elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1294562

201509

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1294562

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Aircraft

After pushback and engine start; upon turning air conditioning packs on; acrid smoke began coming out of vents. Shut off packs and recirculating fan while simultaneously returning to gate. Once the packs were turned off the smoke stopped increasing. Deplaned normally without incident. Smoke appears to have come from a loss of the left hydraulic system.

MD-80 Captain reported smoke in the aircraft when packs were turned on after pushback. Flight returned to the gate.

1247507

201503

1801-2400

SCEL.Airport

FO

0.0

Night

Tower SCEL

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1247507

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Human Factors

Ambiguous

We taxied out on a clearance to use Charlie and Alpha to 17L. As we approached the Charlie to Alpha Y we saw a sign near where the H is on the chart to the left of the Y. It said to go the left to join Alpha to 17L. As I stated to the Ground controller told us to turn right and continue on Charlie to the right and then join Alpha. I immediately complied and we stayed on the hard surface.My FO and I agreed that we had both been snowed by the sign which had indicated to turn left towards Kilo instead of continuing on Charlie to Alpha. Bad signage was at the heart of the problem. Afterwards we taxied uneventfully to 17L.I hope that other unsuspecting pilots that have been caught in the same trap will cause SCEL ground ops to replace the signs leading to Alpha and Kilo. Review of the signage used by SCEL Ground Ops with a clearer depiction of taxiway A's origin northbound.

B777 Captain reported they had difficulty with taxiway signage at SCEL airport.

1248750

201503

0601-1200

ACK.Airport

MA

6.0

340.0

800.0

Marginal

BR (mist); 4

Daylight

4900

TRACON A90; Tower ACK

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Vectors

Class E A90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

1248750

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

It was 6;000 overcast in ZZZ1 and 4;900 overcast in ACK when we left the house for the 5 minute drive to the airport and the 15 min VFR flight that we have done literally hundreds of times. 15 minutes; out the Jetties; follow the ferries; 353 degrees on the GPS if you could be bothered to set it (we always set it in both;) and you can see it climbing through 500 feet anyway. Misty with 4 NM visibility; yes; but easy peasy in an area where we often have dense fog. Lower stuff was forecast for later but fine now. And a quick skim of the NOTAMS revealed that the ILS 15 was inoperative; ILS 24 ACK LOM inoperative but otherwise; ILS 24 ACK OK.We started; ran the checklist; I dialed the altimeter up a hundred or so feet to field elevation. We taxied out to Runway 24; did the run up; and reported ready for takeoff. 'We' was me and my Private Pilot wife who has 800 hours of pretty advanced stuff considering the type of flying that we do. Lots of IFR; Class B airports; flying throughout both of the Americas; etc. And I'm an airline Captain. I gave the usual 'right turnout for ZZZ1' at the end of it. The Tower controller said 'you know it's 300 feet overcast over there?' As I pondered that thought; she offered to stick an IFR flight plan in for us. ACK to coast is an artery for the island. All day; every day; dozens and dozens of planes criss cross. Thinking that it was VFR basically; I confirmed that we should commence the takeoff roll. She said yes; I didn't want to make my wife late for her first client; so off we went. I figured I'd quickly catch up. The little CFI voice; however; was saying that I should taxi clear and think about what we were doing; be more precise with the avionics set up; but then the only 'real IFR' bit would be the last few seconds of the ILS at the other end. The clearance came at about 500 feet 'Via radar vectors; climb to 2;000; expect 3;000 in 10; squawk.' Then over to Cape Approach and 'climb 3;000. Right heading 330; expect RNAV 24.' 'We'll need an ILS please;' I said; thinking of the ILS 15 being out. He replied 'ILS 24 glideslope (GS) is out of service; how about a LLZ?' We had discussed having only 20 Gals of fuel. That's 2 hours worth but when I looked up the LLZ minima and saw that the MDA was 460 feet; but we only had a 300 feet overcast; 20 Gallons didn't sound like much. I then noticed that the two GPS's were showing us in different places. The island has a very distinctive shape so it was very obvious. Which if either was right? I weighed continuing into what was becoming a nice little series of links in the chain (or holes in the swiss cheese) versus returning to ACK for a landing (we were still climbing and were basically still on a wide downwind to the airport.) Just as my wife said 'I can take the airline to work;' I said 'yup; we're going back' and told Cape of this; expecting a right turn onto base and landing within a couple of minutes. He sounded concerned; read back the whole ATIS that we already had; and by the time he had given us a vector for the ACK ILS and a descent to 1;600 feet; it just seemed easier; and would do no harm; to go with the ILS. I pushed over from gentle climb into gentle descent and verified the set up for the return approach; which we always have set up anyway. The GPS's were still baffling me and now we had a legitimate GS flag on NAV 1. While I was fumbling with this stuff; Cape asked what our altitude was. I replied 'passing 1;800 feet.' He said 'I'm showing you at 800 feet.' So I climbed back up and not a lot was said.Error number one happened during the post ATIS setting of the altimeter and was not picked up during the instrument check done during the before takeoff checklist. The pressure from the plane's previous flight had dropped from 30.60 then to 29.60 on this day. I am meticulous during IFR operations but this day; with a VFR mindset; by dialing the needle up to field elevation; rather than leaning across my wife who sits left seat; to check setting; I opened the door to this whole thing. I was off by one whole inch. We were visual the entire time (with the ground and horizontal visibility > 3sm) and nothing was ever compromised in any way but I have never encountered this situation before. We have had deep lows and unusually high domes of pressure this winter. We never levelled off so we never noticed the error and with all the other distractions and brief duration of the flight; one can see how this could have become a big link in a chain. Notes to self would include:1) Check the weather at the VERY last minute. Maybe display the 'Flight Rules Category' colored dots on ForeFlight. Had the ZZZ1 dot gone from blue to pink; we might have spotted it.2) Never accept an IFR clearance during critical phases of flight. It sounds obvious but ACK-ZZZ1 is always the same and is burned into our brains. 3) Complacency complacency complacency.....4) A good point was that we both thought to pull the plug as soon as the issues started piling up; verbalized it; and did it.5) Always stop and pause during instrument and avionics set up. There is no VFR vs. IFR way of doing it. Question each setting every time and answer 'why' each thing is set that way. And refer to the note about complacency above.6) Having had a career of CRM; my wife did offer to take control during the radio confusion; but the insidious nature of this event was such that it didn't trigger my handover of control and formal problem solving methodology mode of thinking. When something goes bang or a light comes on; it's easy to launch into trained for responses. We had no 'BARO DISAGREE' EICAS message on our [airplane].7) We usually both check the altimeter setting informally but will now do so formally and I'll consider what other 'set and crosschecked' items we should extend that discipline to.The GPS's never made any sense. We could see where we were and it wasn't where either of them showed. Nor did we ever get the GS to work despite verifying with ACK Tower that it was radiating. As we were in MVFR; it didn't matter. A subsequent recreation of the flight on a CAVU day; of course; saw no problems whatsoever. But the noise from this sequence of issues blew my Situational Awareness out the window in conjunction with all the other non-normal things that transpired on that 'VFR' day full of CRM issues. And interesting to note that the biggest link in the chain happened before we had even begun to taxi.

A pilot reported departing ACK with an incorrect altimeter setting and leveling at 800 feet over the bay when he thought he was at 1;800 feet. Poor weather planning and two GPS signals reporting different than actual location were mentioned as contributing factors.

1170897

201405

1801-2400

IAH.Airport

TX

1500.0

IMC

Tower IAH

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

SID LOA8

Class B IAH

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 68; Flight Crew Total 12750; Flight Crew Type 3318

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1170897

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Confusion

1170907.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

FILED ROUTE****KIAH LOA8 FUZ J58... CLIMB VIA SID CTC RAMP CONTROL WHEN READY TO PUSH. We were given the clearance; 'On departure turn right to 340; cleared for takeoff Runway 09.' The initial climb altitude was 4;000 feet. First Officer made the takeoff normally and after gear retraction initiated the turn to the right. I delayed pulling the heading knob until passing through 180 because it would have commanded a left turn (the shorter direction to 340). We noticed an amber traffic advisory about 45 off to the right and in front of us; and monitored it. Approximately 1;500 feet the TCAS changed to Resolution advisory (RA) with the command REDUCE CLIMB. I said; 'You need to descend;' and First Officer reduced the climb to 0 VSI as per the RA indication on the VSI. About that time the Tower Controller told us to roll out. I replied; 'We are responding to an RA; rolling out on 210.' The traffic passed nearly over us perhaps within 500 feet; I'm not sure. We were told to continue the turn to 350; and then told to stop the turn at 270. Then we were told to continue the turn to 360 and climb to 16;000 feet.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

A320 flight crew departing Runway 9 at IAH with instructions to turn right to heading 340 after takeoff which results in a TCAS RA and a NMAC with an aircraft turning left off one of the south runways.

1070225

201302

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

12000.0

Marginal

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B717 (Formerly MD-95)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Electrical Distribution Busbar

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1070225

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

Climbing through 12;000 FT both AC tie bus relays tripped open causing numerous level 1 alerts and continuous stick shaker activation. This activated the emergency power - powering only the AC ground service bus off the ships batteries. I notified ATC and requested to stop the climb so we could analyze and treat the emergency. We performed the checklist for AC GS BUS OFF. This calls for a landing at the nearest suitable airport. Aircraft weight was 114;000 LBS - I requested to return to our departure airport and a short hold to reduce the landing weight below 110;000 LBS. The air return; landing; and gate return were uneventful. Maintenance met us at the gate. I made the appropriate log entries - aircraft weight at landing was approximately 108;000 LBS.

A B717 returned to their departure airport when both bus tie relays opened during their climb.

1211649

201410

1201-1800

SFO.Airport

CA

6000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

STAR BIG SUR TWO

Class B SFO

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 122

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1211649

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

While level at 6000' on the arrival; we received a new frequency on 121.5 and a simultaneous jolt of wake turbulence. It wasn't clear to me which radio the call came from or even if it was for us. The other Pilot (Pilot Flying) asked for a repeat on 121.5 and we eventually called Approach on the new frequency. In the meantime; we were trying to locate the source of the wake encounter. Eventually; we reviewed our COMM panels and found the hundredths digit had been inadvertently moved on our previous frequency.

B737-700 Captain reported losing contact with ATC when they incorrectly entered a new frequency. Situation was complicated by a wake turbulence encounter.

1786796

202102

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Elevator ControlSystem

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1786796

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Taxi; Routine Inspection

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

After pushing off gate and starting 1 engine; we received an Elevator Servo Fault ECAM message. We went through all QRH procedures to resolve the problem to no avail. After calling ZZZ Operations to coordinate a return to the gate; we were informed that we were not allowed to return to the gate for a maintenance problem without Maintenance Control authorization. This seems to be in conflict with 14 CFR 121.533; 14 CFR 121.535 regarding Captain's Pilot in Command authority; as well as the MEL preamble which states that Maintenance Control's role is that of technical consultation (Not Command and Control). In any event; we eventually reached Maintenance Control via personal cellphone; and; eventually; Maintenance Control concurred that we should return to the gate. We returned to the gate; maintenance personnel troubleshot the problem to no avail; and the aircraft was taken out of service. My concern is that; in this scenario; the flight crew was forced to go through a Maintenance Control process that has 3 possible outcomes. First; Maintenance Control directs some off book procedure over the phone that 'fixes' the problem. Second; Maintenance Control directs us to flight crew placard the malfunction (which is not allowed by the MEL in any event). Neither one of those outcomes are acceptable with a primary flight control malfunction. The last possible outcome; and the only realistic outcome; is to return the aircraft to the gate; which we were frustrated from doing by this Maintenance Control permission regimen. I am concerned we are being pushed into possibly unsafe operation as our judgment is automatically questioned by a corporate policy that directly conflicts with Federal law.[Reporter stated the need for a revision of] company policy regarding maintenance troubleshooting.We [flight crews] need clearer understanding of the roles and responsibilities of Maintenance Control versus the PIC.

Air carrier Captain reported ground gate return policy violates FARs in regards to Captain's Pilot in Command authority.

1818620

202106

1201-1800

CCB.Airport

CA

400.0

VMC

Daylight

UNICOM CCB

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Final Approach

Class D CCB

UNICOM CCB

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Final Approach

Class D CCB

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 25

Situational Awareness

1818620

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 500; Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Flying Aircraft X which is not equipped with either an electrical system nor radio; I conducted a run-up and 360-degree turn in the hammerhead of Runway 24 at Cable Airport. I did not observe any traffic in the pattern and elected to take off. I did not observe any traffic entering the pattern via the standard crosswind or midfield local entry procedures. Upon reaching the downwind abeam point; I scanned final and did not observe any traffic and began my base turn. After rolling out on final; I ended up wingtip to wingtip within a 1/2-mile of Aircraft Y. I must not have been able to see the aircraft due to ground clutter. Aircraft Y initiated a go-around and I continued to lend to prevent further conflict.

GA pilot reported an NMAC event on the final approach to CCB non-towered airport.

1315764

201512

1801-2400

DTW.Airport

MI

0.0

IMC

Fog

Night

1600

Ground DTW

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 174

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1315764

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 171; Flight Crew Total 5110; Flight Crew Type 2738

1315741.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Weather; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Flight was running an hour late into Detroit. Weather at DTW was RVR T/D 1400 Mid 2000 R/O 1600. Shot a CAT III Autoland to 04L. Landing was uneventful. Prior to landing briefed taxi in plan using low vis taxi charts; planned runway exit A7 then V. Turned off as planned on A7. Tower said to turn onto A then V hold short of 04R. This was the first time the Captain (me) had been to DTW. Visibility was extremely limited but safe to continue. I taxied onto A7 and then started to turn right on A instead of left - my first officer immediately corrected me and I corrected the error and turned left on A then right on V. As we approached runway 04R tower cleared us to cross runway 04R then contact ground; they told us there was an aircraft holding in position on 04R but we could not see the traffic. We turned on our exterior lights; crossed runway 04R; extinguished our exterior lights and the first officer contacted ground. Ground Control told us to turn onto taxiway K to the ramp. We were on taxiway V and as we approached taxiway K my first officer said we should turn right on K; I initially thought we were supposed to go left but after the mistake I had already made while taxiing onto taxiway A; I thought I was in error again so turned right onto K. We taxied a short distance on in the fog; to the right I could see bright lights that I didn't make sense to me; I stopped the aircraft looked at the taxi chart again and realized we had taxied across runway 9L/27R. In front of us I could see the dim lights of another aircraft pointing toward us. Ground Control contacted us and told us to hold our position; cleared the other aircraft to begin their taxi and turn right on taxiway U then cleared us to continue forward; turn right on U; right on Y; cross Runway 9L then continue on Y to K5 and to ramp. We followed these instructions and taxied to the ramp without further issue. Runway 09L/27R was not an active runway at the time we crossed it. The visibility was restricted to the point that we could never see any part of the terminal or the terminal lights while taxiing in.

We conducted a CAT 3 landing to runway 4L. Landing was uneventful but there was a quick discussion on the unexpected pitch attitude on touchdown. Weather was calm winds; 1/1 temp/dew pt. [VV002] FG RVR1600-2000 reported. Low Vis Arr Taxi Routes were briefed but not in effect. Visibility was restricted due to a combination of fog and bright airport ground lighting. Additionally; taxiway markings were hard to discern. Upon exiting the runway at A7 there was momentary confusion as the lights only led to a right turn south along taxiway A; but instructions were to proceed left to taxiway V and hold short of runway 4R; which we did. Approaching runway 4R we were instructed to cross and contact ground on the other side. There were also instructions given to another aircraft to line up and wait on runway 4R. Being unable to see the departure end of runway 4R; a lot of my attention was on the radio transmissions to be sure that no one was in fact departing runway 4R as we were crossing. This was a distraction. After crossing runway 4R we contacted ground and were given instructions to proceed on taxiway K and to contact North Ramp. I do not recall hearing instructions to turn left on taxiway K. This is a marked hotspot on the taxiway charts. We turned right and immediately found ourselves on runway 9L and stopped. There were no lights warning of the runway boundary. In addition the taxiway/runway markings were very worn and hard to discern. Upon stopping; ground control gave us instructions to proceed on taxiways K; U and Y then to cross runway 9L. Interesting that upon doubling back we did have runway warning lights on taxiway Y/runway 9L; whereas there are none on taxiway K/runway 9L. We proceeded to K5; contacted North Ramp and had no further issues.

While taxiing to their gate in low visibility at night; crew made a turn in the wrong direction; crossed a runway; and encountered another aircraft headed in the opposite direction. Ground Control issued revised clearances to both aircraft.

1780435

202012

1201-1800

JAC.Airport

WY

0.0

VMC

Snow; 6

Daylight

6000

Tower JAC

Corporate

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Class D JAC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 7800; Flight Crew Type 300

1780435

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Weather; Human Factors

Weather

We were cleared for taxi to Runway 1. We exited the ramp at Taxiway D and proceeded southbound on Taxiway A. In order to maximize available runway; we followed the second (southernmost) curved taxiway center line onto Taxiway A1; toward the active runway. We observed the enhanced taxiway center line markings; however as the Taxiway A transitioned to Taxiway A1 the hold-short line was completely obscured by packed snow.We stopped the aircraft approximately 60 feet past what we estimate to be the location of the hold-short line and immediately notified the Tower of our error. We were instructed to perform a 180 back to Taxiway A. The incursion did not present any immediate conflict to other aircraft. Another aircraft was simultaneously taxiing on the active runway for the north de-icing pad. The nearest arriving aircraft was greater than 10 miles away and had not yet been cleared to land.Upon further analysis of the error; we (the crew) determined that the short taxi certainly contributed to the confusion. The Holding Position sign for RWY 1-19 is situated on the northern edge of Taxiway A1 and angled to the northeast; in a manner that makes it very easy to miss when entering Taxiway A from Taxiway D. By the time the aircraft is established on Taxiway A; that sign is already abeam the aircraft. From the perspective of the pilot flying from the left seat; that sign is not visible in this situation. But the most significant factor in our misstep today was the nearly complete obscuration of the hold short line at the intersection of taxiways A and A1.

Pilot reported a runway incursion at JAC airport and cited snow obscuring the hold short line and the position of the Holding Position sign contributed to the event.

1574782

201809

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Air Carrier

B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

1574782

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Ground Personnel

Other pushback

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Tower did not alert pilot that a 787 was on taxiway prior to giving pushback the 'clear to push' command. Near ground miss with a plane on the taxiway going at least 30mph.

Ground Crew reported a near strike with a B787 during pushback due to a communication breakdown with ATC.

1194498

201408

1801-2400

LAX.Airport

CA

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 25L

Final Approach

STAR SEAVU 2

Class B LAX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1194498

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 15000

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1194931.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

While flying the SEAVU 2 Arrival procedure into LAX; we were instructed by SoCal Approach to delete the speed restriction at KONZL (280 KIAS) and 'Maintain 310 knots or greater.' We continued the profile descent at 320 KIAS until advised to 'Maintain 250 knots at LUVYN' (39 NM from RNWY 25L @ 10;000 feet). Approximately 10 miles later we were instructed to 'Maintain 210 knots or greater at GAATE.' (15.2 NM from LAX RWY 25L @ 5;000). As the speeds directed by ATC were far higher than the normal profile; and with the aircraft clean/nose down (an energy/speed building attitude) we were forced to begin deceleration to arrive at GAATE @ 210 KIAS plus; and still be able to further slow and configure the aircraft for the ILS approach to 25L (the airport was IMC at the time). As we passed trough 230 KIAS the SoCal Controller called us testily and demanded our airspeed. We reported '230 knots' to which he angrily replied; 'I told you to maintain 250 knots; and you're not the only one out there.' This was in direct conflict with his previous clearance to 'Maintain 210 knots or greater at GAATE.' Which obviously required deceleration to comply and still be able to safely configure for the ILS approach. We temporarily increased speed back to 250 KIAS for approximately 2 minutes after which we had to rapidly decelerate again in order to be able to start extending flaps; slowing and configuring for the final portion of the IFR approach procedure to LAX RWY 25L. The effect of the controller directing higher than normal arrival speeds deep into the arrival; as well as his conflicting and unrealistic demands approaching GAATE; left us with an extremely challenging series of transitions from a high speed descent/arrival to a rushed deceleration; descent and configuration into a hard IFR approach at the last minute. In fact; aircraft auto flight systems were unable to perform the abrupt/conflicting speed deviations directed by ATC requiring the aircraft to be uncoupled from the autopilot and hand flown for the remainder of the ILS approach to a successful landing. Poor ATC communication/conflicting clearances during this arrival created a highly compressed and artificially complex series of events during which the flight crew was forced to scramble to operate the aircraft safely and in accordance with SOP/procedures. Far more situational awareness. Explanation and intent from ATC controllers. In this instance; Controller gave conflicting clearances; abandoned professional standards of language/comm and directed aircrew to operate the aircraft in a manner that clearly demonstrated ignorance of physics or performance capabilities within an IFR/IMC environment.

While descending via the SEAVU2 arrival into LAX we were instructed to maintain 250 knots. Then we received further clearance to maintain 210 knots or greater at GAATE. We began to slow in accordance with instruction and at about 230 knots the Controller asked our speed; which we responded 230 knots. The Controller then said; 'I told you to maintain 250 knots; and you're not the only one out there.' We then increased speed to 250 knots until approaching GAATE at which time we used gear; full speed brakes; and flaps to slow to be stabilized for the approach. Having flown this approach many times in the past where slowing far out on the approach is typical; the instructions to maintain 210 or greater at GAATE seemed faster then normal. After flying this approach; and complying with the '210 or greater at GAATE'; I can say; it's a bad idea. It causes the aircrew to be rushed; and is very difficult to slow to achieve a stable approach; especially with the winglet aircraft that do not; 'Go down; slow down'; well.

Pilots report of a flight into LAX in which the Controller assigned one speed then told the pilots they were going too slow. Pilots had to scramble to keep aircraft fast into the airport.

1844991

202110

0601-1200

ZZZ.Tower

US

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Type 130

Situational Awareness; Workload

1844991

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Software and Automation; Procedure; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Human Factors

During FMS Visual to Runway XXR and after I disconnected the autopilot; I noticed that I was low on the approach but before I corrected; ATC issued us a low altitude alert. I corrected and maintained a stable approach to the landing.

An Air Carrier pilot reported descending below the glideslope on short final and received a Low Altitude Alert from the Tower.

1811279

202105

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

290.0

10.0

10000.0

IMC

Rain; Turbulence; 10

2500

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

SR22

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

GPS

Climb

Vectors; SID ZZZZZ

Class E ZZZ

TRACON ZZZ

Other Unknown

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Other Unkown

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 1100

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1811279

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Horizontal 11000; Vertical 1000

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Weather

Weather

I departed ZZZ; climbed normally; received vector for a right turn to a heading of 290 and a climb to 10;000. I complied with all of the uneventfully. West of the airport was cell of precipitation that I couldn't see through. It was depicted as yellow on my weather display. The precipitation was west of the airport and oriented along the axis of about 290 to 300 west of ZZZ.I was doing the ZZZ4 departure. The tower controller advised in the initial climb that in substance that I'd be boxed around on vectors for the climb before being going to the route.A previous departed reported the ceiling at about 6;500 which was basically true. I changed frequency to ZZZ TRACON and got a heading of 290. When I entered the IMC the rain was very intense and it was turbulent. I noticed changes on the vertical speed indicator up and then later down. The temperature was near freezing; but I did not see any actual ice. While climbing in IMC; the radio frequency began to screech such that I couldn't hear anything. That ultimately occurred on both radios and both frequencies. The marker beacon lights were flashing. I received a traffic alert for traffic on my left. It was very turbulent; but I stayed at 10;000 feet as assigned. With no communications (coms); I squawked 7600.I decided to turn 90 degrees right still in IMC because that resolved the traffic; would get me out of the precipitation; was a heading basically on course; was consistent with the expectations from the departure briefing and ZZZ4; and would restore coms. The precipitation was aligned with the vector so remaining on that heading was not viable. There was traffic there. I didn't change altitude (I was at 10;000 ft. the whole time).After the right turn; I exited the side of the precipitation; I was able to hear ground responding to one of my calls (on COM2 on the bottom antenna); so I went back to the departure frequency on COM1 (on the top); re-established communications and departed.The ATC TRACON controller was upset seemed to think that I was in VMC and just turned randomly or something. I've flown through 'yellow' precipitation many times uneventfully. The lost coms procedure when you're on a vector is to either stay on the vector or turn on course. I turned on course because it solved all of the problems; but seemed to surprise ATC. I think that the confusing thing for ATC was that it was fine weather straight over the airport; which is probably what he has on his computer. But west of the airport was unexpectedly intense rain.I'm not sure that this incident could have been avoided given what everyone knew at the time; although once I squawked 7600; the turn on course shouldn't have been a surprise.

