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crs_R41343 | crs_R41343_0 | Most Recent Developments
After a series of continuing resolutions (CRs)— P.L. 112-8 —on April 15, 2011, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 ( P.L. 112-10 provides $48.6 billion for VHA, a 7.8 % increase over the FY2010-enacted amount of $45.1 billion and 0.3% less than the President's request of $48.8 billion for FY2011 ( Table 1 ). Moreover, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, provides an advance appropriation of $50.6 billion for medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts to be available in FY2012. This is the same as the Administration's request for the same three accounts ( Table 1 ). The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is responsible for health care services and medical and prosthetic research programs. For details on VHA appropriations from FY2005 through FY2010, see Appendix E .
The Veterans Health Care System
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) operates the nation's largest integrated direct health care delivery system. Veteran's Status
Eligibility for VA health care is based primarily on "veteran's status" resulting from military service. 99-272 ), enacted into law in 1986, gave the VHA the authority to bill some veterans and most health care insurers for nonservice-connected care provided to veterans enrolled in the VA health care system, to help defray the cost of delivering medical services to veterans. On July 10, the House passed its version of the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2010 ( H.R. The House-passed bill provided a total of $45.1 billion for VHA. 3082 also provided $48.2 billion in advance appropriations for VHA to be available in FY2011. 111-117 included an advance appropriation of $48.2 billion for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts to be available in FY2011. FY2011 VHA Budget
President's Request
The Obama Administration released its FY2011 budget on February 1, 2010. The Administration's FY2011 budget request for three of the four accounts of VHA (medical services, medical support and compliance, medical facilities) was same as the funding amounts provided in the MILCON-VA Appropriations Act of 2010 ( P.L. Furthermore, as required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-81 ), the President's budget requested $50.6 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care appropriations (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2012. House Action
On July 28, 2010, the House passed its version of the version of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2011 ( H.R. 5822 ; H.Rept. 111-559 ). 5822 provided an advance appropriation of: $39.6 billion for the medical services; $5.5 billion for the medical support and compliance account; and $5.4 billion for the medical facilities account. The House-passed bill recommended $590 million for the medical and prosthetic research account, an increase of $9 million above the FY2010 enacted level and the same as the budget request. Senate Committee Action
On July 15, 2010, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up its version of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2011 ( S. 3615 ; S.Rept. 111-226 ). This amount included $100 million for medical services account, and $20 million for the medical facilities account ( Table 6 ). This act provided a total of $52.0 billion for VHA for FY2011. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA).
This report focuses on the VHA. The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health care system. Veterans generally must enroll in the VA health care system to receive medical care. Eligibility for enrollment is based primarily on previous military service, disability, and income. VA provides free inpatient and outpatient medical care to veterans for service-connected conditions and to low-income veterans for nonservice-connected conditions.
The Obama Administration released its FY2011 budget on February 1, 2010. The President requested an overall funding amount of $48.8 billion for VHA for FY2011, an increase of $3.7 billion over the enacted amount in FY2010. Furthermore, as required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-81), the Administration requested $50.6 billion in advance appropriations for FY2012 for the three medical care accounts: medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities.
On July 15, 2010, the Senate Committee on Appropriations marked up its version of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2011 (S. 3615; S.Rept. 111-226). The Senate Appropriations Committee version of the bill provided $48.9 billion for VHA for FY2011. This amount includes $48.1 billion authorized in FY2010, an additional $120 million for the medical services and medical facilities accounts, and $590 million for the medical and prosthetic research account. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended amount was thus $120 million more than the President's request for VHA for FY2011. S. 3615 also provided an advance appropriation in the amount of $50.6 billion for medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts to be available in FY2012.
On July 28, 2010, the House passed its version of the FY2011 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2011, H.R. 5822; H.Rept. 111-559). The House-passed bill provided a total of $48.8 billion for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) for FY2011, which included $48.1 billion authorized in the FY2010 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117) and $590 million for the medical and prosthetic research account. H.R. 5822 provided advance appropriations of $50.6 billion for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts to be available in FY2012. This is the same as the Administration's request and 5.0% above the FY2011 total amount for the same three accounts.
