elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1759109

202008

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

11000.0

IMC

Haze / Smoke; 3

Daylight

9500

Center ZZZ

Personal

PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Powerplant Lubrication System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 440; Flight Crew Type 40

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1759109

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure; Weather

Procedure

I filed IFR for my second flight of the day; from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2. The air had been smoky for my first flight; with 0.3 hours in actual IMC due to decreased visibility; and I suspected this flight would be the same. I requested ZZZZZ ZZZ3 ZZZ4 VXXX ZZZ5 direct. This would take me west of the fire and the associated TFR; which was centered on ZZZ VOR. I was given ZZZZZ ZZZ3 ZZZ ZZZZZ1; then as filed. This; of course; would take me right over the fire. I opened my IFR flight plan with ZZZ6 Approach and requested that I be rerouted around the fire. They told me I would have to ask Center. When I was switched to Center; the controller refused to reroute me; saying that the route they gave me was the 'preferred route' from my location to ZZZ2. I pointed out the fire directly below my route. The controller pointed out that the TFR ended at 9;000 ft. and I would be above that. I was already in smoke and my eyes were burning.As I was turned direct to ZZZ; I saw green radar reflections straight ahead of me on ADS-B in. I measured these; and they were 20nm away. There was a towering cumulus cloud directly in front of me that appeared to be closer than that. I requested the controller turn me right or left to avoid this convective activity. He refused; saying he would turn me southeast right before I got there. I was not satisfied with that; so I elected to divert to ZZZ6. He then gave me the arrival into ZZZ6 and handed me off to ZZZ6 Approach. As I descended toward ZZZ6; the engine monitor indicated the oil pressure was low. Because of that; I asked to make a precautionary landing at a closer airport. I was rerouted to ZZZ7 and I landed there without incident. I checked the oil upon landing; and it appeared adequate at five quarts. I did add oil.My flight the following day was uneventful. I did choose to fly to ZZZ8 first so I would not be given the same routing over the ZZZ Fire. This flight and the way Center handled it was concerning to me on multiple levels: As a single-engine piston pilot who did not have oxygen on board; I am breathing fumes from the fire. Also; the plane's engine requires oxygen for combustion. Flying through smoke is not ideal; especially when there is a safer route nearby. Not all convective activity involves rain; so it may not be visible on a controller's radar screen. We are taught the developing stage of a thunderstorm involves strong updrafts and no rain. As a single-engine piston pilot; I am not comfortable having a controller fly me right up to the precipitation he sees on his radar screen (which may be 20 minutes delayed) and then give me a turn. I suspect the display I saw using ADS-B in was the same one the controller saw on his screen. It was different from what I was seeing out the front window. Controllers need to listen to pilots. If I am reporting something different from what the controller is seeing on his radar display; he needs to take me seriously. The route I requested was not fundamentally different from the one ATC gave to me. It would have been safer and would have avoided the issues I encountered on this flight.

Pilot reported being denied a request to reroute around a wildfire TFR and convective activity. Pilot diverted to avoid the adverse conditions.

1741314

202004

0001-0600

HNL.Airport

HI

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

1741314

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Gate Agent / CSR

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

We brought Hazmat/Diesel fuel on Aircraft X. The Diesel fuel was failed to be offloaded at HNL and it was continued on to ZZZ on Aircraft X. An Agent in ZZZ realized it was on board in the forward cargo compartment and it was offloaded in ZZZ.

B737 Captain reported Hazmat cargo was not offloaded at intermediate destination and erroneously transported to subsequent destination.

1609383

201901

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

Air Taxi

PC-12

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Ignition Distribution

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 246; Flight Crew Total 1655; Flight Crew Type 463

Training / Qualification

1609383

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

In the morning we were assigned Aircraft X; fresh out of phase inspection. I had divided the flights for the day; and flights I was to be PF (Pilot Flying). Aircraft X was in the maintenance hangar at ZZZ. They (Maintenance) pulled it out and left it in front of the terminal. I completed my exterior check per the checklist and interior/exterior security sweep with nothing abnormal. SIC did interior preflight. I pinned the W&B (Weight and Balance) shortly afterwards and passengers were loaded when we received pin from Dispatch. Started Aircraft X following appropriate checklists and flows with no abnormalities; until the pusher test. The pusher system would not activate and pull the yoke after three tests. I notified [Name] that we will shut down and deplane passengers. I called Maintenance Control as that is the protocol prior to talking to the Local Maintenance. After the call with Maintenance Control; the local mechanic came out to troubleshoot and found that ZZZ Maintenance had not reset the pusher circuit breaker. Pusher tested correctly then for him. They contacted Maintenance Control and after informed me we are cleared to go. Passengers were boarded and we departed ZZZ to ZZZ1. All procedures and checklists were followed per company docs. All indications were normal and performance was as expected. In ZZZ1 the aircraft was fueled and nothing abnormal was noted on post flight. We departed ZZZ1 for ZZZ2. During the flight to ZZZ2; all procedures and checklists were followed per [Company Docs] and was also uneventful. Once in ZZZ2 and after passengers were deplaned; I exited Aircraft X and was about to begin my post flight inspection; I immediately noticed something unusual. There was damage to the left front upper engine cowling just behind the exhaust. There was a large hole with burn marks around it and black soot extending rearward. After checking the temperature of the rear cowling; I opened the cowling which revealed more soot. At first glance; we were both unable to find the source. After some peeking toward the front engine area from rear cowling area; First Officer noticed there was threaded open hole that lined up with the hole damage on front cowling. He showed me this finding and I included that in my initial call to Maintenance Control. While still on the phone with Maintenance Control; ZZZ2 Maintenance had showed up. They loudly proclaimed their disbelief. Since I was waiting for Maintenance Control to type all this in; I went outside to see what the commotion was about. At least four maintenance personnel were looking at Aircraft X cowling and looked shocked. They said that we are lucky to be alive. The igniter was hanging and according to Maintenance there was a potential for combustion inside the cowling. They said they could not believe this happened especially after a phase. I finished with Maintenance Control and Aircraft X was grounded. We were swapped into [another aircraft] and continued the route. First Officer notified our Chief Pilot about the ordeal. As of this time nothing came out of this at the company level. It seems to be swept under the rug. I learned that even if it's hard to inspect the front engine area; I need to take even more time preflighting to possibly catch these things. Especially after service by Maintenance.

PC-12 Captain reported discovering burn marks on the cowl during post flight inspection due to improper maintenance work on the engine.

1618860

201902

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1618860

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Work Refused; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Hazardous liquid spilled in forward cargo department.Cause: TSA missed bag with hazardous liquid in checked bag contained in laundry detergent containers.

B737 First Officer reported hazardous liquid spill in cargo pit from passenger checked bag.

1340476

201603

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Cockpit Furnishing

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 1178

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

1340476

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Company Policy; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Recently we upgraded all of our B-737s with new Ipad holders for ground and flight operations. Upon first review; the Ipad holder seems to be an improvement on the previous suction cup design. However after having flown multiple segments with the new IPad holder; it is a bit of a safety concern. The holder drops down several inches below the clipboard/window line. The creates an impediment to my ability to move my arm while taxing the aircraft. It has also on several occasions; bumped my elbow and forearm while I am performing crosswind landings.While the holder has some good points; modifications are needed to this holder to ensure in does not impede my ability to taxi the aircraft and perform crosswind landings.

A Boeing 737 Captain reported an anomaly with recently installed cockpit holders for the iPad. He stated that the mount tends to drop down which can impede arm movement; especially when taxiing or performing crosswind landings; and needs to be modified.

1441953

201704

1801-2400

D10.TRACON

TX

VMC

Night

TRACON D10

Air Taxi

Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B D10

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1441953

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

We were being radar vectored for a Visual Approach and were told to report 'airport in sight'. Upon obtaining visual contact with the airport; we tried to notify Approach that we had the airport in sight. Due to congested radio traffic we were not able to inform Approach right away. When there was a gap in radio transmissions we immediately informed Approach we had the airport in sight. We were quickly approaching the extended centerline of the runway; and we were at an altitude where we needed to begin our Visual Approach quickly.We reported 'airport in sight' with no response from Approach. We reported 'airport in sight' again and Approach asked for clarification of our call sign. The controller seemed confused as to who we were; and where we were. We responded again with our call sign and stated the airport was in sight. After a short pause; the controller told us to contact the Tower. We asked for clarification about whether we were cleared for a visual approach. I don't think we received a reply. We contacted the Tower; but by this time we had flown through the final approach course and were no longer in a position to land.Tower queried us about our position and status. We told them 'we were told to contact Tower; but were never cleared for a visual approach.' Tower asked for clarification by repeating what we just told them; and we confirmed. Tower then asked did you come to Tower on your own; or were you told to contact Tower. We stated 'we were told to contact Tower; but were not cleared for a visual.' She then gave us vectors to parallel the runway until we were abeam the departure end; then they turned us over to Approach. We were now speaking with a different approach controller than the one who never cleared us for the visual. He vectored us around for another visual approach. We continued the approach and landing without incident.Since we know it was Approach Control's intent to issue a visual approach once the airport was in sight; we could have made the approach without the explicit clearance. We did not feel this would be appropriate; even though it would delay our flight by having to come around for another approach. To our knowledge no one was endangered nor was a traffic conflict created with another aircraft. There was no traffic for the parallel runway.

A pilot reported he was on a base leg vector for a visual approach and was issued a frequency change to the Tower without receiving an approach clearance.

1794415

202103

0001-0600

MGGT.TRACON

FO

TRACON MGGT

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness

1794415

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

Company Policy

On the arrival in MGGT; winds were reported out of the south at 10 kts; so MGGT was landing Runway 20. Referencing WSI (Weather Services International); there were two active areas for volcanic ash; one for Pacaya and one for Agua. Both had plumes and ash clouds from the surface to 14;000 ft; and both were moving west. While selecting what approach we were planning; we looked at the different missed approaches and decided the VOR Z Runway 20 would be best in the event of a missed approach and avoid any ash cloud. The Missed Approach procedure for the VOR Z Runway 20 is AUR; 1 DME past the VOR; a slight left turn via the 169 radial to 17 DME and then hold at 11;000 ft with no special climb rates associated with it. Then our briefing turned to the Engine-Out (EO) Procedure. We immediately noticed the EO procedure splits the gap of the volcanos Pacaya and Agua; and right through the SIGMET area.We thought about what to do in the event of an engine-out missed approach. I decided; in this situation; the EO procedure would not be appropriate due to the active SIGMETs for volcanic ash; and I decided the missed approach for the VOR Z Runway 20 would be more appropriate and safer than the EO as published. We reviewed the terrain that shows on the EO procedure; terrain charts; and considered our landing weight. Landing was normal and no missed approach was accomplished. But planning for worse case revealed challenges to our procedures of following company EO procedures as published.Our training has us brief and setup EO procedures for missed approaches as well as takeoff; and fly them as published in the event of an engine-out event. This particular procedure; on this night; sets a crew up for a terrible scenario of going missed approach or takeoff; losing an engine; and flying directly into a volcanic ash cloud with one engine while these volcanoes are active.My suggestion would be to give the aircrews more options; have the EO procedure ready but review all the missed approaches as published and note whether we can fly them as a published engine-out. In this case; I believe we could have safely executed the missed approach for the VOR Z Runway 20; and possibly an engine-out scenario on initial takeoff; but I just don't have access to the information to confirm this. Blindly following EO procedures when other factors encroach on the procedures could result in a worse outcome.

Air carrier Captain reported company policy for single engine missed approach would be through volcanic ash; unless flight crews plan for a different procedure.

1450668

201705

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

2.0

1500.0

Rain; 3

Daylight

2000

2

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 150

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ

Engine

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 80; Flight Crew Type 65

Situational Awareness

1450668

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Human Factors

On short final after a 3.4 hour cross-country flight the engine quit. [ATC was advised] and pilot safely operated an engine failure landing on runway; vacating the runway as well. Engine failure was due to faulty fuel gauge indicating aircraft had adequate fuel present when fuel starvation occurred.

C150 pilot reported a loss of engine power on short final due to fuel exhaustion that resulted in a dead-stick landing.

1108668

201308

0601-1200

RFD.TRACON

IL

5000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON RFD

Personal

Bonanza 35

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Cruise

Direct; Vectors

Class E RFD

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 693; Flight Crew Type 131

1108668

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated

Procedure

Loss of GPS signal and primary navigation equipment while in flight. Signal was lost twice and service restored within 10 minutes. Longest duration of outage was 5 minutes. Loss of primary GPS navigation was reported to RFD Approach. After discussing this with other local airmen; I believe there may be a source of interference in this area. Another pilot reported loss of GPS while en route at low altitude through this same area.

The reporter states that the area in question is mostly farmland with no large structures or other possible sources of interference in the area. The interference detected by another pilot was on a different date but in the same area.

BE35 pilot reports a loss of GPS signal at 5;000 FT in the vecinity of RFD. Discussions with other local airmen indicate that there may be a source of interference in this area near SIMMN Intersection.

1062192

201301

0001-0600

MEM.Airport

TN

TRACON MEM

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

Initial Approach

Class B MEM

Tower MEM

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Initial Approach

Class B MEM

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1062192

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

The RECAT wake turbulence spacing caused us to encounter the wake turbulence from the previous aircraft. Further Tower was telling every aircraft to use minimum time on the runway because of other aircraft on very close approaches. This is eroding safety both in flight during approach and while decelerating and vacating the runway. Don't space us so close when we have tailwinds on final. The tailwind is holding the vortices of the previous aircraft right on the glide path causing a greater opportunity to cause encounters when aircraft are slow and close to the ground.

MD-11 Captain reported that ATC procedures on MEM arrivals are causing avoidable wake vortex encounters.

1356446

201605

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

King Air C90 E90

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Climb

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

1356446

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We had just received this aircraft the day before and it was 24 years newer than what we had been flying. The chief pilot called and ask if I could fly to an outlying field and pick up a medical team and fly them back to home base. I took my time and ran the complete checklist and departed on the active runway.The aircraft accelerated normally and after I rotated I took my hands off the throttles to raise the landing gear; the left engine lost power. Auto feather was engaged so the aircraft was kept in control and I notified the tower I had an engine failure and continued to climb to a safe altitude. They asked me if I needed priority and said negative and requested for a few minutes to sort the problem out. I started to troubleshoot and found the left power lever was at idle. Advancing the power lever restored normal power and I continued without incident.

BE90 First Officer reported a loss of power after takeoff on one engine due to the friction lock not being set for a throttle.

1053740

201212

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

20.0

1500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Air Taxi

Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

1.0

Part 135

VFR

Passenger

Cruise

None

Class G ZZZ

Cabin Window

X

Failed; Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 3000

Situational Awareness

1053740

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure

During cruise flight port side cabin door window popped out and departed the aircraft. The helicopter just came out of paint and the gasket was installed improperly. Pilot corrective action was to slow to 50-60 KTS and land as soon as possible. No further damage was done to aircraft; people; or property on the ground.

An AS350's right cabin door window popped out and departed the aircraft in-flight; following an aircraft painting the window gasket was improperly installed; the pilot landed as soon a safely possible.

994262

201202

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

Tower ZZZ

Personal

MU-2

1.0

Part 91

Descent

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Bonanza 33

1.0

Part 91

Descent

Class D ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

994262

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

I was working the Local Control position; we were active Runway 3. I had a BE33 (IFR) on an ILS approach to Runway 26R on a 3 mile final with instructions to circle to land Runway 3. SCT Approach switched a MU2 (IFR) to me 4 east of the airport on an IFR Visual Approach. I advised the MU2 to make right traffic to Runway 3. The MU2 turned to the down wind 2 northeast of the field and reported that he did not have the BE33 in sight. The BE33 was turning a 1 and 1/2 mile final to Runway 3. I gave him the traffic. The MU2 abeam the numbers for Runway 3 again said he did not have the BE33 in sight. The BE33 at that point was abeam him less by than 1 mile opposite direction. There were no altitude restrictions on either aircraft. Chino Tower is a VFR Tower. We are not authorized to provide separation between IFR arrivals; per LOA. These two aircraft were well within standard IFR separation requirements. SCT needs to train its controllers on proper IFR separation requirements and inform them that we are not authorized to provide IFR separations on arrivals.

VFR Tower Controller described a potential separation issue when the Approach Controller failed to insure required separation between two IFR arrivals.

1579546

201809

1201-1800

MHT.Airport

NH

VMC

Daylight

TRACON A90

Fractional

Small Transport

2.0

Part 135

IFR

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Initial Approach

STAR ROZZE

Class E A90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1579546

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Human Factors

This report identifies potential human factors traps in the design of the ROZZE.ROZZE2 RNAV Arrival in MHT. They were observed during our flight into MHT. There were no known violations of FAA Regulations. The flight operated normally and safely. The following were observed: on the arrival; there are multiple fixes that begin with the same letter of the alphabet. This could potentially cause the crew to select the incorrect fix if cleared to one of these fixes to join and continue the RNAV arrival. I have noticed this on other RNAV arrivals; and it is a potential human factors trap. I suggest that each fix begin with a different letter of the alphabet; to avoid potential pitfalls in a high workload environment; such as when a crew is issued this arrival while already approaching the terminal environment; thus causing them to reconfigure the FMS automation. Note that fixes 'PNARD' and 'NUUKM' are overlaid upon each other; making it impossible to determine which fix applies to the transition to land south on Runway 17; via 'PURBL'; or Runway 24; via 'JSTNN'; or land to the north on Runways 6; via 'TEETO' or Runway 35; via 'SHOWZ'. Note that the notes for 'PURBL'; 'TESTO; and 'SHOWZ' indicate that the pilot may expect either RADAR VECTORS to the final approach course; reading the notes as written; it is easy; again from a human factors viewpoint; to read that the pilot can expect vectors for one of the approaches. However the intent of the note is that the pilot may be issued either RADAR VECTORS for the approach or; will be expected to fly a transition off of one of the fixes; 'PURBL'; 'JSTNN'; 'TEETO'; or 'SHOWZ'. Again; in a high workload environment; the intent of this wording may be easily misunderstood. The wording should include the phrase; 'expect to fly the transition for the respective approach; or RADAR VECTORS to the final approach course.' ATC verbal instructions should include the verbiage; 'after PURBL'; fly the ILS transition for the ILS 17 Approach.' However ATC may actually issue a clearance which very much sounds like a restatement of the clearance to fly the RNAV STAR; verbalizing only the expected runway transition on the STAR itself; such as 'ROZZE2; PURBL; ILS 17.' A pilot may easily interpret this as a clearance or re-clearance to fly the ROZZE2 RNAV with the transition for a landing to the south via 'PURBL' and then expect further instructions for one of the options listed; e.g. RADAR VECTORS to the approach; etc. Also; late issuance of the type of option to fly; e.g. RADAR VECTORS or the transition from the IAF listed on the approach plate; may cause a delay in sequencing the FMS logic in a timely manner. The following are a summary of suggestions to enhance clarification of RNAV STARS; specifically in this example; the ROZZE.ROZZE2 RNAV arrival into MHT: Each RNAV fix should begin with a different alphabet letter; no two fixes should begin with the same letter of the alphabet. RNAV fixes should be clearly delineated on the chart; fixes should not be overlaid so close that the transitions associated with them cannot be clearly identified and understood. Expectation instructions listed on the RNAV chart should be clearly written; e.g. 'Landing Runway 17; EXPECT to fly the ILS 17 transition; or; EXPECT RADAR VECTORS to the final approach course.' ATC instructions should clearly communicate the actions that the pilot is to take; e.g. 'after 'PURBL' fly the ILS transition to the ILS Runway 17 Approach' or; 'after 'PURBL' fly heading ### and expect RADAR VECTORS to the ILS 17 Approach.'

Small Transport pilot reported alleged confusing and ambiguous arrival chart nomenclature and information during arrival to MHT.

1305726

201510

1201-1800

OAK.Airport

CA

4500.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161

Situational Awareness

1305726

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

Relatively new RNAV Arrivals into OAK resulted in FMC commanded airspeeds exceeding the below Class B 200 knot speed limit requiring Pilot action to prevent exceeding the limit. (Pilot action we accomplished on this and other recent flights into OAK.) Is it possible to adjust the FMC speeds to comply with the Class B airspeed limits at the appropriate point on the arrival?

A B737 Captain wonders if it is possible to adjust the FMC speeds to comply with the under Class B airspeed limits at the appropriate point on arrivals that pass beneath the Class B airspace; in this case OAK.

1804531

202104

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

55.0

5.0

1500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Cirrus Vision SJ50

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Pitot-Static System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 300

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1804531

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

At about 900' after takeoff I received a double dong tone and sfd alt miscompare" yellow EICAS message followed by two more different miscompare EICAS messages and repeating dong tones. I was distracted with the tones and 3 scrolling EICAS messages while troubleshooting the EICAS messages. While going to the checklist for the EICAS messages; I went through assigned altitude of 1500' to about 1750'. I had not turned on the autopilot yet because of my reviewing all the EICAS messages. When I caught the altitude deviation I immediately descended to my assigned correct altitude but about 10 seconds later ATC assigned me to climb to 2000'. There were no traffic conflicts. Ended up being mud daubers had built nests in all 4 static ports. The material deposited by the insects was white and did not look abnormal on my preflight. Lesson is to always fly the plane first and to double check all static ports and other openings for bugs."

Cirrus Vision SJ50 pilot reported an altitude deviation while troubleshooting multiple EICAS messages.

1022023

201207

1201-1800

F11.TRACON

FL

3000.0

TRACON F11

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

IFR

Cruise

Vectors

Class E F11

TRACON F11

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

IFR

Cruise

Class E F11

Facility F11.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1022023

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

I was conducting OJT on STN/STV; we had just gotten the briefing. There was a small single piston holding south of KIZER at 3;000 FT and the previous controller had climbed a twin turboprop to 3;000 FT and turned on the north downwind for the ILS 9L. This created a conflict between the twin turboprop and single piston; I pointed this out immediately to my trainee. The trainee turned the aircraft but waited to descend. This caused them to come closer than 3 miles. Well I teach my OJT's not climb to 3;000 FT on the downwind if holding at this holding fix. If you get this handed to you it may take precise vectors to avoid the holder and possible traffic on the ILS. You can always have the single piston/holding traffic turn north to the fix early due to traffic. I've been told to give my trainee a long leash but in this case I've learned that leash was to long and I needed to take over.

F11 Controller providing OJT described a conflict event when the trainee was late in descending one of the aircraft involved.

1181543

201406

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1181543

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1181696.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airport; Human Factors

Airport

Shortly after contacting Tower on approach we were informed that runway lights at the airport were not coming on and the Tower was unable to reset. The Captain decided to continue the landing. At that time I informed the Captain that I believed that it was not legal to land without operating runway lights at night (I was about 95% sure). The Captain said that she would take full responsibility for the landing and would file an ASAP report if needed. She did inform me that either one of us could call the abort if we could not find the runway. She asked me to inform the Tower that we would continue with the landing. Tower told us to proceed at our own risk. A few seconds later Tower asked us if they should increase the intensity of the taxiway lights. We said yes. At this point I could see the airport complex. I was not able to see the runway except for a black rectangle devoid of any lights. I was about to call for a go around when the Captain said she had the runway in sight. We landed without any further incident after which the Captain said that she had very good night vision. I should have been more assertive and insisted that we not continue the approach. Had I been in command I would have aborted the landing and gone into a hold when the Tower informed us about the runway lights not working especially given the fact we had sufficient fuel. That would have given us enough time to let the Tower work on the lighting issue and for us to verify the FAR's/FOM. The reason I did not assert myself further was two fold. I was not 100% sure of the illegality of the landing and I was worried about the Captains reaction had I forced the issue and turned out to be wrong. There had already been a few instances during the short flight that the Captain had overruled my decisions on some minor instances in which I knew I was correct. Thus I assumed I would have been overruled.