SR22 pilot reported a loss of communication due to moderate weather during departure.

1421533

201702

1201-1800

FLL.Airport

FL

0.0

Daylight

Ramp FLL

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1421533

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General Maintenance Action

Company Policy

While taxiing at FLL; there is a construction fence on the east side of the ramp. Along this fence there are many vehicles; bag carts; and other equipment parked. There are no lines to indicate that we have wing clearance from these items. There was also an aircraft parked at [our intended gate]. I stopped the aircraft and called Ops to tell Ramp we needed Wing Walkers. They told us the Safety Zone was clear.I called Ops again to explain we needed Wing Walkers. Then one of the guys got out of the truck and stood as a Wing Walker for my left side and a Ramp Agent came out to the right wing. We then proceeded to taxi into the gate. Another Pilot heard us talking about this and said they came in last night and agreed with our assessment of the situation. We did not have an incident; but I'm afraid that someone might not be as persistent as me and taxi into this gate without Wing Walkers. There should not be any equipment parked along the fence in this area or lines need to be painted to indicate wing clearance!

Captain of B737 reported the lack of visual cues needed to safely park the aircraft in the presence of close proximity ground equipment and material.

1819904

202107

0601-1200

ZOB.ARTCC

OH

Center ZOB

Military

Heavy Transport; Low Wing; 4 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Vectors

Class A ZOB

Center ZOB

Military

Fighter

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Tactical

Class A ZOB

Facility ZOB.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1819904

Facility ZOB.ARTCC

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1819906.0

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure

Procedure

This is once again another report about the Steelhead MOA/ATCAA. Area X Controllers were briefed that the Steelhead ATCAA (Air Traffic Control Assigned Airspace) was going to be active from 29;000 feet to 31;000 feet from XA:00-XD:00. There would be numerous military aircraft in the MOA (Military Operations Area) due to the VIP being in TVC. When I sat down at the sector; there was already confusion. There were 3 tanker aircraft wanting a clearance into the MOA but it was not yet active. I tried to call the Minneapolis Center military desk and Black Talon (as I've repeatedly been told to do after these reports). Cleveland Center's 'fix' is to call those two facilities. There was no answer at either line. I tried having my Assist call. No answer. I had the Supervisor call. No answer. I called the Minneapolis Center controller at TVC high sector to try to coordinate a new altitude block of 25;000 to 31;000 feet and was denied. The tankers were given vectors until the airspace went active. At that time; I cleared the tankers into the MOA. During this live operation; the tankers repeatedly asked for more vertical airspace. The supervisor coordinated it and it was granted.I told the Operations Manager (OM) that a dangerous situation was occurring and has been occurring with the Steelhead MOA/ATCAA. He stated that he didn't really know how it worked; but the aircraft controlled the airspace and that he did not think there was an air traffic controller working the airspace. Later on; the OM talked to my supervisor who spoke to me. The supervisor said that Black Talon is only the coordinating agency and they simply schedule the airspace but are not controllers. As the day went on; the tankers were asking to join up and were asking for permission to climb and descend. This is not the procedure for military airspace. In MOA/ATCAA; the aircraft are not under the FAA's control. Whose control are they under? I am still unclear. However; they were soliciting separation services. I didn't even have flight plans for these aircraft any longer. Their radar services had been terminated. I advised them that they are responsible for separating themselves and I was not providing separation services. They informed me that Aircraft Y told them that they had to ask my permission for altitude changes inside the Steelhead ATCAA. There were also several spillouts involving these aircraft. At least 2; I personally saw.After another break I came back to a cap and anchor drawn on the screen. Cleveland Center's military guy had come in and drawn a cap and anchor but had told the controllers it 'wasn't official'. Basically; what it seems happened is someone made a cap and anchor in the Steelhead MOA at 29;000 to 31;000 feet. Cap and anchors are typically inclusive vertical altitudes. The cap and anchor; however; were not in the confines of the Steelhead MOA hence the spillouts. To be clear; the Steelhead ATCAA was active just apparently with a cap and anchor that no one forwarded down the line. The aircraft were making altitude and time adjustments real time; not in advance. It went from FL290B310 to FL200B310 and from XA:00-XD:00 to now XA:00-XG:00. Very last minute changes.To make this matter even worse was that I was controlling the VIP aircraft. I had sent the VIP aircraft through this (at the time) unknown cap and anchor because I wasn't told about it. Every pilot and every aircraft is important to me; but the VIP aircraft was placed in an unsafe proximity to randomly maneuvering military aircraft that were not radar identified; who I no longer had flight plan information on; and who were not on my frequency. It was only after the VIP aircraft flew through that a 'not official' cap and anchor was drawn which not only penetrated Cleveland; but Minneapolis and Toronto Centers as well.The Steelhead MOA/ATCAA seems strangely still very confusing. My supervisor and Operations Manager were unclear; and still are unclear; about it. Does Black Talon coordinate it through the Minneapolis military desk? Does Aircraft Y control it? I give pilots a frequency for Black Talon so maybe there is a controller there? Someone needs to find this stuff out. I personally volunteer for the mission. I will be medically disqualified for weeks and I would spend that time and my own money to travel to wherever or Zoom meeting whoever to figure this out. This has been an on-going issue that was especially perverse today. I have been raising the alarm for quite some time and am passionate about it and would like to personally get/set the record straight so that all aircraft and pilots or safe. I hope this will be met with the serious spirit with which it's written.

As a Supervisor in Area X at Cleveland Center; I spent my morning attempting to coordinate and discover why the aircraft were not following what we were briefed on. Area X was briefed that due to the TFR for VIP at Traverse City; Steelhead ATCAA would be activated from 29;000 to 31;000 feet for tanker and E3 activity. These altitudes and ATCAA (Air Traffic Control Assigned Airspace) were supposed to encompass all AEW (airborne early warning) and supporting activity. The ATCAA was activated from approximately XA:45Z to XE:00Z; however aircraft showed up before it was active and then requested it to remain active past it's finish time.From the start; every single aircraft requested different altitudes than what was coordinated. I attempted to get information from Minneapolis Center; our military desk and Black Talon and was unable to get any answers. Eventually; we extended the Steelhead ATCAA from 23;000 to 31;000 feet to accommodate. Later; a tanker aircraft requested a block altitude of 20;000 to 22;000 feet and a controller gave him those until established in the lateral boundaries of Steelhead; at which point the controller understood the aircraft would climb to within the altitude limits of Steelhead (FL230-FL310). The aircraft never climbed. The controller then coordinated with Minneapolis Center blocking 20;000 to 23;000 feet to accommodate the aircraft. I then coordinated with our military coordinator to extend Steelhead to include these altitudes.When any aircraft are cleared into the Steelhead complex; radar service is terminated and the aircraft track gets dropped. This occurred during this session; as we were briefed to treat the aircraft as we normally would with Steelhead. However; while Steelhead was active; we had multiple occasions where an aircraft went outside of the lateral bounds of the Steelhead complex. After trying repeatedly to find out why this was happening; we discovered that the Sentry track was not fully inside of the Steelhead complex as we were briefed. At this point I called on the phone to Minneapolis Center supervisors desk; Toronto Center sectors Hamilton and Centralia to warn and pass along that we discovered that our information was incorrect. VIP Aircraft traveled through our airspace around XB:00 Local time estimated. Having no Controller in Charges on the entire day shift; I asked the Operations Manager to cover the Supervisor position while I plugged in and monitored the VIP movement. VIP Aircraft's course traveled about 4 to 5 miles west of the Steelhead ATCAA. During this time we kept a close eye on any tracks within Steelhead due to their previous spillover events (We were not aware at this point that the Sentry was not fully enclosed within Steelhead). All tracks were on the East side of Steelhead and not in conflct with the VIP aircraft; however that potential did exist due to the Sentry course that we were not aware of.In addition; multiple aircraft called at the Peck sector to request join ups and altitude changes while within the Steelhead ATCAA. The aircraft stated that Aircraft Y told them to do so. I had the controller inform the aircraft calling that Cleveland Center could not provide control instructions within Steelhead ATCAA. I also told the controller to state that they were not providing any separation services within Steelhead and that it was Aircraft control. At this point the floor walker was involved as well and verified that what we were doing was correct and was able to inform us why aircraft were spilling out of Steelhead. Also; we discovered around XD:00Z that the end time of XE:00Z would not be correct. This was only because I prompted my controller to ask detailed and blunt questions about if the aircraft within Steelhead would want it open longer. The aircraft's intention was at XD:45Z to ask to extend Steelhead which in no way is enough time for coordination and planning! It was only because I pressed the controller to ask aboutan ambiguous statement from an aircraft within Steelhead that we discovered this!There is probably more that I have left out; this was all very fluid and unorganized. Nothing occurred how we were briefed it was to occur and answers/information were slow and hard to get.[Recommend] Coordination/communication. The military did not do anything that was expected. They did not request any of the altitudes that were originally blocked for Steelhead. They did not communicate far enough in advance to extend Steelhead. Once their abnormal requests were received; there was nobody to call to get answers. Black Talon is the controlling agency; there were no Whiskey alerts called and information was very slow and untimely to be of use to us. I recommend that if Steelhead is active; Black Talon needs to be monitoring the airspace. We need a direct call/shout line for them to inform us of any Whiskey events; or us to ask questions and perform point outs in case of weather; deviations; emergencies or TCAS events.

A Center Controller and Supervisor reported Military Special Use airspace was implemented in their and adjoining facility airspace without complete coordination or established procedures being followed. The Controller unknowingly allowed an aircraft to fly through airspace which was being used by military aircraft not under his control.

1763787

202009

1201-1800

SCT.TRACON

CA

4500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Personal

Baron 58/58TC

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Initial Climb

VFR Route

Class B LAX

Altitude Hold/Capture

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1900; Flight Crew Type 450

Time Pressure

1763787

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

VFR departure normal. Right turn at shoreline. I departed with flight following but was informed ATC would be too busy along my route and was told to squawk VFR. Limited to the Class Bravo shelf; I set my altitude select to 4500 ft. and engaged the autopilot in the climb. Monitoring the climb; I saw the plane continue the climb past 4500 ft. and where I expected it to settle back to 4500 ft.; instead go through 4600 ft. upon which I disengaged the auto pilot and pushed on the yoke. However; the trim up elevator wouldn't relax; I couldn't turn the trim wheel and all I could do was push hard against the yoke as I busted Bravo and the plane climbed at least another 400 ft. with the trim stuck. I pulled the circuit breaker but it still wouldn't release and I manually pushed the yoke hard to get the plane below the bravo. I cycled the breaker and the switch and finally got the trim under control. I hand flew at 4500 ft. until passing the shelf and continued on my flight climbing to 8500 ft. with no difficulties. Later; I determined that I have a faulty autopilot altitude switch. Getting it fixed tomorrow. In retrospect; I feel I handled the problem calmly but expeditiously.

BE58 pilot reported overshooting altitude during climb due to autopilot runaway.

1238179

201502

1801-2400

MCO.Airport

FL

10000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON MCO

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Descent

Class B MCO

Attitude Indicator(Gyro/Horizon/ADI)

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 193

1238179

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

While flying at cruise altitude at night; the Pilots noticed that the standby attitude gyro was showing 15 degrees left wing down; while the two primary attitude displays were showing 'wings level.' As the flight proceeded; the standby attitude gyro precession in pitch (20 degrees nose up and down) and precession in roll (15 degrees left and right). From the first time the Pilots noticed the standby attitude gyro behaving abnormally until we arrived at the gate (approximately 45 minutes); the 'orange Gyro Failure flag' never appeared to warn the Pilots of the failure. The Captain/Maintenance made appropriate logbook entries. Maintenance removed and replaced the standby attitude gyro; and the next flight was conducted without any problems with the standby attitude gyro. Tonight we were able to reference the two primary attitude displays and outside ground cues in order to maintain the proper aircraft attitude with ease. However; in the unlikely event the two primary attitude references failed; AND the standby attitude gyro failed without the proper 'orange Gyro Failure flag(s);' the Pilots would not know for certain which attitude references were providing valid information and which ones were not providing valid information. Is the B-737-700 standby attitude gyro designed to display an 'orange Gyro Failure flag' when gyro fails? If not; it would certainly be of great assistance during night; IMC flight with multiple attitude display failures.

B737-700 Captain experiences a standby attitude indicator failure in cruise without displaying any failure flags.

1430330

201701

0001-0600

ZZZ.TRACON

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

1430330

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

Our flight experienced what was believed to be moderate (at best) to severe turbulence upon approach into ZZZ airport this afternoon. The turbulence lasted between 15-20 minutes and the Captain did not give any advance notice to our cabin crew. Movement was impossible in the cabin; items were falling around in the bathrooms; and people were extremely scared. We experienced violent altitude changes; slamming of the aircraft side-to-side; rapid pitch and rolls; and sudden/aggressive drops. During said turbulence; the captain never made any PA to advise us of any significant turbulence nor made any attempt to notify the crew via the interphone system at any point. We were not advised of how long the turbulence was expected to last; and passengers were given no updates until I provided one in an effort to comfort terrified passengers.The cockpit crew stated they were unaware of any weather/turbulence reports; which according to two other mainline pilots I spoke with following this incident stated that they would have easily and reasonably forecasted appreciable turbulence based on other immediately available weather factors in reference to ZZZ airport approach/arrival this afternoon; including reports of windshear.Separately; it is my hope that our pilots made accurate; timely and appropriate notifications during this turbulence to ZZZ ATC to assist other approaching aircraft. It is our cabin crews' concern that the communication here was so poor; or complacency was at its highest; that it may have been overlooked. Note: The captain mentioned significant pitching of the nose at times during the approach and 41-mph wind gusts; and agreed the ride conditions were poor. I would also add that in other instances we have diverted for much less. At the conclusion of the flight; and after arriving at the gate; I spoke with the captain via the interphone to inquire about the turbulence and lack of communication and ultimately met with him and the entire crew to discuss it in the forward galley. What resulted was the cabin crew feeling dismissed as the captain said that any announcement wouldn't have changed any of the outcome. While that statement is true; it is an unconscionable approach to piloting and communicating amongst a team of crew members tasked with passenger comfort and safety. The importance of CRM - providing accurate; timely; and needed communication with passengers and crew - is seriously missing with this cockpit crew. Is should be noted that the B flight attendant has been flying for [many] years and commented on how poorly this was handled by the cockpit; and how it was the worst turbulence she has encountered in her career. The A flight attendant also [noticed] the bathroom vanity on the bathroom floor; which fell during the hard landing.The captain was made aware that reports would be filed in response to the way this situation was handled. It should be noted that all times the cabin crew remained professional and fair at all times while communicating our concerns with the pilots on this flight segment. Our company simply must instill in their pilots the fundamentals of CRM and the importance of communication with crews and passengers. This is a noticeable issue with our legacy pilots that we are now flying with more frequently. Due to constant cockpit crew changes; it is noticeable and frightening the diminishing art and importance of crew communication. Never in my years of flying have I witnessed such a decline in CRM. This must be addressed.

A319 Flight Attendant reported a lack of communication from the cockpit during descent in severe turbulence.

1182555

201406

1201-1800

ZOB.ARTCC

OH

17000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Center ZOB

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class E ZOB

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Workload; Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction

1182555

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Captain programmed FMS for SYR. Alternate was ROC with weather building in the area. After BEEPS the Captain put ROC airport instead of SYR. Neither Captain nor the First Officer noted the error. ATC cleared flight to 15;000 FT and plane turned to ROC. ATC asked if we were turning to SYR. The First Officer was the flying pilot stopped the descent and the turn until the Captain reprogrammed the FMS and turned to SYR. The Controller never gave any change of instructions.No TCAS alert. Error was due to the plane arriving late about 50 minutes to gate due to Maintenance. Captain was concerned with weather at the alternate ROC and put that into the flight plan. During the flight we were watching the weather and did not notice anything wrong until the Controller asked if we were turning toward SYR. Be more vigilant while programming the FMS and flying. Not being so concerned about the time off the gate. Rushing did not help.

An aircraft was late arriving at the gate; so the Captain hurriedly entered the FMS data with an incorrect destination; ROC instead of SYR. Enroute watching weather; the crew missed the error until ATC queried about the destination.

1758582

202008

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Haze / Smoke; Thunderstorm

No Aircraft

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1758582

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was settled into my hotel; having just diverted to ZZZ due to smoke and convective activity. I received the two emails I enclosed with this report. They tersely reported 'Southern California ACA' (Airspace Coordination Area) and 'Northern California ACA' and gave a range of altitudes. I had never heard of an ACA; so I used Google to find the FAA acronym list. There was no mention of an ACA. The email also mentioned 'Notice Number: NOTCXXXX' so I searched this as well. I found a reference to ZZZ1. That notice expired December; 2008. My cellphone was having trouble making phone calls; so I didn't call [company] until the following day. At that point; I was informed that nobody (including the FSS briefers) previously knew what an ACA was. The briefer pointed me to an FDC NOTAM that gave further information. There was no reference to the FDC NOTAM in the emails I received. I would not have been able to find the FDC NOTAM myself until the FSS briefer pointed me toward it. I would have hoped that the FAA had learned its lesson after declaring ATC Zero events earlier this year and failing to inform pilots what this meant. If the FAA is going to use terms and acronyms; these need to be defined in advance; and educational materials need to be disseminated to pilots and FSS briefers. Also; if FAASafety.gov is going to send emails to pilots; these emails should have useful information.

Pilot reported diverting due to weather; then received email notifications from FAA that were confusing.

1306008

201510

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Aeroplane Flight Control

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

1306008

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

On climb out; the First Officer (who was flying) said the yoke roll feel was unusual in bank (roll) of over 10 degrees. He gave me the aircraft and I concurred. The control force was more than usual and so we contacted Dispatch who patched us through to [Maintenance]. Phone problems delayed a resolution. We were flying over an area that had gusty crosswinds due to the remnants of hurricane Patricia so we decided the best course of action was to return to EWR in case something else went wrong and we would have to drop into one of these airports underneath us. The QRH did not have a checklist for this but we checked. We also referenced the FOM for the divert. The aircraft also had two deferrals due to speed brakes and we did not know if this was contributing to this or not. [Maintenance] did not think so. Once the flaps extended for landing; the problem went away. It also did not duplicate on the ground for a flight control check. It only happened in flight with the flaps up. We also did not feel [an emergency was warranted] since the flight controls were working; but just felt different. Everything was uneventful once the flaps were extended for landing. We then changed planes and continued to [our destination].

B737 Captain reported they returned to departure airport because of 'unusual' control feel in roll.

1125179

201310

0601-1200

P52.Airport

AZ

360.0

7.0

8200.0

VMC

99

Daylight

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Other Maneuvers

None

Class E ZAB

Other Unknown

Helicopter

Other Unknown

None

Class E ZAB

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1700

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1125179

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Horizontal 100; Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

I am a seven year flight instructor. I was on a dual training flight in VFR conditions with an end of course student trying to obtain his private pilot license in a Cessna 172s-navIII with ADS-B. We had been flying for about an hour in Cottonwood practice area out by Cottonwood airport. I had my student put on the hood so that I could evaluate his Basic Attitude Instrument Flying. We were about 7 NM north of P52. I was simulating ATC to assess his turns to headings; climbs; level flight; and changes of airspeeds. I noticed a target on the ADS-B screen about 8 NM west from us and 500 FT lower in altitude heading towards Mingus Mountain and away from us. The target was about 3 NM southeast of Cottonwood airport. I made a new position report over the local practice area frequency and was monitoring the CTAF/Unicom for Cottonwood (P52). I regularly monitor Cottonwood airport's frequency in that area due to the high amount of sky diving activity into that airport. I was about to give my student some unusual attitudes that he could recover from. I noticed the target began moving towards us and it had climbed to our same altitude (8;000 FT MSL). I saw it about 6 NM away and appeared to be a helicopter. I started giving my student vectors to get out of its way; turned the tail of our plane towards the helicopter and began flying northwest. The target followed us. I lost sight of it; but it was still on our ADS-B. I continued giving my student changes in course to get away from it; but it stayed directly on our tail at the same altitude. It continued to close in on us until the ADS-B said that there was no distance between us. The helicopter appeared to be following us around on purpose trying to stay out of our sight. My student and I became very uneasy and I feared for our safety. It seemed as if this helicopter was practicing targeting us or seeing how close it could fly to us without being noticed. I had student pull up his hood. We discontinued maneuvers. I took controls added full power; began to climb and entered a steep bank turn to the left in an attempt to see where the target was. When we saw the helicopter; it was 100 FT horizontal and 200 FT vertical lower only because I had entered a climb. This happened [during mid-morning] off the 070 degree radial from DRK VOR 27 NM out. It appeared to my student and I that this helicopter realized after my evasive maneuver that we knew that he was following us. The helicopter flew slowly directly under us; stopped following us and began heading towards Sedona airport. My student and I were pretty shaken up and decided to discontinue flight and head towards Prescott airport.The helicopter was large; not a training aircraft. It was completely black. We did not notice any distinct tail number. I am not sure what kind of helicopter it was. It had two large vertical fins sticking out from where the tail rotor would be. We were unsure if this helicopter had blades on the tail rotor. We looked at pictures online and think that it was either an EC145 or an MD Explorer. I am not sure what I could have done differently. I considered calling Albuquerque Center and asking for assistance. I know that what this helicopter did was illegal as we had no prior knowledge or intention of formation flying on this flight and I did fear for my life. Maybe an alert area can be placed on the VFR sectional chart around Prescott warning pilots of concentrated student training in the area. I am unsure if I am supposed to report this incident to Phoenix FSDO as we were on local practice area frequency; not ATC and performing maneuvers not on any flight plan.

A Cessna instructor with his student took evasive action from a helicopter which was apparently flying intentionally close in Class E Airspace about 27 miles east of DRK.

1288664

201507

0601-1200

ATL.Airport

GA

180.0

20.0

5000.0

VMC

Dawn

TRACON A80

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

STAR WARRR 1

Class B ATL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Type 9000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1288664

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Type 7200

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1288996.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

On the WARRR 1 STAR to ATL; we were at 12;000 ft; following the RNAV STAR. There was much congestion on the ATL Approach frequency; and we were assigned the Runway 28 transition; which requires a downwind turn; during which are several step-down fixes. Another aircraft; (other carrier) was on the frequency; and both of us (Company) and (other carrier) asked ATC to verify the call signs multiple times. At no time did I hear ATC warn 'Similar-sounding call signs; use caution.' While still on the 45-degree angle to the RNAV downwind; I heard 'our call sign; descend and maintain 3000 ft.' I read back our call sign leaving 12;000 ft feet for 3000 ft.' As we were passing 6000 ft; ATC queried us; 'where are you going?' I replied; 'we are descending to 3000 ft as directed.' ATC told us to stop descent at I believe; 5000 ft; which we did. The FO and I discussed the presence of (other carrier) on the same arrival. The Controller seemed to have a very heavy workload this morning; as ATL was using three westbound runways for approach and two runways for departures. ATC told us that 'we should know that he doesn't usually descend aircraft to 3000 feet so far from the airport.' I replied that we only complied with our ATC instruction; and had indeed read back the ATC clearance. After that event; we modified our call sign to 'Company XXX; Company'; to avoid further confusion with the similar-sounding 'other carrier XXXX'.In cases where ATC seems to be getting overwhelmed; we can help out by clarifying our call signs; and verifying the instructions by ATC. ATC did not respond to my readback of the descent to 3000; nor did ATC make any mention of my leaving 12;000 on the arrival. For our part; I believe that modifying the call signs to 'Company XXXX; Company' may have helped the Controller avoid conflict.

