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Legalization of organ sales means regulation

A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs by making the sale of human organs legal in the United States The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed. The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold

proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs by making the sale of human organs legal in the U S The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed. The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold

(A TV and radio commercial spokesman, an actor, a freelance broadcast sports producer, and a marketing and public relations consultant. Following four years of service (1953-1957) as a Russian language technician in the U.S. Air Force, Diamond studied foreign affairs at George Washington University in the late 1950’s. He then accepted a number of assignments working for Maryland state senator Newton I. Steers, Jr: as congressional and state senatorial campaign manager; as executive assistant and deputy commissioner in the Maryland Insurance Department; and as legislative assistant in the state capitol in Annapolis. David F., as quoted in “A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs,” August 31, http://bobsnewheart.wordpress.com/2013/08/31/a-proposal-to-sell-human-organs/) ***NOTE -- The “Federal Organ Transplant Law refers to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 Enter David Diamond and his proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs. I met David on the internet. We share backgrounds in politics and broadcasting and in trying to save lives through organ transplantation. The David Diamond Plan to increase the supply of transplantable organs by making the sale of human organs legal in the United States. The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed. The Federal Organ Transplant Law enacted in 1984 provides that only donated organs may be used. The following plan to increase the supply of organs for transplant was developed in subsequent years by David F. Diamond of Memphis, Tennessee. ======0====== The shortage of organs is taking the lives of almost 7,000 people unnecessarily each year. Donation is good. It is the highest altruistic step that a person can contemplate. However, for a number of reasons, many people are not willing to donate. The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold as follows: A. A contract can provide that when a person has decided, for whatever reasons, not to donate organs, he or she (hereafter: the provider) can commit to a plan to have the organs sold if and when the provider is brain dead. This contract will also be signed by the next of kin, spouse or nearest living relative so that that party understands the purpose of the contract and agrees that they will not oppose its implementation when the provider dies. A provider’s option to cancel the contract at any time prior to the provider’s death will be included in the contract. The use of this contract will allow the provider to leave an estate to his heirs or a designated charity. A provider, with few or no assets, might otherwise have none to leave when he or she passed. B. The sale of organs can be conducted by a broker, attorney or individual (hereafter: an agent) designated by the provider. A licensing procedure would establish that the agent would be certified as fiscally responsible and having financial integrity. Upon determination of brain death, the agent selected by the provider, using email, fax or phones, would immediately advise interested buyers of an organ’s availability and condition, etc. Time would be of the essence, of course. Appropriate compensation to the agent, such as a commission for services provided, would be set forth in the contract. Buyers whose bids were accepted would send payment by wire transfer, cashier’s check or other means approved in the law. C. The party designated by the provider must maintain a public record (like a broadcaster’s log which is available for public viewing) specifying the individual who gets the organs, how much is being paid and the identification of the provider. The purpose of this transparency is to eliminate the need for a black market, and to stimulate public awareness. If there is a public record, as soon as organ sales begin, the news media will undoubtedly write about it pointing out how much money was involved in the transactions and stressing how much money goes to the heirs. This will persuade a lot of additional people to agree to such a contract, thus increasing supply exponentially. Through the action of the law of supply and demand, the increased supply will cause prices to decrease to a level most people will consider reasonable. Unless you allow prices to be set by the market process you put a limit on the number of organs that might become available. Any fixed price, set by government or a special agency, would diminish the supply which would defeat the goal of making the most organs available. That would cause some individuals to decide not to participate. But if they knew that the organs they might provide are going to bring whatever the market process allows, they’ll have every incentive to take part. D. The organs would have to be sold only for transplant to U. S. citizens in order to avoid foreigners from bidding up the price and reducing the supply to Americans. Of course, if other countries should adopt model legislation such as ours then we could reciprocate and become partners with them since their organ supply could be shared with ours. E. The poor will not be discriminated against. They will have access to organs because the law will provide that, just as in Medicare or Medicaid presently, the government will pay for any medical procedure or supplies that the patient needs, upon a doctor’s certification that it is medically necessary. The government would buy organs on the market for those with Medicare or Medicaid unless donated organs were available. The same principle will apply for those with health insurance. And the wealthy, who may choose to be self insured, would be free to arrange for organs in the same market. Of course, people would still be free to donate organs. And participation by providers in the futures contracts would be entirely voluntary. F. Presently those uninsured or poor, not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, have to raise tens of thousands of dollars before hospitals or transplant surgeons will help them. The added cost of an organ can also be raised in the same way, or the law can require our government to cover that cost, since it will be less costly over time than dealing with whatever the patient’s medical expenses would be otherwise. G. The plan will require providers to have their medical records maintained by their doctors beginning at least as soon as a futures contract is signed. It would be made available immediately to any parties potentially buying an organ from that cadaver. The purpose, and the result, would be to assure a better, safer organ supply. This plan does not contemplate any sale of kidneys or parts of livers from a living person. There are risks in having such surgery and for that reason and others, we set that aside and take no position on that question. Sometimes, under current law, it is the right thing to do, depending on the circumstances. But in point of fact, the need for such organs will be adequately supplied with adoption of my plan.

<h4><strong>Legalization of organ sales means regulation</h4><p>Diamond ‘13 </p><p></strong>(A TV and radio commercial spokesman, an actor, a freelance broadcast sports producer, and a marketing and public relations consultant. Following four years of service (1953-1957) as a Russian language technician in the U.S. Air Force, Diamond studied foreign affairs at George Washington University in the late 1950’s. He then accepted a number of assignments working for Maryland state senator Newton I. Steers, Jr: as congressional and state senatorial campaign manager; as executive assistant and deputy commissioner in the Maryland Insurance Department; and as legislative assistant in the state capitol in Annapolis. David F., as quoted in “<u><strong>A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs</u></strong>,” August 31, http://bobsnewheart.wordpress.com/2013/08/31/a-proposal-to-sell-human-organs/)</p><p>***NOTE -- The “Federal Organ Transplant Law refers to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 </p><p>Enter David Diamond and his <u><strong><mark>proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs</u></strong></mark>. I met David on the internet. We share backgrounds in politics and broadcasting and in trying to save lives through organ transplantation. The David Diamond Plan to increase the supply of transplantable organs <u><strong><mark>by making the sale of human organs legal in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed.</mark> </u></strong>The Federal Organ Transplant Law enacted in 1984 provides that only donated organs may be used. The following plan to increase the supply of organs for transplant was developed in subsequent years by David F. Diamond of Memphis, Tennessee. ======0====== The shortage of organs is taking the lives of almost 7,000 people unnecessarily each year. Donation is good. It is the highest altruistic step that a person can contemplate. However, for a number of reasons, many people are not willing to donate. <u><strong><mark>The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold</u></strong></mark> as follows: A. A contract can provide that when a person has decided, for whatever reasons, not to donate organs, he or she (hereafter: the provider) can commit to a plan to have the organs sold if and when the provider is brain dead. This contract will also be signed by the next of kin, spouse or nearest living relative so that that party understands the purpose of the contract and agrees that they will not oppose its implementation when the provider dies. A provider’s option to cancel the contract at any time prior to the provider’s death will be included in the contract. The use of this contract will allow the provider to leave an estate to his heirs or a designated charity. A provider, with few or no assets, might otherwise have none to leave when he or she passed. B. The sale of organs can be conducted by a broker, attorney or individual (hereafter: an agent) designated by the provider. A licensing procedure would establish that the agent would be certified as fiscally responsible and having financial integrity. Upon determination of brain death, the agent selected by the provider, using email, fax or phones, would immediately advise interested buyers of an organ’s availability and condition, etc. Time would be of the essence, of course. Appropriate compensation to the agent, such as a commission for services provided, would be set forth in the contract. Buyers whose bids were accepted would send payment by wire transfer, cashier’s check or other means approved in the law. C. The party designated by the provider must maintain a public record (like a broadcaster’s log which is available for public viewing) specifying the individual who gets the organs, how much is being paid and the identification of the provider. The purpose of this transparency is to eliminate the need for a black market, and to stimulate public awareness. If there is a public record, as soon as organ sales begin, the news media will undoubtedly write about it pointing out how much money was involved in the transactions and stressing how much money goes to the heirs. This will persuade a lot of additional people to agree to such a contract, thus increasing supply exponentially. Through the action of the law of supply and demand, the increased supply will cause prices to decrease to a level most people will consider reasonable. Unless you allow prices to be set by the market process you put a limit on the number of organs that might become available. Any fixed price, set by government or a special agency, would diminish the supply which would defeat the goal of making the most organs available. That would cause some individuals to decide not to participate. But if they knew that the organs they might provide are going to bring whatever the market process allows, they’ll have every incentive to take part. D. The organs would have to be sold only for transplant to U. S. citizens in order to avoid foreigners from bidding up the price and reducing the supply to Americans. Of course, if other countries should adopt model legislation such as ours then we could reciprocate and become partners with them since their organ supply could be shared with ours. E. The poor will not be discriminated against. They will have access to organs because the law will provide that, just as in Medicare or Medicaid presently, the government will pay for any medical procedure or supplies that the patient needs, upon a doctor’s certification that it is medically necessary. The government would buy organs on the market for those with Medicare or Medicaid unless donated organs were available. The same principle will apply for those with health insurance. And the wealthy, who may choose to be self insured, would be free to arrange for organs in the same market. Of course, people would still be free to donate organs. And participation by providers in the futures contracts would be entirely voluntary. F. Presently those uninsured or poor, not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, have to raise tens of thousands of dollars before hospitals or transplant surgeons will help them. The added cost of an organ can also be raised in the same way, or the law can require our government to cover that cost, since it will be less costly over time than dealing with whatever the patient’s medical expenses would be otherwise. G. The plan will require providers to have their medical records maintained by their doctors beginning at least as soon as a futures contract is signed. It would be made available immediately to any parties potentially buying an organ from that cadaver. The purpose, and the result, would be to assure a better, safer organ supply. This plan does not contemplate any sale of kidneys or parts of livers from a living person. There are risks in having such surgery and for that reason and others, we set that aside and take no position on that question. Sometimes, under current law, it is the right thing to do, depending on the circumstances. But in point of fact, the need for such organs will be adequately supplied with adoption of my plan.</p>

Diamond ‘13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Diamond ‘13 fulltext: (A TV and radio commercial spokesman, an actor, a freelance broadcast sports producer, and a marketing and public relations consultant. Following four years of service (1953-1957) as a Russian language technician in the U.S. Air Force, Diamond studied foreign affairs at George Washington University in the late 1950’s. He then accepted a number of assignments working for Maryland state senator Newton I. Steers, Jr: as congressional and state senatorial campaign manager; as executive assistant and deputy commissioner in the Maryland Insurance Department; and as legislative assistant in the state capitol in Annapolis. David F., as quoted in “A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs,” August 31, http://bobsnewheart.wordpress.com/2013/08/31/a-proposal-to-sell-human-organs/) ***NOTE -- The “Federal Organ Transplant Law refers to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 Enter David Diamond and his proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs. I met David on the internet. We share backgrounds in politics and broadcasting and in trying to save lives through organ transplantation. The David Diamond Plan to increase the supply of transplantable organs by making the sale of human organs legal in the United States. The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed. The Federal Organ Transplant Law enacted in 1984 provides that only donated organs may be used. The following plan to increase the supply of organs for transplant was developed in subsequent years by David F. Diamond of Memphis, Tennessee. ======0====== The shortage of organs is taking the lives of almost 7,000 people unnecessarily each year. Donation is good. It is the highest altruistic step that a person can contemplate. However, for a number of reasons, many people are not willing to donate. The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold as follows: A. A contract can provide that when a person has decided, for whatever reasons, not to donate organs, he or she (hereafter: the provider) can commit to a plan to have the organs sold if and when the provider is brain dead. This contract will also be signed by the next of kin, spouse or nearest living relative so that that party understands the purpose of the contract and agrees that they will not oppose its implementation when the provider dies. A provider’s option to cancel the contract at any time prior to the provider’s death will be included in the contract. The use of this contract will allow the provider to leave an estate to his heirs or a designated charity. A provider, with few or no assets, might otherwise have none to leave when he or she passed. B. The sale of organs can be conducted by a broker, attorney or individual (hereafter: an agent) designated by the provider. A licensing procedure would establish that the agent would be certified as fiscally responsible and having financial integrity. Upon determination of brain death, the agent selected by the provider, using email, fax or phones, would immediately advise interested buyers of an organ’s availability and condition, etc. Time would be of the essence, of course. Appropriate compensation to the agent, such as a commission for services provided, would be set forth in the contract. Buyers whose bids were accepted would send payment by wire transfer, cashier’s check or other means approved in the law. C. The party designated by the provider must maintain a public record (like a broadcaster’s log which is available for public viewing) specifying the individual who gets the organs, how much is being paid and the identification of the provider. The purpose of this transparency is to eliminate the need for a black market, and to stimulate public awareness. If there is a public record, as soon as organ sales begin, the news media will undoubtedly write about it pointing out how much money was involved in the transactions and stressing how much money goes to the heirs. This will persuade a lot of additional people to agree to such a contract, thus increasing supply exponentially. Through the action of the law of supply and demand, the increased supply will cause prices to decrease to a level most people will consider reasonable. Unless you allow prices to be set by the market process you put a limit on the number of organs that might become available. Any fixed price, set by government or a special agency, would diminish the supply which would defeat the goal of making the most organs available. That would cause some individuals to decide not to participate. But if they knew that the organs they might provide are going to bring whatever the market process allows, they’ll have every incentive to take part. D. The organs would have to be sold only for transplant to U. S. citizens in order to avoid foreigners from bidding up the price and reducing the supply to Americans. Of course, if other countries should adopt model legislation such as ours then we could reciprocate and become partners with them since their organ supply could be shared with ours. E. The poor will not be discriminated against. They will have access to organs because the law will provide that, just as in Medicare or Medicaid presently, the government will pay for any medical procedure or supplies that the patient needs, upon a doctor’s certification that it is medically necessary. The government would buy organs on the market for those with Medicare or Medicaid unless donated organs were available. The same principle will apply for those with health insurance. And the wealthy, who may choose to be self insured, would be free to arrange for organs in the same market. Of course, people would still be free to donate organs. And participation by providers in the futures contracts would be entirely voluntary. F. Presently those uninsured or poor, not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, have to raise tens of thousands of dollars before hospitals or transplant surgeons will help them. The added cost of an organ can also be raised in the same way, or the law can require our government to cover that cost, since it will be less costly over time than dealing with whatever the patient’s medical expenses would be otherwise. G. The plan will require providers to have their medical records maintained by their doctors beginning at least as soon as a futures contract is signed. It would be made available immediately to any parties potentially buying an organ from that cadaver. The purpose, and the result, would be to assure a better, safer organ supply. This plan does not contemplate any sale of kidneys or parts of livers from a living person. There are risks in having such surgery and for that reason and others, we set that aside and take no position on that question. Sometimes, under current law, it is the right thing to do, depending on the circumstances. But in point of fact, the need for such organs will be adequately supplied with adoption of my plan. [/INST] <h4><strong>Legalization of organ sales means regulation</h4><p>Diamond ‘13 </p><p></strong>(A TV and radio commercial spokesman, an actor, a freelance broadcast sports producer, and a marketing and public relations consultant. Following four years of service (1953-1957) as a Russian language technician in the U.S. Air Force, Diamond studied foreign affairs at George Washington University in the late 1950’s. He then accepted a number of assignments working for Maryland state senator Newton I. Steers, Jr: as congressional and state senatorial campaign manager; as executive assistant and deputy commissioner in the Maryland Insurance Department; and as legislative assistant in the state capitol in Annapolis. David F., as quoted in “<u><strong>A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs</u></strong>,” August 31, http://bobsnewheart.wordpress.com/2013/08/31/a-proposal-to-sell-human-organs/)</p><p>***NOTE -- The “Federal Organ Transplant Law refers to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 </p><p>Enter David Diamond and his <u><strong><mark>proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs</u></strong></mark>. I met David on the internet. We share backgrounds in politics and broadcasting and in trying to save lives through organ transplantation. The David Diamond Plan to increase the supply of transplantable organs <u><strong><mark>by making the sale of human organs legal in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed.</mark> </u></strong>The Federal Organ Transplant Law enacted in 1984 provides that only donated organs may be used. The following plan to increase the supply of organs for transplant was developed in subsequent years by David F. Diamond of Memphis, Tennessee. ======0====== The shortage of organs is taking the lives of almost 7,000 people unnecessarily each year. Donation is good. It is the highest altruistic step that a person can contemplate. However, for a number of reasons, many people are not willing to donate. <u><strong><mark>The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold</u></strong></mark> as follows: A. A contract can provide that when a person has decided, for whatever reasons, not to donate organs, he or she (hereafter: the provider) can commit to a plan to have the organs sold if and when the provider is brain dead. This contract will also be signed by the next of kin, spouse or nearest living relative so that that party understands the purpose of the contract and agrees that they will not oppose its implementation when the provider dies. A provider’s option to cancel the contract at any time prior to the provider’s death will be included in the contract. The use of this contract will allow the provider to leave an estate to his heirs or a designated charity. A provider, with few or no assets, might otherwise have none to leave when he or she passed. B. The sale of organs can be conducted by a broker, attorney or individual (hereafter: an agent) designated by the provider. A licensing procedure would establish that the agent would be certified as fiscally responsible and having financial integrity. Upon determination of brain death, the agent selected by the provider, using email, fax or phones, would immediately advise interested buyers of an organ’s availability and condition, etc. Time would be of the essence, of course. Appropriate compensation to the agent, such as a commission for services provided, would be set forth in the contract. Buyers whose bids were accepted would send payment by wire transfer, cashier’s check or other means approved in the law. C. The party designated by the provider must maintain a public record (like a broadcaster’s log which is available for public viewing) specifying the individual who gets the organs, how much is being paid and the identification of the provider. The purpose of this transparency is to eliminate the need for a black market, and to stimulate public awareness. If there is a public record, as soon as organ sales begin, the news media will undoubtedly write about it pointing out how much money was involved in the transactions and stressing how much money goes to the heirs. This will persuade a lot of additional people to agree to such a contract, thus increasing supply exponentially. Through the action of the law of supply and demand, the increased supply will cause prices to decrease to a level most people will consider reasonable. Unless you allow prices to be set by the market process you put a limit on the number of organs that might become available. Any fixed price, set by government or a special agency, would diminish the supply which would defeat the goal of making the most organs available. That would cause some individuals to decide not to participate. But if they knew that the organs they might provide are going to bring whatever the market process allows, they’ll have every incentive to take part. D. The organs would have to be sold only for transplant to U. S. citizens in order to avoid foreigners from bidding up the price and reducing the supply to Americans. Of course, if other countries should adopt model legislation such as ours then we could reciprocate and become partners with them since their organ supply could be shared with ours. E. The poor will not be discriminated against. They will have access to organs because the law will provide that, just as in Medicare or Medicaid presently, the government will pay for any medical procedure or supplies that the patient needs, upon a doctor’s certification that it is medically necessary. The government would buy organs on the market for those with Medicare or Medicaid unless donated organs were available. The same principle will apply for those with health insurance. And the wealthy, who may choose to be self insured, would be free to arrange for organs in the same market. Of course, people would still be free to donate organs. And participation by providers in the futures contracts would be entirely voluntary. F. Presently those uninsured or poor, not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, have to raise tens of thousands of dollars before hospitals or transplant surgeons will help them. The added cost of an organ can also be raised in the same way, or the law can require our government to cover that cost, since it will be less costly over time than dealing with whatever the patient’s medical expenses would be otherwise. G. The plan will require providers to have their medical records maintained by their doctors beginning at least as soon as a futures contract is signed. It would be made available immediately to any parties potentially buying an organ from that cadaver. The purpose, and the result, would be to assure a better, safer organ supply. This plan does not contemplate any sale of kidneys or parts of livers from a living person. There are risks in having such surgery and for that reason and others, we set that aside and take no position on that question. Sometimes, under current law, it is the right thing to do, depending on the circumstances. But in point of fact, the need for such organs will be adequately supplied with adoption of my plan.</p> </s>

The affirmative must legalize all or nearly all—they legalize ZERO sales of live organs

The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two

The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two

Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example the term ‘around half’ is used to describe 50% plus or minus one interview, and ‘nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two interviews.

<h4>The affirmative must legalize <u>all or nearly all</u><strong>—they legalize ZERO sales of live organs</h4><p>Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professors of counseling at Strathclyde University </p><p></strong>(Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/2767391/Proposed_Scoring_Scheme_for_Qualitative_Thematic_Analysis_Mick_Cooper.pdf)</p><p>Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). <u><strong><mark>The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence.</mark> For example</u></strong> the term ‘around half’ is used to describe 50% plus or minus one interview, and ‘<u><strong><mark>nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two</mark> </u></strong>interviews.</p>

Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professors of counseling at Strathclyde University (Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/2767391/Proposed_Scoring_Scheme_for_Qualitative_Thematic_Analysis_Mick_Cooper.pdf)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professors of counseling at Strathclyde University (Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/2767391/Proposed_Scoring_Scheme_for_Qualitative_Thematic_Analysis_Mick_Cooper.pdf) fulltext: Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example the term ‘around half’ is used to describe 50% plus or minus one interview, and ‘nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two interviews. [/INST] <h4>The affirmative must legalize <u>all or nearly all</u><strong>—they legalize ZERO sales of live organs</h4><p>Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professors of counseling at Strathclyde University </p><p></strong>(Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/2767391/Proposed_Scoring_Scheme_for_Qualitative_Thematic_Analysis_Mick_Cooper.pdf)</p><p>Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). <u><strong><mark>The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence.</mark> For example</u></strong> the term ‘around half’ is used to describe 50% plus or minus one interview, and ‘<u><strong><mark>nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two</mark> </u></strong>interviews.</p> </s>

Violation -- the aff is decrim, the plan merely removes the prohibition of organ sales and doesn’t create a regulated market AND it only decrims part of the area.

<h4>Violation -- the aff is decrim, the plan merely removes the prohibition of organ sales and doesn’t create a regulated market AND it only decrims part of the area.</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Violation -- the aff is decrim, the plan merely removes the prohibition of organ sales and doesn’t create a regulated market AND it only decrims part of the area.</h4> </s>

Vote negative on predictable ground -- all of the controversy comes from the regulations portion of the debate -- they jack the decrim counterplan, all of our regs disads and all of our positive state action kritik links AND we lose cadaveric only CPs from nearly all

<h4>Vote negative on predictable ground -- all of the controversy comes from the regulations portion of the debate -- they jack the decrim counterplan, all of our regs disads and all of our positive state action kritik links AND we lose cadaveric only CPs from nearly all</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Vote negative on predictable ground -- all of the controversy comes from the regulations portion of the debate -- they jack the decrim counterplan, all of our regs disads and all of our positive state action kritik links AND we lose cadaveric only CPs from nearly all</h4> </s>

Courts won’t recognize property rights for bodily sale in the status quo

As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in human tissues Matthews observed that where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that as with blood, hair and the like that person had the first and best right to possession, though presumably one might transfer that right Unfortunately, the courts have not generally treated kidneys and other non-renewable organs as property. The Colavito line of cases is illustrative There, the court held that no property right existed in a kidney Where human tissues are destined for research the courts are more likely to deny the property rights of sources against those of the users. This judicial inclination is evident in Moore and Greenberg A more recent example is Washington University v. Catalona

judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in tissues where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that person had possession the courts have not treated non-renewable organs as property Colavito cases is illustrative the court held no property right existed in a kidney Where tissues are destined for research the courts are likely to deny the rights of sources This is evident in Moore and Greenberg more recent example is Catalona

As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in human tissues. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, Matthews (1983) observed that where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that as with blood, hair and the like that person had the first and best right to possession, though presumably one might transfer that right, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). Unfortunately, the courts have not generally treated kidneys and other non-renewable organs as property. The Colavito line of cases is illustrative.27 There, the court held that no property right existed in a misdirected, but histo-compatible, kidney.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ Where human tissues are destined for research or employed in the research process, the courts are more likely (probably on policy grounds) to deny the property rights of sources as against those of the users. This judicial inclination is evident in Moore and Greenberg above. A more recent example is Washington University v. Catalona,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994).

<h4>Courts won’t recognize property rights for bodily sale in the status quo</h4><p>Remigius N. <strong>Nwabueze 11</strong>, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books</p><p><u><strong>As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, <mark>judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in </mark>human <mark>tissues</u></strong></mark>. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, <u><strong>Matthews</u></strong> (1983) <u><strong>observed that <mark>where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought </mark>that as with blood, hair and the like</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>that person had </mark>the first and best right to <mark>possession</mark>, though presumably one might transfer that right</u></strong>, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). <u><strong>Unfortunately, <mark>the courts have not</mark> generally <mark>treated</mark> kidneys and other <mark>non-renewable organs as property</mark>. The <mark>Colavito </mark>line of <mark>cases is illustrative</u></strong></mark>.27 <u><strong>There, <mark>the court held</mark> that <mark>no property right existed in a</u></strong></mark> misdirected, but histo-compatible, <u><strong><mark>kidney</u></strong></mark>.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ <u><strong><mark>Where </mark>human <mark>tissues are destined for research</u></strong></mark> or employed in the research process, <u><strong><mark>the courts are </mark>more <mark>likely</u></strong></mark> (probably on policy grounds) <u><strong><mark>to deny the </mark>property <mark>rights of sources</u></strong></mark> as <u><strong>against those of the users. <mark>This </mark>judicial inclination <mark>is evident in Moore and Greenberg</mark> </u></strong>above.<u><strong> A <mark>more recent example is</mark> Washington University v. <mark>Catalona</u></strong></mark>,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994).</p>

Remigius N. Nwabueze 11, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Remigius N. Nwabueze 11, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books fulltext: As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in human tissues. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, Matthews (1983) observed that where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that as with blood, hair and the like that person had the first and best right to possession, though presumably one might transfer that right, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). Unfortunately, the courts have not generally treated kidneys and other non-renewable organs as property. The Colavito line of cases is illustrative.27 There, the court held that no property right existed in a misdirected, but histo-compatible, kidney.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ Where human tissues are destined for research or employed in the research process, the courts are more likely (probably on policy grounds) to deny the property rights of sources as against those of the users. This judicial inclination is evident in Moore and Greenberg above. A more recent example is Washington University v. Catalona,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994). [/INST] <h4>Courts won’t recognize property rights for bodily sale in the status quo</h4><p>Remigius N. <strong>Nwabueze 11</strong>, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books</p><p><u><strong>As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, <mark>judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in </mark>human <mark>tissues</u></strong></mark>. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, <u><strong>Matthews</u></strong> (1983) <u><strong>observed that <mark>where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought </mark>that as with blood, hair and the like</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>that person had </mark>the first and best right to <mark>possession</mark>, though presumably one might transfer that right</u></strong>, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). <u><strong>Unfortunately, <mark>the courts have not</mark> generally <mark>treated</mark> kidneys and other <mark>non-renewable organs as property</mark>. The <mark>Colavito </mark>line of <mark>cases is illustrative</u></strong></mark>.27 <u><strong>There, <mark>the court held</mark> that <mark>no property right existed in a</u></strong></mark> misdirected, but histo-compatible, <u><strong><mark>kidney</u></strong></mark>.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ <u><strong><mark>Where </mark>human <mark>tissues are destined for research</u></strong></mark> or employed in the research process, <u><strong><mark>the courts are </mark>more <mark>likely</u></strong></mark> (probably on policy grounds) <u><strong><mark>to deny the </mark>property <mark>rights of sources</u></strong></mark> as <u><strong>against those of the users. <mark>This </mark>judicial inclination <mark>is evident in Moore and Greenberg</mark> </u></strong>above.<u><strong> A <mark>more recent example is</mark> Washington University v. <mark>Catalona</u></strong></mark>,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994).</p> </s>

The plan reverses that – necessitates bodily property rights

Compensation systems people may be more willing to provide organs if they receive compensation Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals Additionally, a compensation system could only go into effect if NOTA and the 1987 UAGA amendments are repealed or amended A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death. This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body allowing incentives to donors can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in live tissue and organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as common law and statutory law do not prohibit sales.

people provide organs if they receive compensation Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals compensation could only go into effect if NOTA and are repealed or amended This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body. allowing incentives to donors can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as law do not prohibit sales.

Compensation systems would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that people may be more willing to provide organs if they receive compensation. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals after death. Additionally, a compensation system could only go into effect if NOTA and the 1987 UAGA amendments are repealed or amended. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death. n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body. This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, allowing incentives to donors is a sound idea. This can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in live tissue and organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as common law and statutory law do not prohibit sales.

<h4>The plan reverses that – necessitates bodily property rights</h4><p>Laurel R. <strong>Siegel 2K<u>, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis</p><p>Compensation systems</u></strong> would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that <u><strong><mark>people </mark>may be more willing to <mark>provide organs if they receive compensation</u></strong></mark>. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. <u><strong><mark>Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals</u></strong></mark> after death. <u><strong>Additionally, a <mark>compensation</mark> system <mark>could only go into effect if NOTA and</mark> the 1987 UAGA amendments <mark>are repealed or amended</u></strong></mark>. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. <u><strong>A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death.</u></strong> n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ <u><strong><mark>This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body</u></strong>.</mark> This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, <u><strong><mark>allowing incentives to donors</u></strong></mark> is a sound idea. This <u><strong><mark>can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in </mark>live tissue and <mark>organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as </mark>common law and statutory <mark>law do not prohibit sales.</p></u></strong></mark>

Laurel R. Siegel 2K, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Laurel R. Siegel 2K, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis fulltext: Compensation systems would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that people may be more willing to provide organs if they receive compensation. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals after death. Additionally, a compensation system could only go into effect if NOTA and the 1987 UAGA amendments are repealed or amended. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death. n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body. This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, allowing incentives to donors is a sound idea. This can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in live tissue and organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as common law and statutory law do not prohibit sales. [/INST] <h4>The plan reverses that – necessitates bodily property rights</h4><p>Laurel R. <strong>Siegel 2K<u>, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis</p><p>Compensation systems</u></strong> would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that <u><strong><mark>people </mark>may be more willing to <mark>provide organs if they receive compensation</u></strong></mark>. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. <u><strong><mark>Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals</u></strong></mark> after death. <u><strong>Additionally, a <mark>compensation</mark> system <mark>could only go into effect if NOTA and</mark> the 1987 UAGA amendments <mark>are repealed or amended</u></strong></mark>. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. <u><strong>A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death.</u></strong> n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ <u><strong><mark>This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body</u></strong>.</mark> This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, <u><strong><mark>allowing incentives to donors</u></strong></mark> is a sound idea. This <u><strong><mark>can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in </mark>live tissue and <mark>organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as </mark>common law and statutory <mark>law do not prohibit sales.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

That wrecks the biomedical research

Because biomedical research is a costly and financially risky endeavor Congress must consider carefully whether according human research participants property rights in their tissue will diminish the incentives to invest in this industry if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical scientists would face a significant increase in their transaction costs scientists would be obliged to compensate research participants for their genetic material, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. This obligation to remunerate research participants presents a particular risk to scientists in the nonprofit sector, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings researchers would face significant transaction costs in locating and then negotiating compensation arrangements with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide such negotiations could prove quite complex and protracted bargaining among scientists and research participants could prove impossible in cases where the identities of these participants are unknown the problems of increased financial and transaction costs reach their apex in the case of the potential holdout who refuses to participate in research unless she is compensated at a very high rate recognizing the research participant's right to share in the revenues may imply some right to control the products of that research research participants may demand widespread and affordable licensing of the intellectual property developed from their tissue thereby further decreasing the scientists' profits All of these factors combined would present significant disincentives to researchers, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise

Because biomedical research is financially risky according participants property rights in their tissue will diminish incentives to invest scientists would face significant transaction costs scientists would be obliged to compensate for genetic material This presents a particular risk in the nonprofit sector researchers would face significant costs in locating and negotiating arrangements negotiations could prove complex bargaining could prove impossible where identities are unknown the problems reach their apex in the holdout who refuses to participate unless she is compensated recognizing the right may imply some right to control research participants may demand licensing further decreasing profits these factors would present significant disincentives to researchers

Because biomedical research is a costly and financially risky endeavor,86 Congress must consider carefully whether according human research participants property rights in their tissue will diminish the incentives to invest in this industry. Certainly, if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical scientists would face a significant increase in their transaction costs. First, scientists would be obliged to compensate research participants for their genetic material, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. This obligation to remunerate research participants presents a particular risk to scientists in the nonprofit sector, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings. 87 Second, researchers would face significant transaction costs88 in locating and then negotiating compensation arrangements with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide,89 such negotiations could prove quite complex and protracted. Furthermore, bargaining among scientists and research participants could prove impossible in cases where the identities of these participants are unknown, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, the problems of increased financial and transaction costs reach their apex in the case of the potential holdout who refuses to participate in research unless she is compensated at a very high rate.92 Finally, recognizing the research participant's right to share in the revenues may imply some right to control the products of that research; for example, research participants may demand widespread and affordable licensing of the intellectual property developed from their tissue, thereby further decreasing the scientists' profits.93 All of these factors combined would present significant disincentives to researchers, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation.

<h4>That wrecks the biomedical research</h4><p><strong>Gitter 4</strong> (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Because biomedical research is</mark> a costly and <mark>financially risky</mark> endeavor</u></strong>,86 <u><strong>Congress must consider carefully whether <mark>according</mark> human research <mark>participants property rights in their tissue will diminish </mark>the <mark>incentives to invest</mark> in this industry</u></strong>. Certainly, <u><strong>if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical <mark>scientists would face</mark> a <mark>significant </mark>increase in their <mark>transaction costs</u></strong></mark>. First, <u><strong><mark>scientists would be obliged to compensate</mark> research participants <mark>for </mark>their <mark>genetic material</mark>, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. <mark>This</mark> obligation to remunerate research participants <mark>presents a particular risk </mark>to scientists <mark>in the nonprofit sector</mark>, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings</u></strong>. 87 Second, <u><strong><mark>researchers would face significant</mark> transaction <mark>costs</u></strong></mark>88 <u><strong><mark>in locating and</mark> then <mark>negotiating</mark> compensation <mark>arrangements </mark>with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide</u></strong>,89 <u><strong>such <mark>negotiations could prove</mark> quite <mark>complex</mark> and protracted</u></strong>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>bargaining</mark> among scientists and research participants <mark>could prove impossible</mark> in cases <mark>where</mark> the <mark>identities</mark> of these participants <mark>are unknown</u></strong></mark>, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, <u><strong><mark>the problems</mark> of increased financial and transaction costs <mark>reach their apex in the </mark>case of the potential <mark>holdout who refuses to participate </mark>in research <mark>unless she is compensated</mark> at a very high rate</u></strong>.92 Finally, <u><strong><mark>recognizing the</mark> research participant's <mark>right</mark> to share in the revenues <mark>may imply some right to control</mark> the products of that <mark>research</u></strong></mark>; for example, <u><strong>research <mark>participants may demand</mark> widespread and affordable <mark>licensing </mark>of the intellectual property developed from their tissue</u></strong>, <u><strong>thereby</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>further decreasing</mark> the scientists' <mark>profits</u></strong></mark>.93 <u><strong>All of <mark>these factors</mark> combined <mark>would present significant disincentives to researchers</mark>, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise</u></strong>. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation.</p>

Gitter 4 (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Gitter 4 (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz fulltext: Because biomedical research is a costly and financially risky endeavor,86 Congress must consider carefully whether according human research participants property rights in their tissue will diminish the incentives to invest in this industry. Certainly, if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical scientists would face a significant increase in their transaction costs. First, scientists would be obliged to compensate research participants for their genetic material, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. This obligation to remunerate research participants presents a particular risk to scientists in the nonprofit sector, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings. 87 Second, researchers would face significant transaction costs88 in locating and then negotiating compensation arrangements with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide,89 such negotiations could prove quite complex and protracted. Furthermore, bargaining among scientists and research participants could prove impossible in cases where the identities of these participants are unknown, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, the problems of increased financial and transaction costs reach their apex in the case of the potential holdout who refuses to participate in research unless she is compensated at a very high rate.92 Finally, recognizing the research participant's right to share in the revenues may imply some right to control the products of that research; for example, research participants may demand widespread and affordable licensing of the intellectual property developed from their tissue, thereby further decreasing the scientists' profits.93 All of these factors combined would present significant disincentives to researchers, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation. [/INST] <h4>That wrecks the biomedical research</h4><p><strong>Gitter 4</strong> (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Because biomedical research is</mark> a costly and <mark>financially risky</mark> endeavor</u></strong>,86 <u><strong>Congress must consider carefully whether <mark>according</mark> human research <mark>participants property rights in their tissue will diminish </mark>the <mark>incentives to invest</mark> in this industry</u></strong>. Certainly, <u><strong>if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical <mark>scientists would face</mark> a <mark>significant </mark>increase in their <mark>transaction costs</u></strong></mark>. First, <u><strong><mark>scientists would be obliged to compensate</mark> research participants <mark>for </mark>their <mark>genetic material</mark>, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. <mark>This</mark> obligation to remunerate research participants <mark>presents a particular risk </mark>to scientists <mark>in the nonprofit sector</mark>, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings</u></strong>. 87 Second, <u><strong><mark>researchers would face significant</mark> transaction <mark>costs</u></strong></mark>88 <u><strong><mark>in locating and</mark> then <mark>negotiating</mark> compensation <mark>arrangements </mark>with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide</u></strong>,89 <u><strong>such <mark>negotiations could prove</mark> quite <mark>complex</mark> and protracted</u></strong>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>bargaining</mark> among scientists and research participants <mark>could prove impossible</mark> in cases <mark>where</mark> the <mark>identities</mark> of these participants <mark>are unknown</u></strong></mark>, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, <u><strong><mark>the problems</mark> of increased financial and transaction costs <mark>reach their apex in the </mark>case of the potential <mark>holdout who refuses to participate </mark>in research <mark>unless she is compensated</mark> at a very high rate</u></strong>.92 Finally, <u><strong><mark>recognizing the</mark> research participant's <mark>right</mark> to share in the revenues <mark>may imply some right to control</mark> the products of that <mark>research</u></strong></mark>; for example, <u><strong>research <mark>participants may demand</mark> widespread and affordable <mark>licensing </mark>of the intellectual property developed from their tissue</u></strong>, <u><strong>thereby</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>further decreasing</mark> the scientists' <mark>profits</u></strong></mark>.93 <u><strong>All of <mark>these factors</mark> combined <mark>would present significant disincentives to researchers</mark>, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise</u></strong>. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation.</p> </s>

Ensures environmental pathogens

The key difference between environmental pathogens and other human pathogens is their ability to survive and thrive outside the host a great deal more research is needed. By grouping together the environmental pathogens," it is hoped that the topic can gain the critical mass needed for sustained progress The development of improved diagnostic techniques is critical for accurate assessment of health risks and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens. If these diseases are to be effectively controlled, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and vaccines— require improvement

The key difference between environmental pathogens and other s is their ability to thrive outside the host more research is needed. By grouping together the pathogens," the topic can gain critical mass for progress development of improved techniques is critical for assessment of health risks If these diseases are to be effectively controlled vaccines— require improvement

The key difference between environmental pathogens and other human pathogens is their ability to survive and thrive outside the host. Their widespread occurrence in the environment makes them difficult to monitor and control. Inroads have been made to understand the persistence of these organisms in the environment, the reservoirs they inhabit, the ways they exchange virulence factors, and their diversity, but a great deal more research is needed. By grouping together phylogenetically diverse organisms under the umbrella of "environmental pathogens," it is hoped that the topic can gain the critical mass needed for sustained progress. ¶ Colloquium participants examined other research needs for the field, including the diagnostic and environmental technologies that will be necessary for taking the next steps. It was agreed that because of the complex nature of studying organisms that can exist in the environment and in human hosts, work in this area is best carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion with coordinated input from medical, molecular, and environmental microbiologists, specialists in host responses, epidemiologists, ecologists, environmental engineers, and public health experts. The development of improved diagnostic techniques is critical for accurate assessment of health risks and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens. ¶ If the impacts of these diseases are to be effectively controlled, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and vaccines— require improvement. The processes surrounding drug and vaccine development must be tailored to the special problem of environmental pathogens, which often strike small numbers of individuals or individuals in less developed areas of the world and, therefore, offer less potential for drug development profit than more common diseases. A challenge exists, therefore, in meeting the need for targeted, specific interventions, including development of drugs and vaccines for infections by environmental agents, in the face of a lack of financial incentive for development of these tools.

<h4>Ensures environmental pathogens</h4><p>Gerard A. <strong>Cangelosi 5</strong>, Prof of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and Adjunct Prof of Epidemiology and of Global Health at the University of Washington, PhD in Microbiology from UC Davis, Nancy E. Freitag, PhD, Prof in the Dept of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Medicine, and Merry R. Buckley, Ph.D. in environmental microbiology at Michigan State University, “From Outside to Inside: Environmental Microorganisms as Human Pathogens,” http://academy.asm.org/index.php/environmental-microbiology-ecology-evolution/553-from-outside-to-inside-environmental-microorganisms-as-human-pathogens</p><p><u><strong><mark>The key difference between environmental pathogens and other</mark> human pathogen<mark>s is their ability to</mark> survive and <mark>thrive outside the host</u></strong></mark>. Their widespread occurrence in the environment makes them difficult to monitor and control. Inroads have been made to understand the persistence of these organisms in the environment, the reservoirs they inhabit, the ways they exchange virulence factors, and their diversity, but <u><strong>a great deal <mark>more research is needed. By grouping together</u></strong></mark> phylogenetically diverse organisms under <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> umbrella of "<u><strong>environmental <mark>pathogens," </mark>it is hoped that <mark>the topic can gain</mark> the <mark>critical mass</mark> needed <mark>for </mark>sustained <mark>progress</u></strong></mark>. ¶ Colloquium participants examined other research needs for the field, including the diagnostic and environmental technologies that will be necessary for taking the next steps. It was agreed that because of the complex nature of studying organisms that can exist in the environment and in human hosts, work in this area is best carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion with coordinated input from medical, molecular, and environmental microbiologists, specialists in host responses, epidemiologists, ecologists, environmental engineers, and public health experts. <u><strong>The <mark>development of improved </mark>diagnostic <mark>techniques is critical for </mark>accurate <mark>assessment of health risks</mark> and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens.</u></strong> ¶ <u><strong><mark>If</u></strong></mark> the impacts of <u><strong><mark>these diseases are to be effectively controlled</mark>, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and <mark>vaccines— require improvement</u></strong></mark>. The processes surrounding drug and vaccine development must be tailored to the special problem of environmental pathogens, which often strike small numbers of individuals or individuals in less developed areas of the world and, therefore, offer less potential for drug development profit than more common diseases. A challenge exists, therefore, in meeting the need for targeted, specific interventions, including development of drugs and vaccines for infections by environmental agents, in the face of a lack of financial incentive for development of these tools. </p>

Gerard A. Cangelosi 5, Prof of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and Adjunct Prof of Epidemiology and of Global Health at the University of Washington, PhD in Microbiology from UC Davis, Nancy E. Freitag, PhD, Prof in the Dept of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Medicine, and Merry R. Buckley, Ph.D. in environmental microbiology at Michigan State University, “From Outside to Inside: Environmental Microorganisms as Human Pathogens,” http://academy.asm.org/index.php/environmental-microbiology-ecology-evolution/553-from-outside-to-inside-environmental-microorganisms-as-human-pathogens

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Gerard A. Cangelosi 5, Prof of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and Adjunct Prof of Epidemiology and of Global Health at the University of Washington, PhD in Microbiology from UC Davis, Nancy E. Freitag, PhD, Prof in the Dept of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Medicine, and Merry R. Buckley, Ph.D. in environmental microbiology at Michigan State University, “From Outside to Inside: Environmental Microorganisms as Human Pathogens,” http://academy.asm.org/index.php/environmental-microbiology-ecology-evolution/553-from-outside-to-inside-environmental-microorganisms-as-human-pathogens fulltext: The key difference between environmental pathogens and other human pathogens is their ability to survive and thrive outside the host. Their widespread occurrence in the environment makes them difficult to monitor and control. Inroads have been made to understand the persistence of these organisms in the environment, the reservoirs they inhabit, the ways they exchange virulence factors, and their diversity, but a great deal more research is needed. By grouping together phylogenetically diverse organisms under the umbrella of "environmental pathogens," it is hoped that the topic can gain the critical mass needed for sustained progress. ¶ Colloquium participants examined other research needs for the field, including the diagnostic and environmental technologies that will be necessary for taking the next steps. It was agreed that because of the complex nature of studying organisms that can exist in the environment and in human hosts, work in this area is best carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion with coordinated input from medical, molecular, and environmental microbiologists, specialists in host responses, epidemiologists, ecologists, environmental engineers, and public health experts. The development of improved diagnostic techniques is critical for accurate assessment of health risks and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens. ¶ If the impacts of these diseases are to be effectively controlled, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and vaccines— require improvement. The processes surrounding drug and vaccine development must be tailored to the special problem of environmental pathogens, which often strike small numbers of individuals or individuals in less developed areas of the world and, therefore, offer less potential for drug development profit than more common diseases. A challenge exists, therefore, in meeting the need for targeted, specific interventions, including development of drugs and vaccines for infections by environmental agents, in the face of a lack of financial incentive for development of these tools. [/INST] <h4>Ensures environmental pathogens</h4><p>Gerard A. <strong>Cangelosi 5</strong>, Prof of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and Adjunct Prof of Epidemiology and of Global Health at the University of Washington, PhD in Microbiology from UC Davis, Nancy E. Freitag, PhD, Prof in the Dept of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Medicine, and Merry R. Buckley, Ph.D. in environmental microbiology at Michigan State University, “From Outside to Inside: Environmental Microorganisms as Human Pathogens,” http://academy.asm.org/index.php/environmental-microbiology-ecology-evolution/553-from-outside-to-inside-environmental-microorganisms-as-human-pathogens</p><p><u><strong><mark>The key difference between environmental pathogens and other</mark> human pathogen<mark>s is their ability to</mark> survive and <mark>thrive outside the host</u></strong></mark>. Their widespread occurrence in the environment makes them difficult to monitor and control. Inroads have been made to understand the persistence of these organisms in the environment, the reservoirs they inhabit, the ways they exchange virulence factors, and their diversity, but <u><strong>a great deal <mark>more research is needed. By grouping together</u></strong></mark> phylogenetically diverse organisms under <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> umbrella of "<u><strong>environmental <mark>pathogens," </mark>it is hoped that <mark>the topic can gain</mark> the <mark>critical mass</mark> needed <mark>for </mark>sustained <mark>progress</u></strong></mark>. ¶ Colloquium participants examined other research needs for the field, including the diagnostic and environmental technologies that will be necessary for taking the next steps. It was agreed that because of the complex nature of studying organisms that can exist in the environment and in human hosts, work in this area is best carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion with coordinated input from medical, molecular, and environmental microbiologists, specialists in host responses, epidemiologists, ecologists, environmental engineers, and public health experts. <u><strong>The <mark>development of improved </mark>diagnostic <mark>techniques is critical for </mark>accurate <mark>assessment of health risks</mark> and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens.</u></strong> ¶ <u><strong><mark>If</u></strong></mark> the impacts of <u><strong><mark>these diseases are to be effectively controlled</mark>, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and <mark>vaccines— require improvement</u></strong></mark>. The processes surrounding drug and vaccine development must be tailored to the special problem of environmental pathogens, which often strike small numbers of individuals or individuals in less developed areas of the world and, therefore, offer less potential for drug development profit than more common diseases. A challenge exists, therefore, in meeting the need for targeted, specific interventions, including development of drugs and vaccines for infections by environmental agents, in the face of a lack of financial incentive for development of these tools. </p> </s>

Extinction

it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats this writer can identify infectious disease recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for extinction of numerous amphibian species Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that pathogens required their hosts and some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as fungal pathogens. For those it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity

recent decades provide unequivocal evidence for pathogens to cause extinction Although disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by finding a single fungus responsible for extinction of numerous species Previously, the view that diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that pathogens required hosts that does not apply to microbes acquired directly from the environment such as fungal pathogens it is possible to kill off every last member without harm to itself from existential threats environmental microbes pose a much greater threat to humanity

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

<h4>Extinction </h4><p>Arturo <strong>Casadevall 12</strong>, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full</p><p>In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern <u><strong>it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats</u></strong>. At this time <u><strong>this writer can identify </u></strong>at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) <u><strong>infectious disease</u></strong>. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes <u><strong><mark>recent decades</mark> have <mark>provide</mark>d <mark>unequivocal evidence for</mark> the ability of certain <mark>pathogens to cause</mark> the <mark>extinction</mark> of entire species. <mark>Although </mark>infectious <mark>disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by</mark> the <mark>finding</mark> that <mark>a single</mark> chytrid <mark>fungus</mark> was <mark>responsible for</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>extinction of numerous</mark> amphibian <mark>species</u></strong></mark> (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). <u><strong><mark>Previously, the view that</mark> infectious <mark>diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>pathogens required </mark>their <mark>hosts</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong>some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant</u></strong>. However, <u><strong><mark>that </mark>calculation <mark>does not apply to microbes</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that are</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>acquired directly from the environment</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and have no need for a host, <mark>such as</u></strong></mark> the majority of <u><strong><mark>fungal pathogens</mark>. For those</u></strong> types of host–microbe interactions <u><strong><mark>it is possible</mark> for the pathogen <mark>to kill off every last member</mark> of a species</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>without harm to itself</mark>, since it would return to its natural habitat</u></strong> upon killing its last host. Hence, <u><strong><mark>from</mark> the viewpoint of <mark>existential threats environmental microbes</mark> could potentially <mark>pose a much greater threat to humanity</u></strong></mark> than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.</p>

Arturo Casadevall 12, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Arturo Casadevall 12, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full fulltext: In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering. [/INST] <h4>Extinction </h4><p>Arturo <strong>Casadevall 12</strong>, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full</p><p>In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern <u><strong>it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats</u></strong>. At this time <u><strong>this writer can identify </u></strong>at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) <u><strong>infectious disease</u></strong>. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes <u><strong><mark>recent decades</mark> have <mark>provide</mark>d <mark>unequivocal evidence for</mark> the ability of certain <mark>pathogens to cause</mark> the <mark>extinction</mark> of entire species. <mark>Although </mark>infectious <mark>disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by</mark> the <mark>finding</mark> that <mark>a single</mark> chytrid <mark>fungus</mark> was <mark>responsible for</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>extinction of numerous</mark> amphibian <mark>species</u></strong></mark> (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). <u><strong><mark>Previously, the view that</mark> infectious <mark>diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>pathogens required </mark>their <mark>hosts</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong>some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant</u></strong>. However, <u><strong><mark>that </mark>calculation <mark>does not apply to microbes</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that are</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>acquired directly from the environment</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and have no need for a host, <mark>such as</u></strong></mark> the majority of <u><strong><mark>fungal pathogens</mark>. For those</u></strong> types of host–microbe interactions <u><strong><mark>it is possible</mark> for the pathogen <mark>to kill off every last member</mark> of a species</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>without harm to itself</mark>, since it would return to its natural habitat</u></strong> upon killing its last host. Hence, <u><strong><mark>from</mark> the viewpoint of <mark>existential threats environmental microbes</mark> could potentially <mark>pose a much greater threat to humanity</u></strong></mark> than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.</p> </s>

The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.

<h4>The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.</h4> </s>

Mandated choice solves the case – the aff is super unpopular – the CP isn’t

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular many people consider it “repugnant,” they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission the First-Person Consent Law makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination

a market allowing the selling of organs The idea is spectacularly unpopular people consider it “repugnant,” they object to rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell kidneys a legal market for organs is a political nonstarter “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers When you renew your driver’s license you are required to answer Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state has a 60 percent donor signup rate much higher than the national rate of 38 the First-Person Consent Law makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding mandated choice may achieve a higher rate than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance. One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps. An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor. Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does. Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds. Fortunately, there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference. In Illinois, where I live, this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. Here is how it works: When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent reported by Donate Life America The Illinois system has another advantage. There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, the First-Person Consent Law, which created this system, makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding. Thus, mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination.

<h4>Mandated choice solves the case – the aff is super unpopular – the CP isn’t</h4><p><strong>Thaler 9</strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u><strong>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: <mark>a market allowing the</mark> buying and <mark>selling of organs</u></strong></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. <u><strong><mark>The idea</mark> may have some merit, but it <mark>is spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, <u><strong>many <mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>they object to</mark> the possibility of <mark>rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></strong></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><strong><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell</mark> their <mark>kidneys</u></strong></mark>. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, <u><strong>whether you think <mark>a legal market for organs is</mark> a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s <mark>a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance. One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps. An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor. Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does. Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds. Fortunately, <u><strong>there is another possibility, called <mark>“mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference</u></strong></mark>. In Illinois, where I live, <u><strong>this system has been in use since 2006 and <mark>doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers</mark>.</u></strong> Here is how it works: <u><strong><mark>When you</mark> go to <mark>renew your driver’s license</mark> and update your photograph, <mark>you are required to answer</mark> this question: “<mark>Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state</mark> now <mark>has a 60 percent donor signup rate</u></strong></mark>, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. <u><strong>That is <mark>much higher than the national rate of 38</mark> percent</u></strong> reported by Donate Life America The Illinois system has another advantage. <u><strong>There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission</u></strong>. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, <u><strong><mark>the First-Person Consent Law</u></strong></mark>, which created this system, <u><strong><mark>makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong><mark>mandated choice may achieve a higher rate</mark> of donations <mark>than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent</mark> for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination</u></strong>.</p>

Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz fulltext: Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance. One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps. An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor. Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does. Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds. Fortunately, there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference. In Illinois, where I live, this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. Here is how it works: When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent reported by Donate Life America The Illinois system has another advantage. There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, the First-Person Consent Law, which created this system, makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding. Thus, mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination. [/INST] <h4>Mandated choice solves the case – the aff is super unpopular – the CP isn’t</h4><p><strong>Thaler 9</strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u><strong>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: <mark>a market allowing the</mark> buying and <mark>selling of organs</u></strong></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. <u><strong><mark>The idea</mark> may have some merit, but it <mark>is spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, <u><strong>many <mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>they object to</mark> the possibility of <mark>rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></strong></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><strong><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell</mark> their <mark>kidneys</u></strong></mark>. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, <u><strong>whether you think <mark>a legal market for organs is</mark> a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s <mark>a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance. One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps. An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor. Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does. Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds. Fortunately, <u><strong>there is another possibility, called <mark>“mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference</u></strong></mark>. In Illinois, where I live, <u><strong>this system has been in use since 2006 and <mark>doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers</mark>.</u></strong> Here is how it works: <u><strong><mark>When you</mark> go to <mark>renew your driver’s license</mark> and update your photograph, <mark>you are required to answer</mark> this question: “<mark>Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state</mark> now <mark>has a 60 percent donor signup rate</u></strong></mark>, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. <u><strong>That is <mark>much higher than the national rate of 38</mark> percent</u></strong> reported by Donate Life America The Illinois system has another advantage. <u><strong>There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission</u></strong>. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, <u><strong><mark>the First-Person Consent Law</u></strong></mark>, which created this system, <u><strong><mark>makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong><mark>mandated choice may achieve a higher rate</mark> of donations <mark>than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent</mark> for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Democrats will win now – new unemployment numbers

A better-than-expected report on the US job market Friday could give a lift to Democrats the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is helping them to stay in the game. Obama is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. incumbents like Shaheen and Hagan would probably be having a tougher time if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment or significant improvement In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The same dynamics also may be supporting Democrats helping to keep their hopes alive in places like Arkansas

better-than-expected report on the US job market could give a lift to Democrats such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is helping them to stay in the game. Obama is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. incumbents like Shaheen and Hagan would probably be having a tougher time In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The dynamics may keep hopes alive in places like Arkansas,

WASHINGTON — A better-than-expected report on the US job market Friday could give a modest to lift to struggling Democrats, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is simply helping them to stay in the election game. Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President Obama, seeking to help his party, is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. “When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic incumbents like Sen. Jeanne Shaheen in New Hampshire and Sen. Kay Hagan in North Carolina would probably be having a tougher time if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) or significant improvement (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The same dynamics also may be supporting Democrats who are behind in the polls – helping to keep their hopes alive in places like Arkansas, even though the political terrain favors Republicans.

<h4>Democrats will win now – new unemployment numbers</h4><p><strong>Trumball 10/3</strong> <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? <u><strong>(+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>WASHINGTON — <u><strong>A <mark>better-than-expected report on the US job market</mark> Friday <mark>could give a</mark> </u></strong>modest to<u><strong> <mark>lift to</mark> </u></strong>struggling <u><strong><mark>Democrats</u></strong></mark>, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and <u><strong>the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent</u></strong> from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. <u><strong>That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, <mark>such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House.</mark> </u></strong>But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. <u><strong><mark>Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market</mark> <mark>is</u></strong></mark> simply <u><strong><mark>helping them to stay in the</u></strong></mark> election <u><strong><mark>game.</mark> </u></strong>Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark>, seeking to help his party, <u><strong><mark>is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement.</mark> </u></strong>“When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic <u><strong><mark>incumbents</u></strong> <u><strong>like</u></strong></mark> Sen. Jeanne <u><strong><mark>Shaheen</u></strong></mark> in New Hampshire <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> Sen. Kay <u><strong><mark>Hagan</u></strong></mark> in North Carolina <u><strong><mark>would probably be having a tougher time</mark> if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment</u></strong> (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) <u><strong>or significant improvement</u></strong> (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). <u><strong><mark>In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls.</mark> <mark>The</mark> same <mark>dynamics</mark> also <mark>may </mark>be supporting Democrats</u></strong> who are behind in the polls – <u><strong>helping to <mark>keep</mark> their <mark>hopes alive in places like Arkansas</u></strong>,</mark> even though the political terrain favors Republicans.</p>

Trumball 10/3 <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? (+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Trumball 10/3 <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? (+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS fulltext: WASHINGTON — A better-than-expected report on the US job market Friday could give a modest to lift to struggling Democrats, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is simply helping them to stay in the election game. Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President Obama, seeking to help his party, is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. “When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic incumbents like Sen. Jeanne Shaheen in New Hampshire and Sen. Kay Hagan in North Carolina would probably be having a tougher time if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) or significant improvement (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The same dynamics also may be supporting Democrats who are behind in the polls – helping to keep their hopes alive in places like Arkansas, even though the political terrain favors Republicans. [/INST] <h4>Democrats will win now – new unemployment numbers</h4><p><strong>Trumball 10/3</strong> <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? <u><strong>(+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>WASHINGTON — <u><strong>A <mark>better-than-expected report on the US job market</mark> Friday <mark>could give a</mark> </u></strong>modest to<u><strong> <mark>lift to</mark> </u></strong>struggling <u><strong><mark>Democrats</u></strong></mark>, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and <u><strong>the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent</u></strong> from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. <u><strong>That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, <mark>such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House.</mark> </u></strong>But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. <u><strong><mark>Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market</mark> <mark>is</u></strong></mark> simply <u><strong><mark>helping them to stay in the</u></strong></mark> election <u><strong><mark>game.</mark> </u></strong>Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark>, seeking to help his party, <u><strong><mark>is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement.</mark> </u></strong>“When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic <u><strong><mark>incumbents</u></strong> <u><strong>like</u></strong></mark> Sen. Jeanne <u><strong><mark>Shaheen</u></strong></mark> in New Hampshire <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> Sen. Kay <u><strong><mark>Hagan</u></strong></mark> in North Carolina <u><strong><mark>would probably be having a tougher time</mark> if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment</u></strong> (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) <u><strong>or significant improvement</u></strong> (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). <u><strong><mark>In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls.</mark> <mark>The</mark> same <mark>dynamics</mark> also <mark>may </mark>be supporting Democrats</u></strong> who are behind in the polls – <u><strong>helping to <mark>keep</mark> their <mark>hopes alive in places like Arkansas</u></strong>,</mark> even though the political terrain favors Republicans.</p> </s>

Plan is repugnant to the electorate

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular people consider it “repugnant,” they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter

allowing the buying and selling of organs is spectacularly unpopular people consider it “repugnant,” they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. it’s a political nonstarter

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily.

<h4><strong>Plan is repugnant to the electorate</h4><p>Thaler 9</strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u><strong>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market <mark>allowing the buying and selling of organs</u></strong></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. <u><strong>The idea may have some merit, but it <mark>is spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many <u><strong><mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></strong></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><strong><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys</u></strong>.</mark> These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, <u><strong>whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, <mark>it’s a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily.</p>

Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz fulltext: Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. [/INST] <h4><strong>Plan is repugnant to the electorate</h4><p>Thaler 9</strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u><strong>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market <mark>allowing the buying and selling of organs</u></strong></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. <u><strong>The idea may have some merit, but it <mark>is spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many <u><strong><mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></strong></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><strong><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys</u></strong>.</mark> These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, <u><strong>whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, <mark>it’s a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily.</p> </s>

Democrats get blamed

The report depicts an American electorate that is angry and suspicious, fearful and vengeful. Sixty-five percent of respondents say that Congress is having a negative effect on the country A party in power these days seems like a rodeo cowboy riding a bucking bronco -- just trying to hang on. The fact that the two parties are seen as equally unattractive also might comfort some Democrats, but only if they ignore two realities. we have never seen a midterm election turn into a referendum on a party that had no power. Midterm elections are all about the party in power, particularly when that party controls the White House and Congress. The Republican Party has a plethora of problems, but this election will not be about them this is a lousy time to be the party holding all the power. Democrats can expect that voters will make them bear the brunt of the blame for everything that the people think is wrong with the country.

The American electorate is angry and suspicious, fearful and vengeful. Sixty-five percent of respondents say that Congress is having a negative effect on the country we have never seen a midterm election turn into a referendum on a party that had no power. Midterm elections are all about the party in power, particularly when that party controls the White House and Congress this is a lousy time to be the party holding all the power Democrats can expect that voters will make them bear the brunt of the blame for everything that the people think is wrong with the country.

The report, based on four recent Pew national surveys, depicts an American electorate that is angry and suspicious, fearful and vengeful. Sixty-five percent of respondents say that Congress is having a negative effect on the country; 47 percent say that government threatens their personal rights and freedoms; and only 43 percent say they would like to see their member of Congress re-elected this fall, a record low. Voters were happy to dislodge Republicans from their congressional majorities in 2006 and from the White House in 2008. And this same electorate is threatening to throw out the House's Democratic majority this year. A party in power these days seems like a rodeo cowboy riding a bucking bronco -- just trying to hang on. Deeper in the report is a table comparing current attitudes, captured in Pew's survey of 1,001 Americans taken April 1-5, with those found in Pew polls taken in July 1994 and October 2006, the last years that election "waves" remade the national political landscape. In July 1994, a little more than three months before Democrats lost both the House and Senate, Congress had an overall job-approval rating of 53 percent. In October 2006, the month before Republicans lost both chambers, just 41 percent of Americans had a favorable opinion of Congress. Earlier this month, Congress's favorable rating was an abysmal 25 percent. Meanwhile, the GOP scored a favorable rating of just 37 percent in the recent Pew survey. Some Democrats find considerable solace in the fact that voters don't like Republicans much. Yet their own party's favorable rating was just 38 percent, a mere point higher. (In a recent Gallup Poll, Democrats had a 41 percent favorable rating, putting them 1 point lower than Republicans.) The fact that the two parties are seen as equally unattractive also might comfort some Democrats, but only if they ignore two realities. First, it took Republicans six or eight years to destroy their party's brand; it took Democrats less than 18 months to trash theirs. More important, we have never seen a midterm election turn into a referendum on a party that had no power. Midterm elections are all about the party in power, particularly when that party controls the White House and both chambers of Congress. The Republican Party has a plethora of problems, but this election will not be about them. The GOP will have to deal with its problems by 2012. But this year? Not so much. A larger Pew survey of 2,070 registered voters conducted March 11-21 found the parties tied at 44 percent in the generic congressional ballot test, in which voters were asked whether they intend to vote for the Republican or Democratic House candidate in their district. During those same two weeks, Gallup's tracking poll of registered voters found Democrats ahead by 2 or 3 percentage points -- 47 percent to 45 or 44 percent. The past three weeks of Gallup tracking produced similarly close numbers in response to the generic ballot question. However, Democrats should be extremely worried about the fact that midterm electorates are almost always older and whiter -- meaning, more Republican -- than the electorates in presidential contests. And this year, Republicans are showing much greater intensity and enthusiasm than Democrats. So, even if the parties are running neck and neck among registered voters on Election Day, Republicans would come out ahead in the popular vote and very likely the House seat count. Simply put, this is a lousy time to be the party holding all the power. Democrats can expect that voters will make them bear the brunt of the blame for everything that the people think is wrong with the country.

<h4>Democrats get blamed </h4><p><strong>Cook ’10</strong> Political Reporter (Charlie, Democratic Buckaroos Trying To Hold On, National Journal, 4/24/14, http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/democratic-buckaroos-trying-to-hold-on-20100424<u><strong>, 6/28</p><p><mark>The</mark> report</u></strong>, based on four recent Pew national surveys, <u><strong>depicts an <mark>American electorate</mark> that <mark>is angry and suspicious, fearful and vengeful.</mark> <mark>Sixty-five percent of respondents say that Congress is having a negative effect on the country</u></strong></mark>; 47 percent say that government threatens their personal rights and freedoms; and only 43 percent say they would like to see their member of Congress re-elected this fall, a record low. Voters were happy to dislodge Republicans from their congressional majorities in 2006 and from the White House in 2008. And this same electorate is threatening to throw out the House's Democratic majority this year. <u><strong>A party in power these days seems like a rodeo cowboy riding a bucking bronco -- just trying to hang on. </u></strong>Deeper in the report is a table comparing current attitudes, captured in Pew's survey of 1,001 Americans taken April 1-5, with those found in Pew polls taken in July 1994 and October 2006, the last years that election "waves" remade the national political landscape. In July 1994, a little more than three months before Democrats lost both the House and Senate, Congress had an overall job-approval rating of 53 percent. In October 2006, the month before Republicans lost both chambers, just 41 percent of Americans had a favorable opinion of Congress. Earlier this month, Congress's favorable rating was an abysmal 25 percent. Meanwhile, the GOP scored a favorable rating of just 37 percent in the recent Pew survey. Some Democrats find considerable solace in the fact that voters don't like Republicans much. Yet their own party's favorable rating was just 38 percent, a mere point higher. (In a recent Gallup Poll, Democrats had a 41 percent favorable rating, putting them 1 point lower than Republicans.) <u><strong>The fact that the two parties are seen as equally unattractive also might comfort some Democrats, but only if they ignore two realities. </u></strong>First, it took Republicans six or eight years to destroy their party's brand; it took Democrats less than 18 months to trash theirs. More important, <u><strong><mark>we have never seen a midterm election turn into a referendum on a party that had no power. Midterm elections are all about the party in power, particularly when that party controls the White House and</u></strong></mark> both chambers of<u><strong> <mark>Congress</mark>. The Republican Party has a plethora of problems, but this election will not be about them</u></strong>. The GOP will have to deal with its problems by 2012. But this year? Not so much. A larger Pew survey of 2,070 registered voters conducted March 11-21 found the parties tied at 44 percent in the generic congressional ballot test, in which voters were asked whether they intend to vote for the Republican or Democratic House candidate in their district. During those same two weeks, Gallup's tracking poll of registered voters found Democrats ahead by 2 or 3 percentage points -- 47 percent to 45 or 44 percent. The past three weeks of Gallup tracking produced similarly close numbers in response to the generic ballot question. However, Democrats should be extremely worried about the fact that midterm electorates are almost always older and whiter -- meaning, more Republican -- than the electorates in presidential contests. And this year, Republicans are showing much greater intensity and enthusiasm than Democrats. So, even if the parties are running neck and neck among registered voters on Election Day, Republicans would come out ahead in the popular vote and very likely the House seat count. Simply put, <u><strong><mark>this is a lousy time to be the party holding all the power</mark>. <mark>Democrats can expect that voters will make them bear the brunt of the blame for everything that the people think is wrong with the country.</p></u></strong></mark>

Cook ’10 Political Reporter (Charlie, Democratic Buckaroos Trying To Hold On, National Journal, 4/24/14, http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/democratic-buckaroos-trying-to-hold-on-20100424, 6/28

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Cook ’10 Political Reporter (Charlie, Democratic Buckaroos Trying To Hold On, National Journal, 4/24/14, http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/democratic-buckaroos-trying-to-hold-on-20100424, 6/28 fulltext: The report, based on four recent Pew national surveys, depicts an American electorate that is angry and suspicious, fearful and vengeful. Sixty-five percent of respondents say that Congress is having a negative effect on the country; 47 percent say that government threatens their personal rights and freedoms; and only 43 percent say they would like to see their member of Congress re-elected this fall, a record low. Voters were happy to dislodge Republicans from their congressional majorities in 2006 and from the White House in 2008. And this same electorate is threatening to throw out the House's Democratic majority this year. A party in power these days seems like a rodeo cowboy riding a bucking bronco -- just trying to hang on. Deeper in the report is a table comparing current attitudes, captured in Pew's survey of 1,001 Americans taken April 1-5, with those found in Pew polls taken in July 1994 and October 2006, the last years that election "waves" remade the national political landscape. In July 1994, a little more than three months before Democrats lost both the House and Senate, Congress had an overall job-approval rating of 53 percent. In October 2006, the month before Republicans lost both chambers, just 41 percent of Americans had a favorable opinion of Congress. Earlier this month, Congress's favorable rating was an abysmal 25 percent. Meanwhile, the GOP scored a favorable rating of just 37 percent in the recent Pew survey. Some Democrats find considerable solace in the fact that voters don't like Republicans much. Yet their own party's favorable rating was just 38 percent, a mere point higher. (In a recent Gallup Poll, Democrats had a 41 percent favorable rating, putting them 1 point lower than Republicans.) The fact that the two parties are seen as equally unattractive also might comfort some Democrats, but only if they ignore two realities. First, it took Republicans six or eight years to destroy their party's brand; it took Democrats less than 18 months to trash theirs. More important, we have never seen a midterm election turn into a referendum on a party that had no power. Midterm elections are all about the party in power, particularly when that party controls the White House and both chambers of Congress. The Republican Party has a plethora of problems, but this election will not be about them. The GOP will have to deal with its problems by 2012. But this year? Not so much. A larger Pew survey of 2,070 registered voters conducted March 11-21 found the parties tied at 44 percent in the generic congressional ballot test, in which voters were asked whether they intend to vote for the Republican or Democratic House candidate in their district. During those same two weeks, Gallup's tracking poll of registered voters found Democrats ahead by 2 or 3 percentage points -- 47 percent to 45 or 44 percent. The past three weeks of Gallup tracking produced similarly close numbers in response to the generic ballot question. However, Democrats should be extremely worried about the fact that midterm electorates are almost always older and whiter -- meaning, more Republican -- than the electorates in presidential contests. And this year, Republicans are showing much greater intensity and enthusiasm than Democrats. So, even if the parties are running neck and neck among registered voters on Election Day, Republicans would come out ahead in the popular vote and very likely the House seat count. Simply put, this is a lousy time to be the party holding all the power. Democrats can expect that voters will make them bear the brunt of the blame for everything that the people think is wrong with the country. [/INST] <h4>Democrats get blamed </h4><p><strong>Cook ’10</strong> Political Reporter (Charlie, Democratic Buckaroos Trying To Hold On, National Journal, 4/24/14, http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/democratic-buckaroos-trying-to-hold-on-20100424<u><strong>, 6/28</p><p><mark>The</mark> report</u></strong>, based on four recent Pew national surveys, <u><strong>depicts an <mark>American electorate</mark> that <mark>is angry and suspicious, fearful and vengeful.</mark> <mark>Sixty-five percent of respondents say that Congress is having a negative effect on the country</u></strong></mark>; 47 percent say that government threatens their personal rights and freedoms; and only 43 percent say they would like to see their member of Congress re-elected this fall, a record low. Voters were happy to dislodge Republicans from their congressional majorities in 2006 and from the White House in 2008. And this same electorate is threatening to throw out the House's Democratic majority this year. <u><strong>A party in power these days seems like a rodeo cowboy riding a bucking bronco -- just trying to hang on. </u></strong>Deeper in the report is a table comparing current attitudes, captured in Pew's survey of 1,001 Americans taken April 1-5, with those found in Pew polls taken in July 1994 and October 2006, the last years that election "waves" remade the national political landscape. In July 1994, a little more than three months before Democrats lost both the House and Senate, Congress had an overall job-approval rating of 53 percent. In October 2006, the month before Republicans lost both chambers, just 41 percent of Americans had a favorable opinion of Congress. Earlier this month, Congress's favorable rating was an abysmal 25 percent. Meanwhile, the GOP scored a favorable rating of just 37 percent in the recent Pew survey. Some Democrats find considerable solace in the fact that voters don't like Republicans much. Yet their own party's favorable rating was just 38 percent, a mere point higher. (In a recent Gallup Poll, Democrats had a 41 percent favorable rating, putting them 1 point lower than Republicans.) <u><strong>The fact that the two parties are seen as equally unattractive also might comfort some Democrats, but only if they ignore two realities. </u></strong>First, it took Republicans six or eight years to destroy their party's brand; it took Democrats less than 18 months to trash theirs. More important, <u><strong><mark>we have never seen a midterm election turn into a referendum on a party that had no power. Midterm elections are all about the party in power, particularly when that party controls the White House and</u></strong></mark> both chambers of<u><strong> <mark>Congress</mark>. The Republican Party has a plethora of problems, but this election will not be about them</u></strong>. The GOP will have to deal with its problems by 2012. But this year? Not so much. A larger Pew survey of 2,070 registered voters conducted March 11-21 found the parties tied at 44 percent in the generic congressional ballot test, in which voters were asked whether they intend to vote for the Republican or Democratic House candidate in their district. During those same two weeks, Gallup's tracking poll of registered voters found Democrats ahead by 2 or 3 percentage points -- 47 percent to 45 or 44 percent. The past three weeks of Gallup tracking produced similarly close numbers in response to the generic ballot question. However, Democrats should be extremely worried about the fact that midterm electorates are almost always older and whiter -- meaning, more Republican -- than the electorates in presidential contests. And this year, Republicans are showing much greater intensity and enthusiasm than Democrats. So, even if the parties are running neck and neck among registered voters on Election Day, Republicans would come out ahead in the popular vote and very likely the House seat count. Simply put, <u><strong><mark>this is a lousy time to be the party holding all the power</mark>. <mark>Democrats can expect that voters will make them bear the brunt of the blame for everything that the people think is wrong with the country.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

GOP Majority would cut Obama EPA Regs

Republican Senate candidate Dan Sullivan blamed Obama and Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources , vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix The Obama-Reid agenda has locked up America’s natural resources, burdened small businesses throughout the country with an avalanche of regulations and suffocated job growth through a complete disrespect for the rule of law He added that the Environmental Protection Agency, and Washington, D.C., are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands. That could all change, he explains, if voters put him, and fellow Republicans in charge If Republicans win the Senate in November, Sullivan says the GOP will make energy a priority. A Republican Senate would approve Keystone XL pipeline jobs, because Canada is our neighbor and ally," We’ll authorize more offshore development, because it’s good for coastal states and the rest of the country. We’ll seize the opportunity to expand our energy trade, because that will benefit our nation, and others who need energy – like Ukraine Republicans won't stop there, they will also work to block the administration's carbon pollution proposal for existing power plants, and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize by next year

Sullivan blamed Obama and Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix He added that the E P A are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands That could all change if voters put Republicans in charge If Republicans win the Senate he GOP will make energy a priority Republicans will block the administration's carbon pollution proposal and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize

[Laura Barron-Lopez, “Senate hopeful: GOP-majority would squash Obama's climate agenda” The Hill, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/216827-senate-hopeful-gop-majority-would-squash-obamas-climate-agenda, CBE] Republican Senate candidate Dan Sullivan (Alaska) blamed President Obama and Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources in the party's weekly address, vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix. Sullivan, who is challenging Sen. Mark Begich (D-Alaska) this year, worries for his three teenage daughters, who he claims won't be able to take advantage of the state's wealth of oil, natural gas, hydropower, and more, if the administration's regulatory agenda continues unchecked. "The Obama-Reid agenda has locked up America’s natural resources, burdened small businesses throughout the country with an avalanche of regulations and suffocated job growth through a complete disrespect for the rule of law," Sullivan said during the address on Saturday. He added that the Environmental Protection Agency, and Washington, D.C., are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands." That could all change, he explains, if voters put him, and fellow Republicans in charge. "The American Dream is resilient," he said. "All we need is new leadership in Washington to make it happen once again." If Republicans win the Senate in November, Sullivan says the GOP will make energy a priority. "A Republican Senate would approve Keystone XL pipeline jobs, because Canada is our neighbor and ally," Sullivan said. “We’ll authorize more offshore development, because it’s good for coastal states and the rest of the country. We’ll seize the opportunity to expand our energy trade, because that will benefit our nation, and others who need energy – like Ukraine," he added. Republicans won't stop there, they will also work to block the administration's carbon pollution proposal for existing power plants, and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize by next year. Sullivan accused the administration and Democrats of being "stuck in the last century" tied to a system of "burdensome federal regulations" that is "stifling" the nation.

<h4><strong>GOP Majority would cut Obama EPA Regs</h4><p>The Hill, 9/6</p><p></strong>[Laura Barron-Lopez, “Senate hopeful: GOP-majority would squash Obama's climate agenda” The Hill, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/216827-senate-hopeful-gop-majority-would-squash-obamas-climate-agenda, CBE]</p><p><u><strong>Republican Senate candidate Dan <mark>Sullivan</u></strong></mark> (Alaska) <u><strong><mark>blamed</u></strong></mark> President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong> <u><strong>Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources</u></strong></mark> in the party's weekly address<u><strong>, <mark>vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix</u></strong></mark>. Sullivan, who is challenging Sen. Mark Begich (D-Alaska) this year, worries for his three teenage daughters, who he claims won't be able to take advantage of the state's wealth of oil, natural gas, hydropower, and more, if the administration's regulatory agenda continues unchecked. "<u><strong>The Obama-Reid agenda has locked up America’s natural resources, burdened small businesses throughout the country with an avalanche of regulations and suffocated job growth through a complete disrespect for the rule of law</u></strong>," Sullivan said during the address on Saturday. <u><strong><mark>He added that the E</mark>nvironmental <mark>P</mark>rotection <mark>A</mark>gency, and Washington, D.C., <mark>are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands</mark>.</u></strong>" <u><strong><mark>That could all change</mark>, he explains, <mark>if voters put</mark> him, and fellow <mark>Republicans in charge</u></strong></mark>. "The American Dream is resilient," he said. "All we need is new leadership in Washington to make it happen once again." <u><strong><mark>If Republicans win the Senate</mark> in November, Sullivan says t<mark>he GOP will make energy a priority</mark>. </u></strong>"<u><strong>A Republican Senate would approve Keystone XL pipeline jobs, because Canada is our neighbor and ally,"</u></strong> Sullivan said. “<u><strong>We’ll authorize more offshore development, because it’s good for coastal states and the rest of the country. We’ll seize the opportunity to expand our energy trade, because that will benefit our nation, and others who need energy – like Ukraine</u></strong>," he added. <u><strong><mark>Republicans</mark> won't stop there, they <mark>will</mark> also work to <mark>block the administration's carbon pollution proposal</mark> for existing power plants, <mark>and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize</mark> by next year</u></strong>. Sullivan accused the administration and Democrats of being "stuck in the last century" tied to a system of "burdensome federal regulations" that is "stifling" the nation.</p>

The Hill, 9/6

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: The Hill, 9/6 fulltext: [Laura Barron-Lopez, “Senate hopeful: GOP-majority would squash Obama's climate agenda” The Hill, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/216827-senate-hopeful-gop-majority-would-squash-obamas-climate-agenda, CBE] Republican Senate candidate Dan Sullivan (Alaska) blamed President Obama and Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources in the party's weekly address, vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix. Sullivan, who is challenging Sen. Mark Begich (D-Alaska) this year, worries for his three teenage daughters, who he claims won't be able to take advantage of the state's wealth of oil, natural gas, hydropower, and more, if the administration's regulatory agenda continues unchecked. "The Obama-Reid agenda has locked up America’s natural resources, burdened small businesses throughout the country with an avalanche of regulations and suffocated job growth through a complete disrespect for the rule of law," Sullivan said during the address on Saturday. He added that the Environmental Protection Agency, and Washington, D.C., are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands." That could all change, he explains, if voters put him, and fellow Republicans in charge. "The American Dream is resilient," he said. "All we need is new leadership in Washington to make it happen once again." If Republicans win the Senate in November, Sullivan says the GOP will make energy a priority. "A Republican Senate would approve Keystone XL pipeline jobs, because Canada is our neighbor and ally," Sullivan said. “We’ll authorize more offshore development, because it’s good for coastal states and the rest of the country. We’ll seize the opportunity to expand our energy trade, because that will benefit our nation, and others who need energy – like Ukraine," he added. Republicans won't stop there, they will also work to block the administration's carbon pollution proposal for existing power plants, and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize by next year. Sullivan accused the administration and Democrats of being "stuck in the last century" tied to a system of "burdensome federal regulations" that is "stifling" the nation. [/INST] <h4><strong>GOP Majority would cut Obama EPA Regs</h4><p>The Hill, 9/6</p><p></strong>[Laura Barron-Lopez, “Senate hopeful: GOP-majority would squash Obama's climate agenda” The Hill, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/216827-senate-hopeful-gop-majority-would-squash-obamas-climate-agenda, CBE]</p><p><u><strong>Republican Senate candidate Dan <mark>Sullivan</u></strong></mark> (Alaska) <u><strong><mark>blamed</u></strong></mark> President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong> <u><strong>Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources</u></strong></mark> in the party's weekly address<u><strong>, <mark>vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix</u></strong></mark>. Sullivan, who is challenging Sen. Mark Begich (D-Alaska) this year, worries for his three teenage daughters, who he claims won't be able to take advantage of the state's wealth of oil, natural gas, hydropower, and more, if the administration's regulatory agenda continues unchecked. "<u><strong>The Obama-Reid agenda has locked up America’s natural resources, burdened small businesses throughout the country with an avalanche of regulations and suffocated job growth through a complete disrespect for the rule of law</u></strong>," Sullivan said during the address on Saturday. <u><strong><mark>He added that the E</mark>nvironmental <mark>P</mark>rotection <mark>A</mark>gency, and Washington, D.C., <mark>are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands</mark>.</u></strong>" <u><strong><mark>That could all change</mark>, he explains, <mark>if voters put</mark> him, and fellow <mark>Republicans in charge</u></strong></mark>. "The American Dream is resilient," he said. "All we need is new leadership in Washington to make it happen once again." <u><strong><mark>If Republicans win the Senate</mark> in November, Sullivan says t<mark>he GOP will make energy a priority</mark>. </u></strong>"<u><strong>A Republican Senate would approve Keystone XL pipeline jobs, because Canada is our neighbor and ally,"</u></strong> Sullivan said. “<u><strong>We’ll authorize more offshore development, because it’s good for coastal states and the rest of the country. We’ll seize the opportunity to expand our energy trade, because that will benefit our nation, and others who need energy – like Ukraine</u></strong>," he added. <u><strong><mark>Republicans</mark> won't stop there, they <mark>will</mark> also work to <mark>block the administration's carbon pollution proposal</mark> for existing power plants, <mark>and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize</mark> by next year</u></strong>. Sullivan accused the administration and Democrats of being "stuck in the last century" tied to a system of "burdensome federal regulations" that is "stifling" the nation.</p> </s>

EPA regs curb warming and motivate other countries

President Obama’s Environmental Protection Agency is applying new rules to curb greenhouse-gas emissions from cars, trucks and — most controversially — power plants, the biggest national emitters McConnell has said he will try to restrict the EPA if Republicans take over the Senate The Obama administration’s plan has three pieces. EPA has persuaded carmakers to nearly double the fuel efficiency of U.S. autos the EPA placed limits on the carbon dioxide that new power plants can emit the EPA proposed in June a rule that would restrict the emissions of existing power plants, cutting their carbon emissions by 30 percent by 2030 The central criticism is that these rules , will exact extreme costs on the economy without reversing the rise in global temperatures But critics have been citing high-cost estimates based on faulty assumptions In return, the EPA projects health and climate benefits outstripping costs many times over Even if the EPA’s reckoning is significantly off, the regulations will do more good than harm — without even considering their importance in motivating other countries to act.

President Obama’s Environmental Protection Agency is applying new rules to curb g h -g emissions from cars, trucks and power plants McConnell has said he will try to restrict the EPA if Republicans take over the Senate. the EPA proposed a rule would restrict the emissions of existing power plants, cutting their carbon emissions by 30 percent by 203 critics have been citing high-cost estimates based on faulty assumptions In return, the EPA projects health and climate benefits outstripping costs many times over Even if the EPA’s reckoning is off, the regulations will do more good than harm — without considering their importance in motivating other countries to act.

THE COUNTRY is about to see its fiercest climate-change battle. After years of congressional inaction, President Obama’s Environmental Protection Agency is applying new rules to curb greenhouse-gas emissions from cars, trucks and — most controversially — power plants, the biggest national emitters. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) has said he will try to restrict the EPA if Republicans take over the Senate. Mr. Obama’s executive actions will be an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign. The EPA has drawn up the best possible policy framework under current law, and it is much better than nothing. Congress should not weaken the rules. But lawmakers could significantly improve on them. The Obama administration’s plan has three pieces. First, the EPA has persuaded carmakers to nearly double the fuel efficiency of U.S. autos, in the process cutting their carbon emissions in half. Second, the EPA placed limits on the carbon dioxide that new power plants can emit, virtually guaranteeing that no more conventional coal-fired plants will be built in the United States. Third, the EPA proposed in June a rule that would restrict the emissions of existing power plants, cutting their carbon emissions by 30 percent by 2030. The central criticism is that these rules, particularly the third, will exact extreme costs on the economy without reversing the rise in global temperatures. But critics have been citing high-cost estimates based on faulty assumptions, and the EPA figures that its power plant rule, which gives utilities many years to comply, will peak at about $9 billion per year in 2011 dollars. That’s a relative pittance in an economy that’s nearly $17 trillion and growing. In return, the EPA projects health and climate benefits outstripping costs many times over. Even if the EPA’s reckoning is significantly off, the regulations will do more good than harm — without even considering their importance in motivating other countries to act.

<h4><strong>EPA regs curb warming and motivate other countries</h4><p>Washington Post, 8/26</p><p></strong>[Washington Post Editorial Board, “A climate for change: The EPA’s limits on emissions are important but not enough” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-climate-for-change-the-epas-limits-on-emissions-are-important-but-not-enough/2014/08/26/f47fa828-2a4b-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html<u><strong>, CBE]</p><p></u></strong>THE COUNTRY is about to see its fiercest climate-change battle. After years of congressional inaction, <u><strong><mark>President Obama’s Environmental Protection Agency is applying new rules to curb g</mark>reen<mark>h</mark>ouse<mark>-g</mark>as<mark> emissions from cars, trucks and</mark> — most controversially — <mark>power plants</mark>, the biggest national emitters</u></strong>. Senate Minority Leader Mitch <u><strong><mark>McConnell</u></strong></mark> (R-Ky.) <u><strong><mark>has said he will try to restrict the EPA if Republicans take over the Senate</u></strong>.</mark> Mr. Obama’s executive actions will be an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign. The EPA has drawn up the best possible policy framework under current law, and it is much better than nothing. Congress should not weaken the rules. But lawmakers could significantly improve on them. <u><strong>The Obama administration’s plan has three pieces.</u></strong> First, the <u><strong>EPA has persuaded carmakers to nearly double the fuel efficiency of U.S. autos</u></strong>, in the process cutting their carbon emissions in half. Second, <u><strong>the EPA placed limits on the carbon dioxide that new power plants can emit</u></strong>, virtually guaranteeing that no more conventional coal-fired plants will be built in the United States. Third, <u><strong><mark>the EPA proposed</mark> in June <mark>a rule</mark> that <mark>would restrict the emissions of existing power plants, cutting their carbon emissions by 30 percent by 203</mark>0</u></strong>. <u><strong>The central criticism is that these rules</u></strong>, particularly the third<u><strong>, will exact extreme costs on the economy without reversing the rise in global temperatures</u></strong>. <u><strong>But <mark>critics have been citing high-cost estimates based on faulty assumptions</u></strong></mark>, and the EPA figures that its power plant rule, which gives utilities many years to comply, will peak at about $9 billion per year in 2011 dollars. That’s a relative pittance in an economy that’s nearly $17 trillion and growing. <u><strong><mark>In return, the EPA projects health and climate benefits outstripping costs many times over</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Even if the EPA’s reckoning is </mark>significantly <mark>off, the regulations will do more good than harm — without </mark>even <mark>considering their importance in motivating other countries to act.</p></u></strong></mark>

Washington Post, 8/26 [Washington Post Editorial Board, “A climate for change: The EPA’s limits on emissions are important but not enough” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-climate-for-change-the-epas-limits-on-emissions-are-important-but-not-enough/2014/08/26/f47fa828-2a4b-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html, CBE]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Washington Post, 8/26 [Washington Post Editorial Board, “A climate for change: The EPA’s limits on emissions are important but not enough” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-climate-for-change-the-epas-limits-on-emissions-are-important-but-not-enough/2014/08/26/f47fa828-2a4b-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html, CBE] fulltext: THE COUNTRY is about to see its fiercest climate-change battle. After years of congressional inaction, President Obama’s Environmental Protection Agency is applying new rules to curb greenhouse-gas emissions from cars, trucks and — most controversially — power plants, the biggest national emitters. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) has said he will try to restrict the EPA if Republicans take over the Senate. Mr. Obama’s executive actions will be an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign. The EPA has drawn up the best possible policy framework under current law, and it is much better than nothing. Congress should not weaken the rules. But lawmakers could significantly improve on them. The Obama administration’s plan has three pieces. First, the EPA has persuaded carmakers to nearly double the fuel efficiency of U.S. autos, in the process cutting their carbon emissions in half. Second, the EPA placed limits on the carbon dioxide that new power plants can emit, virtually guaranteeing that no more conventional coal-fired plants will be built in the United States. Third, the EPA proposed in June a rule that would restrict the emissions of existing power plants, cutting their carbon emissions by 30 percent by 2030. The central criticism is that these rules, particularly the third, will exact extreme costs on the economy without reversing the rise in global temperatures. But critics have been citing high-cost estimates based on faulty assumptions, and the EPA figures that its power plant rule, which gives utilities many years to comply, will peak at about $9 billion per year in 2011 dollars. That’s a relative pittance in an economy that’s nearly $17 trillion and growing. In return, the EPA projects health and climate benefits outstripping costs many times over. Even if the EPA’s reckoning is significantly off, the regulations will do more good than harm — without even considering their importance in motivating other countries to act. [/INST] <h4><strong>EPA regs curb warming and motivate other countries</h4><p>Washington Post, 8/26</p><p></strong>[Washington Post Editorial Board, “A climate for change: The EPA’s limits on emissions are important but not enough” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-climate-for-change-the-epas-limits-on-emissions-are-important-but-not-enough/2014/08/26/f47fa828-2a4b-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html<u><strong>, CBE]</p><p></u></strong>THE COUNTRY is about to see its fiercest climate-change battle. After years of congressional inaction, <u><strong><mark>President Obama’s Environmental Protection Agency is applying new rules to curb g</mark>reen<mark>h</mark>ouse<mark>-g</mark>as<mark> emissions from cars, trucks and</mark> — most controversially — <mark>power plants</mark>, the biggest national emitters</u></strong>. Senate Minority Leader Mitch <u><strong><mark>McConnell</u></strong></mark> (R-Ky.) <u><strong><mark>has said he will try to restrict the EPA if Republicans take over the Senate</u></strong>.</mark> Mr. Obama’s executive actions will be an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign. The EPA has drawn up the best possible policy framework under current law, and it is much better than nothing. Congress should not weaken the rules. But lawmakers could significantly improve on them. <u><strong>The Obama administration’s plan has three pieces.</u></strong> First, the <u><strong>EPA has persuaded carmakers to nearly double the fuel efficiency of U.S. autos</u></strong>, in the process cutting their carbon emissions in half. Second, <u><strong>the EPA placed limits on the carbon dioxide that new power plants can emit</u></strong>, virtually guaranteeing that no more conventional coal-fired plants will be built in the United States. Third, <u><strong><mark>the EPA proposed</mark> in June <mark>a rule</mark> that <mark>would restrict the emissions of existing power plants, cutting their carbon emissions by 30 percent by 203</mark>0</u></strong>. <u><strong>The central criticism is that these rules</u></strong>, particularly the third<u><strong>, will exact extreme costs on the economy without reversing the rise in global temperatures</u></strong>. <u><strong>But <mark>critics have been citing high-cost estimates based on faulty assumptions</u></strong></mark>, and the EPA figures that its power plant rule, which gives utilities many years to comply, will peak at about $9 billion per year in 2011 dollars. That’s a relative pittance in an economy that’s nearly $17 trillion and growing. <u><strong><mark>In return, the EPA projects health and climate benefits outstripping costs many times over</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Even if the EPA’s reckoning is </mark>significantly <mark>off, the regulations will do more good than harm — without </mark>even <mark>considering their importance in motivating other countries to act.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

Causes extinction

the Edge of the World, pg. 26] The possibility of abrupt climate change is linked to positive" feedback effects Several of these feedbacks are possible. First, the land's ability to store carbon could weaken Second, carbon sinks in the oceans could be reduced Third, the potent greenhouse gas methane could be released from peat bogs, wetlands, and thawing permafrost, and even from the methane hydrates in the oceans, as the planet warms and changes. Finally, the earth's albedo, the reflectivity of the earth's surface, is slated to be reduced as large areas now covered by ice and snow diminish or are covered by meltwater. All these effects would tend to make warming self-reinforcing, possibly leading to a greatly amplified greenhouse effect Our home planet is now dangerously near a 'tipping point.' Human-made greenhouse gases are near a level such that important climate changes may proceed mostly under the climate system's own momentum. Impacts would include extermination of a large fraction of species on the planet This warming has brought us to the precipice of a great 'tipping point” If we go over the edge, it will be a transition to 'a different planet,' an environment far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity. There will be no return within the lifetime of any generation that can be imagined, and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species on the planet.

The possibility of abrupt climate change is linked to positive" feedback effects , the land's ability to store carbon could weaken , carbon sinks in the oceans could be reduced , methane could be released from bogs, wetlands, and permafrost as the planet warms , the earth's albedo, is reduced as large areas covered by ice diminish these effects make warming self-reinforcing, Our planet is dangerously near a 'tipping point If we go over the edge, it will be a transition to 'a different planet and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species on the planet

[James, dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Currently he serves the school as the Carl W. Knobloch, Jr. Dean and Sara Shallenberger Brown Professor in the Practice of Environmental Policy, The Bridge @ the Edge of the World, pg. 26] The possibility of abrupt climate change is linked to what may be the most problematic possibility of all—"positive" feedback effects where the initial warming has effects that generate more warming. Several of these feedbacks are possible. First, the land's ability to store carbon could weaken. Soils and forests can dry out or burn and release carbon; less plant growth can occur, thus reducing nature's ability to remove carbon from the air. Second, carbon sinks in the oceans could also be reduced due to ocean warming and other factors. Third, the potent greenhouse gas methane could be released from peat bogs, wetlands, and thawing permafrost, and even from the methane hydrates in the oceans, as the planet warms and changes. Finally, the earth's albedo, the reflectivity of the earth's surface, is slated to be reduced as large areas now covered by ice and snow diminish or are covered by meltwater. All these effects would tend to make warming self-reinforcing, possibly leading to a greatly amplified greenhouse effect. The real possibility of these amplifying feedbacks has alarmed some of our top scientists. James Hansen, the courageous NASA climate scientist, is becoming increasingly outspoken as his investigations lead him to more and more disturbing conclusions. He offered the following assessment in 2007: "Our home planet is now dangerously near a 'tipping point.' Human-made greenhouse gases are near a level such that important climate changes may proceed mostly under the climate system's own momentum. Impacts would include extermination of a large fraction of species on the planet, shifting of climatic zones due to an intensified hydrologic cycle with effects on freshwater availability and human health, and repeated worldwide coastal tragedies associated with storms and a continuously rising sea level. .. . "Civilization developed during the Holocene, a period of relatively tranquil climate now almost 12,000 years in duration. The planet has been warm enough to keep ice sheets off North America and Europe, but cool enough for ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica to be stable. Now, with rapid warming of o.6°C in the past 30 years, global temperature is at its warmest level in the Holocene. "This warming has brought us to the precipice of a great 'tipping point” If we go over the edge, it will be a transition to 'a different planet,' an environment far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity. There will be no return within the lifetime of any generation that can be imagined, and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species on the planet.

<h4><strong>Causes extinction</h4><p>Speth 2008 </p><p></strong>[James, dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Currently he serves the school as the Carl W. Knobloch, Jr. Dean and Sara Shallenberger Brown Professor in the Practice of Environmental Policy, The Bridge @<u><strong> the Edge of the World, pg. 26]</p><p><mark>The possibility of</mark> <mark>abrupt climate change is linked to</u></strong></mark> what may be the most problematic possibility of all—"<u><strong><mark>positive" feedback effects</u></strong></mark> where the initial warming has effects that generate more warming. <u><strong>Several of these feedbacks are possible. First<mark>, the land's ability to store carbon could weaken</u></strong></mark>. Soils and forests can dry out or burn and release carbon; less plant growth can occur, thus reducing nature's ability to remove carbon from the air. <u><strong>Second<mark>, carbon sinks in the oceans could</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>be reduced</u></strong></mark> due to ocean warming and other factors. <u><strong>Third<mark>,</mark> the potent greenhouse gas <mark>methane could be released from </mark>peat <mark>bogs, wetlands, and </mark>thawing <mark>permafrost</mark>, and even from the methane hydrates in the oceans, <mark>as the planet warms </mark>and changes. Finally<mark>, the earth's albedo,</mark> the reflectivity of the earth's surface, <mark>is </mark>slated to be <mark>reduced as large areas </mark>now <mark>covered by ice </mark>and snow <mark>diminish</mark> or are covered by meltwater. All <mark>these effects </mark>would tend to <mark>make warming self-reinforcing,</mark> possibly leading to a greatly amplified greenhouse effect</u></strong>. The real possibility of these amplifying feedbacks has alarmed some of our top scientists. James Hansen, the courageous NASA climate scientist, is becoming increasingly outspoken as his investigations lead him to more and more disturbing conclusions. He offered the following assessment in 2007: "<u><strong><mark>Our </mark>home <mark>planet is </mark>now <mark>dangerously near a 'tipping point</mark>.' Human-made greenhouse gases are near a level such that important climate changes may proceed mostly under the climate system's own momentum. Impacts would include extermination of a large fraction of species on the planet</u></strong>, shifting of climatic zones due to an intensified hydrologic cycle with effects on freshwater availability and human health, and repeated worldwide coastal tragedies associated with storms and a continuously rising sea level. .. . "Civilization developed during the Holocene, a period of relatively tranquil climate now almost 12,000 years in duration. The planet has been warm enough to keep ice sheets off North America and Europe, but cool enough for ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica to be stable. Now, with rapid warming of o.6°C in the past 30 years, global temperature is at its warmest level in the Holocene. "<u><strong>This warming has brought us to the precipice of a great 'tipping point” <mark>If we go over the edge, it will be a transition to 'a different planet</mark>,' an environment far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity. There will be no return within the lifetime of any generation that can be imagined, <mark>and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species on the planet</mark>.</p></u></strong>

Speth 2008

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Speth 2008 fulltext: [James, dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Currently he serves the school as the Carl W. Knobloch, Jr. Dean and Sara Shallenberger Brown Professor in the Practice of Environmental Policy, The Bridge @ the Edge of the World, pg. 26] The possibility of abrupt climate change is linked to what may be the most problematic possibility of all—"positive" feedback effects where the initial warming has effects that generate more warming. Several of these feedbacks are possible. First, the land's ability to store carbon could weaken. Soils and forests can dry out or burn and release carbon; less plant growth can occur, thus reducing nature's ability to remove carbon from the air. Second, carbon sinks in the oceans could also be reduced due to ocean warming and other factors. Third, the potent greenhouse gas methane could be released from peat bogs, wetlands, and thawing permafrost, and even from the methane hydrates in the oceans, as the planet warms and changes. Finally, the earth's albedo, the reflectivity of the earth's surface, is slated to be reduced as large areas now covered by ice and snow diminish or are covered by meltwater. All these effects would tend to make warming self-reinforcing, possibly leading to a greatly amplified greenhouse effect. The real possibility of these amplifying feedbacks has alarmed some of our top scientists. James Hansen, the courageous NASA climate scientist, is becoming increasingly outspoken as his investigations lead him to more and more disturbing conclusions. He offered the following assessment in 2007: "Our home planet is now dangerously near a 'tipping point.' Human-made greenhouse gases are near a level such that important climate changes may proceed mostly under the climate system's own momentum. Impacts would include extermination of a large fraction of species on the planet, shifting of climatic zones due to an intensified hydrologic cycle with effects on freshwater availability and human health, and repeated worldwide coastal tragedies associated with storms and a continuously rising sea level. .. . "Civilization developed during the Holocene, a period of relatively tranquil climate now almost 12,000 years in duration. The planet has been warm enough to keep ice sheets off North America and Europe, but cool enough for ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica to be stable. Now, with rapid warming of o.6°C in the past 30 years, global temperature is at its warmest level in the Holocene. "This warming has brought us to the precipice of a great 'tipping point” If we go over the edge, it will be a transition to 'a different planet,' an environment far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity. There will be no return within the lifetime of any generation that can be imagined, and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species on the planet. [/INST] <h4><strong>Causes extinction</h4><p>Speth 2008 </p><p></strong>[James, dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Currently he serves the school as the Carl W. Knobloch, Jr. Dean and Sara Shallenberger Brown Professor in the Practice of Environmental Policy, The Bridge @<u><strong> the Edge of the World, pg. 26]</p><p><mark>The possibility of</mark> <mark>abrupt climate change is linked to</u></strong></mark> what may be the most problematic possibility of all—"<u><strong><mark>positive" feedback effects</u></strong></mark> where the initial warming has effects that generate more warming. <u><strong>Several of these feedbacks are possible. First<mark>, the land's ability to store carbon could weaken</u></strong></mark>. Soils and forests can dry out or burn and release carbon; less plant growth can occur, thus reducing nature's ability to remove carbon from the air. <u><strong>Second<mark>, carbon sinks in the oceans could</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>be reduced</u></strong></mark> due to ocean warming and other factors. <u><strong>Third<mark>,</mark> the potent greenhouse gas <mark>methane could be released from </mark>peat <mark>bogs, wetlands, and </mark>thawing <mark>permafrost</mark>, and even from the methane hydrates in the oceans, <mark>as the planet warms </mark>and changes. Finally<mark>, the earth's albedo,</mark> the reflectivity of the earth's surface, <mark>is </mark>slated to be <mark>reduced as large areas </mark>now <mark>covered by ice </mark>and snow <mark>diminish</mark> or are covered by meltwater. All <mark>these effects </mark>would tend to <mark>make warming self-reinforcing,</mark> possibly leading to a greatly amplified greenhouse effect</u></strong>. The real possibility of these amplifying feedbacks has alarmed some of our top scientists. James Hansen, the courageous NASA climate scientist, is becoming increasingly outspoken as his investigations lead him to more and more disturbing conclusions. He offered the following assessment in 2007: "<u><strong><mark>Our </mark>home <mark>planet is </mark>now <mark>dangerously near a 'tipping point</mark>.' Human-made greenhouse gases are near a level such that important climate changes may proceed mostly under the climate system's own momentum. Impacts would include extermination of a large fraction of species on the planet</u></strong>, shifting of climatic zones due to an intensified hydrologic cycle with effects on freshwater availability and human health, and repeated worldwide coastal tragedies associated with storms and a continuously rising sea level. .. . "Civilization developed during the Holocene, a period of relatively tranquil climate now almost 12,000 years in duration. The planet has been warm enough to keep ice sheets off North America and Europe, but cool enough for ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica to be stable. Now, with rapid warming of o.6°C in the past 30 years, global temperature is at its warmest level in the Holocene. "<u><strong>This warming has brought us to the precipice of a great 'tipping point” <mark>If we go over the edge, it will be a transition to 'a different planet</mark>,' an environment far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity. There will be no return within the lifetime of any generation that can be imagined, <mark>and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species on the planet</mark>.</p></u></strong> </s>

Legalization of organ sales sustains neoliberal violence -- the poor are coerced into deconstructing and commodifying their biological assemblage to allow for the wealthy to live indefinitely

, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries the Journal of the American Medical Association JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants had sold a kidney to pay off debts The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization At an average elapsed time most families reported worsened economic conditions with annual incomes dropping pro-market perspectives dogmatically ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health through violence and infectious disease As the use of live kidney donors has moved to areas of high risk in the developing world surgeons have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people Such motives instrumentalize the poor turning their suffering into an opportunity The “quantification of suffering” misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects If the “supply side” has been distorted the recipient side has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views all conditions as treatable classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation including those over 70 years This new category of patients does not stand to benefit from transplantation because their conditions make rejection likely As if it weren’t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and labor are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio the world’s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world’s elite can have longer, more comfortable lives such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others.

The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization pro-market perspectives dogmatically ignore realities faced by sellers kidney face extraordinary threats to their health through violence and disease surgeons become complicit in suffering of a hidden population Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an exacerbation of already unjust global relations Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs for first-world people motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportunity The “quantification of suffering misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans subjects the “supply side” has been distorted the recipient side has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views all conditions as treatable the world’s most vulnerable are asked to surrender their bodies so the elite can have longer, more comfortable lives

David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in order to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants (96%) had sold a kidney to pay off debts and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). At an average elapsed time of 6 years after the nephrectomy, most families reported worsened economic conditions since the surgery, with annual incomes dropping from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these pro-market perspectives, though perhaps not blindly, dogmatically pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world: Organs Watch has found that living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health and personal safety through violence, accidents and infectious disease that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. As the use of live kidney donors has moved from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances, to areas of high risk in the developing world, transplant surgeons [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations. Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales, and advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people. Such motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportunity” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). The “quantification of suffering” assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects (Donovan, 2007, 64). If the “supply side” has been distorted by this distributive paradigm, the recipient side also has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life. Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views any and all conditions as treatable, and now new classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation, including “those over 70 years, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). This new category of patients does not stand to benefit much from transplantation because their ages and medical conditions make rejection likely: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. As transplant technology advances, this demand from a broadened patient pool will likely increase, along with the persistent lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries. Meanwhile, viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, it does make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world’s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism. As if it weren’t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and that labor and environmental standards are gutted by the trend towards globalization, the world’s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world’s elite can have longer, more comfortable lives. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others.