We were on final approach; we had declared the airport in sight and had been cleared for a visual approach. After transferring to Tower frequency (same Controller as approach frequency) and being cleared to land; the Controller stated that the runway lights would not illuminate. We had the PAPI lights in sight as well as taxiway lighting; we were on the ILS glide path. The Controller asked us to state our intentions for this arrival. I told the First Officer that I was comfortable landing on the runway. I also stated 'If you in any way feel uncomfortable with this approach at any time; we will go around and make an alternate decision. Are you okay with continuing?' He said he was okay to continue. I had him tell the Controller that we were okay to continue. The controller stated that he had contacted the county; but wasn't sure how long it would take them to fix the lighting. The Controller asked if we would like the taxiway lights turned brighter. We said 'sure; it won't hurt.' We continued the approach. I called the runway and runway markings in sight when I saw them. We landed smoothly and exited the runway. All conditions were achieved normally. The controller had us taxi to the gate.

CRJ-900 flight crew is informed during a night visual approach that the runway lights will not come on. The Captain elects to continue; the First Officer is not so sure; but agrees and a normal landing ensues.

1763812

202009

1801-2400

ICL.Airport

IA

20.0

0.5

200.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke; 9

Night

12000

FBO

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Class G X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 2000

1763812

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Horizontal 100; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

On final approach to Runway 20 at ICL there are grain bins in the flight path with the red obstacle [light] burned out. I have requested for weeks that it be fixed; but has not as of today. On a night landing training flight; student was making adjustment for a wind change and drifted too close to the bins because he could not see them without the red light. I as the instructor had to take immediate action to avoid collision with them when I noticed that the wind had drifted us too close to them. I will continue to request that the light be fixed and have students fly an above glide slope on Runway 20 in the future.

Flight instructor reported the aircraft flew close to an obstacle at night that did not have a red obstacle warning light during approach to ICL airport.

1102552

201307

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Visual Approach

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Class B ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

1102552

Facility ZZZ.TOWER

Government

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown

1102576.0

ATC Issue All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Staffing; Human Factors

Human Factors

While working LC3/4 combined at LC4; I had two CRJ's land Runway XXR and exit at Taxiway XX. An A319 then landed Runway XXR and was rolling out towards the second high speed exit; Taxiway XY. I informed the A319 that company traffic was on short final. I then attempted to stop the second CRJ short of Taxiway DY so that the A319 could exit the runway unimpeded. While talking to the CRJ; I realized that the A319 was not going to be off the runway in time and sent the A320 around. At the time I sent the A320 around; the aircraft was crossing the runway threshold. I then gave the A320 runway heading; a climb to 9 thousand; and handed him off the appropriate departure sector. In the future; I will give priority to the possible go-around situations and initiate the missed approach much sooner (before the landing threshold; when it is obvious that the operation will not work). It is also critical to 'paint a picture for each aircraft involved.' Advising the preceding aircraft to plan the first high speed exit and minimal time on the runway for traffic close in trail; and ensuring that the trail aircraft knows of the distance between the preceding aircraft and any speed overtakes.

Two sick leave hits for staffing; leaving only 7 CPCs for the shift. Normal would be 10; and won't approve leave below this. However; in the event of sick leave; OT will not be called and supervisors who are not proficient during normal traffic are forced to work. This was the case here. A Supervisor working due to staffing; no OT was attempted. Due to lack of proficiency; an A320 was sent around very late after crossing landing threshold with another aircraft on the runway. This was during normal arrival rush. If 10 is what we need for staffing; we should be calling fully proficient OT CPC's to replace them; and not try to save the budget by staffing with supervisors who do not work busy traffic.

Tower Controller described a very late go-around instruction noting his/her lack of timely instructions.

1586484

201810

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

High

Aircraft X

Galley

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

1586484

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

During my preflight on this aircraft I usually check the oven just for checks; and surprisingly I found a blanket inside the oven; door was closed and got the attention of the other FA; and the Captain as well. Which gives me the idea that on the previous flight one of the flight attendants was warming up this blanket to keep themselves nice and warm. I would never expected to find such an item; specially a blanket inside the oven; it is super and extremely dangerous; very irresponsible and an unprofessional act; a serious subject for me to bring it up and to be investigated. I had to fill out this [report] to bring the attention for the safety department of [Company]. When it comes to safety issues and preventing a terrible tragedy to happen in the air; I personally would like to take action and the attention of this serious matter. I can't say exactly which of the flight attendants did this; or whoever did it; but a proper investigation about this incident would lead to whoever may have done this. To make sure that anyone do it again.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported finding a blanket in the oven during preflight.

1705454

201911

0601-1200

JFK.Airport

NY

2000.0

Tower JFK

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class B JFK

Tower JFK

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class B JFK

Facility JFK.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1705454

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Ambiguous

I was working the Local 2 position; which entails working Runway 31L off-loaded departures and CBA (VFR/Helicopter Operation in the B). Local 1 is working Runway 4R/L. Aircraft X appears to be vectoring in for Runway 4L and checks in on my frequency; which is the wrong frequency as he should be with Local 1. I switch him to that frequency. He then appears to be disoriented and is overshooting the finals. He's now in conflict with Aircraft Y; an arrival for Runway 4R. Neither of them appear to be Local 1 or the Approach Controller. I double check on my frequency and they aren't on mine either. They finally come up on Local 1 and the Controller separates them both.I recommend that the Approach Controller ensures that aircraft are either established on course and are no longer a factor with other aircraft before switching frequencies because sometimes they go to the wrong frequencies or lose communication and can become a problem; so much so that it can create an accident.

JFK Tower Controller reported an aircraft was using the incorrect frequency during handoff; which resulted in a conflict with another aircraft.

1700972

201911

1801-2400

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Cloudy; Snow; 1

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Workload

1700972

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Workload

1700974.0

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Aircraft

While still in the low-speed regime during takeoff on Runway XX at ZZZZ; I suddenly smelled a strong acrid odor that I perceived to be associated with an electrical short or fire. Because there was no annunciation of an electrical fault or fire; I continued the takeoff roll for approximately 2-3 additional seconds. The odor did not abate and grew stronger; but I did not hear warning chimes or see any EICAS annunciations. Nonetheless; I elected to abort the takeoff well before reaching 80 kts. Because the abort was initiated in the low-speed regime; we were easily able to stop and exit the runway at Taxiway XX.At no time was there a fire annunciation. Accordingly; I did not declare an emergency. By the time we exited the runway; however; we were below minimum fuel. I communicated the issue to ATC; confirmed that I was not declaring an emergency; and received instructions to return to the gate.Upon our return to the gate; I communicated the status of our flight to the passengers; conferred with the station personnel regarding possible options for accommodating the passengers; and then initiated contact with Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and [Operations Control].When I received guidance from [Operations Control] that the flight was cancelled/delayed until the following day; I coordinated with Station Personnel to get the passengers off the aircraft. I then met with Contract Maintenance Personnel and confirmed that the required aircraft inspection would have to wait until the following morning. Upon delivering this information to [Operations Control]; I shut down the aircraft; and the crew went to the assigned hotel for rest in accordance with instructions from [Operations Control] and Crew Scheduling. Because I was ultimately released from duty the next morning; I have had no further interaction with the aircraft or any further discussion with any company personnel regarding this matter.The potentially relevant events before the aborted takeoff are worthy of discussion and consideration in reviewing this event. A winter storm had begun on ZZZZ earlier in the afternoon. By the time we blocked out; the visibility was 1-1/2 SM and forecast to drop. There were several inches of snow covering all runways and taxiways. Pilot reports were calling the braking action on Runway XX fair to moderate.During our turn; the snow immediately began adhering to the aircraft. By the time we blocked out; there was a substantial amount of snow on all critical surfaces. Accordingly; deicing - Type I - and anti-ice - Type IV - applications were necessary.Because the entire operation of the flight; including taxi; was conducted in icing conditions; a two-engine taxi was required. The queue for deicing was quite long and the time from deice to takeoff was approximately 15 minutes. As a result; we were within a couple hundred lbs. of minimum fuel when we commenced the takeoff roll. Accordingly; once the abort was complete; return to the gate was required because of the fuel state.Like all aborted takeoff decisions; my decision to abort this takeoff had to be made quickly; which; by definition; is without time to make a full and detailed evaluation of all the possibly relevant facts. I think that in this instance; I made the correct and safest decision.Because we were performing a 'T/O' power takeoff; I stood up the power while holding the brakes. The acrid smell did not become evident until 2-3 seconds into the takeoff roll. I hesitated an additional 2-3 seconds after first perceiving the smell to determine whether I was certain in my perception that it smelled like an electrical short or fire before initiating the abort. During that period; the smell not only did not abate; it grew stronger.During the moment I had to make the abort decision; I weighed my perception of something burning; the lack of an annunciated problem; the overall weather conditions and how they may impact an emergency return; and the runway/brakingconditions. I concluded that any further delay in aborting the takeoff waiting for an annunciated confirmation of what I was smelling may well put us in the position of a high-speed abort on a snow-covered runway with fair to moderate braking action. Further; because the weather was bad and worsening; I thought about the challenge/possibility of having to make an emergency return to ZZZZ and the risk that would pose. I elected to abort the takeoff and investigate the matter on the ground.I was aware at the time of the possibility of odors in the cockpit and cabin from deicing. However; I waited longer than the required period before turning the bleeds and packs back on after the last de-icing application. Further; more than ten minutes elapsed after turning the bleeds and packs back on and commencing the takeoff. During that time; there were no odors in the cockpit or cabin associated with restoring the bleeds and packs. During my career; I have smelled the results of early restoration of bleeds and packs after de-icing. I would describe the smell as 'sweet or syrupy.' The odor that led to my decision to abort was decidedly acrid like an electrical short/fire. The difference in this odor was why I did not attribute the smell to ingested de-ice fluid. Moreover; the First Officer and the Flight Attendant smelled the same thing and characterized the smell similarly. Because of the combination of these considerations; I elected to abort the takeoff before continued acceleration on the takeoff roll constrained the safe responses to what I perceived to be a potentially growing threat.An additional item to note in the review of this incident is to note what the First Officer saw and perceived. Upon debriefing the incident with the First Officer; not only did he confirm that he perceived the same odor that I did; but that simultaneously with hearing me call for the 'Abort;' he saw the Master Warning flash and instantly pushed the button to cancel it thinking that it was the annunciation flash that caused me to call for the abort. However; upon scrolling through the MFD (Multi-function Flight Display) Maintenance page; there was no electronic record of a fault annunciation.Finally; the First Officer and Flight Attendant carried out their duties in commendable fashion and in accordance with SOP. The crew coordination was excellent and led to a safe and orderly resolution of the incident and the conclusion of the flight.Accordingly; although ambiguity remains regarding the factual premise for making the decision to abort the takeoff; absent some objective forensic data that would not only resolve that ambiguity but would be ascertainable in the moment of decision; I would make the same decision again if presented with the same scenario.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-145 Captain reported smelling a burning odor during the takeoff roll; resulting in a rejected takeoff.

1008949

201205

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Repair; Work Cards

Horizontal Stabilizer

Boeing

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1008949

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; MEL; Logbook Entry; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

Human Factors

As I was reviewing the logbook for a B737-800 aircraft; the First Officer returned to the cockpit from his walk around. He mentioned he saw speed tape along the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer. I noted that we only had a placard form for the speed tape in the right wheel well [for the] vapor barrier. I began a review of the aircraft damage log history. The first entry was for the damage to the right stabilizer in January 2011. The entry referenced that speed tape was applied to damaged area. No mention of follow-on inspection requirements. I called [our] B737 Technical support. After asking Technical support to pull-up the aircraft damage history items; I asked; if speed tape was applied; should there not be a logbook placard form in the logbook. Technician said he was going to have to enter a discrepancy item. I gave my cell phone over to the ZZZ Mechanic that was now present so he could get the item entered per Technical support. I insisted that since the item was originally addressed on January 2011 without any follow-up inspection; that we should at least re-inspect the condition of the Temporary Repair (TR). This aircraft flew over 16-months without any follow-up inspection to a Temporary Repair using speed tape. The logbook may not have been properly filled out at ZZZ1; where the original damage repair was made.

A Captain was informed by his First Officer that he saw speed tape along the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer during his walk around. The B737-800 aircraft had flown for 16-months without any follow-up inspection to a Temporary Repair (TR) using speed tape.

1611426

201901

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Total 10472; Flight Crew Type 2981

1611426

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 168

1611420.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

At FL350; auto flight on; we had an ECAM Yellow Hyd Low Level. We established PF/PM (Pilot Flying/ Pilot Monitoring) roles and completed the ECAM. Notified Dispatch via ACARS. Reviewed the QRH notes; and briefed the landing. We asked Dispatch to confirm our decision to land at [scheduled destination]; but never got a response. Possible ACARS lost message and we didn't have enough time to follow up. Sent a message to [Operations Control] that we had a Yellow Hyd failure. The ECAM had us shut off the Yellow Hyd System; and turn it back on on final. We evaluated our landing distance based upon the Yellow system not recovering; and verified we had a very safe margin with only one reverser and two spoilers per wing inop. I performed a brief with the flight attendants and advised them there was no reason to prepare for an evacuation. We turned the Yellow Engine pump back on when we dropped the gear. We had Approach Control give us an extended final to ensure our flaps would still deploy when operating at half rate. The Yellow Hyd system recovered with normal pressure and very low volume. We made an uneventful landing and exited the runway. Clearing the runway we stopped to allow for the [ramp] crew to complete a walk around safety check. When complete; we taxied to gate and waited until the ground crew verified the chocks were set before securing the number 1 engine; per the QRH notes. The Yellow Hyd pressure remained normal until shutdown; although the volume dropped to zero. On the post flight walk around we found the entire aircraft belly wet with dripping hydraulic fluid.Post flight I debriefed the event with my FO (First Officer) [and ground personnel]; all of whom responded perfectly.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A320 flight crew reported receiving an ECAM for low fluid level in the Yellow hydraulic system.

1333096

201602

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

2500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Chancellor 414A / C414

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft Heating System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Trainee; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 3600; Flight Crew Type 585

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1333096

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 35

Situational Awareness

1331844.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

I was the PF/Receiving training on this flight. After takeoff I experienced a sudden small roll to the left. I was hand flying and visually corrected back to wings level. We would penetrate clouds soon so I selected both pitot heat switches to the ON position. The right pitot heat circuit breaker immediately blew. An attempted reset was unsuccessful. We were assigned a right turn to a 095 (I believe) heading. After turning to the assigned heading; I experienced another small but sudden left roll. I then switched on the auto pilot in HDG mode as we continued to climb. I then noticed the airspeed seemed to be fluctuating. Not wanting to enter the clouds with system malfunctions; I started a turn to a right downwind leg while discontinuing the climb. I was reminded by the PNF/Instructor that the auto pilot was ON and I was inadvertently fighting it. As this was being discussed; I felt another small roll. I shut off the auto pilot and informed the PNF/Instructor that I was having control problems and did not wish to continue. After the auto pilot was turned OFF; we still experienced intermittent rolls. The PNF then informed the tower that we wanted to return to [departure airport]. They started vectors for sequencing to follow other aircraft so I informed the PNF that the control issues were still continuing. He then told ATC that we requested immediate landing clearance. Airspeed was fluctuating wildly and I then found out that the copilot airspeed was also fluctuating. While selecting the landing gear to the DOWN position; I noticed that all three gear lights were already on. The gear had apparently never retracted and I had not yet noticed due to the other distractions. We landed without further incident. We noticed the emergency trucks proceeding along the airport perimeter. After receiving taxi clearance and heading along the parallel; we informed Ground that we seemed to be fine now and they could call off the trucks. Approximately 1000 feet from the FBO; we noticed white smoke billowing from the defrost ducts. We then informed Ground to send the CFR vehicles to the ramp; and that we had smoke in the cockpit. We parked away from the buildings by the grass; powered down and evacuated. After assuring the passengers were safe and well clear; I opened the left nose baggage door and white smoke billowed out. The fire crew inspected the aircraft and found no fire but did notice scorch marks and minor smoke on the bulkhead baggage compartment vertical wall. At the time of this writing; no further evaluation has been done to determine the exact cause of the seemingly unrelated events.

The reporter indicated that the fire appeared to be from residual cabin heater fuel that was ignited by a short in a wire bundle. The shorted wiring was also the source of the multiple electrical problems. The series of uncommanded movements in the roll axis is still under evaluation; but may have been wake turbulence. The aircraft has since been ferried to a nearby airport with no flight control issues reported.

I was the PM/Instructor for the flight. After departure; pitot heat was selected on for both pitot tubes by the PF. The right pitot heat CB popped. Shortly thereafter; the Pilot Flying this aircraft reported an odd control malfunction in the roll axis. I noticed that he appeared to be fighting the autopilot; and asked if he was aware it was on. He was; but turned it off. The roll malfunction (jerk of the yoke) continued intermittently. We remained below the clouds and told ATC we wanted to return to [the departure airport]. They started vectoring us for a long final; and the PF stated it was getting worse. I immediately [notified ATC] and told the PF to turn toward the airport. We landed without incident. After receiving a taxi clearance; we headed toward the FBO. About 500-1000 feet from the ramp; white smoke started to billow from the defrost ducts. I told the PF to head to the ramp immediately. I called ATC and told them to send the CFR vehicles to the ramp; and that we had smoke in the cockpit; and was depowering the aircraft (electrically). CFR met us and I asked them to use their IR camera to inspect the nose of the aircraft to verify no fire exists in the closed compartments.After the previous inbound flight; the CB popped for the cabin fan. We then found the heater inop. We discussed the issue with our normal maintenance and all agreed the aircraft would be safe to fly with the heater and cabin fan inop for the relatively short flight home. Both were placarded inoperative. Maintenance has not inspected the aircraft yet; however there are signs of fire or extreme heat in the nose baggage area above the cabin heater. Smoke trails and burned paint.

C414 pilot and flight instructor experienced several uncommanded wing rolling movements; possibly from wake turbulence; as well as electrical problems that resulted in a return to the field. After landing; smoke was observed in the cabin. Residual fuel from the cabin heater was reported to have been ignited by a shorted wire bundle which was likely also the source of the electrical problems.

1854823

202111

0601-1200

ZZZ.Tower

US

2500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Climb

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Flight Engineer / Second Officer; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 24685; Flight Crew Type 215

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1854823

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

On a southbound departure from ZZZ I requested clearance from ZZZ2 Tower to transition west through the ZZZ2 Class D airspace. The controller approved my request with a midfield crossover restriction. She called [small jet] traffic 2 miles south of ZZZ3 at 3;000 feet. During her call she responded with an incorrect call sign. Subsequent to my initial response I visually acquired the [small jet]. By this point I had initiated a west bound turn and climb to higher altitude for my transition as I believed I was well within the ZZZ2 Class D and below the 3;000 foot floor of the Class B.The controller became excited and issued instructions to stop climb to 'XYY' and subsequent transmissions to 'YY'. This caused extreme confusion to me as to whom her instructions were directed. The airspace in the location near my westbound turn is complicated as there is overlapping design with different control and altitude jurisdictions. I use aircraft GPS navigation and EFB data for a visual presentation of airspace. While it is possible I penetrated Class B airspace it was purely unintentional. At one point the Tower controller stated 'you almost hit a [small jet']. I had visual contact with the small jet who was going to pass well behind my flight path. The complicated nature of the airspace design combined with the controller's tone and delivery of incorrect call sign contributed to an extremely confusing experience.

Single Engine Pilot reported a possible airspace violation and NMAC . The pilot cited the complicated airspace at this location and confusion with ATC instructions as contributing to the event.

1648170

201905

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 503

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1648170

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Horizontal 80; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

While flaring on final a slight wind shift occurred during the flare for landing causing the longitudinal axis of the aircraft to move to the left of the ground track and insufficient right rudder application to correct the change was applied. Side load was placed on the main gear and directional control was temporarily lost as nose wheel touched down. I took control of the aircraft as soon as I observed the loss of directional control from the pilot. The aircraft veered momentarily off the runway into the grass to the left of the runway and back onto the paved runway exit. No damage occurred to the aircraft; airport installations and no physical injuries occurred to the pilot or myself (instructor.)

C172 CFI reported taking control of the aircraft on following his student's loss of directional control after touchdown.

1419353

201701

0601-1200

ZDC.ARTCC

VA

29000.0

IMC

Turbulence

Center ZDC

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZDC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 248

Time Pressure

1419353

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 255; Flight Crew Type 11000

Time Pressure

1419372.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Weather

Weather

Approximately five minutes before this incident the Captain called the flight attendants and told them to clean up early; grab a seat and call when seated because we would be getting some moderate turbulence on the descent fairly soon. I; the First Officer; had the passengers be seated and mentioned about the turbulence we would soon encounter. Approximately four minutes later with about one minute prior to entering the clouds (since we had not received confirmation from the flight attendants that they were indeed seated) the Captain directed them twice to take their seats on the PA. On descent; passing FL290; we entered the clouds and encountered moderate turbulence.The Captain called to check on them and the passengers and they told him that two flight attendants were seated in the aft galley; but the third flight attendant was standing in the aft galley and rode out the turbulence standing up. The ride was still bumpy and the Captain told him that we should encounter a few minutes of relatively smooth air so he could travel up the aisle to his seat. He did make it up to the front and belted in for the remaining of the flight. During the flight the Captain asked the flight attendants three times how they were; and if there were any injuries and they said one of the flight attendants had jammed a finger while in the galley. When he asked specifically about the male flight attendant who was not in a seat; he stated several times that he was fine.After the flight he said that his groin was now hurting and was going to call scheduling. There were two tray tables that needed to be repaired by Maintenance and several vomit areas that needed to be cleaned before departing again. We tried to get assistance from Operations about cleaning; but he told us it was the crew's responsibility to clean the aircraft and no assistance was going to be provided. The Captain promptly called the Chief Pilot on call and within five minutes we had the assistance we needed to clean the soiled areas and continue to move the mission.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported a moderate turbulence encounter while on descent that injured a flight attendant and caused some passengers to get sick.

1865679

202112

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

15000.0

IMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZZ

Corporate

Challenger 300

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1865679

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting

1865680.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Weather

Ambiguous

We were level at approximately 15;000 ft. (unsure of altitude) shortly after departure from ZZZ as we planned a weather divert to ZZZ1. We were IMC with ice detected CAS message and both engine and wing anti-ice on. We began to experience low rumbles and vibrations from the engine(s) followed by L and R Engine Vibration CAS messages. I tried slightly reducing thrust followed by slightly increasing thrust on each engine independently as it wasn't clear from CAS messages which side the problem emanated from. The vibration didn't immediately subside after adjustments to either engine. We then had several CAS messages followed by our PFDs losing all attitude and heading information; in addition to the loss of yaw damper and AP. I don't recall all of the CAS messages but those I remember include: L and R Engine Vibration; EFIS Comparator Inop; Yaw Damper Fail; L Fire Det Fail; FD 1 Fail; as well as red FD; ATT; and HDG flags on both PDFs. I then shifted to using the standby instrument and continued to climb above our cleared altitude as I chose to gain altitude while we still had both engines operative. Given the uncertainty of the failures and being IMC in the mountains I wanted altitude on our side. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) notified ATC of the issue and we were given block altitudes and heading vectors. When we notified ATC of our failures and reliance on the whiskey compass they provided no-gyro vectors. We discussed diversion alternatives and determined that we needed a suitable airport that was VMC. Flying an instrument approach wouldn't be an option. ATC assigned priority handling for us. We got a series of block altitudes and requested different blocks/vectors to stay VMC on top while we determined a course of action. ATC offered ZZZ2 which we accepted and took a turn toward. Shortly thereafter; ATC offered ZZZ3 as a better alternative as it had less terrain and we could stay in their radar control the whole way down. It was only an additional 25 NM to ZZZ3 than ZZZ2 and it was the safer option so we took the clearance/vectors to ZZZ3. We got a series of no-gyro vectors and descents to ZZZ2. I continued to fly with reference to the standby instrument and compass. The PM continued to work the radio and run QRH checklists. It was difficult to determine which checklists to use as there were so many different; seemingly unrelated CAS messages associated with the failures. The engines seemed to operate normally although once during the descent in IMC and icing conditions; the low rumble/vibration returned momentarily. We eventually got vectored straight to the airport and became VMC approximately 10 miles out and 8;000 ft. MSL. Pattern altitude was 6000 MSL. We then made an uneventful visual approach and landing.