We were on arrival into Atlanta; I was the Pilot Flying; radio frequencies were very busy; Captain checked-on with Approach; gave ATC current ATIS info and we were descending via the arrival. I'm used to Atlanta bringing us fairly high (around 10;000 ft) on downwind before they expect an expeditionary descent to about 4;000 ft for a base turn and I usually call for flaps 5 to expedite descent for the base turn into Atlanta. I don't fly into this airport very often and if memory serves me correctly; I always seem to land on the north side; with one landing that I can recall on 27L from a north approach; and this was my first approach from the south and we were advised to plan on a visual to 28. We were given a clearance to descend; I cannot recall the altitude; but I believe it was between 6000 ft and 4000 ft. I dialed in the altitude; we both (Captain and I) pointed to the Altitude window and confirmed the altitude; and I began a descent using Level Change but at flaps 0 simply because we were so far. I got the impression the Captain was expecting a descent a little more expeditiously. That was just my impression. I also recall we were at 210 knots so we were barely descending at around 1000 fpm. As we descended from our previously assigned altitude that was 12;000 ft and were about to descend through 10;000 ft; Atlanta Approach called us and said (call sign) stop your descent! Maintain 10;000 ft. So we looked at each other startled; complied and maintained 10;000 ft. Soon after we heard another carrier flight with a similar call sign and we realized there was confusion on the call sign. As we continued at 10;000 ft; the same Controller called us back and advised us that in the future Atlanta Approach would never clear an aircraft to such a low altitude that far out from the airport. I didn't think the altitude was excessively low under normal circumstances; but I wasn't too familiar with Atlanta Approach from the southwest of the airport. We continued complying with ATC instructions and we both noticed the same Controller getting frustrated and miscommunicating with other aircraft including another Company aircraft and another carrier. Before we switched over to Tower for a visual to Runway 28; we continued hearing the same Controller seem to struggle with communicating effectively; he seemed rather stressed or not entirely on his game. I recall the initial instruction; the initial clearance that was issued to us; as an instruction to Company and not the other carrier; and I did hear him after that incident occur a call or two that were stated incorrectly. I do believe the Captain also understood the same clearance and I do believe he might have questioned the clearance under normal circumstances but the radios were so busy there really wasn't much of a break and again; we both believed we heard the same thing.I'm not entirely sure what can be done. I wish I could hear the transmissions all over again. I think it's possible the other carrier aircraft ahead of us was on approach and we were unaware of his presence. Perhaps if ATC had notified us of a similar sounding call sign like they do quite often; that might have prevented some confusion; but that was not stated. I guess we could question the clearance; but for my part; I did not think the clearance was unreasonable; but since I lack experience in Atlanta that could have been part of the issue. But without a doubt the heavy frequency congestion added to the confusion and the inability to have a break to question ATC. I can't speak for the Captain; but maybe our clearance altitude indeed was so low that he should have verified it. But again; it was VMC; I could see other aircraft visually and on TCAS; I could see the terrain; I didn't think it was an unreasonable clearance to begin with.

B737 flight crew reported becoming confused by similar sounding call signs during approach to ATL and mistakenly accepted a descent clearance meant for another aircraft.

1058568

201301

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Night

Air Taxi

EC135

1.0

Part 91

Ambulance

Takeoff / Launch

Class G ZZZ

Compass (HSI/ETC)

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface

1058568

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling

Aircraft

HSI precessed 101 degrees in 34 minutes while static on roof top helipad. Unable to manually slew HSI; manual compass heading card slew panel NOT INSTALLED. Night flight conditions; [I was] unable to conduct IFR flight; IMC procedures or accept another flight request due to precession of HSI. [I was] unable to navigate with HSI. Dead reckon navigated from hospital to base. HSI began to correct 5 minutes into the return leg to base at a rate of 4 degrees per minute. I would like to point out that while the problem at this specific Medical Center is significant; it merely is the environmental precondition to a forthcoming unsafe act. This Medical Center is one of at least eight hospitals with known magnetic anomaly interference in our area of responsibility. This has historically never been a significant safety factor because the legacy Bell 222B/U model aircraft were all equipped with a slewable HSI. The introduction of new aircraft has created a supervisory precondition for unsafe acts by not properly equipping the aircraft with this function. The aircraft are a newer variant of the EC 135P2+; the advanced avionics and in particular the AHRS are of a different generation than those installed in the older aircraft. I have seen the HSI take as long as 20-25 minutes to fully recover. Pilots have had to reposition to another nearby landing site to wait out the correction to the HSI; before being able to return to their base in IFR conditions. By conducting a risk/benefit analysis; one could clearly see that the risk is the aircraft and the insufficient capability to correct induced anomalies. Inadequate supervision has failed to correct a known problem that has created a precondition for unsafe acts. In order to mitigate the risk; an aircraft modification should be performed to install the necessary HSI control panel. The expense is irrelevant when compared to the cost of preventing a mishap. While it is true that magnetic interference at some landing sites do create an environmental hazard to the aircraft navigation equipment; the latent factors are insignificant when compared to the known active equipment precondition. It would be unreasonable to think that the environmental impact created by at least eight hospitals in the area could be reduced or mitigated to no longer being a risk. It is reasonable to mitigate the risk and control the aircraft anomalies through an improvement to the IFR aircraft.

An EC-135 helicopter pilot reported an HSI precess while parked on a hospital's rooftop helipad which he was unable to correct because the aircraft lacked a compass slew function.

1785472

202101

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Turbine Engine Thrust Reverser

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Fatigue; Training / Qualification

1785472

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Ambiguous

On rollout deployed reversers. Noticed left pull and used heavier braking on RH side. Aircraft tracked fine down centerline. Captain advised one reverser inop. Walk-around prior to flight revealed no indication that No. 2 reverser had been inadvertently locked out. On ground post-flight walk-around verified that reverser lockout pins on No. 2 engine were NOT extended showing red. Mechanic found hydraulics lockout in place after opening cowling. This would not be visible during an external walk-around inspection. This is a procedural issue. During maintenance there is probably a checklist for this and it was simply overlooked; perhaps due to fatigue.

A321 First Officer reported that right engine reverser failed to deploy. Post-flight inspection revealed that the reverser was locked out in a manner that was not visible during preflight.

1319058

201512

0601-1200

RSW.Airport

FL

1800.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower RSW

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class C RSW

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Part 91

Personal

Cruise

Class C RSW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 104

1319058

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Horizontal 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

As First Officer was hand flying and intercepting the final approach course; he alerted me to something he thought was a drone. I was trying to identify something slightly right of the nose and he drew my attention back to the left as two quad copter drones passed right to left off the nose and passed the left wingtip. The drones had a white base/bottom with a dark/black rotor area. We estimate the distance from us was between 200-300 feet. I immediately notified tower and he alerted the aircraft behind us to the threat. After discussing the event on the ground; we realized that the object on the right was also likely a third drone. I notified ground control that we believed there were likely three drones and he stated the aircraft following us had also seen the drones.

Reporter stated they were on approach to RSW when two drones passed from right to left at about 200-300 feet and other drone was off to the right. Their aircraft had just intercepted the glide slope when they saw the drones. They were curious what the drones were doing there.

Air carrier crew on approach to RSW had several drones pass within 200-300 feet.

1181843

201406

1201-1800

LFPG.Airport

FO

VMC

TRACON LFPG

Air Carrier

B777-200

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb; Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 10

Physiological - Other; Workload; Distraction; Confusion

1181843

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1183413.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Human Factors

At LFPG; everything appeared normal until we showed at the gate. The Captain asked where Operations was so he could get paperwork. Gate personnel informed the Captain it would be brought to the aircraft. We were delayed in the gate area while the security check was being accomplished which put us a little behind. When we got to the flight deck the Captain appeared agitated and started rushing the pre-flight. As we continued the pre-flight; the Captain commented we were missing the NAT track message and said he was going to Operations to get the missing item. However; we were not missing the track message. It was with the delivered paperwork. The Captain left the flight deck about 35-40 minutes prior to pushback and did not return until departure time. Our airport operations page at LFPG states the crew will contact Clearance Delivery 10 minutes prior for clearance and start up approval. We missed that window because the Relief Pilot and I thought we should wait for the Captain before we got the clearance/start up approval. And; we weren't ready for departure due to the Captain's absence. Shortly before scheduled departure time the Gate Agent appeared and said he was ready and wanted to close the door; but we told him we couldn't depart because the Captain was still in Operations. The Captain finally returned at departure time. Bottom-line; we did not comply with the TOBT/TSAT procedures at LFPG. We were also a late departure. We later found out why the Captain spent so much time in Operations. The Captain told us after we were airborne the he was on the phone in Operations engaged in a lengthy discussion and disagreement with Operations over a potential security incident that occurred on our inbound flight the day before. After the Captain returned from Operations he appeared distracted. We had to stop the pushback because we got an ACARS message saying he forgot to sign the flight plan. Also; while we were holding short of the runway we started to creep backwards. Either he didn't set the brakes or hold enough toe pressure to prevent the backward movement. On departure the Captain readback an incorrect turn direction from the Departure. I corrected him and we turned in the correct direction. On climbout; around 17;000 feet; the Captain asked me if I had any aspirin. I said no. The Captain then stated he thought he was having a heart attack and needed an aspirin. He called the Lead Flight Attendant to see if she or another flight attendant had an aspirin. No crewmember had any aspirin. He informed the Lead Flight Attendant he thought he was having a heart attack and instructed her to open the Medical Kit to retrieve some aspirin. She stated that it was a sealed container and cannot be opened except for an actual medical emergency. The Captain directed her to open it anyway. The Relief Pilot was out of the flight deck on break during this exchange. I was flying the aircraft and for all practical purposes I was single pilot at this point. The Captain instructed the Relief Pilot to return to the flight deck. He came forward and the Captain informed him he thought he was having a heart attack and a flight attendant was getting him some aspirin from the Medical Kit to relieve the symptoms. The Captain asked the Relief Pilot to stay on the flight deck until things were straightened out. The Relief Pilot informed the Captain it was not his prerogative to self diagnosis a potentially life threatening medical condition. Either he was having a heart attack or he wasn't and; if so; let's get some proper medical help. The Captain advised he was told to take aspirin in the past to relieve similar symptoms. After taking the aspirin he could make a diagnosis. In the end; the Captain was responding to some verbal challenges and the Relief Pilot and I felt he was not an incapacitated crewmember nor was he having a heart attack. In my opinion; the Captain was very stressed and tense which created a physiological episode as well as an excessive distraction. The Captain received some aspirin from the Medical Kit and it seemed to calm him down. We continued and he performed in a satisfactory manner for the remainder of the flight. The rest of the flight was uneventful and the Medical Kit usage was written up in the Logbook. Was our Captain Fit for Duty? I'm writing this [report] because in my opinion his actions placed his crew in a position to violate policy and procedures by disregarding procedures at LFPG; created a late departure; commanded unauthorized use of the Medical Kit and had subsequent disregard for the policies/procedures that govern its application; and degraded the safety of passengers and crew by introducing multiple distractions due to his medical/physiological episode. Does our Captain need a company physical to determine if he has an actual medical condition that could jeopardize the safety of future flights? He should have resolved the inbound passenger potential security problem from the previous flight before he signed in for our return flight. [I believe he] needs additional training on how to manage his time and emotions so he can effectively contribute to a safe and on time airline.

25 minutes after departure time; a hang dog looking/acting Captain; arrives in the cockpit. We begin the checklists. We begin to push back and the Captain calls for brakes. He has forgotten to sign the flight plan; and acknowledge he is 'fit for duty'. Almost immediately after that; he begins to chat about his phone conversation with Operations Control and how they aren't supporting his decisions from the day prior in regards to a passenger incident. Before I can say 'let's focus on today's flight' (as I can see he is occupied with this distraction) the Captain says; 'We will chat about it later in flight.' But he is completely distracted. Completely unfit for duty; as he is disoriented on taxiing; and taxi directions. I stepped back to go on my break; and the flight attendants are worried about breaking regulations. I suggest; they tell the Captain; that it is against their regulations. They offer up Advil; which I say should be fine. I sit down for my crew break; only to have another Flight Attendant approach me and discreetly inform me the Captain says he is having chest pains. I hopped up; grabbed the intercom; and asked him; 'Are you having chest pains?' He replies yes he is. I get him to open the cockpit door; and I see that the First Officer is single pilot; and in control of the radios; and flying; but doing well. I then; start to ask pointed questions. (I felt he was some what crying wolf; and creating undo drama; but I needed to see if; in fact; this was a medical emergency or just a panic attack...some form of need for attention) Are you having chest pains? Yes; intermittently. Then let's divert medically. We have five hours across the Atlantic; and now is the time to divert not three hours from now; as that may be too late. He made the claim; that he was a First Responder; and needed aspirin as that was the first response thing for chest pains. I informed him he was not qualified as a doctor nor was he capable of self diagnosis. I asserted at least three times that; if he was in fact having chest pains; we needed to divert. He made the decision that he was going to be OK and that instead of taking the break; at that time that he would be more relaxed; in the cockpit. In no way shape or form was he fit. He was incapacitated; mentally in some form. But he was focused that he was good enough to continue; and continue as PIC. I did my best to convince him otherwise.

Two First Officers reported strange behavior on the part of their Captain on an over water flight.

1032644

201208

MFE.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower MFE

Corporate

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Tower MFE

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 20500; Flight Crew Type 125

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1032644

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airport

Ambiguous

We taxied out from the FBO to Runway 13. As we approached the area on the parallel taxiway near the end of the runway; we checked in 'ready'. The Local Controller replied to 'hold short of the runway; landing traffic' It was a hazy summer day and on first look down the final approach we could not see the landing Cessna. While looking for the aircraft I failed to see the unusually placed hold short line and inadvertently crossed it. When I realized this; I called the Tower to tell them that I had crossed. The landing aircraft was already on the ground and clearing. He said 'no problem' and cleared us for takeoff. There was no conflict at any time. In the future I will be more diligent in my review of the airport diagram and pay particular attention to the location of 'hold short' lines; looking for unusual placement.

An aircraft crossed the MFE Runway 13 hold short line because it was located so far from the runway.

1593108

201811

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

4000.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb; Landing; Descent

Class B ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 19000

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

1593108

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Climbing out at around 20;000 ft we experienced a thump like we hit something. I thought it was on my side of the aircraft and the Captain thought it was on his side of the aircraft. We discussed what it might be; too high for a bird strike; maybe a panel came off; slight roll back on one of the engines; etc. We checked all systems throughout the flight and every system was normal. We sent Maintenance a message to inspect the aircraft when we arrived in ZZZ. For the next 2 or so hours all indications remained normal. Smooth flight; good weather; nice east flight. We then began our descent into ZZZ; power on slow descents; idle descents; everything remained normal. I was flying the aircraft and the Captain was the PM (Pilot Monitoring). CA (Captain) continued to check the systems throughout the descent. On downwind; we were given a clearance to descend to 4000 feet. I used open descent which is an idle descent because I thought it might be a short final approach. When the # 2 engine came to idle; the vibration started and from that time it stayed at idle. We saw a N1 vibration on the lower ECAM at one time of 9.9. CA immediately called and [advised ATC] and asked for priority. We were landing on XXL and the tower offered XXC so we took [it]. We proceeded on downwind and turned on an 8 to 10 mile final. Tower got us on the ground quick. CA asked if I was comfortable landing the aircraft and I replied yes and continued. We landed the aircraft and rolled to a stop close to where the fire trucks were. During the rollout; we got an ECAM message that the engine failed and tower called and said we had fire coming out the tail pipe. At the end of the roll out CA took the aircraft came to a stop and set the parking brake. He then called for the evacuation checklist so we would be ready because by that time we were already talking to Fire Rescue who had pulled up several trucks and were hosing down the right engine. We never got any kind of fire indication on the FLT deck. They told us not to evacuate. We stayed on the runway for about an hour while Fire Rescue and maintenance made the decision on what to do with the aircraft and passengers. They brought out a super tug and towed us to a gate. This is about the best I can do to describe what happened. During the evacuation checklist; CA did blow the fire bottle on the #2 engine as Fire Rescue was approaching but he elected not to blow a bottle on the #1 engine which was fine by me since nothing was wrong with it; Fire Rescue was approaching; and he had not given the evacuation command.

A320 First Officer reported problems with the #2 engine; including significant vibration indication; engine failure ECAM and visible flames from the tailpipe during landing roll.

1599677

201812

1201-1800

ZKC.ARTCC

KS

31000.0

Center ZKC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZKC

Center ZKC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZKC

Facility ZKC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17.4

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1599677

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was working and sector above me asked me to key their frequency because they believed that they lost frequency. I couldn't change their frequency. The CIC then asked if I had my frequency. I had tried to ship an aircraft prior but then tried another and no response. [Operations Manager] then came down the aisle and said switch to VTABS [Voice Switching and Control System Training and Backup Switch]. I proceeded to plug into D-side position PRE-jack. My frequency still wasn't working. I called ZME Calico sector to try they to give my Aircraft X. No luck reaching Aircraft X. I then plugged into D-side headset jack and broadcast for Aircraft X. I had never gotten a response but Aircraft X started descending at 3 mins till loss of separation and 4 mins till impact. We were CPDLC testing at the time of the event. I needed a D-side but was unable to get help because I needed to communicate with aircraft and there was no position available to help me.

Kansas City Controller reported radio problems in the area and then a loss of separation due to the radio failure.

1477355

201708

0601-1200

RDG.TRACON

PA

2400.0

TRACON RDG

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class E RDG

Facility RDG

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1477355

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Aircraft X checked on frequency expecting an ILS for RY36 as advertised on the ATIS. Due to weather observed on final to RY36 I offered the ILS RY13 as an alternative. The pilot said sounds like a good idea and that he was getting set up for RY13 instead. I then descended him to what I thought was 3000 (the MVA) as I have done for years in that area. The Low Altitude alert went off somewhere around 2600-2500 MSL. I advised the pilot of his altitude and he said I told him to descend to 2000. At this point he was entering a lower MVA area of 2100. I told him to just maintain 2000 and he simultaneously reported the airport was in sight anyway. I asked if he would like a visual approach clearance instead. He did; and I cleared him for the visual approach for RY13. He landed without incident.Aircraft X had his company Aircraft Y about 5 miles in trail inbound also. I advised the aircraft of similar sounding call signs. I don't know if it was the [number]'s in the call signs that were on my mind or not; but after I listened to the tape; I indeed did say to descend to 2000; not 3000 as I thought I had. I've descended aircraft in this area probably a couple thousand times in my career and this is the first time 2000 ever came out. I didn't catch the read back of 2000 either. I was expecting 3000. Recommend closer attention to read back and not what I expect to hear.

Approach Controller reported issuing an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude; triggering a Low Altitude Alert.

1002911

201204

1801-2400

TEB.Airport

NJ

2000.0

10

Night

TRACON N90

Corporate

Hawker Horizon (Raytheon)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 6

Initial Approach

Direct

Class E N90

FMS/FMC

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 6750; Flight Crew Type 485

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1002911

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication

Aircraft

Approach cleared us direct to VINGS; 2;000 MSL and 210 KIAS. Prior to VINGS; Approach changed the clearance to an assigned heading or 090; maintain 2;000 FT until established; cleared for the ILS 6 at TEB. Since we were on an assigned heading to intercept the localizer we accepted the ACT (activate) VECTORS - YES feature of the Honeywell FMS which 'cleans up' the navigation display; depicts the localizer course and TORBY (FAF) was the next fix displayed. We intercepted the localizer course; maintaining 2;000 and were preparing for glideslope intercept when NY Approach indicated we should be over DANDY at 1;500 and to descend to 1;500. DANDY was not available for reference nor displayed. We began an immediate descent to 1;500 intercepted the glide slope; completed the approach and landing uneventfully.To ensure recollection and compliance with mandatory altitude constraints this information should be included in the Notes and/or Plan View sections of the associated approach charts. Also; diligent crew awareness and coordination is required when the FMS; displays no longer depict the fix/altitude and DME (raw data) is the only available remaining reference for DANDY.

When they were given vectors for the ILS Runway 6 at TEB the flight crew of a Hawker Horizon selected the 'Activate Vectors' mode of the Honeywell FMS; which removed the fix prior to the FAF; DANDY--which has a mandatory crossing at 1;500 MSL--from the display. They continued at their previously assigned 2;000 MSL; unaware of the need to cross the fix at the required altitude. ATC caught the impending error and advised the crew of the need to descend.

1257014

201504

1201-1800

MEM.Airport

TN

0.0

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1257014

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Human Factors

Plane loaded early. Received Dangerous Goods (DG) paperwork with accessible DG. Two full pallets; one of flammable liquid; one of oxidizer. These pallets were placed next to each other in 2L and 3L. As this was a Wide body cargo aircraft; no firefighting capability with pallets containing hazardous material.The Flight Operations Manual (FOM) has two statements concerning separation that apply. One; incompatible classes must be separated by 3 feet and the second is that for separation requirements; if the DG is contained in different ULD containers; that suffices for required separation. I was not comfortable with a full pallet of flammable liquid right next to a full pallet of incompatible oxidizer with nothing but less than 12 inches of space and a little Saran wrap between them. Consulted with the ramp agent and specialist and was informed they could move one Haz pallet to allow more room between them. I agreed and accepted responsibility for the resulting delay; the ramp personnel opted to bump the flammable liquid pallet; leaving only the oxidizer which did resolve our issue.A review of the separation requirements might be good; as I'm not sure this is the situation envisioned when the second statement was added. My concern in this DG situation was safety. I was willing to take all the DG material; just wanted a bit more space between the pallets. Please review the FOM separation requirements. Do not remove the crewmembers from the DG review procedures; as this may keep a DG incident from occurring.

Widebody cargo aircraft Captain reported noticing during preflight incorrect loading of hazardous materials. Aircraft was reloaded properly.

1692686

201910

1201-1800

ZID.ARTCC

IN

39000.0

Center ZID

Corporate

Premier 1

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZID

Center ZID

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZID

Facility ZID.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 25

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1692686

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

Aircraft X eastbound at FL390. Aircraft Y northbound direct to a fix at FL390; was going to pass approximately 5 miles behind Aircraft X plus or minus a mile or so. Therefore; lateral separation would at best be 'tight' and at worst would be a loss of separation. Conflict alert activated; and the Radar Controller suppressed Conflict Alert but took no control action whatsoever. The Radar Controller is a problematic employee who has been reported by multiple other controllers plus myself to multiple supervisors on multiple occasions. His control actions and demeanor are not only rude to other controllers and to pilots; they have become increasingly unsafe. With Conflict Alert continually activated but suppressed as shown by the Conflict Alert View on the ERAM display; the Radar Controller continued to take zero action while the airplanes were going to lose lateral separation. He then issued direct routing to Aircraft X; which is probably a 3-degree turn; which would do effectively nothing. I was conducting Radar Assist (D Side) OJT at the time at the sector; and with about 1 minute before lateral separation was going to be likely lost and still no action taken and with conflict alert still 'active' but suppressed; I asked the Radar Controller to turn Aircraft Y. He said it was not necessary.I lost it. I immediately told him; and I quote to the best of my ability here; 'The airplanes are running together. I'm part of the [expletive] sector team. Turn the [expletive] Aircraft Y.' This from a guy in the area who is known to NOT curse. He then casually turned Aircraft Y 20 degrees left. Shortly thereafter; we were able to go to one person at the sector; and I spoke to the Operations Manager at the Watch Desk about the incident; and shortly after that was able to speak to the Supervisor. I reported to both of them in polite but firm language that this employee is; in my opinion and apparently in the opinion of others; becoming a deliberately negligent Controller who is unwilling to take even basic steps to separate aircraft. If the FAA allows a Controller to deliberately suppress conflict alert and let two airplanes lose standard separation while taking essentially no action other than one 3-degree turn late in the process with light traffic and no meaningful complexity; with a Controller who is being reported to multiple management people by multiple Controllers for multiple incidents; then what will it take to have this Controller's behavior addressed? An accident? To be clear. This is an ongoing problem with a deliberately negligent Controller. This is an ongoing problem with a deliberately negligent Controller. It may take serious personnel actions to address this Controller's attitude problems. Suspension? Termination?