<h4>Legalization of organ sales sustains neoliberal violence -- the poor are coerced into deconstructing and commodifying their biological assemblage to allow for the wealthy to live indefinitely <strong> </h4><p>Dillard-Wright 12</p><p></strong>David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals<u><strong>, 20(2), 138-153, AB </p><p>Very few studies have been made in</u></strong> order <u><strong>to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries</u></strong>. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in <u><strong>the Journal of the American Medical Association</u></strong> (<u><strong>JAMA</u></strong>) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA <u><strong>study found that nearly all of the study participants</u></strong> (96%) <u><strong>had sold a kidney to pay off debts</u></strong> and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). <u><strong><mark>The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription</u></strong>” <u><strong>resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization</u></strong></mark> (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). <u><strong>At an average elapsed time</u></strong> of 6 years after the nephrectomy, <u><strong>most families reported worsened economic conditions </u></strong>since the surgery, <u><strong>with annual incomes dropping</u></strong> from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these <u><strong><mark>pro-market perspectives</u></strong></mark>, though perhaps not blindly, <u><strong><mark>dogmatically</u></strong></mark> pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), <u><strong><mark>ignore</mark> the <mark>realities faced by</mark> many kidney <mark>sellers</mark> around the world</u></strong>: Organs Watch has found that <u><strong>living <mark>kidney</mark> donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons <mark>face</u></strong> <u><strong>extraordinary threats to their health</u></strong></mark> and personal safety <u><strong><mark>through violence</u></strong></mark>, accidents <u><strong><mark>and</mark> infectious <mark>disease</u></strong></mark> that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. <u><strong>As the use of live kidney donors has moved </u></strong>from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances,<u><strong> to areas of high risk in the developing world</u></strong>, transplant <u><strong><mark>surgeons</u></strong></mark> [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] <u><strong>have <mark>become complicit in</mark> the needless <mark>suffering of a hidden population</u></strong></mark> (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. <u><strong><mark>Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical</mark> <mark>conditions is an</mark> unconscionable <mark>exacerbation of</mark> an <mark>already unjust</mark> set of <mark>global relations</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Systematic</mark> <mark>wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>arising from </mark>the <mark>ulterior motive of increasing the supply</mark> <mark>of organs</mark> available <mark>for first-world</mark> <mark>people</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Such <mark>motives instrumentalize the poor</u></strong>, “<u><strong>turning their suffering into an opportunity</u></strong></mark>” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>“quantification of suffering</mark>”</u></strong> assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) <u><strong><mark>misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses</u></strong>: <u><strong>this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans </mark>and animal <mark>subjects</u></strong></mark> (Donovan, 2007, 64). <u><strong>If <mark>the “supply side” has been distorted</u></strong></mark> by this distributive paradigm, <u><strong><mark>the recipient side</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>towards medicine</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>that views</u></strong></mark> any and<u><strong> <mark>all conditions as treatable</u></strong></mark>, and now new <u><strong>classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation</u></strong>, <u><strong>including</u></strong> “<u><strong>those over 70 years</u></strong>, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). <u><strong>This new category of patients does not stand to benefit</u></strong> much <u><strong>from transplantation</u></strong> <u><strong>because</u></strong> <u><strong>their</u></strong> ages and medical <u><strong>conditions make rejection likely</u></strong>: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. As transplant technology advances, this demand from a broadened patient pool will likely increase, along with the persistent lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries. Meanwhile, viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, it does make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world’s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism. <u><strong>As if it weren’t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong>labor</u></strong> and environmental standards <u><strong>are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio</u></strong>n, <u><strong><mark>the world’s most vulnerable are</mark> now <mark>asked to surrender their</mark> very <mark>bodies</mark> <mark>so</mark> that <mark>the</mark> world’s <mark>elite</mark> <mark>can have longer, more comfortable lives</u></strong></mark>. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, <u><strong>such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others. </p></u></strong>

Dillard-Wright 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Dillard-Wright 12 fulltext: David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in order to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants (96%) had sold a kidney to pay off debts and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). At an average elapsed time of 6 years after the nephrectomy, most families reported worsened economic conditions since the surgery, with annual incomes dropping from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these pro-market perspectives, though perhaps not blindly, dogmatically pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world: Organs Watch has found that living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health and personal safety through violence, accidents and infectious disease that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. As the use of live kidney donors has moved from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances, to areas of high risk in the developing world, transplant surgeons [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations. Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales, and advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people. Such motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportunity” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). The “quantification of suffering” assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects (Donovan, 2007, 64). If the “supply side” has been distorted by this distributive paradigm, the recipient side also has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life. Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views any and all conditions as treatable, and now new classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation, including “those over 70 years, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). This new category of patients does not stand to benefit much from transplantation because their ages and medical conditions make rejection likely: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. As transplant technology advances, this demand from a broadened patient pool will likely increase, along with the persistent lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries. Meanwhile, viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, it does make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world’s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism. As if it weren’t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and that labor and environmental standards are gutted by the trend towards globalization, the world’s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world’s elite can have longer, more comfortable lives. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others. [/INST] <h4>Legalization of organ sales sustains neoliberal violence -- the poor are coerced into deconstructing and commodifying their biological assemblage to allow for the wealthy to live indefinitely <strong> </h4><p>Dillard-Wright 12</p><p></strong>David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals<u><strong>, 20(2), 138-153, AB </p><p>Very few studies have been made in</u></strong> order <u><strong>to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries</u></strong>. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in <u><strong>the Journal of the American Medical Association</u></strong> (<u><strong>JAMA</u></strong>) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA <u><strong>study found that nearly all of the study participants</u></strong> (96%) <u><strong>had sold a kidney to pay off debts</u></strong> and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). <u><strong><mark>The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription</u></strong>” <u><strong>resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization</u></strong></mark> (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). <u><strong>At an average elapsed time</u></strong> of 6 years after the nephrectomy, <u><strong>most families reported worsened economic conditions </u></strong>since the surgery, <u><strong>with annual incomes dropping</u></strong> from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these <u><strong><mark>pro-market perspectives</u></strong></mark>, though perhaps not blindly, <u><strong><mark>dogmatically</u></strong></mark> pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), <u><strong><mark>ignore</mark> the <mark>realities faced by</mark> many kidney <mark>sellers</mark> around the world</u></strong>: Organs Watch has found that <u><strong>living <mark>kidney</mark> donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons <mark>face</u></strong> <u><strong>extraordinary threats to their health</u></strong></mark> and personal safety <u><strong><mark>through violence</u></strong></mark>, accidents <u><strong><mark>and</mark> infectious <mark>disease</u></strong></mark> that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. <u><strong>As the use of live kidney donors has moved </u></strong>from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances,<u><strong> to areas of high risk in the developing world</u></strong>, transplant <u><strong><mark>surgeons</u></strong></mark> [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] <u><strong>have <mark>become complicit in</mark> the needless <mark>suffering of a hidden population</u></strong></mark> (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. <u><strong><mark>Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical</mark> <mark>conditions is an</mark> unconscionable <mark>exacerbation of</mark> an <mark>already unjust</mark> set of <mark>global relations</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Systematic</mark> <mark>wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>arising from </mark>the <mark>ulterior motive of increasing the supply</mark> <mark>of organs</mark> available <mark>for first-world</mark> <mark>people</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Such <mark>motives instrumentalize the poor</u></strong>, “<u><strong>turning their suffering into an opportunity</u></strong></mark>” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>“quantification of suffering</mark>”</u></strong> assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) <u><strong><mark>misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses</u></strong>: <u><strong>this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans </mark>and animal <mark>subjects</u></strong></mark> (Donovan, 2007, 64). <u><strong>If <mark>the “supply side” has been distorted</u></strong></mark> by this distributive paradigm, <u><strong><mark>the recipient side</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>towards medicine</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>that views</u></strong></mark> any and<u><strong> <mark>all conditions as treatable</u></strong></mark>, and now new <u><strong>classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation</u></strong>, <u><strong>including</u></strong> “<u><strong>those over 70 years</u></strong>, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). <u><strong>This new category of patients does not stand to benefit</u></strong> much <u><strong>from transplantation</u></strong> <u><strong>because</u></strong> <u><strong>their</u></strong> ages and medical <u><strong>conditions make rejection likely</u></strong>: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. As transplant technology advances, this demand from a broadened patient pool will likely increase, along with the persistent lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries. Meanwhile, viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, it does make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world’s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism. <u><strong>As if it weren’t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong>labor</u></strong> and environmental standards <u><strong>are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio</u></strong>n, <u><strong><mark>the world’s most vulnerable are</mark> now <mark>asked to surrender their</mark> very <mark>bodies</mark> <mark>so</mark> that <mark>the</mark> world’s <mark>elite</mark> <mark>can have longer, more comfortable lives</u></strong></mark>. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, <u><strong>such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others. </p></u></strong> </s>

This capitalist regime based on consumption is predicated off of the desire to prolong life indefinitely -- that’s the root cause of violence and warfare

Symbolic exchange suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism Regimes based on symbolic exchange are replaced by regimes based on equivalence Ceremony gives way to spectacle Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. What is fatal to it is reversibility Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’ . Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system This is because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed Death plays a central role what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms , but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value which returns things to a state of indeterminacy Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies” This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity This requires an idea of death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, It creates a split between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death, we still ‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living, mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us Symbolic exchange is based on a game, When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existenc Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it. murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination

Symbolic exchange suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism. symbolic exchange are replaced by equivalence It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. this is bound to fail. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with radical difference. Gift-exchange is radically subversive because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to the dominant system we have lost the ability to engage in exchanges with death Death should not be seen in purely literal terms. but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and value metamorphosis, reversibility as well as physical death biological death is an idealist illusion the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women The original exclusion was of the dead This first split and exclusion forms the basis for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. This requires an idea of death as an end counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. The internalisation of the idea of the subject alienates us It individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. we still ‘exchange’ with the dead We no longer have living relationships with objects They are reduced to the instrumental “We all” become dead The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. death becomes unintelligible This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. People are killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant

Symbolic exchange – or rather, its suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism. Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. Regimes based on symbolic exchange (differences are exchangeable and related) are replaced by regimes based on equivalence (everything is, or means, the same). Ceremony gives way to spectacle, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. What is fatal to it is, rather, reversibility. Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead. Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups. But for Baudrillard, it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system. This is not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system. According to Baudrillard, the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death Death plays a central role in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms. Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body, but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value – which returns things to a state of indeterminacy. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death. According to Baudrillard, indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. Poststructuralists generally maintain that the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions. For Baudrillard, the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded. After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”. This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. Baudrillard suggests that death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. This requires an idea of death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, voices and so on. It creates a split, as Stirner would say, between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death, we still ‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living, mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us. Symbolic exchange is based on a game, with game-like rules. When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existence. Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development. In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. For Baudrillard, capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society. For example, elderly people are excluded from society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it. Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. Baudrillard sees this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies. For Baudrillard, there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. On the other hand, even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination.

<h4>This capitalist regime based on consumption is predicated off of the desire to prolong life indefinitely -- that’s the root cause of violence and warfare </h4><p>Andrew <strong>Robinson 12</strong>, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, March 30, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2</p><p><u><strong><mark>Symbolic exchange</mark> </u></strong>– or rather, its <u><strong><mark>suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism</u></strong>.</mark> Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. <u><strong>Regimes based on <mark>symbolic exchange</u></strong></mark> (differences are exchangeable and related) <u><strong><mark>are replaced by</mark> regimes based on <mark>equivalence</u></strong></mark> (everything is, or means, the same). <u><strong>Ceremony gives way to spectacle</u></strong>, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. <u><strong>Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. <mark>It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same.</mark> Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value.</u></strong> <u><strong>To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value.</u></strong> This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death.</mark> Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation</u></strong>. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). <u><strong>But <mark>this is bound to fail.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death.</mark> Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly</u></strong>. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. <u><strong>And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity</u></strong> – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes <u><strong>desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic.</u></strong> Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. <u><strong>What is fatal to it is</u></strong>, rather, <u><strong>reversibility</u></strong>. <u><strong>Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed</u></strong>. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. <u><strong>The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead</u></strong>. <u><strong>Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’</u></strong>, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder<u><strong>. <mark>Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with</mark> monstrosity, with <mark>radical difference. </mark>The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups</u></strong>. But for Baudrillard, <u><strong>it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange</u></strong>. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. <u><strong><mark>Gift-exchange is radically subversive</mark> of the system</u></strong>. <u><strong>This is</u></strong> not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is <u><strong><mark>because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to</mark> that of <mark>the dominant system</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at</u></strong> <u><strong>bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed</u></strong>, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death <u><strong>Death plays a central role</u></strong> in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>what <mark>we have lost </mark>above all in the transition to alienated society is <mark>the ability to engage in exchanges with death</mark>. <mark>Death should not be seen</mark> here <mark>in purely literal terms</u>.</strong></mark> Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body<u><strong>, <mark>but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and</mark> of <mark>value</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong>which returns things to a state of indeterminacy</u></strong>. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. <u><strong>Death refers to <mark>metamorphosis, reversibility</mark>, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, <mark>as well as physical death</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify.</u></strong> Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>the west’s idea of a <mark>biological</mark>, material <mark>death is</mark> actually <mark>an idealist illusion</mark>, ignoring the sociality of death.</u></strong> Poststructuralists generally maintain that <u><strong><mark>the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions</u></strong></mark>. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, </mark>confining particular groups – <mark>the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women </mark>and so on – to particular segregated situations</u></strong>. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. <u><strong><mark>The original exclusion was of the dead</mark> – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This first split and exclusion forms the basis</mark>, or archetype, <mark>for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>This <mark>discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death</mark>. </u></strong>Baudrillard suggests that <u><strong><mark>death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine</u></strong> which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. <u><strong>The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity</u></strong>. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. <u><strong><mark>This requires an idea of death as an end</mark>. It is <mark>counterposed to the immortality of social institutions.</u></strong></mark> In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. <u><strong>Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. <mark>The internalisation of the idea of the subject</mark> or the soul <mark>alienates us</mark> from our bodies,</u></strong> voices and so on. <u><strong>It creates a split</u></strong>, as Stirner would say, <u><strong>between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. <mark>It</mark> also <mark>individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others</mark>.</u></strong> The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. <u><strong>The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In the case of death, <mark>we still ‘exchange’ with the dead</mark> through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. <mark>We no longer have living</mark>, mortal <mark>relationships with objects </mark>either. <mark>They are reduced to the instrumental</mark>. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us</u></strong>. <u><strong>Symbolic exchange is based on a game,</u></strong> with game-like rules. <u><strong>When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existenc</u></strong>e. <u><strong>Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development</u></strong>. In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. <mark>“We all” become dead</mark>, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. <mark>The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power.</mark> <mark>Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited</mark>. <mark>The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life</mark>. <mark>People are compelled to survive so as to become useful.</u></strong></mark> For Baudrillard, <u><strong>capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production</u></strong>, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. <u><strong>In modern societies, <mark>death </mark>is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society.</u></strong> For example, elderly people are excluded from society. <u><strong>People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it <mark>becomes unintelligible</u></strong></mark>. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. <u><strong>Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. <mark>This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. </mark>The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it.</u></strong> Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, <u><strong>murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value.</u></strong> Baudrillard sees <u><strong>this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies</u></strong>. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>there is not a social improvement here. <mark>People are </mark>effectively being<mark> killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value.</u></strong></mark> On the other hand, <u><strong>even when <mark>capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant</mark>, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette</u></strong>. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. <u><strong>The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination</u></strong>.</p>

Andrew Robinson 12, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, March 30, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Andrew Robinson 12, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, March 30, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2 fulltext: Symbolic exchange – or rather, its suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism. Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. Regimes based on symbolic exchange (differences are exchangeable and related) are replaced by regimes based on equivalence (everything is, or means, the same). Ceremony gives way to spectacle, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. What is fatal to it is, rather, reversibility. Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead. Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups. But for Baudrillard, it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system. This is not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system. According to Baudrillard, the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death Death plays a central role in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms. Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body, but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value – which returns things to a state of indeterminacy. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death. According to Baudrillard, indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. Poststructuralists generally maintain that the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions. For Baudrillard, the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded. After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”. This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. Baudrillard suggests that death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. This requires an idea of death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, voices and so on. It creates a split, as Stirner would say, between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death, we still ‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living, mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us. Symbolic exchange is based on a game, with game-like rules. When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existence. Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development. In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. For Baudrillard, capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society. For example, elderly people are excluded from society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it. Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. Baudrillard sees this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies. For Baudrillard, there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. On the other hand, even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination. [/INST] <h4>This capitalist regime based on consumption is predicated off of the desire to prolong life indefinitely -- that’s the root cause of violence and warfare </h4><p>Andrew <strong>Robinson 12</strong>, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, March 30, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2</p><p><u><strong><mark>Symbolic exchange</mark> </u></strong>– or rather, its <u><strong><mark>suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism</u></strong>.</mark> Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. <u><strong>Regimes based on <mark>symbolic exchange</u></strong></mark> (differences are exchangeable and related) <u><strong><mark>are replaced by</mark> regimes based on <mark>equivalence</u></strong></mark> (everything is, or means, the same). <u><strong>Ceremony gives way to spectacle</u></strong>, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. <u><strong>Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. <mark>It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same.</mark> Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value.</u></strong> <u><strong>To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value.</u></strong> This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death.</mark> Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation</u></strong>. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). <u><strong>But <mark>this is bound to fail.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death.</mark> Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly</u></strong>. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. <u><strong>And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity</u></strong> – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes <u><strong>desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic.</u></strong> Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. <u><strong>What is fatal to it is</u></strong>, rather, <u><strong>reversibility</u></strong>. <u><strong>Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed</u></strong>. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. <u><strong>The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead</u></strong>. <u><strong>Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’</u></strong>, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder<u><strong>. <mark>Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with</mark> monstrosity, with <mark>radical difference. </mark>The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups</u></strong>. But for Baudrillard, <u><strong>it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange</u></strong>. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. <u><strong><mark>Gift-exchange is radically subversive</mark> of the system</u></strong>. <u><strong>This is</u></strong> not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is <u><strong><mark>because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to</mark> that of <mark>the dominant system</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at</u></strong> <u><strong>bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed</u></strong>, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death <u><strong>Death plays a central role</u></strong> in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>what <mark>we have lost </mark>above all in the transition to alienated society is <mark>the ability to engage in exchanges with death</mark>. <mark>Death should not be seen</mark> here <mark>in purely literal terms</u>.</strong></mark> Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body<u><strong>, <mark>but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and</mark> of <mark>value</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong>which returns things to a state of indeterminacy</u></strong>. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. <u><strong>Death refers to <mark>metamorphosis, reversibility</mark>, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, <mark>as well as physical death</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify.</u></strong> Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>the west’s idea of a <mark>biological</mark>, material <mark>death is</mark> actually <mark>an idealist illusion</mark>, ignoring the sociality of death.</u></strong> Poststructuralists generally maintain that <u><strong><mark>the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions</u></strong></mark>. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, </mark>confining particular groups – <mark>the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women </mark>and so on – to particular segregated situations</u></strong>. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. <u><strong><mark>The original exclusion was of the dead</mark> – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This first split and exclusion forms the basis</mark>, or archetype, <mark>for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>This <mark>discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death</mark>. </u></strong>Baudrillard suggests that <u><strong><mark>death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine</u></strong> which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. <u><strong>The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity</u></strong>. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. <u><strong><mark>This requires an idea of death as an end</mark>. It is <mark>counterposed to the immortality of social institutions.</u></strong></mark> In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. <u><strong>Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. <mark>The internalisation of the idea of the subject</mark> or the soul <mark>alienates us</mark> from our bodies,</u></strong> voices and so on. <u><strong>It creates a split</u></strong>, as Stirner would say, <u><strong>between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. <mark>It</mark> also <mark>individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others</mark>.</u></strong> The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. <u><strong>The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In the case of death, <mark>we still ‘exchange’ with the dead</mark> through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. <mark>We no longer have living</mark>, mortal <mark>relationships with objects </mark>either. <mark>They are reduced to the instrumental</mark>. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us</u></strong>. <u><strong>Symbolic exchange is based on a game,</u></strong> with game-like rules. <u><strong>When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existenc</u></strong>e. <u><strong>Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development</u></strong>. In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. <mark>“We all” become dead</mark>, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. <mark>The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power.</mark> <mark>Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited</mark>. <mark>The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life</mark>. <mark>People are compelled to survive so as to become useful.</u></strong></mark> For Baudrillard, <u><strong>capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production</u></strong>, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. <u><strong>In modern societies, <mark>death </mark>is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society.</u></strong> For example, elderly people are excluded from society. <u><strong>People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it <mark>becomes unintelligible</u></strong></mark>. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. <u><strong>Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. <mark>This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. </mark>The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it.</u></strong> Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, <u><strong>murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value.</u></strong> Baudrillard sees <u><strong>this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies</u></strong>. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>there is not a social improvement here. <mark>People are </mark>effectively being<mark> killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value.</u></strong></mark> On the other hand, <u><strong>even when <mark>capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant</mark>, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette</u></strong>. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. <u><strong>The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Our alternative is a refusal to affirm the 1AC -- The justification for organ sales is based on the indefinite extension of a productive life which is the underlying cause of violence

Death as a Problem to Be Solved If a man is dying of kidney failure his life might be prolonged by a transplanted kidney We are heirs of a tradition of thought that teaches us each person’s life as irreplaceable These feelings fuel the belief that it is imperative to make more organs available for transplant the feelings of urgency and desperation make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system in general To take a very different example, we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline In the face of such a shortage, we could permit drilling or we could ease the general demand for oil We could also learn to moderate our desires and demands for gasoline altering our lives there are ways to deal with the shortage that would teach us to modify our desires in a way that we no longer think in terms of a shortage, but would entail accepting certain limits on how we live when the subject is organ transplantation we attend only to the search for new ways to procure organs We look for “opportunities for action.” If we were to moderate the demands we make on medicine we might be less pressured to think of an organ shortage Alongside our desperation at the impending death of one who cannot be replaced alongside our natural tendency to see death as an evil to be combated we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human Each of us is unique and irreplaceable But each of us shares in the limits of our finite condition we are mortals The receiving of an organ does not rescue the living from the need to die It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying We should not deny the existential anguish we should not deny the homely truth that each of our names can and will find its place in the syllogism To refuse to acknowledge that truth would turn medicine into nothing more than a crusade against death plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment recognition of our mortality ought to elicit caution when speaking about a shortage of organs for transplant The survival of society is not threatened when we do not conquer disease as long as one irreplaceable person dies there will always be an organ shortage that is just the truth of the human condition. If we turn organ procurement into a crusade we make death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured we will undermine the needed wisdom and care if we think of this person’s death as only primarily a problem which it is imperative that we solve. Freed of the sense that we are under some imperative to secure more organs we may be able to think again of the price we would pay to increase the supply of organs If our problem is fear, or limited altruism, financial incentives might “solve” the problem But there are deeper reasons at work we pay a considerable price if we seize upon means to increase the supply of organs for transplant. we should start with the disquieting possibility we might prefer to pass by Forget the issue that arises whether some kind of market could be morally acceptable For certain purposes we may try to “reduce” the embodied person simply to a collection of parts, thinking of the person simply as the sum total of these parts 8+

These feelings fuel the belief it is imperative to make organs available the feelings of urgency and desperation make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline In the face of shortage, we could permit drilling or modify our desires in a way that we no longer think of a shortage accepting certain limits on how we live we only search for ways to procure organs We look for action Alongside our desperation at impending death our tendency to see death as an evil to be combated we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human each of us shares in the limits of our finite condition we are mortals The receiving of an organ does not rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying We should not deny existential anguish we should not deny the each of our names will find its place in the syllogism To refuse to acknowledge that would turn medicine into a crusade against death, plagued by a “shortage” of cures for a deadly ailment The survival of society is not threatened there will always be an organ shortage that is just the truth of the human condition. If we turn organ procurement into a crusade, we make death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured we undermine wisdom and care if we think of death as only a problem which it is imperative we solve Freed of the imperative to secure organs we may be able to think again

Death as a Problem to Be Solved If a man is dying of kidney failure, and if his life might be prolonged by a transplanted kidney but none is available for him, those connected to him by special bonds of love or loyalty may quite naturally and appropriately feel grief, frustration, even outrage. We are heirs of a tradition of thought that teaches us to honor each person’s life as unique and irreplaceable (even though we may not be able really to make sense of this inherited belief apart from reference to the God-relation, which is uniquely individuating for each of us). Although the sympathy any of us feels is inevitably proportioned to the closeness of our bond with one who dies, we are right to honor the grief, frustration, and outrage of those who experience a loved one’s death as uniquely powerful. These quite natural feelings fuel the belief, widely shared in our society, that it is imperative to make more organs available for transplant; however, the same feelings of urgency and desperation also make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system in general. To take a very different example, we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline in this country. Relative to the demand, the supply is scarcer than we would like. In the face of such a shortage, we could permit drilling in heretofore protected lands or we could ease the general demand for oil by developing alternative energy sources such as nuclear power. We could also learn to moderate our desires and demands for gasoline, altering the pattern of our lives. So there are ways to deal with the gasoline shortage that might work but would — at least in the eyes of some — exact too high a moral price. And there are ways to deal with the shortage that would teach us to modify our desires in such a way that we no longer think in terms of a shortage, but they would entail accepting certain limits on how we live. Upon reflection, we may well decide that neither of these answers to the gasoline shortage is a wise direction to take, but it would be a frivolous person who continued to speak of a “shortage” without considering carefully both sorts of alternatives: exploring new sources of energy, or moderating our demands and expectations. Most of the time, though, when the subject is organ transplantation, we attend only to the search for new ways to procure organs. We look, as the subtitle of the IOM report puts it, for “opportunities for action.” If, however, we were to moderate the demands we make on medicine, we might be less pressured to think in terms of an organ shortage. Alongside our natural desperation at the impending death of one who cannot be replaced, alongside our natural tendency to see death as an evil to be combated, we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human. Each of us is unique and irreplaceable; that is true. But each of us also shares in the limits of our finite condition; we are mortals. “The receiving of an organ does not,” as William F. May once put it, “rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying.” Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich knew well the relentless logic of the syllogism: if all men are mortal, and if Caius is a man, then Caius is mortal. But that logic seemed both absurd and unjust when he tried to slot his own name, Ivan, into the syllogism in place of Caius. Yet, there is truth in each angle of vision. We should not deny the existential anguish; we should also not deny the homely truth that each of our names can and will find its place in the syllogism. To refuse to acknowledge that second truth would turn medicine into nothing more than a crusade against death, plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment. In other areas of medicine we are ready to brand that approach as inadequate, and recognition of our mortality ought to elicit similar caution when speaking about a shortage of organs for transplant. As Hans Jonas argued in one of the seminal articles of the bioethics movement in this country, progress in curing disease is not an unconditional or sacred commitment. The survival of society is not threatened when we do not conquer disease, however sad this may be for those who suffer. From one angle, as long as one irreplaceable person dies whose life might have been prolonged through transplantation, there will always be an organ shortage. From another angle, that is just the truth of the human condition. If we turn organ procurement into a crusade, we make of death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured as best we can, with whatever resources of mind and spirit are available to us. To be sure, when a particular person — Ivan — faces death, we confront a problem that calls for our attention and our attempts to cure. But not only that. We also face the human condition that calls for wisdom and care. Sometimes, at least, we will undermine the needed wisdom and care if we think of this person’s death as only or primarily a problem which it is imperative that we solve. Recovering the Meaning of the Body Freed of the sense that we are under some imperative to secure more organs, we may be able to think again of the price we would pay — perhaps, to be sure, a justified price — to increase the supply of organs for transplant. It may be that the limited supply of organs is due to thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or simply limited altruism. But it may also be based on weighty — if difficult to articulate — beliefs about the meaning of human bodily life. If our problem is thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or limited altruism, financial incentives might “solve” the problem. But if there are deeper reasons at work, reasons that have to do with what we may even call the sacredness of human life in the body, we pay a considerable price if we seize upon certain means to increase the supply of organs for transplant. Perhaps, then, we should start with the disquieting possibility we might prefer to pass by. Forget the issue that arises farther along the way, whether some kind of market in bodily organs could be morally acceptable. Start farther back with the now widely shared presumption that it is morally acceptable — indeed, praiseworthy — freely to give an organ when this donation may be lifesaving. In the 1930 encyclical letter, Casti Connubii, Pope Pius XI wrote: “Private individuals ... are not free to destroy or mutilate their members, or in any other way render themselves unfit for their natural functions, except when no other provision can be made for the good of the whole body.” How does one get from that to Pope John Paul II’s words sixty-five years later in Evangelium Vitae?: “There is an everyday heroism, made up of gestures of sharing, big or small, which build up an authentic culture of life. A particularly praiseworthy example of such gestures is the donation of organs, performed in an ethically acceptable manner, with a view to offering a chance of health and even of life itself to the sick who sometimes have no other hope.” John Paul’s words notwithstanding, we would not ordinarily want a physician whose “treatment” harmed us in order to bring benefit to someone else. And ordinarily a surgeon would not think of operating on a person in order to help someone other than that person himself. For we know a person only in his or her embodied presence. In and through that body the person is a living whole. For certain purposes we may try to “reduce” the embodied person simply to a collection of parts, thinking of the person (from below) simply as the sum total of these parts. 8+. The very idea of organ transplantation upsets these standard assumptions in a way that is problematic and that calls for justification.

<h4><strong>Our alternative is a refusal to affirm the 1AC -- The justification for organ sales is based on the indefinite extension of a productive life which is the underlying cause of violence </h4><p></strong>Gilbert <strong>Meilaender 6</strong>, holds the Richard and Phyllis Duesenberg Chair in Theological Ethics at Valparaiso University and is a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, "Gifts of the Body," The New Atlantis, Number 13, Summer 2006, pp. 25-35, KB)</p><p><u><strong>Death as a Problem to Be Solved If a man is dying of kidney failure</u></strong>, and if <u><strong>his life might be prolonged by a transplanted kidney</u></strong> but none is available for him, those connected to him by special bonds of love or loyalty may quite naturally and appropriately feel grief, frustration, even outrage. <u><strong>We are heirs of a tradition of thought that teaches us</u></strong> to honor <u><strong>each person’s life as</u></strong> unique and <u><strong>irreplaceable</u></strong> (even though we may not be able really to make sense of this inherited belief apart from reference to the God-relation, which is uniquely individuating for each of us). Although the sympathy any of us feels is inevitably proportioned to the closeness of our bond with one who dies, we are right to honor the grief, frustration, and outrage of those who experience a loved one’s death as uniquely powerful. <u><strong><mark>These</u></strong></mark> quite natural<u><strong> <mark>feelings</mark> <mark>fuel the belief</u></strong></mark>, widely shared in our society, <u><strong>that <mark>it is imperative to make</mark> more <mark>organs available</mark> for transplant</u></strong>; however, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> same <u><strong><mark>feelings of urgency and desperation</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system</mark> in general</u></strong>. <u><strong>To take a very different example, <mark>we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline</u></strong></mark> in this country. Relative to the demand, the supply is scarcer than we would like. <u><strong><mark>In the face of</mark> such a <mark>shortage, we could permit drilling</u></strong></mark> in heretofore protected lands <u><strong><mark>or</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>we could ease the general demand for oil</u></strong> by developing alternative energy sources such as nuclear power. <u><strong>We could also learn to moderate our desires and demands for gasoline</u></strong>, <u><strong>altering</u></strong> the pattern of <u><strong>our lives</u></strong>. So there are ways to deal with the gasoline shortage that might work but would — at least in the eyes of some — exact too high a moral price. And <u><strong>there are ways to deal with the shortage that would teach us to <mark>modify our desires</u></strong> <u><strong>in</u></strong></mark> such <u><strong><mark>a way that we no longer</mark> <mark>think</mark> in terms <mark>of a shortage</mark>, but</u></strong> they <u><strong>would</u></strong> <u><strong>entail <mark>accepting certain limits on how we live</u></strong></mark>. Upon reflection, we may well decide that neither of these answers to the gasoline shortage is a wise direction to take, but it would be a frivolous person who continued to speak of a “shortage” without considering carefully both sorts of alternatives: exploring new sources of energy, or moderating our demands and expectations. Most of the time, though, <u><strong>when the subject is organ transplantation</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>we</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>attend <mark>only</mark> to the <mark>search for</mark> new <mark>ways to procure organs</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>We look</u></strong></mark>, as the subtitle of the IOM report puts it, <u><strong><mark>for</mark> “opportunities for <mark>action</mark>.”</u> <u>If</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>we were to moderate the demands we make on medicine</u></strong>, <u><strong>we might be less pressured</u></strong> <u><strong>to think</u></strong> in terms <u><strong>of an organ shortage</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Alongside our</u></strong></mark> natural <u><strong><mark>desperation at</mark> the <mark>impending death</mark> of one who cannot be replaced</u></strong>, <u><strong>alongside <mark>our</mark> natural <mark>tendency to see death as an evil to be combated</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Each of us is unique and irreplaceable</u></strong>; that is true. <u><strong>But <mark>each of us</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>shares in the limits of our finite condition</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>we are mortals</u></strong></mark>. “<u><strong><mark>The</u></strong> <u><strong>receiving of an organ does not</u></strong></mark>,” as William F. May once put it, “<u><strong><mark>rescue the living from the need to die</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying</u></strong></mark>.” Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich knew well the relentless logic of the syllogism: if all men are mortal, and if Caius is a man, then Caius is mortal. But that logic seemed both absurd and unjust when he tried to slot his own name, Ivan, into the syllogism in place of Caius. Yet, there is truth in each angle of vision. <u><strong><mark>We should not deny</mark> the <mark>existential anguish</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>we should</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>not deny the</mark> homely truth that <mark>each of our names</mark> can and <mark>will find its place in the syllogism</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>To refuse to acknowledge that</u></strong></mark> second <u><strong>truth <mark>would turn medicine into</mark> nothing more than <mark>a crusade against death</u></strong>, <u><strong>plagued</mark> constantly <mark>by a “shortage” of cures for</mark> one or <mark>a</mark>nother <mark>deadly ailment</u></strong></mark>. In other areas of medicine we are ready to brand that approach as inadequate, and <u><strong>recognition of our mortality ought to elicit</u></strong> similar <u><strong>caution when speaking about a shortage of organs for transplant</u></strong>. As Hans Jonas argued in one of the seminal articles of the bioethics movement in this country, progress in curing disease is not an unconditional or sacred commitment. <u><strong><mark>The survival of society is not threatened</mark> when we do not conquer disease</u></strong>, however sad this may be for those who suffer. From one angle, <u><strong>as long as one irreplaceable person dies</u></strong> whose life might have been prolonged through transplantation, <u><strong><mark>there will always be an organ shortage</u></strong></mark>. From another angle, <u><strong><mark>that is just the truth of the human condition.</u></strong> <u><strong>If we turn organ procurement into a crusade</u></strong>, <u><strong>we make</u></strong></mark> of <u><strong><mark>death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured</u></strong></mark> as best we can, with whatever resources of mind and spirit are available to us. To be sure, when a particular person — Ivan — faces death, we confront a problem that calls for our attention and our attempts to cure. But not only that. We also face the human condition that calls for wisdom and care. Sometimes, at least, <u><strong><mark>we</mark> will <mark>undermine</mark> the needed <mark>wisdom and care</mark> <mark>if we think of</mark> this person’s <mark>death as</u></strong> <u><strong>only</u></strong></mark> or <u><strong>primarily <mark>a problem which it is imperative</mark> that <mark>we solve</mark>. </u></strong>Recovering the Meaning of the Body <u><strong><mark>Freed of the</mark> sense that we are under some <mark>imperative to secure</mark> more <mark>organs</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>we</mark> <mark>may be able to think again</mark> of the price we would pay</u></strong> — perhaps, to be sure, a justified price — <u><strong>to increase the supply of organs</u></strong> for transplant. It may be that the limited supply of organs is due to thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or simply limited altruism. But it may also be based on weighty — if difficult to articulate — beliefs about the meaning of human bodily life. <u><strong>If our problem is</u></strong> thoughtlessness, selfishness, <u><strong>fear, or limited altruism, financial incentives might “solve” the problem</u></strong>. <u><strong>But</u></strong> if <u><strong>there are deeper reasons at work</u></strong>, reasons that have to do with what we may even call the sacredness of human life in the body, <u><strong>we pay a considerable price if we seize upon</u></strong> certain <u><strong>means to increase the supply of organs for transplant. </u></strong>Perhaps, then, <u><strong>we should start with the disquieting possibility we might prefer to pass by</u></strong>. <u><strong>Forget the issue that arises</u></strong> farther along the way, <u><strong>whether some kind of market</u></strong> in bodily organs <u><strong>could be morally acceptable</u></strong>. Start farther back with the now widely shared presumption that it is morally acceptable — indeed, praiseworthy — freely to give an organ when this donation may be lifesaving. In the 1930 encyclical letter, Casti Connubii, Pope Pius XI wrote: “Private individuals ... are not free to destroy or mutilate their members, or in any other way render themselves unfit for their natural functions, except when no other provision can be made for the good of the whole body.” How does one get from that to Pope John Paul II’s words sixty-five years later in Evangelium Vitae?: “There is an everyday heroism, made up of gestures of sharing, big or small, which build up an authentic culture of life. A particularly praiseworthy example of such gestures is the donation of organs, performed in an ethically acceptable manner, with a view to offering a chance of health and even of life itself to the sick who sometimes have no other hope.” John Paul’s words notwithstanding, we would not ordinarily want a physician whose “treatment” harmed us in order to bring benefit to someone else. And ordinarily a surgeon would not think of operating on a person in order to help someone other than that person himself. For we know a person only in his or her embodied presence. In and through that body the person is a living whole. <u><strong>For certain purposes we may try to “reduce” the embodied person simply to a collection of parts, thinking of the person</u></strong> (from below) <u><strong>simply as the sum total of these parts</u></strong>. <u><strong>8+</u></strong>. The very idea of organ transplantation upsets these standard assumptions in a way that is problematic and that calls for justification.</p>

Gilbert Meilaender 6, holds the Richard and Phyllis Duesenberg Chair in Theological Ethics at Valparaiso University and is a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, "Gifts of the Body," The New Atlantis, Number 13, Summer 2006, pp. 25-35, KB)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Gilbert Meilaender 6, holds the Richard and Phyllis Duesenberg Chair in Theological Ethics at Valparaiso University and is a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, "Gifts of the Body," The New Atlantis, Number 13, Summer 2006, pp. 25-35, KB) fulltext: Death as a Problem to Be Solved If a man is dying of kidney failure, and if his life might be prolonged by a transplanted kidney but none is available for him, those connected to him by special bonds of love or loyalty may quite naturally and appropriately feel grief, frustration, even outrage. We are heirs of a tradition of thought that teaches us to honor each person’s life as unique and irreplaceable (even though we may not be able really to make sense of this inherited belief apart from reference to the God-relation, which is uniquely individuating for each of us). Although the sympathy any of us feels is inevitably proportioned to the closeness of our bond with one who dies, we are right to honor the grief, frustration, and outrage of those who experience a loved one’s death as uniquely powerful. These quite natural feelings fuel the belief, widely shared in our society, that it is imperative to make more organs available for transplant; however, the same feelings of urgency and desperation also make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system in general. To take a very different example, we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline in this country. Relative to the demand, the supply is scarcer than we would like. In the face of such a shortage, we could permit drilling in heretofore protected lands or we could ease the general demand for oil by developing alternative energy sources such as nuclear power. We could also learn to moderate our desires and demands for gasoline, altering the pattern of our lives. So there are ways to deal with the gasoline shortage that might work but would — at least in the eyes of some — exact too high a moral price. And there are ways to deal with the shortage that would teach us to modify our desires in such a way that we no longer think in terms of a shortage, but they would entail accepting certain limits on how we live. Upon reflection, we may well decide that neither of these answers to the gasoline shortage is a wise direction to take, but it would be a frivolous person who continued to speak of a “shortage” without considering carefully both sorts of alternatives: exploring new sources of energy, or moderating our demands and expectations. Most of the time, though, when the subject is organ transplantation, we attend only to the search for new ways to procure organs. We look, as the subtitle of the IOM report puts it, for “opportunities for action.” If, however, we were to moderate the demands we make on medicine, we might be less pressured to think in terms of an organ shortage. Alongside our natural desperation at the impending death of one who cannot be replaced, alongside our natural tendency to see death as an evil to be combated, we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human. Each of us is unique and irreplaceable; that is true. But each of us also shares in the limits of our finite condition; we are mortals. “The receiving of an organ does not,” as William F. May once put it, “rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying.” Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich knew well the relentless logic of the syllogism: if all men are mortal, and if Caius is a man, then Caius is mortal. But that logic seemed both absurd and unjust when he tried to slot his own name, Ivan, into the syllogism in place of Caius. Yet, there is truth in each angle of vision. We should not deny the existential anguish; we should also not deny the homely truth that each of our names can and will find its place in the syllogism. To refuse to acknowledge that second truth would turn medicine into nothing more than a crusade against death, plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment. In other areas of medicine we are ready to brand that approach as inadequate, and recognition of our mortality ought to elicit similar caution when speaking about a shortage of organs for transplant. As Hans Jonas argued in one of the seminal articles of the bioethics movement in this country, progress in curing disease is not an unconditional or sacred commitment. The survival of society is not threatened when we do not conquer disease, however sad this may be for those who suffer. From one angle, as long as one irreplaceable person dies whose life might have been prolonged through transplantation, there will always be an organ shortage. From another angle, that is just the truth of the human condition. If we turn organ procurement into a crusade, we make of death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured as best we can, with whatever resources of mind and spirit are available to us. To be sure, when a particular person — Ivan — faces death, we confront a problem that calls for our attention and our attempts to cure. But not only that. We also face the human condition that calls for wisdom and care. Sometimes, at least, we will undermine the needed wisdom and care if we think of this person’s death as only or primarily a problem which it is imperative that we solve. Recovering the Meaning of the Body Freed of the sense that we are under some imperative to secure more organs, we may be able to think again of the price we would pay — perhaps, to be sure, a justified price — to increase the supply of organs for transplant. It may be that the limited supply of organs is due to thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or simply limited altruism. But it may also be based on weighty — if difficult to articulate — beliefs about the meaning of human bodily life. If our problem is thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or limited altruism, financial incentives might “solve” the problem. But if there are deeper reasons at work, reasons that have to do with what we may even call the sacredness of human life in the body, we pay a considerable price if we seize upon certain means to increase the supply of organs for transplant. Perhaps, then, we should start with the disquieting possibility we might prefer to pass by. Forget the issue that arises farther along the way, whether some kind of market in bodily organs could be morally acceptable. Start farther back with the now widely shared presumption that it is morally acceptable — indeed, praiseworthy — freely to give an organ when this donation may be lifesaving. In the 1930 encyclical letter, Casti Connubii, Pope Pius XI wrote: “Private individuals ... are not free to destroy or mutilate their members, or in any other way render themselves unfit for their natural functions, except when no other provision can be made for the good of the whole body.” How does one get from that to Pope John Paul II’s words sixty-five years later in Evangelium Vitae?: “There is an everyday heroism, made up of gestures of sharing, big or small, which build up an authentic culture of life. A particularly praiseworthy example of such gestures is the donation of organs, performed in an ethically acceptable manner, with a view to offering a chance of health and even of life itself to the sick who sometimes have no other hope.” John Paul’s words notwithstanding, we would not ordinarily want a physician whose “treatment” harmed us in order to bring benefit to someone else. And ordinarily a surgeon would not think of operating on a person in order to help someone other than that person himself. For we know a person only in his or her embodied presence. In and through that body the person is a living whole. For certain purposes we may try to “reduce” the embodied person simply to a collection of parts, thinking of the person (from below) simply as the sum total of these parts. 8+. The very idea of organ transplantation upsets these standard assumptions in a way that is problematic and that calls for justification. [/INST] <h4><strong>Our alternative is a refusal to affirm the 1AC -- The justification for organ sales is based on the indefinite extension of a productive life which is the underlying cause of violence </h4><p></strong>Gilbert <strong>Meilaender 6</strong>, holds the Richard and Phyllis Duesenberg Chair in Theological Ethics at Valparaiso University and is a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, "Gifts of the Body," The New Atlantis, Number 13, Summer 2006, pp. 25-35, KB)</p><p><u><strong>Death as a Problem to Be Solved If a man is dying of kidney failure</u></strong>, and if <u><strong>his life might be prolonged by a transplanted kidney</u></strong> but none is available for him, those connected to him by special bonds of love or loyalty may quite naturally and appropriately feel grief, frustration, even outrage. <u><strong>We are heirs of a tradition of thought that teaches us</u></strong> to honor <u><strong>each person’s life as</u></strong> unique and <u><strong>irreplaceable</u></strong> (even though we may not be able really to make sense of this inherited belief apart from reference to the God-relation, which is uniquely individuating for each of us). Although the sympathy any of us feels is inevitably proportioned to the closeness of our bond with one who dies, we are right to honor the grief, frustration, and outrage of those who experience a loved one’s death as uniquely powerful. <u><strong><mark>These</u></strong></mark> quite natural<u><strong> <mark>feelings</mark> <mark>fuel the belief</u></strong></mark>, widely shared in our society, <u><strong>that <mark>it is imperative to make</mark> more <mark>organs available</mark> for transplant</u></strong>; however, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> same <u><strong><mark>feelings of urgency and desperation</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system</mark> in general</u></strong>. <u><strong>To take a very different example, <mark>we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline</u></strong></mark> in this country. Relative to the demand, the supply is scarcer than we would like. <u><strong><mark>In the face of</mark> such a <mark>shortage, we could permit drilling</u></strong></mark> in heretofore protected lands <u><strong><mark>or</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>we could ease the general demand for oil</u></strong> by developing alternative energy sources such as nuclear power. <u><strong>We could also learn to moderate our desires and demands for gasoline</u></strong>, <u><strong>altering</u></strong> the pattern of <u><strong>our lives</u></strong>. So there are ways to deal with the gasoline shortage that might work but would — at least in the eyes of some — exact too high a moral price. And <u><strong>there are ways to deal with the shortage that would teach us to <mark>modify our desires</u></strong> <u><strong>in</u></strong></mark> such <u><strong><mark>a way that we no longer</mark> <mark>think</mark> in terms <mark>of a shortage</mark>, but</u></strong> they <u><strong>would</u></strong> <u><strong>entail <mark>accepting certain limits on how we live</u></strong></mark>. Upon reflection, we may well decide that neither of these answers to the gasoline shortage is a wise direction to take, but it would be a frivolous person who continued to speak of a “shortage” without considering carefully both sorts of alternatives: exploring new sources of energy, or moderating our demands and expectations. Most of the time, though, <u><strong>when the subject is organ transplantation</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>we</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>attend <mark>only</mark> to the <mark>search for</mark> new <mark>ways to procure organs</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>We look</u></strong></mark>, as the subtitle of the IOM report puts it, <u><strong><mark>for</mark> “opportunities for <mark>action</mark>.”</u> <u>If</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>we were to moderate the demands we make on medicine</u></strong>, <u><strong>we might be less pressured</u></strong> <u><strong>to think</u></strong> in terms <u><strong>of an organ shortage</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Alongside our</u></strong></mark> natural <u><strong><mark>desperation at</mark> the <mark>impending death</mark> of one who cannot be replaced</u></strong>, <u><strong>alongside <mark>our</mark> natural <mark>tendency to see death as an evil to be combated</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Each of us is unique and irreplaceable</u></strong>; that is true. <u><strong>But <mark>each of us</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>shares in the limits of our finite condition</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>we are mortals</u></strong></mark>. “<u><strong><mark>The</u></strong> <u><strong>receiving of an organ does not</u></strong></mark>,” as William F. May once put it, “<u><strong><mark>rescue the living from the need to die</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying</u></strong></mark>.” Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich knew well the relentless logic of the syllogism: if all men are mortal, and if Caius is a man, then Caius is mortal. But that logic seemed both absurd and unjust when he tried to slot his own name, Ivan, into the syllogism in place of Caius. Yet, there is truth in each angle of vision. <u><strong><mark>We should not deny</mark> the <mark>existential anguish</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>we should</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>not deny the</mark> homely truth that <mark>each of our names</mark> can and <mark>will find its place in the syllogism</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>To refuse to acknowledge that</u></strong></mark> second <u><strong>truth <mark>would turn medicine into</mark> nothing more than <mark>a crusade against death</u></strong>, <u><strong>plagued</mark> constantly <mark>by a “shortage” of cures for</mark> one or <mark>a</mark>nother <mark>deadly ailment</u></strong></mark>. In other areas of medicine we are ready to brand that approach as inadequate, and <u><strong>recognition of our mortality ought to elicit</u></strong> similar <u><strong>caution when speaking about a shortage of organs for transplant</u></strong>. As Hans Jonas argued in one of the seminal articles of the bioethics movement in this country, progress in curing disease is not an unconditional or sacred commitment. <u><strong><mark>The survival of society is not threatened</mark> when we do not conquer disease</u></strong>, however sad this may be for those who suffer. From one angle, <u><strong>as long as one irreplaceable person dies</u></strong> whose life might have been prolonged through transplantation, <u><strong><mark>there will always be an organ shortage</u></strong></mark>. From another angle, <u><strong><mark>that is just the truth of the human condition.</u></strong> <u><strong>If we turn organ procurement into a crusade</u></strong>, <u><strong>we make</u></strong></mark> of <u><strong><mark>death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured</u></strong></mark> as best we can, with whatever resources of mind and spirit are available to us. To be sure, when a particular person — Ivan — faces death, we confront a problem that calls for our attention and our attempts to cure. But not only that. We also face the human condition that calls for wisdom and care. Sometimes, at least, <u><strong><mark>we</mark> will <mark>undermine</mark> the needed <mark>wisdom and care</mark> <mark>if we think of</mark> this person’s <mark>death as</u></strong> <u><strong>only</u></strong></mark> or <u><strong>primarily <mark>a problem which it is imperative</mark> that <mark>we solve</mark>. </u></strong>Recovering the Meaning of the Body <u><strong><mark>Freed of the</mark> sense that we are under some <mark>imperative to secure</mark> more <mark>organs</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>we</mark> <mark>may be able to think again</mark> of the price we would pay</u></strong> — perhaps, to be sure, a justified price — <u><strong>to increase the supply of organs</u></strong> for transplant. It may be that the limited supply of organs is due to thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or simply limited altruism. But it may also be based on weighty — if difficult to articulate — beliefs about the meaning of human bodily life. <u><strong>If our problem is</u></strong> thoughtlessness, selfishness, <u><strong>fear, or limited altruism, financial incentives might “solve” the problem</u></strong>. <u><strong>But</u></strong> if <u><strong>there are deeper reasons at work</u></strong>, reasons that have to do with what we may even call the sacredness of human life in the body, <u><strong>we pay a considerable price if we seize upon</u></strong> certain <u><strong>means to increase the supply of organs for transplant. </u></strong>Perhaps, then, <u><strong>we should start with the disquieting possibility we might prefer to pass by</u></strong>. <u><strong>Forget the issue that arises</u></strong> farther along the way, <u><strong>whether some kind of market</u></strong> in bodily organs <u><strong>could be morally acceptable</u></strong>. Start farther back with the now widely shared presumption that it is morally acceptable — indeed, praiseworthy — freely to give an organ when this donation may be lifesaving. In the 1930 encyclical letter, Casti Connubii, Pope Pius XI wrote: “Private individuals ... are not free to destroy or mutilate their members, or in any other way render themselves unfit for their natural functions, except when no other provision can be made for the good of the whole body.” How does one get from that to Pope John Paul II’s words sixty-five years later in Evangelium Vitae?: “There is an everyday heroism, made up of gestures of sharing, big or small, which build up an authentic culture of life. A particularly praiseworthy example of such gestures is the donation of organs, performed in an ethically acceptable manner, with a view to offering a chance of health and even of life itself to the sick who sometimes have no other hope.” John Paul’s words notwithstanding, we would not ordinarily want a physician whose “treatment” harmed us in order to bring benefit to someone else. And ordinarily a surgeon would not think of operating on a person in order to help someone other than that person himself. For we know a person only in his or her embodied presence. In and through that body the person is a living whole. <u><strong>For certain purposes we may try to “reduce” the embodied person simply to a collection of parts, thinking of the person</u></strong> (from below) <u><strong>simply as the sum total of these parts</u></strong>. <u><strong>8+</u></strong>. The very idea of organ transplantation upsets these standard assumptions in a way that is problematic and that calls for justification.</p> </s>

Organ shortage is exaggerated

Proponents would have the general public believe that there is a severe and growing shortage of human organs for clinical use. Available statistics, however, suggest a different situation. the actual picture is more complex. From 2 to 5 percent of the waiting list numbers are multiple listings for the same individuals The real problem is not all of the people on the waiting list the primary concern is for the approximately 4,000 individuals who died without receiving a suitable organ. This is a more manageable number. relatively minor increases in donations and better recovery of organs from existing donors could easily solve this aspect of the problem

Proponents would have the public believe there is a shortage of organs Available statistics suggest a different situation the actual picture is more complex 5 percent are multiple listings for the same individuals The real problem is not all of the people on the waiting list 4,000 individuals died without receiving a organ. This is a more manageable number minor increases in donations and better recovery of organs solve the problem

Proponents of xenotransplantation would have the general public believe that there is a severe and growing shortage of human organs for clinical use. Available statistics, however, suggest a different situation. Although routinely citing the total number of people on the U.S. organ waiting list (more than 50,000) and the number that died waiting (4,022 in 1996), the actual picture is more complex. From 2 to 5 percent of the waiting list numbers are multiple listings for the same individuals, with 69 percent (down from 87 percent in 1988) of those remaining needing new kidneys. Any significant increase in numbers of organ donors should easily accommodate all of the non-kidney transplant patients and eventually everyone. The real problem is not all of the people on the waiting list, although its sheer size is often used to create a sense of urgency among supporters of xenotransplantation. As a nation, the primary concern is for the approximately 4,000 individuals who died without receiving a suitable organ. This is a more manageable number. In fact, relatively minor increases in donations and better recovery of organs from existing donors could easily solve this aspect of the problem.

<h4>Organ shortage is exaggerated</h4><p><strong>McArdle 88</strong> (John F McArdle, PhD, member of the Center for Responsible Transplantation, no date given, “Xenotransplantation: An Opportunity to Promote Alternatives,” http://www.crt-online.org/organ.html) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Proponents</u></strong></mark> of xenotransplantation <u><strong><mark>would have the</mark> general <mark>public believe</mark> that <mark>there is a</mark> severe and growing <mark>shortage of</mark> human <mark>organs</mark> for clinical use. <mark>Available statistics</mark>, however, <mark>suggest a different situation</mark>. </u></strong>Although routinely citing the total number of people on the U.S. organ waiting list (more than 50,000) and the number that died waiting (4,022 in 1996), <u><strong><mark>the actual picture is more complex</mark>. From 2 to <mark>5 percent </mark>of the waiting list numbers <mark>are multiple listings for the same individuals</u></strong></mark>, with 69 percent (down from 87 percent in 1988) of those remaining needing new kidneys. Any significant increase in numbers of organ donors should easily accommodate all of the non-kidney transplant patients and eventually everyone. <u><strong><mark>The real problem is not all of the people on the waiting list</u></strong></mark>, although its sheer size is often used to create a sense of urgency among supporters of xenotransplantation. As a nation, <u><strong>the primary concern is for the approximately <mark>4,000 individuals</mark> who <mark>died without receiving a</mark> suitable <mark>organ. This is a more manageable number</mark>. </u></strong>In fact, <u><strong>relatively <mark>minor increases in donations and better recovery of organs</mark> from existing donors could easily <mark>solve</mark> this aspect of <mark>the problem</u></strong></mark>.</p>

McArdle 88 (John F McArdle, PhD, member of the Center for Responsible Transplantation, no date given, “Xenotransplantation: An Opportunity to Promote Alternatives,” http://www.crt-online.org/organ.html) gz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McArdle 88 (John F McArdle, PhD, member of the Center for Responsible Transplantation, no date given, “Xenotransplantation: An Opportunity to Promote Alternatives,” http://www.crt-online.org/organ.html) gz fulltext: Proponents of xenotransplantation would have the general public believe that there is a severe and growing shortage of human organs for clinical use. Available statistics, however, suggest a different situation. Although routinely citing the total number of people on the U.S. organ waiting list (more than 50,000) and the number that died waiting (4,022 in 1996), the actual picture is more complex. From 2 to 5 percent of the waiting list numbers are multiple listings for the same individuals, with 69 percent (down from 87 percent in 1988) of those remaining needing new kidneys. Any significant increase in numbers of organ donors should easily accommodate all of the non-kidney transplant patients and eventually everyone. The real problem is not all of the people on the waiting list, although its sheer size is often used to create a sense of urgency among supporters of xenotransplantation. As a nation, the primary concern is for the approximately 4,000 individuals who died without receiving a suitable organ. This is a more manageable number. In fact, relatively minor increases in donations and better recovery of organs from existing donors could easily solve this aspect of the problem. [/INST] <h4>Organ shortage is exaggerated</h4><p><strong>McArdle 88</strong> (John F McArdle, PhD, member of the Center for Responsible Transplantation, no date given, “Xenotransplantation: An Opportunity to Promote Alternatives,” http://www.crt-online.org/organ.html) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Proponents</u></strong></mark> of xenotransplantation <u><strong><mark>would have the</mark> general <mark>public believe</mark> that <mark>there is a</mark> severe and growing <mark>shortage of</mark> human <mark>organs</mark> for clinical use. <mark>Available statistics</mark>, however, <mark>suggest a different situation</mark>. </u></strong>Although routinely citing the total number of people on the U.S. organ waiting list (more than 50,000) and the number that died waiting (4,022 in 1996), <u><strong><mark>the actual picture is more complex</mark>. From 2 to <mark>5 percent </mark>of the waiting list numbers <mark>are multiple listings for the same individuals</u></strong></mark>, with 69 percent (down from 87 percent in 1988) of those remaining needing new kidneys. Any significant increase in numbers of organ donors should easily accommodate all of the non-kidney transplant patients and eventually everyone. <u><strong><mark>The real problem is not all of the people on the waiting list</u></strong></mark>, although its sheer size is often used to create a sense of urgency among supporters of xenotransplantation. As a nation, <u><strong>the primary concern is for the approximately <mark>4,000 individuals</mark> who <mark>died without receiving a</mark> suitable <mark>organ. This is a more manageable number</mark>. </u></strong>In fact, <u><strong>relatively <mark>minor increases in donations and better recovery of organs</mark> from existing donors could easily <mark>solve</mark> this aspect of <mark>the problem</u></strong></mark>.</p> </s>

Status quo solves scarcity

3-D printers may be spitting out something far more complex, and controversial: human organs 3-D printers because of their precise process can reproduce the vascular systems required to make organs viable. Scientists are already using the machines to print tiny strips of organ tissue bioprinting holds great promise. Authentic printed organs could be used for drug or vaccine testing, freeing researchers from less accurate methods such as tests on animals or on synthetic models. 3-D printers could someday produce much-needed organs for transplants The process already is seeing some success a 2-year-old girl in Illinois, born without a trachea, received a windpipe built with her own stem cells. a Virginia foundation that supports regenerative medicine research announced in December it will award a $1 million prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver Organovo is developing what it hopes will be authentic models of human organs, primarily livers, for drug testing. Organovo has also built models of human kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue

3-D printers may be spitting out human organs printers can reproduce the vascular systems printed organs could be used for drug testing, freeing researchers from tests on animals printers could produce organs for transplants a 2-year-old received a windpipe built with her stem cells a foundation announced a prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver Organovo has built models of kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue

The emerging process of 3-D printing, which uses computer-created digital models to create real-world objects, has produced everything from toys to jewelry to food. Soon, however, 3-D printers may be spitting out something far more complex, and controversial: human organs. For years now, medical researchers have been reproducing human cells in laboratories by hand to create blood vessels, urine tubes, skin tissue and other living body parts. But engineering full organs, with their complicated cell structures, is much more difficult. Enter 3-D printers, which because of their precise process can reproduce the vascular systems required to make organs viable. Scientists are already using the machines to print tiny strips of organ tissue. And while printing whole human organs for surgical transplants is still years away, the technology is rapidly developing. "The mechanical process isn't all that complicated. The tricky part is the materials, which are biological in nature," said Mike Titsch, editor-in-chief of 3D Printer World, which covers the industry. "It isn't like 3-D printing plastic or metal. Plastic doesn't die if you leave it sitting on an open-air shelf at room temperature for too long." The idea of printing a human kidney or liver in a lab may seem incomprehensible, even creepy. But to many scientists in the field, bioprinting holds great promise. Authentic printed organs could be used for drug or vaccine testing, freeing researchers from less accurate methods such as tests on animals or on synthetic models. Then there's the hope that 3-D printers could someday produce much-needed organs for transplants. Americans are living longer, and as we get deeper into old age our organs are failing more. Some 18 people die in the United States each day waiting in vain for transplants because of a shortage of donated organs -- a problem that Anthony Atala, director of the Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative Medicine and a pioneer in bioprinting, calls "a major health crisis." An 'exciting new area of medicine' Bioprinting works like this: Scientists harvest human cells from biopsies or stem cells, then allow them to multiply in a petri dish. The resulting mixture, a sort of biological ink, is fed into a 3-D printer, which is programmed to arrange different cell types, along with other materials, into a precise three-dimensional shape. Doctors hope that when placed in the body, these 3-D-printed cells will integrate with existing tissues. The process already is seeing some success. Last year a 2-year-old girl in Illinois, born without a trachea, received a windpipe built with her own stem cells. The U.S. government has funded a university-led "body on a chip" project that prints tissue samples that mimic the functions of the heart, liver, lungs and other organs. The samples are placed on a microchip and connected with a blood substitute to keep the cells alive, allowing doctors to test specific treatments and monitor their effectiveness. "This is an exciting new area of medicine. It has the potential for being a very important breakthrough," said Dr. Jorge Rakela, a gastroenterologist at the Mayo Clinic in Phoenix and a member of the American Liver Foundation's medical advisory committee. "Three-D printing allows you to be closer to what is happening in real life, where you have multiple layers of cells," he said. With current 2-D models, "if you grow more than one or two layers, the cells at the bottom suffocate from lack of oxygen." To accelerate the development of bioprinted organs, a Virginia foundation that supports regenerative medicine research announced in December it will award a $1 million prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver. One early contender for the prize is Organovo, a California start-up that has been a leader in bioprinting human body parts for commercial purposes. Using cells from donated tissue or stem cells, Organovo is developing what it hopes will be authentic models of human organs, primarily livers, for drug testing. The company has printed strips of human liver tissue in its labs, although they are still very small: four by four by one millimeter, or about one-fourth the size of a dime. Each strip takes about 45 minutes to print, and it takes another two days for the cells to grow and mature, said Organovo CEO Keith Murphy. The models can then survive for about 40 days. Organovo has also built models of human kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue, he said. "Basically what it allows you to do is build tissue the way you assemble something with Legos," Murphy said. "So you can put the right cells in the right places. You can't just pour them into a mold."

<h4>Status quo solves scarcity </h4><p><strong>Griggs 14</strong> (Brandon Griggs, reporter for CNN, 4-3-14, “The next frontier in 3-D printing: Human organs,” http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/03/tech/innovation/3-d-printing-human-organs/) gz</p><p>The emerging process of 3-D printing, which uses computer-created digital models to create real-world objects, has produced everything from toys to jewelry to food. Soon, however, <u><strong><mark>3-D printers may be spitting out</mark> something far more complex, and controversial: <mark>human organs</u></strong></mark>. For years now, medical researchers have been reproducing human cells in laboratories by hand to create blood vessels, urine tubes, skin tissue and other living body parts. But engineering full organs, with their complicated cell structures, is much more difficult. Enter <u><strong>3-D <mark>printers</u></strong></mark>, which <u><strong>because of their precise process <mark>can reproduce the vascular systems</mark> required to make organs viable. Scientists are already using the machines to print tiny strips of organ tissue</u></strong>. And while printing whole human organs for surgical transplants is still years away, the technology is rapidly developing. "The mechanical process isn't all that complicated. The tricky part is the materials, which are biological in nature," said Mike Titsch, editor-in-chief of 3D Printer World, which covers the industry. "It isn't like 3-D printing plastic or metal. Plastic doesn't die if you leave it sitting on an open-air shelf at room temperature for too long." The idea of printing a human kidney or liver in a lab may seem incomprehensible, even creepy. But to many scientists in the field, <u><strong>bioprinting holds great promise. Authentic <mark>printed organs could be used for drug </mark>or vaccine <mark>testing, freeing researchers from</mark> less accurate methods such as <mark>tests on animals</mark> or on synthetic models. </u></strong>Then there's the hope that <u><strong>3-D <mark>printers could</mark> someday <mark>produce</mark> much-needed <mark>organs for transplants</u></strong></mark>. Americans are living longer, and as we get deeper into old age our organs are failing more. Some 18 people die in the United States each day waiting in vain for transplants because of a shortage of donated organs -- a problem that Anthony Atala, director of the Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative Medicine and a pioneer in bioprinting, calls "a major health crisis." An 'exciting new area of medicine' Bioprinting works like this: Scientists harvest human cells from biopsies or stem cells, then allow them to multiply in a petri dish. The resulting mixture, a sort of biological ink, is fed into a 3-D printer, which is programmed to arrange different cell types, along with other materials, into a precise three-dimensional shape. Doctors hope that when placed in the body, these 3-D-printed cells will integrate with existing tissues. <u><strong>The process already is seeing some success</u></strong>. Last year <u><strong><mark>a 2-year-old</mark> girl in Illinois, born without a trachea, <mark>received a windpipe built with her</mark> own <mark>stem cells</mark>.</u></strong> The U.S. government has funded a university-led "body on a chip" project that prints tissue samples that mimic the functions of the heart, liver, lungs and other organs. The samples are placed on a microchip and connected with a blood substitute to keep the cells alive, allowing doctors to test specific treatments and monitor their effectiveness. "This is an exciting new area of medicine. It has the potential for being a very important breakthrough," said Dr. Jorge Rakela, a gastroenterologist at the Mayo Clinic in Phoenix and a member of the American Liver Foundation's medical advisory committee. "Three-D printing allows you to be closer to what is happening in real life, where you have multiple layers of cells," he said. With current 2-D models, "if you grow more than one or two layers, the cells at the bottom suffocate from lack of oxygen." To accelerate the development of bioprinted organs, <u><strong><mark>a </mark>Virginia <mark>foundation</mark> that supports regenerative medicine research <mark>announced</mark> in December it will award <mark>a </mark>$1 million <mark>prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver</u></strong></mark>. One early contender for the prize is Organovo, a California start-up that has been a leader in bioprinting human body parts for commercial purposes. Using cells from donated tissue or stem cells, <u><strong>Organovo is developing what it hopes will be authentic models of human organs, primarily livers, for drug testing. </u></strong>The company has printed strips of human liver tissue in its labs, although they are still very small: four by four by one millimeter, or about one-fourth the size of a dime. Each strip takes about 45 minutes to print, and it takes another two days for the cells to grow and mature, said Organovo CEO Keith Murphy. The models can then survive for about 40 days. <u><strong><mark>Organovo has</mark> also <mark>built models of</mark> human <mark>kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue</u></strong></mark>, he said. "Basically what it allows you to do is build tissue the way you assemble something with Legos," Murphy said. "So you can put the right cells in the right places. You can't just pour them into a mold."</p>

Griggs 14 (Brandon Griggs, reporter for CNN, 4-3-14, “The next frontier in 3-D printing: Human organs,” http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/03/tech/innovation/3-d-printing-human-organs/) gz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Griggs 14 (Brandon Griggs, reporter for CNN, 4-3-14, “The next frontier in 3-D printing: Human organs,” http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/03/tech/innovation/3-d-printing-human-organs/) gz fulltext: The emerging process of 3-D printing, which uses computer-created digital models to create real-world objects, has produced everything from toys to jewelry to food. Soon, however, 3-D printers may be spitting out something far more complex, and controversial: human organs. For years now, medical researchers have been reproducing human cells in laboratories by hand to create blood vessels, urine tubes, skin tissue and other living body parts. But engineering full organs, with their complicated cell structures, is much more difficult. Enter 3-D printers, which because of their precise process can reproduce the vascular systems required to make organs viable. Scientists are already using the machines to print tiny strips of organ tissue. And while printing whole human organs for surgical transplants is still years away, the technology is rapidly developing. "The mechanical process isn't all that complicated. The tricky part is the materials, which are biological in nature," said Mike Titsch, editor-in-chief of 3D Printer World, which covers the industry. "It isn't like 3-D printing plastic or metal. Plastic doesn't die if you leave it sitting on an open-air shelf at room temperature for too long." The idea of printing a human kidney or liver in a lab may seem incomprehensible, even creepy. But to many scientists in the field, bioprinting holds great promise. Authentic printed organs could be used for drug or vaccine testing, freeing researchers from less accurate methods such as tests on animals or on synthetic models. Then there's the hope that 3-D printers could someday produce much-needed organs for transplants. Americans are living longer, and as we get deeper into old age our organs are failing more. Some 18 people die in the United States each day waiting in vain for transplants because of a shortage of donated organs -- a problem that Anthony Atala, director of the Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative Medicine and a pioneer in bioprinting, calls "a major health crisis." An 'exciting new area of medicine' Bioprinting works like this: Scientists harvest human cells from biopsies or stem cells, then allow them to multiply in a petri dish. The resulting mixture, a sort of biological ink, is fed into a 3-D printer, which is programmed to arrange different cell types, along with other materials, into a precise three-dimensional shape. Doctors hope that when placed in the body, these 3-D-printed cells will integrate with existing tissues. The process already is seeing some success. Last year a 2-year-old girl in Illinois, born without a trachea, received a windpipe built with her own stem cells. The U.S. government has funded a university-led "body on a chip" project that prints tissue samples that mimic the functions of the heart, liver, lungs and other organs. The samples are placed on a microchip and connected with a blood substitute to keep the cells alive, allowing doctors to test specific treatments and monitor their effectiveness. "This is an exciting new area of medicine. It has the potential for being a very important breakthrough," said Dr. Jorge Rakela, a gastroenterologist at the Mayo Clinic in Phoenix and a member of the American Liver Foundation's medical advisory committee. "Three-D printing allows you to be closer to what is happening in real life, where you have multiple layers of cells," he said. With current 2-D models, "if you grow more than one or two layers, the cells at the bottom suffocate from lack of oxygen." To accelerate the development of bioprinted organs, a Virginia foundation that supports regenerative medicine research announced in December it will award a $1 million prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver. One early contender for the prize is Organovo, a California start-up that has been a leader in bioprinting human body parts for commercial purposes. Using cells from donated tissue or stem cells, Organovo is developing what it hopes will be authentic models of human organs, primarily livers, for drug testing. The company has printed strips of human liver tissue in its labs, although they are still very small: four by four by one millimeter, or about one-fourth the size of a dime. Each strip takes about 45 minutes to print, and it takes another two days for the cells to grow and mature, said Organovo CEO Keith Murphy. The models can then survive for about 40 days. Organovo has also built models of human kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue, he said. "Basically what it allows you to do is build tissue the way you assemble something with Legos," Murphy said. "So you can put the right cells in the right places. You can't just pour them into a mold." [/INST] <h4>Status quo solves scarcity </h4><p><strong>Griggs 14</strong> (Brandon Griggs, reporter for CNN, 4-3-14, “The next frontier in 3-D printing: Human organs,” http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/03/tech/innovation/3-d-printing-human-organs/) gz</p><p>The emerging process of 3-D printing, which uses computer-created digital models to create real-world objects, has produced everything from toys to jewelry to food. Soon, however, <u><strong><mark>3-D printers may be spitting out</mark> something far more complex, and controversial: <mark>human organs</u></strong></mark>. For years now, medical researchers have been reproducing human cells in laboratories by hand to create blood vessels, urine tubes, skin tissue and other living body parts. But engineering full organs, with their complicated cell structures, is much more difficult. Enter <u><strong>3-D <mark>printers</u></strong></mark>, which <u><strong>because of their precise process <mark>can reproduce the vascular systems</mark> required to make organs viable. Scientists are already using the machines to print tiny strips of organ tissue</u></strong>. And while printing whole human organs for surgical transplants is still years away, the technology is rapidly developing. "The mechanical process isn't all that complicated. The tricky part is the materials, which are biological in nature," said Mike Titsch, editor-in-chief of 3D Printer World, which covers the industry. "It isn't like 3-D printing plastic or metal. Plastic doesn't die if you leave it sitting on an open-air shelf at room temperature for too long." The idea of printing a human kidney or liver in a lab may seem incomprehensible, even creepy. But to many scientists in the field, <u><strong>bioprinting holds great promise. Authentic <mark>printed organs could be used for drug </mark>or vaccine <mark>testing, freeing researchers from</mark> less accurate methods such as <mark>tests on animals</mark> or on synthetic models. </u></strong>Then there's the hope that <u><strong>3-D <mark>printers could</mark> someday <mark>produce</mark> much-needed <mark>organs for transplants</u></strong></mark>. Americans are living longer, and as we get deeper into old age our organs are failing more. Some 18 people die in the United States each day waiting in vain for transplants because of a shortage of donated organs -- a problem that Anthony Atala, director of the Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative Medicine and a pioneer in bioprinting, calls "a major health crisis." An 'exciting new area of medicine' Bioprinting works like this: Scientists harvest human cells from biopsies or stem cells, then allow them to multiply in a petri dish. The resulting mixture, a sort of biological ink, is fed into a 3-D printer, which is programmed to arrange different cell types, along with other materials, into a precise three-dimensional shape. Doctors hope that when placed in the body, these 3-D-printed cells will integrate with existing tissues. <u><strong>The process already is seeing some success</u></strong>. Last year <u><strong><mark>a 2-year-old</mark> girl in Illinois, born without a trachea, <mark>received a windpipe built with her</mark> own <mark>stem cells</mark>.</u></strong> The U.S. government has funded a university-led "body on a chip" project that prints tissue samples that mimic the functions of the heart, liver, lungs and other organs. The samples are placed on a microchip and connected with a blood substitute to keep the cells alive, allowing doctors to test specific treatments and monitor their effectiveness. "This is an exciting new area of medicine. It has the potential for being a very important breakthrough," said Dr. Jorge Rakela, a gastroenterologist at the Mayo Clinic in Phoenix and a member of the American Liver Foundation's medical advisory committee. "Three-D printing allows you to be closer to what is happening in real life, where you have multiple layers of cells," he said. With current 2-D models, "if you grow more than one or two layers, the cells at the bottom suffocate from lack of oxygen." To accelerate the development of bioprinted organs, <u><strong><mark>a </mark>Virginia <mark>foundation</mark> that supports regenerative medicine research <mark>announced</mark> in December it will award <mark>a </mark>$1 million <mark>prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver</u></strong></mark>. One early contender for the prize is Organovo, a California start-up that has been a leader in bioprinting human body parts for commercial purposes. Using cells from donated tissue or stem cells, <u><strong>Organovo is developing what it hopes will be authentic models of human organs, primarily livers, for drug testing. </u></strong>The company has printed strips of human liver tissue in its labs, although they are still very small: four by four by one millimeter, or about one-fourth the size of a dime. Each strip takes about 45 minutes to print, and it takes another two days for the cells to grow and mature, said Organovo CEO Keith Murphy. The models can then survive for about 40 days. <u><strong><mark>Organovo has</mark> also <mark>built models of</mark> human <mark>kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue</u></strong></mark>, he said. "Basically what it allows you to do is build tissue the way you assemble something with Legos," Murphy said. "So you can put the right cells in the right places. You can't just pour them into a mold."</p> </s>

Tyranny of the gift is a simplistic view of ethics which justifies violence – prefer psychological studies

Scheper-Hughes she has argued that the lower rate of consent for deceased donation among Black and Hispanic families is a political act of considered resistance' against the oppressive hegemony of transplant professionals. This is incompatible with empirical evidence which shows that the most important variable predicting a lack of consent for donation from Black and Hispanic families is a lack of foreknowledge regarding the decedent's wishes and misconceptions regarding the financial burdens of consenting to deceased donation and the concept of brain-death.[ Though she denies any meaningful moral difference between family bonds and 'family bondage' given that '...Families are often violent and predatory, as inclined to abuse and exploit as to protect and nurture their members Scheper-Hughes offers no reason to accept this bleak view of human relationships. it is unjustified to hold that the inherent moral asymmetry involved in giving the 'gift of life' is only imbued with psychological indenture ////and resentment an approach more receptive to the complexity and ambiguity of the moral lives paints a picture of relationships slightly more diverse and textured than one of master and slave the scientist who coined the term 'Tyranny of the Gift', emphasized and elucidated this diversity and more than fifty studies of psychosocial outcomes of living donors demonstrated either no change or a positive improvement in the psychological health of the vast majority of them

Scheper-Hughes argued lower rate of consent for deceased donation among Black and Hispanic families is resistance' This is incompatible with empirical evidence which shows the most important variable is a lack of foreknowledge Scheper-Hughes offers no reason to accept this bleak view of human relationships it is unjustified to hold that the inherent moral asymmetry involved in the 'gift of life' is only indenture an approach more complex paints a picture more diverse than master and slave fifty studies of psychosocial outcomes of living donors demonstrated either no change or a positive improvement in the psychological health of the vast majority of them

A conspicuous feature of Scheper-Hughes's criticisms is an indifference to countervailing arguments and evidence. For example, she has elsewhere argued that the lower rate of consent for deceased donation among Black and Hispanic families is best explained as '...a political act of considered resistance',[3] (p. 66), against what she believes they see as the oppressive hegemony of transplant professionals. This is incompatible with the empirical evidence that has been collected on the issue, which shows that the most important variable predicting a lack of consent for donation from Black and Hispanic families is a lack of foreknowledge regarding the decedent's wishes[5,6] and misconceptions regarding the financial burdens of consenting to deceased donation and the concept of brain-death.[7] Though she denies any meaningful moral difference between family bonds and 'family bondage',[1] (p. 508), given that '...Families are often violent and predatory, as inclined to abuse and exploit as to protect and nurture their members',[1] (p. 508, italics ours), Scheper-Hughes offers no reason to accept this bleak view of human relationships. Moreover, it is simply unjustified to hold that the inherent moral asymmetry involved in giving the 'gift of life' is only (or even often) imbued with psychological indenture ////and resentment. Instead, an approach more receptive to the raw complexity and ambiguity of the moral lives of thoughtful human beings paints a picture of relationships slightly more diverse and textured than one of master and slave.[8] In fact, the anthropologist and social scientist who coined the term 'Tyranny of the Gift', emphasized and elucidated this diversity,[9] (p. 40), and more than fifty studies of psychosocial outcomes of living donors demonstrated either no change or a positive improvement in the psychological health of the vast majority of them.[10]

<h4>Tyranny of the gift is a simplistic view of ethics which justifies violence – prefer psychological studies</h4><p><strong>Hippen and Taylor 7</strong> (Benjamin E Hipper, clinical associate professor of medicine at UNC Chapel Hill, JS Taylor, 2007, “In Defense of Transplantation: A Reply to Nancy Scheper-Hughes,” American Journal of Transplantation Volume 7 Issue 7)</p><p>A conspicuous feature of <u><strong><mark>Scheper-Hughes</u></strong></mark>'s criticisms is an indifference to countervailing arguments and evidence. For example, <u><strong>she has</u></strong> elsewhere <u><strong><mark>argued</mark> that the <mark>lower rate of consent for deceased donation among Black and Hispanic families is</mark> </u></strong>best explained as '...<u><strong>a political act of considered <mark>resistance'</u></strong></mark>,[3] (p. 66), <u><strong>against</u></strong> what she believes they see as <u><strong>the oppressive hegemony of transplant professionals.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This is incompatible with</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>empirical evidence</u></strong></mark> that has been collected on the issue, <u><strong><mark>which shows</mark> that <mark>the most important variable</mark> predicting a lack of consent for donation from Black and Hispanic families <mark>is a lack of foreknowledge</mark> regarding the decedent's wishes</u></strong>[5,6] <u><strong>and misconceptions regarding the financial burdens of consenting to deceased donation and the concept of brain-death.[</u></strong>7] <u><strong>Though she denies any meaningful moral difference between family bonds and 'family bondage'</u></strong>,[1] (p. 508), <u><strong>given that '...Families are often violent and predatory, as inclined to abuse and exploit as to protect and nurture their members</u></strong>',[1] (p. 508, italics ours), <u><strong><mark>Scheper-Hughes offers no reason to accept this bleak view of human relationships</mark>.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong><mark>it is</u></strong></mark> simply <u><strong><mark>unjustified to hold that the inherent moral asymmetry involved in</mark> giving <mark>the 'gift of life' is only</u></strong></mark> (or even often) <u><strong>imbued with psychological <mark>indenture</mark> ////and resentment</u></strong>. Instead, <u><strong><mark>an approach more</mark> receptive to the</u></strong> raw <u><strong><mark>complex</mark>ity and ambiguity of the moral lives</u></strong> of thoughtful human beings <u><strong><mark>paints a picture</mark> of relationships slightly <mark>more diverse</mark> and textured <mark>than</mark> one of <mark>master and slave</u></strong></mark>.[8] In fact, <u><strong>the</u></strong> anthropologist and social <u><strong>scientist who coined the term 'Tyranny of the Gift', emphasized and elucidated this diversity</u></strong>,[9] (p. 40), <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>more than <mark>fifty studies of psychosocial outcomes of living donors demonstrated either no change or a positive improvement in the psychological health of the vast majority of them</u></strong></mark>.[10]</p>

Hippen and Taylor 7 (Benjamin E Hipper, clinical associate professor of medicine at UNC Chapel Hill, JS Taylor, 2007, “In Defense of Transplantation: A Reply to Nancy Scheper-Hughes,” American Journal of Transplantation Volume 7 Issue 7)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Hippen and Taylor 7 (Benjamin E Hipper, clinical associate professor of medicine at UNC Chapel Hill, JS Taylor, 2007, “In Defense of Transplantation: A Reply to Nancy Scheper-Hughes,” American Journal of Transplantation Volume 7 Issue 7) fulltext: A conspicuous feature of Scheper-Hughes's criticisms is an indifference to countervailing arguments and evidence. For example, she has elsewhere argued that the lower rate of consent for deceased donation among Black and Hispanic families is best explained as '...a political act of considered resistance',[3] (p. 66), against what she believes they see as the oppressive hegemony of transplant professionals. This is incompatible with the empirical evidence that has been collected on the issue, which shows that the most important variable predicting a lack of consent for donation from Black and Hispanic families is a lack of foreknowledge regarding the decedent's wishes[5,6] and misconceptions regarding the financial burdens of consenting to deceased donation and the concept of brain-death.[7] Though she denies any meaningful moral difference between family bonds and 'family bondage',[1] (p. 508), given that '...Families are often violent and predatory, as inclined to abuse and exploit as to protect and nurture their members',[1] (p. 508, italics ours), Scheper-Hughes offers no reason to accept this bleak view of human relationships. Moreover, it is simply unjustified to hold that the inherent moral asymmetry involved in giving the 'gift of life' is only (or even often) imbued with psychological indenture ////and resentment. Instead, an approach more receptive to the raw complexity and ambiguity of the moral lives of thoughtful human beings paints a picture of relationships slightly more diverse and textured than one of master and slave.[8] In fact, the anthropologist and social scientist who coined the term 'Tyranny of the Gift', emphasized and elucidated this diversity,[9] (p. 40), and more than fifty studies of psychosocial outcomes of living donors demonstrated either no change or a positive improvement in the psychological health of the vast majority of them.[10] [/INST] <h4>Tyranny of the gift is a simplistic view of ethics which justifies violence – prefer psychological studies</h4><p><strong>Hippen and Taylor 7</strong> (Benjamin E Hipper, clinical associate professor of medicine at UNC Chapel Hill, JS Taylor, 2007, “In Defense of Transplantation: A Reply to Nancy Scheper-Hughes,” American Journal of Transplantation Volume 7 Issue 7)</p><p>A conspicuous feature of <u><strong><mark>Scheper-Hughes</u></strong></mark>'s criticisms is an indifference to countervailing arguments and evidence. For example, <u><strong>she has</u></strong> elsewhere <u><strong><mark>argued</mark> that the <mark>lower rate of consent for deceased donation among Black and Hispanic families is</mark> </u></strong>best explained as '...<u><strong>a political act of considered <mark>resistance'</u></strong></mark>,[3] (p. 66), <u><strong>against</u></strong> what she believes they see as <u><strong>the oppressive hegemony of transplant professionals.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This is incompatible with</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>empirical evidence</u></strong></mark> that has been collected on the issue, <u><strong><mark>which shows</mark> that <mark>the most important variable</mark> predicting a lack of consent for donation from Black and Hispanic families <mark>is a lack of foreknowledge</mark> regarding the decedent's wishes</u></strong>[5,6] <u><strong>and misconceptions regarding the financial burdens of consenting to deceased donation and the concept of brain-death.[</u></strong>7] <u><strong>Though she denies any meaningful moral difference between family bonds and 'family bondage'</u></strong>,[1] (p. 508), <u><strong>given that '...Families are often violent and predatory, as inclined to abuse and exploit as to protect and nurture their members</u></strong>',[1] (p. 508, italics ours), <u><strong><mark>Scheper-Hughes offers no reason to accept this bleak view of human relationships</mark>.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong><mark>it is</u></strong></mark> simply <u><strong><mark>unjustified to hold that the inherent moral asymmetry involved in</mark> giving <mark>the 'gift of life' is only</u></strong></mark> (or even often) <u><strong>imbued with psychological <mark>indenture</mark> ////and resentment</u></strong>. Instead, <u><strong><mark>an approach more</mark> receptive to the</u></strong> raw <u><strong><mark>complex</mark>ity and ambiguity of the moral lives</u></strong> of thoughtful human beings <u><strong><mark>paints a picture</mark> of relationships slightly <mark>more diverse</mark> and textured <mark>than</mark> one of <mark>master and slave</u></strong></mark>.[8] In fact, <u><strong>the</u></strong> anthropologist and social <u><strong>scientist who coined the term 'Tyranny of the Gift', emphasized and elucidated this diversity</u></strong>,[9] (p. 40), <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>more than <mark>fifty studies of psychosocial outcomes of living donors demonstrated either no change or a positive improvement in the psychological health of the vast majority of them</u></strong></mark>.[10]</p> </s>

Only simulations of the acceptance of death result in any meaningful life affirmation

The sacrificer both destroys and survives. sacrifice is not subterfuge. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. There is no sacrifice,” “unless the one performing it identifies, , with the victim” otherness that is partly sameness, , meeting death is a need, and we must remain as spectators. , critical revaluation of values renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Death cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped through a mirror, to use Perseus’s trick against Medusa. The safety that theater provides, knowing that we will remain alive, enables us to get a taste of death Life loses in interest, when the highest stake may not be risked. . We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but indispensable, paralyzed by the thought of disaster the tendency to exclude death from life brings many other renunciations and exclusions. Sacrifice, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators “The sacred horror “opens , like a theater curtain, and every limited meaning is transfigured The presence of death, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and (violence) melts, the mediation of the intellect , and life is felt at its fullest. intimacy: moments of excess and fusion of beings Survival, , has a price. It limits our life. the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. not so much a negation of life, as an affirmation of the intimate opposed to the normal order of things rejected. the economy of value and future-oriented calculations stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life The need for duration,” “conceals life from us to meet death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human.

The sacrificer both destroys and survives. . Sacrifice burns like a sun, We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. , meeting death we remain as spectators. revaluation of values renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Death cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped through a mirror, Perseus’s trick against Medusa. The safety that theater provides, knowing that we will remain alive, enables us to get a taste of death Life loses in interest, when the highest stake may not be risked. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but indispensable, paralyzed by the thought of disaster the tendency to exclude death from life brings many other renunciations and exclusions. Sacrifice brings together life in its fullness and annihilation “The sacred horror “opens , like a theater curtain, and every meaning is transfigured The presence of death, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and (violence) melts life is felt at its fullest. Survival limits our life. the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. Sacrifice is an affirmation of the intimate opposed to the normal order of things the economy of value and future-oriented calculations stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life to meet death is necessary if life is to have value, and is what makes us human.

Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). The sacrificer both destroys and survives. Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that sacrifice is not a simulacrum, not a mere subterfuge. In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “There is no sacrifice,” writes Denis Hollier, “unless the one performing it identifies, in the end, with the victim” (166). Thus it is through identification, through otherness that is partly sameness, that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly, meeting death is a need, not uncalled-for. We must meet death, and we must remain as spectators. Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved, accompanied by the critical revaluation of values, which renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social. Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. Death perhaps cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped sideways, indirectly, vicariously through a mirror, to use Perseus’s ancient trick against Medusa. The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. The safety that theater provides, of essentially knowing that we will remain alive, emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically enables us to really get a taste of death. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. “The sacred horror,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It “opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world” and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest. Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or intimacy: “immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “The need for duration,” in the words of Bataille, “conceals life from us” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity to meet death is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human. But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things.

<h4>Only simulations of the acceptance of death result in any meaningful life affirmation </h4><p><strong>Razinsky 9</strong> (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88)</p><p>Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). <u><strong><mark>The sacrificer both destroys and survives. </u></strong></mark>Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that <u><strong>sacrifice is not</u></strong> a simulacrum, not a mere <u><strong>subterfuge. </u></strong>In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators<mark>.<u><strong> Sacrifice burns like a sun, </mark>spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, </u></strong>and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). <u><strong><mark>We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. </u></strong></mark>Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “<u><strong>There is no sacrifice,” </u></strong>writes Denis Hollier,<u><strong> “unless the one performing it identifies, </u></strong>in the end<u><strong>, with the victim”</u></strong> (166). Thus it is through identification, through <u><strong>otherness that is partly sameness, </u></strong>that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly<u><strong><mark>, meeting death </mark>is a need, </u></strong>not uncalled-for. We must meet death,<u><strong> and <mark>we </mark>must <mark>remain as spectators. </u></strong></mark>Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved<u><strong>,</u></strong> accompanied by the <u><strong>critical <mark>revaluation of values</u></strong></mark>, which <u><strong><mark>renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.”</u></strong></mark> Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social.<u><strong> </u></strong>Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. <u><strong><mark>Death </u></strong></mark>perhaps <u><strong><mark>cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped</u></strong></mark> sideways, indirectly, vicariously <u><strong><mark>through a mirror, </mark>to use <mark>Perseus’s </u></strong></mark>ancient <u><strong><mark>trick against Medusa. </u></strong></mark>The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. <u><strong><mark>The safety that theater provides, </u></strong></mark>of essentially <u><strong><mark>knowing that we will remain alive, </u></strong></mark>emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically<u><strong><mark> enables us to </u></strong></mark>really <u><strong><mark>get a taste of death</u></strong></mark>. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. <u><strong><mark>Life </u></strong></mark>is impoverished, it <u><strong><mark>loses in interest, when the highest stake </u></strong></mark>in the game of living, life itself, <u><strong><mark>may not be risked. </u></strong></mark>It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us<u><strong>. <mark>We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but</u></strong></mark> in fact <u><strong><mark>indispensable, </u></strong></mark>such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are <u><strong><mark>paralyzed by the thought of </u></strong></mark>who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a <u><strong><mark>disaster </u></strong></mark>should occur. Thus <u><strong><mark>the tendency to exclude death from</u></strong></mark> our calculations in <u><strong><mark>life brings </u></strong></mark>in its train <u><strong><mark>many other renunciations and exclusions. </u></strong></mark>Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. <u><strong><mark>Sacrifice</mark>, </u></strong>Bataille says, <u><strong><mark>brings together life in its fullness and </mark>the <mark>annihilation </mark>of life. We are not mere spectators </u></strong>in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. <u><strong><mark>“The sacred horror</u></strong></mark>,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It <u><strong><mark>“opens </u></strong></mark>itself<u><strong><mark>, like a theater curtain, </u></strong></mark>on to a realm beyond this world” <u><strong><mark>and every </mark>limited <mark>meaning is transfigured</u></strong></mark> in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist.<u><strong> <mark>The presence of death, </u></strong></mark>which he interprets in a more earthly manner,<u><strong> <mark>is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and </u></strong></mark>other related elements <u><strong><mark>(violence) </u></strong></mark>bring life closer to a state where individuality <u><strong><mark>melts</mark>, the mediation of the intellect </u></strong>between us and the world lessens<u><strong>, and <mark>life is felt at its fullest. </u></strong></mark>Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or<u><strong> intimacy: </u></strong>“immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are <u><strong>moments of excess and </u></strong>of <u><strong>fusion of beings</u></strong> (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. <u><strong><mark>Survival</mark>, </u></strong>he tells us<u><strong>, has a price. It <mark>limits our life.</u></strong></mark> As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for <u><strong><mark>the threat of death: it</u></strong> <u><strong>ruins value where value is only assured through duration.</u></strong></mark> It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). <u><strong><mark>Sacrifice is</mark> the opposite of production</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>accumulation. </u></strong>Death is <u><strong>not</u></strong> <u><strong>so much</u></strong> <u><strong>a negation of life, as </u></strong>it is <u><strong><mark>an affirmation of the intimate </u></strong></mark>order of life, which is <u><strong><mark>opposed to the normal order of things</u></strong></mark> and is therefore <u><strong>rejected. </u></strong>“The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely <u><strong><mark>the economy of value and future-oriented calculations </u></strong></mark>that <u><strong><mark>stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life</u></strong></mark>. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “<u><strong>The need for duration,” </u></strong>in the words of Bataille, <u><strong>“conceals life from us</u></strong>” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity <u><strong><mark>to meet death</u></strong></mark> is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death <u><strong><mark>is necessary if life is to have </mark>its full <mark>value, and is </mark>part of <mark>what makes us human.</u></strong></mark> But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things. </p>

Razinsky 9 (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Razinsky 9 (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88) fulltext: Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). The sacrificer both destroys and survives. Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that sacrifice is not a simulacrum, not a mere subterfuge. In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “There is no sacrifice,” writes Denis Hollier, “unless the one performing it identifies, in the end, with the victim” (166). Thus it is through identification, through otherness that is partly sameness, that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly, meeting death is a need, not uncalled-for. We must meet death, and we must remain as spectators. Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved, accompanied by the critical revaluation of values, which renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social. Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. Death perhaps cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped sideways, indirectly, vicariously through a mirror, to use Perseus’s ancient trick against Medusa. The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. The safety that theater provides, of essentially knowing that we will remain alive, emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically enables us to really get a taste of death. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. “The sacred horror,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It “opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world” and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest. Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or intimacy: “immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “The need for duration,” in the words of Bataille, “conceals life from us” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity to meet death is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human. But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things. [/INST] <h4>Only simulations of the acceptance of death result in any meaningful life affirmation </h4><p><strong>Razinsky 9</strong> (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88)</p><p>Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). <u><strong><mark>The sacrificer both destroys and survives. </u></strong></mark>Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that <u><strong>sacrifice is not</u></strong> a simulacrum, not a mere <u><strong>subterfuge. </u></strong>In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators<mark>.<u><strong> Sacrifice burns like a sun, </mark>spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, </u></strong>and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). <u><strong><mark>We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. </u></strong></mark>Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “<u><strong>There is no sacrifice,” </u></strong>writes Denis Hollier,<u><strong> “unless the one performing it identifies, </u></strong>in the end<u><strong>, with the victim”</u></strong> (166). Thus it is through identification, through <u><strong>otherness that is partly sameness, </u></strong>that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly<u><strong><mark>, meeting death </mark>is a need, </u></strong>not uncalled-for. We must meet death,<u><strong> and <mark>we </mark>must <mark>remain as spectators. </u></strong></mark>Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved<u><strong>,</u></strong> accompanied by the <u><strong>critical <mark>revaluation of values</u></strong></mark>, which <u><strong><mark>renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.”</u></strong></mark> Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social.<u><strong> </u></strong>Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. <u><strong><mark>Death </u></strong></mark>perhaps <u><strong><mark>cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped</u></strong></mark> sideways, indirectly, vicariously <u><strong><mark>through a mirror, </mark>to use <mark>Perseus’s </u></strong></mark>ancient <u><strong><mark>trick against Medusa. </u></strong></mark>The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. <u><strong><mark>The safety that theater provides, </u></strong></mark>of essentially <u><strong><mark>knowing that we will remain alive, </u></strong></mark>emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically<u><strong><mark> enables us to </u></strong></mark>really <u><strong><mark>get a taste of death</u></strong></mark>. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. <u><strong><mark>Life </u></strong></mark>is impoverished, it <u><strong><mark>loses in interest, when the highest stake </u></strong></mark>in the game of living, life itself, <u><strong><mark>may not be risked. </u></strong></mark>It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us<u><strong>. <mark>We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but</u></strong></mark> in fact <u><strong><mark>indispensable, </u></strong></mark>such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are <u><strong><mark>paralyzed by the thought of </u></strong></mark>who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a <u><strong><mark>disaster </u></strong></mark>should occur. Thus <u><strong><mark>the tendency to exclude death from</u></strong></mark> our calculations in <u><strong><mark>life brings </u></strong></mark>in its train <u><strong><mark>many other renunciations and exclusions. </u></strong></mark>Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. <u><strong><mark>Sacrifice</mark>, </u></strong>Bataille says, <u><strong><mark>brings together life in its fullness and </mark>the <mark>annihilation </mark>of life. We are not mere spectators </u></strong>in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. <u><strong><mark>“The sacred horror</u></strong></mark>,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It <u><strong><mark>“opens </u></strong></mark>itself<u><strong><mark>, like a theater curtain, </u></strong></mark>on to a realm beyond this world” <u><strong><mark>and every </mark>limited <mark>meaning is transfigured</u></strong></mark> in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist.<u><strong> <mark>The presence of death, </u></strong></mark>which he interprets in a more earthly manner,<u><strong> <mark>is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and </u></strong></mark>other related elements <u><strong><mark>(violence) </u></strong></mark>bring life closer to a state where individuality <u><strong><mark>melts</mark>, the mediation of the intellect </u></strong>between us and the world lessens<u><strong>, and <mark>life is felt at its fullest. </u></strong></mark>Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or<u><strong> intimacy: </u></strong>“immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are <u><strong>moments of excess and </u></strong>of <u><strong>fusion of beings</u></strong> (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. <u><strong><mark>Survival</mark>, </u></strong>he tells us<u><strong>, has a price. It <mark>limits our life.</u></strong></mark> As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for <u><strong><mark>the threat of death: it</u></strong> <u><strong>ruins value where value is only assured through duration.</u></strong></mark> It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). <u><strong><mark>Sacrifice is</mark> the opposite of production</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>accumulation. </u></strong>Death is <u><strong>not</u></strong> <u><strong>so much</u></strong> <u><strong>a negation of life, as </u></strong>it is <u><strong><mark>an affirmation of the intimate </u></strong></mark>order of life, which is <u><strong><mark>opposed to the normal order of things</u></strong></mark> and is therefore <u><strong>rejected. </u></strong>“The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely <u><strong><mark>the economy of value and future-oriented calculations </u></strong></mark>that <u><strong><mark>stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life</u></strong></mark>. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “<u><strong>The need for duration,” </u></strong>in the words of Bataille, <u><strong>“conceals life from us</u></strong>” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity <u><strong><mark>to meet death</u></strong></mark> is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death <u><strong><mark>is necessary if life is to have </mark>its full <mark>value, and is </mark>part of <mark>what makes us human.</u></strong></mark> But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things. </p> </s>

Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny

the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so Nietzsche considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors – "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape “Rather do anything than nothing,” this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming Social selves are fodder for the masses the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant

the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment and ultimate justification for slave morality "separates strength from expressions of strength Nietzsche considered "roles" as "external phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors Integrity spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about causes and consequences of acts Nervous rotation of appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment this principle is a string to throttle all culture these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreachin paves the way for a new type of tyrant

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors – "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. “Rather do anything than nothing,” this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

<h4><u><strong><mark>Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny </h4><p></u></mark>Antonio 95</strong> (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)</p><p>According to Nietzsche, <u><strong><mark>the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment</mark>, master reification, <mark>and ultimate justification for slave morality</mark> and mass discipline <mark>"separates strength from expressions of strength</mark>, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so</u></strong>. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," <u><strong><mark>Nietzsche</u></strong></mark> said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He<u><strong> <mark>considered "roles" as "external</mark>," "surface," or "foreground" <mark>phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement.</u></strong></mark> While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that <u><strong><mark>persons</u></strong></mark> (especially male professionals) <u><strong><mark>in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions</u></strong></mark> and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" <u><strong><mark>They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors</mark> – "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." <mark>Integrity</mark>, decisiveness, <mark>spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about</mark> possible <mark>causes</mark>, meanings, <mark>and consequences of acts</mark> and unending internal dialogue</u></strong> about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). <u><strong><mark>Nervous rotation of</mark> socially <mark>appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows</mark>," "abstracts," or simulacra. <mark>One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially</mark>" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play."</u></strong> Nietzsche asked, <u><strong>"Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? </u></strong>. . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; <u><strong>social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"</u></strong> (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). <u><strong><mark>Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment</mark> to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence</u></strong>; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). <u><strong>Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape</u></strong>. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. <u><strong>“Rather do anything than nothing,” <mark>this principle</mark>, too, <mark>is</mark> merely <mark>a string to throttle all culture</u></strong></mark>. . . . <u><strong>Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others</u></strong>." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, <u><strong><mark>these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming</u></strong></mark>, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " <u><strong>Social selves are fodder for the</u></strong> "great man [person] of the <u><strong>masses</u></strong>." Nietzsche held that "<u><strong>the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely</u></strong>- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. <u><strong><mark>The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreachin</mark>g and untrammeled ressentiment <mark>paves the way for a new type of tyrant</u></strong></mark> (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).</p>

Antonio 95 (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Antonio 95 (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,) fulltext: According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors – "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. “Rather do anything than nothing,” this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4). [/INST] <h4><u><strong><mark>Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny </h4><p></u></mark>Antonio 95</strong> (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)</p><p>According to Nietzsche, <u><strong><mark>the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment</mark>, master reification, <mark>and ultimate justification for slave morality</mark> and mass discipline <mark>"separates strength from expressions of strength</mark>, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so</u></strong>. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," <u><strong><mark>Nietzsche</u></strong></mark> said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He<u><strong> <mark>considered "roles" as "external</mark>," "surface," or "foreground" <mark>phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement.</u></strong></mark> While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that <u><strong><mark>persons</u></strong></mark> (especially male professionals) <u><strong><mark>in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions</u></strong></mark> and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" <u><strong><mark>They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors</mark> – "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." <mark>Integrity</mark>, decisiveness, <mark>spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about</mark> possible <mark>causes</mark>, meanings, <mark>and consequences of acts</mark> and unending internal dialogue</u></strong> about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). <u><strong><mark>Nervous rotation of</mark> socially <mark>appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows</mark>," "abstracts," or simulacra. <mark>One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially</mark>" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play."</u></strong> Nietzsche asked, <u><strong>"Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? </u></strong>. . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; <u><strong>social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"</u></strong> (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). <u><strong><mark>Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment</mark> to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence</u></strong>; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). <u><strong>Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape</u></strong>. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. <u><strong>“Rather do anything than nothing,” <mark>this principle</mark>, too, <mark>is</mark> merely <mark>a string to throttle all culture</u></strong></mark>. . . . <u><strong>Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others</u></strong>." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, <u><strong><mark>these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming</u></strong></mark>, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " <u><strong>Social selves are fodder for the</u></strong> "great man [person] of the <u><strong>masses</u></strong>." Nietzsche held that "<u><strong>the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely</u></strong>- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. <u><strong><mark>The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreachin</mark>g and untrammeled ressentiment <mark>paves the way for a new type of tyrant</u></strong></mark> (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).</p> </s>

This biological and scientific understanding of death ensures a constant slavery to the myth of the subject

The irreversibility of biological death is a modern fact of science specific to our culture Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order Death is not a due payment it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death our modern idea of death is controlled by representations of the machine and the function A machine either works or it does not the biological machine is either dead or alive The symbolic order is ignorant of this And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself There is no longer any objective progress here: the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is no possible definition of death. We are living within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics The subject's identity is continually falling apart But this death is not at all biological. At the symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying It is according to the mind that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics but it no longer declares this it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism

The irreversibility of biological death is a modern fact of science specific to our culture. Every other culture says death begins before death life goes on after we must try to see the radical indeterminacy Death is a nuance of life our modern idea is controlled by representations death articulates life it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death life nor death can be assigned a given end there is no definition of death We are living within evolutionist thought this is the illusion of the subject Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual subject does death take on irreversible meaning. death is not an event, but a myth The subject needs a myth of its end to form its identity. the subject is never there it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution an end­less cycle impelled by death This death must be conjured up and localised in a precise point death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. death objectifies the body as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying Biology has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and world

The irreversibility of biological death, its objective and punctual character, is a modern fact of science. It is specific to our culture. Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death, and the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order. Death is not a due payment [echeance], it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death. But our modern idea of death is controlled by a very different system of representations: that of the machine and the function. A machine either works or it does not. Thus the biological machine is either dead or alive. The symbolic order is ignorant of this digital abstraction. And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? There is no longer any objective progress here: something of the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane.] It is quite another thing to say that death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life: for then it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is therefore no punctuality nor any possible definition of death. We are living entirely within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] The subject's identity is continually falling apart, falling into God's forgetting. But this death is not at all biological. At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). At the other, symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible. Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end, as of its origin, to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death. This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body. In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. In a certain sense, this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. It is according to the mind, this imaginary schizz, that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics, but it no longer declares this. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'

<h4><u><strong>This biological and scientific understanding of death ensures a constant slavery to the myth of the subject </h4><p></u>Baudrillard ’76</strong> (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The irreversibility of biological death</u></strong></mark>, its objective and punctual character, <u><strong><mark>is a modern fact of science</u></strong></mark>. It is <u><strong><mark>specific to our culture</u></strong>. <u><strong>Every other culture says</mark> that <mark>death begins before death</mark>, that <mark>life goes on after</mark> life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death</u></strong>. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, <u><strong><mark>we must try to see the radical indeterminacy</mark> of life and death</u></strong>, and <u><strong>the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Death</mark> is not a due payment</u></strong> [echeance], <u><strong>it <mark>is a nuance of life</mark>; or, life is a nuance of death</u></strong>. But <u><strong><mark>our modern idea</mark> of death <mark>is controlled by</u></strong></mark> a very different system of <u><strong><mark>representations</u></strong></mark>: that <u><strong>of the machine and the function</u></strong>. <u><strong>A machine either works or it does not</u></strong>. Thus <u><strong>the biological machine is either dead or alive</u></strong>. <u><strong>The symbolic order is ignorant of this</u></strong> digital abstraction. <u><strong>And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth</u></strong>, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, <u><strong>death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself</u></strong>: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? <u><strong>There is no longer any objective progress here: </u></strong>something of <u><strong>the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane</u></strong>.] It is quite another thing to say that <u><strong><mark>death articulates life</mark>, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life</u></strong>: for then <u><strong><mark>it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death</mark>, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither <mark>life nor death can</mark> any longer <mark>be assigned a given end</mark>: <mark>there is</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>no</u></strong></mark> punctuality nor any <u><strong>possible <mark>definition of death</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>We are living</u></strong></mark> entirely <u><strong><mark>within evolutionist thought</mark>, which states that we go from Life to death: <mark>this is the illusion of the subject</mark> that sustains both biology and metaphysics</u></strong> (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] <u><strong>The subject's identity is continually falling apart</u></strong>, falling into God's forgetting. <u><strong>But this death is not at all biological.</u></strong> At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). <u><strong>At the</u></strong> other, <u><strong>symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual </mark>conscious <mark>subject does death take on</mark> an <mark>irreversible meaning.</mark> Even here, <mark>death is not an event, but a myth</mark> experienced as anticipation. <mark>The subject needs a myth of its end</u></strong></mark>, as of its origin, <u><strong><mark>to form its identity.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In reality, <mark>the subject is never there</u></strong></mark>: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, <u><strong><mark>it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution</mark>, <mark>an end­less cycle impelled by death</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This death</mark>, everywhere in life, <mark>must be conjured up and localised in a precise point</mark> of time and a precise place: the body</u></strong>. <u><strong>In biological death, <mark>death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other.</mark> The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition.</u></strong> In a certain sense, <u><strong>this duality is <mark>death</mark> itself, since it <mark>objectifies the body</mark> as residual, <mark>as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying</u></strong></mark>. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. <u><strong>It is according to the mind</u></strong>, this imaginary schizz, <u><strong>that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death</u></strong>. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. <u><strong><mark>Biology</mark> lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics</u></strong>, <u><strong>but it no longer declares this</u></strong>. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, <u><strong>it <mark>has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and</mark> on the <mark>world</mark>; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism</u></strong>. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'</p>

Baudrillard ’76 (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Baudrillard ’76 (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160) fulltext: The irreversibility of biological death, its objective and punctual character, is a modern fact of science. It is specific to our culture. Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death, and the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order. Death is not a due payment [echeance], it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death. But our modern idea of death is controlled by a very different system of representations: that of the machine and the function. A machine either works or it does not. Thus the biological machine is either dead or alive. The symbolic order is ignorant of this digital abstraction. And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? There is no longer any objective progress here: something of the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane.] It is quite another thing to say that death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life: for then it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is therefore no punctuality nor any possible definition of death. We are living entirely within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] The subject's identity is continually falling apart, falling into God's forgetting. But this death is not at all biological. At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). At the other, symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible. Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end, as of its origin, to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death. This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body. In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. In a certain sense, this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. It is according to the mind, this imaginary schizz, that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics, but it no longer declares this. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.' [/INST] <h4><u><strong>This biological and scientific understanding of death ensures a constant slavery to the myth of the subject </h4><p></u>Baudrillard ’76</strong> (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The irreversibility of biological death</u></strong></mark>, its objective and punctual character, <u><strong><mark>is a modern fact of science</u></strong></mark>. It is <u><strong><mark>specific to our culture</u></strong>. <u><strong>Every other culture says</mark> that <mark>death begins before death</mark>, that <mark>life goes on after</mark> life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death</u></strong>. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, <u><strong><mark>we must try to see the radical indeterminacy</mark> of life and death</u></strong>, and <u><strong>the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Death</mark> is not a due payment</u></strong> [echeance], <u><strong>it <mark>is a nuance of life</mark>; or, life is a nuance of death</u></strong>. But <u><strong><mark>our modern idea</mark> of death <mark>is controlled by</u></strong></mark> a very different system of <u><strong><mark>representations</u></strong></mark>: that <u><strong>of the machine and the function</u></strong>. <u><strong>A machine either works or it does not</u></strong>. Thus <u><strong>the biological machine is either dead or alive</u></strong>. <u><strong>The symbolic order is ignorant of this</u></strong> digital abstraction. <u><strong>And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth</u></strong>, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, <u><strong>death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself</u></strong>: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? <u><strong>There is no longer any objective progress here: </u></strong>something of <u><strong>the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane</u></strong>.] It is quite another thing to say that <u><strong><mark>death articulates life</mark>, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life</u></strong>: for then <u><strong><mark>it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death</mark>, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither <mark>life nor death can</mark> any longer <mark>be assigned a given end</mark>: <mark>there is</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>no</u></strong></mark> punctuality nor any <u><strong>possible <mark>definition of death</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>We are living</u></strong></mark> entirely <u><strong><mark>within evolutionist thought</mark>, which states that we go from Life to death: <mark>this is the illusion of the subject</mark> that sustains both biology and metaphysics</u></strong> (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] <u><strong>The subject's identity is continually falling apart</u></strong>, falling into God's forgetting. <u><strong>But this death is not at all biological.</u></strong> At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). <u><strong>At the</u></strong> other, <u><strong>symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual </mark>conscious <mark>subject does death take on</mark> an <mark>irreversible meaning.</mark> Even here, <mark>death is not an event, but a myth</mark> experienced as anticipation. <mark>The subject needs a myth of its end</u></strong></mark>, as of its origin, <u><strong><mark>to form its identity.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In reality, <mark>the subject is never there</u></strong></mark>: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, <u><strong><mark>it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution</mark>, <mark>an end­less cycle impelled by death</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This death</mark>, everywhere in life, <mark>must be conjured up and localised in a precise point</mark> of time and a precise place: the body</u></strong>. <u><strong>In biological death, <mark>death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other.</mark> The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition.</u></strong> In a certain sense, <u><strong>this duality is <mark>death</mark> itself, since it <mark>objectifies the body</mark> as residual, <mark>as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying</u></strong></mark>. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. <u><strong>It is according to the mind</u></strong>, this imaginary schizz, <u><strong>that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death</u></strong>. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. <u><strong><mark>Biology</mark> lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics</u></strong>, <u><strong>but it no longer declares this</u></strong>. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, <u><strong>it <mark>has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and</mark> on the <mark>world</mark>; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism</u></strong>. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'</p> </s>

C.) Politics of Death -- the 1AC models a technoscientific insistence on the extension of life -- our Meilaender evidence indicates that the selling of organs is justified based on the assumption that biological death is an evil that must be combated at all costs -- The receiving of an organ does not rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying -- they turn medicine into a crusade against death, plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment and constructs death as a “problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured” -- this form of prolonging life indefinitely prevents an understanding of finality which is necessary for us to enjoy the subjective pleasures and vibrancy of life

What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. death is the source of value. The fact that life has an end means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite it depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns. This is why Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life. Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist. The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. The limit of this project is its own infinitude. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. the space for the creation of value disappears. But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

We must imagine there is an appeal in death itself. death is the source of value. Without the value that death provides, neither love ice cream friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have worth Having infinite time we have no incentive to opt for these experiences We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. experience depends on the limits of finitude The struggle to assert the importance of death is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself They privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death which But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation death provides life becomes bereft of value The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from not from scarcity or death. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object We seek satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the structure this infinite universe is established through repression Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate.