We were level at approximately 15;000 ft. (unsure of altitude) shortly after departure from ZZZ as we planned a weather divert to ZZZ1. We were IMC with ice detected CAS message and both engine and wing anti-ice on. We began to experience low rumbles and vibrations from the engine(s) followed by L and R Engine Vibration CAS messages. I tried slightly reducing thrust followed by slightly increasing thrust on each engine independently as it wasn't clear from CAS messages which side the problem emanated from. The vibration didn't immediately subside after adjustments to either engine. We then had several CAS messages followed by our PFDs losing all attitude and heading information; in addition to the loss of yaw damper and AP. I don't recall all of the CAS messages but those I remember include: L and R Engine Vibration; EFIS Comparator Inop; Yaw Damper Fail; L Fire Det Fail; FD 1 Fail; as well as red FD; ATT; and HDG flags on both PDFs. The FO (First Officer) who was Pilot Flying then shifted to using the standby instrument and continued to climb above our cleared altitude as I chose to gain altitude while we still had both engines operative. Given the uncertainty of the failures and being IMC in the mountains we wanted altitude on our side. I then notified ATC of the issue and we were given block altitudes and heading vectors. When we notified ATC of our failures and reliance on the whiskey compass they provided no-gyro vectors. We discussed diversion alternatives and determined that we needed a suitable airport that was VMC. Flying an instrument approach wouldn't be an option. ATC gave us priority handling. We got a series of block altitudes and requested different blocks/vectors to stay VMC on top while we determined a course of action. ATC offered ZZZ2 which we accepted and took a turn toward. Shortly thereafter; ATC offered ZZZ3 as a better alternative as it had less terrain and we could stay in their radar control the whole way down. It was only an additional 25 NM to ZZZ3 than ZZZ2 and it was the safer option so we took the clearance/vectors to ZZZ3. We got a series of no-gyro vectors and descents to ZZZ2. I continued to fly with reference to the standby instrument and compass. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) continued to work the radio and run QRH checklists. It was difficult to determine which checklists to use as there were so many different; seemingly unrelated CAS messages associated with the failures. The engines seemed to operate normally although once during the descent in IMC and icing conditions; the low rumble/vibration returned momentarily. We eventually got vectored straight to the airport and became VMC approximately 10 miles out and 8;000 ft MSL. Pattern altitude was 6;000 ft MSL. We then made an uneventful visual approach and landing.I think ice accumulation caused both engines to vibrate. The severity of the vibration led to multiple equipment failures.

Flight Crew reported diverting after encountering engine vibrations severe enough to cause multiple systems failures. Flight Crew reported ice build up was most likely the cause of the vibrations.

1658539

201906

ZZZ.Airport

US

2.0

500.0

Windshear; 10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-23-250 Aztec

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Final Approach

Direct; Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 191; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 170

1658539

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

Upon my arrival into ZZZ; I attempted to lower my landing gear and noticed my front nose wheel did not extend fully in the mirror and I was not getting an indication light. I was on final and waited until a minute to see if it would eventually lock in place. I advised ZZZ tower that I needed to conduct a right 360 after they already issued me a clearance to land and informed them that I was having a gear issue. While conducting a 360 steep turn; I was able to get the front nose wheel to lock and a green indication light came on. After returning to final and tower issuing me another clearance to land; I reduced my throttles and set them for landing but noticed my RPM gauges were stuck and I was unable to see what my power settings were. I reduced my throttles to idle as I was approximately 300 yards away from Runway XX at which time my right engine failed. I was able to get the aircraft safely into ground effect and taxied to the local FBO. I am not sure what caused the engine failure; after talking with a mechanic he believes it is a fuel/mixture ratio; however; I do believe the gear issue is most likely low hydraulic pressure which needs to be addressed.

PA-23 Pilot reported landing gear extension issue and engine failure on short final.

1449853

201705

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1449853

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

Arrived at aircraft to be greeted by a pungent odor and Flight Attendants advising me of a deferred row of seats due to a vomit event that had occurred on a prior flight (unknown how many legs flown in present condition). As the FAs had already made inquiries as to additional cleaning of the soiled area it was related/determined that the particular event had taken place in excess of 24 hours prior and the entire row was merely deferred without any apparent or indicated cleaning as a corrective action. The prior resolution was to apparently pick up the 'chunks'; covering the affected area with coffee grounds to mask the odor and then defer the entire row. As the spill was indicated to be vomit and/or containing other bodily fluid; myself and other crew members agreed that the situation was bio-hazard/hazmat in its present condition. Cleaning staff that was present at the time had additionally stated that they would not address; were unable and could not/would not provide any further resolution to the soiled area. 'No supplies or time' was the response I received.I would not/will not expose my crew; my passengers or myself to the continuation of this condition/potential hazard. I subsequently contacted operations and requested further cleaning and Maintenance to review the situation and was met with significant opposition to any resolution. 'Can we board?' was entirely unacceptable to the entire crew with respect to the odor and additionally the visual aspect (especially being that it was row 2). Finally a Maintenance Supervisor arrived to assist in the situation; whereby it was finally agreed on that this was a valid concern. I also then made a logbook entry in an effort document/require corrective action. Additionally I must also mention that the aircraft apparently had flown multiple legs in this condition. Finally further cleaning was accomplished and the corrective action was agreed upon to be satisfactory with the row remaining deferred. Upon further review/scrutiny of the incident it has now become apparent that the original deferral used (a previous crew/crews) was also wrong since this row does not contain inflatable seat belts. There are 2 specific/different MEL deferral procedures relating to the seat belts. Although the deferral used is/would be more restrictive and minor in difference it is nonetheless wrong. It is also troubling that this was overlooked in haste to keep this airplane 'on-time/schedule' under the oversight of myself and however many supervisors were present/became involved.

A320 Captain reported refusing to accept an aircraft until an insufficiently cleaned area of vomit in the cabin had been addressed.

1319768

201512

IMC

Thunderstorm

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Situational Awareness; Workload

1319768

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Dispatch

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Company Policy

Flight was allowed to enter a tornado watch area without dispatcher notifying in a timely manner. It wasn't until almost through the area when I realized they hadn't been notified of hazardous weather. This flight and 16 other flights were passed to me as part of the normal pass down. After the pass down I had turned my attention to completing the 6 or 8 releases still pending. I now had over 20 flight airborne throughout the entire U.S.; Canada and Mexico; weather was marginal throughout the Mississippi/Ohio valleys with convective tornado activity throughout. I had 14 pending departures during this time as well. Several flight had landed without me being able to see and analyze them as required in flight following responsibilities. 40 minutes after being handed this pass down I needed to begin the pass down process myself only this time I had to pass it to a dispatcher with less than 2 months experience who was still under training supervision. I feel that the 20 flights if not for the trainer would have been too overwhelming for a new employee. It was during this pass down of my flights that I realized I had lost situational awareness of several alternates due to weather developing faster than anticipated. The passdown dispatcher excepted this and I assume made the appropriate changes. This scenario plays out almost daily in dispatch and is in no way acceptable to me; I will be trying much harder at the end of my shift to improve; however this will never be enough to handle this total task saturation in the last hour of a difficult shift.Management's total lack of understanding of task saturation and organizational ability to develop a plan to alleviate this scenario. This was a policy change a few months ago to fix a problem; unfortunately it created more than it fixed.I will do the best I can to reorganize my priorities at the end of my shift and deal with this saturation.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported his workload was so high he allowed a flight under his supervision to enter a tornado watch area without notification.

1874854

202202

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

1874854

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

1874610.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Ground Personnel

Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Work Refused

Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

Arrival flight came in with pit 3 soaked with water. Class 9 [Hazmat] marked package base was also wet. After offload; lead ramp service employee notified immediate supervisor of the issue and potential Hazardous Materials spill. Scheduled local departure time of XA:10 was pushed back to XA:40. After updated departure time the crew was asked to speak with immediate Supervisor to determine condition of Hazmat package. Area Manager arrived and stated it was just water and gave a direct order for us to clean it up. Another ramp service employee voiced his concern in which Area Manager stated 'Are you refusing to do your job' in an aggressive manner. At that point; I contacted a lead from another gate who reiterated the fact that we cannot clean the pit of an aircraft if there is a potential Dangerous Goods spill and suggested that I get a Shop Steward. After following that direction and getting a Shop Steward; he informed the supervisors that were still on the gate that we cannot clean that aircraft and that a team of trained employees with proper PPE have to do the task. We were only given paper towels and Clorox wipes; nor are we trained to handle that task. The direct order issued by Area Manager is in direct violation of Safety Policies.

Class 9 Hazmat spill all over bags in forward pit 3.I call for Supervisor and then the Supervisor called for Assistant Manger on duty. Assistant Manager aggressively and menacingly demand I clean up spill. I choose to not clean up the spill due to no PPE and lessons stating that I should not be doing this. He then threaten my job if I did not clean up the spill. directive is against company safety policy's and procedures.

Air Carrier ramp personnel reported refusing supervisor's order to clean up liquid on Class 9 Hazmat package. Ramp agent's refusal was based on company Hazmat cleanup policy which requires specific training to do so.

1449041

201705

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

5000

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Champion Citabria 7ECA

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

None

Tail Wheel

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Instructor

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 7224; Flight Crew Type 70

Situational Awareness

1449041

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

While doing stop and goes; directional control was lost and aircraft impacted a runway electrical hold short sign with the left tire; wheel and strut and ended up facing approximately 230 degrees. No injuries to student or instructor.Post examination revealed the tail wheel had about 5 inch of side to side sloppy travel while the rudder was held stationary. A tighter tail wheel connection may have provided better overall directional control.

Tailwheel flight instructor reported that the student lost control during landing that resulted in contact with a runway sign.

1608852

201901

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

IMC

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Dusk

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise; Initial Approach

Other weather deviate

Class A ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1608852

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Time Pressure

1609318.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Company Policy; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

Weather

We had a flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 with weather/low ceilings in ZZZ. En route; had moderate chop but not a huge deal. In ZZZ1; weather was 300 overcast and 2 mile visibility; so this required a full ILS approach. On arrival; we were given a runway change to expect for landing. ZZZ1 is always a busy ramp to navigate and in lower visibility's can add to the level of challenge. We left ZZZ1 after an hour sit. We experienced light with occasional moderate turbulence for 20 minutes of the flight back. The weather in ZZZ got worse. We were given extra vectors by Approach Control because someone ended up going around. We were IMC during this entire event which adds to work load. We made it in with 400 [feet] overcast and mist with fog developing.We were swapped to a blast fence gate which involves additional explanation to the passengers who did not expect it. We then had a close to 4 hour sit in ZZZ. Visibility dropped to 1/4 mile. Which added takeoff alternate needs. As well as low visibility taxi in ZZZ. Thunderstorms were forecasted at our arrival into ZZZ2; however; we were given an acceptable alternate. This alternate was ZZZ3. En route; we could only paint the weather in front of us not a top full picture view. We could see the weather was building and looking not very good anywhere around ZZZ2. It was multiple thunderstorms. We had moderate turbulence for the first half at least of the arrival. On our descent; we had still hoped we could beat the weather into ZZZ2. This was not the case. Two aircraft in front of us on approach. Tower had told Arrival to report hail on the field. That's an absolute no-go fly into storm; so we said we felt ok to wait for the weather to pass from the south. During this time; we both noticed that the hole to the west towards our alternate had closed up. We both looked at each other and said we were not safe and felt too tired to hold in the thunderstorm area waiting for the weather to possibly pass.The ways out of the mess were closing up rapidly. I said let's go to ZZZ3 and we both agreed that would be the safest option. On the way south; we were told by ATC the cell development was growing much further to the south. We both noticed ZZZ4 on our way to the south. Our ACARS kept coming up with no comm messages. I made the decision to head to ZZZ4 over ZZZ3 without making proper contact with Dispatch. We had a small window to land in ZZZ4 so we got the current weather; got our landing data for ZZZ4 and told the flight attendants and passengers. I did not; however; tell Dispatch until we had safely landed. Upon landing; we told Dispatch and were told to call them at the gate. I did this and discussed the situation and outcome with the Dispatcher and Duty Manager. After briefing passengers what had happened and getting new paperwork; the weather had safely passed. We continued on to ZZZ2.I could have done a better job talking to Dispatch much earlier in the flight. Possibly deciding to stay high go west then come in when it had passed. I did not do this; nor did Dispatch relay any information until we were on approach and Tower reported hail. This was very late to effectively use Dispatch especially having no comm issues from our ACARS at that perfect moment. This lead to a diversion to an airport not discussed with Dispatch. This lead to a quick decision that though we landed safely to sit for the weather to pass did not correctly notify Dispatch to receive all needed information that Dispatch provides. I should have communicated early and often especially when I was tired. I should have discussed thunderstorm developments and direction to create a better plan early; even in preflight. Call Dispatch and discuss possible events and outcomes to better prepare alternate options; to discuss a safe place to hold so as to be out of the weather especially when we were tired; [and to] ask Center even before we start a descent if other aircraft were getting in.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew and the Dispatcher reported the flight diverted for weather to an airport not listed as an alternate.

1445823

201705

1201-1800

NCT.TRACON

CA

4000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON NCT

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Climb

None

Class E NCT

TRACON NCT

SR22

Part 91

Class E NCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 420; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness

1445823

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 400; Vertical 20

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

During the climb phase of a flight from SQL; the C182R with 1 passenger was being vectored for the VFR climb in VMC by Norcal due to traffic. Norcal called out a target; an SR22; descending through the C182R's flight path. At the start of the incident the C182R was at approximately 3000 feet climbing south east bound and the SR22 at 4500; descending north west bound.Norcal called the SR22 to notify them of conflicting traffic (the C182R). They reported traffic in sight. C182R was also given a SE heading and an approximate range and direction to the conflict traffic. The C182R identified a target at approximately the correct location and responded traffic in sight and offered a better vector to avoid said target. Norcal accepted the new vector. The C182R continued its climb on the new vector. A few seconds later; a new target was seen at the same time as a vocal warning was issued by the C182R's GDL-88 showing traffic at 12 o'clock; same altitude; less than a mile. The traffic was immediately identified as the descending SR22 on a near collision course; moving slightly right to left in the windscreen. Evasive action was taken by the C182R; with a steep right hand climbing turn to avoid. I estimate this action occurred when the aircraft were approximately 1000 feet apart (maybe 3 seconds to passing). The Norcal controller asked the SR22 to confirm they had had the traffic in sight and the SR22 confirmed. It did not appear the SR22 took evasive action at any time during the incident.The vector of the SR22 prior to the identification and passing is unknown.What went wrong: The C182R failed to verify visually and with onboard means (ADS-B traffic) the target was the correct one. This led to an incorrect suggestion to the controller for a new vector. The controller could have (is not responsible for; however) noted the vector was incorrect. It is plausible that the suggested vector actually improved the situation; but that is speculation without knowledge of the SR22's path. Additionally; it is possible the SR22 did not have the correct traffic in sight as there were other similar profiled aircraft behind the C182R. I would characterize the last call from the SR22 carried a bit of 'surprised delay' in tone when responding to the controller's confirmation they had had the traffic in sight.What should have happened:The aircraft were both in a dangerous phase of flight (climbing/descending in dense and complex airspace). The SR22; if they did have the correct aircraft in sight; should have moved to a safer vector. The C182R should have verified the traffic was the correct target. Restriction on the descent/climb for both aircraft would have made the entire thing a non-event; although the controllers are not ultimately responsible for traffic avoidance.What worked:ADS-B aural alerts on the C182R. Emergency procedure training/see and avoid (identifying a threat target not moving in windscreen; determining a course of action; and executing occurred within ~1 second) worked. This is the one time I actually wish I had not had flight following (almost a prereq for flights in CA). Had I simply been flying using my onboard means I would have focused more on outside the cockpit; backed up by onboard traffic. Additionally; I would not have been put on an initial vector that setup the conflict.

C182 pilot reported a NMAC with an SR22. Evasive action was taken by the C182 pilot.

1241665

201502

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Training

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure

1241665

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy

I recently completed the B737 [recurrent training] event and feel it is necessary to point out the shortcomings in this fleet's recurrent training program. The [maneuvers check] itself contains too many maneuvers to complete within the allotted time. For example; despite taking a very short 5 minute break during the 4 hour sim period; we were barely able to complete the entire [check ride]; despite pushing quickly and successively through each required segment. During the pre-brief; the [instructor] mentioned several times that there were many tasks to complete (both evaluation and train to proficiency) and that it has been a challenge to finish within the planned time. At no time did either I or my sim partner require additional training; so that was not a contributing factor. When we got to the Category (CAT) 3 approaches; the [instructor] pre- positioned us at 1000 feet on the ILS. This did not permit completion of the Precision Approach Briefing Guide. Day two was the [line-oriented training]; which was given in a [fixed base trainer]. This was the first time I have ever taken a [recurrent training] event in a non-motion simulator. As usual; the [instructor] briefed that the event should occur in the same realistic way as any line flight; however; there were a few caveats. First; the visual display is skewed for one of the pilots. The [instructor] explained that only one pilot would have a visual that was the actual straight ahead view; while the other pilot's view would be skewed. He also explained that he would move the view; as necessary; so the flying pilot had the accurately depicted view as it would exist if we were actually flying the airplane or full flight simulator. Second; the FTD does not have the current ACARS 2.0 software loaded; but rather ACARS 1.0; which was phased out of the 737 fleet. In addition; the ACARS printer does not work in this particular [fixed base trainer]. That would require the pilot who initiates ACARS requests to notify the [instructor] whenever initiating an ACARS request; so he could hand us the torn off slips of paper with ATIS/FWM/Takeoff Data; etc; etc. I first noticed the skewed visual display during taxi out; as my right-side visual display appeared as if the aircraft was crabbed 30 degrees to the right. This later became an issue during the crosswind landing; when the non-flying pilot could not effectively determine if the proper wind correction had been applied. The ACARS requests were also a distraction; as we had to recall ACARS 1.0.After completion of the [line-oriented training]; the [instructor] offered to use the remaining device time to practice the engine failure on final approach maneuver. After performing several of these; it became even more obvious that the use of a fixed base training device for [this training] is inadequate. In closing; both days of training were disappointing from an expectation basis. While the instructors provided quality training to the best of their abilities; the syllabus and [fixed base trainer] were substandard. I respectfully request feedback from the fleet regarding the following questions:How does the fleet determine an adequate amount of simulator/device time is budgeted for completion of all the assigned tasks/maneuvers?Does the fleet have a quality control plan implemented through which it assesses [training] on a routine basis both for content and volume? Is it the intent for the [line-oriented training] to be as realistic as possible for a line flight? If so; how does the fleet expect the [line-oriented training] to be realistic if it is given in a device which does not closely replicate flying the actual airplane on the line?

B737 First Officer reported his concerns with what he sees as an inadequate recurrent training program at his airline.

1505984

201712

0001-0600

CLT.TRACON

NC

20000.0

TRACON CLT

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR FILPZ THREE

Class B CLT

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

IFR

Descent

Class A ZTL

Facility CLT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1505984

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Human Factors

ZTL had Aircraft X high and fast on the RNAV arrival trying to 'blow by' another aircraft; this caused Aircraft X to be high and fast over the arrival fixes as he tried to fight the plane down. ZTL put the plane in an unsafe situation and didn't coordinate any of it. They only called for a handoff 4000 ft above my airspace.Work issues out before the airspace boundary and read the letter of agreement.

CLT TRACON Controller reported that an inbound aircraft handed off from ZTL Center was too high and too fast to comply with crossing restrictions.

1746845

202006

1801-2400

PGV.Airport

NC

70.0

10.0

2000.0

VMC

7

Night

12000

CTAF PGV

Corporate

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

None

Cruise

Direct

Class G PGV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 86; Flight Crew Total 9300; Flight Crew Type 3200

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1746845

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

Experienced significant interference on CTAF 122.800 from what is believed to be a local radio station to the point of distraction. The interference forces the need to turn down the radio monitoring 122.800 to enable pilot and crew to monitor and communicate on other radios required for operations. Additional aircraft operating in said area encountered a similar event. A cursory check of aircraft systems and radio were performed in an attempt to troubleshoot the issue. No aircraft or radio discrepancies were detected.

Pilot reported radio interference on PGV CTAF 122.8. Pilot reported a local radio station as the possible source.

1332817

201602

1201-1800

BWI.Airport

MD

4000.0

IMC

Daylight

TRACON PCT

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID TERPZ 6

Class B BWI

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 226; Flight Crew Type 13500

Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1332817

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 186; Flight Crew Type 186

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1332249.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

My First Officer received a full route clearance via radio. ATC assigned; 'climb via TERPZ 6.' The TERPZ 6 RNAV Departure top altitude for our transition is 17;000 feet. We are used to receiving 'climb via TERPZ 6 except maintain 4000 feet.' For that reason; we called back Clearance Delivery to confirm if the clearance was truly 'climb via TERPZ 6 to 17;000 feet.' Clearance apologized that he made a mistake and corrected the clearance to 'climb via TERPZ 6 except maintain 4000 feet.' We were glad that we rechecked with Clearance since we have always received a clearance of 'climb via TERPZ 6 except maintain 4000 feet.' After takeoff when Tower switched us to Potomac Departure (128.7); I checked-in; 'leaving 1800 feet climbing to 4000 feet.' ATC responded; 'Roger; climb via;' with no top altitude assigned. Shortly after leveling at 4000 feet; my First Officer and I queried ourselves about the 4000 feet level off and usually get assigned; 'climb via except maintain a top altitude.' We were about to query Potomac; when Potomac came back and asked us if we were aware that the top altitude of the SID was 17;000 feet. I responded that we were aware; but our last clearance limit we had received was 4000 feet. When we initially checked-in with Potomac; we were still climbing and complying with the previous clearance of 'climb via TERPZ 6 except maintain 4000 feet.' The standard verbiage used by Potomac ATC; for the last 16 years of flying out of Baltimore; has always been 'climb via TERPZ 6' (accompanied with a top altitude); NOT ' Roger; climb via.' We understand 'climb via' can mean to climb to the top altitude while complying with all published altitude restrictions; however; that is not standard phraseology used by Potomac ATC; hence; our need to seek clarification; which we were unable to get. Twice I asked for altitude clarification; and twice Potomac would not clarify. Potomac pointed out traffic twice and again did not clarify our climb clearance until they placed us in a traffic conflict. At that point; Potomac ATC assigned us 17;000 feet. We initiated the climb and complied with all published altitude crossing restrictions. They wanted me to copy down a phone number while I was still below 10;000 feet in a sterile cockpit environment. My First Officer's priority; as well as mine; is flying the aircraft; not copying down phone numbers. When I refused to take the number down; another Controller (claiming to be a Supervisor); also tried to get me to copy a phone number down. Again; I refused and told him we would deal with this later. The Controller's tone was totally unprofessional; threatening as well as inappropriately timed.The next day; I flew Flight XXXX; BWI-ZZZ; and received the same clearance of 'climb via TERPZ 6 except maintain 4000 feet.' When switched over to Potomac; I received an assignment of 'climb via TERPZ 6 except maintain 17;000 feet;' the published top altitude of the SID. This is how we have always received our clearances from Potomac ATC. My point is; there is a lack of standard phraseology from Potomac ATC. Same departure; both days; why was there a difference in phraseology?

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

While on the TERPZ 6 SID out of BWI; the flight crew reported receiving a confusing; non-standard 'climb via' clearance that resulted in a TCAS TA.

