elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1166333

201404

0601-1200

ZMA.ARTCC

FL

37000.0

Daylight

Center ZMA

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class A ZMA

Center ZMA

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class A ZMA

Facility ZMA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute; Trainee

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1166333

Facility ZMA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.3

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1166024.0

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

I was notified of an incident that while I was training at R5/6/26. During the training session; neither my instructor nor I were aware of the event; however; after watching the event on FALCON; we were made aware of the event and recalled details that may have led to the occurrence of the event. Aircraft X departed MIA (landing Central America). W174C and W465 A/B were active. Aircraft X was cleared 'direct VRGAS direct TADPO rest of route unchanged' to miss W465A and issued a climb instruction to climb to FL370. As the aircraft progressed towards TADPO there was no opposite direction traffic for the aircraft; however; volume and complexity increased due to the combination of sectors and priorities happening in other areas of the sector. When Aircraft X was in the vicinity of MTH or just south of MTH; the Controller at Havana Center called and spoke to my D-side. As the aircraft; got closer to TADPO; I believe I asked my D-side if the radar handoff on Aircraft X had been made; but I can't be sure. I do not remember if the flight progress strip had been updated with a circled 'R;' or if an 'R' had been entered into the 4th line of the flight data block. I transferred communications of Aircraft X to Havana Center while the aircraft was still in a climb to FL370. At the same time; Havana Center had Aircraft Y northbound toward TADPO at FL380. In accordance with the Havana Center/Miami Center LOA; the Havana Center Controller descended Aircraft Y to FL360 prior to TADPO as Aircraft X crossed the center boundary. While; the two aircraft were not in immediate proximity according to Miami Center (7110.65) standards; Havana Center (in an e-mail sent to Quality Assurance); said that drastic action was taken to turn Aircraft X; though a proximity event didn't occur. The message from Havana Center indicated that they had no flight plan information on the aircraft and that a handoff had not been made. My FLM informed me after watching FALCON that a handoff had not been made (according to the D-side and R-side recordings). During the time that Aircraft X was progressing toward TADPO; several other things were happening that impeded my ability to verify the radar handoff. Several MIA departures came onto the frequency after Aircraft X; a military aircraft that had been operational; wanted an IFR clearance; and VFR traffic was picking up in the Marathon Low sector. In addition; I was in the process of trying to split the Marathon Low (R5) sector off amidst the calls from traffic. I recommend that since this occurred on a day of the ERAM test run; that someone look into why Havana Center received no flight plan information on Aircraft X. They received information on at least two subsequent MIA departures that were on my scope at the same time; but failed to identify Aircraft X; which was closer to their boundary. Flight plan processing to and from Havana Center will need to be seamless in order to not have this occur again once ERAM is fully operational 24/7.

Aircraft X entered Havana Center airspace without the required manual hand off being performed. I was informed of this event eleven days after it occurred. I have no recollection of the exact circumstances as they happened.None of the sector team remembers where the breakdown occurred; whether the D-side who would usually perform the hand off misunderstood the Havana Controller and thought the aircraft was in radar contact; or if there was a miscommunication between the D-side and the R-side trainee/trainer about whether the aircraft was handed off. The R-side thought the aircraft had been handed off; and transferred communications to Havana Center.Communication with Aircraft X was transferred approximately one to two minutes before the aircraft entered Havana Center airspace. Havana Controller did not inquire about the incident at that time or subsequently.First and foremost; I must ensure that aircraft are properly handed off to adjacent facilities before radio communications are transferred.The safe and efficient flow of aircraft is dependent upon everyone working together toward that goal. This includes adjacent facilities working together. As human errors occur; we must work together to address and correct them as quickly as possible. If Jacksonville or Houston Center were to erroneously ship an aircraft to me without my having accepted the radar handoff; I would immediately reach out to them via land line to acquire radar contact. I believe that they would do the same for me. Once an error like this has occurred; the focus should be upon transferring radar identification for the sake of safety.Radio communications were transferred; and therefore Havana Center was presumably talking to; Aircraft X for as much as two full minutes before the aircraft entered their airspace. At any point during that time; they could have called us to affect a handoff. If they had no idea who the aircraft was; they should have told him to return to last assigned frequency. Either of these actions would have been much safer than simply allowing the aircraft to enter their space. Again; it is my job to ensure timely hand offs before the transfer of communication. I also feel that once an error has been identified by a sector; the immediate focus should be upon working with adjacent facilities to correct it and ensure the safe and expeditious flow of aircraft.

Two reporters are made aware of an aircraft that was not handed off after returning to work at a later date. Operational error occurred due to this issue.

1253386

201504

1801-2400

BWI.Airport

MD

2100.0

VMC

Tower BWI

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb

SID TERPZ4

Class B DCA

Tower BWI

Helicopter

VFR

Descent

Class B DCA

Facility BWI.TOWER

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 1

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

1253386

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 158; Flight Crew Total 1023; Flight Crew Type 1023

Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1253597.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

I had taken a handoff from Wooly Sector with VFR Aircraft Y when he was 9-10 miles to the NW of BWI. When he checked in I told him to proceed direct to [our hospital] and that there were going to be departures off of runway 28. I had quite a few departures that were lined up at the end of the runway. I had departed a few B737 and they had been climbing well and over where Aircraft Y would be crossing the extended center line of runway 28. After clearing Aircraft X for takeoff I called traffic to Aircraft Y when Aircraft X was rolling midfield to be safe. Aircraft Y said that they were looking for the traffic. I saw that Aircraft X was not climbing like the previous departures. After Aircraft X was airborne I then told him the traffic and he also said that he was looking. I saw the traffic outside and saw that they were getting closer and they both did not have [each other] in sight. I continued to call the traffic to both aircraft giving them updates on their current location. After doing another traffic call Aircraft Y said that they had seem them. At that point Aircraft Y was still at 2500-2600 feet and Aircraft X was around 2100. I observed Aircraft X turning north to advert away from the traffic. Aircraft X then said that they were turning back on course and that they had a Resolution Advisory (RA); and he was still climbing. At that point they were past each other and were no longer a factor. I told Aircraft X to contact Potomac. Aircraft Y continued south bound towards his destination and was handed off back to PCT.Be more aware of aircraft performance.

We were cleared the TERPZ4 departure climb via SID to 4;000 off of RWY 28. Shortly after takeoff ATC made a very timely and accurate traffic call of a helicopter at our 1 [o'clock]; 2500 feet; heading south. We acquired the helicopter on TCAS and shortly after visually. We were on a collision course with zero LOS (Loss of Separation) and climbing into the helicopter. Recognizing it would be difficult to level below or out climb; I turned right/north to pass behind the helicopter. After the maneuver was in progress we received an RA after we had generated lateral clearance. Estimate we passed behind the helicopter between 500 and 1000 feet.

BWI Controller and airline pilot report of a NMAC. Controller thought climb rate would be better for the air carrier based on previous departures. Once the pilot acquired the aircraft visually; a turned was made to avoid it.

1799209

202104

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 MAX 9

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1799209

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals

Company Policy

On pushback; the tow bar shear pin failed. Given the angle the tug was to the airplane it wasn't a surprise and no damage was suspected or reported. I recalled that we could do an information only write up in the logbook if no damage was suspected. Since this was the 737 MAX; I called maintenance control through dispatch to make sure we could still do that. Maintenance control said yes; we could do an information only write up. The fleet Captain contacted [me] today to let me know we can't do this on the MAX yet and that an inspection was required per our manual. I was used to the guidance for the NG and missed the note for the MAX requiring an inspection for shear pin failure. Since it was the MAX; I did take the extra step to obtain guidance from maintenance control but unfortunately that didn't trap this error. Perhaps a quick note or bulletin highlighting this change to the pilot group would help.

B737 MAX 9 Captain reported the shear pin broke during pushback and they failed to have maintenance inspect the aircraft as required.

1776589

202012

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 108; Flight Crew Total 11878; Flight Crew Type 8255

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1776589

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

Alerted to passenger with continuous cough throughout flight. Passenger in [seat] X3 had spent the last year in [foreign country] and reported that she had the cough for a week and had been taking medicine for 2 days. Flight Attendant witnessed her taking cough medicine during flight. No other COVID symptoms reported. Dispatch and Medlink consulted. Passenger was relocated to aft of aircraft to isolate; per recommendation of Medlink doctor. She was also given an N95 mask. Paramedics met aircraft. Passenger's temperature was taken by EMS and was normal. She refused to answer any further questions and treatment. All 3 flight attendants [were] exposed to this passenger.

Air carrier Captain reported having a passenger who was coughing throughout the flight.

1764327

202010

16000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Taxi

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 135

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Pitot-Static System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1764327

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

I had just leveled off at 16;000 [feet] when ATC asked for what my assigned altitude was. I responded 16;000 [feet] [feet] and they informed me that I was showing 17;500 [feet]. I verified that I was showing 16;000 [feet] on my altimeter and then looked at my co-pilot altimeter and realized it was showing 17;600 [feet] and climbing. I communicated this discrepancy to ATC and began to troubleshoot while trying to maintain 16;000 [feet] on my altimeter until I had verified where the discrepancy lay. ATC had me turn off the mode C part of my transponder at this time. My first reaction was to run the icing encounter in flight do list in case it was an issue with icing. I then consulted the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) and ran the static instrument malfunction do list. This 16;000 [feet] helped by raising my altimeter to approximately 16;700 [feet]. ATC then gave me a descent to 11;000 [feet]. At this time I looked at my airspeed indicator and noticed that while the captain speed was showing 160 knots the co-pilot airspeed was showing approximately 230 knots. I reduced power and referenced the co-pilot airspeed indicator for my speed in the descent. I leveled out at 11;000 [feet] on the 17;600 [feet]pilot altimeter and indicating 12;000 [feet] on the co-pilot altimeter. I requested to turn the mode C on my transponder back on and asked ATC for a readout on my altitude. They advised I was showing 12;000 [feet]. I then advised I was continuing my descent to 11;000 [feet] based off of my co-pilot altimeter. I subsequently flew the aircraft based on the co-pilot instruments. While descending I noticed that the airspeed and altitude on the pilot side was more closely matching to the co-pilot side as I got lower. I was able to visually identify the airport of destination and used the PAPI (Precision Approach Path Indicator) to verify my glide slope to the airport. Upon landing my speeds were within approximately 5 knots of each other and the altimeter was less than 200 foot difference. After shutdown the altimeters are less than 30 feet off of each other.I became aware of the event as I was leveling off at what I thought was 16;000 [feet] ft when ATC queried what my assigned altitude was. I then started to work the problem and work to rectify the instrument mismatch.There was a mismatch between the pilot static systems of my aircraft.I advised ATC that I was having an instrument mismatch and began working the problem to find a solution. I initially thought it might be an icing issue so I run the icing in flight do list. When that failed to resolve the issue I went to the QRH and ran the Static source malfunction do list. When that partially solved the issue I asked ATC to verify altitudes to work to determine what instruments were reading the most accurate information so I could plan and execute a plan of action as safely as possible. Not so much how to keep this from happening again but additional steps I could have taken. Once it became obvious to me that I was having an instrument mismatch and potential malfunction I should have declared an emergency. ATC was extremely helpful and assisted me completely but this could have been much more dangerous if the weather had been worse. I should also have requested the ILS (Instrument Landing System)to the opposite direction runway to have had that as a reference to the landing and terrain clearance instead of just the PAPI. I initially opted not to do this because it would have put me back in the clouds while getting vectored out for it.

Air taxi pilot reported pitot static system anomaly.

1271463

201506

Thunderstorm

Air Carrier

A319

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 249; Flight Crew Total 13320; Flight Crew Type 7298

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1271463

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Enroute to DEN we attempted several times to contact Dispatcher to inquire about the conditions at DEN; and the respective arrival gates going into DEN; with impending thunderstorms impacting all the above. We were unable to get any answers; or establish any communication with this dispatcher; which created an unsafe situation for us. Had we been able to get some timely weather information; we could have immediatly altered our course to be at the only arrival gate that was accepting arrivals into DEN. As a result; we were sent there by DEN ATC late; which created an unnessessary delay in holding; and a subsequent divert to COS; when we could have been landing at DEN. The divert to COS put us in another situation on the ground at COS. We got into the 'Passenger Bill of Rights' issue while on the ground in COS due to the an inabity to refuel (stationary storm that didn't move; and had lightning within 7 miles). Upon finally getting refueled; we flew up to DEN in weather that was precarious at best; and landed at DEN with a thunderstorm lurking off the South end of runway 8. Not a safe situation! This whole episode could have been prevented if we had been able to communicated with our dispatchers in a timely manner....which is A FEDERAL LAW! These lapses in communication with our dispatchers is a recurring theme as of late; and is flat out UNSAFE!

A319 Captain reported he was unable to contact Dispatch to discuss options and planning; which in his opinion created an unsafe situation.

1766046

202010

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding; Deplaning; Safety Related Duties; Service

Other / Unknown

1766046

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

When stepping onto aircraft almost immediately my eyes and throat began to burn. I would also feel headaches. When talking to other crewmembers and pilots many of us expressed similar symptoms. I am concerned what is being used to clean the aircraft based on the reactions my body is having.

Flight Attendant reported experiencing burning eyes and throat as well as headaches upon boarding aircraft. Flight Attendant referenced the sanitizing agent used to clean the aircraft as a possible cause.

1050515

201211

0001-0600

MYF.Airport

CA

1500.0

Tower MYF

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Final Approach

None

Class D MYF

Tower MYF

FBO

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Initial Climb

None

Class D MYF

Facility MYF.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1050515

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 955; Flight Crew Type 955

1050747.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X was descending southbound over the top from NKX airspace north of the airport. Aircraft Y requested a left 270 turn northbound which was denied to avoid conflict with Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was issued a right downwind departure and switched to SCT. He continued his climb and began converging on Aircraft X. I called SCT and issued a traffic alert for them. They had already issued traffic as well. The pilot of Aircraft X reported the Aircraft Y in sight; but said it was close; so a MOR was filed. What led to the event was the lack of defined procedures between us and SCT when NKX is closed. It is a grey area with no strict definition in the LOA. Traffic comes to us on random routes and sometimes with or without restrictions. Normally; since we have almost no way of knowing (even though scratchpad entries are supposed to be made); I almost always issue 'comply with previous restrictions' to help cover myself. On the same note; the issue is similar in the transitions from NKX to us; because both northbound and southbound aircraft are issued the same altitudes which have resulted in conflicts on some occasions. The SCT-MYF LOA needs to define clear procedures to follow for coordination of aircraft through the Class B northbound and southbound. As it is; we have nothing in writing; and there is no standard; except for the inefficient 'Class B' clearance which we find confuses some SCT controllers. What we need are clearly defined routes and altitudes for VFR aircraft to help prevent this sort of situation. There is nothing in place; it is just seat-of-the-pants controlling. The same issue needs to be addressed with the NKX-MYF LOA to define routes and/or altitudes to be flown in order to avoid the pre-programmed conflict.

I was approaching MYF from the North having just been handed off by SOCAL to Montgomery Tower. They advised me to continue approach as ordered by SOCAL; cross the airport at midfield at 2;000 feet MSL or greater then enter left downwind for left traffic for Runway 28L. I acknowledged and then noticed there was converging traffic in the right downwind that appeared to be climbing. I notified the Tower and they said the traffic was under the direction of ATC. I continued to monitor the traffic and saw that it was; in fact climbing. As it got close; I initiated a small climb to create a little extra margin of space. When the traffic disappeared as it went under me; I glanced at my MFD and noted that the traffic had passed under me at -200 feet. I contacted the Tower and commented that the traffic had passed about 200 feet below me (thinking 'that's a little close.') When I landed; the Tower gave me a phone number. When I called it; I spoke to a man who identified himself as the Tower Manager. He took my information and said he would mail a copy of the report to me when it was completed. Subsequently; when I was on final and cleared to land; the Tower released traffic on my intended runway and I was forced to go around. I executed a left 180 re-entering the downwind leg and the Tower said they would call my base. The rest of the approach and landing was without incident. The Tower was training new controllers as they often do and I never felt there was a dire emergency. Just new people learning their job with a couple of learning errors.

MYF Controller described a conflict event involving an arrival VFR aircraft; the reporter claiming the procedures with SCT need to be revised to more clearly define routes/procedures and coordination to be used in these types of situations.

1070724

201303

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1070724

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

During preflight I noted that the green system hydraulics were very low; almost into the yellow or amber band. I let Maintenance know we needed to be serviced. He stated the level had been good when Maintenance had last checked it at the termination of the previous flight. I asked when they were servicing the green system if they found any leaked hydraulic fluid; and Maintenance replied in the negative. This seemed a little odd; and indicated either a possible gauge problem or a hidden leak. During descent we received an ECAM warning for low green hydraulic system fluid quantity. The overhead quantity gauge pointer was at the 'red dot.' Per the ECAM we turned off the green hydraulic pumps. Due to the fact we would need some extra time on final approach to manually extend the landing gear; plus the requirement to stop on the runway and be towed in from there; we declared an emergency with ATC. After completing all related ECAM and QRH procedures; we landed uneventfully. After extending the gear; the green hydraulic quantity recovered to about the 12 o'clock position on the quantity gauge. By the time we arrived in the gate after tow-in; the quantity had dropped almost to the yellow band again. On post flight Maintenance stated they found a leak in the Number 1 Engine pylon. Perhaps more in-depth troubleshooting during the preflight would have revealed the hydraulic leak there.

A300 Captain reports loss of Green Hydraulic System fluid during descent for landing. The fluid level had indicated low prior to departure and was serviced. An emergency is declared and a normal landing ensues after gravity gear extension.

1441933

201704

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1441933

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Company Policy

During inspection of main deck cargo I noticed a box on a pallet stack with arrows pointing down instead of up. Upon closer inspection the box was labeled 'flammable liquid' and 'Cargo aircraft only'. I brought it to the attention of the PIC. We then notified the Load Master. He removed the net and restacked the box with the correct orientation. We noted no leakage or deformation of the box.The Hazmat we carry needs to be packed correctly. This is not a small issue or isolated. Train the people loading our airplanes how to do their job.

First Officer reported discovering a box with arrows pointing down when they should have been up. The box was labeled 'FLAMMABLE LIQUID' and 'CARGO AIRCRAFT ONLY.'

1859726

202112

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

10.0

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Single Engine Turboprop Undifferentiated

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Final Approach

STAR none

Class C ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 81; Flight Crew Total 2444; Flight Crew Type 257

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1859726

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

On the arrivals I was flying very high indicated airspeed. Approach controller asked IAS and then assigned 180 IAS. Shortly he said I was still catching up to plane ahead on approach and assigned 150 kts to ZZZZZ. I was aware of 2 planes ahead of me on the ILS and closely monitored my IAS to not overtake. Switched to Tower and heard 2 line up and wait clearances (one after another) with note of my position on final. I put landing flaps (122 max IAS) down at ZZZZZ (GS intercept). Tower asked [company] jet behind me (first time I realized he was there) to slow to min forward sped. Company jet said they were there and asked for S turns. S turns were approved and Tower noted another plane in trail. I was told to expect minimum time on runway. I complied a normal landing and Tower requested I make XX high-speed turn off. My attempt to increase breaking lead to a brief skid and I said unable. Tower sent Company jet around.Had Tower or Approach asked me to keep my speed up on final I certainly could have but my mindset was to not catch up to planes ahead of me. I was also focused on the line up and wait planes which also encouraged me to fly a normal approach profile. The parallel runway is also closed which increased congestion on XXR.

A single engine turboprop pilot reported braking to attempt to turn off the runway at a high speed turn off caused the aircraft to briefly skid and miss the turn at the assigned taxiway. The pilot also failed to maintain the ATC assigned airspeed on final which caused the succeeding arrival to go-around.

1778828

202012

1201-1800

F70.Airport

CA

2400.0

VMC

Daylight

UNICOM F70

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

GPS

Initial Approach

Visual Approach; Direct

Class G F70

UNICOM F70

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Class G F70

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1060; Flight Crew Type 310

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1778828

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 100; Vertical 100

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I was approaching F70 from the southeast after a personal flight while making radio calls every few miles as I noticed on my ADS-B in several targets circling around the airport due to intense student activity.Someone made a radio call a few minutes before I was in the vicinity of another aircraft cutting them off on downwind too and I prepared myself for heavy traffic in the pattern and trying to find an opening so I could join the downwind.Upon entering the 45 for downwind I noticed visually an aircraft on the upwind taking off and repeatedly asked his intentions and if he could see me.There was no answer and seeing him proceed on runway heading I continued on the 45 for downwind being confident he wouldn't start a turn to crosswind until he reached close to pattern altitude as is recommended for the noise abatement procedure out of F70 for departures from Runway 18.Then I saw him maneuver for the crosswind maybe 500 feet below my altitude which was at pattern and make a radio call in that regards. At this point I had contacted him several times regarding his intentions and whether he could see me but without any answer.Seeing him turn and put me on the direct collision course with me although 300 ft. below me I decided to execute a 360 degree turn saw him coming extremely near me. Finally he acknowledged my presence in a subsequent radio call.I continued the full turn and reentered downwind.F70 was extremely busy that day with several schools on the field and at one point I saw no less than 5 aircraft in the traffic pattern. Needless to say a Tower is badly needed in that field for the safety of flight as the indiscriminate addition of several aircraft from several schools without any sort of coordination between those schools makes this urgently needed.A bit of courtesy goes a long way too and someone was nice enough to extend their downwind for me earlier in the day so I could depart as I had to hold short of the active runway at least 10 minutes as one aircraft after another was landing with no end in sight.On my side I should have waited outside the pattern on a hold in a safe area until there was no aircraft on upwind and the downwind leg would be fully opened; with adequate radio communications ensuring everyone in the pattern has knowledge of any other traffic with acknowledgement for all.This was my first experience with this field with that many aircraft in the pattern and the lesson learned here is to stay outside an uncontrolled field until there is fewer than a set limit of aircraft that one can set as personal limit.Such a personal limit is not taught at all as part of any training curriculum nor in the AIM in my knowledge.Most uncontrolled field are uncontrolled because of very low traffic but some reach levels just below the threshold needed for a tower and F70 seems to be in that category.Also the schools on the field could coordinate some kind of schedule among themselves so not everyone is up in the air at the same time. Poisson's law dictates things happen in bursts unless there is coordination to avert it.

