elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1864277

202112

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A330

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

SID ZZZ5

Class B ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1864277

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Relief Pilot; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1864278.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Number two engine. At 80 kt.; thrust normal. Above 100 kt.; #2 engine slightly low. Selected TOGA. In initial climb; autopilot was not selected on. ATC gave us a turn and autopilot was selected on. Climb thrust matched. Above 10;000 ft.; selected MCT (Maximum Continuous Thrust); thrust did not match. Decision to find suitability. Used Maintenance; [requested priority handling]; etc.; and returned to ZZZ. Number two engine started to produce ECAMs. Followed ECAM; followed by QRH. Dumped fuel and followed overweight landing procedures. Ran descent and in-range checklists. Reviewed single-engine missed approach procedures. Kept engine 2 at idle per QRH. Briefed flight attendants on precautionary landing. Landed without incident.

Upon takeoff roll; the takeoff thrust was set below 80 kt.; above 100 kt.; we noticed the number 2 engine thrust had rolled back slightly; 5%; under the desired flex setting. Captain elected to advance the thrust to TOGA and continue the takeoff. The engine thrust was still slightly low; all other indications were normal; [and] we continued the takeoff. The engine thrust was a serious concern being we weighed 501K lb. That distracted our navigation and we ended up initially missing the first turn on the ZZZ SID. ATC gave us a heading and later advised of a possible pilot deviation." We had not [requested priority handling] at this point.The initial 10 seconds after rotation; much attention was being given to flying the aircraft and analyzing the severity of our engine malfunction. This led to slower-than-normal turn rate on initial SID departure. Eventually; [the] engine failed at any thrust setting other than idle and [priority handing was requested]."

A330 flight crew reported a loss of thrust on the number two engine and elected to return to the departure airport and make an overweight landing.

1289401

201508

0601-1200

ATL.Airport

GA

VMC

Daylight

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb; Takeoff / Launch

Class B ATL

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class B ATL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1289401

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1289399.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

Took off from Atlanta behind a 737 and shortly after airborne; just after gear up; encountered what I thought was mild wake turbulence it but triggered a stall shaker. I pushed thrust levers up and called for max thrust/spoilers in; lowered the nose and the shaker immediately stopped and conditions were stable so reduced thrust and continued. I noticed the right engine (3A1 type - intermix aircraft) ITT turned red briefly and returned to normal with reduction. The engine ITT was discussed with dispatch and maintenance; determined to be within limits and documented in the [maintenance log] for info. We had a frequency change to departure and did not mention the wake to ATC - I think we were just focused on ensuring navigation and EICAS indications were ok. We should have reported it; although we get similar wake experiences without the shaker quite often. Flight was continued with no further issues.Wake is nearly always a threat in ATL and other busy airports. Having mismatched engines is another; but we can't really be too mindful of it in a stall situation or windshear etc. I have pushed up thrust on the 3B1 engines a number of times for windshear etc. without seeing red. Also; be assured no one got whiplash from the thrust increase. Being one of the smaller but lower performing jets at the busy airports; I think it might be wise to use normal thrust behind 737s and 757 types (with the recat now). The other MD80 and smaller Airbus types don't seem to cause the wake issues nearly as much. Also; we always need to be ready on the controls even if autopilot is engaged.

Wake turbulence shortly after takeoff; with stick shaker activation. We were close to the ground still when this happened so an aggressive recovery was required (high engine power setting used to recover).

A CRJ-200 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence shortly after takeoff at ATL in trail of a B737 that triggered a momentary stall warning.

998348

201203

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

28000.0

Mixed

Icing; 10

Night

1800

Center ZZZ

Air Taxi

Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 850

998348

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Our aircraft experienced a rapid decompression while descending from FL300 to 12;000. The decompression occurred around FL280. We recognized the situation and initiated an emergency descent to 10;000. Upon reaching a safe altitude of 12;000 FT we advised ATC of the decompression; and declared an emergency. At this time ATC cleared us to descend to 2;800 and proceed to an IAF at our destination. The crew did so and landed safely.The rapid decompression was thought to have been caused by a build up of moisture in the door seal which turned to ice crystals at altitude. This blocked the airflow into the door seal causing a leak that allowed the cabin to rapidly depressurize. This was corrected by draining the door seal and lines to it more frequently during maintenance checks.

A CE550 flight crew experienced a rapid decompression as they began descent to their destination. They declared an emergency and were expedited to a safe landing by ATC.

1761517

202009

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1761517

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

Passenger X was sitting in XXC. His relative; Passenger Y; was sitting across the aisle at XXD. They decided to upgrade themselves to better seats. We told them that they were welcomed to upgrade; but they would have to pay the extra fee. After much ado; they decided to move further back in the cabin. Then Passenger X decides that he doesn't need to wear his mask. We asked countless times for him to wear his mask. Many announcements were made. Every time; after we walked away; he took his mask off. Once I awakened him; asking him to put his mask back on. He said that he was eating. I said; 'Sir; you were sleeping.' He was putting all other passengers on board at risk.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with face mask policy during flight.

1600996

201812

1801-2400

ATL.Airport

GA

3.0

7000.0

Night

TRACON A80

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR HOBTT2

Class B ATL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 562

Workload; Time Pressure

1600996

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

We were on the Arrival into ATL. [On with Approach Control]; were given descent to 10;000 feet abeam EAGYL; and speed 210; between EAGYL and SHURT a descent to 7;000 feet; abeam SHURT we were given a descent to 3;000 feet; then told 'expedite to 3;000 feet; expect short final.' We started expediting down and asked Approach our sequence; they said 'you're number two and following a Air Carrier Y.' The Air Carrier Y was base to final and about eight to ten miles away from our position; we were on downwind. We continued down and configuring the aircraft; the Captain was flying and slowed down; I never challenged the speed and we both misunderstood the 'expedite down' instruction and expect short final with a speed relief.Shortly after; we were given a vector to heading 360. Then Approach called 'say speed;' we did say speed and explained; since it was a short final and the 757 had passed opposite direction our 9 o'clock; we understood we had to slow down. Approach said 'speed 180;' we increased speed to 180; Approach then said 'turn left heading 300; maintain 180 to JUBBA; clear Visual Approach Runway XX.' Then the Controller called 'say speed again' I replied; speed 180. He then said 'Clear visual; call Tower at JUBBA;' keep in mind between the slowed down speed of about 160 to increasing to 180 we approached the 757 to a distance of about three miles once given the turn to final.Once on the ground; Tower gave us taxi via [route]; and gave us a number to call for possible deviation. The Captain called; spoke to a Controller; explained what we understood; and then the Controller explained some things to the Captain. After the call the Captain explained to me what they spoke about; and told me that the Controller said 'No Deviation' just information for the future.

B737-700 First Officer reported deviating from assigned airspeed on approach.

1299334

201509

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Cessna 152

1.0

Part 91

None

Passenger

Cruise

Class D ZZZ

Indicating and Warning - Fuel System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 98; Flight Crew Total 139; Flight Crew Type 124

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

1299334

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Hobbs time from start to landing [was] 3.5 hours. Fuel top off at start. I depended on gauges for fuel enroute. Mechanic instructions before flight; 'It's a new engine; keep RPM high and don't lean'.At approximately 3.0 hours Hobbs; noticed engine RPM decreasing. Fuel gauge read 8 gallons. Altitude 5;500 MSL. Descended over time to 3;000 MSL where engine seem to make enough power to maintain altitude. I was returning directly to my home airport.Called tower advised of situation. Another instructor on [frequency] told me to 'keep full power and enrich mixture'. Go straight to [home airport]. With fuel gauge showing 6 gallons; the instructor told me I had enough fuel to return to [home airport]. I did what I was told. I was losing altitude quickly. I was at 1;500 feet MSL (800 AGL) when the RPM would not support level altitude. I selected an open field for my emergency landing.

The pilot of a C152 with a new engine was advised to run the engine at high RPM and not lean. As he approached the airport of intended landing; the engine would no longer maintain altitude; resulting in an off field landing.

1754497

202008

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Flight Attendant Airline Total 6

Safety Related Duties

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1754497

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

I briefed exit row. Only 1 passenger in there. I did the pre-departure and when I was walking back a woman snuck in exit row when my back was turned. I saw after out of sterile; when I went to wash my hands for service. I asked her when she moved; she said after I had walked through and I said she had to move back to original seat. She did.She wanted to move but never asked me or informed me she took it upon herself. People are wanting to spread out because of COVID.I don't really have a suggestion if they do it upon [themselves] and after my sweep with my back turned. I don't know how to control it. I saw after takeoff when I went to wash my hands for service.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger moved into the exit row after the briefing. Passenger was asked to move back to original seat.

1687600

201909

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

4000.0

IMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Taxi

EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Navigational Equipment and Processing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1687600

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface

1687811.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I was the Captain of Aircraft X; a scheduled public charter operated under FAR Part 135; and an Embraer EMB-135. We had flown 3 flight legs this day and we were departing on our 4th leg of the day without any re-set or shutdown of the aircraft avionics.During our climbout on the SID while passing through approx. 4;000 feet; TRACON asked us; '[Aircraft X]; where are you going?' We advised them that we are on the SID and they advised us that we were approximately a mile west of our intended course. We cross checked both navigation displays and noticed a very significant position error between the left and right navigation systems. The left and right navigation displays were approximately 6 miles different from each other.We advised ATC we were dealing with a navigation issue and we obtained radar vectors while we determined what was going on. As we climbed above 15;000 feet we noticed that the two navigation systems were slowly syncing back together. We were able to continue on course and climb to cruise altitude without any other issue. During the remainder of the flight we did not notice any other system anomalies.Upon arrival; we wrote up the navigation system in the aircraft logbook and advised our maintenance technicians about the issue. The technician that met the flight advised us that he has seen this same issue being reported by aircraft that have departed ZZZ and that the anomaly is also usually resolved when the aircraft climb up above 10;000 feet.I have been flying this type of aircraft out of ZZZ for about one year and have never heard or seen this issue before.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-135 Captain reported a momentary navigation system malfunction that resulted in a course deviation.

1744835

202006

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

600.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

1.0

Part 91

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 1300

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1744835

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 200; Vertical 0

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

The event occurred during traffic pattern operations at ZZZ. There were 3 planes in the pattern. 2 PA-28 planes (1 solo student) and a piper Malibu. The 2 Archers were in left traffic for [Runway] [Runway] XX and the Malibu was in right traffic for [Runway] [Runway] YY. I was number one with the solo student behind me as number 2. Tower instructed the Malibu; who at the time was at around 600 feet MSL on what looked like a right base to [Runway] YY; to enter right downwind for [Runway] XX as number 3 because he was faster than anticipated. The Malibu read back right downwind for [Runway] XX and asked if he should keep it in tight. Tower advised him that he was number 3 for the field. At this point; I was left base turning to final (student was flying at the time) and I looked off to my right and I saw the Malibu coming straight at me at the same altitude. I took the controls; full power; left steep turn to avoid hitting the other plane. The other plane turned final and landed without a landing clearance. I advised Tower of the turn I made and that the plane just cut us off. Tower advised the Malibu to copy a phone number after landing and; thankfully; an accident was avoided. Tower then advised me that he did not know why the plane did that.In hindsight; I believe there was a misunderstanding from the Malibu because he thought that because he was faster; Tower wanted him in first. When he asked Tower if he should keep it in tight; Tower said you're number 3 for the field instead of saying 'negative extend downwind' or something more of a command to ensure the pilot knew what was happening. The weather was not a factor. The pilot should have exercised better judgement and should have tried to get a better picture of who was in the pattern when Tower told him he was number 3.As a CFI; I am going to use this story for all my students about maintaining situational awareness and to always be vigilant and don't expect other pilots to be perfect. If that solo student was number one instead of me; this could have resulted in a tragedy.

Small aircraft instructor pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern.

1747433

202005

0001-0600

ZZZ.TRACON

US

6.0

7000.0

Mixed

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Cruise

Direct; Vectors

Class E ZZZ; Class G ZZZ

Small Aircraft

1.0

None

Cruise

Class E ZZZ; Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 320; Flight Crew Type 167

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1747433

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Horizontal 500; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Aircraft X was flying at 7;000 feet on an IFR flight plan while in contact with ZZZ Approach; had a near miss with Aircraft Y. The aircraft was less than 500 feet away when a deviation from ATC instructions was initiated and a dive down by Aircraft X to 6;000 feet was performed in VMC to avoid a conflict. After the dive and Aircraft Y was no longer a factor ATC advised Aircraft X of a traffic alert after it had occurred. Approach was on [frequency]; the Controller was possibly distracted and did not give traffic prior to it becoming a close call.

GA pilot reported an near miss while on an IFR flight; and that ATC issued a traffic alert after the fact.

1704721

201911

ADS.Airport

TX

90.0

17.0

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

12000

TRACON D10

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Climb

None

Class E D10

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Other 107

Cruise

Class E D10

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Total 88; Flight Crew Type 88

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1704721

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 50; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related

While flying due east at 3000 feet; approximately 17 miles east of the Addison airport; I encountered a gold colored Unmanned Aerial Vehicle of some variety. At first; I believed it was a Mylar balloon; but it was quickly obvious that it was actually a drone of some sort. It was exactly at my altitude; and passed at most 50 feet from my right wing. By [the] time; I saw it; I turned to the left; but it was nearly already past at that point. There was no ADS-B track. I was monitoring 122.8; which is used in the Lake Lavon/Lake Ray Hubbard practice areas; as well as most of the nearby airports. I advised of the near-miss to other pilots on frequency; but took no further action.

C172 pilot reported NMAC with a UAV.

1277194

201507

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

38000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Assembly

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 13000

Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

1277194

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 8000

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

1276623.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

I had just leveled the aircraft at FL380; approx. 30 miles from West of [waypoint] (eastbound) with the autopilot engaged. An FAA Maintenance Inspector had just left the cockpit. Crew meals were waiting at the door to be delivered. I donned my O2 mask as the Captain left her seat to open the cockpit door when suddenly a subtle but noticeable thud was felt in my seat bottom and toes resting lightly on the rudder pedals. Center called us to terminate radar services and switch us to enroute (HF) communication but I advised them that we wanted to remain in VHF contact as long as possible since I sensed an engine problem possibly developing.They gave us an alternate frequency but said it was only good for another 50 miles. At this time; I heard a light whistling sound behind the instrument panel that I hadn't noticed before. Looking at the engines; I observed a slightly lower N1 on the left engine. The Captain quickly returned to her seat and we discussed the indications. While a little hazy on the exact details and sequence of events; I seem to recall we had another brief; slightly larger thud as the Captain reduced power on the left engine to stabilize the N1 at about the 6 o'clock position. The compressor stall checklist was then run by the Captain and I quickly dropped my mask beside me.Simultaneously; an attempt was being made by the FAA Maintenance Inspector and a deadheading First Officer (FO) in the cabin to gain cockpit access using the emergency cockpit access code which seemed confusing/distracting as we were dealing with the situation. After a failed first attempt; they eventually were admitted. The FAA inspector took the #2 observer's seat while the deadheading FO sat in the number 1 Observer's seat and began to work with the Captain running the Severe Engine Damage (shutdown) checklist when engine temperature began to spike after trying to initially recover the engine by slowly pushing up the throttle per the Compressor Stall checklist. The throttle was slowly advanced from the 6 o'clock position but when almost back to the normal cruise 10 o'clock position; a much larger 'thud' occurred; the N1 collapsed; and EGT began to rise rapidly (up to 800 plus deg.?).Knowing that an engine shutdown was imminent; I took the initiative by requesting a descent to FL200 after viewing the 'Eng Out'; prompt on the FMC VNAV page. While a diversion airport had not yet been decided on; it seemed reasonable to me that we at least get turned around and heading in the right (westbound) direction. A descent clearance to FL200 was granted and a 180 degree turn was granted and I commenced a slow right turn and descent before the airspeed decayed too much (10-15 kts at that point). ATC asked for [an update] and I told them to standby while I assessed how high; how far (to ZZZ) and how much fuel we would have after dumping. Later; though not specifically instructed by the Captain due to workload concerns; I advised ATC that we would likely land on [the longest runway] in ZZZ and to have the fire trucks standing by near the high speed intersection Y.I descended in VS mode initially selecting 2;000 fpm to recapture the decayed speed (15 kts) while bugging up to about 300 kts. A 30 mile ring was drawn around ZZZ as I also noted the diversion options near us and mentally calculating about how far they were; checklists still remaining to be run; their runway lengths and my relative familiarity/recency of experience in each. Once stabilized in descent at about 12-1500 fpm at 300 kts and minimal thrust on right engine; I redirected my attention to the discussion between the Captain and newly designated IRO. Flight attendants reported a slight odor in the cabin. [We] were heavily engrossed discussing with Dispatch and [maintenance] what had happened and that we were diverting. By observing the current aircraft weight; and after advising ATC of their requested information; I then also took the initiative to coordinate approval for fuel jettison and it was approved. When the discussion eventually evolved into landing weight; diversion airport; etc.; I advised the Captain & IRO that we had been approved to dump fuel. Initially; the Fuel Auto Jettison checklist was run but later discarded in favor of the correct (unannunciated) Fuel Jettison checklist. As we began to dump fuel; we received an ATC clearance to descend to 10;000 feet and we continued to dump down to Maximum Landing Weight (MLW).After fuel jettison was complete we found ourselves with approx. 4;000 pounds imbalance between main tanks. We decided to run the fuel imbalance checklist to slowly bring them closer to equality. We opted to not finish this checklist before landing since we were already on a downwind abeam the field and were briefing running other checklists and coordinating with the flight attendants and passengers. The approach and landing was uneventful and we turned off onto the taxiway just beyond Y and set the brake as 4 fire trucks converged and advised us on ground frequency that there was no fire. After telling the passengers this news and to remain seated; we eventually were towed to the gate and the passengers disembarked. We inspected the affected engine with the FAA maintenance inspector and observed the destroyed turbine sections. The Captain had an impromptu debrief with the entire crew present with the FAA to discuss impressions/reactions; etc. In our haste to vacate the aircraft since maintenance wanted to tow the aircraft off the gate; we neglected to send in an FRM on the incident.

I was deadheading to work. I was in the passenger cabin. As the flight attendants started their meal and beverage service; I heard a pop and started to feel vibration; although very slight. I got up from my seat and I called the captain to offer my services (I had introduced myself to her during boarding; giving her my seat number and offer to help if anything came up). Captain asked me to come to the cockpit and assist. Upon arriving at the cockpit; the first officer; who was flying the aircraft; had already started a turn back to ZZZ and also commenced a descent. The captain asked me to contact dispatch; which I did over the SATCOM. I advised the dispatcher of the nature of our [situation] and our intentions. After that; I assisted the captain with various checklist - the continuation and conclusion of the engine fire/severe damage checklist; and the fuel jettison checklist. After the conclusion of those items; we got a fuel imbalance EICAS message and I worked with the captain to accomplish that check.During the descent; we did a quick review and critique to make sure no items were missed. By this time we were over our [destination] and concentrated our efforts on landing. A normal ILS was flown to landing. I made the announcement for all passengers to remain seated (as previously briefed by the captain). The captain elected to have the crash/fire/rescue vehicles meet the aircraft. They checked out the left engine; found no fire or fluids leaking; and awaited our intentions. The captain elected to shut down the aircraft and have ZZZ station personnel tow the aircraft to [the] gate.

A B-777 flight crew lost an engine while enroute. They ran appropriate checklists; dumped fuel; and returned to their departure airport and landed.

1758823

202008

1201-1800

ZFW.ARTCC

TX

9000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Center ZFW

Personal

Baron 58/58TC

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZFW

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Cruise

Class E ZFW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 168; Flight Crew Total 1168; Flight Crew Type 463

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1758823

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 200; Vertical 500

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

NMAC occurred in autopilot cruise at 9;000 ft. in VMC. I looked up to see traffic at approximately 11 o'clock approaching me head-on. I estimate the traffic was between 400 to 500 ft. below my altitude and 200 to 300 ft. to my left. In the time it took to recognize the situation; the traffic had already passed behind me; and I did not see it again. I immediately advised ZFW; including color and type of aircraft. At first; the Center controller did not see anyone else on radar; but after a moment said he could see a primary target with no transponder information right behind me. He did not inquire further; and my flight continued normally.

GA pilot flying reported an NMAC without a traffic alert from ATC.

1339321

201603

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

14000.0

VMC

Dusk

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 6369

1339321

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 1449

1339327.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During pre-flight; engine number 1 fire handle light failed test. Maintenance placed B fire loop on placard. Takeoff from runway 8. During climb passing 14;000 ft engine overheat light illuminated with associated overheat/detec and master caution lights. Leveled off at FL180. [Advised ATC] and started return to [departure airport]. Completed QRH for engine overheat. Light extinguished when throttle closed. Planned flaps 15 landing. When thrust lever increased light did not illuminate. Coordinated with inflight crew for air return and made announcement to passengers. Accomplished visual approach. Taxied clear for fire inspection and shut down number 1 engine. Cleared to taxi; but could not due to brakes locked. Called for Maintenance and tug to move aircraft. Coordinated with ops for air stair and buses to move passengers to terminal. Total time in flight 21 minutes. Time from landing to passengers deplaned 1 hour.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after receiving a Number 1 engine overheat warning during initial climb.