On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power.
 4 We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value.5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.6 This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death, which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.9 Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite -the infinite of modernity- depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

<h4>C.) <u>Politics of Death<strong> -- the 1AC models a technoscientific insistence on the extension of life -- our Meilaender evidence indicates that the selling of organs is justified based on the assumption that biological death is an evil that must be combated at all costs -- The receiving of an organ does not rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying -- they turn medicine into a crusade against death, plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment and constructs death as a “problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured” -- this form of prolonging life indefinitely prevents an understanding of finality which is necessary for us to enjoy the subjective pleasures and vibrancy of life </h4><p></u>McGowan 13</strong> (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227)</p><p>On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. <u><strong>What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.</u></strong>3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. <u><strong>Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims</u></strong> of imperialist power.
 4 <u><strong><mark>We must imagine</mark> that for subjects such as these <mark>there is an appeal in death itself.</mark> </u></strong>Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because <u><strong><mark>death is the source of value.</u></strong></mark>5 <u><strong>The fact that life has an end</u></strong>, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, <u><strong>means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. <mark>Without the value that death provides, neither love</mark> nor <mark>ice cream</mark> nor <mark>friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have</mark> any special <mark>worth</u></strong></mark> whatsoever. <u><strong><mark>Having</mark> an <mark>infinite</mark> amount of <mark>time</mark>, <mark>we</mark> would <mark>have no incentive to opt for these experiences</mark> rather than other ones. <mark>We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living.</mark> Even though enjoyment itself is an <mark>experience</mark> of the infinite</u></strong>, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, <u><strong>it</u></strong> nonetheless <u><strong><mark>depends on the limits of finitude</mark>. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject</u></strong>, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. <u><strong><mark>The struggle to assert the importance of death</mark> – the act of being in love with death</u></strong>, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – <u><strong><mark>is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.</u></strong></mark>6 <u><strong>This is</u></strong> exactly <u><strong>why</u></strong> Martin <u><strong>Heidegger</u></strong> attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger <u><strong>sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us.</u></strong> As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. <u><strong><mark>By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters</mark> to us. But of course the <mark>partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself</mark>. <mark>They</mark> simply <mark>privilege life over death</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and see the world in terms of life</mark> <mark>rather than death</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>which</mark> would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. <mark>But this is not what happens.</mark> <mark>By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world.</mark> <mark>Without the mediation</mark> that <mark>death provides</mark>, the system of pure <mark>life becomes</mark> a system utterly <mark>bereft of value</mark>.</u></strong>8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. <u><strong>Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.</u></strong>9 <u><strong>Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion.</u></strong> The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. <u><strong>After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.</u></strong>10 <u><strong>The same dynamic is visible with capitalism.</u></strong> As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 <u><strong>Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much.</u></strong> The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. <u><strong><mark>The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from</mark> excess, <mark>not from scarcity or death.</u></strong></mark> Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. <u><strong>The limit of this project is</u></strong>, paradoxically, <u><strong>its own infinitude.</u></strong> It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. <u><strong><mark>We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object</mark> and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite</u></strong> -the infinite of modernity- <u><strong>depends on a fundamental misrecognition.</u></strong> We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. <u><strong><mark>We seek</mark> the commodity that would finally bring us complete <mark>satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the</mark> commodity <mark>structure</u></strong></mark>, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, <u><strong>scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory</u></strong>, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, <u><strong>the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies</u></strong>; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. <u><strong>The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death.</u></strong> As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, <u><strong>the space for the creation of value disappears.</u></strong> Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 <u><strong>But <mark>this infinite universe is established through</mark> the <mark>repression</mark> of finitude. <mark>Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate.</u></strong></mark> As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 <u><strong>Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.</u></strong> </p>

McGowan 13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McGowan 13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227) fulltext: On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power.
 4 We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value.5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.6 This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death, which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.9 Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite -the infinite of modernity- depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses. [/INST] <h4>C.) <u>Politics of Death<strong> -- the 1AC models a technoscientific insistence on the extension of life -- our Meilaender evidence indicates that the selling of organs is justified based on the assumption that biological death is an evil that must be combated at all costs -- The receiving of an organ does not rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying -- they turn medicine into a crusade against death, plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment and constructs death as a “problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured” -- this form of prolonging life indefinitely prevents an understanding of finality which is necessary for us to enjoy the subjective pleasures and vibrancy of life </h4><p></u>McGowan 13</strong> (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227)</p><p>On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. <u><strong>What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.</u></strong>3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. <u><strong>Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims</u></strong> of imperialist power.
 4 <u><strong><mark>We must imagine</mark> that for subjects such as these <mark>there is an appeal in death itself.</mark> </u></strong>Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because <u><strong><mark>death is the source of value.</u></strong></mark>5 <u><strong>The fact that life has an end</u></strong>, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, <u><strong>means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. <mark>Without the value that death provides, neither love</mark> nor <mark>ice cream</mark> nor <mark>friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have</mark> any special <mark>worth</u></strong></mark> whatsoever. <u><strong><mark>Having</mark> an <mark>infinite</mark> amount of <mark>time</mark>, <mark>we</mark> would <mark>have no incentive to opt for these experiences</mark> rather than other ones. <mark>We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living.</mark> Even though enjoyment itself is an <mark>experience</mark> of the infinite</u></strong>, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, <u><strong>it</u></strong> nonetheless <u><strong><mark>depends on the limits of finitude</mark>. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject</u></strong>, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. <u><strong><mark>The struggle to assert the importance of death</mark> – the act of being in love with death</u></strong>, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – <u><strong><mark>is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.</u></strong></mark>6 <u><strong>This is</u></strong> exactly <u><strong>why</u></strong> Martin <u><strong>Heidegger</u></strong> attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger <u><strong>sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us.</u></strong> As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. <u><strong><mark>By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters</mark> to us. But of course the <mark>partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself</mark>. <mark>They</mark> simply <mark>privilege life over death</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and see the world in terms of life</mark> <mark>rather than death</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>which</mark> would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. <mark>But this is not what happens.</mark> <mark>By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world.</mark> <mark>Without the mediation</mark> that <mark>death provides</mark>, the system of pure <mark>life becomes</mark> a system utterly <mark>bereft of value</mark>.</u></strong>8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. <u><strong>Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.</u></strong>9 <u><strong>Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion.</u></strong> The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. <u><strong>After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.</u></strong>10 <u><strong>The same dynamic is visible with capitalism.</u></strong> As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 <u><strong>Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much.</u></strong> The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. <u><strong><mark>The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from</mark> excess, <mark>not from scarcity or death.</u></strong></mark> Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. <u><strong>The limit of this project is</u></strong>, paradoxically, <u><strong>its own infinitude.</u></strong> It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. <u><strong><mark>We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object</mark> and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite</u></strong> -the infinite of modernity- <u><strong>depends on a fundamental misrecognition.</u></strong> We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. <u><strong><mark>We seek</mark> the commodity that would finally bring us complete <mark>satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the</mark> commodity <mark>structure</u></strong></mark>, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, <u><strong>scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory</u></strong>, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, <u><strong>the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies</u></strong>; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. <u><strong>The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death.</u></strong> As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, <u><strong>the space for the creation of value disappears.</u></strong> Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 <u><strong>But <mark>this infinite universe is established through</mark> the <mark>repression</mark> of finitude. <mark>Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate.</u></strong></mark> As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 <u><strong>Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.</u></strong> </p> </s>

Their “changing the world” attitude through the political sphere is bullshit and leads to a hatred of the self and lashout

death has to be redeemed by a com- pulsive effort to transform the world. One has to ensure one's salvation at all costs by realizing the world for bette A performance that tops off the one described by Max Weber in The Spirit ofCapitalism: that of transforming it is no longer a question now of his glory; it is a question of his death and of exorcizing it. The point is to make the world transparent by extirpating from it any illusion and any evil force. And so, under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and no hell any more, and no damnation. Everything becomes susceptible of redemption. From this point on, good and evil, which were still opposing powers, but linked to each other in transcendence, are to be dissociated for the purposes of a definitive realization of the world under the banner of happiness is to such an evangelization that we can ascribe all the manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment Offered to us by a paradisiac civilization subject to the eleventh commandment, the commandment that sweeps away ~1l others: 'Be happy and show all the signs of happiness the future, it is better and worse yet: everything will be genetically modified to" attain the biological and democratic perfection of the species' From the point when everyone is potentially saved, no one is. Salvation no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons for our democratic enterprise: it forgotten discrimination We need evil from which there is no redemption There is nothing immoral in this. nothing immoral in some losing and What would be immoral would be for everyone to win the imperative of salvation will always be thwarted by some challenge or passion from elsewhere, and any form of personal beatitude may be sacrificed which retains the fateful quality of that which, in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass. Behind its euphoric exaltation, this imperative of maximum performance bears within it evil and misfortune in the form of a deep disavowal and a secret disillusionment. Perhaps performance is merely a collective form of human sacrifice Individuals carry on their lives like a useless function in the eyes of another world, irrelevant even in their own eyes. And they do what they do all the better for the fact that there is no other possibility. No authority to appeal to They have sacrificed their lives to their functional existences They are one with the exact numerical calculation of their lives and their performance Summoned to greatest efficiency and pleasure out of themselves human beings are at odds; and their existences dislocated An existence realized but denied, thwarted, disowned

death has to be redeemed by a effort to transform the world. One has to ensure salvation at all costs by realizing the world better A performance of transforming it is no longer a question of glory; it is a question of death The point is to make the world transparent by extirpating any evil force under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and no hell no damnation Everything becomes susceptible of redemption From this point good and evil, which were still opposing are dissociated for the realization of the world under the banner of happiness It is to manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment show signs of happiness the future will be modified to" attain perfection of the species' From the point when everyone is saved, no one is Salvation no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons democratic enterprise it forgot discrimination We need evil from which there is no redemption There is nothing immoral in this. nothing immoral in some losing What would be immoral would be for everyone to win the imperative of salvation will always be thwarted by challenge elsewhere and personal beatitude sacrificed which retains the fateful quality that in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass. Behind euphoric exaltation, this imperative of maximum performance bears misfortune in the form of disavowal and secret disillusionment performance is collective form of human sacrifice, Individuals carry on their lives like a useless function in the eyes of another world irrelevant even in their own eyes they do what they do for no other possibility No authority to appeal to They have sacrificed their lives to functional existences They are one with calculation of performance Summoned to efficiency human beings are at odds existences dislocated realized but denied, thwarted, disowned

'Bis Gottes Fehle hilft,' says H6lderlin. 'Until God's absence comes to our aid.' The death of God is, in fact, the deliverance from all re- sponsibility to another world. But our responsibility for this world then becomes total, and there is no longer any possible redemption. Or, rather, redemption changes meaning: it is no longer the redemption of man and his sin, but the redemption of the death of God. That death has to be redeemed by a com- pulsive effort to transform the world. One has to ensure one's salvation at all costs by realizing the world for better or for worse. A performance that tops off the one described by Max Weber in The Spirit ofCapitalism: that of transforming the world into wealth for the greater glory of God. But it is no longer a question now of his glory; it is a question of his death and of exorcizing it. The point is to make the world transparent and operational by extirpating from it any illusion and any evil force. And so, under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and, at the same time, going from bad to worse: no hell any more, and no damnation. Everything becomes susceptible of redemption. From this point on, good and evil, which were still opposing powers, but linked to each other in transcendence, are to be dissociated for the purposes of a definitive realization of the world under the banner of happiness. In fact, this idea of happiness bears merely a distant relation to good. For if good is moral in essence, happiness, the performance of happiness - is in essence perfectly immoral. It is to such an evangelization that we can ascribe all the manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment Offered to us by a paradisiac civilization subject to the eleventh commandment, the commandment that sweeps away ~1l others: 'Be happy and show all the signs of happiness!' . We can see this demand for universal redemption in the way all current violence and injustice is being put on "trial, and also, retrospectively, all the crimes and violent events of the past: the French Revolution, slavery, original sin and battered wives, the ozone layer and sexual harassment. In short, the investigative process for the Last Judgement is already well under way and we are doomed first to condemn, then to absolve and whitewash the whole of our history; to exterminate evil from even the tiniest interstices, so as to offer the image of a radiant universe ready to pass over into the next world. An inhuman, superhuman, all-too-human undertaking? And why fuel this eternal repentance, this chain reaction of bad conscience? Because everything must be saved. This is where we have got to today. Everything will be re- deemed, the whole past will be rehabilitated, buffed up to the point of transparency. As for the future, it is better and worse yet: everything will be genetically modified to" attain the biological and democratic perfection of the species'; The salvation that was defined by the equivalence of merit and grace will be defined, once the fixation with evil and Hell has been overcome, by the equivalence of genes and performance. To tell the truth, once happiness becomes the general equi- valent of salvation, pure and simple, then heaven itself is no longer needed. From the point when everyone is potentially saved, no one is. Salvation no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons for our democratic enterprise: it is stifled at birth for having forgotten the necessary discrimination, for the omission of evil. We need, then, an irrevocable presence of evil, an evil from which there is no possible redemption, an irrevocable dis- crimination, a perpetual duality of Heaven and Hell, and even, in a sense, a predestination of evil, for there can be no destiny without some predestination. There is nothing immoral in this. According to the rules of the game, there is nothing immoral in some losing and others winning, or even in everyone losing. What would be immoral would be for everyone to win. This is the contemporary ideal of our democracy: that all should be saved. But that is possible only at the cost of a perpetual inflation and upping of the stakes. And this is reassuring, since the imperative of salvation, of the individual state of grace, will always be thwarted by some challenge or passion from elsewhere, and any form of personal beatitude may be sacrificed to something more vital, which may be of the order of the will in Schopenhauer's terms or of the will to power in Nietzsche's, but which, in any event, retains the fateful quality of that which, in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass. Behind its euphoric exaltation, this imperative of maximum performance bears within it evil and misfortune in the form of a deep disavowal and a secret disillusionment. Perhaps performance is merely a collective form of human sacrifice, but disembodied and distilled into our entire technological machinery. In this strange world, where everything is potentially available - the body, sex, space, money, pleasure - to be taken or rejected en bloc, everything is there; nothing has disappeared physically, but everything has disappeared metaphysically. 'As if by magic,' one might say, except that it has disappeared not so much by enchantment as by disenchantment. Individuals, such as they are, become exactly what they are. Without transcendence and without image, they carry on their lives like a useless function in the eyes of another world, irrelevant even in their own eyes. And they do what they do all the better for the fact that there is no other possibility. No authority to appeal to. They have sacrificed their lives to their functional existences. They are one with the exact numerical calculation of their lives and their performance. Summoned to get the greatest efficiency and pleasure out of themselves, human beings are suddenly at odds; and their existences dislocated. An existence realized, then, but at the same time denied, thwarted, disowned. Wherever humans are condemned to total freedom or to an ideal fulfilment, this automatic abreaction to ;their own good and their own happiness seeps in. This imperative of maximum performance also comes into contradiction with the moral law, which dictates that everyone shall be put on an equal basis and everything set to zero in the name of democracy and an equal division of opportunity and advantage. From the perspective of universal redemption no one must stand out. For justice to be done, all privilege must disappear; everyone is called on to shed any specific qualities and to become once again an elementary particle - collective happiness being that of the lowest common denominator. This is like potlatch in reverse, each outbidding the other in insignificance, while zealously cultivating their tiniest difference and cobbling together their multiple identities. Recrimination means going back over the crime to correct its trajectory and its effects. This is what we are doing in going back over the whole of our history, over the criminal history of the human species, so that we may do penance right now as we await the Last Judgement.

<h4>Their “changing the world” attitude through the political sphere is bullshit and leads to a hatred of the self and lashout</h4><p><strong>Baudrillard 5 </strong>[Jean. French postmodern dude: philosopher, sociologist, cultural theorist, political commentator, and photographer. The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact. Page 146-150]</p><p>'Bis Gottes Fehle hilft,' says H6lderlin. 'Until God's absence comes to our aid.' The death of God is, in fact, the deliverance from all re- sponsibility to another world. But our responsibility for this world then becomes total, and there is no longer any possible redemption. Or, rather, redemption changes meaning: it is no longer the redemption of man and his sin, but the redemption of the death of God. That <u><strong><mark>death has to be redeemed by a</mark> com- pulsive <mark>effort to transform the world. One has to ensure</mark> one's <mark>salvation at all costs by realizing the world</mark> for <mark>bette</u></strong>r</mark> or for worse. <u><strong><mark>A</mark> <mark>performance</mark> that tops off the one described by Max Weber in The Spirit ofCapitalism: that <mark>of transforming</u></strong></mark> the world into wealth for the greater glory of God. But <u><strong><mark>it is no longer a question</mark> now <mark>of</mark> his <mark>glory; it is a</mark> <mark>question of</mark> his <mark>death</mark> and of exorcizing it. <mark>The point is to make the world transparent</u></strong></mark> and operational <u><strong><mark>by extirpating</mark> from it any illusion and <mark>any evil force</mark>. And so, <mark>under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and</u></strong></mark>, at the same time, going from bad to worse: <u><strong><mark>no hell</mark> any more, and <mark>no</mark> <mark>damnation</mark>. <mark>Everything becomes susceptible of redemption</mark>. <mark>From this point </mark>on, <mark>good and evil, which were still opposing</mark> powers, but linked to each other in transcendence, <mark>are</mark> to be <mark>dissociated for the</mark> purposes of a definitive <mark>realization of the world under the banner of happiness</u></strong></mark>. In fact, this idea of happiness bears merely a distant relation to good. For if good is moral in essence, happiness, the performance of happiness - is in essence perfectly immoral. <mark>It <u><strong>is to</mark> such an evangelization that we can ascribe all the <mark>manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment</mark> Offered to us by a paradisiac civilization subject to the eleventh commandment, the commandment that sweeps away ~1l others: 'Be happy and <mark>show</mark> all the <mark>signs of happiness</u></strong></mark>!' . We can see this demand for universal redemption in the way all current violence and injustice is being put on "trial, and also, retrospectively, all the crimes and violent events of the past: the French Revolution, slavery, original sin and battered wives, the ozone layer and sexual harassment. In short, the investigative process for the Last Judgement is already well under way and we are doomed first to condemn, then to absolve and whitewash the whole of our history; to exterminate evil from even the tiniest interstices, so as to offer the image of a radiant universe ready to pass over into the next world. An inhuman, superhuman, all-too-human undertaking? And why fuel this eternal repentance, this chain reaction of bad conscience? Because everything must be saved. This is where we have got to today. Everything will be re- deemed, the whole past will be rehabilitated, buffed up to the point of transparency. As for <u><strong><mark>the future</mark>, it is better and worse yet: everything <mark>will be</mark> genetically <mark>modified to" attain</mark> the biological and democratic <mark>perfection of the species'</u></strong></mark>; The salvation that was defined by the equivalence of merit and grace will be defined, once the fixation with evil and Hell has been overcome, by the equivalence of genes and performance. To tell the truth, once happiness becomes the general equi- valent of salvation, pure and simple, then heaven itself is no longer needed. <u><strong><mark>From the point when everyone is</mark> potentially <mark>saved, no one is</mark>. <mark>Salvation</mark> <mark>no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons</mark> for our <mark>democratic enterprise</mark>: <mark>it</u></strong></mark> is stifled at birth for having <u><strong><mark>forgot</mark>ten</u></strong> the necessary <u><strong><mark>discrimination</u></strong></mark>, for the omission of evil. <u><strong><mark>We need</u></strong></mark>, then, an irrevocable presence of <u><strong><mark>evil</u></strong></mark>, an evil <u><strong><mark>from which there is no</u></strong></mark> possible <u><strong><mark>redemption</u></strong></mark>, an irrevocable dis- crimination, a perpetual duality of Heaven and Hell, and even, in a sense, a predestination of evil, for there can be no destiny without some predestination. <u><strong><mark>There is nothing immoral in this.</mark> </u></strong>According to the rules of the game, there is <u><strong><mark>nothing immoral in some losing </mark>and</u></strong> others winning, or even in everyone losing. <u><strong><mark>What would be immoral would be for everyone to win</u></strong></mark>. This is the contemporary ideal of our democracy: that all should be saved. But that is possible only at the cost of a perpetual inflation and upping of the stakes. And this is reassuring, since <u><strong><mark>the imperative of salvation</u></strong></mark>, of the individual state of grace, <u><strong><mark>will always be thwarted by</mark> some <mark>challenge</mark> or passion from <mark>elsewhere</mark>, <mark>and</mark> any form of <mark>personal</mark> <mark>beatitude</mark> may be <mark>sacrificed</u></strong></mark> to something more vital, which may be of the order of the will in Schopenhauer's terms or of the will to power in Nietzsche's, but <u><strong><mark>which</u></strong></mark>, in any event, <u><strong><mark>retains the fateful quality</mark> of <mark>that</mark> which, <mark>in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass.</mark> <mark>Behind</mark> its <mark>euphoric exaltation, this</mark> <mark>imperative of maximum performance</mark> <mark>bears</mark> within it evil and <mark>misfortune in the form of</mark> a deep <mark>disavowal</mark> <mark>and</mark> a <mark>secret disillusionment</mark>. Perhaps <mark>performance</mark> <mark>is</mark> merely a <mark>collective form of human sacrifice</u></strong>, </mark>but disembodied and distilled into our entire technological machinery. In this strange world, where everything is potentially available - the body, sex, space, money, pleasure - to be taken or rejected en bloc, everything is there; nothing has disappeared physically, but everything has disappeared metaphysically. 'As if by magic,' one might say, except that it has disappeared not so much by enchantment as by disenchantment. <u><strong><mark>Individuals</u></strong></mark>, such as they are, become exactly what they are. Without transcendence and without image, they <u><strong><mark>carry on their lives like a useless function in</mark> <mark>the eyes of another world</mark>, <mark>irrelevant even in their own eyes</mark>. And <mark>they do what they do</mark> all the better <mark>for</mark> the fact that there is <mark>no other possibility</mark>. <mark>No authority to appeal to</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They have sacrificed their lives to</mark> their <mark>functional existences</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They are one with</mark> the exact numerical <mark>calculation</mark> <mark>of</mark> their lives and their <mark>performance</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Summoned to</u></strong></mark> get the <u><strong>greatest <mark>efficiency</mark> and pleasure out of themselves</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>human beings are</u></strong></mark> suddenly <u><strong><mark>at odds</mark>; and their <mark>existences dislocated</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>An existence <mark>realized</u></strong></mark>, then, <u><strong><mark>but</u></strong></mark> at the same time <u><strong><mark>denied, thwarted, disowned</u></strong></mark>. Wherever humans are condemned to total freedom or to an ideal fulfilment, this automatic abreaction to ;their own good and their own happiness seeps in. This imperative of maximum performance also comes into contradiction with the moral law, which dictates that everyone shall be put on an equal basis and everything set to zero in the name of democracy and an equal division of opportunity and advantage. From the perspective of universal redemption no one must stand out. For justice to be done, all privilege must disappear; everyone is called on to shed any specific qualities and to become once again an elementary particle - collective happiness being that of the lowest common denominator. This is like potlatch in reverse, each outbidding the other in insignificance, while zealously cultivating their tiniest difference and cobbling together their multiple identities. Recrimination means going back over the crime to correct its trajectory and its effects. This is what we are doing in going back over the whole of our history, over the criminal history of the human species, so that we may do penance right now as we await the Last Judgement. </p>

Baudrillard 5 [Jean. French postmodern dude: philosopher, sociologist, cultural theorist, political commentator, and photographer. The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact. Page 146-150]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Baudrillard 5 [Jean. French postmodern dude: philosopher, sociologist, cultural theorist, political commentator, and photographer. The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact. Page 146-150] fulltext: 'Bis Gottes Fehle hilft,' says H6lderlin. 'Until God's absence comes to our aid.' The death of God is, in fact, the deliverance from all re- sponsibility to another world. But our responsibility for this world then becomes total, and there is no longer any possible redemption. Or, rather, redemption changes meaning: it is no longer the redemption of man and his sin, but the redemption of the death of God. That death has to be redeemed by a com- pulsive effort to transform the world. One has to ensure one's salvation at all costs by realizing the world for better or for worse. A performance that tops off the one described by Max Weber in The Spirit ofCapitalism: that of transforming the world into wealth for the greater glory of God. But it is no longer a question now of his glory; it is a question of his death and of exorcizing it. The point is to make the world transparent and operational by extirpating from it any illusion and any evil force. And so, under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and, at the same time, going from bad to worse: no hell any more, and no damnation. Everything becomes susceptible of redemption. From this point on, good and evil, which were still opposing powers, but linked to each other in transcendence, are to be dissociated for the purposes of a definitive realization of the world under the banner of happiness. In fact, this idea of happiness bears merely a distant relation to good. For if good is moral in essence, happiness, the performance of happiness - is in essence perfectly immoral. It is to such an evangelization that we can ascribe all the manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment Offered to us by a paradisiac civilization subject to the eleventh commandment, the commandment that sweeps away ~1l others: 'Be happy and show all the signs of happiness!' . We can see this demand for universal redemption in the way all current violence and injustice is being put on "trial, and also, retrospectively, all the crimes and violent events of the past: the French Revolution, slavery, original sin and battered wives, the ozone layer and sexual harassment. In short, the investigative process for the Last Judgement is already well under way and we are doomed first to condemn, then to absolve and whitewash the whole of our history; to exterminate evil from even the tiniest interstices, so as to offer the image of a radiant universe ready to pass over into the next world. An inhuman, superhuman, all-too-human undertaking? And why fuel this eternal repentance, this chain reaction of bad conscience? Because everything must be saved. This is where we have got to today. Everything will be re- deemed, the whole past will be rehabilitated, buffed up to the point of transparency. As for the future, it is better and worse yet: everything will be genetically modified to" attain the biological and democratic perfection of the species'; The salvation that was defined by the equivalence of merit and grace will be defined, once the fixation with evil and Hell has been overcome, by the equivalence of genes and performance. To tell the truth, once happiness becomes the general equi- valent of salvation, pure and simple, then heaven itself is no longer needed. From the point when everyone is potentially saved, no one is. Salvation no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons for our democratic enterprise: it is stifled at birth for having forgotten the necessary discrimination, for the omission of evil. We need, then, an irrevocable presence of evil, an evil from which there is no possible redemption, an irrevocable dis- crimination, a perpetual duality of Heaven and Hell, and even, in a sense, a predestination of evil, for there can be no destiny without some predestination. There is nothing immoral in this. According to the rules of the game, there is nothing immoral in some losing and others winning, or even in everyone losing. What would be immoral would be for everyone to win. This is the contemporary ideal of our democracy: that all should be saved. But that is possible only at the cost of a perpetual inflation and upping of the stakes. And this is reassuring, since the imperative of salvation, of the individual state of grace, will always be thwarted by some challenge or passion from elsewhere, and any form of personal beatitude may be sacrificed to something more vital, which may be of the order of the will in Schopenhauer's terms or of the will to power in Nietzsche's, but which, in any event, retains the fateful quality of that which, in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass. Behind its euphoric exaltation, this imperative of maximum performance bears within it evil and misfortune in the form of a deep disavowal and a secret disillusionment. Perhaps performance is merely a collective form of human sacrifice, but disembodied and distilled into our entire technological machinery. In this strange world, where everything is potentially available - the body, sex, space, money, pleasure - to be taken or rejected en bloc, everything is there; nothing has disappeared physically, but everything has disappeared metaphysically. 'As if by magic,' one might say, except that it has disappeared not so much by enchantment as by disenchantment. Individuals, such as they are, become exactly what they are. Without transcendence and without image, they carry on their lives like a useless function in the eyes of another world, irrelevant even in their own eyes. And they do what they do all the better for the fact that there is no other possibility. No authority to appeal to. They have sacrificed their lives to their functional existences. They are one with the exact numerical calculation of their lives and their performance. Summoned to get the greatest efficiency and pleasure out of themselves, human beings are suddenly at odds; and their existences dislocated. An existence realized, then, but at the same time denied, thwarted, disowned. Wherever humans are condemned to total freedom or to an ideal fulfilment, this automatic abreaction to ;their own good and their own happiness seeps in. This imperative of maximum performance also comes into contradiction with the moral law, which dictates that everyone shall be put on an equal basis and everything set to zero in the name of democracy and an equal division of opportunity and advantage. From the perspective of universal redemption no one must stand out. For justice to be done, all privilege must disappear; everyone is called on to shed any specific qualities and to become once again an elementary particle - collective happiness being that of the lowest common denominator. This is like potlatch in reverse, each outbidding the other in insignificance, while zealously cultivating their tiniest difference and cobbling together their multiple identities. Recrimination means going back over the crime to correct its trajectory and its effects. This is what we are doing in going back over the whole of our history, over the criminal history of the human species, so that we may do penance right now as we await the Last Judgement. [/INST] <h4>Their “changing the world” attitude through the political sphere is bullshit and leads to a hatred of the self and lashout</h4><p><strong>Baudrillard 5 </strong>[Jean. French postmodern dude: philosopher, sociologist, cultural theorist, political commentator, and photographer. The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact. Page 146-150]</p><p>'Bis Gottes Fehle hilft,' says H6lderlin. 'Until God's absence comes to our aid.' The death of God is, in fact, the deliverance from all re- sponsibility to another world. But our responsibility for this world then becomes total, and there is no longer any possible redemption. Or, rather, redemption changes meaning: it is no longer the redemption of man and his sin, but the redemption of the death of God. That <u><strong><mark>death has to be redeemed by a</mark> com- pulsive <mark>effort to transform the world. One has to ensure</mark> one's <mark>salvation at all costs by realizing the world</mark> for <mark>bette</u></strong>r</mark> or for worse. <u><strong><mark>A</mark> <mark>performance</mark> that tops off the one described by Max Weber in The Spirit ofCapitalism: that <mark>of transforming</u></strong></mark> the world into wealth for the greater glory of God. But <u><strong><mark>it is no longer a question</mark> now <mark>of</mark> his <mark>glory; it is a</mark> <mark>question of</mark> his <mark>death</mark> and of exorcizing it. <mark>The point is to make the world transparent</u></strong></mark> and operational <u><strong><mark>by extirpating</mark> from it any illusion and <mark>any evil force</mark>. And so, <mark>under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and</u></strong></mark>, at the same time, going from bad to worse: <u><strong><mark>no hell</mark> any more, and <mark>no</mark> <mark>damnation</mark>. <mark>Everything becomes susceptible of redemption</mark>. <mark>From this point </mark>on, <mark>good and evil, which were still opposing</mark> powers, but linked to each other in transcendence, <mark>are</mark> to be <mark>dissociated for the</mark> purposes of a definitive <mark>realization of the world under the banner of happiness</u></strong></mark>. In fact, this idea of happiness bears merely a distant relation to good. For if good is moral in essence, happiness, the performance of happiness - is in essence perfectly immoral. <mark>It <u><strong>is to</mark> such an evangelization that we can ascribe all the <mark>manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment</mark> Offered to us by a paradisiac civilization subject to the eleventh commandment, the commandment that sweeps away ~1l others: 'Be happy and <mark>show</mark> all the <mark>signs of happiness</u></strong></mark>!' . We can see this demand for universal redemption in the way all current violence and injustice is being put on "trial, and also, retrospectively, all the crimes and violent events of the past: the French Revolution, slavery, original sin and battered wives, the ozone layer and sexual harassment. In short, the investigative process for the Last Judgement is already well under way and we are doomed first to condemn, then to absolve and whitewash the whole of our history; to exterminate evil from even the tiniest interstices, so as to offer the image of a radiant universe ready to pass over into the next world. An inhuman, superhuman, all-too-human undertaking? And why fuel this eternal repentance, this chain reaction of bad conscience? Because everything must be saved. This is where we have got to today. Everything will be re- deemed, the whole past will be rehabilitated, buffed up to the point of transparency. As for <u><strong><mark>the future</mark>, it is better and worse yet: everything <mark>will be</mark> genetically <mark>modified to" attain</mark> the biological and democratic <mark>perfection of the species'</u></strong></mark>; The salvation that was defined by the equivalence of merit and grace will be defined, once the fixation with evil and Hell has been overcome, by the equivalence of genes and performance. To tell the truth, once happiness becomes the general equi- valent of salvation, pure and simple, then heaven itself is no longer needed. <u><strong><mark>From the point when everyone is</mark> potentially <mark>saved, no one is</mark>. <mark>Salvation</mark> <mark>no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons</mark> for our <mark>democratic enterprise</mark>: <mark>it</u></strong></mark> is stifled at birth for having <u><strong><mark>forgot</mark>ten</u></strong> the necessary <u><strong><mark>discrimination</u></strong></mark>, for the omission of evil. <u><strong><mark>We need</u></strong></mark>, then, an irrevocable presence of <u><strong><mark>evil</u></strong></mark>, an evil <u><strong><mark>from which there is no</u></strong></mark> possible <u><strong><mark>redemption</u></strong></mark>, an irrevocable dis- crimination, a perpetual duality of Heaven and Hell, and even, in a sense, a predestination of evil, for there can be no destiny without some predestination. <u><strong><mark>There is nothing immoral in this.</mark> </u></strong>According to the rules of the game, there is <u><strong><mark>nothing immoral in some losing </mark>and</u></strong> others winning, or even in everyone losing. <u><strong><mark>What would be immoral would be for everyone to win</u></strong></mark>. This is the contemporary ideal of our democracy: that all should be saved. But that is possible only at the cost of a perpetual inflation and upping of the stakes. And this is reassuring, since <u><strong><mark>the imperative of salvation</u></strong></mark>, of the individual state of grace, <u><strong><mark>will always be thwarted by</mark> some <mark>challenge</mark> or passion from <mark>elsewhere</mark>, <mark>and</mark> any form of <mark>personal</mark> <mark>beatitude</mark> may be <mark>sacrificed</u></strong></mark> to something more vital, which may be of the order of the will in Schopenhauer's terms or of the will to power in Nietzsche's, but <u><strong><mark>which</u></strong></mark>, in any event, <u><strong><mark>retains the fateful quality</mark> of <mark>that</mark> which, <mark>in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass.</mark> <mark>Behind</mark> its <mark>euphoric exaltation, this</mark> <mark>imperative of maximum performance</mark> <mark>bears</mark> within it evil and <mark>misfortune in the form of</mark> a deep <mark>disavowal</mark> <mark>and</mark> a <mark>secret disillusionment</mark>. Perhaps <mark>performance</mark> <mark>is</mark> merely a <mark>collective form of human sacrifice</u></strong>, </mark>but disembodied and distilled into our entire technological machinery. In this strange world, where everything is potentially available - the body, sex, space, money, pleasure - to be taken or rejected en bloc, everything is there; nothing has disappeared physically, but everything has disappeared metaphysically. 'As if by magic,' one might say, except that it has disappeared not so much by enchantment as by disenchantment. <u><strong><mark>Individuals</u></strong></mark>, such as they are, become exactly what they are. Without transcendence and without image, they <u><strong><mark>carry on their lives like a useless function in</mark> <mark>the eyes of another world</mark>, <mark>irrelevant even in their own eyes</mark>. And <mark>they do what they do</mark> all the better <mark>for</mark> the fact that there is <mark>no other possibility</mark>. <mark>No authority to appeal to</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They have sacrificed their lives to</mark> their <mark>functional existences</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They are one with</mark> the exact numerical <mark>calculation</mark> <mark>of</mark> their lives and their <mark>performance</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Summoned to</u></strong></mark> get the <u><strong>greatest <mark>efficiency</mark> and pleasure out of themselves</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>human beings are</u></strong></mark> suddenly <u><strong><mark>at odds</mark>; and their <mark>existences dislocated</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>An existence <mark>realized</u></strong></mark>, then, <u><strong><mark>but</u></strong></mark> at the same time <u><strong><mark>denied, thwarted, disowned</u></strong></mark>. Wherever humans are condemned to total freedom or to an ideal fulfilment, this automatic abreaction to ;their own good and their own happiness seeps in. This imperative of maximum performance also comes into contradiction with the moral law, which dictates that everyone shall be put on an equal basis and everything set to zero in the name of democracy and an equal division of opportunity and advantage. From the perspective of universal redemption no one must stand out. For justice to be done, all privilege must disappear; everyone is called on to shed any specific qualities and to become once again an elementary particle - collective happiness being that of the lowest common denominator. This is like potlatch in reverse, each outbidding the other in insignificance, while zealously cultivating their tiniest difference and cobbling together their multiple identities. Recrimination means going back over the crime to correct its trajectory and its effects. This is what we are doing in going back over the whole of our history, over the criminal history of the human species, so that we may do penance right now as we await the Last Judgement. </p> </s>

Cadaver link

The 'demand' for human organs, tissues, and body parts is driven, by the medical discourse on scarcity The specter of long transplant 'waiting lists' only virtual lists with little material basis in reality motivated questionable practices of organ harvesting with 'compensated gifting' doctors acting as brokers the very idea of organ 'scarcity' is an artificially created need invented by transplant technicians and dangled before the eyes of an ever- expanding sick, aging and dying population The resulting artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized' as a natural medical phenomenon. In this 'survivalist' utilitarian pragmatics the ethics of transplantation is modeled after 'lifeboat' ethics There is little consciousness of the vulnerability of some social classes and ethnic groups who can be described as the 'designated donor' populations In the United States where cadaver transplant continues to be supported as the norm for donation the brain dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor The poor and minorities are over-represented in ICUs due to their over-exposure to urban violence higher rates of homicide, suicide and vehicular death, as well as the cumulative effects of societal and medical neglect. The irony is that those lacking public insurance also comprise the greatest number of those whose family members are asked to behave altruistically and to donate the organs and tissues of loved ones They are being asked to support with the bodies of their loved ones a social and medical system that excludes them and within which they have a lower probability of receiving an organ, should that need arise The much commented upon refusal of African-Americans to donate organs should be seen as a political act of considered resistance Those who sell a kidney are normally from social and economic strata where access to basic medical care and necessary aftercare are most often lacking the only dissident voices raised against the dominant transplant narrative of life-saving come from unpalatable forms that are all too easily dismissed and discredited These alternative bioethical positions are expressed 'primitively' and from the social margins in the form of moral panics of body theft To those living on the fringes of the new global disorder the scramble for 'fresh' organs increases their profound sense of ontological insecurity in a world that values their bodies as a reservoir of spare parts While popular resistance led to revoking new laws of presumed consent Throughout these radical transformations, the voice of anthropology has been muted while the high-stake debates have been waged among transplant professionals, bioethicists, legal scholars and economists

The 'demand' for organs is driven by the medical discourse on scarcity The specter of virtual lists with little material basis in reality motivated questionable practices of harvesting with 'compensated gifting' doctors acting as brokers, the idea of 'scarcity' is an artificially created need invented by technicians dangled before the eyes of a dying population The artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized' In cadaver transplant the brain dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor minorities are over-represented in ICUs due to their over-exposure to urban violence higher rates of homicide as well as societal and medical neglect those lacking insurance comprise the greatest number of those whose family are asked to altruistically donate organs They are being asked to support a social and medical system that excludes them Those who sell a kidney are from economic strata where access to care are lacking To those living on the fringes of global disorder the scramble for 'fresh' organs increases ontological insecurity in a world that values bodies as a reservoir of spare parts the voice of anthropology has been muted while debates have been waged among bioethicists, legal scholars and economists

Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB The 'demand' for human organs, tissues, and body parts — and the desperate search among wealthy transplant patients to purchase them — is driven, above all, by the medical discourse on scarcity. The specter of long transplant 'waiting lists' — sometimes only virtual lists with little material basis in reality I — has motivated and driven questionable practices of organ harvesting with blatant sales alongside 'compensated gifting', doctors acting as brokers, and fierce competition between public and private hospitals for patients of means. But the very idea of organ 'scarcity' is what Ivan Illich (1970) would call an artificially created need, invented by transplant technicians and dangled before the eyes of an ever- expanding sick, aging and dying population. The resulting artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized' (Bourdieu 1977) as a natural medical phenomenon. In this environment of 'survivalist' utilitarian pragmatics, the ethics of transplantation is modeled after classical 'lifeboat' ethics (Koch 2001). With ethical presumptions of scarcity, there appear to be clear choices to be made, namely who gets into the lifeboat ('getting on the waiting list'); who will be shoved off the boat when it gets overcrowded (getting triaged while on the waiting list); and who will, in the end, be 'eaten' so that others may live (race and class disparities in organs procurement and distribution practices)? There is little consciousness of the vulnerability of some social classes and ethnic groups who can be described as the 'designated donor' populations, both living and brain dead. In the United States, for example, where cadaver transplant continues to be supported as the norm for donation (if not so, increasingly, in practice), the brain dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor — including whites, Latinos and African- Americans. The poor and minorities are over-represented in the intensive care centers (ICUs) of large urban hospitals, due to their over-exposure to urban violence, higher rates of homicide, suicide and vehicular death, as well as the cumulative effects of societal and medical neglect. The great irony is that those lacking public insurance (44 million citizens) also comprise the greatest number of those whose family members are asked to behave altruistically and to donate the organs and tissues of loved ones. That a great many of these poor, African-American and Latino families refuse to donate should come as no surprise. They are being asked to support with the bodies of their loved ones a social and medical system that excludes them and within which they have a lower probability of receiving an organ, should that need arise. One needs to be relatively affluent and otherwise healthy and well looked after to be recommended for organ transplant. The much commented upon refusal of African-Americans to donate organs should be seen as a political act of considered resistance. As for living, paid donation, the social inequities are more transparent. Those who sell a kidney are normally from social and economic strata where access to basic medical care and necessary aftercare are most often lacking. But to date the only dissident voices raised against the dominant transplant narrative of life-saving come from far afield and are generally expressed in unpalatable forms that are all too easily dismissed and discredited. These alternative bioethical positions are often expressed 'primitively' and from the social margins in the form of rumors and moral panics of body theft and organ stealing, some of which turns out not to be so groundless after all. To a great many of those living on the fringes of the new global disorder, the scramble for 'fresh' organs and tissues increases their profound sense of ontological insecurity in a world that values their bodies as a reservoir of spare parts (Scheper-Hughes 1996). While popular resistance in Mexico and Brazil led to revoking new and progressivist laws of presumed consent for the purposes of harvesting organs, such resistance has been ineffectual or lacking with respect to the growth of the international organs market, as those on all sides of the transplant equation have began to accept as normal and routine these nonetheless still largely covert transactions protected by transplant medicine's coyly averted gaze. Throughout these radical transformations, the voice of anthropology has been muted while the high-stake debates have been waged among transplant professionals, bioethicists, legal scholars and economists. But what other human science and discipline is better suited than anthropology to interrogate values and practices from a position of epistemological openness and to offer radical alternatives to the limited pragmatic utilitarianism that dominates medical bioethical thinking today?

<h4><strong>Cadaver link</h4><p>Scheper-Hughes 03</p><p></strong>Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB</p><p><u><strong><mark>The 'demand' for</mark> human <mark>organs</mark>, tissues, and body parts</u></strong> — and the desperate search among wealthy transplant patients to purchase them — <u><strong><mark>is driven</mark>,</u></strong> above all, <u><strong><mark>by the medical discourse on scarcity</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The specter of</mark> long transplant 'waiting lists'</u></strong> — sometimes <u><strong>only <mark>virtual lists with little material basis in reality</u></strong></mark> I — has <u><strong><mark>motivated</u></strong></mark> and driven <u><strong><mark>questionable practices</mark> <mark>of</mark> organ <mark>harvesting</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>with</u></strong></mark> blatant sales alongside <u><strong><mark>'compensated gifting'</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>doctors acting as brokers</u></strong>,</mark> and fierce competition between public and private hospitals for patients of means. But <u><strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>idea of</mark> organ <mark>'scarcity' is</u></strong></mark> what Ivan Illich (1970) would call <u><strong><mark>an artificially created need</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>invented by</mark> transplant <mark>technicians</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and <mark>dangled before the eyes of</mark> <mark>a</mark>n ever- expanding sick, aging and <mark>dying population</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> resulting <mark>artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized'</u></strong></mark> (Bourdieu 1977) <u><strong>as a natural medical phenomenon. In this</u></strong> environment of <u><strong>'survivalist' utilitarian pragmatics</u></strong>, <u><strong>the ethics of transplantation is modeled after</u></strong> classical <u><strong>'lifeboat' ethics</u></strong> (Koch 2001). With ethical presumptions of scarcity, there appear to be clear choices to be made, namely who gets into the lifeboat ('getting on the waiting list'); who will be shoved off the boat when it gets overcrowded (getting triaged while on the waiting list); and who will, in the end, be 'eaten' so that others may live (race and class disparities in organs procurement and distribution practices)? <u><strong>There is little consciousness of the vulnerability of some social classes and ethnic groups who can be described as the 'designated donor' populations</u></strong>, both living and brain dead. <u><strong><mark>In</mark> the United States</u></strong>, for example, <u><strong>where <mark>cadaver</mark> <mark>transplant</mark> continues to be supported as the norm for donation </u></strong>(if not so, increasingly, in practice), <u><strong><mark>the brain</mark> <mark>dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor</u></strong></mark> — including whites, Latinos and African- Americans. <u><strong>The poor and <mark>minorities</mark> <mark>are over-represented</mark> <mark>in</u></strong></mark> the intensive care centers (<u><strong><mark>ICUs</u></strong></mark>) of large urban hospitals, <u><strong><mark>due to their over-exposure to urban violence</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>higher rates of homicide</mark>, suicide and vehicular death, <mark>as well</mark> <mark>as</mark> the cumulative effects of <mark>societal and medical</mark> <mark>neglect</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>The</u></strong> great <u><strong>irony is that <mark>those lacking</mark> public <mark>insurance</mark> </u></strong>(44 million citizens)<u><strong> also <mark>comprise</mark> <mark>the greatest number of those whose family</mark> members <mark>are asked</mark> <mark>to</mark> behave <mark>altruistically</mark> and to <mark>donate</mark> the <mark>organs</mark> and tissues of loved ones</u></strong>. That a great many of these poor, African-American and Latino families refuse to donate should come as no surprise. <u><strong><mark>They are being asked to support</mark> with the bodies of their loved ones <mark>a social and medical system that excludes them</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and within which they have a lower probability of receiving an organ, should that need arise</u></strong>. One needs to be relatively affluent and otherwise healthy and well looked after to be recommended for organ transplant. <u><strong>The much commented upon refusal of African-Americans to donate organs should be seen as a political act of considered resistance</u></strong>. As for living, paid donation, the social inequities are more transparent. <u><strong><mark>Those who sell a kidney</mark> <mark>are</mark> normally <mark>from</mark> social and <mark>economic</mark> <mark>strata where access to</mark> basic medical <mark>care</mark> and necessary aftercare <mark>are</mark> most often <mark>lacking</u></strong></mark>. But to date <u><strong>the only dissident voices raised against</u></strong> <u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong>dominant transplant narrative of life-saving come</u></strong> <u><strong>from</u></strong> far afield and are generally expressed in <u><strong>unpalatable forms that are all too easily dismissed and discredited</u></strong>. <u><strong>These alternative</u></strong> <u><strong>bioethical positions are</u></strong> often <u><strong>expressed 'primitively' and from the social margins in the form of</u></strong> rumors and <u><strong>moral panics of body theft</u></strong> and organ stealing, some of which turns out not to be so groundless after all. <u><strong><mark>To</u></strong></mark> a great many of <u><strong><mark>those</mark> <mark>living on the fringes of</mark> the new <mark>global disorder</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the scramble for 'fresh' organs</u></strong></mark> and tissues <u><strong><mark>increases</mark> their profound sense of <mark>ontological insecurity in a world that values</mark> their <mark>bodies as a reservoir of spare parts</u></strong></mark> (Scheper-Hughes 1996). <u><strong>While popular resistance</u></strong> in Mexico and Brazil <u><strong>led to revoking new</u></strong> and progressivist <u><strong>laws of presumed consent</u></strong> for the purposes of harvesting organs, such resistance has been ineffectual or lacking with respect to the growth of the international organs market, as those on all sides of the transplant equation have began to accept as normal and routine these nonetheless still largely covert transactions protected by transplant medicine's coyly averted gaze. <u><strong>Throughout these radical transformations, <mark>the voice of anthropology has been</mark> <mark>muted</u></strong> <u><strong>while</mark> the high-stake <mark>debates have been waged among</mark> transplant professionals, <mark>bioethicists, legal scholars and economists</u></strong></mark>. But what other human science and discipline is better suited than anthropology to interrogate values and practices from a position of epistemological openness and to offer radical alternatives to the limited pragmatic utilitarianism that dominates medical bioethical thinking today? </p>

Scheper-Hughes 03

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Scheper-Hughes 03 fulltext: Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB The 'demand' for human organs, tissues, and body parts — and the desperate search among wealthy transplant patients to purchase them — is driven, above all, by the medical discourse on scarcity. The specter of long transplant 'waiting lists' — sometimes only virtual lists with little material basis in reality I — has motivated and driven questionable practices of organ harvesting with blatant sales alongside 'compensated gifting', doctors acting as brokers, and fierce competition between public and private hospitals for patients of means. But the very idea of organ 'scarcity' is what Ivan Illich (1970) would call an artificially created need, invented by transplant technicians and dangled before the eyes of an ever- expanding sick, aging and dying population. The resulting artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized' (Bourdieu 1977) as a natural medical phenomenon. In this environment of 'survivalist' utilitarian pragmatics, the ethics of transplantation is modeled after classical 'lifeboat' ethics (Koch 2001). With ethical presumptions of scarcity, there appear to be clear choices to be made, namely who gets into the lifeboat ('getting on the waiting list'); who will be shoved off the boat when it gets overcrowded (getting triaged while on the waiting list); and who will, in the end, be 'eaten' so that others may live (race and class disparities in organs procurement and distribution practices)? There is little consciousness of the vulnerability of some social classes and ethnic groups who can be described as the 'designated donor' populations, both living and brain dead. In the United States, for example, where cadaver transplant continues to be supported as the norm for donation (if not so, increasingly, in practice), the brain dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor — including whites, Latinos and African- Americans. The poor and minorities are over-represented in the intensive care centers (ICUs) of large urban hospitals, due to their over-exposure to urban violence, higher rates of homicide, suicide and vehicular death, as well as the cumulative effects of societal and medical neglect. The great irony is that those lacking public insurance (44 million citizens) also comprise the greatest number of those whose family members are asked to behave altruistically and to donate the organs and tissues of loved ones. That a great many of these poor, African-American and Latino families refuse to donate should come as no surprise. They are being asked to support with the bodies of their loved ones a social and medical system that excludes them and within which they have a lower probability of receiving an organ, should that need arise. One needs to be relatively affluent and otherwise healthy and well looked after to be recommended for organ transplant. The much commented upon refusal of African-Americans to donate organs should be seen as a political act of considered resistance. As for living, paid donation, the social inequities are more transparent. Those who sell a kidney are normally from social and economic strata where access to basic medical care and necessary aftercare are most often lacking. But to date the only dissident voices raised against the dominant transplant narrative of life-saving come from far afield and are generally expressed in unpalatable forms that are all too easily dismissed and discredited. These alternative bioethical positions are often expressed 'primitively' and from the social margins in the form of rumors and moral panics of body theft and organ stealing, some of which turns out not to be so groundless after all. To a great many of those living on the fringes of the new global disorder, the scramble for 'fresh' organs and tissues increases their profound sense of ontological insecurity in a world that values their bodies as a reservoir of spare parts (Scheper-Hughes 1996). While popular resistance in Mexico and Brazil led to revoking new and progressivist laws of presumed consent for the purposes of harvesting organs, such resistance has been ineffectual or lacking with respect to the growth of the international organs market, as those on all sides of the transplant equation have began to accept as normal and routine these nonetheless still largely covert transactions protected by transplant medicine's coyly averted gaze. Throughout these radical transformations, the voice of anthropology has been muted while the high-stake debates have been waged among transplant professionals, bioethicists, legal scholars and economists. But what other human science and discipline is better suited than anthropology to interrogate values and practices from a position of epistemological openness and to offer radical alternatives to the limited pragmatic utilitarianism that dominates medical bioethical thinking today? [/INST] <h4><strong>Cadaver link</h4><p>Scheper-Hughes 03</p><p></strong>Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB</p><p><u><strong><mark>The 'demand' for</mark> human <mark>organs</mark>, tissues, and body parts</u></strong> — and the desperate search among wealthy transplant patients to purchase them — <u><strong><mark>is driven</mark>,</u></strong> above all, <u><strong><mark>by the medical discourse on scarcity</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The specter of</mark> long transplant 'waiting lists'</u></strong> — sometimes <u><strong>only <mark>virtual lists with little material basis in reality</u></strong></mark> I — has <u><strong><mark>motivated</u></strong></mark> and driven <u><strong><mark>questionable practices</mark> <mark>of</mark> organ <mark>harvesting</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>with</u></strong></mark> blatant sales alongside <u><strong><mark>'compensated gifting'</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>doctors acting as brokers</u></strong>,</mark> and fierce competition between public and private hospitals for patients of means. But <u><strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>idea of</mark> organ <mark>'scarcity' is</u></strong></mark> what Ivan Illich (1970) would call <u><strong><mark>an artificially created need</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>invented by</mark> transplant <mark>technicians</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and <mark>dangled before the eyes of</mark> <mark>a</mark>n ever- expanding sick, aging and <mark>dying population</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> resulting <mark>artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized'</u></strong></mark> (Bourdieu 1977) <u><strong>as a natural medical phenomenon. In this</u></strong> environment of <u><strong>'survivalist' utilitarian pragmatics</u></strong>, <u><strong>the ethics of transplantation is modeled after</u></strong> classical <u><strong>'lifeboat' ethics</u></strong> (Koch 2001). With ethical presumptions of scarcity, there appear to be clear choices to be made, namely who gets into the lifeboat ('getting on the waiting list'); who will be shoved off the boat when it gets overcrowded (getting triaged while on the waiting list); and who will, in the end, be 'eaten' so that others may live (race and class disparities in organs procurement and distribution practices)? <u><strong>There is little consciousness of the vulnerability of some social classes and ethnic groups who can be described as the 'designated donor' populations</u></strong>, both living and brain dead. <u><strong><mark>In</mark> the United States</u></strong>, for example, <u><strong>where <mark>cadaver</mark> <mark>transplant</mark> continues to be supported as the norm for donation </u></strong>(if not so, increasingly, in practice), <u><strong><mark>the brain</mark> <mark>dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor</u></strong></mark> — including whites, Latinos and African- Americans. <u><strong>The poor and <mark>minorities</mark> <mark>are over-represented</mark> <mark>in</u></strong></mark> the intensive care centers (<u><strong><mark>ICUs</u></strong></mark>) of large urban hospitals, <u><strong><mark>due to their over-exposure to urban violence</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>higher rates of homicide</mark>, suicide and vehicular death, <mark>as well</mark> <mark>as</mark> the cumulative effects of <mark>societal and medical</mark> <mark>neglect</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>The</u></strong> great <u><strong>irony is that <mark>those lacking</mark> public <mark>insurance</mark> </u></strong>(44 million citizens)<u><strong> also <mark>comprise</mark> <mark>the greatest number of those whose family</mark> members <mark>are asked</mark> <mark>to</mark> behave <mark>altruistically</mark> and to <mark>donate</mark> the <mark>organs</mark> and tissues of loved ones</u></strong>. That a great many of these poor, African-American and Latino families refuse to donate should come as no surprise. <u><strong><mark>They are being asked to support</mark> with the bodies of their loved ones <mark>a social and medical system that excludes them</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and within which they have a lower probability of receiving an organ, should that need arise</u></strong>. One needs to be relatively affluent and otherwise healthy and well looked after to be recommended for organ transplant. <u><strong>The much commented upon refusal of African-Americans to donate organs should be seen as a political act of considered resistance</u></strong>. As for living, paid donation, the social inequities are more transparent. <u><strong><mark>Those who sell a kidney</mark> <mark>are</mark> normally <mark>from</mark> social and <mark>economic</mark> <mark>strata where access to</mark> basic medical <mark>care</mark> and necessary aftercare <mark>are</mark> most often <mark>lacking</u></strong></mark>. But to date <u><strong>the only dissident voices raised against</u></strong> <u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong>dominant transplant narrative of life-saving come</u></strong> <u><strong>from</u></strong> far afield and are generally expressed in <u><strong>unpalatable forms that are all too easily dismissed and discredited</u></strong>. <u><strong>These alternative</u></strong> <u><strong>bioethical positions are</u></strong> often <u><strong>expressed 'primitively' and from the social margins in the form of</u></strong> rumors and <u><strong>moral panics of body theft</u></strong> and organ stealing, some of which turns out not to be so groundless after all. <u><strong><mark>To</u></strong></mark> a great many of <u><strong><mark>those</mark> <mark>living on the fringes of</mark> the new <mark>global disorder</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the scramble for 'fresh' organs</u></strong></mark> and tissues <u><strong><mark>increases</mark> their profound sense of <mark>ontological insecurity in a world that values</mark> their <mark>bodies as a reservoir of spare parts</u></strong></mark> (Scheper-Hughes 1996). <u><strong>While popular resistance</u></strong> in Mexico and Brazil <u><strong>led to revoking new</u></strong> and progressivist <u><strong>laws of presumed consent</u></strong> for the purposes of harvesting organs, such resistance has been ineffectual or lacking with respect to the growth of the international organs market, as those on all sides of the transplant equation have began to accept as normal and routine these nonetheless still largely covert transactions protected by transplant medicine's coyly averted gaze. <u><strong>Throughout these radical transformations, <mark>the voice of anthropology has been</mark> <mark>muted</u></strong> <u><strong>while</mark> the high-stake <mark>debates have been waged among</mark> transplant professionals, <mark>bioethicists, legal scholars and economists</u></strong></mark>. But what other human science and discipline is better suited than anthropology to interrogate values and practices from a position of epistemological openness and to offer radical alternatives to the limited pragmatic utilitarianism that dominates medical bioethical thinking today? </p> </s>

Systematic oppression of capitalism cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales -- their attempt at curbing violence through market based solutions ensures serial policy failure

, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries the Journal of the American Medical Association JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants had sold a kidney to pay off debts The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization At an average elapsed time most families reported worsened economic conditions with annual incomes dropping pro-market perspectives dogmatically ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health through violence and infectious disease As the use of live kidney donors has moved , to areas of high risk in the developing world surgeons have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population Asking the world‟s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people Such motives instrumentalize the poor turning their suffering into an opportunity The “quantification of suffering” misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects If the “supply side” has been distorted the recipient side has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude that views all conditions as treatable classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation including those over 70 years This new category of patients does not stand to benefit from transplantation because their conditions make rejection likely As transplant technology advances this demand will likely increase along lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them it make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world‟s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism As if it weren‟t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and labor are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio the world‟s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world‟s elite can have longer more comfortable lives such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others.

The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization pro-market perspectives dogmatically ignore realities faced by sellers kidney face extraordinary threats to their health through violence and disease surgeons become complicit in suffering of a hidden population Asking the world‟s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an exacerbation of already unjust global relations Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs for first-world people motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportuni The “quantification of suffering misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans subjects the “supply side” has been distorted the recipient side has been manipulated by technoscientific insistence on the extension of artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude the world‟s most vulnerable are asked to surrender their bodies so the elite can have longer, more comfortable lives

David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in order to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants (96%) had sold a kidney to pay off debts and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). At an average elapsed time of 6 years after the nephrectomy, most families reported worsened economic conditions since the surgery, with annual incomes dropping from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these pro-market perspectives, though perhaps not blindly, dogmatically pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world: Organs Watch has found that living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health and personal safety through violence, accidents and infectious disease that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. As the use of live kidney donors has moved from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances, to areas of high risk in the developing world, transplant surgeons [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. Asking the world‟s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations. Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales, and advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people. Such motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportunity” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). The “quantification of suffering” assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects (Donovan, 2007, 64). If the “supply side” has been distorted by this distributive paradigm, the recipient side also has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life. Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views any and all conditions as treatable, and now new classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation, including “those over 70 years, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). This new category of patients does not stand to benefit much from transplantation because their ages and medical conditions make rejection likely: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. As transplant technology advances, this demand from a broadened patient pool will likely increase, along with the persistent lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries. Meanwhile, viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, it does make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world‟s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism. As if it weren‟t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and that labor and environmental standards are gutted by the trend towards globalization, the world‟s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world‟s elite can have longer, more comfortable lives. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others.

<h4><strong>Systematic oppression of capitalism cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales -- their attempt at curbing violence through market based solutions ensures serial policy failure</h4><p>Dillard-Wright 12</p><p></strong>David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals<u><strong>, 20(2), 138-153, AB </p><p>Very few studies have been made in</u></strong> order <u><strong>to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries</u></strong>. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in <u><strong>the Journal of the American Medical Association</u></strong> (<u><strong>JAMA</u></strong>) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA <u><strong>study found that nearly all of the study participants</u></strong> (96%) <u><strong>had sold a kidney to pay off debts</u></strong> and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). <u><strong><mark>The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription</u></strong>” <u><strong>resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization</u></strong></mark> (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). <u><strong>At an average elapsed time</u></strong> of 6 years after the nephrectomy, <u><strong>most families reported worsened economic conditions </u></strong>since the surgery, <u><strong>with annual incomes dropping</u></strong> from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these <u><strong><mark>pro-market perspectives</u></strong></mark>, though perhaps not blindly, <u><strong><mark>dogmatically</u></strong></mark> pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), <u><strong><mark>ignore</mark> the <mark>realities faced by</mark> many kidney <mark>sellers</mark> around the world</u></strong>: Organs Watch has found that <u><strong>living <mark>kidney</mark> donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons <mark>face</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>extraordinary threats to their health</u></strong></mark> and personal safety <u><strong><mark>through violence</u></strong></mark>, accidents <u><strong><mark>and</mark> infectious <mark>disease</u></strong></mark> that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. <u><strong>As the use of live kidney donors has moved </u></strong>from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances<u><strong>, to areas of high risk in the developing world</u></strong>, transplant <u><strong><mark>surgeons</u></strong></mark> [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] <u><strong>have <mark>become</mark> <mark>complicit in</mark> the needless <mark>suffering of a hidden population</mark> </u></strong>(Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. <u><strong><mark>Asking the world‟s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical</mark> <mark>conditions is an</mark> unconscionable <mark>exacerbation of</mark> an <mark>already unjust</mark> set of <mark>global relations</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Systematic</mark> <mark>wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>arising from </mark>the <mark>ulterior</mark> <mark>motive of increasing the supply</mark> <mark>of organs</mark> available <mark>for first-world</mark> <mark>people</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Such <mark>motives instrumentalize the poor</u></strong>, “<u><strong>turning their suffering into an opportuni</mark>ty</u></strong>” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>“quantification of suffering</mark>”</u></strong> assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) <u><strong><mark>misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses</u></strong>: <u><strong>this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans </mark>and animal <mark>subjects</u></strong></mark> (Donovan, 2007, 64). <u><strong>If <mark>the “supply side” has been distorted</u></strong></mark> by this distributive paradigm, <u><strong><mark>the recipient</mark> <mark>side</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>has been</mark> <mark>manipulated</mark> <mark>by</mark> the <mark>technoscientific insistence on the extension of</mark> life</u></strong>. <u><strong>Transplant lists</u></strong> <u><strong>have been <mark>artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude</u></strong></mark> towards medicine <u><strong>that views</u></strong> any and<u><strong> all conditions as treatable</u></strong>, and now new <u><strong>classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation</u></strong>, <u><strong>including</u></strong> “<u><strong>those over 70 years</u></strong>, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). <u><strong>This new category of patients does not stand to benefit</u></strong> much <u><strong>from transplantation</u></strong> <u><strong>because</u></strong> <u><strong>their</u></strong> ages and medical <u><strong>conditions make rejection likely</u></strong>: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. <u><strong>As transplant technology advances</u></strong>, <u><strong>this demand</u></strong> from a broadened patient pool <u><strong>will likely increase</u></strong>, <u><strong>along</u></strong> with the persistent <u><strong>lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries</u></strong>. Meanwhile, <u><strong>viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist</u></strong> (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). <u><strong>Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs</u></strong>, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that <u><strong>many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them</u></strong> (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, <u><strong>it</u></strong> does <u><strong>make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world‟s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism</u></strong>. <u><strong>As if it weren‟t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong>labor</u></strong> and environmental standards <u><strong>are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio</u></strong>n, <u><strong><mark>the world‟s most vulnerable are</mark> now <mark>asked to surrender their</mark> very <mark>bodies</mark> <mark>so</mark> that <mark>the</mark> world‟s <mark>elite</mark> <mark>can have longer</u></strong>, <u><strong>more comfortable lives</u></strong></mark>. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, <u><strong>such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others. </p></u></strong>

Dillard-Wright 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Dillard-Wright 12 fulltext: David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in order to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants (96%) had sold a kidney to pay off debts and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). At an average elapsed time of 6 years after the nephrectomy, most families reported worsened economic conditions since the surgery, with annual incomes dropping from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these pro-market perspectives, though perhaps not blindly, dogmatically pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world: Organs Watch has found that living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health and personal safety through violence, accidents and infectious disease that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. As the use of live kidney donors has moved from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances, to areas of high risk in the developing world, transplant surgeons [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. Asking the world‟s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations. Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales, and advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people. Such motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportunity” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). The “quantification of suffering” assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects (Donovan, 2007, 64). If the “supply side” has been distorted by this distributive paradigm, the recipient side also has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life. Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views any and all conditions as treatable, and now new classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation, including “those over 70 years, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). This new category of patients does not stand to benefit much from transplantation because their ages and medical conditions make rejection likely: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. As transplant technology advances, this demand from a broadened patient pool will likely increase, along with the persistent lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries. Meanwhile, viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, it does make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world‟s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism. As if it weren‟t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and that labor and environmental standards are gutted by the trend towards globalization, the world‟s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world‟s elite can have longer, more comfortable lives. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others. [/INST] <h4><strong>Systematic oppression of capitalism cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales -- their attempt at curbing violence through market based solutions ensures serial policy failure</h4><p>Dillard-Wright 12</p><p></strong>David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals<u><strong>, 20(2), 138-153, AB </p><p>Very few studies have been made in</u></strong> order <u><strong>to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries</u></strong>. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in <u><strong>the Journal of the American Medical Association</u></strong> (<u><strong>JAMA</u></strong>) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA <u><strong>study found that nearly all of the study participants</u></strong> (96%) <u><strong>had sold a kidney to pay off debts</u></strong> and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). <u><strong><mark>The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription</u></strong>” <u><strong>resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization</u></strong></mark> (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). <u><strong>At an average elapsed time</u></strong> of 6 years after the nephrectomy, <u><strong>most families reported worsened economic conditions </u></strong>since the surgery, <u><strong>with annual incomes dropping</u></strong> from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these <u><strong><mark>pro-market perspectives</u></strong></mark>, though perhaps not blindly, <u><strong><mark>dogmatically</u></strong></mark> pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), <u><strong><mark>ignore</mark> the <mark>realities faced by</mark> many kidney <mark>sellers</mark> around the world</u></strong>: Organs Watch has found that <u><strong>living <mark>kidney</mark> donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons <mark>face</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>extraordinary threats to their health</u></strong></mark> and personal safety <u><strong><mark>through violence</u></strong></mark>, accidents <u><strong><mark>and</mark> infectious <mark>disease</u></strong></mark> that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. <u><strong>As the use of live kidney donors has moved </u></strong>from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances<u><strong>, to areas of high risk in the developing world</u></strong>, transplant <u><strong><mark>surgeons</u></strong></mark> [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] <u><strong>have <mark>become</mark> <mark>complicit in</mark> the needless <mark>suffering of a hidden population</mark> </u></strong>(Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. <u><strong><mark>Asking the world‟s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical</mark> <mark>conditions is an</mark> unconscionable <mark>exacerbation of</mark> an <mark>already unjust</mark> set of <mark>global relations</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Systematic</mark> <mark>wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>arising from </mark>the <mark>ulterior</mark> <mark>motive of increasing the supply</mark> <mark>of organs</mark> available <mark>for first-world</mark> <mark>people</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Such <mark>motives instrumentalize the poor</u></strong>, “<u><strong>turning their suffering into an opportuni</mark>ty</u></strong>” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>“quantification of suffering</mark>”</u></strong> assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) <u><strong><mark>misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses</u></strong>: <u><strong>this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans </mark>and animal <mark>subjects</u></strong></mark> (Donovan, 2007, 64). <u><strong>If <mark>the “supply side” has been distorted</u></strong></mark> by this distributive paradigm, <u><strong><mark>the recipient</mark> <mark>side</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>has been</mark> <mark>manipulated</mark> <mark>by</mark> the <mark>technoscientific insistence on the extension of</mark> life</u></strong>. <u><strong>Transplant lists</u></strong> <u><strong>have been <mark>artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude</u></strong></mark> towards medicine <u><strong>that views</u></strong> any and<u><strong> all conditions as treatable</u></strong>, and now new <u><strong>classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation</u></strong>, <u><strong>including</u></strong> “<u><strong>those over 70 years</u></strong>, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). <u><strong>This new category of patients does not stand to benefit</u></strong> much <u><strong>from transplantation</u></strong> <u><strong>because</u></strong> <u><strong>their</u></strong> ages and medical <u><strong>conditions make rejection likely</u></strong>: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. <u><strong>As transplant technology advances</u></strong>, <u><strong>this demand</u></strong> from a broadened patient pool <u><strong>will likely increase</u></strong>, <u><strong>along</u></strong> with the persistent <u><strong>lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries</u></strong>. Meanwhile, <u><strong>viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist</u></strong> (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). <u><strong>Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs</u></strong>, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that <u><strong>many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them</u></strong> (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, <u><strong>it</u></strong> does <u><strong>make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world‟s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism</u></strong>. <u><strong>As if it weren‟t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong>labor</u></strong> and environmental standards <u><strong>are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio</u></strong>n, <u><strong><mark>the world‟s most vulnerable are</mark> now <mark>asked to surrender their</mark> very <mark>bodies</mark> <mark>so</mark> that <mark>the</mark> world‟s <mark>elite</mark> <mark>can have longer</u></strong>, <u><strong>more comfortable lives</u></strong></mark>. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, <u><strong>such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others. </p></u></strong> </s>

Legalization means regulation

, TSW) when considering the moral permissibility of organ sale, it is advisable to focus not on the worst case, but rather on the likely level of harm that would occur within a properly regulated system. the best way of avoiding harm to organ vendors is not to criminalize and drive sale underground but rather to accept and regulate it This style of argument is familiar from other contexts notably debates about the legalization of drugs, and prostitution.

when considering the moral permissibility of organ sale, it is advisable to focus not on the worst case, but rather on the likely level of harm that would occur within a properly regulated system. the best way of avoiding harm to organ vendors is not to criminalize and drive sale underground but rather to accept and regulate it This style of argument is familiar from other contexts notably debates about the legalization of drugs, and prostitution.

(Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/, TSW) 3. Harm and Risk The first, and most straightforward, objection to organ sale is that it is excessively harmful or dangerous for paid organ donors. Present-day organ trafficking certainly does often involve excessive and unacceptable levels of harm. But, as mentioned earlier, when considering the moral permissibility of organ sale, it is advisable to focus not on the worst case, but rather on the likely level of harm that would occur within a properly regulated system. Once this is borne in mind, the harm argument against organ sale appears vulnerable to a number of objections. The first (an empirical point) is simply that the most widely discussed form of organ sale, kidney sale, is not terribly dangerous if performed in good conditions. The UK body NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT), for example, informs us that the risk of postoperative death (to the donor) is about one in 3,000. There is also a small risk (less than 1%) of minor complications (such as chest, wound, or urine infections). As regards long-term health risks, NHSBT claims that there is there is no long-term effect on the health of the donor or on his/her remaining kidney, and that donors are at no greater risk of developing kidney failure after donating than anyone in the general population. So, while there are some not completely insignificant risks to consider, arguably these are tolerable compared to both the risks to the prospective recipient of not receiving the kidney, and the financial benefit to the donor, provided that the level of reward is set at a suitably high level. The second objection says that, if our concern is exposing the organ vendor to risk, then the last thing we should be doing is banning sale since, as Cameron and Hoffenberg put it: It is the marginalization of paid organ donation that leads to its performance in less than ideal circumstances. Paid organ donations need be no more risky than unpaid. In other words, the best way of avoiding harm to organ vendors is not to criminalize and drive sale underground but rather to accept and regulate it. This style of argument is familiar from other contexts: notably debates about the legalization of abortion, drugs, and prostitution.

<h4><strong>Legalization means regulation</h4><p>Wilkinson ‘11</p><p></strong>(Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011<strong> </strong>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/<u><strong>, TSW)</p><p></u></strong>3. Harm and Risk The first, and most straightforward, objection to organ sale is that it is excessively harmful or dangerous for paid organ donors. Present-day organ trafficking certainly does often involve excessive and unacceptable levels of harm. But, as mentioned earlier, <u><strong><mark>when considering the moral permissibility of organ sale, it is advisable to focus not on the worst case, but rather on the likely level of harm that would occur within a properly regulated system.</u></strong></mark> Once this is borne in mind, the harm argument against organ sale appears vulnerable to a number of objections. The first (an empirical point) is simply that the most widely discussed form of organ sale, kidney sale, is not terribly dangerous if performed in good conditions. The UK body NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT), for example, informs us that the risk of postoperative death (to the donor) is about one in 3,000. There is also a small risk (less than 1%) of minor complications (such as chest, wound, or urine infections). As regards long-term health risks, NHSBT claims that there is there is no long-term effect on the health of the donor or on his/her remaining kidney, and that donors are at no greater risk of developing kidney failure after donating than anyone in the general population. So, while there are some not completely insignificant risks to consider, arguably these are tolerable compared to both the risks to the prospective recipient of not receiving the kidney, and the financial benefit to the donor, provided that the level of reward is set at a suitably high level. The second objection says that, if our concern is exposing the organ vendor to risk, then the last thing we should be doing is banning sale since, as Cameron and Hoffenberg put it: It is the marginalization of paid organ donation that leads to its performance in less than ideal circumstances. Paid organ donations need be no more risky than unpaid. In other words, <u><strong><mark>the best way of avoiding harm to organ vendors is not to criminalize and drive sale underground but rather to accept and regulate it</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This style of argument is familiar from other contexts</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong><mark>notably debates about the legalization of</u></strong></mark> abortion, <u><strong><mark>drugs,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and prostitution.</p></u></strong></mark>

Wilkinson ‘11

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Wilkinson ‘11 fulltext: (Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/, TSW) 3. Harm and Risk The first, and most straightforward, objection to organ sale is that it is excessively harmful or dangerous for paid organ donors. Present-day organ trafficking certainly does often involve excessive and unacceptable levels of harm. But, as mentioned earlier, when considering the moral permissibility of organ sale, it is advisable to focus not on the worst case, but rather on the likely level of harm that would occur within a properly regulated system. Once this is borne in mind, the harm argument against organ sale appears vulnerable to a number of objections. The first (an empirical point) is simply that the most widely discussed form of organ sale, kidney sale, is not terribly dangerous if performed in good conditions. The UK body NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT), for example, informs us that the risk of postoperative death (to the donor) is about one in 3,000. There is also a small risk (less than 1%) of minor complications (such as chest, wound, or urine infections). As regards long-term health risks, NHSBT claims that there is there is no long-term effect on the health of the donor or on his/her remaining kidney, and that donors are at no greater risk of developing kidney failure after donating than anyone in the general population. So, while there are some not completely insignificant risks to consider, arguably these are tolerable compared to both the risks to the prospective recipient of not receiving the kidney, and the financial benefit to the donor, provided that the level of reward is set at a suitably high level. The second objection says that, if our concern is exposing the organ vendor to risk, then the last thing we should be doing is banning sale since, as Cameron and Hoffenberg put it: It is the marginalization of paid organ donation that leads to its performance in less than ideal circumstances. Paid organ donations need be no more risky than unpaid. In other words, the best way of avoiding harm to organ vendors is not to criminalize and drive sale underground but rather to accept and regulate it. This style of argument is familiar from other contexts: notably debates about the legalization of abortion, drugs, and prostitution. [/INST] <h4><strong>Legalization means regulation</h4><p>Wilkinson ‘11</p><p></strong>(Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011<strong> </strong>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/<u><strong>, TSW)</p><p></u></strong>3. Harm and Risk The first, and most straightforward, objection to organ sale is that it is excessively harmful or dangerous for paid organ donors. Present-day organ trafficking certainly does often involve excessive and unacceptable levels of harm. But, as mentioned earlier, <u><strong><mark>when considering the moral permissibility of organ sale, it is advisable to focus not on the worst case, but rather on the likely level of harm that would occur within a properly regulated system.</u></strong></mark> Once this is borne in mind, the harm argument against organ sale appears vulnerable to a number of objections. The first (an empirical point) is simply that the most widely discussed form of organ sale, kidney sale, is not terribly dangerous if performed in good conditions. The UK body NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT), for example, informs us that the risk of postoperative death (to the donor) is about one in 3,000. There is also a small risk (less than 1%) of minor complications (such as chest, wound, or urine infections). As regards long-term health risks, NHSBT claims that there is there is no long-term effect on the health of the donor or on his/her remaining kidney, and that donors are at no greater risk of developing kidney failure after donating than anyone in the general population. So, while there are some not completely insignificant risks to consider, arguably these are tolerable compared to both the risks to the prospective recipient of not receiving the kidney, and the financial benefit to the donor, provided that the level of reward is set at a suitably high level. The second objection says that, if our concern is exposing the organ vendor to risk, then the last thing we should be doing is banning sale since, as Cameron and Hoffenberg put it: It is the marginalization of paid organ donation that leads to its performance in less than ideal circumstances. Paid organ donations need be no more risky than unpaid. In other words, <u><strong><mark>the best way of avoiding harm to organ vendors is not to criminalize and drive sale underground but rather to accept and regulate it</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This style of argument is familiar from other contexts</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong><mark>notably debates about the legalization of</u></strong></mark> abortion, <u><strong><mark>drugs,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and prostitution.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

The lit is about regulations and discussions of the extent of regulations is key

The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices An important preliminary point all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care When ethically evaluating organ sale therefore it is best to focus not on the worst aspects of today's organ trafficking practices but rather on what a reasonably well-regulated system of organ sale would look like it should be assumed doctors nurses and transplant coordinators implementing an organ sale system should at least adhere to the standards around consent and clinical care advocated by The Transplantation Society and the W H O

The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices An important preliminary point all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required When ethically evaluating organ sale therefore it is best to focus not on the worst aspects of today's organ trafficking practices but rather on what a reasonably well-regulated system of organ sale would look like it should be assumed doctors nurses and transplant coordinators implementing an organ sale system should at least adhere to the standards around consent and clinical care advocated by The Transplantation Society and the W H O

(Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/, TSW) 1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market. Features (1) and (2) combined are supposed to rule out exploitative organ trafficking from poorer countries, while the ban on direct sales and allocation by a central agency ensure that the organs go not to those most able to pay, but to those in most need. In common with many other defenders of organ sale, Erin and Harris also propose building in practical protections for donors and recipients (e.g., adequate medical care and thorough health checkups before donation takes place). When ethically evaluating organ sale therefore it is best to focus not on the worst aspects of today's organ trafficking practices (since that is not what any serious ethicist is defending or proposing) but rather on what a reasonably well-regulated system of organ sale, controlled by some combination of the medical profession and state regulators, would look like. More specifically, it should be assumed (as it is in what follows) that the doctors, nurses, and transplant coordinators implementing an organ sale system should at least adhere to the standards around consent and clinical care advocated by The Transplantation Society and the World Health Organisation (leaving aside of course those bodies' opposition to organ sale itself) (see Other Internet Resources section below).

<h4><strong>The lit is about regulations and discussions of the extent of regulations is key</h4><p>Wilkinson 11 </p><p></strong>(Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/, TSW)</p><p>1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System <u><strong><mark>The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices</u></strong></mark>. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. <u><strong><mark>An important preliminary point</u></strong></mark> is that almost <u><strong><mark>all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one.</u></strong></mark> Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. <u><strong><mark>Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required</u></strong></mark>, but <u><strong>most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care</u></strong>. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market. Features (1) and (2) combined are supposed to rule out exploitative organ trafficking from poorer countries, while the ban on direct sales and allocation by a central agency ensure that the organs go not to those most able to pay, but to those in most need. In common with many other defenders of organ sale, Erin and Harris also propose building in practical protections for donors and recipients (e.g., adequate medical care and thorough health checkups before donation takes place). <u><strong><mark>When ethically evaluating organ sale therefore it is best to focus not on the worst aspects of today's organ trafficking practices</u></strong></mark> (since that is not what any serious ethicist is defending or proposing) <u><strong><mark>but rather on what a reasonably well-regulated system of organ sale</u></strong></mark>, controlled by some combination of the medical profession and state regulators, <u><strong><mark>would look like</u></strong></mark>. More specifically, <u><strong><mark>it should be assumed</u></strong></mark> (as it is in what follows) that the <u><strong><mark>doctors</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>nurses</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and transplant coordinators implementing an organ sale system should at least adhere to the standards around consent and clinical care advocated by</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>The Transplantation Society and the W</u></strong></mark>orld <u><strong><mark>H</u></strong></mark>ealth <u><strong><mark>O</u></strong></mark>rganisation (leaving aside of course those bodies' opposition to organ sale itself) (see Other Internet Resources section below).</p>

Wilkinson 11

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Wilkinson 11 fulltext: (Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/, TSW) 1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market. Features (1) and (2) combined are supposed to rule out exploitative organ trafficking from poorer countries, while the ban on direct sales and allocation by a central agency ensure that the organs go not to those most able to pay, but to those in most need. In common with many other defenders of organ sale, Erin and Harris also propose building in practical protections for donors and recipients (e.g., adequate medical care and thorough health checkups before donation takes place). When ethically evaluating organ sale therefore it is best to focus not on the worst aspects of today's organ trafficking practices (since that is not what any serious ethicist is defending or proposing) but rather on what a reasonably well-regulated system of organ sale, controlled by some combination of the medical profession and state regulators, would look like. More specifically, it should be assumed (as it is in what follows) that the doctors, nurses, and transplant coordinators implementing an organ sale system should at least adhere to the standards around consent and clinical care advocated by The Transplantation Society and the World Health Organisation (leaving aside of course those bodies' opposition to organ sale itself) (see Other Internet Resources section below). [/INST] <h4><strong>The lit is about regulations and discussions of the extent of regulations is key</h4><p>Wilkinson 11 </p><p></strong>(Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/, TSW)</p><p>1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System <u><strong><mark>The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices</u></strong></mark>. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. <u><strong><mark>An important preliminary point</u></strong></mark> is that almost <u><strong><mark>all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one.</u></strong></mark> Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. <u><strong><mark>Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required</u></strong></mark>, but <u><strong>most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care</u></strong>. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market. Features (1) and (2) combined are supposed to rule out exploitative organ trafficking from poorer countries, while the ban on direct sales and allocation by a central agency ensure that the organs go not to those most able to pay, but to those in most need. In common with many other defenders of organ sale, Erin and Harris also propose building in practical protections for donors and recipients (e.g., adequate medical care and thorough health checkups before donation takes place). <u><strong><mark>When ethically evaluating organ sale therefore it is best to focus not on the worst aspects of today's organ trafficking practices</u></strong></mark> (since that is not what any serious ethicist is defending or proposing) <u><strong><mark>but rather on what a reasonably well-regulated system of organ sale</u></strong></mark>, controlled by some combination of the medical profession and state regulators, <u><strong><mark>would look like</u></strong></mark>. More specifically, <u><strong><mark>it should be assumed</u></strong></mark> (as it is in what follows) that the <u><strong><mark>doctors</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>nurses</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and transplant coordinators implementing an organ sale system should at least adhere to the standards around consent and clinical care advocated by</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>The Transplantation Society and the W</u></strong></mark>orld <u><strong><mark>H</u></strong></mark>ealth <u><strong><mark>O</u></strong></mark>rganisation (leaving aside of course those bodies' opposition to organ sale itself) (see Other Internet Resources section below).</p> </s>

Aff has to defend regulation as part of legalization—any other interp is invented and doesn’t reflect the topic literature

- there are not sufficient solvency advocates for the proposition that organ sales or physician assisted suicide be completely unregulated - informed consent is a huge bio-ethics issue and surely there are going to be some standards. Further there aren't solvency advocates for a completely unregulated legalized market in either prostitution or drugs - certainly existing regulations would apply everyone assumes that legalized drugs would be regulated to some extent like alcohol. legalize is the best stem across the board -- Decriminalization for MJ is going to end up pretty weak because decriminalization advocates assume possession only Its really not considered in the literature to decriminalize

- there are not sufficient solvency advocates for the proposition that organ sales be completely unregulated - informed consent is a huge bio-ethics issue and surely there are going to be some standards. Its really not considered in the literature to decriminalize

(Assistant State's Attorney, Prince George's County, Maryland, JD, Baylor Thomas “ ”http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,5907.105.html) Briefly because have to go back to the prosecution side of this in 30 minutes, but -- We have to allow some mechanism for the Aff to embrace/make some regulations - there are not sufficient solvency advocates for the proposition that organ sales or physician assisted suicide be completely unregulated - informed consent is a huge bio-ethics issue and surely there are going to be some standards. Further there aren't solvency advocates for a completely unregulated legalized market in either prostitution or drugs -- certainly existing labor regulations would apply, most everyone assumes that legalized drugs would be regulated to some extent like alcohol. I think legalize is still the best stem across the board (however you end up phrasing it) -- Decriminalization for MJ is going to end up pretty weak because decriminalization advocates assume possession only and maybe maybe growing a very small number of plants for personal use (Alaska allows you I think 4?) Its really not considered in the literature to decriminalize (as distinct from legalize) sale of narcotics. Decrim for drugs then is going to end up being very weak as the Feds by and large don't prosecute possession, as opposed to distribution or manufacturing for distribution, and something like 17 states have already decriminalized small possession. Decriminalization of possession only is going to be very small affs. Also decrim/legalize doesn't get you out of the regulation query - a number of decrim regimes either involve a number of civil penalties which are essentially regulations (see Portugal) or are specific into the circumstances for which they decriminalize which gets you the same problems (see the Netherlands; only coffee houses, only to club members, only up to a certain THC content).Still think the best option is legalize across the board with the neg getting decrim cp ground against drugs and prostitution.Think enough people want a USFG option that we should have one. USFG solves fine for Organs, Gambling on its own. Can probably win solvency for drugs without getting into the preemption issue just by changing federal laws. Can overturn a court case for PAS (not sure how having to defend a constitutional right vs. the states cp is going to play out - but advantages to PAS are probably philosophical enough in nature that it will be ok). Prostitution is going to be odd on a Fed only topic - but not in a way that hurts the neg - so if there aren't too many affs thats ok. Are there any other Fed only crimes that people are considering other than broader drugs instead of just MJ.?

<h4><strong>Aff has to defend regulation as part of legalization—any other interp is invented and doesn’t reflect the topic literature</h4><p>O’Gorman ’14 </p><p></strong>(Assistant State's Attorney, Prince George's County, Maryland, JD, Baylor Thomas “ ”http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,5907.105.html)</p><p>Briefly because have to go back to the prosecution side of this in 30 minutes, but -- We have to allow some mechanism for the Aff to embrace/make some regulations <u><strong><mark>- there are not sufficient solvency advocates for the proposition that organ sales </mark>or physician assisted suicide <mark>be completely unregulated - informed consent is a huge bio-ethics issue and surely there are going to be some standards.</mark> Further there aren't solvency advocates for a completely unregulated legalized market in either prostitution or drugs -</u></strong>- <u><strong>certainly</u></strong> <u><strong>existing</u></strong> labor <u><strong>regulations would apply</u></strong>, most <u><strong>everyone assumes that legalized drugs would be regulated to some extent like alcohol.</u></strong> I think <u><strong>legalize</u></strong> <u><strong>is</u></strong> still <u><strong>the best stem across the board</u></strong> (however you end up phrasing it) <u><strong>-- Decriminalization for MJ is going to end up pretty weak because decriminalization advocates assume possession only</u></strong> and maybe maybe growing a very small number of plants for personal use (Alaska allows you I think 4?) <u><strong><mark>Its really not considered in the literature to decriminalize</u></strong></mark> (as distinct from legalize) sale of narcotics. Decrim for drugs then is going to end up being very weak as the Feds by and large don't prosecute possession, as opposed to distribution or manufacturing for distribution, and something like 17 states have already decriminalized small possession. Decriminalization of possession only is going to be very small affs. Also decrim/legalize doesn't get you out of the regulation query - a number of decrim regimes either involve a number of civil penalties which are essentially regulations (see Portugal) or are specific into the circumstances for which they decriminalize which gets you the same problems (see the Netherlands; only coffee houses, only to club members, only up to a certain THC content).Still think the best option is legalize across the board with the neg getting decrim cp ground against drugs and prostitution.Think enough people want a USFG option that we should have one. USFG solves fine for Organs, Gambling on its own. Can probably win solvency for drugs without getting into the preemption issue just by changing federal laws. Can overturn a court case for PAS (not sure how having to defend a constitutional right vs. the states cp is going to play out - but advantages to PAS are probably philosophical enough in nature that it will be ok). Prostitution is going to be odd on a Fed only topic - but not in a way that hurts the neg - so if there aren't too many affs thats ok. Are there any other Fed only crimes that people are considering other than broader drugs instead of just MJ.?</p>

O’Gorman ’14

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: O’Gorman ’14 fulltext: (Assistant State's Attorney, Prince George's County, Maryland, JD, Baylor Thomas “ ”http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,5907.105.html) Briefly because have to go back to the prosecution side of this in 30 minutes, but -- We have to allow some mechanism for the Aff to embrace/make some regulations - there are not sufficient solvency advocates for the proposition that organ sales or physician assisted suicide be completely unregulated - informed consent is a huge bio-ethics issue and surely there are going to be some standards. Further there aren't solvency advocates for a completely unregulated legalized market in either prostitution or drugs -- certainly existing labor regulations would apply, most everyone assumes that legalized drugs would be regulated to some extent like alcohol. I think legalize is still the best stem across the board (however you end up phrasing it) -- Decriminalization for MJ is going to end up pretty weak because decriminalization advocates assume possession only and maybe maybe growing a very small number of plants for personal use (Alaska allows you I think 4?) Its really not considered in the literature to decriminalize (as distinct from legalize) sale of narcotics. Decrim for drugs then is going to end up being very weak as the Feds by and large don't prosecute possession, as opposed to distribution or manufacturing for distribution, and something like 17 states have already decriminalized small possession. Decriminalization of possession only is going to be very small affs. Also decrim/legalize doesn't get you out of the regulation query - a number of decrim regimes either involve a number of civil penalties which are essentially regulations (see Portugal) or are specific into the circumstances for which they decriminalize which gets you the same problems (see the Netherlands; only coffee houses, only to club members, only up to a certain THC content).Still think the best option is legalize across the board with the neg getting decrim cp ground against drugs and prostitution.Think enough people want a USFG option that we should have one. USFG solves fine for Organs, Gambling on its own. Can probably win solvency for drugs without getting into the preemption issue just by changing federal laws. Can overturn a court case for PAS (not sure how having to defend a constitutional right vs. the states cp is going to play out - but advantages to PAS are probably philosophical enough in nature that it will be ok). Prostitution is going to be odd on a Fed only topic - but not in a way that hurts the neg - so if there aren't too many affs thats ok. Are there any other Fed only crimes that people are considering other than broader drugs instead of just MJ.? [/INST] <h4><strong>Aff has to defend regulation as part of legalization—any other interp is invented and doesn’t reflect the topic literature</h4><p>O’Gorman ’14 </p><p></strong>(Assistant State's Attorney, Prince George's County, Maryland, JD, Baylor Thomas “ ”http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,5907.105.html)</p><p>Briefly because have to go back to the prosecution side of this in 30 minutes, but -- We have to allow some mechanism for the Aff to embrace/make some regulations <u><strong><mark>- there are not sufficient solvency advocates for the proposition that organ sales </mark>or physician assisted suicide <mark>be completely unregulated - informed consent is a huge bio-ethics issue and surely there are going to be some standards.</mark> Further there aren't solvency advocates for a completely unregulated legalized market in either prostitution or drugs -</u></strong>- <u><strong>certainly</u></strong> <u><strong>existing</u></strong> labor <u><strong>regulations would apply</u></strong>, most <u><strong>everyone assumes that legalized drugs would be regulated to some extent like alcohol.</u></strong> I think <u><strong>legalize</u></strong> <u><strong>is</u></strong> still <u><strong>the best stem across the board</u></strong> (however you end up phrasing it) <u><strong>-- Decriminalization for MJ is going to end up pretty weak because decriminalization advocates assume possession only</u></strong> and maybe maybe growing a very small number of plants for personal use (Alaska allows you I think 4?) <u><strong><mark>Its really not considered in the literature to decriminalize</u></strong></mark> (as distinct from legalize) sale of narcotics. Decrim for drugs then is going to end up being very weak as the Feds by and large don't prosecute possession, as opposed to distribution or manufacturing for distribution, and something like 17 states have already decriminalized small possession. Decriminalization of possession only is going to be very small affs. Also decrim/legalize doesn't get you out of the regulation query - a number of decrim regimes either involve a number of civil penalties which are essentially regulations (see Portugal) or are specific into the circumstances for which they decriminalize which gets you the same problems (see the Netherlands; only coffee houses, only to club members, only up to a certain THC content).Still think the best option is legalize across the board with the neg getting decrim cp ground against drugs and prostitution.Think enough people want a USFG option that we should have one. USFG solves fine for Organs, Gambling on its own. Can probably win solvency for drugs without getting into the preemption issue just by changing federal laws. Can overturn a court case for PAS (not sure how having to defend a constitutional right vs. the states cp is going to play out - but advantages to PAS are probably philosophical enough in nature that it will be ok). Prostitution is going to be odd on a Fed only topic - but not in a way that hurts the neg - so if there aren't too many affs thats ok. Are there any other Fed only crimes that people are considering other than broader drugs instead of just MJ.?</p> </s>

3) It’s arbitrary and undermines research

a clear definition of terms is a precondition Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk exacerbating misperceptions Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research

a clear definition of terms is a precondition Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an ad hoc fashion risk misperceptions Scholars undercut valuable research

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

<h4><strong>3) It’s arbitrary and undermines research</h4><p>Resnick 1</p><p></strong>Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2</p><p>In matters of national security, establishing <u><strong><mark>a clear definition of terms is a precondition</u></strong></mark> for effective policymaking. <u><strong><mark>Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an</mark> erratic, <mark>ad hoc fashion risk</u></strong></mark> alienating their constituencies. They also risk <u><strong>exacerbating <mark>misperceptions</u></strong></mark> and hostility among those the policies target. <u><strong><mark>Scholars</mark> who commit the same error <mark>undercut</mark> their ability to conduct <mark>valuable</mark> empirical <mark>research</u></strong></mark>. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.</p>

Resnick 1 Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Resnick 1 Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 fulltext: In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy. [/INST] <h4><strong>3) It’s arbitrary and undermines research</h4><p>Resnick 1</p><p></strong>Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2</p><p>In matters of national security, establishing <u><strong><mark>a clear definition of terms is a precondition</u></strong></mark> for effective policymaking. <u><strong><mark>Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an</mark> erratic, <mark>ad hoc fashion risk</u></strong></mark> alienating their constituencies. They also risk <u><strong>exacerbating <mark>misperceptions</u></strong></mark> and hostility among those the policies target. <u><strong><mark>Scholars</mark> who commit the same error <mark>undercut</mark> their ability to conduct <mark>valuable</mark> empirical <mark>research</u></strong></mark>. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.</p> </s>

Democrats will win now – new unemployment numbers, but the race will not be a guarantee

A better-than-expected report on the US job market Friday could give a lift to Democrats the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is helping them to stay in the game. Obama is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. incumbents like Shaheen and Hagan would probably be having a tougher time if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment or significant improvement In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The same dynamics also may be supporting Democrats helping to keep their hopes alive in places like Arkansas

better-than-expected report on the US job market could give a lift to Democrats such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is helping them to stay in the game. Obama is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. incumbents like Shaheen and Hagan would probably be having a tougher time In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The dynamics may keep hopes alive in places like Arkansas,

WASHINGTON — A better-than-expected report on the US job market Friday could give a modest to lift to struggling Democrats, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is simply helping them to stay in the election game. Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President Obama, seeking to help his party, is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. “When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic incumbents like Sen. Jeanne Shaheen in New Hampshire and Sen. Kay Hagan in North Carolina would probably be having a tougher time if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) or significant improvement (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The same dynamics also may be supporting Democrats who are behind in the polls – helping to keep their hopes alive in places like Arkansas, even though the political terrain favors Republicans.

<h4>Democrats will win now – new unemployment numbers, but the race will not be a guarantee</h4><p><strong>Trumball 10/3</strong> <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? <u><strong>(+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>WASHINGTON — <u><strong>A <mark>better-than-expected report on the US job market</mark> Friday <mark>could give a</mark> </u></strong>modest to<u><strong> <mark>lift to</mark> </u></strong>struggling <u><strong><mark>Democrats</u></strong></mark>, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and <u><strong>the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent</u></strong> from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. <u><strong>That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, <mark>such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House.</mark> </u></strong>But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. <u><strong><mark>Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market</mark> <mark>is</u></strong></mark> simply <u><strong><mark>helping them to stay in the</u></strong></mark> election <u><strong><mark>game.</mark> </u></strong>Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark>, seeking to help his party, <u><strong><mark>is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement.</mark> </u></strong>“When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic <u><strong><mark>incumbents</u></strong> <u><strong>like</u></strong></mark> Sen. Jeanne <u><strong><mark>Shaheen</u></strong></mark> in New Hampshire <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> Sen. Kay <u><strong><mark>Hagan</u></strong></mark> in North Carolina <u><strong><mark>would probably be having a tougher time</mark> if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment</u></strong> (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) <u><strong>or significant improvement</u></strong> (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). <u><strong><mark>In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls.</mark> <mark>The</mark> same <mark>dynamics</mark> also <mark>may </mark>be supporting Democrats</u></strong> who are behind in the polls – <u><strong>helping to <mark>keep</mark> their <mark>hopes alive in places like Arkansas</u></strong>,</mark> even though the political terrain favors Republicans.</p>

Trumball 10/3 <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? (+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Trumball 10/3 <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? (+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS fulltext: WASHINGTON — A better-than-expected report on the US job market Friday could give a modest to lift to struggling Democrats, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is simply helping them to stay in the election game. Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President Obama, seeking to help his party, is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. “When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic incumbents like Sen. Jeanne Shaheen in New Hampshire and Sen. Kay Hagan in North Carolina would probably be having a tougher time if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) or significant improvement (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The same dynamics also may be supporting Democrats who are behind in the polls – helping to keep their hopes alive in places like Arkansas, even though the political terrain favors Republicans. [/INST] <h4>Democrats will win now – new unemployment numbers, but the race will not be a guarantee</h4><p><strong>Trumball 10/3</strong> <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? <u><strong>(+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>WASHINGTON — <u><strong>A <mark>better-than-expected report on the US job market</mark> Friday <mark>could give a</mark> </u></strong>modest to<u><strong> <mark>lift to</mark> </u></strong>struggling <u><strong><mark>Democrats</u></strong></mark>, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and <u><strong>the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent</u></strong> from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. <u><strong>That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, <mark>such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House.</mark> </u></strong>But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. <u><strong><mark>Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market</mark> <mark>is</u></strong></mark> simply <u><strong><mark>helping them to stay in the</u></strong></mark> election <u><strong><mark>game.</mark> </u></strong>Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark>, seeking to help his party, <u><strong><mark>is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement.</mark> </u></strong>“When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic <u><strong><mark>incumbents</u></strong> <u><strong>like</u></strong></mark> Sen. Jeanne <u><strong><mark>Shaheen</u></strong></mark> in New Hampshire <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> Sen. Kay <u><strong><mark>Hagan</u></strong></mark> in North Carolina <u><strong><mark>would probably be having a tougher time</mark> if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment</u></strong> (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) <u><strong>or significant improvement</u></strong> (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). <u><strong><mark>In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls.</mark> <mark>The</mark> same <mark>dynamics</mark> also <mark>may </mark>be supporting Democrats</u></strong> who are behind in the polls – <u><strong>helping to <mark>keep</mark> their <mark>hopes alive in places like Arkansas</u></strong>,</mark> even though the political terrain favors Republicans.</p> </s>

Marijuana as an issue in the election gives the democrats a win – plan robs them of the wedge issue

By running on pot legalization, Democrats can spur voter turnout and sweep the 2014 Midterms. the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections. If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen. So how can Democrats win big in 2014? It’s simple: run on pot. A recent CNN poll showed that a majority of Americans support legalizing marijuana among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular: over 66% support full legalization. This is great news for the Democratic Party, which has struggled in recent years to turn out voters during Midterm Elections In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people Marijuana is different. It’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion. marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to. By pushing legalized marijuana nationally, Democrats can provide much-needed motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them. Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot just so happen to have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election. This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall). Udall will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch. the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican This presents a golden opportunity to flip seats 4 When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges Legalizing marijuana is the perfect bipartisan solution: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security. It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge. It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them. As crazy as it sounds, pot legalization just might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory in 2014

By running on legalization, Democrats can spur turnout and sweep the Midterms a majority of Americans support legalizing among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular By pushing legalized marijuana Democrats can provide motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them. Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election This presents a golden opportunity to flip seats Legalizing is the perfect solution pot legalization might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory

By running on pot legalization, Democrats can spur voter turnout and sweep the 2014 Midterms. In many ways, the legacy of Barack Obama will be determined by how the final two years of his presidency play out. He will either be remembered as a transformational president who achieved great legislative victories despite unprecedented obstruction, or a president who underestimated the partisanship of the political landscape and failed to deliver on his grandiose message of hope and change. At the moment, you could make the case for either. His accomplishments are impressive: digging us out of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression, passing the Affordable Care Act, getting us out of Iraq and (by the end of this year) Afghanistan, forty-six straight months of job growth, killing Osama Bin Laden. But his first five years in office have also been marred by dysfunction and disappointment, stagnation and inaction. Nothing can get passed in Congress because the Republicans refuse to work with him. No jobs bills. No background checks on gun sales. No extension of unemployment insurance. No Immigration Reform or minimum wage increase. If Obama is to be remembered as one of the great Presidents in history, the rest of his term must be marked by action, not gridlock. He needs a congress that will work with him to pass big, legislative initiatives that improve our country. To accomplish this goal, the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections. If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen. So how can Democrats win big in 2014? It’s simple: run on pot. IT’S ALL ABOUT TURNOUT A recent CNN poll showed that a majority of Americans (55%) support legalizing marijuana, which is a staggering number when you consider that just 34% supported it in 2002. However, when you look deeper into the numbers, it tells a different story. Just 39% of people age 65+ support legalization, and among people age 50-64 the approval rises only slightly to 50%. However, among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular: over 66% support full legalization. This is great news for the Democratic Party, which has struggled in recent years to turn out voters during Midterm Elections, and continued this trend in 2010. In 2008, voters age 18-29 made up 18% of the electorate. In the 2010 midterms, young people accounted for a paltry 11% of the vote. In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people to head to the polls. It doesn’t excite them. They feel invincible and don’t think they need health insurance. It’s too abstract. Marijuana is different. It’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion. Unlike health care, which can feel overwhelming and complicated, marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to. It’s simple and straightforward. By pushing legalized marijuana nationally, Democrats can provide much-needed motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them. Simply put, paying $100 per month for Health Care that you may not even need doesn’t excite young voters, but being able to walk down the street to a pot shop and pay $40 for an 8th of legal marijuana does. Best of all, this isn’t just a theory — the numbers back it up. Election data from the pro-marijuana group Just Say Now showed that in 2008 the youth vote (18-29) stood at 14% in the state of Colorado. In 2012, when a marijuana initiative was on the ballot, that number rose to 20%. In the state of Washington the increase was even more pronounced. In 2008, the youth vote was 10%. With pot on the ballot in 2012 it soared to 22%. If you put it on the ballot, young people will vote for it. THE PATH TO VICTORY Heading into the 2014 Midterm Elections, Democrats control the Senate 55-45. There are 36 open seats, 21 of which are held by Democrats, 15 by Republicans. Democrats can afford to lose up to four seats and still remain in control. It’s a different story in the House, where Democrats are in the minority 201-234. With every seat open — since Representatives are elected every two years — Democrats must flip 17 seats in order to regain the majority. According to a recent Reason.com article, thirteen states could be voting to legalize marijuana in 2014, while sixteen others could be voting to allow medical marijuana. Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot just so happen to have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election. This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall). A fourth Senator up for re-election, Mark Udall of Colorado, will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch. A recent report from the state’s Joint Budget Committee showed that in the first 18 months Colorado expects to generate $610 million in marijuana retail sales and take in $184 million in tax revenue. Aside from full out legalization, the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican. This presents a golden opportunity to flip House seats in states like Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas and Wyoming, all of whom may have medical marijuana on the ballot in 2014. THE TIME IS NOW When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges. Republicans refuse to increase taxes while Democrats refuse to make cuts to entitlements. As a result, methods of addressing our debt and improving our economy are almost impossible to find in Washington. Legalizing marijuana is the perfect bipartisan solution: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security. It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge. It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them. As crazy as it sounds, pot legalization just might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory in 2014, ensuring that the final two years of Obama’s presidency will be marked by action and achievements, not gridlock. All the Democrats need to do is find the courage to inhale.