Congress did not pass any FY2011 appropriations bills before the fiscal year began on October 1, 2010; however, after passing a series of continuing resolutions (CRs), on April 15, 2011, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10), was enacted into law. P.L. 112-10 provides a total of $48.6 billion for VHA. It also provides $50.6 in advance appropriations for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts to be available in FY2012. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44738 | crs_R44738_0 | Water resource issues often arise at the regional level but have a federal connection. Next, it provides an overview of the federal role in water resource, including a discussion of the two major federal water resource agencies—the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation)—and related legislation. Legislation Enacted in the 114th Congress
The 114 th Congress authorized a broad range of water resource and water quality activities through the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN or WIIN Act; P.L. Some WIIN provisions had broad support; others were related to more controversial issues and legislation. Water Resource Considerations for the 115th Congress
The 115 th Congress may address some measures left pending at the end of the 114 th Congress, as well as consider new legislative proposals. Topics that may garner congressional attention include
federal and nonfederal financing for water resource infrastructure investments, particularly for rehabilitating, repairing, or removing aging infrastructure and augmenting water supplies through dam construction, water reuse, desalination, and agricultural and urban stormwater capture; federal permitting and approvals affecting federal and nonfederal water resource projects and activities; oversight of WIIN implementation and funding for WIIN-authorized activities; authorization of new federal water projects and studies transmitted to Congress after enactment of WIIN; federal role and process related to water resource project development and approval, including at the regional and watershed levels; private infrastructure development and public-private partnerships; role of ecosystem and environmental protections, including efforts to comply with the ESA, in water resource management; invasive species, such as the Asian carp, and harmful algal blooms; oversight of regional aquatic ecosystem restoration efforts; and efficacy of federal navigation improvements in inland waterways and coastal harbors (e.g., Gulf Coast and East Coast harbors' ability to accommodate larger vessels transiting the Panama Canal). The 115 th Congress also may address issues in particular river basins. These issues include the operation of federal reservoirs on the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers (Central Valley Project in California) and on the Missouri River and its tributaries. For more information on other federal water activities, see CRS Report R42653, Selected Federal Water Activities: Agencies, Authorities, and Congressional Committees , by Betsy A. Cody et al. 114-322 ). Examples of Reclamation-related water project and management issues that may be considered during the 115 th Congress include the following:
drought response provisions that were proposed in the 114 th Congress but not enacted in the WIIN Act (including provisions that would affect operations of federal reservoirs and water delivery); status of new and proposed water storage projects; status of Reclamation's Safety of Dams program; authorization, appropriations, and reporting to address aging infrastructure; Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley water reliability and species concerns (e.g., California WaterFix and proposals to address California water supplies); oversight of Colorado River water management; authorization of new Indian water rights settlements and appropriations for authorized settlements; and oversight of Klamath River Basin issues and efforts. Policy Issues
In addition to issues related to federal projects, the 115 th Congress faces a number of broad water resource policy issues, including financing investment in new and aging water resource infrastructure; changing federal partnerships; funding and authorizing projects and earmark policies; restoring aquatic ecosystems; and improving drought and flood preparedness and response. Financing Investment in Water Resource Infrastructure
U.S. water infrastructure is aging; the majority of the nation's dams, locks, and levees are more than 50 years old. Additionally, responsibilities for flood damage reduction are spread among federal, state, local, and tribal governments. | The 115th Congress faces various water resource development, management, and protection issues. Water resource activities generally encompass navigation improvements, flood damage reduction measures, water supply augmentation, hydropower generation, and aquatic ecosystem restoration. Congressional actions shape reinvestment in aging federal infrastructure (e.g., dams, locks, and levees) and federal and nonfederal investment in new projects. The principal agencies involved in federal water resource infrastructure are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation).