989643

201201

0001-0600

ZMA.ARTCC

FL

Center ZMA

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Facility ZMA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown

989643

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Procedure

While working the D-Side; a flight plan printed from Havana Center as Air Carrier X. The strip showed the type aircraft being a B737/Q. When the aircraft transitioned into Miami Approach's airspace; the Controller at Approach had noticed that the aircraft was in fact a B763/Q. On the active strip I had received from our automated data exchange with Havana had showed no remarks. Recommendation; the ADE process with Havana and ZMA still has a few 'bugs' that need to be fixed if this system is to remain full time.

ZMA Controller described the flawed ADE process between ZMA and Havana that involved a wrong aircraft type identification of an inbound aircraft; initially identified as a B737; but later corrected to a B767.

1791016

202102

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface

1791016

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Other Person; Person Ground Personnel

Pre-flight

General Work Refused; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

Accepted [release]; two wheeled crates containing aircraft ejection seats. While conducting a physical search; we came across a full oxygen cylinder still attached to one of the seats and showing as pressurized. The item description [was] of Emergency O2 Cylinder. The item is about 15 inches by 2.5 inches. Nothing was declared on the documents that were submitted.

Air Carrier Ground Personnel reported Cargo Department accepted a cargo shipment which contained a full oxygen cylinder.

1872474

202201

1801-2400

P50.TRACON

AZ

4100.0

TRACON P50

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Vectors; Visual Approach

Class B PHX

TRACON P50

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B PHX

Facility P50.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Situational Awareness

1872474

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X was IFR for Runway 26 at PHX. Aircraft Y was IFR for Runway 25L at PHX. Both aircraft were on 30 degree intercepts for their runways and cleared for the visual approach. Aircraft X went through final at almost the same altitude as Aircraft Y on the parallel runway. Separation was less than a mile and maybe 100 ft. Even though both aircraft were cleared for the visual approach and given 30 degree intercept headings they became dangerously close. The operation is completely acceptable in the 7110.65 but is very dangerous. This happens regularly with parallel runway operations at this facility.The 7110.65 needs to be changed to mandate standard separation until aircraft are established inbound on the final approach course. According to the 7110.65 paragraph 7-4-4; nobody is responsible for the IFR separation of 2 IFR aircraft. This operation is extremely unsafe and used at many busy airports with parallel runway operations. Many of the final approach courses are over highly populated cities. The risk of a catastrophic event is high.

P50 TRACON reported a loss of separation between two aircraft on final.

1003172

201204

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

CLR

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B717 (Formerly MD-95)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class C ZZZ

Cargo Door

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

1003172

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

I arrived at the aircraft and began the cockpit safety inspection and applied ground power after reviewing the aircraft logbook. I noticed one MEL that was for the Standby Avionics Cooling Fan INOP and circuit breaker collared. I proceeded outside and did a normal walk-around finding no defects. Boarding was normal and un-rushed. The Captain and I completed all the checklists; pushed back and taxied for departure after 2 successful engine starts. We lined up on the runway and I assumed the controls as pilot flying. We were cleared for takeoff and I applied takeoff power and executed a normal takeoff. Just after takeoff I noticed my ear pressure equalization was unusual and within a matter of minutes we got a CABIN RATE alert on the EAD. We both noticed that the cabin was climbing at roughly the same rate as the aircraft. The Captain said we may have a problem with pressurization and gave me the aircraft and radio control. The Captain attempted switching pressurization controllers to no effect and then tried manual pressurization and could not control the cabin altitude. He then stated we need to level off below 10;000 FT so we amended our clearance with ATC and informed them of pressurization problems. After the Captain tried trouble shooting the pressurization and not getting an adequate response from the system he decided to return to the departure airport. We got an amended clearance from ATC and returned to the departure airport for a visual approach. During the descent we remained in manual pressurization with the outflow valve full open and I executed a slow descent to ease pressure issues for the passengers. During the descent we received a CABIN INFLOW LO alert momentarily then quickly went out. We made a normal landing and returned to the gate. As the Captain conferred with Maintenance I went outside to inspect the outflow valve and noticed nothing unusual. I then went to the aft cargo door suspecting a door had not been closed even though we never had an indication of a door open. I noticed that the aft cargo door was latched but the door was slightly twisted in the frame allowing the forward part of the door to latch but the aft portion had a large gap. I believe this was our problem and upon testing the outflow valve and pressurizing the aircraft found that everything worked fine once the aft cargo door had been sealed properly. One of the ground crew observed the door ajar as I did and was the one who reseated the door properly. Training the ground crew to recognize a properly seated and locked cargo door would prevent future errors.

A B717 Aft Cargo Door was partially closed ajar so that the Door Warning System indicated proper closure but after takeoff the aircraft would not pressurized. The crew returned to the departure airport where door was discovered.

1684315

201909

0001-0600

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Direct

Aircraft X

Galley

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Service

Other / Unknown

1684315

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Y

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

Went to plate the soup; upon twisting the thermos top it exploded like a huge volcano of hot soup in my face; eyes; hair; uniform; shoes; galley walls counters; doors; ceilings it was so powerful that it ricocheted to the wall across the galley and behind me. 4 ft. a complete mess. It ruined a couple settings as well. I was completely blinded and in shock for the first two minutes my eyes and my face were burning and I was shaking with fear; pain and shock. After I realized what happened I immediately called the crew and FD (Flight Deck) and grab some ice and towels. I went to the lavatory to assess my face hands and arms. I have burns and will continue to treat myself until I finish this trip. I was up until XA:00 am doing laundry of my uniform van was at XI:00 am. I noticed many red burn spots on my face; hands and arms. My eyes still sting and are red. I will seek medical treatment when I get home from this trip if symptoms worsen; I will get help right away.We need to be incredibly careful and vigilant about opening the thermos of soup. I believe this experience will and should warrant a service/safety bulletin immediately.

Flight Attendant reported a soup canister exploded as it was being opened and resulted in burns.

1127024

201205

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

A320

Part 121

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Installation

Data Processing

X

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1127024

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Human Factors; Manuals; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Human Factors

On an A320 aircraft; I installed a Data Loading Routing Box (DLRB) Reference AMM 31-38-34. It has been brought to my attention that the correct software was not installed when unit was installed. I don't remember reading that software was to be installed at that time. [Suggest] double check paperwork and check revision dates and check IPC to see if software is to be loaded in units.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed correct software had not installed when he replaced a Data Loading Routing Unit (DLRB) on an A320 aircraft.

1728544

202002

0001-0600

ELP.Airport

TX

VMC

TRACON ELP

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS; VOR / VORTAC vor

Initial Approach

Direct

Class C ELP

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

1728544

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

The event occurred on Aircraft X from PHX to ELP. The weather was clear and daytime flying. As the flight entered the ELP airspace; ATC reported GPS jamming on the frequency. Runway 22 was closed; so the landing runway was 26L. The 2 approaches for this runway are RNAV(GPS) and the VOR RWY 26L. The aircraft was not certified for the RNP approach. We decided on the VOR due to the GPS jamming event. As we approached into ELP airspace we received an ECAM message: NAV FM/GPS POS disagree. Obviously due to the jamming event. The flight was in visual/daytime conditions; thus confirming position was quickly verified. During the VOR approach; First Officer was flying with autopilot on. Approximately 6-8 miles on final I noticed the flight track on Captain's ND (NAV Display) was starting to wander to the left. The First Officer's ND was showing normal indications; but wisely decided to turn off the autopilot and continue visually. At approximately 5 miles on final; we noticed the [VNAV] was commanding a much lower altitude than what was needed to remain on a normal 3 degree flight path to landing. The First Officer disregarded the false indications; and again preceded visually 3 to 1 with the VASI to and normal landing. Cause: GPS jamming probably from the Whites Sands missile range. Suggestions: I would highly recommend alerting crews in advance of these kind of events. This is in addition to ATIS and ATC reporting. I would highly recommend an alternate in the flight plan. If during night/IFR operations and Runway 22 closed; the only means to fly an approach would be raw data VOR.

Air carrier non flying pilot reported GPS jamming while maneuvering for the arrival. Jamming was reported by ATC.

1229164

201412

0001-0600

SBAZ.ARTCC

FO

36000.0

Turbulence

Night

Center SBAZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Center SBAZ

Commercial Fixed Wing

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1229164

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

North of ARVUM at FL360 in continuous moderate+ chop we requested FL340. Amazonica initially denied our request but subsequently cleared us to FL340. Upon reading back our clearance to FL340; Amazonica confirmed our clearance to FL340. Almost immediately Amazonica re-cleared us to FL360. Pop up traffic opposite direction appeared at the limits of TCAS 40nm; level at FL350. We were approaching 35;200 feet as we climbed back up to FL360 and assumed a right 1 mile offset. We were never closer than 30 miles to the opposite direction traffic before leveling at FL360. No TA or RA was received. While Amazonica has radar coverage throughout their airspace; their radios for the most part are atrocious. Constant vigilance is necessary and my alert copilot safely and smoothly maneuvered us to a safe altitude and course. Communication is extremely important in our profession and while read backs; and confirmation are necessary operational procedures; good radios are of paramount importance! A better means of communication must be found to mitigate communication errors; especially in remote and oceanic areas.

A B777 aircraft received a clearance to descend to FL340; and almost immediately were re-cleared to FL360. They noted pop-up traffic on TCAS at FL350 at 40 miles away. The reporter notes the poor condition of Amazonica's radios.

1672992

201908

0601-1200

DAY.Airport

OH

8000.0

VMC

Center ZID

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B DAY

Other

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1672992

Conflict NMAC

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Climbing through about 8;000 ft. ATC advised us of VFR traffic at our 1 o'clock; around 3 miles away. It was maneuvering erratically. I immediately saw it. It was performing aerobatic maneuvers. It seemed to me to be rapidly coming towards us from our 1 to 2 o'clock position; so I told the FO (First Officer) to turn left away from it. It was getting very close doing erratic turns; dives and climbs. The FO didn't respond which lead me to believe he didn't see the traffic; so I took the controls and began a sharp climbing left turn. I thought we had cleared it when the FO said he saw it; it was coming back towards us again; at which point I then saw it going straight up; at our altitude; just in front of us. I immediately pulled the aircraft up into a much sharper climb; momentarily at about 30 degrees up. We flew past it within a few seconds. I returned the controls to the FO; took a deep breath; and advised ATC what took place. The aircraft was not in radio contact with ATC.

Captain reported flight crew was forced to take repeated evasive action due to another aircraft maneuvering near them without ATC contact.

1416682

201701

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

3000.0

Marginal

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Air Data Computer

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1416682

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

During initial climb noted altitude miscompare ALT alert on Captains PFD instrument. At this time I cross checked my baro setting and altitude to the FO and seemed normal. Passing thru 3000 FT I noted the FO altitude miscompare also. I asked the FO to put autopilot on due to previous maintenance write up for CADC2 failure and suspected Airspeed Unreliable. We were now well above the overcast cloud layer in VMC. Ran Airspeed Unreliable checklist. Determined that CADC2 was bad and got numerous altitude and Airspeed edification checks from ATC. Stopped climb at FL330 and notified ATC that our altitude and Airspeed were Unreliable and inaccurate due to equipment malfunction. Got block altitude clearance of Fl320-FL340 and leveled off using vertical speed 0 at FL330 and [advised ATC] due to safety concerns and degraded capability. We also got wind shear det fail and IAS miscompare alerts. ATC confirmed our altitude as FL331 which agreed with the CA instruments. We noted/checked and verified our pitch and power settings for each phase and configuration of flight and all seemed ok after selecting CADC1 as good. We also got our altitude selector window back and PROF. After contacting [Operations Control] we determined that best option was to continue to destination as weather was VMC and we could descend VMC to landing per the checklist and they had parts. We received priority handling from ATC and did a long slow straight in ILS; Captain did approach and landing; to successful landing. FO did a great job with the checklists and backing up configuration speeds and verification checks with ATC.Event caused by bad CADC2. We ran the Airspeed Unreliable checklist and completed flight using good CADC1.

MD11 Captain reported a Central Air Data Computer 2 (CADC2) failure on climbout that resulted in unreliable airspeed and altitude information.

988273

201201

1801-2400

ZAB.ARTCC

NM

25000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZAB

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR GEELA 5 RNAV

Class A ZAB

Facility ZAB.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

988273

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

988492.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

An air carrier aircraft was on the GEELA 5 RNAV arrival into Phoenix. The aircraft checked on and the Controller issued him the descend via clearance with runway transition. The aircraft read back the clearance. A few moments later; the Controller issued the aircraft direct GEELA (which is on the RNAV Star) and comply with the speeds starting at GEELA. The aircraft read back the information correctly. The Controller performed a radar handoff approximately 15 miles from the boundary. The aircraft was later shipped to the arrival Controller. I; the FLM; got a phone call from the PHX FLM inquiring why the aircraft was still at 25;000 FT and that the pilot said he never received lower. I went and check the Falcon and Tapes and verified the descent clearance was given correctly and read back by the pilot. Both were indeed done correctly. I spoke to the pilot on the phone and when I told him after reviewing the tapes that he acknowledged the descend via clearance. When I spoke to PHX they asked for control on contact; which we gave. Since PHX gave a descent clearance prior to the GEELA fix; it would cancel the RNAV window restriction over GEELA so technically I don't believe a pilot deviation or airspace deviation occurred. Quite frankly; I believe the pilot either got confused with the descend via clearance or just forgot to enter the execute in the FMS database. After speaking with the Pilot and with the PHX Front Line Manager; I believe all parties agreed a simple mistake was made but corrected.

After crossing SCOLE intersection at 25;000 FT and 280k on the GEELA FIVE RNAV arrival to PHX; I left the frequency to listen to the ATIS and prepare for the In Range checklist. When I returned to the frequency a short time later the First Officer briefed me of the changes; ABQ Center had cleared us direct to GEELA intersection and assigned us a speed of 300k or faster until the speed restriction at GEELA. The First Officer then asked me a question regarding the speed restrictions on an RNAV arrival; whether a clearance to comply with a speed at a fix also implied complying with the altitude at that fix. I replied that it did not. I then queried the First Officer whether ATC had not assigned us a 'descend via' clearance. He reiterated that the clearance was for the speed only. We had a brief discussion regarding RNAV arrival procedures and 'descend via' clearances until ABQ Center handed us off to PHX Approach in the vicinity of GEELA intersection. It was apparent that we were quite high on the arrival; PHX Approach kept us informed of their plan for our sequence throughout a series of vectors on the arrival. At no time did ATC indicate that we had missed any clearance restriction or caused any loss of separation. I was confused as to why this had occurred; but assumed it might have something to do with the runway closure in PHX. However; after landing in PHX; I initiated a call to see if there had been a problem on our part. I spoke to an individual there who indicated that we had received and acknowledged a 'descend via' clearance. Neither I nor my First Officer recalls receiving such a clearance. Regardless of where the blame for this incident lies; it is clear to me that I probably could have prevented it. Had I taken the initiative to query ATC one I realized that we were higher than we should normally be at a given point on the arrival. Though the thought did enter my mind; I initially dismissed it assuming that we knew what our clearance was. Contributing to this; I think was my distraction with the In Range checklist. I was busy with 'my' duties and failed to keep situational awareness of the aircraft position on the arrival.

An Air Carrier on the GEELA 5 was issued a speed restriction prior to GEELA; but the new First Officer missed the DESCEND VIA clearance and the so the aircraft missed subsequent crossing constraints.

1660611

201906

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Parked

Installation

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Training / Qualification

1660611

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Other During Maintenance

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Company Policy

[Procedures Manual] XX.XX.X XX indicates cabin 'the security seals/stickers are installed by cabin appearance or authorized contractors. The exemption is the life vest compartment security seals that are installed by Aircraft Maintenance. All security fasteners are installed by Aircraft Maintenance. During pre-taxi walkaround; we frequently find improperly sealed and/or packed life vest on aircraft economy class seats. Cabin service gets notified by management to reseal the life vests. As per the [Procedures Manual] referenced above; 'all security fasteners are installed by aircraft maintenance.' Is it proper to have non licensed personnel to perform this type of work (1) on live airplane (2)undocumented? The aircraft mentioned in this report used as an example.

Aircraft Maintenance Technician reports that company violates procedures regarding security seals and stickers.

1120688

201310

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Electrical Distribution Relay

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1120688

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Manuals; Aircraft; MEL

Aircraft

With APU already running for entire flight segment per MEL 24-04A; on taxi in we shut down right engine. Thinking that Maintenance had properly placarded for the previous write-up; we were both surprised to see the right GEN AC BUS go dead along with the First Officer gauges and all other right AC powered items. My question is; would we have been single generator (Left AC; no Cross Tie) in flight IF we had lost right engine? I.e. Multiple emergency situations? Was placarding the AC Crosstie Inop the right solution to the previous write-ups about APU not picking up Right AC BUS on shut down? And has replacing the AC Crosstie Relay solving the problem now? If so; then perhaps jet should have never flown with crosstie relay on placard. To my mind; it really wasn't a crosstie issue since APU does not crosstie on the ground anyway. But APU was consistently failing to pick up Right AC BUS. I do not claim to be the systems expert; however it does concern me that perhaps if we had had the right engine fail; we could have also been single generator ops if the APU did not pick up the Right AC BUS.

An MD-83 was dispatched under MEL 24-04A because of an AC CROSS TIE fault with the APU continuously operating but while taxiing in after landing when the right engine was shutdown the Right AC BUS lost power.

1698028

201911

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

No Aircraft

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Troubleshooting

1698028

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Company Policy

Ambiguous

We have been having lighting issues over at the hangar spots with no lights. Company has put only 2 light towers out to provide limited lighting over some of these spots. Supervisors have been asking employees turn on light tower equipment who have not been trained on this piece of equipment. Supervisors who are not trainers have been going as far as to show employees how to turn on equipment when employees say they don't know how to use the equipment. Last week; a supervisor said on the radio that 'no one touch one of the light towers due to the fuel leaking'. Every employee who use equipment should be sign off on that equipment and know how to do a user check on that equipment. Not just shown how to turn equipment on. If someone went and electrocuted themselves by not knowing how to do a user check on the equipment or turn on the equipment with the fuel leaking and the light tower caught on fire or even themselves on fire from leaking fuel can end up in a bad result from injury to even death.

Ground personnel reported lighting issues and training issues resulted in a safety hazard.

1507484

201712

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 6475; Flight Crew Type 50

Confusion

1507484

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I conducted a visual pattern and approach to runway. I had planned one touch and go followed by a full stop landing. The one minute weather reported the surface winds at 220/6; yielding approximately a 5 knot crosswind component. I conducted a wheel landing and touched down on speed at 70 mph; on centerline; in the touchdown zone; and on the right/upwind wheel. After I lowered the left wheel; the aircraft immediately and uncontrollably veered sharply to the left. I applied full right rudder and immediately held the stick full right and aft to keep the aircraft from ground looping or cartwheeling. I was unable to control the aircraft and we departed the runway to the left and proceeded to impact two of the four PAPI lights. The prop hit a PAPI light causing the engine to quit. The aircraft continued and came to a stop approximately 50 to 100 ft off the runway. There were no injuries to myself (PIC) or passenger. I proceeded to secure the aircraft and survey the scene. I am extremely well trained in tailwheel operations and very familiar with this aircraft as it has been in my family for years. Nothing like this has ever happened. I was alert; well rested; and thoroughly enjoying the beautiful day. I immediately suspected that a brake had locked on the left wheel. This is supported by marks on the runway and grass as well as wear marks on the left wheel. I fully believe that my knowledge; experience; training; and safety minded professionalism prevented this from turning into a disaster. That being said; I urgently desire to know the root cause of the suspected brake/wheel malfunction to allow for future focused training and information sharing in the tailwheel community.

Piper pilot reported a runway excursion following a crosswind landing.

