elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1291338

201508

0601-1200

MEM.Airport

TN

IMC

Ground MEM

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload

1291338

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Staffing

Per our FOM; I reported a cruise altitude change of 4000 ft greater than flight planned to Dispatch and never received an acknowledgment that it was received at all. We also had the airport change from a South flow to a North flow and we were not notified; which is not mandatory but certainly nice to know. There are specific items listed in the FOM that require notification for change and acknowledgement. This is a constant recurring problem with a lack of support from Dispatch while we are enroute which I feel is not in compliance with the intent of Flag/Domestic Operations. Especially with the fuel loads that are on the aircraft with the Fuel Sense initiative.Lack of compliance with FAR 121 Flag Domestic Operations for 'reliable communications.' I feel our dispatchers handle too many flights at one time and do not have the Flight Planning System or automation to handle the number we require.Better Flight Planning Software to allow point by point updates to our flight plans and more training and compliance from Dispatch as true Dispatchers rather than flight followers.

B767-300 Captain reported that due to staffing levels he felt he is not supported by Dispatch services to the extent required by FAR 121.

1099119

201306

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Turbulence

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Musketeer 23

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Electrical Wiring & Connectors

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 1158; Flight Crew Type 226

1099119

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I was flying (by myself) my Beech Musketeer Super III. The sky was clear; but a tad hazy and somewhat turbulent. After flying for about an hour my radios started to make a cracking sound. At approximately fifteen miles from [my destination]; I keyed for the Tower. At this time there was a crack sound and all electric; radio and GPS went out. I checked all other instruments and only the electric was gone.I circled away from the airport pattern to consider my options; always surveying for traffic. The thought of looking for a non-towered airport close by was hindered by my GPS flashing on and off. I also was aware that the electric may not be my only problem; and I did not want to become a glider for an off field landing if I could prevent it.Having knowledge of the wind direction for the landing pattern; I made a decision to survey the total area several times and go for a short field landing and quick departure from the active runway. I had no way to contact the Tower; but surveyed the area several times before taxiing down the tarmac.At this point I stopped in the tie down area and a young woman in a golf cart came to me with a note to call the Tower; which I did. The repair was to fix two wires that had parted from the alternator during flight.

BE23-24 pilot experiences electrical failure and lands at his Tower controlled destination airport without communication.

1577471

201809

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Class B ZZZ

Hydraulic System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6.; Flight Crew Total 11000.; Flight Crew Type 182.

1577471

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Instructor

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1577460.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

[Flight was] second leg of IOE. I (in left seat on Captain IOE) was flying as Pilot Flying. After departure; EICAS 'HYD QTY R' warning illuminated. Secured right hydraulic system according to QRH. Verbally conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance and continued flight. Received ACARS message that this issue had occurred on this jet 5 times recently; and it was a suspected bad sensor. Normal descent and visual approach to ZZZ ILS XXL. On approach; I called for the QRH Deferred Items Landing Checklist. Pilot Monitoring reestablished right hydraulic system per QRH. Right hydraulic quantity began to decrease from 0.44 to the low 0.30s on landing. Crew noticed acrid smell immediately after the right hydraulic system was pressurized. Smell dissipated after 10-15 seconds. Approach was briefed and flown as Flaps 25; Autobrakes 1; and stable. Flare was initiated at 30 feet and power was reduced to idle; speed within limits. Flare was not aggressive enough leading to firm touchdown and no bounce. Jumpseater noticed the autobrakes kicked off and called out 'No Autobrakes' immediately on touchdown. I was concerned that the R system hydraulic loss contributed to this; and then considered that the right engine reverser might also be inoperative. After spoiler deployment; nose pitched up rapidly to approximately 12 degrees. The Pilot Monitoring (Line Check Airman) and I pushed the nose back down to 10 degrees and then the Line Check Airman discontinued control inputs. I then gently lowered the nose to the runway. Landing roll and taxi-in both normal. On post flight inspection; pilots found hydraulic fluid leaking and puddling under left wing and Tail Scrape Damage Limiter worn down as evidence of tailskid contact and reported it to Maintenance Control and Chief Pilot.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

B757 Captain reported a tailstrike during a firm landing following a Hydraulic System malfunction.

1784113

201811

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

IMC

Icing

Night

Air Taxi

PC-12

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Cruise

Propeller Ice System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Troubleshooting

1784113

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Commercial

Troubleshooting

1784140.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

Departed ZZZ on IFR flight to ZZZ1 as first leg of a reposition. Deice systems were inspected on the ground and tested prior to departure with no apparent failures. Boots and prop heat were activated upon entering icing conditions in cruise and both failed within a few minutes. OAT was within boot operation limits. Ran appropriate checklists and were unable to clear the failures. We elected to divert initially selecting ZZZ2. In the descent to ZZZ2 we discovered that our EFBs (electronic flight bags) did not have any approach procedures for the area downloaded. ZZZ2 showed VFR conditions so we attempted a visual approach but were unable to find the airport beacon light. ATC issued delay vectors while we worked on a new plan. It appeared that ice accumulation had stopped and that the layer of rime ice accumulated in cruise had been removed; but the OAT was still below freezing and we were still encountering precipitation and clouds. At this point we [advised ATC] and opted to land at ZZZ3. Upon nearing ZZZ3 It became clear that a visual approach was not going to be possible so we copied the RNAV RWY XX Approach at ZZZ3 from ATC and successfully completed the approach. After shutdown we discovered a layer of clear ice on the wings behind the boots that had not been visible in flight.

Deice equipment tested on ground prior to departure with no issue. During cruise; light ice was encountered; and plane was configured appropriately. De-ice boot message appeared; and was troubleshooted; but could not be rectified. Propeller deice failed shortly after; was troubleshooted; and could not be rectified. ATC was notified to coordinate descent out of icing conditions. Conditions persisted in descent; and decision was made to divert as altitude in positive temperatures could not be established. Vectors were given for ZZZ2; but airport lights could not be confirmed as on in marginal conditions. New vectors were given for approach into ZZZ3. Approach assisted in vectors onto course as EFB issue (unable to pull up approach plate) prevented standard ID of approach. Landing was safely achieved and flight was terminated and calls were made to Dispatch; Director of operations; and Maintenance. Crew believed aircraft to be free of ice on approach descent through visual inspection. Upon landing; patches of clear ice were found on the top of each wing behind the boots. Boots were clear of ice on approach and upon landing.

Air taxi pilots reported that after entering icing conditions; the boots and propeller heat failed. Pilots diverted and during postflight discovered clear ice on the wings.

1618012

201902

0601-1200

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

37000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Pneumatic System - Indicating and Warning

X

Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 117; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 760

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1618012

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

MEL; Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Prior to departure no MEL items were listed [as deferred]. We departed on schedule; pushed back; and upon left engine start I noticed an amber ENG BLEED L EICAS message was displayed. I queried the CA (Captain) and FO (First Officer); and the CA responded that the [Maintenance Release] now listed a MEL for a bleed pressure sensor Status Message. I was also busy coordinating with the flight attendants about the short taxi; so my attention was diverted among several issues. I fished out the [Maintenance Release]; read it as best I could in the dim light; and determined that there was a left engine bleed issue relating to a bleed pressure sensor; and that the message could be displayed as part of the MEL. We then departed. In cruise flight; and after I returned from my rest break; I again inquired about the bleed failure; and that there are usually some operational limitations that go along with that. In our case; there were none. I checked the AIR schematics page and saw that; in fact; we had no bleed air from the left engine; and were using the bleed air from the right engine only. I again read the MEL and it sounded like we might have been given the wrong MEL for the issue we were facing; or the issue we were originally MEL'ed for had become a larger issue. With what we were seeing; we should have been given MEL 361 rather than 362. The CA sent a message to [Maintenance Control] who agreed that the issue we had was different than was MEL 362 would have covered. [Maintenance Control] provided a 777 [flight manual] reference to this issue; and ultimately a reset of the bleed switch was performed; which allowed the left engine to again supply bleed air normally. The flight continued and landed at the intended destination without issue. The CA sent in an ELB message regarding the engine bleed.

B777 First Officer reported incorrect MEL assigned resulting in abnormal operational pneumatic configuration.

1668716

201907

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Repair

Nacelle/Pylon Fairing

X

Failed

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness

1668716

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

There is a common condition on the 787-8 and 787-9 aircraft where Maintenance is finding and documenting heat damage to the engine pylon aft inboard fairings. The finish has been found deteriorated and/or missing from the carbon fiber fairing panel just above the heat shield. The normal interim repair for this condition per the SRM (Structural Repair Manual) 54-51-70-03b- 661a-a is to make a temporary seal on the panel per step 2e (1) with speed tape. The repair has a re-inspect interval of 400 hrs. to check the condition of the speed tape and reapply if necessary. These temporary repairs are not coming close to lasting the 400 hrs. between inspections; which could allow water ingression into the panel and eventual failure of the panel requiring replacement. [Three aircraft] had the speed tape re-applied per the SRM procedure on in ZZZ and when the aircraft returned the tape was missing and had to be re-applied. I believe this repair needs to be re-addressed and the procedure changed to address the exposure to extreme heat and air flow over the damaged area. Also; I believe the inspection interval should be lowered to match the general re-inspection requirement of 100 hours as required for speed tape re-inspection in AFMM 20-11-33.

Maintenance Technician reports that interim repair to 787 engine pylon not working.

1291622

201508

1201-1800

DAL.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower DAL

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 131

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion

1291622

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

1291686.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

Received a runway change from 13L to 13R after taxi out. No hotspots for 13R; but due to construction; taxi out was a threat; so we kept our heads up until established on Taxiway A. After taxiing on Taxiway A; FO went heads down and I started to prepare for the departure plan briefing.I crosschecked my EFB with my taxi track and identified the hold short line as an ILS hold short line due to the position of the line. I went over; stopped; and we briefed the departure plan; did Before Takeoff Checklist; and subsequently looked for the hold short line. We saw one on the right/First Officer side and behind us.There was an aircraft on final during this; but due to the position of the hold short line; there was no conflict and the aircraft landed normally. Tower never said anything either; but we found it worth mentioning.We were both distracted due to yet another checklist to be accomplished. It would also have helped if I knew the runway symbology; difference between a runway hold short line vs ILS hold short line. I do now.

While stopping to read the Departure Checklist because of a runway change; we crossed the hold short line for 13R in DAL. Do away with so many checklists. I feel my attention is sometimes diverted with all the briefs and checklists.

B737 flight crew reported crossing the hold line for Runway 13R in DAL due to the Captain believing it was an ILS hold line and not the runway hold line.

1414154

201701

1201-1800

N90.TRACON

NY

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

SID LGA5

Class B NYC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1414154

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

Utilizing Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) out of LaGuardia; our manual suggests writing the clearance on the flight plan. I mention this to all the First Officers. Many of them do not know this. With CPDLC there's no way to print the clearance. We were cleared to LAGUARDIA FIVE Departure Coney transition. Since we are unable to print I mentioned we should write it on the flight plan; [but] the First Officer did not. We went to the FMC; pulled up the LAGUARDIA FIVE Departure; [but] there were no transitions and no way to select Runway 13. We were both puzzled so I suggested we'll just double check with Tower or they will tell us what to do. Because 30 minutes had elapsed; we did not double check with Tower on the clearance; they just cleared us for takeoff. Once airborne Departure said 'were you given the Coney departure?' I said no. My mistake; they gave us another heading [and] never mentioned anything else. My mistake for being nice; in the future I will demand the First Officers write the clearance on the flight plans. However we are going paperless so where are you going to write these clearances?Because of CPDLC on the 737 and the inability to print the clearance; there's not a directive outlined in our manual directing us what to do. Some First Officers will take a picture on their phone of the clearance page on the CPDLC FMC. I suggest to most of the First Officer's our [manual] requires us to write the clearance on the international flight plan and a domestic flight plan. Many of them doubt me on this; I usually have to pull out the manual and show them.This was my mistake for not catching the Coney on the FMC; and [not] thoroughly reading the departure SID. Even though I asked the First Officer to write the clearance on the flight plan; in the future I will demand the First Officers do this! And failure to follow up with Tower on departure instructions. Part of this is because we don't have said guidance on the new procedure of CPDLC clearances.

B737 Captain reported a track deviation occurred when they misinterpreted the Controller Pilot Data link Communications (CPDLC) departure clearance.

1663823

201907

1801-2400

LAS.Airport

NV

500.0

VMC

Night

TRACON L30

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B LAS

TRACON L30

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B LAS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 500

Situational Awareness

1663823

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

Las Vegas Ground assigned us Runway 26R. We were cleared for takeoff; provided we had visual separation with an A321 and we did have visual separation. Our takeoff data called for a Flaps 1 takeoff; which requires a slightly longer takeoff roll. After the takeoff roll on [Runway] 26R; I was hand flying the aircraft during the initial climb. At about 500 ft. AGL; we encountered wake turbulence from the A321. This is what caused the stick shaker to activate. I immediately stated; 'Stall'; and pitched the nose of the aircraft down; announced 'Max Thrust' and applied Max Thrust by pushing the thrust levers past their detents. We regained speed almost immediately but due to the nose down pitch to recover from the stall; we received an EGPWS warning. We received this EGPWS warning as I was pitching back up to continue our climb after the stall recovery. The EGPWS warning did not last more than one auditory message and it was gone. We advised Las Vegas Tower of the situation and were then transferred to Las Vegas Approach; where we continued the remainder of the flight without incident. In the end; we believe we only lost about 100 feet from the stall recovery before continuing our climb on the departure. After looking back; there are two things in my mind that possibly could have helped. One would be to have re-sent for the takeoff data to get a flaps 2 takeoff; which would have allowed us to have a shorter takeoff roll. However; there was no way of knowing we would encounter the wake of another aircraft and had no reason to believe a flaps 1 takeoff would not suffice. The second thing I think that could have helped was to delay our takeoff roll slightly for about 15-30 more seconds to have a bit more separation from the other aircraft. At the end of the day the stall recovery procedure was performed by the standards it is trained and the flight was completed without injury or incident.

EMB-175 First Officer reported a wake turbulence encounter climbing out of 500 feet AGL departing LAS in trail of an A321 that resulted in a stick shaker and an uncommanded descent that triggered an EGPWS warning.

1689690

201910

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 137; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 11000

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1689690

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 136; Flight Crew Total 2252; Flight Crew Type 1935

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1689708.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure

FO (First Officer) noticed [a suspicious] device hanging on spare bulbs panel before push as he was plugging in his personal headset. Contacted Operations and asked for jet bridge return with a GSC (Ground Security Coordinator). Looked up previous pilots and discovered they were at Gate XX. We reviewed QRH. Called Gate XX and confirmed device was previous FO's. Ownership was identified. Previous FO said device was battery pack for their personal headset. Device given back to previous FO by GSC.

While getting ready to close up cabin door I turned around to plug in my headset and noticed a suspicious item hanging from the spare bulbs handle. I uncoupled it and inspected it; noticing an 8 cell battery pack similar to those used in remote control vehicles; attached by a zip tie and wired in to a black box that had a 2 position switch; led light and what appeared to be an antenna jack. I showed it to the Captain who quickly tried to get the Gate Agent as she had just closed the door. I called Operations requesting the jet bridge be returned and the Captain also asked for a GSC (Ground Security Coordinator) which I asked for through Operations.I looked up the inbound flight and the crew list assuming it was the previous First Officer's homemade charging device but also realized this could be an actual threat so we placed the item on the center pedestal and left it alone. The door was opened and the Captain asked our Gate Agent to contact the Gate Agent at Gate XX where the previous FO (First Officer) was.We reviewed the bomb on board QRH as well as threat level 3 in the FOM. The Captain then went into the jet bridge with the device and handed it over to the GSC. Shortly after; the previous FO came down our jet bridge and confirmed ownership of the suspected device and explained it was a battery pack for his headset.The GSC gave the device to FO who apologized for the confusion. The GSC confirmed the Captain and I felt the aircraft was secure and we were both ok to continue the flight and there was no need to deplane the aircraft. We both felt the aircraft was safe and the device's ownership was confirmed and no threat existed. We boarded the aircraft; ran the remaining checklists; and departed a little past departure time. We were able to make up most of the time and got the customers safely and comfortably to [the destination airport].

B737 NG flight crew reported a suspicious device hanging from the spare bulbs panel resulting in a flight delay.

1291056

201508

1201-1800

DAL.Tower

TX

1500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower DAL

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Traffic Watch

Cruise

VFR Route

Class B DAL

Facility DAL.TWR

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1291056

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Airport; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Procedure

Procedure

I was relieving the Local Controller and was briefed that a traffic watch aircraft was flying a VFR Transition (per the Letter of Agreement; the Tower Transition calls for the traffic watch aircraft to climb to 2;000 feet pass over the airport; South to North; then proceed eastbound after crossing the field descend to 1;500 feet ). Since I don't spend too much time in the tower; I commented that the aircraft would turn East towards [the] highway as to check myself up on the procedure. The controller being relieved said negative; the aircraft is going North to join [another] Highway. I said I didn't think that was correct and began looking for the cheat sheet for the Tower Transition. During this time several others in the tower cab told me I was wrong that the Tower Transition turns north not east; including the supervisor who was shouting across the tower cab. After confirming for myself that the Tower Transition did indeed turn East towards [the] highway; I noticed the aircraft heading North. I asked the pilot's intentions to which he responded; 'North to join [another Highway].' I said negative that is not the Tower Transition; turn right heading 090. At this point the supervisor addressed me again from across the tower cab and said thats not how we do it; the transition is to the North. I again questioned the controller I was relieving to confirm the aircraft was flying the Tower Transition. He confirmed the aircraft was flying the Tower Transition; but really didn't know the procedure. I reiterated that the map shows the transition to the East. Again I was told I was incorrect by others in the tower including for a third time the supervisor. I then questioned the pilot who said he had never been taken East.My conclusion is that no one in the tower cab other than myself knew the correct procedure. It had been done incorrectly so long and so often that even the pilot didn't know the correct routing. Later that morning; two other supervisors were told about the situation and both said that; according to the Letter of Agreement the aircraft is to turn North (which is incorrect). I cannot begin to explain how disconcerting this made me feel trying to control traffic while everyone in the tower cab is telling me I'm doing it wrong and thats not how we do it. When in reality I was the only one who knew the correct procedure. This is not an isolated incident. Situations like this have occurred regularly at the facility. In my opinion as the Support Specialist for the past six years; the controllers are pretty much doing whatever they think will work regardless of documented procedures. And since the supervisors aren't familar enough with the procedures themselves; no one is being held accountable for their actions. My reluctance to share this with the Local Safety Counsel is because the opposition I faced on this issue and other issues in recent time comes from the controllers on the Local Safety Counsel including a NATCA officer. My recommendation is that the entire facility be given Refresher Training and those in the tower this morning be given Skill Enhancement Training covering all the Letters of Agreement and the Standard Operating Procedure as well as the reporting requirements of the Quality Assurance program. I know that the ERC does at times make recommendations to the facility. I hope it doesn't take something more serious to happen at [airport] before somebody actually does something about it. I have decided this evening that today was my last day in the tower. I simply am tired of working in the tower and always having to defend myself for doing what's right. I'm telling you this because I wish to convey to you how serious I think the situation is at [airport]. I truly believe the entire facility will benefit form the training I've suggested and I volunteer to help develop and teach the material. Please do something.