Oversight of Enacted Legislation. Water resource issues during 115th Congress are shaped in part by legislation enacted in earlier Congresses. The 114th Congress passed a broad water bill in December 2016—the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN or WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322)—that addressed water resource and water quality issues. Of its water resource provisions, WIIN
authorized a broad array of water resource activities for the Corps; addressed selected Department of the Interior water issues, including Reclamation projects and related water project management in California and other western states and management of selected Indian water projects; and authorized various regional aquatic ecosystem restoration activities.
Some of WIIN's Reclamation-related provisions on water conveyance and supply in California in particular remain the subject of attention by federal and local policymakers. Supporters of the WIIN provisions view these provisions as a compromise that may deliver greater water supplies to users; critics suggest that the provisions may alter environmental protections in California, thereby potentially harming threatened and endangered species, and that they may alter Congress's ability to oversee new projects. For more on WIIN, see CRS In Focus IF10536, Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN), by Nicole T. Carter et al.
Water Resource Issues in the 115th Congress. The 115th Congress may consider legislative proposals on water resource issues that were not addressed by WIIN, including those in legislative proposals considered but not enacted in previous Congresses. Congressional deliberations are within the context of broad issues shaping federal water resource activities. Areas of interest include the following:
financing investments in water resource infrastructure, changing federal partnerships, funding and authorizing projects and the earmark debate, restoring aquatic ecosystems, and improving drought and flood preparedness and response.
Within these broad issues, potential topics of congressional interest include authorization of additional studies and projects; public and private hydropower improvements; aging water infrastructure rehabilitation; recreational activities at federal projects; water research and science investment and coordination; and environmental requirements, including protection of threatened and endangered species. The 115th Congress also may consider issues that arise at the regional or local levels but have some federal involvement. For example, Congress may engage in policy debates and oversight related to the Columbia River, the Sacramento and San Joaquin River basins, the Colorado River, and the Southeast's Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin due to the role of federal infrastructure and other efforts in these areas. Additionally, budget and appropriations issues often play a key role in directing each agency's activities and priorities. |
crs_RL33091 | crs_RL33091_0 | Introduction
The devastation and displacement caused by Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast region ofthe United States pose a host of environmental, human resource, and other public policy challenges. The loss of livelihood, habitat, and life itself has very specificimplications for foreign nationals who lived in the Gulf Coast region. Whether the noncitizen orforeign national is a legal permanent resident (LPR), a nonimmigrant (e.g., temporary resident sucha foreign student, intracompany transferee, or guest worker) or an unauthorized alien (i.e., illegalimmigrant) is a significant additional factor in how federal immigration and public welfare laws areapplied. In this context, the key question is whether Congress should relax any of these lawspertaining to foreign nationals who are victims of Hurricane Katrina . Personal Identification and Employment Eligibility
Many of the victims of Hurricane Katrina lack personal identification documents as a resultof being evacuated from their homes, loss or damage to personal items and records, and ongoingdisplacement in shelters and temporary housing. As a result of the widespread damage anddestruction to government facilities in the area affected by the hurricane, moreover, many victimswill be unable to have personal documents re-issued in the near future. Lack of adequate personalidentification documentation, a problem for all victims, has specific consequences under immigrationlaw, especially when it comes to employment. As legislation to ease the federaleligibility rules for public assistance for Hurricane Katrina victims generally is under consideration,the question of whether to ease the specific rules for noncitizens has arisen (S. 1695). These programmatic exceptions include
treatment under Medicaid for emergency medical conditions (other than thoserelated to an organ transplant); (15)
short-term, in-kind emergency disaster relief; (16)
immunizations against immunizable diseases and testing for and treatment ofsymptoms of communicable diseases;
services or assistance (such as soup kitchens, crisis counseling andintervention, and short-term shelters) designated by the Attorney General as: (i) delivering in-kindservices at the community level; (ii) providing assistance without individual determinations of each recipient's needs; and (iii) being necessary for the protection of life and safety; (17) and
to the extent that an alien was receiving assistance on the date of enactment,programs administered by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, programs under TitleV of the Housing Act of 1949, and assistance under Section 306C of the Consolidated Farm andRural Development Act. There are very few immigration avenues based on self petitioning; mostrequire that aliens have a family member or employer who is eligible, able, and willing to sponsorthem. The loss of life, devastation of businesses, or depletion of personal assets directly affects visaqualifications for otherwise eligible aliens who are victims of Hurricane Katrina or the family ofvictims. It also affects nonimmigrants whose purposes for the temporary visas are disrupted by thehurricane and its aftermath. H.R. Relief from Removal