1335949

201602

1201-1800

GEG.Airport

WA

359.0

80.0

0.0

VMC

30

Daylight

Personal

Small Transport

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Cruise

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 8200; Flight Crew Type 150

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1335949

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Other Person

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Diverted

Procedure

I was operating as Pilot-in-Command of a privately-owned Part 91 flight from [the United States] to [an airport in] British Columbia to drop off my three passengers before ferrying the aircraft back to [a U.S. airport]. As per the international flight procedures; I had filed US CBP eAPIS manifests and ICAO flight plans for both the flight into Canada and the return flight back into the US. Additionally; I coordinated my arrival into Canada with Canadian Customs and landed [in British Columbia] with no issues. Upon my return flight to the US; I obtained my IFR clearance from Vancouver Center and was handed off to first Seattle Center during my US/Canada border crossing; and then later to Spokane Approach. After checking in with Spokane Approach; I was informed that; rather than continue to [the original destination] to clear Customs where I had intended; the US CBP was requesting that I instead clear Customs at Spokane International (GEG); with which I complied. Upon my shutdown in front of the US Customs office at GEG; I was very sternly informed that; in spite of my filing the appropriate eAPIS Arrival Manifest and ICAO Flight Plan; as well as obtaining my international IFR ATC Clearance; I hadn't received specific permission to enter US Airspace from the US CBP. I explained that it was my understanding that my eAPIS Arrival manifest and subsequent international IFR flight plan clearance had constituted permission and notification of my arrival into the US; which I was again told was incorrect. I spent upwards of 30 minutes then discussing with the Customs officer the preferred US CBP Arrival procedures; as well as the requirement for pilots to call and directly coordinate with the Customs office at the intended US Airport of Entry. After my extensive discussion with the officer; I now fully understand that the notification requirements of the individual Customs offices are independent of eAPIS filing notifications. However; in a fair amount of my after-the-fact reading and research; the absolute necessity of contacting the individual AOE Customs office isn't made particularly clear; nor is it clear that the eAPIS filing is not considered Customs notification. Usage of soft terminology wordings such as 'pilots SHOULD contact the CBP office' or 'CBP RECOMMENDS that flyers directly contact...'; as well as an unclear distinction between eAPIS filing and direct; over-the-phone Customs notification cloud the absolute requirement of directly contacting the CBP office independent of the eAPIS filing. Wording such as 'must' or 'required'; as well as standardized procedures between CBP offices; would've greatly diminished my incorrect understanding that eAPIS constituted the required Customs notification.

A general aviation pilot reported that after filing all known paperwork to return to the United States from Canada; the United States Customs Border Patrol advised that proper permission had not been requested and granted to enter US airspace.

1675305

201908

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

5000.0

Daylight

Air Taxi

Caravan 208B

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain

1675305

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was flying Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1 via direct on an IFR flight plan; level at 5;000 ft. It was a charter; empty out. One soul; 3.5 hours of fuel on board. A little over halfway to my destination; my fuel flow gauge began to rapidly fluctuate between 100-450 pph (pounds per hour). I turned my ignition and fuel boost on and checked both fuel tanks on; my fuel flow then began to fluctuate between 300-450 pph; no other indications; annunciations; or failures at this time. I simultaneously requested to return to the ZZZ airport and requested a higher altitude out of caution. I added power and initiated a climb to 8;000 ft. During my climb to 8;000 ft. my fuel flow began fluctuating again between 100-450 pph accompanied by an oil pressure fluctuation between 85 and 100 psi. Oil pressure unstable but maintaining within the green arc. There were no other failures or annunciations at this time. Given my inability to remedy the fluctuating gauges as well as the introduction of an oil pressure instability; I deemed it most appropriate to [request priority handling.] I landed safely at ZZZ airport approximately 45 minutes after my departure.

Caravan Captain reported fuel flow and engine oil pressure anomalies and elected to return to departure airport.

1584500

201810

0601-1200

S50.Airport

WA

1000.0

VMC

Overcast Stratocumulus; 5

Daylight

1500

TRACON S46

Personal

M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Initial Climb

Class E S46

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 100

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1584500

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was departing S50 (Auburn; WA) for IFR currency (practicing approaches in IMC). I filed a Round Robin IFR flight plan.Weather was MVFR at the airport at S50 due to Stratocumulus clouds; Vis > 6mi; Ceilings 1500-2000; tops reported at 3000-5000 ft. There is a valley; but terrain rises to the east.Once I was ready to depart (aircraft was in run-up) area; I was unable to get an IFR clearance on the ground using my VHF radio and had no cell phone present. (I had contacted SEA Departure on ground in the past.) I did reach SEA clearance delivery on the ground but they were too busy and provided me with alternate frequencies to SEA Departure; those did not work.I departed VFR; staying [in] the traffic pattern planning to contact Departure.Upon contact Departure was too busy with IFR traffic to give me my clearance; but said if I can maintain VFR heading south (getting to a different sector) I could contact them and get my clearance. Ceilings were level so I flew south at 1;100 ft MSL remaining east of the Class B Approach area for SEA. Once I was south enough I contacted Approach for my clearance; but they asked if I could provide my own separation up to 2;000 feet (sector MVA); which wasn't possible without breaking clearances.Ultimately; over Lake Tapps (VPLTP); I found an increase in ceiling (up to about 2;700-3;000 ft MSL) that allowed me to climb to MVA but; as I was climbing; I lost sight of my 'escape' route & airports and I realized that if conditions changed I might not be able to descend back down below the clouds safely. Reflecting; the decision to keep going (taking off into the pattern; traveling south; climbing into a 'hole') were all very risky. At the point that I was going to return to S50; I was considering declaring an emergency to get a clearance rather than trying to navigate back down below the clouds and to the airport.I should have dealt with the clearance on the ground not in the air. When talking to SEA Clearance; I should have been more direct to see if they could help get my clearance; and if not; then don't depart.Contributing factors:- Lack of planning for clearance (assuming VHF)- Forgetting Cell Phone- Mission mindset (departing expecting to get clearance)- Confusion with SEA Clearance (for connecting approach on ground vs. air)

Mooney pilot reported becoming disoriented and entering IMC conditions while trying to get IFR clearance.

1111315

201308

0601-1200

ORD.Airport

IL

VMC

TRACON C90

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Visual Approach

Class E C90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1111315

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

On approach into Chicago O'hare and cleared for the visual approach for Runway 28R we were given an intercept heading of 310 (approaching from the southeast) and cleared for the Visual Approach to Runway 28R. Once cleared for the approach I armed the approach mode on the glareshield; less than 2 seconds later the autopilot had captured a false localizer and began a left turn; I then disengaged the approach mode and selected heading mode to return to the proper intercept heading. I had held off on re-engaging the approach mode to ensure that it would not capture the false localizer again. I maintained a visual contact with the airport and landing runway. I also kept monitoring the PFD to see if the localizer would come 'alive'. There was no movement. I had taken a fast peek to ensure that we had set up and briefed the proper approach and we had. The localizer frequency of 111.1 for 28R was in the proper radio and the 28R approach was loaded in the FMS as a backup to our visual approach. I was rather shocked that the localizer wasn't moving just then I looked up and noticed we had closed in on the runway quicker than I had expected at which point I disengaged the autopilot and rolled into a 40 degree bank to avoid an overshoot. At which time the Approach Controller had transmitted that it appeared I overshot the localizer but there was no traffic on the parallel northern Runway; 27L; we were still outside WILLT Intersection. The localizer had captured prior to seeing an actual movement on the HSI until we were literally right on top of the course when it quickly moved to center. There was no TA or RA and the rest of the approach was uneventful. Hand flying with a greater frequency using pilotage and not relying on automation. Maintaining better situational awareness.

Regional jet Captain reports being cleared for the visual approach to Runway 28R at ORD and intercepting a false localizer before returning to heading select; then overshooting the real localizer because the approach mode had not been rearmed.

1020117

201206

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dusk

Air Taxi

IAI1124/1124A Westwind

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Parked

None

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 66; Flight Crew Total 3220; Flight Crew Type 512

Time Pressure; Fatigue

1020117

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

We were on final [and] upon gear extension we received one unsafe light on the nose gear and illumination of the left/right hydraulic low pressure annunciators. We requested delay vectors to troubleshoot; and were granted a low pass for a Tower visual gear inspection. On short final; the gear light went green; all annunciators extinguished; and we advised Tower that we would like to return to land instead of delay vectors. We continued to land without incident and all hydraulic systems functioned normally and our information was taken down by airport operations regarding the irregularity. Upon post flight inspection; we discovered a low level of hydraulic fluid in the reservoir and evidence of a leak on from the left engine cowling. We advised our Company Maintenance team and requested maintenance to inspect and add fluid. After servicing; we cycled the engine to try to pinpoint the leak. We found it to be coming from a small plug in the pump housing. [Maintenance] procured a gasket for the plug; installed it; and we cycled the engine again. No leak. This process was on the heels of a week-long maintenance delay due to a fuel truck colliding with our aircraft en route to fuel us. There was severe weather in the vicinity as we repositioned empty; as well as schedule pressure for an early departure. In the course of events; I failed to actually write-up the squawk for maintenance to sign-off; and the work performed was not noted in the aircraft log. My error was not following procedures for performed maintenance. After a difficult week of coordinating our passengers' alternative transportation arrangements; overseeing our aircraft repairs; dealing with the poor weather and our mechanical irregularity; I only wanted the problem to go away so we could get home. I gave due attention to the corrective actions required; but failed to have them properly documented.

A Westwind 24 Captain reported that he failed to properly document a hydraulic problem in the maintenance log; citing the pressure of a long assignment away from home as a factor.

1721459

202001

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1721459

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

After leaving the gate and engine start our flight attendants called us and notified a passenger had left batteries in their gate check bag. The passenger had their carry on that wouldn't fit in an overhead so a gate agent checked the bag. In their bag they had two lithium ion batteries (two drill batteries) loose not inserted in a drill. We talked to dispatch and referenced FOM/Hazmat Manual and determined with [Operations] we needed to gate return to remove the bag from the cargo hold and either find room in the cabin for the bag or keep the batteries with the passenger. We Gate returned; retrieved the bag/batteries; and refueled. And all decided we could make room in the cabin for the bag. I spoke again with Dispatch and [Operations Manager] regarding the passenger and Carry-On being back in the cabin and all signs pointed to us following the rules on this situation. We left with an uneventful flight. After review it seems like conflicting information on if we broke a sterile TSA program rule or not. A recent chief pilot newsletter talks about a commuting pilot not able to retrieve a checked bag from the cargo hold. This bag had been screened by TSA and considered sterile. I regret not confirming that piece of information on if we should have removed the passenger; and the bag all together and have them re-screened. As frustrating as the timing was on the passenger realizing they had batteries in their bag; they did the right thing by bringing this to our attention. This was a first for me; if there's anything I overlooked or missed feedback is welcome.Knowing what I know now; I wished I would have been more familiar with this type of situation and if the bag could be returned to the cabin. In hindsight I would have removed the batteries and gave them to the passenger to keep on their person. Ultimately; leave the carry-on in the cargo hold.

Air carrier Captain reported that a customer gate-checked a bag with lithium batteries; resulting in a return to the gate.

1686195

201909

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Testing

APU

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1686195

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Company Policy

Company Policy

Another inoperative APU. I am up to eight now for this calendar year. Versus only three in eight years with [another company]. Why don't you understand how to maintain the Airbus properly?In this case the cabin temperature reached 86 degrees while we waited for a second air start cart after the first one did not work. This is not acceptable! Some passengers were sitting in this stifling heat for over thirty minutes; most notably the elderly passengers who pre-boarded. And they are the most susceptible to extreme temperatures. Being stuck in an aircraft cabin is not like being out in the desert where you get an occasional breeze; it's like being tossed into oven to cook!Additionally; the cross-bleed start checklist advises against single engine taxi operations if the APU generator is not available. Due to the confined gate/alley space this would have meant starting both engines at the gate and severely jeopardizing the safety of the ramp crew who would have had to work around the #2 engine while it was running at idle power. The most important breach of safety in this situation; today; is the go-minded attitude of the Company. There is no apparent regard for doing things right regardless of how long it takes to make the operation safe. Leaving on time regardless of the status of personnel and equipment; regardless of the risk to safety; regardless of the wellbeing of your passengers; is the only thing this company cares about.Stop making us fly around the county with broken APUs! This is not an acceptable way to treat people. This APU has been inoperative for four days! How can you possibly think that is acceptable behavior? Spend the money on maintenance before you kill someone!

A320 Captain reported that inoperative APU that was being deferred over a period of 4 days caused elderly passengers to suffer in 86 degree heat for 30 minutes; causing them extreme discomfort.

1446107

201704

0001-0600

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

1446107

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Upon arrival in ZZZZ I was notified that the inbound flight had an over temp in level cruise at altitude on the left engine. I called dispatch and they patched me through to [Maintenance and Mechanic at Engine desk]. [Maintenance] informed me that the engine only went up to 1032 degrees for less than 15 seconds so no action was required. [Maintenance] also notified me that the engine was old and had 34;300 hours on it and was scheduled for an engine wash. The inbound crew was also experiencing an over burn of fuel on the left engine approximately 1;000 lbs per hour more than the right engine. The engineers and engine group was not concerned as you are allowed to have up to 10 over temp situations of this type before action needs to be taken I was told. [Maintenance] also said twice that he was confident that we would have an over temp on takeoff but it should not go that high out of ZZZZ. I informed [Maintenance] and dispatch that I needed to discuss this issue with my flight crew and line maintenance before I would make the decision to depart. After reaching the cockpit I had a discussion with both the line maintenance mechanic and my 3 first officers. The line maintenance mechanic repeated what I was told by [Maintenance] and confirmed that it would be safe to depart. We decided to depart and had a normal start and taxi out. The left engine was running at idle approximately 100 degrees higher than the right engine; which I was told had only 5;600 hours on it. Upon taking the runway and applying power with the TOGA switch; we had a major spool time difference. The right engine came up to speed normally but the left engine did not. As a result; I believe of the twisting action we received a Takeoff Configuration Gear warning. Prior to advancing the power levers I made sure the main gear trucks were aligned so this warning was a non normal situation. I discontinued the takeoff after only achieving a speed of 30 to 40 knots. We cleared the runway and taxied to a safe and clear area. After clearing I conducted an experiment and brought the power lever on the right engine to approx. 50% range and it took 6 seconds to spool. When I did the same with the left engine it took 13 seconds to spool. I this time I decided to return to the gate. Upon arrival at the gate we shut down the engines and the mechanic came on the plane and showed us the picture that is attached for the left engine. This picture was taken shortly after shutdown. The mechanic believed that we had a fuel controller issue and that the engine was running too rich or that we had a hydro mechanical controller issue for the left engine. As a result the mechanic took the aircraft out of service and said it needed to be borro-scoped. The flight cancelled and my in-flight crew departed and then my flight crew and I moved the aircraft to a hardstand under tug control.

The Captain of a Boeing 777 reported that the #1 engine had an over temp and would not come up to speed as quick as the #2 engine; resulting in a rejected takeoff.

1766684

202010

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1766684

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1766694.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

After sorting out an issue in ZZZ of not getting a cargo load report (CLR) notes on ACARS on any live animals. The flight crew simply asked [the] ramp agents to resend it. They were unable to do so so we simply asked for a paper CLR. The Ramp Lead became flustered with his scanner and went to go ask a manager for help. The manager came back about 10 minutes later after we had closed and gave the flight crew the notice to Captain form (first time we discovered there was dangerous goods onboard) and resent the CLR with the notes on DG (Dangerous Goods) and live animal (I noticed the bird and medical boxes on my walk around but didn't notice any markings on the medical boxes pertaining to DG). Already delayed pushing back we then became saturated with a runway change. Reaching cruise we became talking more about the lack of NOTOC (Notice to Captain) and an impending incident report. After talking for a few moments at cruise. I realized that we are not allowed to be carrying both dry ice and any live animals in the forward cargo bin together. After bringing that to light I began inquiring about possible diversion options. Including the destination of ZZZ1 40-45 minutes out. After the Captain messaged with Dispatch we decided to divert to ZZZ2 as that was the fastest option to separate the dry ice and live animal. Landing and taxing in we made sure we had a ramp crew that was informed of the situation and needing to open the fwd cargo door asap and remove the live animal. As well as a gate in ZZZ2. I went down to check as soon as the jet bridge was pulled up. And when I got down there the bird was out of the fwd cargo and in good health. The live bird was ok and the ramp agents took the bird into the office to be in the air conditioning and off the loud ramp environment while the ramp crew and flight crew figured out a new bag count. Cargo count. And any other required paperwork. I began calling for fuel. Loading in the new flight plan from the release while the Captain went down to talk to ramp managers as to what cargo is staying or going. A new and confirmed bag count after ZZZ2 rampers recounted bags and cargo (which did not match the original bag count out of ZZZ even though we only removed the DG) was received.After getting everything all figured out in ZZZ2 we calmly talked to the passengers and gave them a timeline of when we would expect to be pushing back and going to ZZZ1. After getting to ZZZ1. And finishing the flight. Deplaning. And; making sure the live animal was ok and in the possession of ZZZ1 Ramp Operations. The Captain and I began debriefing today's events. We reconstructed a timeline. No cargo load remarks. Called OPS. They began to get flustered about their system. We then just asked for a paper cargo load report to remedy the glitch in the system. The Ramp Manager came and threw though the window a notice to Captain. This was the very first time we realized we had any DG onboard. We then hyper focused on the problem of closing without a NOTOC and making sure to talk to OPS and Ground. When talking about this in the air. I realized the problem of the DG and live animal in the same compartment. We quickly then realized that this was not a situation that could continue. We began looking at diversion options. Talking to Dispatch and ZZZ2 OPS. We diverted and handled the situation at hand going forward. We talked about how there are numerous safeguards to never let a situation like this happen before it even gets to the airplane or airport/cargo processing counter for that matter. And how this is a prime example of reasons [for the] swiss cheese model. Starting early this morning with 3 runway changes and a wrong turn on a taxiway resulting in the first ASAP. Airline's ramp scanning system and software letting these be scanned together or a safeguard overridden to let this happen. Us hyperfocusing on discovering DG was onboard after closing with no NOTOC. And resulting in missing the combined DG and live animal in the same cargo compartment until cruise flight. Going forward and learning from this. This is a prime example of how to simply complete tasks and move on without hyperfocusing on the previous threats or errors.

Today I; while operating Aircraft X from ZZZ-ZZZ1; made a grave mistake and allowed myself to depart ZZZ with dry ice and a parrot in the forward cargo bin. Upon discovering my mistake I contacted Dispatch and subsequently diverted to ZZZ2. The parrot was alive and we got some gas and continued onto ZZZ1 without further incident. While in ZZZ my FO (First Officer) noticed a big parrot and some medical looking boxes sitting outside cargo bin during preflight. He brought it to my attention. I was focused on making sure we had one or the other listed on load remarks. We got our baggage data but it did not generate a load remarks message. I released parking break while talking to [the] Ramp Lead via interphone. I inquired as to why we did not have a load remarks message. I asked if he could resend it. He was unsure of everything and went to find his supervisor. At this time I could not confirm if we had an animal or DG or both. I called Dispatch to see if he could look at stuff for me and he confirmed we got bag total the weight of some cargo thru close out but no load remarks. As a side bar I spoke with Name1 on the Hazmat hotline and he stated that company had to manually override scanner to allow for DG and animal at same time. Could this be why we didn't get load remarks? After about 10 minutes; [a] ramp agent returned but paced. He did not get back on intercom during most of this but when he did I explained he had a couple options. We could do a return to gate or they could give me a paper CLR (Cargo Load Report) thru [the] window if they could not fix it with [the] scanner. He radioed someone and a minute or so later a supervisor came out of an office and did not look happy. He had a wad of paper. He came to FO side and tossed the wad of paper thru window which ended up being the NOTOC for the dry ice. At about the same time we received the load remarks and I was focused on the DG the live animal got past me. I did not do this on purpose. At the time I was more upset with blocking out without the knowledge of DG on board and focused on making sure I had all my correct paperwork and it matched since I had DG. We also had the remark 'EXST:9A'. This threw me for a loop because I didn't know what it meant. We figured it out to be that a passenger had bought a seat onboard a raft for an animal which I already knew about because of gate agents and flight attendants. We had wasted enough time so I decided to continue with the push. We had a runway change on taxi out so I focused on getting thru that and we as a crew focused on operating safely until we were in a low workload environment to talk about it again. At cruise I was filling out incident report for not getting NOTOC when I was talking my narrative out loud the FO was looking at [the] FOM and said we have both an animal and DG on board and he just realized it as he was reading and telling me. We immediately contacted Dispatch who advised us to go to ZZZ2 or ZZZ3 and divert. I chose ZZZ2. I alerted [the] flight attendants and we landed in ZZZ2 without further incident. There was confusion on [the] ground in ZZZ2 as to which item should continue with us. The bird or dry ice. I called Dispatch again and they chose the dry ice and while I was talking to ramp they said company wanted to keep bird to ZZZ1. While checking packages manually in cargo bin I discovered the DG also contained Blood. UN3373. After OPS and company agreed; we departed to ZZZ1 without further incident. After landing I called Hazmat hotline and submitted pictures of bird and DG and ACARS remarks to company.I did not purposefully depart without NOTOC or depart consciously knowing we had dry ice and a bird in same bin. I know it's one or the other. I was just hyper focused on being legal that I missed connecting the two together. I believe I realize now that I can take as much time as I need to make good decisions. No need to rush. I did and it got me nowhere. I hope someone can imagine getting a wadof paper thrown into flight deck and the distractions of finally realizing the gravity of I had almost departed without knowing what was in cargo bin. I had always believed there were safeguards in place to prevent this from happening. This is the first time in 15 years of safe flying I've had to divert for a bad decision I made. I feel horrible and I'm glad the animal was still alive. I know it could have been much worse. I believe this flight had a happy outcome because of Dispatch and my crew. I tried to thank them but I cannot thank them enough.