A ZID Controller reported he observed another Controller deliberately allow two airplanes to approach with less than required separation even after the conflict was pointed out to them.

1114350

201309

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 91

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Landing

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1114350

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Commercial

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1114354.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Human Factors

I was assigned a maintenance ferry flight but I was not aware until I got to the airport that we would be flying the airplane back at flaps 8 the entire way. The instructions we received from Maintenance specifically stated that the flaps were to remain at 8 degrees for the entire flight including landing. I had flown the flight in and the First Officer stated that he was comfortable flying back under the guidelines stated above. The flight was completely uneventful until the landing. We had briefed multiple times the difference between a normal flaps 45 landing and the flaps 8 landing. Upon crossing the threshold the First Officer inadequately handled the aircraft and began what could only be described as oscillations that continued to get worse. I realized that the landing could no longer be made safely and took the controls from the First Officer to execute a go around. We followed the Tower's instructions and no vertical or lateral deviations were experienced. I kept control of the aircraft and we made an uneventful landing. I would like to commend the Controllers in their help and handling of the go around. They were very pleasant; helpful; and patient with working us back into the pattern. I'm always impressed with their skill and level of professionalism; however I just felt they went above and beyond in their assistance with this flight.The biggest threat was the fact that the aircraft had to remain at flaps 8. This is obviously outside of our realm of what's normal and how we operate on a daily basis. The landing technique is different; however we are trained for it in the simulator and I had complete confidence that the First Officer would have no problem handling the landing. The undesired aircraft state would be the oscillation which created the unstable approach and eventual go around. The First Officer made his errors through the landing technique; and not recognizing the need to abandon the approach and go around a little earlier. I think in the future when doing any flight like this I will be the pilot flying. Like I stated above; I didn't know I was going to be operating a flight back with the flaps stuck at 8. Had I known; I would've had the First Officer fly the first leg and I would have flown back. It would be nice to have some more communication from the company when being sent to do things like this. I always feel like these NRFO [Non Routine Flight Operations] operations aren't very well put together and it's almost like they've never done it before. From the flight crew's perspective it's very frustrating because we're the ones stuck with the airplane; and we're the ones that have to fly it. I just think there could be better procedures and channels to communicate with the flight crews in these situations.

Flew a ferry flight with flaps 8. The approach was stable but floated too far down the runway and executed a go around. ATC vectored us back around and gave us a longer runway and landed safely. Error on my part was leaving the power in too long. Should have reduced power earlier; preventing us from floating down the runway.

CRJ700 flight crew describe the events leading up to a go around from a flaps 8 landing on a maintenance ferry flight.

1209001

201410

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Nose Gear

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34; Flight Crew Total 351; Flight Crew Type 16

Other / Unknown

1209001

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff Roll

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During the course of my Commercial FAA check ride while doing a normal takeoff the nose gear collapsed prior to rotation. I did the normal checklist prior to departure and both myself and the DPE were certain the gear handle was down. There were no warning lights; nor gear horn alarm. Maintenance is still evaluating the situation; but I suspect that the gear handle that pulls out and retracts to allow up and down movement of the handle was sticking; which allowed the handle to move during takeoff.

C172RG pilot experiences a nose gear collapse during takeoff.

1800775

202104

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

3300

3

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Light Sport Aircraft

Part 91

None

Personal

Taxi

None

Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 426; Flight Crew Type 87

Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1800775

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Aircraft

Additional co-pilot brakes had been added to the aircraft by owner/pilot. Low speed taxi tests went well. Progressively higher taxi speeds were used to determine if co-pilot side brakes were operating correctly. During a higher speed taxi test on the main runway the aircraft began to veer to the left. Pilot was unable to maintain directional control of the airplane and struck one 't-post' (not connected to any fencing) on the side of the runway. The impact caused minor damage to the underside of the of the fuselage; a small puncture in the Dacron skin. The minor damage to the aircraft does not fit the definition of 'substantial damage' it was determined that no accident report was required at this time. After further inspection the co-pilot side left master cylinder was found to be 'sticking' when depressed and appears to have locked the left side brakes causing the loss of control. Without disassembling the master cylinder was unable to determine the cause of the master cylinder 'sticking'.

Rans S6 Coyote Light Sport Aircraft pilot reported while completing a high-speed taxi to test out new brakes the aircraft veered left and struck a pole on the side of the runway.

1201009

201409

1201-1800

SEQU.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON SEQU

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1201009

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Human Factors

ARRIVAL: Upon checking in with Quito approach descending to flight level in the low 20s; Quito approach control advised 'this will be radar vectors for Runway 18.' We were anticipating Runway 36 per en route weather requests and current ATIS. After loading new approach into the FMC; Quito approach changed instructions and said; 'Quito landing Runway 36; proceed direct to QIT VOR and cleared for the ILS Z RWY 36 approach; report QIT inbound.' We complied with the instructions and selected our previously anticipated Runway 36; in the FMC. We did not conduct another briefing because this was our Runway and approach of intended landing; but we did pay close attention to the ATIS (non-digital) for wind changes. The winds were reported as a quarterly tailwind on the ATIS for Runway 36.CONDITIONS:Weather: DAY VMC; high level scattered and broken layer. Runway surface dry. Performance: LANDING Weight = 215.4 tons; FLAPS = 25; AUTOBRAKES 2 = roughly 11900ft performance with no T/R credit. Runway is almost 13;500 long at roughly 8000ft MSL. Crew elected AUTOBRAKES 2 due to taxi closure and anticipated full length roll-out to the end of the Runway.APPROACH: After completion of the approach over the QIT VOR and interception of the Runway 36 localizer; tower cleared us to land Runway 36. Tower reported winds out of the west; direct crosswind of 9 kts or so. From 10;500ft MSL (Localizer/GS intercept altitudes) it was clear the winds were a quarterly tailwind (about 150 degrees) at 14kts. After glide slope intercept and descending into the valley; light to occasional moderate turbulence was experienced with gusty winds. Gusty winds were not reported on the ATIS or by the tower. The CA/PF elected to add a slight speed additive to approach speed above Vref. 1000ft AGL to Threshold: The CA/PF had a difficult time getting the aircraft to slow to target approach speed. Due to the light weight of the aircraft and the gusty wind conditions; along with a high altitude airport; the TAS warranted a steeper V/S of 1000-1100fpm to maintain glide slope. I stated to the captain 'Speed' to indicate our current airspeed was above Vref. At one point during the approach; IAS was in excess of 25-30kts of bug. I also stated to the Captain that we still have a tailwind component 'roughly 9 kts; I will call the wind shift for you.' We were still anticipating a direct left crosswind over the threshold as reported by tower. It is not uncommon to have low level wind shifts flying into Quito. My best guess for our tailwind component over the threshold was 9-11kts. Winds were roughly 140 degrees at 12-14kts according to the wind vector displayed on the ND. Approaching the runway threshold; I started to question the successful outcome of this landing and was extra vigilant on flight instruments/indications and primed to call go-around. Our GS on the ND was 195kts over the threshold and we were roughly 20-25kts above Vref at this point.Threshold to Touchdown: The higher IAS above Vref; coupled with the unanticipated tailwind component; the aircraft expeditiously flew through the touchdown zone. Leaving the end of the touchdown zone I called 'Let's go-around' due to roughly 10-15kts above Vref and beyond the touchdown zone at 10ft RA. There was no response from the CA as he was wrestling with the controls to get the aircraft on the runway. A quick 4 seconds pass as I try to see if the captain is struggling with the GO-AROUND procedures; but he is still trying to land the aircraft. I call a more direct 'GO AROUND' and the captain responded; 'No; I got it.' Another 2-4 seconds we touched down and the captain went into full reverse thrust but kept the AUTOBRAKES set at 2. Manually braking occurred at roughly 100kts; and as the 1000ft remaining markers on the runway were approaching I called '1000ft remaining' and saw a GS of 80kts. The aircraft performed well due to the light aircraft weight and dry runway. After touchdown with the spoilers deployed and reverse thrust selected; I DID NOT doubt that we had enough runway remaining.The reason for the 'Go-Around' call-out is clear in our FOM; 'A missed approach is required upon reaching the decision height DA(H); the missed approach point (MAP); or at anytime thereafter if: ... The pilot determines that a landing cannot safely be made in the touchdown zone. OR The airplane is not in a position form which a descent to a landing within the touchdown zone can be made at a normal rate of descent; using normal maneuvers.' Runway 36 at Quito does not have runway distance remaining markers. Our only indication is the touchdown zone. Leaving the touchdown zone; if we assume our GS is roughly 150kts; that means every second we are traveling 250ft down the runway. My first 'Let's Go-Around' call-out was at 3000ft down the runway (end of the touchdown zone). I believe at roughly 4 seconds later was my second 'Go-Around' call-out which means we were at 4000ft down the runway. It was still another 4 seconds for the airplane to touchdown; meaning my best guess is that we touched down at 5000ft down the runway.After taxi-in and completion of the shutdown checklist; I carefully thought how I wanted to approach this subject. I first wanted to have an open conversation with the CA; one-on-one before including the other crew members. I wanted to discuss CRM; TEM; personal minimums; company policies regarding go-arounds and our safety culture. The Captain actually approached me first to apologize about the approach and said that in hindsight he probably should have gone around; but he knew we were light weight and the runway was very long. I understand his point; but my follow-up question was; 'when did you touchdown?' He didn't know; so I asked him again; 'so how did you know you had a long runway in front of you if you didn't know when you touched down?' I gave him my rundown of indications and performance speeds I observed during the approach and that my best guess was that we touched down at 4500-5000ft down the runway. We went over the AERODATA numbers and even worked another performance scenario through AERODATA to reflect the 10kt tailwind component. At; AUTOBRAKES 2; the new data showed 12451ft of landing distance. This assumes a 1500ft touchdown (CAT1) meaning we have roughly 11000ft of ground rollout. We touched down at 4500-5000 feet down the runway; more than 3000 beyond the AERODATA assumed touchdown point. Meaning we had 8500 of runway remaining (13500-5000) and a ground roll-out performance of 11;000ft. After this long conversation the CA understood the issue and once again apologized and lesson learned.GO-AROUND Culture: My biggest concern with the event is the disregard for a crew member calling 'Go-around' ... twice! I conveyed this to the CA and asked; what if I was calling go-around for a different reason than what you thought? Aircraft entering runway etc; how do you know what I am calling go-around for? Our company policy is to allow for any crew member to call go-around; but we have a cultural issue accepting this policy and an overall lack of a contemporary approach to safety. This is a classic 'drift into failure' scenario. The CA admitted that just previously this month; he observed another captain come in who landed long but knew he had enough runway. It worked last time out of tolerances; so it will work this time right? To make matters worse; the CA/PF went back to discuss the event with the other CA in the observers seat; and the other captain agreed with the decision to continue the landing. How far will we drift away from standard procedures before an incident/accident occurs? The qualifications of these two captains; and their extensive experience in South America is very impressive; but the lack of a proper approach to safety and accepting an undesired aircraft state with a desire to disregard a 'crew concept' flight deck will cause an undesired outcome. Luckily; this scenario turned out successful. This CA;and myself learned a lot from this event and I truly feel the CA understands the risks that were taken; and how we could have mitigated the direct threats to our aircraft. Unfortunately; this is one captain and one crew; and with the response from the other CA that he tOo would have continued the landing and disregarded two go-around calls when landing out of the touchdown zone means we have a cultural and systemic problem; not an individual problem. I discussed with the CA and crew how we could have approached this arrival to landing differently. I accepted part of the blame that during the briefing; I did not ask about go-around policies and our personal minimums for this flight at a high altitude airport with gusty winds. A lesson learned for all.We need a no fault Go-Around policy in place at this airline immediately. We need a strict procedure that if ANY crew member calls 'go-around' a go-around is mandatory.

A Widebody Transport freight aircraft was ferried empty into SEQU but with the wind conditions and light weight the Captain could not slow the aircraft. He refused to go-around and landed with about 4;000 feet remaining but was able to stop.

1042554

201210

0001-0600

SBEG.Airport

FO

VMC

Night

Tower SBEG

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

SID ILKUP

FMS/FMC

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1042554

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication

Aircraft

We were cleared the ILKUP Departure with the KOKRU Transition. During the preflight route/FMS review; we noted the departure note 1 mandates runway heading until 2;000 FT; but the FMC is programmed for an immediate turn back to MNS. Because of this discrepancy; I briefed and flew a departure in runway heading/heading select with a manual turn after 2;000 FT to comply with the restriction (we were eventually cleared a left turn direct ILKUP). Also; there are two ground tracks depicted; one which proceeds back to MNS and one which directs a ground track of 280 degrees to intercept the 330 degree radial to ILKUP. However; the narrative does not differentiate. The departure procedure needs to be clarified to specify which ground track to fly and the FMS needs to then be programmed accordingly. In the interim; a note to flight crews should be placed on the flight plan from SBEG clarifying the procedure to follow.

The Reporter stated that he has not received clarification about the departure's track ambiguities. However; his other main concern was his aircraft's FMS directed an immediate left turn prior to the 2;000 FT constraint. He believes that immediate turn is a FMS programming error. Because the departure was manually flown he is uncertain what track the FMS would have directed the aircraft to follow had the automation remain engaged.

A B737 departed on the SBEG ILKUP SID; KOKRU Transition; but the 2;000 FT turn constraint was not in the FMS departure programming and additionally chart ambiguity does not specify which departure track to follow after an eastbound takeoff.

1440646

201704

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Fractional

Challenger 350

2.0

Part 135

Passenger

Parked

DC Battery

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1440646

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was the assigned First Officer to Aircraft X. On the evening [prior to departure]; I requested a cleaning of the aircraft. Prior to the cleaning; the aircraft was secured per the FOM which included; but not limited to; disconnecting the batteries and locking the battery door; pinning the emergency exit (a red flag hangs down inside the cabin while the pin is in identifying it); and a security seal was applied.Upon showing to the aircraft [the next day] for a hot spare duty assignment; we first noticed the battery door was unlocked and the two batteries were connected. While unusual; it's not completely unheard of for this. Usually means that maintenance was on the aircraft and were either still working on it or forgot to secure it.The door was sealed with a maintenance seal. The seal was placed there by the cleaners we later found out.When we opened the door; we looked in the rear cabin and noticed that the emergency exit flag was gone and the cover was in place. From all appearances; the pin was removed from the airplane. This raised our suspicion level and we continued our preflight/investigation of the interior.When I inspected the flight deck; I noticed that my seat belt was straightened and not how I left it. This was due to the cleaners. When I started applying power to the airplane; I noticed that a rubber button on the right side FMS was broken. Button L1. Something heavy must have scraped up against it because while the button was literally hanging by a thread; the plastic tab between the button and the device sensor was located about 3 feet away on the center console.At this point; I went and located our contract maintenance on field and asked if anyone from them was on the aircraft. They said no. I located the cleaning company and discussed the situation with the supervisor. He said that the battery was already hooked up when they got there and that they didn't touch the pin and flag. Based on this information; we decided that at some point the chain of custody was lost and we contacted [Company] security for further guidance. We were told to contact local police for assistance. We gave a statement to the officer; and we requested a bomb sniffing dog to inspect the aircraft. One arrived several hours later and swept the aircraft. No devices were found. Furthermore; when we were showing the emergency exit pin placement to the officer; we took the cover off and found the exit was indeed pinned but the flag was folded up and the cover replaced.Since this occurred at night; we requested additional time the next day to do a visual sweep of the airplane. We got the ladders out and inspected the APU exhaust and other normally inaccessible places.We had a passenger flight [that day]. This was the first flight since the security incident. While enroute; I noticed on the audio control panel that the 'emergency' switch was broken; and the two switches next to it were bent. I had missed this on the preflight; and this is an Aircraft on Ground item. The damage indicated that someone had either hit it with something heavy or kicked it when they were getting into or out of the cockpit chair.The aircraft was grounded [at destination airport] affecting further flights.Based on the evidence at hand; I believe the following events happened:The cleaners thought that since the panel was off of the emergency exit; they put it back thinking they were doing the right thing by folding up the flag.The cleaners connected the battery to raise the door using the motor assist and left it connected.The cleaners damaged the cockpit while cleaning it. The cleaner likely swiped his foot across the FMS panel while getting in or out; and also kicked the audio control panel damaging the three switches.The audio control panel is part of my normal preflight duties. I should have caught the damage prior to the flight. I take full responsibility for this omission.I think that the cleaners need to be told NOT to touch the batteries; any flags; and to stay out of the cockpit.

Challenger 350 First Officer reported that there was evidence that the airplane may have been tampered with while sitting on the ramp all night.

1468540

201707

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

400.0

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

SID ZZZ

Class C ZZZ

Flight Dynamics Navigation and Safety

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1468540

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

At the gate prior to departure; my Captain and I thoroughly briefed the Departure. There was some discussion on headings to fly and I called and got verification from clearance delivery. The Captain and I again reviewed the departure procedure and discussed altitudes and air speeds to be flown. We ran our checklists and pushed and began our taxi. I switched to Tower frequency and we were cleared for takeoff. This was odd because we were still quite some distance from the end of the runway.We ran the Before Takeoff Checklist and took the runway for departure. At 400 FT; I hit Heading Select and began turning the Heading bug. We cleaned up on schedule and we both noticed we were not getting good heading commands. We kept the turn coming and it just didn't seem right. At that point I noticed we were accelerating rapidly. The Captain engaged Level Change to open the speed window at which time we lost our flight directors. It was then that I realized that we never turned them on. We had inadvertently entered TO/GA. We had flight directors for vertical but not lateral guidance. Upon selecting a vertical mode we exited TO/GA and I recycled the flight directors both on. We slowed down; leveled off and continued the flight without further incidence.

B737-700 First Officer reported they lost their flight directors; then they realized that they never turned them on.

997006

201203

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

MD-82

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Testing; Inspection; Work Cards

Escape Slide

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Door Area

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

997006

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Other Person

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Logbook Entry; Human Factors; Company Policy

Human Factors

I was assigned an A-Check; the interior [cabin] portion; I had signed my portion off. An FAA Inspector asked me to bring the A-Check paperwork with me. We stopped at the forward [entry] door and he asked if I inspected the forward entry door slide; as per the A-Check Card; [Item] 18 of 41; I said yes. He told me to show him; what I inspected: the [slide] pressure gauge flipped it over to the back-side; checked [slide] routing and expiration date.We proceeded to the aft service door. Again I showed him [slide] pressure gauge in green [band]; flipped [girt bar flap] over; checked expiration of slide routing; it all appeared normal. I stowed the girt bar back on the hook. That is when the [FAA] Inspector asked me to read verbatim; Paragraph 3a. At that point; he pointed out that I did not engage the girt bar and the Velcro on the right side [of the flap] were not properly fastened. I corrected my mistake and made a logbook entry; stating that the Velcro was not properly installed and made a balancing [corrective action] entry: Resecured flap Velcro tab properly; per Maintenance Manual (M/M) on aft galley service door slide. I apologized for my mistake in not attaching girt bar [in floor locks] arming it; and somehow missed not seeing that the Velcro was not attached properly. I need to pay attention more and ask questions if I do not understand [paperwork] and pay close attention to when revisions are added [to procedures]. There was a revision added on this section [of the A-Check Card]; I'm not sure when; but it was revised January 2012.

A Line Mechanic reports an FAA Inspector pointed out maintenance step procedures that he had failed to accomplish during a Cabin Interior A-Check on an MD-82 aircraft.

1044882

201210

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

2000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

FBO

PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Climb

None

Class D ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Electrical Distribution

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 750; Flight Crew Type 65

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

1044882

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Was practicing instrument approaches for a training flight. Upon starting the missed approach climbout there was a surge in the electricity shown through flickering lights; Low Bus annunciator indications; both alternators shown as inoperative; and a right ALT circuit breaker popped. We (my students and I) started turning off unnecessary equipment since we were running on our battery only; and on the way back toward the airport we started to smell something burning. The smell increased rapidly over the next 1-2 minutes and then the student observing in the back started to see smoke coming from the cockpit area. We immediately notified ATC at this point and told them we were going to land at the closest airport.

A PA-44-180 electrical system surged during a practice instrument approach go around resulting the loss of both generators and smoke in the cockpit so the flight landed at the nearest airport.

1242158

201502

1801-2400

GSP.TRACON

SC

10100.0

Night

TRACON GSP

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR UNMAN

Class E GSP

TRACON GSP

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

VFR

Climb

None

Class E GSP

Facility GSP.TRACON

Government

Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1242158

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was the radar watch supervisor at the time of the incident; and was also working the flight data position.OJT was in progress at West Radar. Aircraft Y called Local Controller for taxi clearance; the pilot requested VFR departure to AVL at 4;500 feet; and Local Controller assigned 4;500 feet. Local Controller cleared the aircraft for takeoff. The pilot contacted West Radar; who advised the pilot to proceed on course; and stated 'Altitude your discretion.' The pilot then stated that he 'Would probably go up to about 10;000 feet.' This action put Aircraft Y opposite direction to and converging with Aircraft X; which was 28 miles away in AVL Approach airspace; landing GSP; and descending out of 14;000 feet for 7;000 feet. (West had already accepted a handoff from AVL on Aircraft X.)West called Aircraft X to Aircraft Y. (Aircraft Y was at 10;000 feet; and Aircraft X was descending through 11;000 feet; the aircraft were now 14 miles apart with a closure rate of 600 knots.) He then requested AVL to assign a left turn heading 110 to Aircraft X; AVL advised that he would once the aircraft descended into AVL airspace (upper limit 10;000 feet); and requested West to start Aircraft Y down. No descent was issued.Immediately after this I instructed West Radar to 'Do something to ensure they don't converge.' West then issued a left turn heading 290; and a subsequent turn to heading 270; but this was insufficient to prevent a TCAS RA by Aircraft X; who climbed from 10;100 feet to 10;600 feet before resuming descent. Before switching Aircraft X to West; AVL advised that the aircraft had responded to an RA. The closest lateral proximity was 2.55 miles.The following day I discussed the incident with the trainee; the OJTI; and the trainee's supervisor. Both the trainee and the OJTI believed that Aircraft X would descend below Aircraft Y without any problem. In addition; the OJTI thought Aircraft X was further east than it actually was. (Arrivals from that direction are usually on the UNMAN STAR; which was a few miles east of Aircraft X; it appeared that the aircraft was direct GSP.) The trainee had forgotten that Aircraft X needed to stop its descent at 10;000 feet in order to slow to 250 knots.1. A number of controllers at this facility; including the trainee in this incident; state 'Altitude your discretion' to VFR departures. This phraseology is not consistent with positive control. In this particular situation; the best course of action was to permit Aircraft Y to climb no higher than 6;000 feet; which would have eliminated any chance of a TCAS RA. Had the pilot wanted higher; and his initial request to the tower was 4;500 feet; he could have been given higher with a vector to ensure that Aircraft X was not a factor.2. It appears that many of our newer terminal radar controllers are not cognizant of closure rates; and simply do not realize just how fast two jets can converge with each other. This is an occasional problem on the southwest side of our airspace where we can have arrivals descending from 11;000 feet over ELW VOR with departures climbing to 10;000 feet towards the same NAVAID. During this incident the closure rate exceeded 600 knots; and when the trainee first called traffic; the aircraft were about 80 seconds away from a collision. Greater emphasis on closure rates during radar classrooms at the FAA Academy and at the facility would be beneficial.