An Air Traffic Control Procedures Specialist was working in the Tower for currency. The reporter cleared a VFR aircraft along a published VFR procedure route. The reporter believed the aircraft would proceed along certain highways and directions for that procedure. Other persons in the Tower including Supervisors told the reporter they were wrong regarding the direction the procedure directs the aircraft to fly. Upon review the reporter was correct and the other control personnel were incorrect. The reporter states this is a recurring issue in this Tower and recommends supplemental/refresher training for Tower Controllers.

1205894

201409

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

5000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1205894

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure

On arrival...; ATC assigned 5;000 feet & and slow to 160 kts. Our next Clearence was to maintain 5;000 feet until [FIX] cleared ILS 36L. The First Officer was still a low time first officer and wanted to slow to landing configuration on schedule; so we did. After contacting tower; they asked our speed and we replied we were at our Vref. They said we were supposed to fly last assigned speed. So we sped up to 160 kts. However we were cleared for the approach and neither of us recalled a speed restriction nor did I recall reading back one to ATC. Tower turned us off the approach and we were vectored around to try it again. No further issues were encountered.

Flight crew; initially cleared to 5;000 feet and 160 knots; slowed to Vref after being cleared for an ILS Approach. When switched to Tower frequency; Tower advised that the flight was supposed to maintain 160 knots. Aircraft was vectored around for another ILS Approach.

1103898

201307

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1200.0

Tower ZZZ

Robinson R44

1.0

Part 91

None

Passenger

Cruise

Class D ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

1103898

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

During cruise portion of [flight]; the helicopter began to lose power. Manifold pressure climbed; RPMs climbed and oil temperature climbed into the red. I decided to divert to [a suitable alternate] to avoid a possible engine failure and possible emergency landing where a mechanic could diagnose the problem (still ongoing).

Robinson R44 pilot reported he diverted to an alternate airport for a precautionary landing when he began to lose power.

1490331

201710

1801-2400

AVL.Airport

NC

8000.0

VMC

Dusk

TRACON AVL

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class E AVL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1490331

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1490458.0

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Going in to Asheville airport (AVL) we were cleared for the visual approach runway 35 on a perpendicular course to the south at 8;000 feet. We had to rush down to make the speed and configuration changes needed to get on the approach. We were using the ILS frequency as backup. We were intercepting the localizer from the south and were slightly below glideslope at UMUXE when we got a ground proximity warning from the aircraft. I (being pilot flying) immediately stopped the descent and leveled off as we had visual references to the ground. The warning went away and we continued the approach without incident.

A more thorough brief of the approach plate; even though it was only backup; could have prevented the GPWS. Also asking ATC for vectors to the final would have prevented the warning as well. The hill that set the warning off is small on the plate and easy to look over.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a visual approach at dusk to AVL airport.

1416697

201701

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

IMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Training

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Air/Ground Communication

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1416697

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft

Climbing out of ZZZ and after being handed off to center we were cleared to our filed cruise altitude. Shortly after we heard a very loud and completely random banging noise over the intercom. The MCDU radio page show a red 'micstck' message but it would not clear or reset after the 90 seconds automatic reset. We were unable to transmit over com 1. We tried to reach center over com 2 on assigned frequency and 121.5 but unable to hear anything inbound. Ran the lost communication QRH procedure with no luck on clearing or resetting the radios or com panels. So we entered 7600 in the transponder. There was weather in ZZZ and we had been in IMC flight conditions most of the climbout. I instructed the PF to continue on our filed flight plan as expected; in addition to fly our filed speeds and try to match our scheduled arrival time for the destination airport. I continued to work on re-establishing communications with ATC. As the loud banging noise persisted; I tried to call the cabin and check with the flight attendants to see if an interphone was possibly causing an issue. We were unable to talk to the flight attendants over the cabin interphone so we passed a note over the door notifying them that the interphone was inoperable and to bang on the door and pass a note if they needed our attention.I then proceeded to try and use the com 3 backup radio to reestablish com with ATC. Once again it showed we could transmit but not receive any inbound audio. At that time I switched com 3 back to DATA mode and sent a msg to dispatch; they too had been trying to get a hold of us. We did find ACARS to be operational. I informed dispatch over ACARS that we would plan to continue as filed on time to ZZZ1 and we would be needed to start our decent just south of ZZZ VOR for the filed arrival and transition to the ILS XXL for approach and landing. I also asked them to contact ATC advice of our situation and to coordinate landing clearance lights with ZZZ1 tower. I sent maintenance control a MSG asking if they had any reset procedures for the radios or com panels. Maintenance responded with no solution or procedure while airborne.The FO and I then tried every known way to clear the system; we unplugged all headsets; tried the masks; and cycled all PTT buttons including the jumpseat panel with no luck. We looked for circuit breaker issues; but it appeared the system had just locked up. As we analyze the situation we came to the conclusion that the only communications we had available was our pilot to pilot intercom; with the erratic banging noise and ACARS. We were also somewhat confident we could transmit in the blind on com 2 and did so on 121.5 changing altitudes on the descent and approach. We got back with the flight attendants to find out the cabin PA and FA to FA Interphone were also INOP; we established an emergency communication procedure if needed. We received a descent clearance via ACARS to cross 20 north of PXR at FL250; we complied and transmitted in the blind to advice we were starting down. Another ACARS MSG was received advising ZZZ1 approach would like us to call them on a cell phone when below 10;000 for a landing clearance; and did comply with the cell phone call when work load permitted. Weather was VFR. In ZZZ1 so we looked for green lights for landing and taxi clearance as well. Once at the gate maintenance was unable to clear the situation without first completing a power reset procedure. I have never had a communication failure of the complexity before. The airplane was in an airworthy state before the flight with all systems operating normal up to this event. As a crew we all did our best to correct the situation; but after realizing this was not going to clear while airborne; we all worked together to deal the best we could. The PF and I did our best to follow lost communication procedures as defined by the FAR/AIM. We did our best to not confuse ATC of our intentions to help maintain traffic separation.

ERJ-175 Captain reported a communication failure during climbout. ACARS was operational and used to communicate with Dispatch and relay some ATC instructions. A cell phone was used to call Approach Control for landing clearance.

1055664

201211

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation

X

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

1055664

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication

Human Factors

Nine hours into shift; volunteered to go on a 'road-trip' to another airport to remove and replace a faulty component. I hurried to grab my tools; references etc. I was given a part; and got on the road. Drove 3.5 hours; removed and replaced part; no fault messages. Aircraft is fixed and I completed a successful road trip. Or so I thought... What I did not realize is the part I was given was not 'effective' for the aircraft. I did not request the part myself; it was requested by our Maintenance Controller. This individual is not at fault however; because he requested the correct part. The Parts System we use to request parts recognized the part I was given as 'Interchangeable With' the correct part. Unfortunately it may be interchangeable; but it is not 'effective' for the aircraft I was working on. But once again the blame rests solely on me. Had I double checked the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) to verify the difference between the two parts I would've been able to extinguish this whole situation. So as you can see; many factors came into effect: never dealing with these two different parts; I was given a part instead of requesting it myself; rushing out the door; long drive; and high hours on the job. But I consider none of these factors in any way as an excuse. I enjoy going on road trips; I have always considered them a great learning experience. And I don't consider this any differently. I have learned from the mistake I made and intend to be much more careful about part effectivity in the future. [Contributing factor was] not double checking/verifying the 'Effectivity' of the part given to me. [Recommend] not trusting the system we use to request parts. Aircraft overnighting at ZZZ1 gate. Complacency.

A Line Mechanic reports replacing a faulty component on an EMB-135 aircraft with a part identified by their Parts Computer System as being 'Interchangeable with' the part he removed. The new part was interchangeable; but not 'Effective' for the aircraft. Mechanic noted the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) had the correct information; but was not used to verify.

1232127

201501

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-100

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1232127

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

Was a normal day; early van to to the airport; accepted plane; boarded; departed a few minutes early and proceeded to de-ice pad to have heavy coat of frost removed. Due to the cold I was in no particular hurry to get in the air; as I recall we were almost done with de-ice before the oil temps were within limits for flight. Just a note; I always like the plane to warm up adequate before flights on these cold mornings (-14c). Taxied out; de-ice equipment check; and took the runway and commenced a takeoff once clearance was received from tower. Somewhere around halfway through gear retraction the right engine began surging very radically; upon closer examination so was the prop. We as a crew determined the most likely cause was a beta lockout failure. We complied with the company memory procedures and when the condition levers were reduced below 1200 the surging ceased. The tower was notified of our intent to return and land; we entered the traffic pattern in a left downwind. The F/A was briefed; the passengers were briefed; ops were notified and we landed as I recall about 9 minutes after liftoff; taxi back to the gate was uneventful where deplaning proceeded without delay. There was a return to field but an emergency was not declared.

A DHC-8 flight crew encountered a surging right engine shortly after landing gear retraction; reduced the RPM until the surging ceased per their Beta lockout procedure and returned to their departure airport.

1604120

201812

1201-1800

D01.TRACON

CO

6100.0

Bonanza 35

Part 91

VFR

Climb

Vectors

Facility D01.TRACON

Government

Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.1

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1604120

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was working DR1 and accepted a handoff from DR2 on a tag that read Aircraft X. The pilot asked for a Bravo clearance and climb which I issued. When I saw that the aircraft did not appear to be climbing; I began making inquiries. The altitude indicated 061 and an approximate 240 heading; not the climb to 085 on a 170 heading I'd issued. I attempted to turn further right to a 150 with no visible change. I asked for his altitude; thirty degree turns and finally to IDENT since I'd seen no change. In between some of this questioning; BJC called to say they tagged up a VFR as a Bravo violator 'BVIO' and wanted me to track him and have him call. When I asked Aircraft X to IDENT; I observed the BVIO IDENT. I asked for position and correlated it to that spot; 20 miles south of the AC DR2 identified as Aircraft X.After watching the replay we discovered that a code [XXYY] departed GXY. When DR2 got the call from Aircraft X and typed it in; the generated code was also [XXYY]. The system tagged the aircraft off GXY instead of the actual Aircraft X who departed BDU almost 35 miles apart. When DR2 called the position correctly; the pilot did not catch that it was incorrect. The real Aircraft X flew through BJC's airspace; through their traffic pattern; and I didn't make the connection until I saw the BVIO with an IDENT. I had to watch the replay to figure out how all of that happened.There were two aircraft squawking [XXYY] and the system didn't show any indication of it. I'd like to see that the system either not allow that to happen or at least have some sort of notification that it's happened.

Denver TRACON Controller reported the ATC Computer allowed two aircraft to be tagged up on the same code; which led to confusion and airspace violations.

1784889

202101

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Testing

Repair Facility

Air Carrier

Instructor; Inspector; Lead Technician

Maintenance Avionics

Training / Qualification

1784889

Repair Facility

Other NA

Air Carrier

Inspector; Lead Technician; Trainee

Maintenance Avionics

Training / Qualification

1784888.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Human Factors

I returned to work after a 3 month absence. I am still qualified on the module. I was assigned as the trainer to Mechanic Y. I was training him on the stator case assembly. I demonstrated how to tighten each vane segment foot bolts. The procedure that I was taught; and which had been in use as long as I can remember; was to slide the case and vane assembly; so that approximately one third of it overhung the table surface. Then the bolts were tightened from below with a ratchet with a socket and long extension; repositioning the case and vane assembly as necessary until all bolts were tightened. At the time of the incident; I was not in the work area; having gone to the restroom.Support the case with a hoist and sling before tightening the bolts. This should be added to the job card.

One week after return from 3 months off and being the first time working on this unit as a trainee.On Graveyard shift I was working on the module and order # XXXX. I was tightening the bolts of the vanes. The bolts are tighten from the bottom while the case sits on the table. To access the bolts part of the case is moved slightly beyond the edge of the table. I was sitting in a chair with rollers while I was tightening the bolts. The chair moved; the wrench and its extension did come off the bolt head causing the case to slide off the table and fall to the floor approximately 30 inches.There was no visible damage to the case because it fell directly on my arm and that cushioned the fall. Inspection will be called to inspect the unit.I would add to the job card to support the case with a hoist before tightening the bolts. Or developing a fixture that would allow to reach the bolts from the bottom without having to move part of the case off the edge of the table.

Maintenance Instructor and Trainee reported a training mistake during a training session and both cited being off for an extended time contributed to the event.

1108683

201308

1201-1800

JFK.Airport

NY

0.0

Tower JFK

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

None

Tower JFK

Air Carrier

B767-200

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Visual Approach

Class B JFK

Facility JFK.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1108683

ATC Issue All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

I was working Local 1 at JFK working ILS to Runway 31R and visuals to Runway 31L. An A320 was told to line up and wait on Runway 31L with a B767-200 on 5 mile final. The A320 was cleared for takeoff and notified of traffic on a 3 mile final. The A320 did not commence his takeoff roll. With the B767 on about 1.5 mile final I told the A320 he needed to go. The A320 slowly rolled down runway at less then taxi speed. I sensed he had a problem and told the A320 to exit the runway at Taxiway Y to allow the B767 to land. At this point the A320 advised he was rolling. The B767 was too close for this to work so I told the A320 to cancel takeoff and exit now at the next turn; which was Runway 4L. I tried to send the B767 around; but he had keyed the frequency asking about what he should do causing me not to be able to speak to the B767. Finally the B767 unkeyed and I sent him around as the A320 exited the runway. If an aircraft is cleared for takeoff but is not ready; they should notify ATC as soon as possible to prevent this type of situation.

JFK Controller described a go-around event when traffic cleared for takeoff delayed longer than expected and separation collapsed; the reporter noted the departing aircraft should have informed ATC of any expected delays.

1753682

202004

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Parked

DC Battery

X

Failed

Company

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Confusion

1753682

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

Company Policy

Aircraft X Battery was replaced due to the log book write up; low voltage; APU would not start with low battery voltage.Storage procedure required battery disconnect not to drain down. Believe this would have occurred sometime.These aircraft were parked due to unusual circumstances. Procedures were changing often. I hope a job card is developed to eliminate any future confusion.

Technician reported an aircraft battery had to be replaced due to incorrect storage procedure.

1475495

201708

1801-2400

ZSU.ARTCC

PR

Center ZSU

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZSU

Facility ZSU.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10.0

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1475495

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Human Factors

I instructed the handoff assist to amend the flight plan for Air Carrier X. Seeing ALURI as the next fix; and never hearing of that fix; I assumed that it was well in ZNY's airspace. Apparently ALERI is before LUCTI in ZMA's airspace; causing the flight plan to back track; resulting in an error within Oceanic Procedures (ATOPS). I should have gone to the end of the airway to tie in the route of flight at the correct fix instead of assuming or called ZMA to confirm. FDIO; ERAM; ERID; AND/OR ATOPS (FLIGH PLAN PROCESSING SOFTWARES) should provide notification alerting the controller that the route entered was in error is back tracking on itself.

ZSU ARTCC Controller reported entering an improper routing in the ERAM for an aircraft.

1240414

201502

0001-0600

LCCC.ARTCC

FO

32000.0

VMC

Center LCCC

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Oceanic

Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 114

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1240414

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

This event cycle began with a call I made to the dispatcher from my hotel room in LLBG just prior to getting on the crew bus for the drive to the airport and subsequent flight home. He mentioned that there was an existing MEL write up on our aircraft. This read; 'Left intermediate press. sensor inop. (Bleed Press Sensor L).' He said that the flight crew that had brought the aircraft had had a rather lengthy conference call on their flight with [Dispatch] and [Maintenance Control] about this write up. My dispatcher indicated (and I concur) that there was nothing for the flight crew to do about this write up; no switches to re-configure and no legal or practical limitations on the operation. Once in our own aircraft doing preflight and cockpit set up duties; we did not see any STATUS messages connected with this MEL. So we sent an ACARS inquiry to [Maintenance Control]. Was the system's ability to generate a status message disabled or locked out by maintenance action in concert with the MEL? Unfortunately; we never received a response back and I did not follow up.We then took off and climbed normally. Then early in cruise; at 32;000 ft after the relief crew had left the cockpit for their rest break; the first officer (FO) and I got an EICAS caution message 'BLEED OFF ENG L.' We read the checklist guidance which basically said 'The engine bleed valve is closed because of a system fault.' We also broke out the flight manual and looked at pneumatic schematic along with pulling up the aircraft 'AIR' synoptic. All the aircraft pneumatic system isolation valves had opened up properly and all systems were being supplied. Next; we SATCOMed [Dispatch] and got a patch with [Maintenance Control]. Our question was whether the EICAS' BLEED OFF ENG L' was at all related to the previously mentioned MEL. We were assured that it was not; that the two anomalies were to be considered separate in that the MEL problem did not cause the EICAS. We also discussed the fact that we still had engine anti-ice available for the L engine as well as a full up wing anti-ice system for both wings. We felt OK with our situation; [Maintenance Control] had nothing more to add and neither did [Dispatch]. When the relief crew took over the cockpit; I had failed to brief them on the EICAS 'BLEED OFF ENG L' that we had dealt with four hours previously. Therefore; they soon launched their own subsequent inquiry when we were over the Atlantic (ETOPS airspace) and were rightly concerned that we were operating with only one air source (the R engine bleed) to supply our pneumatic needs. A loss of that one source would have necessitated an eventual descent to 22;000 to be able to draw APU supplied pneumatic air. Not a great thought. Granted; this EICAS 'BLEED OFF ENG L' occurred after takeoff (after the point of dispatch). No violation; but in retrospect; how good an idea was this operation? I cannot think of a FAR that we violated but it seems that safety was eroded. In this day and age when we want to operate every flight successfully; I believe that it is important to self-reflect and ask 'Did I contribute to a 'Morton Thiokol' mentality where 'By golly; we are going to complete the mission; here boys!' We don't want that mindset to pervade our cockpits to where we develop a culture of 'mission completion' at all costs. Perhaps I succumbed to this mentality myself briefly. Yet; we all know as well that if we want a risk free world; we need to all stay in bed all day curled up in the fetal position. In that kind of world; airplanes do not fly and airlines do not exist. Measure; reasoned risk allows us to operate and make money (since we are not a utility). Yet; due to [a] recent aircraft fire; the very aircraft that we flew was being taken out of a planned 24 hr. service visit to be sent back out. At some point; we may have a situation where we end up fixing that aircraft in a different location as opposed to our own hangar. I'm sure decision makers in those cases; compared to the rest of us; have way more brain power and are making far more money. I rest my case.