GA pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at F70 airport.

1360074

201605

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

30000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1360074

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During cruise; FL300; about 10 minutes from Top of Descent (TOD); I felt a surge in the cabin pressurization and saw the Master Caution light illuminated. Both of us began to scan items; and found that the Pressurization Flow light on the Electronic Overhead Panel (EOP) was illuminated. That was the only indication we had on the overhead that something was wrong. First Officer (FO) checked the switches and readings; and we found all in normal configuration. I asked what was the cabin doing; and I was trying to read the indications as well. I noticed that the Cabin Rate of Climb indication appeared to be full scale deflection; I asked for him to verify. He did in fact say the needle was full scale; then I asked how the cabin altitude and differential pressure readings. At that moment; they actually looked stable. There did not seem to be any change. I asked for the QRH; and as the FO was getting his book out; I could see on my own that the cabin was indeed climbing; just slowly. We modified power settings; and the pressurization flow annunciation was still illuminated. I then asked my FO to ask for a lower altitude. ATC gave us clearance to 260; and as I started my descent; and pulling back on the throttles; that only aggravated the situation; and I could see that the climb rate of the cabin intensified; I then established a rapid descent configuration and asked the FO to request lower; which he did; and I believe we were given FL170. But now with the cabin rapidly climbing; I could see we were now quickly running out of available pressure and the risk of exceeding 14K cabin altitude was now possible. The FO also noticed the climb rate; and he emphasized we needed to get down. I was flying the aircraft; and assuming we were going to exceed 14K; I commanded we put on O2 masks. As the FO was fitting his mask and establishing communications with me; I called ATC and advised them we needed a lower altitude than assigned; and that the issue was a pressurization problem. Another ATC controller then checked in and asked for SOB; nature of problem; and required assistance. The FO responded and she cleared us to 7;000 feet. I assigned; my FO; to go back to the QRH; while I fly and communicate. He did; and the manual pressurization procedure eventually was effective in controlling the cabin altitude. The maximum Cabin altitude we achieved was about 10;300 feet; and we did get the Cabin Altitude Warning for perhaps 3 seconds. Once the First Officer had the cabin back under control; I slowed descent and established a gentle descent profile; with a stable power setting; and continued on with our arrival duties. Things became much less hectic; so I was then able to communicate with the Flight Attendants and queried then on Cabin Status. They stated nothing was abnormal in the cabin or its environment; the passengers were well; with no concerns. I briefed them on what happened and our plan to continue. The First Officer suggested we had enough fuel on board and that maintenance would be an issue; so I assigned him flying and ATC duties. I contacted dispatch; briefed them on our status; and asked if [the destination] was appropriate; or would another point of landing better suit the situation. Dispatch concurred that [the destination] was best; so we proceeded with our original intentions.From that point on; it was a routine approach and landing. We wrote up the malfunction; and maintenance was there to meet us when we parked.

MD80 Captain reported a pressurization surge at FL300 followed by a master caution light and a flow light on the EOP. An emergency descent was initiated and manual control of the pressurization was gained prior to leveling at 10;000 feet.

1362415

201606

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

10

10000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Air Traffic Control Military 28; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 350; Flight Crew Type 3

Training / Qualification

1362415

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Other landing roll

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors

I was landing my Bower's Fly Baby. The winds were about 5 Knots out of the Northeast. As I crossed the approach end of runway 11; I reduced power to idle and began to flare for landing. The aircraft touched down normally (with a slight bounce) and then settled down on to the runway. I rolled out approximately 75 feet and began to decelerate. As the aircraft slowed; it began a slight track to the left of the centerline. I attempted to correct this by inputting right rudder and tapped the right brake. It was at this point that the tail swung around to the left causing the right wing to tip up and left wing to lower. As a result of this; the left wing tip briefly scraped the runway surface and the engine stalled. The tower called to ask if I was OK and to see if I needed assistance. I reported that I was fine but would need some assistance to restart my engine (since it is not equipped with a starter or electrical system).The Airport Authority assisted by escorting me as I pushed my aircraft off of the runway and into the parking ramp. I surveyed the aircraft for damage and noticed only a minor scrape on the lower aft surface of the left wing tip bow.

Bowers Fly Baby pilot reported losing directional control on landing roll; resulting in a ground loop and a scraped wingtip.

1209158

201410

0001-0600

ZGZU.ARTCC

FO

VMC

Center ZGZU

Air Carrier

B777-200

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Climb

SID VIBOS8Y

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1209158

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Received our DCL [Datalinked Clearance] which directed the VIBOS8Y departure but I misread it and saw the VIBOS9Y departure. This was what I expected to see based on my preflight study which indicated that the 9Y was the more direct routing to point VIBOS and the other departures were 'by ATC'. I had preloaded this in the FMS and let my FO know it was there along with my reasons for choosing it. I read the DCL from a printed copy and I believe my expectation bias captured the FO as well. We then briefed and flew the VIBOS9Y. A query by the controller on departure as to what SID we were flying caused us to review the DCL (printed copy) again and we discovered our error. Of course; there were interruptions to our flow by ground personnel but no more than normal. I allowed my attention to detail to falter.Captain failed to ensure clearance was correctly loaded in the FMS.I will return to my normal habit pattern of double checking the DCL clearance with the FMS programming pages after all briefings are completed.

A B777 flight crew departing ZGGG programmed an incorrect SID into the FMS and were advised by Departure Control when they diverged from their clearance.

1027054

201207

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 14700; Flight Crew Type 1500

1027054

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Inbound write up 'Eng N1 vib 7.7 on T/O climbout varied between 4.0 and 7.7. At cruise varies 1.4 to 3.0 Maintenance accomplished Task 77-32-00-810-807-A; No damage found; everything secure.' During takeoff prior to 80 KTS call my First Officer called out N1 indication of 8.7 (we discussed during our briefing if above normal Flight Operations Manual (FOM) range of up to N1 of 5.0 we would abort); rejected takeoff engaged and we notified Tower of our abort. Wheel brakes did not exceed 420; so we elected to taxi to the gate.

Air carrier Captain reported rejecting takeoff when N1 vibration exceeded normal limits.

1798688

202104

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach; Initial Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1798688

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Overrode Automation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

Aircraft

Knowing that Runway XX would put us on a straight visual; while we were still in cruise; we thoroughly briefed the landing. There is rising terrain NE of ZZZ1 at the approach end of [Runway] XX necessitating close in maneuvering. Airport elevation is at XXXX so we decided to be fully configured with gear down and final flap selection at 7;500 feet 5NM from the Runway XX threshold to approximate a glide path. This would give us X;XXX feet buffer to get down. (Much more was briefed; this is just a highlight.) After we were switched from Center to ZZZ Approach we were told to expect vectors to Runway YY ILS. This was preferable because that would give us an instrument approach without terrain for visual backup; and it's within the 10 kt tailwind limit. However when we got switched to ZZZ Tower we were told they were not using YY and to expect vectors for a visual XX. We requested [Runway] YY again but this was refused by Tower; so we elected to get delayed vectors to allow time to set up XX again (we already had landing numbers and we had briefed it so it didn't take long). As had been briefed; we were fully configured 2;100 feet above field elevation at least 5 NM out and the FMS was used to draw an extended line from the Runway XX threshold to give better situational awareness of runway positioning during maneuvering. Green needles were used with the ILS frequency for Runway YY to give a visual indication of when we were approaching the runway centerline knowing that this would also give us reverse sensing and a false glide slope--this was briefed as well. My First Officer was flying but if it had been my leg I would've transferred controls to him anyway. I had flown with him for three days and seen him perform hand flown approaches and was supremely confident of his skills. And since we were being vectored in the NW sector for a right base to final to XX he would have the best view to make the turn to final. On final we got a visual GROUND PROX caution box on the PFD as well as aural 'glideslope' messages with an associated flashing caution some 3-6 times. Each time I canceled it and said disregard it's a false glideslope which was acknowledged by First Officer. First Officer had me cancel his flight director and he flew the visual raw data with me backing him up on descent rate; speed; and how it looked. He did a nice job and set it down without incident. [Unrelated] runways were NOTAMed closed. Runway XX PAPI was NOTAMed OTS. The reason to bring this attention is so that other crews will have notification that they may be required to land with minimal instrumentation backing them up on a visual. Other flight crews may not have the experience nor may benefit from mild weather condition. Please notify other crews that while [other] runways are closed they may be required to shoot a straight visual to XX near rising terrain; so that awareness may be raised and overall risk mitigated.

EMB/ERJ-145 flight crew reported continuing to an uneventful landing in spite of CFIT indications of multiple GPWS alerts during a visual final approach. Flight crew maintained visual clearance of the rising terrain.

1098467

201306

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

37000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 400; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting

1098467

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Workload

1098476.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

On takeoff roll around 100 KTS; received a caution Left High stage bleed; we did not abort; continued with the takeoff. Around 10;000 FT took out the QRH; went to the procedure; which asked us to close the left bleed valve; thereby single pack operation. Informed Dispatch and Maintenance. Confirmed no limitations on single pack. Two minutes later got Red Warning and Aural light for Cabin Altitude. Apparently this single pack was unable to maintain cabin altitude. We contacted Center and started an initial descent to 30;000 FT; 19;000 FT; 14;000 FT; 12;000 FT; [and] 13;000 FT. We told flight attendants that we will be landing at a divert airport in 35-40 minutes. Dispatch 'call me' did not function. Sent a Dispatch Message. After a little while got a hold of them on commercial radio and a phone patch with Maintenance was established. Best course of action was to divert. We declared an emergency; had jumpseater come to cockpit; kept passengers informed. Uneventful. First Officer made the landing.

The deadheading crew member help regulate the pressurization by using the manual control.

A B757 EICAS alerted L HI STAGE BLEED during takeoff so the QRH was completed and the crew continued to FL370 single pack where the aural and light CABIN ALT WARNING alerted. An emergency was declared and the flight descended to a divert airport.

1347217

201604

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

6

Daylight

3300

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

Baron 58/58TC

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Nose Gear

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Military 25; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 12600; Flight Crew Type 350

1347217

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Normal landing configuration; winds were a factor in that they were gusty up to 20 kts with perhaps a 20 [degree] crosswind component. I carried 10 knots over normal Vref and used approach flaps until 500 feet then selected full flaps and confirmed three green indication on my landing gear indicator. Crosswind controls were input and landing was otherwise normal with initial contact on the mains and I held the nose off to reduce flying airspeed; throttles were selected to idle just before touchdown.As the nose gear was lowered to the runway it collapsed and both props ground to a stop. I immediately closed both fuel levers and selected mags to off position. No fire ensued. I reported the event immediately to FSS so as to close the runway and get a NOTAM out.

Beech 58 pilot reported the nose gear collapsed upon landing. The aircraft was secured and evacuated.

1273383

201506

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1273383

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

While taxiing for runway; two status messages were posted. Ground (GRD) spoiler fault; Flight spoiler fault. A Master Caution was also posted as GRD spoiler. Maintenance was notified and crew was advised to return to gate. Upon return to gate; maintenance personnel replaced the faulty electrical systems and aircraft was returned to service. Aircraft taxied back to runway. All pre-takeoff checks were normal. On the takeoff roll after 80 KTS and before V1 approx. 120 KTS a master caution was posted with a takeoff configuration and ground spoilers. The Captain called for an abort and assumed control of aircraft. The aircraft was brought to a stop on the runway; and exited under control to a taxiway. ATC was notified and a call to the flight attendant placed to make sure that all was ok in the cabin. The aircraft was taxied back to a gate. The right brakes were smoking and the Brake temperature Monitoring System (BTMS) readings were 8. Maintenance was notified. A walk around was completed along with all appropriate checklists. The only abnormal aspect was the smoking brakes; that subsided with time. A master caution for a Takeoff configuration at 120 kts with possible ground spoiler deployment. The Captain did a great job in bringing aircraft to a safe stop. I believe that when we have flight control faults the aircraft should undergo deeper checks prior to being released for service. Also during training we should include a high speed abort in simulator training for this exact problem that we experienced.

A CRJ-200 First Officer reported the Captain decided on a high speed rejected takeoff when they received master caution warnings of 'Takeoff Config' and 'Ground Spoilers.' The reporter stated these items were the subject of maintenance attention prior to takeoff.

1634459

201904

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

3100

5500

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

J3 Cub

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

None

Main Gear

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 120

Situational Awareness

1634459

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

Weather

I was on a normal crosswind approach to landing in a landing configuration. After my main gear touched; a gust of wind picked up my left wing and as a result collapsed my right main gear. As a result the aircraft suffered damage. No injuries were involved.

Piper Cub pilot reported a gust of wind during landing caused his landing gear to collapse.

1021994

201207

1201-1800

MYF.Airport

CA

70.0

1.5

1200.0

CLR

Tower MYF

Personal

J3 Cub

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Class D MYF

Tower MYF

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Landing

Class D MYF

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1021994

Conflict NMAC

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

Right hand pattern for 28R MYF; a Cessna had just turned final. I was on downwind about to turn base at pattern altitude; and a Cirrus was #3 for touch and go. All of us had clearances. I told the Tower to assure the Cessna that they were in sight.Cessna was on about a mile and a half final; and I turned above and to the north of that aircraft to establish spacing at the runway. The Cessna pilot asked if I saw her; and the Tower answered in the affirmative. Altitude separation estimated at 300 FT and lateral distance approximately the same. That is roughly 420 FT slant-range separation.Tower changed me to the left runway; because the Cirrus was closing from behind. The Cirrus touched down before I did; and the Cessna was west of the field turning downwind as I touched down. This interesting scenario is due to disparate approach speeds: I estimate the 172 at about 65 KTS; the Cirrus at perhaps 75; and my approach was 35.As the Cessna was turning right base on the next circuit; she started an extended transmission criticizing my flying. It seemed to go on forever; but was probably less than a half minute nonstop. My answer - on the Tower frequency - was 'come see me at my hangar.' The answer: 'I don't have time.'So I landed and dropped by as the pilot was debriefing her student. I introduced myself and she again said 'I do not have time to talk to you.'Putting aside whether paralleling an aircraft on final is some kind of violation or bad judgment - my impression is that it just makes sense for a slow aircraft to try to optimize separation on the runway - the point of this report is that criticizing another pilot on an ATC frequency is bad policy; even if a student is not involved. But adding a student to the mix; and then teaching that such a transmission is good practice is not good instructing. The student has learned that resolving problems should be restricted to ATC frequencies; and that ground and/or telephone discussions are not appropriate.An appropriate response is to call the Tower on the telephone; get the N-number of the pilot you wish to discuss something with; and then either do it on the phone; or in person; or simply call the FSDO.

In an unsolicited attempt to provide spacing at the threshold of the runway the pilot of Piper J3 elected to turn final close to and slightly above and behind the C-172 he was to follow. When the Instructor pilot of the Cessna took exception to the J3's unagreed to propinquity a verbal exchange resulted.

1740494

202004

1801-2400

0.0

Dusk

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Direct

Electrical Power

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

1740494

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

During pushback off of [gate] in ZZZ; the I noticed white smoke and a burning odor. The smoked seemed to be coming out from under the First Officer avionics panels. We stopped the pushback and shut off the engine we had just started. Initially; based on the rapid rate at which smoke was filling the cockpit; I decided to make an announcement to evacuate using the main boarding door without stairs. There were only 14 passengers on board and we had several ground crew outside to help with deplaning without steps. However; the smoke seemed to subside rather quickly when we opened the cockpit windows so; as a crew; we decided that we now had time to have the tow pull us back into the jet bridge to make a safer; more normal deplaning situation. I made another announcement explaining the situation and for each pax to take the nearest seat. We then pulled back into the jet bridge and deplaned. We then shut down the aircraft completely. We returned the personal belonging to the passengers and eventually swapped to a spare aircraft and continued to ZZZ1.We handled the situation in the cockpit by shutting down the engine; opening windows and running the QRH procedures. The procedures are obviously made for inflight; but it had us turn off recirc and gasper fans. We then shut off all inessential electronics and avionics once we talked to everyone we needed to. Since the smoke subsided; we felt like we had time to pull up to the jet bridge and deplane rather than risking a evacuation without stairs. I had called Dispatch right after we deplaned. I was bombarded with many people such as gate managers; ramp managers; [Crash Fire Rescue]; etc. as I was on the phone. Next time I'll wait to call Dispatch and Maintenance until all the information is relayed to the different people on the ground.

EMB-145LR Captain reported smoke in the cockpit during pushback that resulted in a return to the gate.

1651004

201906

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

200.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Citation Excel (C560XL)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class E ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

None

Initial Climb

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1651004

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Human Factors

We were on the RNAV XX Approach. We were reporting position on. Calls were made 8.5 miles out; 4 miles out; and there on frequent calls were made to report our position and intentions. Winds were 140@6 knots. Our intention was a full stop landing on Runway XX. At around 200 feet we suddenly saw a red single engine Aircraft Y take off from the opposite end (runway 32) without making any radio calls and turned away from us (to our left). We landed on runway XX and the incident was terminated. There was no traffic alert on TCAS and we didn't see the airplane takeoff till he was airborne. The pilot monitoring was thorough with all radio calls to report intentions and position. The Aircraft Y didn't make any further calls and departed the pattern.

Flight Crew landing CE-560XLS had Near Miss with small single engine aircraft taking off.

1625898

201903

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1600.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Final Approach

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Part 91

Final Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 570; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1625898

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

We were changing Runway XXR to XXL. We were given turn base on our discretion and cleared to land Runway XXL on downwind and there were aircraft on downwind XXL. I thought they were following us; but according to ATC we were supposed to follow that traffic.

PA-28 flight instructor reported an airborne conflict in the traffic pattern due to confusion with ATC communication.

1094199

201304

0601-1200

DFW.Airport

TX

0.0

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Oxygen System/Crew

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

1094199

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

1094189.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Manuals; Procedure

Human Factors

We departed with an inoperative observer seat O2 mask. I do not think I briefed Flight Attendant at the gate on this item. (was not sure we would even need a lav break on this fairly short leg). However; during the flight; the First Officer needed to very briefly use the lav. I remember briefing the Flight Attendant at the time of transition about using the First Officer's mask if necessary; due to MEL item. In hindsight; it would have been better to have accomplished this briefing before we departed. The MEL does not provide any guidance on inop observers O2 and lav breaks. I suppose using a portable O2 unit would have been possible; but this seemed like it would compromise the desired 3 second cockpit to cabin transition. O2 was always readily available to the Flight Attendant from the First Officer's mask; which was positioned only a few inches from where the observers mask was located.

Was told a flight attendent was not comfortable with it being inop on bathroom breaks.

The flight crew of a MD-83 reported a flight attendant had stressed concerns about an MEL'd Observer O2 mask required for their use when; per security requirements; they occupy that seat while a flight crewmember is absent from the cockpit.