GSP TRACON Flight Line Manager (FLM) reports of a loss of separation by a training team on West radar. The controllers did not separate two aircraft one VFR climbing and one IFR descending.

1199002

201408

1201-1800

ROA.Airport

VA

Daylight

TRACON ROA; Tower ROA

Corporate

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ROA

TRACON ROA; Tower ROA

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ROA

Facility ROA.Tower

Government

Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1199002

Facility ROA.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1197597.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Radar Approach Control approved opposite direction for a departing CRJ. After the necessary separation was applied between the departing CRJ and Aircraft X; Radar turned Aircraft X onto the visual approach for Runway 34 and switched Aircraft X to the Tower. At this time; Aircraft X was higher than normal on the Visual Approach. Aircraft X checks on the Tower frequency and says he is a bit high and needs to lose some altitude. The Local controller says; 'Roger;' and clears Aircraft X to land on Runway 34. Radar then switches Aircraft Y to the Tower frequency on a visual approach for Runway 34. The Local controller makes visual contact of both aircraft out the window and clears Aircraft Y to land #2 behind Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was approximately 5 miles behind Aircraft X. Radar calls Local and asks what Aircraft X is doing and Local said Aircraft X said he needed to lose some altitude. Radar tells Local; 'You're separating them.' The local controller then checks Aircraft Y's speed and asks Aircraft Y to reduce to final approach speed. The Local controller also calls the traffic to Aircraft Y and asks Aircraft Y to report the traffic in sight. Aircraft Y reports the traffic not in sight. The Local controller then asks Aircraft X if he can proceed straight in at present altitude and the pilot responds in the affirmative. Aircraft Y continues to close the gap with Aircraft X and the Local controller is unsure if the necessary runway separation will exist between the two aircraft and asks Aircraft Y again if he has the traffic in sight; thinking if the pilot of Aircraft Y can see Aircraft X; the pilot may of Aircraft Y may be able to keep his own visual separation; potentially providing the required runway separation. The Local controller realizes the required runway separation will not be met and tells Aircraft Y to turn right heading 070 and to climb and maintain 5000 at the request of the Tower CIC. Local then calls Radar and asks if he would like Aircraft Y back for re-sequence due to the fact that visual separation could not be established for the necessary runway separation; neither visual separation applied by the Local controller nor pilot applied visual separation would have worked. Radar declines taking back Aircraft Y for resequence; so the Local controller gives Aircraft Y a continuing right turn to a 360 degree turn to rejoin the final for Runway 34.1. When an aircraft says that he or she needs to lose altitude; ask how the pilot plans do this or approve some form of maneuver to do so; such as s-turns.2. Ask a pilot on a Visual Approach that is cleared 'number two' to make a 360 turn to rejoin final sooner so as to be certain of the runway separation.3. Communicate more effectively and with greater detail between Local and Radar approach control so that each person is aware of what the pilots are doing; especially when running a sequence.

Runway 34 in use; most jets request to depart runway 24 due to length and mountains at the end of 34. Runway 24 was being repainted and could be used with pull back basis. Tower requested opposite direction with a jet to depart Runway 16 with a TMU time. The aircraft should have been in drop list with runway other than active per SOP; but was not. I was working east Roanoke radar and had 2 in bounds and several other aircraft and released the jet off Runway 16 with a short release window. Because of the opposite direction I needed to keep Aircraft X higher and wider than normal; but not by much. I turned the jet under and inside of Aircraft X and then used visual separation and gave Aircraft X visual approach to 34 at 070 feet 10 miles out on base not turned to final. Aircraft Y was similar speed and about 17 miles out opposite base. I vectored Aircraft Y to follow and told him about the traffic he was following. I turned Aircraft Y in 6 miles behind Aircraft X on 4 mile final. Aircraft Y slowed to 170 and Aircraft X slowed to 120. As I started to switch Aircraft Y to tower I noticed Aircraft X turn left off final then seemed to start an S turn. I called the tower because any change to inbounds must be coordinated per SOP. The tower did not seem to answer so tried to make clear they must provide the separation if they are altering aircraft on final and then switched Aircraft Y so they could apply visual separation or use what ever separation they had planned out. I found out afterward the tower did not notice Aircraft X making S turns. Aircraft Y was sent around and I suggested to the tower they keep him in the pattern because it was a very clear day.First I see airport not cooperating well when painting the surface areas and tower assumed less delay by using opposite direction. I would have like to see the SOP used when aircraft are departing runway other than advertised and it should be put in drop list with runway. I may need to use 10 miles separation for arrivals to provide room for pilot error and other unexpected events. I could not allow opposite direction and let my arrivals land first. I think tower may need to work on how to separate aircraft.

ROA Tower and TRACON controllers report of an opposite direction arrival with two aircraft. The first aircraft does S turns on final due to loss of altitude and the second aircraft catches the first due to its speed and not turning. The second aircraft is sent around.

1150151

201402

1801-2400

AVL.Airport

NC

3700.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

TRACON AVL

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C AVL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1150151

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1150287.0

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

ATIS reported to expect the visual to Runway 16. A visual approach was loaded and briefed including obstacle clearances and a pattern altitude of 3;700 FT 5-8 NM prior to SUG; ATC cleared us direct KEANS [direct] AVL. This would place us 5 NM from the runway with a 145 degree turn to final. We were cleared from 10;000 FT MSL to 6;000 FT MSL. Between 10-15 NM from the airport; ATC requested if we had the field in sight in which we acknowledged. We were cleared for a visual approach. We selected heading mode to give us a downwind; base and final. The downwind to base would take us in proximity to a 2;645 FT depicted tower. Other obstacles were considered outside our vertical and lateral paths. We were in terrain mode. We selected 3;700 FT and began a descent from 6;000 FT. Between 4;000 FT-4;300 FT we received a GPWS 'Terrain; Terrain; Pull-Up'. This was in day visual conditions with terrain and obstacle clearly in sight. We took positive corrective action until the GPWS warning/alert stopped and terrain clearance was assured. We advised ATC after we had landed. Although terrain clearance was visually assured; the mountainous terrain caused the GPWS to activate. The descent rate was less than 1;500 FPM trending to 1;000 FPM.

The Captain stated that being that it was day visual conditions this would be acceptable; but in no way would we do a visual if it were night due to the terrain.Recommend vectors onto the LOC runway 16 or full procedure because a visual to 16 requires the mountain range to the east to be flown over at an altitude or rate that may cause a GPWS warning/alert.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS 'Terrain' warning on visual approach to AVL Runway 16.

1871699

202201

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1871699

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion

1871700.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

N

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

Operating ZZZ-ZZZ1 parked at Gate XX we had run the before start checklist all the way through and were ready to push. I verified the ground crew was ready for brake release; released the parking brake and asked the First Officer to call for push. The First Officer called Ramp requesting to push; Ramp cleared us to push giving way to the airplane parking at Gate XY. I relayed these instructions to the ground crew. We didn't move and then the ground crew told me to set the parking brake; which I did. I saw a group of rampers coming out of the terminal looking towards our left wing. I checked to see what they were looking at and then saw that the winglet of the plane parking at Gate XY had hit our aileron. I asked the First Officer to call Ops and get the jet ridge brought back to the plane while I called Dispatch and Maintenance. Once the cabin door was reopened and the gate agent was aware of what was going on; we deplaned the passengers.Wing walkers should look at wingtips to verify clearance. Verify there is enough space for our aircraft to park at [Gate] XY with a larger aircraft parked at [Gate] XX at ZZZ.

On DATE approximately XA50 local; at Gate XX at ZZZ; while at the gate with the tug driver having control of the aircraft; another airline; attempted to enter their gate ended up running their right wing into our left wing. Our aircraft was not moving during the impact. We were at the gate with the jet bridge not connected. Ramp control had given our clearance to push back to spot after giving way to aircraft entering the gate at XY (gate to our left). We relayed this information to the tug driver and they acknowledged us. Then about ten seconds later the tug driver had asked the Captain to set the brake. We saw rampers running towards our aircraft and that is when the Captain had seen that the other aircraft had ran their right wing into the back of our left wing while entering their gate. After determining that there was no emergency that required emergency services; we had a jet bridge driver come back down so we could deplane the aircraft. We contacted Company and Maintenance came out to the aircraft. No passengers or crew members were injured. Our aircraft was stationary at the time and we were struck by another aircraft. In addition; the aircraft was under the control of contract rampers when the incident occurred. As a result; the incident was not the result of any action or inaction on the contractors part and any recommendations for preventing future incidents of this nature would involve third parties.

Air carrier flight crew reported an aircraft parking at the adjacent gate made contact with their wingtip while sitting at the gate waiting for push back.

1438016

201704

1201-1800

P50.TRACON

AZ

5000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON P50

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class B PHX

TRACON P50

Corporate

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Class B PHX

Facility P50.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Situational Awareness; Workload

1438016

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Aircraft; Weather

Airspace Structure

Aircraft X was westbound on the downwind assigned 5000 feet. Aircraft Y was released off of FFZ assigned 3000 feet and 180 heading. After I radar identified Aircraft Y there were numerous VFR aircraft in the vicinity appearing likely to converge with him. I climbed Aircraft Y to 4000 feet. There were still numerous aircraft in their vicinity. I turned Aircraft X to the north heading 350 and as soon as Aircraft X was abeam Aircraft Y I climbed Aircraft Y to 5000 feet to avoid the several VFR aircraft they were conflicting with. I felt this was the safe way even though there may not have been 3 miles lateral separation with Aircraft X.The only fix would be to lower the Class Bravo airspace.

P50 TRACON Controller reported climbing an aircraft through the altitude of another aircraft with less than the required three lateral miles lateral separation to avoid numerous VFR aircraft.

1570682

201808

0001-0600

ZZZ.Tower

US

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Initial Climb

None

Small Aircraft

1.0

VFR

Descent

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local; Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1570682

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was working LC [Local] combined with TCIC [Tower Controller in Charge]. Aircraft X called me with 'the ATIS' requesting to depart FPXX (float pond) opposite direction. I had opposite direction traffic arriving; but I advised him that if he would be ready in about three minutes (I had a gap) I could accommodate that since I had another aircraft waiting to go opposite direction off of Runway XY Right as well. He advised that he would be ready in three minutes and I instructed him to advise when ready for departure at FPXX. He called ready and I advised him to remain outside the channel; traffic was landing opposite direction. He replied 'Roger; Aircraft X.' We don't typically tell aircraft to 'hold short' of the float pond since there is no designated hold lines or markings; so instead it's common to use 'remain outside of the channel'. Aircraft Y was on short final for FPX; he advised that there was traffic departing opposite direction. I looked down the float pond to find Aircraft X airborne midfield off of FPXX just above the trees. I instructed him to 'turn left on course now.' I had intended to give him the wind and altimeter when clearing him for takeoff; but since I didn't get the chance; I never verified that he had the current ATIS. When I told him on frequency that he had been instructed to remain outside the channel; he was confused because I told him to be ready in three minutes and when he called ready he thought I had issued him a takeoff clearance. I did not notice his departure sooner because there is a known blind spot at the N end of the FP (the threshold for FPXX). I did not push for a read-back of my instruction for him to remain outside the channel either and no such read-back was obtained. The N end of the float pond is also known for intermittently poor radio coverage; so that may have been a factor in him hearing that he had been cleared for takeoff even though no transmissions that sounded like a landing/departure clearance were made during that time. The estimated lateral distance between Aircraft Y & Aircraft X when Aircraft X turned to avoid was approximately 3;000 feet; Aircraft Y was just coming up on Taxiway B; Aircraft X was just past mid-pond. Aircraft Y continued inbound for landing FP2; going around could have worsened the situation.You have my permission to share with concerned parties.The blind spot at FPXX should be addressed. I should have obtained a read-back for the pilot to remain outside the channel/hold short of FPXX (it would be helpful if there were markers for this).

Tower Controller reported a NMAC between opposite direction traffic.

1106205

201307

1201-1800

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

31000.0

Daylight

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Oil Filter

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1106205

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Workload

11069214.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

I was flying the IRO position. I was on my crew rest break when I was called back to the cockpit and advised that we had an EICAS message - RT OIL FILTER. We were over the Atlantic Ocean at FL310. We ran the appropriate checklists which led to an engine shutdown. We declared an emergency with Control and diverted. We landed overweight. The passengers and crew deplaned normally. The Captain did a great job running the cockpit and flying the aircraft.

Level FL310 on the oceanic portion of our flight; we got an EICAS message 'RT OIL FILTER.' We ran the checklist; which led to an eventual engine shutdown. We requested and received a clearance from Control to divert the nearest suitable and listed enroute alternate airport. We declared a MAYDAY; announced our situation on GUARD frequency and informed Dispatch on SATCOM. We flew the clearance to an uneventful overweight landing. Prior to leaving the runway we had the fire/rescue personnel inspect the brakes and landing gear; and were told we were safe to continue taxi to parking. After the aircraft was safely parked at an off gate location; fuse plugs melted in two tires on the right main gear. Fire personnel again inspected the aircraft and determined it [was] safe. Passengers and crew deplaned normally. My crew provided outstanding guidance and support; the flight attendants were excellent. I know of no deviations or discrepancies with procedures or regulations. At the time of the engine shutdown; we had approximately 14;000 LBS of fuel in the center tank; which we had the option to dump. Based on the fuel dump and overweight landing section in the Emergency chapter of our Flight Manual Part I; and recent discussions on the subject in recurrent training; I as Captain decided not to dump. The relatively small amount of fuel available for dump would not allow us to get below max landing weight (we landed at about 360;000 LBS); I was quite satisfied with the single engine performance of the aircraft; we were going to an 11;000 FT runway while the charts called for less than 5;000 FT; and it was a coastal; sea level runway on flat terrain giving us no climb limited landing weight issues. Dump was not required; in fact some 767 aircraft do not even have the dump system installed. I did not feel I was compromising safety in any way. I landed on speed; on target and rolled to the end of the 11;000 FT runway. I do not know how I could have been any [easier] on the brakes. I was actually somewhat surprised that the fuse plugs melted after landing. I wonder if dumping the 14;000 LBS would have been just enough to make the difference to save the tires. I feel there needs to be more information including the brake energy discussion in the fuel dump vs. heavy weight landing section of our manuals and in training. Our only brake energy guidance is for an aborted takeoff.

A B767-300 EICAS alerted RT OIL FILTER while on the Oceanic portion of the flight; so an emergency was declared and flight returned to the nearest suitable airport for an uneventful landing except two wheel fuse plugs melted.

1743175

202005

15MO.Airport

MO

500.0

Night

Personal

Small Aircraft

Part 91

Landing

Class G 15MO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 2300

1743175

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Total 3800

1743179.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

There are a series of poorly lit; (some unlit) windmills directly to the east of the private airstrip 15MO. They are currently not marked on VFR sectionals. This creates a potential conflict to aircraft descending into the traffic pattern from the east. This is a much frequented private airfield; and I believe the lack of lighting on these towers could create a fatal accident; especially at night.

Series of poorly lit and/or unlit towers directly to the east of 15MO (a private airfield) that could create a conflict to any aircraft descending into the airfield traffic pattern from the east.

Pilots reported a series of poorly lighted and unlighted windmills nearby 15MO; a private airfield; that are not marked on VFR sectional chart. Pilots believe the lack of lighting causes a hazard to arriving traffic; especially at night.

995323

201202

1801-2400

ZDC.ARTCC

VA

14000.0

Mixed

10

Night

7000

Center ZDC

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class E ZDC

Altitude Alert

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 261

995323

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 241

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

995338.0

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors

We were at 14;000 MSL on a vector to rejoin our routing. We were being held down for traffic. When that traffic passed overhead we were cleared to climb to FL190 and switched to Washington Center. The Captain dialed in what I thought was 190 on the MCP and then dialed in the frequency on the radio because his hand was closest. I do not remember repeating '190' when he removed his hand from the MCP; but it is a procedure and habit I do regularly.There was a lot of chatter on the frequency so I waited to check in on the frequency until it quieted down. I leaned forward to check the out and off times from the FMC. At that time; we were approaching FL180; so we set 29.92 in the altimeters. I wrote down the times. Then; Center called us to see if we were on frequency yet. I responded that we were 'passing 190 for 290' as I looked at the altitude window on the MCP. Center responded that we were only cleared to 190; but it was 'no big deal' because there were no other aircraft above us. Then; he cleared us to climb to FL260. When Center called us; we were passing 19.2.

When finally given a climb and normal speed; I thought the Controller said FL290 versus FL190. It seemed odd to get that much climb from Washington Center all at once; but my pilot not flying seemed to accept it...Although not a particularly difficult day; I think both the First Officer and I let down our guard at the same time. He missed my mistake and I did not pursue verification on a clearance that seemed a little out of place.If something does not seem right--even by a little bit--pursue verification from the other crew member and then ATC. An old lesson relearned.

A B737-700 flight crew failed to follow SOP to verify confirmation of a clearance to a higher altitude. As they passed through FL190 for 290 ATC advised they had only been cleared to 190. They were then cleared to climb to FL270.

1685953

201909

1801-2400

CAK.TRACON

OH

98.0

6.0

5500.0

Clear-Ceiling not factor; 15

TRACON CAK

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class C CAK

Other unknown

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Other unknown

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 1291; Flight Crew Type 715

1685953

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 150; Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

I was flying at approximately 5;500 feet at about 80 knots airspeed. I was using VFR Flight Following; was in contact with Akron-Canton (CAK) approach control on 125.50 MHz; and was squawking an assigned transponder code.I passed an object that appeared to be an Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (UAV). The UAV was generally spherical in shape and about six to twelve inches in diameter. The UAV also appeared to have protrusions or extensions; that could have been rotors and rotor mounts. The UAV was generally black; with other color(s). The UAV passed less than two hundred feet to my right; and less than fifty feet below. It passed generally parallel to my track of flight. The UAV may have been traveling in the same or opposite direction as my track of flight; or it may have been nearly stationary. I did not perceive any relative lateral motion. The total time of observation was less than two seconds.Within ten seconds I keyed my microphone; and said 'Akron Approach; light experimental [tail number];' or nearly identical words to the same effect. There was some delay in establishing communication with the controller who initially repeated my assigned transponder code. I advised the Controller that I was already using VFR flight following. When the Controller asked the purpose of my transmission; I stated I wished to report being nearly struck by a drone. Subsequently; a Controller asked that I telephone [number removed]. I agreed and the rest of the flight proceeded without further incident. After parking the aircraft; I made a few notes; called the number; and made an (audio recorded) report with CAK Approach Control.

Experimental aircraft pilot reported an NMAC with a UAV.

1461151

201706

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

25000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Compressor Bleed Valve

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1461151

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1461152.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft

I was the Pilot Flying (PF) and my First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). We departed ZZZ. The weather was VMC throughout the entire flight. While climbing; still below our clearance of FL230 we received a Bleed Air Duct Warning. I told my FO that I had the radios and controls and for him to reference the QRH. While he opened the book to find the procedures I was told by ATC to climb to FL250 and to fly direct to the departure airport; so that's what we did. At this point I'm now back communicating with my FO and we observed that both bleed valves had closed. In this case the QRH required us to descent to 10;000 feet or the lowest safe altitude. We asked ATC do descend to 10;000 feet. ATC responded by clearing us to 24;000 feet. I told them that we needed 10;000 feet. ATC response was that he was working on it. We began our descent to 24;000 feet and moments later we received the clearance to 10;000 feet. During this time the FO and I closely monitored the cabin altitude as it was climbing; but pretty slowly. For this reason; we descended at a good rate but not so quickly as to make it uncomfortable. We continued through the QRH checklist with no problem and completed the procedures for unpressurized flight as well. Just before reaching our level off at 10;000 feet we received a Cabin Alt Caution message; and then as we leveled off we received a Cabin Alt Warning message. We never began the Immediate Action procedure for Cabin Alt Emergency Descent for the reason that the Cabin Pressurization messages popped up so close to 10;000 feet. Furthermore; the Cabin Altitude Warning message popped up multiple times after we leveled at 10;000. During the time of our descent we properly switched radios and controls back and forth from one another a number of times. We did this because I thought it appropriate that the passengers initially hear from the Captain. I tried to make the initial announcement to the passengers; however; the PA from the captain side was transmitting intermittently. For this reason; I requested the FO to make multiple announcement to inform the passengers of our status and any updates. I also had the FO inform the Flight Attendants of our situation and any updates. Furthermore; it was in the descent that we messaged company/dispatch [and] let them know what we were doing and ask if they wanted us to continue or to turn back for the departure airport. We had the fuel for either option. Finally; they notified us to return to base so we told ATC that [an alternate] would be our destination. The rest of the flight became very hot. By the time we got on the ground and then waited for a gate the temperature in the cabin had reached 36 degrees Celsius and 38 in the flight deck. Other than that; after the QRH was completed we had a safe return.Company was well aware of our situation and I wish that gates would be more readily available when an aircraft has to return to field.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported a dual bleed valve failure during climbout and returned to departure airport.

1748666

202007

1201-1800

MRI.Tower

AK

1000.0

Tower MRI

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

VFR

Initial Climb

Class C ANC

Tower MRI

Air Carrier

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

None

Class C ANC

Facility ZZZ..Tower

Government

Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1748666

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Airspace Structure

ANC coordinated the departure of Aircraft Y from Runway 33 (ANC) to Runway 6 (EDF) which was approved. Then they requested a point out through MRI. GC/CIC was combined and the Controller unabled the transition through MRI's Class D. Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff with the deviation. 40 seconds later; A11 TRACON called us to give us a red light in order for Aircraft Y to transition through the FAR Part 93 corridor inside the MRI Class D. GC/CIC told them behind the guy that was airborne and A11 TRACON argued and said no he's coming into your airspace. GC/CIC told them unable red light. A11 TRACON Controller hung up without acknowledging. There was an aircraft on visual approach to ANC Runway 33 and Aircraft Y was not rolling. Aircraft X kept the Part 93 altitude deviation and flew through the corridor at 010. GC/CIC called back and told them behind the 010 target mid-channel; red light. A11 TRACON did not acknowledge and hung up the line. A11 TRACON refused to call us back and release the FAR 93 corridor back to us after Aircraft Y landed and there were no other pertinent IFR arrivals on the radar for 64 miles out. We are not allowed to call and remind them so a manager had to call their manager and remind them that they can't leave us 'penalty red light' because they are mad at us. (Because it is still our airspace when we are open.)The intention of this situation was that Aircraft Y wanted to depart ANC Runway 33 then intercept the EDF Runway 6 final instead of flying an extra 4 minutes of flight time to depart and loop back around to fly the 10 mile final into EDF. It normally would not be an issue; except ANC doesn't give a heads up until they're about clear Aircraft Y. The majority of our aircraft are single engine fixed-wings flown by student pilots; bush pilots; and weekend pilots. Also of note is the fact that the majority of these aircraft don't have the performance characteristics to make the climb to 020 at a moment's notice to avoid the Far Part 93 corridor so they are forced to descend to 006 or below and fly across the inlet. If they lose their only engine; they will land in the water and most likely become hypothermic during the swim to one of the shores and/or be swept out to sea with the very strong current. Our pilots should not be forced to change their flight paths because Aircraft Y wants to yank and bank it from Tower to Tower for their convenience.This FAR 93 corridor has been an ongoing issue for the entire time that I have worked at MRI and previously mitigated through reports multiple times. Previous guidance and agreed upon steps from prior mitigations is that this is our airspace; A11 TRACON is not allowed to take the airspace from us and must ask; pilots already given the altitude deviation and cleared for takeoff will retain the deviation; MRI must sterilize the airspace or resolve the conflicts prior to releasing the airspace. A11 TRACON has stated on paper that they will follow this guidance; however their actions speak louder than their words. They have told us that by answering the landline; we are acknowledging the red light and there is a specific crew that denies the altitude deviation on an airborne aircraft when they give us a red light. We have the right to approve or deny the use or release of our airspace when we are open. This continued practice is unsafe and will cause a collision over a notoriously busy chunk of terminal airspace in close proximity with terminal airports.Not sure if it's pertinent: A11 TRACON and ANC are still working the COVID 5/5 schedules. MRI has reintegrated the crews; but does not have the staffing to support working our normal operations. MRI is still operating winter hours of 0700-2200 local when normally we would be operating 0700-0000 local. LOA change needs to happen. The language is ambiguous and vague. We do not release the airspace to EDF just because they ask for it and we are also required to sterilizethat chunk of airspace prior to its release. The LOA language needs to be updated to reflect that A11 TRACON is APREQ-ing the airspace for an IFR arrival and allow us enough time to sterilize it. The lack of safety culture and expectation bias at A11 TRACON is going to continue to create unsafe situations and potentially a future collision. Also; an airspace study should be conducted. This is very congested terminal airspace and the Class C should probably be extended to be a full circle around ANC. This would prevent 90% of the other issues that A11 TRACON complains about reference the VFR aircraft flying in/out of LHD; MRI; and surrounding uncontrolled aerodromes.