A flight crew experienced an EICAS message 'BLEED OFF ENG X' early in cruise. They complied with the checklist and consulted with the Dispatcher and Maintenance and continued the flight. The reporter wonders if it was a good idea to have continued the operation into ETOPS airspace.

1081204

201304

1801-2400

TEB.Airport

NJ

2000.0

VMC

10

Dusk

8000

TRACON N90

Corporate

Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

SID RUUDY 4

Class B EWR; Class D TEB

Altitude Alert

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 10050; Flight Crew Type 2000

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1081204

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Human Factors

Departing TEB on the RUUDY departure; the Captain was the non flying pilot in the right seat and I was the SIC/flying pilot; but sitting in the left seat. The Captain deplaned the passengers; handled the luggage and paid the applicable fees then returned to the plane while I received the PDC and set up the FMS for departure. The RUUDY SID has a final altitude of 2;000 (or as assigned) with an intermediate stop at 1;500 until crossing WENTZ. The Captain set 2;000 in the altitude preselect which should have been 1;500. He then briefed the clearance. As the flying pilot I considered the noise abatement for the Teterboro area and intended to climb as expeditiously as possible to the initial altitude. We discussed 1;500 at WENTZ then the climb to 2;000 over TASCA however I didn't catch that the Captain had set 2;000 in the altitude preselect. The chain of events was: 1. the incorrect setting of the altitude preselect; 2. preoccupation with noise abatement; 3. I followed the flight director to the preselected altitude. I should have been able to break the error chain simply by noting the incorrect setting of the initial altitude rather than trusting what was set to be correct.

A Gulfstream flight crew departing TEB on the RUUDY RNAV SID failed to cross WENTZ at 1;500 MSL as required. A contributing factor was setting the final SID altitude; 2;000 MSL; in the altitude alert window rather than the prior hard 1;500.

1101452

201307

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

500.0

Tower ZZZ

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Descent

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Ground; Trainee

Air Traffic Control Developmental

1101452

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Instructor; Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

1101454.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airport

Procedure

A Cessna was doing pattern work and Airport Maintenance was doing work throughout the airport. Ground Control coordinated that Airport Maintenance wanted to drive Runway 14L and hold short of Runway 18. I approved and changed my Cessna to Runway 14R and cleared him for the option. The Cessna asked if he could cross midfield I replied negative extend your base Runway 14R; cleared for the option. Relinquished Runway 14L to Ground Control. Then Ground stated that the Maintenance vehicle now wanted Runway 14R. I advised him we switched the Cessna to the right because of the request and to hold short of Runway 14R; Ground acknowledged. I believe Ground was contacted by two airport vehicles with requests at the same time and because the call signs are so similar; and on frequency sound similar; one took the others permission to proceed as requested. As the aircraft was flaring over the approach end of Runway 14R the CIC/Supervisor yelled out is he on the runway; vehicle on the runway. My Trainer and I were looking at the airplane and the vehicle was at the approach end of the runway but not on the runway. The confusion involved two similar sounding call signs for trucks both in the area and when ground replied. I would make sure that all vehicles that have access to the airport don't have similar sounding call signs. I also recommend better radios.

Ground Control (GC) was having issues with two vehicles with similar sounding call signs. Ground instructed him to proceed as requested hold short of all runway's; but both vehicles started moving. Noticed the vehicle by the approach end of Runway 14R close but not on the runway and still moving. CIC noticed this first and drew it to the attention of me at Local Control. I told the Trainee I was training to send the Cessna around; the aircraft was less than a quarter mile final and approximately 100 FT AGL. He went around; continued to do pattern work while CIC and Ground worked with the vehicles to straighten the problem out. Rename one of the vehicles so the call signs aren't so similar.

Tower Controller described a runway incursion event when several airport vehicles were requesting runway clearances all with similar call signs.

1852799

202111

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

24000.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1852799

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft; MEL

Aircraft

Dual pack fail at FL240. Returned to ZZZ. Landed overweight. Entered malfunction and overweight landing in maintenance log book.Aircraft was dispatched per the MEL with an inop right pack.

B737 Captain reported a dual Pack failure in cruise and returned to the departure airport.

1120982

201310

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

50.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

M-20 J (201) / Allegro

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 550; Flight Crew Type 550

1120982

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Horizontal 1000; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

On crosswind for Runway 9; I saw the other aircraft departing Runway 23. I had heard no radio traffic; so I called on CTAF to see if he had his radio on; no response. I then flew downwind; base and final but could not see the other aircraft; and there was no radio traffic on 122.8. Just as I was about to touch down; the other aircraft crossed the intersection of Runway's 5-23 and 9-27; about 1;000 FT in front of me as he landed on Runway 23. We were both landing simultaneously on different runways that intersected. After shutting down; I walked to the other pilot's hangar and asked him several questions: 'Do you have a radio in your plane?' 'Yes.' 'Do you keep it turned on?' 'No' 'Why not? We just about collided out there.' 'I can't hear it because of my hearing aid.' 'Why don't you get a headset?' 'I have one. It doesn't help.' 'Did you realize we were both landing and almost hit?' 'Oh; were you landing?' This pilot has had multiple near-misses at our field and multiple accidents. Upon discussing this issue with the airport manager immediately after; he informed me that [he] had a close call with another pilot in the past 2 weeks. This pilot apparently recently was flying without a medical; but I understand he has gotten it back. I do not understand how a pilot who is clearly dangerous; who has already exhibited unsafe actions and has had multiple incidents (including taxing in front of a King Air on short final about a year ago; which I previously reported) can be allowed to continue to fly; even under 'light sport'. Do we need to wait for someone to be killed by his actions before something is done? This is a serious matter of public safety. One issue is the pilot himself; and as I see it his inability to operate safely. The second is his use of equipment (or lack of use). At a minimum; he should be using the radio equipment in his aircraft so others can know his position and avoid him. As it is; if I know he is out flying; I do not pull my plane out.

M20 pilot reports a conflict with an LSA pilot landing on an intersecting runway. The LSA pilot does not use his radio due to incompatibility with his hearing aids. Previous conflicts are alleged.

1196680

201408

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

26000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Cockpit Window

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1196680

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

We were at cruise at FL260 when we heard a loud pop noise and the Captain's side front windshield outer panel shattered. We immediately checked to ensure pressure was stable (which it was); and decided to descend in case the other panes shattered as well. I (pilot flying) initiated a descent; the Captain (pilot monitoring) grabbed the QRH; and I advised ATC that our windshield shattered and we were in a descent to 10. The Controller cleared us down and asked if we wanted to declare an emergency; we didn't at that time but did a short time later with the same controller. A broken windshield; besides being startling with no obvious cause; creates at least two specific risks. One - of it worsening to the point that pressure is lost and/or breaks apart into the cockpit; and two - the visibility restrictions caused by a spider webbed window. We started descending prior to receiving clearance in order to minimize the first risk and notified the controller of our actions within a few hundred feet (at the first opportunity) to get an additional set of eyes to compensate for the second; and of course to keep the controller in the loop.

CRJ-200 First Officer reports a shattered Captain's side front windshield at FL260 and starts descending. ATC is advised and an emergency is declared before diverting to a suitable airport.

1692262

201910

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2500.0

VMC

Turbulence; Windshear; 10

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Taxi

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Landing

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot; Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 7700; Flight Crew Type 525

Situational Awareness

1692262

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

After the morning preflight task of checking weather; NOTAMs; and the aircraft; I departed for my morning flights. No applicable NOTAMs existed for the first two airports. While enroute to my second airport; Center gave me a NOTAM that Runway XX/XY was closed for the day. ZZZ asked me to report checking weather and asked for landing intentions. Upon listening to the AWOS; the winds were being reported between 13007 and 14007. I elected to do a straight in to Runway XZ/XA; accepting the light crosswind and tailwind; both of which I estimated at less than 5 kts.The runway length was 3002 feet and dry. I had previously landed on this runway with light crosswinds and no trouble. The approach end of XZ sits at a small bluff. The runway has a crown at the intersection of XX/XY and XZ/XA beyond which a downhill slope exists. I planned the approach to the numbers but at the last moment I experienced a slight updraft that caused me to touchdown long. The longer touchdown was created by a wind shift directly from behind and the subsequent updraft from the bluff.Immediately upon landing brakes and reverse thrust was applied. I crossed the intersection of the runways and was on the downhill slope. Once I realized I may not be able to stop; it was too late for a go-around. Continuing the stopping action was my safest action. The aircraft came to rest half of the end of the runway. I shut down the aircraft and completed a walk around when I observed a REIL lying on the ground and propeller damage.After the fact; there were two things that should have or could have been done. Refuse landing and go on to next destination. I should have made the landing into the predominant forecast of 17008 with the later TAF. Estimating winds from the south at 15-25 kts.

Air taxi Captain reported landing long and experiencing a runway excursion.

1840188

202109

ZZZ.Airport

US

3.0

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class C ZZZ

Helicopter

VFR

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 280; Flight Crew Total 21500; Flight Crew Type 650

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1840188

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Horizontal 0; Vertical 400

N

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure

During RNAV XXL ZZZ we had a TCAS RA with an VFR Rotary traffic @ approximately 3 NM from touch down. ATC didn't provide separation between IFR and VFR traffic in control airspace.

C560 Captain reported a TCAS RA with a helicopter while on approach. Captain further stated that ATC failed to provide traffic separation.

1837027

202109

0601-1200

ZOA.ARTCC

CA

60.0

36400.0

Daylight

Center ZOA

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZOA

Center ZOA

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZOA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 15000

1837027

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Environment - Non Weather Related

Departed SJC for ZZZ; encountered aircraft upset at FL 364 due to close proximity and below Boeing 777 at FL 370. No injuries or aircraft damage were apparent.

Reporter stated he was surprised at the intensity of the wake turbulence.

B737 Captain reported an upset climbing through FL364 after encountering wake turbulence from a B777 at FL370.

1676297

201907

0601-1200

ZAB.ARTCC

NM

13000.0

VMC

20

Daylight

Center ZAB

Air Taxi

PC-12

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Direct

Class E ZAB

Altimeter

X

Improperly Operated

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness

1676297

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 3; Vertical 550

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

[We were] issued a clearance to descend and maintain 13000 ft. We began descent with autopilot engaged and failed to set the appropriate altimeter setting. The autopilot captured normally; however our altimeter setting was set to 30.43; instead of the 29.98 for the destination airport. This put us vertically in conflict with another aircraft as we were now almost 500 ft lower than we would have been. After discussing the event with my First Officer I determined that we should have set the appropriate setting immediately; instead of waiting for the new automated weather to update. It was due to update any minute. We should have asked for the updated setting instead of waiting.

PC-12 Captain reported an airborne conflict resulted from an altitude deviation related to improper altimeter setting.

1487453

201710

0001-0600

NCT.TRACON

CA

9200.0

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

SID STIICK

Class B NCT

TRACON NCT

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

VFR

Cruise

Vectors

Class B NCT

Facility NCT.TRACON

Government

Coordinator; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.0

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party2 Flight Crew

1487453

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

Company Policy

I was working the Coordinator position; a position between two departure sectors in the TRACON. Aircraft X departed on the RNAV departure. Aircraft X never checked in with the Departure position. The departure Controller called Tower and asked them to switch Aircraft X. After multiple tries with tower; the controller called Aircraft X on guard. At the same time Aircraft Y was an overflight at 9;500 feet in Aircraft X's flight path. I as the Coordinator called Tower on multiple occasions to contact Aircraft X and give him a climb for traffic. As a last ditch effort I looked over to the other Departure Controller's scope and asked if he was talking to Aircraft X. The trainee called Aircraft X and he responded. Unsure of what to do; the Departure trainer asked me what he should do. I responded with 'give him traffic; say something'. The controllers at that time had turned the Aircraft Y and fortunately did not have a loss.On multiple occasions aircraft depart on the wrong frequency. We have been told that the only way to fix the problem is to report it. We have a box sitting on top of our flight plan printer where we put strips of aircraft that came off on the wrong frequency. This problem continues to exist and nothing is being done. Recommendation is for Tower to issue departure frequencies to all aircraft on departure. There is obviously a deficiency in the Tower of assigning departures the correct frequency.After review of the recordings; Aircraft X checked in with the wrong Departure Controller out of 1;300 feet and was ignored by the controller. The trainee has had multiple issues while training. He has been briefly qualified and then quickly decertified on all sectors and has struggled to maintain separation during his recertification. He in my opinion is a safety risk and has brought Area controllers down with him. My personal opinion is that his training should be stopped; he is a safety risk and management is not listening to the qualified controllers around him that are afraid to work with him. I personally tried to get off the Coordinator position prior to this event knowing that he was getting a skill check from a mediocre qualified supervisor and felt uncomfortable working next to them.The Area Supervisor is barely proficient Departure Control qualified. He appeared uneasy on the sector alone prior to the skill check and was sitting at another scope writing notes during the time of the incident. He has apologized for not hearing Aircraft X check in and not totally paying attention. The supervisors in the TRACON are required to only maintain limited time on 2 positions in the area. This makes them unfamiliar and not proficient in the entire area. This lack of knowledge is a constant issue with supervisor's abilities to correctly monitor and assist operations on a day to day basis. My opinion and recommendation is that the Supervisor's should be qualified and proficient on all positions in the area at which they supervise. Showing a lack of knowledge and situational awareness has led to misjudged actions and distractions in the facility. This is a major safety issue at the TRACON.

NCT Departure Control Coordinator reported a departure contacted the TRACON on the wrong frequency and neither the trainee or the Supervisor observing the trainee noticed the wrong aircraft had called them.

1030005

201207

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ

Autoflight System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 67; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1600

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1030005

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft

We were in level flight at 3;000 MSL when cleared for a visual approach to 17R. When the Captain selected approach/land mode the aircraft started an uncommanded high pitch/high power right turn. The Captain re-selected 3;000 FT; but we continued the high power/high pitch turn. The Captain disconnected the autopilot and started a descent with the autothrottles still commanding high power. The First Officer selected 2;800 FT in control panel multiple times but the autothrottles did not respond. The Captain then disconnected the autothrottles. Landing was uneventful; but the aircraft had climbed to nearly 4;000 FT before we regained control.

An MD-11 flight crew was surprised when the aircraft entered a climbing right turn and the autothrottles advanced commensurately when the approach/land mode autoflight mode was selected. They disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles but gained nearly 1;000 FT before regaining flight path control.

1072140

201303

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

40000.0

VMC

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Pressurization System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

1072140

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

We got a Cabin Altitude EICAS warning message at FL400 and executed an emergency descent to 10;000 FT per QRH; declared emergency and diverted. Upon initial descent we turned off course 30 degrees and informed ATC of the deviation. Once settled and stable at 10;000 FT we completed appropriate checklists and completed the diversion with no further events.

B757 First Officer experiences a Cabin Altitude EICAS warning message at FL400. An emergency is declared; descent initiated; and a diversion to a suitable airport is planned.

1208053

201409

1201-1800

EISN.ARTCC

FO

41000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center EISN

Corporate

Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Oceanic

Class A EISN

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 5900; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1208053

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

While in oceanic cruise flight; we received instruction via CPDLC to contact Shannon Control at a specified time. VHF radio contact was made at the appropriate time and a normal 'radar identified' message was received with ensuing instructions to proceed after point DOGMA; direct to point NUMPO. After zooming in my map display; I discovered that we had a two mile right of track offset for SLOP and that we had not removed the offset prior to our Oceanic exit point. The track message clearly states that SLOP will be removed prior to the Oceanic exit point. No mention of our not being at the Oceanic exit point was made by the controller and the rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully. The primary cause of this incident was that only part of the crew was aware of the offset as it was made while the third pilot was off the flight deck in crew rest; and that pilot neither asked for or received a briefing as to the particulars of the current phase of flight. Better CRM would have prevented this situation; as well as the pilots on the flight deck maintaining a continuing awareness of the fact that a SLOP had been inserted into the flight plan and the need for its removal prior to Oceanic exit. More thorough inter crew; transfer of flying pilot briefs will be conducted; as well as a review of general basics of Oceanic flying procedures.

Gulfstream Captain discovers after exiting oceanic airspace that the 2 NM SLOP has not been removed as directed by the track message.

1781094

202012

1201-1800

OKC.Airport

OK

3000.0

Small Transport

Class C OKC

UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Class C OKC

Multi-Rotor

Aircraft / UAS; Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Other / Unknown

1781094

Conflict NMAC

Person Observer

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

On left downwind for Runway 35L OKC at 3;000 feet; co-pilot reported seeing a quad-copter drone approximately 15 feet from the left wing tip.

Reporter on a small transport aircraft stated they had a drone sighting during approach to OKC airport.

1140505

201401

1801-2400

FAY.Airport

NC

1800.0

VMC

3200

Tower FAY

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 91

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Final Approach

Class C FAY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Fatigue

1140505

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1140507.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Human Factors

We had an early afternoon report and had endured mechanical and weather delays for approximately 8 hours prior to leaving; which included boarding the passengers twice prior to cancelling the flight all together. Conditions in FAY indicated that the ceilings were going to be 3;200 FT or higher and generally VFR. Ramp conditions made taxiing to the runway very arduous. Once airborne our flight was routine. During the descent we found that the conditions on the ATIS were indicating VFR with BKN 3;200 and we could see the ground at our location approximately 30 NM from the airport. ATIS further indicated LOC BC 22. We briefed the First Officer's approach plate; due to the fact that I had replaced the LOC BC 22 11-2 with the 11-1 for FAY and did not have the plate on board. We set everything up and the First Officer held the plate in his chart holder. During my brief I explained the plate for a VFR approach due to the current conditions should allow a visual landing after we go through the BKN layer. After intercepting the final approach course we descended to 2;100 FT. At ALTSCAP; the 'ALTSCAP' call was made and First Officer dialed in 1;800 FT. I descended to 1;800 FT. At ALTSCAP; the 'ALTSCAP' call was made and First Officer put in 600 FT. I then made the mistake of not looking to make sure we were past MORGY (the descent point to go from 1;800 to 600). I dial a 1;000 FT per minute descent and around 1;000 FT the ATC Controller explained he was getting a low altitude alert. We realized that we were to low and began the climb back to 1;800 FT; reaching 1;800 FT at MORGY. Being stabilized we began the descent down to our MDA of 600 FT. Once there we did not see any of the runway environment so we executed a missed approach. While receiving vectors for the ILS 04 we were told that a new ATIS was just released; Visibility - 7; ceiling - 300 FT. We executed the ILS 04 with no issue and had eyes on the runway at 200 FT AGL. The stress and issues occurring earlier in the day were a contributing factor of becoming complacent on arrival into FAY. It had been a long day and a long 2 days prior to that due to weather around the system. Having only 1 approach plate was a huge pilot error on my part. The incorrect ATIS corresponded to the TAF that we had prior to departing; so we didn't question the weather like we should have. It seemed that the weather was beginning to get worse; so if ATC could have said that we might not be able to get in on [Runway] 22 I would have immediately chosen [Runway] 04 with a slight 4-5 knot tailwind that would get me down to a lower minimum. Rest and more attention to detail could have prevented these issues.

