for organs is</mark> a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s <mark>a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance. One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps. An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor. Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does. Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds. Fortunately, <u><strong>there is another possibility, called <mark>“mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference</u></strong></mark>. In Illinois, where I live, <u><strong>this system has been in use since 2006 and <mark>doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers</mark>.</u></strong> Here is how it works: <u><strong><mark>When you</mark> go to <mark>renew your driver’s license</mark> and update your photograph, <mark>you are required to answer</mark> this question: “<mark>Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state</mark> now <mark>has a 60 percent donor signup rate</u></strong></mark>, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. <u><strong>That is <mark>much higher than the national rate of 38</mark> percent</u></strong> reported by Donate Life America The Illinois system has another advantage. <u><strong>There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission</u></strong>. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, <u><strong><mark>the First-Person Consent Law</u></strong></mark>, which created this system, <u><strong><mark>makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong><mark>mandated choice may achieve a higher rate</mark> of donations <mark>than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent</mark> for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Democrats will win now – new unemployment numbers

A better-than-expected report on the US job market Friday could give a lift to Democrats the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is helping them to stay in the game. Obama is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. incumbents like Shaheen and Hagan would probably be having a tougher time if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment or significant improvement In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The same dynamics also may be supporting Democrats helping to keep their hopes alive in places like Arkansas

better-than-expected report on the US job market could give a lift to Democrats such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is helping them to stay in the game. Obama is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. incumbents like Shaheen and Hagan would probably be having a tougher time In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The dynamics may keep hopes alive in places like Arkansas,

WASHINGTON — A better-than-expected report on the US job market Friday could give a modest to lift to struggling Democrats, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is simply helping them to stay in the election game. Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President Obama, seeking to help his party, is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. “When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic incumbents like Sen. Jeanne Shaheen in New Hampshire and Sen. Kay Hagan in North Carolina would probably be having a tougher time if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) or significant improvement (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The same dynamics also may be supporting Democrats who are behind in the polls – helping to keep their hopes alive in places like Arkansas, even though the political terrain favors Republicans.

<h4>Democrats will win now – new unemployment numbers</h4><p><strong>Trumball 10/3</strong> <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? <u><strong>(+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>WASHINGTON — <u><strong>A <mark>better-than-expected report on the US job market</mark> Friday <mark>could give a</mark> </u></strong>modest to<u><strong> <mark>lift to</mark> </u></strong>struggling <u><strong><mark>Democrats</u></strong></mark>, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and <u><strong>the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent</u></strong> from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. <u><strong>That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, <mark>such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House.</mark> </u></strong>But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. <u><strong><mark>Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market</mark> <mark>is</u></strong></mark> simply <u><strong><mark>helping them to stay in the</u></strong></mark> election <u><strong><mark>game.</mark> </u></strong>Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark>, seeking to help his party, <u><strong><mark>is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement.</mark> </u></strong>“When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic <u><strong><mark>incumbents</u></strong> <u><strong>like</u></strong></mark> Sen. Jeanne <u><strong><mark>Shaheen</u></strong></mark> in New Hampshire <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> Sen. Kay <u><strong><mark>Hagan</u></strong></mark> in North Carolina <u><strong><mark>would probably be having a tougher time</mark> if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment</u></strong> (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) <u><strong>or significant improvement</u></strong> (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). <u><strong><mark>In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls.</mark> <mark>The</mark> same <mark>dynamics</mark> also <mark>may </mark>be supporting Democrats</u></strong> who are behind in the polls – <u><strong>helping to <mark>keep</mark> their <mark>hopes alive in places like Arkansas</u></strong>,</mark> even though the political terrain favors Republicans.</p>

Trumball 10/3 <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? (+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Trumball 10/3 <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? (+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS fulltext: WASHINGTON — A better-than-expected report on the US job market Friday could give a modest to lift to struggling Democrats, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is simply helping them to stay in the election game. Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President Obama, seeking to help his party, is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. “When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic incumbents like Sen. Jeanne Shaheen in New Hampshire and Sen. Kay Hagan in North Carolina would probably be having a tougher time if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) or significant improvement (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The same dynamics also may be supporting Democrats who are behind in the polls – helping to keep their hopes alive in places like Arkansas, even though the political terrain favors Republicans. [/INST] <h4>Democrats will win now – new unemployment numbers</h4><p><strong>Trumball 10/3</strong> <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? <u><strong>(+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>WASHINGTON — <u><strong>A <mark>better-than-expected report on the US job market</mark> Friday <mark>could give a</mark> </u></strong>modest to<u><strong> <mark>lift to</mark> </u></strong>struggling <u><strong><mark>Democrats</u></strong></mark>, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and <u><strong>the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent</u></strong> from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. <u><strong>That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, <mark>such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House.</mark> </u></strong>But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. <u><strong><mark>Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market</mark> <mark>is</u></strong></mark> simply <u><strong><mark>helping them to stay in the</u></strong></mark> election <u><strong><mark>game.</mark> </u></strong>Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark>, seeking to help his party, <u><strong><mark>is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement.</mark> </u></strong>“When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic <u><strong><mark>incumbents</u></strong> <u><strong>like</u></strong></mark> Sen. Jeanne <u><strong><mark>Shaheen</u></strong></mark> in New Hampshire <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> Sen. Kay <u><strong><mark>Hagan</u></strong></mark> in North Carolina <u><strong><mark>would probably be having a tougher time</mark> if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment</u></strong> (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) <u><strong>or significant improvement</u></strong> (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). <u><strong><mark>In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls.</mark> <mark>The</mark> same <mark>dynamics</mark> also <mark>may </mark>be supporting Democrats</u></strong> who are behind in the polls – <u><strong>helping to <mark>keep</mark> their <mark>hopes alive in places like Arkansas</u></strong>,</mark> even though the political terrain favors Republicans.</p> </s>

Plan is repugnant to the electorate

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular people consider it “repugnant,” they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter

allowing the buying and selling of organs is spectacularly unpopular people consider it “repugnant,” they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. it’s a political nonstarter

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily.

<h4><strong>Plan is repugnant to the electorate</h4><p>Thaler 9</strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u><strong>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market <mark>allowing the buying and selling of organs</u></strong></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. <u><strong>The idea may have some merit, but it <mark>is spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many <u><strong><mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></strong></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><strong><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys</u></strong>.</mark> These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, <u><strong>whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, <mark>it’s a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily.</p>

Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz fulltext: Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. [/INST] <h4><strong>Plan is repugnant to the electorate</h4><p>Thaler 9</strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u><strong>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market <mark>allowing the buying and selling of organs</u></strong></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. <u><strong>The idea may have some merit, but it <mark>is spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many <u><strong><mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></strong></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><strong><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys</u></strong>.</mark> These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, <u><strong>whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, <mark>it’s a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily.</p> </s>