MRI Tower Controller reported LOA problems with the overlying A11 TRACON.

1313452

201511

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1800.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Military

Military Transport

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1313452

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1310717.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Procedure

To this date I have not been given time to review the radar data or the voice tapes. The Operations Manager told me; the day after; that they would get me time to review and fill out ATSAP. The week after; a Front Line Manager removed me off position at the end of my shift (18 minutes at the end of a 10 hour day) and wanted to discuss the event. He offered me to look at the data and he wanted to talk about the incident. I told him we would need more than 18 minutes to review the data but I would be happy to discuss the incident.Aircraft X on Visual Approach to RWY XXL. Aircraft Y released off of ZZZ heading 220 degrees; climbing to 3000 feet. I vectored the Aircraft X tight on base to allow room for the military transport to turn downwind. When Aircraft X was about 10 mile base Aircraft Y was airborne and in a right turn to downwind.I noticed Aircraft Y turning eastbound toward Aircraft X. I tried to contact Aircraft Y twice with no response. I then quoted the military transport to Aircraft X to establish visual separation. Aircraft X did not see the military transport so I immediately turned Aircraft X heading 130 degrees in an attempt to keep him away from the military transport who at this time is eastbound; potentially Nordo; and climbing to 3000 feet. I called ZZZ tower to see if they still had Aircraft Y; then tried again to contact Aircraft Y. My concern was that the aircraft was Nordo and potentially going to turn back toward the southwest and I had to keep Aircraft X clear. I then called tower to see if they were talking to Aircraft Y and they responded 'yes.' I told them to turn Aircraft Y heading 270 degrees climbing to 3000 feet establish positive separation; still not knowing that the Aircraft Y had been cleared to land. As soon as I was able to issue that control instruction I got off the line and noticed that an aircraft was airborne on Runway XXR [at ZZZ1]. I immediately went back to ZZZ1 tower to stop the departure at 2000 feet below Aircraft X. Aircraft Z was through 2500 feet so I stopped him at 2500 feet. I then got off the line and vectored Aircraft X heading 180 degrees to ensure diverging flight paths between Aircraft Z and Aircraft X and climbed Aircraft X to 4000. Unfortunately circumstances did not allow for conversation or questions; nor did they allow for proper landline phraseology.Aircraft were coming together rapidly and action needed to be taken to keep them apart! My actions were predicated on a wayward aircraft and not knowing what that aircraft was doing. I only had time to react and not ask questions. Tower controller listen to the aircraft and respond appropriately. Had the ZZZ1 Tower controller listened to the Aircraft Y pilot who reported on frequency climbing to 3000; he may have questioned the pilot and either looked out the window or at the radar display to accurately realize what was going on! This could have been avoided! Apparently the military transport pilots have tried this before; going to ZZZ1 tower directly to minimize delay. Some of these pilots fly for [Aircraft X's carrier] also so they are well aware of procedures and traffic flows. This pilot was probably trying to beat the system. He picked an unfortunate time and caused a perfect storm!

I cleared Aircraft Y to land on Runway XYR; thinking that he had been cleared for the Visual Approach by the approach controller. Aircraft X was inbound for the channel Runway XXL. I told Aircraft Y about Aircraft X; thinking that Aircraft X would either be maintaining visual separation or be restricted above Aircraft Y. Approach then called to ask if I was talking to Aircraft Y; and to issue a left turn and climb. I later realized that Aircraft Y had never checked in with approach; and the approach controller had no idea what Aircraft Y was doing. If an aircraft checks in that soon after departing ZZZ; then verify that they already spoke to approach control.

TRACON Controller had an aircraft on approach to one airport and a second aircraft released off an adjacent airport flying to the same airport as the one on approach. The departure aircraft did not contact the TRACON Controller but immediately contacted the arrival Tower Controller. The TRACON Controller vectored the aircraft on approach away and attempted to get contact with the departure. The TRACON Controller discovered the departure was on Tower frequency and relayed control instructions to further separate the traffic. In the meantime the Tower departed another aircraft which was climbing in to confliction with the arriving aircraft being vectored for traffic. The Controller stopped this departure's climb; but not in enough time to prevent a loss of separation.

1778853

202012

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Mixed

Center ZZZ

Corporate

Light Transport

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR ZZZZZ

TFR Y

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Workload; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1778853

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 8869; Flight Crew Type 120

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1779222.0

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure

This aircraft called asking for lower; they were no longer on my scope; I did not know who was calling. The sector was completely out of control; we had a tracker; and D side. The level of traffic at the same time was unheard of; uncalled for and completely irresponsible. There was no in trail spacing for ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 arrivals; the departures out of ZZZ2; ZZZ3; And ZZZ1 were not stopped. The sector was not split. I do not belief we had the staffing to split the sector. Supervisors did not do enough to slow the sector down; TMU did not do enough to slow the sector down. This is one of the worst situations I have been put in in my XX years as a controller. People should be held responsible for the out of control sector. This event should not have happened. This event was damaging to my health. I think something like this should never be allowed to happened again; and there should be an investigation into how so many airplanes can be allowed in a sector that was already overloaded with traffic. I often asked for a couple minutes to stop the traffic and let me catch up. I several times asked for help from the D side and the Tracker neither one seemed to have any idea what was happening. There should be national flow initiatives to slow the traffic down to these saturated airports. Planes should have to wait safely on the ground. This can not be that hard to figure out. They can safely flow planes to all the ZZZ4 airports; they sure as hell can figure out how to do it to South ZZZ5 airports. Staffing needs to be returned to normal ASAP. TMU needs to get their act together. If the chief of the facility gets this; he does not need to look any further then this session to see that TMU is broken in this building.

I was flying Aircraft X; at this time. During our arrival into ZZZ6 we were on the ZZZZZ STAR talking to ZZZ Center. The controller was very busy and I would say over loaded. He instructed us to descend to 10;000 ft. so we did as we were approaching the inner 10 mile ring on the TFR we radioed many times asking for lower and waiting to be handed off to ZZZ7 Approach. When he finally handed us off we apparently entered the 10 mile ring just as ZZZ7 approach replied to us. We were instructed to turn right I believe to a 250 heading and descend to 8;000 ft. As I started the turn I got a RA and was told I was being followed by the Aircraft Y. I was then asked to descend to 5;000 ft. and he radioed the fighter that he now had radio contact with me and was released. He continued to vector us to land at ZZZ6 and told me to call Phone Number. When I parked the aircraft I called and told him what had happened. I then had a interview with the government agency and told them what had happened. We were in and out of the clouds on the arrival and with as busy as the controller was he never gave us the hand off until it was to late. Knowing we were close to the TFR and the airspace and controller was saturated we could not make any abrupt turns to avoid the situation and could not get the controller to answer us in time to get properly vectored around.

Captain reported due to ATC workload and failed communications; Captain entered TFR.

1057513

201212

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

4500.0

IMC

Fog; 1

Daylight

200

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B747-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

Fuselage Panel

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 6500

1057513

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 7000

1057489.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Upon completion of flap retraction; felt mild thump followed by onset of continuous low frequency buzz and mild vibration in area of door 2R. As relief captain; I visually inspected wing leading edges and upper wing area from cabin windows on both sides of aircraft. Found nothing irregular. Also noticed a mild squeal emanating from upper area of door 2R seal. All handling; system operation and flight characteristics normal with no pressurization issues throughout all phases of flight. Consulted with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. Discussion concluded possible door seal pinched / exposed to slip stream or conditioned air belly door ajar. Decided to continue while monitoring status. As flight entered ZZZ airspace [five plus hours into flight]; reevaluated vibration and decided it was getting bad enough to land and investigate after consulting again with Dispatch and Maintenance. Declared emergency and diverted to ZZZ. Subsequent descent; approach and landing normal. Initially dumped 25k lbs of fuel (30k feet) then another 10k lbs (6k+ feet) closer to initial approach. Max landing weight upon touchdown. Weather on landing: calm winds; 4 nm visibility; 1600 ft overcast; light snow. Reported BRAC good - fair with runway swept and sprayed for our arrival. Emergency equipment was requested and they were out upon landing but not needed or used. Braking action for us was good. Briefed Cat III approach & autoland which was executed with no problems. Subsequent descent; approach and landing normal. Upon arrival at gate; were met at airplane by FAA (local; district and region); NTSB (local and region); Company service manager; Pegasus maintenance and local police. Passengers were handled quickly by service manager. Cabin crew was transported to hotel. Pilots remained at aircraft until FAA & NTSB assured of power removed from FDR and DVR. Gave brief facts verbally to FAA and NTSB. Inspection by maintenance and pilots revealed two ACM [Air Cycle Machine] belly panels departed airplane. Also noted multiple holes in belly next to & aft of departed panels. Noted a partial puncture hole on case of forward-most right ACM. No other damage observed. If maintenance was done in this area; verify integrity of ACM belly panel security before release for flight. If no maintenance was done; perhaps schedule periodic inspections of ACM belly panel attachments on a more frequent basis than presently done.

Five plus hours after takeoff; Purser noticed an increase in intensity of noise and vibration. Two relief pilot crew inspected and concurred with that assessment. I went to that area personally and noticed vibration and loud noise from the floor area rows 21-38; 2R to 3R.Flight crew consensus determined possible structural failure and immediate divert to a suitable airport. Conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance and determined ZZZ weather was now suitable for landing under the conditions as opposed to ZZZ1.

B747 flight crew experienced a mild thump followed by onset of continuous low frequency buzz and mild vibration in the area of Door 2R; upon completion of flap retraction. No faults can be found and the flight continues for several hours before the crew elects to divert for maintenance inspection. Two ACM (pack) panels are found missing from the belly of the aircraft.

1032936

201208

0001-0600

DFW.Airport

TX

Poor Lighting

No Aircraft

Facility D10.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown

1032936

Facility D10.TRACON

Government

Departure; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

1032939.0

ATC Issue All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

The Voice Switching System (RDVS) at DFW failed. The first indications were the failure of DR1; MN and FE frequencies. Controllers stopped departures at both DFW Towers. Many frequencies continued to operate normally for a few minutes. All of the RDVS equipment frequencies and land lines ultimately failed and controllers moved to the emergency jacks. The TMU stopped all arrivals into and out of the DFW terminal airspace. All controllers plugged into emergency jacks and with no land line capability; one arrival from each corner post and one departure from each Tower were allowed into the airspace. A TMC was assigned the responsibility to run between positions with any coordination necessary and was to coordinate necessary information with adjacent facilities via the commercial telephone. Tech Ops advised that they could reset the RDVS but it would take 20 minutes. The decision was made to go to ATC Zero until the reset occurred. It appeared the reset was working and TMU took us out of ATC Zero and returned us to an ATC Alert status. DFW departures were resumed with 15 miles in trail while controllers communicated from the emergency jacks. The system appeared to have reset and arrivals were resumed 20 miles in trail. Arrivals and departures were resumed with normal spacing. DFW Tower reported 76 departure delays. DAL reported 8 departure delays. There were an unknown number of arrival delays. Some satellite airports held aircraft on the ramp and didn't even taxi them out. The D10/DFW Tower RDVS system needs to be replaced. The talk among the technicians was that 'cards' were replaced a few days before and if they are not done with a certain time frame in between; then the system goes into failure. This is evidently a glitch or an old problem that they have been 'worked around' for years. The problem with controllers switching to the emergency radios is two fold: 1. most positions are worked with at least one other position combined to it and aircraft are on multiple frequencies. Each position on has two emergency radios for the primary frequency; a Red Jack and an Orange Jack. The logistics of having to unplug and run down to another position to transmit into that emergency radio to switch aircraft to the other frequency is dangerous and unacceptable. 2. The lighting in the TRACON is very spotty with a few bright lights in places surrounded by extreme dark in others. The lighting is so poor near the RADAR scopes that is takes extremely good eyesight to determine if you are plugging into a Red Emergency Jack which has very limited transmission distance; verses an Orange Emergency Jack which has better transmission distance. In either case using the emergency jacks allows the controller no access to land line or interphone communication.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

D10 Controller described a complete RDVS failure that eliminated all inter/intra-landline connectivity and required the use of emergency equipment. The reporter noted that the RDVS equipment needs to be replaced ASAP.

1188845

201407

1201-1800

BIF.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ELP

Air Carrier

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

VOR / VORTAC ewm

Landing

Class D BIF

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1188845

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airport; Procedure

Procedure

Upon arrival at Ft. Bliss Biggs Army Airfield; Runway 21 was NOTAMed for men and equipment on the runway and a displaced threshold which closes the first 4;000 FT or so of Runway 21. We were cleared to fly the VOR 21 approach to Runway 21 without any mention from Approach Control or Tower of men and equipment on the runway and any mention of the displaced threshold. I believe there is a requirement that Tower should mention these hazards to arriving aircraft. After talking to Tower via the land line they implied that this is not a requirement. The approaches to the runway bring you to the normal touchdown point which is dangerous not only to the men working; but a part of the runway has been excavated around the normal touchdown zone; so if an aircraft mistakenly landed there it would destroy the airplane. Please pass along to all crews. Normally this NOTAM would also be available through ATIS; but BIF uses El Paso regional airport ATIS for arriving traffic which makes no mention of BIF airfield NOTAMs. Approach Control should not have cleared us for an Instrument approach if a runway has a displaced threshold. Tower should mention to every landing aircraft that men and equipment are on the runway and that there is a displaced threshold. Add BIF NOTAMs to El Paso airport ATIS.

Flight crew landed on BIF Runway 21 and unexpectedly discovered men and equipment near the displaced threshold. The BIF NOTAMs are published through the normal FAA channel; but apparently this crew did not get them.

1107088

201308

1801-2400

ZZZ.Tower

US

3.0

1200.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

None

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 195; Flight Crew Type 195

Situational Awareness

1107088

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 100; Vertical 25

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was on extended downwind; right traffic for Runway XX; approximately 3.5 miles south of the runway. Controller had told me he would call my base. It was a busy pattern. I heard him clear another aircraft further south of my position for landing XX; traffic ahead was a Cessna on 3 and a half mile final. The other aircraft said they had no traffic in sight. Controller asked me if I was on final. I responded; 'Negative; you didn't call my base.' Controller responded: 'Cessna 182 turn left to north heading; fly to the highway; then re-enter right pattern at midfield.' I confirmed the instruction; then turned left to a north heading and started flying to the highway. Within 10-30 seconds; I saw oncoming traffic; another Cessna flying directly toward me at what seemed to be a very similar altitude. I veered to the right; but noticed oncoming traffic did not veer right. I immediately called: 'Tower; Cessna 182 almost collided with another aircraft.' I don't recall my exact words; I was very flustered at the time. When my radio transmission ended; I heard the other aircraft calling Tower asking if they had mistakenly flown their course too wide. It appeared my transmission had been 'stepped on.' Controller asked my position. He then gave me the same instruction as before; to fly to [the highway]; then re-enter the right downwind at midfield. I did that; and this time was able to land with no issue. This is a great airspace to fly in. The controllers are always courteous; and even forgiving. This is the first time I have been in a situation as PIC that made me feel uncomfortable flying in their airspace. I didn't recognize the Controller's voice. I don't want to cause trouble for anyone; just want to make sure this kind of thing can be prevented in the future.

VFR pattern traffic instructed to re-enter the downwind experienced a NMAC with other traffic entering the pattern.

1414397

201701

0601-1200

TJSJ.Airport

PR

0.0

VMC

Ground SJU

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 26553; Flight Crew Type 2000

Situational Awareness

1414397

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Company Policy; Airport; Procedure

Ambiguous

The other day I did two flights into SJU. On each with the [widebody aircraft] the ramp was not using SOP signals parking the aircraft and both times the aircraft was off the center line not inches but by 3 feet. I advocated and stopped the aircraft twice because I knew from reference points that the aircraft was not on the center line. The rampers parking the aircraft work for a third party. I called the duty manager asking for a bulletin or alert about the taxi lines and the parking procedures. I felt compelled to call the duty manager; I explained the operation to him and the Non-SOP activity on the ramp. I stated that the wing walkers and guide men are in position but are 'static' and detached from the operation. My example is the nose wheel of the aircraft 3 feet to the left of the center line and the left engine very close to the gate. They had no idea and were not aware of the errors. My statement to the duty manager on the 2 hour sit was that someone is going to hit something here with [this large an aircraft]..The second problem in SJU is the Airport taxi lines. We will exit runway 10 via H5 then make a left turn onto November and use the Apron to taxi to a gate. This is the first error. [This aircraft] should use a different gate for the reason of taxi and confined space. The taxi line on the apron IS NOT a wide body line and the crew must taxi 3-4 feet to the inside of the taxi line or the gear will be on the taxi lights and or in soft asphalt. I suggested to the duty manager in my call that company safety inspect the operation as I believe there is potential for an incident. The ramp apron is not suitable unless the aircraft is towed in to the gate. You're asking pilots to go against their training and not taxi on the yellow taxi line. Compounding the problem of being off the standard taxi line is improper hand signals and non SOP compliance by the ground crew parking the aircraft.The last issue in SJU with the [widebody aircraft] is the use of H to taxi to Runway 8 for takeoff. The airport issued us clearance to taxi on hotel to runway 8. The problem is the notes and the operation. The note on the plate indicated H is closed to AC with wingspan over 160 ft. SJU ground advises you to push deep beyond H3 then they taxi you on H between 10/8 to N1 left turn on the apron because S is closed. Ground assigns a follow me car that drives ahead of you 50-100 feet but no one is watching your wing. I even stated on the ground frequency that I needed a wing walker or the car to observe my left wing not in front of me. We were able to signal to a ramper working a commuter and he gave us a thumbs up or I would not have felt comfortable continuing. The other problem once past the commuter operation you pass many corporate aircraft on the ramp. If one is parked nose in it very possible you would strike its tail with the wing. I believe the company needs to do a safety assessment of the operation of the [widebody aircraft] on the ground; including taxi routes; parking areas; guidance sops (third party contractors) and special NOTAMs for the operation.Last but not least is while debarking the aircraft I noticed (the third party cleaning employees) all congregate in the loading bridge with all the new restocking and cleaning supplies while the passengers are debarking; the loading bridge goes from 7 feet wide to 24 inches. The pillow bags are 2 x 4 and they put about 6 against the wall plus 11 cleaners all stand in the debarking area and block the aircraft exit. They need to wait down stairs on the ramp until the aircraft is totally emptied. The handicap and elderly passengers really have a hard time exiting the aircraft normally let alone having the area size reduced to less than a third because 11-13 people want to stand on the loading bridge. They complicate the off-loading of the passengers tremendously.

Widebody Air Carrier Captain reported that contract employees were not following SOP during taxi into the gate; creating a possible conflict with the jet bridge. He also believed that taxi routes assigned by ATC at SJU did not provide sufficient wingtip clearance and violated a note on the taxi diagram limiting weight and wingspan.

1725385

202002

0001-0600

SEA.Airport

WA

500.0

Tower SEA

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Class B SEA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 168; Flight Crew Type 3569

1725385

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather

Ambiguous

'GLIDE SLOPE' Annunciation at 500 ft. on approach below cloud deck. Deviation was due to a gust or possible wake turbulence. Aircraft was approximately one dot low on GS (glide slope); and we got the aural warning. By the time we would have executed a go-around; aircraft was back on glide slope and all other parameters. We continued the approach; as a go-around would have complicated the situation; as the deviation had already resolved.

A319 First Officer reported a momentary excursion below the glide slope on approach; due to possible wind gust or wake encounter.

1476405

201708

0601-1200

SCT.TRACON

CA

12000.0

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 129

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Descent

STAR OLAAA ONE

Class B LAX

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

1476405

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft X called my frequency descending on the OLAAA ONE arrival. I had no data block and no information on that aircraft. When I clicked on several limited data blocks around and in my airspace I realized that Aircraft X was an aircraft I was supposed to be talking to over OCN VOR. The aircraft was landing LAX. I then called ZLA thinking that they had made a simple mistake and switched him and forgot to initiate a handoff to me. When I looked at the data block it was on an 'E' tag and it had a 'C' in the hand off space of the data tag. As if the 'E' sector was handing off the aircraft to the center. ZLA controller said that he shows that I took the hand off and was attempting to handoff the aircraft off back to ZLA. I asked the controller to try and take the hand off and reflash it back to me. He informed me that he was able to take the handoff but unable to initiate a hand off to my sector. I then did a multi-function on the tag and was able to get control of the data tag to initiate a hand off to the next sector downy. The entire time in my sky it was on a 'C' tag and once the next controller took radar on the aircraft it reverted back to a 'C' tag as if the next sector did not take the handoff. This was a very serious automation issue. It could have created a very bad situation. The data block was limited and I did not see the airplane until it checked on my frequency and I started investigating. We usually have several aircraft over OCN VOR at the same altitude as the LAX arrivals are descending to on the OLAAA arrival. What if the center had forgotten to switch the aircraft? What if the aircraft went nordo. What if I was busy and missed the limited data block in my scan. We also have SAN arrivals that are at 13000 ft that can pass very close to OCN VOR creating a built in conflict with the OLAAA arrivals. If I had a SAN arrival that was north of their usual flight path it would have conflicted with Aircraft X heavy and could have been a potential NMAC; collision or at the very least a loss of standard separation. This was no one's fault. It was an automation issue. And if all the holes in the Swiss cheese had lined up things could have been much worse.

SCT TRACON Controller reported an aircraft checked in on the frequency that had not been handed off by Center due to computer issues.

1274183

201506

1201-1800

DPA.Airport

IL

0.0

Marginal

Rain; 10

Daylight

2000

Ground DPA

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 580; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1274183

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Aircraft taxiing eastbound to Runway 28 sometimes get issued taxi instructions as simply 'taxi via Echo' instead of the full and seemingly proper 'via Echo; Hotel'; which is the complete taxi route. Failure to miss the turn at Hotel will immediately result in an aircraft entering Runway 33.Because of this potential; I think the Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) should issue such taxi instructions as 'Via Echo; Hotel'. It would be a very easy mistake for a solo student or non-local pilot to make. Additionally; the area in the vicinity of Runways 33; 28; and Taxiway Echo should be a hot spot because of the possibility of a runway incursion.

The reporter indicated that a clearance to cross or hold short of Runway 20R on Echo is being provided; and is not the area of potential confusion.

A local pilot is concerned that ATC instructions that are incomplete or unclear may lead to a less experienced or unfamiliar pilot into a runway incursion.