<h4>Marijuana as an issue in the election gives the democrats a win – plan robs them of the wedge issue</h4><p><strong>Applebaum 14</strong> <Josh, B.A. from University of Vermont and Boston-area columnist, “LET’S WEED OUT REPUBLICANS IN 2014,” March 4, 2014, http://suffolkresolves.com/2014/03/04/lets-weed-out-republicans-in-2014/>#SPS</p><p><u><strong><mark>By running on </mark>pot <mark>legalization, Democrats can spur </mark>voter <mark>turnout and sweep the </mark>2014 <mark>Midterms</mark>. </u></strong>In many ways, the legacy of Barack Obama will be determined by how the final two years of his presidency play out. He will either be remembered as a transformational president who achieved great legislative victories despite unprecedented obstruction, or a president who underestimated the partisanship of the political landscape and failed to deliver on his grandiose message of hope and change. At the moment, you could make the case for either. His accomplishments are impressive: digging us out of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression, passing the Affordable Care Act, getting us out of Iraq and (by the end of this year) Afghanistan, forty-six straight months of job growth, killing Osama Bin Laden. But his first five years in office have also been marred by dysfunction and disappointment, stagnation and inaction. Nothing can get passed in Congress because the Republicans refuse to work with him. No jobs bills. No background checks on gun sales. No extension of unemployment insurance. No Immigration Reform or minimum wage increase. If Obama is to be remembered as one of the great Presidents in history, the rest of his term must be marked by action, not gridlock. He needs a congress that will work with him to pass big, legislative initiatives that improve our country. To accomplish this goal, <u><strong>the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections.</u></strong> <u><strong>If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen. So how can Democrats win big in 2014? It’s simple: run on pot. </u></strong>IT’S ALL ABOUT TURNOUT <u><strong>A recent CNN poll showed that <mark>a majority of Americans</u></strong></mark> (55%) <u><strong><mark>support legalizing</mark> marijuana</u></strong>, which is a staggering number when you consider that just 34% supported it in 2002. However, when you look deeper into the numbers, it tells a different story. Just 39% of people age 65+ support legalization, and among people age 50-64 the approval rises only slightly to 50%. However, <u><strong><mark>among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular</mark>: over 66% support full legalization. This is great news for the Democratic Party, which has struggled in recent years to turn out voters during Midterm Elections</u></strong>, and continued this trend in 2010. In 2008, voters age 18-29 made up 18% of the electorate. In the 2010 midterms, young people accounted for a paltry 11% of the vote. <u><strong>In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people</u></strong> to head to the polls. It doesn’t excite them. They feel invincible and don’t think they need health insurance. It’s too abstract. <u><strong>Marijuana is different.</u></strong> <u><strong>It’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion.</u></strong> Unlike health care, which can feel overwhelming and complicated, <u><strong>marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to.</u></strong> It’s simple and straightforward. <u><strong><mark>By pushing legalized marijuana </mark>nationally, <mark>Democrats can provide </mark>much-needed <mark>motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them.</u></strong></mark> Simply put, paying $100 per month for Health Care that you may not even need doesn’t excite young voters, but being able to walk down the street to a pot shop and pay $40 for an 8th of legal marijuana does. Best of all, this isn’t just a theory — the numbers back it up. Election data from the pro-marijuana group Just Say Now showed that in 2008 the youth vote (18-29) stood at 14% in the state of Colorado. In 2012, when a marijuana initiative was on the ballot, that number rose to 20%. In the state of Washington the increase was even more pronounced. In 2008, the youth vote was 10%. With pot on the ballot in 2012 it soared to 22%. If you put it on the ballot, young people will vote for it. THE PATH TO VICTORY Heading into the 2014 Midterm Elections, Democrats control the Senate 55-45. There are 36 open seats, 21 of which are held by Democrats, 15 by Republicans. Democrats can afford to lose up to four seats and still remain in control. It’s a different story in the House, where Democrats are in the minority 201-234. With every seat open — since Representatives are elected every two years — Democrats must flip 17 seats in order to regain the majority. According to a recent Reason.com article, thirteen states could be voting to legalize marijuana in 2014, while sixteen others could be voting to allow medical marijuana. <u><strong><mark>Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot </mark>just so happen to <mark>have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall).</u></strong> A fourth Senator up for re-election, Mark <u><strong>Udall</u></strong> of Colorado, <u><strong>will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch.</u></strong> A recent report from the state’s Joint Budget Committee showed that in the first 18 months Colorado expects to generate $610 million in marijuana retail sales and take in $184 million in tax revenue. Aside from full out legalization, <u><strong>the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This presents a golden opportunity to flip</u></strong></mark> House <u><strong><mark>seats</u></strong></mark> in states like Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas and Wyoming, all of whom may have medical marijuana on the ballot in 201<u><strong>4</u></strong>. THE TIME IS NOW <u><strong>When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges</u></strong>. Republicans refuse to increase taxes while Democrats refuse to make cuts to entitlements. As a result, methods of addressing our debt and improving our economy are almost impossible to find in Washington. <u><strong><mark>Legalizing </mark>marijuana <mark>is the perfect</mark> bipartisan <mark>solution</mark>: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security.</u></strong> <u><strong>It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge. It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them. As crazy as it sounds, <mark>pot legalization</mark> just <mark>might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory </mark>in 2014</u></strong>, ensuring that the final two years of Obama’s presidency will be marked by action and achievements, not gridlock. All the Democrats need to do is find the courage to inhale.</p>

Applebaum 14 <Josh, B.A. from University of Vermont and Boston-area columnist, “LET’S WEED OUT REPUBLICANS IN 2014,” March 4, 2014, http://suffolkresolves.com/2014/03/04/lets-weed-out-republicans-in-2014/>#SPS

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Applebaum 14 <Josh, B.A. from University of Vermont and Boston-area columnist, “LET’S WEED OUT REPUBLICANS IN 2014,” March 4, 2014, http://suffolkresolves.com/2014/03/04/lets-weed-out-republicans-in-2014/>#SPS fulltext: By running on pot legalization, Democrats can spur voter turnout and sweep the 2014 Midterms. In many ways, the legacy of Barack Obama will be determined by how the final two years of his presidency play out. He will either be remembered as a transformational president who achieved great legislative victories despite unprecedented obstruction, or a president who underestimated the partisanship of the political landscape and failed to deliver on his grandiose message of hope and change. At the moment, you could make the case for either. His accomplishments are impressive: digging us out of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression, passing the Affordable Care Act, getting us out of Iraq and (by the end of this year) Afghanistan, forty-six straight months of job growth, killing Osama Bin Laden. But his first five years in office have also been marred by dysfunction and disappointment, stagnation and inaction. Nothing can get passed in Congress because the Republicans refuse to work with him. No jobs bills. No background checks on gun sales. No extension of unemployment insurance. No Immigration Reform or minimum wage increase. If Obama is to be remembered as one of the great Presidents in history, the rest of his term must be marked by action, not gridlock. He needs a congress that will work with him to pass big, legislative initiatives that improve our country. To accomplish this goal, the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections. If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen. So how can Democrats win big in 2014? It’s simple: run on pot. IT’S ALL ABOUT TURNOUT A recent CNN poll showed that a majority of Americans (55%) support legalizing marijuana, which is a staggering number when you consider that just 34% supported it in 2002. However, when you look deeper into the numbers, it tells a different story. Just 39% of people age 65+ support legalization, and among people age 50-64 the approval rises only slightly to 50%. However, among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular: over 66% support full legalization. This is great news for the Democratic Party, which has struggled in recent years to turn out voters during Midterm Elections, and continued this trend in 2010. In 2008, voters age 18-29 made up 18% of the electorate. In the 2010 midterms, young people accounted for a paltry 11% of the vote. In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people to head to the polls. It doesn’t excite them. They feel invincible and don’t think they need health insurance. It’s too abstract. Marijuana is different. It’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion. Unlike health care, which can feel overwhelming and complicated, marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to. It’s simple and straightforward. By pushing legalized marijuana nationally, Democrats can provide much-needed motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them. Simply put, paying $100 per month for Health Care that you may not even need doesn’t excite young voters, but being able to walk down the street to a pot shop and pay $40 for an 8th of legal marijuana does. Best of all, this isn’t just a theory — the numbers back it up. Election data from the pro-marijuana group Just Say Now showed that in 2008 the youth vote (18-29) stood at 14% in the state of Colorado. In 2012, when a marijuana initiative was on the ballot, that number rose to 20%. In the state of Washington the increase was even more pronounced. In 2008, the youth vote was 10%. With pot on the ballot in 2012 it soared to 22%. If you put it on the ballot, young people will vote for it. THE PATH TO VICTORY Heading into the 2014 Midterm Elections, Democrats control the Senate 55-45. There are 36 open seats, 21 of which are held by Democrats, 15 by Republicans. Democrats can afford to lose up to four seats and still remain in control. It’s a different story in the House, where Democrats are in the minority 201-234. With every seat open — since Representatives are elected every two years — Democrats must flip 17 seats in order to regain the majority. According to a recent Reason.com article, thirteen states could be voting to legalize marijuana in 2014, while sixteen others could be voting to allow medical marijuana. Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot just so happen to have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election. This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall). A fourth Senator up for re-election, Mark Udall of Colorado, will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch. A recent report from the state’s Joint Budget Committee showed that in the first 18 months Colorado expects to generate $610 million in marijuana retail sales and take in $184 million in tax revenue. Aside from full out legalization, the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican. This presents a golden opportunity to flip House seats in states like Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas and Wyoming, all of whom may have medical marijuana on the ballot in 2014. THE TIME IS NOW When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges. Republicans refuse to increase taxes while Democrats refuse to make cuts to entitlements. As a result, methods of addressing our debt and improving our economy are almost impossible to find in Washington. Legalizing marijuana is the perfect bipartisan solution: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security. It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge. It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them. As crazy as it sounds, pot legalization just might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory in 2014, ensuring that the final two years of Obama’s presidency will be marked by action and achievements, not gridlock. All the Democrats need to do is find the courage to inhale. [/INST] <h4>Marijuana as an issue in the election gives the democrats a win – plan robs them of the wedge issue</h4><p><strong>Applebaum 14</strong> <Josh, B.A. from University of Vermont and Boston-area columnist, “LET’S WEED OUT REPUBLICANS IN 2014,” March 4, 2014, http://suffolkresolves.com/2014/03/04/lets-weed-out-republicans-in-2014/>#SPS</p><p><u><strong><mark>By running on </mark>pot <mark>legalization, Democrats can spur </mark>voter <mark>turnout and sweep the </mark>2014 <mark>Midterms</mark>. </u></strong>In many ways, the legacy of Barack Obama will be determined by how the final two years of his presidency play out. He will either be remembered as a transformational president who achieved great legislative victories despite unprecedented obstruction, or a president who underestimated the partisanship of the political landscape and failed to deliver on his grandiose message of hope and change. At the moment, you could make the case for either. His accomplishments are impressive: digging us out of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression, passing the Affordable Care Act, getting us out of Iraq and (by the end of this year) Afghanistan, forty-six straight months of job growth, killing Osama Bin Laden. But his first five years in office have also been marred by dysfunction and disappointment, stagnation and inaction. Nothing can get passed in Congress because the Republicans refuse to work with him. No jobs bills. No background checks on gun sales. No extension of unemployment insurance. No Immigration Reform or minimum wage increase. If Obama is to be remembered as one of the great Presidents in history, the rest of his term must be marked by action, not gridlock. He needs a congress that will work with him to pass big, legislative initiatives that improve our country. To accomplish this goal, <u><strong>the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections.</u></strong> <u><strong>If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen. So how can Democrats win big in 2014? It’s simple: run on pot. </u></strong>IT’S ALL ABOUT TURNOUT <u><strong>A recent CNN poll showed that <mark>a majority of Americans</u></strong></mark> (55%) <u><strong><mark>support legalizing</mark> marijuana</u></strong>, which is a staggering number when you consider that just 34% supported it in 2002. However, when you look deeper into the numbers, it tells a different story. Just 39% of people age 65+ support legalization, and among people age 50-64 the approval rises only slightly to 50%. However, <u><strong><mark>among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular</mark>: over 66% support full legalization. This is great news for the Democratic Party, which has struggled in recent years to turn out voters during Midterm Elections</u></strong>, and continued this trend in 2010. In 2008, voters age 18-29 made up 18% of the electorate. In the 2010 midterms, young people accounted for a paltry 11% of the vote. <u><strong>In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people</u></strong> to head to the polls. It doesn’t excite them. They feel invincible and don’t think they need health insurance. It’s too abstract. <u><strong>Marijuana is different.</u></strong> <u><strong>It’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion.</u></strong> Unlike health care, which can feel overwhelming and complicated, <u><strong>marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to.</u></strong> It’s simple and straightforward. <u><strong><mark>By pushing legalized marijuana </mark>nationally, <mark>Democrats can provide </mark>much-needed <mark>motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them.</u></strong></mark> Simply put, paying $100 per month for Health Care that you may not even need doesn’t excite young voters, but being able to walk down the street to a pot shop and pay $40 for an 8th of legal marijuana does. Best of all, this isn’t just a theory — the numbers back it up. Election data from the pro-marijuana group Just Say Now showed that in 2008 the youth vote (18-29) stood at 14% in the state of Colorado. In 2012, when a marijuana initiative was on the ballot, that number rose to 20%. In the state of Washington the increase was even more pronounced. In 2008, the youth vote was 10%. With pot on the ballot in 2012 it soared to 22%. If you put it on the ballot, young people will vote for it. THE PATH TO VICTORY Heading into the 2014 Midterm Elections, Democrats control the Senate 55-45. There are 36 open seats, 21 of which are held by Democrats, 15 by Republicans. Democrats can afford to lose up to four seats and still remain in control. It’s a different story in the House, where Democrats are in the minority 201-234. With every seat open — since Representatives are elected every two years — Democrats must flip 17 seats in order to regain the majority. According to a recent Reason.com article, thirteen states could be voting to legalize marijuana in 2014, while sixteen others could be voting to allow medical marijuana. <u><strong><mark>Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot </mark>just so happen to <mark>have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall).</u></strong> A fourth Senator up for re-election, Mark <u><strong>Udall</u></strong> of Colorado, <u><strong>will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch.</u></strong> A recent report from the state’s Joint Budget Committee showed that in the first 18 months Colorado expects to generate $610 million in marijuana retail sales and take in $184 million in tax revenue. Aside from full out legalization, <u><strong>the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This presents a golden opportunity to flip</u></strong></mark> House <u><strong><mark>seats</u></strong></mark> in states like Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas and Wyoming, all of whom may have medical marijuana on the ballot in 201<u><strong>4</u></strong>. THE TIME IS NOW <u><strong>When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges</u></strong>. Republicans refuse to increase taxes while Democrats refuse to make cuts to entitlements. As a result, methods of addressing our debt and improving our economy are almost impossible to find in Washington. <u><strong><mark>Legalizing </mark>marijuana <mark>is the perfect</mark> bipartisan <mark>solution</mark>: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security.</u></strong> <u><strong>It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge. It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them. As crazy as it sounds, <mark>pot legalization</mark> just <mark>might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory </mark>in 2014</u></strong>, ensuring that the final two years of Obama’s presidency will be marked by action and achievements, not gridlock. All the Democrats need to do is find the courage to inhale.</p> </s>

GOP Senate passes Russia sanctions---Obama won’t block it

Corker introduced a bill that seems designed to destroy what remains of relations between the U S and Russia its provisions would dramatically heighten tensions between Moscow and Washington it would deepen the conflict and shove us to the brink of war The R A P A is just a proposed bill, for now But if the Republicans take the Senate the legislation shows the direction in which Congress will push President Obama as the current standoff intensifies the measure represents a hardline approach the White House is warming to at a pivotal moment in the months-long crisis Its nuclear arsenal the only such arsenal capable of destroying the West imposes an imperative: dialogue if Russia and the U S are quarreling global peace is under threat According to the legislation, the U S and NATO would accelerate European and NATO missile defense efforts The act’s chief clauses would come into force if Putin doesn’t reverse course on Ukraine within seven to 30 days from its enactment How would the Russian president react to such an ultimatum? The former FSB chief would never submit to it damaging economic restrictions would strengthen Russians’ conviction that the West is ganging up on Russia and bent on destroying it If American-made bombs or bullets supplied to Ukraine, end up killing Russian troops Putin would have to respond or risk appearing weak Beyond the R A P A Obama has shown little aptitude for dealing with the crisis in Ukraine

Corker introduced a bill to destroy relations its provisions would dramatically heighten tensions and shove us to the brink of war R A P A is just proposed now. if Republicans take the Senate legislation shows the direction Congress will push Obama the measure represents a hardline approach the White House is warming to Putin would never submit to it If American bombs supplied to Ukraine kill Russian troops Putin would have to respond Beyond R A P A Obama has shown little aptitude for Ukraine

In May, Bob Corker, the ranking Republican on the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a bill of stunning recklessness that seems specifically designed to destroy what remains of relations between the United States and Russia. The legislation’s very name—the “Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014”—is a misnomer, for its provisions, if enacted, would dramatically heighten tensions between Moscow and Washington. By foreclosing the option of doing what we really need to do—launch a serious dialogue with Russia about how to end the Ukraine crisis—it would deepen the conflict there, augment the human misery spreading as a result, and shove us to the brink of war. In fact, the bill is already doing damage to the prospect of peace by serving Kremlin propagandists as a manifesto of U.S. intent to force Russia to its knees and humiliate its leader. It presents an ultimatum to the Kremlin that no head of state, least of all the famously supercilious Vladimir Putin, would accept. The Russian Aggression Prevention Act is just a proposed bill, for now. But if the Republicans take the Senate (and retain the House of Representatives) in November’s midterm elections, the legislation shows the direction in which Congress will push President Obama as the current standoff intensifies. Elections aside, the measure represents a hardline approach that the White House is warming to—at a pivotal moment in the months-long crisis when the Ukrainian military is advancing on the pro-Russian rebel stronghold of Donetsk, and Russian troops are massing on the border. Corker’s document reveals a grave, even inexplicable (in light of history) misapprehension of how to deal with an assertive Russia. Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which put Russia’s socialist, expansionist regime at loggerheads with much of the world for most of the 20th century, the West, and especially the United States, has struggled with a confounding question: What to do about Russia? In the 1970s, the Nixon administration found an answer: détente, a policy predicated not on threats, but on dialogue. Russia is too big, too resource-rich, too vital (as an energy supplier to Europe), and too technologically advanced to disregard (or “isolate” as Obama has said he hopes to do). Its nuclear arsenal alone—the only such arsenal capable of destroying the West—imposes an imperative: dialogue, as distasteful as that may be to many. In short, if Russia and the United States are quarreling, global peace is under threat. Corker’s bill purports to offer a “strategic framework for United States security assistance and cooperation in Europe and Eurasia,” but in fact directs the president to take a number of measures that would imperil both objectives. According to the legislation, the United States and NATO would, in violation of the 1997 Founding Act (concluded between the alliance and Russia), permanently station troops in the alliance member states of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, and “accelerate” (in an unspecified way) “European and NATO missile defense efforts.” (There is much to specify here, since in 2009 the Obama administration, facing strong criticism from Russia and public opposition in the Czech Republic and Poland, the proposed host countries, scaled back plans for missile-defense systems in Eastern Europe.) Unprecedented “major non-NATO ally status” is to be accorded to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Military aid is promised to Ukraine, and cryptic verbiage about providing “defense articles or defense services” leaves open the possibility of doing the same for the other two former Soviet republics. There are many other troubling provisions, but significantly, the bill instructs the president to block Russian assets and dramatically broaden sanctions against Russia if the Kremlin does not withdraw its military from Crimea and the Ukrainian border, and cease destabilizing the Ukrainian government’s control over its eastern regions. It also directs the U.S. secretary of state to “increase efforts [to] … strengthen democratic institutions and political and civil society organizations in the Russian Federation”—which sounds an awful lot like helping NGOs in Moscow promote regime change. (If Putin harbored any doubts that such NGOs were in the pay of the United States and working to subvert him, the bill neatly resolves them.) The act’s chief clauses would come into force if Putin doesn’t reverse course on Ukraine within seven to 30 days from its enactment. How would the Russian president react to such an ultimatum? The former FSB chief, whose 14-year tenure in the country’s highest offices has bristled with televised displays of manliness and derring-do, would never submit to it. Sanctions have so far done nothing but consolidate domestic support for him and his Ukraine policy. Truly damaging economic restrictions would foment more anti-Western (and, specifically, anti-American) hostility and strengthen Russians’ conviction—generated by the virulent propaganda streaming forth endlessly over Kremlin-controlled airwaves—that the West is ganging up on Russia and bent on destroying it. Indeed, this perception is already widespread, and has taken root among many Russians who were previously indifferent to politics or hostile to Putin, whose popularity now stands at 87 percent. The military measures the act proposes are positively dangerous. Providing Western arms, intelligence, and military advisors to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova—all of which are clashing or have clashed with Russia—would make possible scenarios hitherto unimaginable. If American-made bombs or bullets supplied to Ukraine, for example, end up killing Russian troops, or if American intelligence helps Ukraine score significant victories against Russian-backed separatists, Putin would have to respond or risk appearing weak. Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have never formed part of a Western political, military, or economic alliance, though they have participated in NATO’s symbolic Partnership for Peace program. With the exception of Georgia, they do, however, belong to the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States. Just what these countries would bring to the United States and NATO besides trouble is hard to see. Beyond the Russian Aggression Prevention Act, the Obama administration has shown little aptitude for dealing with the crisis in Ukraine, imposing sanctions that have not prompted Putin to quit Crimea or stop supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine, and spouting rhetoric that has only hardened Putin’s determination to not back down.

<h4>GOP Senate passes Russia sanctions---Obama won’t block it </h4><p>Jeffrey <strong>Tayler 14</strong>, contributing editor at The Atlantic, 8/12/14, “The Way Out of the Ukraine Crisis,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/talk-to-the-russians/375898/?single_page=true</p><p>In May, Bob <u><strong><mark>Corker</u></strong></mark>, the ranking Republican on the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, <u><strong><mark>introduced a bill</u></strong></mark> of stunning recklessness <u><strong>that seems</u></strong> specifically <u><strong>designed <mark>to destroy</mark> what remains of <mark>relations</mark> between the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>and Russia</u></strong>. The legislation’s very name—the “Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014”—is a misnomer, for <u><strong><mark>its provisions</u></strong></mark>, if enacted, <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong> <u><strong>dramatically heighten tensions</mark> between Moscow and Washington</u></strong>. By foreclosing the option of doing what we really need to do—launch a serious dialogue with Russia about how to end the Ukraine crisis—<u><strong>it would deepen the conflict</u></strong> there, augment the human misery spreading as a result, <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong> <u><strong>shove us to the brink of war</u></strong></mark>. In fact, the bill is already doing damage to the prospect of peace by serving Kremlin propagandists as a manifesto of U.S. intent to force Russia to its knees and humiliate its leader. It presents an ultimatum to the Kremlin that no head of state, least of all the famously supercilious Vladimir Putin, would accept. <u><strong>The <mark>R</u></strong></mark>ussian <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ggression <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>revention <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ct <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong> <u><strong>just</mark> a <mark>proposed</mark> bill, for <mark>now</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>But <mark>if</mark> the <mark>Republicans take the Senate</u></strong></mark> (and retain the House of Representatives) in November’s midterm elections, <u><strong>the <mark>legislation shows the direction</mark> in which</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Congress will push</mark> President <mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>as the current standoff intensifies</u></strong>. Elections aside, <u><strong><mark>the measure represents a hardline approach</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>the White House is warming to</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>at a pivotal moment in the months-long crisis</u></strong> when the Ukrainian military is advancing on the pro-Russian rebel stronghold of Donetsk, and Russian troops are massing on the border. Corker’s document reveals a grave, even inexplicable (in light of history) misapprehension of how to deal with an assertive Russia. Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which put Russia’s socialist, expansionist regime at loggerheads with much of the world for most of the 20th century, the West, and especially the United States, has struggled with a confounding question: What to do about Russia? In the 1970s, the Nixon administration found an answer: détente, a policy predicated not on threats, but on dialogue. Russia is too big, too resource-rich, too vital (as an energy supplier to Europe), and too technologically advanced to disregard (or “isolate” as Obama has said he hopes to do). <u><strong>Its nuclear arsenal</u></strong> alone—<u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong>only such arsenal capable of destroying the West</u></strong>—<u><strong>imposes an</u></strong> <u><strong>imperative: dialogue</u></strong>, as distasteful as that may be to many. In short, <u><strong>if Russia and the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>are quarreling</u></strong>, <u><strong>global peace is under threat</u></strong>. Corker’s bill purports to offer a “strategic framework for United States security assistance and cooperation in Europe and Eurasia,” but in fact directs the president to take a number of measures that would imperil both objectives. <u><strong>According to the legislation, the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>and NATO would</u></strong>, in violation of the 1997 Founding Act (concluded between the alliance and Russia), permanently station troops in the alliance member states of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, and “<u><strong>accelerate</u></strong>” (in an unspecified way) “<u><strong>European and NATO missile defense efforts</u></strong>.” (There is much to specify here, since in 2009 the Obama administration, facing strong criticism from Russia and public opposition in the Czech Republic and Poland, the proposed host countries, scaled back plans for missile-defense systems in Eastern Europe.) Unprecedented “major non-NATO ally status” is to be accorded to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Military aid is promised to Ukraine, and cryptic verbiage about providing “defense articles or defense services” leaves open the possibility of doing the same for the other two former Soviet republics. There are many other troubling provisions, but significantly, the bill instructs the president to block Russian assets and dramatically broaden sanctions against Russia if the Kremlin does not withdraw its military from Crimea and the Ukrainian border, and cease destabilizing the Ukrainian government’s control over its eastern regions. It also directs the U.S. secretary of state to “increase efforts [to] … strengthen democratic institutions and political and civil society organizations in the Russian Federation”—which sounds an awful lot like helping NGOs in Moscow promote regime change. (If Putin harbored any doubts that such NGOs were in the pay of the United States and working to subvert him, the bill neatly resolves them.) <u><strong>The act’s chief clauses would come into force if <mark>Putin</mark> doesn’t reverse course on Ukraine</u></strong> <u><strong>within seven to 30 days from its enactment</u></strong>. <u><strong>How would the Russian president react to such an ultimatum? The former FSB chief</u></strong>, whose 14-year tenure in the country’s highest offices has bristled with televised displays of manliness and derring-do, <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong> <u><strong>never submit to it</u></strong></mark>. Sanctions have so far done nothing but consolidate domestic support for him and his Ukraine policy. Truly <u><strong>damaging economic restrictions would</u></strong> foment more anti-Western (and, specifically, anti-American) hostility and <u><strong>strengthen Russians’ conviction</u></strong>—generated by the virulent propaganda streaming forth endlessly over Kremlin-controlled airwaves—<u><strong>that the West is ganging up on Russia and bent on destroying it</u></strong>. Indeed, this perception is already widespread, and has taken root among many Russians who were previously indifferent to politics or hostile to Putin, whose popularity now stands at 87 percent. The military measures the act proposes are positively dangerous. Providing Western arms, intelligence, and military advisors to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova—all of which are clashing or have clashed with Russia—would make possible scenarios hitherto unimaginable. <u><strong><mark>If American</mark>-made <mark>bombs</mark> or bullets <mark>supplied to Ukraine</mark>,</u></strong> for example, <u><strong>end up <mark>kill</mark>ing <mark>Russian troops</u></strong></mark>, or if American intelligence helps Ukraine score significant victories against Russian-backed separatists, <u><strong><mark>Putin would have to respond</mark> or risk appearing weak</u></strong>. Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have never formed part of a Western political, military, or economic alliance, though they have participated in NATO’s symbolic Partnership for Peace program. With the exception of Georgia, they do, however, belong to the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States. Just what these countries would bring to the United States and NATO besides trouble is hard to see. <u><strong><mark>Beyond</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>the <mark>R</u></strong></mark>ussian <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ggression <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>revention <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ct, the <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> administration <u><strong><mark>has shown</u></strong> <u><strong>little aptitude for</mark> dealing with the crisis in <mark>Ukraine</u></strong></mark>, imposing sanctions that have not prompted Putin to quit Crimea or stop supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine, and spouting rhetoric that has only hardened Putin’s determination to not back down.</p>

Jeffrey Tayler 14, contributing editor at The Atlantic, 8/12/14, “The Way Out of the Ukraine Crisis,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/talk-to-the-russians/375898/?single_page=true

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Jeffrey Tayler 14, contributing editor at The Atlantic, 8/12/14, “The Way Out of the Ukraine Crisis,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/talk-to-the-russians/375898/?single_page=true fulltext: In May, Bob Corker, the ranking Republican on the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a bill of stunning recklessness that seems specifically designed to destroy what remains of relations between the United States and Russia. The legislation’s very name—the “Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014”—is a misnomer, for its provisions, if enacted, would dramatically heighten tensions between Moscow and Washington. By foreclosing the option of doing what we really need to do—launch a serious dialogue with Russia about how to end the Ukraine crisis—it would deepen the conflict there, augment the human misery spreading as a result, and shove us to the brink of war. In fact, the bill is already doing damage to the prospect of peace by serving Kremlin propagandists as a manifesto of U.S. intent to force Russia to its knees and humiliate its leader. It presents an ultimatum to the Kremlin that no head of state, least of all the famously supercilious Vladimir Putin, would accept. The Russian Aggression Prevention Act is just a proposed bill, for now. But if the Republicans take the Senate (and retain the House of Representatives) in November’s midterm elections, the legislation shows the direction in which Congress will push President Obama as the current standoff intensifies. Elections aside, the measure represents a hardline approach that the White House is warming to—at a pivotal moment in the months-long crisis when the Ukrainian military is advancing on the pro-Russian rebel stronghold of Donetsk, and Russian troops are massing on the border. Corker’s document reveals a grave, even inexplicable (in light of history) misapprehension of how to deal with an assertive Russia. Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which put Russia’s socialist, expansionist regime at loggerheads with much of the world for most of the 20th century, the West, and especially the United States, has struggled with a confounding question: What to do about Russia? In the 1970s, the Nixon administration found an answer: détente, a policy predicated not on threats, but on dialogue. Russia is too big, too resource-rich, too vital (as an energy supplier to Europe), and too technologically advanced to disregard (or “isolate” as Obama has said he hopes to do). Its nuclear arsenal alone—the only such arsenal capable of destroying the West—imposes an imperative: dialogue, as distasteful as that may be to many. In short, if Russia and the United States are quarreling, global peace is under threat. Corker’s bill purports to offer a “strategic framework for United States security assistance and cooperation in Europe and Eurasia,” but in fact directs the president to take a number of measures that would imperil both objectives. According to the legislation, the United States and NATO would, in violation of the 1997 Founding Act (concluded between the alliance and Russia), permanently station troops in the alliance member states of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, and “accelerate” (in an unspecified way) “European and NATO missile defense efforts.” (There is much to specify here, since in 2009 the Obama administration, facing strong criticism from Russia and public opposition in the Czech Republic and Poland, the proposed host countries, scaled back plans for missile-defense systems in Eastern Europe.) Unprecedented “major non-NATO ally status” is to be accorded to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Military aid is promised to Ukraine, and cryptic verbiage about providing “defense articles or defense services” leaves open the possibility of doing the same for the other two former Soviet republics. There are many other troubling provisions, but significantly, the bill instructs the president to block Russian assets and dramatically broaden sanctions against Russia if the Kremlin does not withdraw its military from Crimea and the Ukrainian border, and cease destabilizing the Ukrainian government’s control over its eastern regions. It also directs the U.S. secretary of state to “increase efforts [to] … strengthen democratic institutions and political and civil society organizations in the Russian Federation”—which sounds an awful lot like helping NGOs in Moscow promote regime change. (If Putin harbored any doubts that such NGOs were in the pay of the United States and working to subvert him, the bill neatly resolves them.) The act’s chief clauses would come into force if Putin doesn’t reverse course on Ukraine within seven to 30 days from its enactment. How would the Russian president react to such an ultimatum? The former FSB chief, whose 14-year tenure in the country’s highest offices has bristled with televised displays of manliness and derring-do, would never submit to it. Sanctions have so far done nothing but consolidate domestic support for him and his Ukraine policy. Truly damaging economic restrictions would foment more anti-Western (and, specifically, anti-American) hostility and strengthen Russians’ conviction—generated by the virulent propaganda streaming forth endlessly over Kremlin-controlled airwaves—that the West is ganging up on Russia and bent on destroying it. Indeed, this perception is already widespread, and has taken root among many Russians who were previously indifferent to politics or hostile to Putin, whose popularity now stands at 87 percent. The military measures the act proposes are positively dangerous. Providing Western arms, intelligence, and military advisors to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova—all of which are clashing or have clashed with Russia—would make possible scenarios hitherto unimaginable. If American-made bombs or bullets supplied to Ukraine, for example, end up killing Russian troops, or if American intelligence helps Ukraine score significant victories against Russian-backed separatists, Putin would have to respond or risk appearing weak. Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have never formed part of a Western political, military, or economic alliance, though they have participated in NATO’s symbolic Partnership for Peace program. With the exception of Georgia, they do, however, belong to the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States. Just what these countries would bring to the United States and NATO besides trouble is hard to see. Beyond the Russian Aggression Prevention Act, the Obama administration has shown little aptitude for dealing with the crisis in Ukraine, imposing sanctions that have not prompted Putin to quit Crimea or stop supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine, and spouting rhetoric that has only hardened Putin’s determination to not back down. [/INST] <h4>GOP Senate passes Russia sanctions---Obama won’t block it </h4><p>Jeffrey <strong>Tayler 14</strong>, contributing editor at The Atlantic, 8/12/14, “The Way Out of the Ukraine Crisis,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/talk-to-the-russians/375898/?single_page=true</p><p>In May, Bob <u><strong><mark>Corker</u></strong></mark>, the ranking Republican on the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, <u><strong><mark>introduced a bill</u></strong></mark> of stunning recklessness <u><strong>that seems</u></strong> specifically <u><strong>designed <mark>to destroy</mark> what remains of <mark>relations</mark> between the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>and Russia</u></strong>. The legislation’s very name—the “Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014”—is a misnomer, for <u><strong><mark>its provisions</u></strong></mark>, if enacted, <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong> <u><strong>dramatically heighten tensions</mark> between Moscow and Washington</u></strong>. By foreclosing the option of doing what we really need to do—launch a serious dialogue with Russia about how to end the Ukraine crisis—<u><strong>it would deepen the conflict</u></strong> there, augment the human misery spreading as a result, <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong> <u><strong>shove us to the brink of war</u></strong></mark>. In fact, the bill is already doing damage to the prospect of peace by serving Kremlin propagandists as a manifesto of U.S. intent to force Russia to its knees and humiliate its leader. It presents an ultimatum to the Kremlin that no head of state, least of all the famously supercilious Vladimir Putin, would accept. <u><strong>The <mark>R</u></strong></mark>ussian <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ggression <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>revention <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ct <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong> <u><strong>just</mark> a <mark>proposed</mark> bill, for <mark>now</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>But <mark>if</mark> the <mark>Republicans take the Senate</u></strong></mark> (and retain the House of Representatives) in November’s midterm elections, <u><strong>the <mark>legislation shows the direction</mark> in which</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Congress will push</mark> President <mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>as the current standoff intensifies</u></strong>. Elections aside, <u><strong><mark>the measure represents a hardline approach</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>the White House is warming to</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>at a pivotal moment in the months-long crisis</u></strong> when the Ukrainian military is advancing on the pro-Russian rebel stronghold of Donetsk, and Russian troops are massing on the border. Corker’s document reveals a grave, even inexplicable (in light of history) misapprehension of how to deal with an assertive Russia. Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which put Russia’s socialist, expansionist regime at loggerheads with much of the world for most of the 20th century, the West, and especially the United States, has struggled with a confounding question: What to do about Russia? In the 1970s, the Nixon administration found an answer: détente, a policy predicated not on threats, but on dialogue. Russia is too big, too resource-rich, too vital (as an energy supplier to Europe), and too technologically advanced to disregard (or “isolate” as Obama has said he hopes to do). <u><strong>Its nuclear arsenal</u></strong> alone—<u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong>only such arsenal capable of destroying the West</u></strong>—<u><strong>imposes an</u></strong> <u><strong>imperative: dialogue</u></strong>, as distasteful as that may be to many. In short, <u><strong>if Russia and the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>are quarreling</u></strong>, <u><strong>global peace is under threat</u></strong>. Corker’s bill purports to offer a “strategic framework for United States security assistance and cooperation in Europe and Eurasia,” but in fact directs the president to take a number of measures that would imperil both objectives. <u><strong>According to the legislation, the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>and NATO would</u></strong>, in violation of the 1997 Founding Act (concluded between the alliance and Russia), permanently station troops in the alliance member states of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, and “<u><strong>accelerate</u></strong>” (in an unspecified way) “<u><strong>European and NATO missile defense efforts</u></strong>.” (There is much to specify here, since in 2009 the Obama administration, facing strong criticism from Russia and public opposition in the Czech Republic and Poland, the proposed host countries, scaled back plans for missile-defense systems in Eastern Europe.) Unprecedented “major non-NATO ally status” is to be accorded to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Military aid is promised to Ukraine, and cryptic verbiage about providing “defense articles or defense services” leaves open the possibility of doing the same for the other two former Soviet republics. There are many other troubling provisions, but significantly, the bill instructs the president to block Russian assets and dramatically broaden sanctions against Russia if the Kremlin does not withdraw its military from Crimea and the Ukrainian border, and cease destabilizing the Ukrainian government’s control over its eastern regions. It also directs the U.S. secretary of state to “increase efforts [to] … strengthen democratic institutions and political and civil society organizations in the Russian Federation”—which sounds an awful lot like helping NGOs in Moscow promote regime change. (If Putin harbored any doubts that such NGOs were in the pay of the United States and working to subvert him, the bill neatly resolves them.) <u><strong>The act’s chief clauses would come into force if <mark>Putin</mark> doesn’t reverse course on Ukraine</u></strong> <u><strong>within seven to 30 days from its enactment</u></strong>. <u><strong>How would the Russian president react to such an ultimatum? The former FSB chief</u></strong>, whose 14-year tenure in the country’s highest offices has bristled with televised displays of manliness and derring-do, <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong> <u><strong>never submit to it</u></strong></mark>. Sanctions have so far done nothing but consolidate domestic support for him and his Ukraine policy. Truly <u><strong>damaging economic restrictions would</u></strong> foment more anti-Western (and, specifically, anti-American) hostility and <u><strong>strengthen Russians’ conviction</u></strong>—generated by the virulent propaganda streaming forth endlessly over Kremlin-controlled airwaves—<u><strong>that the West is ganging up on Russia and bent on destroying it</u></strong>. Indeed, this perception is already widespread, and has taken root among many Russians who were previously indifferent to politics or hostile to Putin, whose popularity now stands at 87 percent. The military measures the act proposes are positively dangerous. Providing Western arms, intelligence, and military advisors to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova—all of which are clashing or have clashed with Russia—would make possible scenarios hitherto unimaginable. <u><strong><mark>If American</mark>-made <mark>bombs</mark> or bullets <mark>supplied to Ukraine</mark>,</u></strong> for example, <u><strong>end up <mark>kill</mark>ing <mark>Russian troops</u></strong></mark>, or if American intelligence helps Ukraine score significant victories against Russian-backed separatists, <u><strong><mark>Putin would have to respond</mark> or risk appearing weak</u></strong>. Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have never formed part of a Western political, military, or economic alliance, though they have participated in NATO’s symbolic Partnership for Peace program. With the exception of Georgia, they do, however, belong to the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States. Just what these countries would bring to the United States and NATO besides trouble is hard to see. <u><strong><mark>Beyond</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>the <mark>R</u></strong></mark>ussian <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ggression <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>revention <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ct, the <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> administration <u><strong><mark>has shown</u></strong> <u><strong>little aptitude for</mark> dealing with the crisis in <mark>Ukraine</u></strong></mark>, imposing sanctions that have not prompted Putin to quit Crimea or stop supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine, and spouting rhetoric that has only hardened Putin’s determination to not back down.</p> </s>

Triggers U.S.-Russia nuclear war and extinction

The R A P A will set the US on a path towards direct military conflict with Russia US-Russian war is likely to quickly escalate into a nuclear war since neither the US nor Russia would be willing to admit defeat, both rely upon Counterforce military doctrine RAPA, “Provides RAPA would bypass long-standing German opposition to the US request to make Ukraine and Georgia part of NATO civil war in Ukraine could evolve into a Ukrainian-Russian war deployment of US/NATO forces in Ukraine would make it virtually inevitable they would come into fight with Ukraine against Russia RAPA demands that “Russian forces must have withdrawn from Crimea within seven days of the enactment of the Act Not likely in the eyes of Russia, the requirement to “withdraw from Crimea” amounts to a US demand that Russia surrender Russian territory RAPA stipulates that the US does not recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea, Should NATO intervene Russian military action against any NATO member would trigger the alliance’s Chapter 5 mutual defense clause committing it to war with Russia major Ukrainian attack upon Crimea would make war with Russia inevitable Ukraine appears to be preparing for such an assault A US/NATO-Russian war would instantly put US and Russian nuclear forces at peak alert the US and Russia have changed their nuclear war-fighting plans to include preemptive nuclear first-strikes both nations have “tactical” nuclear weapons Peer-reviewed scientific studies predict the environmental consequences of a war fought with only a fraction of US and/or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would wipe out the human race even a “successful” US nuclear first-strike would create catastrophic changes in global weather Nuclear war is suicide for humans no awareness of the existential danger posed by nuclear war is embodied by The Russian Aggression Prevention Act, which will put us on a direct course for nuclear war with Russia

R A P A will set the US towards military conflict with Russia likely to quickly escalate into nuclear war neither would admit defeat deployment of US forces in Ukraine would make it inevitable they would fight Russia Russian action against any NATO member would trigger mutual defense committing it to war with Russia Ukrainian attack would make war inevitable. Ukraine appears preparing for an assault Peer-reviewed studies predict war with a fraction of Russian nuc s would wipe out the human race Nuclear war is suicide for humans existential danger is embodied by R A P A

The Russian Aggression Prevention Act”, introduced to Congress by U.S. Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), will set the US on a path towards direct military conflict with Russia in Ukraine. Any US-Russian war is likely to quickly escalate into a nuclear war, since neither the US nor Russia would be willing to admit defeat, both have many thousands of nuclear weapons ready for instant use, and both rely upon Counterforce military doctrine that tasks their military, in the event of war, to preemptively destroy the nuclear forces of the enemy. RAPA provides de facto NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova via RAPA The Russian Aggression Prevention Act, or RAPA, “Provides major non-NATO ally status for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova for purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense services.” Major non-NATO ally status would for practical purposes give NATO membership to these nations, as it would allow the US to move large amounts of military equipment and forces to them without the need for approval of other NATO member states. Thus RAPA would effectively bypass long-standing German opposition to the US request to make Ukraine and Georgia part of NATO. Germans rightly fear placing US/NATO troops and US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Ukraine, given the profound and long-standing Russian objections against the expansion of NATO (especially to Ukraine and Georgia) along with deployment of European US/NATO BMD. Germany is acutely aware of the distinct possibility that the civil war raging in Ukraine could evolve into a Ukrainian-Russian war. Under such circumstances, deployment of US/NATO forces in Ukraine would make it virtually inevitable they would come into fight with Ukraine against Russia. RAPA would accelerate the “implementation of phase three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach for Europe-based missile defense . . . by no later than the end of calendar year 2016.” In 2012, Russia’s highest ranking military officer stated that Russia might consider a pre-emptive strike against such BMD deployments “when the situation gets harder.” RAPA “Directs DOD [US Department of Defense] to assess the capabilities and needs of the Ukrainian armed forces” and “Authorizes the President, upon completion of such assessment, to provide specified military assistance to Ukraine.” RAPA would have the US quickly supply Ukraine with$100 million worth of weapons and equipment, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, crew weapons, grenade launchers, machine guns, ammunition, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. RAPA requires the Obama administration to “use all appropriate elements of United States national power…to protect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial and economic integrity of Ukraine and other sovereign nations in Europe and Eurasia from Russian aggression.” This includes “substantially increasing United States and NATO support for the armed forces of the Republics of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia,” and “substantially increasing the complement of forward-based NATO forces in those states.” Consequently, RAPA would produce significant buildups of US/NATO forces into Poland and the Baltic States, accelerate the construction of US BMD systems in Eastern Europe, and authorize substantial U.S. intelligence and military aid for Ukrainian military forces that continue to lay siege to the largest cities in Eastern Ukraine. If RAPA did not result in the deployment of US forces to Ukraine, it would certainly position them for rapid deployment there, in the event that the Ukrainian civil war escalates into a Ukrainian-Russian conflict. RAPA intensifies support for ethnic cleansing in Eastern Ukraine In Russia, Putin now is under intense domestic political pressure to send Russian forces into Eastern Ukraine, in order to stop the attacks by the Ukrainian military on the cities there, which were once part of the Soviet Union.These attacks have created an absolute humanitarian catastrophe. On August 5, 2014, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 740,000 Eastern Ukrainians had fled to Russia. They go there because Russia is close, and because most of the refugees are ethnic Russians, a fact that explains why the Russophobes in Kiev have been quite willing to indiscriminately bombard their cities. What is taking place in Eastern Ukraine amounts to “ethnic cleansing,” the forced removal of ethnic Russians from Eastern Ukraine. This is a process that is fully supported by the US; RAPA would greatly enhance this support. Ukrainian military forces have surrounded Donetsk – a city of almost one million people – and have for weeks conducted daily attacks against it using inaccurate multiple-launch rockets, heavy artillery fire, ballistic missiles carrying warheads with up to 1000 pounds of high explosive, and aerial bombardments. Water supplies, power plants, train stations, airports, bridges, highways, and schools have all been targeted, along with the general population. In Lugansk, a city of more than 440,000 people, a humanitarian crisis has been declared by its mayor, because the siege of the city has left it with little medicine, no fuel,intermittent power, and no water since August 3 (three weeks at the time of this writing). After the separatists of Eastern Ukraine demanded autonomy from Kiev, and then reunion with Russia, the government in Kiev branded them as “terrorists”, and sent its military forces against them in what they euphemistically call an “anti-terrorist operation.” Framing the conflict this way makes it politically acceptable to refuse to negotiate with the separatists, and easier to justify in the US and Europe, which have grown accustomed to “the War on Terrorism.” However, the thousands of Ukrainians being killed and hundreds of thousands of being driven from their homes are just ordinary people, trying to live ordinary lives. The New York Times reports the Ukrainian military strategy has been to bombard separatist-held cities and then send paramilitary forces to carry out “chaotic, violent assaults” against them. Many of the Ukrainian paramilitary forces were recruited from ultra-nationalist, neo-Nazi political parties; the Azov battalion flies the “Wolfs Hook” flag of Hitler’s SS divisions. Considering that more than 20 million Russians died fighting the Nazis during World War II, the presence of openly Nazi militias attacking ethnic Russians in Ukraine creates extreme anger in Russia. RAPA supports plans in Kiev for an attack on Crimea The Russian Aggression Prevention Act demands that Russia “withdraw from the eastern border of Ukraine,” which is by definition, the Russian border. In other words, RAPA provocatively demands that Russia remove its own military forces away from its own borders, while Ukrainian military forces are meanwhile massed on the other side, attacking predominantly Russian cities. RAPA also demands that “Russian forces must have withdrawn from Crimea within seven days of the enactment of the Act.” Not likely to happen, given that (1) Crimea was part of the Russian empire from 1783 until 1954, (2) withdrawal from Crimea would require Russia to abandon its only warm water port at Sevastopol, where Russian forces have been based, by internationally recognized treaty, since 1997, and (3) more than three-quarters of all Crimeans voted “yes” to reunify with Russia, a vote which Russia accepted by its subsequent annexation of Crimea. Thus, in the eyes of Russia, the requirement to “withdraw from Crimea” amounts to a US demand that Russia surrender Russian territory. Putin has just taken the entire Russian Duma (the Russian House of Representatives) to Crimea, to address them there and strongly make the point that there will be no withdrawal from Crimea. RAPA, however, stipulates that the US does not recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea, and creates sanctions and legal penalties for anyone who does. RAPA therefore provides both military and political support for Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s stated goat that Ukraine will retake Crimea. This goal was recently echoed by the Ukrainian defense minister, who was applauded by the Ukrainian Parliament when he told them that the Ukrainian army will “have a victory parade in Sevastopol“. These statements are taken seriously in Moscow, where they are viewed as a promise to attack Russia. Thus, Putin’s advisers are telling him he must fight today in Eastern Ukraine, or tomorrow in Crimea. Any Russian military intervention in Eastern Ukraine would certainly be described in the West as Russian aggression in pursuit of empire, which would trigger deafening demands that US/NATO forces act to support Ukraine. Should NATO intervene, subsequent Russian military action against any NATO member would trigger the alliance’s Chapter 5 mutual defense clause, committing it to war with Russia. Any major Ukrainian attack upon Crimea would make war with Russia inevitable. Ukraine appears to be preparing for such an assault by drafting all men of ages 18 to 60 years, in a forced mobilization of its armed forces, which also includes calling up its active reserves of one million men, and bringing more than 1000 battle tanksout of storage. Putin is being told by his close advisers that Ukraine will have an army of half a million men in 2015. RAPA would provide hundreds of millions of dollars to train and arm the rapidly expanding Ukrainian armed forces, and position US/NATO forces for rapid intervention on the side of Ukraine in the event of a Ukrainian-Russian war. Thus, the many political and military provisions of RAPA would certainly act to fully encourage Ukraine to carry out its stated policy to retake Crimea. The Republic of Georgia attacked Russian forces in 2008 with far fewer US promises of aid. Of course, RAPA would also arm Georgia, too. RAPA moves the US towards nuclear war with Russia A US/NATO-Russian war would instantly put US and Russian nuclear forces at peak alert, with both sides anticipating a nuclear first-strike from the other. Both the US and Russia have changed their nuclear war-fighting plans to include the use of preemptive nuclear first-strikes; both nations have “tactical” nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use. The US has 180 B61 nuclear bombs deployed on six military bases of five other NATO states, which would be released to these NATO members in the event of a US/NATO-Russian war. Russia also has at least 1300 tactical nuclear weapons, and Russian war doctrine specifies their use against overwhelming conventional (NATO) forces. Any use of “tactical” or “battlefield” nuclear weapons, by either side, would likely trigger an equal or greater response from the other. During the first Cold War, the US studiously avoided any direct military confrontation with Russia, because it was widely thought that such a war would inevitably escalate to become a nuclear war – which would utterly destroy both nations. However, there seems to be little thought or discussion of this in the US today, despite the fact that both the US and Russia appear to be preparing for such a war. In May, the increasing tensions in Ukraine led both nations to almost simultaneously conduct large nuclear war games. Long-range Russian nuclear bombers tested US air defenses16 times in a ten day period (July 29 – August 7). US and Russian leaders are either unaware or choose to ignore the fact that such “games” and “tests” are a dress rehearsal for human extinction. Peer-reviewed scientific studies predict the environmental consequences of a war fought with only a fraction of US and/or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would likely wipe out the human race. Scientists predict that even a “successful” US nuclear first-strike, which destroyed 100% of Russia’s nuclear forces before they could be launched, would create catastrophic changes in global weather that would eliminate growing seasons for years. Most humans and large animals would starve to death. Nuclear war is suicide for humans, but our leaders still have their fingers on the nuclear triggers. There seems to be absolutely no awareness, either in our Federal government or in the American public, of the existential danger posed by nuclear war. Such ignorance is embodied by The Russian Aggression Prevention Act, which if enacted will put us on a direct course for nuclear war with Russia.

<h4>Triggers U.S.-Russia nuclear war and extinction </h4><p>Steven <strong>Starr 14</strong>, Senior Scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility, 8/22/14, ““The Russian Aggression Prevention Act” (RAPA): A Direct Path to Nuclear War with Russia,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-russian-aggression-prevention-act-rapa-a-direct-path-to-nuclear-war-with-russia/5397171</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>R</u></strong></mark>ussian <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ggression <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>revention <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ct”, introduced to Congress by U.S. Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), <u><strong><mark>will</u></strong> <u><strong>set the US</mark> on a path <mark>towards</mark> direct <mark>military conflict with Russia</u></strong></mark> in Ukraine. Any <u><strong>US-Russian war is <mark>likely to</u></strong> <u><strong>quickly escalate into</mark> a <mark>nuclear war</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>since <mark>neither</mark> the US nor Russia <mark>would</mark> be willing to <mark>admit defeat</mark>,</u></strong> both have many thousands of nuclear weapons ready for instant use, and <u><strong>both rely upon Counterforce military doctrine</u></strong> that tasks their military, in the event of war, to preemptively destroy the nuclear forces of the enemy. RAPA provides de facto NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova via RAPA The Russian Aggression Prevention Act, or <u><strong>RAPA, “Provides</u></strong> major non-NATO ally status for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova for purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense services.” Major non-NATO ally status would for practical purposes give NATO membership to these nations, as it would allow the US to move large amounts of military equipment and forces to them without the need for approval of other NATO member states. Thus <u><strong>RAPA would</u></strong> effectively <u><strong>bypass long-standing German opposition to the US request to make Ukraine and Georgia part of NATO</u></strong>. Germans rightly fear placing US/NATO troops and US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Ukraine, given the profound and long-standing Russian objections against the expansion of NATO (especially to Ukraine and Georgia) along with deployment of European US/NATO BMD. Germany is acutely aware of the distinct possibility that the <u><strong>civil war</u></strong> raging <u><strong>in Ukraine could evolve into a Ukrainian-Russian war</u></strong>. Under such circumstances, <u><strong><mark>deployment of US</mark>/NATO <mark>forces in Ukraine would make it</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>virtually <mark>inevitable they would</mark> come into <mark>fight</mark> with Ukraine against <mark>Russia</u></strong></mark>. RAPA would accelerate the “implementation of phase three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach for Europe-based missile defense . . . by no later than the end of calendar year 2016.” In 2012, Russia’s highest ranking military officer stated that Russia might consider a pre-emptive strike against such BMD deployments “when the situation gets harder.” RAPA “Directs DOD [US Department of Defense] to assess the capabilities and needs of the Ukrainian armed forces” and “Authorizes the President, upon completion of such assessment, to provide specified military assistance to Ukraine.” RAPA would have the US quickly supply Ukraine with$100 million worth of weapons and equipment, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, crew weapons, grenade launchers, machine guns, ammunition, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. RAPA requires the Obama administration to “use all appropriate elements of United States national power…to protect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial and economic integrity of Ukraine and other sovereign nations in Europe and Eurasia from Russian aggression.” This includes “substantially increasing United States and NATO support for the armed forces of the Republics of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia,” and “substantially increasing the complement of forward-based NATO forces in those states.” Consequently, RAPA would produce significant buildups of US/NATO forces into Poland and the Baltic States, accelerate the construction of US BMD systems in Eastern Europe, and authorize substantial U.S. intelligence and military aid for Ukrainian military forces that continue to lay siege to the largest cities in Eastern Ukraine. If RAPA did not result in the deployment of US forces to Ukraine, it would certainly position them for rapid deployment there, in the event that the Ukrainian civil war escalates into a Ukrainian-Russian conflict. RAPA intensifies support for ethnic cleansing in Eastern Ukraine In Russia, Putin now is under intense domestic political pressure to send Russian forces into Eastern Ukraine, in order to stop the attacks by the Ukrainian military on the cities there, which were once part of the Soviet Union.These attacks have created an absolute humanitarian catastrophe. On August 5, 2014, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 740,000 Eastern Ukrainians had fled to Russia. They go there because Russia is close, and because most of the refugees are ethnic Russians, a fact that explains why the Russophobes in Kiev have been quite willing to indiscriminately bombard their cities. What is taking place in Eastern Ukraine amounts to “ethnic cleansing,” the forced removal of ethnic Russians from Eastern Ukraine. This is a process that is fully supported by the US; RAPA would greatly enhance this support. Ukrainian military forces have surrounded Donetsk – a city of almost one million people – and have for weeks conducted daily attacks against it using inaccurate multiple-launch rockets, heavy artillery fire, ballistic missiles carrying warheads with up to 1000 pounds of high explosive, and aerial bombardments. Water supplies, power plants, train stations, airports, bridges, highways, and schools have all been targeted, along with the general population. In Lugansk, a city of more than 440,000 people, a humanitarian crisis has been declared by its mayor, because the siege of the city has left it with little medicine, no fuel,intermittent power, and no water since August 3 (three weeks at the time of this writing). After the separatists of Eastern Ukraine demanded autonomy from Kiev, and then reunion with Russia, the government in Kiev branded them as “terrorists”, and sent its military forces against them in what they euphemistically call an “anti-terrorist operation.” Framing the conflict this way makes it politically acceptable to refuse to negotiate with the separatists, and easier to justify in the US and Europe, which have grown accustomed to “the War on Terrorism.” However, the thousands of Ukrainians being killed and hundreds of thousands of being driven from their homes are just ordinary people, trying to live ordinary lives. The New York Times reports the Ukrainian military strategy has been to bombard separatist-held cities and then send paramilitary forces to carry out “chaotic, violent assaults” against them. Many of the Ukrainian paramilitary forces were recruited from ultra-nationalist, neo-Nazi political parties; the Azov battalion flies the “Wolfs Hook” flag of Hitler’s SS divisions. Considering that more than 20 million Russians died fighting the Nazis during World War II, the presence of openly Nazi militias attacking ethnic Russians in Ukraine creates extreme anger in Russia. RAPA supports plans in Kiev for an attack on Crimea The Russian Aggression Prevention Act demands that Russia “withdraw from the eastern border of Ukraine,” which is by definition, the Russian border. In other words, RAPA provocatively demands that Russia remove its own military forces away from its own borders, while Ukrainian military forces are meanwhile massed on the other side, attacking predominantly Russian cities. <u><strong>RAPA</u></strong> also <u><strong>demands that “Russian forces must have withdrawn from Crimea within seven days of the enactment of the Act</u></strong>.” <u><strong>Not likely</u></strong> to happen, given that (1) Crimea was part of the Russian empire from 1783 until 1954, (2) withdrawal from Crimea would require Russia to abandon its only warm water port at Sevastopol, where Russian forces have been based, by internationally recognized treaty, since 1997, and (3) more than three-quarters of all Crimeans voted “yes” to reunify with Russia, a vote which Russia accepted by its subsequent annexation of Crimea. Thus, <u><strong>in the eyes of Russia, the requirement to “withdraw from Crimea”</u></strong> <u><strong>amounts to a US demand that Russia surrender Russian territory</u></strong>. Putin has just taken the entire Russian Duma (the Russian House of Representatives) to Crimea, to address them there and strongly make the point that there will be no withdrawal from Crimea. <u><strong>RAPA</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>stipulates that the US does not recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea,</u></strong> and creates sanctions and legal penalties for anyone who does. RAPA therefore provides both military and political support for Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s stated goat that Ukraine will retake Crimea. This goal was recently echoed by the Ukrainian defense minister, who was applauded by the Ukrainian Parliament when he told them that the Ukrainian army will “have a victory parade in Sevastopol“. These statements are taken seriously in Moscow, where they are viewed as a promise to attack Russia. Thus, Putin’s advisers are telling him he must fight today in Eastern Ukraine, or tomorrow in Crimea. Any Russian military intervention in Eastern Ukraine would certainly be described in the West as Russian aggression in pursuit of empire, which would trigger deafening demands that US/NATO forces act to support Ukraine. <u><strong>Should NATO intervene</u></strong>, subsequent <u><strong><mark>Russian</mark> military <mark>action against any NATO member would</u></strong> <u><strong>trigger</mark> the alliance’s Chapter 5 <mark>mutual defense</mark> clause</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>committing it to war with Russia</u></strong></mark>. Any <u><strong>major <mark>Ukrainian attack</mark> upon Crimea <mark>would make war</mark> with Russia <mark>inevitable</u></strong>. <u><strong>Ukraine appears</mark> to be</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>preparing for</mark> such <mark>an assault</u></strong></mark> by drafting all men of ages 18 to 60 years, in a forced mobilization of its armed forces, which also includes calling up its active reserves of one million men, and bringing more than 1000 battle tanksout of storage. Putin is being told by his close advisers that Ukraine will have an army of half a million men in 2015. RAPA would provide hundreds of millions of dollars to train and arm the rapidly expanding Ukrainian armed forces, and position US/NATO forces for rapid intervention on the side of Ukraine in the event of a Ukrainian-Russian war. Thus, the many political and military provisions of RAPA would certainly act to fully encourage Ukraine to carry out its stated policy to retake Crimea. The Republic of Georgia attacked Russian forces in 2008 with far fewer US promises of aid. Of course, RAPA would also arm Georgia, too. RAPA moves the US towards nuclear war with Russia <u><strong>A US/NATO-Russian war would instantly put US and Russian nuclear forces at peak alert</u></strong>, with both sides anticipating a nuclear first-strike from the other. Both <u><strong>the US and Russia have changed their nuclear war-fighting plans to include</u></strong> the use of <u><strong>preemptive nuclear first-strikes</u></strong>; <u><strong>both nations have “tactical” nuclear weapons</u></strong> designed for battlefield use. The US has 180 B61 nuclear bombs deployed on six military bases of five other NATO states, which would be released to these NATO members in the event of a US/NATO-Russian war. Russia also has at least 1300 tactical nuclear weapons, and Russian war doctrine specifies their use against overwhelming conventional (NATO) forces. Any use of “tactical” or “battlefield” nuclear weapons, by either side, would likely trigger an equal or greater response from the other. During the first Cold War, the US studiously avoided any direct military confrontation with Russia, because it was widely thought that such a war would inevitably escalate to become a nuclear war – which would utterly destroy both nations. However, there seems to be little thought or discussion of this in the US today, despite the fact that both the US and Russia appear to be preparing for such a war. In May, the increasing tensions in Ukraine led both nations to almost simultaneously conduct large nuclear war games. Long-range Russian nuclear bombers tested US air defenses16 times in a ten day period (July 29 – August 7). US and Russian leaders are either unaware or choose to ignore the fact that such “games” and “tests” are a dress rehearsal for human extinction. <u><strong><mark>Peer-reviewed</mark> scientific <mark>studies</u></strong> <u><strong>predict</mark> the environmental consequences of a <mark>war</mark> fought <mark>with</mark> only <mark>a fraction of</mark> US and/or <mark>Russian</mark> strategic <mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s would</u></strong></mark> likely <u><strong><mark>wipe out the human race</u></strong></mark>. Scientists predict that <u><strong>even a “successful” US nuclear first-strike</u></strong>, which destroyed 100% of Russia’s nuclear forces before they could be launched, <u><strong>would create catastrophic changes in global weather</u></strong> that would eliminate growing seasons for years. Most humans and large animals would starve to death. <u><strong><mark>Nuclear war is suicide for humans</u></strong></mark>, but our leaders still have their fingers on the nuclear triggers. There seems to be absolutely <u><strong>no awareness</u></strong>, either in our Federal government or in the American public, <u><strong>of the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>existential danger</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>posed by nuclear war</u></strong>. Such ignorance <u><strong><mark>is embodied by</mark> The <mark>R</mark>ussian <mark>A</mark>ggression <mark>P</mark>revention <mark>A</mark>ct, which</u></strong> if enacted <u><strong>will put us on a direct course for nuclear war with Russia</u></strong>.</p>

Steven Starr 14, Senior Scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility, 8/22/14, ““The Russian Aggression Prevention Act” (RAPA): A Direct Path to Nuclear War with Russia,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-russian-aggression-prevention-act-rapa-a-direct-path-to-nuclear-war-with-russia/5397171

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Steven Starr 14, Senior Scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility, 8/22/14, ““The Russian Aggression Prevention Act” (RAPA): A Direct Path to Nuclear War with Russia,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-russian-aggression-prevention-act-rapa-a-direct-path-to-nuclear-war-with-russia/5397171 fulltext: The Russian Aggression Prevention Act”, introduced to Congress by U.S. Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), will set the US on a path towards direct military conflict with Russia in Ukraine. Any US-Russian war is likely to quickly escalate into a nuclear war, since neither the US nor Russia would be willing to admit defeat, both have many thousands of nuclear weapons ready for instant use, and both rely upon Counterforce military doctrine that tasks their military, in the event of war, to preemptively destroy the nuclear forces of the enemy. RAPA provides de facto NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova via RAPA The Russian Aggression Prevention Act, or RAPA, “Provides major non-NATO ally status for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova for purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense services.” Major non-NATO ally status would for practical purposes give NATO membership to these nations, as it would allow the US to move large amounts of military equipment and forces to them without the need for approval of other NATO member states. Thus RAPA would effectively bypass long-standing German opposition to the US request to make Ukraine and Georgia part of NATO. Germans rightly fear placing US/NATO troops and US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Ukraine, given the profound and long-standing Russian objections against the expansion of NATO (especially to Ukraine and Georgia) along with deployment of European US/NATO BMD. Germany is acutely aware of the distinct possibility that the civil war raging in Ukraine could evolve into a Ukrainian-Russian war. Under such circumstances, deployment of US/NATO forces in Ukraine would make it virtually inevitable they would come into fight with Ukraine against Russia. RAPA would accelerate the “implementation of phase three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach for Europe-based missile defense . . . by no later than the end of calendar year 2016.” In 2012, Russia’s highest ranking military officer stated that Russia might consider a pre-emptive strike against such BMD deployments “when the situation gets harder.” RAPA “Directs DOD [US Department of Defense] to assess the capabilities and needs of the Ukrainian armed forces” and “Authorizes the President, upon completion of such assessment, to provide specified military assistance to Ukraine.” RAPA would have the US quickly supply Ukraine with$100 million worth of weapons and equipment, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, crew weapons, grenade launchers, machine guns, ammunition, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. RAPA requires the Obama administration to “use all appropriate elements of United States national power…to protect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial and economic integrity of Ukraine and other sovereign nations in Europe and Eurasia from Russian aggression.” This includes “substantially increasing United States and NATO support for the armed forces of the Republics of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia,” and “substantially increasing the complement of forward-based NATO forces in those states.” Consequently, RAPA would produce significant buildups of US/NATO forces into Poland and the Baltic States, accelerate the construction of US BMD systems in Eastern Europe, and authorize substantial U.S. intelligence and military aid for Ukrainian military forces that continue to lay siege to the largest cities in Eastern Ukraine. If RAPA did not result in the deployment of US forces to Ukraine, it would certainly position them for rapid deployment there, in the event that the Ukrainian civil war escalates into a Ukrainian-Russian conflict. RAPA intensifies support for ethnic cleansing in Eastern Ukraine In Russia, Putin now is under intense domestic political pressure to send Russian forces into Eastern Ukraine, in order to stop the attacks by the Ukrainian military on the cities there, which were once part of the Soviet Union.These attacks have created an absolute humanitarian catastrophe. On August 5, 2014, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 740,000 Eastern Ukrainians had fled to Russia. They go there because Russia is close, and because most of the refugees are ethnic Russians, a fact that explains why the Russophobes in Kiev have been quite willing to indiscriminately bombard their cities. What is taking place in Eastern Ukraine amounts to “ethnic cleansing,” the forced removal of ethnic Russians from Eastern Ukraine. This is a process that is fully supported by the US; RAPA would greatly enhance this support. Ukrainian military forces have surrounded Donetsk – a city of almost one million people – and have for weeks conducted daily attacks against it using inaccurate multiple-launch rockets, heavy artillery fire, ballistic missiles carrying warheads with up to 1000 pounds of high explosive, and aerial bombardments. Water supplies, power plants, train stations, airports, bridges, highways, and schools have all been targeted, along with the general population. In Lugansk, a city of more than 440,000 people, a humanitarian crisis has been declared by its mayor, because the siege of the city has left it with little medicine, no fuel,intermittent power, and no water since August 3 (three weeks at the time of this writing). After the separatists of Eastern Ukraine demanded autonomy from Kiev, and then reunion with Russia, the government in Kiev branded them as “terrorists”, and sent its military forces against them in what they euphemistically call an “anti-terrorist operation.” Framing the conflict this way makes it politically acceptable to refuse to negotiate with the separatists, and easier to justify in the US and Europe, which have grown accustomed to “the War on Terrorism.” However, the thousands of Ukrainians being killed and hundreds of thousands of being driven from their homes are just ordinary people, trying to live ordinary lives. The New York Times reports the Ukrainian military strategy has been to bombard separatist-held cities and then send paramilitary forces to carry out “chaotic, violent assaults” against them. Many of the Ukrainian paramilitary forces were recruited from ultra-nationalist, neo-Nazi political parties; the Azov battalion flies the “Wolfs Hook” flag of Hitler’s SS divisions. Considering that more than 20 million Russians died fighting the Nazis during World War II, the presence of openly Nazi militias attacking ethnic Russians in Ukraine creates extreme anger in Russia. RAPA supports plans in Kiev for an attack on Crimea The Russian Aggression Prevention Act demands that Russia “withdraw from the eastern border of Ukraine,” which is by definition, the Russian border. In other words, RAPA provocatively demands that Russia remove its own military forces away from its own borders, while Ukrainian military forces are meanwhile massed on the other side, attacking predominantly Russian cities. RAPA also demands that “Russian forces must have withdrawn from Crimea within seven days of the enactment of the Act.” Not likely to happen, given that (1) Crimea was part of the Russian empire from 1783 until 1954, (2) withdrawal from Crimea would require Russia to abandon its only warm water port at Sevastopol, where Russian forces have been based, by internationally recognized treaty, since 1997, and (3) more than three-quarters of all Crimeans voted “yes” to reunify with Russia, a vote which Russia accepted by its subsequent annexation of Crimea. Thus, in the eyes of Russia, the requirement to “withdraw from Crimea” amounts to a US demand that Russia surrender Russian territory. Putin has just taken the entire Russian Duma (the Russian House of Representatives) to Crimea, to address them there and strongly make the point that there will be no withdrawal from Crimea. RAPA, however, stipulates that the US does not recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea, and creates sanctions and legal penalties for anyone who does. RAPA therefore provides both military and political support for Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s stated goat that Ukraine will retake Crimea. This goal was recently echoed by the Ukrainian defense minister, who was applauded by the Ukrainian Parliament when he told them that the Ukrainian army will “have a victory parade in Sevastopol“. These statements are taken seriously in Moscow, where they are viewed as a promise to attack Russia. Thus, Putin’s advisers are telling him he must fight today in Eastern Ukraine, or tomorrow in Crimea. Any Russian military intervention in Eastern Ukraine would certainly be described in the West as Russian aggression in pursuit of empire, which would trigger deafening demands that US/NATO forces act to support Ukraine. Should NATO intervene, subsequent Russian military action against any NATO member would trigger the alliance’s Chapter 5 mutual defense clause, committing it to war with Russia. Any major Ukrainian attack upon Crimea would make war with Russia inevitable. Ukraine appears to be preparing for such an assault by drafting all men of ages 18 to 60 years, in a forced mobilization of its armed forces, which also includes calling up its active reserves of one million men, and bringing more than 1000 battle tanksout of storage. Putin is being told by his close advisers that Ukraine will have an army of half a million men in 2015. RAPA would provide hundreds of millions of dollars to train and arm the rapidly expanding Ukrainian armed forces, and position US/NATO forces for rapid intervention on the side of Ukraine in the event of a Ukrainian-Russian war. Thus, the many political and military provisions of RAPA would certainly act to fully encourage Ukraine to carry out its stated policy to retake Crimea. The Republic of Georgia attacked Russian forces in 2008 with far fewer US promises of aid. Of course, RAPA would also arm Georgia, too. RAPA moves the US towards nuclear war with Russia A US/NATO-Russian war would instantly put US and Russian nuclear forces at peak alert, with both sides anticipating a nuclear first-strike from the other. Both the US and Russia have changed their nuclear war-fighting plans to include the use of preemptive nuclear first-strikes; both nations have “tactical” nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use. The US has 180 B61 nuclear bombs deployed on six military bases of five other NATO states, which would be released to these NATO members in the event of a US/NATO-Russian war. Russia also has at least 1300 tactical nuclear weapons, and Russian war doctrine specifies their use against overwhelming conventional (NATO) forces. Any use of “tactical” or “battlefield” nuclear weapons, by either side, would likely trigger an equal or greater response from the other. During the first Cold War, the US studiously avoided any direct military confrontation with Russia, because it was widely thought that such a war would inevitably escalate to become a nuclear war – which would utterly destroy both nations. However, there seems to be little thought or discussion of this in the US today, despite the fact that both the US and Russia appear to be preparing for such a war. In May, the increasing tensions in Ukraine led both nations to almost simultaneously conduct large nuclear war games. Long-range Russian nuclear bombers tested US air defenses16 times in a ten day period (July 29 – August 7). US and Russian leaders are either unaware or choose to ignore the fact that such “games” and “tests” are a dress rehearsal for human extinction. Peer-reviewed scientific studies predict the environmental consequences of a war fought with only a fraction of US and/or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would likely wipe out the human race. Scientists predict that even a “successful” US nuclear first-strike, which destroyed 100% of Russia’s nuclear forces before they could be launched, would create catastrophic changes in global weather that would eliminate growing seasons for years. Most humans and large animals would starve to death. Nuclear war is suicide for humans, but our leaders still have their fingers on the nuclear triggers. There seems to be absolutely no awareness, either in our Federal government or in the American public, of the existential danger posed by nuclear war. Such ignorance is embodied by The Russian Aggression Prevention Act, which if enacted will put us on a direct course for nuclear war with Russia. [/INST] <h4>Triggers U.S.-Russia nuclear war and extinction </h4><p>Steven <strong>Starr 14</strong>, Senior Scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility, 8/22/14, ““The Russian Aggression Prevention Act” (RAPA): A Direct Path to Nuclear War with Russia,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-russian-aggression-prevention-act-rapa-a-direct-path-to-nuclear-war-with-russia/5397171</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>R</u></strong></mark>ussian <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ggression <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>revention <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ct”, introduced to Congress by U.S. Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), <u><strong><mark>will</u></strong> <u><strong>set the US</mark> on a path <mark>towards</mark> direct <mark>military conflict with Russia</u></strong></mark> in Ukraine. Any <u><strong>US-Russian war is <mark>likely to</u></strong> <u><strong>quickly escalate into</mark> a <mark>nuclear war</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>since <mark>neither</mark> the US nor Russia <mark>would</mark> be willing to <mark>admit defeat</mark>,</u></strong> both have many thousands of nuclear weapons ready for instant use, and <u><strong>both rely upon Counterforce military doctrine</u></strong> that tasks their military, in the event of war, to preemptively destroy the nuclear forces of the enemy. RAPA provides de facto NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova via RAPA The Russian Aggression Prevention Act, or <u><strong>RAPA, “Provides</u></strong> major non-NATO ally status for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova for purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense services.” Major non-NATO ally status would for practical purposes give NATO membership to these nations, as it would allow the US to move large amounts of military equipment and forces to them without the need for approval of other NATO member states. Thus <u><strong>RAPA would</u></strong> effectively <u><strong>bypass long-standing German opposition to the US request to make Ukraine and Georgia part of NATO</u></strong>. Germans rightly fear placing US/NATO troops and US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Ukraine, given the profound and long-standing Russian objections against the expansion of NATO (especially to Ukraine and Georgia) along with deployment of European US/NATO BMD. Germany is acutely aware of the distinct possibility that the <u><strong>civil war</u></strong> raging <u><strong>in Ukraine could evolve into a Ukrainian-Russian war</u></strong>. Under such circumstances, <u><strong><mark>deployment of US</mark>/NATO <mark>forces in Ukraine would make it</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>virtually <mark>inevitable they would</mark> come into <mark>fight</mark> with Ukraine against <mark>Russia</u></strong></mark>. RAPA would accelerate the “implementation of phase three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach for Europe-based missile defense . . . by no later than the end of calendar year 2016.” In 2012, Russia’s highest ranking military officer stated that Russia might consider a pre-emptive strike against such BMD deployments “when the situation gets harder.” RAPA “Directs DOD [US Department of Defense] to assess the capabilities and needs of the Ukrainian armed forces” and “Authorizes the President, upon completion of such assessment, to provide specified military assistance to Ukraine.” RAPA would have the US quickly supply Ukraine with$100 million worth of weapons and equipment, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, crew weapons, grenade launchers, machine guns, ammunition, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. RAPA requires the Obama administration to “use all appropriate elements of United States national power…to protect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial and economic integrity of Ukraine and other sovereign nations in Europe and Eurasia from Russian aggression.” This includes “substantially increasing United States and NATO support for the armed forces of the Republics of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia,” and “substantially increasing the complement of forward-based NATO forces in those states.” Consequently, RAPA would produce significant buildups of US/NATO forces into Poland and the Baltic States, accelerate the construction of US BMD systems in Eastern Europe, and authorize substantial U.S. intelligence and military aid for Ukrainian military forces that continue to lay siege to the largest cities in Eastern Ukraine. If RAPA did not result in the deployment of US forces to Ukraine, it would certainly position them for rapid deployment there, in the event that the Ukrainian civil war escalates into a Ukrainian-Russian conflict. RAPA intensifies support for ethnic cleansing in Eastern Ukraine In Russia, Putin now is under intense domestic political pressure to send Russian forces into Eastern Ukraine, in order to stop the attacks by the Ukrainian military on the cities there, which were once part of the Soviet Union.These attacks have created an absolute humanitarian catastrophe. On August 5, 2014, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 740,000 Eastern Ukrainians had fled to Russia. They go there because Russia is close, and because most of the refugees are ethnic Russians, a fact that explains why the Russophobes in Kiev have been quite willing to indiscriminately bombard their cities. What is taking place in Eastern Ukraine amounts to “ethnic cleansing,” the forced removal of ethnic Russians from Eastern Ukraine. This is a process that is fully supported by the US; RAPA would greatly enhance this support. Ukrainian military forces have surrounded Donetsk – a city of almost one million people – and have for weeks conducted daily attacks against it using inaccurate multiple-launch rockets, heavy artillery fire, ballistic missiles carrying warheads with up to 1000 pounds of high explosive, and aerial bombardments. Water supplies, power plants, train stations, airports, bridges, highways, and schools have all been targeted, along with the general population. In Lugansk, a city of more than 440,000 people, a humanitarian crisis has been declared by its mayor, because the siege of the city has left it with little medicine, no fuel,intermittent power, and no water since August 3 (three weeks at the time of this writing). After the separatists of Eastern Ukraine demanded autonomy from Kiev, and then reunion with Russia, the government in Kiev branded them as “terrorists”, and sent its military forces against them in what they euphemistically call an “anti-terrorist operation.” Framing the conflict this way makes it politically acceptable to refuse to negotiate with the separatists, and easier to justify in the US and Europe, which have grown accustomed to “the War on Terrorism.” However, the thousands of Ukrainians being killed and hundreds of thousands of being driven from their homes are just ordinary people, trying to live ordinary lives. The New York Times reports the Ukrainian military strategy has been to bombard separatist-held cities and then send paramilitary forces to carry out “chaotic, violent assaults” against them. Many of the Ukrainian paramilitary forces were recruited from ultra-nationalist, neo-Nazi political parties; the Azov battalion flies the “Wolfs Hook” flag of Hitler’s SS divisions. Considering that more than 20 million Russians died fighting the Nazis during World War II, the presence of openly Nazi militias attacking ethnic Russians in Ukraine creates extreme anger in Russia. RAPA supports plans in Kiev for an attack on Crimea The Russian Aggression Prevention Act demands that Russia “withdraw from the eastern border of Ukraine,” which is by definition, the Russian border. In other words, RAPA provocatively demands that Russia remove its own military forces away from its own borders, while Ukrainian military forces are meanwhile massed on the other side, attacking predominantly Russian cities. <u><strong>RAPA</u></strong> also <u><strong>demands that “Russian forces must have withdrawn from Crimea within seven days of the enactment of the Act</u></strong>.” <u><strong>Not likely</u></strong> to happen, given that (1) Crimea was part of the Russian empire from 1783 until 1954, (2) withdrawal from Crimea would require Russia to abandon its only warm water port at Sevastopol, where Russian forces have been based, by internationally recognized treaty, since 1997, and (3) more than three-quarters of all Crimeans voted “yes” to reunify with Russia, a vote which Russia accepted by its subsequent annexation of Crimea. Thus, <u><strong>in the eyes of Russia, the requirement to “withdraw from Crimea”</u></strong> <u><strong>amounts to a US demand that Russia surrender Russian territory</u></strong>. Putin has just taken the entire Russian Duma (the Russian House of Representatives) to Crimea, to address them there and strongly make the point that there will be no withdrawal from Crimea. <u><strong>RAPA</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>stipulates that the US does not recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea,</u></strong> and creates sanctions and legal penalties for anyone who does. RAPA therefore provides both military and political support for Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s stated goat that Ukraine will retake Crimea. This goal was recently echoed by the Ukrainian defense minister, who was applauded by the Ukrainian Parliament when he told them that the Ukrainian army will “have a victory parade in Sevastopol“. These statements are taken seriously in Moscow, where they are viewed as a promise to attack Russia. Thus, Putin’s advisers are telling him he must fight today in Eastern Ukraine, or tomorrow in Crimea. Any Russian military intervention in Eastern Ukraine would certainly be described in the West as Russian aggression in pursuit of empire, which would trigger deafening demands that US/NATO forces act to support Ukraine. <u><strong>Should NATO intervene</u></strong>, subsequent <u><strong><mark>Russian</mark> military <mark>action against any NATO member would</u></strong> <u><strong>trigger</mark> the alliance’s Chapter 5 <mark>mutual defense</mark> clause</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>committing it to war with Russia</u></strong></mark>. Any <u><strong>major <mark>Ukrainian attack</mark> upon Crimea <mark>would make war</mark> with Russia <mark>inevitable</u></strong>. <u><strong>Ukraine appears</mark> to be</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>preparing for</mark> such <mark>an assault</u></strong></mark> by drafting all men of ages 18 to 60 years, in a forced mobilization of its armed forces, which also includes calling up its active reserves of one million men, and bringing more than 1000 battle tanksout of storage. Putin is being told by his close advisers that Ukraine will have an army of half a million men in 2015. RAPA would provide hundreds of millions of dollars to train and arm the rapidly expanding Ukrainian armed forces, and position US/NATO forces for rapid intervention on the side of Ukraine in the event of a Ukrainian-Russian war. Thus, the many political and military provisions of RAPA would certainly act to fully encourage Ukraine to carry out its stated policy to retake Crimea. The Republic of Georgia attacked Russian forces in 2008 with far fewer US promises of aid. Of course, RAPA would also arm Georgia, too. RAPA moves the US towards nuclear war with Russia <u><strong>A US/NATO-Russian war would instantly put US and Russian nuclear forces at peak alert</u></strong>, with both sides anticipating a nuclear first-strike from the other. Both <u><strong>the US and Russia have changed their nuclear war-fighting plans to include</u></strong> the use of <u><strong>preemptive nuclear first-strikes</u></strong>; <u><strong>both nations have “tactical” nuclear weapons</u></strong> designed for battlefield use. The US has 180 B61 nuclear bombs deployed on six military bases of five other NATO states, which would be released to these NATO members in the event of a US/NATO-Russian war. Russia also has at least 1300 tactical nuclear weapons, and Russian war doctrine specifies their use against overwhelming conventional (NATO) forces. Any use of “tactical” or “battlefield” nuclear weapons, by either side, would likely trigger an equal or greater response from the other. During the first Cold War, the US studiously avoided any direct military confrontation with Russia, because it was widely thought that such a war would inevitably escalate to become a nuclear war – which would utterly destroy both nations. However, there seems to be little thought or discussion of this in the US today, despite the fact that both the US and Russia appear to be preparing for such a war. In May, the increasing tensions in Ukraine led both nations to almost simultaneously conduct large nuclear war games. Long-range Russian nuclear bombers tested US air defenses16 times in a ten day period (July 29 – August 7). US and Russian leaders are either unaware or choose to ignore the fact that such “games” and “tests” are a dress rehearsal for human extinction. <u><strong><mark>Peer-reviewed</mark> scientific <mark>studies</u></strong> <u><strong>predict</mark> the environmental consequences of a <mark>war</mark> fought <mark>with</mark> only <mark>a fraction of</mark> US and/or <mark>Russian</mark> strategic <mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s would</u></strong></mark> likely <u><strong><mark>wipe out the human race</u></strong></mark>. Scientists predict that <u><strong>even a “successful” US nuclear first-strike</u></strong>, which destroyed 100% of Russia’s nuclear forces before they could be launched, <u><strong>would create catastrophic changes in global weather</u></strong> that would eliminate growing seasons for years. Most humans and large animals would starve to death. <u><strong><mark>Nuclear war is suicide for humans</u></strong></mark>, but our leaders still have their fingers on the nuclear triggers. There seems to be absolutely <u><strong>no awareness</u></strong>, either in our Federal government or in the American public, <u><strong>of the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>existential danger</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>posed by nuclear war</u></strong>. Such ignorance <u><strong><mark>is embodied by</mark> The <mark>R</mark>ussian <mark>A</mark>ggression <mark>P</mark>revention <mark>A</mark>ct, which</u></strong> if enacted <u><strong>will put us on a direct course for nuclear war with Russia</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Mexico’s economy is recovering but is fragile

upbeat April data buoyed hopes that the economy is finally on the path toward improved growth. economists welcomed the broad 1.3% expansion in the global index of economic activity in April, which marked the best monthly performance since November 2012 "The frequency of the positive data over the negative data is increasing. There are a whole range of indicators that show that we're in a recovery cycle Aportela cited recent improvements in retail sales and industrial production as encouraging The finance ministry is keeping its 2.7% growth forecast for now. Some analysts argue that this guidance could be too pessimistic. "Markets might be surprised to the upside Capistrán chief economist said the Mexican economy is exiting a "recessive period" the Mexican economy will significantly rebound in the second half of the year government spending jumped 13% compared with the same period a year earlier the Bank of Mexico is sounding a note of discord. In its most recent policy decision in June, the central bank cut interest rates to support economic growth and said that it will likely lower its 2.3% to 3.3% growth estimate for the year, suggesting that the economic recovery in the coming months will be more moderate. unemployment is relatively high and that the slack in the economy is widening economists argue it's too early to say that the recovery is firm. indicators are still showing weakness in domestic demand nonmanufacturing index fell the urban unemployment rate was close to 6% in May Inflation was subdued until early June, indicating that there is no significant demand pressure on prices. consumer credit growth has been weak.

April data buoyed hopes that the economy is on the path toward growth economists welcomed the 1.3% expansion in activity "The frequency of the positive data is increasing we're in a recovery cycle the Mexican economy is exiting a "recessive period" the Mexican economy will significantly rebound in the second half of the year suggesting that the recovery will be moderate unemployment is high and the slack is widening economists argue it's too early to say that the recovery is firm.

(JUAN MONTES, reporter, “Mexican Economy Sees Glimpse of Recovery” June 25, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/mexican-economy-sees-glimpse-of-recovery-1403719934, KB) After many months of dreary economic news from Mexico, upbeat April data buoyed hopes that the economy is finally on the path toward improved growth. The government of President Enrique Peña Nieto and some economists welcomed the broad 1.3% expansion in the global index of economic activity in April, which marked the best monthly performance since November 2012, bolstered by growth in services, construction and industry. "The frequency of the positive data over the negative data is increasing. There are a whole range of indicators that show that we're in a recovery cycle," said Fernando Aportela, Mexico's deputy finance minister. In an interview, Mr. Aportela cited recent improvements in retail sales and industrial production as encouraging. The data, released Tuesday, surprised a market that had been discounting another disappointing year for growth. In 2013, Mexico expanded just 1.1%, the lowest rate since the recession of 2009. Prospects for this year worsened quickly after a sluggish first quarter that prompted the government to cut its growth estimates to 2.7%, well below the 5% growth target sought by Mr. Peña Nieto. The finance ministry is confident that the effect of new taxes on consumption is dissipating, that a battered construction sector is picking up and that Mexico's export engine is gaining pace. Mexico sends 80% of its exports to the U.S., where economic activity is recovering after an unusually harsh winter knocked down demand. The finance ministry is keeping its 2.7% growth forecast for now. Some analysts argue that this guidance could be too pessimistic. "Markets might be surprised to the upside (in coming months) as there are still unjustified bearish views regarding the economy's performance in 2014," said Marco Oviedo, an economist with Barclays, reaffirming his 3% growth forecast. Carlos Capistrán, chief economist of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, said the Mexican economy is exiting a "recessive period" that began in mid-2012, when the country's export engine started to slow and delays in government spending dented investments. "We're very confident that the Mexican economy will significantly rebound in the second half of the year," Mr. Capistrán said, adding that the government is now spending at a much faster pace. In the January-April period, government spending jumped 13% compared with the same period a year earlier. Among the chorus of optimism, however, the Bank of Mexico is sounding a note of discord. In its most recent policy decision in early June, the central bank cut interest rates to support economic growth and said that it will likely lower its 2.3% to 3.3% growth estimate for the year, suggesting that the economic recovery in the coming months will be more moderate. Mexico's central bank has said unemployment is relatively high and that the slack in the economy is widening. The bank is expecting the output gap—the difference between actual output and its potential—to close only in late 2015. Some economists argue it's too early to say that the recovery is firm. "It's premature to say that this is the beginning of a strong recovery. The April data could just be a one-time rebound, given the huge contraction seen in March," said Jonathan Heath, an independent economist. In March, Mexico's economy shrank 0.6% versus February. Mr. Heath said some indicators are still showing weakness in domestic demand. The Mexican Institute of Finance Executives' nonmanufacturing index fell for a fourth straight month in May, and the urban unemployment rate was close to 6% in May, giving no clues of improvement. Inflation was also subdued until early June, indicating that there is no significant demand pressure on prices. And consumer credit growth has been weak. "We should wait to see the economic growth in May and June to be sure that this is a long-lasting recovery and not something temporary," said Mr. Heath. Gross domestic product data for the second quarter of the year will be released on August 21.

<h4>Mexico’s economy is recovering but is fragile</h4><p><strong>Montes 6-25</p><p></strong>(JUAN MONTES, reporter, “Mexican Economy Sees Glimpse of Recovery” June 25, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/mexican-economy-sees-glimpse-of-recovery-1403719934, KB)</p><p>After many months of dreary economic news from Mexico, <u><strong>upbeat <mark>April data buoyed hopes that the economy is</mark> finally <mark>on the path toward</mark> improved <mark>growth</mark>.</u></strong> The government of President Enrique Peña Nieto and some <u><strong><mark>economists welcomed the</mark> broad <mark>1.3% expansion in</mark> the global index of economic <mark>activity</mark> in April, which marked the best monthly performance since November 2012</u></strong>, bolstered by growth in services, construction and industry. <u><strong><mark>"The frequency of the positive data </mark>over the negative data <mark>is increasing</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>There are a whole range of indicators that show that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>we're in a recovery cycle</u></strong></mark>," said Fernando Aportela, Mexico's deputy finance minister. In an interview, Mr. <u><strong>Aportela cited recent improvements in retail sales and industrial production as encouraging</u></strong>. The data, released Tuesday, surprised a market that had been discounting another disappointing year for growth. In 2013, Mexico expanded just 1.1%, the lowest rate since the recession of 2009. Prospects for this year worsened quickly after a sluggish first quarter that prompted the government to cut its growth estimates to 2.7%, well below the 5% growth target sought by Mr. Peña Nieto. The finance ministry is confident that the effect of new taxes on consumption is dissipating, that a battered construction sector is picking up and that Mexico's export engine is gaining pace. Mexico sends 80% of its exports to the U.S., where economic activity is recovering after an unusually harsh winter knocked down demand. <u><strong>The finance ministry is keeping its 2.7% growth forecast for now. Some analysts argue that this guidance could be too pessimistic. "Markets might be surprised to the upside</u></strong> (in coming months) as there are still unjustified bearish views regarding the economy's performance in 2014," said Marco Oviedo, an economist with Barclays, reaffirming his 3% growth forecast. Carlos <u><strong>Capistrán</u></strong>, <u><strong>chief economist</u></strong> of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, <u><strong>said <mark>the Mexican economy is exiting a "recessive period"</u></strong></mark> that began in mid-2012, when the country's export engine started to slow and delays in government spending dented investments. "We're very confident that <u><strong><mark>the Mexican economy will significantly rebound in the second half of the year</u></strong></mark>," Mr. Capistrán said, adding that the government is now spending at a much faster pace. In the January-April period, <u><strong>government spending jumped 13% compared with the same period a year earlier</u></strong>. Among the chorus of optimism, however, <u><strong>the Bank of Mexico is sounding a note of discord. In its most recent policy decision in</u></strong> early <u><strong>June, the central bank cut interest rates to support economic growth and said that it will likely lower its 2.3% to 3.3% growth estimate for the year, <mark>suggesting that</u></strong> <u><strong>the</mark> economic <mark>recovery</mark> in the coming months <mark>will be</mark> more <mark>moderate</mark>. </u></strong>Mexico's central bank has said <u><strong><mark>unemployment is </mark>relatively <mark>high and</mark> that <mark>the slack</mark> in the economy <mark>is widening</u></strong></mark>. The bank is expecting the output gap—the difference between actual output and its potential—to close only in late 2015. Some <u><strong><mark>economists argue it's too early to say that the recovery is firm.</mark> </u></strong>"It's premature to say that this is the beginning of a strong recovery. The April data could just be a one-time rebound, given the huge contraction seen in March," said Jonathan Heath, an independent economist. In March, Mexico's economy shrank 0.6% versus February. Mr. Heath said some <u><strong>indicators are still showing weakness in domestic demand</u></strong>. The Mexican Institute of Finance Executives' <u><strong>nonmanufacturing index fell</u></strong> for a fourth straight month in May, and <u><strong>the urban unemployment rate was close to 6% in May</u></strong>, giving no clues of improvement. <u><strong>Inflation was</u></strong> also <u><strong>subdued until early June, indicating that there is no significant demand pressure on prices.</u></strong> And <u><strong>consumer credit growth has been weak.</u></strong> "We should wait to see the economic growth in May and June to be sure that this is a long-lasting recovery and not something temporary," said Mr. Heath. Gross domestic product data for the second quarter of the year will be released on August 21.</p>

Montes 6-25

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Montes 6-25 fulltext: (JUAN MONTES, reporter, “Mexican Economy Sees Glimpse of Recovery” June 25, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/mexican-economy-sees-glimpse-of-recovery-1403719934, KB) After many months of dreary economic news from Mexico, upbeat April data buoyed hopes that the economy is finally on the path toward improved growth. The government of President Enrique Peña Nieto and some economists welcomed the broad 1.3% expansion in the global index of economic activity in April, which marked the best monthly performance since November 2012, bolstered by growth in services, construction and industry. "The frequency of the positive data over the negative data is increasing. There are a whole range of indicators that show that we're in a recovery cycle," said Fernando Aportela, Mexico's deputy finance minister. In an interview, Mr. Aportela cited recent improvements in retail sales and industrial production as encouraging. The data, released Tuesday, surprised a market that had been discounting another disappointing year for growth. In 2013, Mexico expanded just 1.1%, the lowest rate since the recession of 2009. Prospects for this year worsened quickly after a sluggish first quarter that prompted the government to cut its growth estimates to 2.7%, well below the 5% growth target sought by Mr. Peña Nieto. The finance ministry is confident that the effect of new taxes on consumption is dissipating, that a battered construction sector is picking up and that Mexico's export engine is gaining pace. Mexico sends 80% of its exports to the U.S., where economic activity is recovering after an unusually harsh winter knocked down demand. The finance ministry is keeping its 2.7% growth forecast for now. Some analysts argue that this guidance could be too pessimistic. "Markets might be surprised to the upside (in coming months) as there are still unjustified bearish views regarding the economy's performance in 2014," said Marco Oviedo, an economist with Barclays, reaffirming his 3% growth forecast. Carlos Capistrán, chief economist of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, said the Mexican economy is exiting a "recessive period" that began in mid-2012, when the country's export engine started to slow and delays in government spending dented investments. "We're very confident that the Mexican economy will significantly rebound in the second half of the year," Mr. Capistrán said, adding that the government is now spending at a much faster pace. In the January-April period, government spending jumped 13% compared with the same period a year earlier. Among the chorus of optimism, however, the Bank of Mexico is sounding a note of discord. In its most recent policy decision in early June, the central bank cut interest rates to support economic growth and said that it will likely lower its 2.3% to 3.3% growth estimate for the year, suggesting that the economic recovery in the coming months will be more moderate. Mexico's central bank has said unemployment is relatively high and that the slack in the economy is widening. The bank is expecting the output gap—the difference between actual output and its potential—to close only in late 2015. Some economists argue it's too early to say that the recovery is firm. "It's premature to say that this is the beginning of a strong recovery. The April data could just be a one-time rebound, given the huge contraction seen in March," said Jonathan Heath, an independent economist. In March, Mexico's economy shrank 0.6% versus February. Mr. Heath said some indicators are still showing weakness in domestic demand. The Mexican Institute of Finance Executives' nonmanufacturing index fell for a fourth straight month in May, and the urban unemployment rate was close to 6% in May, giving no clues of improvement. Inflation was also subdued until early June, indicating that there is no significant demand pressure on prices. And consumer credit growth has been weak. "We should wait to see the economic growth in May and June to be sure that this is a long-lasting recovery and not something temporary," said Mr. Heath. Gross domestic product data for the second quarter of the year will be released on August 21. [/INST] <h4>Mexico’s economy is recovering but is fragile</h4><p><strong>Montes 6-25</p><p></strong>(JUAN MONTES, reporter, “Mexican Economy Sees Glimpse of Recovery” June 25, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/mexican-economy-sees-glimpse-of-recovery-1403719934, KB)</p><p>After many months of dreary economic news from Mexico, <u><strong>upbeat <mark>April data buoyed hopes that the economy is</mark> finally <mark>on the path toward</mark> improved <mark>growth</mark>.</u></strong> The government of President Enrique Peña Nieto and some <u><strong><mark>economists welcomed the</mark> broad <mark>1.3% expansion in</mark> the global index of economic <mark>activity</mark> in April, which marked the best monthly performance since November 2012</u></strong>, bolstered by growth in services, construction and industry. <u><strong><mark>"The frequency of the positive data </mark>over the negative data <mark>is increasing</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>There are a whole range of indicators that show that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>we're in a recovery cycle</u></strong></mark>," said Fernando Aportela, Mexico's deputy finance minister. In an interview, Mr. <u><strong>Aportela cited recent improvements in retail sales and industrial production as encouraging</u></strong>. The data, released Tuesday, surprised a market that had been discounting another disappointing year for growth. In 2013, Mexico expanded just 1.1%, the lowest rate since the recession of 2009. Prospects for this year worsened quickly after a sluggish first quarter that prompted the government to cut its growth estimates to 2.7%, well below the 5% growth target sought by Mr. Peña Nieto. The finance ministry is confident that the effect of new taxes on consumption is dissipating, that a battered construction sector is picking up and that Mexico's export engine is gaining pace. Mexico sends 80% of its exports to the U.S., where economic activity is recovering after an unusually harsh winter knocked down demand. <u><strong>The finance ministry is keeping its 2.7% growth forecast for now. Some analysts argue that this guidance could be too pessimistic. "Markets might be surprised to the upside</u></strong> (in coming months) as there are still unjustified bearish views regarding the economy's performance in 2014," said Marco Oviedo, an economist with Barclays, reaffirming his 3% growth forecast. Carlos <u><strong>Capistrán</u></strong>, <u><strong>chief economist</u></strong> of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, <u><strong>said <mark>the Mexican economy is exiting a "recessive period"</u></strong></mark> that began in mid-2012, when the country's export engine started to slow and delays in government spending dented investments. "We're very confident that <u><strong><mark>the Mexican economy will significantly rebound in the second half of the year</u></strong></mark>," Mr. Capistrán said, adding that the government is now spending at a much faster pace. In the January-April period, <u><strong>government spending jumped 13% compared with the same period a year earlier</u></strong>. Among the chorus of optimism, however, <u><strong>the Bank of Mexico is sounding a note of discord. In its most recent policy decision in</u></strong> early <u><strong>June, the central bank cut interest rates to support economic growth and said that it will likely lower its 2.3% to 3.3% growth estimate for the year, <mark>suggesting that</u></strong> <u><strong>the</mark> economic <mark>recovery</mark> in the coming months <mark>will be</mark> more <mark>moderate</mark>. </u></strong>Mexico's central bank has said <u><strong><mark>unemployment is </mark>relatively <mark>high and</mark> that <mark>the slack</mark> in the economy <mark>is widening</u></strong></mark>. The bank is expecting the output gap—the difference between actual output and its potential—to close only in late 2015. Some <u><strong><mark>economists argue it's too early to say that the recovery is firm.</mark> </u></strong>"It's premature to say that this is the beginning of a strong recovery. The April data could just be a one-time rebound, given the huge contraction seen in March," said Jonathan Heath, an independent economist. In March, Mexico's economy shrank 0.6% versus February. Mr. Heath said some <u><strong>indicators are still showing weakness in domestic demand</u></strong>. The Mexican Institute of Finance Executives' <u><strong>nonmanufacturing index fell</u></strong> for a fourth straight month in May, and <u><strong>the urban unemployment rate was close to 6% in May</u></strong>, giving no clues of improvement. <u><strong>Inflation was</u></strong> also <u><strong>subdued until early June, indicating that there is no significant demand pressure on prices.</u></strong> And <u><strong>consumer credit growth has been weak.</u></strong> "We should wait to see the economic growth in May and June to be sure that this is a long-lasting recovery and not something temporary," said Mr. Heath. Gross domestic product data for the second quarter of the year will be released on August 21.</p> </s>

The plan destroys cartels

a large portion of the US illegal drug market is controlled directly by Mexican cartels. Now, those cartels and their farmers complain that marijuana legalization is hurting their business. pot farmers in the Sinaloa region have stopped planting due to a massive drop in wholesale prices “It’s not worth it anymore. I wish the Americans would stop with this legalization.” before legalization in Washington and Colorado, about 10 million pounds of pot were grown in the US every year. But 40 million pounds came from Mexico. “Is it hurting the cartels? Yes. They aren’t able to move as much cannabis inside the US now.” US state legalization would cut into cartel business and take over about 30 percent of their market.

the US illegal drug market is controlled by Mexican cartels those cartels complain that legalization is hurting their business pot farmers have stopped planting due to a drop in prices “Is it hurting the cartels? Yes. US state legalization would take over 30 percent of their market.

Marijuana has accounted for nearly half of all total drug arrests in the US for the past 20 years, according to the FBI’s crime statistics. And according to the Department of Justice (DOJ), a large portion of the US illegal drug market is controlled directly by Mexican cartels. The DOJ’s National Drug Intelligence Center, which has since been shut down, found in 2011 that the top cartels controlled the majority of drug trade in marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine in over 1,000 US cities. Now, those cartels and their farmers complain that marijuana legalization is hurting their business. And some reports could suggest that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is more interested in helping to protect the Mexican cartels’ hold on the pot trade than in letting it dissipate. Seven Mexican cartels have long battled for dominance of the US illegal drug market: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Gulf, Juarez, Knights Templar, La Familia, and Tijuana. While some smaller cartels operate only along border regions in the Southwest and Southeast, giant cartels like Sinaloa have a presence on the streets of every single region. The Washington Post reported on Tuesday that pot farmers in the Sinaloa region have stopped planting due to a massive drop in wholesale prices, from $100 per kilo down to only $25. One farmer is quoted as saying: “It’s not worth it anymore. I wish the Americans would stop with this legalization.” VICE News talked to retired federal agent Terry Nelson, a former field level commander who worked to prevent drugs from crossing the southern border. Nelson said that before medical marijuana and state legalization in Washington and Colorado, about 10 million pounds of pot were grown in the US every year. But 40 million pounds came from Mexico. Given the DEA’s relationship with Sinaloa, and the agency’s fury over legalized marijuana, it almost seems like the DEA wants to crush the legal weed market in order to protect the interests of their cartel friends. Almost. Exact numbers on illegal drug trafficking are always hard to pin down, due to the black market nature of distribution and sales. “Is it hurting the cartels? Yes. The cartels are criminal organizations that were making as much as 35-40 percent of their income from marijuana,” Nelson said, “They aren’t able to move as much cannabis inside the US now.” In 2012, a study by the Mexican Competitiveness Institute found that US state legalization would cut into cartel business and take over about 30 percent of their market.