1185558

201407

1201-1800

TCY.Airport

CA

120.0

1.0

400.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF TCY; TRACON NCT

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class G TCY

CTAF TCY

Other Unknown

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

Other unknown

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class G TCY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 700

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1185558

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 300; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

I was enroute to TCY with VFR Flight Following. When about 10 NM NNE of TCY; NORCAL (123.85) advised me of traffic ahead on approach to TCY Runway 12; and to squawk VFR and change to TCY advisory frequency (CTAF 123.075). TCY is an uncontrolled field with standard left hand patterns. TCY AWOS said wind was something like 300 deg at 15 knots gusting to 20; so I decided to land on Runway 30 and I announced my position on the CTAF. I can't remember whether ATC told me the type of traffic on approach to Runway 12 but I will refer to it as [Aircraft Y]; the #2 airplane in this report. [Aircraft Y] announced his position several times also and I saw him as we both passed over the Runway 12 threshold at about the same time. The pilot had an Asian accent (Japanese?) and I had trouble understanding him. [Aircraft Y] was quite low and I was several hundred feet above; descending rapidly for a left downwind to Runway 30. [Aircraft Y's] track was aligned with Runway 12. I would estimate my heading as 150 degrees; crossing to the west of [Aircraft Y's] track. I lost sight of [Aircraft Y] at this time and assumed he would execute a standard missed approach to the ECA VOR; which is what I have done when practicing Runway 12 instrument low approaches into TCY. That would have taken [Aircraft Y] away from the TCY airport headed to the NW; such that he would not be a factor for my left downwind pattern for Runway 30. While on left downwind I was surprised to hear an aircraft announce he was on right downwind for landing on TCY Runway 30 and wondered why someone would be flying a RH pattern. By the voice accent I realized it was the same [aircraft] but I didn't know his flight path and assumed I was ahead of him. I also assumed he would abandon his approach when he saw that I was in the standard left hand pattern and he was not. However both of my assumptions were wrong and we both turned base and final; and [Aircraft Y] climbed out while I landed. I'm guessing we got to less than 300 feet of one another and I could clearly see it was a low wing blue and white single engine aircraft. I lost sight of the [aircraft] while concentrating on the landing (gear down etc) and never heard from him again. I don't know whether he intended to land or just do a low approach to Runway 30. I was further primed to expect [Aircraft Y] to abandon the approach because a couple years earlier; on a VFR training approach on the MCC ILS with an instructor; when another aircraft announced he was landing in the opposite direction; which the wind favored; my instructor told me the landing aircraft had priority and to break off our approach. So I assumed that VFR practice approaches had lower priority at non-towered airports. I have since reviewed the FAR's and AIM wondering who had priority in this conflict. I see that the TCY Runway 12 approach has circling minimums and it would be a right hand pattern to Runway 30 because the approach plate says circling NA on the SW side of the airport (the left hand pattern). Aside from arguing who was ahead or lower altitude etc; it appears that we were both operating legally; one in a RH traffic pattern and the other in a LH traffic pattern.In hindsight I should have broken off my approach before we got so close to each other because we both contributed to creating a dangerous situation. Also on hindsight I think I may have heard [Aircraft Y] announce something about 'circling' but due to the accent (Asians have trouble with the 'L' sound) and my not being familiar with the TCY circling approach; I didn't anticipate the upcoming conflict.I don't know whether Norcal knew [Aircraft Y] was going to do a circling approach; he didn't mention it to me. I wonder whether non-instrument rated pilots would be expected to anticipate authorized traffic in a RH pattern at TCY.I also noticed that AG pilots have an exemption to standard patterns at non-towered airports but with the exception that they must at all times remain clear of; and give way to; aircraft conforming to the traffic pattern for the airport. FAR 137.45 (d). That would be a nice addition to Part 91 Operating Rules for aircraft on IFR approaches in VFR conditions at airports without functioning control towers. Reviewing the MCC ILS approach; I see that circling is NA; so maybe that is what my instructor had in mind for telling me to break off the practice ILS approach a couple of years ago. I haven't had a chance to talk with him about it yet.

A pilot on a left downwind to the TCY Runway 30 had a near miss on final with an aircraft whose foreign accented pilot had just completed a practice instrument approach to Runway 12 and broke the approach off entering a Runway 30 right downwind to final.

1200790

201409

0001-0600

SLC.Airport

UT

11000.0

Tower SLC

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

VFR

Skydiving

Cruise

Class B SLC

Facility SLC.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 7

Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1200790

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Parachute operation being conducted to the east of the airport close enough to be a factor for east downwind traffic. I was informed the aircraft would be held outside the airspace until jumpers were on the ground. The supervisor informed me aircraft will be held out until he gave the ok. The TRACON called me and said Aircraft X reported the jumpers on the ground and the arrivals were now inbound. I informed the supervisor who appeared to be on the line with the TRACON at the time. Another controller informed me it didn't look like the last jumper was all the way on the ground yet. I then moved the traffic as far west as I could to avoid any possible conflict.There was some type of miscommunication between the supervisors in the TRACON and tower; and the TRACON controller as to when to allow aircraft back into the airspace. Additionally Aircraft X reported the jumpers were on the ground when that may not have been the case. It seems to avoid any confusion the tower supervisor should make this call.

SLC Tower Controller reports of parachuting exercise going on in close proximity to the airport.

1874010

202202

0601-1200

DCA.Airport

DC

Tower DCA

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B DCA

Autopilot

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1874010

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

The flight to DCA was uneventful till about 5 miles on final. We had a constant tail wind on the approach around 30-40 kts. Approach was conducted on autopilot. We broke off around 1400-1800 ft. and continued in marginal VMC. After we passed 1000 ft. in stable conditions I noticed that aircraft slowly and then more aggressively starting to pitch down and vertical speed suddenly increasing from 800-900 ft/min to 1200-1800 ft/min. I was hoping that autopilot would correct this pitch down moment; but it didn't respond as I expected. I disconnected autopilot and stabilized path and speed before 500 ft. AGL. The rest of the of the approach and landing was uneventful. I would think that there was a combination of factors of the strong tailwind and some interference from the ground facilities. I am not sure if 5G interference played a role in this approach. I hope my case was a single event today; but if there were numerous aircraft affected on the approach this day; it should be investigated.

Air carrier Captain reported autopilot issues on final approach at DCA; citing 5G interference as possibly contributing.

1625513

201903

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

7.0

8500.0

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 172; Flight Crew Type 1743

1625513

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 275

1625524.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Environment - Non Weather Related

[We were] descending on the Arrival into ZZZ and on downwind for a visual approach to Runway XXR. As the aircraft began to descend from 9;000 feet to 8;000 feet at 210 knots; the crew heard a very loud bang. Both pilots suspected a bird strike. A few seconds later the ENG Master Caution came on then went back off. Both pilots agreed more than likely engine damage occurred; but a glance at the engine instruments showed both engines were normal operation. However; the autothrottles did kick off further indicating engine damage. The First Officer [advised] with Approach Control and requested priority handling for immediate landing. Approach requested to know the nature of the [event] time permitting. The FO (First Officer) informed Approach of suspected bird strike and engine surge suspected on number one engine.The Captain started the APU in anticipation of losing an engine. The FO suggested completing the Engine Surge Checklist. The Captain agreed and then also asked for the Single Engine Landing Checklist; which was performed. During turn to final the Captain noted an Airspeed Disagree Caution light. The FO confirmed the GPS ground speed was 178 knots; which matched the Captain's airspeed indicator. The FO's airspeed indicator was 30 knots low; thus; both pilots agreed the Captain's airspeed indicator was the reliable indicator. Since we were turning final and had visual contact with the runway; it was decided to continue the approach and to rely on Captain's airspeed indicator. We completed the Single Engine Before Landing Checklist prior to the final approach fix; and the Captain affected an approach to landing; flaps 30; at a faster than normal speed in anticipation of a possible engine failure. We touched down with no further incident.In regards to communication with the flight attendants and passengers; we asked the flight attendants to stay seated and that we would get back to them. The flight attendants did call us back later to inform us of visual damage due to bird strike. We thanked them and continued to focus on the approach to landing; we did not make an announcement to passengers. After landing it was noted that both engines were operating in the Alternate mode. Multiple bird strikes causing damage to both engines; leading edge slats and radome.

We were abeam the airport on downwind; descending to 8;000 feet at 210 knots; and flaps one. We heard a very loud noise in the flight deck that sounded almost like an explosion. The aircraft also shuddered. My initial thought was we just blew an engine. I crossed checked the instruments and initially had an A/T LIM indication. The other engine indications looked fine. I then received a Master Caution and an ENG annunciator light...both engines had gone to ALT mode. I then thought we either took a bird or had a huge compressor stall. I've had compressor stalls before and; although loud and sometimes violent; not this violent. I had my FO (First Officer) [advise ATC] with immediate vectors to landing.I then received an IAS disagree light. I then; still not quite sure of our situation with multiple differing indications; directed the FO to get out the QRC for engine limit; surge; stall to ensure we had these areas covered in the event it was a stall; and ensure engine operation sufficient for landing. I had already disconnected the autothrottle. We went through the QRC; then the checklist; ensuring the engine was operating normally. With multiple abnormalities I was unsure of the exact nature of our damage or problem; but I had by now surmised that we had a major bird strike. This was also confirmed when the Flight Attendant called and said a Passenger saw a bird hit and lodge in the aircraft. Unsure of the extent of the damage or the possibility of increasing problems and/or structural damage; I elected to land immediately. I also had the FO run the One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist as a precaution in case one of our engines failed; although I told him we'd remain at 30 flaps (I didn't want to introduce another change to flaps 15 at this point when not necessary). We started the APU and went to Flaps Inhibit and quickly reviewed our plan if the engine failed. I also had to quickly assess the IAS disagree. The maximum and minimum airspeed bars seemed much closer together than normal. I crosschecked my airspeed with my FO's and I was about 25 knots faster. I then crosschecked my airspeed with the aircraft groundspeed. My airspeed was validated by the groundspeed and the FO's was much lower. I used my airspeed and increased my VREF slightly to ensure I had enough speed and didn't even come close to the minimum speed bars...that I didn't fully trust at this point. We finished configuring and landed uneventfully. I did not get out a call to the passengers since we were very time compressed and I was focused on analyzing the problems and getting the aircraft on the ground.All ATC agencies were very helpful and expedited our recovery. The crew did an outstanding job. We both; the FO and I; had our hands full with multiple aircraft problems and the unknown of the full extent of our problems. I will tell you that having systems knowledge and some of the scenarios we have seen in the LOE (Line Operating Experience) (IAS Disagree for one) were huge assets for me to fall back on in this time compressed scenario. This is not something we normally train for. This scenario didn't fit the mold of a typical EP; so being able to quickly fall back on training and knowledge was instrumental in our quick recovery and landing.

B737-700 flight crew reported several aircraft system malfunctions due to multiple bird strike on approach.

1601802

201812

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Toilet Furnishing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1601802

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On climbout at approximately 1;000 feet AGL; we had a SMOKE TOILET Caution message with the smell of electrical fumes in the cabin and possible smoke. This was a ferry flight with no Flight Attendant; the cockpit door was open and the cabin lights were off; so it was difficult to confirm the smoke. I informed ATC we needed to return to the airport due to cabin smoke. We accomplished immediate action items for smoke and prepared for the return to the airport. ATC vectored us to a visual. Turning to final; I noticed the caution message was out and the fumes had dissipated. I was the Pilot Monitoring and the First Officer; who was the Pilot Flying; accomplished an uneventful landing. We told Tower the situation had cleared and that we could taxi back to the gate. We were given all clear from the fire department after an external inspection; and we taxied back to the gate. From there; we called Maintenance; and the Dispatcher.I am not aware of any undesired aircraft states occurring; but we had threats including numerous MELs (no Autopilot; and Antiskid channel one inop.); busy airport; and approaching 10 hours of duty. Another threat was that my O2 mask continued to fog up making it hard to see. Because I was unable to ascertain if there was actual smoke in the cabin due to the no lights in the cabin; on future ferry flights; I may turn on a few reading lights in the rear of the cabin. The fogging of the O2 mask was probably due to me not ensuring I had a good seal when I put the mask on. In the future; I'll be sure to have a good seal.

CRJ-200 Captain reported returning to departure airport after receiving a SMOKE TOILET caution message and smelling electrical fumes.

1700214

201911

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

500.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Training / Qualification

1700214

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

Other Landing

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was flying an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to Runway XXR during VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions) conditions. At 1;000 and 500 ft. AGL; the aircraft was stable and on glide slope with target landing speed. At approximately 400 ft. AGL I noticed a yaw to the left along with a master caution light. I corrected the yaw condition and asked the Captain to look at the caution. The aircraft remained stable and I landed without incident. Upon landing roll out the left engine was observed to be at 0 RPM.The Captain informed me that he was guarding the throttles and adjusted his position in his seat for better visual lookout. While adjusting his position his hand must have brushed against the left engine start lever and once out of the stop it fell approximately 1' and began to shut down the engine.Specifically provide guidance for hand placement for throttle guarding during an approach for the pilot monitoring.

B737 First Officer reported that the Captain bumped an engine start lever during approach and caused the engine to shut down.

1770493

202011

0601-1200

ZZZ.Tower

US

400.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1770493

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1770518.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

The First Officer briefed the ZZZZZ SID Runway XXL; which has the same initial altitude then a turn to ZZZZZ1; as is listed for Runway XY. As we performed the Before Push Checklist we became distracted during the runway response by the confirmation of receiving Report X. As we began the climb; we then noticed that the FMC was setup for XXL. As we passed 5;XXX feet; the FMC sequenced to turn direct ZZZZZ1; which was the same flight path for a Runway XY departure for the ZZZZZ SID; therefore no flight path deviation occurred.

During loading of the FMC route the runway was initially loaded as XXL; after verifying with the Ramp that Runway XY was the intended departure runway for the ZZZZZ SID; I began to update the FMC. At that time the FA informed me of an issue that required the Ops Agent; therefore; distracting me from completing the runway change. When I returned; in my mind I had completed the runway change. I briefed the departure and we did not catch the error as the altitude of the turn coded in the FMC; and all the waypoints are identical for the two runways. As we performed the Before Push Checklist we were also distracted during the runway response by the confirmation of receiving Report X. We taxied out single engine and my focus was on starting the #2 engine. As we approached the end of Taxiway G we were cleared for takeoff. As we began the initial climb; I noticed that the FMC was setup for XXL. As we passed 5;XXX feet; the FMC sequenced to turn direct ZZZZZ1; which was actually the intended flight path for a Runway XY departure for the ZZZZZ SID; therefore no lateral fight path deviation occurred. Some additional external factors involved that led to additional distractions are the possibilities of furloughs related to COVID-19.

Air Carrier flight crew reported loading the incorrect departure runway in the FMS but no track deviation occurred due to the flight path being the same. The First Officer reported distraction and COVID-19 job related concerns contributed to the event.

1088852

201305

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Dawn

4000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 450

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

1088852

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

Stinson. Ground loop on runway; taxied to the end of the 31C. Stopped at the FBO and [had an] A&P look over the aircraft. No damaged to the airplane then left the same day.

A Stinson V-77 pilot reported no injury or damage following a ground loop during landing. Maintenance examined the aircraft prior to departure the same day.

1015884

201206

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

1015884

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft

Shortly after arriving at the gate in our destination; the C Flight Attendant reported to me that she experienced symptoms and smelled an odor consistent with previous cabin odor reports turned in by other crew members. Her experience; as reported to me; occurred during takeoff and climb to approximately 10;000 FT. She stated that she smelled a dirty sock or musty odor and experience burning eyes at position 2R (A321) beginning at initial takeoff thrust application; with the smell and burning eye sensation gradually subsiding during the climb out; stating that she recalled not smelling the odor at about the time that I turned off the PED at 10;000 FT. Her only complaint beyond those was a sensation in the back of her throat throughout the remainder of the flight. None of the other flight attendants or the cockpit crew members experienced what the C Flight Attendant experienced. After receiving her report; I contacted Maintenance through Dispatch to report the odor occurrence. I advised the Flight Attendant to contact her Supervisor and get advice on whether she should seek medical care; and also advised the rest of the crew to do the same if they thought it was necessary. The aircraft was written up; an Aircraft Cabin Odor Report was filled out by me with the assistance of the effected Flight Attendant; and the logbook page and Odor Report were faxed to Maintenance. Our outbound flight was subsequently canceled; and at the time of this writing; the aircraft is awaiting Maintenance personal from a nearby maintenance station to trouble shoot the problem.

An A321 Flight Attendant reported a dirty socks odor and experienced symptoms during takeoff and climb to 10;000 FT. The aircraft was removed from service at its destination.

1314571

201511

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Corporate

Challenger 605

Part 91

Personal

Parked

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Repair; Installation; Testing

Hangar / Base

Flight Deck

Corporate

Inspector

Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Avionics

Maintenance Avionics 15; Maintenance Inspector 15; Maintenance Lead Technician 20; Maintenance Technician 25

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

1314571

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Human Factors

Chart Or Publication

The crew reported a 'Stall Fail' Crew Alerting System (CAS) message in flight that was intermittent. The crew followed the Abnormal Checklist and disengaged one side of the Stall Warning System for the remainder of the flight. Upon inspection after landing; it was found that the Right-Hand (R/H) Angle Of Attack (AOA) transducer Voltage checks failed. These Voltage checks were provided by Bombardier Technical support and not listed in the Maintenance Manual (M/M). The unit in question passed the Linearity (Resistance Checks) which is a required check every 300 flight hours. It was interesting that the Resistance Checks passed but the Non-published Voltage Checks failed.There is an Airworthiness Directive (AD) (AD 2003-22-12) for this system for the Bombardier CL604 Challenger model; but not for the CL605 system. This AD requires that the resistance be checked every 300 hours. This unit would have passed that check. The Voltage Check showed a voltage error of approximately .8 volts low for every five degrees of AOA travel. This equaled approximately four degrees of error between the L/H and R/H AOA Vane which caused the stall fail message to illuminate. The R/H AOA transducer was replaced with a new unit and the aircraft was returned to service.It should be noted that the required AOA Transducer Resistance Check may not be enough on its own to check the serviceability of these units. Bombardier AOA transducer Part Number (P/N) 600 59154-3.

Reporter stated that icing was not an issue at the time the flight crew saw the 'Stall Fail' CAS light appear. There were multiple illuminations of the 'Stall Fail' light in flight that would go 'On'; then 'Out'; then come back 'On.' No indication is given to pilots whether the Left or Right Stall Protection System had failed. Per their checklist; pilots have to decide which yoke pusher actuator motor switch (Left or Right) to shut-off; leaving only one side with a pusher actuator operational. They will still get a Stick Shaker and Aural Warning if a stall occurs.Reporter stated they previously performed a repetitive 300-Hour Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2003-22-12 Linearity Resistance Check measurement of both AOA vane transducers. The Left AOA failed the Resistance Check and the AOA Assembly was replaced. The right AOA was OK. Shortly after; on a different flight; another 'Stall Fail' Warning CAS light appeared. But no faults were found in the aircraft's Maintenance Diagnostic Computer (MDC). He performed another Resistance Check and both AOAs passed. Since the Left AOA was new and the Right also passed the Resistance Check and Bombardier does not have a Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) to troubleshoot; they went to Bombardier's 'Smart Fix Plus' site to determine what to do next. No other information for troubleshooting 'Stall Fail' CAS warning involving the AOAs could be found.Reporter stated he performed a Voltage Check of the Right AOA using Non-published Voltage Checks. Resistance Checks only require three AOA vane positions to check. The Voltage Checks require verification of voltage readings at 15-different vane positions. The Right AOA assembly had failed the Voltage Check even though the same AOA had passed the Resistance Check that satisfies the AD.Reporter stated his concerns are that mechanics are signing-off AOA units as Serviceable after passing Resistance Checks performed per AD 2003-22-12. When in fact; the same units have failed the Voltage Check procedure which is not published in their Maintenance Manual (M/M); except under an Alignment Check section if the AOA Assembly is replaced for cause. Otherwise the Voltage Check is not applied. In their situation; the cause of the 'Stall Fail' CAS Warning light was not due to an AOA transducer Ohms Resistance failure; but a Voltage disparity. If the AOA Assembly fails a Voltage Check the unit must be replaced. That is why he believes the Voltage Check should be included with the Resistance Check to determine Serviceability and proper determination of the AOA vane positions.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) with Avionics experience reported the Linearity Resistance Check of AOA Vane Assembly transducers required by Airworthiness Directive (AD) on Bombardier aircraft should include a Voltage Check to properly determine the Serviceability of the AOA assemblies. Troubleshooting for an inflight 'Stall Fail' CAS warning revealed that the Right AOA vane had passed the Resistance Check; but failed the Voltage Check.

1866265

202201

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Rain

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Parking Brake

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 108; Flight Crew Type 2300

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1866265

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 209; Flight Crew Type 963

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1866288.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

Aircraft

Delayed reporting after Captain submitted [report]. Realized I should submit [a report] as well. Normal arrival into ZZZ. Snowstorm the previous night and into the morning. Ground taxi behind Aircraft Y with Captain riding the brakes. Taxiways with some snow and ice. Captain called for #2 engine shutdown. After arriving near the gate and lined up for a straight-in taxi; Captain set the parking brake; waiting for Ground crew to guide us in for the remaining 100 yards to the gate. Once directed by Ground crew; Captain released the parking brake and began to add power. No movement was noted and the Captain added more power; thinking that there was snow or ice preventing us from moving. I looked to checked that the parking brake was released and no message was displayed. I then looked at the pressure gauge and saw the needles pegged at 3000 psi; but was unable to recognize the discrepancy before the plane broke free with the asymmetric thrust and skidded in a 150-degree right hand turn. Once stopped; we confirmed that the needles were at 3000 psi with the brakes released. The Captain cycled the parking brake and the pressure returned to normal. With Ramp coordination; we continued our right-hand turn and returned to the gate normally. The brake issue was not reported via maintenance report since indications had return to normal. Follow-on flight crew was at the gate and we gave a verbal report of what happened with the brakes.

We landed ZZZ XXR and taxied to the gate. We were waiting for the Ramp guys to marshal us in. We were pointed south with the right engine shut down; parking brake set. When they eventually showed up; I released the brake and added a bit of thrust to taxi in but the aircraft did not move. I assumed we had some ice and frozen clutter possibly stuck to the brake so I kept increasing thrust to get the aircraft to move. I am not sure how much thrust we had when the aircraft suddenly pivoted about 150 degrees to the right. I immediately retarded the throttle and selected full brakes. Ramp inquired why we made the turn. After we were cleared to continue the turn to taxi to the gate; we noticed that the park brake appeared to be stuck. Brakes released and indicated 3;000 psi. I cycled the brake a few times and when it showed normal indication; we continued in to the gate for an uneventful parking. I did not do a maintenance write-up as I believed this was the result of frozen clutter. I did inform the new Captain of what had happened. The pivot was sudden but it was not violent. We literally slid across an icy ramp. Very smooth.