1458240

201706

0001-0600

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Nosewheel Steering

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1458240

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1458246.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During cruise flight; we had several electrical malfunctions. Some we could correct and some we couldn't. Lost #1 Approach Path; #1 Flight Director; #1 pressure regulator; #1 pitch trim; landing gear system 1; First Officer (FO) alpha probe heat. We complied with ECAM's and QRH. Stabilized the situation and continued on to destination. Number 1 AP came back so I took the aircraft back. In the pattern; we got an ECAM #2 FO pitot heat fault. Complied with ECAM and turned off. When we extended the gear; the FO noticed that we had no antiskid release bars. Cycled brake antiskid switch with no help. No QRH help for this. Elected to land with antiskid off and manual brakes. Runway length was not an issue and was dry. After touchdown; I went into full reverse thrust until 80 knots without any problems. When I transferred to the tiller for steering; it was jammed. I had to use differential braking to keep aircraft on the runway. I had no way to steer off the runway. Came to a stop and advised the tower and had safety equipment called out. Did not declare an emergency. Crash crew evaluated the aircraft and said they saw no hydraulic leaks or broken parts around nose wheel. Maintenance towed us off the runway to our gate.

While enroute aircraft encountered spurious failure of the #1 Flight Director;#1 Autopilot; #1 Pitch Damper; FO's pitot heat; #1 Cabin Pressure controller; ECAM directed selection of #2 Landing Gear indicating system. Crew followed ECAM and QRH procedures recovering lost systems or selecting secondary systems except FO's Pitot Heat and #1 Pitch Damper. After recovery of #1 Autopilot Captain resumed role of pilot flying. As a precaution crew decided to descend from FL350 to FL310 and slow to Mach .77 allowing a larger flight envelope margin in the event of a secondary failure of the Pitch system. Upon reaching the terminal area during approach check the ECAM directed the FO pitot heat be placed in the off position and crew complied. After gear was selected down to land ECAM had no Brake Release indicators on the display. Switch position was verified; crew opted to land with the Brake/Anti-Skid switch in the ALT/OFF position. Touchdown and roll out were normal until approx 50 kts when the pilot flying announced; 'No nose wheel steering.' He brought the aircraft to a stop while pilot monitoring informed the tower of the inability to clear the runway. As a precaution crew had the fire department look over the aircraft and follow us to our ramp while maintenance towed the aircraft to the gate. No emergency was declared. Maintenance found a failed Proximity Box and detector; replaced the component; ran checks and returned the aircraft to service. Components fail.

A300 flight crew reported multiple electrical failures in cruise. Crew followed QRH procedures recovering lost systems and upon landing; it was discovered that nose wheel steering was inoperative.

1290157

201508

1801-2400

ZME.ARTCC

TN

37000.0

Turbulence

Night

Center ZME

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZME

Facility ZME.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 23

Situational Awareness

1290157

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather

I just learned that there was an issue; that some people were injured. Aircraft X was handed-off to ZTL (T08) and switched to their frequency without any reported issue.Several minutes later; T08 called back to relay that Aircraft X had reported severe turbulence on their frequency at the ZME/ZTL boundary (near JANES intersection); with no other information; no injuries reported. (Of course; injuries are not required to make the report serious; any severe turbulence report is dangerous). For the next hour I relayed the PIREP to pilot's heading anywhere near the area regardless of altitude. During the same time frame; I received severe turbulence reports (if I remember the specifics correctly) [near] BHM at FL370 [also at the ZME/ZTL boundary] and over MON at FL340. Aircraft eastbound and westbound near these areas received the PIREPs but reported no ill effects.ZTL did a great job; calling me to ensure I received the PIREP. We all forward PIREPs to our local Center Weather Service Unit (CWSU) for facility dissemination but that does not ensure the information gets passed to adjacent facilities. Controllers should verbally coordinate PIREPs occurring near their facility boundary. I've found this more commonly occurs near Approach Controls; but the need is the same for adjacent ARTCCs. Turbulence is especially difficult because it can develop and then dissipate so quickly; with preceding and following aircraft not finding it.

ZME Controller reported of an aircraft that encountered severe turbulence on its route. Controller then took steps to advise others of the turbulence.

1790654

202102

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

180.0

5.0

1300.0

VMC

10

Dusk

20000

6000

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Initial Approach

None

Class E ZZZ1

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 150

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Initial Approach

None

Class E ZZZ1

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 310

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1790654

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 400; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

I was 10 miles north of ZZZ and flying heading 220 at 1;500 ft. MSL and 105 knots in a Mooney inbound for a VFR traffic pattern entry on a right downwind to Runway XX. Three airplanes had just landed and I was maneuvering for the 45 degree entry to Runway XX. I heard the Cessna announce it was 4 miles ahead and also maneuvering for the same entry to Runway XX. The sun was setting to the west which made it difficult to spot aircraft to the southwest and west of my flight path. I announced on CTAF that I was 10 miles north and maneuvering for the 45 degree entry right downwind Runway XX. At 5 miles northwest of ZZZ; I announced that I was 5 miles northwest maneuvering for the 45 degree entry; right downwind; for Runway XX.At that point; I heard the Cessna was on the 45 entry to right downwind Runway XX. I turned to a heading of 180 at 1;300 ft. MSL; 113 knots; and remained 5 miles west of ZZZ; while visually scanning ahead; left and right; for the Cessna. It was very difficult to see southwest and west due to the sun setting. At 5 miles west of ZZZ; I announced Mooney is 5 miles west of ZZZ maneuvering for the 45 entry; right downwind; Runway XX".Within a minute; I spotted the Cessna approximately 100 ft. below and 400 ft. to the right. The CFI onboard called on the radio; and said "did you see us?" I responded; "Yes I just did. Would you like to go ahead of me or do you want me to proceed on the 45 entry?" He responded that they would continue the entry and go ahead of me. I continued to fly a heading of 180 and then executed a turn to the west followed by a 360 degree turn to the east to enter the pattern after the Cessna. I landed and did not see the Cessna on the ramp.Afterwards; I called the CFI in the Cessna; whom I've known for years. I listened to his remarks and explained that I had no intention of overtaking him in The Cessna. This is not something I would ever attempt nor have I ever done in 18 years of flying. He mentioned they had requested my position in the air (around 5 miles out) and I said that I never heard that request nor that they were in the Cessna. I was only monitoring CTAF and visually scanning for traffic. I heard they were already on the 45 degree entry to Runway XX. I believe that 1 or 2 of their position reports or requests for my position were not transmitted or heard because we may have both pressed the mic button at the same time to give or request position reports. One of the Cessna's communications may have been incomplete which could explain why I heard that the Cessna was on the 45 degree entry to Runway XX; as I was 5 miles west northwest of ZZZ."

A single pilot reported a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) with another aircraft entering the landing pattern. Sun position reportedly inhibited early visual contact.

1103472

201307

1201-1800

ELP.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground ELP

Air Carrier

B737-500

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1103472

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Clearing Runway 22 after landing; I thought the Controller stated; 'Exit the runway at Hotel. Remain this frequency and taxi to the gate.' I thought; 'Cool;' and changed pages on the EFB IPad to the airport page to reconfirm the location of our gate. Next thing I know the Controller says; 'Company Flight Number; STOP!' I hit the brakes and saw that another aircraft was lifting off on Runway 26. The Controller intervention had prevented what would have been a runway incursion. I looked at the First Officer and asked; 'I thought he said taxi to the gate?' The First Officer replied; 'No; he said to hold short of the approach end of 8.' The Tower Controller then cleared us to the gate.Beyond the obvious failure to communicate intentions and verify; the lack of signage and standard hold short runway markings at that end of the airport has always been a problem.

After exiting Runway 22 on Taxiway H in ELP; a B737-500 Captain believed he had been cleared 'to the gate.' Instead; as they approached the lengthy overrun of Runway 8/26; Ground Control alerted they had been cleared to '...hold short of [the approach end] of runway eight.

1092897

201306

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Fractional

PC-12

1.0

Part 135

Landing

Nose Gear Tire

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1092897

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Weather; Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

Landed at the airport on Runway XX. Winds were reported 090/18 KTS. I judged the crosswind to be in aircraft limits with 30 degrees of flaps. The left main tire blew out upon landing and the aircraft departed the runway to the left. It is my impression that no excessive side loads were imposed on the landing gear. The blow out appeared to happen immediately after touchdown.I will be more cautious landing with any crosswind in the Pilatus.

While landing in a crosswind the downwind tire of a PC-12 failed and the aircraft exited the runway to the left.

1634040

201904

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

None

Attitude

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion

1634040

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Ambiguous

I have the following questions about the Landing Attitude Modifier:1. How will the Flight Crew know if this system has failed? Will the Spoiler light illuminate?2. What action is necessary by the Flight Crew if this system fails? I understand this system gives additional nose wheel clearance during landing.3. In light of the poor design of the new MCAS system can we be sure a single component failure or poor software design in the LAM system will not cause an erroneous spoiler deployment; or deployment of the spoilers on a single wing? I believe it would be prudent to review the design and implementation of this system.

B737-800 MAX Captain reported questions about the Landing Attitude Modifier.

1161412

201403

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

600.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Fractional

Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)

2.0

Part 91

Takeoff / Launch

Class D ZZZ

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface

1161412

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After takeoff; and having raised gear and flaps around 600 FT AGL I started to add some primary stab trim to release pressure on yoke when we received 2 - amber CASS messages 1) primary stab trim fail; and 2) Autopilot stab trim INOP. Also we received 1 blue CASS message - autopilot fail A\B. I then pushed the red autopilot/trim disconnect button and informed my First Officer I would some help on the yoke due to no stab trim available. As we were trying to level off; Tower asked us to switch to Center. At that time I tried to use the secondary trim and saw no movement on trim indicator nor heard any 'clacking'. The first officer then tried to relieve pressure on the yoke with secondary trim to no avail. While maintain runway heading and leveling off at 2;000 as was our initial assignment; the First Officer declared an emergency with Tower and they said to contact Center as they could not help! Upon contacting Center [the First Officer] informed them we were an emergency aircraft with 2 crew on board and we would need to maintain present heading and possibly altitude to run some checklists. Center asked us to climb to 3;000 FT and fly northerly heading; so that we would be clear of antennas in the area. While doing the new clearance I reduced power and kept airspeed around 200-220 KTS which helped keep pressure on yoke to a minimum.We then ran the amber primary stab trim fail checklist. After completing that; we trouble shot some more to try and get secondary trim to work. We pushed the red autopilot trim disc button and tried reengaging primary stab; which would not work and then switching to secondary to see if that helped...it didn't!!! We then tried clearing CASS messages by pushing red autopilot trim disc. button and instead of using primary trim again we went to directly to secondary trim and this helped. We then advised ATC of our intention to diverting to a nearby airport with very long runways. We then worked through the remainder of the checklist for landing. This checklist informed us of the limit of landing flaps 15 and increased v -speeds and runway usage. While I was flying the plane and helping with radios; the First Officer set up the approach and coordinated with ATC to have emergency vehicles standing by. When abeam the airport I asked for flaps 7 to see how much secondary trim would be needed and we coordinated with ATC on how long a final we would need for our approach. We [flew and uneventful approach; landed and] informed Tower that we would no longer need emergency vehicles and we would be taxiing to parking. After shutting down engines; I retried the primary stab trim and it worked as if nothing happened.

A CE-680 flight crew declared an emergency and diverted to a nearby airport when primary and secondary stabilizer trim systems failed prior to flap retraction.

1355788

201605

0601-1200

MHT.Airport

NH

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower MHT

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Central Warning/Master Caution

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 205; Flight Crew Type 8900

1355788

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 176

1356029.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

Taking off of Runway 35 at MHT; at approximately 110 KIAS (V1 was 134); the Takeoff Configuration Warning horn sound began. My abort briefing has always included the statement that the only things that meet our abort criteria above 80 knots will have some kind audible warning or indication; with the exception being; aircraft unsafe or unable to fly. With this in mind; and hearing an audible warning; I instinctively began to retard the thrust levers to abort the takeoff; and looked at the flap indicator; which correctly read flaps 1. I immediately decided that I did not want to perform a high speed abort for a Takeoff Warning horn. I immediately increased the thrust levers back to the Max Thrust N1 bugs; and completed the takeoff uneventfully. The Takeoff Warning horn only sounded for two; or maybe three beeps; and then stopped. I had only slightly retarded the thrust levers when I decided not to abort (I estimate approximately 10% N1). I know; from years of human factors education; that indecision can often be your own worst enemy; however; I did not have any concerns about the airworthiness of the aircraft; and felt that the decision to continue; even though the takeoff performance data was now invalid; was of considerably less risk than a high speed abort for an erroneous takeoff configuration Warning horn. All checklists were properly completed; to the best of my knowledge. We were not rushed. The warning horn did not sound during the thrust lever check.I messaged Maintenance through ACARS to meet us at [destination]; however; nobody showed up. Enroute I had confirmed in the FOM that an 'Info Only' entry in the logbook was the correct course of action with no Maintenance notification required. Upon arrival at the gate; I completed the 'Info Only' entry in the logbook; and briefed the next Flight Crew about the incident.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported they elected to continue the takeoff after receiving a momentary takeoff warning horn at approximately 110 kts.

1842195

202109

1801-2400

ROA.TRACON

VA

3700.0

VMC

TRACON ROA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Visual Approach

Class C ROA

Altitude Alert

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Distraction

1842195

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Environment - Non Weather Related; Software and Automation; Aircraft

Aircraft

Visual landing into ROA with airport in sight; the Captain was in a left base for Runway 24 and while approaching the course between PROSE and HIBAN above 3700 ft. with a shallow descent of about 600 ft. per minute; we were approaching the mountain range under visual conditions and the terrain caused an RA to go off. The RA lasted about 5 seconds and we did not overreact because we could visually see that we were clear of the mountain or any terrain. Terrain page was up on FO (Flight Officer) side as well.

Air carrier First Officer reported that while on a visual approach to ROA over mountains; they received a terrain RA while visually being clear of terrain.

1428292

201702

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

Tower ZZZ

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Tail Boom

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 435; Flight Crew Type 11

Training / Qualification; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1428292

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I meet two students for lessons. I briefed both students per the lesson plan and since I had not flown with either student I asked them if they had landed an aircraft by themselves and had they been demonstrated a forward slip to land by their regular instructor. Both students replied in the affirmative and demonstrated sufficient knowledge of the procedures and V speed during the pre-mission brief. Preflight run up and taxi were all within standards; however I noticed that the student pilot taxied well left of center line; he corrected after prompting.On the takeoff we performed a short field takeoff [and] the student lacked right rudder inpu. The student corrected when prompted; [but] this tendency continued for the duration of the flight. We stayed in the pattern and made left traffic. The first approach performed was a normal landing the student turned early to final and was well left of course; we performed a go-around. Second approach performed was a short field landing at the 1;000 feet mark; student preformed the landing within standards with minimum instructor input until the threshold touching down just past his intended landing point. Third approach was a forward slip to land. Student preformed the downwind and base leg to standards; but turned early to final and was well left of center line. I aborted the approach and we performed a go around. The fourth and fifth approaches were normal and short; both within lessons standards.Sixth approach was forward slip to land; downwind was within 100 feet of TPA; abeam touchdown 1;000 feet mark point student reduced power to 1;600 RPM and extended Flaps 10 and descended to 1;900 MSL (700 AGL). Student maintained altitude from base to final; aircraft was aligned with the center line on final however student began the forward slip early. Airspeed was 70 KIAS in the decent; I instructed the student to an increase engine power from idle by 300 RPM to make the 1;000 foot markers. Upon the threshold passing under the engine cowl the student abruptly reduced power to idle and began pitch for a nose up attitude without removing the forward slip. I promptly took control of the aircraft and pitched nose down while applying right rudder to remove the slip. The aircraft landed hard with the stall horn going off I heard a loud 'thunk' and immediately suspect a tail strike. I requested a taxi back to the apron where we parked and inspected the tail and saw visible damage. We secured the aircraft and returned to the [ramp].

A PA-28 instructor reported his student's control and landing difficulties ended with a high flare and an early power reduction. Subsequently; the aircraft landed hard which resulted in a tail strike.

1875655

202202

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZZZ

FCC (Flight Control Computer)

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting

1875655

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

During cruise flight at FL350; FLT CTRL SYS B became inoperative. We completed QRH procedures which directed us to place the FLT CTRL B switch to RUD STBY. This also created additional failures in Diff Feel and Yaw Damper Fail. We also noticed that 'A' system hydraulic fluid appeared to be decreasing. Since we were not yet halfway and about to go on a portion of our trip completely over water for approximately 500 miles; we elected to turn around to divert back to ZZZ. We considered diverting 300 miles to ZZZ1 and looked at other potential diversion points on the return to ZZZ. We were going to be approximately 2;000 pounds overweight; so we [requested priority handling] in accordance with the FOM and company policy. During the approach the flight controls were sluggish. The approach and landing were completed per the 737 QRH Overweight Landing Checklist; and an overweight landing entry made in addition to the SYS B Failure in the a/c logbook.Suggestions - I think the 737 QRH needs to be reviewed for additional steps on this item. Very brief. Doesn't mention that follow on failures will occur including loss of Yaw Damper and Feel Diff. Additionally there is no information in QRH Overweight Landing Checklist that indicates[requesting priority handling] is required per company policy.

B737-800 Captain reported a flight control system malfunction and hydraulics system quantity decreasing made flight control sluggish during cruise. The crew decided to return to the departure airport.

1656891

201906

0001-0600

SNA.Airport

CA

8.0

2500.0

Daylight

Tower SNA

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 20R

Initial Approach

Class C SNA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 287

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1656891

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 100

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

A drone/object passed overhead our position as we descended on the glidepath for [Runway] 20R. I saw the object for only a few seconds. We reported it to Tower. It was about 100 feet above us as we descended through 2;500 feet on final approach to [Runway] 20R.

B737-700 First Officer reported a NMAC with a UAV while on approach.

1699496

201911

0001-0600

ZMP.ARTCC

MN

37000.0

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZMP

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 129

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZMP

Facility ZMP.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

Situational Awareness

1699496

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure; Company Policy

Procedure

The adjacent Center was handing us two aircraft off on collision courses at the same altitude. We called the sector that was responsible for the two aircraft and in communication to advise them we weren't going to accept the aircraft on collision courses. The adjacent Center 'Controller' said; 'Roger.' Then he called back and told us 'he didn't know what to do about it.' We had to issue control instructions to him because he didn't know what to do! We told him to turn Aircraft X 20 right. Without this turn Aircraft X and Aircraft Y would have collided 15 miles inside our airspace. I'm not sure what to say. We brought to the attention two aircraft that were going to crash in less than three minutes and the Controller didn't know how to separate them! The Supervisor was on scene and watched everything transpire.

ZMP Center Controller reported the adjacent Center handed two aircraft off to them on conflicting courses at the same altitude.

1494429

201711

0601-1200

ZZZ.Tower

US

IMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Class C ZZZ

Main Gear Tire

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Check Pilot; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1494429

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1494428.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

I was acting as a check airman giving [the First Officer] Captain IOE. The takeoff roll was uneventful. During the rotation though; we felt a shaking in the left rear of the aircraft immediately before liftoff. The shaking stopped once airborne. At the time; I thought it felt like the aircraft was 'skipping' to the side due to a little side load from the crosswind. The flight to [the destination] was uneventful until we lowered the gear on the approach. With the gear handle down; we saw the left main was showing a red unsafe light and the gear horn was sounding. I cycled the gear and the same thing happened again. I told [the First Officer] to go around so we could run the checklist. I informed ATC of the problem and began getting vectors. I accomplished the 'Gear Disagree' and 'One or both main landing gear position indicators show unsafe' checklists. With the gear handle down; the main gear indicators showed the red left main light; but the secondary main gear indicator showed green. I retracted the gear and the red light turned off; but the secondary green light stayed illuminated. I lowered the gear again and proceeded to call maintenance control. I spoke with [a maintenance technician] and he said he couldn't think of anything else to do. I said about doing a tower fly-by to get an external look at the gear. [Maintenance] agreed. Before doing the fly-by; I told [the First Officer] I'd feel more comfortable if I took over as pilot flying since he only had one landing in the left seat. He agreed. I told him we would keep the gear down for the remainder of the flight unless we needed to raise it for performance. We performed the fly-by without incident. The tower and an aircraft holding short both said the gear appeared to be down and locked. I decided to still have emergency equipment standing by. I called [maintenance] back and informed him of our plan to land. I also told him to call [operations] so they could come out to pin the gear and tow us in. I informed ATC that we would most likely be stopping on the runway. I told [the First Officer] I wanted to land with the flaps at 40 degrees so we would touch down at the slowest ground speed. I also said that we would keep the auto brakes off so no extra stress was placed on the gear until we were slowed. Our approach speed was 120 with a ref of 115. The touchdown was smooth; but a strong vibration in the back left happened almost immediately. No braking was being applied. A few seconds later the Tower advised us that an aircraft on the taxiway reported seeing one of our left main tires blown out. As we slowed below 70 the vibration disappeared. I added very minor braking to stop us just beyond the runway intersection. I did not want to taxi with a blown out tire; so we shut down the aircraft on the runway. I called operations and they advised that maintenance was on the way. When they arrived they pinned the gear and confirmed the Tire was blown out. Twenty minutes later the tug showed up and pulled us to the ramp.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported that during final approach when they attempted to extend the landing gear they got a 'LANDING GEAR UNSAFE' indication.

1061038

201301

0601-1200

DEN.Airport

CO

Mixed

Fog

Daylight

1400

Tower DEN

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

STAR PURRL RNAV

Class B DEN

FMS/FMC

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 126; Flight Crew Type 12000

Confusion; Distraction; Workload

1061038

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Weather

I am filing this report to point out an extremely challenging arrival and approach. Initially cleared for PURRL RNAV STAR to DEN; we set up for Runway 35R since they didn't give us a runway and we had used 35R on an earlier trip. We briefed the arrival and approach to 35R and then had following changes:1) Slow to 250 from published 280.2) Given Runway 35L (changed box and briefed).3) Given ZPLYN1 Arrival and 35L (changed box and briefed).4) Told to accelerate to 280.5) Switched controllers and told to hold 210.Several of these changes required total [reprogramming of our route on the FMS]. Still a ways out the RVR dropped to 1;400 for blowing fog. The minimums for our CAT I aircraft (no HUD) were RVR 1;800. However; we had had 35R in sight for 40 miles so we asked for a visual to 35R with the field in sight. Approach Control said he couldn't do it because the field was IFR; but he gave us a heading and cleared us for the ILS 35R. (We were way out as all this was happening.) He said RVR for 35R was 2500/6000/6000. Tower then recleared us to land 35R. We flew the ILS 35R as previously briefed to an uneventful visual landing. As we cleared the runway; Tower told the guy behind us RVR has dropped to 1;400 approach end. He said he needed 1;800 and Tower said to wait as it just came up to 1;800 and then quickly to 6;000. My concern is whether we had the reported visibility required for the ILS even though we were visual the whole way. My First Officer said Tower told us RVR was 2500/6000/6000. He did not file a report because he is sure of this and is positive we stayed within the rules.I don't like the new RNAV arrivals that are very complex. It takes a long time to load and check them. The many restrictions--accompanied by numerous airspeed; arrival and runway changes--make them extremely challenging. We commented that they should attach a company safety form to the flight plan. Tower and Approach Control guys were very helpful.

Great coordination between ATC and the flight crew of a B737-700 salvaged an uneventful landing at DEN during rapidly changing airport weather due to blowing fog. Programming changes to complex RNAV STARs was cited as a contributing factor to the flight crew's workload.

1815669

202106

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

121.0

VMC

None; 10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

2.0

Part 91

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ

Normal Brake System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Other A&P

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 134; Flight Crew Total 934; Flight Crew Type 75

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

1815669

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Human Factors

Came in to land on Runway XX. Upon landing student applied heavy left brakes. I applied right rudder to counteract. I applied the handbrake and there was no pressure. I had to use the handbrake because the Cherokee doesn't have brakes on copilot side.Ended up off the runway and in the grass. Taxied off the grass back to parking.

Instructor reported that student pilot used heavy braking action on landing; causing the aircraft to exit the runway.