<h4><strong>The plan destroys cartels</h4><p>O’Hara 14</p><p></strong>(Mary Emily O’Hara, Freelance journalist, “Legal Pot in the US Is Crippling Mexican Cartels” May 8, 2014, https://news.vice.com/article/legal-pot-in-the-us-is-crippling-mexican-cartels<u><strong>, KB)</p><p></u></strong>Marijuana has accounted for nearly half of all total drug arrests in the US for the past 20 years, according to the FBI’s crime statistics. And according to the Department of Justice (DOJ), <u><strong>a large portion of <mark>the US illegal drug market is controlled</mark> directly <mark>by Mexican cartels</mark>. </u></strong>The DOJ’s National Drug Intelligence Center, which has since been shut down, found in 2011 that the top cartels controlled the majority of drug trade in marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine in over 1,000 US cities. <u><strong>Now, <mark>those cartels</mark> and their farmers <mark>complain that</mark> marijuana <mark>legalization is hurting their business</mark>.</u></strong> And some reports could suggest that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is more interested in helping to protect the Mexican cartels’ hold on the pot trade than in letting it dissipate. Seven Mexican cartels have long battled for dominance of the US illegal drug market: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Gulf, Juarez, Knights Templar, La Familia, and Tijuana. While some smaller cartels operate only along border regions in the Southwest and Southeast, giant cartels like Sinaloa have a presence on the streets of every single region. The Washington Post reported on Tuesday that <u><strong><mark>pot farmers</mark> in the Sinaloa region <mark>have stopped planting due to a</mark> massive <mark>drop in </mark>wholesale <mark>prices</u></strong></mark>, from $100 per kilo down to only $25. One farmer is quoted as saying: <u><strong>“It’s not worth it anymore. I wish the Americans would stop with this legalization.” </u></strong>VICE News talked to retired federal agent Terry Nelson, a former field level commander who worked to prevent drugs from crossing the southern border. Nelson said that <u><strong>before</u></strong> medical marijuana and state <u><strong>legalization in Washington and Colorado, about 10 million pounds of pot were grown in the US every year. But 40 million pounds came from Mexico. </u></strong>Given the DEA’s relationship with Sinaloa, and the agency’s fury over legalized marijuana, it almost seems like the DEA wants to crush the legal weed market in order to protect the interests of their cartel friends. Almost. Exact numbers on illegal drug trafficking are always hard to pin down, due to the black market nature of distribution and sales. <u><strong><mark>“Is it hurting the cartels? Yes.</mark> </u></strong>The cartels are criminal organizations that were making as much as 35-40 percent of their income from marijuana,” Nelson said, “<u><strong>They aren’t able to move as much cannabis inside the US now.” </u></strong>In 2012, a study by the Mexican Competitiveness Institute found that <u><strong><mark>US state legalization would</mark> cut into cartel business and <mark>take over</mark> about <mark>30 percent of their market.</p></u></strong></mark>

O’Hara 14 (Mary Emily O’Hara, Freelance journalist, “Legal Pot in the US Is Crippling Mexican Cartels” May 8, 2014, https://news.vice.com/article/legal-pot-in-the-us-is-crippling-mexican-cartels, KB)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: O’Hara 14 (Mary Emily O’Hara, Freelance journalist, “Legal Pot in the US Is Crippling Mexican Cartels” May 8, 2014, https://news.vice.com/article/legal-pot-in-the-us-is-crippling-mexican-cartels, KB) fulltext: Marijuana has accounted for nearly half of all total drug arrests in the US for the past 20 years, according to the FBI’s crime statistics. And according to the Department of Justice (DOJ), a large portion of the US illegal drug market is controlled directly by Mexican cartels. The DOJ’s National Drug Intelligence Center, which has since been shut down, found in 2011 that the top cartels controlled the majority of drug trade in marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine in over 1,000 US cities. Now, those cartels and their farmers complain that marijuana legalization is hurting their business. And some reports could suggest that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is more interested in helping to protect the Mexican cartels’ hold on the pot trade than in letting it dissipate. Seven Mexican cartels have long battled for dominance of the US illegal drug market: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Gulf, Juarez, Knights Templar, La Familia, and Tijuana. While some smaller cartels operate only along border regions in the Southwest and Southeast, giant cartels like Sinaloa have a presence on the streets of every single region. The Washington Post reported on Tuesday that pot farmers in the Sinaloa region have stopped planting due to a massive drop in wholesale prices, from $100 per kilo down to only $25. One farmer is quoted as saying: “It’s not worth it anymore. I wish the Americans would stop with this legalization.” VICE News talked to retired federal agent Terry Nelson, a former field level commander who worked to prevent drugs from crossing the southern border. Nelson said that before medical marijuana and state legalization in Washington and Colorado, about 10 million pounds of pot were grown in the US every year. But 40 million pounds came from Mexico. Given the DEA’s relationship with Sinaloa, and the agency’s fury over legalized marijuana, it almost seems like the DEA wants to crush the legal weed market in order to protect the interests of their cartel friends. Almost. Exact numbers on illegal drug trafficking are always hard to pin down, due to the black market nature of distribution and sales. “Is it hurting the cartels? Yes. The cartels are criminal organizations that were making as much as 35-40 percent of their income from marijuana,” Nelson said, “They aren’t able to move as much cannabis inside the US now.” In 2012, a study by the Mexican Competitiveness Institute found that US state legalization would cut into cartel business and take over about 30 percent of their market. [/INST] <h4><strong>The plan destroys cartels</h4><p>O’Hara 14</p><p></strong>(Mary Emily O’Hara, Freelance journalist, “Legal Pot in the US Is Crippling Mexican Cartels” May 8, 2014, https://news.vice.com/article/legal-pot-in-the-us-is-crippling-mexican-cartels<u><strong>, KB)</p><p></u></strong>Marijuana has accounted for nearly half of all total drug arrests in the US for the past 20 years, according to the FBI’s crime statistics. And according to the Department of Justice (DOJ), <u><strong>a large portion of <mark>the US illegal drug market is controlled</mark> directly <mark>by Mexican cartels</mark>. </u></strong>The DOJ’s National Drug Intelligence Center, which has since been shut down, found in 2011 that the top cartels controlled the majority of drug trade in marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine in over 1,000 US cities. <u><strong>Now, <mark>those cartels</mark> and their farmers <mark>complain that</mark> marijuana <mark>legalization is hurting their business</mark>.</u></strong> And some reports could suggest that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is more interested in helping to protect the Mexican cartels’ hold on the pot trade than in letting it dissipate. Seven Mexican cartels have long battled for dominance of the US illegal drug market: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Gulf, Juarez, Knights Templar, La Familia, and Tijuana. While some smaller cartels operate only along border regions in the Southwest and Southeast, giant cartels like Sinaloa have a presence on the streets of every single region. The Washington Post reported on Tuesday that <u><strong><mark>pot farmers</mark> in the Sinaloa region <mark>have stopped planting due to a</mark> massive <mark>drop in </mark>wholesale <mark>prices</u></strong></mark>, from $100 per kilo down to only $25. One farmer is quoted as saying: <u><strong>“It’s not worth it anymore. I wish the Americans would stop with this legalization.” </u></strong>VICE News talked to retired federal agent Terry Nelson, a former field level commander who worked to prevent drugs from crossing the southern border. Nelson said that <u><strong>before</u></strong> medical marijuana and state <u><strong>legalization in Washington and Colorado, about 10 million pounds of pot were grown in the US every year. But 40 million pounds came from Mexico. </u></strong>Given the DEA’s relationship with Sinaloa, and the agency’s fury over legalized marijuana, it almost seems like the DEA wants to crush the legal weed market in order to protect the interests of their cartel friends. Almost. Exact numbers on illegal drug trafficking are always hard to pin down, due to the black market nature of distribution and sales. <u><strong><mark>“Is it hurting the cartels? Yes.</mark> </u></strong>The cartels are criminal organizations that were making as much as 35-40 percent of their income from marijuana,” Nelson said, “<u><strong>They aren’t able to move as much cannabis inside the US now.” </u></strong>In 2012, a study by the Mexican Competitiveness Institute found that <u><strong><mark>US state legalization would</mark> cut into cartel business and <mark>take over</mark> about <mark>30 percent of their market.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

Cartels are key to Mexico’s banking sector – collapse crushes the entire economy

Collins is one of dozens under suspicion of laundering money for the nation's booming drug business, whose growing economic impact now pervades just about every level of Mexican life. cartels bring $40 billion into Mexico from their global operations every year. Mexico probably made more money in 2009 moving drugs than it did exporting oil drug cash is everywhere in Mexico It has propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy. "Mexico is saturated with this money," said Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor. the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate What's going on in Zapopan is happening all over Mexico. Drug money has fueled part of a real estate boom around tourist resorts cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses. Much of the cartels' profits eventually ends up in Mexico's banking system During the global financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity, says economist Ibarra "They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that helped the banks drug money in banks is a global phenomenon, not just in Mexico. Drug gangs in Mexico have their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking authorities, a practice known as "smurfing," more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its legitimate economy should be generating. drug money is driving nearly 20 percent of the state's economy. organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded sharply in the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy. Another problem the economy could face is that drug funding could one day fall if authorities cracked down on money laundering or wrenched power away from the cartels. the moment it stops it all crashes

Mexico made more money moving drugs than it did exporting oil It has propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy. the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate Drug money has fueled a real estate boom cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses. the cartels' profits ends up in Mexico's banking system During the financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity "They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that helped the banks drug money is driving 20 percent of the state's economy. drug funding could one day fall the moment it stops it all crashes

At a modern factory in a city whose main claim to fame is an image of the Virgin Mary revered for granting miracles, Mexican pharmaceuticals firm Grupo Collins churns out antibiotics and other medicines. But the United States contends that the company in Zapopan is not what it seems. The U.S. Treasury put Grupo Collins on a black list in 2008, saying the firm supplies a small drug cartel in western Mexico with chemicals needed to make methamphetamines. Grupo Collins, which has denied any connection to organized crime, is one of dozens under suspicion of laundering money for the nation's booming drug business, whose growing economic impact now pervades just about every level of Mexican life. Mexican cartels, which control most of the cocaine and methamphetamine smuggled into the United States, bring an estimated $25 billion to $40 billion into Mexico from their global operations every year. To put that in perspective: Mexico probably made more money in 2009 moving drugs than it did exporting oil, its single biggest legitimate foreign currency earner. From the white Caribbean beaches of Cancun to violent towns on the U.S. border and the beauty parlors of Mexico City's wealthy suburbs, drug cash is everywhere in Mexico. It has even propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy. Smuggled into Mexico mostly from the United States in $100 bills, narco money finds its way onto the books of restaurants, construction firms and bars as drug lords try to legitimize their cash and prevent police from tracing it. "Mexico is saturated with this money," said George Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor. In western Mexico, drug money started pouring into Zapopan and nearby Guadalajara in the 1980s as the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate, said Martin Barron, a researcher at the institute that trains Mexico's organized crime prosecutors. Now residents in the region known in Mexico for its piety say drug smugglers barely make an effort to disguise themselves. A strip of fancy boutiques in Zapopan was financed with drug money, says Jaime Ramirez, a local newspaper columnist who has been reporting on the drug world for two decades. As well as the Grupo Collins factory in Zapopan, a nearby car wash is also on the U.S. Treasury's black list. A local cemetery draws relatives of traffickers who were among the 17,000 people killed in the drug war in Mexico since 2006. "A lot of narcos are buried there. You should see it on Fathers' Day," Ramirez said, as a black pick-up truck with tinted windows pulled in. Zapopan residents just shrug their shoulders when a wealthy neighbor displays traits seen as typical of a drug trafficker -- wearing cowboy gear, playing loud "norteno" music from the country's north or holding lavish parties attended by guests who arrive in pick-up trucks or SUVs. "Living alongside them is normal," Ramirez said. "Everybody knows when a neighbor is on the shady side." One of those neighbors was Sandra Avila, a glamorous trafficker known as the "Queen of the Pacific," who lived in Zapopan before being arrested in Mexico City in 2007. On a typical day in Zapopan recently, men unloaded boxes from vans in the Grupo Collins compound, near the company's private chapel and soccer field. From behind the factory's high walls, there was little to suggest it could have ties to a cartel. "It has always been really calm," said Genaro Rangel, who sells tacos every morning to factory workers from a stall across the street. The plant was advertising a job opening on the company web site for a machine room technician. Washington's accusation, filed under a U.S. sanctions program, makes it illegal for Americans to do business with Grupo Collins and freezes any assets it might have in U.S. accounts. In a 2006 report, Mexican authorities named Grupo Collins' owner Telesforo Tirado as an operator of the Colima cartel. The U.S. Treasury and Mexico's Attorney General's office both declined to provide further details on the case and Grupo Collins executives also refused to comment. But Tirado has previously denied the charges in the Mexican media. CASHING IN ON THE DRUG TRADE What's going on in Zapopan is happening all over Mexico. A well-known Mexico City restaurant specializing in the spicy cuisine of the Yucatan peninsula was added to the U.S. list of front companies in December. Months earlier, one of Mexico's top food critics had recommended it. Drug money has also fueled part of a real estate boom around tourist resorts such as Cancun, said a senior U.S. law enforcement official in Mexico City. "We've had cases where traffickers purchased large tracts of land in areas where any investor would buy," he said, asking not to be named because of concerns about his safety. An architect in the city of Tijuana did well out of designing buildings that cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses. "The pay was enough for me to build a house for myself, as well as to buy a lot a tools," he said. He was once hired to design a tunnel that led to the street from a secret door in a drug gang member's closet. Craving acceptance, the drug gangs even throw their money at acquaintances to get them on the social scene. A drug trafficker pays his friend Roberto, who declined to give his last name, to keep him connected in Tijuana and introduce him to women. "I take him to parties," Roberto said. In the wealthy shopping areas of Interlomas, near Mexico City, the Perfect Silhouette spa offers breast implants. Staffed by young women in loose-fitting white suits, the spa also sells weight-loss creams and offers massages. The U.S. Treasury recently said it was part of the financial network of the Beltran Leyva cartel, whose leader was gunned down by elite Mexican marines in December. The salon's manager, Teresa Delgado, appeared baffled by the U.S. accusations. "We haven't seen anything strange here," she said. A woman Delgado identified as the owner did not return a phone call requesting an interview. Businesses enlisted to launder drug money typically get a cut worth 3 percent to 8 percent of the funds passing through their books, the U.S. law enforcement official said. "SMURFING" AROUND THE LAWS Much of the cartels' profits eventually ends up in Mexico's banking system, the U.S. official said. During the global financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity, says economist Guillermo Ibarra of the Autonomous University of Sinaloa. "They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that to a certain extent helped the banks," Ibarra said. Indeed, drug money in banks is a global phenomenon, not just in Mexico. A United Nations report on the global drug trade in 2009 said that "at a time of major bank failures, money doesn't smell, bankers seem to believe." Drug gangs in Mexico have their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking authorities, a practice known as "smurfing," said the U.S. official. Mexico's banking association and the finance ministry's anti-money laundering unit declined to comment for this story. While Mexico is confiscating more drugs and assets than ever under President Felipe Calderon, forfeitures of money are still minuscule compared to even low-ball estimates of the amount of drug money that flows into Mexico. Under Calderon, authorities have confiscated about $400 million, almost none of which was seized from banks, said Ricardo Najera, a spokesman for the Attorney General's Office. Mexican bank secrecy laws make it particularly difficult to go after drug money in financial institutions, Najera said. "We can't just go in there and say 'OK, let's have a look,'" he said. "We have to trace the illicit origin of that money before we can get at those bank accounts." The U.S. Treasury has blocked only about $16 million in suspected Mexican drug assets since June 2000, a Treasury official in Washington said. The official, who asked not to be named, said the sanctions program aims to hit drug lords by breaking "their commercial and financial backbones." But freezing assets is not "the principal objective nor the key measure of success." MAFIA CAPITALISM Data on Mexican banking provides a novel way for calculating the size of the drug economy. Ibarra crunched numbers on monetary aggregates across different Mexican states and concluded that more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its legitimate economy should be generating. "It's as if two people had the same job and the same level of seniority, but one of them has twice as much savings," he said, talking about comparisons between Sinaloa and other states. Ibarra estimates cartels have laundered more than $680 million in the banks of Sinaloa -- which is a financial services backwater -- and that drug money is driving nearly 20 percent of the state's economy. Edgardo Buscaglia, an academic at Columbia University, recently scoured judicial case files and financial intelligence reports, some of which were provided by Mexican authorities. His research found organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded sharply in the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy. Buscaglia thinks Mexico's lackluster effort to confiscate dirty money is allowing drug gangs and other mafias to flourish. "You will wind up with mafia capitalism here before things improve," he said. Even though cartels are clearly creating jobs and giving a lot of people extra spending money, some of these economic benefits are neutralized by a raging drug war that has scared investors. About a dozen foreign companies in Ciudad Juarez, across the border from Texas, are postponing investments in factories there because of regular gun battles in the city, said Soledad Maynez, who heads a local factory association. She met with the companies' representatives in November. "They need the security issue improved," she said. Business leaders say thousands of shops have closed in Ciudad Juarez because of the violence. Another problem the economy could face is that drug funding could one day fall if authorities cracked down on money laundering or somehow wrenched power away from the cartels. "(Drug money) could have a short-term positive effect. But in the long run, because you're propping up this artificial economy, the moment it stops it all crashes," the U.S. law enforcement official said. (Additional reporting by Lizbeth Diaz in Tijuana, editing by Claudia Parsons and Jim Impoco)

<h4>Cartels are key to Mexico’s banking sector – collapse crushes the entire economy</h4><p><strong>Lange 10</p><p></strong>(Jason Lange, Correspondent, Washington, “From spas to banks, Mexico economy rides on drugs” Jan 22, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/22/us-drugs-mexico-economy-idUSTRE60L0X120100122, KB)</p><p>At a modern factory in a city whose main claim to fame is an image of the Virgin Mary revered for granting miracles, Mexican pharmaceuticals firm Grupo Collins churns out antibiotics and other medicines. But the United States contends that the company in Zapopan is not what it seems. The U.S. Treasury put Grupo Collins on a black list in 2008, saying the firm supplies a small drug cartel in western Mexico with chemicals needed to make methamphetamines. Grupo <u><strong>Collins</u></strong>, which has denied any connection to organized crime, <u><strong>is one of dozens under suspicion of laundering money for the nation's booming drug business,</u></strong> <u><strong>whose growing economic impact now pervades just about every level of Mexican life. </u></strong>Mexican <u><strong>cartels</u></strong>, which control most of the cocaine and methamphetamine smuggled into the United States, <u><strong>bring</u></strong> an estimated $25 billion to <u><strong>$40 billion into Mexico from their global operations every year. </u></strong>To put that in perspective: <u><strong><mark>Mexico</mark> probably <mark>made more money</mark> in 2009 <mark>moving drugs than it did exporting oil</u></strong></mark>, its single biggest legitimate foreign currency earner. From the white Caribbean beaches of Cancun to violent towns on the U.S. border and the beauty parlors of Mexico City's wealthy suburbs, <u><strong>drug cash is everywhere in Mexico</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>It has</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong><mark>propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy.</mark> </u></strong>Smuggled into Mexico mostly from the United States in $100 bills, narco money finds its way onto the books of restaurants, construction firms and bars as drug lords try to legitimize their cash and prevent police from tracing it. <u><strong>"Mexico is saturated with this money," said</u></strong> George <u><strong>Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor.</u></strong> In western Mexico, drug money started pouring into Zapopan and nearby Guadalajara in the 1980s as <u><strong><mark>the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate</u></strong></mark>, said Martin Barron, a researcher at the institute that trains Mexico's organized crime prosecutors. Now residents in the region known in Mexico for its piety say drug smugglers barely make an effort to disguise themselves. A strip of fancy boutiques in Zapopan was financed with drug money, says Jaime Ramirez, a local newspaper columnist who has been reporting on the drug world for two decades. As well as the Grupo Collins factory in Zapopan, a nearby car wash is also on the U.S. Treasury's black list. A local cemetery draws relatives of traffickers who were among the 17,000 people killed in the drug war in Mexico since 2006. "A lot of narcos are buried there. You should see it on Fathers' Day," Ramirez said, as a black pick-up truck with tinted windows pulled in. Zapopan residents just shrug their shoulders when a wealthy neighbor displays traits seen as typical of a drug trafficker -- wearing cowboy gear, playing loud "norteno" music from the country's north or holding lavish parties attended by guests who arrive in pick-up trucks or SUVs. "Living alongside them is normal," Ramirez said. "Everybody knows when a neighbor is on the shady side." One of those neighbors was Sandra Avila, a glamorous trafficker known as the "Queen of the Pacific," who lived in Zapopan before being arrested in Mexico City in 2007. On a typical day in Zapopan recently, men unloaded boxes from vans in the Grupo Collins compound, near the company's private chapel and soccer field. From behind the factory's high walls, there was little to suggest it could have ties to a cartel. "It has always been really calm," said Genaro Rangel, who sells tacos every morning to factory workers from a stall across the street. The plant was advertising a job opening on the company web site for a machine room technician. Washington's accusation, filed under a U.S. sanctions program, makes it illegal for Americans to do business with Grupo Collins and freezes any assets it might have in U.S. accounts. In a 2006 report, Mexican authorities named Grupo Collins' owner Telesforo Tirado as an operator of the Colima cartel. The U.S. Treasury and Mexico's Attorney General's office both declined to provide further details on the case and Grupo Collins executives also refused to comment. But Tirado has previously denied the charges in the Mexican media. CASHING IN ON THE DRUG TRADE <u><strong>What's going on in Zapopan is happening all over Mexico. </u></strong>A well-known Mexico City restaurant specializing in the spicy cuisine of the Yucatan peninsula was added to the U.S. list of front companies in December. Months earlier, one of Mexico's top food critics had recommended it. <u><strong><mark>Drug money has</mark> </u></strong>also <u><strong><mark>fueled</mark> part of <mark>a real estate boom</mark> around tourist resorts</u></strong> such as Cancun, said a senior U.S. law enforcement official in Mexico City. "We've had cases where traffickers purchased large tracts of land in areas where any investor would buy," he said, asking not to be named because of concerns about his safety. An architect in the city of Tijuana did well out of designing buildings that <u><strong><mark>cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses.</mark> </u></strong>"The pay was enough for me to build a house for myself, as well as to buy a lot a tools," he said. He was once hired to design a tunnel that led to the street from a secret door in a drug gang member's closet. Craving acceptance, the drug gangs even throw their money at acquaintances to get them on the social scene. A drug trafficker pays his friend Roberto, who declined to give his last name, to keep him connected in Tijuana and introduce him to women. "I take him to parties," Roberto said. In the wealthy shopping areas of Interlomas, near Mexico City, the Perfect Silhouette spa offers breast implants. Staffed by young women in loose-fitting white suits, the spa also sells weight-loss creams and offers massages. The U.S. Treasury recently said it was part of the financial network of the Beltran Leyva cartel, whose leader was gunned down by elite Mexican marines in December. The salon's manager, Teresa Delgado, appeared baffled by the U.S. accusations. "We haven't seen anything strange here," she said. A woman Delgado identified as the owner did not return a phone call requesting an interview. Businesses enlisted to launder drug money typically get a cut worth 3 percent to 8 percent of the funds passing through their books, the U.S. law enforcement official said. "SMURFING" AROUND THE LAWS <u><strong>Much of <mark>the cartels' profits</mark> eventually <mark>ends up in Mexico's banking system</u></strong></mark>, the U.S. official said. <u><strong><mark>During the</mark> global <mark>financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity</mark>, says economist</u></strong> Guillermo <u><strong>Ibarra</u></strong> of the Autonomous University of Sinaloa. <u><strong><mark>"They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that</u></strong></mark> to a certain extent <u><strong><mark>helped the banks</u></strong></mark>," Ibarra said. Indeed, <u><strong>drug money in banks is a global phenomenon, not just in Mexico.</u></strong> A United Nations report on the global drug trade in 2009 said that "at a time of major bank failures, money doesn't smell, bankers seem to believe." <u><strong>Drug gangs in Mexico have their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking authorities, a practice known as "smurfing," </u></strong>said the U.S. official. Mexico's banking association and the finance ministry's anti-money laundering unit declined to comment for this story. While Mexico is confiscating more drugs and assets than ever under President Felipe Calderon, forfeitures of money are still minuscule compared to even low-ball estimates of the amount of drug money that flows into Mexico. Under Calderon, authorities have confiscated about $400 million, almost none of which was seized from banks, said Ricardo Najera, a spokesman for the Attorney General's Office. Mexican bank secrecy laws make it particularly difficult to go after drug money in financial institutions, Najera said. "We can't just go in there and say 'OK, let's have a look,'" he said. "We have to trace the illicit origin of that money before we can get at those bank accounts." The U.S. Treasury has blocked only about $16 million in suspected Mexican drug assets since June 2000, a Treasury official in Washington said. The official, who asked not to be named, said the sanctions program aims to hit drug lords by breaking "their commercial and financial backbones." But freezing assets is not "the principal objective nor the key measure of success." MAFIA CAPITALISM Data on Mexican banking provides a novel way for calculating the size of the drug economy. Ibarra crunched numbers on monetary aggregates across different Mexican states and concluded that <u><strong>more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its legitimate economy should be generating.</u></strong> "It's as if two people had the same job and the same level of seniority, but one of them has twice as much savings," he said, talking about comparisons between Sinaloa and other states. Ibarra estimates cartels have laundered more than $680 million in the banks of Sinaloa -- which is a financial services backwater -- and that <u><strong><mark>drug money is driving</mark> nearly <mark>20 percent of the state's economy.</mark> </u></strong>Edgardo Buscaglia, an academic at Columbia University, recently scoured judicial case files and financial intelligence reports, some of which were provided by Mexican authorities. His research found <u><strong>organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded sharply in the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy. </u></strong>Buscaglia thinks Mexico's lackluster effort to confiscate dirty money is allowing drug gangs and other mafias to flourish. "You will wind up with mafia capitalism here before things improve," he said. Even though cartels are clearly creating jobs and giving a lot of people extra spending money, some of these economic benefits are neutralized by a raging drug war that has scared investors. About a dozen foreign companies in Ciudad Juarez, across the border from Texas, are postponing investments in factories there because of regular gun battles in the city, said Soledad Maynez, who heads a local factory association. She met with the companies' representatives in November. "They need the security issue improved," she said. Business leaders say thousands of shops have closed in Ciudad Juarez because of the violence. <u><strong>Another problem the economy could face is that <mark>drug funding could one day fall</mark> if authorities cracked down on money laundering or</u></strong> somehow <u><strong>wrenched power away from the cartels. </u></strong>"(Drug money) could have a short-term positive effect. But in the long run, because you're propping up this artificial economy, <u><strong><mark>the moment it stops it all crashes</u></strong></mark>," the U.S. law enforcement official said. (Additional reporting by Lizbeth Diaz in Tijuana, editing by Claudia Parsons and Jim Impoco)</p>

Lange 10 (Jason Lange, Correspondent, Washington, “From spas to banks, Mexico economy rides on drugs” Jan 22, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/22/us-drugs-mexico-economy-idUSTRE60L0X120100122, KB)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Lange 10 (Jason Lange, Correspondent, Washington, “From spas to banks, Mexico economy rides on drugs” Jan 22, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/22/us-drugs-mexico-economy-idUSTRE60L0X120100122, KB) fulltext: At a modern factory in a city whose main claim to fame is an image of the Virgin Mary revered for granting miracles, Mexican pharmaceuticals firm Grupo Collins churns out antibiotics and other medicines. But the United States contends that the company in Zapopan is not what it seems. The U.S. Treasury put Grupo Collins on a black list in 2008, saying the firm supplies a small drug cartel in western Mexico with chemicals needed to make methamphetamines. Grupo Collins, which has denied any connection to organized crime, is one of dozens under suspicion of laundering money for the nation's booming drug business, whose growing economic impact now pervades just about every level of Mexican life. Mexican cartels, which control most of the cocaine and methamphetamine smuggled into the United States, bring an estimated $25 billion to $40 billion into Mexico from their global operations every year. To put that in perspective: Mexico probably made more money in 2009 moving drugs than it did exporting oil, its single biggest legitimate foreign currency earner. From the white Caribbean beaches of Cancun to violent towns on the U.S. border and the beauty parlors of Mexico City's wealthy suburbs, drug cash is everywhere in Mexico. It has even propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy. Smuggled into Mexico mostly from the United States in $100 bills, narco money finds its way onto the books of restaurants, construction firms and bars as drug lords try to legitimize their cash and prevent police from tracing it. "Mexico is saturated with this money," said George Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor. In western Mexico, drug money started pouring into Zapopan and nearby Guadalajara in the 1980s as the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate, said Martin Barron, a researcher at the institute that trains Mexico's organized crime prosecutors. Now residents in the region known in Mexico for its piety say drug smugglers barely make an effort to disguise themselves. A strip of fancy boutiques in Zapopan was financed with drug money, says Jaime Ramirez, a local newspaper columnist who has been reporting on the drug world for two decades. As well as the Grupo Collins factory in Zapopan, a nearby car wash is also on the U.S. Treasury's black list. A local cemetery draws relatives of traffickers who were among the 17,000 people killed in the drug war in Mexico since 2006. "A lot of narcos are buried there. You should see it on Fathers' Day," Ramirez said, as a black pick-up truck with tinted windows pulled in. Zapopan residents just shrug their shoulders when a wealthy neighbor displays traits seen as typical of a drug trafficker -- wearing cowboy gear, playing loud "norteno" music from the country's north or holding lavish parties attended by guests who arrive in pick-up trucks or SUVs. "Living alongside them is normal," Ramirez said. "Everybody knows when a neighbor is on the shady side." One of those neighbors was Sandra Avila, a glamorous trafficker known as the "Queen of the Pacific," who lived in Zapopan before being arrested in Mexico City in 2007. On a typical day in Zapopan recently, men unloaded boxes from vans in the Grupo Collins compound, near the company's private chapel and soccer field. From behind the factory's high walls, there was little to suggest it could have ties to a cartel. "It has always been really calm," said Genaro Rangel, who sells tacos every morning to factory workers from a stall across the street. The plant was advertising a job opening on the company web site for a machine room technician. Washington's accusation, filed under a U.S. sanctions program, makes it illegal for Americans to do business with Grupo Collins and freezes any assets it might have in U.S. accounts. In a 2006 report, Mexican authorities named Grupo Collins' owner Telesforo Tirado as an operator of the Colima cartel. The U.S. Treasury and Mexico's Attorney General's office both declined to provide further details on the case and Grupo Collins executives also refused to comment. But Tirado has previously denied the charges in the Mexican media. CASHING IN ON THE DRUG TRADE What's going on in Zapopan is happening all over Mexico. A well-known Mexico City restaurant specializing in the spicy cuisine of the Yucatan peninsula was added to the U.S. list of front companies in December. Months earlier, one of Mexico's top food critics had recommended it. Drug money has also fueled part of a real estate boom around tourist resorts such as Cancun, said a senior U.S. law enforcement official in Mexico City. "We've had cases where traffickers purchased large tracts of land in areas where any investor would buy," he said, asking not to be named because of concerns about his safety. An architect in the city of Tijuana did well out of designing buildings that cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses. "The pay was enough for me to build a house for myself, as well as to buy a lot a tools," he said. He was once hired to design a tunnel that led to the street from a secret door in a drug gang member's closet. Craving acceptance, the drug gangs even throw their money at acquaintances to get them on the social scene. A drug trafficker pays his friend Roberto, who declined to give his last name, to keep him connected in Tijuana and introduce him to women. "I take him to parties," Roberto said. In the wealthy shopping areas of Interlomas, near Mexico City, the Perfect Silhouette spa offers breast implants. Staffed by young women in loose-fitting white suits, the spa also sells weight-loss creams and offers massages. The U.S. Treasury recently said it was part of the financial network of the Beltran Leyva cartel, whose leader was gunned down by elite Mexican marines in December. The salon's manager, Teresa Delgado, appeared baffled by the U.S. accusations. "We haven't seen anything strange here," she said. A woman Delgado identified as the owner did not return a phone call requesting an interview. Businesses enlisted to launder drug money typically get a cut worth 3 percent to 8 percent of the funds passing through their books, the U.S. law enforcement official said. "SMURFING" AROUND THE LAWS Much of the cartels' profits eventually ends up in Mexico's banking system, the U.S. official said. During the global financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity, says economist Guillermo Ibarra of the Autonomous University of Sinaloa. "They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that to a certain extent helped the banks," Ibarra said. Indeed, drug money in banks is a global phenomenon, not just in Mexico. A United Nations report on the global drug trade in 2009 said that "at a time of major bank failures, money doesn't smell, bankers seem to believe." Drug gangs in Mexico have their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking authorities, a practice known as "smurfing," said the U.S. official. Mexico's banking association and the finance ministry's anti-money laundering unit declined to comment for this story. While Mexico is confiscating more drugs and assets than ever under President Felipe Calderon, forfeitures of money are still minuscule compared to even low-ball estimates of the amount of drug money that flows into Mexico. Under Calderon, authorities have confiscated about $400 million, almost none of which was seized from banks, said Ricardo Najera, a spokesman for the Attorney General's Office. Mexican bank secrecy laws make it particularly difficult to go after drug money in financial institutions, Najera said. "We can't just go in there and say 'OK, let's have a look,'" he said. "We have to trace the illicit origin of that money before we can get at those bank accounts." The U.S. Treasury has blocked only about $16 million in suspected Mexican drug assets since June 2000, a Treasury official in Washington said. The official, who asked not to be named, said the sanctions program aims to hit drug lords by breaking "their commercial and financial backbones." But freezing assets is not "the principal objective nor the key measure of success." MAFIA CAPITALISM Data on Mexican banking provides a novel way for calculating the size of the drug economy. Ibarra crunched numbers on monetary aggregates across different Mexican states and concluded that more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its legitimate economy should be generating. "It's as if two people had the same job and the same level of seniority, but one of them has twice as much savings," he said, talking about comparisons between Sinaloa and other states. Ibarra estimates cartels have laundered more than $680 million in the banks of Sinaloa -- which is a financial services backwater -- and that drug money is driving nearly 20 percent of the state's economy. Edgardo Buscaglia, an academic at Columbia University, recently scoured judicial case files and financial intelligence reports, some of which were provided by Mexican authorities. His research found organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded sharply in the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy. Buscaglia thinks Mexico's lackluster effort to confiscate dirty money is allowing drug gangs and other mafias to flourish. "You will wind up with mafia capitalism here before things improve," he said. Even though cartels are clearly creating jobs and giving a lot of people extra spending money, some of these economic benefits are neutralized by a raging drug war that has scared investors. About a dozen foreign companies in Ciudad Juarez, across the border from Texas, are postponing investments in factories there because of regular gun battles in the city, said Soledad Maynez, who heads a local factory association. She met with the companies' representatives in November. "They need the security issue improved," she said. Business leaders say thousands of shops have closed in Ciudad Juarez because of the violence. Another problem the economy could face is that drug funding could one day fall if authorities cracked down on money laundering or somehow wrenched power away from the cartels. "(Drug money) could have a short-term positive effect. But in the long run, because you're propping up this artificial economy, the moment it stops it all crashes," the U.S. law enforcement official said. (Additional reporting by Lizbeth Diaz in Tijuana, editing by Claudia Parsons and Jim Impoco) [/INST] <h4>Cartels are key to Mexico’s banking sector – collapse crushes the entire economy</h4><p><strong>Lange 10</p><p></strong>(Jason Lange, Correspondent, Washington, “From spas to banks, Mexico economy rides on drugs” Jan 22, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/22/us-drugs-mexico-economy-idUSTRE60L0X120100122, KB)</p><p>At a modern factory in a city whose main claim to fame is an image of the Virgin Mary revered for granting miracles, Mexican pharmaceuticals firm Grupo Collins churns out antibiotics and other medicines. But the United States contends that the company in Zapopan is not what it seems. The U.S. Treasury put Grupo Collins on a black list in 2008, saying the firm supplies a small drug cartel in western Mexico with chemicals needed to make methamphetamines. Grupo <u><strong>Collins</u></strong>, which has denied any connection to organized crime, <u><strong>is one of dozens under suspicion of laundering money for the nation's booming drug business,</u></strong> <u><strong>whose growing economic impact now pervades just about every level of Mexican life. </u></strong>Mexican <u><strong>cartels</u></strong>, which control most of the cocaine and methamphetamine smuggled into the United States, <u><strong>bring</u></strong> an estimated $25 billion to <u><strong>$40 billion into Mexico from their global operations every year. </u></strong>To put that in perspective: <u><strong><mark>Mexico</mark> probably <mark>made more money</mark> in 2009 <mark>moving drugs than it did exporting oil</u></strong></mark>, its single biggest legitimate foreign currency earner. From the white Caribbean beaches of Cancun to violent towns on the U.S. border and the beauty parlors of Mexico City's wealthy suburbs, <u><strong>drug cash is everywhere in Mexico</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>It has</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong><mark>propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy.</mark> </u></strong>Smuggled into Mexico mostly from the United States in $100 bills, narco money finds its way onto the books of restaurants, construction firms and bars as drug lords try to legitimize their cash and prevent police from tracing it. <u><strong>"Mexico is saturated with this money," said</u></strong> George <u><strong>Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor.</u></strong> In western Mexico, drug money started pouring into Zapopan and nearby Guadalajara in the 1980s as <u><strong><mark>the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate</u></strong></mark>, said Martin Barron, a researcher at the institute that trains Mexico's organized crime prosecutors. Now residents in the region known in Mexico for its piety say drug smugglers barely make an effort to disguise themselves. A strip of fancy boutiques in Zapopan was financed with drug money, says Jaime Ramirez, a local newspaper columnist who has been reporting on the drug world for two decades. As well as the Grupo Collins factory in Zapopan, a nearby car wash is also on the U.S. Treasury's black list. A local cemetery draws relatives of traffickers who were among the 17,000 people killed in the drug war in Mexico since 2006. "A lot of narcos are buried there. You should see it on Fathers' Day," Ramirez said, as a black pick-up truck with tinted windows pulled in. Zapopan residents just shrug their shoulders when a wealthy neighbor displays traits seen as typical of a drug trafficker -- wearing cowboy gear, playing loud "norteno" music from the country's north or holding lavish parties attended by guests who arrive in pick-up trucks or SUVs. "Living alongside them is normal," Ramirez said. "Everybody knows when a neighbor is on the shady side." One of those neighbors was Sandra Avila, a glamorous trafficker known as the "Queen of the Pacific," who lived in Zapopan before being arrested in Mexico City in 2007. On a typical day in Zapopan recently, men unloaded boxes from vans in the Grupo Collins compound, near the company's private chapel and soccer field. From behind the factory's high walls, there was little to suggest it could have ties to a cartel. "It has always been really calm," said Genaro Rangel, who sells tacos every morning to factory workers from a stall across the street. The plant was advertising a job opening on the company web site for a machine room technician. Washington's accusation, filed under a U.S. sanctions program, makes it illegal for Americans to do business with Grupo Collins and freezes any assets it might have in U.S. accounts. In a 2006 report, Mexican authorities named Grupo Collins' owner Telesforo Tirado as an operator of the Colima cartel. The U.S. Treasury and Mexico's Attorney General's office both declined to provide further details on the case and Grupo Collins executives also refused to comment. But Tirado has previously denied the charges in the Mexican media. CASHING IN ON THE DRUG TRADE <u><strong>What's going on in Zapopan is happening all over Mexico. </u></strong>A well-known Mexico City restaurant specializing in the spicy cuisine of the Yucatan peninsula was added to the U.S. list of front companies in December. Months earlier, one of Mexico's top food critics had recommended it. <u><strong><mark>Drug money has</mark> </u></strong>also <u><strong><mark>fueled</mark> part of <mark>a real estate boom</mark> around tourist resorts</u></strong> such as Cancun, said a senior U.S. law enforcement official in Mexico City. "We've had cases where traffickers purchased large tracts of land in areas where any investor would buy," he said, asking not to be named because of concerns about his safety. An architect in the city of Tijuana did well out of designing buildings that <u><strong><mark>cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses.</mark> </u></strong>"The pay was enough for me to build a house for myself, as well as to buy a lot a tools," he said. He was once hired to design a tunnel that led to the street from a secret door in a drug gang member's closet. Craving acceptance, the drug gangs even throw their money at acquaintances to get them on the social scene. A drug trafficker pays his friend Roberto, who declined to give his last name, to keep him connected in Tijuana and introduce him to women. "I take him to parties," Roberto said. In the wealthy shopping areas of Interlomas, near Mexico City, the Perfect Silhouette spa offers breast implants. Staffed by young women in loose-fitting white suits, the spa also sells weight-loss creams and offers massages. The U.S. Treasury recently said it was part of the financial network of the Beltran Leyva cartel, whose leader was gunned down by elite Mexican marines in December. The salon's manager, Teresa Delgado, appeared baffled by the U.S. accusations. "We haven't seen anything strange here," she said. A woman Delgado identified as the owner did not return a phone call requesting an interview. Businesses enlisted to launder drug money typically get a cut worth 3 percent to 8 percent of the funds passing through their books, the U.S. law enforcement official said. "SMURFING" AROUND THE LAWS <u><strong>Much of <mark>the cartels' profits</mark> eventually <mark>ends up in Mexico's banking system</u></strong></mark>, the U.S. official said. <u><strong><mark>During the</mark> global <mark>financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity</mark>, says economist</u></strong> Guillermo <u><strong>Ibarra</u></strong> of the Autonomous University of Sinaloa. <u><strong><mark>"They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that</u></strong></mark> to a certain extent <u><strong><mark>helped the banks</u></strong></mark>," Ibarra said. Indeed, <u><strong>drug money in banks is a global phenomenon, not just in Mexico.</u></strong> A United Nations report on the global drug trade in 2009 said that "at a time of major bank failures, money doesn't smell, bankers seem to believe." <u><strong>Drug gangs in Mexico have their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking authorities, a practice known as "smurfing," </u></strong>said the U.S. official. Mexico's banking association and the finance ministry's anti-money laundering unit declined to comment for this story. While Mexico is confiscating more drugs and assets than ever under President Felipe Calderon, forfeitures of money are still minuscule compared to even low-ball estimates of the amount of drug money that flows into Mexico. Under Calderon, authorities have confiscated about $400 million, almost none of which was seized from banks, said Ricardo Najera, a spokesman for the Attorney General's Office. Mexican bank secrecy laws make it particularly difficult to go after drug money in financial institutions, Najera said. "We can't just go in there and say 'OK, let's have a look,'" he said. "We have to trace the illicit origin of that money before we can get at those bank accounts." The U.S. Treasury has blocked only about $16 million in suspected Mexican drug assets since June 2000, a Treasury official in Washington said. The official, who asked not to be named, said the sanctions program aims to hit drug lords by breaking "their commercial and financial backbones." But freezing assets is not "the principal objective nor the key measure of success." MAFIA CAPITALISM Data on Mexican banking provides a novel way for calculating the size of the drug economy. Ibarra crunched numbers on monetary aggregates across different Mexican states and concluded that <u><strong>more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its legitimate economy should be generating.</u></strong> "It's as if two people had the same job and the same level of seniority, but one of them has twice as much savings," he said, talking about comparisons between Sinaloa and other states. Ibarra estimates cartels have laundered more than $680 million in the banks of Sinaloa -- which is a financial services backwater -- and that <u><strong><mark>drug money is driving</mark> nearly <mark>20 percent of the state's economy.</mark> </u></strong>Edgardo Buscaglia, an academic at Columbia University, recently scoured judicial case files and financial intelligence reports, some of which were provided by Mexican authorities. His research found <u><strong>organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded sharply in the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy. </u></strong>Buscaglia thinks Mexico's lackluster effort to confiscate dirty money is allowing drug gangs and other mafias to flourish. "You will wind up with mafia capitalism here before things improve," he said. Even though cartels are clearly creating jobs and giving a lot of people extra spending money, some of these economic benefits are neutralized by a raging drug war that has scared investors. About a dozen foreign companies in Ciudad Juarez, across the border from Texas, are postponing investments in factories there because of regular gun battles in the city, said Soledad Maynez, who heads a local factory association. She met with the companies' representatives in November. "They need the security issue improved," she said. Business leaders say thousands of shops have closed in Ciudad Juarez because of the violence. <u><strong>Another problem the economy could face is that <mark>drug funding could one day fall</mark> if authorities cracked down on money laundering or</u></strong> somehow <u><strong>wrenched power away from the cartels. </u></strong>"(Drug money) could have a short-term positive effect. But in the long run, because you're propping up this artificial economy, <u><strong><mark>the moment it stops it all crashes</u></strong></mark>," the U.S. law enforcement official said. (Additional reporting by Lizbeth Diaz in Tijuana, editing by Claudia Parsons and Jim Impoco)</p> </s>

Mexico is key to the economy

Mexico also remains vital for the U.S. economy, although the current economic slowdown presents special challenges that will have to be addressed with great care Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports, border states economies are particularly tied with Mexico’ This degree of integration creates opportunities for more focused economic cooperation, but also generates risks for spillover effects in times of economic crisis An economic slowdown in either country will inevitably affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border . The United States and Mexico have the opportunity to develop a framework for economic integration that helps to contain the effect of economic shocks, takes advantage of complementarities to increase the competitive position of both countries

Mexico remains vital for the U.S. economy Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports border states economies ¶are tied with Mexico integration generates ¶risks for spillover effects in times of economic ¶ crisis.An economic slowdown will affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border

(Eric L., M.A., International Affairs, American University; B.A., History and Secondary Education, Trinity College, Associate Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, as a Senior Specialist in the Department for Promotion of Good Governance at the Organization of American States, January 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf) Mexico also remains vital for the U.S. economy, ¶ although the current economic slowdown ¶presents special challenges that will have to be ¶addressed with great care. Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports, and the first or ¶ second destination of exports for at least twenty two U.S. states. Over six million Americans live ¶ in cities and counties on the border and over ¶ 60 million in border states, whose economies ¶are particularly tied with Mexico’s. This degree ¶of integration creates opportunities for more ¶focused economic cooperation, but also generates ¶risks for spillover effects in times of economic ¶ crisis.An economic slowdown in either country will inevitably affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border. ¶ Moreover, the persistent wage gap between the ¶ two countries presents a long-term challenge that ¶ has been insufficiently addressed in past efforts at ¶ deepening cross-border economic ties. The United States and Mexico have the opportunity to develop ¶a framework for economic integration that helps ¶to contain the effect of economic shocks, takes ¶advantage of complementarities to increase the ¶competitive position of both countries, and, above ¶ all, places an emphasis on improving the well-being ¶ of average citizens in both countries.

<h4><strong>Mexico is key to the economy</h4><p>Olson 9 </p><p></strong>(Eric L., M.A., International Affairs, American University; B.A., History and Secondary Education, Trinity College, Associate Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, as a Senior Specialist in the Department for Promotion of Good Governance at the Organization of American States, January 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Mexico</mark> also <mark>remains vital for the U.S. economy</mark>, </u></strong>¶ <u><strong>although the current economic slowdown </u></strong>¶<u><strong>presents special challenges that will have to be </u></strong>¶<u><strong>addressed with great care</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports</mark>, </u></strong>and the first or ¶ second destination of exports for at least twenty two U.S. states. Over six million Americans live ¶ in cities and counties on the border and over ¶ 60 million in <u><strong><mark>border states</u></strong></mark>, whose <u><strong><mark>economies </u></strong>¶<u><strong>are</mark> particularly <mark>tied with Mexico</mark>’</u></strong>s. <u><strong>This degree </u></strong>¶<u><strong>of <mark>integration</mark> creates opportunities for more </u></strong>¶<u><strong>focused economic cooperation, but also <mark>generates </u></strong>¶<u><strong>risks for spillover effects in times of economic </u></strong>¶<u><strong> crisis</u></strong>.<u><strong>An economic slowdown</mark> in either country <mark>will</mark> inevitably <mark>affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border</u></strong></mark>. ¶ Moreover, the persistent wage gap between the ¶ two countries presents a long-term challenge that ¶ has been insufficiently addressed in past efforts at ¶ deepening cross-border economic ties<u><strong>. The United States and Mexico have the opportunity to develop </u></strong>¶<u><strong>a framework for economic integration that helps </u></strong>¶<u><strong>to contain the effect of economic shocks, takes </u></strong>¶<u><strong>advantage of complementarities to increase the </u></strong>¶<u><strong>competitive position of both countries</u></strong>, and, above ¶ all, places an emphasis on improving the well-being ¶ of average citizens in both countries.</p>

Olson 9

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Olson 9 fulltext: (Eric L., M.A., International Affairs, American University; B.A., History and Secondary Education, Trinity College, Associate Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, as a Senior Specialist in the Department for Promotion of Good Governance at the Organization of American States, January 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf) Mexico also remains vital for the U.S. economy, ¶ although the current economic slowdown ¶presents special challenges that will have to be ¶addressed with great care. Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports, and the first or ¶ second destination of exports for at least twenty two U.S. states. Over six million Americans live ¶ in cities and counties on the border and over ¶ 60 million in border states, whose economies ¶are particularly tied with Mexico’s. This degree ¶of integration creates opportunities for more ¶focused economic cooperation, but also generates ¶risks for spillover effects in times of economic ¶ crisis.An economic slowdown in either country will inevitably affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border. ¶ Moreover, the persistent wage gap between the ¶ two countries presents a long-term challenge that ¶ has been insufficiently addressed in past efforts at ¶ deepening cross-border economic ties. The United States and Mexico have the opportunity to develop ¶a framework for economic integration that helps ¶to contain the effect of economic shocks, takes ¶advantage of complementarities to increase the ¶competitive position of both countries, and, above ¶ all, places an emphasis on improving the well-being ¶ of average citizens in both countries. [/INST] <h4><strong>Mexico is key to the economy</h4><p>Olson 9 </p><p></strong>(Eric L., M.A., International Affairs, American University; B.A., History and Secondary Education, Trinity College, Associate Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, as a Senior Specialist in the Department for Promotion of Good Governance at the Organization of American States, January 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Mexico</mark> also <mark>remains vital for the U.S. economy</mark>, </u></strong>¶ <u><strong>although the current economic slowdown </u></strong>¶<u><strong>presents special challenges that will have to be </u></strong>¶<u><strong>addressed with great care</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports</mark>, </u></strong>and the first or ¶ second destination of exports for at least twenty two U.S. states. Over six million Americans live ¶ in cities and counties on the border and over ¶ 60 million in <u><strong><mark>border states</u></strong></mark>, whose <u><strong><mark>economies </u></strong>¶<u><strong>are</mark> particularly <mark>tied with Mexico</mark>’</u></strong>s. <u><strong>This degree </u></strong>¶<u><strong>of <mark>integration</mark> creates opportunities for more </u></strong>¶<u><strong>focused economic cooperation, but also <mark>generates </u></strong>¶<u><strong>risks for spillover effects in times of economic </u></strong>¶<u><strong> crisis</u></strong>.<u><strong>An economic slowdown</mark> in either country <mark>will</mark> inevitably <mark>affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border</u></strong></mark>. ¶ Moreover, the persistent wage gap between the ¶ two countries presents a long-term challenge that ¶ has been insufficiently addressed in past efforts at ¶ deepening cross-border economic ties<u><strong>. The United States and Mexico have the opportunity to develop </u></strong>¶<u><strong>a framework for economic integration that helps </u></strong>¶<u><strong>to contain the effect of economic shocks, takes </u></strong>¶<u><strong>advantage of complementarities to increase the </u></strong>¶<u><strong>competitive position of both countries</u></strong>, and, above ¶ all, places an emphasis on improving the well-being ¶ of average citizens in both countries.</p> </s>

Nuclear war

*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf) the Great Depression lessons include the potential for greater conflict in a constantly volatile economic environment Terrorist groups will likely be self-radicalized in an economic downturn The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider nuclear ambitions The lack of strategic depth short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies this could result in interstate conflicts Maritime security concerns modernization efforts increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves cooperation is likely to be difficult in a more dog-eat-dog world.

lessons include conflict in a volatile environment The most dangerous casualty would be the Middle East worries could lead states to develop new security arrangements acquire weapons, and nuclear ambitions short warning and flight times, and uncertainty of intentions may place focus on preemption leading to escalating crises.¶ cooperation is difficult in a dog-eat-dog world.

*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf) number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.¶ The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.¶ Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

<h4>Nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Harris and Burrows, 9</strong> </p><p><u><strong>*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)</p><p></u></strong>number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that <u><strong>the Great Depression</u></strong> is not likely to be repeated, the <u><strong><mark>lessons</u></strong></mark> to be drawn from that period <u><strong><mark>include</u></strong></mark> the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which <u><strong>the potential for greater <mark>conflict</u></strong></mark> could grow would seem to be even more apt <u><strong><mark>in a </mark>constantly <mark>volatile</mark> economic <mark>environment</mark> </u></strong>as they would be if change would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. <u><strong>Terrorist groups</u></strong> in 2025 <u><strong>will likely be</u></strong> a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become <u><strong>self-radicalized</u></strong>, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower <u><strong>in an economic downturn</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong><mark>The most dangerous casualty </mark>of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence <mark>would</mark> almost certainly <mark>be the Middle East</mark>.</u></strong> Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, <u><strong><mark>worries</mark> about a nuclear-armed Iran <mark>could lead states</mark> in the region <mark>to develop new security arrangements </mark>with external powers, <mark>acquire </mark>additional <mark>weapons, and </mark>consider </u></strong>pursuing their own <u><strong><mark>nuclear ambitions</u></strong></mark>. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. <u><strong>The lack of strategic depth</u></strong> in neighboring states like Israel, <u><strong><mark>short warning and</mark> missile <mark>flight times, and uncertainty of</mark> </u></strong>Iranian <u><strong><mark>intentions may place </mark>more <mark>focus on preemption</mark> rather than defense, potentially <mark>leading to escalating crises</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong></mark>Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices</u></strong>. <u><strong>Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies</u></strong>. In the worst case, <u><strong>this could result in interstate conflicts</u></strong> if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. <u><strong>Maritime security concerns</u></strong> are providing a rationale for naval buildups and <u><strong>modernization efforts</u></strong>, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to <u><strong>increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves</u></strong>, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, <u><strong><mark>cooperation</u></strong></mark> to manage changing water resources <u><strong><mark>is </mark>likely to be</u></strong> increasingly <u><strong><mark>difficult</u></strong></mark> both within and between states <u><strong><mark>in a </mark>more <mark>dog-eat-dog world.</p></u></strong></mark>

Harris and Burrows, 9

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Harris and Burrows, 9 fulltext: *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf) number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.¶ The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.¶ Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world. [/INST] <h4>Nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Harris and Burrows, 9</strong> </p><p><u><strong>*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)</p><p></u></strong>number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that <u><strong>the Great Depression</u></strong> is not likely to be repeated, the <u><strong><mark>lessons</u></strong></mark> to be drawn from that period <u><strong><mark>include</u></strong></mark> the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which <u><strong>the potential for greater <mark>conflict</u></strong></mark> could grow would seem to be even more apt <u><strong><mark>in a </mark>constantly <mark>volatile</mark> economic <mark>environment</mark> </u></strong>as they would be if change would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. <u><strong>Terrorist groups</u></strong> in 2025 <u><strong>will likely be</u></strong> a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become <u><strong>self-radicalized</u></strong>, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower <u><strong>in an economic downturn</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong><mark>The most dangerous casualty </mark>of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence <mark>would</mark> almost certainly <mark>be the Middle East</mark>.</u></strong> Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, <u><strong><mark>worries</mark> about a nuclear-armed Iran <mark>could lead states</mark> in the region <mark>to develop new security arrangements </mark>with external powers, <mark>acquire </mark>additional <mark>weapons, and </mark>consider </u></strong>pursuing their own <u><strong><mark>nuclear ambitions</u></strong></mark>. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. <u><strong>The lack of strategic depth</u></strong> in neighboring states like Israel, <u><strong><mark>short warning and</mark> missile <mark>flight times, and uncertainty of</mark> </u></strong>Iranian <u><strong><mark>intentions may place </mark>more <mark>focus on preemption</mark> rather than defense, potentially <mark>leading to escalating crises</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong></mark>Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices</u></strong>. <u><strong>Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies</u></strong>. In the worst case, <u><strong>this could result in interstate conflicts</u></strong> if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. <u><strong>Maritime security concerns</u></strong> are providing a rationale for naval buildups and <u><strong>modernization efforts</u></strong>, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to <u><strong>increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves</u></strong>, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, <u><strong><mark>cooperation</u></strong></mark> to manage changing water resources <u><strong><mark>is </mark>likely to be</u></strong> increasingly <u><strong><mark>difficult</u></strong></mark> both within and between states <u><strong><mark>in a </mark>more <mark>dog-eat-dog world.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

Double Bind! - Either

<h4>Double Bind! - Either</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Double Bind! - Either</h4> </s>

A.) the harms to the 1AC are true and they cannot solve for extinction before they control the levers of power

<h4>A.) the harms to the 1AC are true and they cannot solve for extinction before they control the levers of power </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>A.) the harms to the 1AC are true and they cannot solve for extinction before they control the levers of power </h4> </s>

OR

<h4>OR </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>OR </h4> </s>

B.) their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which makes them symbolic terrorists.

<h4>B.) their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which makes them symbolic terrorists.</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>B.) their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which makes them symbolic terrorists.</h4> </s>

Their form of food security pays lip service to the hungry while serving as a justification for the violent expansion of global governance

Since the 1970s, the concept of ‘food security’ has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of global hunger has been viewed. The adoption of the term at the FAO-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). This pervasive predilection for empirical clarity is symptomatic of traditional positivist epistemologies and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence and meaning, we ought to historicize and relativize them as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories’ (1994: 10). The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘reconstruction’ of food security and re-articulation of its normative criteria reproduce precisely the kind of technical, managerial set of solutions which characterise the positivistic need for definitional certainty that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, while lip-service is occasionally paid to the lives and faces of hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘objective’ methods of identifying and stratifying the ‘food insecure’. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for food security is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This results in a technocratic discourse which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact (thematic patterns) and deflects consideration of values choices and the social, moral and political responsibility for such choices’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. I adopt a broad perspective from which to interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how the militaristic component of traditional security discourse is reproduced in the wider agenda of food security, through the notions of risk, threat and permanent emergency that constitute its governmental rationale

food security’ is symptomatic of positivist epistemologies a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence we ought to historicize them food security reproduce the kind of managerial solutions which characterise the positivistic need for certainty while lip-service is occasionally paid to hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by objective’ methods of stratifying the ‘ insecure’ food security results in technocratic discourse I interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance the militaristic component of security discourse is reproduced in food security, through the notions of risk emergency

Since the 1970s, the concept of ‘food security’ has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of global hunger has been viewed. The adoption of the term at the FAO-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). This pervasive predilection for empirical clarity is symptomatic of traditional positivist epistemologies and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence and meaning, we ought to historicize and relativize them as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories’ (1994: 10). The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘reconstruction’ of food security and re-articulation of its normative criteria reproduce precisely the kind of technical, managerial set of solutions which characterise the positivistic need for definitional certainty that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, while lip-service is occasionally paid to the lives and faces of hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘objective’ methods of identifying and stratifying the ‘food insecure’. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for food security is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This results in a technocratic discourse which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact (thematic patterns) and deflects consideration of values choices and the social, moral and political responsibility for such choices’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. I adopt a broad perspective from which to interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how the militaristic component of traditional security discourse is reproduced in the wider agenda of food security, through the notions of risk, threat and permanent emergency that constitute its governmental rationale.

<h4>Their form of food<u> security pays lip service to the hungry while serving as a justification for the violent expansion of global governance </h4><p></u><strong>Alcock 9<u></strong> (Rupert, graduated with a distinction in the MSc in Development and Security from the Department of Politics, University of Bristol in 2009, MSc dissertation prize joint winner 2009, “Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security” 2009, pdf available online, p. 10-14 MT)</p><p>Since the 1970s, <strong>the concept of ‘<mark>food security’</mark> has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of</strong> global <strong>hunger has been viewed</strong>. The adoption of the term at <strong>the FAO</strong>-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which <strong>takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity</strong>’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). <strong>This</strong> pervasive predilection for empirical clarity <strong><mark>is symptomatic of</mark> traditional <mark>positivist epistemologies</strong></mark> and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that <strong>to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, <mark>a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence</mark> and meaning, <mark>we ought to historicize</mark> and relativize <mark>them</mark> as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories</strong>’ (1994: 10). <strong>The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity</strong>. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. <strong>The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm</strong>. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on <strong>the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government</strong>. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘<strong>reconstruction’ of <mark>food security</mark> and re-articulation of its normative criteria <mark>reproduce </mark>precisely <mark>the kind of </mark>technical, <mark>managerial</mark> set of <mark>solutions which characterise the positivistic need for</strong></mark> definitional <strong><mark>certainty</strong></mark> that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, <strong><mark>while lip-service is occasionally paid to</mark> the lives and faces of <mark>hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by</mark> increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘<mark>objective’ methods of</mark> identifying and <mark>stratifying the ‘</mark>food <mark>insecure</strong>’</mark>. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for <strong><mark>food security</strong></mark> is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This <strong><mark>results in</mark> a <mark>technocratic discourse</mark> which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact</strong> (thematic patterns) <strong>and deflects consideration of values choices</strong> and the social, moral <strong>and political responsibility for such choices</strong>’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. <strong><mark>I</mark> adopt a broad perspective from which to <mark>interrogate</mark> <mark>food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance</mark>. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s</strong>. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how <strong><mark>the militaristic component of</mark> traditional <mark>security discourse is</mark> <mark>reproduced in</mark> the wider agenda of <mark>food security, through the notions of risk</mark>, threat and permanent <mark>emergency</mark> that constitute its governmental rationale</u>.</p></strong>

Alcock 9 (Rupert, graduated with a distinction in the MSc in Development and Security from the Department of Politics, University of Bristol in 2009, MSc dissertation prize joint winner 2009, “Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security” 2009, pdf available online, p. 10-14 MT)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Alcock 9 (Rupert, graduated with a distinction in the MSc in Development and Security from the Department of Politics, University of Bristol in 2009, MSc dissertation prize joint winner 2009, “Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security” 2009, pdf available online, p. 10-14 MT) fulltext: Since the 1970s, the concept of ‘food security’ has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of global hunger has been viewed. The adoption of the term at the FAO-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). This pervasive predilection for empirical clarity is symptomatic of traditional positivist epistemologies and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence and meaning, we ought to historicize and relativize them as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories’ (1994: 10). The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘reconstruction’ of food security and re-articulation of its normative criteria reproduce precisely the kind of technical, managerial set of solutions which characterise the positivistic need for definitional certainty that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, while lip-service is occasionally paid to the lives and faces of hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘objective’ methods of identifying and stratifying the ‘food insecure’. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for food security is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This results in a technocratic discourse which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact (thematic patterns) and deflects consideration of values choices and the social, moral and political responsibility for such choices’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. I adopt a broad perspective from which to interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how the militaristic component of traditional security discourse is reproduced in the wider agenda of food security, through the notions of risk, threat and permanent emergency that constitute its governmental rationale. [/INST] <h4>Their form of food<u> security pays lip service to the hungry while serving as a justification for the violent expansion of global governance </h4><p></u><strong>Alcock 9<u></strong> (Rupert, graduated with a distinction in the MSc in Development and Security from the Department of Politics, University of Bristol in 2009, MSc dissertation prize joint winner 2009, “Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security” 2009, pdf available online, p. 10-14 MT)</p><p>Since the 1970s, <strong>the concept of ‘<mark>food security’</mark> has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of</strong> global <strong>hunger has been viewed</strong>. The adoption of the term at <strong>the FAO</strong>-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which <strong>takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity</strong>’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). <strong>This</strong> pervasive predilection for empirical clarity <strong><mark>is symptomatic of</mark> traditional <mark>positivist epistemologies</strong></mark> and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that <strong>to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, <mark>a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence</mark> and meaning, <mark>we ought to historicize</mark> and relativize <mark>them</mark> as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories</strong>’ (1994: 10). <strong>The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity</strong>. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. <strong>The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm</strong>. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on <strong>the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government</strong>. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘<strong>reconstruction’ of <mark>food security</mark> and re-articulation of its normative criteria <mark>reproduce </mark>precisely <mark>the kind of </mark>technical, <mark>managerial</mark> set of <mark>solutions which characterise the positivistic need for</strong></mark> definitional <strong><mark>certainty</strong></mark> that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, <strong><mark>while lip-service is occasionally paid to</mark> the lives and faces of <mark>hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by</mark> increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘<mark>objective’ methods of</mark> identifying and <mark>stratifying the ‘</mark>food <mark>insecure</strong>’</mark>. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for <strong><mark>food security</strong></mark> is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This <strong><mark>results in</mark> a <mark>technocratic discourse</mark> which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact</strong> (thematic patterns) <strong>and deflects consideration of values choices</strong> and the social, moral <strong>and political responsibility for such choices</strong>’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. <strong><mark>I</mark> adopt a broad perspective from which to <mark>interrogate</mark> <mark>food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance</mark>. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s</strong>. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how <strong><mark>the militaristic component of</mark> traditional <mark>security discourse is</mark> <mark>reproduced in</mark> the wider agenda of <mark>food security, through the notions of risk</mark>, threat and permanent <mark>emergency</mark> that constitute its governmental rationale</u>.</p></strong> </s>

Framing the global environment in a securitizing manner causes elite takeover and diminishes agency, exacerbating the problem

Along with supporting diverse sites of human agency, rhetors may want to avoid the inherent conservatism of apocalyptic discourse. apocalyptic framing endows an array of experts and elites with the power to understand, frame, and perhaps resolve the issue; helping fuel the common sentiment that ordinary people cannot do anything to reduce global warming or that they will not need to because "'someone will invent the gizmo' that solves the problem by linking climate change solutions to common sense-especially Americans' notions of sacrifice, conservation, community, and family )-we may free scientists from their role as controversial prophets awareness needs to work toward arousing the public toward action We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions These efforts also must extend beyond the media to include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from kitchen tables and water coolers, to board rooms and classrooms. By providing the public, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), and community leaders with ways to structure communication that promote agency, rhetoricians might advance widespread public action on climate change The apocalyptic frame has been developed over at least the last decade of press coverage, a time in which the US has refused all but the most paltry political action on greenhouse gas reductions we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity

apocalyptic framing endows elites with the power to frame and resolve the issue; helping fuel the sentiment that ordinary people cannot do anything to reduce warming or 'someone will invent the gizmo' that solves the problem , awareness needs to work toward arousing public action collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions must extend beyond the media to kitchen tables board rooms and classrooms. By providing the public and community leaders with ways to structure communication that promote agency, rhetoricians advance public action . The apocalyptic frame, has been developed over a time in which the US has refused all action on greenhouse gas reductions.

Along with supporting diverse sites of human agency, rhetors may want to avoid the inherent conservatism of apocalyptic discourse. Apocalyptic rhetoric suggests that received sense-making systems (i.e., common sense) cannot explain great changes, but that various prophets can (Brummett, 1991). In the case of climate change, apocalyptic framing endows an array of experts and elites (including scientists, actuaries, politicians, and journalists) with the power to understand, frame, and perhaps resolve the issue; helping fuel the common sentiment that ordinary people cannot do anything to reduce global warming (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), or that they will not need to because "'someone will invent the gizmo' that solves the problem" (Gregg Easterbrook, quoted in Nocera, 2007, p. C1). Perhaps by linking climate change solutions to common sense-especially Americans' notions of sacrifice, conservation, community, and family (Moser & Dilling, 2004)-we may free scientists from their role as controversial prophets, while expanding agency beyond Fate. As our analysis suggests, simply creating awareness of an issue is not enough to create an active public. Rather, that awareness needs to work toward arousing the public toward action (Hallahan, 2001). In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Moser & Dilling, 2007). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, 2007b). These efforts also must extend beyond the media to include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from kitchen tables and water coolers, to board rooms and classrooms. By providing the public, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), and community leaders with ways to structure communication that promote agency, rhetoricians might advance widespread public action on climate change. The apocalyptic frame, particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It has been developed over at least the last decade of press coverage, a time in which the US has refused all but the most paltry political action on greenhouse gas reductions. Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. Together, we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity.

<h4>Framing the global environment in a securitizing manner causes elite takeover and diminishes agency, exacerbating the problem</h4><p><strong>Foust and Murphy 2009</strong> </p><p>Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 </p><p><u><strong>Along with supporting diverse sites of human agency, rhetors may want to avoid the inherent conservatism of apocalyptic discourse.</u></strong> Apocalyptic rhetoric suggests that received sense-making systems (i.e., common sense) cannot explain great changes, but that various prophets can (Brummett, 1991). In the case of climate change, <u><strong><mark>apocalyptic framing</mark> <mark>endows</mark> an array of experts and <mark>elites</u></strong></mark> (including scientists, actuaries, politicians, and journalists) <u><strong><mark>with the power to</mark> understand, <mark>frame</mark>, <mark>and</mark> perhaps <mark>resolve</mark> <mark>the issue;</mark> <mark>helping fuel the</mark> common <mark>sentiment that ordinary people</mark> <mark>cannot do anything to reduce</mark> global <mark>warming</u></strong></mark> (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), <u><strong><mark>or</mark> that they will not need to because "<mark>'someone will invent the gizmo' that solves the problem</u></strong></mark>" (Gregg Easterbrook, quoted in Nocera, 2007, p. C1). Perhaps <u><strong>by linking climate change solutions to common sense-especially Americans' notions of sacrifice, conservation, community, and family </u></strong>(Moser & Dilling, 2004<u><strong>)-we may free scientists from their role as controversial prophets</u></strong><mark>,</mark> while expanding agency beyond Fate. As our analysis suggests, simply creating awareness of an issue is not enough to create an active public. Rather, that <u><strong><mark>awareness needs to work toward arousing</mark> the <mark>public</mark> toward <mark>action</u></strong></mark> (Hallahan, 2001). In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. <u><strong>We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a <mark>collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions</u></strong></mark> (Moser & Dilling, 2007). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, 2007b). <u><strong>These efforts also <mark>must extend beyond</mark> <mark>the media to</mark> include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from <mark>kitchen tables</mark> and water coolers, to <mark>board rooms and classrooms.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>By providing the public</mark>, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), <mark>and community leaders with ways to structure</mark> <mark>communication that promote agency, rhetoricians</mark> might <mark>advance</mark> widespread <mark>public action</mark> on climate change</u></strong><mark>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>The apocalyptic frame</u></strong>,</mark> particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It <u><strong><mark>has been</mark> <mark>developed over</mark> at least the last decade of press coverage, <mark>a time in which the US has refused all</mark> but the most paltry political <mark>action on greenhouse gas reductions</u></strong>.</mark> Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-<u><strong>we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. </u></strong>Together, <u><strong>we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity</u></strong>.</p>

Foust and Murphy 2009 Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Foust and Murphy 2009 Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 fulltext: Along with supporting diverse sites of human agency, rhetors may want to avoid the inherent conservatism of apocalyptic discourse. Apocalyptic rhetoric suggests that received sense-making systems (i.e., common sense) cannot explain great changes, but that various prophets can (Brummett, 1991). In the case of climate change, apocalyptic framing endows an array of experts and elites (including scientists, actuaries, politicians, and journalists) with the power to understand, frame, and perhaps resolve the issue; helping fuel the common sentiment that ordinary people cannot do anything to reduce global warming (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), or that they will not need to because "'someone will invent the gizmo' that solves the problem" (Gregg Easterbrook, quoted in Nocera, 2007, p. C1). Perhaps by linking climate change solutions to common sense-especially Americans' notions of sacrifice, conservation, community, and family (Moser & Dilling, 2004)-we may free scientists from their role as controversial prophets, while expanding agency beyond Fate. As our analysis suggests, simply creating awareness of an issue is not enough to create an active public. Rather, that awareness needs to work toward arousing the public toward action (Hallahan, 2001). In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Moser & Dilling, 2007). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, 2007b). These efforts also must extend beyond the media to include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from kitchen tables and water coolers, to board rooms and classrooms. By providing the public, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), and community leaders with ways to structure communication that promote agency, rhetoricians might advance widespread public action on climate change. The apocalyptic frame, particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It has been developed over at least the last decade of press coverage, a time in which the US has refused all but the most paltry political action on greenhouse gas reductions. Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. Together, we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity. [/INST] <h4>Framing the global environment in a securitizing manner causes elite takeover and diminishes agency, exacerbating the problem</h4><p><strong>Foust and Murphy 2009</strong> </p><p>Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 </p><p><u><strong>Along with supporting diverse sites of human agency, rhetors may want to avoid the inherent conservatism of apocalyptic discourse.</u></strong> Apocalyptic rhetoric suggests that received sense-making systems (i.e., common sense) cannot explain great changes, but that various prophets can (Brummett, 1991). In the case of climate change, <u><strong><mark>apocalyptic framing</mark> <mark>endows</mark> an array of experts and <mark>elites</u></strong></mark> (including scientists, actuaries, politicians, and journalists) <u><strong><mark>with the power to</mark> understand, <mark>frame</mark>, <mark>and</mark> perhaps <mark>resolve</mark> <mark>the issue;</mark> <mark>helping fuel the</mark> common <mark>sentiment that ordinary people</mark> <mark>cannot do anything to reduce</mark> global <mark>warming</u></strong></mark> (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), <u><strong><mark>or</mark> that they will not need to because "<mark>'someone will invent the gizmo' that solves the problem</u></strong></mark>" (Gregg Easterbrook, quoted in Nocera, 2007, p. C1). Perhaps <u><strong>by linking climate change solutions to common sense-especially Americans' notions of sacrifice, conservation, community, and family </u></strong>(Moser & Dilling, 2004<u><strong>)-we may free scientists from their role as controversial prophets</u></strong><mark>,</mark> while expanding agency beyond Fate. As our analysis suggests, simply creating awareness of an issue is not enough to create an active public. Rather, that <u><strong><mark>awareness needs to work toward arousing</mark> the <mark>public</mark> toward <mark>action</u></strong></mark> (Hallahan, 2001). In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. <u><strong>We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a <mark>collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions</u></strong></mark> (Moser & Dilling, 2007). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, 2007b). <u><strong>These efforts also <mark>must extend beyond</mark> <mark>the media to</mark> include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from <mark>kitchen tables</mark> and water coolers, to <mark>board rooms and classrooms.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>By providing the public</mark>, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), <mark>and community leaders with ways to structure</mark> <mark>communication that promote agency, rhetoricians</mark> might <mark>advance</mark> widespread <mark>public action</mark> on climate change</u></strong><mark>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>The apocalyptic frame</u></strong>,</mark> particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It <u><strong><mark>has been</mark> <mark>developed over</mark> at least the last decade of press coverage, <mark>a time in which the US has refused all</mark> but the most paltry political <mark>action on greenhouse gas reductions</u></strong>.</mark> Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-<u><strong>we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. </u></strong>Together, <u><strong>we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Alternative – Reject the affirmative’s security logic

Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6] Security politics is, , an anti-politics,"' reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. ; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, learning to tolerate the uncertainties, that come with being human; 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

Security politics is anti-politics," We need to get beyond security politics not add more 'sectors' to it The task is not to fill the hole with another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which does not throw us into the arms of the state. demanding 'more security' while hoping this increased security doesn't damage our liberty is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to forge another kind of politics it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition

Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6] could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sewnse, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising= that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

<h4>Alternative – Reject the affirmative’s security logic </h4><p><strong><mark>Neocleous 08</strong></mark> </p><p><u>Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6]</p><p></u>could be told - what might count as having achieved it. <u><mark>Security politics is</mark>,</u> in this sewnse<u>, an <mark>anti-politics,"</mark>'</u> dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, <u>reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. <mark>We</mark> therefore <mark>need to get beyond security politics</mark>, <mark>not add</mark> yet <mark>more 'sectors' to it</u></mark> in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if <u>you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever</u>. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. <u><mark>The</mark> real <mark>task is</mark> <mark>not to fill the</mark> supposed <mark>hole with</mark> yet <mark>another vision of security, but</mark> <mark>to fight for an alternative political language which</mark> </u>takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore <u><mark>does not</mark> constantly <mark>throw us into the arms of the state.</mark> That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language</u> more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that <u>the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep <mark>demanding 'more security'</mark> (<mark>while</mark> meekly <mark>hoping</mark> that <mark>this increased security doesn't damage our liberty</mark>) <mark>is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives</mark> to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. <mark>To situate ourselves against security politics would</mark> </u>allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also<u> <mark>allow us to forge another kind of politics </mark>centred on a different conception of the good. </u>We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising= that security is not the same as solidarity<u>; <mark>it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition</mark>, </u>and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead <u>learning to tolerate the uncertainties, </u>ambiguities and 'insecurities'<u> that come with being human;</u> it requires accepting that <u>'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it<strong> </strong>out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'</p></u>

Neocleous 08

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Neocleous 08 fulltext: Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6] could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sewnse, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising= that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."' [/INST] <h4>Alternative – Reject the affirmative’s security logic </h4><p><strong><mark>Neocleous 08</strong></mark> </p><p><u>Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6]</p><p></u>could be told - what might count as having achieved it. <u><mark>Security politics is</mark>,</u> in this sewnse<u>, an <mark>anti-politics,"</mark>'</u> dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, <u>reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. <mark>We</mark> therefore <mark>need to get beyond security politics</mark>, <mark>not add</mark> yet <mark>more 'sectors' to it</u></mark> in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if <u>you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever</u>. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. <u><mark>The</mark> real <mark>task is</mark> <mark>not to fill the</mark> supposed <mark>hole with</mark> yet <mark>another vision of security, but</mark> <mark>to fight for an alternative political language which</mark> </u>takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore <u><mark>does not</mark> constantly <mark>throw us into the arms of the state.</mark> That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language</u> more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that <u>the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep <mark>demanding 'more security'</mark> (<mark>while</mark> meekly <mark>hoping</mark> that <mark>this increased security doesn't damage our liberty</mark>) <mark>is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives</mark> to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. <mark>To situate ourselves against security politics would</mark> </u>allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also<u> <mark>allow us to forge another kind of politics </mark>centred on a different conception of the good. </u>We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising= that security is not the same as solidarity<u>; <mark>it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition</mark>, </u>and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead <u>learning to tolerate the uncertainties, </u>ambiguities and 'insecurities'<u> that come with being human;</u> it requires accepting that <u>'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it<strong> </strong>out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'</p></u> </s>

CP Text: The United States should hold a binding national referendum to coincide with the 2014 midterm elections regarding whether or not the United States federal government should amend the Controlled Substances Act to establish an exemption for state-level marijuana laws for states that establish cannabis exchanges and whether or not the states and territories of the United States should legalize marihuana by establishing a Cannabis Exchange.

<h4>CP Text: The United States should hold a binding national referendum to coincide with the 2014 midterm elections regarding whether or not the United States federal government should amend the Controlled Substances Act to establish an exemption for state-level marijuana laws for states that establish cannabis exchanges and whether or not the states and territories of the United States should legalize marihuana by establishing a Cannabis Exchange. </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>CP Text: The United States should hold a binding national referendum to coincide with the 2014 midterm elections regarding whether or not the United States federal government should amend the Controlled Substances Act to establish an exemption for state-level marijuana laws for states that establish cannabis exchanges and whether or not the states and territories of the United States should legalize marihuana by establishing a Cannabis Exchange. </h4> </s>

The United States should amend the Controlled Substances Act to establish an exemption for state-level marijuana laws for states that establish cannabis exchanges and the United States and territories of the United States should legalize marihuana by establishing a Cannabis Exchange if and only if the referendum receives more than 50% of the popular vote.

<h4>The United States should amend the Controlled Substances Act to establish an exemption for state-level marijuana laws for states that establish cannabis exchanges and the United States and territories of the United States should legalize marihuana by establishing a Cannabis Exchange if and only if the referendum receives more than 50% of the popular vote.</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>The United States should amend the Controlled Substances Act to establish an exemption for state-level marijuana laws for states that establish cannabis exchanges and the United States and territories of the United States should legalize marihuana by establishing a Cannabis Exchange if and only if the referendum receives more than 50% of the popular vote.</h4> </s>

The referendum passes and provides uniqueness to the midterms disad

The writing is on the wall; marijuana will be completely legal in the U.S. within 10 years. Demographics project legalization with a 2-1 majority among younger voters legalization is just a matter of time You cannot legislate against a social movement that is on the right side of history. prohibition seems to be crumbling before our eyes This current vote is the start of correcting the original ignorance that allowed marijuana prohibition to become a law As 60+ people in my generation die off, our replacements view marijuana use as harmless Marijuana is an idea whose time has come; this new marijuana majority social movement is a political force that politicians who want to get elected must now listen to; they need to start a conversation with us if they want votes. Going against the will of an overwhelming majority of Americans who worked though the system is not something to be taken lightly by any elected official who wants to be voted into office Think we don’t vote? Think again! Marijuana legalization polled 3 points higher than Obama in Colorado marijuana was voted more popular than either presidential candidate in November 2012 it’s time for the media and politicians to lose the DEA The majority pro-marijuana vote that took place in Colorado and Washington state is a directive to the federal government to stand down These two states are a strong representative sample of the country as a whole. Put it to a national referendum and the numbers would be about the same– a majority of Americans want legalized cannabis

marijuana will be legal in 10 years Demographics project legalization with a 2-1 majority legalization is just a matter of time You cannot legislate against a social movement prohibition seems to be crumbling this new movement is a force that politicians who want to get elected must listen to they need to start a conversation with us Going against the will is not something to be taken lightly by any official who wants to be voted into office The majority vote in Colorado is a directive to the fed to stand down. These states are a strong representative sample of the country as a whole. Put it to a national referendum and the numbers would be the same– a majority of Americans want legalized cannabis

Ron, former drug education specialist and M.S. in cardiac rehabilitation and exercise physiology, “Worth Repeating: ‘Marijuana Spring’ Will Save Future of Earth”, http://www.tokesignals.com/worth-repeating-marijuana-spring-will-save-future-of-earth/, October 18th, AB The writing is on the wall; marijuana will be completely legal in the U.S. within 10 years. “Demographics project legalization with a 2-1 majority among younger voters,” and legalization is just a matter of time. Hey… Have you ever tried putting toothpaste back into the tube? The new marijuana spring is here to stay… You cannot legislate against a social movement that is on the right side of history. “The Berlin Wall of pot prohibition seems to be crumbling before our eyes.” This current vote also is the start of correcting the original ignorance that allowed marijuana prohibition to become a law back in the 1937. The hidden agency that originally made cannabis illegal was designed to replace a plant that was in use by humans for 10,000 years and to replace it worldwide with petroleum and plastics for profit by the oligarchies of the day. You see where that got us? As 60+ people in my generation die off, our replacements view marijuana use as harmless as gay marriage is to society, a normal, and good for you, healthy behavior. Trying to outlaw marijuana is like trying to outlaw gay. Marijuana as a social movement is an idea whose time has come; this new marijuana majority social movement is a political force that politicians who want to get elected must now listen to; they need to start a conversation with us if they want our votes. Going against the will of an overwhelming majority of Americans who worked though the system is not something to be taken lightly by any elected official who wants to be voted into office. Think we don’t vote? Think again! Marijuana legalization polled 3 points higher than President Obama did in Colorado. As a matter of fact, marijuana was voted more popular than either presidential candidate in November 2012. Americans are in love with this gentle plant. Maybe it’s time for the media and politicians to lose the DEA misinformation that frames people who use cannabis as addicted, apathetic, criminals. We are your mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters; we are your family. Marijuana prohibition destroys families; that’s why it is a failure. And one more thing: historically, the word “marijuana” was a made-up word to discriminate and demonize Hispanics who are now the upcoming new racial majority in the U.S. Remember, the word “marijuana” was used to discriminate against your great-grandparents who picked fruit in the hot sun, and whose purpose was to profile them as lazy, degenerate and violent marijuana-smokers who should be deported. I would like to watch any prohibitionist explain to a Hispanic town meeting how marijuana first became illegal and why and then ask for their support and vote. Karma can be a real bitch. The majority pro-marijuana vote that took place in Colorado and Washington state is a directive to the federal government to stand down. These two states are a strong representative sample of the country as a whole. Put it to a national referendum and the numbers would be about the same– a majority of Americans want legalized cannabis. You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.

<h4><strong>The referendum passes and provides uniqueness to the midterms disad </h4><p>Marczyk 13</p><p></strong>Ron, former drug education specialist and M.S. in cardiac rehabilitation and exercise physiology, “Worth Repeating: ‘Marijuana Spring’ Will Save Future of Earth”, http://www.tokesignals.com/worth-repeating-marijuana-spring-will-save-future-of-earth/, October 18th, AB </p><p><u><strong>The writing is on the wall; <mark>marijuana will be</mark> completely <mark>legal in</mark> the U.S. within <mark>10 years</mark>. </u></strong>“<u><strong><mark>Demographics project legalization with a 2-1 majority</mark> among younger voters</u></strong>,” and <u><strong><mark>legalization is just a matter of time</u></strong></mark>. Hey… Have you ever tried putting toothpaste back into the tube? The new marijuana spring is here to stay… <u><strong><mark>You cannot legislate against a social movement</mark> that is on the right side of history. </u></strong>“The Berlin Wall of pot <u><strong><mark>prohibition seems to be crumbling</mark> before our eyes</u></strong>.” <u><strong>This current vote</u></strong> also <u><strong>is the start of correcting the original ignorance that allowed marijuana prohibition to become a law</u></strong> back in the 1937. The hidden agency that originally made cannabis illegal was designed to replace a plant that was in use by humans for 10,000 years and to replace it worldwide with petroleum and plastics for profit by the oligarchies of the day. You see where that got us? <u><strong>As 60+ people in my generation die off, our replacements view marijuana use as harmless</u></strong> as gay marriage is to society, a normal, and good for you, healthy behavior. Trying to outlaw marijuana is like trying to outlaw gay. <u><strong>Marijuana</u></strong> as a social movement <u><strong>is an idea whose time has come; <mark>this new</mark> marijuana majority social <mark>movement is a</mark> political <mark>force that politicians who want to get elected must</mark> now <mark>listen to</mark>; <mark>they need to start a conversation with us</mark> if they want</u></strong> our<u><strong> votes. <mark>Going against the will</mark> of an overwhelming majority of Americans who worked though the system <mark>is not something</mark> <mark>to be taken lightly by</mark> <mark>any</mark> elected <mark>official who wants to be voted into office</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Think we don’t vote? Think again!</u></strong> <u><strong>Marijuana legalization polled 3 points higher than </u></strong>President <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> did <u><strong>in Colorado</u></strong>. As a matter of fact, <u><strong>marijuana was voted more popular than either presidential candidate in November 2012</u></strong>. Americans are in love with this gentle plant. Maybe <u><strong>it’s time for the media and politicians to lose the DEA</u></strong> misinformation that frames people who use cannabis as addicted, apathetic, criminals. We are your mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters; we are your family. Marijuana prohibition destroys families; that’s why it is a failure. And one more thing: historically, the word “marijuana” was a made-up word to discriminate and demonize Hispanics who are now the upcoming new racial majority in the U.S. Remember, the word “marijuana” was used to discriminate against your great-grandparents who picked fruit in the hot sun, and whose purpose was to profile them as lazy, degenerate and violent marijuana-smokers who should be deported. I would like to watch any prohibitionist explain to a Hispanic town meeting how marijuana first became illegal and why and then ask for their support and vote. Karma can be a real bitch. <u><strong><mark>The majority</mark> pro-marijuana <mark>vote</mark> that took place <mark>in Colorado</mark> and Washington state <mark>is a directive to the</mark> <mark>fed</mark>eral government <mark>to stand down</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>These</mark> two <mark>states are a strong representative sample of the country as a whole.</u></strong> <u><strong>Put it to a national referendum and the numbers would be</mark> about <mark>the same– a majority of Americans want legalized cannabis</u></strong></mark>. You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.</p>

Marczyk 13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Marczyk 13 fulltext: Ron, former drug education specialist and M.S. in cardiac rehabilitation and exercise physiology, “Worth Repeating: ‘Marijuana Spring’ Will Save Future of Earth”, http://www.tokesignals.com/worth-repeating-marijuana-spring-will-save-future-of-earth/, October 18th, AB The writing is on the wall; marijuana will be completely legal in the U.S. within 10 years. “Demographics project legalization with a 2-1 majority among younger voters,” and legalization is just a matter of time. Hey… Have you ever tried putting toothpaste back into the tube? The new marijuana spring is here to stay… You cannot legislate against a social movement that is on the right side of history. “The Berlin Wall of pot prohibition seems to be crumbling before our eyes.” This current vote also is the start of correcting the original ignorance that allowed marijuana prohibition to become a law back in the 1937. The hidden agency that originally made cannabis illegal was designed to replace a plant that was in use by humans for 10,000 years and to replace it worldwide with petroleum and plastics for profit by the oligarchies of the day. You see where that got us? As 60+ people in my generation die off, our replacements view marijuana use as harmless as gay marriage is to society, a normal, and good for you, healthy behavior. Trying to outlaw marijuana is like trying to outlaw gay. Marijuana as a social movement is an idea whose time has come; this new marijuana majority social movement is a political force that politicians who want to get elected must now listen to; they need to start a conversation with us if they want our votes. Going against the will of an overwhelming majority of Americans who worked though the system is not something to be taken lightly by any elected official who wants to be voted into office. Think we don’t vote? Think again! Marijuana legalization polled 3 points higher than President Obama did in Colorado. As a matter of fact, marijuana was voted more popular than either presidential candidate in November 2012. Americans are in love with this gentle plant. Maybe it’s time for the media and politicians to lose the DEA misinformation that frames people who use cannabis as addicted, apathetic, criminals. We are your mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters; we are your family. Marijuana prohibition destroys families; that’s why it is a failure. And one more thing: historically, the word “marijuana” was a made-up word to discriminate and demonize Hispanics who are now the upcoming new racial majority in the U.S. Remember, the word “marijuana” was used to discriminate against your great-grandparents who picked fruit in the hot sun, and whose purpose was to profile them as lazy, degenerate and violent marijuana-smokers who should be deported. I would like to watch any prohibitionist explain to a Hispanic town meeting how marijuana first became illegal and why and then ask for their support and vote. Karma can be a real bitch. The majority pro-marijuana vote that took place in Colorado and Washington state is a directive to the federal government to stand down. These two states are a strong representative sample of the country as a whole. Put it to a national referendum and the numbers would be about the same– a majority of Americans want legalized cannabis. You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows. [/INST] <h4><strong>The referendum passes and provides uniqueness to the midterms disad </h4><p>Marczyk 13</p><p></strong>Ron, former drug education specialist and M.S. in cardiac rehabilitation and exercise physiology, “Worth Repeating: ‘Marijuana Spring’ Will Save Future of Earth”, http://www.tokesignals.com/worth-repeating-marijuana-spring-will-save-future-of-earth/, October 18th, AB </p><p><u><strong>The writing is on the wall; <mark>marijuana will be</mark> completely <mark>legal in</mark> the U.S. within <mark>10 years</mark>. </u></strong>“<u><strong><mark>Demographics project legalization with a 2-1 majority</mark> among younger voters</u></strong>,” and <u><strong><mark>legalization is just a matter of time</u></strong></mark>. Hey… Have you ever tried putting toothpaste back into the tube? The new marijuana spring is here to stay… <u><strong><mark>You cannot legislate against a social movement</mark> that is on the right side of history. </u></strong>“The Berlin Wall of pot <u><strong><mark>prohibition seems to be crumbling</mark> before our eyes</u></strong>.” <u><strong>This current vote</u></strong> also <u><strong>is the start of correcting the original ignorance that allowed marijuana prohibition to become a law</u></strong> back in the 1937. The hidden agency that originally made cannabis illegal was designed to replace a plant that was in use by humans for 10,000 years and to replace it worldwide with petroleum and plastics for profit by the oligarchies of the day. You see where that got us? <u><strong>As 60+ people in my generation die off, our replacements view marijuana use as harmless</u></strong> as gay marriage is to society, a normal, and good for you, healthy behavior. Trying to outlaw marijuana is like trying to outlaw gay. <u><strong>Marijuana</u></strong> as a social movement <u><strong>is an idea whose time has come; <mark>this new</mark> marijuana majority social <mark>movement is a</mark> political <mark>force that politicians who want to get elected must</mark> now <mark>listen to</mark>; <mark>they need to start a conversation with us</mark> if they want</u></strong> our<u><strong> votes. <mark>Going against the will</mark> of an overwhelming majority of Americans who worked though the system <mark>is not something</mark> <mark>to be taken lightly by</mark> <mark>any</mark> elected <mark>official who wants to be voted into office</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Think we don’t vote? Think again!</u></strong> <u><strong>Marijuana legalization polled 3 points higher than </u></strong>President <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> did <u><strong>in Colorado</u></strong>. As a matter of fact, <u><strong>marijuana was voted more popular than either presidential candidate in November 2012</u></strong>. Americans are in love with this gentle plant. Maybe <u><strong>it’s time for the media and politicians to lose the DEA</u></strong> misinformation that frames people who use cannabis as addicted, apathetic, criminals. We are your mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters; we are your family. Marijuana prohibition destroys families; that’s why it is a failure. And one more thing: historically, the word “marijuana” was a made-up word to discriminate and demonize Hispanics who are now the upcoming new racial majority in the U.S. Remember, the word “marijuana” was used to discriminate against your great-grandparents who picked fruit in the hot sun, and whose purpose was to profile them as lazy, degenerate and violent marijuana-smokers who should be deported. I would like to watch any prohibitionist explain to a Hispanic town meeting how marijuana first became illegal and why and then ask for their support and vote. Karma can be a real bitch. <u><strong><mark>The majority</mark> pro-marijuana <mark>vote</mark> that took place <mark>in Colorado</mark> and Washington state <mark>is a directive to the</mark> <mark>fed</mark>eral government <mark>to stand down</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>These</mark> two <mark>states are a strong representative sample of the country as a whole.</u></strong> <u><strong>Put it to a national referendum and the numbers would be</mark> about <mark>the same– a majority of Americans want legalized cannabis</u></strong></mark>. You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.</p> </s>

They don’t solve emissions - industrial factory farms emit now because they have control of the market – the plan only shifts that – farmers will ignore the environment in favor of profit

<h4>They don’t solve emissions - industrial factory farms emit now because they have control of the market – the plan only shifts that – farmers will ignore the environment in favor of profit</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>They don’t solve emissions - industrial factory farms emit now because they have control of the market – the plan only shifts that – farmers will ignore the environment in favor of profit</h4> </s>

Industrial model is sustainable and small farms aren’t net better

Worldwatch goes so far as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to sustainable food security while reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing biodiversity evidence argues otherwise organic ag resulted in significant down-leaching of nitrate" into groundwater of land conventional ag ammonia emissions, nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide emissions per product unit were higher from organic systems" than conventional farming systems, as were "land use, eutrophication potential and acidification If the scale of organic production were significantly increased, the lower yields would increase the pressure for conversion of more land to farming and more water for irrigation, limitation of organic production is that it disfavors the best approach to enhancing soil quality namely minimization of soil disturbances such as tilling, combined with cover crops Both approaches help to limit soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides Organic growers in the absence of effective herbicides rely on tillage for weed control prevalent myth is organic ag does not employ pesticides. Organic farming does use insecticides and fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals are commonly used in the growing and processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to animals, and rotenone, so toxic to fish that it's widely used for the mass poisoning of fish populations the least sustainable aspect of organic farming is the exclusion of "g m o s but only those that were modified with the most precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing virtually all fruits, vegetables and grains have been genetically improved by one technique or another, the exclusion from organic ag of organisms makes no sense In recent decades, we have seen advances in ag that have been more environmentally friendly and sustainable than ever they have resulted from science-based research and tech ingenuity by agribusiness companies, not from social elites opposed to modern industrial agriculture

ammonia nitrogen nitrous oxide emissions were higher than conventional farming as were "land use eutrophication and acidification organic production significantly increased would increase the pressure for conversion of land and more water Organic farming use rotenone widely used for mass poisoning of fish populations the least sustainable aspect is exclusion of "g m o s advances in ag that have been more sustainable have resulted from science-based research and tech ingenuity b agribusiness companies, not from elites opposed to modern industrial agriculture

You may have noticed that the organic section of your local supermarket is growing. Advocates tout organic-food production—in everything from milk and coffee to meat and vegetables—as a "sustainable" way to feed the planet's expanding population. The Worldwatch Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental group, goes so far as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to sustainable food security by improving nutrition intake and sustaining livelihoods in rural areas, while simultaneously reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing biodiversity." The evidence argues otherwise. A study by the Institute for Water Research at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, published last year in the journal Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, found that "intensive organic agriculture relying on solid organic matter, such as composted manure that is implemented in the soil prior to planting as the sole fertilizer, resulted in significant down-leaching of nitrate" into groundwater. With many of the world's most fertile farming regions in the throes of drought, increased nitrate in groundwater is hardly a hallmark of sustainability. Moreover, as agricultural scientist Steve Savage has documented on the Sustainablog website, wide-scale composting generates significant amounts of greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. Compost may also deposit pathogenic bacteria on or in food crops, which has led to more frequent occurrences of food poisoning in the U.S. and elsewhere. Organic farming might work well for certain local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food per unit of land and water than conventional ones. The low yields of organic agriculture—typically 20%-50% less than conventional agriculture—impose various stresses on farmland and especially on water consumption. A British meta-analysis published in the Journal of Environmental Management (2012) found that "ammonia emissions, nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide emissions per product unit were higher from organic systems" than conventional farming systems, as were "land use, eutrophication potential and acidification potential per product unit." Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic farming's systematic rejection of many advanced methods and technologies. If the scale of organic production were significantly increased, the lower yields would increase the pressure for the conversion of more land to farming and more water for irrigation, both of which are serious environmental issues. Another limitation of organic production is that it disfavors the best approach to enhancing soil quality—namely, the minimization of soil disturbances such as tilling, combined with the use of cover crops. Both approaches help to limit soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides. Organic growers do frequently plant cover crops, but in the absence of effective herbicides, often they rely on tillage (or even labor-intensive hand weeding) for weed control. One prevalent myth is that organic agriculture does not employ pesticides. Organic farming does use insecticides and fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals (mostly containing copper and sulfur) are commonly used in the growing and processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to warm-blooded animals, and rotenone, which is moderately toxic to most mammals but so toxic to fish that it's widely used for the mass poisoning of unwanted fish populations during restocking projects. Perhaps the most illogical and least sustainable aspect of organic farming in the long term is the exclusion of "genetically modified organisms," but only those that were modified with the most precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing. Except for wild berries and wild mushrooms, virtually all the fruits, vegetables and grains in our diet have been genetically improved by one technique or another, often through what are called wide crosses, which move genes from one species or genus to another in ways that do not occur in nature. Therefore, the exclusion from organic agriculture of organisms simply because they were crafted with modern, superior techniques makes no sense. It also denies consumers of organic goods nutritionally improved foods, such as oils with enhanced levels of omega-3 fatty acids. In recent decades, we have seen advances in agriculture that have been more environmentally friendly and sustainable than ever before. But they have resulted from science-based research and technological ingenuity by farmers, plant breeders and agribusiness companies, not from social elites opposed to modern insecticides, herbicides, genetic engineering and "industrial agriculture."

<h4>Industrial model is sustainable and small farms aren’t net better</h4><p><strong>Miller 14</strong> (Dr. Henry I. Miller, a physician and molecular biologist, was the founding director of the FDA's Office of Biotechnology and is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, “Organic Farming Is Not Sustainable,” May 15, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304431104579550002888434432, Groot)</p><p>You may have noticed that the organic section of your local supermarket is growing. Advocates tout organic-food production—in everything from milk and coffee to meat and vegetables—as a "sustainable" way to feed the planet's expanding population. The <u><strong>Worldwatch </u></strong>Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental group, <u><strong>goes so far as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to sustainable food security </u></strong>by improving nutrition intake and sustaining livelihoods in rural areas, <u><strong>while </u></strong>simultaneously <u><strong>reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing biodiversity</u></strong>." The <u><strong>evidence argues otherwise</u></strong>. A study by the Institute for Water Research at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, published last year in the journal Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, found that "intensive <u><strong>organic ag</u></strong>riculture relying on solid organic matter, such as composted manure that is implemented in the soil prior to planting as the sole fertilizer, <u><strong>resulted in significant down-leaching of nitrate" into groundwater</u></strong>. With many of the world's most fertile farming regions in the throes of drought, increased nitrate in groundwater is hardly a hallmark of sustainability. Moreover, as agricultural scientist Steve Savage has documented on the Sustainablog website, wide-scale composting generates significant amounts of greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. Compost may also deposit pathogenic bacteria on or in food crops, which has led to more frequent occurrences of food poisoning in the U.S. and elsewhere. Organic farming might work well for certain local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food per unit<u><strong> of land </u></strong>and water than conventional ones. The low yields of organic agriculture—typically 20%-50% less than<u><strong> conventional ag</u></strong>riculture—impose various stresses on farmland and especially on water consumption. A British meta-analysis published in the Journal of Environmental Management (2012) found that "<u><strong><mark>ammonia </mark>emissions, <mark>nitrogen </mark>leaching and <mark>nitrous oxide emissions </mark>per product unit <mark>were higher </mark>from organic systems" <mark>than conventional farming </mark>systems, <mark>as were "land use</mark>, <mark>eutrophication</mark> potential <mark>and acidification</u></strong> </mark>potential per product unit." Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic farming's systematic rejection of many advanced methods and technologies. <u><strong>If the scale of <mark>organic production </mark>were <mark>significantly increased</mark>, the lower yields <mark>would increase the pressure for</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>conversion of </mark>more <mark>land </mark>to farming <mark>and more water </mark>for irrigation,</u></strong> both of which are serious environmental issues. Another<u><strong> limitation of organic production is that it disfavors the best approach to enhancing soil quality</u></strong>—<u><strong>namely</u></strong>, the <u><strong>minimization of soil disturbances such as tilling, combined with</u></strong> the use of <u><strong>cover crops</u></strong>. <u><strong>Both approaches help to limit soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides</u></strong>. <u><strong>Organic growers</u></strong> do frequently plant cover crops, but <u><strong>in the absence of effective herbicides</u></strong>, often they <u><strong>rely on tillage</u></strong> (or even labor-intensive hand weeding) <u><strong>for weed control</u></strong>. One <u><strong>prevalent myth is</u></strong> that <u><strong>organic ag</u></strong>riculture <u><strong>does not employ pesticides. <mark>Organic farming</mark> does <mark>use</mark> insecticides and fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals</u></strong> (mostly containing copper and sulfur) <u><strong>are commonly used in the growing and processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to</u></strong> warm-blooded <u><strong>animals, and <mark>rotenone</mark>,</u></strong> which is moderately toxic to most mammals but <u><strong>so toxic to fish that it's <mark>widely used for </mark>the <mark>mass poisoning of </u></strong></mark>unwanted<u><strong><mark> fish populations</u></strong> </mark>during restocking projects. Perhaps <u><strong><mark>the </u></strong></mark>most illogical and <u><strong><mark>least sustainable aspect </mark>of organic farming</u></strong> in the long term <u><strong><mark>is </mark>the <mark>exclusion of "g</u></strong></mark>enetically <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>odified <u><strong><mark>o</u></strong></mark>rganism<u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>but only those that were modified with the most precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing</u></strong>. Except for wild berries and wild mushrooms, <u><strong>virtually all</u></strong> the <u><strong>fruits, vegetables and grains</u></strong> in our diet <u><strong>have been genetically improved by one technique or another,</u></strong> often through what are called wide crosses, which move genes from one species or genus to another in ways that do not occur in nature. Therefore, <u><strong>the exclusion from organic ag</u></strong>riculture <u><strong>of organisms</u></strong> simply because they were crafted with modern, superior techniques <u><strong>makes no sense</u></strong>. It also denies consumers of organic goods nutritionally improved foods, such as oils with enhanced levels of omega-3 fatty acids. <u><strong>In recent decades, we have seen <mark>advances in ag</u></strong></mark>riculture <u><strong><mark>that have been more </mark>environmentally friendly and <mark>sustainable </mark>than ever</u></strong> before. But <u><strong>they <mark>have resulted from science-based research and tech</u></strong></mark>nological <u><strong><mark>ingenuity b</mark>y </u></strong>farmers, plant breeders and<u><strong> <mark>agribusiness companies, not from </mark>social <mark>elites opposed to modern</u></strong> </mark>insecticides, herbicides, genetic engineering and "<u><strong><mark>industrial agriculture</u></strong></mark>." </p>

Miller 14 (Dr. Henry I. Miller, a physician and molecular biologist, was the founding director of the FDA's Office of Biotechnology and is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, “Organic Farming Is Not Sustainable,” May 15, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304431104579550002888434432, Groot)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Miller 14 (Dr. Henry I. Miller, a physician and molecular biologist, was the founding director of the FDA's Office of Biotechnology and is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, “Organic Farming Is Not Sustainable,” May 15, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304431104579550002888434432, Groot) fulltext: You may have noticed that the organic section of your local supermarket is growing. Advocates tout organic-food production—in everything from milk and coffee to meat and vegetables—as a "sustainable" way to feed the planet's expanding population. The Worldwatch Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental group, goes so far as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to sustainable food security by improving nutrition intake and sustaining livelihoods in rural areas, while simultaneously reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing biodiversity." The evidence argues otherwise. A study by the Institute for Water Research at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, published last year in the journal Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, found that "intensive organic agriculture relying on solid organic matter, such as composted manure that is implemented in the soil prior to planting as the sole fertilizer, resulted in significant down-leaching of nitrate" into groundwater. With many of the world's most fertile farming regions in the throes of drought, increased nitrate in groundwater is hardly a hallmark of sustainability. Moreover, as agricultural scientist Steve Savage has documented on the Sustainablog website, wide-scale composting generates significant amounts of greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. Compost may also deposit pathogenic bacteria on or in food crops, which has led to more frequent occurrences of food poisoning in the U.S. and elsewhere. Organic farming might work well for certain local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food per unit of land and water than conventional ones. The low yields of organic agriculture—typically 20%-50% less than conventional agriculture—impose various stresses on farmland and especially on water consumption. A British meta-analysis published in the Journal of Environmental Management (2012) found that "ammonia emissions, nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide emissions per product unit were higher from organic systems" than conventional farming systems, as were "land use, eutrophication potential and acidification potential per product unit." Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic farming's systematic rejection of many advanced methods and technologies. If the scale of organic production were significantly increased, the lower yields would increase the pressure for the conversion of more land to farming and more water for irrigation, both of which are serious environmental issues. Another limitation of organic production is that it disfavors the best approach to enhancing soil quality—namely, the minimization of soil disturbances such as tilling, combined with the use of cover crops. Both approaches help to limit soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides. Organic growers do frequently plant cover crops, but in the absence of effective herbicides, often they rely on tillage (or even labor-intensive hand weeding) for weed control. One prevalent myth is that organic agriculture does not employ pesticides. Organic farming does use insecticides and fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals (mostly containing copper and sulfur) are commonly used in the growing and processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to warm-blooded animals, and rotenone, which is moderately toxic to most mammals but so toxic to fish that it's widely used for the mass poisoning of unwanted fish populations during restocking projects. Perhaps the most illogical and least sustainable aspect of organic farming in the long term is the exclusion of "genetically modified organisms," but only those that were modified with the most precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing. Except for wild berries and wild mushrooms, virtually all the fruits, vegetables and grains in our diet have been genetically improved by one technique or another, often through what are called wide crosses, which move genes from one species or genus to another in ways that do not occur in nature. Therefore, the exclusion from organic agriculture of organisms simply because they were crafted with modern, superior techniques makes no sense. It also denies consumers of organic goods nutritionally improved foods, such as oils with enhanced levels of omega-3 fatty acids. In recent decades, we have seen advances in agriculture that have been more environmentally friendly and sustainable than ever before. But they have resulted from science-based research and technological ingenuity by farmers, plant breeders and agribusiness companies, not from social elites opposed to modern insecticides, herbicides, genetic engineering and "industrial agriculture." [/INST] <h4>Industrial model is sustainable and small farms aren’t net better</h4><p><strong>Miller 14</strong> (Dr. Henry I. Miller, a physician and molecular biologist, was the founding director of the FDA's Office of Biotechnology and is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, “Organic Farming Is Not Sustainable,” May 15, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304431104579550002888434432, Groot)</p><p>You may have noticed that the organic section of your local supermarket is growing. Advocates tout organic-food production—in everything from milk and coffee to meat and vegetables—as a "sustainable" way to feed the planet's expanding population. The <u><strong>Worldwatch </u></strong>Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental group, <u><strong>goes so far as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to sustainable food security </u></strong>by improving nutrition intake and sustaining livelihoods in rural areas, <u><strong>while </u></strong>simultaneously <u><strong>reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing biodiversity</u></strong>." The <u><strong>evidence argues otherwise</u></strong>. A study by the Institute for Water Research at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, published last year in the journal Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, found that "intensive <u><strong>organic ag</u></strong>riculture relying on solid organic matter, such as composted manure that is implemented in the soil prior to planting as the sole fertilizer, <u><strong>resulted in significant down-leaching of nitrate" into groundwater</u></strong>. With many of the world's most fertile farming regions in the throes of drought, increased nitrate in groundwater is hardly a hallmark of sustainability. Moreover, as agricultural scientist Steve Savage has documented on the Sustainablog website, wide-scale composting generates significant amounts of greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. Compost may also deposit pathogenic bacteria on or in food crops, which has led to more frequent occurrences of food poisoning in the U.S. and elsewhere. Organic farming might work well for certain local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food per unit<u><strong> of land </u></strong>and water than conventional ones. The low yields of organic agriculture—typically 20%-50% less than<u><strong> conventional ag</u></strong>riculture—impose various stresses on farmland and especially on water consumption. A British meta-analysis published in the Journal of Environmental Management (2012) found that "<u><strong><mark>ammonia </mark>emissions, <mark>nitrogen </mark>leaching and <mark>nitrous oxide emissions </mark>per product unit <mark>were higher </mark>from organic systems" <mark>than conventional farming </mark>systems, <mark>as were "land use</mark>, <mark>eutrophication</mark> potential <mark>and acidification</u></strong> </mark>potential per product unit." Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic farming's systematic rejection of many advanced methods and technologies. <u><strong>If the scale of <mark>organic production </mark>were <mark>significantly increased</mark>, the lower yields <mark>would increase the pressure for</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>conversion of </mark>more <mark>land </mark>to farming <mark>and more water </mark>for irrigation,</u></strong> both of which are serious environmental issues. Another<u><strong> limitation of organic production is that it disfavors the best approach to enhancing soil quality</u></strong>—<u><strong>namely</u></strong>, the <u><strong>minimization of soil disturbances such as tilling, combined with</u></strong> the use of <u><strong>cover crops</u></strong>. <u><strong>Both approaches help to limit soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides</u></strong>. <u><strong>Organic growers</u></strong> do frequently plant cover crops, but <u><strong>in the absence of effective herbicides</u></strong>, often they <u><strong>rely on tillage</u></strong> (or even labor-intensive hand weeding) <u><strong>for weed control</u></strong>. One <u><strong>prevalent myth is</u></strong> that <u><strong>organic ag</u></strong>riculture <u><strong>does not employ pesticides. <mark>Organic farming</mark> does <mark>use</mark> insecticides and fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals</u></strong> (mostly containing copper and sulfur) <u><strong>are commonly used in the growing and processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to</u></strong> warm-blooded <u><strong>animals, and <mark>rotenone</mark>,</u></strong> which is moderately toxic to most mammals but <u><strong>so toxic to fish that it's <mark>widely used for </mark>the <mark>mass poisoning of </u></strong></mark>unwanted<u><strong><mark> fish populations</u></strong> </mark>during restocking projects. Perhaps <u><strong><mark>the </u></strong></mark>most illogical and <u><strong><mark>least sustainable aspect </mark>of organic farming</u></strong> in the long term <u><strong><mark>is </mark>the <mark>exclusion of "g</u></strong></mark>enetically <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>odified <u><strong><mark>o</u></strong></mark>rganism<u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>but only those that were modified with the most precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing</u></strong>. Except for wild berries and wild mushrooms, <u><strong>virtually all</u></strong> the <u><strong>fruits, vegetables and grains</u></strong> in our diet <u><strong>have been genetically improved by one technique or another,</u></strong> often through what are called wide crosses, which move genes from one species or genus to another in ways that do not occur in nature. Therefore, <u><strong>the exclusion from organic ag</u></strong>riculture <u><strong>of organisms</u></strong> simply because they were crafted with modern, superior techniques <u><strong>makes no sense</u></strong>. It also denies consumers of organic goods nutritionally improved foods, such as oils with enhanced levels of omega-3 fatty acids. <u><strong>In recent decades, we have seen <mark>advances in ag</u></strong></mark>riculture <u><strong><mark>that have been more </mark>environmentally friendly and <mark>sustainable </mark>than ever</u></strong> before. But <u><strong>they <mark>have resulted from science-based research and tech</u></strong></mark>nological <u><strong><mark>ingenuity b</mark>y </u></strong>farmers, plant breeders and<u><strong> <mark>agribusiness companies, not from </mark>social <mark>elites opposed to modern</u></strong> </mark>insecticides, herbicides, genetic engineering and "<u><strong><mark>industrial agriculture</u></strong></mark>." </p> </s>

Impact is inevitable – their Cummins evidence gives a laundry list of requirements to avert extinction – they do none of them

reducing agriculture GHGs means eliminating the overproduction and over-consumption of GMO crops, factory-farmed meat, and animal products. It also means creating massive consumer demand for organic foods, including pasture-raised, grass-fed animal products.

3) eliminating the overproduction and over-consumption of GMO crops, factory-farmed meat, and animal products. creating massive consumer demand for organic foods

3) reducing agriculture GHGs means eliminating the overproduction and over-consumption of GMO crops, factory-farmed meat, and animal products. It also means creating massive consumer demand for organic foods, including pasture-raised, grass-fed animal products.

<h4><u><strong>Impact is inevitable – their Cummins evidence gives a laundry list of requirements to avert extinction – they do none of them</h4><p></u><mark>1)</mark> <u>To drastically reduce C02, methane, and nitrous oxide releases <mark>we need an immediate consumer boycott</u></strong></mark>, followed by <u><strong><mark>a government ban on factory farms, dairies, and feedlots</mark>. To reduce black carbon or soot emissions we</u></strong> will <u><strong>need to</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>upgrade old diesel engines</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>provide farmers and rural villagers in the developing world with alternatives to slash and burn agriculture</u></strong></mark> (compost, compost tea, biochar) <u><strong><mark>and non-polluting cook stoves and home heating.</p><p></u>2)</strong></mark> <u><strong>We</u></strong> also <u><strong>need to <mark>implement mandatory separation and recycling of food wastes and “green garbage”</u></strong></mark> (yard waste, tree branches, etc.) <u><strong>at the municipal level, so that that we can reduce methane emissions from landfills. Mandatory composting will also enable us to produce large quantities of high quality organic compost to replace the billions of pounds of chemical fertilizer and sewage sludge, which are releasing GHGs, destroying soil fertility, polluting our waters, and undermining public health.</p><p></u><mark>3)</strong></mark> <u><strong>reducing agriculture GHGs means <mark>eliminating the overproduction and over-consumption of GMO crops, factory-farmed meat, and animal products.</mark> It also means <mark>creating massive consumer demand for organic foods</mark>, including pasture-raised, grass-fed animal products.</p></u></strong>

1) To drastically reduce C02, methane, and nitrous oxide releases we need an immediate consumer boycott, followed by a government ban on factory farms, dairies, and feedlots. To reduce black carbon or soot emissions we will need to upgrade old diesel engines, and provide farmers and rural villagers in the developing world with alternatives to slash and burn agriculture (compost, compost tea, biochar) and non-polluting cook stoves and home heating. 2) We also need to implement mandatory separation and recycling of food wastes and “green garbage” (yard waste, tree branches, etc.) at the municipal level, so that that we can reduce methane emissions from landfills. Mandatory composting will also enable us to produce large quantities of high quality organic compost to replace the billions of pounds of chemical fertilizer and sewage sludge, which are releasing GHGs, destroying soil fertility, polluting our waters, and undermining public health.

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: 1) To drastically reduce C02, methane, and nitrous oxide releases we need an immediate consumer boycott, followed by a government ban on factory farms, dairies, and feedlots. To reduce black carbon or soot emissions we will need to upgrade old diesel engines, and provide farmers and rural villagers in the developing world with alternatives to slash and burn agriculture (compost, compost tea, biochar) and non-polluting cook stoves and home heating. 2) We also need to implement mandatory separation and recycling of food wastes and “green garbage” (yard waste, tree branches, etc.) at the municipal level, so that that we can reduce methane emissions from landfills. Mandatory composting will also enable us to produce large quantities of high quality organic compost to replace the billions of pounds of chemical fertilizer and sewage sludge, which are releasing GHGs, destroying soil fertility, polluting our waters, and undermining public health. fulltext: 3) reducing agriculture GHGs means eliminating the overproduction and over-consumption of GMO crops, factory-farmed meat, and animal products. It also means creating massive consumer demand for organic foods, including pasture-raised, grass-fed animal products. [/INST] <h4><u><strong>Impact is inevitable – their Cummins evidence gives a laundry list of requirements to avert extinction – they do none of them</h4><p></u><mark>1)</mark> <u>To drastically reduce C02, methane, and nitrous oxide releases <mark>we need an immediate consumer boycott</u></strong></mark>, followed by <u><strong><mark>a government ban on factory farms, dairies, and feedlots</mark>. To reduce black carbon or soot emissions we</u></strong> will <u><strong>need to</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>upgrade old diesel engines</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>provide farmers and rural villagers in the developing world with alternatives to slash and burn agriculture</u></strong></mark> (compost, compost tea, biochar) <u><strong><mark>and non-polluting cook stoves and home heating.</p><p></u>2)</strong></mark> <u><strong>We</u></strong> also <u><strong>need to <mark>implement mandatory separation and recycling of food wastes and “green garbage”</u></strong></mark> (yard waste, tree branches, etc.) <u><strong>at the municipal level, so that that we can reduce methane emissions from landfills. Mandatory composting will also enable us to produce large quantities of high quality organic compost to replace the billions of pounds of chemical fertilizer and sewage sludge, which are releasing GHGs, destroying soil fertility, polluting our waters, and undermining public health.</p><p></u><mark>3)</strong></mark> <u><strong>reducing agriculture GHGs means <mark>eliminating the overproduction and over-consumption of GMO crops, factory-farmed meat, and animal products.</mark> It also means <mark>creating massive consumer demand for organic foods</mark>, including pasture-raised, grass-fed animal products.</p></u></strong> </s>

Plan doesn’t lead to a green revolution – their Fine ev says When prohibition ends, some consumers will choose a Big Tobacco or Big Alcohol model, and some will seek out the co-op, farmers market or CSA farm.