A319 flight crew reported a loss of aircraft control during taxi in to the gate due to the parking brake getting stuck and not releasing.

1595068

201811

0001-0600

SEA.Airport

WA

3000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON S46

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Class B SEA

TRACON S46

Widebody Transport

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Class B SEA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1595068

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

On final for the visual 34L into SEA we were following a [widebody] being vectored for the approach to 34C. Being 5 miles behind the heavy jet; we were cleared for the visual and I even prudently asked for the separation and their speed to better adjust things on our end to avoid wake turbulence. Around 5-10 miles from the runway at approximately 2500-3000 ft; we experienced a roll upset from wake turbulence from the [widebody]. It was aggressive; but controllable. If I had to guess; the aircraft was quickly rolled to about a 20 degree bank. The event only lasted a couple of seconds before we corrected the upset and were easily re-established. The Captain adjusted the glide path to sit even higher to the glide slope as to avoid the wake turbulence; but within the stable criteria. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful and the landing and taxi to the gate routine. Upon reaching the gate and deplaning; one passenger stated 'thanks for not killing us' in a very rude disdainful tone. The second passenger asked if we dodged an airplane or birds. Neither were true. Due to the nature of the passenger concerns; I found it necessary to file an ASAP and crew report. After that the Flight Attendant-A informed us that the passenger didn't wear his seat belt even when instructed to. He was also the individual that stated his remarks to us. I also think that the [widebody] was high on his visual approach to 34C so it put the wake turbulence right at our altitude when we were flying a higher glide slope already; but it was dark and difficult to see the situation fully. I would suggest that the wake separation be increased for [widebodies]. Five miles was just barely adequate and any aircraft smaller might actually experience jet upset at a low altitude.

EMB-175 reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to SEA in trail of a widebody transport. Reporter recommended increased separation from this type aircraft.

1201111

201409

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Brasilia EMB-120 All Series

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Nosewheel Steering

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction

1201111

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure

Aircraft

Upon rotation received a 'peddle Steer Inop' glareshield message. We declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport for an uneventful landing.The root cause of this event is poor maintenance on the EMB-120 by this Airline. This aircraft has had this same issue multiple times. Either the Airline is not technically capable of maintaining these aircraft or they are not attempting to actually fix the issues at hand.I suggest this Airline Maintenance needs to be examined for systematical issues pertaining to troubleshooting and repeat write-ups. This is not a problem with a specific mechanic but comes from the top of our Company.

An EMB-120 glare shield message 'PEDDLE Steer Inop' alerted at rotation on takeoff so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport. Aircraft Maintenance is apparently lacking.

1332687

201602

1201-1800

VVTS.ARTCC

FO

43000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center VVTS

Corporate

Falcon 7X

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 76; Flight Crew Total 12300; Flight Crew Type 700

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1332687

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Other post flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

As this was my first trip to Southeast Asia using Controller Pilot Datalink Communications (CPDLC); I had studied the applicable procedures extensively; and was additionally confident in the experience of my copilot operating in this region. Crossing from the Manila Flight Information Region (FIR) into the Ho Chi Minh FIR over MIGUG and communicating over VHF; the controller asked us to report MESOX. We informed him that we were CPDLC; and he instructed us to use CPDLC. My colleague suggested that since we had ADS-C; we didn't need to send a position report. I accepted his recommendation; and shortly thereafter we were in radar contact. We proceeded to our destination without incident. In retrospect; I believe that we should have sent that position report; and will use this experience as a lesson for the future.

Falcon 7X Captain reported he was unsure about reporting requirements in Southeast Asia using Controller Pilot Datalink Communications (CPDLC).

1807534

202105

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Transponder

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

1807534

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

The situation happened on leg 1 on the second day of a 4 day sequence. We departed ZZZ for ZZZ1. As the First Officer I completed both the interior checklists and performed the exterior inspection. I noticed during the walk around that one of the red navigation lights was inoperative. When I got back to the flight deck I confirmed that it was previously written up and had been deferred in the AML. No other issues were noted during the preflight. The Captain was the Pilot Flying and I was the Pilot Monitoring. We departed ZZZ on Runway XXL. The takeoff and departure were uneventful. Weather was clear with unrestricted visibility. The climb was continued until we leveled off at FL340. At approximately XA:13Z; I started to smell something. It smelled like burning plastic. At the same time I noticed the smell the Captain asked 'Do you smell that?' Before replying we both saw smoke coming from the 'FL' button on the transponder located on the center console. At this time we both we executed the items for 'Smoke; Fire; or Fumes'; donned our oxygen masks and established crew communication. At that point the Captain gave me both aircraft control and the radios so he could focus on the abnormal. While I monitored the autopilot the Captain continued with the 'Smoke; Fire; or Fumes' checklist. I confirmed with him that the proper switches were being turned off in accordance with the checklist. We noticed that the smoke and fumes were decreasing and did not need to run the 'Smoke or Fumes Removal' checklist. While the Captain attempted to locate the transponder circuit breaker to isolate the problem he noticed that the 'ELEC PANEL LIGHTS AFT/CENTER' circuit breaker located at the base of the front of the center pedestal was popped. We were confident the problem had been isolated and the Captain informed me that he was about 90% sure we were going to divert but he wanted to check with company to see if we were missing anything. We quickly realized that a step in the checklist had us turn off the internet and he would be unable to use the crew phone app to communicate with the Dispatcher. The Captain then took the radios back and attempted to get phone patch with the Center Controller. The controller was unable to give us the phone patch but was able to relay information. After communicating through the controller and using ACARS; it was decided that we would divert to ZZZ2. The Captain notified ATC and informed Center we wanted to divert to ZZZ2. The controller asked if we want ARFF (aircraft rescue firefighting) and the Captain said yes. The Captain then gave me back the radios so that he could run more checklists. The Captain continued with the checklists the controller asked what runway we wanted to land on. The Captain and I agreed that we wanted the longest runway due to the fact we would be landing overweight. I then requested Runway XXR. I got the airplane set up for an ILS approach to XXR. I started the descent into ZZZ2 while the Captain finished checklists and briefed the passengers and Flight Attendants. Then the Captain told me that he ran the 'Non Routine Landing Considerations' checklist and that the passengers and flight attendants had been briefed. He talked about the heavy weight landing and did a landing assessment. He asked if I had anything to add or could think of anything else we might need to do before landing. I told him that I think we had covered everything and I had nothing else to add. He then briefed the approach and took aircraft control. We completed both the descent and before landing checklists. After landing we cleared the runway at taxiway. I relayed to ARFF that unless they see anything abnormal from the outside our plan was to continue taxing to gate. They informed us that they did not see any unusual readings on thethermal scan. ARFF followed us to the gate. The Captain had me make a PA to the passengers that we would be taxing to gate and they would be accommodated after deplaning. The taxi and engine shutdown at the gate was uneventful. At the gate we were met by a member of the company Flight Office and he asked if we needed to be checked out at the hospital. We both said we did not require medical attention and that no more than a few seconds went by that we breathed in fumes before getting on oxygen. He then told us that he was pulling us off the remainder of the trip and could positive space home. The Captain completed writing up items in the AML. We then debriefed when it was just the two of us left on the airplane. I told him I thought maybe I could have done more to help. He said I did what he needed by flying the airplane and communicating with ATC while he ran the appropriate checklists and backed him up in his decision making process. We both agreed that we handled the situation in the way we are trained to handle abnormal at the school house. The cause was smoke coming from the 'FL' button on the transponder located on the center console.

B737-800 First Officer reported a fumes event in the flight deck during cruise resulting in a diversion.

1420307

201701

0601-1200

BOS.Airport

MA

0.0

VMC

Windshear

Daylight

Tower BOS

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

SID HYLND4

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1420307

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Weather

Boston was departing on Runway 22R; winds were reported 260 at 13 kts with no gusts or windshear forecast. We planned a max power takeoff for departure on the HYLND4. At rotation; prior to establishing a positive rate of climb; the airspeed stagnated and the WAGS system sounded an aural Tailwind Shear alert and the flight director switched to wind shear guidance. Due to poor acceleration and climb performance; I advanced the throttles towards Firewall Power and we climbed out in takeoff configuration. The pilot monitoring notified Boston Tower of the windshear; and after windshear guidance was exited; Tower and departure provided vectors to HYLND; the final point of the SID. The power setting was reduced to max at about 1000 ft AGL and no exceedances were observed. With no evidence of damage or exceedances the flight was continued.Aircraft systems operated normally; windshear escape procedures were followed. Simulator training is very valuable in developing the reflexes for unexpected events such as low level wind shear.

Air carrier Captain reported using firewall thrust to cope with an unexpected tailwind shear event during takeoff from BOS.

1581081

201809

1801-2400

MIA.TRACON

FL

4000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON MIA

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Vectors

Class E MIA

TRACON MIA

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Cruise

VFR Route

Class E MIA

Facility MIA.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1581081

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure

Airspace Structure

FLL feeder final was combined together. ROMEO was working Aircraft X inbound from the east for the 10L ILS final. Several controllers saw a 4;500 feet VFR [Aircraft Y] inbound from the north; descending southbound for the OPF/HWO area; and it was tagged as ''TFC'' acquiring the callsign via ADSB. Aircraft X was given an expeditious descent to get under the VFR as the Arrival Controller had numerous inbounds to both FLL parallel runways and it seemed this was the easiest way to de-conflict Aircraft X and Aircraft Y and go to immediately fix the other many aircraft who were also in conflict. Aircraft X was then also turned sharply in the descent in an attempt to join the final without crossing the projected path of the traffic; and miss a Caravan inbound for the airport too. Aircraft Y continued through the ILS approaches just west of PIONN; which has a crossing altitude of 025 and even turned back to the south and west to both miss the Bravo; but clearly also miss aircraft it saw out its window; creating even more problems for the ROMEO controller. The fact that this is allowed to happen and create unmitigated risk in the NAS is [absurd]. The traffic volume and complexity were already high; however had this event occurred during busier times of day; it would have been substantially more dangerous. FLL needs a bigger Class C airspace or a Class B! FLL airport is the 19th busiest airport in the USA; and one of the top 3 fastest growing; averaging 8% growth each of the last 5 years. FLL has a basic Class C airspace surrounding it that is beyond out of date and unable to aid in the safety of its aircraft on the finals. Planes inbound to each of their parallel runways are not offered any sort of protection until within 5 miles of the field; which allows several dozen VFRs each day to climb; descend; and transition across each final; without ATC advisories creating a very dangerous; unsafe; and hazardous situation in the skies above; not unlike San Diego in 1978. The FLL Class C is inadequate; and out of date; and needs a major airspace change around it; whether a bigger Charlie; or a full blown Class B before it's too late; just like [an accident in 1978] where people had to die before airspace changes happened.

MIA TRACON Controller reported vectoring several aircraft conducting instrument approaches off course to avoid a VFR aircraft they were not in communication with.

1095803

201306

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

39000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Flap/Slat Control System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Total 10450

Situational Awareness

1095803

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction

1095804.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors

I was pilot flying during this event. I was resting my arm on the flap lever; inputting information into the FMS. I felt the flap handle move aft; the aircraft 'raised up a bit;' and the flap position indicator moved from the up position toward the 1 degree mark on the gauge. I immediately moved the handle down into the detent position. I pulled back on the handle to ensure that it was completely in the correct position. This confirmed to me that the flap handle had not been properly seated after takeoff cleanup. We were at FL390; 0.79 mach and 240 KTS. This whole event lasted less than 3 seconds.1

In cruise flight at FL390; we received clearance direct to a fix on the XXX Arrival. I was making an address to the passengers at that same time. The First Officer as pilot flying entered the new fix in the CDU and as he pulled his left hand back his wrist or hand brushed the Flap Control Lever and it momentarily dropped back the Flaps 1 position. The aircraft bumped momentarily before the First Officer could return the lever to the Flaps Zero position. There was no aural overspeed indication and the Leading Edge Device (Amber) in Transit Light did not ever illuminate. We notified Dispatch via free text message of the occurrence and asked for them to advise Maintenance. We entered the occurrence in the logbook and radioed Aircraft Maintenance of the event upon arrival at the gate.

B737-800 First Officer inadvertently bumped the flap handle while entering data into the FMC during cruise; causing it to move out of the 'up' detent.

1307469

201511

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

3000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class C ZZZ

Pneumatic Control Valves

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

1307469

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

Departed as normal; upon reaching approximately 400 feet received an EICAS message and warning for bleed 1 and 2 over pressure. Continued climb while cleaning up plane as normal. Leveled at 3;000 feet. I had the airplane and the radios; [Captain] began to run the QRH checklist. After completing the checklist the bleed 1 over pressure message went away but 2 did not. The captain decided to run the checklist once more with the same result. The checklist required us to land with one engine idle. At that time the captain decided to switch duties. I ran the single engine land checklist while he flew and had radios. After the checklist was completed we asked for vectors back to [departure airport] and proceeded to fly the visual. After landing we exited the runway. Everyone was fine and no other incidents occurred. Overall the [situation] was a success. We used CRM and the training we received. The only thing I would have changed was the decision to switch roles in between checklists. The captain had briefed that I would fly and he would run checklists as needed. The switch caused slight confusion on my end but we were able to handle the situation safely.

An EMB-175 First Officer reported returning to the departure airport after receiving an EICAS message for dual bleed overpressure.

1315277

201512

0001-0600

SDF.Airport

KY

3000.0

VMC

5

Night

5000

TRACON SDF

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Approach

Visual Approach; STAR MBELL1

Class C SDF

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1315277

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1315279.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Arriving on the RNAV Star; we were cleared direct [fix] to cross at 8000 feet. Prior to [fix] we were given descend to 6000 feet then later 3000 feet. We were instructed to join the localizer. At that point I selected heading mode and V/L on the MCP. Our heading was direct to a fix which is an extension of the Runway 35L localizer with no significant wind that would affect our course. At some point the controller; apparently in training; said: turn left to 020 to join the localizer do you have the runway in sight? The pilot monitoring repeated the heading and declared the runway in sight. The controller said: cleared for the visual. In the turn the localizer came alive and we joined and I selected LAND on the MCP. Immediately a voice came on and asked us why we departed from the arrival. The pilot monitoring said: we were cleared to join the localizer. The pilot monitoring asked: If you have a minute can you explain the problem. The same male voice in a very condescending manner repeated his previous statement insinuating that we had done something wrong. We continued the approach to land. After shut down the First officer and I discussed the event and were still puzzled. We did not over shoot the localizer or deviate from course. We decided the best thing to do would be to call the controller by phone which we did. The controller's supervisor said that they had discussed the event already. He said that our heading would take us toward the traffic for the parallel runway and that was the reason for the last minute heading change. Well of course it does; that's what happens when you come from the West. We both agreed that the instructions given to us on the approach should have been more precise. The trainee should have said: continue on the arrival to join; or present heading to join the localizer; which is what we did. Either way there should have been very little difference. The supervisor also said that there was no incident because of that issue.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

An aircraft on an RNAV arrival with a transition to the ILS approach was vectored off the arrival to join the localizer then cleared for a visual approach. There was confusion between the pilots and ATC if the crew was navigating in accordance with their clearance.

1258125

201504

1201-1800

ZHU.ARTCC

TX

18000.0

Daylight

Center ZHU

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR TWSTD3

Class A ZHU

FMS/FMC

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 585

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1258125

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

We were flying to IAH. I am an A320 Captain and was receiving right seat training (to become a LCA) from a Line Check Captain. I was the pilot monitoring. We were originally filed on the WHACK2 arrival (which is for a west operation in IAH). Since IAH was landing to the east I asked Houston Center if we could still expect this arrival. Houston re-cleared us via the TWSTD3 arrival.At some point we were cleared direct to WHACK and to cross WHACK at 13;000. As I recall we were then at FL220. The Pilot flying (PF) (Captain) properly selected 13;000 in the FCU and entered the crossing restriction altitude in the FMS. I verified that his entries were correct. Several miles prior to the TOD arrow I made a remark that it was almost time to start down. A couple of miles prior to the TOD arrow the PF initiated a managed descent to 13;000. We were below the path (later directly on the vertical path). Everything looked as we expected it to look.The published crossing altitudes for the WHACK fix are between FL200 & 17;000 @ 280 KTS. Again; we had been cleared to cross WHACK at 13000. The fix after WHACK (TWSTD) has a published crossing altitude of between 16;000 & 13;000 @ 280 KTS. Approximately 10 miles prior to WHACK both the PF and myself realized that the aircraft was not descending the way it should. The PF clicked off the autopilot; went into open descent; and extended the speed brakes (only 1/2 speed brakes are available with the autopilot connected). Several miles prior to WHACK ATC asked us to slow to 250 KTS. I informed him that we would not be able to make WHACK at 13000. He told us 'no problem' then gave us a revised clearance to descend via the TWSTD3. I also asked whether he wanted us to maintain 250 or comply with the published speeds on the STAR. He told us to maintain 250 KTS.The LCA I was flying with said that he had programmed the FMS correctly (I agree) and that this was a known anomaly with the Thales FMS. He said that when we were cleared to an altitude below what the published altitude for WHACK; with the corresponding other crossing altitudes at TWSTD; that the FMS gets confused as to what altitude to make. He told me he would be following up on this with the Fleet Captain and technical pilots for corrective action. Obviously we both could've done a better job of monitoring the ongoing descent. I was lulled into believing that since everything was loaded correctly and was descending on profile that it would make the restriction as entered.

The reporter states that his company has issued a bulletin covering this anomaly; descending to a hard altitude with window altitude to follow; will cause the hard altitude to be missed under certain circumstances. The window altitude must be changed to a hard altitude at or below the earlier altitude to use managed descent.

A320 First Officer on the TWSTD3 RNAV arrival to IAH reports being cleared by ATC to cross WHACK at 13;000 feet and the Captain sets 13;000 in the FCU and in the FMGC WHACK. The waypoint after WHACK is TWSTD with a crossing restriction between 16;000 and 13;000 which remains displayed and the reporter states confuses the FMGC into starting a late descent for the WHACK restriction. The flying Captain states that this was a known anomaly with the Thales FMS.

1160081

201403

1801-2400

SJU.Tower

PR

1500.0

VMC

10

Dusk

Tower SJU

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Climb

Class C SJU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 5475; Flight Crew Type 110

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1160081

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure

Departed Isla Grande airport (TJIG) VFR approved for the (VFR) Tango Transition by TJIG Tower to TIST (St. Thomas). Was cleared for takeoff by TJIG Tower climb to 1;500 FT and fly the Tango Transition. I departed on 095 heading and waited for as always for Tower to transfer me to San Juan Tower; but they never did. I called San Juan Tower and checked in on the Tango Transition proceeding as approved to the Tower. I was informed by the Controller that I had entered Class C airspace without authorization. I apologized and stated that I was not handed over to Tower as usual. The Controller stated that I should have circumvented Class C airspace. I have always understood that once I was cleared for the Tango Transition and given a discreet transponder code that my authorization was already granted. I still believe that is the case; nonetheless I will in the future assure myself that I call San Juan Tower before proceeding. There were no conflicts with other aircraft; I was switched to San Juan Departure and continued my VFR flight. I will be more vigilant in the future.

SMA pilot assumed he had Class C clearance; Controller advised pilot that they had violated the airspace.

1207440

201409

0601-1200

LGA.Airport

NY

11000.0

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class E N90

Altitude Hold/Capture

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Confusion

1207440

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft

We were on the HAARP3 arrival into LGA when we were given a descent and holding instructions. ATC advised that they were turning LGA around; and that we were to descend and maintain 11000 ft; cleared direct VALRE and hold as published with 10 NM legs. The First Officer (FO) was the flying pilot and entered 11000 and started a descent using PATH. He also entered the hold into the FMS and we both verified the course. When we entered the hold (which was essentially a direct entry) we were level and 11;000 ft with 11;000 ft set in the altitude preselect. The FO also had the speed set in manual at 210 kts. Upon entering the hold I made the ATC report. Just after the AP started its turn (as it should have); the auto-throttles advanced to full thrust and the AC started an aggressive climb leaving the 11000 ALT and disregarding the 210 kts speed. Again; 11;000 was set in the ALT and 210 kts in manual speeds. Because the AC was departing from its programmed values; I used TCS to take control and returned the AC to 11;000 and 210 kts. (I believe I was able to keep it from exceeding 11;200 ft.) I then gave the controls back to the FO and told him to fly it manually while I changed the Vertical mode to green ALT. The FO got us established in the hold and we were able to return to AP for the remainder of the hold. After reviewing what happened the FO said he selected one of the 3 holds in the Database for VALRE. The one he had selected showed the hold BELOW FL180. His reasoning was that since we were level at 11;000 that would be appropriate. (I would have to agree.) Regardless of the hold selected from the database the AC should never have departed from the 11;000 ft selected. I believe there is a programming error with the current software load that would allow the AC to depart from an altitude without having a different altitude selected. At no time were we prompted to enter a new altitude (which the automation will usually prompt you to do if you've asked it to make a crossing without entering the new ALT in the preselect). Bottom line the AC should never decide on its own to start a climb without us authorizing it. If I had not overridden the AP as quickly as I did we could have easily climbed into other traffic in the same holding pattern (there was none there at the time but there was a few min later).