At various times in the past, the Attorney General has provided, under certain conditions,discretionary relief from deportation so that aliens who have not been legally admitted to the UnitedStates or whose temporary visa has expired nonetheless may remain in this country temporarily. (40)
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, INS issued a press release announcingthat family members of victims of the terrorist attacks whose own immigration status was dependenton the victim's immigration status should not be concerned about facing immediate removal fromthe United States. | The devastation and displacement caused by Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast region ofthe United States has very specific implications for foreign nationals who lived in the region. Whether the foreign national is a legal permanent resident (LPR), a nonimmigrant (e.g., temporaryresident such a foreign student, intracompany transferee, or guest worker) or an unauthorized alien(i.e., illegal immigrant) is a significant additional factor in how federal laws and policies are applied. In this context, the key question is whether Congress should relax any of these laws pertaining toforeign nationals who are victims of Hurricane Katrina .
Many of the victims of Hurricane Katrina lack personal identification documents as a resultof being evacuated from their homes, loss or damage to personal items and records, and ongoingdisplacement in shelters and temporary housing. As a result of the widespread damage anddestruction to government facilities in the area affected by the hurricane, moreover, many victimswill be unable to have personal documents re-issued in the near future. Lack of adequate personalidentification documentation, a problem for all victims, has specific consequences under immigrationlaw, especially when it comes to employment and eligibility for programs and assistance.
Noncitizens -- regardless of their immigration status -- are not barred from short-term,in-kind emergency disaster relief and services, or from assistance that delivers in-kind services atthe community level, provides assistance without individual determinations of each recipient's needs,and is necessary for the protection of life and safety. As legislation to ease the eligibility rules ofmajor federal programs for Hurricane Katrina victims generally is under consideration, the questionof whether to ease the specific rules for immigrants has arisen ( S. 1695 ).
Most avenues for immigration require that aliens have a family member or employer who iseligible, able, and willing to sponsor them. There are very few immigration opportunities based onself petitioning. The loss of life, devastation of businesses, or depletion of personal assets directlyaffects visa qualifications for otherwise eligible aliens who are victims of Hurricane Katrina or thefamily of victims. It also affects nonimmigrants whose purposes for the temporary visas aredisrupted by the hurricane and its aftermath. Legislation comparable to that enacted for survivingfamily of victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks has passed the House ( H.R. 3827 ).
Finally, at various times in the past, the government has given discretionary relief fromdeportation so that aliens who have not been legally admitted to the United States or whosetemporary visas have expired nonetheless may remain in this country temporarily. Following theSeptember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, for example, family members of victims whose ownimmigration status was dependent on the victim's immigration status were assured that they shouldnot be concerned about facing immediate removal from the United States. This report will beupdated. |
crs_R41556 | crs_R41556_0 | The Middle East: Introduction and General Questions for Congressional Consideration
The Middle East, broadly defined as an area stretching from North Africa to Afghanistan, presents an array of challenges to U.S. foreign policy. Although the United States maintains strong relations with several key Arab and non-Arab states such as Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey, other state and non-state actors, such as Iran, the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Palestinian Sunni group Hamas, are aligned against U.S. interests. The United States has continued to advocate for economic and political reform to address these challenges. Members of the 112 th Congress may face any number of issues in or relating to the Middle East including the war in Afghanistan, terrorism, foreign assistance, democracy promotion, human rights concerns, and ongoing effects of the global financial crisis. U.S. Support for Lebanon17
Current U.S. policy toward Lebanon is to support the current unity government under the leadership of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, to limit Iranian and Syrian influence, and to contain the U.S. State Department-designated terrorist organization Hezbollah. Appendix A. Relevant Congressional Research Service Reports
Iran Sanctions
CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. | The Middle East, broadly defined as an area stretching from North Africa to Afghanistan, presents an array of challenges to U.S. foreign policy. Although the United States maintains strong relations with several key Arab and non-Arab states such as Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey, other state and non-state actors, such as Iran, the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Palestinian Sunni group Hamas, are aligned against U.S. interests. The United States and its regional and international allies continue to work to limit the influence of these actors while advocating for economic and political reform to address ongoing socioeconomic challenges and to promote democracy and a greater respect for human rights in the region.