We were assigned the LOC BC 22 approach in to FAY. We were vectored into the approach at 2;100 FT and once established; descended to 1;800 FT enroute to MORGY (FAF). After Captain made the callout of 'ALTSCAP'; I entered the MDA of 600 FT into the altitude selector. On the FMS map; there was a crossing restriction of 900 FT at JONSI which Captain asked me about. I checked the approach plate and told him there was not a restriction on the plate and JONSI was only identified as the MAP on the approach plate. While I was further reviewing the plate to make sure I had given him completely accurate information; he began to descend. After I confirmed that I had given him accurate information; I began to scan outside for the airport after sensing the descent to minimums. At approximately 1;000 FT; Fayetteville Tower queried us; asking us to confirm that we were descending via the LOC BC 22 approach. It was at this point; we became aware that our descent to minimums had begun too early. We immediately returned to 1;800 FT; the published altitude prior to MORGY. Upon reaching MORGY we resumed the approach normally and executed a missed approach at the MAP (JONSI) due to not being able to see the runway. After the missed approach; the Departure/Approach Controller informed us that Tower had just updated the weather to show the ceiling at 300 AGL and lowering; I do not remember the updated visibility that was given to us. The ceiling was originally reported at 2;300 AGL and 8 SM visibility; when we had began the LOC BC 22 approach. We requested ILS 4 based on the new information; flew the approach; and landed.The early descent error could have been avoided by a final cross check of all position/navigational information before I started scanning outside for the runway rather than assuming the descent was occurring at the correct phase of the approach. My heads down time looking at the plate to make sure I had not missed any notes on the approach plate and attempting to figure out why the FMS was showing a crossing restriction at JONSI of 900 FT distracted me from doing such. The missed approach was impossible to avoid. The Tower did not update the weather report to reflect the current conditions until after we executed the missed approach; given the weather information we had; the LOC BC 22 was a valid approach assignment.

CRJ-200 flight crew reports descending toward minimums prior to MORGY on the LOC BC to Runway 22 at FAY and ATCT issues a low altitude alert. The aircraft is climbed back to 1;800 FT then down to 600 FT passing MORGY; but a missed approach ensues due to the runway not being sighted. The ensuing ILS to Runway 4 is successful.

1627108

201903

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Parked

Class B ZZZ

Pax Seat

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 25000

Situational Awareness

1627108

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

During preflight on Flight XXXX I was notified by the flight attendants that I needed to talk to the maintenance guy on board about a problem with the overwing emergency exit row seats. The maintenance guy showed me that all of the emergency exit row seats tray tables folded down and blocked the exit rows on this [new] interior. This is in direct violation of FAA directives of nothing blocking the emergency exits. I entered it into the maintenance log and was assigned another aircraft after a long debate with the flight office.Outsourced Maintenance installed the wrong seats at the overwing emergency exit rows.Replace seats at emergency exit rows with proper seats on all [new] interiors. Until then aircraft should be removed from service.

B737 Captain reported that incorrect seat type with fold down tray tables were installed at overwing exit row in violation of FAR.

1149569

201402

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

30000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Landing Gear Indicating System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1149569

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1149261.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

[We were] operating at night VMC cruise flight at FL300. We noticed that the nose wheel landing gear down indication was illuminated while using the Number 2 landing gear indication system. There was a previous write up in the 5- day maintenance log for this occurring recently while using the Number 1 landing gear indication system. There was no gear door light; vibration; noise; increased fuel flow (higher thrust needed for increased drag) or other secondary indication that the nose gear was in the locked down position. There was also no ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring System) warning and the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) did not provide additional guidance. So we decided that it was just an errant signal maybe caused by the deicing fluid. Several minutes later we had a level 2 (Amber) ECAM for the First Officer's TAT (Total Air Temperature) probe failure and the ECAM directed us to monitor the Number 2 ADC (Air Data Computer). There was no additional indication that the Number 2 ADC failed and all the First Officer's flight displays were nominal. As the Captain was referencing the QRH we both acknowledged an acrid; electrical-burning smell in the cockpit. So at this point we had two off nominal electrical indications followed by an acrid odor in the cockpit. It was not clear to us at the time how these two electrical indications could be related (lack of accurate systems knowledge) and we both agreed that it would be prudent to land at a nearby airport where our Maintenance personnel could work on the jet. At this point the Captain took the airplane and became the pilot flying and I performed duties as the pilot not flying. We declared an emergency and expedited a descent into an airport. The whole evolution from FL300 to landing was close to 15 minutes. Center; Approach; Tower and Ground personnel were all very helpful. Airport emergency personnel found no indications of a fire and our 3 jumpseaters did not smell or see smoke. At no time did we have a visual indication of smoke in the cockpit and the Avionics Bay Smoke warning never illuminated. I did not use the huffer fan since we had already decided that we confirmed a smoke smell. 1. Safety- Were we safe? Yes. We made the best risk decision possible. 2. Standard- For the most part we were standard. The challenge here was time compression and getting the entire checklist done with the correct priority. I did not accurately ID audibly the ILS frequency. We were VMC and I did load the approach up in the FMS and Captain already had raw data set up. I also did not get landing data but used the FMS hook for a target landing speed since we had a very long runway. The 02 mask really challenged communication. The jumpseaters stated that they had a difficult time understanding me. I had the ATC communications but missed some of the 1;000 FT calls which indicated to me a degradation of my situational awareness (SA). 3. Unanswered Questions- When we landed none of the Maintenance personnel could not smell the acrid odor. We were dispatched with only the #2 PAC and I wondered if the acrid smell in flight was more pronounced due to less airflow? Suggestions: 4. Opportunities for Improvement? We can land the Airbus after performing Phase 1's; Red ECAMs and ideally the Landing Checklist. When I started to miss the 1;000 FT calls and failed in my pilot not flying duties I should have stopped the checklist and just backed up the Captain. I felt that my SA was caught up well before entering the terminal environment. Timing is an inherent part of SA. The 1;000 FT calls come a lot quicker at high speeds and high descent rates. We at this carrier have done a good job at training for this type of problem and I have reminded myself that you need to 'reset your clock' when working these type of scenarios. The QRH and MEL do not provide Circuit Breaker location for the First Officer's TAT Heat. I should have looked for a popped CB but got too busy with other flight duties. According to Maintenance; the illumination of the down nose gear indication is a no-go item. That information is not clearly provided to crew members.

Maintenance found burnt relay in Avionics Compartment. We revisited nose gear issues the following day. Old plane with several repeat issues.

An Airbus widebody Nose Gear down-lock illuminated at cruise along with the First Officer's Total Air Temperature heater failure. Shortly thereafter an acrid electrical odor was detected; so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and the flight diverted to a nearby airport where Maintenance found burnt Avionics Compartment relays.

1762928

202009

0601-1200

XNA.Airport

AR

2.0

2200.0

Marginal

Rain

Tower XNA

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class C XNA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1762928

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

1762930.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Procedure; Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related

Procedure

We were holding short of RWY 16 at XNA. [An aircraft] had just been cleared for take off on a runway heading. Additionally; there was an aircraft inbound about 7 miles out on the ILS 16. We were then cleared for take off via the Highfill 8 turn heading 180.METAR at the time: XNA 08005KT 4SM -RA BR SCT005 OVC040 17/16 A3017 I was the Non Flying Pilot and during the take roll; I noticed radar showed moderate rain (yellow) at the 180 heading. Once airborne and before the 400 feet heading call; I asked the tower for runway heading to avoid the weather. Tower approved the runway heading and at approximately 2;500 feet to 3;000 feet we received a Terrain Terrain alert. I looked first at my Radar Altimeter which was reading and flickering between 0 and - 5; our altitude was now over 3;000 feet; and we were climbing over 1500 FPM. I stated I thought it was a spurious error; but due to the marginal weather conditions the First Officerfollowed his instincts and went to Max Thrust. At about 4;000 feet I pulled up the ILS 34 Jepp chart and noted a Tower 1;855 feet SE of the Localizer and about 8 km SE of the airport. I also noted that our GPS position was showing on this chart and we were on the outbound LOC course. Additionally; there is no Obstacle DP for RWY 16 on the 20-9 page. I still believe this was a spurious Radar Atl error but while troubleshooting I may have distracted the First Officerfrom making the Terrain Max Thrust call. Considering the marginal visual conditions I should have stated Terrain instead of Troubleshooting.

We tookoff at XNA on Runway 16. Just after takeoff; as per the departure procedure we were supposed to turn right to 180 heading. Right at about 400 feet; when I'm supposed to call heading; the Captain asked ATC for runway heading to avoid some bad weather. ATC gave us runway heading and the Captain turned the heading bug to runway heading and selected HDG. At about 1;000 feet; I called Vnav. Then at about 3;000 feet; we had a terrain alert; 'Too low terrain.' I was a little startled by the alert; and thought it must have been an erroneous alert and was somewhat confused because of it. I did pitch up a little more due to the alert; but I did not go max thrust and do a proper terrain escape procedure; even though I still should have.After pitching up a little more for a few seconds I noticed the speed start to drop which I stated to the Captain; and thinking that I should have just done the proper procedure; I then went to max thrust. He stated to just lower the nose a little bit; at which point I did; and then pulled the thrust levers back out of max thrust and started to go into the recovery. The speed started to come back up; and then I called for flaps 1; and flaps up. We switched over to the departure frequency; and then I asked him for the auto throttle back on; and the autopilot on. The flight continued normally without any further incidents. Once we were all cleaned up and climbing properly; we looked over the charts; to see what could have caused the terrain alert. It is not a mountainous terrain airport and the elevation all looks constant. There looks to be one obstacle that may have caused it that goes up to 1;855 feet about 8 miles SE of the field. Both the Captain and I seemed to believe that it was a false indication for the alert; because an [aircraft] took off a few minutes before we did; and the tower told them to fly runway heading right after they were airborne; which I doubt tower would have given them if there were obstacles or terrain in the way. Because we thought it was a false indication was why we did not do a proper escape and recovery; which is not a good excuse. Next time I will be sure to do a proper procedure; no matter what I may think or feel.

E175 flight crew reported ATC approved weather avoidance clearance where crew received a terrain alert that the Captain doubted resulted in failure to call and allow First Officer proper escape and recover maneuver.

1614880

201902

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 188; Flight Crew Total 1443; Flight Crew Type 1443

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1614880

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 239; Flight Crew Total 1182; Flight Crew Type 1182

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1614935.0

Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Other pushback

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

During pushback from gate the tug operator stated that we had a problem. He then stated that we were loose. Suspecting that we might have a breakaway I asked him if we had a breakaway. He never responded with the term 'breakaway.' His communication was confusing and non-standard. I noticed that the tug was separating away from the aircraft and then the tug operator appeared to chase the aircraft in an attempt to catch up with it. As the aircraft came to a stop the tug continued to approach the aircraft until contact was made between the tug and the aircraft. Maintenance and operations were notified and a maintenance entry was made.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported they were unsure if their aircraft broke away from the towbar because the tug driver was using nonstandard verbiage.

1104462

201307

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

1000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1104462

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction

1104451.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

My takeoff; reduced thrust power. This is our third flight of the day with this aircraft. After gear up and just prior to 1;000 feet; we get a fire warning on the left engine. The First Officer silences the bell and we note that the engine indications look normal. The First Officer declares an emergency and Tower asks us to switch to Departure Control; which we do. The First Officer then gets out the Engine Fire/Damage/Separation Checklist. After level off; the fire light went out as soon as the throttle was pulled to idle. There were no indications of severe engine damage/separation. In fact; the fire light never came back on and the left engine indications were normal throughout the flight. We make a climb to 3;000 feet and followed ATC headings for a return to land on XXR. On downwind; I gave control of the aircraft to my First Officer so I could brief my flight attendants and make a PA to the passengers. On crosswind with the gear down; I took back control of the aircraft. I kept the left engine running during the flight and flew a visual approach to XXR with an uneventful landing. Approach and landing were made with the left engine at idle. After landing; I stopped straight ahead on the runway and immediately made a PA telling the passengers to remain seated while the First Officer started radio contact with the Fire Chief. The Fire Chief made a complete circular inspection of our aircraft; including a thermal scan of the left engine. He stated that all looked normal and we requested taxi to our gate. We shut down the left engine during taxi to the gate. I would like to add that ATC was very helpful and seemed to anticipate what we wanted/needed.

[This Report contains no additional information.]

A MD-83 Left Engine Fire Warning alerted at 1;000 feet after takeoff but extinguished when thrust was reduced; so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport with engine running where a thermal scan detected no abnormal heat.

1316817

201512

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

6000

CTAF ZZZ

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 380; Flight Crew Total 420; Flight Crew Type 30

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1316817

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

After landing; a wind gust picked up the right wing; the aircraft started to pivot on the left main and we went into the grass next to the taxiway. We struck a taxiway light before exiting the grass. The winds were 230/6 on ATIS during descent.

A C172 instructor pilot reported striking a taxiway light after losing directional control following the landing.

1431112

201703

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Taxi

EC130

Part 135

Parked

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Other / Unknown

1431112

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Weather

Ambiguous

The aircraft was shutdown in accordance with the shutdown procedures check list. After the engine was turned off and the main rotor RPM was at approximately 120; the flight medic opened the right side cabin door and stepped out of the aircraft. The winds at the airport were approximately 260 degrees at 15 knots. The aircraft was parked on a dolly that was oriented approximately 90 degrees to the wind - on a heading of approximately 170 degrees. The winds blew on the cabin door to the point that the air piston that holds the door at about 90 degrees in the normal open position broke loose from the aircraft mounting point and the door opened to a 180 degree position with the top of the door being above the cabin level in this position. During this event; the rotor blades were slowing down - thus drooping to a lower point in the rotation path. The rotors struck the top of the door breaking the door window and damaging the top edge of the door. All the rotor blades were damaged as well due to the door strike. [Suggestion: inspect] cabin door air piston for defects.

EC130 pilot reported damage to the cabin door and rotor blades when the main cabin door was blown past the normal position; allowing the rotors to contact the top of the door.

994693

201202

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

CLR

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Troubleshooting

994693

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 13900; Flight Crew Type 3800

994695.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure

Aircraft

Inbound flight logged 2 items- SYS 1 FAULT DISPLAYED ON UPPER ECAM-BRAKES and AUTOBRAKE FAULT DISPLAYED ON UPPER ECAM SCREEN-BRAKES. Maintenance deferred the first ECAM with MEL 32-42-03 BSCU 1 inoperative. That deferral makes a reference to the autobrake panel mode lights being inoperative and has a note FOR BSCU CHANNEL/SYSTEM 1 INOPERATIVE REFER TO MEL FOR AUTO/BRK PANEL MODE LIGHTS DEFERRAL. Maintenance took that reference and used it to defer the second ECAM listed above (MEL 32-42-04). In my review of the MEL; once on board; I did not question the linking of the second ECAM to the first ECAM MEL; guidance that was made by Maintenance. I ASSUMED that Maintenance had specific guidance that the second ECAM was a result of the loss of BSCU 1 and the autobrake panel lights; nothing more complex that had to be evaluated for compound failures. We complied with all MEL restrictions prior to departure to include verifying that the autobrakes were armed on the wheels SD page. Checking recall prior to departure only brought up the first ECAM. No autobrake ECAM or status messages were present. This furthered my belief that the maintenance issues had been addressed correctly. Taxi; takeoff and initial climb were normal. Nearing FL350 we received the same autobrake fault ECAM received by the first crew. We complied with the Irregular Procedure. We determined that we had lost normal brakes but did have antiskid. Further review of the Flight Manual to include the system resets section made it apparent to me that the autobrakes ECAM; while obviously related to the brake system fault ECAM; was not linked to it as a secondary failure due to the lights failure. We had two separate failures; as did the inbound flight that should have been treated as such. The maintenance dispatch was improper/illegal. Trust but VERIFY everything! Careful verification of maintenance actions could have prevented this.

Illegal dispatch; the aircraft was dispatched with a BSCU channel 1 fault; along with the annunciator lights for the autobrakes inoperative. In fact the autobrakes and the BSCU 1 were written up on the inbound flight and Maintenance interpreted the autobrake fault as just an annunciator light issue. The plane should have been dispatched with an autobrake fault and BSCU channel 1 fault. Enroute we ran the autobrake fault ECAM; contacted Dispatch and Maintenance and continued to destination.

A320 flight crew experiences an autobrake fault in cruise after the fault had been previously written up and diagnosed as an autobrake panel light fault and MELed as such. BSCU 1 was also MELed separately. Flight continues to destination.

1776691

202012

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

160.0

0.5

0.0

VMC

6

Daylight

6500

Corporate

Citation II/SP (C551)

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Antiskid System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 2000

1776691

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

Just to raise awareness of a potential problem with anti-skid systems on Cessna aircraft. Normal approach and landing. Initial braking action good; anti-skid released; then reapplied brakes a couple of times; then released completely; cycled anti-skid switch with no effect; emergency brake had no effect either. Manufacturers emergency/abnormal checklist states'in the event of anti-skid failure; be prepared to use the emergency brake'.

Citation pilot reported failure of the Anti-Skid Braking System on landing rollout.

1008729

201205

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1008729

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Company Policy; Procedure

Procedure

We had a very busy pre-departure time while preparing for our trip to an unfamiliar destination; including multiple calls for catering cleaning; window wash; and FMS programming for a long and unfamiliar route; including verifying the route on the paper charts. The Captain had informed me that we needed to get off the ground in a hurry as per a chief pilot briefing he received the day prior. The flight attendants had informed me that the 700 had been catered with first class meals. A few minutes before departure the Captain and I went to load the ACARS weight and balance information and tried to select the first class meals in the load manifest. This is where things started to happen really fast. The data came back with a note that the catering selection was unsupported by the aircraft type. This was news to me. I have only been on the 700/900 a few months and had never been told that we had first class meals. I made the assumption that it worked like it was supposed to. By this time the Captain had called for push back and started our push. I told him that we had a problem with the numbers. I tried it again and even with the standard catering selection. We had good numbers with the standard catering; but still the first class meals selection was showing an unsupported aircraft type. At this point the Captain had already started an engine. We did the after start check and started our taxi. While taxiing south the Captain was talking to the Dispatcher. He was going to try to run the numbers with the back up method (I'm really not sure what that meant). Now I had to assume the communication with the Dispatcher trying to get the numbers to work because the Captain was taxiing the aircraft. At this point I felt like I was just along for the ride. The Dispatcher was working the problem from his end to no avail. We ended up adding the weight for a jumpseater to account for the weight of the first class meals. I figure ten bags of 10 LBS ice is about 100 LBS and the glass ware couldn't be more than 90 LBS. In hindsight I think we were too mission focused and should have returned to the gate to make better decisions. The biggest threat in this scenario was the Chief Pilot's call to tell the Captain to hurry. I have never flown with this person before; but I do not think this would have happened without the time pressure placed on him by the company. I understand that this is a company and has to make money; but if a particular flight must be operated in a manner that other flights are not operated under then that a check airman or chief pilot must operate flight. The second biggest threat is that this flight was the first to operate to a new city. The third is that there is no very clear information regarding the selection of First Class meals on the 700 and if this should work or not. I'd say the biggest error is not clarifying if the First Class meals should be aboard the 700. If not; we should have returned to the gate to drop that stuff off.I need to be more assertive with some of our more senior Captains. It is hard to balance the necessary speaking up with good CRM. The company needs to make sure that their technology works they way they think it does.