1259493

201505

0601-1200

PHX.Airport

AZ

8000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZAB; TRACON P50

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Descent

Vectors; STAR EAGUL 6

Class B PHX

FMS/FMC

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1259493

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Vertical 600

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

We were cleared by Albuquerque center to descend via the EAGUL6 with an east landing. We selected 7;000 in the altitude and soon began the descent. All crossing restrictions and speeds had been verified by both pilots. However; soon afterward there were multiple interruptions to the arrival by Albuquerque center taking us repeatedly off the profile. They included giving hard altitudes to stop at; speed changes differing from the arrival and even a heading off of the arrival and eventually cleared to return to the eagul6 arrival and then handed off to Phoenix approach. With this much confusion I looked at the FMC to confirm that we were going to cross our next point (GENO) as prescribed on the eagul6. It showed we would indeed cross it at 11;000 (is prescribed for crossing between 11;000-12;000). However we were once again given a speed deviation by Phoenix approach but comply with altitude restrictions. The next things happened almost simultaneously: we received a TCAS TA; saw the traffic; Approach asked us our altitude; we responded. We said climbing back to 10;000 (which was where we were supposed to cross the next point; QUENY. The First Officer (FO) (flying pilot) immediately disconnected the autopilot and we were back at 10;000 within seconds. No TCAS RA was issued.I cannot say for certain; only guess; as to why the aircraft did not respect the altitude restrictions. The MULTIPLE speed; course; and altitude changes on an already difficult arrival certainly was a contributing factor. I can also say that although we had obviously been pushed into the 'red' that 'automation' (TCAS); 'external resources' (ATC); 'knowledge; skill and aircraft handling' -as described in the model of the threat and error management - brought us back out of the 'red'One of the purposes of the RNAV arrival is that once cleared on it everyone should be doing the same speeds; altitudes; etc so there is little need for ATC intervention. I do understand some adjustments may need to be made. The event we were taken through was beyond the ordinary and pushed the airplane and the crew to the edge. This should not happen on an RNAV approach. Once ATC decides the need to start manipulating an aircraft to this degree they should take over full responsibility for issuing speeds and altitudes for the remainder of the flight. Of course the other option is for the crew to refuse to return to following the RNAV arrival and request hard altitudes and speeds be issued by ATC.

An air carrier on the PHX EAGUL6 RNAV was vectored off the arrival and given altitude changes so that when cleared back onto the track; the aircraft failed to capture a 10;000 foot altitude constraint. Similar malfunctions occur at other airports where ATC makes extensive RNAV changes causing the FMS to not respect crossing altitudes.

1750436

202007

1201-1800

N90.TRACON

NY

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B LGA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1750436

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was PF on this leg; first flight in 40 days. During approach prep for LGA ILS 4; review of briefing strip indicated 'Autopilot Coupled approach not authorized.' Review of other available approaches with similar 3.1 degree glideslopes and initial approach fixes have no restrictions. Since weather was rain with low ceilings; the ILS was the approach with the best capability. Trying to hand-fly an ILS in bad weather didn't seem to be a viable option or the safest; and ceilings were low enough to require an ILS approach. I shot the approach with both APs engaged; monitored flight path compliance; and was able to take over visually around 400 feet AGL; landing in the first 1;200 feet of runway. This breakout point is similar to the DH for the RNAV GPS to Runway 4; which is allowed to be coupled. After returning home I inquired about why this restriction was listed; and what we are expected to do when bad weather requires approach to LGA Runway 4. New to aircraft; had not flown in 40 days. Had not been in situation where a published ILS approach could not be used with an autopilot. 1. Provide a precision approach into LGA Runway 4 suitable for low ceiling/bad weather.2. Provide some insight into why the coupled ILS is not as safe as a hand-flown ILS along the exact same flight path. 3. Provide some insight into why the RNAV GPS 4 can be coupled and flies the same flight path. (If the coupled ILS can only go down to 400-500 AGL; that seems like a more correct limitation than to completely limit AP use for an entire approach.)4. Make this a review item in the company pages and provide some guidance on how best to handle this.5. ATIS should not advertise ILS 4 as the active approach in bad weather when the approach is not authorized to be coupled. Should advertise 'ILS and RNAV Runway 4.'

Air carrier First Officer reported concerns with the LGA ILS 4 approach identified as 'Autopilot Coupled approach not authorized.'

1556766

201807

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

38000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1556766

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Our flight prior to this incident was normal in every way. Nothing out of the ordinary occurred until approximately 40-45 minutes after takeoff.While at cruise at FL380; I noticed that our right engine oil pressure had turned yellow. It was around 35 psi. Although I had not seen one earlier in the flight; my first instinct was to check for a R OIL LEVEL LOW status message. Sure enough; there was a message there and upon observing the oil quantity; we saw that it was at 15%. Referencing the QRH; I read that if it is indicating 15% (it won't show any lower); the handbook advises you to complete the flight. I texted our Dispatcher that we would require maintenance when we reached[destination].A few minutes later; a master warning message displayed on our EICAS screen. It was 'R ENG OIL PRESSURE.' The oil pressure had dropped into the red zone. We immediately referenced the QRH and within just a few seconds had set the right thrust level to idle. Reading further in the procedure; it instructs you to complete an in-flight engine shutdown. I took my time and read through the text very carefully:If any 2 of the following 3 indications are displayed:L or R ENG OIL PRESS warning message;Affected engine oil pressure is below limits;Affected engine oil temperature is increasing or decreasing abnormally.Single Engine Procedures/In-Flight Engine Shutdown ..............................................ACCOMPLISHWhile we obviously had the warning message; the oil pressure was vacillating between red and yellow (25 and 26) for a short period. I was also a bit wary to shut down the engine since our oil temperature was not showing high nor was it climbing. It was showing almost the same as the left engine (within a few degrees) and was well within the green range. I did NOT want to shut an engine down unless ABSOLUTELY necessary. After a few moments; however; the oil pressure stayed constantly in the red range; and appeared to only be dropping. At that point we decided to go ahead with the in-flight shutdown.All the while; we had advised ATC of the situation and told them that we would be diverting to [a nearby alternate]. Per their instructions; we began to descend.Referencing our QRH; we proceeded to complete the in-flight shutdown of the right engine and all associated instructions. We started the APU as well. We did not expect the engine was damaged but did not want to attempt any restart of the engine (since it was very unlikely that the engine would just magically find more oil). We also completed the single engine landing portion of the QRH and made a note of all changes from the norm that would be associated with that. These included a flaps 20 landing; a higher than normal Vref speed; and additional runway length required.We [advised] ATC and advised them of fuel and souls on board. I was able to speak with our flight attendants and advise them of the situation. I sent a message to Dispatch informing them of our diversion and our situation. As we continued to descend; the First Officer got the ATIS; and we briefed the approach as well as completed the 'In-Range' checklist. I got the landing data from our ACARS and factored in our additional runway distance required. We had plenty.Our approach and landing were completed without any further issues. We were met with the fire trucks when we landed; which must be standard practice for any emergency aircraft landing. After arriving at the gate; I spoke with the airport representative and the fire department/police marshals and gave them any additional information that they required. Afterwards; I spoke with Dispatch and Maintenance Control and advised them of all that had happened and answered all questions that they asked. As far as I know and remember; no clearances were deviated from and all SOP were adhered to.I would like to end the narrative by complimenting everyone involved in this situation. From the flight attendants to ATC to the airport fire department; each and every entity was calm; collected; and extremely helpful in getting this aircraft down safely! The First Officer did an absolutely exceptional job; as well; as the pilot flying! My sincere thanks to all involved. This aircraft had been held the night before this incident due to the right engine not starting. The maintenance personnel had apparently fixed this issue; by installing a new starter I believe; and signed off the maintenance log. We had no problems starting the engine. I; admittedly; have no idea how the intricacies of the starter work; nor do I know if oil flows through there; but I think that it is possible that the two incidents could be related. If they are; then obviously something needs to be looked at.Whatever the root cause of the engine losing oil quantity and pressure was needs to be found out and fixed.

CRJ-900 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after shutting down the right engine because of low oil pressure.

1778159

202012

No Aircraft

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 36.7; Flight Crew Total 903.45; Flight Crew Type 903.45

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

1778159

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

I am concerned about having to wear a mask at cruise altitude while a Flight Attendant is on the Flight Deck. I feel we are putting Flight Attendant mask concerns over safety of flight concerns. If we experience a Rapid Decompression at FL 390; time of useful consciousness is measured in single digit seconds. A Rapid Decompression would be stressful; disconcerting and confusing. Now we would also have to waste a precious second or two to remove the cloth mask. If it is OK for the pilots to be mask-less in the cockpit when no Flight Attendant is present; why put the safety of the flight at risk solely for the comfort of flight attendants?

Air Carrier Captain reported the requirement of wearing a face mask with a Flight Attendant on the Flight Deck is a safety concern; especially if there is an event such as a rapid decompression.

1113712

201309

0601-1200

SFO.Tower

CA

1100.0

VMC

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B SFO

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

1113712

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

During a visual approach to Runway 28L in SFO; we received an RA. The airport was conducting simultaneous close parallel visual approaches to the 28s. We had the plane in sight on the parallel runway. They were slightly behind us and had been told to slow to follow us. The conflicting aircraft appeared to be established on the 28R LOC and was descending near the same rate and altitude as us. As we descended through about 1;100 FT; we received an RA to descend. We complied and ended up descending below 1;000 FT while below the glideslope. We saw the aircraft to our right and were clear of conflict and able to return to the glide slope by approximately 900 FT. We continued the approach and landed.

An ERJ-170 pilot on a visual to SFO 28L reported taking TCAS RA evasive action from an aircraft on 28R which did not slow as directed by ATC.

1722382

202001

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Physiological - Other

1722382

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After the safety video was finished; #3 (me); #4; & #2 were walking through the cabin doing our safety compliance checks. The minute we all got in the aisle; we smelled a horrific dirty sock smell that reminded us of a dirty boy's locker room. Passengers were stopping us asking what that awful smell is. I #3 ran up front & called the cockpit. We eventually went back to the gate. Everyone deplaned including all 4 of us F/A's & the cockpit. Maintenance was waiting for us & they took the plane out of service. We 4 F/As went to the Emergency Room here in ZZZ to be tested & checked out for poisoning since it definitely was confirmed it was a FUME event!

B737-800 Flight Attendants reported a ground gate return due to a fume event during taxi.

1670574

201908

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 91; Flight Crew Total 378; Flight Crew Type 378

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1670574

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Type 1417

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1670586.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Airport

After leaving Gate XX at ZZZ. We were being pushed to spot A. The Tug Driver stopped momentarily and we heard about a second of static on the radio. The Captain asked the Tug Driver if he said set brakes while simultaneously flashing the lights. At that point the tug and airplane began to move again. I heard a tow bar noise immediately followed by 'breakaway; breakaway'. The Captain and I instantly stepped on the brakes. The Captain then set the brakes and made sure everyone was ok. After coordinating with ramp crew; Maintenance; and Operations. We taxied back to the gate.

While being towed to spot A off Gate XX we experienced an uncommanded aircraft movement. Tug Driver failed to say 'set brakes' before disconnecting tow bar and the jet moved forward striking the tow bar. The First Officer and I heard a scratchy sound over the intercom; I queried the Tug Driver over the intercom asking him 'Did you say set brakes?' since I felt the jet moving and sensed something wasn't right while seeing the tug moving backwards. I immediately stepped on the brakes; turned on the taxi light; felt a thump and heard the Tug Driver say 'breakaway; breakaway'. The Tug Driver and I re-established communication. Tug Driver had the Ramp Supervisor approach the jet and we exchanged information to ensure that everyone was ok. I requested that Maintenance inspect the nose gear per AFM 3.40.1 and broke the [Maintenance Release] via ACARS. The maintenance supervisor asked me to taxi the jet back to the gate for further inspection; I had the First Officer coordinate the taxi back to the gate. I informed the Flight Attendants and passengers of the tow bar incident and proceeded to Gate XX. Passengers were given the opportunity to deplane. The First Officer and I spoke with the Ramp Supervisor in the jet bridge and shared with him the chain of events. We went down to the ramp in order to inspect the nose gear and obtain information from the Maintenance Technicians. The Maintenance Supervisor briefed me on the need to replace the 'Tow Lug' since it had scratches. Visual inspection revealed no other damage. I contacted [Dispatch] and requested that the [Chief Pilot] join the phone conversation in order to inform him of the incident and request his advice. The Maintenance Technicians released the jet back into service and I continued the flight without further incident.

Flight crew reported miscommunication with ground crew resulting in a tow breakaway.

1310344

201511

0.0

Rain

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1310344

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

I'm still perplexed as to why the fuel predictive modeler showed a rapid drop in available fuel once established in cruise and LRC power settings; followed by a rapid increase of over 1000 lbs on approach to landing. This should not have happened in the fuel predictive model. Running the fuel calculations manually we expected to have more; but we decided to error on the side of caution.Still being relatively new and never having had to divert before; and dealing with constant messages from dispatch; I was getting a little task saturated in my duties on this leg and this continued once we got on the ground with the termination of the flight and the disembarking of grumpy passengers. With the change of crew and termination of the flight we failed to contact maintenance regarding the fuel predictive modeler showing 1600 lbs and then rapidly increasing to 2600 lbs on approach.This happened on the last leg of our first day; of the four day trip. At the time of our departure we were +1000 lbs over our minimum fuel requirement for the flight. Operationally we were already several hours delayed and in an extended flight duty period. Due to weather and congestion; we were slowed approximately 250 miles out to 250 KIAS and then told to backtrack on a 180 degree reversal in lieu of holding. We queried ATC about our position and found that we were number 12 in line. At this point we checked our fuel and found that we were at our bugout fuel limit and had to proceed on to our field alternate. We headed towards our alternate and set LRC power. About 1/2 way to our alternate our fuel predictive modeler rapidly decreased to 1600 lbs of fuel estimated at arrival to our alternate. We could not account for the drop and decided to error on the side of caution and [advise ATC] to receive priority handling. We stayed high and executed an idle descent to a visual approach and landing. On the approach to landing; the fuel predictive modeler rapidly increased available fuel and after landing the totalizer showed 2600 lbs. At time of shutdown we had 2580 lbs remaining. After my walk around and the captain's announcement to the passengers; we should have contacted maintenance and followed on from there before we departed the aircraft.

CRJ-900 First reported that while diverting to their alternate the fuel prediction at landing suddenly decreased by a thousand pounds possibly due to a totalizer anomaly. During approach the missing thousand pounds came back. The crew forgot to make a logbook entry concerning the fuel anomaly and departed to their original destination with no maintenance being performed.

1472753

201708

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

5000.0

IMC

Daylight

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 774

1472753

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 734

Physiological - Other

1472765.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors

The captain was flying the leg. We were a heavy Aircraft but within limits for takeoff. On climb out approximately 5000 ft through transition altitude on the departure both myself and the Captain reached down to set our altimeters. As this was happening I noticed that the Captain inadvertently continued a turn past the course line for the departure. As we were turning through the course I alerted him that he was doing so and called for a correction. He was still heads down setting the altimeter and started to further raise the nose up in the climbing turn. He started his correction back the other way but the nose was too high and the airspeed started to decay rapidly. I immediately noticed the yellow barber pole rising up to meet our speed bug (approx. 220-230) at an alarming rate. As the nose was still too high in a bank and the speed tape continued to decrease to the stick shaker; I alerted him then immediately took control of the Aircraft and performed a nose high turning unusual attitude recovery back to level and accelerating. Once the Aircraft was under control the Captain took control of the aircraft and continued to fly the departure. The timeline on these events written sounds like this event unfolded over a period of time but in reality it was literally seconds.

Following a max gross weight takeoff; while turning right and climbing; with flaps up at clean maneuvering speed; as I turned right; the relief pilot stated 'transition altitude'; as a reminder for the PM and myself to set 29.92. We were in and out of clouds at the time and I was hand flying. I reached out to set 29.92 with the aircraft on speed and following the flight director. As I set the altimeters; I experienced vertigo; allowed the nose to get too high; and the stall feathers rapidly moved down to the nose attitude. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) was immediately aware; and pushed the stick forward; I said to him 'you have the controls'; and the aircraft was in a stable situation within seconds; though stick shaker was induced and it was necessary to rapidly lower the nose. I concentrated my attention on the attitude indicator; reset my internal gyros; and resumed aircraft control within ten to twenty seconds. The clean maneuvering speed was 254 and the aircraft probably decelerated to 235 momentarily.

B767 flight crew reported a nose high attitude with stick shaker after the Captain experienced vertigo during the climb.

1504281

201712

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Safety Instrumentation & Information

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue

1504281

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I was advised by the Flight Attendants just prior to push that the passenger prerecorded announcement system was playing. I called Maintenance who sent a local mechanic to check it out and who subsequently deferred the system. In the hustle and bustle of turning a long delayed jet; I neglected to coordinate with the dispatcher to amend the release for the new MEL item. Contributing to this was the fact we were already late and I was being rushed by operations and the agent. Additionally; and more importantly; was the fact that the company had us fly an extended day the day before with long airport sits. Over thirteen hours just from show to finish so in reality a fourteen hour plus day with respect to hotel door to door; which resulted in less than adequate sleep and no opportunity for me to get proper exercise which is every bit as important to me functioning at my highest levels as breathing.As long as the company continues to push us this hard; I for one will be occasionally filling out [reports] for missing small items because I'm not at my best. Additionally; the most mentally and physically dulling thing you can have me do is sit at airports. There is nothing relaxing or restful about these sits at all. And I absolutely see that dulling effect on everyone I fly with.

EMB-170 Captain reported he forgot to request an amended flight release due to fatigue.

1793790

202103

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

150.0

15.0

2000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Center ZZZ3

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Cruise

VFR Route

Class E ZZZ3

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Class E ZZZ3

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 116; Flight Crew Type 89

1793790

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure

I was flying VFR with one passenger from ZZZ to ZZZ1 for a touch and go and back to ZZZ. In order to avoid the Class B airspace; I planned to do the FLY VFR shoreline route below class B shelf at 2;000 ft. In my cross country flight; I always like to take flight following. I did the same this time starting from Approach followed by ZZZ3 Center. I entered the shoreline [route] after clearing the class D of ZZZ3. I informed the ZZZ3 Center that I will be staying at 2;000 ft. along the shoreline route. When crossing over the [landmark]; I was informed of traffic at my 2 o clock. I couldn't see the traffic so I reported by saying 'looking for traffic'. At the same time; I turned a little to the left knowing that the traffic is to my 2 o clock. After about 20 seconds I saw the traffic crossing to my right and felt like it was about 200 ft. in horizontal distance flying at the same altitude. I continued to my planned route to ZZZ2 ; performed the touch and go and returned back to ZZZ1 using the VFR shoreline route again at 2;000 ft.

PA28 pilot reported a NMAC with crossing traffic.

1610275

201901

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

High

Emergency Equipment

X

Design

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1610275

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Aircraft; Manuals

Ambiguous

This aircraft has two exit placard on the ceiling; one at the window exit and one at row 18. Nowhere in the emergency PA do we notify passengers that they are on a plane with two ceiling exit placards. Nowhere in the Passenger Safety Information Card is this information notified to our passengers. In the emergency PA; we tell our passengers; 'Signs overhead and lights on the floor will lead you to the exit'; however; they do not on this plane. If smoke is in the cabin and our passengers follow the ceiling exit placard; they will not be aware that the one at row 18 does not lead to the over-wing exits. This misleading information has the potential to cause serious harm and or death.

B737-700 Flight Attendant reported confusing location of the aircraft cabin emergency exit lights.

1677227

201908

0001-0600

ZSE.ARTCC

WA

2600.0

Center ZSE

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Climb

Vectors

Class E ZSE

Facility ZSE.ATRCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1677227

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Aircraft X was cleared by Approach to ZZZ and placed on a heading of 180 climbing to 040. The aircraft checked on with me still climbing below the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) of 030 heading towards a 050 MIA within a minute and a half. The aircraft was also climbing at less than a 300 ft per minute climb rate. I initially went to turn him away from the MIA but he was still below the MIA of 030. The pilot read it back as a question so I responded negative; maintain current heading of 180. And he read that back correct. The pilot was having a hard time hearing me also when I asked to be out of 030ft in 1 minute or less. So I asked him if he had all surrounding terrain in sight and to maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance then I also climbed him to 050ft. Pilots should advise if they're climb rate is going to be less than 300 ft per minute especially on an IFR clearance. Better coordination should have been done with myself and PDX approach.

ZSE Controller reported an IFR departure at less than expected standard climb rate entering a higher MVA.

1067995

201302

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Dusk

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1067995

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1067997.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Gate Agent / CSR

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing

Company Policy

During my pre-flight at the gate; I noticed that the cargo loading and ground crew was wearing 'Worldwide' safety vests instead of our Company. I observed no Company supervisors on the ramp. The ground crew was not ready for departure at departure time. They used non-standard phraseology during the pre-departure; push back; engine start and disconnect process. The ground crew opened the forward cargo door twice after the parking brake was released for push back without first notifying the Captain. The Captain flew to our destination and other than noting that the aircraft was nose heavy on takeoff; the flight was uneventful. After we parked at gate the Crew Chief entered the cockpit as the passengers were deplaning. He explained that the cargo had been incorrectly loaded and pointed to his 'Offload Report.' The report clearly showed that only ONE bag should have been placed in the forward cargo and the rest should have been in the aft cargo. The Crew Chief reported that the aft cargo was empty and ALL the bags were in the forward cargo. Obviously this is a very serious issue - one which could have caused aircraft controllability issues; or worse; a hull loss. The ground crew for our flight was one of the Company's recently outsourced crews. They used non-standard phraseology; indicating a lack of proper training. They were unable to prepare the aircraft for departure in a timely manner in spite of the fact that the cargo was relatively light; needing only one cargo bay. In my opinion; this lack of training; experience and supervision resulted in a very dangerous cargo loading error.Better training and supervision of new; improved outsourced contractors. Provide pilots with the same paperwork used to load the aircraft so we can double check with the load closeout/takeoff performance data and verify proper loading.

This report adds no new information.

A B737-800 crew reported that an outsourced ground crew loaded all freight forward when it should have been aft causing a nose heavy aircraft and also used non-standard phraseology during pushback.