Members of the 112th Congress may face any number of issues in or relating to the Middle East including the war in Afghanistan, terrorism, foreign assistance, democracy promotion, and ongoing effects of the global financial crisis. This report provides an overview of key issues, a summary of past congressional action on these issues, and options for congressional consideration during the 112th Congress.
Key issues include:
Iran Sanctions
Preserving Israel's Qualitative Military Edge
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process
U.S. Aid to the Palestinians
Saudi Arabia: Arms Sales and Security Cooperation
Yemen
Iraq: Defining Post-2011 Relations
Turkey
U.S. Policy Toward Syria
U.S. Support for Lebanon
U.S. Democracy Promotion in Egypt
Islam, Al Qaeda, and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy
This report also contains a section, Appendix A, with links to relevant Congressional Research Service reports, along with analyst contact information. |
crs_R40713 | crs_R40713_0 | Agencies' Use of Unified Agenda Before Proposed Rules Varied
To determine the extent to which agencies used the Unified Agenda to notify the public about their upcoming proposed rules, CRS examined all published proposed rules that had been reviewed by OIRA during calendar year 2008. Viewed another way, however, for about one-quarter of the proposed rules, the agencies did not use the Unified Agenda to alert the public of those NPRMs before they were published in the Federal Register , and one-third of the time there were no "proposed rule" Agenda entries published before OIRA started its reviews. The NPRMs that were published with no prior "proposed rule" Unified Agenda entries included the following:
an August 2008 Department of Agriculture (USDA) rule on "Requirements for the Disposition of Cattle that Become Non-Ambulatory Disabled Following Ante-Mortem Inspection" a December 2008 Department of Commerce (DOC) rule on the "Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis System" a March 2008 Department of Defense (DOD) rule on the "Relationship Between the TRICARE Program and Employer-Sponsored Group Health Insurance" an April 2008 Department of Education (ED) rule on "Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged" a January 2009 Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) rule on "Payments to Sponsors of Prescription Drug Plans" a March 2008 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rule clarifying "Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter" an April 2008 Department of the Interior (DOI) rule on "Firearms in National Park Service Lands" an April 2008 Department of Justice (DOJ) rule on "Classification of Three Steroids as Schedule III Anabolic Steroids under the Controlled Substances Act" an August 2008 Department of Labor (DOL) rule on "Requirements for DOL Agencies' Assessment of Occupational Health Risks" a January 2008 DOT rule on "Passenger Car and Light Truck Corporate Average Fuel Economy, 2011-2015" an April 2008 Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) rule on "Grants for the Hiring and Retention of Nurses in the State Home Program" a November 2008 EPA rule on "Petroleum Refinery Residual Risk Standards" a December 2008 Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and DOD rule on the "National Security Personnel System" an August 2008 Social Security Administration (SSA) rule on "Authorization of Representative Fees" a January 2009 GSA rule on "Federal Supply Schedule Contracting"
Table 1 also shows that the agencies differed in the extent to which they used the Unified Agenda to notify the public about upcoming proposed rules. Discussion
The Obama Administration has launched an initiative to make the policymaking process more open and transparent, and has asked for comments from the public on how the rulemaking process in particular can be improved in these respects. Some observers have concluded that the most critical part of that process occurs before the proposed rule is published in the Federal Register , and (for significant rules) possibly even earlier—before the rule is approved by the issuing agency and submitted to OIRA for review. However, in order for the public to participate prior to the publication of a proposed rule, or even to begin preparing comments during sometimes brief public comment periods, the public must first become aware that the proposed rule is about to be issued. Although a variety of methods could be used to accomplish this