<h4>Plan doesn’t lead to a green revolution – their Fine ev says</h4><p><u><mark>When prohibition ends</u></mark>, some <u><mark>consumers will</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>choose a Big Tobacco or Big Alcohol model</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and some will</strong></mark> <strong><mark>seek out the </mark>co-op, <mark>farmers market</mark> or CSA farm</strong>.</p></u>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Plan doesn’t lead to a green revolution – their Fine ev says</h4><p><u><mark>When prohibition ends</u></mark>, some <u><mark>consumers will</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>choose a Big Tobacco or Big Alcohol model</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and some will</strong></mark> <strong><mark>seek out the </mark>co-op, <mark>farmers market</mark> or CSA farm</strong>.</p></u> </s>

No shocks impact

debates on whether scarcity of food or water will lead to conflict comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between resources and population growth most empirical studies do not support these arguments. Tech and capital have dramatically increased productivity the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because humankind has breached resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. alarmist scenarios linked use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. In the Middle East foreign ministers have used this bellicose rhetoric. The evidence seems quite weak. none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited to governmental rhetoric more than two-thirds of 1800 water events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale organized political bodies signed more than 3600 water-related treaties There is no correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Water rich countries have been involved in disputes with other water rich countries perceptions of the amount of available water drives co-operation among riparians the threat of water wars does not make sense in the light of the recent historical record. debates over climate change popularised water wars. Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin

Tech and capital have increased productivity humankind has breached resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. None of the various and extensive databases on causes of war show water 80% of incidents were limited to rhetoric two-thirds fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale perceptions of water drives co-operation threat of water wars does not make sense in the light of the historical record

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.¶ Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.¶ The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).¶ The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).¶ In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

<h4>No shocks impact</h4><p><strong>Allouche 11</p><p></strong>Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11¶ (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)</p><p>The question of resource scarcity has led to many <u><strong>debates on whether scarcity</u></strong> (whether <u><strong>of food or water</u></strong>) <u><strong>will lead to conflict</u></strong> and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars <u><strong>comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between</u></strong> the economic availability of natural <u><strong>resources and population growth</u></strong> since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that <u><strong>most empirical studies do not support</u></strong> any of <u><strong>these</u></strong> neo-Malthusian <u><strong>arguments.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Tech</u></strong></mark>nological change <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> greater inputs of <u><strong><mark>capital have</mark> dramatically <mark>increased</u></strong></mark> labour <u><strong><mark>productivity</u></strong></mark> in agriculture. More generally, <u><strong>the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because</u></strong> during the last two centuries <u><strong><mark>humankind has breached</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.</u></strong></mark>¶<u> </u>Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of <u><strong>alarmist scenarios</u></strong> have <u><strong>linked</u></strong> the increasing <u><strong>use of water resources and food insecurity with wars.</u></strong> The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ <u><strong>In the Middle East</u></strong>, presidents, prime ministers and <u><strong>foreign ministers have</u></strong> also <u><strong>used this bellicose rhetoric.</u></strong> Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. <u><strong>The evidence seems quite weak.</u></strong> Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, <u><strong>none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.</u></strong>¶<u> </u>The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ <u><strong><mark>None of the various and extensive databases on</mark> the <mark>causes of war show water</mark> as a casus belli.</u></strong> Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, <u><strong>Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause</u></strong> for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about <u><strong><mark>80% of</mark> the <mark>incidents</mark> relating to water <mark>were limited</u></strong></mark> purely <u><strong><mark>to</mark> governmental <mark>rhetoric</u></strong></mark> intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, <u><strong>more than <mark>two-thirds</mark> of</u></strong> over <u><strong>1800 water</u></strong>-related ‘<u><strong>events’ <mark>fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale</u></strong></mark> (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), <u><strong>organized political bodies signed</u></strong> between the year 805 and 1984 <u><strong>more than 3600 water-related treaties</u></strong>, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).¶ The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. <u><strong>There is</u></strong> however <u><strong>no</u></strong> direct <u><strong>correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. </u></strong>Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). <u><strong>Water rich countries have been involved in</u></strong> a number of <u><strong>disputes with other</u></strong> relatively <u><strong>water rich countries</u></strong> (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, <u><strong><mark>perceptions of</mark> the amount of available <mark>water</u></strong></mark> shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity <u><strong><mark>drives</u></strong></mark> the process of <u><strong><mark>co-operation</mark> among riparians</u></strong> (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).¶ In terms of international relations, <u><strong>the <mark>threat of water wars</u></strong></mark> due to increasing scarcity <u><strong><mark>does not make</u></strong></mark> much <u><strong><mark>sense in the light of the</mark> recent <mark>historical record</mark>.</u></strong> Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ The <u><strong>debates over</u></strong> the likely impacts of <u><strong>climate change</u></strong> have again <u><strong>popularised</u></strong> the idea of <u><strong>water wars.</u></strong> The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). <u><strong>Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin</u></strong> ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).</p>

Allouche 11 Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11¶ (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Allouche 11 Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11¶ (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January) fulltext: The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.¶ Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.¶ The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).¶ The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).¶ In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008). [/INST] <h4>No shocks impact</h4><p><strong>Allouche 11</p><p></strong>Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11¶ (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)</p><p>The question of resource scarcity has led to many <u><strong>debates on whether scarcity</u></strong> (whether <u><strong>of food or water</u></strong>) <u><strong>will lead to conflict</u></strong> and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars <u><strong>comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between</u></strong> the economic availability of natural <u><strong>resources and population growth</u></strong> since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that <u><strong>most empirical studies do not support</u></strong> any of <u><strong>these</u></strong> neo-Malthusian <u><strong>arguments.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Tech</u></strong></mark>nological change <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> greater inputs of <u><strong><mark>capital have</mark> dramatically <mark>increased</u></strong></mark> labour <u><strong><mark>productivity</u></strong></mark> in agriculture. More generally, <u><strong>the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because</u></strong> during the last two centuries <u><strong><mark>humankind has breached</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.</u></strong></mark>¶<u> </u>Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of <u><strong>alarmist scenarios</u></strong> have <u><strong>linked</u></strong> the increasing <u><strong>use of water resources and food insecurity with wars.</u></strong> The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ <u><strong>In the Middle East</u></strong>, presidents, prime ministers and <u><strong>foreign ministers have</u></strong> also <u><strong>used this bellicose rhetoric.</u></strong> Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. <u><strong>The evidence seems quite weak.</u></strong> Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, <u><strong>none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.</u></strong>¶<u> </u>The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ <u><strong><mark>None of the various and extensive databases on</mark> the <mark>causes of war show water</mark> as a casus belli.</u></strong> Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, <u><strong>Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause</u></strong> for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about <u><strong><mark>80% of</mark> the <mark>incidents</mark> relating to water <mark>were limited</u></strong></mark> purely <u><strong><mark>to</mark> governmental <mark>rhetoric</u></strong></mark> intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, <u><strong>more than <mark>two-thirds</mark> of</u></strong> over <u><strong>1800 water</u></strong>-related ‘<u><strong>events’ <mark>fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale</u></strong></mark> (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), <u><strong>organized political bodies signed</u></strong> between the year 805 and 1984 <u><strong>more than 3600 water-related treaties</u></strong>, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).¶ The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. <u><strong>There is</u></strong> however <u><strong>no</u></strong> direct <u><strong>correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. </u></strong>Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). <u><strong>Water rich countries have been involved in</u></strong> a number of <u><strong>disputes with other</u></strong> relatively <u><strong>water rich countries</u></strong> (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, <u><strong><mark>perceptions of</mark> the amount of available <mark>water</u></strong></mark> shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity <u><strong><mark>drives</u></strong></mark> the process of <u><strong><mark>co-operation</mark> among riparians</u></strong> (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).¶ In terms of international relations, <u><strong>the <mark>threat of water wars</u></strong></mark> due to increasing scarcity <u><strong><mark>does not make</u></strong></mark> much <u><strong><mark>sense in the light of the</mark> recent <mark>historical record</mark>.</u></strong> Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ The <u><strong>debates over</u></strong> the likely impacts of <u><strong>climate change</u></strong> have again <u><strong>popularised</u></strong> the idea of <u><strong>water wars.</u></strong> The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). <u><strong>Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin</u></strong> ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).</p> </s>

No impact – their Altieri evidence says that small farming in other countries are the asset for planetary survival – no ev that those are collapsing in the squo and the plan can’t possibly affect them

<h4>No impact – their Altieri evidence says that small farming in other countries are the asset for planetary survival – no ev that those are collapsing in the squo and the plan can’t possibly affect them </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>No impact – their Altieri evidence says that small farming in other countries are the asset for planetary survival – no ev that those are collapsing in the squo and the plan can’t possibly affect them </h4> </s>

OR corporations solve – only warrant they have is that farmers will better prepare for climate change – corporations would adapt too in order to continue profiting

<h4>OR corporations solve – only warrant they have is that farmers will better prepare for climate change – corporations would adapt too in order to continue profiting</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>OR corporations solve – only warrant they have is that farmers will better prepare for climate change – corporations would adapt too in order to continue profiting</h4> </s>

Their ev also says the squo solves To stabilize the climate we will need to drastically reduce all of these greenhouse gas emissions, not just CO2, and sequester twice as much carbon matter in the soil (through organic farming and ranching, and forest and wetlands restoration) as we are doing presently.

<h4><u><strong>Their ev also says the squo solves </h4><p><mark>To stabilize the climate we </mark>will <mark>need to</u></strong></mark> drastically reduce all of these greenhouse gas emissions, not just CO2, and <u><strong><mark>sequester</u></strong></mark> twice as much <u><strong><mark>carbon</mark> matter in the soil</u></strong> (<u><strong><mark>through organic farming and ranching, and</mark> <mark>forest and wetlands restoration) as we are doing presently.</p></u></strong></mark>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4><u><strong>Their ev also says the squo solves </h4><p><mark>To stabilize the climate we </mark>will <mark>need to</u></strong></mark> drastically reduce all of these greenhouse gas emissions, not just CO2, and <u><strong><mark>sequester</u></strong></mark> twice as much <u><strong><mark>carbon</mark> matter in the soil</u></strong> (<u><strong><mark>through organic farming and ranching, and</mark> <mark>forest and wetlands restoration) as we are doing presently.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

No food scarcity

Economist Dennis Avery explained in 1995 that, food production was more than keeping pace with population growth since the world had, “more than doubled world food output in the past 30 years. We have raised food supplies per person by 25 percent in the populous Third World UNFAO) also dispelled fears of shortages in the food supply when in November of 1995 it reported that, “Globally food supplies have more than doubled in the last 40 years…at a global level, there is probably no obstacle to food production rising to meet demand.” simply with the present available technologies fully employed, the world could feed 30 to 35 billion people, i.e. roughly six times the present world population.6 It also reported that the number of people considered malnourished has declined from 36 percent in 1961-1970 to 20 percent in 1988-90 and later proclaimed that “earlier fears of chronic food shortages over much of the world proved unfounded. The World Bank joined in to predict in 1993 that the improvement in the world food supply would continue, while pointing out that in developing countries grain production has grown at a faster rate than population since 1985

the world doubled food output We have raised supplies per person by 25 percent in the Third World there is no obstacle to production rising to meet demand with available tech the world could feed 35 billion people fears of shortages proved unfounded in developing countries production has grown faster than population

The pattern continues today. Economist Dennis Avery explained in 1995 that, food production was more than keeping pace with population growth since the world had, “more than doubled world food output in the past 30 years. We have raised food supplies per person by 25 percent in the populous Third World.”4 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) also dispelled fears of shortages in the food supply when, in preparation for the World Food Summit in Rome in November of 1995 it reported that, “Globally food supplies have more than doubled in the last 40 years…at a global level, there is probably no obstacle to food production rising to meet demand.”5 The UNFAO also later estimated that, simply with the present available technologies fully employed, the world could feed 30 to 35 billion people, i.e. roughly six times the present world population.6 It also reported that the number of people considered malnourished has declined from 36 percent in 1961-1970 to 20 percent in 1988-90 and later proclaimed that “earlier fears of chronic food shortages over much of the world proved unfounded.”7 The World Bank joined in to predict in 1993 that the improvement in the world food supply would continue, while pointing out that in developing countries grain production has grown at a faster rate than population since 1985. Grain production has slowed in the United States, but that is because stocks have grown so large that additional production could not be stored.8 A further wealth of evidence is available to remove any concerns about resource shortage in the modern world.

<h4>No food scarcity</h4><p><strong>Jalsevac 4 </strong>(Paul, Life site news a division of Interim Publishing, “The Inherent Racism of Population Control”, http://www.lifesite.net/waronfamily/Population_Control/Inherentracism.pdf<strong>)</p><p></strong>The pattern continues today. <u>Economist Dennis Avery explained in 1995 that, food production was more than keeping pace with population growth since <mark>the world</mark> had, “more than <mark>doubled</mark> world <mark>food output</mark> in the past 30 years. <mark>We have raised</mark> food <mark>supplies per person by 25 percent in the</mark> populous <mark>Third World</u></mark>.”4 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (<u>UNFAO) also dispelled fears of shortages in the food supply when</u>, in preparation for the World Food Summit in Rome <u>in November of 1995 it reported that, “Globally food supplies have more than doubled in the last 40 years…at a global level, <mark>there is</mark> probably <mark>no obstacle to</mark> food <mark>production rising to meet demand</mark>.”</u>5 The UNFAO also later estimated that, <u>simply <mark>with</mark> the present <mark>available tech</mark>nologies fully employed, <mark>the world could feed</mark> 30 to <mark>35 billion people</mark>, i.e. roughly six times the present world population.6 It also reported that the number of people considered malnourished has declined from 36 percent in 1961-1970 to 20 percent in 1988-90 and later proclaimed that “earlier <mark>fears of</mark> chronic food <mark>shortages</mark> over much of the world <mark>proved unfounded</mark>.</u>”7 <u>The World Bank joined in to predict in 1993 that the improvement in the world food supply would continue, while pointing out that <mark>in developing countries</mark> grain <mark>production has grown</mark> at a <mark>faster</mark> rate <mark>than population</mark> since 1985</u>. Grain production has slowed in the United States, but that is because stocks have grown so large that additional production could not be stored.8 A further wealth of evidence is available to remove any concerns about resource shortage in the modern world.</p>

Jalsevac 4 (Paul, Life site news a division of Interim Publishing, “The Inherent Racism of Population Control”, http://www.lifesite.net/waronfamily/Population_Control/Inherentracism.pdf)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Jalsevac 4 (Paul, Life site news a division of Interim Publishing, “The Inherent Racism of Population Control”, http://www.lifesite.net/waronfamily/Population_Control/Inherentracism.pdf) fulltext: The pattern continues today. Economist Dennis Avery explained in 1995 that, food production was more than keeping pace with population growth since the world had, “more than doubled world food output in the past 30 years. We have raised food supplies per person by 25 percent in the populous Third World.”4 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) also dispelled fears of shortages in the food supply when, in preparation for the World Food Summit in Rome in November of 1995 it reported that, “Globally food supplies have more than doubled in the last 40 years…at a global level, there is probably no obstacle to food production rising to meet demand.”5 The UNFAO also later estimated that, simply with the present available technologies fully employed, the world could feed 30 to 35 billion people, i.e. roughly six times the present world population.6 It also reported that the number of people considered malnourished has declined from 36 percent in 1961-1970 to 20 percent in 1988-90 and later proclaimed that “earlier fears of chronic food shortages over much of the world proved unfounded.”7 The World Bank joined in to predict in 1993 that the improvement in the world food supply would continue, while pointing out that in developing countries grain production has grown at a faster rate than population since 1985. Grain production has slowed in the United States, but that is because stocks have grown so large that additional production could not be stored.8 A further wealth of evidence is available to remove any concerns about resource shortage in the modern world. [/INST] <h4>No food scarcity</h4><p><strong>Jalsevac 4 </strong>(Paul, Life site news a division of Interim Publishing, “The Inherent Racism of Population Control”, http://www.lifesite.net/waronfamily/Population_Control/Inherentracism.pdf<strong>)</p><p></strong>The pattern continues today. <u>Economist Dennis Avery explained in 1995 that, food production was more than keeping pace with population growth since <mark>the world</mark> had, “more than <mark>doubled</mark> world <mark>food output</mark> in the past 30 years. <mark>We have raised</mark> food <mark>supplies per person by 25 percent in the</mark> populous <mark>Third World</u></mark>.”4 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (<u>UNFAO) also dispelled fears of shortages in the food supply when</u>, in preparation for the World Food Summit in Rome <u>in November of 1995 it reported that, “Globally food supplies have more than doubled in the last 40 years…at a global level, <mark>there is</mark> probably <mark>no obstacle to</mark> food <mark>production rising to meet demand</mark>.”</u>5 The UNFAO also later estimated that, <u>simply <mark>with</mark> the present <mark>available tech</mark>nologies fully employed, <mark>the world could feed</mark> 30 to <mark>35 billion people</mark>, i.e. roughly six times the present world population.6 It also reported that the number of people considered malnourished has declined from 36 percent in 1961-1970 to 20 percent in 1988-90 and later proclaimed that “earlier <mark>fears of</mark> chronic food <mark>shortages</mark> over much of the world <mark>proved unfounded</mark>.</u>”7 <u>The World Bank joined in to predict in 1993 that the improvement in the world food supply would continue, while pointing out that <mark>in developing countries</mark> grain <mark>production has grown</mark> at a <mark>faster</mark> rate <mark>than population</mark> since 1985</u>. Grain production has slowed in the United States, but that is because stocks have grown so large that additional production could not be stored.8 A further wealth of evidence is available to remove any concerns about resource shortage in the modern world.</p> </s>

Status quo solves – the number of small farms is increasing now.

Tens of thousands of small farms were created since 02 small farms have increased in number. a result of farm programs instituted at the USDA to encourage organic farming" and other environmentally benign practices

Tens of thousands of small farms were created since 02 small farms have increased in number. a result of farm programs instituted at the USDA to encourage organic farming" and other environmentally benign practices

When the economy gets tough, it seems that the tough get farming. Tens of thousands of small farms were created since 2002, according to new data from the Census of Agriculture. The farming forecast isn't entirely sunny. But packed with a cornucopia of surprise findings — such as large increases in the number and percentage of Asian, Hispanic, Black and female farmers, and a coup staged by the frigid state of Wisconsin to become the second-leading vegetable producer, behind California — the census brings promising news to those interested in reducing obesity and improving the environment. What's the connection? More small farms brings greater diversity of crops, more fresh and local foods, less dependency on chemical fertilizers, less concentration of manure, and less emphasis on cheap corn to make unhealthy, industrially produced beef, pork and chicken. And if Wisconsin can grow vegetables with its yearly average temperature of 43 degrees, nearly every state can become self-sufficient vegetable producers; only seven states are colder. Back to basics "I find it hopeful that the number of farms in this country has increased," said newly appointed Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack at the Feb. 4 debut of agricultural census data, held in Washington. "I don't think it is a statistical anomaly that small farms have increased in number... a result of farm programs we have instituted at the USDA to encourage organic farming" and other environmentally benign practices, he said.

<h4>Status quo solves – the number of small farms is increasing now.</h4><p><u><strong>Wanjek 09</u></strong> (Christopher, LiveScience's Bad Medicine Columnist, author of the books "Bad Medicine" and "Food At Work," 2/10, http://www.livescience.com/culture/090210-bad-small-farms.html)</p><p>When the economy gets tough, it seems that the tough get farming. <u><mark>Tens of thousands of small farms were created since</u></mark> 20<u><mark>02</u></mark>, according to new data from the Census of Agriculture. The farming forecast isn't entirely sunny. But packed with a cornucopia of surprise findings — such as large increases in the number and percentage of Asian, Hispanic, Black and female farmers, and a coup staged by the frigid state of Wisconsin to become the second-leading vegetable producer, behind California — the census brings promising news to those interested in reducing obesity and improving the environment. What's the connection? More small farms brings greater diversity of crops, more fresh and local foods, less dependency on chemical fertilizers, less concentration of manure, and less emphasis on cheap corn to make unhealthy, industrially produced beef, pork and chicken. And if Wisconsin can grow vegetables with its yearly average temperature of 43 degrees, nearly every state can become self-sufficient vegetable producers; only seven states are colder. Back to basics "I find it hopeful that the number of farms in this country has increased," said newly appointed Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack at the Feb. 4 debut of agricultural census data, held in Washington. "I don't think it is a statistical anomaly that <u><mark>small farms have increased in number.</u></mark>.. <u><mark>a result of farm programs</u></mark> we have <u><mark>instituted at the USDA to encourage organic farming" and other environmentally benign practices</u></mark>, he said.</p>

Wanjek 09 (Christopher, LiveScience's Bad Medicine Columnist, author of the books "Bad Medicine" and "Food At Work," 2/10, http://www.livescience.com/culture/090210-bad-small-farms.html)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Wanjek 09 (Christopher, LiveScience's Bad Medicine Columnist, author of the books "Bad Medicine" and "Food At Work," 2/10, http://www.livescience.com/culture/090210-bad-small-farms.html) fulltext: When the economy gets tough, it seems that the tough get farming. Tens of thousands of small farms were created since 2002, according to new data from the Census of Agriculture. The farming forecast isn't entirely sunny. But packed with a cornucopia of surprise findings — such as large increases in the number and percentage of Asian, Hispanic, Black and female farmers, and a coup staged by the frigid state of Wisconsin to become the second-leading vegetable producer, behind California — the census brings promising news to those interested in reducing obesity and improving the environment. What's the connection? More small farms brings greater diversity of crops, more fresh and local foods, less dependency on chemical fertilizers, less concentration of manure, and less emphasis on cheap corn to make unhealthy, industrially produced beef, pork and chicken. And if Wisconsin can grow vegetables with its yearly average temperature of 43 degrees, nearly every state can become self-sufficient vegetable producers; only seven states are colder. Back to basics "I find it hopeful that the number of farms in this country has increased," said newly appointed Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack at the Feb. 4 debut of agricultural census data, held in Washington. "I don't think it is a statistical anomaly that small farms have increased in number... a result of farm programs we have instituted at the USDA to encourage organic farming" and other environmentally benign practices, he said. [/INST] <h4>Status quo solves – the number of small farms is increasing now.</h4><p><u><strong>Wanjek 09</u></strong> (Christopher, LiveScience's Bad Medicine Columnist, author of the books "Bad Medicine" and "Food At Work," 2/10, http://www.livescience.com/culture/090210-bad-small-farms.html)</p><p>When the economy gets tough, it seems that the tough get farming. <u><mark>Tens of thousands of small farms were created since</u></mark> 20<u><mark>02</u></mark>, according to new data from the Census of Agriculture. The farming forecast isn't entirely sunny. But packed with a cornucopia of surprise findings — such as large increases in the number and percentage of Asian, Hispanic, Black and female farmers, and a coup staged by the frigid state of Wisconsin to become the second-leading vegetable producer, behind California — the census brings promising news to those interested in reducing obesity and improving the environment. What's the connection? More small farms brings greater diversity of crops, more fresh and local foods, less dependency on chemical fertilizers, less concentration of manure, and less emphasis on cheap corn to make unhealthy, industrially produced beef, pork and chicken. And if Wisconsin can grow vegetables with its yearly average temperature of 43 degrees, nearly every state can become self-sufficient vegetable producers; only seven states are colder. Back to basics "I find it hopeful that the number of farms in this country has increased," said newly appointed Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack at the Feb. 4 debut of agricultural census data, held in Washington. "I don't think it is a statistical anomaly that <u><mark>small farms have increased in number.</u></mark>.. <u><mark>a result of farm programs</u></mark> we have <u><mark>instituted at the USDA to encourage organic farming" and other environmentally benign practices</u></mark>, he said.</p> </s>

Small farms don’t solve sustainability

the parts of farming that are the most “industrial” are the most likely to be owned by family farmers Corn farms are almost all owned and managed by small family farmers But corn farmers salivate at the thought of one more biotech breakthrough, use vast amounts of energy to increase production, and raise large quantities of an indistinguishable commodity Most livestock is produced by family farms

the parts of farming that are the most “industrial” are the most likely to be owned by family farmers Corn farms are almost all owned and managed by small family farmers But corn farmers salivate at the thought of one more biotech breakthrough, use vast amounts of energy to increase production, and raise large quantities of an indistinguishable commodity Most livestock is produced by family farms

The most delicious irony is this: the parts of farming that are the most “industrial” are the most likely to be owned by the kind of family farmers that elicit such a positive response from the consumer. Corn farms are almost all owned and managed by small family farmers. But corn farmers salivate at the thought of one more biotech breakthrough, use vast amounts of energy to increase production, and raise large quantities of an indistinguishable commodity to sell to huge corporations that turn that corn into thousands of industrial products. Most livestock is produced by family farms, and even the poultry industry, with its contracts and vertical integration, relies on family farms to contract for the production of the birds. Despite the obvious change in scale over time, family farms, like ours, still meet around the kitchen table, send their kids to the same small schools, sit in the same church pew, and belong to the same civic organizations our parents and grandparents did. We may be industrial by some definition, but not our own. Reality is messier than it appears in the book my tormentor was reading, and farming more complicated than a simple morality play.

<h4>Small farms don’t solve sustainability</h4><p><strong>Hurst 09</strong> (Blake, farmer in Missouri. The American, Journal of the American Enterprise Institute, 7/30, http://www.american.com/archive/2009/july/the-omnivore2019s-delusion-against-the-agri-intellectuals)</p><p>The most delicious irony is this: <u><mark>the parts of farming that are the most “industrial” are the most likely to be owned by</u></mark> the kind of <u><mark>family farmers</u></mark> that elicit such a positive response from the consumer. <u><mark>Corn farms are almost all owned and managed by <strong>small family farmers</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>But corn farmers salivate at the thought of one more biotech breakthrough, use vast amounts of energy to increase production, and raise large quantities of an indistinguishable commodity</u></mark> to sell to huge corporations that turn that corn into thousands of industrial products. <u><mark>Most livestock is produced by family farms</u></mark>, and even the poultry industry, with its contracts and vertical integration, relies on family farms to contract for the production of the birds. Despite the obvious change in scale over time, family farms, like ours, still meet around the kitchen table, send their kids to the same small schools, sit in the same church pew, and belong to the same civic organizations our parents and grandparents did. We may be industrial by some definition, but not our own. Reality is messier than it appears in the book my tormentor was reading, and farming more complicated than a simple morality play.</p>

Hurst 09 (Blake, farmer in Missouri. The American, Journal of the American Enterprise Institute, 7/30, http://www.american.com/archive/2009/july/the-omnivore2019s-delusion-against-the-agri-intellectuals)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Hurst 09 (Blake, farmer in Missouri. The American, Journal of the American Enterprise Institute, 7/30, http://www.american.com/archive/2009/july/the-omnivore2019s-delusion-against-the-agri-intellectuals) fulltext: The most delicious irony is this: the parts of farming that are the most “industrial” are the most likely to be owned by the kind of family farmers that elicit such a positive response from the consumer. Corn farms are almost all owned and managed by small family farmers. But corn farmers salivate at the thought of one more biotech breakthrough, use vast amounts of energy to increase production, and raise large quantities of an indistinguishable commodity to sell to huge corporations that turn that corn into thousands of industrial products. Most livestock is produced by family farms, and even the poultry industry, with its contracts and vertical integration, relies on family farms to contract for the production of the birds. Despite the obvious change in scale over time, family farms, like ours, still meet around the kitchen table, send their kids to the same small schools, sit in the same church pew, and belong to the same civic organizations our parents and grandparents did. We may be industrial by some definition, but not our own. Reality is messier than it appears in the book my tormentor was reading, and farming more complicated than a simple morality play. [/INST] <h4>Small farms don’t solve sustainability</h4><p><strong>Hurst 09</strong> (Blake, farmer in Missouri. The American, Journal of the American Enterprise Institute, 7/30, http://www.american.com/archive/2009/july/the-omnivore2019s-delusion-against-the-agri-intellectuals)</p><p>The most delicious irony is this: <u><mark>the parts of farming that are the most “industrial” are the most likely to be owned by</u></mark> the kind of <u><mark>family farmers</u></mark> that elicit such a positive response from the consumer. <u><mark>Corn farms are almost all owned and managed by <strong>small family farmers</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>But corn farmers salivate at the thought of one more biotech breakthrough, use vast amounts of energy to increase production, and raise large quantities of an indistinguishable commodity</u></mark> to sell to huge corporations that turn that corn into thousands of industrial products. <u><mark>Most livestock is produced by family farms</u></mark>, and even the poultry industry, with its contracts and vertical integration, relies on family farms to contract for the production of the birds. Despite the obvious change in scale over time, family farms, like ours, still meet around the kitchen table, send their kids to the same small schools, sit in the same church pew, and belong to the same civic organizations our parents and grandparents did. We may be industrial by some definition, but not our own. Reality is messier than it appears in the book my tormentor was reading, and farming more complicated than a simple morality play.</p> </s>

Agreement already between FARC and Colombia government – currently only aerial spraying coca plants – legalizing marijuana doesn’t solve

FARC vow to sever their ties with the drugs trade work with the government to help farmers substitute government’s eradication have centred on aerial fumigation of coca

FARC vow to sever their ties with the drugs trade work with the government to help farmers substitute government’s eradication have centred on aerial fumigation of coca

In the accord announced Friday, the FARC, whose top leaders face extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges, vow to sever their ties with the drugs trade, clear landmines, and work with the government to help farmers substitute their plantations of coca, the raw material used in making cocaine.The government’s eradication efforts, backed by millions of dollars in US aid, have thus far centred on aerial fumigation of coca crops. It said it would use forceful eradication only where no accords for voluntary crop substitution were reached. It also said it would promote an international conference under the auspices of the UN to reconsider global strategies against drugs. "With this we will eliminate the gasoline that has fuelled the conflict in Colombia—drug trafficking," said the government’s lead negotiator, Humberto de la Calle (pictured). Ricardo Vargas, a drug policy expert and political analyst, said the agreement on drugs was a win for the government. "This is a triumph for the government because there is no change in the current policies," he says. "What it does is remove the obstacle of the guerrillas to implement them."

<h4>Agreement already between FARC and Colombia government – currently only aerial spraying <u>coca</u> plants – legalizing marijuana doesn’t solve</h4><p><strong>The Economist 5/17 </strong>(“The politics of peace,” May 17, 2014)</p><p>In the accord announced Friday, the <u><mark>FARC</u></mark>, whose top leaders face extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges, <u><mark>vow to sever their ties with the drugs trade</u></mark>, clear landmines, and <u><mark>work with the government to help farmers substitute</u></mark> their plantations of coca, the raw material used in making cocaine.The <u><mark>government’s eradication</u></mark> efforts, backed by millions of dollars in US aid, <u><mark>have</u></mark> thus far <u><mark>centred on aerial fumigation of coca</u></mark> crops. It said it would use forceful eradication only where no accords for voluntary crop substitution were reached. It also said it would promote an international conference under the auspices of the UN to reconsider global strategies against drugs. "With this we will eliminate the gasoline that has fuelled the conflict in Colombia—drug trafficking," said the government’s lead negotiator, Humberto de la Calle (pictured). Ricardo Vargas, a drug policy expert and political analyst, said the agreement on drugs was a win for the government. "This is a triumph for the government because there is no change in the current policies," he says. "What it does is remove the obstacle of the guerrillas to implement them."</p>

The Economist 5/17 (“The politics of peace,” May 17, 2014)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: The Economist 5/17 (“The politics of peace,” May 17, 2014) fulltext: In the accord announced Friday, the FARC, whose top leaders face extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges, vow to sever their ties with the drugs trade, clear landmines, and work with the government to help farmers substitute their plantations of coca, the raw material used in making cocaine.The government’s eradication efforts, backed by millions of dollars in US aid, have thus far centred on aerial fumigation of coca crops. It said it would use forceful eradication only where no accords for voluntary crop substitution were reached. It also said it would promote an international conference under the auspices of the UN to reconsider global strategies against drugs. "With this we will eliminate the gasoline that has fuelled the conflict in Colombia—drug trafficking," said the government’s lead negotiator, Humberto de la Calle (pictured). Ricardo Vargas, a drug policy expert and political analyst, said the agreement on drugs was a win for the government. "This is a triumph for the government because there is no change in the current policies," he says. "What it does is remove the obstacle of the guerrillas to implement them." [/INST] <h4>Agreement already between FARC and Colombia government – currently only aerial spraying <u>coca</u> plants – legalizing marijuana doesn’t solve</h4><p><strong>The Economist 5/17 </strong>(“The politics of peace,” May 17, 2014)</p><p>In the accord announced Friday, the <u><mark>FARC</u></mark>, whose top leaders face extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges, <u><mark>vow to sever their ties with the drugs trade</u></mark>, clear landmines, and <u><mark>work with the government to help farmers substitute</u></mark> their plantations of coca, the raw material used in making cocaine.The <u><mark>government’s eradication</u></mark> efforts, backed by millions of dollars in US aid, <u><mark>have</u></mark> thus far <u><mark>centred on aerial fumigation of coca</u></mark> crops. It said it would use forceful eradication only where no accords for voluntary crop substitution were reached. It also said it would promote an international conference under the auspices of the UN to reconsider global strategies against drugs. "With this we will eliminate the gasoline that has fuelled the conflict in Colombia—drug trafficking," said the government’s lead negotiator, Humberto de la Calle (pictured). Ricardo Vargas, a drug policy expert and political analyst, said the agreement on drugs was a win for the government. "This is a triumph for the government because there is no change in the current policies," he says. "What it does is remove the obstacle of the guerrillas to implement them."</p> </s>

Legalization causes cocaine shift -- triggers their impact

in the worst-case scenario for the drug traffickers, legalization in California would mean marijuana would retain less than 9 to 15 percent of its original market share But if you factor in smuggling costs, excise taxes and the perceived potency the market share could remain as high as 33 to 38 percent. cartels make their money from more than just marijuana like cocaine make up a large chunk of their business models they've shown a remarkable ability to adapt as market forces and drug policies shift marijuana sales make up only 17 percent of sales, while the pricier cocaine makes up more than a third is clear for Mexican cartels that cocaine are the areas where in terms of export they earn the most

in the worst-case scenario legalization would mean marijuana would retain 9 percent of market share cartels make their money from more than just marijuana like cocaine make up a large chunk of their models they've shown a remarkable ability to adapt as market forces and drug policies shift marijuana make up only 17 percent while cocaine makes up a third It is clear cartels that cocaine are the areas where they earn the most

They also found that in the worst-case scenario for the drug traffickers, legalization in California would mean Mexican marijuana would retain less than 9 to 15 percent of its original market share in the U.S. But if you factor in smuggling costs, excise taxes and the perceived potency of the product, the market share could remain as high as 33 to 38 percent. Then there's the fact that cartels make their money from more than just marijuana -- drugs like cocaine and methamphetamines, as well as activities like human smuggling and kidnapping, make up a large chunk of their business models. And they've shown a remarkable ability to adapt as market forces and drug policies shift. With non-drug activities in mind, Stanford University psychiatry professor Keith Humphreys, a former Senior Policy Advisor at the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, developed a theoretical pie chart breaking down cartels' likely revenue streams: Here, marijuana sales make up only 17 percent of sales, while the pricier cocaine makes up more than a third. "It is clear for Mexican cartels that cocaine and heroin are the areas where in terms of export they earn the most," Martin Jelsma, an expert on drug policy in Latin America at the Transnational Institute in the Netherlands, told the Christian Science Monitor.

<h4>Legalization causes cocaine shift -- triggers their impact </h4><p><strong>Khazan 12</strong> (Olga, November 9th 2012, “How marijuana legalization will affect Mexico’s cartels, in charts”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/09/how-marijuana-legalization-will-affect-mexicos-cartels-in-charts/, AB)</p><p>They also found that <u><strong><mark>in the worst-case scenario</mark> for the drug traffickers, <mark>legalization</mark> in California</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>would mean</u></strong></mark> Mexican <u><strong><mark>marijuana</mark> <mark>would</mark> <mark>retain</mark> less than <mark>9</mark> to 15 <mark>percent</mark> <mark>of</mark> its original <mark>market</mark> <mark>share</u></strong></mark> in the U.S. <u><strong>But if you factor in smuggling costs, excise taxes and the perceived potency</u></strong> of the product, <u><strong>the market share could remain as high as 33 to 38 percent.</u></strong> Then there's the fact that <u><strong><mark>cartels make their money from more than just marijuana</u></strong></mark> -- drugs <u><strong><mark>like cocaine</u></strong></mark> and methamphetamines, as well as activities like human smuggling and kidnapping, <u><strong><mark>make up a large chunk</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>their</mark> business <mark>models</u></strong></mark>. And <u><strong><mark>they've</mark> <mark>shown a remarkable ability to adapt as market forces and drug policies shift</u></strong></mark>. With non-drug activities in mind, Stanford University psychiatry professor Keith Humphreys, a former Senior Policy Advisor at the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, developed a theoretical pie chart breaking down cartels' likely revenue streams: Here, <u><strong><mark>marijuana</mark> sales <mark>make up only 17 percent</mark> of sales, <mark>while</mark> the pricier <mark>cocaine</mark> <mark>makes</mark> <mark>up</mark> more than <mark>a third</u></strong></mark>. "<mark>It</mark> <u><strong><mark>is clear</mark> for Mexican <mark>cartels that cocaine</u></strong></mark> and heroin <u><strong><mark>are the areas where</mark> in terms of export <mark>they earn the most</u></mark>," Martin Jelsma, an expert on drug policy in Latin America at the Transnational Institute in the Netherlands, told the Christian Science Monitor.</p></strong>

Khazan 12 (Olga, November 9th 2012, “How marijuana legalization will affect Mexico’s cartels, in charts”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/09/how-marijuana-legalization-will-affect-mexicos-cartels-in-charts/, AB)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Khazan 12 (Olga, November 9th 2012, “How marijuana legalization will affect Mexico’s cartels, in charts”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/09/how-marijuana-legalization-will-affect-mexicos-cartels-in-charts/, AB) fulltext: They also found that in the worst-case scenario for the drug traffickers, legalization in California would mean Mexican marijuana would retain less than 9 to 15 percent of its original market share in the U.S. But if you factor in smuggling costs, excise taxes and the perceived potency of the product, the market share could remain as high as 33 to 38 percent. Then there's the fact that cartels make their money from more than just marijuana -- drugs like cocaine and methamphetamines, as well as activities like human smuggling and kidnapping, make up a large chunk of their business models. And they've shown a remarkable ability to adapt as market forces and drug policies shift. With non-drug activities in mind, Stanford University psychiatry professor Keith Humphreys, a former Senior Policy Advisor at the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, developed a theoretical pie chart breaking down cartels' likely revenue streams: Here, marijuana sales make up only 17 percent of sales, while the pricier cocaine makes up more than a third. "It is clear for Mexican cartels that cocaine and heroin are the areas where in terms of export they earn the most," Martin Jelsma, an expert on drug policy in Latin America at the Transnational Institute in the Netherlands, told the Christian Science Monitor. [/INST] <h4>Legalization causes cocaine shift -- triggers their impact </h4><p><strong>Khazan 12</strong> (Olga, November 9th 2012, “How marijuana legalization will affect Mexico’s cartels, in charts”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/09/how-marijuana-legalization-will-affect-mexicos-cartels-in-charts/, AB)</p><p>They also found that <u><strong><mark>in the worst-case scenario</mark> for the drug traffickers, <mark>legalization</mark> in California</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>would mean</u></strong></mark> Mexican <u><strong><mark>marijuana</mark> <mark>would</mark> <mark>retain</mark> less than <mark>9</mark> to 15 <mark>percent</mark> <mark>of</mark> its original <mark>market</mark> <mark>share</u></strong></mark> in the U.S. <u><strong>But if you factor in smuggling costs, excise taxes and the perceived potency</u></strong> of the product, <u><strong>the market share could remain as high as 33 to 38 percent.</u></strong> Then there's the fact that <u><strong><mark>cartels make their money from more than just marijuana</u></strong></mark> -- drugs <u><strong><mark>like cocaine</u></strong></mark> and methamphetamines, as well as activities like human smuggling and kidnapping, <u><strong><mark>make up a large chunk</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>their</mark> business <mark>models</u></strong></mark>. And <u><strong><mark>they've</mark> <mark>shown a remarkable ability to adapt as market forces and drug policies shift</u></strong></mark>. With non-drug activities in mind, Stanford University psychiatry professor Keith Humphreys, a former Senior Policy Advisor at the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, developed a theoretical pie chart breaking down cartels' likely revenue streams: Here, <u><strong><mark>marijuana</mark> sales <mark>make up only 17 percent</mark> of sales, <mark>while</mark> the pricier <mark>cocaine</mark> <mark>makes</mark> <mark>up</mark> more than <mark>a third</u></strong></mark>. "<mark>It</mark> <u><strong><mark>is clear</mark> for Mexican <mark>cartels that cocaine</u></strong></mark> and heroin <u><strong><mark>are the areas where</mark> in terms of export <mark>they earn the most</u></mark>," Martin Jelsma, an expert on drug policy in Latin America at the Transnational Institute in the Netherlands, told the Christian Science Monitor.</p></strong> </s>

Alt causes to Amazon collapse --Brazilian agriculture politics

Brazil’s Congress has voted to relax laws which protect the Amazon from deforestation the country’s powerful farming lobby won over enough MPs to over-rule her and her party. WWF) and Greenpeace called the vote the beginning of the end of the rainforest.” Brazil has been held hostage to the interests of the agriculture lobby The agriculture lobby has done everything it could to push through its demands.” the law grants amnesty to those who have destroyed rainforest and opens the floodgates to further destruction. e weakening the law will reverse this progress and unleash a wave of new deforestation by convincing farmers and ranchers that Brazil doesn’t have the political will to truly enforce the law.” it will encourage more land clearance because government agencies have proved unable to determine when a plot was deforested. Under the new bill, farmers will be able to cultivate land closer to hilltops and riverbanks, which are especially vulnerable to erosion if trees are chopped down.

Brazil’s Congress has voted to relax laws protect the Amazon from deforestation country’s powerful farming lobby won over to over-rule WWF) and Greenpeace Brazil has been held hostage to the interests of the agriculture lobby weakening the law will reverse this progress and unleash a wave of new deforestation by convincing farmers and ranchers that Brazil doesn’t have the political will to truly enforce the law.”

Brazil’s Congress has voted to relax laws which protect the Amazon from deforestation. The new forest code now goes to President Dilma Rousseff, who is being urged to veto the bill or at least some of its clauses. Rousseff opposed the bill, but the country’s powerful farming lobby won over enough MPs to over-rule her and her party. World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Greenpeace called the vote: “O início do fim das florestas — the beginning of the end of the rainforest.” “Brazil has been held hostage to the interests of the agriculture lobby from the outset,” said Paulo Adário of Greenpeace in Brazil. “The agriculture lobby has done everything it could to push through its demands.” WWF says the law grants amnesty to those who have destroyed rainforest and opens the floodgates to further destruction. The amnesty is conditional in that perpetrators must enroll in a government-sponsored conservation program and abide by the rules — but there are no clear guidelines for these programs. Increased enforcement of the Forest Code, which dates back to 1965, has slowed deforestation in recent years, with authorities using satellite images to track clearance. Under that code, landowners must conserve a percentage of their terrain forested, ranging from 20% in some regions to 80% in the Amazon. Jeff Tollefson points out in Nature: “The fear is that weakening the law will reverse this progress and unleash a wave of new deforestation by convincing farmers and ranchers that Brazil doesn’t have the political will to truly enforce the law.” Critics of the law say it will encourage more land clearance because government agencies have proved unable to determine when a plot was deforested. Under the new bill, farmers will be able to cultivate land closer to hilltops and riverbanks, which are especially vulnerable to erosion if trees are chopped down.

<h4><strong>Alt causes to Amazon collapse --Brazilian agriculture politics </h4><p>Canning 12 </p><p></strong>Paul Canning, Writer for Care2, “Brazil Goes Backwards on Amazon Deforestation,” Care2, 4/27/12, <u>http://www.care2.com/causes/brazil-goes-backwards-on-amazon-deforestation.html</p><p><strong><mark>Brazil’s Congress has voted to relax laws</mark> which <mark>protect the Amazon from deforestation</u></strong></mark>. The new forest code now goes to President Dilma Rousseff, who is being urged to veto the bill or at least some of its clauses. Rousseff opposed the bill, but <u><strong>the <mark>country’s powerful farming lobby won over</mark> enough MPs</strong> <strong><mark>to over-rule</mark> her and her party</strong>. </u>World Wide Fund for Nature (<u><strong><mark>WWF) and Greenpeace</mark> called the vote</u></strong>: “O início do fim das florestas — <u><strong>the beginning of the end of the rainforest.”</strong> </u>“<u><strong><mark>Brazil has been held hostage to the interests of the agriculture lobby</u></strong></mark> from the outset,” said Paulo Adário of Greenpeace in Brazil. “<u><strong>The agriculture lobby has done everything it could to push through its demands.”</strong> </u>WWF says <u>t<strong>he law grants amnesty to those who have destroyed rainforest and opens the floodgates to further destruction.</strong> </u>The amnesty is conditional in that p<u>e</u>rpetrators must enroll in a government-sponsored conservation program and abide by the rules — but there are no clear guidelines for these programs. Increased enforcement of the Forest Code, which dates back to 1965, has slowed deforestation in recent years, with authorities using satellite images to track clearance. Under that code, landowners must conserve a percentage of their terrain forested, ranging from 20% in some regions to 80% in the Amazon. Jeff Tollefson points out in Nature: “The fear is that <u><strong><mark>weakening the law will reverse this progress and unleash a wave of new deforestation by convincing farmers and ranchers that Brazil doesn’t have the political will to truly enforce the law.”</strong></mark> </u>Critics of the law say <u><strong>it will encourage more land clearance because government agencies have proved unable to determine when a plot was deforested. Under the new bill, farmers will be able to cultivate land closer to hilltops and riverbanks, which are especially vulnerable to erosion if trees are chopped down.</p></u></strong>

Canning 12 Paul Canning, Writer for Care2, “Brazil Goes Backwards on Amazon Deforestation,” Care2, 4/27/12, http://www.care2.com/causes/brazil-goes-backwards-on-amazon-deforestation.html

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Canning 12 Paul Canning, Writer for Care2, “Brazil Goes Backwards on Amazon Deforestation,” Care2, 4/27/12, http://www.care2.com/causes/brazil-goes-backwards-on-amazon-deforestation.html fulltext: Brazil’s Congress has voted to relax laws which protect the Amazon from deforestation. The new forest code now goes to President Dilma Rousseff, who is being urged to veto the bill or at least some of its clauses. Rousseff opposed the bill, but the country’s powerful farming lobby won over enough MPs to over-rule her and her party. World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Greenpeace called the vote: “O início do fim das florestas — the beginning of the end of the rainforest.” “Brazil has been held hostage to the interests of the agriculture lobby from the outset,” said Paulo Adário of Greenpeace in Brazil. “The agriculture lobby has done everything it could to push through its demands.” WWF says the law grants amnesty to those who have destroyed rainforest and opens the floodgates to further destruction. The amnesty is conditional in that perpetrators must enroll in a government-sponsored conservation program and abide by the rules — but there are no clear guidelines for these programs. Increased enforcement of the Forest Code, which dates back to 1965, has slowed deforestation in recent years, with authorities using satellite images to track clearance. Under that code, landowners must conserve a percentage of their terrain forested, ranging from 20% in some regions to 80% in the Amazon. Jeff Tollefson points out in Nature: “The fear is that weakening the law will reverse this progress and unleash a wave of new deforestation by convincing farmers and ranchers that Brazil doesn’t have the political will to truly enforce the law.” Critics of the law say it will encourage more land clearance because government agencies have proved unable to determine when a plot was deforested. Under the new bill, farmers will be able to cultivate land closer to hilltops and riverbanks, which are especially vulnerable to erosion if trees are chopped down. [/INST] <h4><strong>Alt causes to Amazon collapse --Brazilian agriculture politics </h4><p>Canning 12 </p><p></strong>Paul Canning, Writer for Care2, “Brazil Goes Backwards on Amazon Deforestation,” Care2, 4/27/12, <u>http://www.care2.com/causes/brazil-goes-backwards-on-amazon-deforestation.html</p><p><strong><mark>Brazil’s Congress has voted to relax laws</mark> which <mark>protect the Amazon from deforestation</u></strong></mark>. The new forest code now goes to President Dilma Rousseff, who is being urged to veto the bill or at least some of its clauses. Rousseff opposed the bill, but <u><strong>the <mark>country’s powerful farming lobby won over</mark> enough MPs</strong> <strong><mark>to over-rule</mark> her and her party</strong>. </u>World Wide Fund for Nature (<u><strong><mark>WWF) and Greenpeace</mark> called the vote</u></strong>: “O início do fim das florestas — <u><strong>the beginning of the end of the rainforest.”</strong> </u>“<u><strong><mark>Brazil has been held hostage to the interests of the agriculture lobby</u></strong></mark> from the outset,” said Paulo Adário of Greenpeace in Brazil. “<u><strong>The agriculture lobby has done everything it could to push through its demands.”</strong> </u>WWF says <u>t<strong>he law grants amnesty to those who have destroyed rainforest and opens the floodgates to further destruction.</strong> </u>The amnesty is conditional in that p<u>e</u>rpetrators must enroll in a government-sponsored conservation program and abide by the rules — but there are no clear guidelines for these programs. Increased enforcement of the Forest Code, which dates back to 1965, has slowed deforestation in recent years, with authorities using satellite images to track clearance. Under that code, landowners must conserve a percentage of their terrain forested, ranging from 20% in some regions to 80% in the Amazon. Jeff Tollefson points out in Nature: “The fear is that <u><strong><mark>weakening the law will reverse this progress and unleash a wave of new deforestation by convincing farmers and ranchers that Brazil doesn’t have the political will to truly enforce the law.”</strong></mark> </u>Critics of the law say <u><strong>it will encourage more land clearance because government agencies have proved unable to determine when a plot was deforested. Under the new bill, farmers will be able to cultivate land closer to hilltops and riverbanks, which are especially vulnerable to erosion if trees are chopped down.</p></u></strong> </s>

No impact to deforestation

the rainforests have only been around for 12,000 years in terms of the history of the earth, it's hardly a pinprick The simple point is that there are now still - despite what humans have done - more rainforests today than there were 12,000 years ago." "This lungs of the earth business is nonsense; the daftest of all theories because the trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out. "The idea of them soaking up carbon dioxide and giving out oxygen is a myth In terms of world systems, the rainforests are basically irrelevant. World weather is governed by the oceans Most things that happen on land are mere blips to the system, basically insignificant the argument that the cure for cancer could be hidden in a rainforest plant or animal is also based on false science because the sea holds more mysteries of life than the rainforests fears destroying this raw source of medicine are unfounded because the rainforests are remarkably healthy. "They are just about the healthiest forests in the world. This stuff about them vanishing at an alarming rate is a con based on bad science

rainforests have only been around for 12,000 years in terms of the history of the earth, it's hardly a pinprick despite humans more rainforests today than 12,000 years ago." because the trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out rainforests are irrelevant. World the argument that the cure for cancer could be hidden in a rainforest is based on false science because the sea holds more than rainforests rainforests are remarkably healthy stuff about them vanishing at an alarming rate is a con based on bad science

"One of the simple, but very important, facts is that the rainforests have only been around for between 12,000 and 16,000 years. That sounds like a very long time but, in terms of the history of the earth, it's hardly a pinprick. "Before then, there were hardly any rainforests. They are very young. It is just a big mistake that people are making. "The simple point is that there are now still - despite what humans have done - more rainforests today than there were 12,000 years ago." "This lungs of the earth business is nonsense; the daftest of all theories," Stott adds. "If you want to put forward something which, in a simple sense, shows you what's wrong with all the science they espouse, it's that image of the lungs of the world. "In fact, because the trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out. "The idea of them soaking up carbon dioxide and giving out oxygen is a myth. It's only fast-growing young trees that actually take up carbon dioxide," Stott says. "In terms of world systems, the rainforests are basically irrelevant. World weather is governed by the oceans - that great system of ocean atmospherics. "Most things that happen on land are mere blips to the system, basically insignificant," he says. Both scientists say the argument that the cure for cancer could be hidden in a rainforest plant or animal - while plausible - is also based on false science because the sea holds more mysteries of life than the rainforests. And both say fears that man is destroying this raw source of medicine are unfounded because the rainforests are remarkably healthy. "They are just about the healthiest forests in the world. This stuff about them vanishing at an alarming rate is a con based on bad science," Moore says.

<h4>No impact to deforestation</h4><p><strong>Wigmore 5</strong>– quoting biogeography professor at London University who edits the Journal of Biogeography and a Canadian co-founder of Greenpeace (6/9, Barry, New York Post, Posted at Cheat Seeking Missiles, date is date of post, http://cheatseekingmissiles.blogspot.com/2005/06/stop-global-whining-2.html)</p><p>"One of the simple, but very important, facts is that <u><strong>the <mark>rainforests have only been around for</u></strong></mark> between <u><strong><mark>12,000</u></strong></mark> and 16,000 <u><strong><mark>years</u></strong></mark>. That sounds like a very long time but, <u><strong><mark>in terms of the history of the earth, it's hardly a pinprick</u></strong></mark>. "Before then, there were hardly any rainforests. They are very young. It is just a big mistake that people are making. "<u><strong>The simple point is that there are now still - <mark>despite</mark> what <mark>humans</mark> have done - <mark>more rainforests today than</mark> there were <mark>12,000 years ago." </mark>"This lungs of the earth business is nonsense; the daftest of all theories</u></strong>," Stott adds. "If you want to put forward something which, in a simple sense, shows you what's wrong with all the science they espouse, it's that image of the lungs of the world. "In fact, <u><strong><mark>because the trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out</mark>. "The idea of them soaking up carbon dioxide and giving out oxygen is a myth</u></strong>. It's only fast-growing young trees that actually take up carbon dioxide," Stott says. "<u><strong>In terms of world systems, the <mark>rainforests are </mark>basically <mark>irrelevant. World </mark>weather is governed by the oceans</u></strong> - that great system of ocean atmospherics. "<u><strong>Most things that happen on land are mere blips to the system, basically insignificant</u></strong>," he says. Both scientists say <u><strong><mark>the argument that the cure for cancer could be hidden in a rainforest</mark> plant or animal</u></strong> - while plausible - <u><strong><mark>is</mark> also <mark>based on false science because the sea holds more</mark> mysteries of life <mark>than</mark> the <mark>rainforests</u></strong></mark>. And both say <u><strong>fears</u></strong> that man is <u><strong>destroying this raw source of medicine are unfounded because the <mark>rainforests are remarkably healthy</mark>. "They are just about the healthiest forests in the world. This <mark>stuff about them vanishing at an alarming rate is a con based on bad science</u></strong></mark>," Moore says.</p>

Wigmore 5– quoting biogeography professor at London University who edits the Journal of Biogeography and a Canadian co-founder of Greenpeace (6/9, Barry, New York Post, Posted at Cheat Seeking Missiles, date is date of post, http://cheatseekingmissiles.blogspot.com/2005/06/stop-global-whining-2.html)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Wigmore 5– quoting biogeography professor at London University who edits the Journal of Biogeography and a Canadian co-founder of Greenpeace (6/9, Barry, New York Post, Posted at Cheat Seeking Missiles, date is date of post, http://cheatseekingmissiles.blogspot.com/2005/06/stop-global-whining-2.html) fulltext: "One of the simple, but very important, facts is that the rainforests have only been around for between 12,000 and 16,000 years. That sounds like a very long time but, in terms of the history of the earth, it's hardly a pinprick. "Before then, there were hardly any rainforests. They are very young. It is just a big mistake that people are making. "The simple point is that there are now still - despite what humans have done - more rainforests today than there were 12,000 years ago." "This lungs of the earth business is nonsense; the daftest of all theories," Stott adds. "If you want to put forward something which, in a simple sense, shows you what's wrong with all the science they espouse, it's that image of the lungs of the world. "In fact, because the trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out. "The idea of them soaking up carbon dioxide and giving out oxygen is a myth. It's only fast-growing young trees that actually take up carbon dioxide," Stott says. "In terms of world systems, the rainforests are basically irrelevant. World weather is governed by the oceans - that great system of ocean atmospherics. "Most things that happen on land are mere blips to the system, basically insignificant," he says. Both scientists say the argument that the cure for cancer could be hidden in a rainforest plant or animal - while plausible - is also based on false science because the sea holds more mysteries of life than the rainforests. And both say fears that man is destroying this raw source of medicine are unfounded because the rainforests are remarkably healthy. "They are just about the healthiest forests in the world. This stuff about them vanishing at an alarming rate is a con based on bad science," Moore says. [/INST] <h4>No impact to deforestation</h4><p><strong>Wigmore 5</strong>– quoting biogeography professor at London University who edits the Journal of Biogeography and a Canadian co-founder of Greenpeace (6/9, Barry, New York Post, Posted at Cheat Seeking Missiles, date is date of post, http://cheatseekingmissiles.blogspot.com/2005/06/stop-global-whining-2.html)</p><p>"One of the simple, but very important, facts is that <u><strong>the <mark>rainforests have only been around for</u></strong></mark> between <u><strong><mark>12,000</u></strong></mark> and 16,000 <u><strong><mark>years</u></strong></mark>. That sounds like a very long time but, <u><strong><mark>in terms of the history of the earth, it's hardly a pinprick</u></strong></mark>. "Before then, there were hardly any rainforests. They are very young. It is just a big mistake that people are making. "<u><strong>The simple point is that there are now still - <mark>despite</mark> what <mark>humans</mark> have done - <mark>more rainforests today than</mark> there were <mark>12,000 years ago." </mark>"This lungs of the earth business is nonsense; the daftest of all theories</u></strong>," Stott adds. "If you want to put forward something which, in a simple sense, shows you what's wrong with all the science they espouse, it's that image of the lungs of the world. "In fact, <u><strong><mark>because the trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out</mark>. "The idea of them soaking up carbon dioxide and giving out oxygen is a myth</u></strong>. It's only fast-growing young trees that actually take up carbon dioxide," Stott says. "<u><strong>In terms of world systems, the <mark>rainforests are </mark>basically <mark>irrelevant. World </mark>weather is governed by the oceans</u></strong> - that great system of ocean atmospherics. "<u><strong>Most things that happen on land are mere blips to the system, basically insignificant</u></strong>," he says. Both scientists say <u><strong><mark>the argument that the cure for cancer could be hidden in a rainforest</mark> plant or animal</u></strong> - while plausible - <u><strong><mark>is</mark> also <mark>based on false science because the sea holds more</mark> mysteries of life <mark>than</mark> the <mark>rainforests</u></strong></mark>. And both say <u><strong>fears</u></strong> that man is <u><strong>destroying this raw source of medicine are unfounded because the <mark>rainforests are remarkably healthy</mark>. "They are just about the healthiest forests in the world. This <mark>stuff about them vanishing at an alarming rate is a con based on bad science</u></strong></mark>," Moore says.</p> </s>

Your studies are bad and the impact is exaggerated

deforestation has been significantly exaggerated it may well be the only about a third of the figures used by international organizations and climatologists Exaggerated claims of deforestation have misled ecologists. and may reflect less "nature and its degradation", than real histories of climatic fluctuations in interaction with past land management Exaggerated estimates of deforestation on this scale will also mislead regional and global climatic modeling Exaggerated estimates obscure appreciation of how farmers may have been enriching and managing their landscapes in sustainable ways

eforestation has been significantly exaggerated it may well be the only about a third of the figures used by international organizations and climatologists Exaggerated claims of deforestation have misled ecologists and may reflect less "nature and its degradation", than real histories of climatic fluctuations in interaction with past land management Exaggerated estimates obscure appreciation of how farmers may have been enriching and managing their landscapes in sustainable ways

Indeed, drawing together evidence from the two cases presented in this essay and the other countries we have studied (Fairhead and Leach 1998), we calculate that deforestation during the twentieth century has been significantly exaggerated across a large part of West Africa. As table 3 summarizes, it may well be the only about a third of the figures used by international organizations and climatologists such as Zheng and Eltahir (1997) cited at the beginning of this essay. Cassandra is using poor data for her predictions. It also seems likely that 1900-1920 was a high point in forest cover in several countries (certainly in Ghana and perhaps also in Cote D'Ivoire) following the decline of earlier farming populations. Forest loss might therefore appear as even less were it possible to take an earlier baseline. As each of the cases exemplifies in different ways, the history of West African forests is long, involving phases of peopling, management, depopulation, and the repopulation. Taylor's concern with European forest history is certainly pertinent to African conditions: The idea of great areas of primeval woodland, whose clearance in Saxon medieval and even later times which is such a feature of Professor Hoskins' work and is still repeated endlessly today, continues to mislead us. We shall never understand the history of the English landscape until we remove from our minds the concept of primeval woodland that our prehistoric ancestors had largely removed from the landscape by 1000 B.C. (Taylor 1988 in Hoskins 1955/1988:8). Exaggerated claims of deforestation have misled ecologists. They obscure how far present forest ecology and composition may reflect less "nature and its degradation", than real histories of climatic fluctuations in interaction with past land management. In West Africa in particular, claims of one-way deforestation have completely obscured what seems to have been a large increase in the area of the forest zone in recent centuries. Exaggerated estimates of deforestation on this scale will also mislead regional and global climatic modeling. Exaggerated estimates of deforestation have other, more nefarious consequences. They obscure appreciation of how farmers may have been enriching and managing their landscapes in sustainable ways. They obscure the historical experience of inhabitants and the origins of their claims to land. They obscure locality as it has been lived and is understood by those living it. And most significantly exaggerated rates of forest loss have often unjustly supported draconian environmental policies that further impoverish people in what is already a poor region.

<h4>Your studies are bad and the impact is exaggerated </h4><p>Vigdis <strong>Broch</strong> Due and Richard A Schroeder. Producing Nature and Poverty in Africa. <strong>2000</strong>. http://books.google.com/books?id=PUwYrkiKZzwC</p><p>Indeed, drawing together evidence from the two cases presented in this essay and the other countries we have studied (Fairhead and Leach 1998), we calculate that <u>d<mark>eforestation</u></mark> during the twentieth century <u><mark>has been significantly exaggerated</u></mark> across a large part of West Africa. As table 3 summarizes, <u><mark>it may well be the only about a third of the figures used by international organizations and climatologists</u></mark> such as Zheng and Eltahir (1997) cited at the beginning of this essay. Cassandra is using poor data for her predictions. It also seems likely that 1900-1920 was a high point in forest cover in several countries (certainly in Ghana and perhaps also in Cote D'Ivoire) following the decline of earlier farming populations. Forest loss might therefore appear as even less were it possible to take an earlier baseline. As each of the cases exemplifies in different ways, the history of West African forests is long, involving phases of peopling, management, depopulation, and the repopulation. Taylor's concern with European forest history is certainly pertinent to African conditions: The idea of great areas of primeval woodland, whose clearance in Saxon medieval and even later times which is such a feature of Professor Hoskins' work and is still repeated endlessly today, continues to mislead us. We shall never understand the history of the English landscape until we remove from our minds the concept of primeval woodland that our prehistoric ancestors had largely removed from the landscape by 1000 B.C. (Taylor 1988 in Hoskins 1955/1988:8). <u><mark>Exaggerated claims of deforestation have misled ecologists</mark>.</u> They obscure how far present forest ecology <u><mark>and</mark> </u>composition <u><mark>may reflect less "nature and its degradation", than real histories of climatic fluctuations in interaction with past land management</u></mark>. In West Africa in particular, claims of one-way deforestation have completely obscured what seems to have been a large increase in the area of the forest zone in recent centuries. <u>Exaggerated estimates of deforestation on this scale will also mislead regional and global climatic modeling</u>. <u><mark>Exaggerated estimates</u></mark> of deforestation have other, more nefarious consequences. They <u><mark>obscure appreciation of how farmers may have been enriching and managing their landscapes in sustainable ways</u></mark>. They obscure the historical experience of inhabitants and the origins of their claims to land. They obscure locality as it has been lived and is understood by those living it. And most significantly exaggerated rates of forest loss have often unjustly supported draconian environmental policies that further impoverish people in what is already a poor region.</p>

Vigdis Broch Due and Richard A Schroeder. Producing Nature and Poverty in Africa. 2000. http://books.google.com/books?id=PUwYrkiKZzwC

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Vigdis Broch Due and Richard A Schroeder. Producing Nature and Poverty in Africa. 2000. http://books.google.com/books?id=PUwYrkiKZzwC fulltext: Indeed, drawing together evidence from the two cases presented in this essay and the other countries we have studied (Fairhead and Leach 1998), we calculate that deforestation during the twentieth century has been significantly exaggerated across a large part of West Africa. As table 3 summarizes, it may well be the only about a third of the figures used by international organizations and climatologists such as Zheng and Eltahir (1997) cited at the beginning of this essay. Cassandra is using poor data for her predictions. It also seems likely that 1900-1920 was a high point in forest cover in several countries (certainly in Ghana and perhaps also in Cote D'Ivoire) following the decline of earlier farming populations. Forest loss might therefore appear as even less were it possible to take an earlier baseline. As each of the cases exemplifies in different ways, the history of West African forests is long, involving phases of peopling, management, depopulation, and the repopulation. Taylor's concern with European forest history is certainly pertinent to African conditions: The idea of great areas of primeval woodland, whose clearance in Saxon medieval and even later times which is such a feature of Professor Hoskins' work and is still repeated endlessly today, continues to mislead us. We shall never understand the history of the English landscape until we remove from our minds the concept of primeval woodland that our prehistoric ancestors had largely removed from the landscape by 1000 B.C. (Taylor 1988 in Hoskins 1955/1988:8). Exaggerated claims of deforestation have misled ecologists. They obscure how far present forest ecology and composition may reflect less "nature and its degradation", than real histories of climatic fluctuations in interaction with past land management. In West Africa in particular, claims of one-way deforestation have completely obscured what seems to have been a large increase in the area of the forest zone in recent centuries. Exaggerated estimates of deforestation on this scale will also mislead regional and global climatic modeling. Exaggerated estimates of deforestation have other, more nefarious consequences. They obscure appreciation of how farmers may have been enriching and managing their landscapes in sustainable ways. They obscure the historical experience of inhabitants and the origins of their claims to land. They obscure locality as it has been lived and is understood by those living it. And most significantly exaggerated rates of forest loss have often unjustly supported draconian environmental policies that further impoverish people in what is already a poor region. [/INST] <h4>Your studies are bad and the impact is exaggerated </h4><p>Vigdis <strong>Broch</strong> Due and Richard A Schroeder. Producing Nature and Poverty in Africa. <strong>2000</strong>. http://books.google.com/books?id=PUwYrkiKZzwC</p><p>Indeed, drawing together evidence from the two cases presented in this essay and the other countries we have studied (Fairhead and Leach 1998), we calculate that <u>d<mark>eforestation</u></mark> during the twentieth century <u><mark>has been significantly exaggerated</u></mark> across a large part of West Africa. As table 3 summarizes, <u><mark>it may well be the only about a third of the figures used by international organizations and climatologists</u></mark> such as Zheng and Eltahir (1997) cited at the beginning of this essay. Cassandra is using poor data for her predictions. It also seems likely that 1900-1920 was a high point in forest cover in several countries (certainly in Ghana and perhaps also in Cote D'Ivoire) following the decline of earlier farming populations. Forest loss might therefore appear as even less were it possible to take an earlier baseline. As each of the cases exemplifies in different ways, the history of West African forests is long, involving phases of peopling, management, depopulation, and the repopulation. Taylor's concern with European forest history is certainly pertinent to African conditions: The idea of great areas of primeval woodland, whose clearance in Saxon medieval and even later times which is such a feature of Professor Hoskins' work and is still repeated endlessly today, continues to mislead us. We shall never understand the history of the English landscape until we remove from our minds the concept of primeval woodland that our prehistoric ancestors had largely removed from the landscape by 1000 B.C. (Taylor 1988 in Hoskins 1955/1988:8). <u><mark>Exaggerated claims of deforestation have misled ecologists</mark>.</u> They obscure how far present forest ecology <u><mark>and</mark> </u>composition <u><mark>may reflect less "nature and its degradation", than real histories of climatic fluctuations in interaction with past land management</u></mark>. In West Africa in particular, claims of one-way deforestation have completely obscured what seems to have been a large increase in the area of the forest zone in recent centuries. <u>Exaggerated estimates of deforestation on this scale will also mislead regional and global climatic modeling</u>. <u><mark>Exaggerated estimates</u></mark> of deforestation have other, more nefarious consequences. They <u><mark>obscure appreciation of how farmers may have been enriching and managing their landscapes in sustainable ways</u></mark>. They obscure the historical experience of inhabitants and the origins of their claims to land. They obscure locality as it has been lived and is understood by those living it. And most significantly exaggerated rates of forest loss have often unjustly supported draconian environmental policies that further impoverish people in what is already a poor region.</p> </s>

Interpretation and violation --- the affirmative should defend the desirability of a topical action

<h4>Interpretation and violation --- the affirmative should defend the desirability of a topical action</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Interpretation and violation --- the affirmative should defend the desirability of a topical action</h4> </s>

A legal market would increase Afghan instability

Goodman reasons that since there are currently few legal means to make a living in Afghanistan providing a legitimate market f could mitigate instability by depriving war-lords of the illegal narcotic profits The question is why we would think providing a legal market for marijuana in Afghanistan would somehow remove the unsavory element from the country’s drug trade. Warlords and armies have a lengthy history in Afghanistan They are part of the Afghan DNA Today there are more than 200 key warlords controlling Afghanistan with 250,000 heavily armed militiamen The formally established Afghan government even with the assistance of the U.S., has been unable to unarm or dismantle these groups Why would these warlords give up the hold they currently have on the drug trade that represents their primary source of income, power and existence Legal or illegal warlords are going to continue to control the drug trade in Afghanistan and will continue to use the proceeds from such to finance terrorist activity creating continued instability within the region The only thing creating a “legal” market for Afghan’s bumper cannabis will do is substantially increase the profits flowing to these groups enhancing the means they have available to them as they remain equally as committed to fighting the West.

why would a legal market for marijuana in Afghanistan remove the unsavory element from the country’s drug trade Warlords are part of the Afghan DNA there are 200 controlling Afghanistan with 250,000 armed militiamen The government has been unable or dismantle these groups Why would warlords give up the hold they currently have on the drug trade that represents income, power and existence Legal or illegal warlords are going to continue to control the drug trade in Afghanistan and continue to use the proceeds to finance terrorist activity creating instability The only thing “legal” market will do is substantially increase the profits flowing to these groups enhancing means as they remain committed to fighting

Goodman further reasons that, since there are currently few legal means to make a living in countries like Afghanistan, providing a legitimate market for such cash crops could mitigate instability, by depriving the country’s war-lords and criminal groups of the illegal narcotic profits they frequently use to undermine our national security and counterterrorism objectives involving these countries. Considering that some 23 million Americans are reported to spend an estimated $42 billion on marijuana every year, there is little doubt that the Afghan economy could benefit if Afghanis were able to legally supply their agricultural products to legitimate private markets in the U.S. The question is though, why we would think providing a legal market for marijuana in Afghanistan would somehow remove the unsavory element from the country’s drug trade. Warlords and their personal armies have a lengthy history in Afghanistan. They are part of the Afghan DNA. Today there are more than 200 key warlords controlling various territories in Afghanistan, with as many as 250,000 heavily armed, and often militarily experienced, militiamen at their disposal. The formally established Afghan government, even with the assistance of the U.S., has been unable to unarm or dismantle these groups. Why would these warlords give up the hold they currently have on the drug trade, a trade that represents their primary source of income, power and existence. Legal or illegal, these warlords and the unsavory characters that surround them are going to continue to control the drug trade in Afghanistan and, if so disposed, will continue to use the proceeds from such to finance terrorist activity and other operations creating continued instability within the region. The only thing creating a “legal” market for Afghan’s bumper cannabis crop will do is substantially increase the profits flowing to these groups, thereby enhancing the means they have available to them as they remain equally as committed to fighting the West.

<h4>A legal market would increase Afghan instability </h4><p>Ken <strong>Adcox 14<u>, Drug war/national security writer for Medium and El Paso Police Department Assistant Chief, “Legalizing Marijuana as a National Security Strategy: Are you on drugs or thinking outside the box?”, https://medium.com/homeland-security/legalizing-marijuana-as-a-national-security-strategy-are-you-on-drugs-or-thinking-outside-the-box-ffc9f3a5e715, AB </p><p>Goodman</u></strong> further <u><strong>reasons that</u></strong>, <u><strong>since there are currently few legal means to make a living in</u></strong> countries like <u><strong>Afghanistan</u></strong>, <u><strong>providing a legitimate market f</u></strong>or such cash crops <u><strong>could mitigate instability</u></strong>, <u><strong>by depriving</u></strong> the country’s <u><strong>war-lords </u></strong>and criminal groups <u><strong>of the illegal narcotic profits</u></strong> they frequently use to undermine our national security and counterterrorism objectives involving these countries. Considering that some 23 million Americans are reported to spend an estimated $42 billion on marijuana every year, there is little doubt that the Afghan economy could benefit if Afghanis were able to legally supply their agricultural products to legitimate private markets in the U.S. <u><strong>The question is </u></strong>though,<u><strong> <mark>why</mark> we <mark>would</mark> think providing <mark>a legal market for marijuana in Afghanistan</mark> would somehow <mark>remove</mark> <mark>the unsavory element from the country’s drug trade</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Warlords</mark> and</u></strong> their personal <u><strong>armies have a lengthy history in Afghanistan</u></strong>. <u><strong>They <mark>are part of the Afghan DNA</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Today <mark>there are</mark> more than <mark>200</mark> key warlords <mark>controlling</u></strong></mark> various territories in <u><strong><mark>Afghanistan</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>with</u></strong></mark> as many as <u><strong><mark>250,000</mark> heavily <mark>armed</u></strong></mark>, and often militarily experienced, <u><strong><mark>militiamen</u></strong></mark> at their disposal. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> formally established Afghan <mark>government</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>even with the assistance of the U.S.,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>has been unable</mark> to unarm <mark>or dismantle these groups</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Why would</mark> these <mark>warlords give up the hold they currently</u></strong> <u><strong>have on the drug trade</u></strong></mark>, a trade <u><strong><mark>that represents</mark> their primary source of <mark>income, power and existence</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Legal or illegal</u></strong></mark>, these <u><strong><mark>warlords</u></strong></mark> and the unsavory characters that surround them <u><strong><mark>are going to continue to control the drug trade in Afghanistan</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong></mark>, if so disposed, <u><strong>will <mark>continue to use the proceeds</mark> from such <mark>to finance terrorist activity</u></strong></mark> and other operations <u><strong><mark>creating </mark>continued <mark>instability</mark> within the region</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The only thing</mark> creating a <mark>“legal” market</mark> for Afghan’s bumper cannabis</u></strong> crop <u><strong><mark>will do is substantially increase the profits flowing to these groups</u></strong></mark>, thereby <u><strong><mark>enhancing</mark> the <mark>means</mark> they have available to them <mark>as they remain</mark> equally as <mark>committed to fighting</mark> the West.</p></u></strong>

Ken Adcox 14, Drug war/national security writer for Medium and El Paso Police Department Assistant Chief, “Legalizing Marijuana as a National Security Strategy: Are you on drugs or thinking outside the box?”, https://medium.com/homeland-security/legalizing-marijuana-as-a-national-security-strategy-are-you-on-drugs-or-thinking-outside-the-box-ffc9f3a5e715, AB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ken Adcox 14, Drug war/national security writer for Medium and El Paso Police Department Assistant Chief, “Legalizing Marijuana as a National Security Strategy: Are you on drugs or thinking outside the box?”, https://medium.com/homeland-security/legalizing-marijuana-as-a-national-security-strategy-are-you-on-drugs-or-thinking-outside-the-box-ffc9f3a5e715, AB fulltext: Goodman further reasons that, since there are currently few legal means to make a living in countries like Afghanistan, providing a legitimate market for such cash crops could mitigate instability, by depriving the country’s war-lords and criminal groups of the illegal narcotic profits they frequently use to undermine our national security and counterterrorism objectives involving these countries. Considering that some 23 million Americans are reported to spend an estimated $42 billion on marijuana every year, there is little doubt that the Afghan economy could benefit if Afghanis were able to legally supply their agricultural products to legitimate private markets in the U.S. The question is though, why we would think providing a legal market for marijuana in Afghanistan would somehow remove the unsavory element from the country’s drug trade. Warlords and their personal armies have a lengthy history in Afghanistan. They are part of the Afghan DNA. Today there are more than 200 key warlords controlling various territories in Afghanistan, with as many as 250,000 heavily armed, and often militarily experienced, militiamen at their disposal. The formally established Afghan government, even with the assistance of the U.S., has been unable to unarm or dismantle these groups. Why would these warlords give up the hold they currently have on the drug trade, a trade that represents their primary source of income, power and existence. Legal or illegal, these warlords and the unsavory characters that surround them are going to continue to control the drug trade in Afghanistan and, if so disposed, will continue to use the proceeds from such to finance terrorist activity and other operations creating continued instability within the region. The only thing creating a “legal” market for Afghan’s bumper cannabis crop will do is substantially increase the profits flowing to these groups, thereby enhancing the means they have available to them as they remain equally as committed to fighting the West. [/INST] <h4>A legal market would increase Afghan instability </h4><p>Ken <strong>Adcox 14<u>, Drug war/national security writer for Medium and El Paso Police Department Assistant Chief, “Legalizing Marijuana as a National Security Strategy: Are you on drugs or thinking outside the box?”, https://medium.com/homeland-security/legalizing-marijuana-as-a-national-security-strategy-are-you-on-drugs-or-thinking-outside-the-box-ffc9f3a5e715, AB </p><p>Goodman</u></strong> further <u><strong>reasons that</u></strong>, <u><strong>since there are currently few legal means to make a living in</u></strong> countries like <u><strong>Afghanistan</u></strong>, <u><strong>providing a legitimate market f</u></strong>or such cash crops <u><strong>could mitigate instability</u></strong>, <u><strong>by depriving</u></strong> the country’s <u><strong>war-lords </u></strong>and criminal groups <u><strong>of the illegal narcotic profits</u></strong> they frequently use to undermine our national security and counterterrorism objectives involving these countries. Considering that some 23 million Americans are reported to spend an estimated $42 billion on marijuana every year, there is little doubt that the Afghan economy could benefit if Afghanis were able to legally supply their agricultural products to legitimate private markets in the U.S. <u><strong>The question is </u></strong>though,<u><strong> <mark>why</mark> we <mark>would</mark> think providing <mark>a legal market for marijuana in Afghanistan</mark> would somehow <mark>remove</mark> <mark>the unsavory element from the country’s drug trade</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Warlords</mark> and</u></strong> their personal <u><strong>armies have a lengthy history in Afghanistan</u></strong>. <u><strong>They <mark>are part of the Afghan DNA</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Today <mark>there are</mark> more than <mark>200</mark> key warlords <mark>controlling</u></strong></mark> various territories in <u><strong><mark>Afghanistan</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>with</u></strong></mark> as many as <u><strong><mark>250,000</mark> heavily <mark>armed</u></strong></mark>, and often militarily experienced, <u><strong><mark>militiamen</u></strong></mark> at their disposal. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> formally established Afghan <mark>government</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>even with the assistance of the U.S.,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>has been unable</mark> to unarm <mark>or dismantle these groups</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Why would</mark> these <mark>warlords give up the hold they currently</u></strong> <u><strong>have on the drug trade</u></strong></mark>, a trade <u><strong><mark>that represents</mark> their primary source of <mark>income, power and existence</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Legal or illegal</u></strong></mark>, these <u><strong><mark>warlords</u></strong></mark> and the unsavory characters that surround them <u><strong><mark>are going to continue to control the drug trade in Afghanistan</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong></mark>, if so disposed, <u><strong>will <mark>continue to use the proceeds</mark> from such <mark>to finance terrorist activity</u></strong></mark> and other operations <u><strong><mark>creating </mark>continued <mark>instability</mark> within the region</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The only thing</mark> creating a <mark>“legal” market</mark> for Afghan’s bumper cannabis</u></strong> crop <u><strong><mark>will do is substantially increase the profits flowing to these groups</u></strong></mark>, thereby <u><strong><mark>enhancing</mark> the <mark>means</mark> they have available to them <mark>as they remain</mark> equally as <mark>committed to fighting</mark> the West.</p></u></strong> </s>

Legalize means to make permissible by law

le·gal·ize make (something that was previously illegal) permissible by law

le·gal·ize make (something that was previously illegal) permissible by law

le·gal·ize [ˈlēgəˌlīz/] verb verb: legalize; 3rd person present: legalizes; past tense: legalized; past participle: legalized; gerund or present participle: legalizing; verb: legalise; 3rd person present: legalises; past tense: legalised; past participle: legalised; gerund or present participle: legalizing 1. make (something that was previously illegal) permissible by law. "a measure legalizing gambling in Deadwood"

<h4>Legalize means to m<strong>ake permissible by law</h4><p>DICTIONARY.COM </p><p><u><mark>le·gal·ize</u></strong></mark> [ˈlēgəˌlīz/] verb verb: legalize; 3rd person present: legalizes; past tense: legalized; past participle: legalized; gerund or present participle: legalizing; verb: legalise; 3rd person present: legalises; past tense: legalised; past participle: legalised; gerund or present participle: legalizing 1. <u><strong><mark>make (something that was previously illegal) permissible by law</u></strong></mark>. "a measure legalizing gambling in Deadwood"</p>

DICTIONARY.COM

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: DICTIONARY.COM fulltext: le·gal·ize [ˈlēgəˌlīz/] verb verb: legalize; 3rd person present: legalizes; past tense: legalized; past participle: legalized; gerund or present participle: legalizing; verb: legalise; 3rd person present: legalises; past tense: legalised; past participle: legalised; gerund or present participle: legalizing 1. make (something that was previously illegal) permissible by law. "a measure legalizing gambling in Deadwood" [/INST] <h4>Legalize means to m<strong>ake permissible by law</h4><p>DICTIONARY.COM </p><p><u><mark>le·gal·ize</u></strong></mark> [ˈlēgəˌlīz/] verb verb: legalize; 3rd person present: legalizes; past tense: legalized; past participle: legalized; gerund or present participle: legalizing; verb: legalise; 3rd person present: legalises; past tense: legalised; past participle: legalised; gerund or present participle: legalizing 1. <u><strong><mark>make (something that was previously illegal) permissible by law</u></strong></mark>. "a measure legalizing gambling in Deadwood"</p> </s>

The aff can’t fiat changing Afghanistan laws -- WEED IS ILLEGAL IN AFGHANISTAN – the aff can’t create a market because the US CANNOT buy from farmers

<h4>The aff can’t fiat changing Afghanistan laws -- WEED IS ILLEGAL IN AFGHANISTAN – the aff can’t create a market because the US CANNOT buy from farmers</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>The aff can’t fiat changing Afghanistan laws -- WEED IS ILLEGAL IN AFGHANISTAN – the aff can’t create a market because the US CANNOT buy from farmers</h4> </s>

The agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government action

each topic contains certain key elements An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy the agent is the subject of the sentence The verb should urges action should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur

each topic contains An agent doing the acting The U S in “The U S should adopt a policy the agent is the subject . The verb should urges action should adopt means to put a policy into action through governmental means A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

<h4>The <u>agent and verb</u> indicate a debate about <u>hypothetical government </u><strong>action</h4><p>Ericson 3</p><p></strong>Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4</p><p>The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, <u><strong><mark>each topic contains</mark> certain key elements</u></strong>, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. <u><strong><mark>An agent</mark> <mark>doing the acting</mark> ---“<mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates” <mark>in “The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>should</mark> <mark>adopt a policy</u></strong></mark> of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, <u><strong><mark>the agent is the subject </mark>of the sentence</u></strong>. 2<mark>. <u><strong>The verb should</u></strong></mark>—the first part of a verb phrase that <u><strong><mark>urges action</u></strong></mark>. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, <u><strong><mark>should adopt</mark> here <mark>means to put a</mark> program or <mark>policy into action through governmental means</u></strong></mark>. 4. <u><strong><mark>A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired</u></strong></mark>. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. <u><strong><mark>The entire debate is about whether something ought</mark> <mark>to occur</u></strong></mark>. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. </p>

Ericson 3 Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ericson 3 Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4 fulltext: The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. [/INST] <h4>The <u>agent and verb</u> indicate a debate about <u>hypothetical government </u><strong>action</h4><p>Ericson 3</p><p></strong>Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4</p><p>The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, <u><strong><mark>each topic contains</mark> certain key elements</u></strong>, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. <u><strong><mark>An agent</mark> <mark>doing the acting</mark> ---“<mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates” <mark>in “The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>should</mark> <mark>adopt a policy</u></strong></mark> of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, <u><strong><mark>the agent is the subject </mark>of the sentence</u></strong>. 2<mark>. <u><strong>The verb should</u></strong></mark>—the first part of a verb phrase that <u><strong><mark>urges action</u></strong></mark>. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, <u><strong><mark>should adopt</mark> here <mark>means to put a</mark> program or <mark>policy into action through governmental means</u></strong></mark>. 4. <u><strong><mark>A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired</u></strong></mark>. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. <u><strong><mark>The entire debate is about whether something ought</mark> <mark>to occur</u></strong></mark>. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. </p> </s>

“Smoke Local” swamps solvency

t full liberalisation of the cannabis market will be followed milliseconds later by calls for trade barriers to be imposed./////// if Malawi were to be allowed to compete then all and every US based producer will go bust. Which, given the interplay between the localisation movement and the legalise cannabis movement isn’t something that will be welcomed. Legalisation would therefore be followed by the “Smoke Local” campaign.

full liberalisation of the cannabis market will be followed milliseconds later by calls for trade barriers to be imposed , if Malawi were allowed to compete then all and every US based producer will go bust Legalisation would therefore be followed by the “Smoke Local” campaign.

I would also go on to make two further predictions. Currently the proposed and enacted taxes on cannabis are ad valorem. That is, they’re based upon the value of the cannabis itself. As the price crashes as a result of trade I am certain that those ad valorem taxes will be replaced by unit taxation. So many dollars per pack of joints, rather than x or y percentage of the value of them. The second is that full liberalisation of the cannabis market will be followed milliseconds later by calls for trade barriers to be imposed./////// For, obviously, if Malawi were to be allowed to compete then all and every US based producer will go bust. Which, given the interplay between the localisation movement and the legalise cannabis movement isn’t something that will be welcomed. Legalisation would therefore be followed by the “Smoke Local” campaign.

<h4>“Smoke Local” swamps solvency </h4><p>Economics <strong>Worstall 14<u><mark>, finance and public policy writer, “Global Capitalism Would Make A Pack Of Fully Legal Cannabis Joints Cost 50 Cents, Not $50,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/03/22/global-capitalism-would-make-a-pack-of-fully-legal-cannabis-joints-cost-50-cents-not-50/, Vitz </p><p></u></strong></mark>I would also go on to make two further predictions. Currently the proposed and enacted taxes on cannabis are ad valorem. That is, they’re based upon the value of the cannabis itself. As the price crashes as a result of trade I am certain that those ad valorem taxes will be replaced by unit taxation. So many dollars per pack of joints, rather than x or y percentage of the value of them. The second is tha<u><strong>t <mark>full liberalisation of the cannabis market will be followed milliseconds later by calls for trade barriers to be imposed</mark>./////// </u></strong>For, obviously<mark>, <u><strong>if Malawi were</mark> to be <mark>allowed to compete then all and every US based producer will go bust</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Which, given the interplay between the localisation movement and the legalise cannabis movement isn’t something that will be welcomed. <mark>Legalisation would therefore be followed by the “Smoke Local” campaign.</p></u></strong></mark>

Economics Worstall 14, finance and public policy writer, “Global Capitalism Would Make A Pack Of Fully Legal Cannabis Joints Cost 50 Cents, Not $50,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/03/22/global-capitalism-would-make-a-pack-of-fully-legal-cannabis-joints-cost-50-cents-not-50/, Vitz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Economics Worstall 14, finance and public policy writer, “Global Capitalism Would Make A Pack Of Fully Legal Cannabis Joints Cost 50 Cents, Not $50,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/03/22/global-capitalism-would-make-a-pack-of-fully-legal-cannabis-joints-cost-50-cents-not-50/, Vitz fulltext: I would also go on to make two further predictions. Currently the proposed and enacted taxes on cannabis are ad valorem. That is, they’re based upon the value of the cannabis itself. As the price crashes as a result of trade I am certain that those ad valorem taxes will be replaced by unit taxation. So many dollars per pack of joints, rather than x or y percentage of the value of them. The second is that full liberalisation of the cannabis market will be followed milliseconds later by calls for trade barriers to be imposed./////// For, obviously, if Malawi were to be allowed to compete then all and every US based producer will go bust. Which, given the interplay between the localisation movement and the legalise cannabis movement isn’t something that will be welcomed. Legalisation would therefore be followed by the “Smoke Local” campaign. [/INST] <h4>“Smoke Local” swamps solvency </h4><p>Economics <strong>Worstall 14<u><mark>, finance and public policy writer, “Global Capitalism Would Make A Pack Of Fully Legal Cannabis Joints Cost 50 Cents, Not $50,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/03/22/global-capitalism-would-make-a-pack-of-fully-legal-cannabis-joints-cost-50-cents-not-50/, Vitz </p><p></u></strong></mark>I would also go on to make two further predictions. Currently the proposed and enacted taxes on cannabis are ad valorem. That is, they’re based upon the value of the cannabis itself. As the price crashes as a result of trade I am certain that those ad valorem taxes will be replaced by unit taxation. So many dollars per pack of joints, rather than x or y percentage of the value of them. The second is tha<u><strong>t <mark>full liberalisation of the cannabis market will be followed milliseconds later by calls for trade barriers to be imposed</mark>./////// </u></strong>For, obviously<mark>, <u><strong>if Malawi were</mark> to be <mark>allowed to compete then all and every US based producer will go bust</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Which, given the interplay between the localisation movement and the legalise cannabis movement isn’t something that will be welcomed. <mark>Legalisation would therefore be followed by the “Smoke Local” campaign.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

The aff doesn’t legalize any mandates of the topic -- they are literally the opposite of the resolution

<h4>The aff doesn’t legalize any mandates of the topic -- they are literally the opposite of the resolution </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>The aff doesn’t legalize any mandates of the topic -- they are literally the opposite of the resolution </h4> </s>

They remove barriers to entry and push Afghanistan farmers out of the market

Goodman illustrates some of the possible benefits of legalizing marijuana. Goodman notes that Afghanistan is the world’s largest supplier of cannabis and legalization would allow Afghans to realize an immediate revenue stream , he does not consider the fact that legalization would remove barriers of entry for American and international entrepreneurs. Goodman cites Rand Corporation figures that Americans spend approximately $40.6 billion a year on marijuana Hence, entrepreneurs from around the world would put their hat into the ring and effectively push Afghan growers out of any new market created by legalization the conjectured stabilization in Afghanistan as a result from marijuana legalization is not likely to happen.

Goodman he does not consider the fact that legalization would remove barriers of entry for international entrepreneurs entrepreneurs from around the world would put their hat into the ring and effectively push Afghan growers out of any new market created by legalization the stabilization is not likely to happen

In his recent blog, H.A. Goodman illustrates some of the possible benefits of legalizing marijuana. Goodman notes that Afghanistan is the world’s largest supplier of cannabis and legalization would allow Afghans to realize an immediate revenue stream. Goodman concludes that this revenue would contribute to the overall stability in the region. However, he does not consider the fact that legalization would remove barriers of entry for American and international entrepreneurs. Goodman cites Rand Corporation figures that Americans spend approximately $40.6 billion a year on marijuana. Hence, entrepreneurs from around the world would put their hat into the ring and effectively push Afghan growers out of any new market created by legalization. Thus, the conjectured stabilization in Afghanistan as a result from marijuana legalization is not likely to happen.

<h4>They remove barriers to entry and push Afghanistan farmers out of the market </h4><p>Marlowe<strong> Fox 14<u>, “Drug Cartels, Terrorism, and Marijuana,” http://raybounmulligan.com/mexican-drug-cartels-afghanistan-and-marijuana/, Vitz</p><p></u></strong>In his recent blog, H.A. <u><strong><mark>Goodman </mark>illustrates some of the possible benefits of legalizing marijuana. Goodman notes that Afghanistan</u></strong> <u><strong>is the world’s largest supplier of cannabis and legalization would allow Afghans to realize an immediate revenue stream</u></strong>. Goodman concludes that this revenue would contribute to the overall stability in the region. However<u><strong>, <mark>he does not consider the fact that legalization would</mark> <mark>remove barriers of entry</u></strong> <u><strong>for </mark>American and <mark>international entrepreneurs</mark>. Goodman cites Rand Corporation figures that Americans spend approximately $40.6 billion a year on marijuana</u></strong>. <u><strong>Hence, <mark>entrepreneurs from around the world would put their hat into the ring and effectively push Afghan growers out of any new market created by legalization</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> conjectured <mark>stabilization </mark>in Afghanistan as a result from marijuana legalization <mark>is not likely to happen</mark>.</p></u></strong>

Marlowe Fox 14, “Drug Cartels, Terrorism, and Marijuana,” http://raybounmulligan.com/mexican-drug-cartels-afghanistan-and-marijuana/, Vitz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Marlowe Fox 14, “Drug Cartels, Terrorism, and Marijuana,” http://raybounmulligan.com/mexican-drug-cartels-afghanistan-and-marijuana/, Vitz fulltext: In his recent blog, H.A. Goodman illustrates some of the possible benefits of legalizing marijuana. Goodman notes that Afghanistan is the world’s largest supplier of cannabis and legalization would allow Afghans to realize an immediate revenue stream. Goodman concludes that this revenue would contribute to the overall stability in the region. However, he does not consider the fact that legalization would remove barriers of entry for American and international entrepreneurs. Goodman cites Rand Corporation figures that Americans spend approximately $40.6 billion a year on marijuana. Hence, entrepreneurs from around the world would put their hat into the ring and effectively push Afghan growers out of any new market created by legalization. Thus, the conjectured stabilization in Afghanistan as a result from marijuana legalization is not likely to happen. [/INST] <h4>They remove barriers to entry and push Afghanistan farmers out of the market </h4><p>Marlowe<strong> Fox 14<u>, “Drug Cartels, Terrorism, and Marijuana,” http://raybounmulligan.com/mexican-drug-cartels-afghanistan-and-marijuana/, Vitz</p><p></u></strong>In his recent blog, H.A. <u><strong><mark>Goodman </mark>illustrates some of the possible benefits of legalizing marijuana. Goodman notes that Afghanistan</u></strong> <u><strong>is the world’s largest supplier of cannabis and legalization would allow Afghans to realize an immediate revenue stream</u></strong>. Goodman concludes that this revenue would contribute to the overall stability in the region. However<u><strong>, <mark>he does not consider the fact that legalization would</mark> <mark>remove barriers of entry</u></strong> <u><strong>for </mark>American and <mark>international entrepreneurs</mark>. Goodman cites Rand Corporation figures that Americans spend approximately $40.6 billion a year on marijuana</u></strong>. <u><strong>Hence, <mark>entrepreneurs from around the world would put their hat into the ring and effectively push Afghan growers out of any new market created by legalization</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> conjectured <mark>stabilization </mark>in Afghanistan as a result from marijuana legalization <mark>is not likely to happen</mark>.</p></u></strong> </s>

TWO IMPACTS

<h4>TWO IMPACTS </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>TWO IMPACTS </h4> </s>

Afghanistan instability is inevitable and no impact

The key problem was structural objectives could not be achieved without much larger commitment but the stakes weren't worth that Troop levels never approached successful nation-building, and that was compounded by ethnic divisions, mountainous terrain, geographic isolation, poor infrastructure, and porous borders. Pakistan continued to support the Taliban, and provided sanctuaries Washington was never willing to force Pakistan to halt support, we couldn't get Karzai to reform counterinsurgencies require effective local partners, we never had one. the U.S. was destined to lose

The key problem was structural objectives could not be achieved without much larger commitment the stakes weren't worth that Troop levels never approached successful nation-building, compounded by ethnic divisions, poor infrastructure, and porous borders. Pakistan continued to support the Taliban, and provided sanctuaries Washington was never willing to force Pakistan to halt support, we couldn't get Karzai to reform counterinsurgencies require effective local partners, we never had one. the U.S. was destined to lose

Both Nasr and Chayes make useful points about the dysfunction that undermined the AfPak effort, and I'm not going to try to adjudicate between them. Rather, I think both of them miss the more fundamental contradiction that bedeviled the entire U.S./NATO effort, especially after the diversion to Iraq allowed the Taliban to re-emerge. The key problem was essentially structural: US. objectives in Afghanistan could not be achieved without a much larger commitment of resources, but the stakes there simply weren't worth that level of commitment. In other words, winning wasn't worth the effort it would have taken, and the real failure was not to recognize that fact much earlier and to draw the appropriate policy conclusions. First, achieving a meaningful victory in Afghanistan -- defined as defeating the Taliban and creating an effective, Western-style government in Kabul -- would have required sending far more troops (i.e., even more than the Army requested during the "surge"). Troop levels in Afghanistan never approached the ratio of troops/population observed in more successful instances of nation-building, and that deficiency was compounded by Afghanistan's ethnic divisions, mountainous terrain, geographic isolation, poor infrastructure, and porous borders. Second, victory was elusive because Pakistan continued to support the Taliban, and its territory provided them with effective sanctuaries. When pressed, they could always slip across the border and live to fight another day. But Washington was never willing to go the mattresses and force Pakistan to halt its support, and it is not even clear that we could have done that without going to war with Pakistan itself. Washington backed off for very good reasons: We wanted tacit Pakistani cooperation in our not-so-secret drone and special forces campaign against al Qaeda, and we also worried about regime stability given Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Unfortunately, these factors made victory even harder to achieve. Third, we couldn't get Karzai to reform because he was the only game in town, and he knew it. Unless the U.S. and NATO were willing to take over the whole country and try to govern it ourselves -- a task that would have made occupying Iraq seem easy -- we were forced to work with him despite his many flaws. Successful counterinsurgencies require effective and legitimate local partners, however, and we never had one. In short, the U.S. was destined to lose because it didn't go all-out to win, and it shouldn't have. Indeed, an all-out effort would have been a huge mistake, because the stakes were in fact rather modest. Once the Taliban had been ousted and al Qaeda had been scattered, America's main interest was continuing to degrade al Qaeda (as we have done). That mission was distinct from the attempt to nation-build in Afghanistan, and in the end Afghanistan's importance did not justify a substantially larger effort. By the way, I am not suggesting that individual commanders and soldiers did not make enormous personal sacrifices or try hard to win, or that the civilians assigned to the Afghan campaign did not do their best in difficult conditions. My point is that if this war had been a real strategic priority, we would have fought it very differently. We would not have rotated commanders, soldiers, and civilian personnel in and out of the theatre as often as we did, in effect destroying institutional memory on an annual basis and forcing everyone to learn on the job. In a war where vital interests were at stake, we certainly wouldn't have let some of our NATO partners exempt the troops they sent from combat. And if the war had been seen aa a major priority, both parties would have been willing to raise taxes to pay for it. Thus, the real failure in Afghanistan was much broader than the internal squabbles that Nasr and Chayes have addressed. The entire national security establishment failed to recognize or acknowledge the fundamental mismatch between 1) U.S. interests (which were limited), 2) our stated goals (which were quite ambitious), and 3) the vast resources and patience it would have required to achieve those goals. Winning would have required us to spend much more than winning was worth, and to undertake exceedingly risky and uncertain actions towards countries like Pakistan. U.S. leaders wisely chose not to do these things, but they failed to realize what this meant for the war effort itself. Given this mismatch between interests, goals, and resources, it was stupid to keep trying to win at a level of effort that was never going to succeed. Yet no one on the inside seems to have pointed this out, or if they did, their advice was not heeded. And that is the real reason why the war limped on for so long and to such an unsatisfying end.