1221606

201411

0601-1200

CYWG.Airport

MB

0.0

IMC

Icing; Snow

Dawn

Ground CYWG

Air Carrier

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1221606

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1221607.0

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

This event happened on the ramp at CYWG in the morning. It had been snowing throughout the night and morning and everything was covered with about 3' to 4' of snow. The airport operations was in the process of clearing the runways at the time of our arrival at the airport and had yet to begin working on clearing the taxiways and ramp areas. The preflight and boarding process went smoothly and without incident. As the First Officer (FO) and I were both familiar with the airport; neither of us had de-iced at CYWG and we spent most of our preflight briefing talking about where and how we would get to the deice pad. We noticed that there were a couple different routes we could take to get there. We decided that more than likely; as the ramp was going to be occupied with other aircraft pushing back; that the ground controllers would send us to the deice pad via taxiway K which was right behind our gate. After completing the Before start/push back checklist of the Deicing/Anti-Icing Configuration Checklists in the QRH; we begun the push back. The FO and I discussed that we should start both engines such that it would lower our workload; and that it would give the engines plenty of time to warm up given the outside air temp. During the pushback; we could see another aircraft that had pushed from the gate to our right; and we could hear their communications with the ground controller about some maintenance problem that they were having. The other aircraft's maintenance personnel had their trucks parked next to it such that the mechanic could stand on the roof of the truck and talk to the pilot via their window. The ramp agents disconnected the tow bar and quickly left to go inside; there was no wave off given. With the weather conditions as they were; I remember thinking that I didn't blame them for the obvious desire to go get warm. The engines started normally and we finished the After Start portion of the checklist. My thought process at this time was that since the ramp area was pretty big behind us; and since the other aircraft was off our right wing; that the only option to get to the deice pad was to use Taxiway K and that a left 180 degree turn would be our only option. The FO called the ground controller and asked for permission to taxi for deice. The instructions given to us were to taxi via K; F; W; and the apron to the deice pad. So; at this point all was going as we had briefed. We could see out our front windows clearly; however; our side windows were still covered in snow and ice which made for very poor visibility. However; my FO could see well enough through his side window to tell that his wing was clear; and I could see well enough to tell that no aircraft was to our left. I began to commence the left hand 180 to get to taxiway K. As we came around; at a very slow speed; it was very difficult to tell where any markings were; in fact we couldn't see any. We didn't quite make it to 180 degrees when my alert FO told me to stop. I straightened out the nose wheel; stopped; and put on the parking brake. I asked him if he could see taxiway K which he then informed me that he could only see a blue taxi light out his window and that he thought we had only grass ahead of us. I at first didn't believe that that could be true as I could see tire tracks in the snow in front of us. I opened my window to gain a better advantage and at that I point see another blue taxi light creeping up above the snow. My FO was right. As there was no 'bump' or any indication to us that we had driven off the concrete and onto the grass; we were thinking; and hoping that we were still on the pavement. While we were trying to figure out exactly where we were and what had gone wrong; the ground controller asked if we needed assistance. We said that we probably will as we believed we were facing the grass and not a taxiway. After asking if we needed assistance; ground controller asked another aircraft if they too needed assistance which I believe they declined. My FO tried calling ops several times without any luck. At this point I asked the ground controller if he had a phone number to our operations; which he said that he had alerted the airport field operations and that they were on their way. After about 45 minutes of waiting a ramp agent showed up with the airport field chief and informed us that we indeed had our nose wheel three feet past the concrete and on the grass. I was so surprised by this information. The ramp agent at this point called our dispatch; took pictures and left us for another 30 minutes. We made as many PA's as we thought were needed to keep the passengers informed; and our FA did a fantastic job of keeping them comfortable and calm. From this point; with the snow and weather as it was; we were told that buses would take hours to get to us. Our operations; with the cooperation from the airport and CBP; deplaned our passengers via airport operation pickup trucks. After the passengers were off the plane; the head ramp agent was able to push the empty aircraft off the grass and back to the gate without any problem at all. The push was done with minimal power from the tug; and was as normal push back from any gate. Just as before; there was no indication for us sitting on the AC during the push off the grass that we had changed surfaces. No bump; no drop off; it was as smooth as could be. From here we waited for mechanics to fly in to conduct an inspection. In retrospect what I believe happened and where I lost situational awareness was during the push back. I was paying attention to the engines start and to what was going on with the other aircraft. Turns out that the ramp personnel didn't push us straight back as I assumed they would do with our tail facing taxiway K; but rather they angled our tail slightly to the northeast. They also pushed us back further than I was expecting. This put our aircraft with our tail facing the corner of the apron and taxiway K and making my left 180 degree turn impossible to get to taxiway K. From the ramp agents' point of view; I can understand why they did this if they were thinking this action would make a right turn easier for us. However; no communication between the ramp agent pushing us back and us concerning this maneuver existed. So; since the visibility out my window was compromised; my paying attention to the engine starts and the other aircraft; my situational awareness suffered. I turned left; when I should have waited for the other aircraft to finish with their maintenance delay and turned right. There were many threats to this flight; with the weather being the biggest. The lack of visibility out our side windows is another. Also; as this was the first major snow storm for the area; the fact that there was the same amount of snow that covered the concrete and the grass left no visible distinction between the two. I still don't know why there were tire tracks through the grass area which made it look just like a taxiway. If it wasn't for the blue lights poking up through the snow in the dim morning light; we would have had no idea where the concrete ended and where the grass began. The fact that the apron and taxiways were not plowed was also another threat. The errors were mostly on my part for the lack of situational awareness as to where the push back had located our aircraft on the apron. Another error I made was the lack of communication with the agent pushing us back. I could have asked him (as he had a better view point of the apron area) if we could make the left turn. Had I done that; I believe he would have informed me that I couldn't and that a right hand turn was the only option. I have learned a lot from this experience. I have learned that good CRM is critical at every phase of flight. The FO and I; I believe; used proper CRM to handle this situation. The FO is a great communicator and is easy to work with. As soon as I heard him say 'STOP' I knew that he had seen something and that I needed to comply. We worked well together as a team throughout this situation. I also have learned that I need to keep a high level of situation awareness even when things are going as we had briefed. Just because things are happening as planned doesn't mean that it's ok to let your situational awareness drift. I simply turned left when I should have turned right; and had I maintained my situational awareness; communicated with the ramp agent; this wouldn't have happened. I also learned the importance of good visibility out our windows. I could have made a better effort to clear off the snow from the side window. However; given that most of it was ice; I know I couldn't have scrapped it off. I feel terrible for having made this mistake and will learn from it. I am grateful that during this incident no damage was caused to the aircraft; or airport facilities. I know that this is a side note and not important; but I have seen other airlines use iPads that show with GPS accuracy their exact location on the 10-9 page. That would have been great in this situation as it would have shown our exact location to taxiway K.

We showed up to the airplane on time and completed our safety and receiving checks. During the walk around it was evident that we would need to deice since it was snowing; blowing snow and gusty winds with a temperature of approximately -16c with low visibility. We boarded the airplane and did our receiving checklist followed by the QRH deicing/anti-icing configuration checklists. We briefed our taxi route along with everything else and the Captain (CA) mentioned we would more than likely taxi out via K and that it was right behind us. He asked me if I was familiar with the airport and I had told him that I was. He also briefed that we would start both engines before moving. Our entire aircraft was covered in snow and our side windows were completely frozen over. Both the front windshields were clear. The ramp or apron was uncontrolled and once we were both ready we asked the tug driver to push us back. During the push we started engine #2 and discussed that it would take a while for the engines to warm up in this cold. Ground crew completed their push; disconnected and took off. I never saw a wave off. Sitting there we started engine #1 and completed the QRH after start checklist. While sitting there I called Ground and advised him that we were ready for taxi and needed to head over to the ice pad for deice. The instructions we received were taxi to ice pad via K; F; W; transition through the apron and call pad control on 122.92 short of the pad. During the push back we had seen another aircraft off to the right of our airplane. Since it was hard to see out our windows the CA said he was going turn left to join K since K is right behind us and made a remark about keeping clear of the other aircraft on my side. I remember glancing over to my 10-9B page because the apron and all taxiways were completely covered in 3 inches of snow and couldn't see the signs for K as we started to make the 180 degree left turn. When we completed the turn I kept looking for an indication of being on K since I thought it was directly behind us. The CA had just straightened out the nose wheel and had started to move slightly forward when I saw a blue taxi light out my window. I still could not see any indication of K. I told the CA to stop because I couldn't see K and I thought that was the grass directly in front of us. He stopped immediately and we were trying to find indications of the apron; the taxiway and the edge of the grass. He pointed out to me that there were what appeared as tire marks directly in front of us but again we were unsure so the CA opened his window completely (took it off the hinge) to get a better view. It became clear when we saw another blue taxi light abeam his window that we were facing the grass. At that point we had discussed if we were still on the edge of the apron or on the grass and neither of us could tell since there was no clear definition between the two. We never felt a drop off either. He asked me to call ops so that they could come out and possibly push us back and at least check if we were still on concrete so that we can continue the turn or determine if we needed maintenance. On a side note while waiting we heard another airplane discuss with ground the poor conditions on the ground and ground offered a follow me car. Ops would not answer the radio so I believe he asked ground if they could contact our ops so that they could come out to us. While waiting we had shut down engine #1 and shortly after we shut down engine #2 when the plow started clearing the taxiways and the apron. The conditions started changing quickly and daylight combined with better visibility and plowed taxiways made it clear to us that we were facing grass. I would say more than 30 minutes had passed without any word from ops and at least 45 minutes for them to actually come out to our location. Ops confirmed that our nose wheel was on the grass and not the concrete. We both discussed that we could no longer simply get pushed back and go and that we needed a maintenance inspection even though we were sure there was no damage. We coordinated with ops; dispatch; on call chief pilot; airport operations; customs and our flight attendant. The CA made multiple announcements to the passengers. Our flight attendant did an amazing job at keeping everyone happy on board considering our situation. We knew we would have to deplane and being in Canada didn't make it any easier. We were told it would take hours to get a bus to unload the passengers. Airport operations brought airport vehicles and we eventually deplaned our passengers 4 at the time. After everyone deplaned I walked outside and saw that our nose wheel was 3-4 feet beyond the apron and onto the grass. Eventually a tug was hooked up and we were pushed back to the gate.The biggest threat was the weather and the conditions at the airport that early morning along with our failure to have exact situational awareness as to our precise location on the ground. We never realized how far back we had been pushed back and our angle to taxiway K. The threat of having both our side windows frozen also compounded the situation. The threat of taxiway K and apron not being plowed hiding taxiway edges. I think there is a lot to be learned for me from all of the events that took place that day. I think we could have had better communication with our ops people while we were getting pushed back as to the location of taxiway K. In these conditions I realized how important it is to have our side windows clear in order to have a better view of our surroundings. I think the possibility of using a follow me car could have also prevented the situation. Maybe better communication with ground. Simply asking if a left turn out was possible could have prevented our situation. In my opinion having had taxiways and aprons plowed would have made all the difference since we would have been able to distinguish our surroundings better. Another tool that could have prevented our situation would be technology. GPS tracking for taxiing such as iPads could have helped us realize our exact location at all times. Even during these events I was thankful that it took place with the crew I had. I believe the CA and I always had great CRM and we really tried to work well together to accomplish the flight safely. I know that our nose wheel was on the grass but I am glad that we stopped when we did and not later. I wish I had seen that blue taxi light 4 feet earlier as that would have prevented this whole thing. I'm glad we started both engines before moving so that my work load was focused on looking outside as opposed to starting engines or doing other things. This goes to show the importance of being vigilant at all times along with having great CRM in the cockpit.

Air Carrier flight crew describes the events leading up to a taxiway excursion while attempting to taxi away from the gate with new snow covering all surfaces. The aircraft is eventually towed back to the gate for a maintenance inspection.

1586140

201810

0601-1200

SFO.Airport

CA

0.0

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B SFO

Autoflight System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Local; Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1586140

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Aircraft

Aircraft TOW (Take-Off Weight) approximately 140K lbs; CG 17.7; T.O. trim setting 2.7NU. During takeoff roll; approximately ten knots prior to rotate speed; nose gear began lifting off of runway. Nose down force applied to side stick controller failed to control pitch. At five knots prior to rotate speed nose gear became fully airborne and the aircraft continued an uncommanded rotation until fully airborne. For several seconds the side stick controller was unable to overcome the continued increase in pitch. As the automated pitch trim system continued to trim; normal flight characteristics were restored after approximately 20-30 seconds. Aircraft accelerated near the flap speed limit until control of the aircraft was restored.Both dispatch and maintenance were fully debriefed about this incident. I am waiting for the results of their investigations. Improper aircraft loading and/or errors in the [performance calculations] are suspected.Feedback from dispatch and maintenance are required to determine the cause of the incident prior to making any recommendations.

A321 Captain reported uncommanded rotation prior to V1 that could not be overcome by the side stick.

1085842

201305

1201-1800

MTPP.Airport

FO

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower MTPP

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1085842

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 14000

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1085845.0

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was pilot flying into MTPP. Weather was day VMC with good visibility. Captain and I had briefed that we would fly the approach to [Runway] 10; then circle to land [Runway] 28. We discussed circling altitude and the fact that the glide path on the instrument approach to [Runway] 28 was steeper than average. Also [we] discussed that the PAPI's were hard to see above 1;000 FT; so the RNAV glidepath would be a back up once we were established on final. We were anticipating the DME arc to 10; and I believe it was over SAVAR that we were told to proceed direct IRDAS by ATC. The Captain did not hear ATC's garbled transmission clearly; and while ATC was phonetically spelling the name of the fix; I typed it in so as to turn in the correct direction. The Captain then programmed the remainder of the approach into the FMC. Between IRDAS and RIKOT I descended from 4;500 FT to 4;000 FT and we received a GPWS warning. Although I had visual contact with the terrain and saw no threat; I initiated a climb and the warning immediately ceased. Continued the approach and landed uneventfully.I believe that an earlier confirmation of the approach to be flown would have helped us to be better prepared. We did not expect to fly the full RNAV approach to [Runway] 28; and that put us behind in preparing to fly the approach. The difficulty of communications created a higher workload; between the Controller's heavily accented English and the poor quality of the radio transmissions overall. Being cleared direct IRDAS left a route discontinuity; since the transition was not selected and the intermediate step down altitudes between IRDAS and RIKOT were then not on the FMC. In the future; verify that all altitudes on the electronic chart are represented on the FMC.

During a visual approach to MTPP with RNAV GPS 28 as a back-up; mis-programmed VNAV and began a descent from 4;500 FT over IRDAS Intersection to 3;000 FT early on terminal routing to the GPS final approach course. [We] got a momentary GPWS terrain warning while descending visually over terrain with terrain and airport in sight. Complied with the GPWS terrain warning and altered flight path immediately and warning ceased immediately. Continued descent to 3;000 FT to RIKOT Intersection and completed visual approach and landing Runway 28 MTPP. Pilot flying programmed direct to IRDAS Intersection per ATC and proceeded direct; after which myself; pilot not flying; cleared a discontinuity between IRDAS and RIKOT as pilot flying acquired the airport visually. As pilot not flying; I failed to look for and select a 'SAVAR' transition to the RNAV GPS 28 approach; which would have given the appropriate step-down points on the terminal routing using VNAV. Extenuating circumstances were garbled and weak radio transmissions from ATC and a late clearance directly to IRDAS intersection due to ATC mis-communication; subverting the 'SAVAR' transition. Also; crew was expecting and briefed a GANIV DME ARC arrival (which was on the flight plan) to a circling approach to Runway 28 using RNAV GPS 28 APP as a back-up. This was the procedure both pilots had experienced before and were expecting. Neither pilot had let-down to MTPP using direct routing to the RNAV GPS 28 approach previously.I believe that future recurrences of this event can be avoided by always looking for and selecting appropriate transitions; especially when being vectored or given direct to points inside the transition. Also; regardless of visual flight conditions; verify that the FMC glass routing AND ALTITUDES are the same as the iPad routing and altitudes before flying a procedure even as a visual back-up.

B757 flight crew reports descending early on the RNAV Runway 28 to MTPP. The clearance direct IRDAS is received late and the transition from IRDAS is not selected in the FMC eliminating two step down fixes and results in a terrain warning.

1210649

201410

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Main Gear Tire

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1210649

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1210652.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

At FL320 a loud bang was heard and felt. Right main gear door warning light and overspeed warning. No other indications. QRH was followed and complied with. Got new burn numbers from [Operations] and continued with only gear door warning. On touchdown we could feel the right main rumble. We rolled to the end and cleared [the runway]. Aircraft was towed to parking. We discovered a large hole in the wheel well door and a large hole in the outside tire on the right main gear. Cause: Fault in tire or we picked up something on takeoff roll.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

A300 flight crew reported a main gear tire exploded in cruise at FL320 causing damage to the wheel well door.

1865796

202112

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

8000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb; Initial Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Nose Gear Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1865796

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1865710.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

This report is to replace the first report previously submitted. During initial climb; the FO (First Officer) called for gear up and I selected the gear up lever. We received a NOSE GEAR DOOR warning along with a GEAR DISAGREE message; a WOW INPUT caution message; and a WOW OUTPUT FAIL status message. I informed ZZZ Departure that we need to stay in the ZZZ area and we may be returning to the field. We continued the climb sequence and engaged the autopilot. I delegated duties by telling the FO that he will continue flying and I'll be running the QRH. He suggested that he could also take the radios and I agreed and said that he had control and the radios. At this point; ATC had assigned us a northbound heading and to maintain 10;000 ft. I found the appropriate QRH procedure and read aloud the first which stated to 'Not exceed 200 KIAS.' I bugged 200 kts for the speed. While running the QRH procedure the conditions were turbulent from the gusty and shifting winds in the area. I looked up at the PFD at one point as I continued through the QRH procedure and saw the speed deteriorating below the speed bug. I announced 'speed' and the FO acknowledged and began correcting. Shortly after correcting with power we received a brief stick shaker. I called 'Upset' and the FO recovered as appropriate. The airspeed returned to a safe speed and he corrected back to our assigned altitude of 10;000 ft.; only losing 200 ft. during the recovery. He called for autopilot and after that was reengaged we continued with our QRH procedure and prepared for our return to field as a [priority handling] aircraft due to the landing gear issue. Since we recognized the slowing airspeed and the turbulent conditions likely triggered the stick shaker I do not feel the safety of the flight was compromised.The cause of this event was due to the saturation of the crew due to the high volume of elements that were occurring all at once. The delegation of duties as per the PIC (Pilot In Command) had the Captain running the QRH and the FO flying the aircraft during the turbulent conditions. While we were recognizing the warning messages and the need to respond to them; I also recognized that we were climbing towards the mountains and so we needed to communicate our intentions with ATC so that we stayed in the area. Because of terrain and other aircraft such as arrivals to the field ATC turned us North and kept us at 10;000 ft. In addition; the QRH required us to maintain at or below 200 kts airspeed. All of these elements occurring simultaneously required quick action of the Pilot Flying (FO) and myself in terms of managing the flight control panel and communicating with ATC. The large power reduction required to level off; the QRH requirement to maintain below 200 kts; as well as the added drag of the nose gear being down were the key contributing factors to the deteriorating airspeed. Since we recognized the slowing airspeed prior to the stick shaker and corrections were being implemented I do not feel the safety of the flight was compromised. Once recognizing the turbulent conditions requesting a climb to a higher altitudes may have provided a more smooth environment for managing the landing gear issue and the return to field.To avoid a recurrence of this event; my suggestion is to that the aircraft be stable on speed and altitude prior to continuing with the QRH. However; in this case; I knew that airspeed was a consideration since we were flying with the nose gear down. The QRH provided us with the 200 kt limitation. Once that speed was bugged; ensuring we were stable at that speed before continuing would have been prudent.

After calling for GEAR UP; we received a warning message NOSE GEAR DOOR; GEAR DISAGREE; a caution message WOW INPUT; and status message WOW OUTPUT FAIL. While the Captain ran the QRH; I continued to fly the airplane and took over the radios. We informed ATC that we required vectors and to stay in the area. I asked Captain which speed we should maintain and he initially said 210 before correcting with 200 as per the QRH. We leveled off at altitude and I reduced power to a typical power setting to keep airplane below speed detailed in the QRH. At this point we were in moderate turbulence with the winds gusting and shifting around causing the airspeed indicator to bounce all over the place. As ATC vectored us around; the airspeed dropped suddenly; accelerated by the fact that the gear remained down adding extra drag. In the process of communicating with ATC and inputting new information; the airspeed started dropping outside the bug; accelerated by the fact that the gear remained down adding extra drag. Captain called airspeed. I added power but got a momentary stick shaker as engines were spooling up. Captain called upset; I assumed manual control of the airplane; pitched down and added power. We lost 200-300 ft. during the recovery; recovered airspeed and altitude; and reengaged autopilot. We continued with the emergency QRH procedures for the nose gear and came back to land. Safety of flight was never compromised.Dealing with the warning and caution messages from the gear issues; communicating with ATC and inputting new data all at once; monitoring of the airspeed dropped for a few seconds. With the gusty winds; the trend vector was jumping up and down; showing increases followed by immediate decreases. The QRH specified keeping airspeed below 200 and following an increase trend vector; I reduced the power. ATC then gave new instructions which led to the momentary lapse in monitoring airspeed. Because of terrain and other aircraft such as arrivals to the field ATC turned us North and kept us at 10;000 ft. All of these elements occurring simultaneously required quick action. The large power reduction required to level off as well as maintain below 200 kts as per the QRH and the extra added drag from the gear remaining down were the key contributing factors to the deteriorating airspeed. Better anticipate additional power requirements with gear remaining down. Once speed was bugged; better monitoring of the trend vector. Telling ATC to standby while letting airspeed stabilize would have been prudent.

Flight Crew reported an air turn back was complicated by turbulence that affected airspeed and the ability to hold altitude. The landing gear systems including weight on wheels sensing caused other systems failures.

1343854

201603

1201-1800

ZMP.ARTCC

MN

37000.0

Daylight

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZMP

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZMP

Facility ZMP.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24

Situational Awareness

1343854

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

ARTCC handed me two aircraft on collision courses at the same altitude! Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were going to lose separation within a few miles of crossing my boundary coming from Denver Center. I called the ARTCC 'controller' and told him to turn Aircraft X 30 degrees left to go behind Aircraft Y. He acknowledged that he would comply. He waited at least a couple minutes before he told the aircraft. The sooner he gave the clearance the better because there was a 100 knot tail wind on Aircraft X and he was going to pick up speed. I feel that the ARTCC 'controller' defiantly waited to turn Aircraft X because the aircraft took so long to start his turn; but this is only speculation.Retrain these people before a midair occurs!

ZMP ARTCC reported ZDV ARTCC handed off two aircraft at the same altitude on converging courses without taking action to ensure separation.

995281

201202

0601-1200

ZBW.ARTCC

NH

23000.0

Center ZBW

Air Carrier

B737-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class A ZBW

Altimeter

X

Improperly Operated

Center ZBW

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZBW

Facility ZBW.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 30

995281

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

995590.0

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Weather; Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Whilst operating the BOSOX Sector (ZBW Sector 47) Radar Position; I took a hand-off on Air Carrier X from Bradley Departure Control; in Windsor Locks; CT; and a hand off on Air Carrier Y; and another aircraft from ZBW Sector 19. After initial contact from Air Carrier X; and subsequent clearances; I cleared Air Carrier X to climb to an interim altitude of FL220 due to Air Carrier Y traffic at FL230. Air Carrier X's read-back was normal and confirmed receipt of clearance to climb to FL220. As Air Carrier X approached Air Carrier Y; I called traffic to Air Carrier X advising Air Carrier X of Air Carrier Y's position and altitude relative to Air Carrier X's position and assigned altitude. Air Carrier X reported Air Carrier Y in sight. Shortly thereafter; I observed Air Carrier X's MODE C readout at FL222 (200 FT above assigned altitude; which is within conformance for FL220 but unusual in today's ATC environment). As I was observing Air Carrier X's MODE C of FL222 I asked Air Carrier X to confirm that they were level at FL220; no response was forthcoming from Air Carrier X; and as I observed Air Carrier X climbing further I again asked Air Carrier X to confirm their assigned altitude as being level at FL220; again; nothing was forthcoming; shortly thereafter; Air Carrier X said that they were above FL220. Though the traffic situation between Air Carrier Y and Air Carrier X had deteriorated to less than standard separation (5 NM lateral; 1;000 FT vertical); the lateral separation and geometry was such that no risk of a mid-air collision existed (also; Air Carrier X had reported Air Carrier Y in sight before the altitude excursion). However; my concern for Air Carrier X became separation from the wake of Air Carrier Y; and separation from the subsequent following aircraft to Air Carrier Y. To try to increase the distance between Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y wake; I turned both aircraft to the right. In my opinion; turning each aircraft to the right would result in increased separation of Air Carrier X from the wake of Air Carrier Y and was necessary. The situation became resolved when sufficient lateral separation (5 NM) had been regained; and then Air Carrier X reported that they had descended back to and were level at FL220.Unfortunately; from an ATC perspective; even though verbal confirmation on the part of Air Carrier X took place; Air Carrier X still climbed to an altitude other than that assigned by ATC; therefore; nothing can be done to preemptively avert a situation in which an aircraft climbs or descends to other than its ATC assigned altitude without a system that in real-time correlates the inputted autopilot altitude assignment (if an autopilot is being used for altitude maintenance) as being identical to that assigned by ATC and placed into the subject aircrafts ATC data-block. Allowing ATC to visually or electronically validate the autopilot altitude input could defensively identify situations such as this.