goal, including blogs and other forms of new "social media," the Unified Agenda—which has been published twice each year since 1983, and online since 1995—arguably provides agencies with the most systematic, government-wide method to alert the public about their upcoming proposed rules. About three-quarters of the significant proposed rules that were published after OIRA reviewed the rules in 2008 were preceded by a "proposed rule" Unified Agenda entry. Two-thirds of the rules had such entries even earlier, before the draft rules were submitted to OIRA for review under Executive Order 12866. However, should either Congress or the Obama Administration conclude that improvements are needed in the transparency of the rulemaking process, or in opportunities for the public to participate in that process prior to the publication of proposed rules, various policy options are available. Some of the available options have nothing to do with the Unified Agenda. One such option is to improve the visibility of the Unified Agenda to the public. To remedy this situation, either Congress or the President could require agencies to publish "proposed rule" entries in the Unified Agenda before submitting significant draft rules to OIRA, or to explain why such entries were not possible. In that system, agencies are not allowed to establish a rulemaking docket before an NPRM is published in the Federal Register . | The Obama Administration has launched an initiative to make the policymaking process more open and transparent, and has asked for comments from the public on how the rulemaking process in particular can be improved in these respects. Some observers have concluded that the most critical part of that process occurs before a proposed rule is published in the Federal Register, and (for significant rules) possibly even earlier—before the rule is approved by the issuing agency and submitted to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget for review pursuant to Executive Order 12866. A representative of the Obama Administration has said that the public will be allowed to participate in the development of proposed rules. However, in order for the public to do so, or to allow more time to prepare comments during sometimes brief comment periods, the public must first know that the proposed rule is being developed.
The Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (Unified Agenda), which has been published twice each year since 1983, arguably provides federal agencies with the most systematic, government-wide method to alert the public about their upcoming proposed rules. To determine how frequently agencies are using the Unified Agenda to perform this task, CRS examined all 231 significant proposed rules that were issued after having been reviewed by OIRA in 2008. About three-quarters of those rules were preceded by a "proposed rule" Unified Agenda entry (indicating that the agency was developing a proposed rule), and two-thirds of the rules had such entries even earlier, before the rules were submitted to OIRA for review. Viewed another way, however, there were no "proposed rule" Unified Agenda entries for about one-quarter of the proposed rules before they were published in the Federal Register, and there were no such entries before one-third of the rules were submitted to OIRA for review. Some agencies almost always used the Unified Agenda to notify the public about their upcoming proposed rules, while others did so less frequently.
If Congress or the Obama Administration conclude that improvements are needed in the transparency of the rulemaking process, or in the ability of the public to participate in that process prior to the publication of proposed rules, various policy options are available. Some of the options do not involve the Unified Agenda (e.g., greater use of public meetings, blogs, or making agencies' internal rulemaking tracking systems available to the public). Also, or alternatively, either Congress or the Obama Administration could take one or more of the following actions: (1) improve the visibility of the Unified Agenda to the public; (2) require agencies to publish "proposed rule" entries in the Unified Agenda before submitting their significant draft rules to OIRA, or to explain why such entries were not possible; (3) increase the frequency with which the Unified Agenda is published; and (4) require agencies to establish a rulemaking docket where comments could be placed when the public is notified of an upcoming proposed rule.