<h4>Afghanistan instability is inevitable and no impact</h4><p>Stephen<strong> Walt 13</strong>, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, where he served as academic dean from 2002-2006. “The REAL reason the U.S. failed in Afghanistan.” Foreign Policy, March 15</p><p>Both Nasr and Chayes make useful points about the dysfunction that undermined the AfPak effort, and I'm not going to try to adjudicate between them. Rather, I think both of them miss the more fundamental contradiction that bedeviled the entire U.S./NATO effort, especially after the diversion to Iraq allowed the Taliban to re-emerge. <u><strong><mark>The key problem was </u></strong></mark>essentially<u><strong><mark> structural</u></strong></mark>: US.<u><strong> <mark>objectives </u></strong></mark>in Afghanistan<u><strong><mark> could not be achieved without</u></strong></mark> a<u><strong><mark> much larger commitment</u></strong></mark> of resources, <u><strong>but <mark>the stakes </u></strong></mark>there simply <u><strong><mark>weren't worth that </u></strong></mark>level of commitment. In other words, winning wasn't worth the effort it would have taken, and the real failure was not to recognize that fact much earlier and to draw the appropriate policy conclusions. First, achieving a meaningful victory in Afghanistan -- defined as defeating the Taliban and creating an effective, Western-style government in Kabul -- would have required sending far more troops (i.e., even more than the Army requested during the "surge"). <u><strong><mark>Troop levels </u></strong></mark>in Afghanistan<u><strong><mark> never approached </u></strong></mark>the ratio of troops/population observed in more<u><strong> <mark>successful </u></strong></mark>instances of<u><strong><mark> nation-building, </mark>and that </u></strong>deficiency<u><strong> was <mark>compounded by </u></strong></mark>Afghanistan's<u><strong><mark> ethnic divisions, </mark>mountainous terrain, geographic isolation, <mark>poor infrastructure, and porous borders.</u></strong></mark> Second, victory was elusive because<u><strong><mark> Pakistan continued to support the Taliban, and </u></strong></mark>its territory<u><strong><mark> provided </u></strong></mark>them with effective<u><strong><mark> sanctuaries</u></strong></mark>. When pressed, they could always slip across the border and live to fight another day. But <u><strong><mark>Washington was never willing to </u></strong></mark>go the mattresses and<u><strong><mark> force Pakistan to halt </u></strong></mark>its<u><strong><mark> support, </u></strong></mark>and it is not even clear that we could have done that without going to war with Pakistan itself. Washington backed off for very good reasons: We wanted tacit Pakistani cooperation in our not-so-secret drone and special forces campaign against al Qaeda, and we also worried about regime stability given Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Unfortunately, these factors made victory even harder to achieve. Third, <u><strong><mark>we couldn't get Karzai to reform</u></strong></mark> because he was the only game in town, and he knew it. Unless the U.S. and NATO were willing to take over the whole country and try to govern it ourselves -- a task that would have made occupying Iraq seem easy -- we were forced to work with him despite his many flaws. Successful<u><strong> <mark>counterinsurgencies require effective </u></strong></mark>and legitimate<u><strong><mark> local partners, </u></strong></mark>however, and<u><strong><mark> we never had one.</mark> </u></strong>In short, <u><strong><mark>the U.S. was destined to lose </u></strong></mark>because it didn't go all-out to win, and it shouldn't have. Indeed, an all-out effort would have been a huge mistake, because the stakes were in fact rather modest. Once the Taliban had been ousted and al Qaeda had been scattered, America's main interest was continuing to degrade al Qaeda (as we have done). That mission was distinct from the attempt to nation-build in Afghanistan, and in the end Afghanistan's importance did not justify a substantially larger effort. By the way, I am not suggesting that individual commanders and soldiers did not make enormous personal sacrifices or try hard to win, or that the civilians assigned to the Afghan campaign did not do their best in difficult conditions. My point is that if this war had been a real strategic priority, we would have fought it very differently. We would not have rotated commanders, soldiers, and civilian personnel in and out of the theatre as often as we did, in effect destroying institutional memory on an annual basis and forcing everyone to learn on the job. In a war where vital interests were at stake, we certainly wouldn't have let some of our NATO partners exempt the troops they sent from combat. And if the war had been seen aa a major priority, both parties would have been willing to raise taxes to pay for it. Thus, the real failure in Afghanistan was much broader than the internal squabbles that Nasr and Chayes have addressed. The entire national security establishment failed to recognize or acknowledge the fundamental mismatch between 1) U.S. interests (which were limited), 2) our stated goals (which were quite ambitious), and 3) the vast resources and patience it would have required to achieve those goals. Winning would have required us to spend much more than winning was worth, and to undertake exceedingly risky and uncertain actions towards countries like Pakistan. U.S. leaders wisely chose not to do these things, but they failed to realize what this meant for the war effort itself. Given this mismatch between interests, goals, and resources, it was stupid to keep trying to win at a level of effort that was never going to succeed. Yet no one on the inside seems to have pointed this out, or if they did, their advice was not heeded. And that is the real reason why the war limped on for so long and to such an unsatisfying end.</p>

Stephen Walt 13, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, where he served as academic dean from 2002-2006. “The REAL reason the U.S. failed in Afghanistan.” Foreign Policy, March 15

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Stephen Walt 13, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, where he served as academic dean from 2002-2006. “The REAL reason the U.S. failed in Afghanistan.” Foreign Policy, March 15 fulltext: Both Nasr and Chayes make useful points about the dysfunction that undermined the AfPak effort, and I'm not going to try to adjudicate between them. Rather, I think both of them miss the more fundamental contradiction that bedeviled the entire U.S./NATO effort, especially after the diversion to Iraq allowed the Taliban to re-emerge. The key problem was essentially structural: US. objectives in Afghanistan could not be achieved without a much larger commitment of resources, but the stakes there simply weren't worth that level of commitment. In other words, winning wasn't worth the effort it would have taken, and the real failure was not to recognize that fact much earlier and to draw the appropriate policy conclusions. First, achieving a meaningful victory in Afghanistan -- defined as defeating the Taliban and creating an effective, Western-style government in Kabul -- would have required sending far more troops (i.e., even more than the Army requested during the "surge"). Troop levels in Afghanistan never approached the ratio of troops/population observed in more successful instances of nation-building, and that deficiency was compounded by Afghanistan's ethnic divisions, mountainous terrain, geographic isolation, poor infrastructure, and porous borders. Second, victory was elusive because Pakistan continued to support the Taliban, and its territory provided them with effective sanctuaries. When pressed, they could always slip across the border and live to fight another day. But Washington was never willing to go the mattresses and force Pakistan to halt its support, and it is not even clear that we could have done that without going to war with Pakistan itself. Washington backed off for very good reasons: We wanted tacit Pakistani cooperation in our not-so-secret drone and special forces campaign against al Qaeda, and we also worried about regime stability given Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Unfortunately, these factors made victory even harder to achieve. Third, we couldn't get Karzai to reform because he was the only game in town, and he knew it. Unless the U.S. and NATO were willing to take over the whole country and try to govern it ourselves -- a task that would have made occupying Iraq seem easy -- we were forced to work with him despite his many flaws. Successful counterinsurgencies require effective and legitimate local partners, however, and we never had one. In short, the U.S. was destined to lose because it didn't go all-out to win, and it shouldn't have. Indeed, an all-out effort would have been a huge mistake, because the stakes were in fact rather modest. Once the Taliban had been ousted and al Qaeda had been scattered, America's main interest was continuing to degrade al Qaeda (as we have done). That mission was distinct from the attempt to nation-build in Afghanistan, and in the end Afghanistan's importance did not justify a substantially larger effort. By the way, I am not suggesting that individual commanders and soldiers did not make enormous personal sacrifices or try hard to win, or that the civilians assigned to the Afghan campaign did not do their best in difficult conditions. My point is that if this war had been a real strategic priority, we would have fought it very differently. We would not have rotated commanders, soldiers, and civilian personnel in and out of the theatre as often as we did, in effect destroying institutional memory on an annual basis and forcing everyone to learn on the job. In a war where vital interests were at stake, we certainly wouldn't have let some of our NATO partners exempt the troops they sent from combat. And if the war had been seen aa a major priority, both parties would have been willing to raise taxes to pay for it. Thus, the real failure in Afghanistan was much broader than the internal squabbles that Nasr and Chayes have addressed. The entire national security establishment failed to recognize or acknowledge the fundamental mismatch between 1) U.S. interests (which were limited), 2) our stated goals (which were quite ambitious), and 3) the vast resources and patience it would have required to achieve those goals. Winning would have required us to spend much more than winning was worth, and to undertake exceedingly risky and uncertain actions towards countries like Pakistan. U.S. leaders wisely chose not to do these things, but they failed to realize what this meant for the war effort itself. Given this mismatch between interests, goals, and resources, it was stupid to keep trying to win at a level of effort that was never going to succeed. Yet no one on the inside seems to have pointed this out, or if they did, their advice was not heeded. And that is the real reason why the war limped on for so long and to such an unsatisfying end. [/INST] <h4>Afghanistan instability is inevitable and no impact</h4><p>Stephen<strong> Walt 13</strong>, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, where he served as academic dean from 2002-2006. “The REAL reason the U.S. failed in Afghanistan.” Foreign Policy, March 15</p><p>Both Nasr and Chayes make useful points about the dysfunction that undermined the AfPak effort, and I'm not going to try to adjudicate between them. Rather, I think both of them miss the more fundamental contradiction that bedeviled the entire U.S./NATO effort, especially after the diversion to Iraq allowed the Taliban to re-emerge. <u><strong><mark>The key problem was </u></strong></mark>essentially<u><strong><mark> structural</u></strong></mark>: US.<u><strong> <mark>objectives </u></strong></mark>in Afghanistan<u><strong><mark> could not be achieved without</u></strong></mark> a<u><strong><mark> much larger commitment</u></strong></mark> of resources, <u><strong>but <mark>the stakes </u></strong></mark>there simply <u><strong><mark>weren't worth that </u></strong></mark>level of commitment. In other words, winning wasn't worth the effort it would have taken, and the real failure was not to recognize that fact much earlier and to draw the appropriate policy conclusions. First, achieving a meaningful victory in Afghanistan -- defined as defeating the Taliban and creating an effective, Western-style government in Kabul -- would have required sending far more troops (i.e., even more than the Army requested during the "surge"). <u><strong><mark>Troop levels </u></strong></mark>in Afghanistan<u><strong><mark> never approached </u></strong></mark>the ratio of troops/population observed in more<u><strong> <mark>successful </u></strong></mark>instances of<u><strong><mark> nation-building, </mark>and that </u></strong>deficiency<u><strong> was <mark>compounded by </u></strong></mark>Afghanistan's<u><strong><mark> ethnic divisions, </mark>mountainous terrain, geographic isolation, <mark>poor infrastructure, and porous borders.</u></strong></mark> Second, victory was elusive because<u><strong><mark> Pakistan continued to support the Taliban, and </u></strong></mark>its territory<u><strong><mark> provided </u></strong></mark>them with effective<u><strong><mark> sanctuaries</u></strong></mark>. When pressed, they could always slip across the border and live to fight another day. But <u><strong><mark>Washington was never willing to </u></strong></mark>go the mattresses and<u><strong><mark> force Pakistan to halt </u></strong></mark>its<u><strong><mark> support, </u></strong></mark>and it is not even clear that we could have done that without going to war with Pakistan itself. Washington backed off for very good reasons: We wanted tacit Pakistani cooperation in our not-so-secret drone and special forces campaign against al Qaeda, and we also worried about regime stability given Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Unfortunately, these factors made victory even harder to achieve. Third, <u><strong><mark>we couldn't get Karzai to reform</u></strong></mark> because he was the only game in town, and he knew it. Unless the U.S. and NATO were willing to take over the whole country and try to govern it ourselves -- a task that would have made occupying Iraq seem easy -- we were forced to work with him despite his many flaws. Successful<u><strong> <mark>counterinsurgencies require effective </u></strong></mark>and legitimate<u><strong><mark> local partners, </u></strong></mark>however, and<u><strong><mark> we never had one.</mark> </u></strong>In short, <u><strong><mark>the U.S. was destined to lose </u></strong></mark>because it didn't go all-out to win, and it shouldn't have. Indeed, an all-out effort would have been a huge mistake, because the stakes were in fact rather modest. Once the Taliban had been ousted and al Qaeda had been scattered, America's main interest was continuing to degrade al Qaeda (as we have done). That mission was distinct from the attempt to nation-build in Afghanistan, and in the end Afghanistan's importance did not justify a substantially larger effort. By the way, I am not suggesting that individual commanders and soldiers did not make enormous personal sacrifices or try hard to win, or that the civilians assigned to the Afghan campaign did not do their best in difficult conditions. My point is that if this war had been a real strategic priority, we would have fought it very differently. We would not have rotated commanders, soldiers, and civilian personnel in and out of the theatre as often as we did, in effect destroying institutional memory on an annual basis and forcing everyone to learn on the job. In a war where vital interests were at stake, we certainly wouldn't have let some of our NATO partners exempt the troops they sent from combat. And if the war had been seen aa a major priority, both parties would have been willing to raise taxes to pay for it. Thus, the real failure in Afghanistan was much broader than the internal squabbles that Nasr and Chayes have addressed. The entire national security establishment failed to recognize or acknowledge the fundamental mismatch between 1) U.S. interests (which were limited), 2) our stated goals (which were quite ambitious), and 3) the vast resources and patience it would have required to achieve those goals. Winning would have required us to spend much more than winning was worth, and to undertake exceedingly risky and uncertain actions towards countries like Pakistan. U.S. leaders wisely chose not to do these things, but they failed to realize what this meant for the war effort itself. Given this mismatch between interests, goals, and resources, it was stupid to keep trying to win at a level of effort that was never going to succeed. Yet no one on the inside seems to have pointed this out, or if they did, their advice was not heeded. And that is the real reason why the war limped on for so long and to such an unsatisfying end.</p> </s>

B.) Certainty --

<h4>B.) <u>Certainty</u> --</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>B.) <u>Certainty</u> --</h4> </s>

A.) Decision making -- Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis - that’s key to decision making

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a conflict of interest If everyone is in agreement there is no need for debate the matter can be settled by unanimous consent it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," Controversy is an essential prerequisite Where there is no clash of ideas there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration How many are in the United States? Do they take job Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy controversies must be stated clearly Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007 Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations but without a focus for their discussions they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow But if a precise question is posed then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by placing limits on the decision the basis for argument should be clearly defined If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation Although we now have a general subject It is still too broad What sort of writing are we concerned with What does "effectiveness" mean The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a conflict of interest Where there is no clash there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question Participation in this "debate" is not likely to be productive without focus on a particular question demarcating sides controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions without a focus for discussions, they could agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or solutions. . But if a precise question is posed a more profitable area of discussion is opened up To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by placing limits on the decision the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument a general subject is still too broad The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition debate is best facilitated by focus on a particular point of difference

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

<h4>A.) Decision making -- Debate over a controversial <u>point of action</u> creates argumentative stasis - that’s key to decision making </h4><p><strong>Steinberg & Freeley 8<u><mark> </p><p></mark>*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, </p><p><mark>Debate is a means of settling differences,</u></strong> <u><strong>so there must be a</u></strong></mark> difference of opinion or a <u><strong><mark>conflict of interest</u></strong></mark> before there can be a debate. <u><strong>If everyone is in agreement</u></strong> on a tact or value or policy, <u><strong>there is no need for debate</u></strong>: <u><strong>the matter can be settled by unanimous consent</u></strong>. Thus, for example, <u><strong>it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"</u></strong> because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (<u><strong>Controversy is an essential prerequisite</u></strong> of debate. <u><strong><mark>Where there is no clash</mark> of ideas</u></strong>, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, <u><strong><mark>there is no debate</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u><strong><mark>debate cannot produce effective decisions</u></strong> <u><strong>without clear identification of a question</mark> or questions to be answered</u></strong>. For example, <u><strong>general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration</u></strong>. <u><strong>How many</u></strong> illegal immigrants <u><strong>are in the United States?</u></strong> What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? <u><strong>Do they take job</u></strong>s from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? <u><strong>Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration</u></strong> by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? <u><strong>Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?</u></strong> Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? <u><strong>Should we build a wall on the Mexican border</u></strong>, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? <u><strong>Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. <mark>Participation in this "debate"</mark> is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it <mark>is not likely to be productive</mark> or useful <mark>without focus on a particular question</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and identification of a line <mark>demarcating sides</mark> in the controversy</u></strong>. To be discussed and resolved effectively, <u><strong><mark>controversies must be stated clearly</u></strong>. <u><strong>Vague understanding</u></strong> <u><strong>results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions</u></strong></mark>, frustration, and emotional distress, as <u><strong>evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007</u></strong>. <u><strong>Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!</u></strong> They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." <u><strong>Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations</u></strong>, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, <u><strong>but <mark>without a focus for </mark>their <mark>discussions</u></strong>, <u><strong>they could</mark> easily <mark>agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or</mark> potential <mark>solutions.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>A gripe session would follow</u></strong><mark>. <u><strong>But if a precise question is posed</u></strong></mark>—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—<u><strong>then <mark>a more profitable area of discussion is opened up</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step</u></strong>. <u><strong>One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.</u></strong> The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. <u><strong>They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. <mark>To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making</u></strong> <u><strong>by</u></strong></mark> directing and <u><strong><mark>placing limits on the decision</u></strong></mark> to be made, <u><strong><mark>the basis for argument should be clearly defined</u></strong>. <u><strong>If we merely talk about </mark>"homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "<mark>global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument</u></strong></mark>. For example, <u><strong>the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation</u></strong>. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. <u><strong>Although we now have <mark>a general subject</u></strong></mark>, we have not yet stated a problem. <u><strong>It <mark>is still too broad</u></strong></mark>, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. <u><strong>What sort of writing are we concerned with</u></strong>—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? <u><strong>What does "effectiveness" mean</u></strong> in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" <u><strong><mark>The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition</u></strong></mark> such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. <u><strong>This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation</u></strong> of the controversy by advocates, <u><strong>or</u></strong> <u><strong>that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that <mark>debate is best facilitated by </mark>the guidance provided by <mark>focus on a particular point of difference</mark>, which will be outlined in the following discussion.</p></u></strong>

Steinberg & Freeley 8 *Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami,

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Steinberg & Freeley 8 *Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, fulltext: Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion. [/INST] <h4>A.) Decision making -- Debate over a controversial <u>point of action</u> creates argumentative stasis - that’s key to decision making </h4><p><strong>Steinberg & Freeley 8<u><mark> </p><p></mark>*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, </p><p><mark>Debate is a means of settling differences,</u></strong> <u><strong>so there must be a</u></strong></mark> difference of opinion or a <u><strong><mark>conflict of interest</u></strong></mark> before there can be a debate. <u><strong>If everyone is in agreement</u></strong> on a tact or value or policy, <u><strong>there is no need for debate</u></strong>: <u><strong>the matter can be settled by unanimous consent</u></strong>. Thus, for example, <u><strong>it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"</u></strong> because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (<u><strong>Controversy is an essential prerequisite</u></strong> of debate. <u><strong><mark>Where there is no clash</mark> of ideas</u></strong>, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, <u><strong><mark>there is no debate</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u><strong><mark>debate cannot produce effective decisions</u></strong> <u><strong>without clear identification of a question</mark> or questions to be answered</u></strong>. For example, <u><strong>general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration</u></strong>. <u><strong>How many</u></strong> illegal immigrants <u><strong>are in the United States?</u></strong> What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? <u><strong>Do they take job</u></strong>s from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? <u><strong>Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration</u></strong> by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? <u><strong>Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?</u></strong> Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? <u><strong>Should we build a wall on the Mexican border</u></strong>, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? <u><strong>Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. <mark>Participation in this "debate"</mark> is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it <mark>is not likely to be productive</mark> or useful <mark>without focus on a particular question</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and identification of a line <mark>demarcating sides</mark> in the controversy</u></strong>. To be discussed and resolved effectively, <u><strong><mark>controversies must be stated clearly</u></strong>. <u><strong>Vague understanding</u></strong> <u><strong>results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions</u></strong></mark>, frustration, and emotional distress, as <u><strong>evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007</u></strong>. <u><strong>Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!</u></strong> They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." <u><strong>Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations</u></strong>, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, <u><strong>but <mark>without a focus for </mark>their <mark>discussions</u></strong>, <u><strong>they could</mark> easily <mark>agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or</mark> potential <mark>solutions.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>A gripe session would follow</u></strong><mark>. <u><strong>But if a precise question is posed</u></strong></mark>—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—<u><strong>then <mark>a more profitable area of discussion is opened up</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step</u></strong>. <u><strong>One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.</u></strong> The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. <u><strong>They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. <mark>To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making</u></strong> <u><strong>by</u></strong></mark> directing and <u><strong><mark>placing limits on the decision</u></strong></mark> to be made, <u><strong><mark>the basis for argument should be clearly defined</u></strong>. <u><strong>If we merely talk about </mark>"homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "<mark>global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument</u></strong></mark>. For example, <u><strong>the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation</u></strong>. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. <u><strong>Although we now have <mark>a general subject</u></strong></mark>, we have not yet stated a problem. <u><strong>It <mark>is still too broad</u></strong></mark>, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. <u><strong>What sort of writing are we concerned with</u></strong>—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? <u><strong>What does "effectiveness" mean</u></strong> in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" <u><strong><mark>The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition</u></strong></mark> such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. <u><strong>This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation</u></strong> of the controversy by advocates, <u><strong>or</u></strong> <u><strong>that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that <mark>debate is best facilitated by </mark>the guidance provided by <mark>focus on a particular point of difference</mark>, which will be outlined in the following discussion.</p></u></strong> </s>

First - “Resolved” means

: to find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something) to make a definite decision to do something

to make a definite decision to do something

: to find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something) : to make a definite and serious decision to do something That’s Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved]

<h4>First - “Resolved” means </h4><p>re·solve verb \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\</p><p><u><strong>: to find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something)</p><p></u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>to make a definite</u></strong></mark> and serious <u><strong><mark>decision to do something</p><p></u></mark>That’s Merriam Webster 14 </strong>[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved]</p>

re·solve verb \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: re·solve verb \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ fulltext: : to find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something) : to make a definite and serious decision to do something That’s Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved] [/INST] <h4>First - “Resolved” means </h4><p>re·solve verb \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\</p><p><u><strong>: to find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something)</p><p></u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>to make a definite</u></strong></mark> and serious <u><strong><mark>decision to do something</p><p></u></mark>That’s Merriam Webster 14 </strong>[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved]</p> </s>

Second is Limited Dialogue – our entire negative strategy is based on the question of the resolution --- there are an infinite limitless number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative --- changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives

<h4>Second is Limited Dialogue – our entire negative strategy is based on the question of the resolution --- there are an infinite limitless number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative --- changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Second is Limited Dialogue – our entire negative strategy is based on the question of the resolution --- there are an infinite limitless number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative --- changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives </h4> </s>

The AFF calls on the judge to identify with the suffering of the black body within the univeristy. By circulating the horrors of slavery and attempting to draw in suffering for intellectual analysis they spectralize black pain -- that only recreates the worst form of suffering

/Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/

/Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/

<h4>The AFF calls on the judge to identify with the suffering of the black body within the univeristy. By circulating the horrors of slavery and attempting to draw in suffering for intellectual analys<strong>is they spectralize black pain -- that only recreates the worst form of suffering </h4><p>Hartman 97</p><p><u></strong>/Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/</p></u>

Hartman 97

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Hartman 97 fulltext: /Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/ [/INST] <h4>The AFF calls on the judge to identify with the suffering of the black body within the univeristy. By circulating the horrors of slavery and attempting to draw in suffering for intellectual analys<strong>is they spectralize black pain -- that only recreates the worst form of suffering </h4><p>Hartman 97</p><p><u></strong>/Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/</p></u> </s>

They make the debate into an echo-chamber – turns the aff

The deliberativist view involved some degree of epistemic modesty. On this the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, as a way of testing her views against the objections her present view is open to reasonable critique politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable for the activist discussion with those who disagree need not be involved According to the activist, there is no room for reasoned objection. the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, Activists must engage in deliberation Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists Group polarization has ‘been found all over the world in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ the polarization is even more pronounced he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth

the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons as a way of testing her views against the objections politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable for the activist discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist there is no room for reasoned objection. the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether Activists must engage in deliberation . Group polarization has ‘been found all over the world in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions the polarization is even more pronounced he may decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees we do not engage opposing views our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431 The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched hold that reasonableness involved some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuitof justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

<h4>They make the debate into an echo-chamber – <strong>turns the aff</h4><p>Talisse 5</p><p></strong>Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431</p><p>The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. <u><strong>The deliberativist view </u></strong>I have sketched hold that reasonableness <u><strong>involved some degree of </u></strong>what we may call <u><strong>epistemic modesty. On this </u></strong>view, <u><strong><mark>the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons</mark>,</u></strong> and so she enters into public discourse <u><strong><mark>as a way of testing her views against the objections</mark> </u></strong>and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that <u><strong>her present view is open to reasonable critique</u></strong> and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of <u><strong><mark>politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable</u></strong></mark>. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness <u><strong><mark>for the activist</mark> </u></strong>consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; <u><strong><mark>discussion with those who disagree need not be involved</u></strong>. <u><strong>According to the activist</mark>, </u></strong>there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which <u><strong><mark>there is no room for reasoned objection.</mark> </u></strong>Under such conditions, <u><strong><mark>the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice</mark>; it is therefore irrational</u></strong>. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political <u><strong><mark>activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether</mark>; they often engage in rallies,</u></strong> demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. <u><strong><mark>Activists</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>must engage in deliberation</u></strong></mark> among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. <u><strong>Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists</u></strong><mark>. <u><strong>Group polarization</u></strong></mark> is a well-documented phenomenon that <u><strong><mark>has ‘been found all over the world</u></strong></mark> and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, <u><strong><mark>in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions</mark>’</u></strong> over time, <u><strong><mark>the polarization is even more pronounced</u></strong></mark> (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that <u><strong><mark>he may</mark> reasonably <mark>decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees</u></strong></mark> in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. <u><strong>For even if we have the truth, if <mark>we do not engage opposing views</mark>,</u></strong> but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree,<u><strong> <mark>our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth</u></strong></mark> ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuitof justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.</p>

Talisse 5

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Talisse 5 fulltext: Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431 The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched hold that reasonableness involved some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuitof justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable. [/INST] <h4>They make the debate into an echo-chamber – <strong>turns the aff</h4><p>Talisse 5</p><p></strong>Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431</p><p>The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. <u><strong>The deliberativist view </u></strong>I have sketched hold that reasonableness <u><strong>involved some degree of </u></strong>what we may call <u><strong>epistemic modesty. On this </u></strong>view, <u><strong><mark>the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons</mark>,</u></strong> and so she enters into public discourse <u><strong><mark>as a way of testing her views against the objections</mark> </u></strong>and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that <u><strong>her present view is open to reasonable critique</u></strong> and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of <u><strong><mark>politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable</u></strong></mark>. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness <u><strong><mark>for the activist</mark> </u></strong>consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; <u><strong><mark>discussion with those who disagree need not be involved</u></strong>. <u><strong>According to the activist</mark>, </u></strong>there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which <u><strong><mark>there is no room for reasoned objection.</mark> </u></strong>Under such conditions, <u><strong><mark>the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice</mark>; it is therefore irrational</u></strong>. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political <u><strong><mark>activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether</mark>; they often engage in rallies,</u></strong> demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. <u><strong><mark>Activists</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>must engage in deliberation</u></strong></mark> among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. <u><strong>Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists</u></strong><mark>. <u><strong>Group polarization</u></strong></mark> is a well-documented phenomenon that <u><strong><mark>has ‘been found all over the world</u></strong></mark> and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, <u><strong><mark>in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions</mark>’</u></strong> over time, <u><strong><mark>the polarization is even more pronounced</u></strong></mark> (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that <u><strong><mark>he may</mark> reasonably <mark>decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees</u></strong></mark> in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. <u><strong>For even if we have the truth, if <mark>we do not engage opposing views</mark>,</u></strong> but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree,<u><strong> <mark>our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth</u></strong></mark> ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuitof justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.</p> </s>

Second - “Should” means

to express obligation or expediency

to express obligation or expediency

1—used in auxiliary function to express condition <if he should leave his father, his father would die — Genesis 44:22(Revised Standard Version)> 2—used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency <'tis commanded I should do so — Shakespeare> <this is as it should be — H. L. Savage> <you should brush your teeth after each meal> That’s also Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should]

<h4>Second - “Should” means </h4><p>Should<u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>1—used in auxiliary function to express condition <if he should leave his father, his father would die — Genesis 44:22(Revised Standard Version)> 2—used in auxiliary function <u><strong><mark>to express obligation</u></strong></mark>, propriety, <u><strong><mark>or expediency</u></strong></mark> <'tis commanded I should do so — Shakespeare> <this is as it should be — H. L. Savage> <you should brush your teeth after each meal></p><p><strong>That’s also Merriam Webster 14</strong> [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should]</p>

Should

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Should fulltext: 1—used in auxiliary function to express condition <if he should leave his father, his father would die — Genesis 44:22(Revised Standard Version)> 2—used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency <'tis commanded I should do so — Shakespeare> <this is as it should be — H. L. Savage> <you should brush your teeth after each meal> That’s also Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should] [/INST] <h4>Second - “Should” means </h4><p>Should<u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>1—used in auxiliary function to express condition <if he should leave his father, his father would die — Genesis 44:22(Revised Standard Version)> 2—used in auxiliary function <u><strong><mark>to express obligation</u></strong></mark>, propriety, <u><strong><mark>or expediency</u></strong></mark> <'tis commanded I should do so — Shakespeare> <this is as it should be — H. L. Savage> <you should brush your teeth after each meal></p><p><strong>That’s also Merriam Webster 14</strong> [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should]</p> </s>

The United States should legalize nearly all marijuana in the United States.

<h4>The United States should legalize nearly all marijuana in the United States. </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>The United States should legalize nearly all marijuana in the United States. </h4> </s>

The United States should legalize nearly all marihuana in the United States.

<h4>The United States should legalize nearly all marihuana in the United States. </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>The United States should legalize nearly all marihuana in the United States. </h4> </s>

As well, we need ask why the site of suffering so readily lends itself to inviting identification. Why is pain the conduit of identification? This question may seem to beg the obvious, given the violent domination and dishonor constitutive of enslavement, the acclaimed transformative capacities of pain in sentimental culture, the prevalence of public displays of suffering inclusive of the pageantry of the trade, the spectacle of punishment, circulating reports of slavery’s horrors, the runaway success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and the passage through the “bloodstained gate,” which was a convention of the slave narrative, all of which contributed to the idea that the feelings and consciousness of the enslaved were most available at this site. However, what I am trying to suggest is that if the scene of beating readily lends itself to an identification with the enslaved, it does so at the risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment and, in complete defiance of Rankin’s good intention, increases the difficulty of beholding black suffering since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral character of suffering and the inability to witness the captive’s pain. If, on one hand, pain extends humanity to the dispossessed and the ability to sustain suffering leads to transcendence, on the other, the spectral and spectacular character of this suffering, or, in other words, the shocking and ghostly presence of pain, effaces and restricts black sentience. As Rankin himself states, in order for this suffering to induce a reaction and stir feelings, it must be brought close. Yet if sentiment or morality are “inextricably tied to human proximity,” to quote Zygmunt Bauman, the problem is that in the very effort to “bring it near” and “inspect it closely” it is dissipated. According to Bauman, “morality conforms to the law of optical perspective. It looms large and thick close to the eye.” So, then, how does suffering elude or escape us in the very effort to bring it near? It does so precisely because it can only be brought near by way of a proxy and by way of Rankin’s indignation and imagination. If the black body is the vehicle of the other’s power, pleasure, and profit, then it is no less true that it is the white or near-white body that makes the captive’s suffering visible and discernible. Indeed, the elusiveness of black suffering can be attributed to a racist optics in which black flesh is itself identified as the source of opacity, the denial of black humanity, and the effacement of sentience integral to the wanton use of the captive body. And as noted earlier, this is further complicated by the repressive underside of an optics of morality that insists upon the other as a mirror of the self and that in order to recognize suffering must substitute the self for the other. While Rankin attempts to ameliorate the insufficiency of feeling before the spectacle of the other’s suffering, this insufficiency is, in fact, displaced rather than remedied by his standing in. Likewise, this attempt exacerbates the distance between the readers and those suffering by literally removing the slave from view as pain is brought close. Moreover, we need to consider whether the identification forged at the site of suffering confirms black humanity at the peril of reinforcing racist assumptions of limited sentience, in that the humanity of the enslaved and the violence of the institution can only be brought into view by extreme examples of incineration and dismemberment or by placing white bodies at risk. What does it mean that the violence of slavery or pained existence of the enslaved, if discernible, is only so in the most heinous and grotesque examples and not in the quotidian routines of slavery? As well, is not the difficulty of empathy related to both the devaluation and the valuation of black life? Empathic identification is complicated further by the fact that it cannot be extricated from the economy of chattel slavery with which it is at odds, for this projection of one’s feeling upon or into the object of property and the phantasmic slipping into captivity, while it is distinct from the pleasures of self-augmentation yielded by the ownership of the captive body and the expectations fostered therein, is nonetheless entangled with this economy and identification facilitated by a kindred possession or occupation of the captive body, albeit on a different register. In other words, what I am trying to isolate are the kinds of expectations and the qualities of affect distinctive to the economy of slavery. The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave-that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion. Thus, while the beaten and mutilated body presumably establishes the brute materiality of existence, the materiality of suffering regularly eludes (re)cognition by virtue of the body’s being replaced by other signs of value, as well as other bodies. Thus the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess enjoyment is both founded upon and enabled by the material relations of chattel slavery. In light of this, is it too extreme or too obvious to suggest that Rankin’s flight of imagination and the excitements engendered by suffering might also be pleasurable? Certainly this willing abasement confirms Rankin’s moral authority, but what about the pleasure engendered by this embrace of pain-that is the tumultuous passions of the flightly imagination stirred by this fantasy of being beaten? Rankin’s imagined beating is immune neither to the pleasures to be derived from the masochistic fantasy nor to the sadistic pleasure to be derived from the spectacle of sufferance. Here my intention is not to shock or exploit the perverse but to consider critically the complicated nexus of terror and enjoyment by examining the obviated and debased diversions of the capricious master; the pleasure of indignation yielded before the spectacle of sufferance; the instability of the scene of suffering; and the confusion of song and sorrow typical of the coffle, the auction block, performing before the master, and other popular amusements.

<h4>As well, <u><strong>we need ask why the site of suffering so readily lends itself to inviting identification. Why is pain the conduit of identification? This question may seem to beg the obvious, given the violent domination and dishonor constitutive of enslavement, <mark>the acclaimed transformative capacities of</mark> pain in sentimental culture, the prevalence of <mark>public displays of suffering</mark> inclusive of the pageantry of the trade, <mark>the spectacle of punishment, circulating reports of slavery’s horrors</mark>,</u></strong> the runaway success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and the passage through the “bloodstained gate,” which was a convention of the slave narrative<u><strong>, <mark>all of which contributed to the idea that the feelings</mark> and consciousness <mark>of the enslaved were</mark> most <mark>available at this site.</mark> However, what I am trying to suggest is that <mark>if the scene of beating readily lends itself to an identification with the enslaved, it does so at the risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment an</mark>d, in complete defiance of Rankin’s good intention, <mark>increases the difficulty of beholding black suffering since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral character of suffering and the inability to witness the captive’s pain</mark>. If, on one hand, pain extends humanity to the dispossessed and the ability to sustain suffering leads to transcendence, on the other, <mark>the spectral and spectacular character of this suffering</u></strong></mark>, or, in other words, the shocking and ghostly presence of pain, <u><strong><mark>effaces and restricts black sentience.</u></strong></mark> As Rankin himself states, <u><strong><mark>in order for this suffering to induce a reaction and stir feelings, it must be brought close</mark>. Yet if sentiment or morality are “inextricably tied to human proximity,”</u></strong> to quote Zygmunt Bauman, <u><strong>the problem is that <mark>in the very effort to “bring it near” and “inspect it closely” it is dissipated</mark>.</u></strong> According to Bauman, “morality conforms to the law of optical perspective. It looms large and thick close to the eye.” So, then, how does <u><strong>suffering elude or escape us</u></strong> in the very effort to bring it near? It does so <u><strong>precisely because it can only be brought near by way of a proxy</u></strong> and by way of Rankin’s indignation and imagination. <u><strong><mark>If the black body is the vehicle of the other’s power</mark>, pleasure, <mark>and profit, then it is</mark> no less true that it is <mark>the white</mark> or near-white body <mark>that makes the captive’s suffering visible</mark> and discernible. Indeed, the elusiveness of black suffering can be attributed to <mark>a racist optics in which black flesh is itself identified as</mark> the source of opacity, <mark>the denial of black humanity, and the effacement of sentience integral to the wanton use of the captive body</mark>.</u></strong> And as noted earlier, <u><strong>this is further complicated by the repressive underside of an optics of morality that insists upon the other as a mirror of the self and that in order to recognize suffering must substitute the self for the other. </u></strong> While Rankin attempts to ameliorate the insufficiency of feeling before the spectacle of the other’s suffering, this insufficiency is, in fact, displaced rather than remedied by his standing in. Likewise, <u><strong><mark>this</mark> attempt <mark>exacerbates the distance between the readers and those suffering by literally removing the slave from view as pain is brought close.</mark> Moreover, we need to consider whether the identification forged at the site of suffering confirms black humanity at the peril of reinforcing racist assumptions of limited sentience, in that the humanity of the enslaved and the violence of the institution can only be brought into view by extreme examples of incineration and dismemberment or by placing white bodies at risk. </u></strong>What does it mean that the violence of slavery or pained existence of the enslaved, if discernible, is only so in the most heinous and grotesque examples and not in the quotidian routines of slavery? As well, is not the difficulty of empathy related to both the devaluation and the valuation of black life? <u><strong><mark>Empathic identification is complicated</mark> further <mark>by the fact that it</u></strong> <u><strong>cannot be extricated from the economy of</mark> chattel <mark>slavery</mark> with which it is at odds, <mark>for this projection of one’s feeling upon</mark> or into <mark>the object of property</mark> and the phantasmic slipping into captivity, while it is distinct from the pleasures of self-augmentation yielded by the ownership of the captive body and the expectations fostered therein, <mark>is</u></strong></mark> nonetheless <u><strong><mark>entangled with this economy and identification facilitated by a kindred</mark> <mark>possession or occupation of the captive body</u></strong></mark>, albeit on a different register. <u><strong>In other words</u></strong>, what I am trying to isolate are the kinds of expectations and the qualities of affect distinctive to the economy of slavery. <u><strong><mark>The relation between pleasure</mark> <mark>and</mark> the <mark>possession</mark> of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, <mark>can be</mark> explained in part <mark>by the fungibility of the slave</u></strong></mark>-that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, <u><strong><mark>the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings</mark>, ideas, <mark>desires, and values</mark>; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion.</u></strong> Thus, while the beaten and mutilated body presumably establishes the brute materiality of existence, the materiality of suffering regularly eludes (re)cognition by virtue of the body’s being replaced by other signs of value, as well as other bodies. <u><strong><mark>Thus the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess enjoyment is both founded upon and enabled by the material relations of chattel slavery</u></strong></mark>. In light of this, is it too extreme or too obvious to suggest that Rankin’s flight of imagination and the excitements engendered by suffering might also be pleasurable? Certainly this willing abasement confirms Rankin’s moral authority, but what about the pleasure engendered by this embrace of pain-that is the tumultuous passions of the flightly imagination stirred by this fantasy of being beaten? Rankin’s imagined beating is immune neither to the pleasures to be derived from the masochistic fantasy nor to the sadistic pleasure to be derived from <u><strong>the spectacle of sufferance</u></strong>. Here my intention<u><strong> is</u></strong> not to shock or exploit the perverse but to consider critically <u><strong>the complicated nexus of terror and enjoyment by examining the obviated and debased diversions of the capricious master;</u></strong> the pleasure of indignation yielded before the spectacle of sufferance; the instability of the scene of suffering; <u><strong>and the confusion of</u></strong> song and sorrow typical of the coffle, the auction block, <u><strong>performing before the master,</u></strong> and other popular amusements.</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>As well, <u><strong>we need ask why the site of suffering so readily lends itself to inviting identification. Why is pain the conduit of identification? This question may seem to beg the obvious, given the violent domination and dishonor constitutive of enslavement, <mark>the acclaimed transformative capacities of</mark> pain in sentimental culture, the prevalence of <mark>public displays of suffering</mark> inclusive of the pageantry of the trade, <mark>the spectacle of punishment, circulating reports of slavery’s horrors</mark>,</u></strong> the runaway success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and the passage through the “bloodstained gate,” which was a convention of the slave narrative<u><strong>, <mark>all of which contributed to the idea that the feelings</mark> and consciousness <mark>of the enslaved were</mark> most <mark>available at this site.</mark> However, what I am trying to suggest is that <mark>if the scene of beating readily lends itself to an identification with the enslaved, it does so at the risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment an</mark>d, in complete defiance of Rankin’s good intention, <mark>increases the difficulty of beholding black suffering since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral character of suffering and the inability to witness the captive’s pain</mark>. If, on one hand, pain extends humanity to the dispossessed and the ability to sustain suffering leads to transcendence, on the other, <mark>the spectral and spectacular character of this suffering</u></strong></mark>, or, in other words, the shocking and ghostly presence of pain, <u><strong><mark>effaces and restricts black sentience.</u></strong></mark> As Rankin himself states, <u><strong><mark>in order for this suffering to induce a reaction and stir feelings, it must be brought close</mark>. Yet if sentiment or morality are “inextricably tied to human proximity,”</u></strong> to quote Zygmunt Bauman, <u><strong>the problem is that <mark>in the very effort to “bring it near” and “inspect it closely” it is dissipated</mark>.</u></strong> According to Bauman, “morality conforms to the law of optical perspective. It looms large and thick close to the eye.” So, then, how does <u><strong>suffering elude or escape us</u></strong> in the very effort to bring it near? It does so <u><strong>precisely because it can only be brought near by way of a proxy</u></strong> and by way of Rankin’s indignation and imagination. <u><strong><mark>If the black body is the vehicle of the other’s power</mark>, pleasure, <mark>and profit, then it is</mark> no less true that it is <mark>the white</mark> or near-white body <mark>that makes the captive’s suffering visible</mark> and discernible. Indeed, the elusiveness of black suffering can be attributed to <mark>a racist optics in which black flesh is itself identified as</mark> the source of opacity, <mark>the denial of black humanity, and the effacement of sentience integral to the wanton use of the captive body</mark>.</u></strong> And as noted earlier, <u><strong>this is further complicated by the repressive underside of an optics of morality that insists upon the other as a mirror of the self and that in order to recognize suffering must substitute the self for the other. </u></strong> While Rankin attempts to ameliorate the insufficiency of feeling before the spectacle of the other’s suffering, this insufficiency is, in fact, displaced rather than remedied by his standing in. Likewise, <u><strong><mark>this</mark> attempt <mark>exacerbates the distance between the readers and those suffering by literally removing the slave from view as pain is brought close.</mark> Moreover, we need to consider whether the identification forged at the site of suffering confirms black humanity at the peril of reinforcing racist assumptions of limited sentience, in that the humanity of the enslaved and the violence of the institution can only be brought into view by extreme examples of incineration and dismemberment or by placing white bodies at risk. </u></strong>What does it mean that the violence of slavery or pained existence of the enslaved, if discernible, is only so in the most heinous and grotesque examples and not in the quotidian routines of slavery? As well, is not the difficulty of empathy related to both the devaluation and the valuation of black life? <u><strong><mark>Empathic identification is complicated</mark> further <mark>by the fact that it</u></strong> <u><strong>cannot be extricated from the economy of</mark> chattel <mark>slavery</mark> with which it is at odds, <mark>for this projection of one’s feeling upon</mark> or into <mark>the object of property</mark> and the phantasmic slipping into captivity, while it is distinct from the pleasures of self-augmentation yielded by the ownership of the captive body and the expectations fostered therein, <mark>is</u></strong></mark> nonetheless <u><strong><mark>entangled with this economy and identification facilitated by a kindred</mark> <mark>possession or occupation of the captive body</u></strong></mark>, albeit on a different register. <u><strong>In other words</u></strong>, what I am trying to isolate are the kinds of expectations and the qualities of affect distinctive to the economy of slavery. <u><strong><mark>The relation between pleasure</mark> <mark>and</mark> the <mark>possession</mark> of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, <mark>can be</mark> explained in part <mark>by the fungibility of the slave</u></strong></mark>-that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, <u><strong><mark>the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings</mark>, ideas, <mark>desires, and values</mark>; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion.</u></strong> Thus, while the beaten and mutilated body presumably establishes the brute materiality of existence, the materiality of suffering regularly eludes (re)cognition by virtue of the body’s being replaced by other signs of value, as well as other bodies. <u><strong><mark>Thus the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess enjoyment is both founded upon and enabled by the material relations of chattel slavery</u></strong></mark>. In light of this, is it too extreme or too obvious to suggest that Rankin’s flight of imagination and the excitements engendered by suffering might also be pleasurable? Certainly this willing abasement confirms Rankin’s moral authority, but what about the pleasure engendered by this embrace of pain-that is the tumultuous passions of the flightly imagination stirred by this fantasy of being beaten? Rankin’s imagined beating is immune neither to the pleasures to be derived from the masochistic fantasy nor to the sadistic pleasure to be derived from <u><strong>the spectacle of sufferance</u></strong>. Here my intention<u><strong> is</u></strong> not to shock or exploit the perverse but to consider critically <u><strong>the complicated nexus of terror and enjoyment by examining the obviated and debased diversions of the capricious master;</u></strong> the pleasure of indignation yielded before the spectacle of sufferance; the instability of the scene of suffering; <u><strong>and the confusion of</u></strong> song and sorrow typical of the coffle, the auction block, <u><strong>performing before the master,</u></strong> and other popular amusements.</h4> </s>

That’s Words and Phrases ‘64 [40 W&P 759]

<h4><mark>That’s Words and Phrases ‘64</mark> [40 W&P 759] </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4><mark>That’s Words and Phrases ‘64</mark> [40 W&P 759] </h4> </s>

Focused debate over state regulations of PAS are key to cost-benefit analysis and deliberation -- the alternative is abstract moral relativism that fails to translate into material change

Bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence a common thread joining all of the issues is difficult the core is a felt concern over the technology of control of man's body, his mind, and quality of life concerns of bioethics are concerns of public policy with legislation and policy guidelines at state, local, and federal levels, that need to be enacted and enforced with respect to all of the issues comprising the de facto set Outside the individual context a democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging that a certain good must be promoted individual morality operates within a system of restraints policies affect society as a whole operate on a level where promotion of good is a moral option The pivotal question thus becomes Of priorities values and goods must be weighed and compared In a more specific sense bioethics encompasses a whole political movement It is a movement which seeks to harness political forces to deal with ethical problems relating to health care delivery, both at the micro and the macro level It also endeavors to respond often through legislative reforms to complex issues such as physician assisted suicide contemporary society's concerns over the need for regulating ethical regimes to guide or even control these activities to seek medical laws about areas such as death and dying there is little choice for legal passivity or inaction since the law is a primary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and the treatment of real persons Each legal tool used must be constantly fine-tuned and re-evaluated by ever changing public policies with the purpose of determining tools best fitted to deal with specific biomedical problems" and validates a final action that minimizes human suffering

concerns of bioethics are concerns of policy with legislation and policy guidelines at state and federal levels that need to be enacted and enforced Outside the individual context a democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging a certain good must be promoted individual morality operates within restraints policies affect society as a whole The pivotal question becomes priorities values must be weighed and compared bioethics encompasses a whole political movement which seeks to harness political forces to deal with ethical problems relating to health both at the micro and the macro level It endeavors to respond through legislative reforms to complex issues such as p a s society's concerns over the need for regulating ethical regimes guide activities to seek medical laws about death there is little choice for legal passivity or inaction "the law is a primary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and the treatment of real persons Each legal tool must be constantly fine-tuned and re-evaluated by changing public policies with the purpose of determining tools best fitted to deal with specific biomedical problems" and validates a final action minimizes human suffering

George, Professor of Law @ The Catholic University of America, Notre Dame Journal Of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, Vol. 13, “Judicial Decision-Making in the Age of Biotechnology”, AB Bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence which sets it apart as a distinct study or discipline. Rather, its individuation derives from a de facto set of issues interrelated by what might be termed "family resemblances." While a common thread joining all of the issues is exceedingly difficult to find, the central core comprising the list of these issues, without question, is a felt concern over the technology of control of man's body, his mind, and quality of life. Many of the concerns of bioethics are concerns of public policy—or with legislation and policy guidelines—at state, local, and federal levels, that need to be enacted and enforced with respect to all of the issues comprising the de facto set. It has been suggested that bioethical concerns are but those prohibitions all rational people urge everyone to follow in an effort to avoid evils on which common agreement exists. Outside the individual context of determining how one treats another, for moral acceptability to be given at the broader societal level, a democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging that a certain good must be promoted though its promotion causes some degree of harm. It is within this setting where much of what is recognized as "bioethics" is focused. While individual morality operates primarily within a system of restraints, policies affecting society as a whole operate on a level where promotion of good is a moral option. The pivotal question thus becomes, "what goods ought to be restrained (e.g., scientific research)?" Of necessity, priorities, values, and goods must be weighed, balanced, and compared. Whenever the benefits and the risks of a particular course of action are weighed, it is well remembered that those very elements in the balancing test are based upon judgments about values, with the penultimate goal being the formulation and validation of a final action which minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social good. 5 In a more specific sense, bioethics encompasses a whole political movement. 6 It is a movement which seeks to harness political forces to deal with a plethora of ethical problems relating to health care delivery, both at the micro and the macro level of economic distribution. It also endeavors to respond—often through legislative reforms—to complex issues such as physician assisted suicide, cryonic suspension, genetic discrimination in the workplace, abortion, privacy, sterilization, human experimentation, collaborative reproduction by use of in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, cloning, and personal relationships necessary to create a family by homosexuals and lesbians. 7 All too often, contemporary society's concerns over the need for regulating ethical regimes to guide or even control these activities has driven it in turn to seek medical laws about areas such as death and dying, genetic counseling and screening, reproductive technologies, and organ transplants. Often there is little choice for legal passivity or inaction since "the law is a primary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and the treatment of real persons."8 And today, Americans seem to be reshaping their political questions ultimately into judicial questions.9 Yet, a healthy degree of skepticism is needed to see the inherent limitations on the legal system in its efforts to regulate biomedical developments. 10 Each legal tool used must be constantly fine-tuned and re-evaluated by ever changing public policies—all with the purpose of determining which of the tools is best fitted to deal with specific biomedical problems" and which one validates a final action that ideally minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social or common good.

<h4><strong>Focused debate over state regulations of PAS are key to cost-benefit analysis and deliberation -- the alternative is abstract moral relativism that fails to translate into material change</h4><p>Smith 99</p><p></strong>George, Professor of Law @ The Catholic University of America, Notre Dame Journal Of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, Vol. 13, “Judicial Decision-Making in the Age of Biotechnology”, AB </p><p><u><strong>Bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence</u></strong> which sets it apart as a distinct study or discipline. Rather, its individuation derives from a de facto set of issues interrelated by what might be termed "family resemblances." While <u><strong>a common thread joining all of the issues</u></strong> <u><strong>is</u></strong> exceedingly <u><strong>difficult</u></strong> to find, <u><strong>the</u></strong> central <u><strong>core</u></strong> comprising the list of these issues, without question, <u><strong>is a felt concern over the technology of control of man's body, his mind, and quality of life</u></strong>. Many of the <u><strong><mark>concerns of bioethics are concerns of</mark> public <mark>policy</u></strong></mark>—or <u><strong><mark>with</mark> <mark>legislation and policy guidelines</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>at</mark> <mark>state</mark>, local, <mark>and federal levels</mark>, <mark>that need to be enacted and enforced</mark> with respect to all of the issues comprising the de facto set</u></strong>. It has been suggested that bioethical concerns are but those prohibitions all rational people urge everyone to follow in an effort to avoid evils on which common agreement exists. <u><strong><mark>Outside the individual context</u></strong></mark> of determining how one treats another, for moral acceptability to be given at the broader societal level, <u><strong><mark>a democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging</mark> that <mark>a certain good must be promoted</u></strong></mark> though its promotion causes some degree of harm. It is within this setting where much of what is recognized as "bioethics" is focused. While <u><strong><mark>individual morality</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>operates</u></strong></mark> primarily <u><strong><mark>within</mark> a system of <mark>restraints</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>policies</mark> <mark>affect</u></strong></mark>ing<u><strong> <mark>society as a whole</mark> operate on a level where promotion of good is a moral option</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The pivotal question </mark>thus <mark>becomes</u></strong></mark>, "what goods ought to be restrained (e.g., scientific research)?" <u><strong>Of</u></strong> necessity, <u><strong><mark>priorities</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>values</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>and goods <mark>must be weighed</u></strong></mark>, balanced, <u><strong><mark>and compared</u></strong></mark>. Whenever the benefits and the risks of a particular course of action are weighed, it is well remembered that those very elements in the balancing test are based upon judgments about values, with the penultimate goal being the formulation and validation of a final action which minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social good. 5 <u><strong>In a more specific sense</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>bioethics encompasses a whole political movement</u></strong></mark>. 6 <u><strong>It is a movement <mark>which seeks to harness political forces</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>to deal with</u></strong></mark> a plethora of <u><strong><mark>ethical problems relating to health</mark> care delivery, <mark>both at the micro and the macro level</u></strong></mark> of economic distribution. <u><strong><mark>It</mark> also <mark>endeavors to respond</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>often</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>through</mark> <mark>legislative reforms</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>to complex issues such as</mark> <mark>p</mark>hysician <mark>a</mark>ssisted <mark>s</mark>uicide</u></strong>, cryonic suspension, genetic discrimination in the workplace, abortion, privacy, sterilization, human experimentation, collaborative reproduction by use of in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, cloning, and personal relationships necessary to create a family by homosexuals and lesbians. 7 All too often, <u><strong>contemporary <mark>society's concerns over</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>the need for regulating ethical regimes</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to <mark>guide</mark> or even control these <mark>activities</u></strong></mark> has driven it in turn <u><strong><mark>to seek</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>medical</u></strong> <u><strong>laws about</mark> areas such as <mark>death</mark> and dying</u></strong>, genetic counseling and screening, reproductive technologies, and organ transplants. Often <u><strong><mark>there is little choice for legal passivity or inaction</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>since</u></strong> <mark>"<u><strong>the law is a primary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and the treatment of real persons</u></strong></mark>."8 And today, Americans seem to be reshaping their political questions ultimately into judicial questions.9 Yet, a healthy degree of skepticism is needed to see the inherent limitations on the legal system in its efforts to regulate biomedical developments. 10 <u><strong><mark>Each legal tool</mark> used <mark>must be constantly fine-tuned</mark> <mark>and re-evaluated by</mark> ever <mark>changing public policies</u></strong></mark>—all <u><strong><mark>with the purpose of determining</u></strong></mark> which of the <u><strong><mark>tools</u></strong></mark> is <u><strong><mark>best fitted to deal with specific biomedical problems"</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> which one <u><strong><mark>validates a final action</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that</u></strong> ideally <u><strong><mark>minimizes human suffering</u></strong></mark> and maximizes the social or common good. </p>

Smith 99

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Smith 99 fulltext: George, Professor of Law @ The Catholic University of America, Notre Dame Journal Of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, Vol. 13, “Judicial Decision-Making in the Age of Biotechnology”, AB Bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence which sets it apart as a distinct study or discipline. Rather, its individuation derives from a de facto set of issues interrelated by what might be termed "family resemblances." While a common thread joining all of the issues is exceedingly difficult to find, the central core comprising the list of these issues, without question, is a felt concern over the technology of control of man's body, his mind, and quality of life. Many of the concerns of bioethics are concerns of public policy—or with legislation and policy guidelines—at state, local, and federal levels, that need to be enacted and enforced with respect to all of the issues comprising the de facto set. It has been suggested that bioethical concerns are but those prohibitions all rational people urge everyone to follow in an effort to avoid evils on which common agreement exists. Outside the individual context of determining how one treats another, for moral acceptability to be given at the broader societal level, a democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging that a certain good must be promoted though its promotion causes some degree of harm. It is within this setting where much of what is recognized as "bioethics" is focused. While individual morality operates primarily within a system of restraints, policies affecting society as a whole operate on a level where promotion of good is a moral option. The pivotal question thus becomes, "what goods ought to be restrained (e.g., scientific research)?" Of necessity, priorities, values, and goods must be weighed, balanced, and compared. Whenever the benefits and the risks of a particular course of action are weighed, it is well remembered that those very elements in the balancing test are based upon judgments about values, with the penultimate goal being the formulation and validation of a final action which minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social good. 5 In a more specific sense, bioethics encompasses a whole political movement. 6 It is a movement which seeks to harness political forces to deal with a plethora of ethical problems relating to health care delivery, both at the micro and the macro level of economic distribution. It also endeavors to respond—often through legislative reforms—to complex issues such as physician assisted suicide, cryonic suspension, genetic discrimination in the workplace, abortion, privacy, sterilization, human experimentation, collaborative reproduction by use of in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, cloning, and personal relationships necessary to create a family by homosexuals and lesbians. 7 All too often, contemporary society's concerns over the need for regulating ethical regimes to guide or even control these activities has driven it in turn to seek medical laws about areas such as death and dying, genetic counseling and screening, reproductive technologies, and organ transplants. Often there is little choice for legal passivity or inaction since "the law is a primary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and the treatment of real persons."8 And today, Americans seem to be reshaping their political questions ultimately into judicial questions.9 Yet, a healthy degree of skepticism is needed to see the inherent limitations on the legal system in its efforts to regulate biomedical developments. 10 Each legal tool used must be constantly fine-tuned and re-evaluated by ever changing public policies—all with the purpose of determining which of the tools is best fitted to deal with specific biomedical problems" and which one validates a final action that ideally minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social or common good. [/INST] <h4><strong>Focused debate over state regulations of PAS are key to cost-benefit analysis and deliberation -- the alternative is abstract moral relativism that fails to translate into material change</h4><p>Smith 99</p><p></strong>George, Professor of Law @ The Catholic University of America, Notre Dame Journal Of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, Vol. 13, “Judicial Decision-Making in the Age of Biotechnology”, AB </p><p><u><strong>Bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence</u></strong> which sets it apart as a distinct study or discipline. Rather, its individuation derives from a de facto set of issues interrelated by what might be termed "family resemblances." While <u><strong>a common thread joining all of the issues</u></strong> <u><strong>is</u></strong> exceedingly <u><strong>difficult</u></strong> to find, <u><strong>the</u></strong> central <u><strong>core</u></strong> comprising the list of these issues, without question, <u><strong>is a felt concern over the technology of control of man's body, his mind, and quality of life</u></strong>. Many of the <u><strong><mark>concerns of bioethics are concerns of</mark> public <mark>policy</u></strong></mark>—or <u><strong><mark>with</mark> <mark>legislation and policy guidelines</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>at</mark> <mark>state</mark>, local, <mark>and federal levels</mark>, <mark>that need to be enacted and enforced</mark> with respect to all of the issues comprising the de facto set</u></strong>. It has been suggested that bioethical concerns are but those prohibitions all rational people urge everyone to follow in an effort to avoid evils on which common agreement exists. <u><strong><mark>Outside the individual context</u></strong></mark> of determining how one treats another, for moral acceptability to be given at the broader societal level, <u><strong><mark>a democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging</mark> that <mark>a certain good must be promoted</u></strong></mark> though its promotion causes some degree of harm. It is within this setting where much of what is recognized as "bioethics" is focused. While <u><strong><mark>individual morality</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>operates</u></strong></mark> primarily <u><strong><mark>within</mark> a system of <mark>restraints</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>policies</mark> <mark>affect</u></strong></mark>ing<u><strong> <mark>society as a whole</mark> operate on a level where promotion of good is a moral option</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The pivotal question </mark>thus <mark>becomes</u></strong></mark>, "what goods ought to be restrained (e.g., scientific research)?" <u><strong>Of</u></strong> necessity, <u><strong><mark>priorities</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>values</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>and goods <mark>must be weighed</u></strong></mark>, balanced, <u><strong><mark>and compared</u></strong></mark>. Whenever the benefits and the risks of a particular course of action are weighed, it is well remembered that those very elements in the balancing test are based upon judgments about values, with the penultimate goal being the formulation and validation of a final action which minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social good. 5 <u><strong>In a more specific sense</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>bioethics encompasses a whole political movement</u></strong></mark>. 6 <u><strong>It is a movement <mark>which seeks to harness political forces</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>to deal with</u></strong></mark> a plethora of <u><strong><mark>ethical problems relating to health</mark> care delivery, <mark>both at the micro and the macro level</u></strong></mark> of economic distribution. <u><strong><mark>It</mark> also <mark>endeavors to respond</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>often</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>through</mark> <mark>legislative reforms</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>to complex issues such as</mark> <mark>p</mark>hysician <mark>a</mark>ssisted <mark>s</mark>uicide</u></strong>, cryonic suspension, genetic discrimination in the workplace, abortion, privacy, sterilization, human experimentation, collaborative reproduction by use of in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, cloning, and personal relationships necessary to create a family by homosexuals and lesbians. 7 All too often, <u><strong>contemporary <mark>society's concerns over</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>the need for regulating ethical regimes</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to <mark>guide</mark> or even control these <mark>activities</u></strong></mark> has driven it in turn <u><strong><mark>to seek</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>medical</u></strong> <u><strong>laws about</mark> areas such as <mark>death</mark> and dying</u></strong>, genetic counseling and screening, reproductive technologies, and organ transplants. Often <u><strong><mark>there is little choice for legal passivity or inaction</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>since</u></strong> <mark>"<u><strong>the law is a primary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and the treatment of real persons</u></strong></mark>."8 And today, Americans seem to be reshaping their political questions ultimately into judicial questions.9 Yet, a healthy degree of skepticism is needed to see the inherent limitations on the legal system in its efforts to regulate biomedical developments. 10 <u><strong><mark>Each legal tool</mark> used <mark>must be constantly fine-tuned</mark> <mark>and re-evaluated by</mark> ever <mark>changing public policies</u></strong></mark>—all <u><strong><mark>with the purpose of determining</u></strong></mark> which of the <u><strong><mark>tools</u></strong></mark> is <u><strong><mark>best fitted to deal with specific biomedical problems"</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> which one <u><strong><mark>validates a final action</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that</u></strong> ideally <u><strong><mark>minimizes human suffering</u></strong></mark> and maximizes the social or common good. </p> </s>

Contention 1 is the OAS

<h4>Contention 1 is the OAS</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Contention 1 is the OAS</h4> </s>

Contention 1 is the OAS

<h4>Contention 1 is the OAS</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Contention 1 is the OAS</h4> </s>

This produces cycles of ressentiment – the affirmative temporally locks the black body into a state of abjection which prevents both resistance and the ability to craft social life – their presentation renders black as phobogenic object which enables a constant repetition of traumatic mortification

Part of the rites of lynching, photographs of dead black men and their white executioners are meant to be seen. They are public portraits: posed, compelling, an exhibition and narration of racist violence. Pressed up close, or drawing back, the camera lens is a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man- and, sometimes, to identify with the white men, and women, at the scene. Spectacle a consolidation of racist community and a posture of whiteness. The assembly of white men and boys look out at the photographer/spectator - as if they have sated their appetites for looking at the black corpse white identity emerges from a spectacle of annihilation this little bit of theatre serves to reveal, and support, a race hatred predicated on an identification between blackness and sexual guilt, an identification which generates the sadistic desire to witness the spectacle of emasculated black men slowly bleeding to death. it is a law which operates through visual terror. The lesson to be learned through the murderous gazes of these white men is that you might be reduced to something that 'don't look human' - a reduction which is, precisely, your annihilation and their pleasure the photograph is a part of the process, another form of racist slur which can travel through time to do its work: 'Don't look human, does it? a figure in a public event, a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man and the identification with fellow whites which can follow. Slaton wants others to see him there, to know he was present at the obliteration of a man whose end could not be imagined without this visible prop. Who can deny the (merciless) evidence of such a photo, its framing - and containing - of the stink of the real? To put this another way: white men, and women, demand a keep- sake, a memento mori: toes, fingers, or - most highly prized reviving the carnival atmosphere of the day, the photograph is there to be gazed at, and fingered, over and over again: Look at me. I was there. Again, it was all part of the ritual: this appetite for document, this devouring by the eye - as if only a camera can bring the spectator close enough for the eye to be embedded in flesh the camera plays its part in sustaining that appetite, prolonging the scene it is supposed to record the drive to document, to be in the show - becomes part of that drama, prolonging the agony of the mutilated blacks From the first act - the moment of accusation: rape, murder, theft - this is what the audience has been waiting for: confirmation, via a fatal iconography of the brute black male, that he really' don't look human' the act of lynching is part of a racial imaginary, a primal scene of racist culture in the southern states of America, in which black men bear the brunt of a hatred which seems, at times, to know no bounds.' Burdened by history, black men lived, and perhaps con- tinue to live, in that climate, one permeated by racist fantasy - and the violence to which it so often gives rise. you don't have to see a lynching to live with its effects: 'I had never in my life been abused by whites, but I had already become as conditioned to their existence as though I had been the victim of a thousand lynchings' the black man can die and die and die again He doesn't know if the story is true or not, but it keeps him awake at nights: taking the place of his dreams, the lynching scene becomes a daytime nightmare. Revenge, defence, attack: a refusal to accept 'their cruelty as the law of my life' I felt completely helpless In the face of this threat that might come upon me at any time, and because there did not exist to my knowledge any possible course of action which could have saved me if I had ever been confronted by a white mob' Imagine the black man the white man wants you to be, then, and be him There's no place here for what the black man wants The unconscious usurped, by the work of identifying what the white man wants. An image of hate, a hated image. A phobic imago What do black men see when they encounter, perhaps for the first time, a phobic image of themselves in (white) culture? we find once again the spectacle of a lynching that the black child hasn't seen but which, in some sense, appears to have happened to him Has the young black child seen his father beaten or lynched by the white man? Has there been a real traumatism To all this we have to answer: no. Well then? Well then? What has traumatised this black child who has not seen his father beaten or lynched? the child has been caught looking not-by the real but by his own racist imaginary, a capture in- separable from an exposure to the cultural representations of the 'white world'. But what if the cultural milieu of that white world insists that the child's eye zone in on such real traumas as way of grounding its - racist culture's - own fantasy? What if the cultural traffic in images of the black man as phobic object- , beaten, disfigured, lynched - is trauma enough? the black man who encounters himself as a phobic object within white culture encounters the dereliction of his own self-representation through that culture: dereliction as one of the effects of a hatred coming now from both inside and outside As a symbol of the self-destructive, lacerating ground upon which phobia and fantasy meet, the black child, in taking up the burden of such imagery has been fatally exposed to the glare of those phobic anxieties constructed upon his visual image - as have other blacks exposed, for the first time, to the colonial fantasies of Euro pean culture. This vision of blacks confounded by their reflected images is also acutely aware of the collusions be- tween unconscious and cultural forms of violence; 'of a dreaming possessed not, or not only, by the subject's own wishful-shameful fantasies but by the real' There is a re- markable correlation between the fantasy - of black men in cultural life and black self-images an imago stalking a little black child through his memories and dreams. 'I have never seen a lynching' I understand it is a terrible Sight' That understanding, and knowledge, comes not only from photographs and stories but from those who have seen -like the man who recollects a lynching The lesson will stay with you: blackness afflicted, mutilated, a fatal way of being alive." You might end up wishing you were white. That you were one of the white children playing around the smoking body of a black man, a happy part of the show

the camera lens is a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man- and to identify with the white men, and women, at the scene. a consolidation of racist community and a posture of whiteness white identity emerges from a spectacle of annihilation The lesson learned through murderous gazes of white men is that you might be reduced to something that 'don't look human' the photograph is a part of the process, another form of racist slur which can travel time a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man and identification with fellow whites which can follow you don't have to see a lynching to live with its effects: 'I had never in my life been abused by whites, but I had become as conditioned as though I had been the victim of a thousand lynchings' the black man can die and die and die again I felt helpless In the face of this threat that might come at any time we find the spectacle of a lynching that the black child hasn't seen but appears to have happened to him Has the black child seen his father beaten or lynched we have to answer: no. Well then? What has traumatised this black child the child has been caught looking not-by the real but by his own racist imaginary, a capture in an exposure to the representations of the 'white world' What if the cultural traffic in images of the black man as phobic object is trauma enough? the black man who encounters himself as a phobic object within white culture encounters the dereliction of his own self-representation dereliction as one of the effects of a hatred coming from both inside and outside As a symbol of the self-destructive, lacerating ground upon which phobia and fantasy meet, the black child has been fatally exposed to the glare of those phobic anxieties constructed upon his visual image There is correlation between fantasy in cultural life and black self-images The lesson will stay with you: blackness afflicted, mutilated, a fatal way of being alive

Cameron describes the sickness which overwhelms him at the sight of the image of his dead friends; Wright recalls his mind 'frozen with a cold pity for the life thaj; was gone' when he comes across the debris of a public lynching (Cameron 1995: 84; Wright 1935). Nausea, petrification: nothing like the gleam in the white man's eye as he vies with his neighbour to have his picture taken. Part of the rites (or rights) of lynching, photographs of dead black men and their white executioners are meant to be seen. They are public portraits: posed, compelling, an exhibition and narration of racist violence. Pressed up close, or drawing back, the camera lens is a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man- and, sometimes, to identify with the white men, and women, at the scene. Spectacle, and gallery, both: a consolidation of racist community and a posture of whiteness. Consider, for example, the repertoire of poses on display at the lynching in Clanton, Alabama in August 1891. Published in Ida B. Wells-Barnett's A Red Record, in 1895, this image is arranged, orderly, composed - a far cry from the hectic jostling described by Cameron. The assembly of (largely) white men and boys look out at the photographer/spectator - as if they have sated their appetites for looking at the black corpse hanging above them (only one or two still look up). What they want to see now is themselves looking at the camera: judges and executioners in the lives, and deaths, of black men. Above all, they are vigilant. An image of white identity emerges from a spectacle of annihilation: the lynchers posing, grimly, alongside their black 'trophies'. A moment frozen in time, flash-lit in the heat of subsided passion. That compulsion to bring the eye of the camera up close, to put themselves in the picture as spectators of torn black flesh, means that we - black men - can still look at those lynchers: look at them looking at teeth, nails, bone, skin. What are they thinking about as they gaze out at the camera, pointing up at black bodies dangling in the trees? Sullen, stern, defiant, satisfied, curious: what do they see? What do they want us to see? That, as Richard Wright puts it in a brief comment on another such image, 'the law is white' (Wright 194T 44)? Wright will come to use the photographic evidence of lynching to present his own convictions about the spectacular place of black men in white scopic pleasure: 'the law is white'. And if this is law, it is both fantasmatic and perverse. Consider, for example, the following account given by Howard Kester in The Lynching of Claude Neal in 1934: 'After taking the nigger to the woods ... they cut off his penis. He was made to eat it. Then they cut off his testicles and made him eat them and say he liked it' (Kester 1934, cited in Dowd Hall I984: 339)· As a response to the 'unspeakable crime' of black- on-white rape, the act of forcing a man to 'fuck' himself to death with his own excised genitals, to feed and gorge himself on his own violating (Violated) pleasure, may well have been hugely satisfying to those assembled - especially when the man got to confess his (seeming) enjoyment. To hear him desire his own death - and so turn their terrible pleasure into his own violent wish - was to construct a vision of the castrated black man as one actively seeking the pleasures of castration. And what of the black man's desires and identifications here? It must have been exhausting trying to name that pleasure, to mention - without choking - how much he liked that severed penis now become his dew protruding tongue. J I suppose that this little bit of theatre serves to reveal, and support, a race hatred predicated on an identification between blackness and sexual guilt, an identification which generates the sadistic desire to witness the spectacle - the stench - of emasculated black men slowly bleeding to death. As such, it is a law which operates through visual terror. The lesson to be learned through the murderous gazes of these white men is that you might be reduced to something that 'don't look human' - a reduction which is, precisely, your annihilation and their pleasure. In Red Wine First, published in 1947, Nedra Tyre records the thoughts of one Skinny Slaton: 'Well, said Skinny Slaton, shore as I'm born I'm gonna borrer me a kodak tomorrer and I'm coming back here and I'm gonna take me some pitchers of that. Don't look human, does it?' (Tyre 194T II2-13). The technological moment which gives us the Kodak - the first turn-of-the-century mass-produced roll-film camera - also gives us a way of venturing into some dark places. For Slaton, anxious to go borrow a Kodak, the photograph represents the climax of an unfolding drama. More than an aid to memory (though it is that too), the photograph is a part of the process, another form of racist slur which can travel through time to do its work: 'Don't look human, does it?' No doubt, Slaton is fascinated by what taking the picture can do and reveal about himself: a figure in a public event, a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man and the identification with fellow whites which can follow. At the same time, it is as if he wants to make an archive of what he sees, to preserve an event for the benefit of those who could not be there (friends, family, a son or daughter, perhaps). Wish you were here. A grotesgue family album. Slaton wants others to see him there, to know he was present at the obliteration of a man whose end could not be imagined without this visible prop. Who can deny the (merciless) evidence of such a photo, its framing - and containing - of the stink of the real? To put this another way: white men, and women, demand a keep- sake, a memento mori: toes, fingers, or - most highly prized - a black penis, a black scrotum. 'Miller's body hung thus exposed from three tofive0'clock',writesIdaB.Wells-BarnettinARedRecordin1895, 'during which time, several photographs of him as he hung dangling at the end of the chain were taken, and his toes and fingers cut off' (Wells-Barnett 1991: 182). But how long will they keep, these organs and limbs, subject to the reek of putrefaction? They're not like the Ir;,age, which registers a moment in time complete, pure, clean - free of the blood, and rot, of the lost body part. Reining in the spill of human wreckage, reviving the carnival atmosphere of the day, the photograph is there to be gazed at, and fingered, over and over again: Look at me. I was there. Again, it was all part of the ritual: this appetite for document, this devouring by the eye - as if only a camera can bring the spectator close enough for the eye to be embedded in flesh. And, of course, the camera plays its part in sustaining that appetite, prolonging the scene it is supposed to record. 'After three full hours had been spent in torturing the two', writes Sutton Griggs in The Hindered Hand in 1905, 'the spokesman announced that they were now ready for the final act. The brother of Sidney Fletcher was called for and was given a match. He stood near his mutilated victims until the photographer could take a picture of the scene' (Griggs 1905: 133-4; my italics). The final act in a popular melodrama: the camera itself- the drive to document, to be in the show - becomes part of that drama, prolonging the agony of the mutilated blacks who must hope that death will come quickly. From the first act - the moment of accusation: rape, murder, theft - this is what the audience has been waiting for: confirmation, via a fatal iconography of the brute black male, that he really' don't look human'. 2 How do we look at these pictures now? How do we start to try to understand the hatred, and misery, on display through them? We know now - as we knew then - that most of the charges on which black men were 'tried' by Judge Lynch (to coin Ida B. Wells' well- known phrase) were fabricated; they were ideological narratives, or fantasies, of black men as murderers, rapists, thieves: 'the black brute ... lurking in the dark' (Dowd Hall 1984: 344). In other words, the act of lynching is part of a racial imaginary, a primal scene of racist culture in the southern states of America, in which black men bear the brunt of a hatred which seems, at times, to know no bounds.' Burdened by history, black men lived, and perhaps con- tinue to live, in that climate, one permeated by racist fantasy - and the violence to which it so often gives rise. As Wright was one of the first to point out in Black Boy, first published in 1945, you don't have to see a lynching to live with its effects: 'I had never in my life been abused by whites, but I had already become as conditioned to their existence as though I had been the victim of a thousand lynchings' (Wright 1945: 84)· 'The victim of a thousand lynchings'? On Wright's reading the black man can die and die and die again - as if, as I suggested before, the identification between the black man looking and the black man lynched becomes irresistible. That identification can, in Wright's work, run riot through the black man's psychic and cultural life. Describing his response to the story of a black woman whose husband had been 'seized and killed by a mob', Wright insists on the 'emotional truth' of the feeling that 'there existed men against whom I was powerless, men who could violate my life at will' (the pedagogic value of the lynch photo/plot) (ibid.: 83-4). He doesn't know if the story is true or not, but it keeps him awake at nights: taking the place of his dreams, the lynching scene becomes a daytime nightmare. Relief comes only with the young Wright's resolve to 'emulate' the black woman who, concealing a rifle at her husband's funeral, shot dead four of his attackers. Revenge, defence, attack: a refusal to accept 'their cruelty as the law of my life' (ibid.: 84). But Wright knows the limits of that identification, one that has no 'objective value'. )My spontaneous fantasies lived in my mind, he continues, 'because I felt completely helpless In the face of this threat that might come upon me at any time, and because there did not exist to my knowledge any possible course of action which could have saved me if I had ever been confronted by a white mob' (ibid.). No possible action, so Wright needs (and it is need rather than, say, wish) his defensive fantasy, his way of defending himself psychically against the death of a thousand lynchings. But no defence, either, because Wright knows that this fantasy has no 'objective value': it cannot be made real, unlike the racist fantasy which structures reality for botfi whites and blacks. Above all, Wright's exploration of his experience of white Southern cuiture uncovers an identification with, or interpellation by, what he - a black man - imagines white desire to be: 'Even when a white man asked us an innocent question', Wright recalls in Twelve Million Black Voices, first published in 1941, some unconscious part of us would listen closely, not only to the obvious words, but also to the intonations of voice that indicated what kind of answer he wanted; and, automatically; we would determine whether an affirmative or negative reply was expected, and we would answer, not in terms of objective truth, but in terms of what the white man wanted to hear. (Wright 1941 : 41) Imagine the black man the white man wants you to be, then, and be him (or, at least, mime him). To push the point, our unconscious - or some of it, in Wright's terms - is given over to that work of second- gueSSing, of dare and double dare. There's no place here for what the black man wants, or for a black unconscious driven by its own desire and aggression. On the contrary. The unconscious (if that is what it is) usurped, by the work of identifying (with) what the white man wants. Even if the black man is a dead man, a lynched man? We can start to clarify this through one of the key works on race, hatred and fantasy: Frantz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, first published in French in 1952,.translated into English in 1967.ff'owards the end of Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon describes his book as a 'mirror' in whose reflective image black men can view their own future. 'This book, it is hoped', he writes in 'The Negro and Psychopathology', 'will be a mirror with a progressive infrastructure, in which it will be possible to discern the Negro on the road to disalienation- (Fanon 196T 184). A new image in the mirror is, for Fanon, crucial if that disalienation is to take place: black men need to look and be reflected, otherwise, to become other than the distorted -and fantasmatic image of white desire. Imagine a 'mirror of confusion' (to use James Baldwin's phrase) in which only the shade, or shadow, of the black man can appear. An image of hate, a hated image. A phobic imago, to use Fanon's terms. Listen, for example, to his account of the psycho-social dynamics of Negrophobogenesis: 'Is the Negro's [sexual] superiority real? Everyone knows that it is not. It is the triumph, and complexity, of Fanon's thinking that he was able to identify the inner life of specular confusion supporting the knot of phobic fantasy. For Fanon, the problem is that white phobic anxiety about black men takes the form of a fetishistic investment in their sexuality: crudely, being well-hung, the black man must be hung well. In other words, the violated body of the black man comes to be used as a defence against the anxiety, or hatred, that body appears to generate. Describing that basic ambivalence of Negrophobia, Fanon uses the syntax of fetishism - 'I know, but all the same' - to account for the construction of the black man a phobic object: 'Everyone knows that he is not superior, but all the same…. But, again, what of black men in all this? What, if anything, can be glimpsed of them in these alienating, and confusing, images? What do black men see when they encounter, perhaps for the first time, a phobic image of themselves in (white) culture? . In Black Skin, White Masks, we find once again the spectacle of a lynching that the black child hasn't seen but which, in some sense, appears to have happened to him. 'Frequently', Fanon argues in 'The Negro and Psychopathology', the negro who becomes abnormal [s'anormalise] has never had any relations with the White man. Has there been an ancient experience and repression in the unconscious [Y a-t-il eu experience ancienne et refoulement dans l'inconscient?]? Has the young black child seen his father beaten or lynched by the white man? Has there been a real traumatism [traumatisme effectif]? To all this we have to answer: no. Well then? (Fanon 1952: II8; 196T 145; t.m.) Well then? What has traumatised this black child who has not seen his father beaten or lynched? Fanon's statement on what the black child has seen, or not, implies that the child has been caught looking not-by the real but by his own racist imaginary, a capture in- separable from an exposure to the cultural representations of the 'white world'. But what if the cultural milieu of that white world insists that the child's eye zone in on such real traumas as way of grounding its - racist culture's - own fantasy? Which it did. What if the cultural traffic in images of the black man as phobic object- , beaten, disfigured, lynched - is trauma enough? As Vicky Lebeau has pointed out in a recent discussion of Black Skin, White Masks, that, insight - the trauma of representation - is, in fact, central to Fanons analysis ofthe black child devouring [devore] and identifying with the stories and images of white culture. Brought up to think and act subjectively 'like a white man' (Fanon's phrase), Lebeau suggests that: the black man who encounters himself as a phobic object within white culture encounters the dereliction of his own self-representation through that culture: dereliction as one of the effects of a hatred coming now from both inside and outside, which Fanon tracks throughout Black Skin, White Masks. (Lebeau 1998: II5) If Fanon seems impervious to the invasive possibilities of real, racial violence in that child's neurotic encounter, blind to the extent to which that evil twin lurking in the mirror of culture may prove to be more than a dark, imaginary double, it is worth taking a few moments to think about how this accusation squares with his continued insistence on the violence of the real. As a symbol of the self-destructive, lacerating ground upon which phobia and fantasy meet, the black child, in taking up the burden of such imagery, Fanon concludes, has been fatally exposed to the glare of those phobic anxieties constructed upon his visual image - as have other blacks exposed, for the first time, to the colonial fantasies of Euro pean culture. This vision of blacks confounded by their reflected images is also acutely - powerfully - aware of the collusions be- tween unconscious and cultural forms of violence; 'of a dreaming possessed not, or not only, by the subject's own wishful-shameful fantasies but by the real' (Lebeau 1998: 121). Not only is the 'sadistic aggression' [agressivite sadique] of culture most visibly at work in the child's 'sacrificial dedication [oblativitej' to his distorted image; his unconscious dreamlife has learned to play its part by demanding that debasement (Fanon I96T 147). There is, in other words, a re- markable correlation between the imago - the fantasy - of black men in cultural life and black self-images. Behind those images and inverted screens lurks a dark intruder albeit framed by a black (and white) vision of black identity; an imago stalking a little black child through his memories and dreams. 'I have never seen a lynching', writes Calvin Hernton in his now classic Sex and Racism in America in 1969, 'never looked upon a Negro who has been castrated. I understand, however, and know, that it is a terrible Sight' (Hernton 1969: 100). That understanding, and knowledge, comes not only from photographs and stories but from those who have seen -like the man who recollects a lynching in Mississippi, Alabama which took place when he was nine years old. Let's listen to the account he gives to Hernton. 'I will never forget it', he says: I can still see him hanging up like that .... The next morning my uncle and me and me and some other coloured folks in the county went to look at the man who had been lynched. The man's wife and brother were with us, and they were crying. Everybody was afraid. I wasn't - for I really didn't know what to expect. But maybe I was a little scared just because of aU the racket that went on that night. Anyway, when we got there in the woods, everyone started crying and turning their heads away in horror. I looked up at the man. I knew him, yet he was so messed up I could not tell who he was. He was naked, and they had put tar on him and burnt him. He smelled awful. Then I saw what they had done. Even though I was only nine, I knew what they had done was a sin. They had cut out his private and left it laying on the ground. The blood had caked all about his legs and thighs. (ibid. 1969: 100) This is what the lynchers want. A memory, an imago, that will not go away. Not only the body, burned and stinking in the trees, but black men, women and children looking, and then looking away, from what the white men have done. 'Everybody was afraid' except the young black boy who, not knowing what to expect, keeps looking until he can see what has happened. Something has been torn away and left lying on the ground, something private which confirms - as, it seems, the tarred body cannot - that what has happened is a 'sin'. It's a vision which stays with this boy for the rest of his life - 'I can still see him hanging up like that' - a reminder of how fragile his possession of himself, his 'manhood', can be. The real difference between black and white men. 'Psychologically, he [the black male] experiences himself as castrated', writes Hernton in the course of a discussion of 'The Negro Male': a castration which, in the context of African-American history, suggests the impact of the real on that psychology, the psychic weight of learning what to expect by going down to the woods (ibid.: 59). The lesson will stay with you: blackness afflicted, mutilated, a fatal way of being alive." You might end up wishing you were white. That you were one of the white children playing around the smoking body of a black man, a happy part of the show. The participation of white children at lynchings is documented in photographs and in reports like the following from the New York Times in 1899: All the afternoon children, some of them not more than six years old, kept up the fire around the blackened body by throwing grass, brush, bits of boards, and everything combustible that they could get together. This they kept up until dark ... 5 Inexhaustible, excited, these children can play till dark, part of the type of 'racket' which so frightened the black man interviewed by Hernton. Their presence - so difficult to separate from an idea of innocence, of not knowing - takes us back to the question of where does white hatred come from? What does it have to do with this play? Is this a game played in deadly seriousness, a miming of their parents' own excitement, a search for their loving approval: 'Look at me, I'm burning the black man ... for you'? Are these children spellbound by their parents' own fascinated looking? What do these white men and women want their children to see and to think? What's the purpose of the 'lesson' when it is directed not, or not only, at a black boy but at a white one?

<h4>This produces cycles of ressentiment – the affirmative temporally locks the black body into a state of abjection which prevents both resistance and the ability to craft social life – their presentation renders black as phobogenic object which enables a constant repetition of traumatic mortification</h4><p><strong>Marriott, 2k</strong> – associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at UC Santa Cruz (David, “On Black Men,” Edinburgh University Press, pgs. 6-14)//eek</p><p>Cameron describes the sickness which overwhelms him at the sight of the image of his dead friends; Wright recalls his mind 'frozen with a cold pity for the life thaj; was gone' when he comes across the debris of a public lynching (Cameron 1995: 84; Wright 1935). Nausea, petrification: nothing like the gleam in the white man's eye as he vies with his neighbour to have his picture taken. <u><strong>Part of the rites</u></strong> (or rights) <u><strong>of lynching, photographs of dead black men and their white executioners are meant to be seen. They are public portraits: posed, compelling, an exhibition and narration of racist violence. Pressed up close, or drawing back, <mark>the camera lens is a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man- and</mark>, sometimes, <mark>to identify with the white men, and women, at the scene. </mark>Spectacle</u></strong>, and gallery, both: <u><strong><mark>a consolidation of racist community and a posture of whiteness</mark>. </u></strong>Consider, for example, the repertoire of poses on display at the lynching in Clanton, Alabama in August 1891. Published in Ida B. Wells-Barnett's A Red Record, in 1895, this image is arranged, orderly, composed - a far cry from the hectic jostling described by Cameron. <u><strong>The assembly of </u></strong>(largely) <u><strong>white men and boys look out at the photographer/spectator - as if they have sated their appetites for looking at the black corpse</u></strong> hanging above them (only one or two still look up). What they want to see now is themselves looking at the camera: judges and executioners in the lives, and deaths, of black men. Above all, they are vigilant. An image of <u><strong><mark>white identity emerges from a spectacle of annihilation</u></strong></mark>: the lynchers posing, grimly, alongside their black 'trophies'. A moment frozen in time, flash-lit in the heat of subsided passion. That compulsion to bring the eye of the camera up close, to put themselves in the picture as spectators of torn black flesh, means that we - black men - can still look at those lynchers: look at them looking at teeth, nails, bone, skin. What are they thinking about as they gaze out at the camera, pointing up at black bodies dangling in the trees? Sullen, stern, defiant, satisfied, curious: what do they see? What do they want us to see? That, as Richard Wright puts it in a brief comment on another such image, 'the law is white' (Wright 194T 44)? Wright will come to use the photographic evidence of lynching to present his own convictions about the spectacular place of black men in white scopic pleasure: 'the law is white'. And if this is law, it is both fantasmatic and perverse. Consider, for example, the following account given by Howard Kester in The Lynching of Claude Neal in 1934: 'After taking the nigger to the woods ... they cut off his penis. He was made to eat it. Then they cut off his testicles and made him eat them and say he liked it' (Kester 1934, cited in Dowd Hall I984: 339)· As a response to the 'unspeakable crime' of black- on-white rape, the act of forcing a man to 'fuck' himself to death with his own excised genitals, to feed and gorge himself on his own violating (Violated) pleasure, may well have been hugely satisfying to those assembled - especially when the man got to confess his (seeming) enjoyment. To hear him desire his own death - and so turn their terrible pleasure into his own violent wish - was to construct a vision of the castrated black man as one actively seeking the pleasures of castration. And what of the black man's desires and identifications here? It must have been exhausting trying to name that pleasure, to mention - without choking - how much he liked that severed penis now become his dew protruding tongue. J I suppose that <u><strong>this little bit of theatre serves to reveal, and support, a race hatred predicated on an identification between blackness and sexual guilt, an identification which generates the sadistic desire to witness the spectacle</u></strong> - the stench - <u><strong>of emasculated black men slowly bleeding to death. </u></strong>As such, <u><strong>it is a law which operates through visual terror. <mark>The lesson</mark> to be <mark>learned through</mark> the <mark>murderous gazes of</mark> these <mark>white men is that you might be reduced to something that 'don't look human'</mark> - a reduction which is, precisely, your annihilation and their pleasure</u></strong>. In Red Wine First, published in 1947, Nedra Tyre records the thoughts of one Skinny Slaton: 'Well, said Skinny Slaton, shore as I'm born I'm gonna borrer me a kodak tomorrer and I'm coming back here and I'm gonna take me some pitchers of that. Don't look human, does it?' (Tyre 194T II2-13). The technological moment which gives us the Kodak - the first turn-of-the-century mass-produced roll-film camera - also gives us a way of venturing into some dark places. For Slaton, anxious to go borrow a Kodak, the photograph represents the climax of an unfolding drama. More than an aid to memory (though it is that too), <u><strong><mark>the photograph is a part of the process, another form of racist slur which can travel </mark>through <mark>time</mark> to do its work: 'Don't look human, does it?</u></strong>' No doubt, Slaton is fascinated by what taking the picture can do and reveal about himself: <u><strong>a figure in a public event, <mark>a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man and </mark>the <mark>identification with fellow whites which can follow</mark>.</u></strong> At the same time, it is as if he wants to make an archive of what he sees, to preserve an event for the benefit of those who could not be there (friends, family, a son or daughter, perhaps). Wish you were here. A grotesgue family album. <u><strong>Slaton wants others to see him there, to know he was present at the obliteration of a man whose end could not be imagined without this visible prop. Who can deny the (merciless) evidence of such a photo, its framing - and containing - of the stink of the real? To put this another way: white men, and women, demand a keep- sake, a memento mori: toes, fingers, or - most highly prized</u></strong> - a black penis, a black scrotum. 'Miller's body hung thus exposed from three tofive0'clock',writesIdaB.Wells-BarnettinARedRecordin1895, 'during which time, several photographs of him as he hung dangling at the end of the chain were taken, and his toes and fingers cut off' (Wells-Barnett 1991: 182). But how long will they keep, these organs and limbs, subject to the reek of putrefaction? They're not like the Ir;,age, which registers a moment in time complete, pure, clean - free of the blood, and rot, of the lost body part. Reining in the spill of human wreckage, <u><strong>reviving the carnival atmosphere of the day, the photograph is there to be gazed at, and fingered, over and over again: Look at me. I was there. Again, it was all part of the ritual: this appetite for document, this devouring by the eye - as if only a camera can bring the spectator close enough for the eye to be embedded in flesh</u></strong>. And, of course, <u><strong>the camera plays its part in sustaining that appetite, prolonging the scene it is supposed to record</u></strong>. 'After three full hours had been spent in torturing the two', writes Sutton Griggs in The Hindered Hand in 1905, 'the spokesman announced that they were now ready for the final act. The brother of Sidney Fletcher was called for and was given a match. He stood near his mutilated victims until the photographer could take a picture of the scene' (Griggs 1905: 133-4; my italics). The final act in a popular melodrama: the camera itself- <u><strong>the drive to document, to be in the show - becomes part of that drama, prolonging the agony of the mutilated blacks</u></strong> who must hope that death will come quickly. <u><strong>From the first act - the moment of accusation: rape, murder, theft - this is what the audience has been waiting for: confirmation, via a fatal iconography of the brute black male, that he really' don't look human'</u></strong>. 2 How do we look at these pictures now? How do we start to try to understand the hatred, and misery, on display through them? We know now - as we knew then - that most of the charges on which black men were 'tried' by Judge Lynch (to coin Ida B. Wells' well- known phrase) were fabricated; they were ideological narratives, or fantasies, of black men as murderers, rapists, thieves: 'the black brute ... lurking in the dark' (Dowd Hall 1984: 344). In other words, <u><strong>the act of lynching is part of a racial imaginary, a primal scene of racist culture in the southern states of America, in which black men bear the brunt of a hatred which seems, at times, to know no bounds.' Burdened by history, black men lived, and perhaps con- tinue to live, in that climate, one permeated by racist fantasy - and the violence to which it so often gives rise.</u></strong> As Wright was one of the first to point out in Black Boy, first published in 1945, <u><strong><mark>you don't have to see a lynching to live with its effects: 'I had never in my life been abused by whites, but I had</mark> already <mark>become as conditioned </mark>to their existence <mark>as though I had been the victim of a thousand lynchings'</u></strong></mark> (Wright 1945: 84)· 'The victim of a thousand lynchings'? On Wright's reading <u><strong><mark>the black man can die and die and die again</u></strong></mark> - as if, as I suggested before, the identification between the black man looking and the black man lynched becomes irresistible. That identification can, in Wright's work, run riot through the black man's psychic and cultural life. Describing his response to the story of a black woman whose husband had been 'seized and killed by a mob', Wright insists on the 'emotional truth' of the feeling that 'there existed men against whom I was powerless, men who could violate my life at will' (the pedagogic value of the lynch photo/plot) (ibid.: 83-4). <u><strong>He doesn't know if the story is true or not, but it keeps him awake at nights: taking the place of his dreams, the lynching scene becomes a daytime nightmare.</u></strong> Relief comes only with the young Wright's resolve to 'emulate' the black woman who, concealing a rifle at her husband's funeral, shot dead four of his attackers. <u><strong>Revenge, defence, attack: a refusal to accept 'their cruelty as the law of my life'</u></strong> (ibid.: 84). But Wright knows the limits of that identification, one that has no 'objective value'. )My spontaneous fantasies lived in my mind, he continues, 'because<u><strong> <mark>I felt </mark>completely <mark>helpless In the face of this threat that might come </mark>upon me <mark>at any time</mark>, and because there did not exist to my knowledge any possible course of action which could have saved me if I had ever been confronted by a white mob'</u></strong> (ibid.). No possible action, so Wright needs (and it is need rather than, say, wish) his defensive fantasy, his way of defending himself psychically against the death of a thousand lynchings. But no defence, either, because Wright knows that this fantasy has no 'objective value': it cannot be made real, unlike the racist fantasy which structures reality for botfi whites and blacks. Above all, Wright's exploration of his experience of white Southern cuiture uncovers an identification with, or interpellation by, what he - a black man - imagines white desire to be: 'Even when a white man asked us an innocent question', Wright recalls in Twelve Million Black Voices, first published in 1941, some unconscious part of us would listen closely, not only to the obvious words, but also to the intonations of voice that indicated what kind of answer he wanted; and, automatically; we would determine whether an affirmative or negative reply was expected, and we would answer, not in terms of objective truth, but in terms of what the white man wanted to hear. (Wright 1941 : 41) <u><strong>Imagine the black man the white man wants you to be, then, and be him</u></strong> (or, at least, mime him). To push the point, our unconscious - or some of it, in Wright's terms - is given over to that work of second- gueSSing, of dare and double dare. <u><strong>There's no place here for what the black man wants</u></strong>, or for a black unconscious driven by its own desire and aggression. On the contrary. <u><strong>The unconscious</u></strong> (if that is what it is) <u><strong>usurped, by the work of identifying</u></strong> (with) <u><strong>what the white man wants.</u></strong> Even if the black man is a dead man, a lynched man? We can start to clarify this through one of the key works on race, hatred and fantasy: Frantz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, first published in French in 1952,.translated into English in 1967.ff'owards the end of Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon describes his book as a 'mirror' in whose reflective image black men can view their own future. 'This book, it is hoped', he writes in 'The Negro and Psychopathology', 'will be a mirror with a progressive infrastructure, in which it will be possible to discern the Negro on the road to disalienation- (Fanon 196T 184). A new image in the mirror is, for Fanon, crucial if that disalienation is to take place: black men need to look and be reflected, otherwise, to become other than the distorted -and fantasmatic image of white desire. Imagine a 'mirror of confusion' (to use James Baldwin's phrase) in which only the shade, or shadow, of the black man can appear. <u><strong>An image of hate, a hated image. A phobic imago</u></strong>, to use Fanon's terms. Listen, for example, to his account of the psycho-social dynamics of Negrophobogenesis: 'Is the Negro's [sexual] superiority real? Everyone knows that it is not. It is the triumph, and complexity, of Fanon's thinking that he was able to identify the inner life of specular confusion supporting the knot of phobic fantasy. For Fanon, the problem is that white phobic anxiety about black men takes the form of a fetishistic investment in their sexuality: crudely, being well-hung, the black man must be hung well. In other words, the violated body of the black man comes to be used as a defence against the anxiety, or hatred, that body appears to generate. Describing that basic ambivalence of Negrophobia, Fanon uses the syntax of fetishism - 'I know, but all the same' - to account for the construction of the black man a phobic object: 'Everyone knows that he is not superior, but all the same…. But, again, what of black men in all this? What, if anything, can be glimpsed of them in these alienating, and confusing, images? <u><strong>What do black men see when they encounter, perhaps for the first time, a phobic image of themselves in (white) culture?</u></strong> . In Black Skin, White Masks, <u><strong><mark>we find </mark>once again <mark>the spectacle of a lynching that the black child hasn't seen but </mark>which, in some sense, <mark>appears to have happened to him</u></strong></mark>. 'Frequently', Fanon argues in 'The Negro and Psychopathology', the negro who becomes abnormal [s'anormalise] has never had any relations with the White man. Has there been an ancient experience and repression in the unconscious [Y a-t-il eu experience ancienne et refoulement dans l'inconscient?]? <u><strong><mark>Has the</mark> young <mark>black child seen his father beaten or lynched</mark> by the white man? Has there been a real traumatism</u></strong> [traumatisme effectif]? <u><strong>To all this <mark>we have to answer: no. Well then?</u></strong></mark> (Fanon 1952: II8; 196T 145; t.m.) <u><strong>Well then? <mark>What has traumatised this black child</mark> who has not seen his father beaten or lynched?</u></strong> Fanon's statement on what the black child has seen, or not, implies that <u><strong><mark>the child has been caught looking not-by the real but by his own racist imaginary, a capture in</mark>- separable from <mark>an exposure to the </mark>cultural <mark>representations of the 'white world'</mark>. But what if the cultural milieu of that white world insists that the child's eye zone in on such real traumas as way of grounding its - racist culture's - own fantasy?</u></strong> Which it did. <u><strong><mark>What if the cultural traffic in images of the black man as phobic object</mark>- , beaten, disfigured, lynched - <mark>is trauma enough?</u></strong></mark> As Vicky Lebeau has pointed out in a recent discussion of Black Skin, White Masks, that, insight - the trauma of representation - is, in fact, central to Fanons analysis ofthe black child devouring [devore] and identifying with the stories and images of white culture. Brought up to think and act subjectively 'like a white man' (Fanon's phrase), Lebeau suggests that: <u><strong><mark>the black man who encounters himself as a phobic object within white culture encounters the dereliction of his own self-representation</mark> through that culture: <mark>dereliction as one of the effects of a hatred coming</mark> now <mark>from both inside and outside</u></strong></mark>, which Fanon tracks throughout Black Skin, White Masks. (Lebeau 1998: II5) If Fanon seems impervious to the invasive possibilities of real, racial violence in that child's neurotic encounter, blind to the extent to which that evil twin lurking in the mirror of culture may prove to be more than a dark, imaginary double, it is worth taking a few moments to think about how this accusation squares with his continued insistence on the violence of the real. <u><strong><mark>As a symbol of the self-destructive, lacerating ground upon which phobia and fantasy meet, the black child</mark>, in taking up the burden of such imagery</u></strong>, Fanon concludes, <u><strong><mark>has been fatally exposed to the glare of those phobic anxieties constructed upon his visual image</mark> - as have other blacks exposed, for the first time, to the colonial fantasies of Euro pean culture. This vision of blacks confounded by their reflected images is also acutely </u></strong>- powerfully - <u><strong>aware of the collusions be- tween unconscious and cultural forms of violence; 'of a dreaming possessed not, or not only, by the subject's own wishful-shameful fantasies but by the real'</u></strong> (Lebeau 1998: 121). Not only is the 'sadistic aggression' [agressivite sadique] of culture most visibly at work in the child's 'sacrificial dedication [oblativitej' to his distorted image; his unconscious dreamlife has learned to play its part by demanding that debasement (Fanon I96T 147). <u><strong><mark>There is</u></strong></mark>, in other words, <u><strong>a re- markable <mark>correlation between </mark>the</u></strong> imago - the <u><strong><mark>fantasy </mark>- of black men <mark>in cultural life and black self-images</u></strong></mark>. Behind those images and inverted screens lurks a dark intruder albeit framed by a black (and white) vision of black identity; <u><strong>an imago stalking a little black child through his memories and dreams. 'I have never seen a lynching'</u></strong>, writes Calvin Hernton in his now classic Sex and Racism in America in 1969, 'never looked upon a Negro who has been castrated. <u><strong>I understand</u></strong>, however, and know, that <u><strong>it is a terrible Sight'</u></strong> (Hernton 1969: 100). <u><strong>That understanding, and knowledge, comes not only from photographs and stories but from those who have seen -like the man who recollects a lynching</u></strong> in Mississippi, Alabama which took place when he was nine years old. Let's listen to the account he gives to Hernton. 'I will never forget it', he says: I can still see him hanging up like that .... The next morning my uncle and me and me and some other coloured folks in the county went to look at the man who had been lynched. The man's wife and brother were with us, and they were crying. Everybody was afraid. I wasn't - for I really didn't know what to expect. But maybe I was a little scared just because of aU the racket that went on that night. Anyway, when we got there in the woods, everyone started crying and turning their heads away in horror. I looked up at the man. I knew him, yet he was so messed up I could not tell who he was. He was naked, and they had put tar on him and burnt him. He smelled awful. Then I saw what they had done. Even though I was only nine, I knew what they had done was a sin. They had cut out his private and left it laying on the ground. The blood had caked all about his legs and thighs. (ibid. 1969: 100) This is what the lynchers want. A memory, an imago, that will not go away. Not only the body, burned and stinking in the trees, but black men, women and children looking, and then looking away, from what the white men have done. 'Everybody was afraid' except the young black boy who, not knowing what to expect, keeps looking until he can see what has happened. Something has been torn away and left lying on the ground, something private which confirms - as, it seems, the tarred body cannot - that what has happened is a 'sin'. It's a vision which stays with this boy for the rest of his life - 'I can still see him hanging up like that' - a reminder of how fragile his possession of himself, his 'manhood', can be. The real difference between black and white men. 'Psychologically, he [the black male] experiences himself as castrated', writes Hernton in the course of a discussion of 'The Negro Male': a castration which, in the context of African-American history, suggests the impact of the real on that psychology, the psychic weight of learning what to expect by going down to the woods (ibid.: 59). <u><strong><mark>The lesson will stay with you: blackness afflicted, mutilated, a fatal way of being alive</mark>." You might end up wishing you were white. That you were one of the white children playing around the smoking body of a black man, a happy part of the show</u></strong>. The participation of white children at lynchings is documented in photographs and in reports like the following from the New York Times in 1899: All the afternoon children, some of them not more than six years old, kept up the fire around the blackened body by throwing grass, brush, bits of boards, and everything combustible that they could get together. This they kept up until dark ... 5 Inexhaustible, excited, these children can play till dark, part of the type of 'racket' which so frightened the black man interviewed by Hernton. Their presence - so difficult to separate from an idea of innocence, of not knowing - takes us back to the question of where does white hatred come from? What does it have to do with this play? Is this a game played in deadly seriousness, a miming of their parents' own excitement, a search for their loving approval: 'Look at me, I'm burning the black man ... for you'? Are these children spellbound by their parents' own fascinated looking? What do these white men and women want their children to see and to think? What's the purpose of the 'lesson' when it is directed not, or not only, at a black boy but at a white one?</p>

Marriott, 2k – associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at UC Santa Cruz (David, “On Black Men,” Edinburgh University Press, pgs. 6-14)//eek

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Marriott, 2k – associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at UC Santa Cruz (David, “On Black Men,” Edinburgh University Press, pgs. 6-14)//eek fulltext: Cameron describes the sickness which overwhelms him at the sight of the image of his dead friends; Wright recalls his mind 'frozen with a cold pity for the life thaj; was gone' when he comes across the debris of a public lynching (Cameron 1995: 84; Wright 1935). Nausea, petrification: nothing like the gleam in the white man's eye as he vies with his neighbour to have his picture taken. Part of the rites (or rights) of lynching, photographs of dead black men and their white executioners are meant to be seen. They are public portraits: posed, compelling, an exhibition and narration of racist violence. Pressed up close, or drawing back, the camera lens is a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man- and, sometimes, to identify with the white men, and women, at the scene. Spectacle, and gallery, both: a consolidation of racist community and a posture of whiteness. Consider, for example, the repertoire of poses on display at the lynching in Clanton, Alabama in August 1891. Published in Ida B. Wells-Barnett's A Red Record, in 1895, this image is arranged, orderly, composed - a far cry from the hectic jostling described by Cameron. The assembly of (largely) white men and boys look out at the photographer/spectator - as if they have sated their appetites for looking at the black corpse hanging above them (only one or two still look up). What they want to see now is themselves looking at the camera: judges and executioners in the lives, and deaths, of black men. Above all, they are vigilant. An image of white identity emerges from a spectacle of annihilation: the lynchers posing, grimly, alongside their black 'trophies'. A moment frozen in time, flash-lit in the heat of subsided passion. That compulsion to bring the eye of the camera up close, to put themselves in the picture as spectators of torn black flesh, means that we - black men - can still look at those lynchers: look at them looking at teeth, nails, bone, skin. What are they thinking about as they gaze out at the camera, pointing up at black bodies dangling in the trees? Sullen, stern, defiant, satisfied, curious: what do they see? What do they want us to see? That, as Richard Wright puts it in a brief comment on another such image, 'the law is white' (Wright 194T 44)? Wright will come to use the photographic evidence of lynching to present his own convictions about the spectacular place of black men in white scopic pleasure: 'the law is white'. And if this is law, it is both fantasmatic and perverse. Consider, for example, the following account given by Howard Kester in The Lynching of Claude Neal in 1934: 'After taking the nigger to the woods ... they cut off his penis. He was made to eat it. Then they cut off his testicles and made him eat them and say he liked it' (Kester 1934, cited in Dowd Hall I984: 339)· As a response to the 'unspeakable crime' of black- on-white rape, the act of forcing a man to 'fuck' himself to death with his own excised genitals, to feed and gorge himself on his own violating (Violated) pleasure, may well have been hugely satisfying to those assembled - especially when the man got to confess his (seeming) enjoyment. To hear him desire his own death - and so turn their terrible pleasure into his own violent wish - was to construct a vision of the castrated black man as one actively seeking the pleasures of castration. And what of the black man's desires and identifications here? It must have been exhausting trying to name that pleasure, to mention - without choking - how much he liked that severed penis now become his dew protruding tongue. J I suppose that this little bit of theatre serves to reveal, and support, a race hatred predicated on an identification between blackness and sexual guilt, an identification which generates the sadistic desire to witness the spectacle - the stench - of emasculated black men slowly bleeding to death. As such, it is a law which operates through visual terror. The lesson to be learned through the murderous gazes of these white men is that you might be reduced to something that 'don't look human' - a reduction which is, precisely, your annihilation and their pleasure. In Red Wine First, published in 1947, Nedra Tyre records the thoughts of one Skinny Slaton: 'Well, said Skinny Slaton, shore as I'm born I'm gonna borrer me a kodak tomorrer and I'm coming back here and I'm gonna take me some pitchers of that. Don't look human, does it?' (Tyre 194T II2-13). The technological moment which gives us the Kodak - the first turn-of-the-century mass-produced roll-film camera - also gives us a way of venturing into some dark places. For Slaton, anxious to go borrow a Kodak, the photograph represents the climax of an unfolding drama. More than an aid to memory (though it is that too), the photograph is a part of the process, another form of racist slur which can travel through time to do its work: 'Don't look human, does it?' No doubt, Slaton is fascinated by what taking the picture can do and reveal about himself: a figure in a public event, a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man and the identification with fellow whites which can follow. At the same time, it is as if he wants to make an archive of what he sees, to preserve an event for the benefit of those who could not be there (friends, family, a son or daughter, perhaps). Wish you were here. A grotesgue family album. Slaton wants others to see him there, to know he was present at the obliteration of a man whose end could not be imagined without this visible prop. Who can deny the (merciless) evidence of such a photo, its framing - and containing - of the stink of the real? To put this another way: white men, and women, demand a keep- sake, a memento mori: toes, fingers, or - most highly prized - a black penis, a black scrotum. 'Miller's body hung thus exposed from three tofive0'clock',writesIdaB.Wells-BarnettinARedRecordin1895, 'during which time, several photographs of him as he hung dangling at the end of the chain were taken, and his toes and fingers cut off' (Wells-Barnett 1991: 182). But how long will they keep, these organs and limbs, subject to the reek of putrefaction? They're not like the Ir;,age, which registers a moment in time complete, pure, clean - free of the blood, and rot, of the lost body part. Reining in the spill of human wreckage, reviving the carnival atmosphere of the day, the photograph is there to be gazed at, and fingered, over and over again: Look at me. I was there. Again, it was all part of the ritual: this appetite for document, this devouring by the eye - as if only a camera can bring the spectator close enough for the eye to be embedded in flesh. And, of course, the camera plays its part in sustaining that appetite, prolonging the scene it is supposed to record. 'After three full hours had been spent in torturing the two', writes Sutton Griggs in The Hindered Hand in 1905, 'the spokesman announced that they were now ready for the final act. The brother of Sidney Fletcher was called for and was given a match. He stood near his mutilated victims until the photographer could take a picture of the scene' (Griggs 1905: 133-4; my italics). The final act in a popular melodrama: the camera itself- the drive to document, to be in the show - becomes part of that drama, prolonging the agony of the mutilated blacks who must hope that death will come quickly. From the first act - the moment of accusation: rape, murder, theft - this is what the audience has been waiting for: confirmation, via a fatal iconography of the brute black male, that he really' don't look human'. 2 How do we look at these pictures now? How do we start to try to understand the hatred, and misery, on display through them? We know now - as we knew then - that most of the charges on which black men were 'tried' by Judge Lynch (to coin Ida B. Wells' well- known phrase) were fabricated; they were ideological narratives, or fantasies, of black men as murderers, rapists, thieves: 'the black brute ... lurking in the dark' (Dowd Hall 1984: 344). In other words, the act of lynching is part of a racial imaginary, a primal scene of racist culture in the southern states of America, in which black men bear the brunt of a hatred which seems, at times, to know no bounds.' Burdened by history, black men lived, and perhaps con- tinue to live, in that climate, one permeated by racist fantasy - and the violence to which it so often gives rise. As Wright was one of the first to point out in Black Boy, first published in 1945, you don't have to see a lynching to live with its effects: 'I had never in my life been abused by whites, but I had already become as conditioned to their existence as though I had been the victim of a thousand lynchings' (Wright 1945: 84)· 'The victim of a thousand lynchings'? On Wright's reading the black man can die and die and die again - as if, as I suggested before, the identification between the black man looking and the black man lynched becomes irresistible. That identification can, in Wright's work, run riot through the black man's psychic and cultural life. Describing his response to the story of a black woman whose husband had been 'seized and killed by a mob', Wright insists on the 'emotional truth' of the feeling that 'there existed men against whom I was powerless, men who could violate my life at will' (the pedagogic value of the lynch photo/plot) (ibid.: 83-4). He doesn't know if the story is true or not, but it keeps him awake at nights: taking the place of his dreams, the lynching scene becomes a daytime nightmare. Relief comes only with the young Wright's resolve to 'emulate' the black woman who, concealing a rifle at her husband's funeral, shot dead four of his attackers. Revenge, defence, attack: a refusal to accept 'their cruelty as the law of my life' (ibid.: 84). But Wright knows the limits of that identification, one that has no 'objective value'. )My spontaneous fantasies lived in my mind, he continues, 'because I felt completely helpless In the face of this threat that might come upon me at any time, and because there did not exist to my knowledge any possible course of action which could have saved me if I had ever been confronted by a white mob' (ibid.). No possible action, so Wright needs (and it is need rather than, say, wish) his defensive fantasy, his way of defending himself psychically against the death of a thousand lynchings. But no defence, either, because Wright knows that this fantasy has no 'objective value': it cannot be made real, unlike the racist fantasy which structures reality for botfi whites and blacks. Above all, Wright's exploration of his experience of white Southern cuiture uncovers an identification with, or interpellation by, what he - a black man - imagines white desire to be: 'Even when a white man asked us an innocent question', Wright recalls in Twelve Million Black Voices, first published in 1941, some unconscious part of us would listen closely, not only to the obvious words, but also to the intonations of voice that indicated what kind of answer he wanted; and, automatically; we would determine whether an affirmative or negative reply was expected, and we would answer, not in terms of objective truth, but in terms of what the white man wanted to hear. (Wright 1941 : 41) Imagine the black man the white man wants you to be, then, and be him (or, at least, mime him). To push the point, our unconscious - or some of it, in Wright's terms - is given over to that work of second- gueSSing, of dare and double dare. There's no place here for what the black man wants, or for a black unconscious driven by its own desire and aggression. On the contrary. The unconscious (if that is what it is) usurped, by the work of identifying (with) what the white man wants. Even if the black man is a dead man, a lynched man? We can start to clarify this through one of the key works on race, hatred and fantasy: Frantz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, first published in French in 1952,.translated into English in 1967.ff'owards the end of Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon describes his book as a 'mirror' in whose reflective image black men can view their own future. 'This book, it is hoped', he writes in 'The Negro and Psychopathology', 'will be a mirror with a progressive infrastructure, in which it will be possible to discern the Negro on the road to disalienation- (Fanon 196T 184). A new image in the mirror is, for Fanon, crucial if that disalienation is to take place: black men need to look and be reflected, otherwise, to become other than the distorted -and fantasmatic image of white desire. Imagine a 'mirror of confusion' (to use James Baldwin's phrase) in which only the shade, or shadow, of the black man can appear. An image of hate, a hated image. A phobic imago, to use Fanon's terms. Listen, for example, to his account of the psycho-social dynamics of Negrophobogenesis: 'Is the Negro's [sexual] superiority real? Everyone knows that it is not. It is the triumph, and complexity, of Fanon's thinking that he was able to identify the inner life of specular confusion supporting the knot of phobic fantasy. For Fanon, the problem is that white phobic anxiety about black men takes the form of a fetishistic investment in their sexuality: crudely, being well-hung, the black man must be hung well. In other words, the violated body of the black man comes to be used as a defence against the anxiety, or hatred, that body appears to generate. Describing that basic ambivalence of Negrophobia, Fanon uses the syntax of fetishism - 'I know, but all the same' - to account for the construction of the black man a phobic object: 'Everyone knows that he is not superior, but all the same…. But, again, what of black men in all this? What, if anything, can be glimpsed of them in these alienating, and confusing, images? What do black men see when they encounter, perhaps for the first time, a phobic image of themselves in (white) culture? . In Black Skin, White Masks, we find once again the spectacle of a lynching that the black child hasn't seen but which, in some sense, appears to have happened to him. 'Frequently', Fanon argues in 'The Negro and Psychopathology', the negro who becomes abnormal [s'anormalise] has never had any relations with the White man. Has there been an ancient experience and repression in the unconscious [Y a-t-il eu experience ancienne et refoulement dans l'inconscient?]? Has the young black child seen his father beaten or lynched by the white man? Has there been a real traumatism [traumatisme effectif]? To all this we have to answer: no. Well then? (Fanon 1952: II8; 196T 145; t.m.) Well then? What has traumatised this black child who has not seen his father beaten or lynched? Fanon's statement on what the black child has seen, or not, implies that the child has been caught looking not-by the real but by his own racist imaginary, a capture in- separable from an exposure to the cultural representations of the 'white world'. But what if the cultural milieu of that white world insists that the child's eye zone in on such real traumas as way of grounding its - racist culture's - own fantasy? Which it did. What if the cultural traffic in images of the black man as phobic object- , beaten, disfigured, lynched - is trauma enough? As Vicky Lebeau has pointed out in a recent discussion of Black Skin, White Masks, that, insight - the trauma of representation - is, in fact, central to Fanons analysis ofthe black child devouring [devore] and identifying with the stories and images of white culture. Brought up to think and act subjectively 'like a white man' (Fanon's phrase), Lebeau suggests that: the black man who encounters himself as a phobic object within white culture encounters the dereliction of his own self-representation through that culture: dereliction as one of the effects of a hatred coming now from both inside and outside, which Fanon tracks throughout Black Skin, White Masks. (Lebeau 1998: II5) If Fanon seems impervious to the invasive possibilities of real, racial violence in that child's neurotic encounter, blind to the extent to which that evil twin lurking in the mirror of culture may prove to be more than a dark, imaginary double, it is worth taking a few moments to think about how this accusation squares with his continued insistence on the violence of the real. As a symbol of the self-destructive, lacerating ground upon which phobia and fantasy meet, the black child, in taking up the burden of such imagery, Fanon concludes, has been fatally exposed to the glare of those phobic anxieties constructed upon his visual image - as have other blacks exposed, for the first time, to the colonial fantasies of Euro pean culture. This vision of blacks confounded by their reflected images is also acutely - powerfully - aware of the collusions be- tween unconscious and cultural forms of violence; 'of a dreaming possessed not, or not only, by the subject's own wishful-shameful fantasies but by the real' (Lebeau 1998: 121). Not only is the 'sadistic aggression' [agressivite sadique] of culture most visibly at work in the child's 'sacrificial dedication [oblativitej' to his distorted image; his unconscious dreamlife has learned to play its part by demanding that debasement (Fanon I96T 147). There is, in other words, a re- markable correlation between the imago - the fantasy - of black men in cultural life and black self-images. Behind those images and inverted screens lurks a dark intruder albeit framed by a black (and white) vision of black identity; an imago stalking a little black child through his memories and dreams. 'I have never seen a lynching', writes Calvin Hernton in his now classic Sex and Racism in America in 1969, 'never looked upon a Negro who has been castrated. I understand, however, and know, that it is a terrible Sight' (Hernton 1969: 100). That understanding, and knowledge, comes not only from photographs and stories but from those who have seen -like the man who recollects a lynching in Mississippi, Alabama which took place when he was nine years old. Let's listen to the account he gives to Hernton. 'I will never forget it', he says: I can still see him hanging up like that .... The next morning my uncle and me and me and some other coloured folks in the county went to look at the man who had been lynched. The man's wife and brother were with us, and they were crying. Everybody was afraid. I wasn't - for I really didn't know what to expect. But maybe I was a little scared just because of aU the racket that went on that night. Anyway, when we got there in the woods, everyone started crying and turning their heads away in horror. I looked up at the man. I knew him, yet he was so messed up I could not tell who he was. He was naked, and they had put tar on him and burnt him. He smelled awful. Then I saw what they had done. Even though I was only nine, I knew what they had done was a sin. They had cut out his private and left it laying on the ground. The blood had caked all about his legs and thighs. (ibid. 1969: 100) This is what the lynchers want. A memory, an imago, that will not go away. Not only the body, burned and stinking in the trees, but black men, women and children looking, and then looking away, from what the white men have done. 'Everybody was afraid' except the young black boy who, not knowing what to expect, keeps looking until he can see what has happened. Something has been torn away and left lying on the ground, something private which confirms - as, it seems, the tarred body cannot - that what has happened is a 'sin'. It's a vision which stays with this boy for the rest of his life - 'I can still see him hanging up like that' - a reminder of how fragile his possession of himself, his 'manhood', can be. The real difference between black and white men. 'Psychologically, he [the black male] experiences himself as castrated', writes Hernton in the course of a discussion of 'The Negro Male': a castration which, in the context of African-American history, suggests the impact of the real on that psychology, the psychic weight of learning what to expect by going down to the woods (ibid.: 59). The lesson will stay with you: blackness afflicted, mutilated, a fatal way of being alive." You might end up wishing you were white. That you were one of the white children playing around the smoking body of a black man, a happy part of the show. The participation of white children at lynchings is documented in photographs and in reports like the following from the New York Times in 1899: All the afternoon children, some of them not more than six years old, kept up the fire around the blackened body by throwing grass, brush, bits of boards, and everything combustible that they could get together. This they kept up until dark ... 5 Inexhaustible, excited, these children can play till dark, part of the type of 'racket' which so frightened the black man interviewed by Hernton. Their presence - so difficult to separate from an idea of innocence, of not knowing - takes us back to the question of where does white hatred come from? What does it have to do with this play? Is this a game played in deadly seriousness, a miming of their parents' own excitement, a search for their loving approval: 'Look at me, I'm burning the black man ... for you'? Are these children spellbound by their parents' own fascinated looking? What do these white men and women want their children to see and to think? What's the purpose of the 'lesson' when it is directed not, or not only, at a black boy but at a white one? [/INST] <h4>This produces cycles of ressentiment – the affirmative temporally locks the black body into a state of abjection which prevents both resistance and the ability to craft social life – their presentation renders black as phobogenic object which enables a constant repetition of traumatic mortification</h4><p><strong>Marriott, 2k</strong> – associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at UC Santa Cruz (David, “On Black Men,” Edinburgh University Press, pgs. 6-14)//eek</p><p>Cameron describes the sickness which overwhelms him at the sight of the image of his dead friends; Wright recalls his mind 'frozen with a cold pity for the life thaj; was gone' when he comes across the debris of a public lynching (Cameron 1995: 84; Wright 1935). Nausea, petrification: nothing like the gleam in the white man's eye as he vies with his neighbour to have his picture taken. <u><strong>Part of the rites</u></strong> (or rights) <u><strong>of lynching, photographs of dead black men and their white executioners are meant to be seen. They are public portraits: posed, compelling, an exhibition and narration of racist violence. Pressed up close, or drawing back, <mark>the camera lens is a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man- and</mark>, sometimes, <mark>to identify with the white men, and women, at the scene. </mark>Spectacle</u></strong>, and gallery, both: <u><strong><mark>a consolidation of racist community and a posture of whiteness</mark>. </u></strong>Consider, for example, the repertoire of poses on display at the lynching in Clanton, Alabama in August 1891. Published in Ida B. Wells-Barnett's A Red Record, in 1895, this image is arranged, orderly, composed - a far cry from the hectic jostling described by Cameron. <u><strong>The assembly of </u></strong>(largely) <u><strong>white men and boys look out at the photographer/spectator - as if they have sated their appetites for looking at the black corpse</u></strong> hanging above them (only one or two still look up). What they want to see now is themselves looking at the camera: judges and executioners in the lives, and deaths, of black men. Above all, they are vigilant. An image of <u><strong><mark>white identity emerges from a spectacle of annihilation</u></strong></mark>: the lynchers posing, grimly, alongside their black 'trophies'. A moment frozen in time, flash-lit in the heat of subsided passion. That compulsion to bring the eye of the camera up close, to put themselves in the picture as spectators of torn black flesh, means that we - black men - can still look at those lynchers: look at them looking at teeth, nails, bone, skin. What are they thinking about as they gaze out at the camera, pointing up at black bodies dangling in the trees? Sullen, stern, defiant, satisfied, curious: what do they see? What do they want us to see? That, as Richard Wright puts it in a brief comment on another such image, 'the law is white' (Wright 194T 44)? Wright will come to use the photographic evidence of lynching to present his own convictions about the spectacular place of black men in white scopic pleasure: 'the law is white'. And if this is law, it is both fantasmatic and perverse. Consider, for example, the following account given by Howard Kester in The Lynching of Claude Neal in 1934: 'After taking the nigger to the woods ... they cut off his penis. He was made to eat it. Then they cut off his testicles and made him eat them and say he liked it' (Kester 1934, cited in Dowd Hall I984: 339)· As a response to the 'unspeakable crime' of black- on-white rape, the act of forcing a man to 'fuck' himself to death with his own excised genitals, to feed and gorge himself on his own violating (Violated) pleasure, may well have been hugely satisfying to those assembled - especially when the man got to confess his (seeming) enjoyment. To hear him desire his own death - and so turn their terrible pleasure into his own violent wish - was to construct a vision of the castrated black man as one actively seeking the pleasures of castration. And what of the black man's desires and identifications here? It must have been exhausting trying to name that pleasure, to mention - without choking - how much he liked that severed penis now become his dew protruding tongue. J I suppose that <u><strong>this little bit of theatre serves to reveal, and support, a race hatred predicated on an identification between blackness and sexual guilt, an identification which generates the sadistic desire to witness the spectacle</u></strong> - the stench - <u><strong>of emasculated black men slowly bleeding to death. </u></strong>As such, <u><strong>it is a law which operates through visual terror. <mark>The lesson</mark> to be <mark>learned through</mark> the <mark>murderous gazes of</mark> these <mark>white men is that you might be reduced to something that 'don't look human'</mark> - a reduction which is, precisely, your annihilation and their pleasure</u></strong>. In Red Wine First, published in 1947, Nedra Tyre records the thoughts of one Skinny Slaton: 'Well, said Skinny Slaton, shore as I'm born I'm gonna borrer me a kodak tomorrer and I'm coming back here and I'm gonna take me some pitchers of that. Don't look human, does it?' (Tyre 194T II2-13). The technological moment which gives us the Kodak - the first turn-of-the-century mass-produced roll-film camera - also gives us a way of venturing into some dark places. For Slaton, anxious to go borrow a Kodak, the photograph represents the climax of an unfolding drama. More than an aid to memory (though it is that too), <u><strong><mark>the photograph is a part of the process, another form of racist slur which can travel </mark>through <mark>time</mark> to do its work: 'Don't look human, does it?</u></strong>' No doubt, Slaton is fascinated by what taking the picture can do and reveal about himself: <u><strong>a figure in a public event, <mark>a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man and </mark>the <mark>identification with fellow whites which can follow</mark>.</u></strong> At the same time, it is as if he wants to make an archive of what he sees, to preserve an event for the benefit of those who could not be there (friends, family, a son or daughter, perhaps). Wish you were here. A grotesgue family album. <u><strong>Slaton wants others to see him there, to know he was present at the obliteration of a man whose end could not be imagined without this visible prop. Who can deny the (merciless) evidence of such a photo, its framing - and containing - of the stink of the real? To put this another way: white men, and women, demand a keep- sake, a memento mori: toes, fingers, or - most highly prized</u></strong> - a black penis, a black scrotum. 'Miller's body hung thus exposed from three tofive0'clock',writesIdaB.Wells-BarnettinARedRecordin1895, 'during which time, several photographs of him as he hung dangling at the end of the chain were taken, and his toes and fingers cut off' (Wells-Barnett 1991: 182). But how long will they keep, these organs and limbs, subject to the reek of putrefaction? They're not like the Ir;,age, which registers a moment in time complete, pure, clean - free of the blood, and rot, of the lost body part. Reining in the spill of human wreckage, <u><strong>reviving the carnival atmosphere of the day, the photograph is there to be gazed at, and fingered, over and over again: Look at me. I was there. Again, it was all part of the ritual: this appetite for document, this devouring by the eye - as if only a camera can bring the spectator close enough for the eye to be embedded in flesh</u></strong>. And, of course, <u><strong>the camera plays its part in sustaining that appetite, prolonging the scene it is supposed to record</u></strong>. 'After three full hours had been spent in torturing the two', writes Sutton Griggs in The Hindered Hand in 1905, 'the spokesman announced that they were now ready for the final act. The brother of Sidney Fletcher was called for and was given a match. He stood near his mutilated victims until the photographer could take a picture of the scene' (Griggs 1905: 133-4; my italics). The final act in a popular melodrama: the camera itself- <u><strong>the drive to document, to be in the show - becomes part of that drama, prolonging the agony of the mutilated blacks</u></strong> who must hope that death will come quickly. <u><strong>From the first act - the moment of accusation: rape, murder, theft - this is what the audience has been waiting for: confirmation, via a fatal iconography of the brute black male, that he really' don't look human'</u></strong>. 2 How do we look at these pictures now? How do we start to try to understand the hatred, and misery, on display through them? We know now - as we knew then - that most of the charges on which black men were 'tried' by Judge Lynch (to coin Ida B. Wells' well- known phrase) were fabricated; they were ideological narratives, or fantasies, of black men as murderers, rapists, thieves: 'the black brute ... lurking in the dark' (Dowd Hall 1984: 344). In other words, <u><strong>the act of lynching is part of a racial imaginary, a primal scene of racist culture in the southern states of America, in which black men bear the brunt of a hatred which seems, at times, to know no bounds.' Burdened by history, black men lived, and perhaps con- tinue to live, in that climate, one permeated by racist fantasy - and the violence to which it so often gives rise.</u></strong> As Wright was one of the first to point out in Black Boy, first published in 1945, <u><strong><mark>you don't have to see a lynching to live with its effects: 'I had never in my life been abused by whites, but I had</mark> already <mark>become as conditioned </mark>to their existence <mark>as though I had been the victim of a thousand lynchings'</u></strong></mark> (Wright 1945: 84)· 'The victim of a thousand lynchings'? On Wright's reading <u><strong><mark>the black man can die and die and die again</u></strong></mark> - as if, as I suggested before, the identification between the black man looking and the black man lynched becomes irresistible. That identification can, in Wright's work, run riot through the black man's psychic and cultural life. Describing his response to the story of a black woman whose husband had been 'seized and killed by a mob', Wright insists on the 'emotional truth' of the feeling that 'there existed men against whom I was powerless, men who could violate my life at will' (the pedagogic value of the lynch photo/plot) (ibid.: 83-4). <u><strong>He doesn't know if the story is true or not, but it keeps him awake at nights: taking the place of his dreams, the lynching scene becomes a daytime nightmare.</u></strong> Relief comes only with the young Wright's resolve to 'emulate' the black woman who, concealing a rifle at her husband's funeral, shot dead four of his attackers. <u><strong>Revenge, defence, attack: a refusal to accept 'their cruelty as the law of my life'</u></strong> (ibid.: 84). But Wright knows the limits of that identification, one that has no 'objective value'. )My spontaneous fantasies lived in my mind, he continues, 'because<u><strong> <mark>I felt </mark>completely <mark>helpless In the face of this threat that might come </mark>upon me <mark>at any time</mark>, and because there did not exist to my knowledge any possible course of action which could have saved me if I had ever been confronted by a white mob'</u></strong> (ibid.). No possible action, so Wright needs (and it is need rather than, say, wish) his defensive fantasy, his way of defending himself psychically against the death of a thousand lynchings. But no defence, either, because Wright knows that this fantasy has no 'objective value': it cannot be made real, unlike the racist fantasy which structures reality for botfi whites and blacks. Above all, Wright's exploration of his experience of white Southern cuiture uncovers an identification with, or interpellation by, what he - a black man - imagines white desire to be: 'Even when a white man asked us an innocent question', Wright recalls in Twelve Million Black Voices, first published in 1941, some unconscious part of us would listen closely, not only to the obvious words, but also to the intonations of voice that indicated what kind of answer he wanted; and, automatically; we would determine whether an affirmative or negative reply was expected, and we would answer, not in terms of objective truth, but in terms of what the white man wanted to hear. (Wright 1941 : 41) <u><strong>Imagine the black man the white man wants you to be, then, and be him</u></strong> (or, at least, mime him). To push the point, our unconscious - or some of it, in Wright's terms - is given over to that work of second- gueSSing, of dare and double dare. <u><strong>There's no place here for what the black man wants</u></strong>, or for a black unconscious driven by its own desire and aggression. On the contrary. <u><strong>The unconscious</u></strong> (if that is what it is) <u><strong>usurped, by the work of identifying</u></strong> (with) <u><strong>what the white man wants.</u></strong> Even if the black man is a dead man, a lynched man? We can start to clarify this through one of the key works on race, hatred and fantasy: Frantz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, first published in French in 1952,.translated into English in 1967.ff'owards the end of Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon describes his book as a 'mirror' in whose reflective image black men can view their own future. 'This book, it is hoped', he writes in 'The Negro and Psychopathology', 'will be a mirror with a progressive infrastructure, in which it will be possible to discern the Negro on the road to disalienation- (Fanon 196T 184). A new image in the mirror is, for Fanon, crucial if that disalienation is to take place: black men need to look and be reflected, otherwise, to become other than the distorted -and fantasmatic image of white desire. Imagine a 'mirror of confusion' (to use James Baldwin's phrase) in which only the shade, or shadow, of the black man can appear. <u><strong>An image of hate, a hated image. A phobic imago</u></strong>, to use Fanon's terms. Listen, for example, to his account of the psycho-social dynamics of Negrophobogenesis: 'Is the Negro's [sexual] superiority real? Everyone knows that it is not. It is the triumph, and complexity, of Fanon's thinking that he was able to identify the inner life of specular confusion supporting the knot of phobic fantasy. For Fanon, the problem is that white phobic anxiety about black men takes the form of a fetishistic investment in their sexuality: crudely, being well-hung, the black man must be hung well. In other words, the violated body of the black man comes to be used as a defence against the anxiety, or hatred, that body appears to generate. Describing that basic ambivalence of Negrophobia, Fanon uses the syntax of fetishism - 'I know, but all the same' - to account for the construction of the black man a phobic object: 'Everyone knows that he is not superior, but all the same…. But, again, what of black men in all this? What, if anything, can be glimpsed of them in these alienating, and confusing, images? <u><strong>What do black men see when they encounter, perhaps for the first time, a phobic image of themselves in (white) culture?</u></strong> . In Black Skin, White Masks, <u><strong><mark>we find </mark>once again <mark>the spectacle of a lynching that the black child hasn't seen but </mark>which, in some sense, <mark>appears to have happened to him</u></strong></mark>. 'Frequently', Fanon argues in 'The Negro and Psychopathology', the negro who becomes abnormal [s'anormalise] has never had any relations with the White man. Has there been an ancient experience and repression in the unconscious [Y a-t-il eu experience ancienne et refoulement dans l'inconscient?]? <u><strong><mark>Has the</mark> young <mark>black child seen his father beaten or lynched</mark> by the white man? Has there been a real traumatism</u></strong> [traumatisme effectif]? <u><strong>To all this <mark>we have to answer: no. Well then?</u></strong></mark> (Fanon 1952: II8; 196T 145; t.m.) <u><strong>Well then? <mark>What has traumatised this black child</mark> who has not seen his father beaten or lynched?</u></strong> Fanon's statement on what the black child has seen, or not, implies that <u><strong><mark>the child has been caught looking not-by the real but by his own racist imaginary, a capture in</mark>- separable from <mark>an exposure to the </mark>cultural <mark>representations of the 'white world'</mark>. But what if the cultural milieu of that white world insists that the child's eye zone in on such real traumas as way of grounding its - racist culture's - own fantasy?</u></strong> Which it did. <u><strong><mark>What if the cultural traffic in images of the black man as phobic object</mark>- , beaten, disfigured, lynched - <mark>is trauma enough?</u></strong></mark> As Vicky Lebeau has pointed out in a recent discussion of Black Skin, White Masks, that, insight - the trauma of representation - is, in fact, central to Fanons analysis ofthe black child devouring [devore] and identifying with the stories and images of white culture. Brought up to think and act subjectively 'like a white man' (Fanon's phrase), Lebeau suggests that: <u><strong><mark>the black man who encounters himself as a phobic object within white culture encounters the dereliction of his own self-representation</mark> through that culture: <mark>dereliction as one of the effects of a hatred coming</mark> now <mark>from both inside and outside</u></strong></mark>, which Fanon tracks throughout Black Skin, White Masks. (Lebeau 1998: II5) If Fanon seems impervious to the invasive possibilities of real, racial violence in that child's neurotic encounter, blind to the extent to which that evil twin lurking in the mirror of culture may prove to be more than a dark, imaginary double, it is worth taking a few moments to think about how this accusation squares with his continued insistence on the violence of the real. <u><strong><mark>As a symbol of the self-destructive, lacerating ground upon which phobia and fantasy meet, the black child</mark>, in taking up the burden of such imagery</u></strong>, Fanon concludes, <u><strong><mark>has been fatally exposed to the glare of those phobic anxieties constructed upon his visual image</mark> - as have other blacks exposed, for the first time, to the colonial fantasies of Euro pean culture. This vision of blacks confounded by their reflected images is also acutely </u></strong>- powerfully - <u><strong>aware of the collusions be- tween unconscious and cultural forms of violence; 'of a dreaming possessed not, or not only, by the subject's own wishful-shameful fantasies but by the real'</u></strong> (Lebeau 1998: 121). Not only is the 'sadistic aggression' [agressivite sadique] of culture most visibly at work in the child's 'sacrificial dedication [oblativitej' to his distorted image; his unconscious dreamlife has learned to play its part by demanding that debasement (Fanon I96T 147). <u><strong><mark>There is</u></strong></mark>, in other words, <u><strong>a re- markable <mark>correlation between </mark>the</u></strong> imago - the <u><strong><mark>fantasy </mark>- of black men <mark>in cultural life and black self-images</u></strong></mark>. Behind those images and inverted screens lurks a dark intruder albeit framed by a black (and white) vision of black identity; <u><strong>an imago stalking a little black child through his memories and dreams. 'I have never seen a lynching'</u></strong>, writes Calvin Hernton in his now classic Sex and Racism in America in 1969, 'never looked upon a Negro who has been castrated. <u><strong>I understand</u></strong>, however, and know, that <u><strong>it is a terrible Sight'</u></strong> (Hernton 1969: 100). <u><strong>That understanding, and knowledge, comes not only from photographs and stories but from those who have seen -like the man who recollects a lynching</u></strong> in Mississippi, Alabama which took place when he was nine years old. Let's listen to the account he gives to Hernton. 'I will never forget it', he says: I can still see him hanging up like that .... The next morning my uncle and me and me and some other coloured folks in the county went to look at the man who had been lynched. The man's wife and brother were with us, and they were crying. Everybody was afraid. I wasn't - for I really didn't know what to expect. But maybe I was a little scared just because of aU the racket that went on that night. Anyway, when we got there in the woods, everyone started crying and turning their heads away in horror. I looked up at the man. I knew him, yet he was so messed up I could not tell who he was. He was naked, and they had put tar on him and burnt him. He smelled awful. Then I saw what they had done. Even though I was only nine, I knew what they had done was a sin. They had cut out his private and left it laying on the ground. The blood had caked all about his legs and thighs. (ibid. 1969: 100) This is what the lynchers want. A memory, an imago, that will not go away. Not only the body, burned and stinking in the trees, but black men, women and children looking, and then looking away, from what the white men have done. 'Everybody was afraid' except the young black boy who, not knowing what to expect, keeps looking until he can see what has happened. Something has been torn away and left lying on the ground, something private which confirms - as, it seems, the tarred body cannot - that what has happened is a 'sin'. It's a vision which stays with this boy for the rest of his life - 'I can still see him hanging up like that' - a reminder of how fragile his possession of himself, his 'manhood', can be. The real difference between black and white men. 'Psychologically, he [the black male] experiences himself as castrated', writes Hernton in the course of a discussion of 'The Negro Male': a castration which, in the context of African-American history, suggests the impact of the real on that psychology, the psychic weight of learning what to expect by going down to the woods (ibid.: 59). <u><strong><mark>The lesson will stay with you: blackness afflicted, mutilated, a fatal way of being alive</mark>." You might end up wishing you were white. That you were one of the white children playing around the smoking body of a black man, a happy part of the show</u></strong>. The participation of white children at lynchings is documented in photographs and in reports like the following from the New York Times in 1899: All the afternoon children, some of them not more than six years old, kept up the fire around the blackened body by throwing grass, brush, bits of boards, and everything combustible that they could get together. This they kept up until dark ... 5 Inexhaustible, excited, these children can play till dark, part of the type of 'racket' which so frightened the black man interviewed by Hernton. Their presence - so difficult to separate from an idea of innocence, of not knowing - takes us back to the question of where does white hatred come from? What does it have to do with this play? Is this a game played in deadly seriousness, a miming of their parents' own excitement, a search for their loving approval: 'Look at me, I'm burning the black man ... for you'? Are these children spellbound by their parents' own fascinated looking? What do these white men and women want their children to see and to think? What's the purpose of the 'lesson' when it is directed not, or not only, at a black boy but at a white one?</p> </s>