E-175 flight crew reported an uneventful diversion due to Hazmat loading issue due to missing NOTOC at departure.

1791799

202103

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

TRACON ZZZ

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

IFR

Cruise

TRACON ZZZ

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

VFR

Cruise

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1791799

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors; Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related

Staffing

The staffing has been really poor. We have taken a few hits because of people being out with coronavirus or close contact. I just wanna say on Day X that I worked a X AM to Y PM shift and that was the beginning of my week. It was tough to get caught up from the fatigue of that for a shift in the very first part of my week. Also; I have worked X weeks in a row with only a single day off.I took a handoff Aircraft X IFR from ZZZ [Center] (X SECTOR) at 4;000 destined ZZZ [Airport]. Airspace configuration was north based on ZZZ1 [Airport] international traffic. This required me to vector Aircraft X around the ZZZ1 [Airport] Final Box. I did so. Because of the staffing we were told or encouraged to not work VFR overflights or VFR practice approaches that day. I don't know if that word was past two adjacent facilities; But I was trying to eliminate as much of the VFR traffic as I could by terminating them whenever they checked on from other facilities or by denying services.ZZZ [Center] (Y SECTOR) handed off Aircraft Y; VFR at 4;500; but the pilot never checked in. I had to call ZZZ [Center] (Y SECTOR) and ask for communications. I had no intention of working Aircraft Y. I wanted to be able to communicate with the pilot to terminate Flight Following in order to concentrate on other tasks. I had the Flight Data controller remove Aircraft Y from the NAS.While I'm doing this; a couple of things happened at or about the same time. Aircraft Z checked on the frequency and was in the ZZZ1 [Airport] Final Box under the Class Bravo Airspace. Aircraft Z requested clearance into the Class Bravo airspace and to navigate VFR to a hospital that I hadn't heard of and was not mapped. I was trying to determine where exactly the hospital was. At or about that same time I had an aircraft (Aircraft A) check on my frequency (the wrong frequency); wanting clearance into the Class Charlie airspace at ZZZ2 [Airport] for closed traffic. Aircraft A should have made the request on ZZZ1 [TRACON] frequency XYZ.Y. I looked over to my left and the ZZZ1 [TRACON] Controller looked and sounded busy so I decided to accommodate Aircraft A and then point out Aircraft A to the ZZZ1 [TRACON] Controller. I issued all of the instructions for Aircraft A. I also accomplished all of the coordination for the Aircraft Z with the Final Controller. When I finally get Aircraft Y on frequency I told him I was too busy to accommodate VFR flight following; told him squawk VFR and radar service terminated. At some point I drop the track on the wrong aircraft. I drop the track on Aircraft X IFR to ZZZ [Airport].I'm shocked that I did not realize that I dropped the track on the wrong flight; but for whatever reason I did not. I'm pretty sure I was pretty tired by this point. My previous session in the day ran almost 2 hours; during which I took an absolute pounding. I am further shocked that at no time in the session did I realize and correct my mistake.Later in the session I took the hand off on Aircraft B from ZZZ1 [TRACON] Y Sector. Aircraft B was requesting 6;000. Departure 3 & 4 were being worked by one controller; who was probably the busiest controller in the room. I decided to give Aircraft B; 4;000 as a final altitude.Aircraft B was now IFR at 4;000 southwest bound and on a converging course with Aircraft X. I don't remember the destination for Aircraft B. Aircraft X is tracking pretty much direct ZZZ [Airport] I don't remember if I had given them direct or not. I noticed Aircraft B was converging with limited target at 4;000; which was Aircraft X. I called the traffic to Aircraft X. Seeing the conflict I decided to climb Aircraft B to 5;000. I don't recall if Aircraft B ever called the traffic in sight; but I know; after watching the replay that I never had more than 500 feet separation between the two flights.Still not realizing my mistake; Aircraft X calls ZZZ [Airport] in sight. I ask who he is and where he came from. Not one of my better moments. At some point; I began to remember Aircraft X and I start the track on the flight; make the appropriate entries in the scratch pad; coordinate with the ZZZ1 [TRACON] Y Sector Controller for landing ZZZ [Airport]; inbounded the flight to the Tower; and cleared Aircraft X for the visual approach to ZZZ [Airport].I know this recommendation will be laughed out of the office; however it would be terrific if the terminal world had a version of EDST [En-route Decision Support Tool] along with a monitor/terminal to view and amend flight data at your position. This technological implementation is frankly overdue and it is a genuine travesty that we don't have it.

TRACON Controller reported numerous issues while working traffic and problems associated with the workload and staffing.

1583538

201810

1801-2400

MMU.Airport

NJ

10.0

6000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Class B EWR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 12711; Flight Crew Type 7401

Situational Awareness

1583538

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

At 6;000 feet night VMC. About 10NM South of Morristown Airport. I noticed a possible drone about 500 to 750 feet above us moving in the opposite direction. It was very fast and I just noticed this off the corner of my left peripheral vision. There was no TCAS identification. We reported to NY Approach a possible drone sighting.

Air Carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict with UAV during approach.

1606074

201812

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

0.0

Tower EWR

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Check Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1606074

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Airport

Airport

After landing in EWR we were given instructions from Ground to taxi RB to the gate and contact ramp. Upon getting towards the B intersection we contacted ramp and they said to enter on RA. We were confused about the direction of RA because of recent construction and the moving of the RA taxiway. I knew that there was construction and that there had been an email from the assistant Chief Pilot about a few months ago and I had not flown to EWR since; so I had my student ask the ramp for clarification and all we got was contact Ground again. This went back and forth and we turned the wrong direction on B taxiway towards the old location of RA. We had been monitoring ground on the other radio and he asked if ramp had sent us that way. Our response was one of confusion and we immediately stopped the aircraft. Ground allowed us to turn around and come back the proper direction where we finally got some guidance from the rather less than helpful Ramp Controller; after some cajoling. We did not enter any closed taxiway and we just turned around in the non-movement area; according to Ground; but it was concerning that I could not get good guidance from Ramp and in the heat of the moment I could not find the disseminated information required to taxi knowledgeably. We as a crew should have been more properly prepared for a new taxi situation; however prior to the flight I could not find the email where the information was printed. This may have something to do with trying to find email on my phone versus the company email tool. The ramp [our company uses] at the gates could be more helpful; rather than 'contact Ground' when asked for assistance. The disseminated information should be in the form of Jeppesen updates; not in an old; buried email. Ground seemed to see the light later on with other aircraft and asked if they were familiar. And the biggest problem of all is that there are no signs anywhere to show the location of the new RA. Also why would they not rename a completely new taxiway a new name? The new RA does not go in the proper order: RA; RB; RC as opposed to RB; RA; [and] then RC. All very confusing. Also finding the 'taxi out spots' which are only labeled in small print on the pavement; is also a problem for crews.

Airline Check Pilot reported taxiing the wrong direction due to insufficient chart updates and taxiway surface markings.

1683268

201909

0601-1200

JNU.Airport

AK

1000.0

Mixed

Daylight

Tower JNU

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Other Instrument Approach

Class D JNU

Tower JNU

FBO

Helicopter

1.0

VFR

Initial Approach

VFR Route

Class D JNU

Facility JNU.TWR

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1683268

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was on CIC (Controller in Charge). Helicopters were in bound to the field from the northwest; expected to join a VFR arrival route. Weather wasn't good. Poor visibility and wind shear to the west. The trainee had given traffic on the inbound helicopters to Aircraft X about 10 miles out. The helicopters appeared to be south of course to avoid clouds and Aircraft X got a CA (Conflict Alert) about 5 miles from the runway. I asked the trainee if he had updated the traffic to get him to look; either out the window or at his screen at the traffic. The trainee said he already gave the traffic and it wasn't an issue. Aircraft X continued to have the CA all the way into the runway. We've had issues with helicopters; which are mostly seasonal; all summer long. The VFR arrival/departure is way too close to final for Runway 8. On weather days; they are very hard to see. These helicopter companies have been flying in flights with paying passengers all season as well. We have multiple aircraft inbound to Juneau from that area. This is not safe. The trainee should pay attention since this was very slow traffic and update traffic calls. Aircraft X had a CA with multiple helicopters inbound to the field. This 'I don't care enough to look attitude' is what's going to hurt someone someday. Helicopters with paying passengers should not be flying in flights. We need to update the helicopter arrivals/departures into Juneau Airport.

JNU Tower Controller in Charge reported Local Control was not issuing sufficient traffic information about helicopters on a VFR route to an air carrier on final approach.

1816007

202106

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

3500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Vectors

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X; Facility ZZZ

Government

Approach; Instructor

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1816007

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Airspace Structure

Aircraft X was issued 3;500 ft. by my Trainee and we heard a good read back of 3;500 ft. I observed the aircraft at 3;100 ft. and I issued a climb immediately as the aircraft was a few miles from a 3;500 ft. MVA. The aircraft continued to descend further before he was able to climb. To be honest I let the Trainee go too far in running his own sequence. Had I been working I would typically not have the aircraft that low and close to the airport if he wasn't number one for the runway. I think this may have contributed to the Pilot mistaking thinking he was cleared for the visual approach.

TRACON Controller reported during that OJT an aircraft descended below its assigned altitude and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1755933

202008

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

50.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Eclipse 500

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Landing

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 567; Flight Crew Type 99

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1755933

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

On visual approach to Runway XXR at ZZZ; LLWS led to loss of altitude on short final and stall warning horn. [I] was able to recover and execute a go-around. [The event] occurred within airport property but prior to the runway threshold. I would estimate that I recovered at approximately 50 ft. above the ground [and] 200 ft. prior to the runway threshold; which is way closer than I would want to be. As a lower-time pilot; I don't have high confidence in my measurement estimates.I don't believe the ATIS was reporting gusty winds; so I didn't add speed to Vref as I was trained to do in gusty conditions. I think my takeaway in the future is I will add speed to Vref in moderate turbulence conditions as well because of the potential for LLWS. When executing a visual approach to XXR at ZZZ; aircraft are typically asked to keep base turn within 2 miles of airport; which makes it hard to execute a stabilized approach to final; especially in moderate turbulence conditions.

Single Pilot reported a stall warning and loss of altitude on short final due to a moderate turbulence event.

1638865

201903

0601-1200

PIT.Airport

PA

161.0

104.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower PIT

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Other Part 107

None

Class B PIT

Hangar / Base

Contracted Service

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 14; Flight Crew Type 14

Situational Awareness

1638865

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Routine Inspection

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

Arrived at the loss location and was in a hurry to get out of the extreme cold temperatures. Did not adequately check airspace at the location and flew without prior authorization. Airspace violation was discovered in my company's monthly flight reviews and has been discussed with me for corrective measures. Will file a flight plan next time I am in a LAANC ready airspace.

DJI Phantom UAV operator reported inadvertently operating in PIT Class B airspace without clearance.

1591385

201811

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Rain

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 102

Other / Unknown

1591385

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 255; Flight Crew Type 742

Other / Unknown

1591385.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

During taxi into the gate at ZZZ while setting up for single engine taxi; I inadvertently selected the Number 1 ENG GEN switch off while intending to turn off the APU GEN switch to prevent a potential power cycle for a pending APU start. Because the Number 2 ENG GEN had already been turned off in preparation for single engine taxi (and awaiting the required 3 minutes for engine shutdown) switch misidentification resulted in a momentary loss of electrical power also effecting the nose wheel steering and brakes. The error was immediately noticed and power was reapplied retuning power; steering and braking immediately without incident.

While taxiing in; I was slowing to make the turn to enter the ramp area to park. The Number two engine was set up for single engine taxi waiting on the time to shut it down. The first Officer was going to start the APU so he went to turn off the APU Gen but accidentally hit the no.1 Gen instead of the APU gen. and we lost all power brakes and steering momentarily. He immediately realized what he had done and selected the no.1 gen back online. The aircraft drifted left of centerline and I almost missed the taxiway I was slowing for due to no brakes. The brakes and steering came back as soon as the power was selected back on and I was able to stop for the turn and correct back towards the taxiway centerline. The First Officer was new and finishing consolidation and thought he had the correct switch; immediately recognized the mistake and corrected the issue. I was looking out the window towards the gate and did not see the switch he was pushing.

A319 flight crew reported a momentary loss of electrical power during taxi when the operating generator disconnect switch was inadvertently activated.

1245277

201503

0001-0600

PHL.Airport

PA

1000.0

VMC

Night

Tower PHL

Air Carrier

Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B PHL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1245277

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

Procedure

Had to go around on a visual approach to RW 27R in KPHL due to the aircraft in front failing to clear as quickly as I had expected. We were cleared the visual approach after being told to proceed direct JALTO. Prior to that we were on vectors with an assigned airspeed of 180KTs (approximately 4 miles from JALTO on a right base). After being cleared the visual approach we seemed a bit tight on the proceeding aircraft so I slowed to 160 KTs 2 miles prior to JALTO and aimed about a mile outside the marker so as to make enough room. All seemed fine as we had 2.5 miles spacing on the TCAS as I slowed to approach. Normally 3 miles would be optimal on visual approaches but still it seemed we had enough. As we were descending through 1000 AFL tower asked the proceeding aircraft (company) to clear at K4 however we heard no response from them on the radio. Apparently they weren't able to make that exit as they continued down to T. Tower asked them to expedite down to T as we were on short final by then (approx. 700 AFL I'd guess) but again we heard no response from the preceding aircraft. At about 500 AFL tower directed us to go around which we did just as the aircraft was turning off at T.We had to go around for 2 reasons. First of all I didn't recognize the tight spacing quick enough to give myself 3 miles.... that extra .5 miles would have made the difference. However the secondary reason was that our company aircraft refused to respond to tower which raised doubt as to whether he/she would clear at T. I have witnessed many pilots (including myself) become annoyed when tower calls them on the radio during landing since obviously it is a busy time. That being said had they told tower that they would be off shortly then I'm certain we'd have been able to continue that approach to landing.... again we were not all that low at the time of the go around.... 500 AFL.At any rate it wasn't that much of a problem as we circled right back around and landed just a few minutes later.Personally I try to answer tower if possible when they call even during the landing. The best example is when you land RW 04 in KLGA and the tower immediately asks you if you can make P or G. Until you acknowledge with an answer they can't clear the aircraft on RW 13 for takeoff. We have to work as a team with tower during that landing/departing configuration and I think a bit of teamwork could have been used on RW 27R the other morning as well.

An Airbus Captain executed a go-around on short final to PHL because the preceding aircraft was not clear of the runway; and failed to acknowledge ATC's request for an expedited runway exit.

1424680

201702

1801-2400

DEN.Airport

CO

19000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZDV

Citation Excel (C560XL)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR TELLR2

Class A ZDV

FMS/FMC

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Workload

1424680

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

Inbound on the TELLR2 RNAV arrival into DEN level at FL190 were approaching the fix CRSTE and already established the arrival; we were cleared to descend via the TELLR2. We waited almost a full minute for the Top of Descent (TOD) to display and engaged VNAV/VALT. Approximately 2 minutes later over CREDE intersection; ATC changed our runway so the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) reloaded the FMS to 34L transition. When he executed the change; our TOD and all speed commands disappeared from the PFD. It took over 3 minutes for a TOD and VNAV to return; during this time I was very focused on manually making the altitude crossings while the PNF was desperately trying to determine why the FMS VNAV had failed. I was successful at making the altitude crossings manually; but due to task saturation caused by an inadequate and antiquated Honeywell FMS; I did not catch the speed restriction of 250 KTS at POWDR; about 3 miles past POWDR; Denver approach queried us about our current speed to which the PNF responded 'slowing for 250;' which was done immediately after the query. The rest of the arrival and landing was normal and there were no other excursions.The Excel crews are getting sick and tired of the shortcoming of the underpowered and antiquated FMS system. It amazes me that our safety department can't figure out why this fleet is having so many ALT/NAV deviations; but it is very clear in our minds that there is a direct correlation between this substandard and outdated FMS system and the deviations; it simply cannot meet the demands of the latest generation of RNAV procedures and is very unpredictable. The worst case scenario for this FMS is an arrival comprised of multiple in between altitudes; it does not have the computing power to make these calculations in a timely fashion.To mitigate this in the future; I recommend the safety department and the FAA do not authorize the XL fleet to perform these complex RNAV procedures. We should be using only NON-RNAV arrivals. I'm going to go out on a limb and assume the above recommendation will fall on deaf ears so I will also recommend that when between altitudes [that] are part of an RNAV arrival; the procedure is to replace every in between with a manual hard altitude that is in compliance with the published between range. For example; if the procedure specifies cross between FL190 and FL150; the crew would manually input FL170 as a hard altitude.

CE-560XL Captain reported the Honeywell FMS installed in this type of aircraft is; in his opinion; incapable of complying with the complex demands of modern RNAV arrival procedures.

1653867

201906

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

11500.0

VMC

50

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

RV-4

2.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 10

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1653867

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

In Day VFR CAVU cruise flight at 11;500 MSL over mountainous terrain; I inadvertently and unexpectedly ran the right fuel tank dry causing the engine to quit. I switched to the left tank but the engine refused to restart despite the windmilling propeller. Fuel pressure remained at zero even though I tried the electric fuel boost pump; leaning and enriching the mixture. I even tried going back to the right fuel tank but nothing changed so I reverted to the left tank again since I was certain that it had to have fuel since I had visually verified the fuel quantity in each tank during my pre-flight inspection. The engine is fuel injected hence no carb heat was available nor needed (but I'd have tried anything at that point). I cycled the mag switch off then back on; cycled the throttle and quickly rechecked everything one last time. This was all to no avail so I committed to a forced landing.Luckily; Airport (ZZZ1) was within easy gliding distance and I highlighted it on Foreflight on my iPhone (the only long range nav on board) and pointed toward the field. It turns out that I misidentified the field visually and wound up landing at ZZZ despite making all my radio calls on ZZZ1 UNICOM frequency.ZZZ UNICOM traffic informed me that there is only one runway at Cable and since I was calling for right traffic to the right runway I must be at a different airport. By the time I realized my error there was no time or attention to spare trying to find the Tower frequency for ZZZ. I hit my 'high key' on right downwind for Runway 26R and proceeded to a 'low key' abeam the numbers. Landing went well and I touched down just as the prop stopped windmilling about 40% down the runway. I coasted clear of 26R. My co-pilot and I had to push the airplane the last few feet to clear the runway.I initiated a phone call to ZZZ Tower and explained my situation. I felt very embarrassed for my confusion as to location and apologized for barging in unannounced. Tower was extremely pleasant and reassuring. They collected my information. At the time; I suspected a blocked fuel vent on the left side but it tested fine when I blew into it from both the vent tube and by blowing into the fuel tank through the fuel cap opening...it flowed air just fine. Refilling the tanks took quite a bit more fuel than should have been consumed in the 70 minute flight.After fueling both tanks to capacity; the engine started and ran normally on either tank. Fuel pressure indicated normal with either the engine driven pump or the electric boost pump on either tank. An extensive run up verified that normal fuel delivery was occurring. It was decided that we must have experienced a vapor lock; so after much discussion with my friend and experienced and co-pilot for the day we decided to test fly the airplane. Takeoff and climb out were normal so we continued on our way.During the otherwise normal flight from ZZZ to our original destination we noticed a slight mist above and aft of each fuel cap but fuel flow; pressure and level indications remained normal so we continued the flight.Upon further examination at [our destination]; the fuel caps were found to be misadjusted and allowing fuel to siphon out into the slipstream. No characteristic blue staining was visible due to the fact that the wing is painted in metallic light blue. The fuel caps were tightened so as to provide more clamping force on the sealing O-Ring and the return flight from ZZZ2 to ZZZ3 went smoothly with no further difficulties.If the airplane wing were painted white or had a white round-el paint around the fuel cap; I might have seen evidence of the fuel loss in the form of blue staining at the fuel caps.If I had more time in that serial number; I might have trusted the gauges even though they were indicating less fuel than I thought should be present. Basically; I ignored what the gauges were telling me and should have stopped sooner to investigate what appeared to be disappearing fuel as indicated on the fuel gauge.I'm very accustomed to using Foreflight on my iPad but only had my iPhone for the flight in question. I feel screen size played a part in my airport ID error. Also; fumbling with the smaller iPhone; which I dropped several times during the emergency; didn't help. An iPad on a mount would be much safer and will be used in the future.I could have exercised better crew resource management and used my co-pilot in the back seat to handle communications; especially once I realized my airport error on downwind. He could have easily found the correct frequency but I'm not sure I could have spared the time to go 'head down' in the cockpit to select the correct freq. But I could have at least tried if I had thought of it. I'll try to exercise better CRM (Crew Resource Management) going forward.All in all; a very lucky outcome. No injuries; and no damage to anything but my pride.