First Officer was pilot flying; climbing out of BDL on the Coastal 3 departure [at] approximately 25 NM northeast of CCC VOR. Altitude assigned was FL220. Boston Center inquired if we were at our assigned altitude. We realized our actual altitude was FL226. As we were correcting back to FL220; ATC turned us 30 degrees to the right. ATC also directed an aircraft at FL230 to turn 30 degrees to there right. The other aircraft was in sight at all times. We returned expeditiously to FL220. Remainder of flight was operated normally.Local altimeter at BDL was 29.37. During the First Officer before start flow; as he set his altimeter; he did not notice that the Kollsman window was set 28.37. The altimeter needle indicated 173 FT; the field elevation at BDL. He did not realize his altimeter was indicating 1;000 FT low. As a result we were actually climbing through FL226 when his altimeter was indicating FL216. Auto pilot B was engaged and followed the indication of the First Officer altimeter; therefore there was no altitude alert as we passed the actual FL220.

B737 flight crew and a Controller describe the events surrounding an altitude overshoot and loss of separation in ZBW airspace. The First Officer had incorrectly set his altimeter by 1;000 FT prior to departure and the same error was retained during the altimeter change at FL180.

1024568

201206

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

50.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke; 10

Daylight

FSS ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 180 Skywagon

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Class G ZZZ

Cessna 150

Part 91

Final Approach

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1024568

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Airport

Human Factors

I finished pre-takeoff checklist and taxied towards end of runway [at an] uncontrolled airport with an active FSS. I was in radio communication with airport FSS. An aircraft reported turning base for a touch and go on the runway in use. I looked and saw the aircraft on base. It appeared as if I had lots of room so I reported my intention to expedite takeoff and clear the area prior to aircraft on base arriving. I rapidly took the runway at the end; which was in the displaced threshold area used for takeoff but not landing. I added the power and started the takeoff. About 1;000 FT down the runway; and just before lifting off; an aircraft reported 'Going Around.' As I lifted off a Cessna 150 passed overhead (with plenty of room to spare) on the missed approach. There had been another aircraft on approach in front of the one I saw on base. The Cessna 150 was evidently on final and by focusing on the aircraft on base I missed the one on final and cut him off by taking the runway. Cessna 150 continued climb out in front of me and I departed the pattern; (feeling like less than a pro) without further incident. Problem was haste and not adhering to procedures I teach my students at uncontrolled airports. I train students - prior to takeoff - announce; make a minimum 45 turn on the taxiway towards final to clear the area and preferably a 360 degree clearing turn on the taxiway to search the entire pattern prior to taking the runway; and announce again. If I would have practiced what I preach I most likely would have seen the other aircraft.

C180 pilot reports not seeing an aircraft on final approach; believing his only traffic is an aircraft on base. The C150 on final approach goes around as the reporter is about to lift off.

1289940

201508

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 147; Flight Crew Type 7000

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1289940

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 268

1289979.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Captain rejected the takeoff at approximately 135-140 KIAS due to a red engine overheat light on the number two engine. Aircraft was brought to a stop. The Captain notified the flight attendants and passengers to remain seated. Then the aircraft was taxied clear of the runway. Fire crew assistance was requested to inspect the tires and brakes for damage.While waiting for the fire crew inspection; a flight attendant notified the Captain that an elderly passenger requested to go to the hospital and was not doing well. Once the fire crew reported no problems with the brakes or tires; the Captain taxied the aircraft back to the gate and requested EMT and medical personnel meet the flight.Once at the gate; EMTs tended to and removed the passenger. Once that passenger was removed; all other passengers were deplaned and the aircraft was turned over to maintenance.

On takeoff; right engine EGT climbed to 945; I called 'high EGT right engine' and pointed to the gauge. Captain immediately rejected the takeoff using standard procedure. Speed was approximately 138 knots; V1 was 145. Captain rejected takeoff outside high speed reject criteria.

B737 flight crew experienced high EGT during takeoff and the Captain elected to reject the takeoff just prior to V1. A Flight Attendant notified the Captain that an elderly passenger had been adversely affected by the reject and EMT's should meet the aircraft at the gate.

1753783

202007

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 97; Flight Crew Total 6364; Flight Crew Type 1712

Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1753783

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 179; Flight Crew Total 14415; Flight Crew Type 3184

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1753784.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors

We departed ZZZ; Runway X; on the SID (Standard Instrument Departure). Unfortunately we did not catch that the SID Runway X is not authorized for use by Aircraft X Make/Model. There are several holes (traps) that we missed. We received an ATC (Air Traffic Control) uplink with the SID. In later crew discussion - we believe that this was based on our originally planned runway 1 departure.Our flight was originally flight planned for Runway Y; via the SID. With a late ZFW (Zero Fuel Weight) increase the working IRO (International Relief Officer) pointed out that we were no longer good to take off on Runway Y; that we needed Runway X. We asked ATC and were cleared out to Runway X.The takeoff and departure was normal and accomplished with SOP's; with no traffic or navigation conflicts. ATC never said anything about our departure. We didn't see any restrictions on the Jeppesen SID page. I forgot to re-check the 10-7 pages for departure notes after the runway change. None of us caught the note on the page that the SID is not authorized for Aircraft X Make/Model on Runway X.On the climb portion; after the turn to the northeasterly portion of the SID (at approximately 5;000 ft.) - the working IRO mentioned that we were not authorized to use the departure that we were already on. We had a quick look and since all elements of the flight appeared normal; we decided to discuss it later in the flight.We continued on and the flight was terminated in ZZZZ with no further issues or problems. ATC never queried us and I told the crew that I would be filing a report on our return.Also - I am a relatively new transfer to the ZZZ base; having been displaced recently. When I flew out of ZZZ we never used Runway Y. So I was probably predisposed to use Runway X; and my expectation bias likely had me trusting the ATC upload as valid and legal for the runway as well.

Our flight plan showed Runway Y as our departure runway and the SID (Standard Instrument Departure). On taxi out we were assigned Runway X for departure and the SID. Bottom line none of us caught that Aircraft X Make/Model is not authorized to fly this SID.

Air carrier flight crew reported inadvertently using an unauthorized departure route for their aircraft type.

1016199

201206

1801-2400

MEM.Airport

TN

3000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON M03

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class B MEM

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1016199

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Airspace Structure

We were being vectored from the north for a visual approach to Runway 27 at MEM. During the descent from 4;000 FT to 3;000 FT the Controller told us we were re-entering Class B airspace and that we had been out of Class B airspace for about 1 mile. The threat was (and continues to be) the lack of a practical; real-time means for pilots to detect where they are in relation to the base of Class B airspace around an airport. It is totally impractical (too attention consuming during a critical phase of flight) to try to monitor on the EFB the aircraft's position relative to the varying radials; DMEs and altitudes. Suggestions from a piloting standpoint: 1) Slow to 200 KTS whenever approaching a Class B airspace. The downside of this approach is increased delays at airports; as Class B starts a considerable distance from airports. 2) Never descend before it is required to make altitude restrictions on the approach. The downside here is the increased potential for being high/fast if there is any misjudgment. From an automation standpoint; enhance automation; showing Class B airspace on the PFD or; perhaps better (to avoid excessive data on the PFD); showing aircraft location on a moving map on the Class B page of the EFB. From a regulatory standpoint: simplify the speed requirement; perhaps to be similar to that used by Canada (200 KTS if below 3;000 AGL within 10 miles of an airport).

Wide Body Aircraft Captain is informed by ATC aircraft is reentering Class B after having been out of it. Reporter comments on the difficulty of monitoring Class B in the flight deck with current instruments.

1142272

201401

0001-0600

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Ramp ZZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

APU

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

1142272

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Upon arriving to the aircraft an extreme strong odor was coming through the jetway from the aircraft cabin. During my preflight security check and preparing the galley for inflight service the C Flight Attendant came back and stated the odor in the cabin is toxic and we should not stay in the cabin; I agreed and we left to the jetway. The C Flight Attendant alerted the Captain of the toxic odor. The Captain called Maintenance and went through several procedures to clear the cabin of the toxins. Maintenance could not clear the cabin and could not assure that it would not reoccur. The next morning my throat was sore/scratchy and my eyes were irritated. A more routine Maintenance Program; clearing and cleaning hydraulic fuel leaks from cabin air sources. Certifying and documentation in the cabin log book when these checks and cleanings are done. It is important that all crew members should be in the loop with all aspects of cabin health and safety.

An A319 Flight Attendant reported he and other crew members exited the aircraft because of a strong toxic odor which Maintenance was unable to clear. The flight was canceled and he had physical symptoms the following day.

1808135

202105

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Testing; Inspection; Work Cards

Aileron Control System

X

Improperly Operated

Gate / Ramp / Line

Other Exterior

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Other

1808135

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

N

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling

Chart Or Publication

We are currently in the process of returning X number of 737-MAX aircraft to service following the accomplishment of an EO. When auditing the paperwork on Aircraft Y; it was discovered that the tooling required to accomplish Step XX F.X; and F.Y was unavailable. This caused a retroactive audit of previously completed paperwork on Aircraft Z. It was determined that the tasks were stamped as accomplished in spite of the lack of available tooling. The aircraft was not in service at the time; however it was due to be released. The paperwork was pulled and the required tooling has been ordered to ensure correct accomplishment of these steps on both aircraft prior to aircraft release.The reference material uses generic three digit ATA codes (XX-XX-XX; XX-YY-XX) instead of complete ATA codes to identify applicable AMM references for a given task. Additionally; the maintenance tasks are all very similar when performed and easily confused. Furthermore the job card does not include the tooling in the bill of required materials; further obfuscating the tooling requirement. Finally; the tasks all have very similar nomenclature. You can be easily fooled into thinking you've accomplished more than one task when you have; in fact; only accomplished one; or part of another task. It is also worth noting that other similar task cards for this fleet type are significantly less vague. It appears that this card was created quickly with little mind paid to details. This is also the first time this job card has been accomplished at this station.Include the full ATA code for each task. Include the required tooling on the job card bill of materials. Add a note to Step XX F.X and F.X indicating that tooling is required to complete these steps.

Technician reported ambiguity in AMM references for task cards resulted in not using the required tooling to return B737 MAX aircraft to service after storage.

1273887

201506

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 530

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1273887

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Local show time was approximately XA:00. This was 55 minutes prior to scheduled takeoff time. (XA:55Z). Airfield conditions were night operations with no visibility issues. Upon arriving at the aircraft at gate; maintenance informed us of a write up requiring deferment (Auto Speed Brake System). There was also a problem with the Captain's seat belt. The maintenance issues lead to a block out time of XB:45Z (:50 late). During taxi out; #2 DEU failure caused a return to the terminal. After maintenance was performed; the aircraft blocked out for the second time at XD:36 (2:46 late). Ground control cleared us to taxi to Runway XXL and [along the route hold at] Taxiway X. Taxiway X and Taxiway Y are both at the approach end of runway XXL with open tarmac between them. Taxiway Y is nearest the beginning of the runway. Also; there is a flange on the west end of Taxiway Y to facilitate a high-speed turn off from runway XYR. The width of the widest part of this flange is approximately equal to the runway width.Approaching hold point Taxiway X; tower instructed us to hold short of holding point Taxiway Y. There was a wide-body aircraft holding at Taxiway X; which was subsequently cleared for takeoff. As that aircraft was rolling for takeoff; we were instructed to taxi into position and hold. We entered the runway area via holding point Taxiway Y. A yellow runway exit line curved to the right toward the runway centerline from hold point Taxiway Y. Hold point Taxiway X was to the left; which allowed the full length of the runway. We expected full length. There was open tarmac between these two runway entrances; so we turned about 45 degrees left to maneuver the aircraft to a position closer to the beginning of the runway. When the aircraft was turned right to align with the runway; the yellow line leading to the runway centerline was not evident and the right runway-edge line was mistaken for the runway centerline. The captain set the brakes and transferred aircraft control to the first officer. During the turn to the right to align the aircraft; the first officer was scanning for possible malfunctions associated with the multiple maintenance issues leading up to this point. After transfer of aircraft control; I noticed there was a notable lack of runway markings in this hold position. In my mind; this was attributed to being on an open ramp area prior to the beginning of the runway. I expected normal runway markings to be just ahead. A lack of familiarity with this runway and the large open tarmac between the hold-short area and the runway contributed to this misperception. After receiving takeoff clearance and during the initial part of the takeoff roll; the first officer's attention was inside focused on setting takeoff power. During this time; the aircraft was aligned with the right-side runway edge lights. As the flange narrowed from right to left to meet the edge of the runway; it became apparent that the centerline was to the left. With rudder pedal steering; the aircraft was maneuvered to the left to join the centerline. The maneuvering occurred after setting takeoff power and runway centerline was achieved just prior to 100 knots. All maneuvering was in the low-speed regime and it was not apparent that we impacted any runway lights during the takeoff roll. We elected to continue the takeoff. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. After blocking in at ZZZZ1; we discovered that one of the nose wheels sustained notable damage to its sidewall.

While taxiing the aircraft onto the runway for takeoff; B-737 crew was unable to see the yellow line leading to the runway centerline and mistook the right runway-edge line for the runway centerline. Crew recognized the error; corrected to centerline by 100 knots and continued the takeoff. On post-flight inspection the crew discovered damage to the nose wheels sidewalls.

1671011

201907

0001-0600

SAT.Airport

US

VMC

TRACON SAT

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C SAT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 15000

Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1671011

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

ATC had been vectoring our aircraft so as to fit other traffic in front of us. After we were clear for the visual approach; we were too high for safe approach in my judgment. The FO (First Officer) said; 'I am going to maneuver the aircraft' and began to S turn. I stated 'No we are not' and 'Go Around' A Soft Go Around was accomplished. The FO wanted to hack the approach by S turning from what would be a steep approach. The FO had been up for 21 hours at this point as he is a commuter who got up at 2am PDT the previous day I think the FO was tired and just wanted to put it on the ground. His subsequent landing was quite hard. I believe his judgment was affected by fatigue. Ultimately we did the right thing by going around. Unfortunately; I; as the Captain had to command it.

A319 Captain reported having to command a go around to fatigued First Officer on an unstabilized approach.

1210440

201410

0601-1200

BPT.Airport

TX

2000.0

IMC

Icing; Thunderstorm; Turbulence; 1.25

Daylight

1400

3500

Tower BPT

Air Taxi

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Direct

Class D BPT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 850

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1210440

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Weather; Human Factors

Human Factors

I am writing this from a first officer position on a 135 flight. We (referring from here on as crew) departed on schedule for an IFR flight plan route to HOU. Enroute we received instructions from ATC to hold and expect further clearance [in 30 minutes] due to the conditions at HOU. After several minutes we make the decision to divert to our alternate. After descending to begin the arrival for IAH; we get informed by ATC that it has been also shut down. ATC gives us the option to hold; but due to our fuel overhead/situation that was not an option. ATC issued us clearance to 'BPT via direct; descend and maintain 11;000 feet.' At that time ATC said the field was reported VFR and we can get vectored around build ups for a visual or we can shoot the LOC back-course to runway 30. Then they asked us what we would prefer. I had looked up the approaches to runway 30 and noticed and RNAV. After discussing the options; my captain agreed that we should just do the RNAV into RW30. During this time he is hand flying the aircraft with the spoilers extended to get it down faster from altitude. After leveling; I advise him to connect the auto pilot and get no response. Soon after we find ourselves in the clouds getting bumped around as we are being vectored on an extended downwind leg for the approach. I had us set up for the approach with the IAF's all in there and it displayed on the MFD. My captain asks me to get a heading on course back for the approach. I ask ATC and they give me a heading for the base. After asking my captain I request direct to the final approach fix; which is approximately 15 miles out while we are at 3000 MSL. ATC issues 'descend and maintain 2k till established on the approach; cleared RNAV to RW30.' After that I advised my captain to connect the auto pilot to ease the work load; however no response. I changed him up to a NAV needle and armed the approach on the panel for him. At that point we were turning final inside of the final approach fix; so ATC called us and notified us of our deviation and to contact the BPT tower. We should have been at 2000 MSL because we were still outside of the final approach fix and not established; however; we were descending through 2k. I called altitude once; expecting him to make the correction; as I go back heads down on the approach plate. We don't have much time but trying to brief the approach. I remember setting the d(h) and calling out the minimums of the RNAV. I myself was very busy and still have yet to contact the tower. At this point I happened to see that my captain is still descending even though we have not crossed the final approach fix to begin the approach. I then suddenly called altitude then again altitude and the second time very aggressively. During this process I was not getting a response. Then we broke out of the base. I stress to my captain that we are still not on the approach and we should be at 2000k feet. He finally responded and I am going to maintain this. At that point we were at 700-800 feet MSL (and that is verified by flight aware); which was over a 1000k low. When we came out of the bases we were in heavy rain with little visibility. After the fact to find out by the national weather service; the metar was reporting 1.2 SM visibility with 3500RVR at the field. At this point I contacted the tower and we were cleared to land. Just inside of two miles we got the field insight. We were at 800 ft MSL and on the VASI. After the aircraft was on the ground all of this became a discussion. After looking back on the chain of events that lead up to this it is obvious to see some contributing factors. Obviously one major case was the weather but more importantly the aircraft should have been on the auto pilot during this time. It lessens the work load allowing the crew to be more aware of the environment. I was performing all the second in command duties so my captain was just focused on flying the aircraft and wasn't really ready for the approach. We should have taken the time to get everything briefed after I had it set up. I have learned a lot from this event and will not put myself in that situation again.

Part 135 First Officer describes a weather diversion into BPT with the Captain becoming fixated and descending well below the published altitude for the approach segment. Attempts by the First Officer to get the Captain back up to the published altitude and to turn on the autopilot are not successful. The 800 foot ceiling allows the approach to be continued to a successful landing.

991779

201201

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

A320

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Work Cards; Installation; Testing

Cockpit/Cabin Communication

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Troubleshooting; Confusion

991779

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Avionics

Confusion; Troubleshooting

991781.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Manuals; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

Manuals

Aircraft X; an A320 aircraft; arrived at gate with a log gripe concerning the Cabin Intercommunication DATA System (CIDS). The flight crew verbally informed us that they had a CIDS Director-1 and -2 ECAM fault and an Evacuate Warning that would not silence. Due to previous history of CIDS and Evacuate Warning problems; my Aircraft Electronics Technician (AET) coworker; Technician Y; and myself determined that we would replace CIDS Directors-1 and -2. The new CIDS Directors were ordered referencing Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 23-73-34 for this aircraft effectivity. The last update of this document was May 2011. During the installation of the CIDS units; it was noted that the Company Part Numbers (CPN) of the old and new [CIDS Director] units were different. The IPC calls for CPN XXX729 for this aircraft effectivity; however; CPN XXX732 CIDS units were found installed. We contacted Maintenance Control for clarification and Maintenance Controller X agreed that this aircraft effectivity should have the CPN XXX729 CIDS units installed per IPC 23-73-34; Page-1f. Per IPC 23-73-34; Page-1; the CPN XXX731 unit is effective only for Aircraft Y; [a different A320 aircraft]. Installation and Test of both CIDS Directors was accomplished per Aircraft Maintenance Manuals (AMM) 23-73-34; with all tests passing and aircraft was then dispatched. A few minutes after the aircraft left ZZZ; my Supervisor; found an Airbus Maintenance Tip (MT) in the AMM. The Maintenance Tip was found to have a Part Number effectivity table that is in conflict with the current IPC. We immediately contacted Maintenance Control; this time speaking with Controller Y; and informed him of the conflicting part number information on these documents. Controller Y concluded that proper procedures were followed and that he would contact the Engineering Group to correct the documents in question. In addition I submitted a report to Engineering about the matter and hope to get a response soon.

Aircraft X; an A320 aircraft; arrived with a logbook write-up of Cabin Intercommunication DATA System (CIDS). The crew reported verbally and the log was updated to (Evacuation Warning sounding and could not reset). The crew also reported and the post flight report showed the CIDS Directors-1 and -2 had failed. The fault could not be duplicated on the ground. It was determined that it would be best to replace both CIDS Directors reference Maintenance Manual (M/M) 23-73-34. The parts were ordered reference Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 23-73-34 Page-1F; dated (May 2011). The parts arrived and [it] was found that the parts [previously] installed were different.

A Line Technician; Avionics Technician; and a Maintenance Controller report about conflicting information between their Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) and the Airbus Maintenance Manual regarding the correct Cabin Intercommunication DATA System (CIDS) Directors they could use on an A320 aircraft with a CIDS Director ECAM fault and Evacuation Warning that would not silence.

1659181

201906

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Taxi

EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

1659181

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

Prior to the flight I checked the maintenance status of the aircraft via the pilot portal and observed the Aileron Disconnection light was deferred and the cabin window shade at seat 7A was stuck and both were properly deferred.When I arrived at the airport; I was told that the aircraft had an open maintenance item and I would need to speak with the [Maintenance Control] regarding the status of the airplane. I called the [Maintenance Control] and was advised that the prior evening the 'spoiler fail' message came on during taxi in. For more than 2 hours we worked with three maintenance techs and the [Maintenance Control] to troubleshoot the issue. This including three separate taxi tests; one after each Maintenance Action was completed; in order to get the airplane back in service.My concern is that we had an aircraft that was assigned to go fly and had been released to do so; however our maintenance records were are not updated to reflect that the aircraft was not currently airworthy. This should not be occurring.After a delay; with several electric panels on the airplane having been opened up during the Maintenance Actions to correct the spoiler failure issue; we departed the gate and taxied to Runway XXR for takeoff to ZZZ. We had an uneventful taxi out and we were cleared for takeoff. As we were passing 100 kts we heard a single cabin to cockpit chime. I elected to continue the departure. When passing 1;500 ft we heard a second cabin to cockpit chime and we answered the call. Our F/A (Flight Attendant) advised that she is seeing white smoke in the cabin around row 5.We advised ATC of the report of smoke in the cabin and asked to return to ZZZ. We were given a 270 degree radar vector heading which would not result in an immediate return to the airport. I continued the turn towards the airport and advised the F/O (First Officer) to [request priority handling] and he did so. We asked that the fire trucks meet the airplane. After a few minutes; I called the F/A and asked if there was any change in the smoke entering the cabin and she said that she was still seeing the white smoke coming from the floor area around seat 5A but it did not appear to be getting any worse. I made a PA announcement and informed the passengers of our intentions to return to ZZZ.We continued with vectors to the ILS XXR and conducted an uneventful landing on Runway XXR in ZZZ. After clearing the runway; we stopped the airplane and I again contacted our F/A to get an update on the status of the cabin and the smoke. She indicated that it was still visible from row 5 and we agreed that it was safe to taxi back to the gate with the fire trucks following us.Once at the gate; the fire fighters boarded the aircraft and conducted an inspection of the area and did not see anything wrong. We deplaned the passengers normally and contacted [Operations] Control and the [Maintenance Control].It was determined that the 'white smoke' that the F/A observed was most likely condensation from the air cycle machine that was very effective at cooling the humid air to a point at which 'snow balls' and 'white condensation vapor' was being blown from the floor vent in the area of seat 5A. Our newly hired Flight Attendant had never seen this occur before and did not recognize what was happening. She took the conservative course of action and reported what she was observing to us.Since our F/A had tried to contact us while we were in the high speed portion of the takeoff run and having just had several hours of observing Maintenance Tech's accessing multiple panels on the aircraft; I immediately suspected the worse (that we did have some type of smoke in the cabin) and I did not follow up in flight with more probing questions of our F/A about the type of white smoke or odor associated with it; which with the benefit now of 20/20 hindsight; I should have. Since our aircraft are staffed with a single Flight Attendant; I would suggest that during their initial training; our flight attendants be shown a video of what this condensation from the air cycle machine looks like; so they are not seeing it for the first time by themselves; while on a revenue flight with passengers.Suggestion: In the future; I will be asking more probing questions and possibly opening the cockpit door to observe the cabin before declaring an emergency and diverting. Our new flight attendants need training on this issue so they don't see it for the first time alone. Our maintenance procedures need to be reviewed so that an airplane that is NOT airworthy is not assigned to go fly.

EMB135 Captain reported air return after takeoff due to Flight Attendant erroneously identifying condensation as smoke in passenger cabin.