C.) Legalize --

<h4>C.) <u>Legalize</u> --</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>C.) <u>Legalize</u> --</h4> </s>

We need to learn how to speak the language of policy makers as a precursor to critical activist research and advocacy --- They have no offense against our interp

scholars found critical policy analysis an indispensable tool for questioning the roots of policy work. critical policy analysis enabled a deeper critique of the contextual nuances and complexities of the policy process critical policy analysis was “focused on the questions of epistemology,” and recognizes the complexities of policy contexts and how these complexities impact what we know to be real and true. scholars found it important to carefully examine policies and interrogate the policy process because policies are “subjective,” “value laden,” “complex,” and “messy.” Through critical policy analyses researchers can decipher multiple arguments or viewpoints, question and discover how nebulous concepts become reality, and explore how ideas become normalized. critical policy analysis is a tool for questioning structures and systems within the policy field. critical policy analysis reveals critical imperfections in the way traditional scholars think about the policy process Within the policy field, this scholar explained, deeply held beliefs about reality and agency are palpable. critical policy analysis enabled them to explore the role of power in making knowledge … which is always shaped by power relationships” as well as, “to investigate the kinds of questions that fundamentally have to do with power and access to the policy process … about what and who has informed this definition over time.” deep investigations of individual policies enabled a better understanding of the way power and voice operated within the policy process. analysis involved exploring the power imbalances among discourse within communities, interest groups, or policy-makers vis-à-vis those impacted by policy “Who is sitting around the decision-making table, and more importantly, who’s not sitting around the decision-making table?” to identify who has a voice in the policy process. Researchers also described the examination of inequities in power as exploring questions of “Who’s winning and who’s not winning?” or “Who’s benefiting and who’s not benefiting?” critical policy analysis allowed him to, “ask important questions about the role of race and racism, of inequity, of issues of social justice and oppression.” Scholars also stressed the importance of exploring silences by looking at, “what policy says and doesn’t say, looking at how problems and solutions are defined and not defined, what voices are included and not included, and looking for voices on the margin.” This idea of distinguishing not only what is centered in policy and policy conversations but also what is marginalized or absent was a common concern among the scholars we interviewed. One scholar explained: We don’t just look at how the problems and solutions are defined …. [We also examine] how they’re not defined. We don’t just look at whose voices were included, but silenced voices using a critical framework when analyzing policy enables the exploration of the voices of those typically not heard in traditional policy contexts and processes. Conducting comprehensive examinations of specific policies involving detailed analyses of each policy-making and implementation stage was the crux of critical policy work “unpacking the assumptions,” exploring the foundational ideas “underpinning the policy,” or “unpacking the sense making” of policy discourse critical policy analysis as a method for critiquing/questioning various stages of policy enactment You’re going in very well aware that there are societal structures that oppress. And policy is then the vehicle through which these things are cemented or not. And so that’s a very different perspective than going in with that kind of an ahistorical, non-historical view. researchers engaged in this project considered analyses an essential precursor to engaged and activist research , “critical policy analysis opens up a space for activism.” Engaged and activist research participants identified informing the work of policy-makers as a key purpose for conducting critical policy analysis. Expressing dissatisfaction with the way the policy process has traditionally worked, they have sought ways to bring different perspectives to bear on policy. critical perspectives enable not only critique, but also indications of what might work in the best interest of certain populations. … We need to learn to speak the language of those who draft and approve policy.” critical policy work is more than an intellectual exercise – that it influences practice and policy critical policy analysis is focused not only on theoretical change but on real change as well: A lot of times we do research and we propose … what we think may be some practices that are worthy of consideration at the policy level. Some real pieces that we’ve done for legislators have actually become part of the state directives. We feel pretty good about that. critical policy analysis fosters a: perspective and the methodological approaches to be able to be more of an activist … it allows me to center the stories and the perspective of students and of families and of communities that have for very much [of the time] been silenced in this. purpose for conducting critical policy analysis to bridging the gap between policy and practice, grounding this bridging activity in the field. Participants shared that their use of critical perspectives that emphasized context and collaboration enabled them to communicate authentically with and be useful to a variety of stakeholders, including teachers, principals, and regional or district leadership personnel. However, making research findings and policy analyses accessible to local educators and educational leaders appeared to be of utmost importance to this group. For example, one researcher stated: practitioners try to show how they can use the policy – any policy. It’s a leverage agency how can you subvert it, how can you move it, how can you use the discourses to mobilize them in ways that actually make it a value meaningful to them as practitioners? build educators’ capacity and then assist them in advocating for or making needed changes part of understanding how to leverage state or federal policy to support typically underserved populations involves challenging wrong-headed beliefs with data, introducing alternate ways of thinking and practicing, and then setting up systems to support them as they change their practice. the key value of critical policy analysis was how it enabled a “revolutionary [stance] position… looking at: What does this policy do within this grid that privileges some and marginalizes and oppresses others?

scholars found critical policy analysis an indispensable tool for questioning the roots of policy work. enabled deeper critique of contextual nuances and complexities of the policy process critical policy analysis “focused on epistemology,” and recognizes scholars found it important to carefully examine policies and interrogate the policy process because policies are “subjective,” researchers can decipher multiple arguments or viewpoints, question and discover how concepts become reality, and critical policy analysis is a tool for questioning structures and systems within the policy field. analysis reveals critical imperfections in the way traditional scholars think about the policy process: analysis enabled them to explore the role of power in making knowledge always shaped by power relationships” “to investigate questions that fundamentally have to do with power and access to the policy process … deep investigations of individual policies enabled a better understanding of the way power and voice operated within the policy process. exploring power imbalances among discourse within communities, policy-makers vis-à-vis those impacted by policy to, “ask important questions about the role of race and racism, of inequity, of issues of social justice and oppression.” exploring silences by looking at, “what policy says and doesn’t say, looking at how problems and solutions are defined and not defined, what voices are included and not included, and looking for voices on the margin.” examine] how they’re not defined silenced voices analyzing policy enables the exploration of the voices of those typically not heard in traditional policy contexts and processes. Conducting comprehensive examinations of specific policies involving detailed analyses of each policy-making and implementation stage was the crux of critical policy work unpacking assumptions foundational ideas “underpinning the policy,” or “unpacking the sense making” of policy discourse a method for critiquing/questioning various stages of policy enactment researchers considered analyses an essential precursor to engaged and activist research “critical policy analysis opens up a space for activism.” participants identified informing the work of policy-makers as Expressing dissatisfaction with policy process critical perspectives enable not only critique, but what might work critical policy work is more than an intellectual exercise – that it influences practice and policy. focused not only on theoretical change but on real change critical policy analysis fosters a: perspective and the methodological approaches to be able to be more of an activist practitioners show how they can use policy It’s a leverage agency how you subvert it move it how you use the discourses to mobilize in ways that actually make it meaningful to them : build educators’ capacity and assist them in advocating for or making needed changes how to leverage federal policy to support typically underserved populations challenging wrong-headed beliefs with data, introducing alternate ways of practicing then setting up systems to support them as they change their practice. critical policy analysis enabled a “revolutionary position… looking at: What does this policy do within this grid that privileges some and marginalizes and oppresses others?

The scholars interviewed for this project found critical policy analysis an indispensable tool for questioning the roots of much policy work. Contrasting their work to traditional policy analyses, several scholars pointed out how critical policy analysis enabled a deeper critique of the contextual nuances and complexities of the policy process. One scholar explained how critical policy analysis was “focused on the questions of epistemology,” and, unlike traditional approaches to policy analysis, critical policy analysis recognizes the complexities of policy contexts and how these complexities impact what we know to be real and true. The scholars we interviewed found it important to carefully examine policies and interrogate the policy process because, as they pointed out, policies are “subjective,” “value laden,” “complex,” and “messy.” Through critical policy analyses researchers can decipher multiple arguments or viewpoints, question and discover how nebulous concepts become reality, and explore how ideas become normalized. In the words of one participant, critical policy analysis enables both discovery and exploration of “how categories work, and how do they become fixed, and how do we need to constantly challenge the categories?” In this sense, critical policy analysis is a tool for questioning structures and systems within the policy field. Data revealed that participants placed particular importance on using critical policy analysis to explore and question the policy process. One researcher said: We should be constantly asking questions: is this the way it has to be; what’s the value of doing it this way; how are people hurt by this; what are the alternatives? And then: How do you collect information that informs decisions? What would present a compelling case for changing the policy that may be having negative impacts? According to a second scholar, critical policy analysis reveals critical imperfections in the way traditional scholars think about the policy process: You are more or less guided by the tenets of traditional policy analysis, meaning that it’s a realist, structuralist epistemology. There’s a real world out there, and it’s flawed. It’s deeply flawed, and it’s flawed in a very predictable way. Doing work in that area means that you would deal with inequity, you would anticipate people being both effective and ineffective, you are a strong component of “there’s got to be practice” and “there’s got to be change,” and “you can’t get in this conversation just to do the critique; you also have to take part.” Within the policy field, this scholar explained, deeply held beliefs about reality and agency are palpable. The same deeply held beliefs that govern the behavior and assumptions of many policy scholars also impact the role of power and voice in policy processes. Scholars ascertained that critical policy analysis enabled them to explore, “what is the role of power in making knowledge … which is always shaped by power relationships” as well as, “to investigate the kinds of questions that fundamentally have to do with power and access to the policy process … about what and who has informed this definition over time.” It was noted that deep investigations of individual policies enabled a better understanding of the way power and voice operated within the policy process. In some cases, analysis involved exploring the power imbalances among discourse within communities, interest groups, or policy-makers vis-à-vis those impacted by policy. In their work, several scholars used questions such as, “Who is sitting around the decision-making table, and more importantly, who’s not sitting around the decision-making table?” to identify who has a voice in the policy process. Researchers also described the examination of inequities in power as exploring questions of “Who’s winning and who’s not winning?” or “Who’s benefiting and who’s not benefiting?” Through the process of raising critical questions, several scholars focused specifically on identifying and exposing inequities and social injustices, such as “loss of opportunity or lack of opportunity,” “who is not represented and why,” and “what are going to be the repercussions and for whom?” Such explorations unmask how one community’s accumulation of power may result in another community’s loss of power. To illustrate, one scholar found critical policy analysis allowed him to, “ask really important questions about the role of race and racism, of inequity, of issues of social justice and oppression.” Scholars also stressed the importance of exploring silences by looking at, “what policy says and doesn’t say, looking at how problems and solutions are defined and not defined, what voices are included and not included, and looking for voices on the margin.” One participant referred to such silences as “white spaces.” White spaces reveal: What’s missing; what needs to be there that’s not there; what are the silences that are there, and why aren’t they being addressed; and what can you do to help make sure that they are addressed? So looking at inequities, looking at loss of opportunity or lack of opportunity, looking at silences, looking at who’s not represented and why … This idea of distinguishing not only what is centered in policy and policy conversations but also what is marginalized or absent was a common concern among the scholars we interviewed. One scholar explained: We don’t just look at how the problems and solutions are defined …. [We also examine] how they’re not defined. We don’t just look at whose voices were included, but try to figure out what the silenced voices would say if they did have a chance to voice their concerns. In other words, using a critical framework when analyzing policy enables the exploration of the voices of those typically not heard in traditional policy contexts and processes. Conducting comprehensive examinations of specific policies involving detailed analyses of each policy-making and implementation stage, for some scholars, was the crux of critical policy work. Several scholars described their analytical work as “unpacking the assumptions,” exploring the foundational ideas “underpinning the policy,” or “unpacking the sense making” of policy discourse. One researcher defined critical policy analysis as a method for critiquing/questioning various stages of policy enactment: I want to know who is behind the policy, whose voice is being privileged …. And then I want to see how that rolls out to every student, and how it affects particular students …. So analyzing policy in a critical way to see how it is enacted, who it affects, who’s putting it forth, what it means, how it actually does or does not do what the intent is. This scholar explained that exploring how policy is enacted allows the researcher to consider the contextual intricacies of the policy process: You’re going in very well aware that there are societal structures that oppress. And policy is then the vehicle through which these things are cemented or not. And so that’s a very different perspective than going in with that kind of an ahistorical, non-historical view. For some researchers, an examination of this nature was not an end in itself, however. Rather, just over half of the researchers engaged in this project considered analyses an essential precursor to engaged and activist research. In the words of one scholar, “critical policy analysis opens up a space for activism.” Engaged and activist research Although the complexity offered through the application of most critical perspectives to policy analysis might make it hard to accept that influencing policy could even be an option for critical policy scholars, our participants identified informing the work of policy-makers as a key purpose for conducting critical policy analysis. Expressing dissatisfaction with the way the policy process has traditionally worked, they have sought ways to bring different perspectives to bear on policy. According to one participant, “most critical perspectives enable not only critique, but also indications of what might work in the best interest of certain populations. … We need to learn to speak the language of those who draft and approve policy.” Thinking about the development of this particular area of scholarship, one scholar expressed the expectation that critical policy work is more than an intellectual exercise – that it influences practice and policy. Another scholar remarked that critical policy analysis is focused not only on theoretical change but on real change as well: A lot of times we do research and we propose … what we think may be some practices that are worthy of consideration at the policy level. Some real pieces that we’ve done for legislators have actually become part of the state directives. We feel pretty good about that. One participant explained that critical policy analysis fosters a: perspective and the methodological approaches to be able to be more of an activist … it allows me to center the stories and the perspective of students and of families and of communities that have for very much [of the time] been silenced in this. Respondents linked their purpose for conducting critical policy analysis to bridging the gap between policy and practice, grounding this bridging activity in the field. Participants shared that their use of critical perspectives that emphasized context and collaboration enabled them to communicate authentically with and be useful to a variety of stakeholders, including teachers, principals, and regional or district leadership personnel. However, making research findings and policy analyses accessible to local educators and educational leaders appeared to be of utmost importance to this group. For example, one researcher stated: The thing you’re trying to do with the practitioners is to try to show how they can use the policy – any policy. It’s a leverage; some agency for them. You know, how can you subvert it, how can you move it, how can you use the discourses to mobilize them in ways that actually make it a value meaningful to them as practitioners? Another participant provided a perspective on how to build bridges between policy and educators’ practice: build educators’ capacity and then assist them in advocating for or making needed changes. This researcher explained that part of understanding how to leverage state or federal policy within local schools to support typically underserved student populations involves challenging wrong-headed beliefs about such students with data, introducing alternate ways of thinking and practicing, and then setting up systems to support them as they change their practice. Indeed, another researcher told us that given the current direction of federal and national education policy, critical policy analysis: is wonderful because we have an obligation, those of us in universities, to ask what structural priorities aren’t being addressed when we direct federal funding streams in certain directions. And I think that it becomes harder to have that kind of dissent, if you will, when there is such a powerful sort of torrential flood and momentum in one direction. I think it’s essential for the field of policy to nurture independence in scholars. I think we want to continue to bring in people from many different disciplines to ask these questions. This researcher went on to say that it is important to “be experimental” and not “be afraid to pose questions that are right at the heart of central issues about power,” particularly when it comes to what this researcher described as the “new federal role” in education. One scholar explained that the key value of critical policy analysis was how it enabled a “revolutionary [stance] position… looking at: What does this policy do within this grid that privileges some and marginalizes and oppresses others? It is a different view.” Along similar lines, a different scholar stated: The problem is there and there’s a sense of urgency to do something about the problem. … We have to be engaged. We have to care about something so much that it’s going to move us to act, that it’s going to move us to do something, not just necessarily write about it.

<h4>We need to learn how to speak the language of policy makers as a precursor to critical activist research and advocacy --- They have no offense against our interp</h4><p><strong>Diem et al 2014</strong> (Sarah Diem, Michelle D. Young, Anjalé D. Welton, Katherine Cumings Mansfield & Pei-Ling Lee (2014) The intellectual landscape of critical policy analysis, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 27:9, 1068-1090, DOI: 10.1080/09518398.2014.916007 [bracket modified])</p><p>The <u><strong><mark>scholars</u></strong></mark> interviewed for this project <u><strong><mark>found</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>critical policy analysis an indispensable tool for questioning the roots of</mark> </u></strong>much <u><strong><mark>policy work.</u></strong></mark> Contrasting their work to traditional policy analyses, several scholars pointed out how <u><strong>critical policy analysis <mark>enabled</mark> a <mark>deeper critique</mark> <mark>of</mark> the <mark>contextual nuances and complexities of the policy process</u></strong></mark>. One scholar explained how <u><strong><mark>critical policy analysis</mark> was <mark>“focused on</mark> the questions of <mark>epistemology,” and</u></strong></mark>, unlike traditional approaches to policy analysis, critical policy analysis <u><strong><mark>recognizes</mark> the complexities of policy contexts and how these complexities impact what we know to be real and true.</p><p></u></strong>The <u><strong><mark>scholars</u></strong></mark> we interviewed <u><strong><mark>found it important to</mark> <mark>carefully examine policies and interrogate the policy process</mark> <mark>because</u></strong></mark>, as they pointed out, <u><strong><mark>policies are “subjective,”</mark> “value laden,” “complex,” and “messy.” Through critical policy analyses <mark>researchers can decipher multiple arguments or viewpoints, question and discover how</mark> nebulous <mark>concepts become reality, and </mark>explore how ideas become normalized.</p><p></u></strong>In the words of one participant, critical policy analysis enables both discovery and exploration of “how categories work, and how do they become fixed, and how do we need to constantly challenge the categories?” In this sense, <u><strong><mark>critical policy analysis is a tool for questioning structures and systems within the policy field.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Data revealed that participants placed particular importance on using critical policy analysis to explore and question the policy process. One researcher said:</p><p>We should be constantly asking questions: is this the way it has to be; what’s the value of doing it this way; how are people hurt by this; what are the alternatives? And then:</p><p>How do you collect information that informs decisions? What would present a compelling case for changing the policy that may be having negative impacts?</p><p>According to a second scholar, <u><strong>critical policy <mark>analysis reveals critical imperfections</mark> <mark>in the way traditional scholars think about the policy process</u></strong>:</p><p></mark>You are more or less guided by the tenets of traditional policy analysis, meaning that it’s a realist, structuralist epistemology. There’s a real world out there, and it’s flawed. It’s deeply flawed, and it’s flawed in a very predictable way. Doing work in that area means that you would deal with inequity, you would anticipate people being both effective and ineffective, you are a strong component of “there’s got to be practice” and “there’s got to be change,” and “you can’t get in this conversation just to do the critique; you also have to take part.”</p><p><u><strong>Within the policy field, this scholar explained, deeply held beliefs about reality and agency are palpable.</p><p></u></strong>The same deeply held beliefs that govern the behavior and assumptions of many policy scholars also impact the role of power and voice in policy processes. Scholars ascertained that <u><strong>critical policy <mark>analysis</mark> <mark>enabled them to explore</u></strong></mark>, “what is<u><strong> <mark>the role of power in making knowledge</mark> … which is <mark>always shaped by power relationships”</mark> as well as, <mark>“to investigate</mark> the kinds of <mark>questions</mark> <mark>that fundamentally have to do with power and access to the policy process …</mark> about what and who has informed this definition over time.”</u></strong> It was noted that <u><strong><mark>deep investigations of</mark> <mark>individual policies</mark> <mark>enabled a better understanding of the way power and voice operated within the policy process.</p><p></u></strong></mark>In some cases, <u><strong>analysis involved <mark>exploring</mark> the <mark>power imbalances among discourse within communities,</mark> interest groups, or <mark>policy-makers vis-à-vis those impacted by policy</u></strong></mark>. In their work, several scholars used questions such as, <u><strong>“Who is sitting around the decision-making table, and more importantly, who’s not sitting around the decision-making table?” to identify who has a voice in the policy process. Researchers also described the examination of inequities in power as exploring questions of “Who’s winning and who’s not winning?” or “Who’s benefiting and who’s not benefiting?”</p><p></u></strong>Through the process of raising critical questions, several scholars focused specifically on identifying and exposing inequities and social injustices, such as “loss of opportunity or lack of opportunity,” “who is not represented and why,” and “what are going to be the repercussions and for whom?” Such explorations unmask how one community’s accumulation of power may result in another community’s loss of power. To illustrate, one scholar found <u><strong>critical policy analysis allowed him <mark>to, “ask </u></strong></mark>really<u><strong><mark> important questions about the role of race and racism, of inequity, of issues of social justice and oppression.”</p><p></mark>Scholars</u></strong> <u><strong>also stressed the importance of <mark>exploring silences by looking at, “what policy says and doesn’t say, looking at how problems and solutions are defined and not defined, what voices are included and not included, and looking for voices on the margin.”</u></strong></mark> One participant referred to such silences as “white spaces.” White spaces reveal:</p><p>What’s missing; what needs to be there that’s not there; what are the silences that are there, and why aren’t they being addressed; and what can you do to help make sure that they are addressed? So looking at inequities, looking at loss of opportunity or lack of opportunity, looking at silences, looking at who’s not represented and why …</p><p><u><strong>This idea of distinguishing not only what is centered in policy and policy conversations but also what is marginalized or absent was a common concern among the scholars we interviewed. One scholar explained:</p><p>We don’t just look at how the problems and solutions are defined …. [We also <mark>examine] how they’re not defined</mark>. We don’t just look at whose voices were included, but </u></strong>try to figure out what the<u><strong> <mark>silenced voices</mark> </u></strong>would say if they did have a chance to voice their concerns.</p><p>In other words,<u><strong> using a critical framework when <mark>analyzing policy enables the exploration of the voices of those typically not heard in traditional policy contexts and processes.</p><p>Conducting comprehensive examinations of</mark> <mark>specific policies involving detailed analyses of each policy-making and implementation stage</u></strong></mark>, for some scholars, <u><strong><mark>was the crux of critical policy work</u></strong></mark>. Several scholars described their analytical work as <u><strong>“<mark>unpacking</mark> the <mark>assumptions</mark>,” exploring the <mark>foundational ideas</mark> <mark>“underpinning the policy,” or “unpacking the sense making” of policy discourse</u></strong></mark>. One researcher defined <u><strong>critical policy analysis as <mark>a method for critiquing/questioning various stages of</mark> <mark>policy enactment</u></strong></mark>:</p><p>I want to know who is behind the policy, whose voice is being privileged …. And then I want to see how that rolls out to every student, and how it affects particular students …. So analyzing policy in a critical way to see how it is enacted, who it affects, who’s putting it forth, what it means, how it actually does or does not do what the intent is. This scholar explained that exploring how policy is enacted allows the researcher to consider the contextual intricacies of the policy process:</p><p><u><strong>You’re going in very well aware that there are societal structures that oppress. And policy is then the vehicle through which these things are cemented or not. And so that’s a very different perspective than going in with that kind of an ahistorical, non-historical view.</p><p></u></strong>For some researchers, an examination of this nature was not an end in itself, however. Rather, just over half of the <u><strong><mark>researchers</mark> engaged in this project <mark>considered analyses an</mark> <mark>essential precursor to engaged and activist research</u></strong></mark>. In the words of one scholar<u><strong>, <mark>“critical policy analysis opens up a space for activism.”</p><p></mark>Engaged and activist research</p><p></u></strong>Although the complexity offered through the application of most critical perspectives to policy analysis might make it hard to accept that influencing policy could even be an option for critical policy scholars, our <u><strong><mark>participants</mark> <mark>identified informing the work of policy-makers</mark> <mark>as </mark>a key purpose for conducting critical policy analysis.</p><p><mark>Expressing dissatisfaction with</mark> the way the <mark>policy process</mark> has traditionally worked, they have sought ways to bring different perspectives to bear on policy.</u></strong> According to one participant, “most <u><strong><mark>critical perspectives enable not only critique, but</mark> also indications of <mark>what might work</mark> in the best interest of certain populations. … We need to learn to speak the language of those who draft and approve policy.”</p><p></u></strong>Thinking about the development of this particular area of scholarship, one scholar expressed the expectation that <u><strong><mark>critical policy work is more than an intellectual exercise – that it influences practice and policy</u></strong>.</mark> Another scholar remarked that <u><strong>critical policy analysis is <mark>focused not only on theoretical change but on real change</mark> as well:</p><p>A lot of times we do research and we propose … what we think may be some practices that are worthy of consideration at the policy level. Some real pieces that we’ve done for legislators have actually become part of the state directives. We feel pretty good about that.</p><p></u></strong>One participant explained that<u><strong> <mark>critical policy analysis fosters a: perspective and the methodological approaches to be able to be more of an activist</mark> … it allows me to center the stories and the perspective of students and of families and of communities that have for very much [of the time] been silenced in this.</p><p></u></strong>Respondents linked their <u><strong>purpose for conducting critical policy analysis to bridging the gap between policy and practice, grounding this bridging activity in the field. Participants shared that their use of critical perspectives that emphasized context and collaboration enabled them to communicate authentically with and be useful to a variety of stakeholders, including teachers, principals, and regional or district leadership personnel. However, making research findings and policy analyses accessible to local educators and educational leaders appeared to be of utmost importance to this group. For example, one researcher stated:</p><p></u></strong>The thing you’re trying to do with the<u><strong> <mark>practitioners</u></strong></mark> is to <u><strong>try to <mark>show how they can use</mark> the <mark>policy</mark> – any policy. <mark>It’s a leverage</u></strong></mark>; some <u><strong><mark>agency</mark> </u></strong>for them. You know, <u><strong><mark>how</mark> can <mark>you subvert it</mark>, how can you <mark>move it</mark>, <mark>how</mark> can <mark>you use the discourses to mobilize</mark> them <mark>in ways that actually make it</mark> a value <mark>meaningful to them</mark> as practitioners? </u></strong>Another participant provided a perspective on how to build bridges between policy and educators’ practice<mark>: <u><strong>build educators’ capacity and</mark> then <mark>assist them in advocating for or making needed changes</u></strong></mark>. This researcher explained that<u><strong> part of understanding <mark>how to leverage</mark> state or <mark>federal policy</mark> </u></strong>within local schools <u><strong><mark>to support typically underserved</u></strong></mark> student<u><strong> <mark>populations</mark> involves <mark>challenging wrong-headed beliefs</mark> </u></strong>about such students<u><strong> <mark>with data, introducing alternate ways of</mark> thinking and <mark>practicing</mark>, and <mark>then setting up systems to support them as they change their practice.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Indeed, another researcher told us that given the current direction of federal and national education policy, critical policy analysis: is wonderful because we have an obligation, those of us in universities, to ask what structural priorities aren’t being addressed when we direct federal funding streams in certain directions. And I think that it becomes harder to have that kind of dissent, if you will, when there is such a powerful sort of torrential flood and momentum in one direction. I think it’s essential for the field of policy to nurture independence in scholars.</p><p>I think we want to continue to bring in people from many different disciplines to ask these questions.</p><p>This researcher went on to say that it is important to “be experimental” and not “be afraid to pose questions that are right at the heart of central issues about power,” particularly when it comes to what this researcher described as the “new federal role” in education.</p><p>One scholar explained that <u><strong>the key value of <mark>critical policy analysis</mark> was how it <mark>enabled a “revolutionary </mark>[stance] <mark>position…</mark> <mark>looking at: What does this policy do within this grid that privileges some and marginalizes and oppresses others?</u></strong></mark> It is a different view.” Along similar lines, a different scholar stated:</p><p>The problem is there and there’s a sense of urgency to do something about the problem. … We have to be engaged. We have to care about something so much that it’s going to move us to act, that it’s going to move us to do something, not just necessarily write about it.</p>

Diem et al 2014 (Sarah Diem, Michelle D. Young, Anjalé D. Welton, Katherine Cumings Mansfield & Pei-Ling Lee (2014) The intellectual landscape of critical policy analysis, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 27:9, 1068-1090, DOI: 10.1080/09518398.2014.916007 [bracket modified])

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Diem et al 2014 (Sarah Diem, Michelle D. Young, Anjalé D. Welton, Katherine Cumings Mansfield & Pei-Ling Lee (2014) The intellectual landscape of critical policy analysis, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 27:9, 1068-1090, DOI: 10.1080/09518398.2014.916007 [bracket modified]) fulltext: The scholars interviewed for this project found critical policy analysis an indispensable tool for questioning the roots of much policy work. Contrasting their work to traditional policy analyses, several scholars pointed out how critical policy analysis enabled a deeper critique of the contextual nuances and complexities of the policy process. One scholar explained how critical policy analysis was “focused on the questions of epistemology,” and, unlike traditional approaches to policy analysis, critical policy analysis recognizes the complexities of policy contexts and how these complexities impact what we know to be real and true. The scholars we interviewed found it important to carefully examine policies and interrogate the policy process because, as they pointed out, policies are “subjective,” “value laden,” “complex,” and “messy.” Through critical policy analyses researchers can decipher multiple arguments or viewpoints, question and discover how nebulous concepts become reality, and explore how ideas become normalized. In the words of one participant, critical policy analysis enables both discovery and exploration of “how categories work, and how do they become fixed, and how do we need to constantly challenge the categories?” In this sense, critical policy analysis is a tool for questioning structures and systems within the policy field. Data revealed that participants placed particular importance on using critical policy analysis to explore and question the policy process. One researcher said: We should be constantly asking questions: is this the way it has to be; what’s the value of doing it this way; how are people hurt by this; what are the alternatives? And then: How do you collect information that informs decisions? What would present a compelling case for changing the policy that may be having negative impacts? According to a second scholar, critical policy analysis reveals critical imperfections in the way traditional scholars think about the policy process: You are more or less guided by the tenets of traditional policy analysis, meaning that it’s a realist, structuralist epistemology. There’s a real world out there, and it’s flawed. It’s deeply flawed, and it’s flawed in a very predictable way. Doing work in that area means that you would deal with inequity, you would anticipate people being both effective and ineffective, you are a strong component of “there’s got to be practice” and “there’s got to be change,” and “you can’t get in this conversation just to do the critique; you also have to take part.” Within the policy field, this scholar explained, deeply held beliefs about reality and agency are palpable. The same deeply held beliefs that govern the behavior and assumptions of many policy scholars also impact the role of power and voice in policy processes. Scholars ascertained that critical policy analysis enabled them to explore, “what is the role of power in making knowledge … which is always shaped by power relationships” as well as, “to investigate the kinds of questions that fundamentally have to do with power and access to the policy process … about what and who has informed this definition over time.” It was noted that deep investigations of individual policies enabled a better understanding of the way power and voice operated within the policy process. In some cases, analysis involved exploring the power imbalances among discourse within communities, interest groups, or policy-makers vis-à-vis those impacted by policy. In their work, several scholars used questions such as, “Who is sitting around the decision-making table, and more importantly, who’s not sitting around the decision-making table?” to identify who has a voice in the policy process. Researchers also described the examination of inequities in power as exploring questions of “Who’s winning and who’s not winning?” or “Who’s benefiting and who’s not benefiting?” Through the process of raising critical questions, several scholars focused specifically on identifying and exposing inequities and social injustices, such as “loss of opportunity or lack of opportunity,” “who is not represented and why,” and “what are going to be the repercussions and for whom?” Such explorations unmask how one community’s accumulation of power may result in another community’s loss of power. To illustrate, one scholar found critical policy analysis allowed him to, “ask really important questions about the role of race and racism, of inequity, of issues of social justice and oppression.” Scholars also stressed the importance of exploring silences by looking at, “what policy says and doesn’t say, looking at how problems and solutions are defined and not defined, what voices are included and not included, and looking for voices on the margin.” One participant referred to such silences as “white spaces.” White spaces reveal: What’s missing; what needs to be there that’s not there; what are the silences that are there, and why aren’t they being addressed; and what can you do to help make sure that they are addressed? So looking at inequities, looking at loss of opportunity or lack of opportunity, looking at silences, looking at who’s not represented and why … This idea of distinguishing not only what is centered in policy and policy conversations but also what is marginalized or absent was a common concern among the scholars we interviewed. One scholar explained: We don’t just look at how the problems and solutions are defined …. [We also examine] how they’re not defined. We don’t just look at whose voices were included, but try to figure out what the silenced voices would say if they did have a chance to voice their concerns. In other words, using a critical framework when analyzing policy enables the exploration of the voices of those typically not heard in traditional policy contexts and processes. Conducting comprehensive examinations of specific policies involving detailed analyses of each policy-making and implementation stage, for some scholars, was the crux of critical policy work. Several scholars described their analytical work as “unpacking the assumptions,” exploring the foundational ideas “underpinning the policy,” or “unpacking the sense making” of policy discourse. One researcher defined critical policy analysis as a method for critiquing/questioning various stages of policy enactment: I want to know who is behind the policy, whose voice is being privileged …. And then I want to see how that rolls out to every student, and how it affects particular students …. So analyzing policy in a critical way to see how it is enacted, who it affects, who’s putting it forth, what it means, how it actually does or does not do what the intent is. This scholar explained that exploring how policy is enacted allows the researcher to consider the contextual intricacies of the policy process: You’re going in very well aware that there are societal structures that oppress. And policy is then the vehicle through which these things are cemented or not. And so that’s a very different perspective than going in with that kind of an ahistorical, non-historical view. For some researchers, an examination of this nature was not an end in itself, however. Rather, just over half of the researchers engaged in this project considered analyses an essential precursor to engaged and activist research. In the words of one scholar, “critical policy analysis opens up a space for activism.” Engaged and activist research Although the complexity offered through the application of most critical perspectives to policy analysis might make it hard to accept that influencing policy could even be an option for critical policy scholars, our participants identified informing the work of policy-makers as a key purpose for conducting critical policy analysis. Expressing dissatisfaction with the way the policy process has traditionally worked, they have sought ways to bring different perspectives to bear on policy. According to one participant, “most critical perspectives enable not only critique, but also indications of what might work in the best interest of certain populations. … We need to learn to speak the language of those who draft and approve policy.” Thinking about the development of this particular area of scholarship, one scholar expressed the expectation that critical policy work is more than an intellectual exercise – that it influences practice and policy. Another scholar remarked that critical policy analysis is focused not only on theoretical change but on real change as well: A lot of times we do research and we propose … what we think may be some practices that are worthy of consideration at the policy level. Some real pieces that we’ve done for legislators have actually become part of the state directives. We feel pretty good about that. One participant explained that critical policy analysis fosters a: perspective and the methodological approaches to be able to be more of an activist … it allows me to center the stories and the perspective of students and of families and of communities that have for very much [of the time] been silenced in this. Respondents linked their purpose for conducting critical policy analysis to bridging the gap between policy and practice, grounding this bridging activity in the field. Participants shared that their use of critical perspectives that emphasized context and collaboration enabled them to communicate authentically with and be useful to a variety of stakeholders, including teachers, principals, and regional or district leadership personnel. However, making research findings and policy analyses accessible to local educators and educational leaders appeared to be of utmost importance to this group. For example, one researcher stated: The thing you’re trying to do with the practitioners is to try to show how they can use the policy – any policy. It’s a leverage; some agency for them. You know, how can you subvert it, how can you move it, how can you use the discourses to mobilize them in ways that actually make it a value meaningful to them as practitioners? Another participant provided a perspective on how to build bridges between policy and educators’ practice: build educators’ capacity and then assist them in advocating for or making needed changes. This researcher explained that part of understanding how to leverage state or federal policy within local schools to support typically underserved student populations involves challenging wrong-headed beliefs about such students with data, introducing alternate ways of thinking and practicing, and then setting up systems to support them as they change their practice. Indeed, another researcher told us that given the current direction of federal and national education policy, critical policy analysis: is wonderful because we have an obligation, those of us in universities, to ask what structural priorities aren’t being addressed when we direct federal funding streams in certain directions. And I think that it becomes harder to have that kind of dissent, if you will, when there is such a powerful sort of torrential flood and momentum in one direction. I think it’s essential for the field of policy to nurture independence in scholars. I think we want to continue to bring in people from many different disciplines to ask these questions. This researcher went on to say that it is important to “be experimental” and not “be afraid to pose questions that are right at the heart of central issues about power,” particularly when it comes to what this researcher described as the “new federal role” in education. One scholar explained that the key value of critical policy analysis was how it enabled a “revolutionary [stance] position… looking at: What does this policy do within this grid that privileges some and marginalizes and oppresses others? It is a different view.” Along similar lines, a different scholar stated: The problem is there and there’s a sense of urgency to do something about the problem. … We have to be engaged. We have to care about something so much that it’s going to move us to act, that it’s going to move us to do something, not just necessarily write about it. [/INST] <h4>We need to learn how to speak the language of policy makers as a precursor to critical activist research and advocacy --- They have no offense against our interp</h4><p><strong>Diem et al 2014</strong> (Sarah Diem, Michelle D. Young, Anjalé D. Welton, Katherine Cumings Mansfield & Pei-Ling Lee (2014) The intellectual landscape of critical policy analysis, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 27:9, 1068-1090, DOI: 10.1080/09518398.2014.916007 [bracket modified])</p><p>The <u><strong><mark>scholars</u></strong></mark> interviewed for this project <u><strong><mark>found</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>critical policy analysis an indispensable tool for questioning the roots of</mark> </u></strong>much <u><strong><mark>policy work.</u></strong></mark> Contrasting their work to traditional policy analyses, several scholars pointed out how <u><strong>critical policy analysis <mark>enabled</mark> a <mark>deeper critique</mark> <mark>of</mark> the <mark>contextual nuances and complexities of the policy process</u></strong></mark>. One scholar explained how <u><strong><mark>critical policy analysis</mark> was <mark>“focused on</mark> the questions of <mark>epistemology,” and</u></strong></mark>, unlike traditional approaches to policy analysis, critical policy analysis <u><strong><mark>recognizes</mark> the complexities of policy contexts and how these complexities impact what we know to be real and true.</p><p></u></strong>The <u><strong><mark>scholars</u></strong></mark> we interviewed <u><strong><mark>found it important to</mark> <mark>carefully examine policies and interrogate the policy process</mark> <mark>because</u></strong></mark>, as they pointed out, <u><strong><mark>policies are “subjective,”</mark> “value laden,” “complex,” and “messy.” Through critical policy analyses <mark>researchers can decipher multiple arguments or viewpoints, question and discover how</mark> nebulous <mark>concepts become reality, and </mark>explore how ideas become normalized.</p><p></u></strong>In the words of one participant, critical policy analysis enables both discovery and exploration of “how categories work, and how do they become fixed, and how do we need to constantly challenge the categories?” In this sense, <u><strong><mark>critical policy analysis is a tool for questioning structures and systems within the policy field.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Data revealed that participants placed particular importance on using critical policy analysis to explore and question the policy process. One researcher said:</p><p>We should be constantly asking questions: is this the way it has to be; what’s the value of doing it this way; how are people hurt by this; what are the alternatives? And then:</p><p>How do you collect information that informs decisions? What would present a compelling case for changing the policy that may be having negative impacts?</p><p>According to a second scholar, <u><strong>critical policy <mark>analysis reveals critical imperfections</mark> <mark>in the way traditional scholars think about the policy process</u></strong>:</p><p></mark>You are more or less guided by the tenets of traditional policy analysis, meaning that it’s a realist, structuralist epistemology. There’s a real world out there, and it’s flawed. It’s deeply flawed, and it’s flawed in a very predictable way. Doing work in that area means that you would deal with inequity, you would anticipate people being both effective and ineffective, you are a strong component of “there’s got to be practice” and “there’s got to be change,” and “you can’t get in this conversation just to do the critique; you also have to take part.”</p><p><u><strong>Within the policy field, this scholar explained, deeply held beliefs about reality and agency are palpable.</p><p></u></strong>The same deeply held beliefs that govern the behavior and assumptions of many policy scholars also impact the role of power and voice in policy processes. Scholars ascertained that <u><strong>critical policy <mark>analysis</mark> <mark>enabled them to explore</u></strong></mark>, “what is<u><strong> <mark>the role of power in making knowledge</mark> … which is <mark>always shaped by power relationships”</mark> as well as, <mark>“to investigate</mark> the kinds of <mark>questions</mark> <mark>that fundamentally have to do with power and access to the policy process …</mark> about what and who has informed this definition over time.”</u></strong> It was noted that <u><strong><mark>deep investigations of</mark> <mark>individual policies</mark> <mark>enabled a better understanding of the way power and voice operated within the policy process.</p><p></u></strong></mark>In some cases, <u><strong>analysis involved <mark>exploring</mark> the <mark>power imbalances among discourse within communities,</mark> interest groups, or <mark>policy-makers vis-à-vis those impacted by policy</u></strong></mark>. In their work, several scholars used questions such as, <u><strong>“Who is sitting around the decision-making table, and more importantly, who’s not sitting around the decision-making table?” to identify who has a voice in the policy process. Researchers also described the examination of inequities in power as exploring questions of “Who’s winning and who’s not winning?” or “Who’s benefiting and who’s not benefiting?”</p><p></u></strong>Through the process of raising critical questions, several scholars focused specifically on identifying and exposing inequities and social injustices, such as “loss of opportunity or lack of opportunity,” “who is not represented and why,” and “what are going to be the repercussions and for whom?” Such explorations unmask how one community’s accumulation of power may result in another community’s loss of power. To illustrate, one scholar found <u><strong>critical policy analysis allowed him <mark>to, “ask </u></strong></mark>really<u><strong><mark> important questions about the role of race and racism, of inequity, of issues of social justice and oppression.”</p><p></mark>Scholars</u></strong> <u><strong>also stressed the importance of <mark>exploring silences by looking at, “what policy says and doesn’t say, looking at how problems and solutions are defined and not defined, what voices are included and not included, and looking for voices on the margin.”</u></strong></mark> One participant referred to such silences as “white spaces.” White spaces reveal:</p><p>What’s missing; what needs to be there that’s not there; what are the silences that are there, and why aren’t they being addressed; and what can you do to help make sure that they are addressed? So looking at inequities, looking at loss of opportunity or lack of opportunity, looking at silences, looking at who’s not represented and why …</p><p><u><strong>This idea of distinguishing not only what is centered in policy and policy conversations but also what is marginalized or absent was a common concern among the scholars we interviewed. One scholar explained:</p><p>We don’t just look at how the problems and solutions are defined …. [We also <mark>examine] how they’re not defined</mark>. We don’t just look at whose voices were included, but </u></strong>try to figure out what the<u><strong> <mark>silenced voices</mark> </u></strong>would say if they did have a chance to voice their concerns.</p><p>In other words,<u><strong> using a critical framework when <mark>analyzing policy enables the exploration of the voices of those typically not heard in traditional policy contexts and processes.</p><p>Conducting comprehensive examinations of</mark> <mark>specific policies involving detailed analyses of each policy-making and implementation stage</u></strong></mark>, for some scholars, <u><strong><mark>was the crux of critical policy work</u></strong></mark>. Several scholars described their analytical work as <u><strong>“<mark>unpacking</mark> the <mark>assumptions</mark>,” exploring the <mark>foundational ideas</mark> <mark>“underpinning the policy,” or “unpacking the sense making” of policy discourse</u></strong></mark>. One researcher defined <u><strong>critical policy analysis as <mark>a method for critiquing/questioning various stages of</mark> <mark>policy enactment</u></strong></mark>:</p><p>I want to know who is behind the policy, whose voice is being privileged …. And then I want to see how that rolls out to every student, and how it affects particular students …. So analyzing policy in a critical way to see how it is enacted, who it affects, who’s putting it forth, what it means, how it actually does or does not do what the intent is. This scholar explained that exploring how policy is enacted allows the researcher to consider the contextual intricacies of the policy process:</p><p><u><strong>You’re going in very well aware that there are societal structures that oppress. And policy is then the vehicle through which these things are cemented or not. And so that’s a very different perspective than going in with that kind of an ahistorical, non-historical view.</p><p></u></strong>For some researchers, an examination of this nature was not an end in itself, however. Rather, just over half of the <u><strong><mark>researchers</mark> engaged in this project <mark>considered analyses an</mark> <mark>essential precursor to engaged and activist research</u></strong></mark>. In the words of one scholar<u><strong>, <mark>“critical policy analysis opens up a space for activism.”</p><p></mark>Engaged and activist research</p><p></u></strong>Although the complexity offered through the application of most critical perspectives to policy analysis might make it hard to accept that influencing policy could even be an option for critical policy scholars, our <u><strong><mark>participants</mark> <mark>identified informing the work of policy-makers</mark> <mark>as </mark>a key purpose for conducting critical policy analysis.</p><p><mark>Expressing dissatisfaction with</mark> the way the <mark>policy process</mark> has traditionally worked, they have sought ways to bring different perspectives to bear on policy.</u></strong> According to one participant, “most <u><strong><mark>critical perspectives enable not only critique, but</mark> also indications of <mark>what might work</mark> in the best interest of certain populations. … We need to learn to speak the language of those who draft and approve policy.”</p><p></u></strong>Thinking about the development of this particular area of scholarship, one scholar expressed the expectation that <u><strong><mark>critical policy work is more than an intellectual exercise – that it influences practice and policy</u></strong>.</mark> Another scholar remarked that <u><strong>critical policy analysis is <mark>focused not only on theoretical change but on real change</mark> as well:</p><p>A lot of times we do research and we propose … what we think may be some practices that are worthy of consideration at the policy level. Some real pieces that we’ve done for legislators have actually become part of the state directives. We feel pretty good about that.</p><p></u></strong>One participant explained that<u><strong> <mark>critical policy analysis fosters a: perspective and the methodological approaches to be able to be more of an activist</mark> … it allows me to center the stories and the perspective of students and of families and of communities that have for very much [of the time] been silenced in this.</p><p></u></strong>Respondents linked their <u><strong>purpose for conducting critical policy analysis to bridging the gap between policy and practice, grounding this bridging activity in the field. Participants shared that their use of critical perspectives that emphasized context and collaboration enabled them to communicate authentically with and be useful to a variety of stakeholders, including teachers, principals, and regional or district leadership personnel. However, making research findings and policy analyses accessible to local educators and educational leaders appeared to be of utmost importance to this group. For example, one researcher stated:</p><p></u></strong>The thing you’re trying to do with the<u><strong> <mark>practitioners</u></strong></mark> is to <u><strong>try to <mark>show how they can use</mark> the <mark>policy</mark> – any policy. <mark>It’s a leverage</u></strong></mark>; some <u><strong><mark>agency</mark> </u></strong>for them. You know, <u><strong><mark>how</mark> can <mark>you subvert it</mark>, how can you <mark>move it</mark>, <mark>how</mark> can <mark>you use the discourses to mobilize</mark> them <mark>in ways that actually make it</mark> a value <mark>meaningful to them</mark> as practitioners? </u></strong>Another participant provided a perspective on how to build bridges between policy and educators’ practice<mark>: <u><strong>build educators’ capacity and</mark> then <mark>assist them in advocating for or making needed changes</u></strong></mark>. This researcher explained that<u><strong> part of understanding <mark>how to leverage</mark> state or <mark>federal policy</mark> </u></strong>within local schools <u><strong><mark>to support typically underserved</u></strong></mark> student<u><strong> <mark>populations</mark> involves <mark>challenging wrong-headed beliefs</mark> </u></strong>about such students<u><strong> <mark>with data, introducing alternate ways of</mark> thinking and <mark>practicing</mark>, and <mark>then setting up systems to support them as they change their practice.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Indeed, another researcher told us that given the current direction of federal and national education policy, critical policy analysis: is wonderful because we have an obligation, those of us in universities, to ask what structural priorities aren’t being addressed when we direct federal funding streams in certain directions. And I think that it becomes harder to have that kind of dissent, if you will, when there is such a powerful sort of torrential flood and momentum in one direction. I think it’s essential for the field of policy to nurture independence in scholars.</p><p>I think we want to continue to bring in people from many different disciplines to ask these questions.</p><p>This researcher went on to say that it is important to “be experimental” and not “be afraid to pose questions that are right at the heart of central issues about power,” particularly when it comes to what this researcher described as the “new federal role” in education.</p><p>One scholar explained that <u><strong>the key value of <mark>critical policy analysis</mark> was how it <mark>enabled a “revolutionary </mark>[stance] <mark>position…</mark> <mark>looking at: What does this policy do within this grid that privileges some and marginalizes and oppresses others?</u></strong></mark> It is a different view.” Along similar lines, a different scholar stated:</p><p>The problem is there and there’s a sense of urgency to do something about the problem. … We have to be engaged. We have to care about something so much that it’s going to move us to act, that it’s going to move us to do something, not just necessarily write about it.</p> </s>

The United States’ unilateral hardline approach to the war on drugs has devastated OAS credibility

The [Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security," said Rep from Florida You can’t expect much from the OAS. It’s like a corpse that must be buried." The Organization of American States’ troubles go beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum The Summit showed many of the region's presidents disagreeing with the United States on key issues like drug policy and diplomacy Latin American governments have formed a handful of parallel organizations that explicitly exclude the United States. the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board a place to build consensus around broad policies, from anti-communism to counternarcotics to counterterrorism The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has reduced friction OAS components -- have made important contributions to regional peace, security and democracy. The OAS is also hampered by a perception that the Washington-based body is dominated by the United States the perception of an uneven playing field has damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made Latin American states reluctant to take decisions that might require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS, even for the benefit of a greater good. As a result, the OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy Instead, the CICAD has reinforced Washington’s hard-line approach the OAS has become a more active voice in favor of strengthening the transition to democracy Cases of interstate conflict in Latin America, can be explosive The OAS has played a role at times in defusing them usually by quickly convening regional heads of state and exerting united international pressure.

The O A S presidents disagree with the U S on key issues like drug policy Latin American governments exclude the U S the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board, a place to build consensus around broad policies OAS components have made important contributions to peace The OAS is hampered by a perception that the body is dominated by the U S the perception of an uneven playing field damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made states reluctant to take decisions that require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS the OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy. Cases of interstate conflict in Latin America, can be explosive The OAS has played a role in defusing them by quickly exerting international pressure

"The [Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security," said Rep. David Rivera, a Republican congressman from Florida, in July 2011 as he joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee's GOP majority in voting to cut off U.S. funding for the OAS. Rivera’s low regard for the organization was matched by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who in urging the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to form a new regional bloc excluding the United States said, "You can’t expect much from the OAS. It’s like a corpse that must be buried." The Organization of American States’ troubles go beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum. The April 2012 Summit of the Americas showed many of the region's presidents disagreeing, at times sharply, with the United States on key issues like drug policy and diplomacy toward Cuba; several said they saw little reason to continue with the series of periodic meetings that began in 1995. Latin American governments, meanwhile, have formed a handful of parallel organizations that explicitly exclude the United States. What is going on here? The OAS, the world's oldest regional organization, has never been a diplomatic powerhouse. Since the Pan-American Union's founding in 1910, it has rarely been the center of gravity for the Western Hemisphere's politics or diplomacy. It has helped to resolve only a small fraction of the region's armed conflicts or crises that threatened to deteriorate into conflicts. Instead, the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board, a place to build consensus around broad policies, from anti-communism to counternarcotics to counterterrorism. The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has reduced friction among its members. And some OAS components -- the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, electoral observer missions and efforts to verify postconflict demobilizations -- have made important contributions to regional peace, security and democracy. But the OAS has been hampered by its design, which keeps it deliberately weak. The organization operates on a consensus model, in which a determined minority can prevent action. Its “one country, one vote” system means that a tiny state like St. Lucia has as much voice as a large state like Brazil. The OAS has no analogue to the U.N. Security Council and no dispute-resolution or peace-enforcement mechanism to deal with breaches of the peace like that contemplated in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. The OAS is also hampered by a perception, reinforced during the Cold War, that the Washington-based body is dominated by the United States. This is perhaps inevitable given the asymmetry of wealth and power between the United States and its regional neighbors. Still, the perception of an uneven playing field has damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made Latin American states reluctant to take decisions that might require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS, even for the benefit of a greater good. As a result, the OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy. Instead, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), which is largely funded by the United States, has reinforced Washington’s hard-line approach emphasizing supply reduction. Nor has the OAS been a leading voice on regional security issues; little of note has emerged from its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security since it was established in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. The organization's security guarantees exist mostly on paper: The 1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which commits all countries to view an attack against one as an attack against all, has not been meaningfully invoked in decades, and Mexico dropped out of it entirely in the 2002 run-up to the Iraq War. By contrast, the OAS has become a more active voice in favor of strengthening the region's 30-year-old transition from dictatorship to democracy. However, its 2001 Democratic Charter, which in theory automatically suspends nondemocratic members and calls for diplomatic measures to deal with interruptions in democracy, has not been employed successfully. It failed key tests in Venezuela in 2002 and Honduras in 2009, as well as in more recent cases of democratic erosion in several countries. Cases of interstate conflict are rare in Latin America, but when they do occur they can be explosive. The OAS has played a role at times in defusing them, usually by quickly convening regional heads of state and exerting united international pressure. From the 1950s to the 1970s, for instance, frequent flare-ups along a disputed border between Nicaragua and army-less Costa Rica were taken to the OAS. In one of the organization's greatest achievements, it helped broker an end to a brief 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador, which included the deployment of a postconflict observer mission. Many other 20th century border conflicts, though, were settled by other international actors. The Vatican, for instance, mediated a 1978 dispute between Argentina and Chile, and the International Court of Justice is currently considering a maritime dispute between Peru and Chile. Far more common in Latin America have been internal conflicts: civil wars, insurgencies, coups d'état and mass outbreaks of violent crime. Here, it is far harder for an international actor to resolve the conflict, because it means obligating a state or an insurgency to change its behavior within its own borders.

<h4>The United States’ unilateral hardline approach to the war on drugs has devastated OAS credibility </h4><p>Adam<strong> Isacson 12</strong> director of the Regional Security Policy Program at the Washington Office on Latin America, May 22, “Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-of-the-oas, AB</p><p>"<u>The [Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security," said</u> <u>Rep</u>. David Rivera, a Republican congressman <u>from Florida</u>, in July 2011 as he joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee's GOP majority in voting to cut off U.S. funding for the OAS. Rivera’s low regard for the organization was matched by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who in urging the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to form a new regional bloc excluding the United States said, "<u>You can’t expect much from the OAS. It’s like a corpse that must be buried." <mark>The</mark> <mark>O</mark>rganization of <mark>A</mark>merican <mark>S</mark>tates’ troubles go beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum</u>. <u>The</u> April 2012 <u>Summit</u> of the Americas <u>showed many of the region's <mark>presidents</mark> <mark>disagree</mark>ing</u>, at times sharply, <u><mark>with the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>on <strong>key issues like drug policy</strong></mark> and diplomacy</u> toward Cuba; several said they saw little reason to continue with the series of periodic meetings that began in 1995. <u><mark>Latin American governments</u></mark>, meanwhile, <u>have formed a handful of <strong>parallel organizations</strong> that <strong>explicitly <mark>exclude the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</strong>. </u>What is going on here? The OAS, the world's oldest regional organization, has never been a diplomatic powerhouse. Since the Pan-American Union's founding in 1910, it has rarely been the center of gravity for the Western Hemisphere's politics or diplomacy. It has helped to resolve only a small fraction of the region's armed conflicts or crises that threatened to deteriorate into conflicts. Instead, <u><mark>the OAS has functioned as a <strong>multilateral sounding board</u></strong>, <u>a place to <strong>build consensus</strong> around broad <strong>policies</strong></mark>, from anti-communism to <strong>counternarcotics</strong> to counterterrorism</u>. <u>The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has <strong>reduced friction</u></strong> among its members. And some <u><mark>OAS components</u></mark> -- the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, electoral observer missions and efforts to verify postconflict demobilizations <u>-- <mark>have made <strong>important contributions to </mark>regional <mark>peace</mark>, security and democracy. </u></strong>But the OAS has been hampered by its design, which keeps it deliberately weak. The organization operates on a consensus model, in which a determined minority can prevent action. Its “one country, one vote” system means that a tiny state like St. Lucia has as much voice as a large state like Brazil. The OAS has no analogue to the U.N. Security Council and no dispute-resolution or peace-enforcement mechanism to deal with breaches of the peace like that contemplated in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. <u><strong><mark>The OAS is </mark>also <mark>hampered by a perception</u></strong></mark>, reinforced during the Cold War, <u><mark>that the <strong></mark>Washington-based <mark>body is dominated by the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. This is perhaps inevitable given the asymmetry of wealth and power between the United States and its regional neighbors. Still, <u><mark>the <strong>perception of an uneven playing field</strong> </mark>has <strong><mark>damaged</strong> the organization's "honest broker" <strong>status</strong> and made</mark> Latin American <mark>states <strong>reluctant to take decisions</strong> that</mark> might <mark>require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS</mark>, even for the benefit of a greater good. As a result, <mark>the OAS has <strong>not been viewed as a forum</strong> for debating drug policy</u>.</mark> <u>Instead, the</u> Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (<u>CICAD</u>), which is largely funded by the United States, <u>has reinforced Washington’s hard-line approach</u> emphasizing supply reduction. Nor has the OAS been a leading voice on regional security issues; little of note has emerged from its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security since it was established in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. The organization's security guarantees exist mostly on paper: The 1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which commits all countries to view an attack against one as an attack against all, has not been meaningfully invoked in decades, and Mexico dropped out of it entirely in the 2002 run-up to the Iraq War. By contrast, <u>the OAS has become a more active voice in favor of strengthening the</u> region's 30-year-old <u>transition</u> from dictatorship <u>to democracy</u>. However, its 2001 Democratic Charter, which in theory automatically suspends nondemocratic members and calls for diplomatic measures to deal with interruptions in democracy, has not been employed successfully. It failed key tests in Venezuela in 2002 and Honduras in 2009, as well as in more recent cases of democratic erosion in several countries. <u><mark>Cases of interstate conflict</mark> </u>are rare<u> <mark>in Latin America, </u></mark>but when they do occur they<u> <mark>can be <strong>explosive</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>The OAS has <strong>played a role </mark>at times <mark>in defusing them</u></strong></mark>, <u>usually <mark>by quickly </mark>convening regional heads of state and <strong><mark>exerting</mark> united <mark>international pressure</strong></mark>. </u>From the 1950s to the 1970s, for instance, frequent flare-ups along a disputed border between Nicaragua and army-less Costa Rica were taken to the OAS. In one of the organization's greatest achievements, it helped broker an end to a brief 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador, which included the deployment of a postconflict observer mission. Many other 20th century border conflicts, though, were settled by other international actors. The Vatican, for instance, mediated a 1978 dispute between Argentina and Chile, and the International Court of Justice is currently considering a maritime dispute between Peru and Chile. Far more common in Latin America have been internal conflicts: civil wars, insurgencies, coups d'état and mass outbreaks of violent crime. Here, it is far harder for an international actor to resolve the conflict, because it means obligating a state or an insurgency to change its behavior within its own borders.</p>

Adam Isacson 12 director of the Regional Security Policy Program at the Washington Office on Latin America, May 22, “Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-of-the-oas, AB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Adam Isacson 12 director of the Regional Security Policy Program at the Washington Office on Latin America, May 22, “Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-of-the-oas, AB fulltext: "The [Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security," said Rep. David Rivera, a Republican congressman from Florida, in July 2011 as he joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee's GOP majority in voting to cut off U.S. funding for the OAS. Rivera’s low regard for the organization was matched by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who in urging the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to form a new regional bloc excluding the United States said, "You can’t expect much from the OAS. It’s like a corpse that must be buried." The Organization of American States’ troubles go beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum. The April 2012 Summit of the Americas showed many of the region's presidents disagreeing, at times sharply, with the United States on key issues like drug policy and diplomacy toward Cuba; several said they saw little reason to continue with the series of periodic meetings that began in 1995. Latin American governments, meanwhile, have formed a handful of parallel organizations that explicitly exclude the United States. What is going on here? The OAS, the world's oldest regional organization, has never been a diplomatic powerhouse. Since the Pan-American Union's founding in 1910, it has rarely been the center of gravity for the Western Hemisphere's politics or diplomacy. It has helped to resolve only a small fraction of the region's armed conflicts or crises that threatened to deteriorate into conflicts. Instead, the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board, a place to build consensus around broad policies, from anti-communism to counternarcotics to counterterrorism. The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has reduced friction among its members. And some OAS components -- the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, electoral observer missions and efforts to verify postconflict demobilizations -- have made important contributions to regional peace, security and democracy. But the OAS has been hampered by its design, which keeps it deliberately weak. The organization operates on a consensus model, in which a determined minority can prevent action. Its “one country, one vote” system means that a tiny state like St. Lucia has as much voice as a large state like Brazil. The OAS has no analogue to the U.N. Security Council and no dispute-resolution or peace-enforcement mechanism to deal with breaches of the peace like that contemplated in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. The OAS is also hampered by a perception, reinforced during the Cold War, that the Washington-based body is dominated by the United States. This is perhaps inevitable given the asymmetry of wealth and power between the United States and its regional neighbors. Still, the perception of an uneven playing field has damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made Latin American states reluctant to take decisions that might require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS, even for the benefit of a greater good. As a result, the OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy. Instead, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), which is largely funded by the United States, has reinforced Washington’s hard-line approach emphasizing supply reduction. Nor has the OAS been a leading voice on regional security issues; little of note has emerged from its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security since it was established in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. The organization's security guarantees exist mostly on paper: The 1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which commits all countries to view an attack against one as an attack against all, has not been meaningfully invoked in decades, and Mexico dropped out of it entirely in the 2002 run-up to the Iraq War. By contrast, the OAS has become a more active voice in favor of strengthening the region's 30-year-old transition from dictatorship to democracy. However, its 2001 Democratic Charter, which in theory automatically suspends nondemocratic members and calls for diplomatic measures to deal with interruptions in democracy, has not been employed successfully. It failed key tests in Venezuela in 2002 and Honduras in 2009, as well as in more recent cases of democratic erosion in several countries. Cases of interstate conflict are rare in Latin America, but when they do occur they can be explosive. The OAS has played a role at times in defusing them, usually by quickly convening regional heads of state and exerting united international pressure. From the 1950s to the 1970s, for instance, frequent flare-ups along a disputed border between Nicaragua and army-less Costa Rica were taken to the OAS. In one of the organization's greatest achievements, it helped broker an end to a brief 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador, which included the deployment of a postconflict observer mission. Many other 20th century border conflicts, though, were settled by other international actors. The Vatican, for instance, mediated a 1978 dispute between Argentina and Chile, and the International Court of Justice is currently considering a maritime dispute between Peru and Chile. Far more common in Latin America have been internal conflicts: civil wars, insurgencies, coups d'état and mass outbreaks of violent crime. Here, it is far harder for an international actor to resolve the conflict, because it means obligating a state or an insurgency to change its behavior within its own borders. [/INST] <h4>The United States’ unilateral hardline approach to the war on drugs has devastated OAS credibility </h4><p>Adam<strong> Isacson 12</strong> director of the Regional Security Policy Program at the Washington Office on Latin America, May 22, “Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-of-the-oas, AB</p><p>"<u>The [Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security," said</u> <u>Rep</u>. David Rivera, a Republican congressman <u>from Florida</u>, in July 2011 as he joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee's GOP majority in voting to cut off U.S. funding for the OAS. Rivera’s low regard for the organization was matched by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who in urging the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to form a new regional bloc excluding the United States said, "<u>You can’t expect much from the OAS. It’s like a corpse that must be buried." <mark>The</mark> <mark>O</mark>rganization of <mark>A</mark>merican <mark>S</mark>tates’ troubles go beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum</u>. <u>The</u> April 2012 <u>Summit</u> of the Americas <u>showed many of the region's <mark>presidents</mark> <mark>disagree</mark>ing</u>, at times sharply, <u><mark>with the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>on <strong>key issues like drug policy</strong></mark> and diplomacy</u> toward Cuba; several said they saw little reason to continue with the series of periodic meetings that began in 1995. <u><mark>Latin American governments</u></mark>, meanwhile, <u>have formed a handful of <strong>parallel organizations</strong> that <strong>explicitly <mark>exclude the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</strong>. </u>What is going on here? The OAS, the world's oldest regional organization, has never been a diplomatic powerhouse. Since the Pan-American Union's founding in 1910, it has rarely been the center of gravity for the Western Hemisphere's politics or diplomacy. It has helped to resolve only a small fraction of the region's armed conflicts or crises that threatened to deteriorate into conflicts. Instead, <u><mark>the OAS has functioned as a <strong>multilateral sounding board</u></strong>, <u>a place to <strong>build consensus</strong> around broad <strong>policies</strong></mark>, from anti-communism to <strong>counternarcotics</strong> to counterterrorism</u>. <u>The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has <strong>reduced friction</u></strong> among its members. And some <u><mark>OAS components</u></mark> -- the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, electoral observer missions and efforts to verify postconflict demobilizations <u>-- <mark>have made <strong>important contributions to </mark>regional <mark>peace</mark>, security and democracy. </u></strong>But the OAS has been hampered by its design, which keeps it deliberately weak. The organization operates on a consensus model, in which a determined minority can prevent action. Its “one country, one vote” system means that a tiny state like St. Lucia has as much voice as a large state like Brazil. The OAS has no analogue to the U.N. Security Council and no dispute-resolution or peace-enforcement mechanism to deal with breaches of the peace like that contemplated in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. <u><strong><mark>The OAS is </mark>also <mark>hampered by a perception</u></strong></mark>, reinforced during the Cold War, <u><mark>that the <strong></mark>Washington-based <mark>body is dominated by the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. This is perhaps inevitable given the asymmetry of wealth and power between the United States and its regional neighbors. Still, <u><mark>the <strong>perception of an uneven playing field</strong> </mark>has <strong><mark>damaged</strong> the organization's "honest broker" <strong>status</strong> and made</mark> Latin American <mark>states <strong>reluctant to take decisions</strong> that</mark> might <mark>require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS</mark>, even for the benefit of a greater good. As a result, <mark>the OAS has <strong>not been viewed as a forum</strong> for debating drug policy</u>.</mark> <u>Instead, the</u> Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (<u>CICAD</u>), which is largely funded by the United States, <u>has reinforced Washington’s hard-line approach</u> emphasizing supply reduction. Nor has the OAS been a leading voice on regional security issues; little of note has emerged from its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security since it was established in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. The organization's security guarantees exist mostly on paper: The 1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which commits all countries to view an attack against one as an attack against all, has not been meaningfully invoked in decades, and Mexico dropped out of it entirely in the 2002 run-up to the Iraq War. By contrast, <u>the OAS has become a more active voice in favor of strengthening the</u> region's 30-year-old <u>transition</u> from dictatorship <u>to democracy</u>. However, its 2001 Democratic Charter, which in theory automatically suspends nondemocratic members and calls for diplomatic measures to deal with interruptions in democracy, has not been employed successfully. It failed key tests in Venezuela in 2002 and Honduras in 2009, as well as in more recent cases of democratic erosion in several countries. <u><mark>Cases of interstate conflict</mark> </u>are rare<u> <mark>in Latin America, </u></mark>but when they do occur they<u> <mark>can be <strong>explosive</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>The OAS has <strong>played a role </mark>at times <mark>in defusing them</u></strong></mark>, <u>usually <mark>by quickly </mark>convening regional heads of state and <strong><mark>exerting</mark> united <mark>international pressure</strong></mark>. </u>From the 1950s to the 1970s, for instance, frequent flare-ups along a disputed border between Nicaragua and army-less Costa Rica were taken to the OAS. In one of the organization's greatest achievements, it helped broker an end to a brief 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador, which included the deployment of a postconflict observer mission. Many other 20th century border conflicts, though, were settled by other international actors. The Vatican, for instance, mediated a 1978 dispute between Argentina and Chile, and the International Court of Justice is currently considering a maritime dispute between Peru and Chile. Far more common in Latin America have been internal conflicts: civil wars, insurgencies, coups d'état and mass outbreaks of violent crime. Here, it is far harder for an international actor to resolve the conflict, because it means obligating a state or an insurgency to change its behavior within its own borders.</p> </s>

The United States’ unilateral hardline approach to the war on drugs has devastated OAS credibility

The [Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security," said Rep from Florida You can’t expect much from the OAS. It’s like a corpse that must be buried." The Organization of American States’ troubles go beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum The Summit showed many of the region's presidents disagreeing with the United States on key issues like drug policy and diplomacy Latin American governments have formed a handful of parallel organizations that explicitly exclude the United States. the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board a place to build consensus around broad policies, from anti-communism to counternarcotics to counterterrorism The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has reduced friction OAS components -- have made important contributions to regional peace, security and democracy. The OAS is also hampered by a perception that the Washington-based body is dominated by the United States the perception of an uneven playing field has damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made Latin American states reluctant to take decisions that might require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS, even for the benefit of a greater good. As a result, the OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy Instead, the CICAD has reinforced Washington’s hard-line approach the OAS has become a more active voice in favor of strengthening the transition to democracy Cases of interstate conflict in Latin America, can be explosive The OAS has played a role at times in defusing them usually by quickly convening regional heads of state and exerting united international pressure.

The O A S presidents disagree with the U S on key issues like drug policy Latin American governments exclude the U S the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board, a place to build consensus around broad policies OAS components have made important contributions to peace The OAS is hampered by a perception that the body is dominated by the U S the perception of an uneven playing field damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made states reluctant to take decisions that require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS the OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy. Cases of interstate conflict in Latin America, can be explosive The OAS has played a role in defusing them by quickly exerting international pressure

"The [Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security," said Rep. David Rivera, a Republican congressman from Florida, in July 2011 as he joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee's GOP majority in voting to cut off U.S. funding for the OAS. Rivera’s low regard for the organization was matched by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who in urging the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to form a new regional bloc excluding the United States said, "You can’t expect much from the OAS. It’s like a corpse that must be buried." The Organization of American States’ troubles go beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum. The April 2012 Summit of the Americas showed many of the region's presidents disagreeing, at times sharply, with the United States on key issues like drug policy and diplomacy toward Cuba; several said they saw little reason to continue with the series of periodic meetings that began in 1995. Latin American governments, meanwhile, have formed a handful of parallel organizations that explicitly exclude the United States. What is going on here? The OAS, the world's oldest regional organization, has never been a diplomatic powerhouse. Since the Pan-American Union's founding in 1910, it has rarely been the center of gravity for the Western Hemisphere's politics or diplomacy. It has helped to resolve only a small fraction of the region's armed conflicts or crises that threatened to deteriorate into conflicts. Instead, the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board, a place to build consensus around broad policies, from anti-communism to counternarcotics to counterterrorism. The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has reduced friction among its members. And some OAS components -- the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, electoral observer missions and efforts to verify postconflict demobilizations -- have made important contributions to regional peace, security and democracy. But the OAS has been hampered by its design, which keeps it deliberately weak. The organization operates on a consensus model, in which a determined minority can prevent action. Its “one country, one vote” system means that a tiny state like St. Lucia has as much voice as a large state like Brazil. The OAS has no analogue to the U.N. Security Council and no dispute-resolution or peace-enforcement mechanism to deal with breaches of the peace like that contemplated in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. The OAS is also hampered by a perception, reinforced during the Cold War, that the Washington-based body is dominated by the United States. This is perhaps inevitable given the asymmetry of wealth and power between the United States and its regional neighbors. Still, the perception of an uneven playing field has damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made Latin American states reluctant to take decisions that might require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS, even for the benefit of a greater good. As a result, the OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy. Instead, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), which is largely funded by the United States, has reinforced Washington’s hard-line approach emphasizing supply reduction. Nor has the OAS been a leading voice on regional security issues; little of note has emerged from its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security since it was established in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. The organization's security guarantees exist mostly on paper: The 1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which commits all countries to view an attack against one as an attack against all, has not been meaningfully invoked in decades, and Mexico dropped out of it entirely in the 2002 run-up to the Iraq War. By contrast, the OAS has become a more active voice in favor of strengthening the region's 30-year-old transition from dictatorship to democracy. However, its 2001 Democratic Charter, which in theory automatically suspends nondemocratic members and calls for diplomatic measures to deal with interruptions in democracy, has not been employed successfully. It failed key tests in Venezuela in 2002 and Honduras in 2009, as well as in more recent cases of democratic erosion in several countries. Cases of interstate conflict are rare in Latin America, but when they do occur they can be explosive. The OAS has played a role at times in defusing them, usually by quickly convening regional heads of state and exerting united international pressure. From the 1950s to the 1970s, for instance, frequent flare-ups along a disputed border between Nicaragua and army-less Costa Rica were taken to the OAS. In one of the organization's greatest achievements, it helped broker an end to a brief 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador, which included the deployment of a postconflict observer mission. Many other 20th century border conflicts, though, were settled by other international actors. The Vatican, for instance, mediated a 1978 dispute between Argentina and Chile, and the International Court of Justice is currently considering a maritime dispute between Peru and Chile. Far more common in Latin America have been internal conflicts: civil wars, insurgencies, coups d'état and mass outbreaks of violent crime. Here, it is far harder for an international actor to resolve the conflict, because it means obligating a state or an insurgency to change its behavior within its own borders.

<h4>The United States’ unilateral hardline approach to the war on drugs has devastated OAS credibility </h4><p>Adam<strong> Isacson 12</strong> director of the Regional Security Policy Program at the Washington Office on Latin America, May 22, “Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-of-the-oas, AB</p><p>"<u><strong>The [Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security," said</u></strong> <u><strong>Rep</u></strong>. David Rivera, a Republican congressman <u><strong>from Florida</u></strong>, in July 2011 as he joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee's GOP majority in voting to cut off U.S. funding for the OAS. Rivera’s low regard for the organization was matched by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who in urging the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to form a new regional bloc excluding the United States said, "<u><strong>You can’t expect much from the OAS. It’s like a corpse that must be buried." <mark>The</mark> <mark>O</mark>rganization of <mark>A</mark>merican <mark>S</mark>tates’ troubles go beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum</u></strong>. <u><strong>The</u></strong> April 2012 <u><strong>Summit</u></strong> of the Americas <u><strong>showed many of the region's <mark>presidents</mark> <mark>disagree</mark>ing</u></strong>, at times sharply, <u><strong><mark>with the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>on key issues like drug policy</mark> and diplomacy</u></strong> toward Cuba; several said they saw little reason to continue with the series of periodic meetings that began in 1995. <u><strong><mark>Latin American governments</u></strong></mark>, meanwhile, <u><strong>have formed a handful of parallel organizations that explicitly <mark>exclude the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates. </u></strong>What is going on here? The OAS, the world's oldest regional organization, has never been a diplomatic powerhouse. Since the Pan-American Union's founding in 1910, it has rarely been the center of gravity for the Western Hemisphere's politics or diplomacy. It has helped to resolve only a small fraction of the region's armed conflicts or crises that threatened to deteriorate into conflicts. Instead, <u><strong><mark>the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board</u></strong>, <u><strong>a place to build consensus around broad policies</mark>, from anti-communism to counternarcotics to counterterrorism</u></strong>. <u><strong>The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has reduced friction</u></strong> among its members. And some <u><strong><mark>OAS components</u></strong></mark> -- the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, electoral observer missions and efforts to verify postconflict demobilizations <u><strong>-- <mark>have made important contributions to </mark>regional <mark>peace</mark>, security and democracy. </u></strong>But the OAS has been hampered by its design, which keeps it deliberately weak. The organization operates on a consensus model, in which a determined minority can prevent action. Its “one country, one vote” system means that a tiny state like St. Lucia has as much voice as a large state like Brazil. The OAS has no analogue to the U.N. Security Council and no dispute-resolution or peace-enforcement mechanism to deal with breaches of the peace like that contemplated in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. <u><strong><mark>The OAS is </mark>also <mark>hampered by a perception</u></strong></mark>, reinforced during the Cold War, <u><strong><mark>that the </mark>Washington-based <mark>body is dominated by the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. This is perhaps inevitable given the asymmetry of wealth and power between the United States and its regional neighbors. Still, <u><strong><mark>the perception of an uneven playing field </mark>has <mark>damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made</mark> Latin American <mark>states reluctant to take decisions that</mark> might <mark>require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS</mark>, even for the benefit of a greater good. As a result, <mark>the OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>Instead, the</u></strong> Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (<u><strong>CICAD</u></strong>), which is largely funded by the United States, <u><strong>has reinforced Washington’s hard-line approach</u></strong> emphasizing supply reduction. Nor has the OAS been a leading voice on regional security issues; little of note has emerged from its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security since it was established in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. The organization's security guarantees exist mostly on paper: The 1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which commits all countries to view an attack against one as an attack against all, has not been meaningfully invoked in decades, and Mexico dropped out of it entirely in the 2002 run-up to the Iraq War. By contrast, <u><strong>the OAS has become a more active voice in favor of strengthening the</u></strong> region's 30-year-old <u><strong>transition</u></strong> from dictatorship <u><strong>to democracy</u></strong>. However, its 2001 Democratic Charter, which in theory automatically suspends nondemocratic members and calls for diplomatic measures to deal with interruptions in democracy, has not been employed successfully. It failed key tests in Venezuela in 2002 and Honduras in 2009, as well as in more recent cases of democratic erosion in several countries. <u><strong><mark>Cases of interstate conflict</mark> </u></strong>are rare<u><strong> <mark>in Latin America, </u></strong></mark>but when they do occur they<u><strong> <mark>can be explosive</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The OAS has played a role </mark>at times <mark>in defusing them</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>usually <mark>by quickly </mark>convening regional heads of state and <mark>exerting</mark> united <mark>international pressure</mark>. </u></strong>From the 1950s to the 1970s, for instance, frequent flare-ups along a disputed border between Nicaragua and army-less Costa Rica were taken to the OAS. In one of the organization's greatest achievements, it helped broker an end to a brief 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador, which included the deployment of a postconflict observer mission. Many other 20th century border conflicts, though, were settled by other international actors. The Vatican, for instance, mediated a 1978 dispute between Argentina and Chile, and the International Court of Justice is currently considering a maritime dispute between Peru and Chile. Far more common in Latin America have been internal conflicts: civil wars, insurgencies, coups d'état and mass outbreaks of violent crime. Here, it is far harder for an international actor to resolve the conflict, because it means obligating a state or an insurgency to change its behavior within its own borders.</p>

Adam Isacson 12 director of the Regional Security Policy Program at the Washington Office on Latin America, May 22, “Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-of-the-oas, AB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Adam Isacson 12 director of the Regional Security Policy Program at the Washington Office on Latin America, May 22, “Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-of-the-oas, AB fulltext: "The [Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security," said Rep. David Rivera, a Republican congressman from Florida, in July 2011 as he joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee's GOP majority in voting to cut off U.S. funding for the OAS. Rivera’s low regard for the organization was matched by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who in urging the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to form a new regional bloc excluding the United States said, "You can’t expect much from the OAS. It’s like a corpse that must be buried." The Organization of American States’ troubles go beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum. The April 2012 Summit of the Americas showed many of the region's presidents disagreeing, at times sharply, with the United States on key issues like drug policy and diplomacy toward Cuba; several said they saw little reason to continue with the series of periodic meetings that began in 1995. Latin American governments, meanwhile, have formed a handful of parallel organizations that explicitly exclude the United States. What is going on here? The OAS, the world's oldest regional organization, has never been a diplomatic powerhouse. Since the Pan-American Union's founding in 1910, it has rarely been the center of gravity for the Western Hemisphere's politics or diplomacy. It has helped to resolve only a small fraction of the region's armed conflicts or crises that threatened to deteriorate into conflicts. Instead, the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board, a place to build consensus around broad policies, from anti-communism to counternarcotics to counterterrorism. The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has reduced friction among its members. And some OAS components -- the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, electoral observer missions and efforts to verify postconflict demobilizations -- have made important contributions to regional peace, security and democracy. But the OAS has been hampered by its design, which keeps it deliberately weak. The organization operates on a consensus model, in which a determined minority can prevent action. Its “one country, one vote” system means that a tiny state like St. Lucia has as much voice as a large state like Brazil. The OAS has no analogue to the U.N. Security Council and no dispute-resolution or peace-enforcement mechanism to deal with breaches of the peace like that contemplated in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. The OAS is also hampered by a perception, reinforced during the Cold War, that the Washington-based body is dominated by the United States. This is perhaps inevitable given the asymmetry of wealth and power between the United States and its regional neighbors. Still, the perception of an uneven playing field has damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made Latin American states reluctant to take decisions that might require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS, even for the benefit of a greater good. As a result, the OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy. Instead, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), which is largely funded by the United States, has reinforced Washington’s hard-line approach emphasizing supply reduction. Nor has the OAS been a leading voice on regional security issues; little of note has emerged from its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security since it was established in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. The organization's security guarantees exist mostly on paper: The 1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which commits all countries to view an attack against one as an attack against all, has not been meaningfully invoked in decades, and Mexico dropped out of it entirely in the 2002 run-up to the Iraq War. By contrast, the OAS has become a more active voice in favor of strengthening the region's 30-year-old transition from dictatorship to democracy. However, its 2001 Democratic Charter, which in theory automatically suspends nondemocratic members and calls for diplomatic measures to deal with interruptions in democracy, has not been employed successfully. It failed key tests in Venezuela in 2002 and Honduras in 2009, as well as in more recent cases of democratic erosion in several countries. Cases of interstate conflict are rare in Latin America, but when they do occur they can be explosive. The OAS has played a role at times in defusing them, usually by quickly convening regional heads of state and exerting united international pressure. From the 1950s to the 1970s, for instance, frequent flare-ups along a disputed border between Nicaragua and army-less Costa Rica were taken to the OAS. In one of the organization's greatest achievements, it helped broker an end to a brief 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador, which included the deployment of a postconflict observer mission. Many other 20th century border conflicts, though, were settled by other international actors. The Vatican, for instance, mediated a 1978 dispute between Argentina and Chile, and the International Court of Justice is currently considering a maritime dispute between Peru and Chile. Far more common in Latin America have been internal conflicts: civil wars, insurgencies, coups d'état and mass outbreaks of violent crime. Here, it is far harder for an international actor to resolve the conflict, because it means obligating a state or an insurgency to change its behavior within its own borders. [/INST] <h4>The United States’ unilateral hardline approach to the war on drugs has devastated OAS credibility </h4><p>Adam<strong> Isacson 12</strong> director of the Regional Security Policy Program at the Washington Office on Latin America, May 22, “Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-of-the-oas, AB</p><p>"<u><strong>The [Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security," said</u></strong> <u><strong>Rep</u></strong>. David Rivera, a Republican congressman <u><strong>from Florida</u></strong>, in July 2011 as he joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee's GOP majority in voting to cut off U.S. funding for the OAS. Rivera’s low regard for the organization was matched by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who in urging the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to form a new regional bloc excluding the United States said, "<u><strong>You can’t expect much from the OAS. It’s like a corpse that must be buried." <mark>The</mark> <mark>O</mark>rganization of <mark>A</mark>merican <mark>S</mark>tates’ troubles go beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum</u></strong>. <u><strong>The</u></strong> April 2012 <u><strong>Summit</u></strong> of the Americas <u><strong>showed many of the region's <mark>presidents</mark> <mark>disagree</mark>ing</u></strong>, at times sharply, <u><strong><mark>with the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>on key issues like drug policy</mark> and diplomacy</u></strong> toward Cuba; several said they saw little reason to continue with the series of periodic meetings that began in 1995. <u><strong><mark>Latin American governments</u></strong></mark>, meanwhile, <u><strong>have formed a handful of parallel organizations that explicitly <mark>exclude the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates. </u></strong>What is going on here? The OAS, the world's oldest regional organization, has never been a diplomatic powerhouse. Since the Pan-American Union's founding in 1910, it has rarely been the center of gravity for the Western Hemisphere's politics or diplomacy. It has helped to resolve only a small fraction of the region's armed conflicts or crises that threatened to deteriorate into conflicts. Instead, <u><strong><mark>the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board</u></strong>, <u><strong>a place to build consensus around broad policies</mark>, from anti-communism to counternarcotics to counterterrorism</u></strong>. <u><strong>The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has reduced friction</u></strong> among its members. And some <u><strong><mark>OAS components</u></strong></mark> -- the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, electoral observer missions and efforts to verify postconflict demobilizations <u><strong>-- <mark>have made important contributions to </mark>regional <mark>peace</mark>, security and democracy. </u></strong>But the OAS has been hampered by its design, which keeps it deliberately weak. The organization operates on a consensus model, in which a determined minority can prevent action. Its “one country, one vote” system means that a tiny state like St. Lucia has as much voice as a large state like Brazil. The OAS has no analogue to the U.N. Security Council and no dispute-resolution or peace-enforcement mechanism to deal with breaches of the peace like that contemplated in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. <u><strong><mark>The OAS is </mark>also <mark>hampered by a perception</u></strong></mark>, reinforced during the Cold War, <u><strong><mark>that the </mark>Washington-based <mark>body is dominated by the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. This is perhaps inevitable given the asymmetry of wealth and power between the United States and its regional neighbors. Still, <u><strong><mark>the perception of an uneven playing field </mark>has <mark>damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made</mark> Latin American <mark>states reluctant to take decisions that</mark> might <mark>require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS</mark>, even for the benefit of a greater good. As a result, <mark>the OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>Instead, the</u></strong> Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (<u><strong>CICAD</u></strong>), which is largely funded by the United States, <u><strong>has reinforced Washington’s hard-line approach</u></strong> emphasizing supply reduction. Nor has the OAS been a leading voice on regional security issues; little of note has emerged from its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security since it was established in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. The organization's security guarantees exist mostly on paper: The 1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which commits all countries to view an attack against one as an attack against all, has not been meaningfully invoked in decades, and Mexico dropped out of it entirely in the 2002 run-up to the Iraq War. By contrast, <u><strong>the OAS has become a more active voice in favor of strengthening the</u></strong> region's 30-year-old <u><strong>transition</u></strong> from dictatorship <u><strong>to democracy</u></strong>. However, its 2001 Democratic Charter, which in theory automatically suspends nondemocratic members and calls for diplomatic measures to deal with interruptions in democracy, has not been employed successfully. It failed key tests in Venezuela in 2002 and Honduras in 2009, as well as in more recent cases of democratic erosion in several countries. <u><strong><mark>Cases of interstate conflict</mark> </u></strong>are rare<u><strong> <mark>in Latin America, </u></strong></mark>but when they do occur they<u><strong> <mark>can be explosive</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The OAS has played a role </mark>at times <mark>in defusing them</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>usually <mark>by quickly </mark>convening regional heads of state and <mark>exerting</mark> united <mark>international pressure</mark>. </u></strong>From the 1950s to the 1970s, for instance, frequent flare-ups along a disputed border between Nicaragua and army-less Costa Rica were taken to the OAS. In one of the organization's greatest achievements, it helped broker an end to a brief 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador, which included the deployment of a postconflict observer mission. Many other 20th century border conflicts, though, were settled by other international actors. The Vatican, for instance, mediated a 1978 dispute between Argentina and Chile, and the International Court of Justice is currently considering a maritime dispute between Peru and Chile. Far more common in Latin America have been internal conflicts: civil wars, insurgencies, coups d'état and mass outbreaks of violent crime. Here, it is far harder for an international actor to resolve the conflict, because it means obligating a state or an insurgency to change its behavior within its own borders.</p> </s>

The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination -- turns the case

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in an opposition against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed) but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words The predicament we face in the West Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper?

The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in oppositional against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return claims of oppression and victimization are used to guilt-trip and to control; affirmations of diversities that are made in the name of righteousness create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is not their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed but the privilege that accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper

(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

<h4>The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination <strong>-- turns the case </h4><p>Chow </strong>– Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown -<strong> 1993</p><p></strong>(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) </p><p><u>While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary</u> for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. <u><mark>The question</u></mark> for me <u><mark>is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony</u></mark> (a question that positions them <u><mark>in</mark> an <mark>opposition</u>al</mark> light <u><mark>against dominant power</u></mark> and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), <u><mark>but <strong>how they can resist</u></strong></mark>, as Michel Foucault said, “<u><mark>the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse</u></mark>.’ “ Putting it another way, <u><mark>how do intellectuals struggle against <strong>a hegemony which already includes them</u></strong></mark> and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? <u>As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,”</u> <u>and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and <mark>as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, <strong>many</strong> deep-rooted, <strong>politically reactionary forces return</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to haunt us.</u></strong> <u>Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested <strong><mark>claims</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of oppression and victimization</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>are used</u></strong></mark> merely <u><strong><mark>to guilt-trip and to control</strong>; </mark>sexist and racist re<mark>affirmations of </mark>sexual and racial <mark>diversities that are made</mark> merely <mark>in the name of righteousness</mark>—all these forces <mark>create new “solidarities whose ideological premises <strong>remain unquestioned</u></strong></mark>. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. <u>The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense,</u> <u>We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are <strong>battles of words</u></strong>. <u><mark>Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are</mark> </u>most certainly <u><strong><mark>not</u></strong></mark> directly<u> <strong><mark>changing the</strong></mark> </u>downtrodden<u> <strong><mark>lives of those who seek</strong></mark> </u>their<u> <strong><mark>survival</strong></mark> </u>in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike.<u> <mark>What academic intellectuals must confront is</mark> thus <mark>not their</mark> </u>victimization by society at large (<u>or their <mark>victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed</mark>)</u>, <u><mark>but the</mark> power, wealth, and <mark>privilege that</mark> Ironically <mark>accumulate <strong>from their</strong> “oppositional” <strong>viewpoint</strong></mark>, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words</u>. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) <u>The predicament we face in the West</u>, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, <u>Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business</u>, . . . <u>he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.</u> “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? <u><mark>How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses</u></mark>, <u><mark>when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper</mark>?</u> How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?</p>

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993 fulltext: (Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense? [/INST] <h4>The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination <strong>-- turns the case </h4><p>Chow </strong>– Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown -<strong> 1993</p><p></strong>(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) </p><p><u>While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary</u> for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. <u><mark>The question</u></mark> for me <u><mark>is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony</u></mark> (a question that positions them <u><mark>in</mark> an <mark>opposition</u>al</mark> light <u><mark>against dominant power</u></mark> and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), <u><mark>but <strong>how they can resist</u></strong></mark>, as Michel Foucault said, “<u><mark>the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse</u></mark>.’ “ Putting it another way, <u><mark>how do intellectuals struggle against <strong>a hegemony which already includes them</u></strong></mark> and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? <u>As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,”</u> <u>and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and <mark>as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, <strong>many</strong> deep-rooted, <strong>politically reactionary forces return</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to haunt us.</u></strong> <u>Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested <strong><mark>claims</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of oppression and victimization</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>are used</u></strong></mark> merely <u><strong><mark>to guilt-trip and to control</strong>; </mark>sexist and racist re<mark>affirmations of </mark>sexual and racial <mark>diversities that are made</mark> merely <mark>in the name of righteousness</mark>—all these forces <mark>create new “solidarities whose ideological premises <strong>remain unquestioned</u></strong></mark>. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. <u>The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense,</u> <u>We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are <strong>battles of words</u></strong>. <u><mark>Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are</mark> </u>most certainly <u><strong><mark>not</u></strong></mark> directly<u> <strong><mark>changing the</strong></mark> </u>downtrodden<u> <strong><mark>lives of those who seek</strong></mark> </u>their<u> <strong><mark>survival</strong></mark> </u>in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike.<u> <mark>What academic intellectuals must confront is</mark> thus <mark>not their</mark> </u>victimization by society at large (<u>or their <mark>victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed</mark>)</u>, <u><mark>but the</mark> power, wealth, and <mark>privilege that</mark> Ironically <mark>accumulate <strong>from their</strong> “oppositional” <strong>viewpoint</strong></mark>, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words</u>. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) <u>The predicament we face in the West</u>, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, <u>Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business</u>, . . . <u>he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.</u> “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? <u><mark>How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses</u></mark>, <u><mark>when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper</mark>?</u> How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?</p> </s>

It means to authorize

le·gal·ize verb (used with object), le·gal·ized, le·gal·iz·ing. to make legal; authorize.

le·gal·ize verb with object to make legal; authorize.

le·gal·ize [lee-guh-lahyz] Show IPA verb (used with object), le·gal·ized, le·gal·iz·ing. to make legal; authorize. Also, especially British, le·gal·ise.

<h4>It means to authorize</h4><p><strong>RANDOM HOUSE 14</strong> [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/legalize]</p><p><u><strong><mark>le·gal·ize</u></strong></mark> [lee-guh-lahyz] Show IPA</p><p><u><strong><mark>verb</mark> (used <mark>with object</mark>), le·gal·ized, le·gal·iz·ing.</p><p><mark>to make legal; authorize.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Also, especially British, le·gal·ise.</p>

RANDOM HOUSE 14 [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/legalize]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: RANDOM HOUSE 14 [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/legalize] fulltext: le·gal·ize [lee-guh-lahyz] Show IPA verb (used with object), le·gal·ized, le·gal·iz·ing. to make legal; authorize. Also, especially British, le·gal·ise. [/INST] <h4>It means to authorize</h4><p><strong>RANDOM HOUSE 14</strong> [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/legalize]</p><p><u><strong><mark>le·gal·ize</u></strong></mark> [lee-guh-lahyz] Show IPA</p><p><u><strong><mark>verb</mark> (used <mark>with object</mark>), le·gal·ized, le·gal·iz·ing.</p><p><mark>to make legal; authorize.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Also, especially British, le·gal·ise.</p> </s>