RV-4 pilot reported having to land due to a lack of fuel problem.

1260604

201504

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

None

Other Maintenance

Taxi

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Normal Brake System

Bombardier CRJ

X

Malfunctioning

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Gate / Ramp / Line

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1260604

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Person Maintenance

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

CRJ-700 aircraft was pushed back from the gate. We performed engine start checks; then started engine. I; Mechanic X; called for taxi and we get clearance from Tower. Mechanic Y reports no brakes or steering. I try my brakes; no stop. I then armed thrust reverses and pull back on thrust reverser levers. I saw on the EICAS the thrust reverser did activate but not soon enough to stop us. After the incident I go to stop the engines and we go through shutdown procedures. Tower calls and ask if we need assistance or medical crew; and I tell them that we were okay. Then aircraft shutdown. I feel [that] an abnormal event and then the onset of panic caused the event along with the amount of time to fix said event. Aircraft damage. Struck against an aircraft. Surface dry.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes his efforts to stop their CRJ-700 aircraft during taxi out when he realized they did not have any brakes or nosewheel steering control prior to contacting another aircraft. The abnormal event and onset of panic contributed to the incident.

1038888

201209

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 150

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Part 91

Final Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1610; Flight Crew Type 1600

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1038888

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 100; Vertical 200

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

While waiting for traffic to pass before takeoff from an untowered airport; I heard one aircraft report on final and another on downwind. I watched the one on downwind while the one on final landed and exited the runway. At that point; aircraft previously on downwind was turning base; and I looked and did not see anyone else on final; so I taxied onto the runway and took off.About the time I rotated; another pilot announced a go-around; and then overflew me slightly to the left. As it turned out; he was on final; but I did not see him. Good thing he did a go-around; as otherwise; he may not have been able to stop before colliding with me if he had landed.In retrospect; I suspect both pilots may have announced being on final on CTAF; but I was not aware of it being two separate aircraft. Being more cognizant of the different pilots making CTAF announcements and a better scan of the final approach path may have prevented this near collision.

Despite CTAF transmissions and visual contact with other aircraft in the pattern; a C-150 pilot just airborne from a non-towered airport suffered an NMAC with another aircraft executing a go-around that had been on final to the same runway; but was unobserved by the reporter.

1685566

201909

0601-1200

LIRF.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Parked

Fire Protection System

X

Design

Gate / Ramp / Line

Crew Rest Area

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 227; Flight Crew Type 3855

1685566

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; MEL

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Lower level Flight Attendant crew rest area by Door 3R; inspection showed Halon light DISCH. Switch did not have guard or safety wire to prevent accidental discharge. Not sure if cleaners or stranger hit button. Maintenance consulted and dialog revealed a non-standard panel. The correct panel should have had a guard and procedure on label.I suggest installing a new panel or modify the existing panel to include a guard or safety wire system and recommend issuing a safety bulletin to alert crews. Without lower crew rest we lost 5 revenue seats to crew rest and left uncertainty as to what Maintenance Control thinks is installed on the aircraft.

B777 Captain reported a non-standard fire protection panel installed in crew rest area; resulting in a delay and 5 seats to be reserved for crew rest.

1016542

201206

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

35000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown

1016542

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

Aircraft X was at 35;000 FT on the track out of ZZZZZ [Intersection]. As the aircraft was entering Center's airspace; the aircraft stated that due to aircraft maintenance it was turning around. I confirmed this with the aircraft via phone patch. I then treated the aircraft as an emergency. The aircraft was cleared to descend to 34;500 FT and was told upon reaching 34;500 FT; then cleared right turned direct ZZnZZw; further routing to follow.

En route Controller provided emergency handling to an aircraft experiencing equipment difficulties.

1765571

202009

0001-0600

S50.Airport

WA

Mixed

Haze / Smoke

Daylight

Personal

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Class B SEA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 35; Flight Crew Type 290

Situational Awareness

1765571

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Climbed out of S50 in Aircraft X; ATC requested we maintain visual obstacle clearance which we agreed; due to smoke visibility was low; passenger became nervous and turned the aircraft while we were being vectored; Requested ATC to vector us back to S50 for landing; ATC provided phone number to call TRACON after landing due to us turning while being vectored. Landed without incident; ATC marked matter as closed.

Pilot reports deviation from Air Traffic Control vectors.

1764286

202009

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

14300.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction

1764286

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction

1764288.0

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

After departing ZZZ Runway XX; Departure Control directed turn to 020 degrees; climb 10;000 MSL. Air Traffic Control then directed passing 11;000 MSL; cleared left turn direct ZZZ [VOR]; climb and maintain FL180. Air Traffic Control then amended clearance to 14;000 MSL. With aircraft in the turn; autopilot engaged; thrust in climb power and Open Climb mode; aircraft exceeded 14;000 MSL by 275 feet during automatic level with autopilot likely due to light weight. Air Traffic Control immediately gave us right turn 360 and firmly reminded us of our assigned altitude of 14;000 MSL; then called traffic at our 11 o'clock at 15;000 MSL. Autopilot was disconnected; we initiated immediate turn to 360; manually complete the level off at 14;000 MSL. There were no TA's or RA's during this event. Aircraft never exceeded 14;300 MSL during this event.Got altitude assignment while climbing at a high rate.

Cause - Light weight aircraft as a result of very light passenger load.Suggestions - Awareness on aircraft operations with non-standard weight...much lighter than standard ops weights.

Air carrier flight crew reported overshooting an assigned altitude during departure and cited the rate of climb due to the aircraft being light in weight as a contributing factor.

1324242

201601

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

9000.0

Mixed

Haze / Smoke; Icing; 7

Daylight

2200

Center ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 310/T310C

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise; Landing

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Fuel Selector

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 66; Flight Crew Total 910; Flight Crew Type 340

1324242

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Weather

Aircraft

I was approximately 80 miles from destination airport level at 9;000 feet on an IFR flight plan. I was operating both engines on the auxiliary tanks and in preparation for descent and landing went to change the fuel selectors back to the main tanks. The right engine selector moved freely; however the left selector would not move. The left aux tank had two gallons remaining as indicated by instruments. The airport was reporting 600 scattered and if I recall correctly the ceiling was coming down and visibility was dropping due to snow.I could see alternate airport directly ahead and controllers informed me weather was 2;200 OVC. I requested a destination change and descent. I elected to make a power reduction on both engines but pulled to power to idle on the left engine in an attempt to conserve fuel. I broke out into visual conditions and noticed that Exhaust Gas Temperatures (EGTs) on the left engine had dropped indicating it had run out of fuel. I secured the left engine; increased power on the right engine to full. I located the alternate airport and selected a runway I was aligned with and it was also the longest available. ATC had reported that the braking action was reported as poor.I landed and applied brakes to stop when the plane began sliding on the ice. The brakes were locked when a dry patch of concrete was encountered. This caused the right side main tire to flat spot and wear to the point of failure. An attempt was made to taxi the plane but was found impossible with a single engine operating and with a flat tire. We were able to move the plane onto runway a cross runway. We notified airport management that we would require a tug and to NOTAM the occupied runway closed. Due to the ice conditions and facility staff availability the plane remained on the runway overnight and another attempt will be made today.Other than the flat tire; the plane does not appear to be damaged and an investigation into the fuel selector valve will be initiated.

The fuel selector for left engine malfunctioned resulting in fuel starvation of the left engine. The pilot diverted to closest field available. Poor braking action resulted in a failed tire on landing rollout.

1060751

201301

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1.0

300.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Cessna 152

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Initial Climb

None

Class D ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 950

1060751

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

The preflight looked good [with the rental C152]; there were no noticeable leaks or discrepancies with the aircraft. The run up and magneto check was good. I got clearance to take off. The takeoff roll was normal. I rotated and climbed out at Vy. Everything was fine until I reached around 300 feet AGL; [at] that time I noticed I was no longer climbing and that the airspeed was dropping as well as the VSI. The stall warning horn began to sound and I started extending flaps to transition into slow flight to keep from stalling. The engine was still running smoothly; however the engine was not producing enough power to maintain altitude. At this time Tower asked me what was going on. I told them due to an unknown reason I was not able to maintain altitude and I was going to try to circle back and land. It did not look as though I would make it back to [the takeoff] runway and the Tower advised that I could land on [a different] runway instead. I was able to make it down and land and the partial power I still had was enough to taxi back to [FBO] where I notified them of the events and issue with their plane.

C152 pilot reported engine was not producing normal power on takeoff and he was losing altitude; so he returned for an immediate landing.

1272196

201506

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

B777-200

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

N

Scheduled Maintenance

Work Cards; Inspection; Installation

Oxygen System/Pax

Boeing

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1272196

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

N

Person Maintenance

Other During Maintenance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Chart Or Publication

While working an Engineering Repair Authorization EC/EA and AD 2012-11-09; Step 2-B1 appears to have the mechanic inspect the existing cable; install the mask and insert [Release] Cable pin into the striker pin of the cylinder if no damage was found. There was a misunderstanding by the [maintenance] crew of Step 2 of AD 2012-11-09; since the mechanic had to install a new cable; which is not addressed in AD 2012-11-09. As a result; the Cable assembly and oxygen masks were incorrectly installed on a B777-200 Aircraft during reactivation of the Oxygen System.Additional reference should include an Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 35-21-01-40b (item C) for a better understanding of [Release] Cable routing. Also add a [maintenance] step to install any missing cable to [passenger O2] box; including hardware; into the Engineering Kit for AD 2012-11-09 and better training.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) recommends an additional reference be added to Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2012-11-09 to include Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 35-21-01-40b; (item C). The IPC would provide a better understanding of the Passenger O2 mask box release cable routing. Misunderstanding of Step 2 of the AD resulted in an incorrect installation of the release cable and O2 masks on a B777-200 aircraft.

1595198

201809

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

21000.0

VMC

20

Daylight

Corporate

Small Transport

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Oxygen System/General

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 78; Flight Crew Total 5400; Flight Crew Type 900

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1595198

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Procedure; Aircraft

Ambiguous

I have been working in a dysfunctional flight department. I flew an aircraft without being sure that the MEL was done correctly. It originally became nonfunctional as I was flying with the Chief Pilot; and I asked him how we should write it up. He asked; officially or unofficially. I said officially; and thought the matter was going to be resolved before we flew it at altitude again. It was not and I flew with the O2 nonfunctional. There are a number of issues at this flight department; and I have reported it to the management; and the POI (Principle Operations Inspector).

Flight Department Captain reported flying an aircraft with a non-functional O2 system and not knowing if the MEL for it had been followed correctly.

1757997

202008

1801-2400

ANC.Airport

AK

7000.0

Daylight

TRACON A11

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Class C ANC

Facility A11.TRACON

Government

Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1757997

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

Human Factors

Aircraft X departed ANC on the SID climbing to 4;000 ft. I vectored Aircraft X to the north and climbed him to 7;000 ft. below another IFR aircraft that was eastbound above. I became busy with other aircraft requesting special VFR clearances. When my scan brought me back to Aircraft X; I saw he was at an altitude that I could turn him on course into higher MVAs and thought I climbed him to 20;000 ft.As my scan approached him again; he was climbing well through 6;500 ft. in a 2;000 ft. MVA area. I asked him for a PIREP and was writing that down on the PIREP form. I turned around to give the PIREP form to the CIC and as I was sitting down; Aircraft X requested higher. I saw that Aircraft X was still at 7;000 ft. in an 8;000 ft. MVA by a few miles and climbed him to 20;000 ft. I realized the climb was not going to be well enough to clear the 10;000 ft. MVA so I expedited his climb through 10;000 ft. When I realized that wasn't going to work and he was out of 8;000 ft.; I turned him left to avoid the higher MVAs. He was clear of the 10;000 ft. MVA box but had already missed the 8;000 ft. MVA.My recommendation is when we are inundated with IFRs off of our satellites and primary airport and our satellites start going below basic VFR; we should have a low radar staffed so that they can deal with all the special VFR requests rather than leaving the North Radar Controller to do it all.

TRACON Controller reported being overwhelmed by distractions from satellite airport operations and forgetting to climb an air carrier departure; resulting in the aircraft flying below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1599118

201811

SAN.Airport

CA

4000.0

IMC

Rain

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Class B SAN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Type 8192

Situational Awareness

1599118

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161; Flight Crew Type 1828

Situational Awareness

1599078.0

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

Established on LOC 27 between VYDDA and OKAIN. LOC Capture and VNAV Path were established. Speed 170 Kts as assigned by ATC. Flaps 20 Gear Up. Descending to out of 3800 MSL and we received a GPWS warning 'Terrain Terrain - Pull Up Pull Up Pull Up' warning. Initiated Terrain Escape maneuver and as soon as we climbed 200 feet the warning ceased. We continued to climb to 4000 feet and advised ATC. After initiating Terrain Escape maneuver; we were unable to re-establish VNAV Path and executed a Go-Around and diverted.

After executing a missed approach due to low visibility on our first try into SAN we were vectored north of the airport and cleared for the LOC 27 again. We were established in LOC and VNAV Path modes; at approximately 3;800 ft; approaching OKAIN; at 170 KIAS; flaps 20; gear up and speed brake armed. We received a 'TERRAIN; TERRAIN; PULL UP; PULL UP' GPWS Alert. The PF (Pilot Flying) (Captain) executed the GPWS escape maneuver and the alert did not reoccur. I alerted ATC of the GPWS alert and our maneuver. We were subsequently re-cleared the approach but were unable to re-establish VNAV Path in time; executed a missed approach and diverted.

B757 flight crew reported executing a go-around and diverting to an alternate after receiving a GPWS terrain alert on approach to SAN.

1351199

201604

1201-1800

ZBAA.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Tower ZBAA

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1351199

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Human Factors

Approaching number 1 for the runway; we had watched 4-5 departing and arriving aircraft. Spacing between arrivals and departure was large; maybe 2-3 miles. Number one and holding short of the runway; just as landing traffic passed by; I heard the controller say what sounded like 'can you accept immediate?' Clearing left (final) and confirming with Captain; I responded to the affirmative. There was no reply. I was watching the landing traffic roll out and clear when I heard the controller repeat the request; and I again responded affirmatively. At this point the Captain was saying I wasn't transmitting. I looked at my communication panel and realized we had begun moving into position as the Captain responded to Tower we were lining up to hold for immediate takeoff. I selected my mic button as the Tower ask if we were lining up on the runway. 'I responded affirmative' and Tower then cleared us for takeoff. On departure; we were asked to contact the Tower. I remained on departure frequency while the Captain talked to Tower. They said we had taxied into position without clearance and to be more careful. It all had happened quickly and with some language barrier combined with the communication mishap; the Captain's reply to Tower led me to believe he had heard a different clearance than me; but by then we had been cleared for Takeoff. I did not hear anything from the First Officer B or First Officer C during all this; but I may have missed something listening to the Captain speaking as well as the Tower transmissions. To the best of my knowledge; no other aircraft/traffic was affected.

First Officer reported taxiing into position on runway without clearance. The flight was subsequently cleared for takeoff.

1101332

201307

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Turbulence

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Door

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

1101332

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Aircraft; Weather

Weather

Repositioning flight about 29 minutes from landing; we got the announcement to prepare cabin. Secured galley and came back into cabin at row 1 hit turbulence so took seat in 1C. After sitting we had at least one really hard jolt and then I heard the other Flight Attendant call my name then turned to see if she was ok. Still could not get up at that point. When we arrived at the ramp area to deplane the boarding door would not open after trying 2 times the Captain then tried with no success. Also First Officer tried. Severe turbulence was cause.

A CRJ-900 on a repositioning flight with only flight and cabin crews aboard encountered severe turbulence during the descent. Upon landing they were unable to open the main cabin boarding door.

1276055

201507

1801-2400

RSW.Airport

FL

0.0

VMC

Dusk

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 7500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1276055

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Weather

Procedure

Frequently at RSW METAR/SPECI and weather reported on the ATIS is inaccurate. This leads to poor decision making and flight planning mistakes by pilots; dispatchers and meteorologists who rely on the weather observations to be accurate and representative.[One day] a thunderstorm was reported in the METAR for several hours after it ended. A few days earlier a FC (funnel cloud) was reported in METAR by accident when none occurred.The ATC at RSW should either learn how to augment the ASOS properly or leave it in AUTO mode. Currently; the ATC augmentation of the ASOS at RSW leads to a poor and inaccurate product which has the potential to be dangerous.

A pilot reported that RSW METAR at times was inaccurate with outdated conditions or conditions which have not occurred.

1417596

201701

1201-1800

4A4.Airport

GA

3.0

3500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

CTAF 4A4

Personal

PA-34-220T Turbo Seneca III

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Cruise

Direct

Class E A80

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 1484; Flight Crew Type 612

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1417596

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Horizontal 5000; Vertical 2000

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

We were doing practice approaches in VFR. We were on our way to RMG to shoot the GPS approach to RW1. I was under the hood; the safety pilot saw a parachutist we immediately deviated. We were listening to 4A4 CTAF; but did not hear info about parachute jump. In my briefing; I did not see a NOTAM about parachute jumpers in my route. While there was plenty of space to maneuver it was a concern as we did not know if there were other parachutists in the area. In retrospect I should have asked for flight following. In the future I intend to do all practice approaches under an IFR flight plan in constant communication with ATC.

PA34 pilot reported coming upon parachute jumpers necessitating evasive action in the vicinity of 4A4 Airport.

1353395

201605

1801-2400

BFI.Airport

WA

2200.0

Night

TRACON S46

Fractional

Citation X (C750)

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Final Approach

Vectors

Class B SEA

TRACON S46

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

VFR

Cruise

None

Class E ZSE

Facility S46.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.3

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1353395

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Airspace Structure

Working Boeing satellite sector; light traffic; marginal VFR conditions. Aircraft X on a vector to the ILS rwy 13R approach at 2200 feet. As I turned Aircraft X to a base leg heading of 040 I scanned and saw VFR traffic NE of the localizer moving westbound at 2000 feet and the target appeared to be climbing. Anticipating that this traffic would become a factor for Aircraft X I continued their turn to a 090 heading and called the traffic. Aircraft X did not have the traffic in sight; so I also advised them of the field for the visual approach. Aircraft X reported the field in sight; so I instructed them to continue the right turn towards the field and cleared them for the visual approach. By this time; the VFR target's Mode-C indicated the same altitude as Aircraft X. After Aircraft X cleared the traffic the pilot advised me that they had responded to a TCAS-RA reference the VFR traffic I had issued as they were in the turn on the visual approach. I informed the supervisor on duty and after determining that no more information was required for the daily log I transferred communication with Aircraft X to BFI ATCT and the aircraft landed without further incident.The FALCON replay demonstrated the targets were .89 NM apart at the same altitude and closest laterally at .71 NM by which point Aircraft X had descended 200 feet below the VFR. While I believe both of those measurements occurred after I had taken positive control action to separate Aircraft X from the VFR target; had I been busier or not caught the VFR target in my scan it could have been much worse. FALCON also illustrates that the VFR target crossed the BFI runway 13R localizer less than 2NM North of ISOGE at 2100 feet climbing; which is exactly where an IFR aircraft would be positioned; both vertically and laterally; to execute the ILS approach to BFI.This is another report of a continued problem within our airspace. Something needs to change. The VFR aircraft are transiting a very narrow; busy corridor of airspace and are doing so without any communication with ATC. It is simply unsafe. The VFR aircraft in this area at the very least need to be in communication with ATC so that we can assign; as necessary; altitude restrictions ensuring the safety of all the aircraft involved. The solution(s) are not hard and while they are potentially more restrictive to VFR aircraft the bottom line is that what happens day in and day out in that airspace as it exists and operates now will eventually result in a very bad accident.

S46 TRACON Controller reported of a conflict between and IFR arrival and a VFR aircraft. Controller reported this is an ongoing problem with VFR aircraft using a corridor that conflicts with IFR aircraft arrivals at the same altitudes.