EMB-175 flight crew reports being issued a holding clearance at VALRE at 11;000 FT. A database hold that matches the clearance is selected in the FMC. As the aircraft crosses the holding fix at 11;000 FT and starts to turn; autothrust advances to climb power and the nose pitches up. The Captain quickly takes control and returns the aircraft to the proper altitude and flight path. Autothrust is normal for the remainder of the flight.

1820409

202107

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

31000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Workload; Fatigue

1820409

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure

1820936.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Notified ATC and diversion due to burning smell inside flight deck. Passing through FL310 Captain asked First Officer (FO) if he smelled anything out of the ordinary. FO stated he smelled something like burning toast. Captain rang flight attendant and asked the same to which she stated burnt toast as well. Captain notified ATC and we diverted to ZZZ. During descent smell went away but reoccurred intermittently. Performed overweight landing smoothly and stopped on runway. Confirmed smell was gone with flight attendant and taxied to gate while fire rescue followed. Passengers deplaned. Maintenance met us at gate and we were able to duplicate smell when packs were turned on using APU. First Officer flew aircraft while Captain performed checklist. We landed without further incident. Captain and FO spoke and initially felt okay to continue on [from] ZZZ. However as time passed and adrenaline wore off fatigue set in. We spoke again and both determined that we could not safely operate the flight [from] ZZZ.

When climbing through 31;000 feet; both the FO and I noticed a distinct odor that smelled like burning toast. We immediately asked the FA if she smelled it as well and she did. I then [requested priority handling] with ATC and the FO initiated a descent as we diverted to ZZZ1. Once we descended through 31;000 feet; the smell dissipated. Throughout the flight; we smelled the burning order intermittently for short durations of only a few seconds. Once we landed; we came to a stop on the runway and assessed the situation. The odor was gone so we taxied back to our gate under our own power with fire trucks in tow. When at the gate with the door open and APU bleed and packs on; the odor came back and intensified. Maintenance was able to reproduce this on the ground.

EMB-145 flight crew reported a fume event that resulted in a diversion. After landing when the APU bleed and packs were on; the odor returned.

1083104

201304

CHD.Airport

AZ

700.0

VMC

20

50000

Personal

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

GPS

Cruise

Class D CHD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface

1083104

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

GPS provided faulty direction to an entered waypoint which I did not immediately recognize. While manipulating the controls of the unit to attempt to get the appropriate result to the desired waypoint I continued to travel on an inappropriate course for my destination. When I switched back to the map page I was very close to the Class D airspace of CHD and IWA and may have breached the border of the D airspace(s) while I was reversing course. It could have been eliminated if I had reversed course immediately when I became aware of the problem with the GPS and returned to my departure airport and attempted to solve the problem on the ground.

General aviation pilot reports problems with his GPS which is not immediately recognized; resulting in possible Class D airspace entry without a clearance.

996096

201202

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft Auto Temperature System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

996096

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

After taxiing to the runway; we were cleared for takeoff. We proceeded with a normal takeoff and contacted Departure Control when instructed by the Tower. Upon contacting departure at approximately 600 FT MSL; the Departure Controller instructed us to turn RIGHT to a heading of 290. On this heading of 290; we reached our 'Acceleration Height' and began to commence the CLIMB checklist. As soon as my First Officer turned our Bleed System to its proper operating condition; very warm air began coming out of the vents. I asked the First Officer to turn down the heat; and he stated that the heat was already at the COLD position. I verified this setting; as we were given more departure instructions from Departure Control. Right then; the Flight Attendant called up to the flight deck on the Normal Call phone line; and stated that it was 'very warm' in the cabin and asked if we could please turn down the heat. We stated that we were trying to fix the problem; and would get back to her when we had a chance to; since we were still trying to climb as instructed while figuring out the heat issue. At this point; we are at approximately 3;500 FT MSL; only a few minutes after our departure. Realizing there was a potential problem with our Bleed Air System (due to the fact that I could not seem to rectify the problem through manipulation of the temperature control settings); I told the First Officer that this was abnormal for warm air to be blowing out in a full COLD configuration. Just then (approximately 15-20 seconds after the end of the initial call from the Flight Attendant); the Emergency Call button lit up; and I answered. The Flight Attendant stated that the cabin had become extremely hot all of a sudden; and that there was a haze developing in the back from approximately Rows 7 all the way back to the flight attendant galley; and that there was a 'burning smell' in the cabin as well. She also stated that passengers were feeling the sidewalls of the cabin saying that the walls were very hot; as well as their overhead vents. She then stated that the haze appeared to be turning into a smoky haze. I informed her that we will be immediately returning and to prepare the cabin for an emergency landing. At this point; we were only about 4 miles from the airport; as we had turned into a 50+ knot headwind on departure. I immediately informed Departure that we were declaring an emergency; and that we needed to return to the airport; as well as the nature of the event. The Departure Controller gave us a heading that pointed us directly back to the airport (now about 5 miles away) and gave us descent instructions to 3;000 FT MSL. While making this initial turn and descent; I had my First Officer pull out the Emergency and Abnormal Checklist; and we ran the appropriate checklist for aircraft smoke in the cabin. We were asked if we had the airport in sight; and we confirmed that we did have the airport in sight. We were cleared for a visual approach and told to contact the Tower. While on this now 4 mile right downwind; we contacted the Flight Attendant and she stated that the cabin was prepared for landing; and she also stated that the smoky haze had dissipated shortly after she heard us turn the Bleed System off; and that the cabin temperature had also decreased. I asked her if there would be any need to evacuate on the tarmac away from the gate; and she stated that there would be no reason to; now that the smoke and temperature issues were gone. The First Officer and I ran the landing checklist and turned onto a 3 mile final. After configuring the aircraft; we landed and were greeted with multiple fire trucks and emergency vehicles that were waiting for our arrival on the side of the runway. Tower asked if we would need any further assistance; and I stated that we needed no further assistance other than an expedited taxi into the gate. The Controller handed us off to Ground Control; who gave us taxi instructions into the gate. One fire truck anda couple of emergency vehicles followed us into the gate. As we were taxiing in; we re-confirmed with the Flight Attendant that the cabin was still clear of smoke and heat. After being marshaled into the gate; we shut down the engines and had the passengers exit through the Main Cabin Door into the terminal. Maintenance was waiting for the aircraft; and immediately began checking the engines and exterior fuselage for any additional problems as we were deplaning the passengers. The entire segment from takeoff to touchdown was 8 (eight) minutes.

DHC8 Captain experiences uncontrollable heat coming from the vents in the cockpit and cabin when the bleeds are turned on after takeoff. An emergency is declared and the bleeds are turned off per the QRH prior to a visual approach and landing.

1699257

201911

1801-2400

SFO.Airport

CA

1800.0

VMC

Night

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Class B SFO

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

1699257

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Human Factors

We were cleared to land. There was parallel traffic that was cleared to land on the right parallel runway. Prior to our clearance we called the field and not the traffic in sight for the visual approach. At approximately 2;000 feet; as we were getting established on glide slope; the First Officer who was the Pilot Monitoring noticed Aircraft Y flying very close to us and queried ATC to verify he was cleared to land on the right runway and not the left runway as it looked like he was lining up with our runway. As he queried; we got a TCAS RA. The autopilot was on and I called TCAS blue as the plane reacted to the RA and descended at a rate of about 1;800 FPM. Aircraft Y was now descending on our path above us; so close that we knew he was not lined up with the right runway and was lining up with the left runway. The First Officer told ATC we were responding to an RA and the Tower just replied 'Roger' and did not instruct Aircraft Y to go-around. The First Officer again queried ATC and said are you sure Aircraft Y is lined up with the right runway; which Tower replied; 'Yes Aircraft Y is lined up…oh; it looks like Aircraft X is getting a little nervous.'The plane leveled at 1;200 feet and was almost about to do another descend RA when I clicked off the autopilot because we were so close to the ground and I lined the plane up to the left of the runway to get away from Aircraft Y. The First Officer saw Aircraft Y bank away when he had queried the second time about their clearance. When we saw Aircraft Y no longer descending above and towards us we executed a go-around. On short final [and] on the second go-around; Tower instructed us to go-around once again due to traffic not clearing the runway fast enough. We landed on the third attempt and had an arrival fuel of 6;080 LB. I got the Tower's phone number and spoke with a Controller who said; 'Yes we saw Aircraft Y was just slightly south of course but he corrected and the second go-around was for traffic.' I told him he was not south of course; he was lined up with the incorrect runway and that's what caused the RA and the Tower dismissed me and said they're not filing a report.The first TCAS RA was handled SOP. Aircraft Y was clearly not lined up with the right parallel runway and it was not just an overshoot of lining up with their final. Because of the TCAS RA command we were able to descend quickly enough away from their lineup and descend to our runway. Our aircraft was in dangerously [in] close proximity to Aircraft Y and we could visually see their trajectory was with our runway. The breakaway from the second TCAS RA was due to the aircraft being at 1200 ft. and visually seeing Aircraft Y start to bank away from our flight path so we were then able to execute a go-around. ATC should have told Aircraft Y to go-around when they heard us responding to a TCAS RA. Aircraft Y was silent the whole time during this event and I suspect it was due to them realizing they were the ones in error. ATC is also in denial when I spoke with them on the phone about the event that caused an aggressive low altitude TCAS RA and two go-arounds.

Air carrier Captain reported having to go-around two times due to conflicting traffic.

1739447

202004

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

700.0

IMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Takeoff / Launch

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Nose Gear Tire

X

Failed

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1739447

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

While taxiing out we turned onto the taxiway and heard a pop; stopped; [and] checked for any indication of something abnormal. Nothing noted. Continued taxiing and took off with no indication of anything wrong. Tower called at 140 kts. on the takeoff roll. Called again passing 700 ft. after gear was retracted to inform us of a nose tire left on the taxiway. [We] made the decision to bring the jet to [destination]. Landed on [Runway XX] after advising ATC. Flaps 50 Power on flare. No damage noted; towed back to parking.

Air Carrier Captain reported hearing multiple loud pops on takeoff and was informed that a nose wheel assembly was left on the runway.

1057987

201212

0601-1200

FSD.Airport

SD

1.0

2000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower FSD

Air Taxi

Cessna 404 Titan

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Landing

Direct

Class D FSD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 200

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1057987

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 6000

Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was cleared to land Runway 15; while 8 miles from the airport. My company traffic was preceding me to the airport. Prior to company traffic landing; the Tower had an F-16 which was in the traffic pattern; execute a go-around. As I neared the airport; the Tower advised me of the F-16 in the traffic pattern. I noticed the F-16 on a downwind for Runway 21. As I neared approximately a mile final for Runway 15; I noticed the F-16 on an approximate 1 mile final for Runway 21. At this time I questioned the Controller if I was cleared to land Runway 15. The Controller said yes; that I was number 2. At this point I decided to initiate a left 360; to re-enter final for Runway 15 and land. As I initiated my turn; I advised the Controller that I was making a left 360. The Controller said nothing. As I was about 180 degrees into my turn; I verified with the Controller that I was cleared to land on Runway 15. The Controller confirmed that I was cleared to land [Runway] 15. Upon discussing this with my Director of Operations and Director of Safety; it was mentioned that I should have initiated a go-around straight ahead; as that airspace 'should' be cleared ahead of me. It was also made mention that if traffic had been behind me; it could have created a conflict. With the situational awareness I had; I knew there was no conflicting traffic behind me; and with the F-16's go-around before the preceding company traffic; I could not guarantee that the airspace was cleared ahead of me. Also; my turn to the left put me closer to the traffic; rather than away from it; so a right turn may have been a better option. I choose the left; since I was single pilot and my view is best in a left turn. Corrective action; speak up sooner if something doesn't seem right!!!

IFR Twin inbound to FSD elected to execute a 360 degree turn on final without ATC approval because of military traffic operating on an intersecting runway.

1684875

201909

0001-0600

LOWW.Airport

FO

VMC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Air Carrier

B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1684875

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

We were being vectored to final for Runway 29. I was the PF [Pilot Flying]. We had been assigned 180 knots by the Approach Controller; I was maintaining that. There was an aircraft about 5 miles ahead as we were on base to final. While intercepting the localizer; the Captain instructed me to slow to 160 knots; as the aircraft was now 4 miles in front of us. I hesitated as we had been assigned a speed; but then followed the Captain's instructions. He told ATC 'we are slowing to 160 knots for separation with the aircraft in front of us.' ATC immediately told us not to slow without permission; then said to maintain 160 knots to 6 DME. He then told us he can go to 2.5 miles separation. We encountered some light wake turbulence and after landing saw that the preceding aircraft was a 787. ATC in Vienna is always challenging to deal with at best. As PF; I was put in the position where I had to choose whether to follow an ATC clearance; or the Captain's instructions. ATC in Vienna is not the best. Approach Controllers will assign speeds on final that are immediately contradicted by the Tower Controller after switching over; for example; 'maintain 180 knots to 6 miles' then after switching to Tower; 'slow to minimum approach speed; aircraft departing ahead.' The Captain made orders to me contradicting an ATC clearance; that didn't make sense at the time; so I just had to randomly follow his instructions. After landing and thinking about it for a while; he explained his reasoning; which then made some sense. Better communication during the event would have helped us be on the same page during it; which I always think is a better way to do things. The Captain made the right call in my opinion; we would have probably encountered more wake turbulence with the 787 as our separation decreased. Tower also departed an aircraft ahead of us on 29; and had we not slowed; it more than likely would have resulted in a go around for us.

Air carrier F/O reported slowing below ATC assigned speed when directed to do so by the Captain; who saw a potential conflict occurring with the aircraft preceding them.

1260858

201505

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

800.0

VMC

Daylight

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

Training

Other Go Around

Class C ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Trainee

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1260858

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

During a go-around the aircraft was on the upwind at 800 feet MSL when the engine lost all power and the engine began wind milling. The instructor performed the engine failure in flight checklist with no restart. The instructor made a radio call to tower 'Tower; Aircraft X [has an] emergency engine failure' the engine restarted 'we have it back I want the first available runway.' Tower responded 'Cleared to land.' The instructor executed a normal landing and turned right on taxiway. Tower wanted to know if any further assistance was needed. The instructor responded 'Negative.' and taxied back to the ramp under aircraft's own power.

GA pilot reported the engine quit in the pattern. Engine was restarted successfully and a normal landing ensued.

1135196

201312

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Night

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Air Conditioning Distribution System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Physiological - Other; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1135196

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Procedure

[We were] required to wear C02 monitor due to dry ice waiver. During de-icing operations with packs off; the monitor alarm began to chirp. I donned the O2 mask and noticed the level on the monitor as 0.5 and climbing to 0.7. Both the Captain and I stayed on O2 for approximately 20 minutes during the duration of de-icing. After confirmation from ground support that the deicing procedure was complete; I turned the packs on per the QRH and the CO2 alarm subsided approximately 1 minute later. The Captain called the Duty Officer for protocol guidance regarding the event and we were advised that we were 'probably OK' to continue. We resumed the flight. Unfortunately; we have no idea to determine the levels of CO2 in the cockpit and our exposure levels. We followed the published bulletin relating to the CO2. Better guidance and knowledge from flight safety regarding our susceptibility of the types of exposure risks pertaining to hazardous materials.

The First Officer of a cargo flight noticed his carbon monoxide monitor alerting at a 0.5 to 0.7 level during de-ice operations with the Packs OFF and dry ice onboard. The crew used oxygen for about 20 minutes until the Packs were ON again.

1123869

201310

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

7.0

5500.0

Mixed

10

Daylight

3500

Center ZZZ

Corporate

Challenger 300

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Autothrottle/Speed Control

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 43; Flight Crew Total 9900

Distraction; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

1123869

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

During our climb out from Runway 30; we received vectors 20 degrees left from our initial heading of 301 degrees due to another aircraft not answering radio transmissions. Just prior to the new vector; we had also been cleared to an altitude higher than the departure procedure's initial 3;000 FT. During this climb and the vectors; we entered intermittent IMC conditions. This report is due to the fact that as the flying pilot; I allowed the aircraft to reach a speed of 270-280 KTS below 10;000 for approximately 1 minute. I realized this through a visual scan of my instruments; it was not brought to my attention otherwise. Although I am not attempting to excuse my lack of full situational awareness for this; I will explain what I believe were contributing factors: The CL300 does not have autothrottles. I have not flown an aircraft without auto throttles for 15+ years. The aircraft also has issues with the FLCH mode 'porpoising' the aircraft; so our company has its pilots take off in FLCH; but prefers us to switch to VS mode as soon as practical. With the newness to the aircraft; and my past experiences of taking off with autothrottles in either FLCH and/or VNAV modes; I did not appreciate that my V-bars had a significant lag when switching from FLCH pitch mode to my newly set 3;000 FPM VS setting. By following the V-bars and paying more attention to my new heading and looking out for the other aircraft while in an out of IMC conditions; I did not anticipate how much I needed to pull back the throttles in order to not surpass my required 250 KT speed below 10;000 FT.This made a significant impact on me; as I always aspire to be a safe; fully aware pilot at all times! As for myself; this is being corrected by continuing to gain more flight time in the CL300 and studying the manuals; paying particular attention to what I can expect to see on the Primary Flight Display in various flight modes as well as gain knowledge as to the various power settings the throttles require in a variety of operational situations. As for other pilots to learn from my mistake: the FAA should continue to stress that pilots still need to hand fly their aircraft when it is operationally feasible and not get too reliant on technology.

A CL300 reached about 275 KTS during a level off at about 5;000 FT on a SID; the pilot was new to this aircraft and the transition from FLCH to VS caused lag in the Flight Director command bars.

1586018

201810

1201-1800

ZAU.ARTCC

IL

21000.0

VMC

Turbulence

Center ZAU

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZAU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 6112; Flight Crew Type 595

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1586018

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Total 14800; Flight Crew Type 1731

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1586029.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Weather

We were operating Aircraft X to ZZZ. We were in cruise at 21;000 in clear air; with smooth flight conditions and no restrictions to visibility. The seatbelt sign was off. With no indications or reports of turbulence at our altitude; we suddenly encountered Moderate to Severe turbulence. The aircraft oversped by 3-5 knots and the autopilot disconnected. I was the pilot flying and immediately took control of the aircraft. The turbulence action plan was immediately initiated. The Captain turned on the fasten seatbelt sign and immediately made a PA for the flight attendants to be seated immediately. We then requested a descent to 18;000 and the ride improved as we passed through 20;000. The Captain then had the flight attendants check in where we were notified of two possible passenger injuries. One was to a woman in the Lav who hit her head on the door but stated that she was fine. A male passenger reported hitting his knee on a galley cart. He requested ice and said he was fine. The Captain initiated contact with dispatch and Medlink and requested that paramedics meet the airplane upon arrival in ZZZ. The rest of the flight was uneventful. On taxi in; the lead Flight Attendant called to inform us that another male passenger was complaining of back pain. We arrived at the gate; shut down; and the paramedics were there to offer assistance to the injured passengers.

Level at 21;000; CNOTA intersection. Ride went from smooth to moderate/severe turbulence in 5 seconds or less. Used Turbulence [report] commands. When Purser checked in with me; she had reports from two passengers that had been mildly injured (one in lavatory bumped head; one standing in aisle hurt knee). Approaching top of descent into ZZZ another passenger reported a hurt back; this passenger would go to the hospital for evaluation. While the first two passengers did not request medical attention; my FO (First Officer) and I agreed that with two injuries we would go ahead and have medical assistance meet the aircraft. Filed a PIREP through ACARS; notified Dispatch who correctly suggested MedLink as backup. With nothing more than mild injuries; we continued to ZZZ. Further info: There was turbulence forecast 5000 feet above us; and ATC did report that we would not like the ride higher but nothing worse than light at our altitude. Our dispatcher mentioned it in the release; and filed us lower to stay out of it. I even commented when accepting the release that I had been thinking the same thing. We were completely not expecting what happened. Purser informed us later that the aft flight attendants had just gotten the cart to the front of coach to start their service. Quite frankly; we're lucky more weren't injured. My 5 seconds or less estimate above for turbulence onset is likely long with time dilation in the heat of the moment. In my 25 years I've never seen turbulence hit so hard; so fast; with nothing forecast or reported in the vicinity. There wasn't time to get the seat belt sign on - and indeed I forgot it until I heard our Purser make a PA for the passengers to fasten their seat belts. I'm usually the one that would rather call MedLink proactively. This time; I did not due to my perception that nobody was really injured. I was clearly wrong here. Finally - I'll admit that I've rolled my eyes a bit at the Turbulence [report]. I still think we are a little over-sensitive to light turbulence; this trains the passengers that the seat belt sign doesn't signal that it's not safe to move around. However - the Turbulence [report] was perfect for this event. Perfect. The commands were excellent; and I was glad to have the guide; the training; and the shared language for what needed to happen in the flight deck and the cabin. I'll go ahead and say it: I was wrong.