The First Officer aboard a CRJ addressed his concerns about First Class meals being boarded for an inaugural route flight and discovering that the weight and balance program for the aircraft was not programmed to accept the carriage of the heavier meals. The problem was exacerbated by the Captain's recent phone call from a Chief Pilot strongly encouraging 'timely' release and taxi from the gate for takeoff.

1484960

201709

1201-1800

BJC.Airport

CO

7000.0

IMC

Turbulence

Daylight

TRACON D01

Air Taxi

Citation Excel (C560XL)

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 30R

Initial Approach

Class B DEN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1484960

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

This situation occurred While in IMC conditions; and being vectored onto an ILS approach into BJC. We had just checked on with DEN approach and were issued a descent. As I was descending; the PM began turning anti-ice on; and became distracted discussing anti-ice and why they felt it was necessary to have it on at a higher temperature (OAT was 11C and anti-ice was not required). This unnecessary explanation caused the flight crew to miss part of a radio call from ATC. I was able to catch part of our call sign; and the fact that a heading was being assigned; but I didn't catch the actual heading. After getting back the PMs attention to the radio calls; I informed them that the last radio call was for us; and to query the heading assigned. PM replied to ATC with 'please repeat.'ATC did not reply to PM's request; and instead told us we were '5 miles from ALIKE; maintain 7000 until established; cleared for the ILS 30R approach.' Since we did not have a proper heading yet; but were cleared for the approach; I rolled the heading bug to an intercept heading that I thought would capture the localizer and selected APPROACH mode; in an effort to move us into the proper direction. At this time; PM replied to ATC's radio call with; 'Maintain 5000 until established;' and rolled the ASEL to 5000; as we were still descending to 7000. ATC replied; 'negative - maintain 7000' - PM repeated to 'maintain 7000' I then realized the PM was lagging behind the procedure we were flying; so I rolled the ASEL back to 7000 as the PM read back the instructions to maintain 7000. It was at this point I should have disconnected autopilot and hand-flown the ILS approach we were cleared for; and as I heard it; instead of attempting to correct the PM's actions. After the PM finished their radio call; I immediately made the radio call to clarify the heading ATC originally assigned us; as the PM still had not retrieved that information. ATC replied with the heading; and then indicated we had flown through the localizer; so he assigned a new heading; and asked us to slow our airspeed. Shortly after that; ATC canceled the approach clearance; and gave us a left turn to heading 200; and climb & maintain 8000. At this point we were no longer in a position to make a stabilized approach. I disconnected the autopilot and we complied with this new instruction. We were given new vectors back onto the approach and landed safely; with happy passengers who; fortunately; had no idea any of this had occurred. There was a breakdown in communication between flight crew due to an unnecessary discussion about anti-ice usage at a time where a sterile cockpit is required. This breakdown of communication and loss of proper monitoring with ATC caused the need to be re-vectored back to the ILS. The missed vector could have been considered a Pilot Deviation by ATC though nothing was said to us about it. The approach became unstable due to a breakdown in Crew CRM; which led to missed calls and misunderstandings with ATC. I should have become aware that PM was becoming overwhelmed with the approach; and taken over flying the aircraft earlier in the approach; so PM's inputs would not have affected the path of the aircraft. In a post-flight debrief we discussed our communication breakdown & determined a better job could have been done in not discussing issues not immediately pertinent to the phase of flight. This is especially important during the high workload we were experiencing at the time (IMC; vectors to an approach; descending; slowing & configuring). As the PIC I should have been more forceful with ending the anti-ice discussion so the PM could focus on the tasks at hand. I should have more quickly initiated the radio call to ATC to confirm the missed vector and assigned altitude when it was clear the PM was not situationally aware of what needed to be done. I will be sure to take all these lessons learned and apply them to my future flights.

CE560XL Captain reported executing a go-around when the approach became unstabilized following confusion in the cockpit as to the ATC clearance.

1811222

202105

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

302.0

1500.0

VMC

Daylight

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Climb

None

Class E ZZZ

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 74; Flight Crew Total 2773; Flight Crew Type 2664

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1811222

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

On go-around Aircraft X had a gradual loss of power which resulted in having to land in a nearby field. The airplane had been sitting (pickled) for three years a week before but had recently been flown from and to maintenance for the annual inspection (at ZZZ) and back to ZZZ1. The same day the off-field landing occurred; I had performed several landings and had no problems at all with the aircraft until this last takeoff/climbout.The RPM seemed to drop and the aircraft was not producing thrust. The engine has a massive carb heat system. Carb heat was used and possibly left on in the climbout however nobody thinks that carb heat would cause enough power loss to cause a catastrophic thrust - lift scenario in low density altitude flight conditions (sea level 65 degrees).Other issues might have been debris in the recently fueled tank; carburetor float issue and then possibly a prop governor issue. We could not reproduce the problem on the ground. So far; the issue is unknown as to the continual loss of power.In looking back at this event; I think that it would have been prudent to take a newly run aircraft that has been sitting for a while and just out of annual to a large airport where there is more room for errors. Only after several hours or days of 'testing' should you exercise an aircraft to other shorter riskier areas. You just never know what can go wrong. They say hindsight is 20/20 but I will need to take a better look at risk management when it comes to flying an aircraft that has an unfamiliar history or has just come out of hibernation and or annual inspection.

GA pilot reported engine failure while climbing out from a go-around. Reporter successfully landed in a field near the airport.

1741095

202004

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

77.0

12.0

240.0

VMC

Night

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

1.0

Other 107

None

Other SAR

Cruise

None

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Other Ground UAV Pilot

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 275

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1741095

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

The [ ] Police Department requested assistance in locating a missing autistic teenager that had been missing for about three hours. It was reported the missing child with diminished intelligence was barefoot and without a coat. Sources felt the male teenager would likely find a spot and hide. The outside air temperature at the time of the search was about 55 degrees Fahrenheit. The subject was last seen around the neighborhood pool complex; which was located a couple of blocks away from the child's residence. The neighborhood was a tight network of townhomes. I decided the better landing zone (LZ) would be in the pool complex parking lot or on the wider open street next to it. After relocating and establishing the LZ; I readied the aircraft for flight. The top and bottoms strobes were turned on; blades attached; and the aircraft was powered up. There were no error messages except for an SD card error on the visual camera. Since it was night; there was going to be little need for the visual camera. I determined to launch with that error. The thermal camera was set for White Hot ISO with isotherms turned on for people search. The thermal and visual cameras operated normally. I went to approximately 240 feet AGL and made a 360 degree turn with the thermal camera at 0 degrees to see if any obstructions could be identified. None were identified; so I selected that as my search altitude. I began a loose grid search with [ ] looking over my shoulder at the screen to assist in spotting possible targets. The normal targets alerted; including sewer covers; electric transformers; street lights; and many heat pumps located behind homes. [ ] went to examine the back of one row of townhomes that had a different target. He reported back it was more HVAC units generating heat signatures. When the first battery was down to 20% flight time; I began to head back to the LZ to change batteries. [ ] changed the batteries to another fully charged TB55 set. I launched again and went to an altitude of 240 feet AGL and began a grid search across the area. There were times towards the edge of the grid search where I lost sight of the aircraft; but I continued the search because this was a missing disadvantaged child. Since there were no people spotted below; I felt the risk to people on the ground was minimal. I accepted the risk for the flight and continued. Approximately six minutes into the second flight; the aircraft showed about 18 minutes of flight time remaining. I observed I had lost control of the thermal camera gimbal and could not move it from a 55 degree down angle. I was at the furthermost most point on one of the grid arms and hovering over a possible target I was going to have visually examined. I felt that the target may have been a street light with the head of the light under or in the trees but it may have also been a person sitting under a tree. Without warning the aircraft gave me a battery voltage error and a statement it was landing immediately. I was unable to keep the aircraft in the air; and the most I could do was guide the aircraft to a Final Termination Point (FTP) and get the aircraft to the ground without injuring anyone. Without the ability to move the thermal camera; I was left with few options. I could see what might have been an open field in front of me with some trees nearby. There was what appeared to be one of the primary streets into the neighborhood in front of me; but I had no idea of any traffic approaching on that road or trees below me. I turned to the left and spotted one of the townhome parking lots that was a dead end. I attempted to keep the aircraft in the air to look for any other FTPs; but the aircraft continued descending; and I received a message that it only had seconds of flight time remaining. I decided to put the aircraft down in the townhome parking area and began directionally controlling the aircraft during an uncontrolled descent to what I felt was a safe landing area considering I had no camera gimbal control. Police Department officers on the scene said the aircraft passed close over the roof of one row of townhomes and landed in the center of the dead-end street.

DJI Matrice 210 pilot reported landing the UA with only minutes to spare due to a mechanical issue and loss of power.

1751904

202007

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Night

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

N

Scheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Work Cards

Main Gear

X

Improperly Operated

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Inspector; Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1751904

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Manuals; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

Procedure

I was asked to inspect the right MLG (Main Landing Gear) assembly per job card XXX. On page 2 of the job card is a note that the 'Aircraft Must Be On Jacks'. The right MLG was supported by an axle jack and both wheel and brake assemblies were removed. I was to accomplish Step 3: DETAILED INSPECTION OF MLG; SLIDING TUBE; BRAKE ATTACHMENT FLANGE; UPPER AND LOWER TORQUE LINKS; UPPER AND LOWER TORQUE LINK PINS AND APEX PIN & NUT - EXTERNAL SURFACES; EXCEPT WHERE COVERED BY DRESSINGS AND BUSH FLANGES; and Step 4: DETAILED INSPECTION OF MLG; MAIN FITTING; FWD PINTLE PIN; FWD PINTLE PIN LOCK/ STUB BOLTS; REAR PINTLE PIN & NUT; RETRACTION ACTUATOR ATTACHMENT PINS & UPPER DIAPHRAGM CROSS PIN - EXTERNAL SURFACES; EXCEPT WHERE COVERED BY DRESSINGS & BUSH FLANGES.I read the note on page 2 of the job card; which stated the Aircraft Must Be On Jacks. I began inspecting the MLG but could not access all the points described because the axle jack interfered. I stated in a Work In Progress entry in [software] what items I inspected as well as a Work In Progress that the Aircraft needed to be jacked to complete the job card. The job card was completed without the aircraft being placed on jacks. Steps 5 & 6 of the job card are mechanic steps; however they require measurements to be taken with the weight off the gear. By using an axle jack to support the gear; inaccurate measurements may be obtained; and excessive wear fails to be identified. This job card is normally sequenced in the check to be accomplished after the aircraft is jacked; I noted that it is scheduled on day XX.I would suggest having this job card worked after the aircraft is jacked as the normal workflow shows.

Maintenance Inspector reported an inability to complete a task card because of procedural issues concerning correct jacking of aircraft.

1601020

201812

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Type 3137

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1601020

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Uneventful preflight; checklists; pushback; taxi and takeoff on first leg of four total on the last day of a three-day trip until receiving an ACARS message from Dispatch at (time) that read 'your Ops agent from ZZZ just called to say they neglected to give you hazmat paperwork to sign. You have oxygen cylinders onboard. 5 pieces totaling 280 lb.' On arrival at the gate in ZZZ1; the faxed hazmat paperwork was signed by the Captain. Out time: XX18Z. Takeoff Time: XX24Z. Notification: XX36Z. The crew were completely unaware of the hazmat onboard until notified by Dispatch. Once the discrepancy was discovered the Ops Agent made a timely call to Dispatch who contacted the Chief Pilot on call and the [Company Communications System]. Attention to detail from the Ops Agent or the agents responsible for supplying the paperwork to the Ops Agent would have mitigated this discrepancy.

B737-700 First Officer reported no pre-departure notification or documents of onboard hazmat shipment provided to the flight crew.

1279890

201507

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

CAVOK

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1279890

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1279896.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

While at cruise altitude; cockpit began filling with smoke. Smoke appeared to come from the ventilation system. Smoke density increased to a point where cockpit visibility was difficult. Both crewmembers immediately donned oxygen masks. Center was contacted and a divert was initiated. Prior to the event; the cockpit temp had been recently adjusted to a warmer setting. When the smoke was noticed; the rheostats were returned to the full cold setting the smoke stopped after 3-5 minutes.The divert; approach; and landing were uneventful. ARFF met the aircraft upon landing. ARFF escorted both flight crew members to the hospital for evaluation. Both crew members were released with no injuries and no signs of smoke inhalation.

During enroute cruise the cockpit filled with smoke from the ventilation duct inside the cockpit. The cockpit filled with smoke requiring the crew to execute the Phase I Oxygen Mask On. Smoke was billowing so much so that it became difficult to see the flight instruments. A temperature adjustment was made prior to the first sign of smoke. The pilot monitoring adjusted the rheostats back to full cold. After approximately 3-5 minutes the smoke dissipated and the visibility increased enough to see the instruments. The landing was uneventful. [Fire rescue] shuttled the crew to a local hospital for observation for potential carbon monoxide poisoning. The crew was released several hours later after tests came back negative.

Flight crew experiences a cockpit full of smoke shortly after the temperature controls have been adjusted to a warmer temperature. Oxygen masks are donned and temperature selected to full cold. As a descent is initiated the smoke begins to dissipate and the crew continues the descent and diverts to a suitable airport.

1346058

201604

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

Spoiler System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1346058

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1347025.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

Captain flying. After an extended taxi; with a pass through the deicing pad; no ice detected; continued towards runway. Approximately 10 minutes before TO started engine 2. After engine 2 start and at power change over received a FLCT SPLR FAULT. Following non normal methodology decided to contact dispatched and advised. Connected with maintenance and a reset of SEC 3 was suggested and instructed by maintenance. This cleared the fault and all flight controls and spoiler movement was checked. After takeoff; FLCT SPLR FAULT returned. No high roll rate experienced or autopilot disconnect with fault. Through 10;000 ft followed non normal methodology; and ECAM exception procedures. First officer is now flying pilot. After discussion with dispatch; selected a diversion airport. Enroute [we advised ATC] and managed fuel to an acceptable landing weight. Uneventful landing and taxied to gate.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A320 flight crew reported a FLCT SPLR FAULT after takeoff. Crew followed recommended procedures. After discussion with Dispatch; the crew diverted for an uneventful landing.

1345867

201603

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Situational Awareness

1345867

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

We landed; the seatbelt sign was [turned off]; and the Inflight Service Manager (ISM) made the announcement; 'Flight attendants; please prepare your doors for arrival; crosscheck; standby for all call'. The three of us at door two (2) released our seatbelts and got up. I then proceeded to stop; drop; review; I proceeded to touch the disarming lever; but instead accidentally hardly lifted the door handle; causing the pneumatic assist to kick in; therefore fully opening the 2R door and causing the slide to fully deploy. As soon as the pneumatic assist took over I took a step back. Once the slide was fully deployed; [another] flight attendant placed the barrier strap across the door; while I blocked passengers away from the door. During the all-call; the ISM [was] informed of the mishap.

B767-300 Flight Attendant reported accidentally deploying a slide at destination gate following an international flight.

1727619

202002

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Poor Lighting

Night

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Testing

Fan Reverser

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Other Exterior

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1727619

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

During maintenance operation on the aircraft; my co-worker and I damaged the thrust reverser. We were scheduled to do overnight maintenance that included RTWO DAY/ QRH INSTALL/ ACMF;FHDB;DVDR;QAR downloads; and lastly a Engine 1 thrust reverser fault. Before plane arrival I did some research as to what needed to be done on the E1 thrust reverser. It was noted that it simply needed an operational test due to previous maintenance. Once the plane arrived me and my co-worker planned we would start with the simple tasks as the RTWO DAY; and begin to start our downloads. Once accomplishing the ACMF/FHDB download. I went back to the shop with a QAR download due to lack of internet;before I stepped away from the plane I had the computer attached to the front of the aircraft where the DVDR download was taking place. This is when I instructed my co-worker to only remove and open the fan cowl for engine 1; since I was focused on the downloads. He mentioned to me he did not have full awareness of the thrust reverser system; which is why I only instructed him to open and release the fan cowling. Once at the shop and completing the QAR download/upload; my lead wanted to tag along since he assigned himself to an airplane that would be arriving near our gate. Upon approach to the plane I noticed that my co worker was unlatching the thrust reverser cowling latches. I mentioned this to my lead since he was in the same vehicle with me and he stepped out to speak with him to notify him. I was not aware of what was spoken between them; because I walked towards the DVDR download that was being done but had failed. I stayed there and retried my download not paying attention as to if the latches were secured on the thrust reverser. Once my download was complete my lead had left to take care of his plane. At this point me and my co-worker were at the flight deck and we started preparing to test the thrust reverser. According to the deferral; the thrust reverser was deactivated and need to be activated. According to the maintenance manual (AMM 78-XX-XX) for reactivation remove screws; fairing plugs; remove lock plates; inhibition bolts from trans cowl. Then install fairing plugs with screws on the transcowl (torqued to spec) Lastly reactivate the ICU clearing the E1 REV INHIBIT. with all of this being accomplished I powered up the APU together and ran hydraulics. At this point I told my coworker to have the reference opened for the operational test of the thrust reverser; which he did. Being a two man job I was on the ground pushing GMO switch to operate the thrust reverser. Being in sync with him on the phone we began to operate the thrust reverser; for a cycle of 3-4 time approximately. During this cycle I heard a very loud cracking sound that didn't seem normal to me due to past experience. I could not see where this sound was coming from during those cycles since I had to have my hand on the GMO switch while operating. At this point I needed a new set of eyes; so I contacted my supervisor explaining to him what I was hearing and also noted to him I had operated the engine 2 thrust reverser to confirm the odd noise coming from ENG1. Being no sound on E2 it confirmed to me something was off. I rechecked the screws I had tightened earlier to see if I misplaced any of them but noticed they were all good. As my supervisor was coming to assist me it never occurred to me to check the thrust reverser cowl latches; since I was not aware if my co-worker had secured them. I had been to occupied and concerned with the failed DVDR which worked for me the second time. When my supervisor arrived we did the same cycles and he heard the same noise. He inspected it and didn't find much until he bent down and noticed one of the latches was slightly opened. We switched places and he held the GMO switch and I laid underneath the engine to see the forward transcowl latch; latched within itself but not securing the cowl together. Once I latched it to secure it; I noticed that the center IFS latch was completely crushed and bent to bits. I also noticed it had damaged around the latch bolts and cracking some of the frames around it. After this; it was inspected by other Mechanics and found significant damage. It was my negligence to double check the work being performed; it should have been a smarter action on my part to double check the work; it was my lack of awareness.