1270485

201506

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1270485

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Staffing; Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

Procedure

In the last pay period and this pay period for here at the Center; I was scheduled to supervise air traffic control in these operational areas that are foreign to me:Day 0 XA:00 shift in [Area X] (I have never managed this area before!)Day 2 XA:00-XB:00 in [Area X]Day 7 XH:45 shift in [Area Y] (never managed this area)Day 9 XB:00 shift in [Area Y]Day 11 XA:00 shift in [Area X]Day 16 XH:00 shift in [Area Z] (never managed this area)Day 17 XC:00-XG:00 in [Area Y]Day 23 XH:00 shift in [Area X] They have me all over the place without regard to knowledge of personnel; the operation; or safety. It is thunderstorm season. You need to be able to provide operational support for the controllers you supervise when things get hectic. I was by [the] Center's new Traffic Management Officer who is now in charge of the Traffic Management Unit. At XB:30 while performing FLM (Front Line Manager) duties in my operational area; I was approached for STMC (Supervisory Traffic Management Coordinator) duties in the TMU for I stated that I no longer maintain currency within the TMU and a lot of procedures and guidance for STMCs have changed. I was informed that I was to vacate my position as FLM of my operational area to perform STMC duties in the TMU so the current STMC could work as part of staffing. I was forced to manage the Traffic Management Unit although I have lost my currency and am no longer certified on positions and am no longer up to speed on current guidelines and practices and procedures. It's been 5 months I stated to the TMO that I would not feel comfortable with this as in my opinion it violates JO 7210.3. I stated to him that I know it is a big mess you're faced with; but they (superiors) put me in this situation by involuntarily moving out of the TMU as I am now a [Area A] FLM. Recently; (yesterday morning); I was scheduled to supervise (Area X) for on a shift at XA:00 that I have never supervised before. I am now an [Area A] supervisor. It is an unsafe expectation to manage air traffic control operations in this manner. I am expected to 'wing it'. No training; no currency; no certifications; no knowledge of who is certified in what positions (except for a few that I may know); no knowledge of staffing needs of the area; not knowing who is in training or who they train with or whether the staffing can support the training; who is partially certified from who is fully certified (to be able to assign positions effectively); not knowing a controllers abilities or limitations with sector volume; not knowing interpersonal differences between controllers as some people don't get along with each other; etc. I walked into a situation after coming off of a leave of absence to be put in an unsafe situation to manage air traffic control operations in a completely foreign area. I have stated my disposition about being in this situation (basically my desire to not be put in an area I have never managed before). This scheduling of supervisors is being done regardless to a supervisor's comfortability and/or experience and is sanctioned by upper management. Nevertheless; the supervisors put in these situations are accountable if anything goes wrong. This is not a rant. Operational managers have acknowledged that they know this is not proper. Safety is the issue here. I have listened to several horror stories of situations my peer FLMs; have experienced while being put in these situations. All someone needs to do is interview a few FLMs here to ascertain the gravity of what is occurring. Upper management is looking for ways to 'get around' a standard that has been around years before I became a supervisor here (Supervisors managed there areas that they are assigned to). We never operated in this manner until recently. FLMs have filed reports on this matter. How many does it take? The flying public deserves better. The safety team here is tasked to fashion a work around to thecurrent JO7210.3. It will be manipulated by upper management to minimally appease the ERC (Event Review Committee) to continue its practices. The newest FLMs here are rumored to obtain an hour on each position in another operational area and then an hour at the FLM desk of another area and then be competent to manage the operation. Can a CIC manage another operational area? No. Some FLMs are afraid of what is expected of them. No one has the courage to voice this out loud. An intervention is necessary.

Front Line Manager (FLM) reports of having to supervise other areas that he has little or no knowledge of. Facility is mandating this to the FLM and the FLM reports that he feels this is an unsafe practice.

1339506

201603

1201-1800

UDD.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF UDD

Personal

SR22

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 2700; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness

1339506

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway

Horizontal 1000; Vertical 20

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I was descending to land. At 12 miles out I switched from flight following to monitoring Unicom. Unicom announced 'Rwy 28 active; left hand pattern'. I then responded with my position and intentions to stay north of I-10; cross midfield for a left downwind. I again reported midfield; downwind and turning base. Just as I was finishing my turn to final at about 800 ft AGL; a Falcon announced a 5 mile final. I called him saying I was 2 mile final. Then again announced 1 mile final. After touchdown and rollout; I saw lights approaching to land from the opposite direction (Rwy 10) at about 700 feet. I called: 'jet on final; I am on the runway'. As he continued his approach; I was looking for a turnoff. Getting close to the turnoff; I again screamed at the jet that I was on the runway. As he was about 1000 ft on my nose; about 20 ft above touchdown height; I decided to leave the runway for the sand/grass. As I cleared the runway; the jet performed an abrupt go-around.As the sand was soft; I required a tow back onto the asphalt. No damage was caused.After I tied down I examined my radios and found that I was monitoring Unicom; but transmitting on my last flight following frequency.

SR22 pilot reported taxiing off the runway after landing in UDD when he noticed a small jet about to land on the opposite runway. Reporter stated he noticed later he was transmitting on the wrong frequency.

1850019

202110

1801-2400

ATL.Airport

GA

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ATL

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ATL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1850019

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

Flight departed Runway 26L from ATL behind an Airbus A321. Airbus had just rotated when we were cleared for takeoff. On rotation just as Captain called for gear up aircraft encountered wake turbulence causing stick shaker to activate. Captain slightly lowered nose and shaker immediately went away. Regained airspeed and continued departure with no further incidents.

Reporter suggested increased separation from A321 type aircraft.

CRJ Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing ATL in trail of an A321 that resulted in a stick shaker.

1751880

202007

0601-1200

No Aircraft

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Workload; Distraction; Time Pressure

1751880

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Dispatch

General None Reported / Taken

Staffing; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Company Policy

Whomever decided to split up desks gave me 11 additional aircraft's to dispatch and flight follow until the X shift comes in at XF:00 hours am.Since I start at XA:00am it means I had 19 aircraft on my desk as usual with an additional 11 aircraft on top of that. Half of my shift I was dealing with 30 aircraft and it wasn't an issue until XE:00 am when we started to get reroutes based on the weather.My Coordinator tried to find a solution but we were so close to XF:00am; it was better to keep them until the relief takes them. Another problem is how the phones are set. It appears that I have a higher priority so I get almost all the calls to whatever code share I work.We have to make sure the desks are spread evenly including the desks for dispatchers who come in later. Phones need to be set so inbound calls are split evenly. We also need more people early in the morning. The X shift helps the night shift but puts more load on the morning shift who actually dispatches twice as much aircraft than the night shift. We could use some dispatchers back in the morning.It would also help everyone in Dispatch if we could simply get pilots to use the extensions to call Dispatchers.

Dispatcher reported working an overloaded desk and overall staffing issues.

1845552

202110

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2.0

500.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Rudder Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 31000; Flight Crew Type 700

Troubleshooting

1845552

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Approaching rotation speed on takeoff the Pilot Flying said it felt like the rudder pedals locked up in neutral. He rotated the aircraft and we became airborne. Shortly afterward he tried pushing alternately on the left and right rudder pedals and they were indeed immovable. And I found the same thing on my side. I announced that to the Pilot Flying (PF) and we continued a normal climbout and cockpit flow to reach a safe altitude where we could evaluate our status. I engaged the yaw damper; which engaged normally; and then the autopilot and we continued our climbout. The 680 climbs quickly; so we were climbing in the teens as the I pulled out our QRH checklist for Jammed Rudder. We had just flown into ZZZ on a short flight from ZZZ1 at 10;000 ft.; so we knew that cold soak was not a factor. We had not set the flight control gust lock because the winds were calm and we were doing a quick turn. When we started engines; we did a 'full throw' flight control check (including the rudder); per our checklist; so we knew the flight controls were free before taxi. Anyway; as the Jammed Rudder checklist was run with no relief; we [requested priority handling] and diverted into ZZZ2 and used the longest runway; XXL. On about a 3 mile final; the rudder became free; and a normal landing and rollout ensued. Maintenance drove over from our home airport (ZZZ1). Unfortunately the problem could not be duplicated. The aircraft flight control gust lock system was thoroughly inspected and it was determined that it was operating normally and could not have caused the jammed rudder. Maintenance examined the rudder control cables from the rudder pedals to the rudder and found no problems in the flight control system. In short they were unable to definitively identify what caused our jammed rudder condition. Since then the aircraft has flown 4 legs with no further problem.

Citation 680 Captain reported diverting after the rudder system jammed. A precautionary landing was made and the rudder worked normally during landing.

1839133

202109

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

180.0

7.0

1900.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

CTAF ZZZ

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ1

CTAF ZZZ

Beechcraft King Air Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Final Approach

Class E ZZZ1

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 876; Flight Crew Type 830

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1839133

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 50; Vertical 300

N

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Vectoring student onto RNAV XX into ZZZ at 3;000 feet; 11nm South of the field; we switch to CTAF to start monitoring incoming traffic. On an estimated 030 heading giving the final vector to intercept for the RNAVXX; we hear our first transmission from the King Air stating '15nm South descending out of 5;000 feet inbound runway XX; ZZZ'. I tried to find the traffic visually and on TCAS but we could not visually see them as they were almost fully behind us and TCAS did not show any traffic in the area they reported; so I immediately made a radio call on CTAF declaring; 'ZZZ traffic; Aircraft X; 11nm South; intercepting the RNAV XX; 3;000 feet descending to 2;600 feet; King Air traffic you can overtake us before we come in.' The King Air advises the traffic call and states; 'We have someone on TCAS; that should be you.' With two-way communication established we continued with our approach descending to 2;600 feet expecting the King Air to sidestep and overtake us. After a few seconds of no communication; the King Air appears on our TCAS showing plus 2;000 feet about 13nm South of the field on an extended final for runway XX. As the traffic was behind us and high there was no way for me to visually identify the oncoming aircraft. As I couldn't maintain visual separation myself; I stated on CTAF 'We would appreciate 1;000ft of clearance while you overtake.' We received no response from the King Air. The TCAS altitude separation continued to reduce from 2;000 feet to 1;000 feet. As the traffic came within 1nm; altitude separation was under 1;000 feet and continued to rapidly reduce; I had my student began a descent to try and avoid a potential collision as it appeared the King Air was going to continue descending directly into our reported altitude. As the traffic passed overhead about 7nm from the end of the runway; the last TCAS message noted in the cockpit was +500ft and the traffic alerting system sounding from the G1000. During the descent to gain separation; we had to maneuver down to 1;900ft just to maintain a +500ft separation as the King Air continued to descend directly on top of us with no indication of leveling before crossing overhead. When I first gained a visual of the aircraft; it appeared the separation was much lower than the +500 feet last seen on the TCAS and estimated between +300/+400 feet. After the traffic was no longer within NMAC distance; I stated on CTAF; 'You could have given us some more clearance'. The King Air responds with; 'We gave you 500ft; learn to fly your airplane.' If he had 500ft of separation it was because we descended 700ft to avoid him. Multiple other CTAF transmissions were made between us after; fighting between who was at fault and who wasn't following the regulations. After landing; another crew that was on an approximate 1nm final for runway 36 stated that the separation on their TCAS as the King Air overtook us was +300 feet. The whole incident from first radio contact to final radio transmission between the two crews was an estimated 3-4 minutes. No injuries during the incident. There are several witnesses besides the two aircraft that were involved that are willing to corroborate the situation; their information will be available upon request.

Flight Crew reported evasive action to avoid collision with aircraft that did not communicate their intentions clearly.

1855563

202110

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Other All Phases

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Fatigue

1855563

No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Person Flight Crew

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

After 4 days of giving new hire FO IOE I was exhausted. We finished up our four-day trip just about 2.5 hours late due to maintenance issues and an understaffed airline. The four-day finished at XA30pm. I then had to take the employee shuttle from the terminal which took time. I finally drove home to my place and made it to sleep around XDam [two and half hours later]. I did my best to sleep and I was unable to get adequate rest for the 5 legs I was supposed to fly on my 5th straight day of duty. The sign in was supposed to be 12 hours on the dot almost from when I finished my 4-day trip.Cause - Understaffed airline forcing us to do the last turn of the four day. The last turn resulted in maintenance issues and required a plane swap. Due to this flight; we were 2.5 hours late and I was super tired from doing 2 straight weeks of IOE.

EMB-145 Captain reported going to work while extremely fatigued and attributed the challenging schedules to staffing issues at their company.

1026658

201207

0601-1200

PHX.Airport

AZ

16000.0

TRACON PHX

Air Taxi

Embraer Phenom 100

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR EAGUL5

Class E PHX

FMS/FMC

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3400; Flight Crew Type 350

Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

1026658

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

The EAGUL5 arrival can be misleading for aircrew and could result in an unsafe position. If an aircrew were to pass HOMRR just below 16;000 FT; in accordance with the arrival procedure; and then be required to be between 11;000 and 10;000 FT within four miles; an unsafe descent rate could ensue (1;500 FT/NM or > 6;000 FT/min). Avionics systems read 'HOMRR at or below 16;000 FT' to be '16;000;' and when calculating ability to be between 11;000 and 10;000 FT in four miles; determines that it cannot be done and thus reads unable. Please consider altering the STAR to allow a more gradual descent.

Phenom 100 Captain reports that his FMC incorrectly reads the HOMRR crossing restriction on the EAGUL5 RNAV to PHX as a hard altitude instead of 'at or below' as depicted. This makes the VNNOM crossing restriction impossible to achieve.

1473457

201708

1201-1800

JFK.Airport

NY

4000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B NYC

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Other 107

Cruise

Class B NYC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1473457

Conflict NMAC

Vertical 150

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors

We were being vectored for a visual 22L into JFK. Just after crossing the shore of Long Island at 4000 ft heading 040; speed 250 KIAS about 2-4 miles southwest of FRG airport; [the First Officer] and I were both heads up because of all the VFR traffic surrounding the airport. It was a beautiful day. That's when something caught my eye passing off the left side of the aircraft. It was only visible for about 3 seconds before it passed about 100-200 ft below us; but it was quite clearly a drone. It was white and shaped like a box. Looked like one of those phantom quadcopters or larger. The First Officer did not see it. I reported it to the Approach Controller and then called to give a more detailed report after we parked at the gate.

CRJ-200 Captain reported a NMAC with a UAV on a visual approach to JFK Runway 22L.

1463933

201707

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B777-200

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Repair

Interphone System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Door Area

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Other; Party2 Ground Personnel

1463933

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Following the Crew Chief's instruction; I went to the aircraft. I was informed by a cabin crew member that the cabin interphones were not operating correctly. I called the office to request technical assistance. A Technician arrived to assist me approximately 5 minutes later. After discussing the issue with the Captain; it was determined that the fault was with the chime at L1 Door. As a result the Customer Service Manager falsely accused me of making the aircraft late on purpose. This is a troubling trend the Managers have recently adapted towards aircraft departures.This has an unsettling after effect whether intended or unintended by management to lower actual write ups in the logbook to thus lower maintenance delays subsequently impeding with the safety of the travelling public whom have put their safety and the safety of their loved ones in our hands. Furthermore; through intimidation; as well as impediment with legal and compliant documentation required for aircraft departure; myself as well as every mechanic here at this airline's number one responsibility is to the safety of all onboard. The unsettling truth for Maintenance at Company is non-maintenance management attempting to dictate how maintenance is performed. Allow us to have the time to properly maintain aircraft.

B777 Maintenance Technician reported that while attempting to repair a cabin interphone problem; a Customer Service Manager accused him of intentionally delaying the flight.

1154001

201402

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B777-200

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

N

Scheduled Maintenance

Installation; Work Cards

Electrical Distribution Relay

X

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Avionics

Maintenance Avionics 12; Maintenance Technician 3

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1154001

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Other During Maintenance

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

Upon opening P-110 Power Panel to install new wiring; found six relay bases installed incorrectly. Because of improper installation of the bases; four of the installed relays were contacting panel structure or the adjacent relay. Relay bases affected: DK23022; DK23025; DK23040; DK23041; DK23042 and DK23043.

Reporter stated he has 15 years experience; much of the time in avionics doing special wiring modifications on various aircraft for an air carrier. He was installing new wiring for Wi-Fi and passenger seatback touch screens on some of their B777 aircraft when he saw the improper relay installations in the Left P-110 Power Management Panel in the lower Main Equipment Center (MEC). Reporter stated all the relays have a common base; are installed with three screws and involve the In-flight Entertainment System (IFEs). When properly installed; there is approximately 1/4' of an inch clearance between the relays. But since the bases of the six relays were torqued at an angle and installed on the opposite side of their mounting flange; the tops of the relays were contacting the adjacent relays and chafing against the inside of the P-110 Power Panel. He suspects the six relays have been flying around in that condition for three years; possibly since the last Service Bulletin (SB) modifications involving the Cabin IFE System that brought some of their B777 up to a base standard to allow future expansion of cabin IFE equipment. The six relays were replaced and installed correctly.

An Aircraft Avionics Technician reports finding six relay bases installed incorrectly; contacting structure and adjacent relays inside the Left P-110 Power Panel located in the lower Main Equipment Center (MEC) on a B777-200 aircraft.

1753101

202007

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1753101

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Company Policy

At the gate in ZZZ; a Flight Attendant comes up and tells me about a passenger issue regarding a passenger who wasn't wearing a mask. Evidently this passenger had been flagged for noncompliance with the mask policy on a previous flight. The Supervisor came and told me that she had counseled the passenger and boarded her. I saw the passenger board without her mask and pointed it out to the Supervisor. The Supervisor turned and reminded the passenger again that her mask needs to be in place. The passenger complied. I asked the Supervisor what her gut level feeling was and she answered that she thought the passenger could be a problem. I asked why are we boarding her then? At that point; a Flight Attendant went back and had a discreet discussion with the passenger; advising her that we were ok with her flying; but only if she wore her mask. She complied and slept most of the way to ZZZ1. We did depart one minute late; and the delay message referenced our needing to deal with this passenger. Two other people were also non compliant. A couple boarded with masks pulled down and while carrying coffee cups. The man asserted that he knew airline policy and if he was drinking; he was exempt from mask usage. The Flight Attendant told him that it's only for active drinking; not just holding the cup. Initially; he was dismissive of her instructions; but eventually he and his companion did put their masks up. By the end of the flight; he and the Flight Attendant had a respectful discussion about the policy.The Supervisor knew the first passenger had caused trouble yet boarded her anyway. Certainly the agent saw the other couple board while not complying with the mask policy. I feel there still isn't enough specific guidance on mask usage.The airline needs to be very specific with passenger expectations regarding mask usage. It's a hot button issue and it creates division among the other (compliant) passengers which could lead to an inflight altercation and diversion. The mask policy is also creating a lot of chances for passengers' noncompliance with crew member instructions. People look for loopholes. The airline needs to be very blunt and specific; vs leaving it to the cabin crew to play the role of babysitter. It distracts from their primary safety role.

Air carrier pilot reported being advised about a possible non-compliant passenger regarding mask wear.

1277323

201507

JFK.Airport

NY

0.0

Cloudy

1900

TRACON N90

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb

SID Kennedy One

Class B JFK

FMS/FMC

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

1277323

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1277324.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

When I initially loaded the FMS I misspelled a waypoint. We went through the legs and thought they were right until we noticed the MFD was saying we would be landing with 0 fuel. The captain realized my error and reentered the flight route. After fixing the error we did not go back through all of the points and did not catch that there was no discontinuity after the departure like there should have been.We were climbing out of JFK on the Kennedy One Departure Canarsie climb. The flight director had us make the turn to the left like it should have; but then told us to turn right even though the departure has us continuing to the left to avoid LGA. The captain was familiar with the departure and knew there was something wrong when I started following the flight director to the right. He told me to turn back towards the left and contacted Departure asking us for a heading assignment and apologizing for the incorrect turn. Departure gave us a heading and later told us it wasn't a big deal and there were no LGA separation issues. As soon as we got the heading assignment the captain fixed my FMS and flight director. I should have been slower with initially entering the flight plan; we should also have reviewed all of the legs again after fixing my mistake. It was also good to learn that if you put in the departure before the first waypoint no discontinuity appears in the FMS.

My first officer loaded the flight plan into the FMS; and after verifying the route with the route on the dispatch release; we noticed that the projected fuel on arrival was 0 lbs (ZERO). Since we already verified the route; I decided to re-enter the flight plan; and this corrected it. The problem happened to be a misspelling of the fix BENEE- it was originally entered as BENNE. When I entered the flight plan; I loaded the departure procedure before the route; which left us without the discontinuity. We did not recheck the flight plan.The fix that followed CRI on the departure was named CRI02. When we reached CRI; CRI02 was almost directly to our left (9 o'clock position). Climbing out of JFK on the Kennedy One departure; Canarsie Climb; we had a course deviation. When we got to CRI; the flight director commanded a right turn instead of a left turn. I noticed after take off that there was no discontinuity between the departure and our first fix- NEION. When I noticed the deviation; I told the pilot flying to turn back to the left and then asked ATC for a heading; and advised them that the autopilot ( I should have said flight director) turned us in the wrong direction. ATC asked us what climb we were given and I told him the CRI climb. He said to be careful with that due to LGA traffic. When making corrections to a flight plan in the FMS; I will re-verify the legs with my crew; to insure accuracy. Also; when I see the problem start to occur; I will take quicker appropriate action- in this case have the pilot flying go to heading mode and turn in the right direction; or even take the controls and correct it myself; explaining later what happened.

Air carrier crew report misspelling a waypoint during FMC set up which is not detected until the FMC indicates landing with zero fuel. On the Kennedy One Departure CANARSIE climb it is not noticed that the route discontinuity after CRI is missing resulting in a turn toward the first flight plan waypoint. The Captain detects the wrong turn direction and requests ATC assistance.