A320 flight crew reported unexpected severe turbulence; resulting in passenger injuries.

1671694

201811

0001-0600

0.0

No Aircraft

Company

Air Carrier

Quality Assurance / Audit

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Other

1671694

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Other Person

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Company Policy

Company Policy

This is an official report of [company] Airline's shortcuts in maintenance and processes. During the month of November 2018; there have been 22 SDRs (Service Difficulty Reports) that have not been reported; for events like shattered windows in-flight; engine shutdowns in-flight; landing gears malfunctioning; etc. When I informed these to my supervisors; they swept it under the rug; and my boss literally said; 'That is not my problem...let it go!!' And he is the Quality Assurance Director. These guys should not work in aviation because all the safety issues are most of the time ignored; or neglected.

Reporter explained that discrepancies in reporting process related to Service Difficulty Reports (SDR) were found during audits but were not corrected. Critical items such as in-flight engine shutdowns and landing gear malfunctions were not reported to the FAA. Fuel tank mechanics were not properly trained to comply with SFR88 requirements.

Maintenance Auditor reported critical airplane component failures are not being reported as required by the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)'s.

1044122

201210

1201-1800

ORD.Airport

IL

10000.0

IMC

TRACON C90

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Cruise

Class B ORD

Pressurization System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1044122

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Flying at FL240 in and out of IMC with Pack 1 MEL'd. We were in the process of getting coffee from the Flight Attendant when the First Officer and I both felt a change in cabin pressure. The First Officer locked the door and we both noted the rapidly climbing cabin (it was in red in a matter of seconds). Neither of us recall the rate at which the cabin was climbing but we both agree it was very; very fast. The Flight Attendant was still on the phone since we had just closed the door and told us the masks had deployed. I told her to use the mask as well as the passengers and to be seated as we are going to descend. The First Officer and I donned our masks; notified ATC of the pressure loss and emergency descent. We squawked 7700 and I initiated the descent almost immediately since the cabin was so high and the pressure was very uncomfortable. I didn't slow to 240 KTS to wait for the gear extension prior to starting down. I just wanted to get the aircraft down since I knew the passengers were without the benefit of 100% oxygen and the cabin was lost. Midway through the descent I noticed the Pack 2 valve closed EICAS message. During the descent I called for the emergency descent QRC. It was then that I had slowed enough to drop the gear and continue the descent. During the descent we encountered ice and got the bleed low temp message since we were at idle. Once leveled off at 10;000 FT and reconfigured; Pack 2 was reset and began pressurizing again. I checked in with the Flight Attendant to make sure everyone was OK. She seemed shaken up but assured me everything was fine. I informed her that we were at 10;000 FT and oxygen was no longer necessary. We told ATC the emergency was over and everything was stable. We squawked our original beacon code. After conferring with Dispatch and Maintenance we decided the fuel load was sufficient to continue to destination at 10;000 FT. I didn't want to climb again even though the pack was working again since the oxygen generators had already been used and I didn't think the passengers wanted to experience that again if it were to happen. I feel that the aircraft cabin climbed much faster than I was ever led to believe it would if I were to loose both packs. I was taught the outflow valve would close and there would be a slow leak giving us time to get down to 10;000 FT. This event seemed more like a rapid decompression rather than a slow loss of pressurization. I would like to see the maintenance data that shows the climb rate of the cabin as well as how high it got. Also; the QRC memory items for emergency descent seem fine on the ground but in practice waiting for the aircraft to slow; drop the gear; and then begin the descent seems like a long time with a very high cabin.

EMB145 Captain experiences a rapid decompression at FL240 when the Number 2 pack shuts down after being dispatched with the Number 1 pack inoperative. The descent is initiated without extending the landing gear as required by the QRC. Flight continues to destination at 10;000 FT although the crew is able to reestablish pack operation.

1189235

201407

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

30000.0

IMC

Icing

Dawn

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Climb

Vectors

Class A ZZZ

Pitot/Static Ice System

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 3800; Flight Crew Type 500

Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1189235

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 25

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1189232.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Weather

Aircraft

Departed Runway XXR; light winds from the south; approximately 8 SM; -RA; 050 OVC; 29.93. Due to storms along extended centerline; all flights departing XXR were being turned to heading 080 until clear of storms south and west of the airport. We headed east approximately 15 minutes before Center provided new route: direct and enroute waypoint; then as filed. Center then suggested right turn direct to the enroute waypoint. After we turned; we could see a red cell on weather radar near our route of flight. We were climbing through approximately 13;000 FT. I requested autopilot Number 2. At this time we went IMC; no precipitation was occurring. Approximately 80 NM from red cell; request 15 degrees to the left and remained greater than 20 NM from edge of cell. We continued our climb to FL300. At FL300 we were near the top of the clouds as we could occasionally see patches of blue sky (did not know bottoms; but assumed they were low as we had entered the weather at approximately 13;000 FT). Winds at altitude were out of the northwest at 9 KTS; negative turbulence. Since we had entered IMC; our radio contact with Center continuously deteriorated to the point of being unusable. By the time we reached FL300; another air carrier was passing radio calls between Center and us. We assumed it was either due to interference in the clouds or a problem with Center as we had no issues communicating with the other aircraft. All of our anti-ice systems were operating. At approximately the 30 minute point in the flight; I notice that approximately 25% of my windshield had frosted over and a piece of ice had formed under the windshield wiper arm near the pivot point. One could see ice crystals impacting the nose and windscreen. Soon thereafter; we received an ECAM master caution: Pitot Heat/Captain Pitot Heat Fault. I could see Captain's altimeter climbing and the throttles automatically advanced. All of my flight indications and engine readings were normal. I disconnected auto-throttles (A/T) to prevent over-speeding. This was immediately followed by ECAM IAS Discrepancy; an ADC fault; auto fuel feed fault; and an altitude warning horn. The Captain stated that my data was correct. I was to continue to follow my instruments and she switched her instruments to my side. After the switch; her flight director commanded a slight left turn (3-5 degrees) while mine showed straight and level. Her flight director was ignored. I re-engaged the A/T; but they advanced in contra indication to my flight instruments and our flight conditions and were subsequently disengaged again. Captain announced to the relaying aircraft that we needed left turn for weather and they coordinated as we attempted to get VMC. The heading bug was moved approximately 20 degrees to the left. Aircraft began to turn left when Yaw Damper Number 1 kicked off. When aircraft switched to Yaw Damper Number 2; the nose moved right approximately 3 degrees during the left hand turn. I disconnected A/P and maintained a 15 degree turn. When the yaw damper kicked off it felt as if someone had kicked a rudder pedal. After rolling out of the turn; A/P and yaw damper were reengaged. EMER CANCEL was used repetitively to silence the altitude warning horn. Captain started to run ECAM which was made difficult as the pages seemed to appear and disappear quickly. Apparently higher priority faults would occur then disappear rapidly. The Pitot Heat Fault ECAM was completed. Fault lights initially appeared on Trim Tank pumps; then they went out. System auto switched to Auto Feed Fwd and remained there for the remainder of the flight. We requested and received a descent of perhaps 6;000 FT to FL240 which took us clear of the weather (bottom approximately FL270). We had been in a deck that extended for many miles. Captain initiated a search for ADC1 circuit breaker as directed in one of the ECAM procedures; but the search was abandoned due to higher priorities.Captain requested 'bat phone' to call company. In order to facilitate the operation (phone on right hand side of cockpit); we switched roles and Captain became flying pilot and talked to Center; I worked with Dispatch to discuss issue and backed up the Captain concerning aircraft control. We did not switch back for the remainder of the flight. Radio contact with Center returned to normal at approximately this time. The situation was stable except for nearly continuous altitude warning horn that required continuous and repeated EMER CANCEL. We continued southbound on vectors and eventually exceeding the VHF range thereby losing contact with Flt Control. I asked the Captain to turn back north to return within range. Yaw Damper Number 1 kicked off again and 15 degree angle of bank was utilized for the remainder of the flight to prevent the yaw damper from kicking off. Note: Utilizing RCL (recall) on the ECAM did not return any faults other than PITOT HEAT. I backed up the Captain's completion of this check on the ECAM utilizing my QRH. Dispatch recommended we divert to an airport ahead of us; but due to the continuing questions about flight controls; reduced flight instrument availability; weather over the mountains; we concluded that the appropriate airfield would be an a large airport behind us (to return to the departure airport would require penetrating the previously mentioned T storm that had moved east). We chose to remain VMC for the remainder of the flight. A revised release was received and divert initiated. Note: Once we began our descent to FL200; flight directors agreed; Yaw Damper remained engaged; and the altitude warning horn ceased to be triggered. To facilitate routing as well as requiring vectors utilizing 15 degree AOB; we [advised ATC] at this time. We had 57;000 LBS of fuel on board. At no time did we deviate from the AOM; FOM; or assigned altitude and/or heading without Center approval. Configuration; landing; and taxi to parking were normal. Captain did an excellent job managing the radios; checklists; emergency warnings; and CRM.

The First Officer [advised] with ATC and then sent an ACARS message to our Dispatcher also letting him know we were heading to a divert airport. We landed without incident where we were met by CFR equipment. They followed us to the ramp and met us in the cockpit after everything was shut down to see if we needed any other assistance. I think that we handled the situation pretty well. We had a lot of issues to deal with all at one time with regards to communications; instrumentation; and weather. I think we used all of our resources to include using other aircraft to communicate. Looking back I do believe we made the right decision to head to [a nearby airport]. The First Officer and I worked well together with regards to CRM. We were each doing our own thing to get the job done for a while which needed to be done that way; but we made sure we were both back on the same page after decisions were made and that we both felt comfortable with the plan.

An A300 in a thin cloud layer top at FL300 encountered an area of light icing; then developed VHF communication difficulties; and an Air Data Computer 1 fault accompanied by Yaw Damper; autopilot; autothrottle; airspeed; and altimeter irregularities. They advised ATC of their situation and diverted to a nearby airport.

1048401

201211

1201-1800

ZLC.ARTCC

UT

14000.0

IMC

Icing; Rain; Turbulence; Snow; 6

Dusk

1500

Center ZLC

Personal

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Direct

Class E ZLC

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 4800; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1048401

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Human Factors

I set up an approach in the recently installed IFMS system. The approach was input for the ILS 20 at CDC using MEGGI as the IAF. For some reason the IFMS system was anticipating a steep turn for the outbound leg of the approach. The Center Controller commented that it was showing south [me] of course; which I acknowledged. He continued to press me on the variance to direct. I acknowledged that I was seeing the same thing and finally just asked him to cancel that approach and take me to MLF (Milford) for the Milford Transition to the ILS. That is when the problems got bad; I could not get the previous inserted approach out of the IFMS system to input a new one. It was not allowing me to remove the old (I am sure it is my lack of experience with the 'button-ology'). The Controller was frustrated as was I; so I finally asked for Vectors to MLF. He continued to tell me how far off course I was; and asking if I was navigating to MLF. I told him I was trying. I continued to ask for vectors and the Controller continued to tell me how far my variance was to the correct course. Our communication was not working well. In the end I arrived at MLF and made the turn back to the 154 to VELDE; again requesting vectors. The Controller continued to give me my variance; but never once (to my memory) gave me a vector to my needed waypoint. I finally arrived at VELDE and began the approach; when the Controller told me to break off the approach and climb to 14;000 FT. I declined. I had used up much of my reserve in the process of finding my way to MLF and back to VELDE. I told him I was low on fuel and was going to make the approach. He then cleared me for the approach and I successfully flew the approach under less than ideal conditions. I experienced ice; turbulence; and 35 KTS gusting winds.My error was not knowing the IFMS system as well as I should have. I did not know how to get rid of the incorrect information on the screen and in the system to re-input the correct information. My only complaint was the Controller's lack of willingness to give vectors as requested. I have only had one other situation when I needed the 'urgent help' of a controller. A Center Controller calmly talked me through a bad case of vertigo. He saved my life. This Controller was less than empathetic or helpful.

Pilot of a small jet experienced course deviations on the ILS2 Approach to CDC due to unfamiliarity with a newly installed IFMS system and apparent lack of assistance from ATC.

1764068

202009

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Other Rejected Takeoff

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1764068

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff Roll

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Aircraft

We were in position on the runway; initially with a Lineup and Wait clearance; when we received takeoff clearance. My Captain was Pilot Flying. As he began to advance the thrust levers for takeoff we received an ECAM Caution message F/CTL ELAC 2 PITCH FAULT (Flight Control Elevator and Aileron Computer). Thrust was still spooling up to 50% on the initial setting and we slowly had begun to roll not quite up to a normal taxi speed. The Captain retarded thrust levers to idle and I notified tower of our problem as well as the need to taxi off the runway. Tower cleared us to taxi off the runway where we stopped; discussed the message; and ran our QRH procedure. My Captain also contacted [Maintenance Control] for concurrence as we conducted the QRH procedure. This directed us to perform a reset of the system. This reset successfully cleared the Fault; the Captain entered an INFO ITEM in the AML (Airplane Maintenance Log) indicating as such at the direction of [Maintenance Control]; and we then continued by performing a successful takeoff with no further issues.The sole issue in this instance is a Flight Control Computer Fault which was successfully cleared via a QRH-directed reset procedure. I believe we handled this properly in accordance with FOM; OM Vol 1; and QRH procedures. The problem was due to a Computer Fault causing us to reject the takeoff.

A319 First Officer reported rejected takeoff.

1439710

201704

1801-2400

SFO.Tower

CA

500.0

VMC

Night

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 28R

Final Approach

Class B SFO

Facility SFO.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1439710

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Airport

Human Factors

Aircraft X checked in at the FAF for the right runway. The Data Tag was in the proper position and indicated the left runway. I cleared Aircraft X to land on the left runway. Pilot read back 'cleared to land'. I did not notice the omission of the runway in his readback. I crossed the next two departures across left runway to depart the right runway. I told the first departure; to 'Line up and wait; 28R'. At this point he had not gotten to the runway hold bars yet. At a 1.5 mile final Aircraft X is observed on lined up for the right runway. I immediately told the departure to hold short of the right runway. Aircraft X continued his approach and landed safely on the right runway without incident or loss of separation. The pilot was never cleared to land on the right runway. According to the Supervisor who investigated the event and talked to the Supervisor at the TRACON Aircraft X had been told by the feeder sector to expect the right runway and was initially tagged for the right runway. Subsequently the Finals sector cleared the pilot for the left runway approach and changed the tag to the left runway. The pilot read back '28R.' Finals sector did not notice.The tag direction and scratch pad saying 'LFT' is the biggest factor that causes expectation bias. I never heard that on check in or on landing clearance readback. Aircraft X never read back the runway assignment to me. The only reason I caught this is that his altitude out the window didn't look right for the left runway; and the ground radar clearly showed him lined up for the right runway. Had I not been monitoring the final I don't know if I would have caught it.The problem here started at TRACON; was exacerbated by the final controllers. I missed the first opportunity to correct it when the pilot checked on over right runway fix and the pilot not reading back the runway. Luckily I caught the error on my second chance once the aircraft showed up on the ground radar.I know that a safety review has already been initiated; but the pilot of Aircraft X should be contacted in order to make him aware that the incident occurred and to hear his perspective; and to let him know he was a contributing factor. We should look into TRACON's procedure in terms of what they do when a pilot is told to 'expect' a runway by one controller; and then assigned a different Runway by the next controller. Is there a 'change to' phraseology? Is feeder required to coordinate to the final controller about the previous runway expectation? The main issue for everyone from TRACON to the pilot to the tower is the power of expectation bias. If Finals sector had known the pilot had previously been told to expect the right runway; I'm certain he would have scrutinized the left approach clearance readback more diligently.We already have put up a sheet in the tower reminding the controllers what fixes are on what approach. Knowing the Runway 28R final approach fix and being aware of that I could have caught the error sooner. Management recently required us to monitor the final inside of 1.5 miles based on a previous similar incident. I was already doing so prior to it being mandatory for exactly this purpose. Monitoring the final on the ASSC (Airport Surface Surveillance Capability) is a great improvement to safety in these situations.

SFO Tower Controller reported an aircraft was cleared to land on the left runway; but lined up and landed on the parallel runway.

993724

201202

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 1300

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

993724

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

Other Aborted takeoff

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Human Factors

After an aborted takeoff; student incorrectly applied power to aircraft and failed to correct for left turning tendencies allowing aircraft to veer off runway into the grass and knocked over an airport sign and runway light. Student failed and refused to relinquish throttle to me (CFI); my application of brakes and rudder were ineffective in trying to overpower the student's applications. Damage [was] only to skin of leading edge of the starboard wing from impact with the sign. No power plant/prop or landing gear damage. Airport manager has students' aircraft insurance information for claim and repair of sign and light.

A CH2T instructor reported a student lost control of the aircraft after an aborted takeoff; refused to relinquish control; had a runway excursion damaging an airport sign and the aircraft wing.

1122275

201310

1201-1800

MUE.Airport

HI

1500.0

Marginal

10

Daylight

2500

CTAF MUE

Air Taxi

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Direct

Class E MUE

CTAF MUE

Corporate

Helicopter

1.0

Part 91

Passenger

Descent

Class E MUE

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 380

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1122275

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Horizontal 2000; Vertical 100

N

Automation Aircraft TA

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Departing MUE VFR; we were on the right downwind climbing out. There was a BKN-OVC layer about 1;000 above us; just south of our location. I was about to switch to Approach to open my IFR flight plan; when I received a traffic alert on the TAS. The target was showing 100 FT above me and right on top of my location. I stopped the climb; and maneuvered to the right in an attempt to avoid the traffic. I was surprised to see traffic in this location and questioned whether or not the target was possibly a false echo or even our own ship. I never saw anybody; but a few seconds later a helicopter made a broken radio call that said he was two miles south of the airport; which was also our approximate location. I switched to HCF Approach and began receiving advisories until getting my IFR clearance. The tour helicopters seem to fly pretty close to clouds out here and can be very hard to see. Our company has recently started airline service into this airport and the helicopter pilots are probably not used to much traffic in this area. I will be much more vigilant when departing uncontrolled fields in Hawaii. One lesson here is to remember to keep eyes outside and always be aware of the possibilities of other traffic in the area.

A departing fixed-wing pilot encountered an inbound helicopter as he was in the process of picking up his IFR clearance.

1367071

201606

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

150.0

VMC

20

Daylight

20000

Tower ZZZZ

Personal

Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 1780; Flight Crew Type 1700

1367071

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Aircraft

Normal checklist run up. Departed and at midfield and approximately 150 feet altitude; experienced a complete loss of power...straight ahead landing not an option due to rugged terrain with trees...180 turn executed with very hard landing and roll out into a fence near the parking area. Prop strike; front wheel separation; cowling damage. I was the only occupant and had no injuries what so ever. JP Instrument [engine monitor] data reveals a drop in fuel flow from 26 GPH to 0 and rpm from 2850 to 0 in approx 12 seconds. Fuel on board was 30.8 gallons...fuel selector valve was on the fullest tank that had approximately 23 gallons.

The pilot of a C206 reported a loss of engine power during takeoff. A turn away from terrain was executed and a hard landing was made.

1329618

201602

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B ZZZ

INS / IRS / IRU

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Type 777

1329618

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On departure Master Caution illuminated with associated right IRU 'Fault' and 'Align' light on overhead panel after running proper QRH the decision was made to divert to [a nearby airport]. An overweight landing of +900 to 1000 LBS was accomplished. Required write ups were entered and inspection completed. Flight continued after inspection and IRU replacement.

B737 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after receiving IRU 'Fault' and 'Align' caution lights in flight.

1599351

201812

1201-1800

ZKC.ARTCC

KS

6000.0

Center ZKC

Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZKC

Center ZKC

Commercial Fixed Wing

IFR

Cruise; Descent

Class A ZKC

Facility ZKC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1599351

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

Human Factors

During this event; I was working Sector 68/66 combined. The weather was IFR with reports of light ice in the area. I just accepted four radar handoffs from ICT Approach; 2 HYS arrivals; a GBD arrival and a GCK arrival. 2 aircraft at 060 and 2 at 080. I then accepted a MPR arrival from SEC06 inside of ICT Approach's airspace descending to FL240; which needs to descend to 060 by ICT boundary per LOA. This was a complex scenario because all aircraft requested RADAR vectors for ILS approaches at their destinations and the close proximity of all the aircraft. I was also having to go offline to issue multiple IFR clearances through FSS. The MPR arrival was on a vector for traffic descending to 090 initially then issued a descent to 060; traffic was the GBD arrival that I had on vectors for the ILS RY35. Everything was working fine then I started losing aircraft on RADAR! I inquired to the Supervisor if there was any reported issues with the HTI radar. He then informed me it was [going to be out of service for 8 hours] . This was never briefed to the controllers working or written down on any status information areas in SEC68/66. Why would anyone release a RADAR when it is IFR knowing all arrivals will need instrument approaches! This is not the first time this has happened in the last few months! This is unacceptable! At no time should NAVAIDS or Radar sites be released for maintenance during IFR conditions. All aircraft were RADAR separated until the RADAR went out and then I didn't have any aircraft at the same altitude non-radar procedurally separated. The OM (Operations Manager) and FLM (Front Line Manage)] released the radar knowing the weather conditions and that is unsafe. This was the worst position I've been put in by someone's negligence.In the last few years; we had a lot of new FLM's and OM's with very little experience. Most supervisors are on the computer not engaged on what's going on in the area. I see multiple FLM's on the internet looking at sport scores when they have red sectors. No cell phones in the areas but FLM's on [the web]; no accountability. It was always common practice for Management to ask the opinion of the controllers working the sector when it came to releasing NAVAIDS or RADAR. How about they come up with a checklist when releasing equipment. i.e.; look at the weather forecast; forecasting IFR conditions don't release it. If VFR tentatively release it but coordinate with sector effected. I feel that Management is not held to the same level of responsibility; they released the RADAR putting me in a bad situation and nothing happens. If they are unsure what to do ask the sector for their opinion!