Technician reported lack of communication during a thrust reverser operational check resulted in damage to the engine thrust reverser.

1006795

201204

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

45000.0

VMC

20

Daylight

180

Center ZZZ

Personal

Global Express (BD700)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Test Flight / Demonstration

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Captain

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Air Traffic Control Non Radar 6; Air Traffic Control Radar 15; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 850

Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1006795

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Horizontal 800; Vertical 3

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Aircraft; Weather

Ambiguous

I would like to elaborate on a loss of separation event that occurred. The events below are to the best of my recollection at this time. I was the Pilot in Command of a Global Express aircraft on an IFR flight plan. In the remarks section of the flight plan was 'training flight; HMU check.' The aircraft had just been returned to service after maintenance and the event occurred off an airway in VMC conditions at FL450. Late morning; the crew was flying at FL430. The crew decided to climb to a higher altitude and referred to approved performance data (FMS and cruise charts.) After establishing that the aircraft performance was within the acceptable range for FL450 we requested a climb. The Controller cleared us to FL450 and we commenced a slow climb. After leveling off; the aircraft would not accelerate to cruise speed. After approximately four minutes our first request to ATC was for a lower altitude. We stated 'We would like a lower altitude if possible.' The Controller said 'We have your request; expect lower in nine minutes' After approximately four minutes our second request was for a lower altitude with a turn if necessary. The Controller responded 'Turn left 15 degrees-lower in three minutes. The crew set maximum continuous thrust to maintain airspeed and altitude; but the aircraft performance continued to degrade. After two minutes the aircraft safety parameters were in jeopardy and the crew took evasive action and informed ATC 'We need an immediate descent!!' ATC cleared us to FL400 with a turn to 180 degrees. We observed an aircraft visually and on our TCAS. After passing FL430 we were re-assigned maintain FL430 if able. We told ATC we were unable and continued to FL400 and received a request to contact ATC Sector Supervisor via telephone upon landing. I believe some contributing factors associated with this occurrence were: The possibility of a temperature inversion or unusual warmer than expected air at FL450. Turbulence associated with the assigned altitude and the lack of phraseology to convey immediacy of situation to ATC. [This was] an aircraft returning to service after a heavy inspection.

A BD-700 climbed to FL450 on a test flight but aircraft performance deteriorated to an unsafe level. After several requests; FL400 was approved but traffic separation was lost.

1446780

201705

1201-1800

MSY.Airport

LA

VMC

Daylight

Tower MSY

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 2

Initial Approach

Class C MSY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1446780

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1447101.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were on a visual approach into New Orleans Rwy 2 backed up by ILS Rwy 2. On downwind; Tower gave a left turn to heading 110 and cleared for visual to follow aircraft on final. The clearance heading was well inside the final approach fix with a 90 degrees intercept to final approach. I needed to start the descent down because we were high to begin with. Tower gave low altitude alert and we made the correction with power adjustment. I believe we were at 1;100 FT between FAF POVVI and YERUB. I made correction and we were below GS while correcting and at one point with one white and three red on the PAPI. On short final 3/4 mile we were back on GS.Next time advise ATC for vectors outside FAF and do not accept 90 intercept and try to get a vector to FAF with 30 degrees intercept.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on a visual approach to MSY.

1835176

202108

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

229.0

56.0

500.0

VMC

500

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Air Taxi

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 135

VFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class G ZZZ1

CTAF ZZZ

Helicopter

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Class G ZZZ1

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 16700; Flight Crew Type 16000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1835176

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 100; Vertical 0

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

The Heli Pilot was not talking on the radio; but had it on. I found out later in the day he was unsure where he was. He heard my radio calls but didn't know how to process them. Didn't understand N1ame & Name 2 Beach or where they were. I have T-CAS & ADS-B that are working perfectly; he didn't have transponder turned on & I'm not sure if he had ADS-B. My system would have warned me he was there. I was descending through 500 feet on base-leg 1/2 mile off shore to land on the Name 1 Beach to pick up clients. I checked the 3 planes on the Name 2 beach to my left to make sure they were not departing; then focused on my landing paying close attention to the two Bears sleeping on the beach and folks taking pictures; maneuvering around and beyond them. Then suddenly there was a Heli at my altitude 100 feet off my right wing. At the end of the day I have discussed this with Company that own the Heli & the Pilot. I believe it to be resolved.

Pilot reported a NMAC with a helicopter.

1787076

202102

1201-1800

HNL.Airport

HI

VMC

B777-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1787076

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight; Routine Inspection

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Software and Automation; Human Factors

Software and Automation

During preflight; the crew noticed the Hazmat paperwork showed 15300 pounds of Lithium in position 15L. This Lithium was in an AAD can. This can only weighted 2800 pounds. As the Captain; I asked for the Dangerous Goods [DG] specialist to explain what we were seeing. I asked the ramp agent what the weight of the can was and that is when I found out it was around 2800 pound. Clearly there was a problem. First problem is that the two systems do not talk and crosscheck the weights. Secondly; the DG system does not know the max weight of a can and therefore can't check to see that the maximum can weight is not violated. Third; did I have a CG issue? Fourth; how does the system generate paperwork that has such gross errors?I believe the cause is the systems for DG and W&B do not talk and the DG system Allows Lithium to be declared way above the maximum AAD can weight. Also; the W&B system does not catch such gross errors.My suggestion is to ensure the DG paperwork system and Weight and Balance system learn how to crosstalk. There should be no way for the system to produce paperwork that has gross errors. The DG paperwork system must know and be able to verify the max can weight is not violated. Further; the actual can weight must be known by the DG paperwork system as another crosscheck. It should never be able to have more Lithium declared in the can than the can weights.

B777-200 Captain reported Hazmat documents contained Hazmat cargo weight errors caused by Weight & Balance software/automation issues.

1679093

201908

1201-1800

CAK.Airport

OH

0.0

Tower CAK

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

Taxi

Tower CAK

Air Carrier

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

None

Facility CAK.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1679093

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Procedure; Human Factors; Airport

Airport

Aircraft X was cleared to land on Runway 23. Aircraft Y was holding short of Runway 23 at Taxiway E; and Aircraft Z was continuing inbound for Runway 23; having been advised that traffic would be holding in position. Once Aircraft X had passed Taxiway E; Aircraft Y was instructed to line up and wait was as issued traffic for Aircraft Z inbound. Aircraft X was rolling out on Runway 23; and as instructed to turn left onto Taxiway K; Cross Runway 19 on K and contact Ground Control. Aircraft X slowed to taxi speed and was informed no delay off the runway; traffic holding in position; which the pilot acknowledged. Once I visually assured that the tail for the Aircraft X was clear of the runway; I issued a takeoff clearance to Aircraft Y; with a wind check and an instruction to turn left to heading 190. I observed Aircraft Y beginning a departure roll; and then issued a landing clearance to Aircraft Z. The Ground Controller/ICT then informed me that Aircraft X had not completed crossing Runway 19. Aircraft X was informed to continue to pull forward as he was still in the runway environment. The pilot of Aircraft X then asked if he was cleared to cross Runway 23. Then; I informed the pilot to cross Runway 19 straight ahead and then contact Ground Control. The Ground Controller then taxied the aircraft to parking. [My recommendations are to] improve the airport markings at the Taxiway K; Runway 23 and Runway 19 intersection to make it more clear to pilots which runway they are currently on; or change Taxiway K to parallel Runway 19 south of Runway 23 to join Taxiway F.

CAK Tower Controller reported a runway incursion of a pilot that hadn't fully cleared the runway.

1170000

201405

1801-2400

MSN.TRACON

WI

6300.0

Night

TRACON MSN

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

IFR

Descent

Class E MSN

TRACON MSN

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

IFR

Cruise

Class E MSN

Facility MSN.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Confusion

1170000

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Human Factors

I was working combined Radar Approach Control from the east side R3 position. Aircraft X was descending west to east on an IFR flight plan to UES. I received Aircraft X from ZAU descending to 110 and continued his decent to 050 to comply with MKE LOA. I received Aircraft Y from MKE Approach Ripon sector north east of UNU airport level at 060 enroute to SUS. Somewhere between UNU and RYV I inadvertently terminated control on Aircraft Y resulting in a dropped data block. The target still showed a splat with altitude. As I was scanning Aircraft X's descent to see if he was going to make his descent per our LOA to 050 before entering MKE airspace. I saw the 060 altitude splat over RYV without a data tag and assumed it was a VFR aircraft. I issued traffic to Aircraft X told him to stop descent. Aircraft X leveled at 063. I then realized that this was not a VFR aircraft but Aircraft Y enroute to SUS. Before I issued traffic to Aircraft Y he reported aircraft in sight as the CA alert chimed. Aircraft Y passed behind Aircraft X at an estimated 2 miles and 300 feet vertical. The event happened due to my inadvertent dropping of the IFR tag enroute to SUS; and failing to realize that the tag was an aircraft I had on frequency and was IFR. My scan missed the dropped data block.To prevent this from happening I need to pay particular attention to tags I drop. I also need to slow my scan to ensure I am aware of all targets on my scope.

MSN Controller drops IFR tag not realizing it and later has conflict with other IFR aircraft causing a loss of separation.

1198502

201408

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Landing

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 47; Flight Crew Total 145; Flight Crew Type 115

Human-Machine Interface

1198502

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Weather; Human Factors; Aircraft

Ambiguous

During a 10 knot direct cross wind landing; immediately after the all three wheels were down; the plane veered sharply to the left. I was unable to correct the left turn with right rudder and right brake and the plane exited the runway onto the grass field between the runway and Juliet Taxiway. The plane crossed the grass and came to a rest adjacent to Juliet with the engine still running and no structural damage. I was able to apply power and get the plane onto the taxiway and taxi back to the East Ramp without assistance.

Upon touchdown in a moderate left crosswind the pilot of a C-172 lost control of the aircraft which exited the runway onto a grassy area and came to a stop close to a crossing taxiway. No damage or injuries were reported and the undamaged aircraft was taxied back onto the hard surface and to parking.

1313927

201511

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Flight Dynamics Navigation and Safety

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1313927

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

I was on the PF on the flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. While in cruise flight at FL320 approximately in VMC and 50 miles east of the ZZZ VOR; the FMA displayed an amber 'HORIZON' light and a 'NO AUTOLAND' light. The autopilot remained engaged and initially we did not notice any other abnormal indications. The Captain and I discussed the situation and we began researching the problem in the QRH. As we researched the problem in the QRH and discussed the situation the amber 'HEADING' light illuminated on the FMA. The pitch indication on the First Officer (FO) Primary Flight Display (PFD) now indicated a 10 degree nose down pitch indication (actual flight was straight and level). We referred to the standby compass and determined the FO ND compass the Captain (CA) RMI headings also were incorrect by about 20 degrees.The autopilot remained engaged and appeared to be properly tracking to ZZZ. As we continued the ground speed on the FP PFD began increasing rapidly to 800+ knots and the GS on the ND indicated 275 knots on the tail. About 15 NM prior to the ZZZ VOR the airplane began a smart turn on the route in the FMS and we immediately selected heading and continued to assess the situation while attempting to track to ZZZ manually via the VOR on the RMI. ATC asked us our heading at the very time we were discussing our plan to communicate our malfunction with ATC.ATC gave us a heading to fly and shortly thereafter the autopilot; auto throttles disconnected and the FD disappeared. The FMAs went blank. We informed ATC of our capability losses and received guidance to descend from FL320 to FL280 where we remained until descending into ZZZ1. As we continued the MAP function on the FO ND failed and we received an MCDU message IRS Platform (2) Fail.A couple of times during the process of assessing the malfunction; reviewing the QRH and data; and communication process we transferred control back and forth. The CA PFD and ND appeared mostly normal so we selected EFIS display BOTH ON 1 and I continued to act as PF for the remainder of the flight. At some point the FD came back into view but the FD guidance appeared erroneous so we turned off the #1 PFD. At some point in the process we selected the DFGC #1 but that did not seem to change anything and the FD did not come into view. The CA ND/MAP appeared mostly normal for about 5 minutes after the FO ND became unreliable and it subsequently failed and we received a MCDU message IRS Platform (1) Fail.We continued to compare headings against the standby compass and flew via vectors towards ZZZ1. We determined out position using the VOR and compared that with the ATC known position. The FMS position was approximately 500 NM from our actual position (it was normal and the route positions and lengths all checked prior to Takeoff).We [advised ATC] in the process and the CA informed the company via flight phone of our situation and intentions. We elected to continue to ZZZ1 as we deemed the weather capable for a visual approach once we got below the weather on final.Descent into ZZZ1 was relatively uneventful and ATC set us up for a 10 mile final at 2100 feet. We were able to track inbound on the localizer manually (no FD) and monitor the glide slope manually (no FD). We broke out at 2300 feet and acquired the runway and flew a visual approach using the PAPI and ILS Manual GS information to a landing.

While in cruise the FMA displayed an amber 'HORIZON' light and a 'NO AUTOLAND' light. The 'HEADING' light illuminated on the FMA. While in level flight; the pitch indication on the FO Primary Flight Director indicated a 10 degree nose down pitch. The FO Navigation Display compass and the Captains RMI headings also were incorrect by about 20 degrees. The ground speed on the FO PFD began increasing rapidly to 800+ knots and the Ground Speed on the ND indicated 275 knots. FO ND became unreliable and it subsequently failed then received a MCDU message IRS Platform (1) Fail.

1598532

201811

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

28000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1598532

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Taxiing to runway was uneventful as was the takeoff.As we were climbing through about 28;000 feet approximately 20 minutes into the flight; I noticed on the EICAS display that the Engine 2 Oil Pressure PSI indication was amber and dropping. I had my FO (First Officer) bring up the Status page on his MFD at which time we noticed the oil quantity was dropping at a constant rate. We briefly discussed this situation and determined that at any moment we were going to get a low oil pressure message. We determined [departure airport] would be the better option for the safety of the flight.I instructed my FO to tell ATC we needed to return. I also had him look up engine 2 low oil pressure in the QRH as we anticipated this indication. Within a minute after telling ATC we needed to return; we did get the Engine 2 low oil pressure indication. I was flying the airplane and I had my FO run the QRH which required the engine to be shut down. The engine was shut down approximately within 5 minutes after we noticed the low pressure indication on the EICAS at an altitude of approximately FL300.We verified that Dispatch had been notified [and] we informed the flight attendants of the situation. They were told we were returning to [departure airport]. We also informed the passengers that we were returning for precautionary reasons as a result of abnormal engine indications and at no time were the passengers informed that the number 2 engine had been shut down. We continued to make sure that all QRH procedure had been completed and that all checklists were done as we were descending. I had my FO ask for straight out missed approach if we needed to go around. ATC provided a discrete frequency; I had my FO advise we would be stopping on the runway to have the emergency vehicles inspect the number 2 engine before we proceed to the gate. We did not send for number via ACARS; instead we used the check list numbers together with QRH procedures and inputted them manually. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful. The FO did an outstanding job with the QRH and ATC communications.When the aircraft came to a complete stop; vehicles inspected the number 2 engine and did not notice any abnormalities and indicated it would be OK to taxi to the gate however they would follow us to the gate as a precaution. When we arrived at the gate we proceeded to shut down the aircraft at which time the passengers deplaned.

EMB-175 Captain reported returning to departure airport after shutting down Number 2 engine because of low oil quantity and pressure.

1494373

201710

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

43000.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

Center ZZZ

Fractional

Challenger 350

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Oil Pressure Indication

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1494373

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

Enroute with 3 Passengers and a dog operating under FAR part 91K. Both Pilots were seated in their respective seats cruising at FL430 in smooth; clear air with unrestricted visibility. The master warning chimed and began flashing red with a red CAS message 'R OIL Pressure Low' displayed on the EICAS. The oil pressure indication was reading 25 in red and decreasing. I the PIC (Pilot in Command) was the flying Pilot and stated that I have the controls and the radios and directed the SIC (Second in Command) to accomplish the QRH for Low Oil Pressure. I then [advised ATC] and informed him that we had lost an engine and needed a lower altitude. As the SIC performed the required items on the checklist (with confirmation from the PIC on critical items) ATC gave us several choices of diversionary airports. We chose ZZZ because it was off the nose and we knew that they had emergency equipment because they had airline service. In addition; it was about the perfect distance for us to accomplish the required checklists; brief the passengers and descend at a reasonable rate that wouldn't alarm the passengers any further. After the SIC completed the QRH I directed him to go to the QRC for the remaining checklists because I felt that the QRC was written to mirror all of our standard SOPs and that the QRH was very generic. Coming through FL280 we started the APU to reduce the electrical load on the operating generator. After receiving vectors for our descent and lining up on an 18 mile final; approach control informed us that the emergency equipment was still 8 to 10 minutes from the airfield. We elected to continue the visual approach backed up with the RNAV and made a normal landing. Due to taxiway construction we back taxied on the runway and taxied into the FBO ramp where we were met by the emergency equipment. At some point I queried the tower controller about the emergency equipment not being at the airport and he informed me that they are only on station when the airline flights are operating.After shutting down the aircraft we checked on our pax who seemed very calm and not alarmed at all. They made several comments about our calm demeanor and asked several questions before we escorted them into the FBO so that they could call [company customer service]. I began making the required company notifications as I was visually inspecting the aircraft for signs of an oil leak. The oil reservoir indicated that it was full on the fueling panel and the sight gauge on the engine indicated full as well. While I was mostly happy with our performance and of course the outcome; I identified a couple things that could have gone more smoothly. I didn't brief the SIC on my opinion of the QRC being better than the QRH for completing the engine inop approach and landing checklists. In addition; I inadvertently called the secondary phone number to report an aircraft emergency to [operations control] and it rang 11 or 12 times before a maintenance tech answered the phone. I'm sure that there were other issues or omissions that I'm unaware of because of the stress of the situation.

Challenger 350 Captain reported an in-flight Oil Pressure Low warning; the crew elected to divert.

1009557

201205

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-100

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Elevator ControlSystem

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1009557

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 13600

1012374.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

First Officer was the flying pilot. After rotation First Officer felt the elevator was heavy and oversensitive. After we cleaned up the aircraft and ran the checklist I confirmed that there was a 5 second delay between elevator command and elevator reaction. [I was] asked to return to the airport and notified flight attendant; Operations; and passengers that we were returning to land. I did not declare an emergency; approach was normal until flare; then the pitch became over sensitive; notified Dispatch and Maintenance.