1839928

202109

DEN.Airport

CO

0.0

VMC

Tower DEN

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Class B DEN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1839928

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Chart Or Publication

I am writing this report to request some communication and coordination between DEN ATC and JEPPS. The reason for this request is that routinely; DEN ATC does not use the Tower frequencies that are printed on the JEPPS Approach plates. For example; there is only one ATC Tower frequency printed on each one of the approach plates; however; DEN Tower does not always adhere to these frequencies. It is frustrating that DEN Tower does not use the frequencies printed on the JEPPS plates. I submitted a report on this same issue years ago; and I did get a response that DEN ATC was not aware of the Tower frequencies printed on the JEPPS plates. I was informed that most of the time; DEN ATC uses some type of reasoning for which frequencies they use for each runway; but that reasoning does not match up with the frequencies on the JEPPS plates. DEN is the only airport that always has this issue.Can someone from JEPPS get together with DEN ATC and communicate which are the correct frequencies for each runway. The frequencies that DEN Tower uses should match the same frequencies that are printed on the JEPPS Approach plates.This is all on top of the fact that it is extremely frustrating and adds to our high work load when DEN TRACON changes our STAR and/or arrival runway two or three times when we are close to the airport. This has to stop! Absolutely ridiculous that they make so many changes to arrivals and runways every single time we fly into DEN. I would rather fly an extra 3 minutes than have to change the arrival and runway in the FMC two or three times within close proximity the airport.

Air carrier Captain reported ATC frequency does not match published frequencies on Jeppesen approach charts for DEN airport.

1003752

201204

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Parked

Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1003752

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

1003753.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Departing with an inoperative fuel gauge; right inner (RI) on an A-300. MEL 24-42-01 (Inner Wing Tank Fuel Quantity Indication System RT Inner Inoperative) was read and complied with to include checking the logbook for entry verifying that the right inner was fueled to a known quantity. The left outer; left inner and right outer gauges were operating normally and were indicating 8.2; 13.0 and 8.3 respectively. The logbook entry and fuel service form verified the right inner quantity at 12.8. The Fuel Service Form (FSF) indicated the after fueling numbers cited above for a total of 42.3. In the remarks section of the FSF was a note that the right inner was fueled with 1;911 gallons which at a 6.7 density is 12;803 LBS. At this point we were satisfied that we had the required fuel on board because the operating fuel gauges plus the logbook verified fuel added up to our required fuel of 42.0. We called Maintenance with a question about the note in the MEL regarding the dash in the right inner quantity indicator. When he showed at the aircraft; he stated the right inner was verified to be fueled to a known quantity. We departed and I was the pilot not flying. Prior to top of descent; we noticed the right inner fuel valve had closed indicating the right inner was out of fuel. The right engine started to be fed from the right outer tank. The left inner still had about 5.0 remaining. To prevent a fuel imbalance we fed both engines from the left inner tank until it was empty. We calculated that we had enough fuel in the remaining tanks (left outer; left inner and right outer) to arrive at our destination with 10.5 versus 14.5 planned and proceeded to our destination and landed with approximately 10.4. Upon landing at our destination; Maintenance verified that the right inner tank was indeed empty. We concluded that we departed with less than 12.8 in the right inner tank. It appears that the fueler somehow allowed fuel to transfer out of the right inner tank after or while fueling it. The logbook and FSF both stated we had 12.8 in the right inner tank; but due to the fact we still had 5.0 in the lift inner tank when the right inner fuel valve closed en route; we concluded we did not have 12.8 in the right inner. More education and training for all parties involved; more discussion during training/IOE/hot topics about inoperative gauges and ways to catch mistakes.

Have Maintenance verify by a means other than by the FSF after fueling is complete that the tank in question has the required fuel. Then have the crew verify by total gallons metered added to the before fueling numbers to verify TOTAL fuel on board; THEN verify the tank quantity in question by the logbook.

A300 flight crew reports being dispatched with the right inner fuel gauge inoperative with the fueler verifying that 12.8 thousand pounds of fuel were loaded in the RI tank for a total fuel load of 42.3. Prior to top of descent; it is noticed the right inner fuel valve has closed indicating the RI was out of fuel.

1162618

201404

1201-1800

ZBW.ARTCC

NH

35000.0

Center ZBW

A380

2.0

Part 129

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZBW

Center ZBW

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Class A ZBW

Facility ZBW.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Distraction

1162618

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors

I was working the radar at Sector 17/18 combined; was talking to both airplanes. I issued the standard crossing clearance to a B757; 'cross 25 miles east of BOS at FL280'. There were a number of other things going on in the area; traffic wise; including a Global Hawk UAV that was holding in airspace on my sector's northern boundary. The supervisors; TMU and military coordinators had been trying to figure out for hours what we were going to do with the UAV because we do not normally work them and have no procedures in place for working them currently. I was distracted by that activity; as well as my regular traffic; including issuing reroutes to two other aircraft; and did not notice that an A380 was head-on with the B757. The two were approximately 1.5-2 minutes from losing separation; and I panicked and told the B757 to start down; no delay through FL340; then turned him 10 left. I realized I had meant to turn him right; so I turned the A380 10 left; also. I then noticed that was not going to be quite enough; so I turned them each another 10 left. I told the B757 to report leaving FL340; then a foreign aircraft asked a question; and I am not sure if I lost separation or not; it was very close. The hit prior to losing separation the B757 was at FL344. By the time the B757 was able to report; he said he was almost through FL330; and they were at 3 miles on my scope. Neither my D-side nor I caught it until it would have been too late; but the B757 had not started descending. Had I taken half a second longer to assess the situation; I would have just told the B757 to maintain FL360 until I saw him clear of the traffic. I then made the situation worse by turning him into the traffic instead of away from it; and had to take more action. Being less distracted by the unusual situation; and not having missed the oncoming traffic; I would have just waited to issue the descent clearance.

ZBW Controller reports being distracted by a UAV holding in his airspace and not noting two aircraft that are head on; in a timely manner. Controller errors exacerbated the problem and separation may have been lost.

1241583

201502

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Parked

None

Flight Director

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180

Time Pressure; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

1241583

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 163

1241600.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

N

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

The aircraft arrived early with a flight director problem. Maintenance MELed the write-up. In the process they discovered the AFCS EXC AC circuit breaker popped and would not reset. This led to the addition of six more inter-related MELs that had to be addressed; to include collaring several circuit breakers. After verifying the appropriate application of each of the seven MELs; we pushed about an hour late. The plan was to have the repairs done in ZZZ after passing through ZZZ1. The flights from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 were uneventful. In ZZZ1; Maintenance attempted to repair the aircraft; they were unable to repair it and returned it back to its originally MELed status. In the process they collared an additional circuit breaker that was not collared in the first instance. Additionally; one of the circuit breakers previously noted as collared does not actually exist (B AFCS sensor exc DC circuit breaker). The Captain had a lengthy discussion with Maintenance Control (including a picture of the actual write-up in Denver sent via cell phone). It was determined the 'D' in DC was actually an 'A'; making it AC. We continued on and terminated the aircraft.

I believe this aircraft should have been pulled [out of service] and not allowed to leave in its condition. Additionally; I believe that my First Officer and I were set up to fail by having to apply seven MELs in a compound situation; not only from a safety aspect; but from a potential FAA action standpoint; in the event any portion of this complicated procedure was found to have not been executed properly after the fact. To my knowledge; I believe we acted appropriately and legally; but I should not be placed in a situation where I have to guess or wonder. I'm also embarrassed that the originating crew tomorrow will [receive] this aircraft in its current condition.

A malfunctioning Flight Director; for which maintenance had no immediate resolution; ultimately resulted in multiple MEL deferrals that were intended to be resolved at a subsequent stop. After two uneventful legs maintenance was unable to resolve the problem at the planned repair station. Instead; they found another item they believed was required to be deferred. A subsequent in depth investigation; including emailed pictures of the original write-up; uncovered the source of the confusion; it was the incorrect interpretation of the letter 'A' instead of 'D'; thus changing 'AC' to 'DC'.

1326978

201601

1201-1800

DEN.Airport

CO

38000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZDV

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR WAHUU2

Class A ZDV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180

Workload; Situational Awareness

1326978

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

Captain was flying. We were just inside the WAHUU2 Arrival at FL380 when ATC issued a clearance to descend to FL340 and expect to descend via the WAHUU2. The Captain elected to start the descent by using Vertical Speed (VS) at 500 FPM then reinitialized the FMC to FL340 to place the FMC in a CRZ DESC mode; not VNAV PATH. She kept the descent going at 500 FPM.As we were approaching the new Top of Descent (TD) for FL340; we were at 35;500 feet MSL and I mentioned to the Captain we are going to be about 2;000 feet high above path unless we increase the rate of descent. The Captain elected to continue the slow descent as we passed the TD 1;500 feet above path and increasing while she stated not to worry. ATC then issued a clearance to descend via the WAHUU2. We were 2;500 feet above path. The Captain never engaged VNAV and elected to use VS to try and catch up to the path.As we were accelerating past 300 KIAS; I mentioned we are fast and need to maintain 280 KIAS per the note on the arrival. The Captain denied it at first; checked the chart looking for the note; found it; but continued to accelerate to catch the path in VS mode. I then requested ATC give us 'speed our discretion;' which they denied. We accelerated to 310 KIAS in VS. She never once engaged VNAV during the entire approach; putting my PM duties in the yellow to ensure we did not bust an altitude restriction. We finally got vectored off the WAHUU2 and landed uneventfully.The technique for Captains to use VS on published arrivals is still being practiced and places the PM in the yellow to crosscheck aircraft performance not to exceed published restrictions. There still remains a misunderstanding of how CRZ DESC works vs VNAV PATH; VNAV SPD; or VS. Please publish a training guide that is handed out or published on the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) to clearly spell out the difference; with examples of each. There should be a comparison between CRZ DESC; VNAV PATH; VNAV SPD; and VS on the effects and impact to properly fly a published arrival with airspeed and altitude restrictions.

B737-700 FO reported the Captain; as the pilot flying; chose to use CRZ DESC mode rather than VNAV; and was having difficulty complying with the RNAV STAR constraints.

1166651

201404

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

5000.0

Mixed

5

Daylight

2400

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 26100; Flight Crew Type 1000

1166651

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Weather

Equipment / Tooling

Filed IFR to ZZZ; IMC most of the way. Given a vector direct to ZZZ; TRACON asked what approach I would like. I asked for and was given the GPS to Runway XX (more or less a straight in). Now I am in the clouds and trying to select that approach in the G430w/GMX200. No such approach in the database. I had just updated the data card a few days ago. In fact; there was no approach to ZZZ for any runway in the database that I could find. Now I am scrambling to figure out what I have done wrong and cannot find any approaches in the database for ZZZ. The only thing I had was a partial (Vectors only) approach VOR to Runway YY (nowhere near where I was or going to be). Found a hole; cancelled IFR and landed. I called the chart manufacturer this evening to ask if they had heard anybody complain that this database was faulty. After researching it; the tech found that Garmin had 'excluded' the GPS approach to Runway XX. So how is the pilot supposed to know that beforehand? I had printed out an approach plate for that approach and it is shown as a valid approach online. SoCal assigned the approach to me as it is a valid approach as far as they are concerned. The chart manufacturer says they send all approaches for each airport to Garmin. Then Garmin can delete as they wish; before the chart manufacturer releases the data for our download. Turns out we as pilots are also supposed to check on the Garmin website under 'excluded approaches' to see if any approaches at our destination are not in the database update just downloaded. The chart manufacturer sends out weekly notices to all subscribers about problems with their own data in their databases (corrections; additions; etc.); but the manufacturer does not maintain what changes Garmin makes. Imagine being IMC; being assigned an approach and then fumbling around with the [GPS] trying to enter a non existent approach. Not fun. Thought others should know of this possibility. [I] have not had this happen before today. So; as part of your preflight on the ground you might want to go to Garmin website and look to see if your destination airport has any Garmin deleted approaches.

Pilot of a single engine; fixed gear aircraft in IMC requested and was cleared for a GPS approach to destination airport only to find that the GPS approach to that airport was not in his Garmin GPS. Pilot maneuvered to VMC and landed. Pilot later acertained that Garmin 'excludes' certain approaches from their database and pilots must therefore check a Garmin website for 'excluded approaches.'

1616011

201902

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

VOR / VORTAC ZZZ

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Navigational Equipment and Processing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1616011

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Human Factors

While departing ZZZ with no long range navigation operational; the captain inadvertently switched the COM 1 frequency off of an active center frequency to one that was previously used. According to ZZZ Center; they were trying to call us numerous times on the frequency that was switched off; likely for less than a minute. They finally reached us on the previous frequency and we immediately switched to the correct frequency. The aircraft was being flown via VOR inputs as the primary navigation system; and the comm frequency was accidentally switched off as the captain switched VOR frequencies while attempting to acquire the next VOR station. Firstly; aircraft that are dispatched into the country's busiest airspace should have the navigation equipment operational that ATC expects and is used to using. Every time there is a non-RNAV aircraft; ATC still clears the crew to fly to GPS points or on RNAV arrivals or departure procedures; regardless of what is filed. Aircrew of course correct the controllers; but these non-RNAV aircraft generally result in confusion from one ATC controller to the next. Additionally; if an aircraft is to be dispatched using VORs as a primary means of navigation; all of the facilities on the route and the major ones near that route that help fix reporting points should be investigated by dispatch for closures or issues. We were repeatedly cleared to ZZZ VOR and it was; after we could not identify the fix; finally determined to be inoperative. We did not see this on the release.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported a temporary loss of communication while attempting to tune the next VOR on non-RNAV required route.

1679951

201909

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

IMC

Cloudy

Poor Lighting

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Landing Gear Indicating System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1679951

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

I got this airplane in ZZZ. During the preflight all of the annunciator lights; including the three green gear lights worked. Once at cruise; I noticed a lot of post lights were out. As it was cloudy and getting darker; I started to change some of the post lights. I then pressed the press to test to make sure all of those lights were still working as they were on the ground. When I hit the press to test button; I noticed the right main landing gear green light was not illuminated. I thought to myself that this must be a bulb that burned out; and went into the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) to find the 'bulb replacement' procedure. I followed the steps in QRH 5.6; and the bulb still did not come on. I consulted with a senior pilot on company frequency to get advice about if I should declare an emergency; because I knew I would need to blow the gear down. We agreed it was the smart and safe thing to do. I [notified ATC] with ZZZ Approach. I told them I needed a heading to let the passengers know what was going on. I let the passengers know what was happening; and also called SOC (System Operations Control). SOC asked if I could come to [base]; which I said I could. I told Approach that I would like to divert to [base] and [notify ATC]; and have emergency personnel standing by as a precaution. I then went to page 5.2 (as the QRH says to do) to go about blowing down the gear. While I was on base for XX in [base]; I went below 130 KTS and put the gear down. I did have 3 green lights; but continued to follow the procedure as outlined in QRH 5.2 to be safe and pre-cautionary. I then blew the gear down per QRH 5.2. I landed on XX in [base] without incident. Emergency personnel followed me off the runway and I stopped the aircraft. Airport Ops came and got my passengers off the aircraft. I then had MX (Maintenance) tow the aircraft as a precaution to the fleet and wrote up the aircraft. One passenger on the flight was a [other carrier] Captain and was pleased that I took pre-cautionary measures to ensure a safe and un-eventful landing. He told me through his years you always go by the book and complimented me on my professionalism and smooth landing. The passengers were brought to the gate and got on another aircraft with another pilot to head to ZZZ1. I explained the situation to the MX personnel; called the on-call duty manager and filled out necessary paperwork.

Pilot flying light twin encountered gear indication light anomaly.

1291879

201508

1201-1800

FOK.Airport

NY

2000.0

10

Tower FOK

Corporate

Premier 1

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class D FOK

Sail Plane

Class D FOK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 1100

Situational Awareness

1291879

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 500; Vertical 500

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Routine departure on Runway 24. Cleared to 2;000 feet. Tower gave heading to 200. On IFR flight plan; VFR conditions. Copilot called out glider. Observed white t-tail glider making a rapid left rolling maneuver and pull down; to escape my flight path. No communication from Tower or glider. No TCAS alert. Over in 5 seconds. Tower switched us to departure. Called airport manager to advise him of the event; and request condition of other aircraft. Passengers had full view of glider from rear of aircraft through cockpit window. Rest of flight uneventful. All my lights were on. Glider pilot made excellent combat style escape maneuver.

Premier 1 Captain reported an NMAC with a glider departing FOK airport.

1792468

202103

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Nose Gear

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1792468

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

Upon taxiing to [Runway] XXL; a loud banging and grinding sound with vibration and shimmy would happen intermittently on taxi with no real reason. Once crossed XXR we asked ATC if we could pull off and called Maintenance; they agreed best course of action was to gate return. Taxied back in slowly still hearing and feeling strange sounds and vibrations intermittently. Once parked a quick inspection by Maintenance revealed that while everything looked normal when still; once the aircraft was moved (they rocked it) the entire nose gear assembly wobbled and was loose. We were delayed swapped planes and continued [the] day as normal.The aircraft was received like this. It had already flown more than likely like this. There needs to be better discipline on reporting foreign sounds. Also; push crews sound like they are fighting a war when they hook up and disconnect. Maybe there is a correlation there.

EMB-145 Captain reported noticing grinding sounds and vibrations during taxi-out resulting in a return to gate for an aircraft swap. Post maintenance inspection revealed the nose gear assembly was loose.

1672084

201908

1201-1800

D10.TRACON

TX

10000.0

Thunderstorm; 10

Daylight

8000

TRACON D10

Personal

Learjet 45

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Initial Climb

Class B DFW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 2000

Situational Awareness

1672084

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Weather

During the initial climb of our departure; it was apparent that the towering cumulonimbus was going to be a factor for the SID that was issued. We asked for; and received a heading. We wanted a climb to attempt to avoid the clouds due to the expected turbulence. During the turn and initial level off; we entered into a cumulonimbus type cloud with moderate turbulence and updrafts. During this time; we couldn't level off at our assigned altitude and reached a max of 10500 ft. We immediately lowered the nose and descended back to our assigned altitude. We received NO TCAS TAs or RAs. No further issues were experienced.

Captain reported updrafts in weather resulted in overshooting altitude.

1252769

201504

0001-0600

BHM.Airport

AL

2000.0

Marginal

10

Night

1400

TRACON BHM

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 24

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class C BHM

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1252769

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 6550; Flight Crew Type 500

Confusion

1252770.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

BHM approach cleared us direct to SPATT 'for now' and to expect the ILS 24 approach. This clearance set us on an approximate course of 100 degrees to SPATT and the 'for now' part of the clearance placed a biased expectation in my mind that at some point ATC would give us a left turn vector to parallel the localizer course outbound before turning us inbound. This was in keeping with how this approach has been conducted in the past. At this point we were descending to 3000 ft. As we got closer to SPATT; I commented to the FO that ATC needed to turn us out soon as the turn inbound from SPATT was way too tight. This indicates the mindset of my expectation. About 4 NM from SPATT ATC assigned us a right turn heading 180 to join the localizer; maintain 2600 feet until established. This was unexpected by me and I realized that it was a close-in turn onto the approach. I immediately pulled the power back to slow down but we soon were crossing the localizer. ATC; aware of this; gave us a heading of 270 to rejoin. We rejoined the localizer inside of HUKEV. Somewhere in the automation selection; I lost the vertical command bar in the turn to try to intercept the localizer and I lost vertical situational awareness to the extent that a 'TERRAIN AHEAD' caution was initiated due; I think; to the rate of descent. I descended to 2000 feet where the minimum altitude was 2200 feet at LOWGA. I initiated a climb to an appropriate altitude on the approach as the TAWS (Terrain Avoidance Warning System) display displayed only green terrain contours as soon as the climb was started. The approach was stabilized by the time we arrived at LOWGA and the rest of the approach and landing were normal. Crossing the localizer and rushing to get established and configured. TAWS alert. Because of a biased expectation about how the flight would be set up for the approach; I found myself going from a place of comfort with the approach to suddenly being severely behind the 'eight ball'.As we were nearing SPATT; the thought occurred to me to query ATC as to what their plan was for vectoring me onto the approach. I should have acted upon that thought. As soon as I received the heading I did not expect and realized that it was a tight turn-on creating a rushing situation; I should have abandoned the approach and requested vectors back around instead of trying to salvage the approach. This would have preempted the problems that occurred with the rushing that led to automation confusion and altitude deviation.