Kansas City Center Controller reported that a radar system was released to maintenance during IFR conditions with highly complex traffic.

1677808

201908

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1.0

2000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Cessna 150

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Class D ZZZ

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 44; Flight Crew Total 408; Flight Crew Type 408

Situational Awareness

1677808

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

I flew a Cessna 150 from ZZZ. After doing the pre-flight check; everything appeared to be in working order. I taxied the airplane slowly from FBO1 to FBO2 for fuel. So it maybe took me about 0.3 or 0.4 hour from engine start because I needed to wait for the fuel person. After refilling; I taxied to the run up area with full fuel. My destination airport was ZZZ1. After taking off; the engine [shuddered] suddenly; I checked all the engine gauges but everything was good. Few minutes later; the engine [was] back to normal. It took me about 1.8h to ZZZ1 which was less than what I planned. So I didn't think I needed additional fuel. I made a full stop for the restroom.After a few minutes rest; I took off from ZZZ1. I picked another route. At the start of the flight everything worked; but when I flew above ZZZ2; the engine started [shuddering] again. I tried to find out what the problem weas but everything still looked good. And the engine stopped [shuddering] few minutes later. I checked the fuel gauges and I[recall] that it showed me 1/4 per tank (about 5.6 gallons in total). It was enough for me to fly back to ZZZ.After the radar service [was] terminated by Approach; I got the landing clearance from ZZZ Tower. At the time I was descending to 2000ft; my engine started to lose power with RPM dropping. I noticed the fuel gauges still showed me 1/4 per tank. I tried to restart the engine but I failed. I talked to ZZZ Tower immediately for emergency landing. Fortunately I landed on Taxiway A. I really appreciate ZZZ Tower's help. I didn't know what the problems were. But [when] I turned on the battery again the fuel gauges showed completely different. Left tanks showed the fuel almost empty (maybe 0.5-1 gallon I thought). Right one still showed 1/4 (approximately 2.5 gallons). The total fuel of the flight on my flight plan in day VFR is 22.17 gallons. I made a perfect flight plan; but I didn't realized my flight cannot be [done within] that time. I ignored other factors. Also under the influence of the fuel gauges. I made a bad decision. Even though it was an intense experience; I believe it was a good learning experience in my career to consider other factors during flight.

Cessna pilot reported a safe landing on a taxiway after the engine quit because of a low fuel issue.

1675679

201908

1201-1800

JFK.Airport

NY

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1675679

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Other Pushback

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

Aircraft

Today Aircraft X called after push out that fluid was observed dripping out of #1 engine by baggage handlers. I sent two mechanics out to the plane. Supervisor went out on his own. Unbeknownst to me the flight crew ran the engine and the mechanics observed hydraulic fluid dripping out of the drain mast at the rate of 1 drop every 8 seconds. They came in and updated me. I pulled up the drain mast inspection MM 71-XX-XX and gave it to them. A few minutes later [Supervisor] came in and said the plane taxiied out. Since the plane had no entry in the logbook and we weren't sure of the limits I demanded the plane return to the gate. [Supervisor] said if I wanted the plane back I had to call myself. I tried raising the plane on the radio to no avail. I told [Supervisor] I was filing a report for the plane leaving illegally. At first he didn't care but then came running back claiming he called Tech to have the plane return. I advised [Supervisor] that if the plane returned I would delete the report. However; the plane took off.

Maintenance Technician reported aircraft departed after fluid was observed dripping from aircraft engine drain mast.

1355631

201605

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

IMC

Rain; 3

Daylight

900

3000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Final Approach

Vectors

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 56; Flight Crew Total 1601; Flight Crew Type 56

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1355631

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

The temporary loss of control due to spatial disorientation occurred on the ILS approach into my alternate airport on an IFR flight plan from. The loss of control was precipitated by the pilot's inability to disconnect the altitude pre-select and an otherwise non-stable approach.The contributing factors were:1. Low IFR with conditions not improving as forecasted for the time of my arrival.2. Did not adhere to personal limits.3. While current; not proficient for IFR flight in the aircraft with only 56 hours in type.4. Not proficient with auto pilot and avionics in the aircraft.5. Did not have the 'numbers' memorized for the aircraft type to insure a stable approach.Corrective Action:1. Spoke with and discussed incident with Gold Seal Instructor.2. Arranging schedules to do in depth IFR recurrent training in the aircraft with [with a CFI].3. Equipment familiarization with auto-pilot and navigational avionics training.4. Subscribe to and participate in the FAA Wings Program.

GA pilot reported getting disoriented during instrument conditions.

1175153

201405

1201-1800

SFO.Airport

CA

VMC

Daylight

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

Brasilia EMB-120 All Series

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Class B SFO

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Takeoff / Launch

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

1175153

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

Tower cleared the B737 ahead of us to cross [Runway] 28L; hold short [Runway] 28R. Then we were given the same clearance. We noted the pair on short final and knowing there was not much holding space we expedited across and stopped pretty close to the B737. We were only able to get half of our plane over the runway hold short line. It looked like slight staggering on arrival so it was possible for the B737 to just take the runway making room for us between arrival of [Runways] 28R and 28L traffic. Tower amended our departure - right turn 060 now a new frequency. Before the arrival of the [Runway] 28R traffic though Tower cleared another airplane to cross [Runway] 28L and hold short [Runway] 28R. They questioned his clearance since this would be three aircraft holding short of [Runway] 28R with not even room for two and traffic closing in. Tower reconfirmed previous instructions. Upon [Runway] 28R landing; Tower cleared the B737 to line up and wait [Runway] 28R. We were so close that their expedited movement really rocked our plane from jet wash. After Tower cleared the B737 for takeoff; were given line up and wait [Runway] 28R; maintain 3;000 on departure; and to move down the runway so he could line up [another aircraft] on the runway behind us. Reaching about the 1;000 FT marker Tower cleared us for takeoff and to turn as soon as able. I was aware we had performance for the pseudo intersection takeoff since we were well before Taxiway E that we had data for. Wake turbulence separation was not as well planned as we hit it upon rotation. The early turn helped avoid it more however it put us rather close to the B737 that departed ahead of us.Cause: Tower playing cowboy trying to get more departures out. [It was] our inability to see the big picture and having to trust Tower's plan and their spacing.Suggestions: Not to accept Tower's clearance even if they say there is room. Not to get rushed by the situation so you can focus on things like wake separation; and inform Tower of your requirement. Find out how much they want us to 'move down' when lining up a second aircraft. Try to accommodate Tower but do not let them fly your plane for you.

EMB-120 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence after takeoff from SFO in trail of a B737.

1744232

202005

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

15.0

550.0

CTAF ZZZ

Air Taxi

Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Class E ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

VFR

Training

Final Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3726; Flight Crew Type 43

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1744232

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Horizontal 4000; Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

We were a MEDEVAC flight; carrying an organ onboard for the purpose of transplant. Since it was a busy; uncontrolled field; we opted to depart VFR and pickup our IFR clearance in the air. The winds were favoring Runway XX; and there were several aircraft in the traffic pattern. While waiting for two close-in aircraft to land (one on final; and another on base); there was a radio call from an aircraft that was practicing the wrong-way approach to RWY XY. We made a radio announcement of our intention to depart RWY XX ASAP (when the landing aircraft were clear of the runway or out of the way from touch-and-go). The aircraft on the wrong-way final made statement that they would break the approach off early; giving us the indication they understood there was traffic in the pattern. We seen the landing lights of the wrong-way aircraft on a long final for RWY XY; and kept an eye on him the entire time. Our takeoff was announced on the radio; and as we were approaching V1; it was clear that the wrong-way aircraft was still continuing to descend and remain on the approach course. I felt it would have been unsafe to abort at this time; and took the aircraft into the air. Our closure rate was increasing; and it appeared that the inbound aircraft had no intention of breaking off the approach. Once airborne; evasive maneuvering toward the east was required to avoid what could have potentially been a collision course. Concurrently; the other aircraft began a turn to the west (I would estimate that they were less than a mile from the approach end of RWY XY when they began to turn)On our part; we could have waited on the runway longer to observe what the inbound aircraft was going to do. On the other aircraft's part: If there is a number of aircraft in a traffic pattern at an uncontrolled field taking off and landing in the opposite direction that a practice approach is being conducted; it is prudent to either choose a more-appropriate approach/runway and/or establish more defined communications and intentions with the other affected aircraft.

CE525 First Officer reported NMAC with opposite direction landing traffic.

1584689

201810

1201-1800

DTW.Airport

MI

17000.0

VMC

Dusk

TRACON D21

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR LECTR1

Class E D21

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

1584689

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

We were cleared on the LECTR1 arrival into DTW which is for landing north but the airport was landing south. We were between SHANX and HANBL on the arrival and were maintaining 17000 ft and had not been given a descend via clearance yet. On the LECTR1; the HANBL fix says to cross at or above 11000 ft. ATC told us to switch to the HANBL1 arrival. In hindsight I cannot remember how the controller phrased the clearance but it was a little confusing so I verified that we were now cleared on the HANBL1 and we were cleared to descend via; which he confirmed. My FO (First Officer) dialed in 11000 ft; which I confirmed; and he started a descent. The controller then asked us if we were going direct to HANBL; which I confirmed. He then told us to descend and maintain 15000 ft; which we complied with. At that point I realized that we still had the LECTR1 arrival in the FMS. I then switched the arrival and my FO confirmed it. I then pulled up the HANBL1 arrival on my charts and saw that the crossing restriction for HANBL on the HANBL1 arrival is different and requires us to cross between FL210 and 17000 ft. At that point I realized that we had descended too early on the new arrival segment and made an altitude deviation. The main factor in this deviation was my inexperience with these new arrivals into DTW. I had not been flying for several weeks after these arrival came into effect; so this was only the 4th or 5th time I had gone into DTW with these new arrivals. We were expecting to get switched onto another arrival but I didn't know which one it would be. When ATC cleared us we were already well into the old arrival and I think that we were both anxious about starting down for the old crossing restrictions. When we were switched I just assumed that since the new arrival had the same fix that the crossing restriction would be the same. The fact that both arrivals had the same fix and the fact that we wouldn't be making a lateral change in our flight path for at least 10 miles made me think that I had some time to change the arrival in the FMS and that the descent should take priority in my monitoring duties. This is the third airport that I have been based at that has switched over to RNAV arrivals so I was prepared for a teething period with both how we fly them and how ATC assigned them. I knew that there can be confusing clearances given as the controller get used to the arrivals; which is why I verified the descend clearance when they switched our arrival. However after this incident happened I couldn't remember of any arrivals in the past that had the same arrival fix on two different arrivals with two different altitude restrictions. Perhaps an [alert] could be issued if this problem is happening with other crews. I think it might be a unique situation to DTW; where our prior experience might not be enough of a safeguard against this type of issue happening to other crews unless they are made aware of the issue.

CRJ900 Captain reported missing crossing restriction due to wrong STAR entered into FMS.

1056721

201212

0001-0600

N90.TRACON

NY

8000.0

IMC

Rain; Turbulence; Windshear

Night

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Descent

Class B EWR

Autoflight System

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Human-Machine Interface

1056721

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

Cleared to descend via PHLBO3 RNAV Arrival into EWR for an ILS 04L approach. Captain was pilot flying. Used max automation due to poor weather. Autopilot Number 1 was engaged with NAV and Profile selected. We made the SOMTO Intersection crossing restriction at 11;000 FT with no problem. Shortly after SOMTO we still had a tailwind and also encountered an area of heavy rain and moderate turbulence. We were night IMC conditions with engine anti ice on and static electricity on the windshield. Captain disconnected the autopilot and manually began flying the aircraft when he realized the FMS in Profile mode would not make the crossing restriction at DYLIN of 8;000 FT. Had he allowed the autopilot and profile to stay engaged it probably would have crossed DYLIN at least 1;500 FT high. First Officer called ATC and told Controller we were in heavy rain with moderate turbulence and that we crossed DYLIN intersection 500 FT high. No traffic was noted on the TCAS within a 12 mile range; we had no loss of separation; and Controller didn't say anything about it. He gave us a vector to final approach for ILS 04L. Profile mode in the Airbus apparently cannot handle strong tailwinds; updrafts and turbulence. In retrospect; one level less of automation might have helped (using level change with step down altitudes); but the situation we encountered would probably still have required an autopilot disconnect.

An A300 First Officer reported crossing DYLAN high on the PHLBO 3 RNAV arrival due to strong tailwinds and turbulence. The Captain was the pilot flying using LNAV and VNAV. The autopilot was disconnected in an attempt to make the restriction.

1736080

202003

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

180.0

12.0

12000.0

Dusk

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

STAR ZZZZZ2

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 489; Flight Crew Type 400

Distraction

1736080

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

We were descending into ZZZ on the ZZZZZ2 Arrival when we were given a vector to the east and held up higher than normal. Upon handoff to the final Controller; we were still at 12;000' and the FMC was telling us that we would be about 1500'-2000' high after I extended the centerline off the FAP. I had briefed the visual Runway XXL backed up by the ILS. However; due to being concerned about how high we were; I didn't go through the FMC to brief those points as well. Unbeknownst to me; my F/O had put in XXR and I did not catch it via a correct briefing. We were given a vector to join the XXL Localizer and I extended the centerline and then selected LNAV to join. My mistake allowed us to go through the XXL Localizer; and we aligned up with XXR. Due to it being dusk and the distance made it slightly difficult to tell; but thankfully the Final Controller saw what was going on and asked us which runway we were setup for. We immediately came back to the left; joined up with Runway XXL and landed without incident.With news of the COVID 19 Pandemic fresh in my head; I can state quite certainly that I let my worry and thoughts of what is happening to Company and the industry creep into my job performance. I let outside threats cloud my performance and I was not focusing on the task at hand as much as I should have been. My briefing was rushed; and because of that and that ATC left us high; I completely missed that the FMC was setup for Runway XXR instead of Runway XXL. In times like this when the stress level is high; we need to hammer home the importance of standardization; and I need to remind myself to slow down and make sure that both my F/O and I are sufficiently briefed and we both have a shared mental model of what we are going to do. After landing both my F/O and I walked back through the event and identified what went wrong; and how we strayed from not properly briefing the approach. As the Captain and Pilot Flying I should have taken the extra minute or two so that every aspect of this simple approach was briefed and talked about. Slightly contributing to this incident is when ATC asked us what runway we were lined up for instead of telling us what he was seeing. When ATC asks a question like this; there is always a 5-10 seconds of hesitation as we are double checking to make sure we have it right. I think ATC telling us what they see instead of asking us might be a quicker way to get the problem resolved. Of course in the end it is my fault that this happened; but I would rather ATC tell than ask.

Air Carrier Captain reported lining up for the incorrect runway on a set of parallel runways.

1232128

201501

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

IMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-100

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 11500

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1232128

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

While enroute; I heard a snap and some caution lights came on. The caution lights were the Number 1 ECU and the Number 1 fuel tank low caution light. I notice the torque on the Number 1 engine had fallen to 3.8 percent. The aircraft did not yaw when this event occurred. We ran the ECU checklist; but there was no improvement. I slowly retarded the Number 1 power lever to confirm that the engine was no longer producing power. It was not so we elected to shut down the Number 1 engine I suspected we had a TQ motor failure. After calling MTC; I found two more circuit breakers popped the Number 1 TQ cond; and the Number 1 auto temp controller.We ran some checklists and talked to the FO to decide what was going on. Once we concluded the Number 1 engine was not producing any power; we shut down that engine. Ran all the checklist. Declared an emergency. Notified company and made announcements to the people.

A DHC-8-100 Number 1 ECU and Fuel Tank Low caution lights illuminated along with the torque drop so the engine was shut down; the QRH completed; an emergency declared and the aircraft landed at its destination.

1556894

201807

1201-1800

HVR.Airport

MT

400.0

CTAF HVR

Small Transport

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E HVR

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Other 107

Cruise

Class E HVR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Situational Awareness

1556894

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Horizontal 150; Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Drone in Vicinity of Airport: We were at 400 feet AGL off of Runway 26 in HVR and began reducing the power for normal climb and began our turn toward the southeast. Upon entering the turn; I spotted what was clearly a personal drone (DJI Phantom) off our left wing at 150 feet away and 50 feet lower than our altitude. I alerted the captain about the drone; he made the same assessment about the drone sighting upon seeing it. We then got on the CTAF to let other potential traffic in the area about the drone approximately 1 mile west of the field. HVR UNICOM asked for more details; we gave them the above statement. Upon reaching a higher altitude; we checked in with Salt Lake Center; asked for VFR flight following and gave them the report of the drone sighting.

Pilot reported airborne conflict with a drone approximately 400 feet AGL after takeoff from Havre City-County Airport; Montana.

1482252

201709

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Turbine Engine

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 7521; Flight Crew Type 1145

Confusion

1482252

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 4458

Confusion

1482254.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

After landing and clearing runway we were instructed by ground to taxi via 'C' to hold short of taxiway 'R' while waiting for the alley around the gate to clear of traffic. Once holding short; with the parking brake set; I proceeded to start the APU. At the same time the Captain instructed me to shutdown engine number 2 when we had the appropriate cool down time (3 minutes). After the appropriate cool down time; I proceeded to shut down what I thought was engine number 2 but was in fact engine number 1. Since the number 2 generator was already OFF the first indication of my error was the loss of power. The APU generator kicked on shortly after. While this was happening the alley near our gate had cleared and ground cleared us to continue to the gate. We advised ground that we were working a problem and that we needed a few minutes. After a quick systems discussion; we both decided that the best course of action was to restart engine number 1 before continuing to the gate to establish a normal configuration for taxi in. We both confirmed that the engine was shut down by verifying the N2 was at zero. The N1 also indicated the amber 'XX' with amber band. I noted the EGT was about 250 and decreasing when I attempted the start. We then received an ECAM because I forgot to configure the APU BLEED appropriately so I shut off the number 1 engine master and turned the APU BLEED ON. I then re-attempted the start. The engine motored longer than usual as expected due to the higher EGT. Just after 1 minute of motoring; ground control advised us of excessive smoke coming out of the number 1 engine. We shutoff the engine master at approximately 1m 19s after initiating the start (start valve opening). At the same time the Captain asked the controller to send out the fire trucks as a precaution; however; there was never an ECAM; or fire warning. Since there was no fire warning we decided to hold off any further checklists until the approaching crash/fire/rescue (CFR) vehicles could give the number 1 engine a visual inspection. CFR still noted smoke but no fire. CFR offered to spray water only into the inlet to see if smoke would dissipate. We both agreed and the Captain instructed CFR to proceed with the water shot. The water did dissipate the smoke. We both decided that shutting down engine 2 and being towed the rest of the way to the gate was the safest course of action at that point. We coordinated with ops and accomplished the tow-in checklist. The tow in was uneventful. Once towed in to the gate we accomplished the parking checklist.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A319 flight crew reported shutting down the wrong engine on the taxiway. During the attempted engine restart; smoke was reported from the tailpipe.

1572589

201808

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Temperature - Extreme

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

Training

Parked

N

Scheduled Maintenance

Repair; Inspection

Hangar / Base

Contracted Service

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Technician 3

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1572589

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Logbook Entry

Procedure

Approximately 2.5 weeks ago; I was contracted to complete a 100 hour inspection by a personal friend who owns a local flight school. The owner has had a difficult time finding mechanics to work on his equipment. The flight school had previously employed some mechanics that appeared to not fully inspect/maintain the school's aircraft properly. Prior to my offering to help the owner; one of his aircraft had suffered a flight control failure/jam which had attracted the attention of the FAA. I agreed to help my friend (owner of the school) in order to help him keep his aircraft flying by fixing them.I had previously performed a few 100 hour inspections prior to this on the owner's aircraft. During these previous inspections; I discovered quite a few discrepancies that I corrected/repaired and documented in the logs. This would be the second time I performed a 100 hour on this aircraft. I work with an individual who is not a certified mechanic; but has previously been certified in the past. This individual works under my supervision and does not inspect any part of the aircraft; he only corrects discrepancies (which I then inspect). During this inspection; I discovered and corrected a few minor discrepancies; but at a level nowhere near the number and severity discovered during the previous inspection. I signed off the aircraft and returned it to service. The aircraft has been flying regularly for the past 2 weeks. Today I discovered that the FAA inspected the aircraft and tagged it. The inspectors provided a list which contained: door hinge pins; signs of damage at rudder; possibly 1 incorrect flap installed; cowling Cam-Loc too long; [and] 1 rudder pedal appears worn.While I have not been contacted by the FAA; I don't believe I could have missed those items at all during both inspections. If in fact I did miss them; I can only contribute that to feeling rushed. In a perfect world; a mechanic would have an infinite amount of time to inspect/repair an aircraft in an air-conditioned hangar. However; this isn't always the case. Feeling pressured to finish the plane due to lost revenue combined with 100+ degree heat could possibly lead to making mistakes. The mechanic perhaps inspects the smaller items - but may not inspect them thoroughly. While I am not admitting I didn't inspect the items above; it may be possible I didn't look at them long enough. Even-though the owner is a personal friend; I spoke with him about the importance of downing the aircraft to fix all the items. This can sometimes be a major issue at a small flight school. A mechanic needs time to accurately and correctly inspect/repair an aircraft.I also spoke with the owner about the importance of documenting ALL maintenance. I noticed after I inspected the aircraft other mechanics had worked on it. I am unsure if any of their work was documented. It is important to do this because; (for example); another mechanic removes the cowl to fix a starter; loses a cowl fastener; and puts an incorrect one in without documenting it [and] then something happens. It may still be seen as the fault of the last mechanic who documented removing the cowl in the logbooks.I will remember that the importance of taking your time while performing maintenance and inspections; and documenting all maintenance in the logs will ensure pilots and the public are provided with a safe aircraft.