During before takeoff controls check the elevator felt heavy; but with a tail wind on the parallel taxiway; this was normal. The take-off run was normal until Vr; the elevator was slow to respond and over sensitive. The aircraft over pitched to 12-15 degrees and I relaxed the back pressure to 8 degrees and the aircraft nose lowered to about 4 degrees. The aircraft oscillated a few more times until it stabilized into a normal climb attitude. After aircraft clean up and running appropriate checklists; the Captain confirmed that the controls were slow to react; 3-5 seconds between input command and elevator reaction. We discussed if we should continue or not. The Captain and I agreed to return to the field. I flew a wide downwind leg to give the Captain time to call the Flight Attendant; Operations and make a PA to the passengers that we were returning. The Captain did not declare an Emergency because we had control of the aircraft. We configured the aircraft early with gear down; flaps 15 degrees and 1200 RPM. The approach was normal until the flare; and then the elevator was overly pitch sensitive again and oscillated between too high and low for normal landing attitude. The aircraft bounced once and landed firm. We cleared the runway and taxied to the gate. The Captain called Dispatch and talked to Maintenance. The aircraft was taken to the Hangar and the flight was canceled. We found out later; that the elevator servo for the auto-pilot was partially jammed. The servo was removed and replaced.

DHC100 flight crew detects strange elevator response during takeoff and initial climb. The crew elects to return to the departure airport where maintenance discovers the autopilot elevator servo is partially jammed. Tail winds during the elevator check prior to takeoff apparently masked the condition.

1054392

201212

0601-1200

RHV.Airport

CA

1000.0

VMC

Night

Tower RHV

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Class D RHV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 4000

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1054392

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Airport

Two developments have happened recently in the vicinity of RHV that have dramatically decreased safety at night.The first is that the street east of the runways (Capitol Expressway) has had new street lights installed. From the air these street lights look EXTREMELY similar to runway lights. The street lights exist only in the vicinity of and approximately parallel to the runways.The second of the two events is that the actual runway lighting has been converted to Pilot Controlled Lighting (PCL). However since the conversion was done many pilots have complained that the PCL control circuitry does not recognize their inputs to the system and that they have been unable to turn on the runway lights.Now that the street lights are on permanently and the runway lights are difficult to turn on the opportunity exists for pilots at night to think that they have turned on the runway lights (when in fact the runway lights have not turned on) and mistake the street lights on Capitol Expressway for the runway.I have already heard reports of pilots mistaking the street lights for runway lights even when the runway lights are turned on. If the runway lights are turned off the temptation to assume the street lights are the runway lights will be VERY strong.There needs to be something done to prevent this potential disaster. At a minimum there needs to be an entry in the Airport and Facilities Directory that alerts pilots to the possible error. Fixing the PCL so that it is easier to turn on will also help.

An experienced area Flight Instructor advised that the new street lights installed to the east of and parallel to the runways at RHV are easily mistaken for runway lights. Difficulties associated with activating the newly installed pilot controlled runway lighting exacerbates the likelihood of misidentifying the highway as the runway.

1365558

201606

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

420.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower EWR

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 22L

Final Approach

Class B EWR

Personal

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Other 107

Cruise

Class B EWR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1365558

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 423

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1365881.0

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

While flying the ILS 22L into EWR we heard an aircraft in front of us report that 'They may have just flown past a drone'. The tower then asked us to be sure we heard the report. I was the Pilot monitoring so was looking intently for the drone. At about 420 MSL the drone came into sight above and to the right of our flight path. The FO also had it in sight and no deviations were needed. It all happened very fast and the object was quite a blur. It appeared to be brown or grey in color and the outline of circular rotor blades visible. Size; speed and direction of travel impossible to tell. It appeared stationary from my perspective but may be because of the large speed differential. We landed completely normally other than spotting the drone. We verbally reported to the tower and also were met by police who wanted a description as well.

The aicraft was stable and the drone was not in our immediate Flight Path as it was to the right and above us. The CA filed a report to capture the details for the company.

An air carrier crew was notified by EWR Tower about an earlier UAS sighting. They also detected the UAS at about 420 feet; but the craft's details were difficult to determine.

1029581

201208

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Taxi

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 226

1029581

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

On taxi out; ENG 1 overheat light illuminated. Consulted the QRH (shut off engine and discharged fire bottle) and returned to gate. For safety declared emergency and equipment followed. Cockpit indications [were] all normal except ENG 1 overheat light. Outside reported engine normal as we taxied to gate.

B737-700 Captain reported that engine #1 overheat light illuminated on taxi out. Engine was shut down; fire bottle discharged; and flight returned to gate.

1315334

201512

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

A330

2.0

Part 121

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1315334

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1315345.0

Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Airport

Human Factors

I had taxied the aircraft to a hold short position on Z1 for RWY36L and parked the brakes. While waiting for our clearance from tower to takeoff our aircraft was struck on the right stabilizer and then right wingtip by an A330 that taxied behind us. Our aircraft was not moving as we had the brakes set.We [notified] tower and requested assistance. I made several PA's to the cabin crew and passengers to stay seated and keep calm. Ramp personnel and a fire truck observed the damage and no spillage of fluids. We left the aircraft configured as it was and coordinated a return to a gate. There were no injuries to crew or passengers.After arrival at the gate station personnel rerouted the passengers and crew. I informed dispatch and the Chief pilot on duty; as well as Union representatives. After ensuring the aircraft and passengers were secure I left with the crew to the hotel.

Captain taxied out to Runway 36L on Z1 for takeoff. Holding short with brakes parked. Aircraft was struck from behind on right stab and right wingtip. By an A330. [Notified ATC]. Fire trucks called; escorted back to gate. Aircraft left configured for inspection.

A B777 flight crew reports being struck on the right horizontal stabilizer and the right wingtip by a passing A330; while holding short of the runway for takeoff. The flight returns to the ramp for maintenance.

1074958

201303

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Circuit Breaker / Fuse / Thermocouple

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew

1074958

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

During our enroute climb we received an Avionics Smoke Warning accompanied by the smell of fumes. We declared an emergency and got vectors to return to our departure airport. After landing we stopped on the runway for CFR to inspect for hot spots. When they found none we cleared runway and taxied to ramp parking where CFR inspected inside the aircraft for overheating avionics and/or lithium batteries in a shipping container. Preceding this event we had a deferral of the Field Limit Computer System 2 and the MEL did not direct us to pull the circuit breakers; thus power was applied to [the system which] caused overheating and fumes of the system 2 computer. I recommend that pulling circuit breakers should be written into the MEL.

An A300 flight crew declared an emergency and returned to their departure airport after receipt of an Avionics Smoke warning accompanied by the smell of electrical fumes. A circuit breaker involved with an associated system had not been pulled when deferred prior to departure.

1171298

201405

1801-2400

ZKC.ARTCC

KS

45000.0

Marginal

Turbulence; Thunderstorm

Center ZKC

Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450

2.0

Cruise

Class A ZKC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1171298

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Weather

Enroute to PHL at 45;000 feet we encountered a 5 minute period of heavy moderate turbulence. There was a north south line of thunderstorms stretching 800 miles centered over Nebraska along our route. We transited the area along the same route that ATC had sent all previous airline traffic. Passengers and Flight Attendant were briefed and cabin was secure. We encountered speed variations between .83 and .74 and altitude variations between 44;700 and 45;300 feet. We advised ATC of the turbulence and there was no traffic near our altitude. In retrospect the situation would have been much safer if our situational awareness could have been expanded by looking at the real time weather radar picture available thru using the onboard wireless to access internet live radar shot. Our current company policy forbids the crew members from accessing the WiFi signal during flight. The aircraft radar only gave us a sliver of the big weather picture and it is possible that with more information a smoother route could have been selected.

G IV Captain experiences moderate turbulence at FL450 on a transcontinental flight due to a long line of thunderstorms perpendicular to his route. He believes he may have been able to choose a better route had he been able to view a Nexrad radar image via on board WiFi which is prohibited by his company.

1154608

201403

0001-0600

SNA.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Ground SNA

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Ground SNA

Helicopter

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Total 25000

Other / Unknown

1154608

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Landed at SNA Runway 19R. Exited Taxiway E. Just prior to turning on to Taxiway A noticed helicopter approaching on Taxiway A flying southbound; opposite taxi flow; at a high rate of speed. Locked brakes and stopped short of Taxiway A to avoid a collision. Ground Control was busy with radio communications. The helicopter took no evasive action and passed 30 feet off our nose 10-15 feet above the taxiway. After the helicopter passed us; Ground Control told us to stop short of Taxiway A. Had we not stopped; the helicopter would have collided with our aircraft. After talking to the Tower Supervisor; my understanding is that Ground Control; with Tower concurrence; can clear helicopters to takeoff from Taxiway A opposite the taxi flow of jets exiting Runway 19R. I think this is an extremely dangerous practice and collision potential is high. Runway 19L was available to the helicopter for back taxi and takeoff but was not used.

B737 Captain exiting Runway 19R on Echo reports a near collision with a helicopter air taxiing southbound on Alpha at SNA.

1171713

201405

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Y

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Testing

Data Processing

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

1171713

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

[Flight] crew called me up during their prefight to show me the First Officer had a message flag in his lower right display that said DCU; and [DCU] was in a White box. Neither I nor the crew was aware what it was or meant and I checked the EICAS Maintenance Page and there was no message there or any status message and the First Officer's displays were normal. I called Maintenance Control and discussed it with the Representative (Rep) X and he wasn't real sure what it was either; but we decided that we could get relief using MEL Data Concentrator Units-Flat Panel Display Data Concentrator Unit (DCU) and that since it was on the First Officer's side we would use the [Right] 'R' DCU. As that is the normal (norm) in the layout of the B757. We accomplished the Maintenance portion of [MEL] verifying that the Captain's and First Officer's DCU's could be isolated using the Electronic Flight Instrument (EFI) switch. The Crew; Maintenance Control Rep; and I were in agreement that this was the appropriate course of action and I dispatched the B757 aircraft 19 minutes late. I read the Corrective Action accomplished in ZZZ1 and saw where the Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) there said that the wrong DCU had been MEL'd and that he would 'Close' this out and write-up the correct DCU. He performed the EFIS Adjustment (Adj)/Test and signed it off without writing the correct one up. And I still didn't know which one it should have been until I talked to Maintenance Control Representative Y; who knew much more and was able to explain to me how it all worked. It all goes back to 'that' white outlined box that had DCU in it. The white box is for the Center DCU and saying [indicating] that the DCU was bad; or has had a fault entered; and the amber box would be for the 'Right' DCU or First Officer's side. Apparently there was no real fault as it passed the Adj/Test and I assumed it was the Center DCU that was tested. But the sign-off doesn't say. So now I know and I hope the word gets out about this because I don't recall this being addressed in our two week systems class. This is the first time I've had anything like this since working this aircraft. As I mentioned; this was the first time I've had a write-up like this and it was unfamiliarity with how the system works and what the white and amber colors meant. Also nothing against the Maintenance Control Reps; but the level of knowledge differs depending on who you talk to. Maintenance Controller Y was very helpful in explaining the system to me...unfortunately after the fact. In my case; I know now what the amber and white boxes mean. Maybe training can review these kinds of events and incorporate these lessons learned into their training.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes his efforts to determine the meaning of a message flag with 'DCU' inside a white box on the First Officer's (F/O) lower right Display. The B757-200 aircraft's Center Data Concentrator Unit (DCU) had faulted; but was incorrectly deferred as the 'Right' DCU with the concurrence of the flight crew; Maintenance Controller; and Technician.

1703152

201911

1201-1800

SPG.Airport

FL

1600.0

IMC

Rain; Turbulence

Dusk

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

GPS

Descent

Vectors

Class D SPG

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 280; Flight Crew Type 260

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1703152

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

I was on an IFR flight plan to SPG. During the descent into the airport in the IMC condition; ATC clears me to fly direct to IAF (Initial Approach Fix) JRGAL. I was not sure if the approach that I load in the GPS was correct; so I looked over to verify. When I looked back at the instrument; since it was a descent turn; I got disoriented. It took me two to three seconds to recover; however; I ended up heading 90 degrees to the right of my course and around 300 feet lower. I then informed ATC and continue to destination without other problems.

Pilot reported disorientation on a descending turn in IMC led to deviating from approach course.

1815850

202106

0601-1200

N90.TRACON

NY

6000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR PHLBO 3

Class B EWR

UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Class B EWR

Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Aircraft / UAS

Number of UAS 1

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1815850

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Horizontal 100; Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors

On PHLBO 3 arrival to EWR; approximately 5 to 10 miles south of PHLBO; level at 6;000 feet; 250 KIAS. Saw a bright yellow drone off the left side of the aircraft; maybe 200 feet below our altitude and 100 feet lateral. Reported the drone sighting to ATC; New York Approach Control on 120.15.

Air carrier flight crew was descending into a Class B airport on a STAR. At approximately 6;000 feet they had a near miss with a UAS and advised ATC.

1176108

201405

0001-0600

ZAB.ARTCC

NM

34000.0

Night

Center ZAB

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZAB

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification

1176108

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

We were delayed leaving so we were in the very early morning hours when this happened. As we neared White Sands; NM our Dispatch advised us that the military was conducting GPS jamming exercises; so we were anticipating losing our GPS signals for a short time period. We got a warning on our FMGC that GPS signals were being lost. We were able to see on our FMGC that the signals had degraded. As we neared an intersection the aircraft began to bank the wrong direction in a 30 degree bank. I had to select heading to force the aircraft back on course. ATC then called and said we were 5 degrees off on heading to the next intersection. Once I had the aircraft back on course I found that we had lost both GPS signals completely. Apparently the FMGC weighs the GPS signal very highly and losing it from a very good to lost signal caused the aircraft to shift the perceived location enough to cause a 30 degree bank and ATC to see the error. Eventually we recovered GPS number 2 but GPS number 1 never came back online. After the signal was lost and things 'settled down' it seemed that the system was able to restore an accurate position. We confirmed position with basic VOR tuning and flying over the VOR. Military was conducting GPS jamming in area. Dispatch was aware that this was happening but ATC was not. We had a momentary loss of nav position as the FMGC had to adjust to the loss of its' best and most accurate signal. This adjustment meant we had a slight nav error. Please have ATC advised when GPS jamming will occur in their ATC zones. Please give pilots a method to disable GPS when jamming will occur to avoid the nav errors when the FMGC has to adjust to losing the GPS signal. Please give pilots a method for recovering a GPS signal when the receiver won't recover on its' own. Perhaps pilots will have to be advised to use heading when going into a GPS jamming area. ATC may need to increase separation if GPS jamming will occur as they are used to our aircraft having a very high level of nav accuracy.

A321 Captain describes the effects of military GPS jamming on his aircraft over White Sands late one night.

1603156

201812

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-900

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Other Exterior of A/C

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1603156

Hangar / Base

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1603155.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Maintenance

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

Three mechanics assigned to accomplish an irregular refuel process on Aircraft X. After I reviewed MEL AMM we started the refuel process. One mechanic in the flight deck to monitor the fuel load; and in direct radio contact with a mechanic at the fuel panel. The refuel process started and stopped several times as the fuel load was balanced. There was some miscommunication causing a few gallons of fuel to spill on the ramp. A fuel spill kit was brought in to contain and clean up fuel.

There was no power at the fueling panel. Fueling procedure per MEL [and] AMM were followed. I was in the flight deck to read fuel quantity while fuel was added to aircraft. We were near the total fuel needed but had too much fuel in the right tank. I said to stop fueling on the radio and said I was coming down [to] review the fuel numbers. We were discussing the numbers when we saw fuel coming out of the wing. We immediately contained the fuel spill.

Maintenance personnel reported a communications breakdown during irregular refueling procedure resulting in fuel spill of a B737.

1274081

201506

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

32000.0

IMC

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Pitot/Static Ice System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Troubleshooting

1274081

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

At the start of the event; the first officer was the flying pilot; and autopilot 1 was engaged due to autopilot 2 being MEL'd. Earlier in the day the aircraft had Inertial Reference (IR) # 1 Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) deferred; along with several associated items; and the aircraft was refused by multiple crews ('Flight Crew refused legal aircraft'). However; just prior to our flight the ADIRU was signed off cleared from the MX log.We were level at FL320 and had just received a clearance to climb to FL360 from Center. We were IMC and in light to moderate chop. We went to 'thrust climb open climb' and initiated a climb. As the engines went to climb power we started a slow climb. I noticed the airspeed on my PFD begin to slowly increase. As we climbed; it appeared the aircraft began to accelerate past a normal climb speed of about Mach .78. Over the next several seconds I made a few calls to the First Officer (FO) to 'watch the airspeed' which were acknowledged and corrections made. According to my airspeed tape the aircraft was now nearing MMO and the speed was still slowly accelerating. At about this moment; the FO and I realized there was a discrepancy in our indicated Mach. Due to the fact we were IMC; in turbulence; low vertical speed (we were heavy and engine anti ice was on); and that the trust was at climb power; It took us several seconds to decipher what speed indications were correct and what action we should take. An ECAM Caution 'NAV - IAS Discrepancy' was alerted.A few seconds later; the high speed Continuous Repetitive Chime (CRC) warning sounded; Master Warning flashed; and red ECAM appeared. At this time either the high speed protection logic or the first officer disconnected the autopilot and the first officer began manually flying the airplane. The first officer leveled the airplane and we immediately requested a decent on our Center frequency. We got no reply. The request was repeated and again no reply.The first officer and I agreed to start a very shallow descent as we began to make sense of the situation. Both a lower altitude (because it widens the margin between high-speed and low-speed regimes) and a lower attitude (because it allows you to fly more 'pitch & power') was the best option for us. Several more radio calls were immediately made to Center to advise of our climb clearance deviation and to notify them of our problem - still no reply from ATC.The first officer and I agreed that the Captain's airspeed; the CRC over speed warning; and Master Warning were all related; but inaccurate; indications. We followed the ECAM and switched the Captain's Air Data to #3 on the Switching Panel.Over the next 30 seconds or so; several transmissions on both the Center frequency and 121.5 were made to advise ATC that we had descended back down. We leveled back at FL320 as indications returned to normal and the continuous over-speed chime stopped. After another minute or two; we were finally able to reestablish communication with ATC and explain why we had descended and leveled back at our previously assigned altitude of FL320. Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM) procedure was followed and ADR 1 was turned off. The flight continued to our intended point of landing.In debriefing the situation; I believe the first officer and I did an excellent job assessing the situation. An immediate reaction to a high airspeed indication; Master Warning; and CRC is to reduce thrust to idle and pitch the nose up to bleed excess speed. If the crew would have not recognized other indications by cross checking all flight instruments; it is likely we would have ended up in an Alpha Floor (low speed / stall recovery situation) which would have likely caused larger issues.It is possible that the captain's Pitot Tube had also become blocked; essentially making my airspeed an altimeter where it indicating airspeed increased with a gain in altitude. This is how the flight instruments were acting. This same scenario had a fatal outcome for an A330 over the Atlantic.

A320 Captain reports erroneous airspeed indication during climb from FL320 to FL360 resulting in exceeding Vmo on the Captain's airspeed indicator; while the First Officer's airspeed indicated normal airspeed. The aircraft is returned to FL320 and ATC is advised.