1742941

202005

0601-1200

HDC.Airport

LA

0.0

6.0

1000.0

Mixed

Cloudy; 8

Daylight

1200

TRACON MSY

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class D HDC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 100

1742941

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

During the approach to HDC; New Orleans was vectoring me for the ILS to Runway 18. They gave me a heading to join the LOC and cleared me for the ILS to Runway 18. Moments later they ask if I was receiving the LOC; and advised me that a previous aircraft had let them know that they had not received it. I replied that I was not receiving the LOC; and they ask if I would like the RNAV to Runway 18. I replied yes; and they immediately cleared me for the RNAV to Runway 18. I had expected that ATC was going to vector me back around in a box pattern to set up for the RNAV to Runway 18; and when they simply cleared me for that approach; I started scrambling; since I was single pilot to reset the radios for the approach and join the inbound course. I was able to join the inbound course; a couple of miles outside the FAF; however upon being handed over to HDC Tower; Tower immediately advised me of a low altitude alert from New Orleans Approach. I had descended below the minimum altitude on the approach; prior to the FAF. I broke out of the clouds into VMC at approximately 1200 ft.; 600 ft. below the minimum altitude. I believe that the cause for this event is my failure to NOT accept the clearance for an approach that I was not completely set up and ready for. I should have asked for vectors in a box pattern to join the approach; and give myself time to fully brief the approach; have the radios set up; and be completely prepared prior to joining the final approach course. My hurried effort to set up the radios for the approach and join the course distracted me from flying the airplane and cause me to bust the altitude.

Cessna 182 Pilot reported being alerted by Air Traffic Control that LOC Approach was not working and therefore being cleared for an RNAV approach completely unprepared which caused a descent below minimum altitude.

1145259

201401

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Turbulence

CLR

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1145259

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1145266.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Company Policy; MEL; Aircraft

Human Factors

[This was my] second consecutive AM 'out and back' assignment off reserve. The first was delayed approximately 1+15. This trip; my second; [was flown in an aircraft with] the autothrottles MEL'd inoperative. During descent and visual approach to Runway XXL we encountered continuous distractions on the radios due to MULTIPLE similar sounding call signs. One was the exact same digits as ours; two of which were just transposed; plus several others ending in the same number as ours.During the final approach segment of our visual to the runway I let my pilot not flying duties focus to too great an extent on the [pilot flying's] airspeed control which was complicated by the manual throttles and a wind shift. As a result I did not properly back him up and let us descend to the point we received a GPWS 'Too Low Flaps' warning; at which point I called for a go-around. We executed it in accordance with ATC instructions; then re-entered the pattern for a second visual approach to an uneventful landing.My fatigue level had ramped up quite quickly during our 'return' flight. I drank a cup of coffee; but it didn't help enough. I got target fixated on the airspeed and manual throttle control after being distracted by the continuous similar callsigns on frequency.[We need to make] a conscious attempt to change the way the company assigns call signs. A change that focuses on dissimilar phonetics rather ground personnel recognition convenience. Try to use the best aircraft available for these AM 'out and back' assignments. Even though we are returning in the day; which might seem easier; it most definitely isn't. The increased ATC traffic and increased work load associated with MEL's and focusing on so many similar sounding call signs; combined with the additional fatigue that hits once the sun comes up really got me to me today.

When cleared onto final; we noticed winds of 330/50 at 3;000 FT MSL. The winds shifted significantly during the approach until they reached 250/14G20 on the ground. With the autothrottles inoperative; I was working hard to keep the airspeed in a safe regime while configuring the aircraft. Unfortunately; my focus on airspeed control combined with my fatigue lead me to not call for the final flap/slat setting of 30/40. Fatigue from an early morning out and back combined with coming off afternoon flying previously was more significant than I thought it would be.

Fatigue; MEL'd autothrottles and communications problems due to similar call signs contributed to the failure of an A300-600 flight crew to select landing flaps prior to receipt of an EGPWS configuration warning. The flight crew initiated a go-around and flew a second approach uneventfully.

994268

201202

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Distraction

994268

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

The rides had been bad and several aircraft had been asking for ride reports and I was spacing for the Class B airport. An E170 was eastbound at FL350 and requesting FL330 because of the bad rides. The E170 was in Sector X's airspace and I had just given Sector X the first of two northbound arrivals at FL340. In the next couple of minutes I was distracted by a situation in the southern part of my sector. When I scanned back to the north; the E170 had entered my airspace and the first arrival northbound was in Sector X. I gave the E170 a clearance for lower and Conflict Alert went of with an E145; the second arrival at FL340. I turned E170 20 degrees left to add more space between them. There was no loss of separation but it felt like a safety issue to me because they were closer than I usually let airplanes get and I had just been dealing with the other situation in the sector. I need to take a moment to refocus after some kind of distraction. When pilots are trying to get out of bad rides; it adds a sense of urgency to get them out of it as quickly as possible. If I would have taken just a moment to scan my entire sector again I would have made another evaluation at the traffic situation with the E145; and probably waited two minutes before descending E170.

Distracted by attempts to resolve 'bad ride' reports; an Enroute Controller experienced a near separation loss.

1872912

202201

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

400.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Center ZZZ

Corporate

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 6250; Flight Crew Type 175

1872912

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted

Environment - Non Weather Related

On DATE we were departing from ZZZ around XA:00 local time. We operate a type aircraft and was departing ZZZ to ZZZ1 to return to our home base with 4 passengers onboard. I was flying as PIC of the trip. Shortly after takeoff; we noticed a small flock of large black birds. We estimated the number to be around 5. During this critical phase of flight there was nearly no time to react. One bird struck the nose of our aircraft around 400 ft AGL. It created a loud thump noise throughout the cabin. The pilot monitoring and I accessed the situation and decided the plane was flying as it should; with no indication of engine damage or unusual flight characteristics. Due to the weather impact of ZZZ we decided to fly under 200 kts and head to a more serviceable airport. We diverted to ZZZ2 and checked in with ZZZ Approach to get a VFR clearance into the Bravo then land at ZZZ2. During cruise flight our passengers made us aware that there was blood on our left wing as well. We landed safely at ZZZ2 and parked at [the] FBO. We got out to check the damage and was surprised to see the nose cone damaged significantly. Part of the bird was inside the nose compartment as it made a hole and good size dent to the nose of the aircraft. There was blood as well on the left wing also around the right engine. After a closer look there does not seem to be any damage to the blades of the right engine. We talked to Company at ZZZ3 and to determine what the next steps are. We grounded the aircraft at ZZZ2 and will be in further discussions with maintenance to determine what the next steps will be to get our plane back home safely.

Corporate aircraft Captain reported hitting a bird and then having to deviate.

1469241

201707

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

2.0

VMC

10

Dusk

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

None

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 1450; Flight Crew Type 550

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1469241

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I was training a student who has approximately 30 hours and who has soloed 3 times. We were doing a training flight in the traffic pattern working on short and soft field takeoffs and landings. For the short field landings; I was giving the scenario that a previous student of mine had received during his private pilot checkride. Simply enough; the examiner wanted him to land on the threshold. So that is the same scenario that my student and I were practicing. We had performed 9 takeoffs and landings; and he was doing very well with the spot landings and short field procedure. In the beginning I was following very closely on the controls to ensure the proper threshold crossing height for the point which we were landing. As the lesson progressed; I slowly eased off of the controls to allow him to be more in control. After the 9th landing; I knew it was about time to finish up for the evening. My student asked if we could do just one more takeoff and landing; to which I agreed. The sun had set and we were beginning to lose some of our light. The lesson before this was his first night flight where we did 7 full stop takeoff and landings; so I wasn't terribly concerned with a little bit of light loss. While we were on the downwind leg; I told my student that we would try to touchdown at the beginning of the runway; just before the numbers one last time. As we turned onto final; the lighting system was not turned on. I preferred it that way; but failed to vocalize to my student to keep them off. When we approached short final I heard him keying on the lights. Before I could say anything; the lights were coming on. He had turned them on high intensity. As we kept coming down; I began reaching for the hand held mic to turn down the lights. We were low enough; I thought the best decision was for me to try to get them and let him focus on the landing. When I got the mic and got them keyed down; we were probably 20 ft above the ground. I made a quick glance over to his airspeed indicator to verify he was at the proper speed and to put the mic back so my hands were free. When I looked back; we were beginning to cross the threshold and I knew we had gotten a little lower than I would have liked and we then felt the RH (right hand) tire hit the threshold light. It didn't alter the course of the airplane; and we were able to touchdown straight; on the main wheels; and in the center of the runway. We didn't actually realize it was a light until we taxied back to the beginning of the runway to make sure it wasn't a light. Sure enough; there it was. It knocked it off its base and broke the glass. We taxied in and shutdown. We did a visual inspection of the entire aircraft and there was no evidence of any damage. I immediately called the airport foreman to report what had happened so he could get a hold of the proper maintenance technician.Looking back; there are a few things I; as the instructor; could have done differently to prevent this situation. I should have stuck with my instinct that we had done enough takeoffs and landings and that any more could be detrimental to the progress made. Next; I could have made the decision to pick a point further down the runway due to the diminishing sunlight. Third; when my student keyed the lights to high intensity; I should have had him adjust to land farther down the runway due to the effect it was having on our vision. I have learned a lot from this situation and will never let it happen again. I am trying my hardest to do everything properly to fix the situation.

C172 flight instructor reported striking a runway threshold light during landing with his student at the controls.

1273508

201506

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 67; Flight Crew Total 3398; Flight Crew Type 191

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

1273508

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

This morning I was on a routine training flight with a multiengine commercial student. We were working on [a] lesson; which is the last flight before the stage check and is a review of all of the maneuvers from the course. At the end of the flight; we were working through a simulated engine failure after lift-off. This means that we had taken off from 17L; and I had simulated an engine failure for her by retarding the throttle on the left engine at approximately 600 FT AGL. We flew the circuit around the traffic pattern with standard procedures; however the gear down had been delayed due to aircraft performance while flying on one engine. As a note; the gear warning horn sounds the entire time that the throttle is retarded below approximately 14' manifold pressure. So the gear warning horn had been sounding the entire time we were in the traffic pattern. As the student was coming in to land; I was focused on her directional control and runway distance being used during her flare.As she rounded out and the aircraft started to settle; we began to notice it felt slightly lower than usual; and began to hear metal scraping noises at that time. When we heard the noise; the student released the controls and began screaming; 'oh my gosh; oh my gosh!' With the airplane being in a nose-high attitude; we thought it was the tailskid and the bottom comm. antenna that were scraping and did not notice any reduced engine performance. Because the airplane had not settled; I took the controls the moment I heard the metal scraping noise and added power for a go-around. As we lifted off; there was no perceivable degradation in performance; so we continued to climb...assuming we had just scraped the tailskid or maybe a small aft portion of the fuselage. The moment the metal scraping noise stopped; there were no indications in the cockpit that there had been a propeller strike. There was no extra vibration and all instrument indications were otherwise normal. I flew the airplane around the traffic pattern; ran the checklists as normal; verified all engine indications and landing gear down indications; and landed the airplane. We did not declare an emergency or require assistance since we did not initially suspect substantial damage and there was no perceivable degradation in performance. As I taxied back in I pulled directly up to the maintenance hangar and shutdown the airplane. It was as we reduced the power during shutdown that I noticed a color change in the tips of the propeller arcs and realized we had most likely struck the props. Upon shutdown; we exited the airplane and were met by mechanics to survey the damage.During the damage survey; maintenance took photos and we discussed the event. I then proceeded to call the Tower to check in and see what we needed to do for them and provide any additional information they needed. From that point; Maintenance took control of the aircraft and I proceeded; with the student; to our Department Chair's office to debrief the situation and initiate the necessary protocols for the school. While in their office; I double-checked NTSB 830 to verify that we did not require an immediate notification (which we did not); and then the student and I proceeded to Human Resources to accomplish the required drug screening.

During a training flight with a simulated engine failure; the pilots neglected to extend the landing gear; but were able to go around after minimal contact with the runway. The gear warning horn sounded the entire time prior to the go-around as the throttle was retarded to simulate zero thrust.

1016169

201206

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

Helicopter

1.0

Part 135

Ambulance

Cruise

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1016169

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was completing the patient leg of the flight; delivering the patient to University Hospital under night vision goggles. I was following the GPS guidance information and didn't identify the hospital; subsequently flying past the hospital on the left side of the aircraft by one mile (airspeed approximately 90 KTS). I asked the med crew if they had the hospital in sight and the left side crew member said he had it behind the aircraft. I made a right hand turn to return to the hospital and in the process; I may have flown into the Class D airspace for ZZZ International Airport. I had the Tower frequency in the VHF radio but my pin selector switch was down inadvertently so I am not aware if ZZZ Tower tried to make contact. I placed my pin switch up at that moment; but didn't hear any traffic pertaining to my flight. I had the appropriate squawk code assigned to my aircraft in the transponder. I continued the flight to the University Hospital with the intent to contact ATC once on the ground; but was unable to find a good telephone number.In the future when flying night vision goggles over a highly lit up congested area; it may be easier to identify a hospital unaided. I have flown into this hospital using night vision goggles in the past; but in this circumstance; it was from a direction that I was not familiar with. Better crew coordination between the experienced medical crew and myself could have helped greatly. Medical crew thought I had the hospital in site and that I was making an orbit to align myself with prevailing winds; but did not state that we overflew the hospital until I asked if they had the hospital in site. Even though I had no intention of flying into Class D airspace; an advisory call to Tower while inbound would have made this situation nonexistent as they would have known of my intentions.

Bell-407 pilot initially missed sighting the destination hospital while utilizing GPS and night vision goggles in a well-lit city environment. Pilot may have also inadvertantly infringed on nearby Class D airspace.

1276936

201507

0601-1200

CLE.Airport

OH

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower CLE

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Compressor Stator/Vane

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1276936

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

I was acting as PIC/Pilot Monitoring. At approximately 50 KTS; the ECAM annunciated '#1 Engine Compressor Vane.' I assumed control of the aircraft and rejected the takeoff without incident. After performing our prescribed duties per SOP; we returned to the gate. There appeared to be a history of related maintenance issues in the logbook.

A319 Captain reports receiving an ECAM message 'ENG 1 Compressor Vane' at 50 knots and rejects the takeoff. Previous write ups for the same anomaly had been noted in the Logbook.

1745186

202006

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Turbulence

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 2

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1745186

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 3713

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1745310.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

We were flying to ZZZ. Neither I nor the Captain had been to ZZZ before. The Captain also had not flown in a couple of weeks he told me. ATC kept us high while arriving. As we came towards the airport I called it out but my Captain said that wasn't it. I wasn't familiar with the area or airport; so I thought he knew it wasn't it. We were going in and out of clouds when Center handed us off to Tower. As we flew almost over the airport my Captain then realized it was the airport. At the same time Tower asked us our plans for the visual approach. My Captain told me to tell them we wanted to join left downwind for the visual. At this time we were still very high; fighting turbulence; and gusty winds. ATC cleared us for the approach. He turned the AP off to do the visual. We backed it up with the RNAV. I feel as though my Captain was too close to the airport to make a stable landing and I reminded him 'We can always go around.' The winds (I can't remember the exact direction) were almost a direct crosswind from the left. We were making a left pattern. This caused the plane to have a high airspeed on the base leg; causing him to overshoot final. Density altitude also did not help as we had a higher TAS and steeper angle to descend as well and decreased engine performance. He then decided to do a go-around. He hit TOGA but forgot to call for flaps which I then asked 'Flaps 2?' He told me to put flaps 3 which I thought was odd. I then said positive rate and got the gear up. I also told tower that we are going around. They asked us our plans and he said he wanted to fly the pattern again but set up better. I told them that and requested a longer final. There was a small business jet landing and they said to follow behind them and to take as long of a final for whatever we needed. At this time he started turning but the airplane thought we were still doing the published missed. He was confused by this and overrode the AP. I was trying to help fix the automation because the AT kept wanting to go full power. He clicked on heading mode but the heading bug was set to the runway and the plane started to turn to the heading. I quickly centered the heading bug back up. I was like just fly the airplane and deal with the automation later. He turned everything off at this point. I then was able to correct the automation and set the RNAV back up. By this time we were on downwind. He kept more distance and a longer final and we landed in very gusty winds and went back to the gate to debrief. There were a few causes that led to a unstable approach and go around. 1. ATC put us right over the runway very high. 2. The weather was not smooth and there were high winds 3. It is a difficult airport to land at. 4. The Captain was rusty from not flying 5. I'm new and this was my first go around and the worst winds/turbulence I have experienced 6. Automation; in this case; hindered not helped us I think pilots need to constantly review profiles like the go-around profile to remember the call outs. I should have told the Captain that flaps 3 was incorrect. More knowledge that when flying in the mountains ATC will keep you high all the way up to the airport; there aren't arrivals like in ZZZ that walk you down to keep a stable approach. More knowledge on high density altitude and the effects on flying. More knowledge of hand flying visual approaches; I don't think my Captain realized the effect of a tailwind on base and that caused us overshoot.

The event was a go-around after an unstable approach on a visual; backed up by RNAV; RWY ZZ at ZZZ; followed by a successful hand flown visual. As a Captain flying into ZZZ for the first time; I was pilot flying due to the FO being fairly new to the line. Approaching the ZZZ area; we went through a pretty thick cloud layer; with some light rime ice; which added ice speeds. Upon breaking out of the layer; we noticed another layer between us and the field. Around this time; Center started calling out the field; but between the cloud layer and my unfamiliarity with the area; we were unable to identify the field until we were very close. We had; however; begun slowing early in anticipation due to conversations I had with colleagues about this tendency to be left high by Center. The FO was first to spot the field; but by that time we were within several miles; if not virtually on top of the airport. Center cleared us visual and terminated radar services when we were at around 13;000 feet for a field with X;XXX feet elevation. Tower offered a pass over midfield; then a turn downwind to lose altitude and setup. Around this time; we picked up some gusty and shifty winds in the valley that comprises ZZZ. I felt that the automation was having difficulty keeping up with these wind shifts; and elected to hand fly with the auto throttles disengaged. However; I did not descend sufficiently before turning final inside ZZZZZ; which left us too high and without enough room to fully configure and be stable by 1;000 feet AGL for landing. The FO and I jointly called for go-around. We then proceeded to muddle through the go-around profile; but got cleaned up in time to coordinate with Tower for a second attempt. At about this time; I asked the FO to re-sequence the approach in the FMS; thinking that it would get us out of GA mode. This took some time; and while that was going on; I was confused as to why automation was still flying the go-around. I clicked off the autopilot and auto-throttles in time to assume a heading at tower's request for some other inbound traffic. About this time; the FO reminded me that maybe cycling VNAV to re-enter the 'green world' might help exit GA; which it did; but I elected to keep hand flying. Wind conditions in the area introduced variances in speed and altitude that I compensated for. We then continued on a second visual approach; this time allowing more distance on final; and got fully configured and stable.Winds had picked up more in the interim; introducing a fairly direct cross wind on [runway] XX; but the landing was successful. As soon as we got to the gate; I made sure to debrief the event with the FO; while our recollections were fresh; in order to ensure that we both got lessons learned; etc.The primary cause was PF lack of situational awareness and over reliance on manual handling when automation might have been more appropriate. A further primary cause was accepting a short visual instead of asking Center for vectors farther out to allow for more maneuvering space for the approach. There are several secondary causes; the largest of which was unfamiliarity with the area compounded by insufficient backup descent references. As PF; I have flown infrequently in the last 5 weeks due to COVID-19 related schedule reductions and a return to reserve. (In fact; I had picked up this trip partly in order to get some flying time.) This led to degraded manual handling skills; a rusty go-around profile; and some confusion with automation at times. The PM was fairly new to the line; having been called off standby on short notice; and with about XX hours on the airplane. FO was also unfamiliar with mountain flying; and while I have operated into mountain airports such as ZZZ2 and ZZZ3; neither of us had been to ZZZ. There were also minor crew coordination issues; likely due to a combination of my lack of recent flying and an FO new to line flying.Crews must be cognizant of the differences between flat landflying at major airports; and mountain flying; to include altitude; terrain; and weather effects. Multiple descent references might be prudent; instead of simply using '10;000 at 30' or a field elevation driven path; in order to increase situational awareness. While we slowed down early with the notion that we might be left high; crews should brief and act on descent planning that allows for extra margin in high altitude field operations. Do not be afraid to ask for vectors to allow for space to configure. Crews should also ensure that they stay sharp on all aspects of equipment and operations while they are not flying in this era of reduced schedules. Lastly; rely on joint coordination between CA and FO to mitigate the challenges of operating in airports outside of our norm.

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach resulting in a go-around. Unfamiliarity with the airport and rustiness from lack of flying were cited as contributing factors.

1867440

202201

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting

1867440

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1867448.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On climbout of ZZZ; approximately 10;000 feet; had an ECAM message ENG1 COMPRESSOR VANE. After following ECAM procedures the only instruction is to avoid rapid thrust movements. We continued our Climb and our route to ZZZ1. In order to avoid rapid thrust movements; I descended using VS instead of open descent. At approximately 28;000 feet on the arrival the engine made it to idle and I heard an audible bang from the number one engine followed by the ECAM message ENG1 STALL. After accomplishing the first step of the procedure; THR LEVER1....Confirm....IDLE; The engine failed and we got the ECAM message; ENG1 FAIL. We followed the procedure and decided not to restart due to engine damage. We continued into ZZZ1 single ENG and had an uneventful landing. We stopped on the runway to allow inspection of the aircraft. We were given the all clear and taxied to the gate uneventfully. Mechanical anomaly caused by a failure of either the low compressor bleed valve or the variable stator vane.

Climbing out of ZZZ we got an ECAM for engine 1 compressor vane which guided us to not make any rapid thrust changes. We continued on our way to ZZZ1. Beginning our descent on the arrival leaving FL330 around or below FL300 when power went idle we experienced an ENG1 compressor stall upon following that procedure which calls for thrust lever idle the number 1 engine failed. We continued our descent and approach into ZZZ1 landing. We stopped on the runway for the fire crew to inspect the aircraft after which we taxied to gate.

A321 flight crew reported an ECAM engine problem which led to engine failure resulting in a single engine landing.

1808926

202103

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

N

Y

N

Escape Slide

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Other Exterior

Air Carrier

Inspector; Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1808926

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Manuals

Human Factors

On Date Mechanic Name requested me to witness the removal and storage of the over wing slide bottle pins of the left and right wing slide bottles. The corrected action block of the non routine stated as such and that is what I witnessed and signed off as RII (Required Inspection Item).I saw nothing at the time directing the arming of the left and right over wing doors.I'm not sure why the disarming of the left and right over wing doors was written up on a non routine. There should be a Task Card for storing an aircraft and specific items called out to prepare the aircraft for storage; and to put the aircraft back into service.

Technician reported confusion in signing off items when returning an aircraft to service after storage.

1244277

201503

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 233; Flight Crew Total 9570; Flight Crew Type 9570

1244277

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Work Refused

Aircraft; Company Policy

Company Policy

Arrived to the flight planning area and downloaded [flight plan]; for flight [to] SNA; for the second time; and noticed RLS #2 was because of an aircraft change. The TCAS was MEL'd on our new aircraft. I conferred with the First Officer (FO) and I decided that I would refuse [the aircraft]; as I feel that operating the flight with the TCAS inoperative was unsafe. The 10-7 for SNA also states; 'VFR traffic; Use caution for extensive general aviation traffic in the area'. I called and spoke to Dispatch and stated that I am refusing the aircraft. I expected to get some type of pushback or an excuse as why we need to take the aircraft to SNA; but to my pleasure he took my refusal well and I then gave him my number and asked to please call me when they had another aircraft. We were then notified that we had another aircraft change AGAIN (second time) and then it hit me. The reason WE had the original aircraft change in the first place; was that the crew before us also refused this aircraft; and they tried to assign this aircraft to us to take it. We were notified [of] our second new gate.[I then learned that] Dispatch switched the aircraft AGAIN (third time) so they tried to get a THIRD crew to take [the] aircraft with the TCAS on MEL! I met the Captain leaving the flight planning area; explained what happened and he also refused this aircraft!