1597380

201811

ZZZ.TRACON

US

2000.0

Rain; Snow

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Autoflight System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 626

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

1597380

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

It was day three of six for me and day three with very good FO (First Officer). Well rested; great rapport and above average Crew coordination. Knew we had a MAX. It was my leg; normal Ops Brief; plus I briefed our concerns with the MAX issues; bulletin; MCAS; stab trim cutout response etc. I mentioned I would engage autopilot sooner than usual (I generally hand fly to at least above 10;000 ft.) to remove the possible MCAS threat. Weather was about 1000 OVC drizzle; temperature dropping and an occasional snow flake. I double checked with an additional personal walkaround just prior to push; a few drops of water on the aircraft but clean aircraft; no deice required. Strong crosswind and I asked Tug Driver to push a little more tail east so as not to have slow/hung start gusts 30+. Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times; normal flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to 'up' and above clean 'MASI up speed' with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot Monitoring) called 'DESCENDING' followed by almost an immediate: 'DONT SINK DONT SINK!' I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn etc.) and resumed climb. Now; I would generally assume it was my automation error; i.e.; aircraft was trying to acquire a miss-commanded speed/no autothrottles; crossing restriction etc.; but frankly neither of us could find an inappropriate setup error (not to say there wasn't one). With the concerns with the MAX 8 nose down stuff; we both thought it appropriate to bring it to your attention. We discussed issue at length over the course of the return to ZZZ. Best guess from me is airspeed fluctuation due to mechanical shear/frontal passage that overwhelmed automation temporarily or something incorrectly setup in MCP (Mode Control Panel). PM's callout on 'descending' was particularly quick and welcome as I was just coming back to my display after looking away. System and procedures coupled with CRM (Resource Management) trapped and mitigated issue.

B737MAX Captain reported an autopilot anomaly in which led to an undesired brief nose down situation.

1715022

202001

1201-1800

LTAA.ARTCC

FO

34000.0

VMC

Center LTAA

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Cruise

Direct

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1715022

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

1715022.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

In cruise flight at FL340 northbound direct to NINVA (FIR boundary Turkey). We received ATC transponder 1 & 2 alerts/ADS B out fault; along with GNS sensor fail messages. We expected these to be associated with GPS jamming and complied QRH procedures. During the evaluation of these malfunctions and unannounced to us; the aircraft reverted into speed; heading and altitude hold (white annunciations). During this time the aircraft reached NINVA and did not turn towards SRT as it was not in NAV mode. We noticed the error and were also queried by ATC. Less than five miles off course; we corrected and were given direct SRT. Flight continued to destination without further incident. GPS jamming caused PROF/NAV issues. Better monitoring and awareness during GPS jamming and transponder issues.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

MD-11 pilot crew reported possible GPS jamming.

1797386

202103

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Mixed

Thunderstorm

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class B ZZZ

Airspeed Indicator

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1797386

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Weather

Weather

During decent in ZZZ; [we] received [a] lightning strike. Approximately 5 minutes later; [we] lost [the] Captain's air data and airspeed was INOP. [We] received many related and unrelated EICAS messages to air data failure [and] also received many other EICAS messages; such as EEC for both engines; ground proximity; rudder ratio; etc. [There were] so many messages I lost track. We ran QRH procedures for unreliable airspeed [and requested priority handling] with ATC. Captain landed safely. [We] notified [the Dispatcher]; Duty Officer; and Maintenance. [The] event [was] documented in [the] aircraft maintenance logbook. I do not know for sure but suspect a lightning strike [was the cause].

B757 First Officer reported a lightning strike had rendered numerous systems inoperative during descent to destination airport.

1800861

202104

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

N

Electrical Distribution

X

Failed; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 99; Flight Crew Total 3981; Flight Crew Type 2118

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1800861

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Remote Power Distribution Unit (RPDU) (1 of 17) lead to multiple system failures. After lengthy discussion with Dispatch; Maintenance Control and the duty manager; we determined to continue the flight to our destination due to system redundancies. One of the failures was an APU fuel valve failure which lead to the APU not being able to be used if necessary. Multiple status messages were displayed and discussed with Maintenance to include going into the maintenance pages to ensure operational systems for later use in the flight. Upon landing and parking at the gate; the flying pilot (First officer) attempted to shut down the left engine while keeping the right engine running while ground power was connected. The engine did not shut down with the fuel cut off switch (initially) and we got an EICAS message to run the ENGINE FUEL VALVE FAILURE Checklist. The checklist directed us to wait 20 seconds - we did and then the engine shut itself down. At no point after the RPDU electrical failure did we expect it would lead to an engine fuel valve failure. The rest of the parking and termination checklist was normal.

B787 First Officer reported miscommunication when an RPDC failed and impacted systems unexpectedly.

1422291

201702

0601-1200

MZJ.Airport

AZ

5500.0

VMC

20

Daylight

CLR

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

None

Class E ZAB

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 20

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

1422291

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Horizontal 200; Vertical 200

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Aircraft was on autopilot; set on cruise power at approximately 230 knots when what appeared to be birds or balloons appeared. Attempted a small course correction but the autopilot was too much to overcome and then realized it was skydivers. Reached to disengage; but by that time I was already beneath them and one was very close maybe 200 feet. Passed by with nothing happening; but possible irritated skydivers. The problem resulted from not knowing the autopilot system well and traveling at high speed in a known parachuting location. The reaction time after understanding what you are seeing at high speeds is very short. Never in 20 years of flying have I seen free falling parachutes. I did not recognize what it was until too close. My future action to avoid a situation like this is talk to Flight Following when transitioning jump zones as jumpers are hard to spot.

GA pilot reported an NMAC with parachutists in a known jump zone near MZJ.

1759471

202008

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

5000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

PC-12

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class B ZZZ

Personal

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

1.0

Other 107

None

Personal

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1759471

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

We took off from ZZZ. We made a right turn to 250 heading; then were cleared to climb to 5;000 ft.; and then turn to 190 heading. While cruising at 5;000 ft.; we had just crossed the northern surface-12;500 ft Bravo line of ZZZ1 when we approached what looked like an aircraft about 500 ft. higher heading directly toward us. As we got closer the object looked more stationary and appeared to be a drone. We let ATC know it was a possible drone and answered a few questions from them and continued on our way. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.Always maintain a good visual lookout; even in Class B airspace.

PC-12 Captain reported an airborne conflict event during cruise with a Drone; no significant conflict. Reported event to ATC.

1693366

201910

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

1693366

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Ground Personnel

Pre-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Close to departure time; I was removing the chocks from the working side of the aircraft following SOP that all equipment was removed from the aircraft and ensured that there was a person on the pushback tractor. As I removed one of the chocks the aircraft rolled at me. I put the chock back in and went to the person on the pushback and communicated my concern for my safety while under the aircraft. I asked him if he has communication with the flight deck yet and did he give authorization to release brakes. He said no and that he had no communication yet with the flight deck. I looked at the nose gear and the green light was on meaning the brakes have been released. I looked up to the number 2 side and he opened the window. I asked why would he have released the brakes with no communication with us? How do they know what' going on? Are we hooked up? Are we still servicing the water; which we were; as they asked operations for water after the bridge was pulled. They have no idea what we have going on downstairs if they have no communication; and they risk my safety and others on the ground as well as the uncontrolled safety of the aircraft. This was a close call to my leg and foot was almost caught under the tire!I have to tell you that this is not the first time that this type of action has happened. We don't operate like this on mainline. They don't do anything until communication has happened and things are verified by using SOP. I would like you to do what you can to introduce this to whomever needs this info to stop this unsafe action as soon as possible.

Ramp worker reported that the flight crew failed to set the brakes properly which caused the aircraft to roll forward unexpectedly.

1742174

202005

0601-1200

CLE.Airport

OH

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground CLE

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 1000

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1742174

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Human Factors

Airport

At CLE; we were given taxi instructions from the FBO to Runway 24R for departure via L2; L; K; J1; J; S. There were numerous taxiway closures due to construction. This also included Runway 24L/6R. After we turned left from Taxiway K onto J1; I observed a taxiway sign that indicated Taxiway J was off to the left at a 45 [degree] angle. I turned left according to the sign; but was then advised by ATC that I was in fact heading towards J2 which did not connect with J due to a barricade. I performed a 180 [degree] turn and continued farther down J1 where I eventually found Taxiway J and continued the taxi to Runway 24R. I think the sign I saw while on J1 indicating Taxiway J was to the left is misleading as J1 continues for some distance before it intersects with Taxiway J. A request by me for clarification or a progressive taxi could have avoided the occurrence or better signage to properly indicate how to get to Taxiway J...straight and then left.

Light Transport Captain reported making a wrong turn during taxi at CLE airport; citing poor signage as contributing.

1280472

201507

0601-1200

ZLC.ARTCC

UT

13000.0

IMC

Icing; 10

Daylight

13500

Center ZLC

Personal

Cessna 400

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZLC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 54; Flight Crew Total 1346; Flight Crew Type 656

Situational Awareness

1280472

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Weather

Weather

I filed for 13;000 MSL and ATC wanted a climb to 15;000 for mountain clearance. (13;000 was VMC and 15;000 was IMC) At 15;000 I began picking up some rime ice (temp was -4C) so engaged my TKS system and pitot heat. TKS took a few minutes to work and since airspeed decreased 10 knots and more; I tried to contact ATC to request lower. Since I could not contact ATC; another pilot radioed my request to descend to 13;000 and ATC did not want to allow. I said I had on-board terrain information and would be responsible for terrain clearance. I then told him I was descending to 13;000 to get out of clouds and he said I could have a VFR on top clearance which I accepted and came down to 13;000. I was now out of clouds and TKS was removing ice; so after I was past the clouds I requested a climb back to 15;000 and rest of flight had no problems. I was given a number to call after landing which I called to explain situation and he did a good job of explaining why the MVA was 15;000 where I was flying.This problem was caused by ATC requiring me to climb to 15;000 and I now understand why. I'm thankful my plane has a TKS system which helped remove the ice and prevent additional build-up. In the future I will avoid flying in clouds at -4C by requesting a deviation to clear clouds horizontally or by requesting vectors to remain at a VMC altitude authorized by ATC.

Columbia 400 pilot reported he was picking up ice and unable to maintain altitude. Pilot descended below MVA to get clear of clouds.

1061112

201301

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Hydraulic System Pump

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1061112

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff Roll

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

All checklists were completed and all systems showed normal. We were cleared for takeoff prior to reaching the runway hold short line. The Before Takeoff checklist was completed and the takeoff was initiated without stopping on the runway. After the '80 Knots' call out; the master warning illuminated. First Officer alerted then of a ELEC1 HYD OVRHT annunciator illuminated on the forward overhead panel. I proceeded to abort the takeoff using the new procedure except no thrust reverse was activated due to the length of the runway and the extremely effective and immediate response of the RTO braking system. The rejected takeoff was initiated at approximately 95 knots and a TOW of approximately 143;000 lbs. We requested to be directed to a holding place on the airport; for brake cooling and time to troubleshoot the problem. After QRH was accomplished and brake cooling chart was verified; we requested a gate/ramp spot to allow for Maintenance to reach the aircraft as well as to establish communication with Maintenance Control via cellphone. The issue was MEL'd by me with Maintenance Control via cellphone and the aircraft inspection completed by a local Maintenance representative.

B737-700 Captain reports rejecting a takeoff at 95 knots after a master warning illuminated indicating a ELEC1 HYD OVRHT annunciator illuminated.

1453481

201706

1801-2400

DOV.Airport

DE

VMC

Daylight

TRACON PCT

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Climb

Class E PCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1453481

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Pre-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

We received the following clearance on the ground from Dover Clearance Delivery: Flight XXX is cleared via runway heading then vectors to BAL MORTI LITME HIRCK SCRAM WALCE LYH then as filed; on departure climb to 3000 expect FL360 10 minutes after. Departure frequency 132.42; squawk ABCD. After we entered the route of flight on FMC; we noticed the point MORTI will take us 50 miles north of our route. Captain told me we will query departure control after airborne. During climb out we were cleared direct BAL. The captain asked Potomac Departure on 2 different frequencies while we were heading towards BAL; if they want us to go to that point MORTI that would take us 50 miles north of our path; and specifically told them that it seemed very unusual. The first controller told us he would try to take us over the outbound traffic. Then the second controller said that we needed to go to MORTI after BAL. After we reached BAL we started a turn toward MORTI. The controller asked us where we were going. We said MORTI and spelled out MORTI. The controller told us the correct spelling was MORTY. Captain corrected the point on the FMC and we corrected our course. The controller apologized for the confusion and the flight continued uneventfully. ATC controllers saw us going in the wrong direction. The event occurred because there are 2 points with similar names near each other and when we received the clearance the controller did not spell out the point. We suspected something was not right; we should have resolved it on the ground. When there is any question with the clearance; clarify with the clearance delivery on the ground.

B737 First Officer reported receiving a clearance on the ground via MORTI which caused a jog in the route of flight. The confusion was not corrected until the turn toward the fix attracted ATC's attention. The proper spelling for the fix was MORTY.

1581145

201809

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Mixed

6

Daylight

400

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

Other Unknown

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 473

Situational Awareness

1581145

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 284

Situational Awareness

1581154.0

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

A Cessna taxied out and entered the run-up area at the western end prior to departure. ATC (Ground) advised the pilot to call when ready to exit the pad. We began our taxi from the gate area and were taxiing on A towards runway. Ground Control instructed us to taxi 'up to and hold short' of the runway. As we approached the run-up area; the Cessna moved to the eastern corner of the run-up pad appearing as if he were trying to go ahead of our aircraft. Tower gave us a takeoff clearance and we rounded the corner onto the runway. The Captain used normal taxi thrust throughout the entire turn and we taxied into position on the runway. Entering the runway; we heard the Tower ask the Cessna if he needed any assistance. The Cessna owner said he wasn't sure but then stated that his prop had struck the ground and sustained damage due to the jet blast from our aircraft. He was asking for pilot names and owner information for insurance purposes. By moving to the east end of the pad and close up to Taxiway A; the Cessna had put himself directly behind our aircraft and apparently in our thrust line. No excessive thrust was used; just normal taxi thrust; but due to the proximity of the Cessna it was apparently enough to upset his aircraft.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported a Cessna in the run up area was exposed to jet blast that caused damage to the aircraft.

1414071

201701

0601-1200

SJC.Airport

CA

5800.0

IMC

Night

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 12R

Descent

STAR RAZZR4

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 18800; Flight Crew Type 10688

Situational Awareness

1414071

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 12131; Flight Crew Type 10769

Situational Awareness

1414067.0

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Off-airway vector for approach to runway 12R in SJC. NORCAL cleared us to descend to 5600 feet. (MVA and MSA alt 5600 feet). In IMC; both of us noted the terrain in area. [We] got [a] 2500 feet call out as expected as we crossed over ridge line. Shortly after; as [we were] descending through 5800 feet; [we got a] GPWS terrain warning. We immediately performed escape maneuver with Takeoff Go Around thrust. ATC was notified of our climb. We leveled off at 6600 feet. Once clear of the terrain; and with clearance from ATC; [we] descended back down to 5600 feet.

We [were] on the RAZZR4 Arrival into SJC. NORCAL took us off the arrival and cleared us direct ARTAQ on the ILS12R. We were Night IMC in the weather. We were cleared down to 5600 feet. We discussed the terrain ahead and kept a shallow descent [so as] not to trigger the GPWS. We got the 2500 foot call followed by the RA bouncing around. The lowest I noted was 1800 feet RA. The GPWS triggered TERRAIN TERRAIN followed by PULL UP. Performed the GPWS Escape Maneuver. Climbed to 6600 feet. The Captain notified ATC of the climb. ATC said 5600 feet is a safe vectoring altitude. After clearing the terrain we continued our descent and approach into SJC.

A319 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a night IMC approach into SJC when they were vectored off the arrival. ATC reportedly assured the flight they were at a safe vectoring altitude.

1048162

201211

0001-0600

CYYZ.Airport

ON

14000.0

VMC

TRACON CYYZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR YWT RNAV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 15000

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1048162

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Aircraft

Ambiguous

We were cleared for the YWT4 [WATERLOO FOUR] RNAV STAR; descend to 11;000 MSL. The FMC was programmed and on VNAV PATH. When it became clear we would not make the intermediate crossing restrictions we contacted ATC.

When a B737-800 flight crew became aware they would be unable to comply with a crossing restriction on the YWT RNAV STAR to CYYZ they advised ATC.

1811895

202105

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Parked

Class B ZZZ

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Repair; Inspection

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1811895

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Aircraft; Procedure; Software and Automation; Staffing

Procedure

This was a maintenance reposition flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I was flying as the PIC with a Captain in the right seat. Pushing back from the gate; we had a zero fuel weight (ZFW) of 52;000 lbs. The gross weight on the performance was off by over 4;000 lbs from the data received; and we were out of balance. The aircraft had no passengers; no flight attendants; no baggage; just 14;700 lbs of fuel and two pilots and all galley carts. We called the Dispatcher to inform her that we were out of balance. She told me on the phone that she was [gone] the previous week when we were transitioning to 5 zone weight and balance and she didn't know what was going on; and literally just handed me off to the pilot on duty to figure out. This was totally unacceptable. She is the dispatcher of record; has equal legal responsibility for the planning of this flight and upon being informed that we're out of balance and had our ZFW change by thousands of pounds in a few minutes time; she just hands me off to an unrecorded phone line with the pilot on duty?! My head is still spinning. At the gate; our ZFW was 52;000 lbs. Now we are being told to put numbers in the box for ballast but I have no idea what it means 1.0 2.0 3.0 etc; what does that correspond to? We are not actually moving any ballast anywhere etc. The pilot on duty and some other manager on with him; and myself went back and forth for a good amount of time trying to figure out what the accurate zero fuel weight was; what an accurate gross take off weight was; and my main concern; if our stab trim; and V speeds were accurate and safe. I want to reiterate; this was a total and complete debacle. There was so much confusion on the phone as to how we got these numbers from computer and what they meant; and if they were accurate. I had to ask the pilot on duty and manager point blank on the phone; are you telling me these numbers are accurate; and safe for us to depart; before I would continue this flight any further. This 5 zone weight and balance makes no sense how we could be out of balance with only fuel on board. It does not seem like this 5 zone system was well thought out; or that ferry / reposition flights were accounted for. How this got approved by the FAA is beyond me. Additionally; our FOM states that 'the amount to be considered unusable shall be noted on the dispatch release and be considered as unusable by the flight crew'; no such comment on this release is present. If were using fuel for ballast for CG limits which is totally news to me seeing as we never had a problem with CG on 3 zone weight and balance; then the PIC must be notified because if that fuel is used; an in flight emergency would have to be declared because the aircraft would no longer be within CG limits.

Captain reported that dispatch was unable to supply the correct weight and balance information for a scheduled maintenance reposition flight.

1592790

201811

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Citation Latitude (C680A)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Takeoff / Launch

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1592790

ATC Issue All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Evacuated

Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Shortly after takeoff before 1000 agl; I noticed a very odd odor coming into the cabin. It took me approximately 20 seconds to recognize that it was possible smoke entering the cabin. We were cleared to 5000 feet initially and while checking in with departure we were cleared to 15000. As we turned to our assigned heading and continued to climb; I was still unsure if it was actually smoke that was causing the odor or possibly something else. When I took my sunglasses off; I could see a faint haze in the cabin. I immediately put on my o2 mask and told the SIC; a new hire FO (First Officer) with the company; that I had the airplane and to put his mask on. During the process; I informed departure we had smoke and fumes in the cabin and I was returning to land immediately.As a side note; we found that with both o2 masks selected to mask mic; there is a real problem communicating as the overhead speaker that was previously off; now is on and cannot be turned off. This causes severe feedback anytime you attempt to transmit. I was forced to turn my mic off on the mask and put my headset boom mic inside the lip of the o2 mask to communicate with ATC.Another point of note was ATC inquired if we would extend to an 8 mile final to accommodate an aircraft that was on final doing practice approaches. I respectfully declined that option and advised that I was landing now; I was immediately cleared for a visual to XXR. Which was good; because I had already started a turn that way.On short final I notified tower we would be evacuating the aircraft as soon as we landed. We landed and immediately exited the runway; came to a stop on the perpendicular taxi way; I instructed the FO to go ahead and get out as I finished shutting down the aircraft. We proceeded to the Hospital and were checked out as a precaution. Nothing was noted or expected to cause any further adverse health issues. Overall; I felt we handled the situation well. There was a breakdown in communication due to the overhead speakers causing feedback. Although ATC did a fairly decent job clearing everyone out; I don't believe asking an emergency aircraft to extend his downwind to accommodate an aircraft doing practice approaches was appropriate. After the Valujet crash in the Everglades and Swiss Air off Nova Scotia; I feel smoke and fumes is an immediate threat and should be handled as expeditiously as possible.I elected to evacuate on the taxiway simply to get out of the cabin environment as soon as possible.

CE-680 Captain reported smoke/fumes in flight deck on climbout and returned to departure airport.

1287236

201508

1201-1800

IND.Airport

IN

4700.0

VMC

10

Daylight

25000

TRACON IND

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Utility / Infrastructure

Cruise

None

Class C IND

Government

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Class C IND

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 158; Flight Crew Total 417; Flight Crew Type 383

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1287236

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

During an aerial survey mission; another aircraft flying near our same altitude came within 100-200 feet of our aircraft; while traveling the opposite direction. No notification was given to either aircraft by ATC and this incident almost resulted in a Midair Collision. Evasive action was taken on our part once the aircraft was spotted; however by then the aircraft was too close for evasive action to be effective and the aircraft passed below our aircraft. Earlier during this flight we had coordinated with Ft. Wayne Indiana's airport approach controller to receive air traffic advisories while we operated near their airspace. We were then handed over to Indianapolis approach control in order to continue the traffic advisories as we grew closer to their airspace. We were acknowledged by Indianapolis Approach on Frequency 120.650 with our full tail number and asked to report any altitude changes; to maintain our own navigation and we maintained the squawk code. Approximately 45 to 60 minutes after being handed over to Indianapolis approach; while continuing our aerial survey flight at a constant altitude of 4700 MSL; is when the other aircraft involved passed dangerously close to our aircraft; headed southwesterly; while we maintained a north heading. The other aircraft never made any indication as to the proximity they had just flown to us; either by evasive action or by notification to ATC about the incident. We were unable to see the aircraft heading in our direction due to a small window of time during survey collection where we need to be inside the aircraft; operating our survey equipment and ensuring everything is working properly so that we may complete our mission. By the time we were able to continue scanning our outside surroundings; the other aircraft was under ours.I have since talked with Indianapolis TRACON and we have determined that due to a fault of their controller system; sometime after our aircraft was recognized by the assigned approach controller; their system accidentally dropped our beacon code and they were no longer being notified as to our location. This accompanied by a lack of situational awareness by the controller personnel; led to our two aircraft being allowed to continue on a course that nearly resulted in a near midair collision.

The non-flying pilot reported a near-miss while receiving traffic advisories from IND Approach.

1132757

201311

1201-1800

TEB.Airport

NY

300.0

20.0

3000.0

IMC

10

3000

TRACON N90

Corporate

Gulfstream V / G500 / G550

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 19

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class E N90

Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 600

Human-Machine Interface

1132757

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Horizontal 100; Vertical 100

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

Being vectored for approach to ILS 19 at TEB IMC at 3;000 FT MSL; 190 KTS; received a TA followed immediately by an RA descend command and within one second RA reversed to a climb; then an increase climb command. Topped out at 3;800 FT MSL. RA was displaying -500 then -100 and the RA commenced. The issue was the initial descend command with the target below us. It didn't make sense; but followed the commands and they reversed themselves to a climb shortly after the descent. No visual on the conflicting traffic. Approach was moderately busy and did not provide a traffic advisory. Training is to always follow the TCAS commands and we did. This G550 is equipped with Certification F [CPDLC Software] and submitting this to crosscheck if other like equipped G550s have had similar reversal RAs.

G550 Captain experiences a TCAS RA at 3;000 FT while being vectored for the ILS at TEB. The initial RA is to descend and is then reversed to a climb; then an increase climb. The reporter was in IMC and did not see the intruder and ATC did not provide a traffic advisory.