1193739

201407

0601-1200

SAC.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground SAC

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 2554; Flight Crew Type 2103

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

1193739

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

Routine Inspection

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

I exited Runway 20 at Alpha after landing and taxied to apron. Turned right next to grass and taxied parallel to Runway 20 to a marked taxiway leading toward Taxiway Charlie. I have followed this routing many times in the past after progressive taxi instructions were given to me many years ago. While in slow taxi; I heard a bang while following the marked taxiway in the open apron area. I could not see anything that could have been hit so I continued taxi to shutdown. I inspected the propeller and saw a scuff mark on the forward side of one blade's tip. Looked back into the incident area and didn't see any obstructions. Several days later I thought to return and investigate further. Walking the area I found a row of plastic taxi lights across the marked taxiway I followed with markings and evidence one light was glued to the pavement on the taxiway line. At this point; there is a slight dip in the pavement from the direction I approached; apparently obscuring the taxiway lights as I approached. I thought I was following an authorized taxiway because the yellow line was clearly visible.On further investigation; I learned that the area is now marked closed on the airport diagram. The diagram was not consulted before the incident because of familiarity with the airport; clear VMC conditions prevailing in daylight hours; in reliance upon the taxiway markings on paved open apron area; and the absence of clearly painted warnings on the pavement that the area was closed despite the clearly marked taxiway. If the taxi light had been placed a few feet to either side of the marked taxi line; a propeller strike would not have occurred.It would be helpful if the marked taxi lines in this area were moved off the existing taxi lines; the taxi lines obliterated; and painted signage on the pavement be installed stating 'Closed Area' at intervals around the closed part of the apron or the entire area painted green or red to better alert of the area's closure to aircraft operations.

The reporter stated that he had not looked at the airport diagram but had read the NOTAMs. Since he did not see any reference to a closed apron area he assumed no restrictions exited. He felt deceived by Taxiway H centerline markings continuing into the closed area and suggests the line be obliterated. Because of the prop strike an engine tear down was required. He also remembers short duration drop in RPM from around 900 to 500 at the time of the event but did not connect the event with an encounter.

After landing at SAC; a pilot taxied to parking on Taxiway H without referencing an airport diagram and taxied into the closed apron area where his propeller struck a taxi light. The taxiway centerline was clearly visible deceiving the pilot into believing the area was open.

1460750

201706

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Electrical Distribution Busbar

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1460750

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

We experienced a DC EMER BUS caution message. We ran the QRH. The first line in the QRH for this event was 'land at nearest suitable airport.' We (the FO and myself) discussed the situation and made a plan. We [advised ATC] diverted to [a nearby airport]. This gave us enough time to prepare the plane for landing. We asked ATC to roll the fire trucks as we no longer had any system fire protection and lost our DC Emergency Bus (electrical). I [briefed] the flight attendants. I made an announcement to the passengers that we were diverting due to mechanical issues. I ACARS texted Dispatch to let them know our plan. We landed and taxied to the gate without further incident. We deplaned the passengers and shutdown the aircraft. I have a concern in this event. The Tower Controller cleared an aircraft to takeoff in front of me when we were at 500 ft. The aircraft was slow to depart. I queried the Tower Controller again if we had been cleared to land. Had that aircraft had any difficulties on the runway; we would have had to go around. No aircraft in an emergency that needs to 'land at nearest suitable airport' would like to accomplish a go around; for any reason. I understand the ATC description of the 'Safe; efficient flow of traffic.' Unfortunately in this event I believe 'efficient' took precedence over 'safe.' During normal traffic flow it would have been good work; but not during an emergency.

CRJ-900 Captain reported diverting to a nearby alternate after experiencing a DC EMER BUS caution message.

1709867

201912

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

100.0

IMC

2

Tower EWR

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch

Class B N90

Tower EWR

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Initial Climb

Class B N90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

1709867

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1709890.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 1000; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

On takeoff from EWR Runway (RWY) 04L at approximately 100 feet AGL noted traffic executing go-around/missed approach from RWY 04R. Weather at time was OVC 003; 2SM RA. Traffic was at our 2 O'clock position when first noticed and slightly above our altitude. We ultimately were at same altitude and separated by approximately 500-1000 feet laterally before losing sight of traffic as we climbed into clouds at 300 AGL. ATC issued traffic an immediate right turn to HDG 080 and to climb to 3;000 and then issued our aircraft clearance to fly RWY HDG and climb to 2;000.

After takeoff from EWR 4L on the NEWARK FOUR Departure we spotted close proximity traffic to our right as we were climbing through approximately 200 feet. My best guess is the traffic was about 100 feet above our altitude and 1000 feet laterally. I found out later the traffic was on a go-around from 4R. I do not remember hearing any traffic declaring they were going around. Tower immediately instructed us to maintain runway heading and an altitude of 2000 feet and instructed the traffic to turn right to a heading of 080. We did not receive a TCAS TA or RA which are inhibited on takeoff below 600 feet and 1100 feet respectively.

Flight crew reported sighting close proximity traffic immediately after takeoff from runway 4L at Newark.

1587386

201810

ZZZ.TRACON

US

50.0

15.0

9000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

SR22

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Personal

Sail Plane

1.0

Part 91

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 500; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1587386

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While in cruise to ZZZ; ZZZ Approach issues traffic advisory of a glider at 5;000 [feet]; 1 o'clock. Negative contact. 3 minutes later; glider appears on collision course but at around 9;200 [feet]. I query ATC [if] they have that contact and reported evasive action. ATC advises they only had the glider at 5k with transponder not other targets. The near miss glider at 9;200 [feet] did not have a transponder and was not showing up at a primary target.

SR22 pilot reported NMAC with non-transponder equipped glider.

1119842

201310

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Y

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

AC Generator/Alternator

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew

1119842

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure; MEL; Logbook Entry; Human Factors

Human Factors

A CRJ-200 aircraft in ZZZ displayed an 'IDG 2' Caution message as the flight crew advanced power for takeoff. The crew aborted their takeoff at 50-60 KTS; and then returned to the gate. I asked the Captain if the IDG had been disconnected; to which he replied that it 'had not' been disconnected. I contacted Contract Maintenance in ZZZ to comply with the Maintenance Action and defer the Number 2 Generator. The Contract Mechanic complied with the Maintenance Action for the deferral for the Number 2 Generator and it was deferred per MEL 24-11-1b. The aircraft then departed ZZZ enroute to ZZZ1.Some time after the CRJ-200 had departed ZZZ; I was reviewing work that I had performed in the earlier hours of my shift on various aircraft. As I read through the deferral for the IDG on the CRJ-200; I came to the conclusion that the EICAS Caution message 'IDG 2' is caused by a low oil pressure or high oil temperature condition; and should be manually disconnected and deferred per MEL 24-11-1a; regardless of whether or not the IDG had been disconnected by the [flight] crew. After getting a brief description of the discrepancy with the Captain; I asked him if the IDG had been disconnected; to which he replied that it had not been disconnected. I then reviewed the deferrals for the IDG Constant Speed Drive (CSD) (24-11-1a); and for the IDG Generator (24-11-1b). The remarks section of MEL 24-11-1a deferral states that 'the respective IDG is disconnected;' whereas MEL 24-11-1b states that the 'respective Gen 1/2 switch is selected to the 'Off' position' (and is not disconnected). Because the IDG had not been previously disconnected; I decided to use MEL (24-11-1b). I had the Contract Mechanic check oil level in the opposite IDG and APU and comply with the Maintenance Action for that deferral. Upon realizing that the incorrect MEL may have been applied to the aircraft; I contacted ZZZ1 Line Maintenance to have them defer the Number 2 IDG Constant Speed Drive per MEL 24-11-1a and physically disconnect the IDG.This event has been a reminder for me personally to be sure I review the messages displayed on EICAS and verify that the correct MEL is used as a Corrective Action. Perhaps a memo to all maintenance controllers specifically about this deferral would be helpful. High workload. Flight delay. Dayshift.

A Maintenance Controller explains why he revised a previous MEL deferral he had applied to a CRJ-200 aircraft that had aborted takeoff due to an EICAS 'IDG 2' Caution message. After later reviewing probable causes for the EICAS message; he decided MEL 24-11-1A was more appropriate; but required a physical disconnection of the IDG Constant Speed Drive (CSD).

1090696

201305

0001-0600

SBGL.Tower

FO

0.0

VMC

Tower SBGL

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1090696

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

1090709.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were cleared to line up and wait behind landing traffic on Runway 28 for our night time departure. After a normal delay; during which the landing aircraft disappeared from view; we were cleared for takeoff. As we rolled down the runway I became suspicious that the lights we believed were the runway edge lights were in fact the lights of another aircraft. At about 130 knots I was reasonably certain the lights were in fact a second aircraft; parked or taxing slowly; at the end of the runway. The clues to my analysis were a shift in the position of two of the lights relative to the other edge lights; and the fact that I did not see an aircraft on the parallel taxiway. Runway 28 is over 13;000 feet long; we would normally rotate well in advance of Taxiway BB; and be airborne before reaching the 10;000 foot point of the runway. Accordingly; I realized that a high-speed abort within 10 to 15 knots of V1 was not an option; and that we would clear the aircraft by a significant margin; if indeed another aircraft was even at the end of the runway. As my First Officer rotated; and we became airborne; I looked downward and could see an aircraft apparently parked on the end of the runway. After attaining a safe altitude I returned to the Tower frequency; while the First Officer monitored the departure frequency. I first confirmed we had in fact been cleared for takeoff. I next inquired whether there was an aircraft on the end of the runway. The Control Tower clearly did not believe there was another aircraft on the runway; but then queried the aircraft in question. They replied to the Tower to apologize to us. [Two other flights] confirmed the aircraft was in fact on the end of the runway during our takeoff from Runway 28.

We were departing SBGL and I was the pilot flying. We had taxied to the holding point for Runway 28 and had held there for several minutes. Tower gave us the following instruction: 'after preceding aircraft has landed; cleared to line up and wait Runway 28'; which we did. I looked downfield at this time and did not see any moving lights etc. that would indicate an aircraft still on our runway. We were then cleared for takeoff and began the takeoff roll. The initial part of the takeoff was normal; however at some point above 100 knots I heard the Captain remark that he thought there was still an aircraft at the end of our runway. I glanced up but could not distinguish anything out of the ordinary; and continued the takeoff roll and rotation. Nothing about our takeoff roll and rotation was non-normal. Upon rotation; I was able to see farther down the runway; and now could clearly see that there was indeed an aircraft at the end of Runway 28; I couldn't tell if he was parked or moving; as he disappeared from view very quickly. Separation was not an issue for us; but could certainly have been so if we had had to perform an abort. After takeoff; the Captain had me monitor the departure freq and called the Tower back; and both the Tower and another Air Carrier flight confirmed that there was an aircraft that had landed and not vacated the runway prior to our being cleared for takeoff; and that crew apologized to us over the Tower frequency. Three experienced; rested crew members were not able to identify that there was an aircraft at the end of our runway upon receiving a takeoff clearance. We had been cleared for takeoff; and did not see any moving lights etc; that would normally have given us a clue that there was still an aircraft on the runway. The Tower should not have cleared us for takeoff without being unequivocally certain that the preceding aircraft had vacated the runway. I commend the Captain; for his excellent judgment and decision to continue the takeoff rather than abort. This was a dynamic; time-compressed situation; and he reacted; I think; in the best interest of our entire crew and passengers. As it was; we were not close to the offending aircraft; but had we aborted; close to V1; things could have turned out very differently.

Air Carrier flight crew reports being cleared for a night takeoff at SBGL then noticing an aircraft at the far end of the runway just prior to V1. The Captain elects to continue the takeoff and easily clears the other aircraft. The Tower Controller was speaking Portuguese to the local pilots and English to this U.S. crew.

1831150

202108

0601-1200

ZZZ.Tower

US

200.0

IMC

Fog; Haze / Smoke; 6

Daylight

600

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Caravan 208B

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Takeoff / Launch

Class D ZZZ

Autopilot

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload

1831150

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

Aircraft X departed ZZZ with its planned destination of ZZZ1. The aircraft taxied for runway XXR and departed on an IFR clearance. By all indications the takeoff was normal and nothing unusual occurred. At approximately 200 feet the Garmin autopilot Self - Engaged and put the airplane into a steep descent. I immediately pushed the Auto-Pilot (AP) disconnect switch; which (briefly) disconnected the AP before it re-engaged. This occurred two or three times consecutively as I tried to troubleshoot the issue. I then pushed and held the AP disconnect switch for 5-6 seconds with no success. (All the while the airplane continued to make attempts at descents.) Additionally; I tried the CWS (Control Wheel Steering) button to attempt to regain control over the autopilot. The current weather in ZZZ was IMC; with ceilings of 600 feet and 6 miles visibility with mist. I was on an IFR flight plan; and made the decision to request priority handling with ZZZ tower. I remained below the weather to return to the field and land runway XXR. To regain control over the autopilot; I turned off the avionics; and landed without incident. The cause of the event is unknown at this time while maintenance is troubleshooting the issue. At this time it is unknown (from a pilot's perspective) as to what could have prevented the malfunction of the autopilot; and cause it to self-engage.

C208 pilot reported autopilot malfunctions in IMC conditions and elected to perform an air turn back and a precautionary landing.

1340075

201603

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

37000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting

1340075

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1340072.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Weather

Weather

During cruise flight at our planned cruising altitude of FL370; we encountered mountain wave and up/downdrafts. During the hour or so in cruise at FL370 leading up to the event; we were constantly changing the power; attempting to maintain our filed cruise speed of M.77. At one point; the airspeed started to drop towards M.74. I selected the climb detent. Instead of increasing; the airspeed started decreasing. At about M.72 I selected MAX POWER (APR thrust). I told my First Officer (FO) to ask ATC for a lower altitude. ATC said it would be 3 minutes before they could grant a descent clearance. The airspeed continued to decrease; even though we were still set at APR thrust. Once the speed decreased to approximately M.705 and showed a negative trend vector; I started approximately 1;000FPM descent and instructed my FO to inform [Center] that we were in a descent. Within about 600 feet descent; we were able to regain our normal airspeed and returned to a normal flight profile at FL350 with an amended ATC clearance. Flying at a lower altitude than our planned cruising altitude during times of strong jetstream winds and mountain wave would give us a greater margin to recover airspeed lost due to a downdraft.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported descended from assigned altitude of FL370 when they were unable to maintain speed because of downdrafts.

1454905

201706

1201-1800

ZAN.ARTCC

AK

15000.0

Center ZAN

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

GPS

Descent

Vectors

Class E ZAN

Center ZAN

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 91

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Descent

Direct; STAR WITTI2

Class E ZAN

Facility ZAN.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.0

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting

1454905

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Equipment / Tooling

Aircraft X was descending via the RNAV arrival. Aircraft Y was from the south and also descending via the WITTI2 arrival. The aircraft were initially tied. Aircraft Y started down first and slowed anywhere from 10-80 knots slower than Aircraft X. Spacing was building steadily between the two aircraft. When the two aircraft were just about in trail; there was 6.5 miles with Aircraft Y 10-30 knots slower. Less than a minute later there was 6 miles with Aircraft Y and still 10-30 knots slower. Passing it off as a bad hit; I knew the spacing was fine with the speeds shown. I reduced Aircraft Y to 250 Knots to insure the separation remained. Maybe a minute later; around the time to handoff the aircraft to Approach; I saw that space had decreased again to 4.84 miles with Aircraft Y still showing slower! By this time; the aircraft were entering TRACON Airspace. Knowing that they only needed 4 miles between the aircraft; I just shipped them over.I am completely baffled by this scenario. How could I lose separation with 6.5 miles and faster in front? We replayed the data from TRACON's radar feed and it showed an overtake situation. We are waiting to pull the data from our facility to see what ours showed. I do not recall an overtake the entire time I was watching this. Talking to a veteran controller that has been in this facility for over 25 years; he said he has seen this happen too. He said he saw separation decreasing with faster in front as they were approaching the gate at the TRACON boundary. We do have a radar outage at one site but we still have coverage from other radar sires. I don't know that this would affect anything. I don't have any recommendations yet. There shouldn't be a disparity between what the targets are doing and what the speeds say.

The Controller reported the Center data was displaying different ground speeds than the TRACON radar data was processing.

A Center controller reported an aircraft was overtaking a leading aircraft even though the ground speed readouts indicated the trailing aircraft was slower.

1755993

202008

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

37000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1755993

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft

Cabin altitude - red - EICAS at FL370. [We] donned oxygen masks; [requested priority handling]; and performed [an] emergency descent. [The cause was the] pressurization controller. [I suggest that the] cabin rate trend indicator displays directly in front of pilots.

B757-200 First Officer reported a loss of cabin pressure inflight; resulting in an emergency descent.

1016488

201206

1201-1800

CZEG.ARTCC

AB

8000.0

VMC

50

Daylight

20000

Center CZEG

Personal

Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

1016488

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

I used ForeFlight on my iPad to file and brief an IFR flight plan from Great Falls to Springbank airport (west of Calgary). However; when I got in the airplane to program the route into my airplane's GPS I failed to input one waypoint; namely; Cutbank.As I was flying north from Great Falls; my airplane's zoomed-in GPS showed me on the centerline of my route; but my iPad showed me getting more and more to the right of course. The controller queried me as to whether I was heading straight to Lethbridge instead of to Cutbank; and that was when I realized my mistake. I was heading to Lethbridge; because I had omitted inputting the Cutbank waypoint. Lesson one: Be sure to double-check when programming the route from the listing on the iPad to the airplane's GPS. Lesson two: Believe the VOR when it shows you off the airway.

A Cessna Turbo 210 pilot suffered a track deviation when he misprogrammed his IFR route into the aircraft's GPS based navigation system. ATC advised of the deviations and the reporter corrected the error.

1321293

201601

1201-1800

RDG.Tower

PA

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower RDG

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Tower RDG

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Facility RDG.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0.2

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

1321293

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft X was put into position on the runway and appropriate traffic calls were made. Aircraft Y landed on an intersecting runway and was told to turn right at taxiway and hold short of the runway for the departing traffic. The pilot read back the instructions and complied. Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff. On departure roll the ASDE-X alarmed and displayed a conflict between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. I observed Aircraft Y holding short of the runway; stationary; as instructed. Aircraft X departed safely. The ASDE-X alarmed in error and should be checked for accuracy to ensure it is operating correctly.

RDG Local Controller reported a false ASDE-X warning. An arrival was holding short of an active runway with a departing aircraft when the warning sounded. The Controller visually confirmed the arrival was holding short and the takeoff was uneventful.

1753923

202007

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

135.0

7.0

1900.0

VMC

10

Night

CTAF ZZZ

Other Flight school

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

2.0

VFR

Training

Descent

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Other Flight school

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 260; Flight Crew Type 10

1753923

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Other Student Pilot

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Student

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

1753923.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Horizontal 300; Vertical 700

Person Flight Crew