We were vectored for an ILS 24 approach into BHM. I identified the localizer and announced it was identified on both sides. We were on a heading approximately 110 degrees navigating direct to SPATT intersection (12.2nm final for runway 24) using LNAV mode and cleared down to 3;000 still in the descent. Since it looked like a very sharp turn necessary to get established on the localizer; the Captain and I both thought the controller would turn us left to make a downwind leg first. Instead the controller turned us sharply right to 180 degrees and cleared us to join the localizer and descend and maintain 2;600. The Captain had the speed up at 220 knots and made the turn and descent. This was a 60-degree intercept onto the localizer. The captain was still in RNAV mode and must have pushed the NAV button on the [FGS] because the lateral mode of the FD dumped. We were in basic mode for roll. I said; 'We are in Basic Mode on the lateral mode.' The captain did and said nothing. I called 'Localizer Alive...it will not capture...LOC is NOT armed.' The Captain then started pushing buttons on the [FGS] and LNAV engaged and turned the airplane to parallel the localizer. I said; 'We need to turn right to join the localizer.' ATC saw we went through the localizer and issued a 270 degree heading to join and maintain 2;600 until established and cleared for the approach. I set the heading bug. The Captain pushed some more buttons on the [FGS] and the FD lateral mode went again to basic mode. Then he disengaged the AP to make the turn and failed to apply back-pressure to maintain altitude. I was so focused on him keeping us on course; that I failed to notice the altitude loss. The TAWS (Terrain Avoidance Warning System) sounded once; 'Terrain Ahead'. I immediately said; 'We need to climb NOW.' We were at 2;000 when the climb began and we leveled off at 2;600 and intercepted the GS and made a normal approach and landing. We de-briefed extensively after the flight.We didn't expect the controller to slam dunk us on the sharp turn to final. The Captain had the speed up as a result. We were in LNAV mode navigating direct to SPATT. V/L (Vertical/Lateral) was not active on the Captain's EFIS. The approach checklist was not called until after intercepting the localizer and glideslope. We had mode confusion from the Captain freaking out and pushing buttons on the [FGS] trying to figure why we were not joining the localizer.Over-reliance on the automation: The Captain did not disconnect and fly raw-data until the situation was out of hand. Failure to properly monitor the situation: I simply could not keep up with the rapid button pushing the Captain was doing. I had no idea what he was doing; what mode he was in; or what he was trying to do. It was so many errors occurring at the same time that I became task-saturated. Standardize the ILS profile to include guidance for when to go to V/L mode and use Heading Mode instead of using LNAV to navigate. This should be XX miles/minutes from the initial fix/final fix/localizer cross-track distance.

Turboprop flight crew reports an unexpected turn to intercept to the localizer at BHM resulting in the Captain overshooting the LOC and descending 600 feet below the assigned altitude of 2;600 feet. A Terrain Avoidance Warning System (TAWS) 'Terrain Ahead' warning is annunciated and the crew climbs back to 2;600 feet.

1752733

202007

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Parked

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Lead Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1752733

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Procedure

Procedure

I filed a report recently about this very same situation. The hangar is ignoring the pitot tube cover policy on aircraft that are on the ground for more than 48 hours. Today; aircraft came to the line for trip X. Aircraft had been here since [date]. My Supervisor called the hangar at approximately XA:00 to inform the hangar that the pitot inspection was required since they failed to follow procedures. The aircraft was released for service anyway and sent to the line with a violation they were made aware of.This keeps happening because the hangar managers keep failing to follow procedures.Have the hangar managers and supervisors ensure the pitot cover policy is being complied with.

Maintenance Technician reported problems with other technicians not following the correct company policy for aircraft checks.

1561312

201807

1201-1800

ZAN.ARTCC

AK

5000.0

Center ZAN

Air Carrier

Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Visual Approach

Class E ZAN

Facility ZAN.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

1561312

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Ambiguous

Aircraft X responded to a TCAS RA that he thought was erroneous and returned to airport on a visual approach. There was no traffic observed on the radar [at] the time of the event; nor was there any observed traffic within 10 minutes before and after the event. Aircraft X did refer to himself as [an incorrect flight number] a few times while communicating. It took me a minute to realize it was him calling; because I initially thought Aircraft X was trying to pick up IFR. I did verify that the aircraft was VMC with terrain and the airport in sight before issuing the visual approach because he had descended below the [minimum IFR altitude]. I also informed him the minimum IFR altitude was 5000 feet.

ATC Center Controller reported an aircraft descended below the Minimum IFR Altitude and reported a TCAS/RA while there appeared to be no traffic in the area.

1698909

201911

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

5.0

3000.0

VMC

5

Daylight

5000

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach; Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aeroplane Flight Control

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Type 1000

1698909

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting

1698910.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy

Aircraft

Taxiing out on Aircraft X [I] noted to Captain I felt some vibration in [the] yoke during the elevator check. Because of a similar instance on Aircraft Y (where the aircraft was removed from service) I had seen this anomaly. In sequence; awaiting takeoff and stopped; he ran the elevator and found it to be normal. We assumed it was our light weight or a nose wheel shimmy that led to the vibration. Flew a manual departure until about 17;000 feet when AP (Auto Pilot) 2 was engaged. Turning final into ZZZ; outside the marker I turned the AP off; tried to roll out of the turn manually and noticed controls were very heavy/almost unresponsive. Turning in opposite direction the controls were equally heavy. Force required to turn was about three to four times heavier than normal. It felt as though the AP was still engaged or we were flying in manual reversion. Verified AP was off. Asked Captain to try it and he agreed; noting a slight roll to right requiring left aileron to remain wings level and that the elevator was also very heavy. Captain elected to do the landing; used power to help control rate of descent and some rudder to augment roll (rudder was fine). AP Single Land and No-Autoland alerts observed 2 miles out. Captain elected to disregard these level one alerts and focus on flying the airplane. Asked me to back him up on controls. Discussed how we would perform a go-around and use the AP if necessary for a go-around if control became unmanageable. Glide slope was intermittent due to other Aircraft on either side of the antenna on the ground (so use of AP was inappropriate for this landing). Small inputs by Captain were difficult; but deliberate and perfect. Landing was within normal parameters. We agreed to leave aircraft configured as it was to the blocks. Maintenance met us and ran the controls on RMP's. Thankfully; the problem persisted so they were able to witness the same difficulty moving the yoke. In the half hour we spent writing this up; I overheard the Maintenance Supervisor leaning towards swapping the FCC's (Flight Control Computers) as a fix. Thankfully; the line mechanics insisted AP was red for at least 12 hours and pushed to dig further into it. They eventually found a faulty actuator in the right wing. This is as much as I know about the current situation on Aircraft X. Thankfully; the weather was VFR; with 8 kts down the runway. Gusty winds or high crosswinds would have made it extremely difficult (if not impossible) to land this airplane safely. Submitting this [report] due to the grave nature of this flight control malfunction; which could have resulted in a hull loss or fatalities under other circumstances.Explanation of recommendations: This same anomaly has occurred at least three times in the past six months at our company after disconnecting the AP on approach: the previous flight of Aircraft X two days earlier; our flight on this same Aircraft X; and on Aircraft Z a few months ago. There was also an incident last winter on Aircraft A in ZZZ1; which nearly resulted in the loss of the airplane due to the crew's inability to control excessive up/down pitch forces. Aircraft Y was removed from service for strong vibrations that shook the entire airplane during the elevator check (my flight). Two recommendations/notifications have been generated over the past 6 months regarding these events. These notifications emphasized the use of the Jammed or Restricted Flight Control Checklist in the AOM. Unfortunately; these notifications appear to be more legal posturing rather than a serious; proactive effort to address what seems to be a systemic problem. Despite these (known) incidents; I have been told by company management and safety representatives that a fleet-wide inspection is unwarranted/unnecessary. If this is true and recommendations/notifications are favorable to an in-depth inspection of all company MD11's prior to heavy checks; I suggest the following procedures be implemented immediately.Recommend Control Check be performed at flap extension; prior to aircraft movement. As a considerably 'long' airplane; any anomalies in the flight control check would be/are difficult to detect during taxi; due to bouncing of aircraft on taxi. If a manual landing is planned; recommend disconnection of AP above 3;000 feet AGL; prior to approach; and re-engagement later; if desired. While a briefing on the use of automation is already required by FOM; this would allow crews the time (and altitude) to discover controllability problems prior to being committed to land or to doing an unwanted go-around with limited/partial control. Part of our decision to continue was not wanting to be 25 degrees nose high; light-weight at full power; with limited lateral/longitudinal control.Aircraft X had been written up two days earlier for the same malfunction. In this case; the previous crew wrote that the ailerons 'were stiff and unresponsive' and elected to do an Auto-Land instead of a manual landing. Having flown the MD11 for several years I can tell you that doing an auto-land with a single AP (because manual controls aren't working) is a last resort. Recommend mandatory review of aircraft history for flight control issues as a first course of action prior to troubleshooting. In our case; this did not happen and Maintenance began troubleshooting prior to reviewing the history.Recommend the FDR/CFDS (Flight Data Recorder/Centralized Fault And Display System) and all other available reporting systems be reviewed on our flight to determine the position of the AP clutches; control wheel deflections; control wheel forces; control surface positions; etc.; to rule out partial AP engagement after AP disengagement.

While turning final for Runway XXR at ZZZ the FO (First Officer); PF (Pilot Flying) disconnected the AP (autopilot). The aircraft was configured gear down and flaps 35. The FO verbalized to me that the flight controls seemed extremely heavy (as if the AP were still engaged). We verified the AP had disconnected. We positively transferred control of the aircraft to the Captain. I immediately noticed a very heavy feel to both the elevator and aileron controls. It felt similar to flying a B727 in Manual Reversion. The aircraft also had a slight rolling tendency to the right; which necessitated a left aileron control input to maintain heading. A slight push on the rudder pedals found the rudder operating normally. We checked for alerts and warnings. Nothing was displayed at this time. We quickly discussed requesting priority handling and possible go-around; but I felt due to our proximity to the runway; continuing for a landing with the FO backing me up on the controls was most prudent.Both crewmembers were aware of the QRH Non Alert; Controls Jammed or Restricted Checklist; and its reference to engaging the AP. It was about this time we received a Single Land/No auto land Misc. Que message. I chose to manually land the aircraft as I had positive control. Had we gone around we had already discussed engaging the AP; this was from our working knowledge of the Jammed or Restricted Checklist. The Que alerts were our first visual indication of a possible FCC (Flight Control Computer) failure. The landing and rollout were normal for conditions. We chose to leave the aircraft configured for landing with the flaps extended to give maintenance the opportunity to inspect the aircraft and this was relayed through ZZZ Operations to the mechanics. The mechanics joined us in the cockpit and with the Aux Hydraulics pumps operating they were able to experience the same difficulties we had encountered in-flight. We stayed with the mechanics to answer all questions and spent about a half an hour preparing the write up in the logbook.As I have had time to reflect on this event some facts have become crystal clear. As the MD11 has become 'long in the tooth' having seasoned well-trained crews in the cockpit is imperative. Having just finished 6 month training I had just discussed; face to face with other crew-members events similar to this one. Distance based learning would not have helped. We had just discussed; in detail; the Non alert Jammed or Restricted procedures. I was very fortunate to have an experienced FO who is extremely professional and knowledgeable; an excellent aviator he injected great insight and ideas throughout the entire event. As with any event more questions arise. Are the controls jammed; restricted or are they binding? Are these problems truly an FCC issue? What about the increased occurrence across the fleet type? Will this checklist work or not for an FCC issue caused by binding? Lastly; we all are aware of the FCC's control of the control actuators electrically with the AP on; but a blanket statement to engage the AP if you are manually controlling the aircraft in the checklist may come to bite a less experienced crew.

MD-11 flight crew reported heavy/unresponsive flight controls during approach to landing. Flight crew stated this is a recurring issue on the MD-11 aircraft fleet.

1000747

201203

1801-2400

ELP.Airport

TX

VMC

Night

Tower ELP

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Part 91

Initial Climb

Class C ELP

Fuel Tank Cap

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Commercial

Other / Unknown

1000747

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Human Factors

At night; following refueling; aircraft was being repositioned to hospital base. Pilot smelled an odor of fuel and elected to return to the airport. Following landing; pilot discovered fuel cap was not adequately secured. Additional attention following refueling to ensure cap is not only in place but completely secured.

Pilot of unknown type aircraft smelled fuel after takeoff; returned to airport and found fuel cap not properly secured.

1447287

201705

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

11000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Initial Approach

Class C ZZZ

FMS/FMC

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1447287

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1400

Confusion

1447288.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft

A full IRS alignment was completed on the ground prior to flight. There were no position inaccuracies seen on the ground with relation to the runway alignment for takeoff. While climbing through 11;000 ft; we encountered a map shift. LNAV/VNAV were engaged with the center autopilot also on. Aircraft turned about 30 degrees right from previous course to intercept magenta line. Progress page 2 indicated 0.5 NM left of course. Aircraft intercepted course and proceeded on course for remainder of flight with 0 deviation indicated or observed. Later on the arrival and approaching the ZZZZZ intersection; ATC assigned a heading and asked us to verify that we were on the Arrival. We answered in the affirmative and observed 0 deviation from course on Progress page 2 with LNAV engaged; reporting that we showed directly over the ZZZZZ intersection. ATC reported showing us 1 NM west. Both VOR mode selectors were confirmed in the AUTO mode.

Approaching ZZZZZ intersection at 4;000 feet on the Arrival; Approach asked us if we were still on the arrival; to which the captain as PM responded yes. The approach controller responded that he was showing us 1 mile west of course. The captain stated that we were showing on course; and by that point he indicated we were showing directly over ZZZZZ intersection as cleared. The controller thereafter gave us vectors to align with the procedure ground track; however our indications on both sides of the cockpit with zero crosstrack error; as loaded from the database; thereafter showed us offset from our map indications. As a matter of reference; earlier in the arrival the captain and I both noticed what appeared to be a rapid and transient map shift with a cross-track error approximately .5 miles left of course. It was momentary; and the FMC almost immediately began a correction back to the STAR course line and soon thereafter to zero cross-track error. The subsequent comment from the Controller indicated we were essentially paralleling the course line; and affirmed the likelihood that we had an FMS cockpit indication anomaly. Upon landing and block-in; the captain and I briefed the mechanic on what occurred; and made the appropriate entry in the aircraft logbook.

B757 flight crew reported experiencing a map shift of about a half mile during arrival. Later during arrival; ATC informed the crew they were slightly off course and issued vectors.

1420673

201701

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

3000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

5500

Tower ZZZ

Personal

SR22

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

Powerplant Lubrication System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 173; Flight Crew Type 139

1420673

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

I was flying an IFR flight. About 10 miles west of [destination] at 3000 feet; I noticed a steady decline in the oil pressure. I thought it might be a sensor at first; but the gauge was steadily declining vs. jumping around; so I thought there was a potentially serious problem with the plane. At the time; ATC was vectoring me for a visual approach. I knew that I was likely to be brought down towards beach before being turned inland for the final approach. I requested being granted priority handling and they told me to descend to 1600 feet. After a few seconds; I decided that it would be best to get the plane on the ground vs. continuing south and risk an engine loss over a heavily populated area so I [advised ATC]. I was asked [which runway I wanted]. I took a runway straight in from my position. When I landed; tower informed me that there was a trail of black smoke behind me. I took off with 7 quarts of oil and when I landed I had just over 1; so an engine out scenario was in fact imminent.

SR22 pilot reported a loss of oil pressure while on approach.

1338556

201603

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

33000.0

IMC

Icing; Turbulence

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-82

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Pitot-Static System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1338556

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 15000

Confusion

1338561.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

Started getting moderate turbulence at FL330. Asked ATC for FL240 since we were approaching TOD. FO started a gradual descent and noticed that the airspeed was slowly decreasing so FO increased the vertical speed down. We cross checked the air speeds and mine was the same as FO's; 235 KIAS and decreasing. Aircraft started a buffet much like the speedbrakes were extended so I cross checked standby airspeed indicator and it read 310 KIAS (actually approaching an over speed). FO decreased the vertical speed. We decided to run the Airspeed Unreliable Quick Action checklist. FO turned autopilot; auto throttle; and FD off. I checked Meter SEL and Heat switch not off. We decided both primary airspeed indicators were faulty. FO transferred control of aircraft to me so I could fly by standby airspeed indicator. FO asked for descent to 10;000 feet. Contacted dispatch; informed FA's; and briefed PAX. ATC cleared us direct to the airport. Several minutes after attaining VMC the primary instruments started to return to normal parameters. Landed without further problems.Fix the airplane. It had numerous write ups.

We were flying at FL330. The anti-ice and pitot heat were on and there were no indications of any anti-ice or pitot heat system failure. We were flying in IMC and we started to pick up ice and turbulence. Captain asked Center for lower. The clearance was for us to descend to 24;000 feet. I was the flying pilot; so I put 1;000 feet down in the vertical speed window. During the descent we started to feel some shaking. At one point the Captain checked the lights (which hang down) and asked about the speed brakes and checked them to make sure they were stowed and they were. I noticed my airspeed was getting slow and I pointed it out to the Captain who confirmed that his airspeed indicator was in agreement. We noticed the speed decreasing to around 235 at that time. Captain noted the standby airspeed and said that it was showing fast (around 300 IAS is what I saw across the cockpit). That made sense to me given that the aircraft should not be slow with the established pitch and power. We started to pick up more of the shaking or buffeting. I turned the autopilot and auto throttles off and smoothly but firmly pitched up a slightly nose high attitude to slow the aircraft. I held the pitch until the aircraft buffeting stopped. A crosscheck of the standby airspeed confirmed that the speed was back in a normal range. I returned the aircraft to normal pitch and power settings. We talked to ATC and continued our descent using the standby instruments. I transferred the control to the Captain because he has a better view of the standby flight instruments. We accomplished Airspeed Unreliable Checklist and nothing fixed the primary airspeed indicator problem. After descending out of the clouds into the clear air; all of the flight instruments starting working properly again and were in agreement. Captain transferred the controls back to me and we landed the aircraft safely. There were no lights on the annunciator panel or aural warnings such as overspeed to alert us to this condition.

MD82 flight crew reported unreliable airspeed indications during descent from FL330. Both primary pitot systems showed signs of icing as airspeed decreased with altitude and showed 235 knots while the standby showed 310 knots. After descending out of IMC; airspeed indications returned to normal.

1016029

201206

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

10000.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke; 50

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Taxi

SA-227 AC Metro III

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 4875; Flight Crew Type 1767

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1016029

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

I was giving Initial Operating Experience to a pilot who was about to upgrade to Captain in the SA227 Metroliner. We had just finished dropping off our cargo and were enroute on our return leg. This leg I was having the trainee conduct the flight as a 'single pilot leg' while I monitored his progress.We soon leveled off at 10;000 MSL in VFR conditions when I felt the aircraft yaw to the right. I looked up at the annunciator panel and found the right 'Oil Pressure'; 'Right Generator'; and 'R SRL' annunciators illuminated and the right engine's torque between 40-50% and dropping when it should have been closer to 60%. As I monitored the engine's declining torque I informed my trainee that we were now acting in a two crew [member] environment. I took an extra 30-40 seconds to try and unsuccessfully to diagnose the engine's loss of power. We then ran the 'Engine Failure in Flight' Checklist; thus securing and feathering the right engine. We then ran the 'Failed Engine Clean-Up' and 'Operating Engine Considerations' checklists. We advised Approach Control that we were declaring an emergency that our right engine had failed; that we planned to continue to our destination and requested ARFF for our arrival. We had decided to continue to our destination because of the availability of longer runways and better ARFF support than at nearer airports. When all of this was done I assumed pilot flying duties and transferred pilot not flying duties to the less experienced trainee. It was hazy as the sun was starting to set on the horizon so instead of a visual approach we elected to do the ILS to Runway 26L to get better established on the final approach. We had approximately ten miles visibility with winds 220 degrees at approximately 15-20 KTS on landing. We landed without incident and taxied the aircraft; under its own power; off the runway and taxi way and into the FBO parking where we were met by ARFF. Exiting the aircraft I found that the right engine contained all its oil and hydraulic fluid and there was no visible external damage.

When their right engine lost power and illuminated multiple system anomaly annunciations the flight crew of an SA227 shut the engine down per checklists; declared and emergency and proceded to their destination due to superior runways and CFR facilities.

1682399

201909

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Class G ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

Part 91

Landing

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 1903; Flight Crew Type 1504

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1682399

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Horizontal 100; Vertical 150

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I had just landed (Piper Archer) at ZZZ runway XX and had taxied back for departure to return to (home airport). I announced on the CTAF that I was departing runway XX; and as I was taxing into position for takeoff; a Glasair on short final came into view and announced that he was going around. He executed the go-around about 150 feet above the runway while I was taking position for takeoff. His evasive action avoided a collision.I had not heard the Glasair position announcements in the pattern; if any. I also did not see the Glasair on final as I was taking into position for takeoff. I should have been more diligent in scanning the pattern area; and especially the final approach course; before taxing onto the runway. The volume control on my headset was set lower than usual; and in retrospect; if I had set the volume higher; if the Glasair had made position announcements; I would have been more likely to hear his reports.

PA28 pilot reported taking the runway at non-towered airport and seeing a non-communicating Glasair go-around above him.