A B737 Captain reported that when he refused to fly an aircraft to SNA because of heavy light aircraft traffic and an inoperative TCAS his company 'shopped' the aircraft to other flight crews hoping someone would take it.

1154370

201403

1801-2400

CYMX.Airport

PQ

14000.0

VMC

TRACON CYUL

Air Carrier

DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Spoiler System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1154370

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

While descending through approximately 14;000 MSL; to ensure that the aircraft remained on the proper descent profile; the pilot flying extended the speedbrakes. Immediately after extending the speedbrakes; the aircraft went into an uncommanded right turn at approximately a 45 degree bank angle causing the aircraft to depart our cleared track by approximately one half mile. The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and had to apply full left aileron to maintain wings level. He then attempted to retract the speedbrake handle; but due to the friction on the handle; was unable to do so. He then directed me to retract the speedbrakes while he flew the aircraft. I was able to retract the speed brakes; and the pilot flying was immediately able to regain full control of the aircraft. Montreal Control noticed our heading deviate from course; and asked us to confirm that we were proceeding as previously cleared. I advised that the autopilot made an uncommanded input and that we were correcting back to course. After confirming that full aircraft control was maintained; we attempted to analyze the malfunction. We concluded that there was binding in the spoiler handle and that extension of the speedbrakes was the cause of the asymmetric flight control malfunction. After a full analysis of the malfunction; the landing runway; landing data; and possible solutions we decided to perform an ILS approach to Runway 24 using flaps 50; and no spoilers. After an uneventful landing; we taxied to parking; made the appropriate write-up in the logbook; and debriefed the aircraft mechanic as to the details of the malfunction.

When a DC10 flight crew extended spoilers to assist compliance with their planned descent profile the aircraft abruptly banked 45 degrees and deviated from their cleared track. The pilot flying was unable to retract the spoilers while resisting the bank and directed the First Officer to do so. Normal flight was recovered and the landing was made without deploying spoilers as a precaution.

1784768

202101

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

225.0

5.0

1000.0

IMC

7

Daylight

1500

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Initial Approach; Final Approach

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Type 3140

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction

1784768

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 11000

Workload; Time Pressure; Fatigue; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1784765.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

Human Factors

For the ILS Runway 04R at ZZZ; performance numbers were run for a Flaps 30 landing with a good stopping margin at Autobrakes 3. ATIS winds were calling approximately 070/13 - no gusts. Upon switching to Tower at ZZZZZ on the localizer course and tracking the glideslope; Tower cleared us to land with winds now gusting to 20. As PF (Pilot Flying); I elected to add 4 knots to the Vtarget and as an added Safety measure at ZZZ; I selected Autobrakes MAX to compensate for a slightly increased approach speed. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) attempted to quickly re-run the performance data; but the gusts were not yet accounted for in the METAR. Rather than going heads down any longer inside 1;000 feet AGL; we agreed a 4-5 knot addition to VTarget and using Autobrakes MAX would be more than sufficient to account for the gust factor.At approximately 500 feet AGL; we received a GPWS Too Low Flaps Alert. The PM immediately called for the go-around and it was initiated. A quick scan of the flap handle and I realized that I had neglected to call for Flaps 30 from a Flaps 15 setting; and the Before Landing Checklist was not run. We were quickly vectored around for another uneventful ILS. The minor distraction of adding a gust factor and changing the Autobrakes setting sent me out of a normal approach configuration sequence and we ended up both missing the final flap setting and subsequent checklist.With the normal ZZZ procedure of not contacting (and often not switching to) Tower until reaching the fix at about a 5-mile final; it's possible for us to miss out on cues to changing weather on the ground. We were number 3 or 4 in a sequence of landings on 04R. Had we switched to Tower five or more miles sooner; we may have caught the gusting winds earlier and had more time to type in the adjusted winds and send away for the performance numbers prior to 1;000 feet AGL. This was another series of events combined with mild fatigue that led to poor task prioritization on our parts.

The short version is that we got 'Too Low; Flaps' at 500 feet because we were at Flaps 15. We went around. Planned winds were 070/7. Tower winds were 070/12G20. I re-ran the performance landing numbers at 1;500 feet; but did not override the METAR and got back the numbers for 070/7. The PF (Pilot Flying) chose to add 5 knots to VTarget and we agreed to go from Medium to Max braking and continue.There is no guidance I am aware of as to when we would be required to re-run our landing numbers. I should not have tried to re-run the landing numbers at that point. That would have eliminated the distraction that led to not selecting our planned final flaps or running the Before Landing Checklist.

B737-800 flight crew reported executing a go-around due to improper flap setting on short final.

1328979

201602

0001-0600

JFK.Tower

NY

500.0

Night

Tower JFK

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class B JFK

Tower JFK

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

3.0

Part 129

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class B JFK

Facility JFK.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1328979

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight; Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Weather

I was working LC1 which has arrivals to runway 13L and arrivals to runway 22L. Aircraft A landed runway 13L and attempted to turn off at taxiway ZA which was closed due to the snow that had fallen 7 days ago. Taxiway ZA turnoff was broadcasted as closed on the current ATIS. I told Aircraft A that that turnoff was closed and he had to go to the next one if able (taxiway E). Aircraft A did not move right away so I was forced to send the next arrival for runway 13L around; which was Aircraft X.I looked up at saw that Aircraft Z was airborne off runway 13R and was dipping his wings to turn left to a heading of 110. After seeing this I decided to turn the Aircraft X to a 090 heading and climb to 2000 feet so he wouldn't be a factor for the wake from Aircraft Z. At the time Aircraft Y was about 3 miles out for runway 22L at around 1000 feet. The 090 heading I thought would have the Aircraft X pass behind Aircraft Y but Aircraft Y was going 100 knots over the ground at the time so Aircraft X may have passed over head at 2000 feet. I pointed out Aircraft X to Aircraft Y and I believe Aircraft Y said he had him in sight. I did not have time to point out Aircraft Z or Aircraft Y to Aircraft X because of the other traffic I was working at the time. I also felt Aircraft X would be too busy in the cockpit to respond due to the recent go around instructions I issued. Aircraft A eventually cleared runway 13L and Aircraft Y landed runway 22L without any issues. The other Local controller turned Aircraft Z back to a 155 heading so Aircraft Z was not a factor for Aircraft X.The biggest problem that caused the whole event was Aircraft A trying to turnoff at a closed exit to their runway. Aircraft A had just rolled past the previous turnoff of DB; so I was about to give them instructions to exit at Taxiway E when I noticed them turning at ZA. If the pilot had listened to the ATIS they would have known not to turn off at taxiway ZA and Aircraft X would not have gone around. Also if the PONYNJ (Port Authority of NY and NJ) had plowed all the turnoffs to all of their runways at any point in the 7 days since it lasted snowed; this runway exit would of been open and therefore not an issue for Aircraft A to turnoff there. Also doing converging approaches without CRDA (Converging Runway Display Aid) is dangerous in the event of go arounds with departure headings that conflict with a straight out missed approach.

JFK Local Controller reported an aircraft turned to exit the runway at a closed and blocked intersection. The next arrival had to be sent around. In the go around the aircraft now became a conflict for two other aircraft. Eventually the go around traffic comes back and lands. Controller reported that he thought the Port Authority should have done a better job clearing the intersections from snow.

1294642

201509

0601-1200

DCA.Airport

VA

VMC

Daylight

TRACON PCT

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

SID DOCTR2

Class B DCA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1294642

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1294643.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

Aircraft

On initial climb out from DCA Runway 1; First Officer made initial turn to follow the river. Engaged the autopilot to intercept the DOCTR2 RNAV course from the West. AP turned sharply to intercept and did not capture. Immediately disengaged AP and turned back towards the northwest. East bank of the river remained in view the whole time and we do not believe we crossed it. Winds at the time were approximately 330/11G19. FO hand flew plane until AP was transferred to CA side and recaptured course. FMS 2 was deferred; but 900 MEL does not preclude RNAV procedures as the 200 MEL does. CA was in white needles with FO in yellow (cross-side data) with MFD map data available and FMS 1 on the annunciator.Add an operational note to 900 MEL 34-61-1A that AP should only be coupled to non-deferred FMS side. Also; DCA DOCTR2 RNAV should be assigned cautiously with a strong west winds because of equipment limitations.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information].

CRJ-900 flight crew reported they deviated from their assigned RNAV departure when the aircraft failed to track the course.

1567615

201808

0001-0600

MEM.Airport

TN

1.0

300.0

Night

Tower MEM

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B MEM

Tower MEM

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Approach

Class B MEM

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 364; Flight Crew Type 10400

1567615

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Procedure

We were cleared the Visual Approach to Runway 36L following a heavy widebody aircraft; who was approximately 3 NM in front of us. I briefed the First Officer that I would ride the glideslope slightly high to avoid wake turbulence. Winds on final were a left quartering tailwind of about eight knots and shifting left quartering headwind around 500' AGL. At around 300' AGL; we encountered wake turbulence with a significant right roll to at least 35 degrees of bank. I countered with left aileron and elected to go around; asserting that the deviation had resulted in an unstable approach on short final. The go-around and subsequent landing to 36L were uneventful.With the shifting winds; at least five mile spacing behind the heavy widebody aircraft would have probably prevented the event. In fact; the subsequent approach was behind another heavy widebody aircraft and I assured 5 NM spacing resulting in a successful approach and landing with no wake turbulence.

B737-800 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to MEM in trail of a heavy widebody aircraft.

1100053

201307

0001-0600

SBGR.TRACON

FO

10000.0

VMC

TRACON SBGR

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

SID CGO 1

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

1100053

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1100686.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Ambiguous

During climbout from SBGR (Sao Paulo) on the CGO 1 (Congonhas One Departure) SCB transition; the Captain; First Officer; and Relief Pilot observed a large rectangular balloon; or kite approximately 100 feet in size directly in our flight path at exactly 10;000 feet. The object had a thick line or cable attached to it and descended downward from the object as far as the eye could see. The location of the object was directly in our path located over the Congonhas VOR on the departure. While executing the turn on the SID over CGO; all pilots saw the object and I proceeded to take evasive action to prevent hitting the object. The aircraft missed the object by approximately 200 feet. Captain reported the objects location and altitude to Departure Control. The SBGR ATIS did have warnings of possible balloon activity in the airport area. But; one never expects to see it at 10;000 feet with a large cable attached to it. Please notify the Brazilian Government on the seriousness of allowing this type of activity to continue. They make announcements on the ATIS; and know they are there; but seem to do little to correct this problem.

[Narrative contained no additional information].

Air Carrier flight crew reports encountering a tethered balloon at 10;000 feet over CGO on the CGO 1 departure from SBGR. The SID crossing restriction at CGO is between FL100 and FL150.

1070313

201302

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Takeoff / Launch

Electrical Distribution

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Troubleshooting

1070313

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Flight was cleared for takeoff on Runway 08. As the throttles were raises to set takeoff power the crew received a level two alert 'ELEC Alerts'. After a brief moment on Runway 08 with ATC approval the crew decided to exit the runway to investigate the level two alert. Referring to the QRH the crew was instructed to contact aircraft Maintenance. After discussing the malfunction with aircraft Maintenance it was determined that we had a bad Electrical System Controller. Aircraft Maintenance instructed the crew to contact Maintenance Control to get a control number. After contacting Maintenance Control the crew received a control number for the inoperative Electrical System Controller. As the crew prepared to taxi for takeoff the level two alert 'ELEC Alerts' returned. After some troubling shooting with aircraft Maintenance it was determined that the number one IDG was bad. As directed by MEL 24-21-01 Integrated Drive Generators (IDG) inoperative; the number one IDG was disconnected. The MEL directed the crew to operative the electrical system in manual and the crew contacted Maintenance Control for control number. Flight departed with a deferred Electrical System Controller inoperative and the number one IDG deferred (disconnected) and arrived at our filed destination with no further incident or system malfunctions.

An MD-11 developed two separate electrical system malfunctions while taxiing for takeoff. On the first takeoff attempt the Electrical System Controller failed; on the second attempt an IDG failed.

1016835

201206

1201-1800

AVL.Airport

NC

VMC

Tower AVL

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C AVL

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1016835

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Manuals; Human Factors

Aircraft

When configuring for a visual approach at AVL we received a 'Flaps Fail' amber message when selecting flaps from 8 to 20. (IAS was approximately 180 KIAS). We asked Tower to give us holding instructions. We entered the holding pattern and ran the Flaps Fail QRH. We determined that 8;000 FT was plenty of runway for the conditions; so we elected to land at our destination and to not declare an emergency. This was a 'no-alternate' fuel plan and we felt that returning to our departure airport while the flaps were stuck at 17 would burn significantly more fuel.Once at the gate; Maintenance was able to talk us through resetting the flap indicator system IAW guidance found in the appropriate MEL Chapter. The outbound flight was slightly delayed; but able to its scheduled flights.Here are some thoughts as to my decision making. According to the most conservative numbers we could derive from the QRH; no more than 6;000 FT of runway would be required; we had 8;000 FT. Flap failures with plenty of runway available are routinely practiced in the simulator and under more demanding conditions. As a result we decided NOT to declare an emergency. We also decided not to have the passengers brace because we believed we had plenty of runway available. When I stopped the airplane on the runway; however; we were at the 2;000 FT marker. After landing; 3 out of 4 BTMS (Brake Temperature Monitoring System) indicators went white due to the maximum-effort braking on rollout. None of the indicators went red. My advice to other crews would be to take the flaps 45 landing distance in the AOM and double it. The 55% additive factor is wishful thinking; in my humble opinion. It is also good that when we practice this event in the simulator; we do it with no vertical guidance whatsoever. That way; when you do it backed up with a glide slope; it doesn't feel out of the ordinary at all.

A commuter jet flight crew experienced the failure of the flaps to extend to a normal landing setting. They opted to land on their destination airport's 8;000 FT runway as their AOM indicated they would need only 6;000 FT of runway to come to a stop based on the setting at which the flaps had failed. After coming to a stop using maximum effort braking they had 2;000 FT of runway remaining.

1106639

201308

1201-1800

C90.TRACON

IL

10000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON C90

Personal

Albatros (L39)

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Descent

Direct

Class B ORD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 120

Situational Awareness

1106639

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Ambiguous

I was lead aircraft (L-39) with a wingman (BAE-AV-8) in a ferry flight to GYY. We were both flying experimental aircraft and are required to file VFR. The weather was VMC and because of the crowded Chicago airspace; we flew at 11;500 feet direct to GYY and asked for radar flight following to stay clear of controlled airspace. After climbing to cruising altitude; Milwaukee Departure told us that our radar service was terminated and frequency change approved. I went to Gary/Chicago Intl Tower and did a straight in to Runway 12. Ground Control told me to call Chicago TRACON. I was then informed that I had entered Class B airspace without permission. In retrospect; I should have continued to pursue radar flight following and assistance in an area with which I am not familiar. I am unsure as to how it was determined that I had violated airspace restrictions as both my wingman and I were monitoring our GPS and I showed descending beyond Chicago airspace.

L39 pilot is informed after landing at GYY that he and his wingman may have violated the ORD Class B airspace during their arrival from the north.

1005318

201204

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

3500.0

Marginal

1000

TRACON ZZZ

Jet/Long Ranger/206

1.0

Descent

Class D ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Departure; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1005318

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors; Weather; Procedure

Weather

The airport was consistently reporting a marginal VFR ceiling of OVC010. A B206; a helicopter called about 25 miles west of the airport; inbound with the ATIS. I vectored him a little bit for sequence and issued traffic at 2;000 that he was going to follow in to the airport. He replied that he was looking for the traffic. Once the preceding traffic was no longer a factor; a jet; I told him to resume his own navigation to the airport. Then I called him three times; giving him the location of the airport. He did not answer until the third call and he said that he couldn't see the airport because there were some clouds between him and the airport. I told him to maintain VFR and contact the Tower. A couple of minutes later; the Tower called me and advised that the aircraft was an emergency with low fuel and unable to get down. I checked with three other aircraft in my airspace looking for a hole in the clouds; none were found. The crash crew responded and other traffic was broken off of the approach behind him as he maneuvered down through the clouds. I worked the helicopter for about 25 miles. He said that he had the ATIS with the reported overcast layer. He accepted traffic calls and said he was looking for traffic. At no point did he indicate any fuel criticality nor did he mention that he might have any issue descending. Only once did he mention clouds between him and the airport. I assumed this was a small scud deck that he expected not to be an issue. The pilot should have mentioned his concern with the weather much earlier. It goes without saying that the pilot should have checked the weather before getting airborne and had sufficient fuel.

TRACON Controller described an emergency event when an inbound helicopter encountered weather and fuel issues but failed to provide ATC with critical information regarding same.

1465205

201707

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

700.0

VMC

10

Night

6000

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Cessna 152

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Initial Climb

None

Class D ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 47; Flight Crew Total 528; Flight Crew Type 180

Troubleshooting

1465205

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

We took off Runway XX to practice some night takeoffs and landings. Upon the second takeoff somewhere around 600-700 ft the rpm dropped drastically then the engine power dropped and we could not climb. Almost simultaneously I took control from my student because I could hear stall warning and the airplane was getting uncontrollable [quickly] so I pitched down [advised ATC] and landed on Runway YY (opposite direction of the runway we took off from) with a tailwind. Just about 15 ft I could hear the engine rev up again.

C-152 instructor pilot reported power loss during initial climb that resulted in a return to the departure airport.

1644872

201905

ZZZ.Airport

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Physiological - Other

1644872

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After takeoff; the #1 [Flight Attendant] and I started smelling something foul. The # 2 [Flight Attendant] called the #1 [Flight Attendant] to see if all crew was smelling the same thing and the cockpit pitched in saying they were smelling something pungent as well. At first; the pilots wanted to continue on but when the smell kept coming back; they decided to head back to ZZZ. The #4 [Flight Attendant] felt nauseous and threw up; the #1 [Flight Attendant] had a headache; [and] the flight crew had a headache along with itchy and dry eyes. I felt nauseous and had a severe headache with heat flashes. As a team; we decided to go to the ER to check ourselves out.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reported persistent foul fumes during climb causing health issues. Flight crew executed a return to departure airport.

1062128

201301

0601-1200

SLC.Airport

UT

IMC

2

Daylight

2000

B757-200

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

None

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 11000

Situational Awareness; Fatigue

1062128

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Situational Awareness

1062132.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff roll

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

This flight was to be the last of a week long assignment of flying; and incorporated a schedule revision which resulted in a shift from day into evening flying to night into day flying. This shift could have been a factor in our one procedural omission. After a deadhead in; followed by approximately two hours of wait time; the subject flight commenced. Upon initial arrival at the aircraft; weather was IFR; but deteriorated somewhat rapidly to low IFR upon pushback. I then suggested a takeoff alternate with this development; which we obtained. What followed was a very challenging duty period. Initial taxi out ultimately was a low RVR taxi; involving multiple Sid/runway changes and high workload. The taxi out was exceptionally slow; with high vigilance for orientation; as well as other potential traffic. While we awaited sufficient takeoff minimums; a release revision for TO fuel became necessary; followed by a required [60% 10 second] engine runup [ice]. Each was accomplished. Coordination was ongoing with Dispatch and Operations for numerous evolving matters. Ultimately; we returned to the ramp due to expired holdover time; and the concurrent need for fuel upload. Taxi back in was below TO minimums; and took considerable time and care. Upon refueling; and a protracted de/anti ice process; weather improved to about 2 NM visibility; with no precipitation. The decision was made to return the fuel load to the original release fuel for various reasons.Taxi out was much easier this time; with generally good visibility. We noticed a long line of aircraft waiting to takeoff; so we shut down one engine during taxi; to avert a release fuel issue re-emerging. Shortly before takeoff; we restarted the right engine utilizing crossbreed thrust from the left engine. At this point we were number one for takeoff; and given takeoff clearance. With the drastically improved weather; we failed to accomplish a second static runup prior to takeoff. In retrospect; I believe a component of this was the accomplishment of the second engine re-start right before takeoff; and the associated checklists thereafter....a seldom utilized practice. During the takeoff roll; and in the low speed regime; but near takeoff thrust; the left engine compressor stalled; requiring an aborted takeoff; and return to the ramp for maintenance action. We were subsequently told by Maintenance that a valve or valves had coded as not sequencing properly; and that the engine had 'burped'.

First attempt to depart resulted in a 1 + 46 turn back due to expired hold over time when visibility dropped from 2 1/2 SM to RVR 300 - 400. During our wait we had performed a 60% 10 second run-up (B757RR) holding short of runway. Then returned to ramp. After re-fueling we were pushed back for a second de-ice/anti-ice treatment which took a very long time during which wx improved to 1 1/2 SM and the sun was well up (negating the need for anti-ice; but it was already completed). On Taxiway Foxtrot I could see a long line of aircraft waiting on the taxiway for departure; so we decided to shut down the right engine to save fuel and avoid another delay (first taxi out required a new release to adjust takeoff fuel and we were number one for departure and couldn't risk shutting down an engine at that time). When we were #4 we restarted the right engine via a left engine cross bleed start. Visibility had improved. We were instructed to line up and wait; then cleared for take off. The First Officer was pilot flying and pushed the thrust levers up toward 60%; but neither one us had thought to hold it for 10 seconds prior to selecting N1 on the MCP. Shortly after selecting N1 on the MCP; and before reaching 60 KIAS; we heard a bang sound and the airplane made a slight jerk to the left. I rejected the take off and noted a burned rubber smell. I initially thought we might have blown a tire. After clearing the runway the First Officer asked ATC if anyone in the line of aircraft waiting for departure had noticed anything unusual during our brief takeoff roll. Some one answered they had seen a puff of black smoke from our left engine. We returned to the ramp for mx inspection and entered in the logbook as a suspected compressor stall. Maintenance confirmed a compressor stall and a code for a problem with a regulator valve.

B757 flight crew describes a long morning which included deadheading into the trip two hours early; deicing; weather below minimums for takeoff; return to the gate for more fuel and more deicing; and ultimately a rejected takeoff due to a compressor stall.

1271934

201506

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 162

Fatigue

1271934

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

This trip started with an ANF for ZZZ to ZZZ1. The flight was delayed due to late inbound aircraft by approximately 1+ hours. An 11 hour day layover was reduced to XA:06. The hotel cleaning crew was talking loudly outside my door; off and on; until approximately noon. A late afternoon departure to ZZZ2 was delayed 3 hours due to weather. The next segment was scheduled ZZZ2 ZZZ3; approximately 4 hour flight. After the ANF; poor rest; scheduled short day layover; scheduled late night 2 leg flying the next night and adverse weather due to thunderstorms; I was fatigued. Upon arrival at the gate; my fatigue was verified by my failure to shut down the engine once the parking brake was set and APU established on the airplane. My overall parking flow was missed as I realized; during the parking checklist; I had missed other switches (IRS to off; for example). Running the checklist corrected my errors.

Captain reported omitting or deviating from several post flight SOP procedures due to feeling fatigued.

1621279

201902

1201-1800

ZOA.ARTCC

CA

3500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Center ZOA

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZOA

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Class E ZOA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 160; Flight Crew Type 5

1621279

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Returning at 3;500 cruise altitude heading direct to CCR (Concord; CA) between 120 and 130 knots. Using Flight Following with Oakland Center (Freq 127.8). Executive type; twin engine jet was approaching head on at same flight level. Its landing gear was retracted. Oakland Center warned of traffic at 12 o'clock. Approaching jet was on radar; but not identified. Jet did not change course or attitude. Given closing speeds and the fact the jet remained wings level; I determined safest course of evasive action was to force my plane into a steep dive to avoid head on collision. Estimate jet passed directly overhead at approximately 300 feet.

C182 pilot reported an NMAC with a small jet in Oakland Center Class E airspace.