Technician reported the FAA found irregularities after the 100 hour inspection on a Cessna 172 was completed.

1478669

201708

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

900.0

VMC

8

Daylight

1500

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Cheetah; Tiger; Traveler AA5 Series

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Part 91

VFR

Training

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 19; Flight Crew Total 550; Flight Crew Type 120

Situational Awareness

1478669

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Horizontal 3500; Vertical 100

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Flying VFR into ZZZ. At approximately 4.5 miles out I made a unicom call and declared that I was on 4.5 mile final for Runway 17. Immediately after my call; the other aircraft called that it was in the pattern for Runway 17 and was midfield on the downwind. At 3 miles out; I called 3 mile final for Runway 17. I was traveling approximately 85-90 knots and was at 900 feet AGL. Shortly after; the other aircraft called that it was turning base for Runway 17. At that point; I received a traffic alert from ADS-B and saw that our aircraft were converging on the ADS-B display. I broke off final approach with an immediate right turn and made a unicom call that I was executing a right turn to avoid traffic. The other aircraft executed a touch and go. I completed a full circle turn; reestablished on final; and executed a landing. Shortly afterwards; I approached the owner of the flight school to discuss this incident. His response was that the FAA has mandated that aircraft in the pattern ALWAYS have the right of way; and he complained that aircraft coming 'straight in' were violating FAA guidelines. I attempted to point out that the FAA regulations do not state anything near his interpretation and that common sense should rule. I specifically pointed out that Instrument Approaches are always straight in. His response was that pilots making an instrument approach should 'circle to land' and join the pattern. I tried to point out that his interpretation was going to get someone killed; because he was teaching his students to ignore any traffic 'not in the pattern.' He responded that if an accident happened then it would be the fault of the 'straight-in' traffic. I ended the conversation at that point.CFR 91.113 (g) is very clear that aircraft on final approach have the right of way. Turning from downwind to base by definition means the other aircraft was not on final. It clearly turned into me while I had the right of way. I had made two calls establishing that I was on final before the other aircraft turned into my flight path. CFR 91.113 (e) is also very clear that aircraft approaching each other 'head-on' must 'alter course to the right'. Given that I was on final at 170 degrees and the other aircraft was on a reciprocal heading (350 degrees as downwind to 17) then the other aircraft was obligated to turn right to avoid. That turn would have taken it away from final approach course. Instead; it executed a LEFT turn onto base for Runway 17. Finally; CFR 91.113 (d) is clear that 'when aircraft of the same category are converging at approximately the same altitude (except head-on; or nearly so); the aircraft to the other's right has the right-of-way.' When the other aircraft turned to base it put my aircraft to its right and established that I had the right of way under this condition.My concern is that this is the third incident I've experienced at this airport; with aircraft operated by this school; where it is clear that they are instructing student pilots to believe that they have the right of way over any traffic that is 'not in the pattern.' Given the responses to my attempt to discuss this with the school owner; it is clear he believes his interpretation is correct and that he intends to continue operating and INSTRUCTING in this manner. If this continues; then it is highly likely that a mid-air will occur; particularly under MVFR conditions when another aircraft is flying an approach to the airport and one of these school operated flights turns into that traffic.

GA pilot reported a go around was required on final approach when another GA aircraft turned base and caused an airborne conflict.

1716033

202001

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Class B ZZZ

Normal Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161; Flight Crew Total 2420; Flight Crew Type 671

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1716033

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 781; Flight Crew Type 781

Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

1716044.0

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Ambiguous

We had a deferred APU bleed air and did a air start at the gate then went to spot 3 and did a cross bleed start. We taxied out to Runway 4L and it was my leg as Pilot Flying. ATC was issuing windshear loss of 15 kts. on final for Runway 4R and we planned for a Vr max for takeoff for the windshear. Wind was 330 gusting to 27 kts. We were cleared for takeoff I set 1.1 EPR called for set thrust. Captain set it. Check thrust. Thrust checked we were accelerating. We had not hit 100 kts. when ATC issued the reject. We rejected the takeoff. I called for the flight attendants to remain seated and we taxied off the runway to Taxiway P about 3;000 ft. down the runway. I ran the QRC and pulled the QRH. Another aircraft said they saw smoke coming from our gear so we asked [Crash Fire rescue] to come. Brakes hit 3 on the left side with the white box. We checked on the passengers and flight attendants. I called Maintenance and they said we would have to go to the ballpark for inspection. [Software] chart showed 56 min I rounded up to 100 kts. as I know we were below that. [Crash Fire Rescue] could not inspect our gear because they needed us to shutdown engines which we could not do because of the inoperative APU. We taxied to the [ramp] and Maintenance met us and we wrote up the reject there. We also notified Dispatch and the passengers and flight attendants. The brakes went back to 0 and after shutting down the left engine; Maintenance cleared us. We did a crossbleed at Taxiway Y short of Taxiway U and got a new release with the fuel we had; new to data and departed.

Gusty winds on clear day. LLWS (Low Level Wind Shear) advisories in effect in departure ATIS. First Officer's takeoff. Cleared for takeoff and approaching 80 kts.; tower cancelled our takeoff clearance due to aircraft on Runway 4R executing a go-around due to wind shear. We completed the Rejected Takeoff Checklist and were cleared off the runway onto Taxiway P; between the runways; to run checklists and resequence for takeoff. Tower noted seeing smoke around the brake assemblies; so we had [Crash Fire Rescue] inspect the aircraft. Referencing the brake cooling checklist; we needed 56 mins for cooling. Brake temperatures reached 3 for 230.0. Because of limitations due to a deferred APU; we were not able to shut down both engines for complete inspection by [Crash Fire Rescue]. With 40 minutes remaining for cooling; we decided to have Maintenance and [Crash Fire Rescue] check the aircraft. Brake temperatures was 0 by time we reached the [parking spot]. Shutdown 1 engine shutdown for inspection and Maintenance and Crash Fire Rescue saw no damage and cleared us to go. Conferred with [Maintenance] and Dispatch and updated our weights and flight plan. Started 2nd engine; taxied out; and departed off Runway 4L.

B757 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff that resulted in hot brakes and a flight delay.

1595816

201811

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1595816

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Company Policy

While taxiing west for departure; we were cleared by the Tower Controller to 'Taxi into Position and Hold.' The questionable matter was [that] there was [another air carrier; Aircraft Y;] in front of us at the Hold Short Line that was not moving. I thought that there was a probability that the aircraft sequence of taxi to takeoff could have been out-of-order because Aircraft Y was stopped at the Hold Short Line. Seeing that Aircraft Y was still not moving; my read-back to Tower was more of an interrogative than an acceptance. Tower then asked me if we were not yet ready. My reply was that we are ready; but my tone was that of observing Aircraft Y still not yet moving; causing the order of these events to seem questionable for us to taxi into position. By this time; Aircraft Y slowly; and I do mean slowly; began to taxi past the Hold Short Line and onto the runway. We then continued to taxi; made the turn off of taxiway towards the runway environment; and Aircraft Y continued to take more time than usual to power up and takeoff. Finally; Aircraft Y powered up; released their brakes; and started to roll.As Aircraft Y's takeoff roll commenced; we crossed the Hold Short Line to taxi into position and hold. As we were rolling into position; the Tower Controller cleared us for takeoff. Aircraft Y was clearly still on the runway continuing their takeoff roll; from my perspective; they were not yet even halfway down the runway. As a pilot should communicate anything that appears to be out of the realm of normal operational safety; I read back close to these words; 'Aircraft X cleared for takeoff 8R as soon as Aircraft Y gets airborne.' At this time; the Tower Controller cancelled our takeoff clearance. This seemed normal and fine to me; but then he said to copy a phone number and call the Tower as if what I did was wrong or unsafe.The Captain chose to call right away instead of calling after arriving in destination airport as Tower suggested. We taxied off the runway for the phone call. The Tower Supervisor was upset; and the Tower Controller was mad because they said that they were operating fully within their acceptable parameters. They accused us of not being ready and interrupting their flow of departures. The Captain asked if any violations occurred on our part; and the reply was 'No.'Whenever something appears unsafe; unusual; inaccurate; or questionable; it is FULLY within the responsibility and duty of a pilot to verify; inform; or question the situation. It is also FULLY expected for the pilot to either accept or reject a given clearance. Anytime this happens; NO Air Traffic Controller should ridicule or punish the pilot - EVER. Furthermore; no Air Traffic Controller should put a pilot into a questionable situation (ATC does this often). The field of aviation REQUIRES communication and cooperation from all parties at any given moment. Over my 4 decades of professional aviation; I have seen the pendulum swing back-and-forth between pilots and ATC; from attitudes of animosity; to cooperation; to animosity. This display by the Tower Supervisor reveals renewed animosity. Their unprofessional attitude of refusal to re-assess a pilot's observations and communication for the purpose of safety is uncalled for. They became over-focused on the 'assembly line' mentality of pushing airplanes out rather than ensuring each situation is safe. Even if they believed they were operating within their acceptable parameters; they would do well to realize that acceptable parameters do NOT always guarantee practical and safe events. Their challenging of pilots and insisting pilots call them when pilots do their job responsibly; reflects the lack of cooperation and safety by Tower personnel that night.These two air traffic controllers have taken the word controller beyond the scope of its intended authority. They are headed for unfavorable results for air traffic if they are not corrected. Their role as air traffic controllers is notto bark orders and throw their weight around. This is not a military environment. This is a commercial; civilian environment; moving people for pleasure and business. Safety in the aviation field requires cooperative communication between ATC and pilots. Safe coordination by the accepting; amending; rejecting; and the verifying of ANY situation that in the observation of either pilot or ATC deems worthy of accepting; rejecting; amending; or verifying will result. Tower should be advised to back off and re-focus.

Air Carrier pilot reported their takeoff clearance was cancelled after they questioned the timing of the Controller's clearance.

1126179

201310

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

MD-83

Part 121

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Work Cards

Cowling/Nacelle Fasteners; Latches

Pratt-Whitney

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1126179

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing

Human Factors

This report is being filed with reference to a Cargo Loose Metal Task on an MD-83 aircraft on early evening. During accomplishing the task I noticed that there were numerous 'Smoking' and appearing to be Loose Rivets; on the Left and Right Hand Engine Exhaust Nozzles. I then proceeded to complete my Task at this time [but] I was scared and felt in Fear of losing employment; therefore I chose not to report or document this incident to Management personnel. First: I have previously written-up similar maintenance items in Aircraft Logbooks on several occasions only to be sternly counseled and threatened with further harm to my employment with my Air Carrier if I continue to report maintenance defects. [Numerous] Air Carrier supervisors and managers whom have acted in concert to willfully; knowingly; and intentionally; do harm to my employ and hinder my efforts to perform and properly document assigned maintenance actions. Air Carrier Supervisor X has even signed-off several discrepancies as being 'OK for Service'; or has fabricated false test indications to sign-off my maintenance findings. I had been recording the maintenance [that] I and others have performed to provide evidence of my concerns. However; many times aircraft damage and the like have gone unchecked and have been allowed. The actions of our Air Carrier Management personnel of constantly threatening and harassing me through counseling sessions and negative permanent personnel entries for performing my tasks as an Airframe (A) and Powerplant (P) Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) has placed me in a hostile work environment. Whereby I fear for my employment if I take the proper steps to perform my assigned tasks in accordance with prescribed Aircraft Maintenance Manuals (AMM); Air Carrier Policies and Procedures; Air Carrier Human Factors training; Company 100% verbatim compliance training; Company Critical Behaviors policy; and the FARs. Therefore; I feel compelled to report future findings through this confidential forum with the hope of providing the FAA with insight into what Company ZZZ frontline Management personnel are doing; regardless of what other Company Management personnel are prescribing through formal training. In this current environment; I have Air Carrier Management personnel in [the] compliance and training [department] telling me what is expected of me as a licensed FAA A and P AMT at our Air Carrier and I have frontline supervisors and their superiors [subjecting] me to an extremely hostile work environment while in the performance of my assigned duties all the while following their compliance directives. This situation should not be allowed to continue. But my attempts to utilize internal remedies; such as: the Company internal confidential business ethics hotline; the grievance process within the Union/Company Bargaining Agreement; and filing of previous reports regarding my findings and company actions; have placed me in harms way regarding my employ. The aforementioned Air Carrier ZZZ personnel are actively engaged in thwarting my attempts to perform my tasks and they are placing the flying public in harms ways. Once again; I therefore feel compelled to report future findings through this confidential forum with the hope of providing the FAA with insight into what ZZZ frontline management personnel are doing regardless of what other Company Management personnel are prescribing through formal training. I have been given strict written directives to follow Air Carrier company policy which doesn't allow me to take pictures as proof to document my maintenance findings. [Limited] staff.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports he did not document or inform his Air Carrier Management personnel about loose 'smoking' rivets on the Left and Right Engine Exhaust Nozzles on their MD-83 aircraft; due to fear of losing employment.

1222225

201412

1801-2400

11000.0

IMC

Air Carrier

Caravan Undifferentiated

1.0

Part 121

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Ice/Rain Protection System

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Physiological - Other

1222225

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

IFR flight plan in IMC at night. Cruising at 11;000 in visible moisture; OAT 0*C. TKS anti ice system on; vents closed; heater on. Noted cooked TKS odor in cockpit immediately after turning on TKS system. Immediate difficulty breathing; tightness in chest; later in flight noted chemical film on lips; bad taste in mouth; throat irritation; and voice became raspy. Symptoms of TKS exposure as noted on TKS 406B MSDS.

A C-208 pilot reported suffering symptoms of TKS exposure consistent with those noted on the TKS 406B MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet).

1444159

201704

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

8800.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class E ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

1444159

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 5300; Flight Crew Type 400

1445333.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

We were descending on the ILS [and] had just entered sterile cockpit and ATC asked if we had the airport in sight. We responded that we did and they cleared us for the visual and gave a speed reduction from 250 kts to 210 kts. I set the speed selector to 210 kts and after the throttles went to idle for the slowdown we received an ENG 2 CONTROL FAULT caution message on the EICAS. My FO grabbed the QRH and I told him that I had the aircraft and the radios and he would run the QRH for the displayed message. We performed QRH which after disconnecting autothrottles asked if the engine was responsive. I advanced the engine 2 thrust lever and there was no response; this was at approximately at 8800 ft. The QRH said that throttle response would be either slow or stabilized in an idle condition. The engine was stabilized at idle and the QRH told us to prepare for a single engine approach and landing. After determining that the throttle was unresponsive we told ATC our problem. We informed the flight attendants of the situation even though we were in sterile because I felt they should be aware of the situation. We did not brief the passengers because of the high workload and felt that it was more important to get the airplane on the ground since we would be landing very shortly. I elected to keep the non-responsive engine running because it was at a stabilized idle thrust condition and there was no indications that I felt warranted a complete shutdown. We configured the aircraft early to ensure a stabilized approach. In the high workload I forgot to arm the approach mode and ended up slightly high on glide slope. I clicked off the autopilot and hand flew the approach to an uneventful landing. We taxied to the gate and deplaned normally without any further incidents. Once everyone was off the plane I called Dispatch to notify them of the event as required per the Flight Operations Manual.

While descending through approximately 10;000 MSL after speed reduction to 210 knots; EICAS message 'ENG 2 FADEC CONTROL FAULT' appeared.

EMB-175 flight crew reported landing with the #2 engine at idle thrust; with no response to thrust lever input; due to a FADEC fault.

1660608

201903

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

No Aircraft

Repair Facility

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Time Pressure; Workload

1660608

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Other Person

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing; Company Policy

Human Factors

The FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) conducted a facility audit. During the audit; they found several consumable products with an expired shelf life in the Fire / Storage in the hangar. The FAA brought these items to the Supervisor's attention at the time and the Supervisor responded properly and removed the items from use. I received a phone call and an email stating that the FAA had decided to issue a SNAAP (Streamed No Action and Administrative Action Program) Letter to me regarding the incident.Monthly audits performed at the base failed to identify or locate the material prior to the expiration. This is not caused by an improper audit; but by the extensiveness of the task and the number of locations requiring the audit. In my opinion; the tasks is too large to be 100 % accurate.Expired shelf life or improperly labeled material was found in the work area.After the FAA brought the items to our attention; Management disposed of the items.[Company] needs to implement a new program dealing with shelf life material. Possibly an electronic program to Label; Monitor; Track; and Control shelf life items; or a 'one Time Use' program so material is not stored for later use and have the possibility of expiring. The current program is too complicated and labor intensive; and a 100% level of accuracy is difficult to achieve. Also; our Company culture needs to change as well so employees stop storing items for later use creating the possibility of the finding.

Maintenance Manager reports that audit found expired consumable products in stock at maintenance facility.

1473133

201708

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

6000

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

M-20 E Super 21

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Landing Gear

X

Failed; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 449; Flight Crew Type 78

1473133

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Person Flight Crew

Other landing roll

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After departing for home field; the landing gear failed to raise. When within range I called Unicom; advised the attendant of the situation; and asked him to stay on duty to visually verify that my gear was down. When I was adjacent to the terminal; he verified that the gear was in fact down. I had a green gear down light and with visual confirmation I landed the airplane. I felt the wheels on the pavement and immediately the airplane was on its belly. I shut everything down and got out. The airport attendant had closed the runway and met me at the airplane. He called a tow and we got the airplane back on its wheels and towed it to the hangar. It's worth noting that after being serviced [earlier this year]; the gear had failed to raise as I departed for home. I returned to the shop and they worked on the squat switch for several hours before releasing it. I had not had any more issues until this incident.

M20E pilot reported that after being unable to raise the landing gear; the gear collapsed on the landing roll.

1682768

201909

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 140 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 815

Situational Awareness

1682768

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling

Aircraft

While serving as First Officer; the following event occurred.After takeoff while performing the After Takeoff Flow Checklist; crew noticed illuminated BAGG EXT button at approximately 4;000 ft. Crew [advised ATC]; and asked to return to ZZZ while also requesting assistance from Crash Fire Rescue. Crew performed the [recommended procedure] in the QRH; returned and landed safely at ZZZ on Runway XXR. Crash Fire Rescue crews inspected the baggage compartment on the taxiway and then escorted the airplane back to the gate for further inspection.There were no live animals onboard and no personnel injury or aircraft damage noted. Unsure of cause of smoke alarm; overweight landing reported to Maintenance with a touchdown descent rate of 250 fpm.

ERJ-140 flight crew reported cargo compartment fire warning after takeoff; resulting in a return to land.

1418159

201701

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

8300.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ; Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

SR22

1.0

Part 91

Training

Cruise

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 875; Flight Crew Type 150

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1418159

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Horizontal 5280; Vertical 100

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was given a heading for a (diverging) right downwind for [the] visual. I was advised to remain at 7500 feet as the approach controller tried to get me in sequence for a touch and go. I was given directions to a lower aircraft which I understood that I was to follow and then immediately told to climb to 8500 (1500 above pattern) due to converging traffic. In fact this would have put me at the same altitude as the converging traffic; a Cirrus; there was immediate evasive action required by me. I was brought back into the pattern and told to follow Diamond Star; then they said 'that's not going to work because you are overtaking him by 50 knots'; I was on Right base and the other traffic was on final. I had not slowed down because I was being vectored all over.On departure after switching back to tower I was told to maintain an altitude and given a heading which took me into the [a near by] Class D airspace. I continued to fly this heading until the approach controller turned me out of the airspace. I assumed I had been cleared into as I was vectored to the airspace. I don't know what was going on that day but it was pretty scary.I am uncertain if they created a collision hazard by flying me on a heading and making me climb to a converging aircrafts heading or that I truly violated airspace squawking a discreet code and being vectored into [a near by Delta] airspace at 8500.

Cessna 182 pilot had to maneuver to avoid oncoming traffic in the airport pattern. While maneuvering he entered another airports class D airspace inadvertently. Once clear of traffic the pilot departed the airspace and landed normally.

1427370

201702

X51.Airport

FL

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CTAF X51

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 210; Flight Crew Type 70

1427370

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Ground Personnel