This report will be updated to reflect changes in factual information or policy developments. |
crs_R41340 | crs_R41340_0 | 1473 , the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011, which the President signed into law ( P.L. Overview of FY2011 Appropriations
On February 1, 2010, President Obama issued his FY2011 FSGG budget request, which included $48.219 billion, an increase of $1.785 billion over FY2010 appropriations. S. 3677 would provide $48.296 billion for FY2011, an increase of $1.862 billion above FY2010 appropriations and $77 million above the President's request. 1 , which the House passed on February 19, 2011. 1 would have provided FSGG agencies with $43.298 billion for FY2011, $3.136 billion below FY2010 enacted appropriations and $4.921 billion below the President's request. On April 15, 2011, President Obama signed H.R. 112-10 ). FY2011 enacted figures may be revised when further details become available. In FY2010, a total of $105 million was provided for both. Recommended appropriations for the Treasury Department reflect that intention. In addition, H.R. Executive Office of the President and Funds Appropriated to the President33
The FSGG appropriations bill provides funding for all but three offices under the EOP. On July 29, 2010, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 3677 , the FY2011 FSGG appropriations bill. Appropriations for the CFTC are under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Subcommittee in the House, and the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) Subcommittee in the Senate. 111-80 . P.L. P.L. 1 , the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, would provide the SBA an appropriation of $740 million in FY2011, 25.6% below the Administration's FY2011 request of $994.1 million, 32.9% below the Senate Committee on Appropriations' FY2011 request of $1.103 billion, and 10.2% below the FY2010 enacted amount of $824 million ( P.L. United States Postal Service152
The U.S. 111-117 for FY2010. 111-117 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2010. | The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President, the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and 26 independent agencies. Among the independent agencies funded by the bill are the Small Business Administration, the Office of Personnel Management, and the United States Postal Service.
The FSGG FY2010 appropriations were provided through P.L. 111-117, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010. P.L. 111-117 provided $46.265 billion for FSGG agencies in FY2010. In addition, P.L. 111-80 provided an additional $169 million for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission—which is under the jurisdiction of the FSGG Subcommittee in the Senate but not in the House—for a total of $46.434 billion for FSGG agencies in FY2010.
On February 1, 2010, President Obama issued his FY2011 FSGG budget request for $48.219 billion, an increase of $1.785 billion over FY2010 appropriations. On July 29, 2010, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved S. 3677, which would provide FSGG agencies with $48.296 billion for FY2011, an increase of $1.861 billion above FY2010 appropriations. On February 19, 2011, the House passed H.R. 1, which would provide FSGG agencies with $43.298 billion for FY2011, $3.136 billion below FY2010 enacted appropriations.
On April 15, 2011, President Obama signed H.R. 1473, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011, into law (P.L. 112-10). The bill provides FSGG agencies with $44.745 billion for FY2011, a decrease of $1.69 billion from FY2010 enacted levels and $3.47 billion less that the President's FY2011 request. FY2011 enacted figures may be revised when further details become available. |
crs_RL34517 | crs_RL34517_0 | In at least some ecosystems, logging, livestock grazing, and a century of fire suppression efforts have allowed biomass fuels to accumulate to unnatural levels. Climate change, and its impacts on drought, fire, and insects and diseases, could exacerbate these problems. Some interests are concerned that current efforts to reduce fuel levels on federal lands are inadequate, and that "environmentalist objections" to some of those efforts are unnecessarily raising costs and delaying action. Congress continues to address these issues as it considers funding and legislative proposals. Not surprisingly, crown fires are difficult, if not impossible, to control. Often, however, crown fires burn until they run out of fuel or the weather changes (the wind dies or it rains or snows). Nearly all fires are "patchy," with a mix of areas of varying fire severities, depending on site-specific fuel, moisture, and wind conditions. Treating these three elements addresses all three ways by which structures are ignited—direct contact, radiation, and firebrands. Adjacent burnable materials are items that can burn that abut the house. Finally, landscaping—the character of the vegetation surrounding the house—is critical to preventing both direct burning and ignition by radiation. Protecting Wildlands and Natural Resources
Wildlands and natural resources can also be damaged by wildfires. Wildfire damages vary widely, depending on the nature of the ecosystems burned as well as site-specific conditions. Surface Fire Ecosystems
Surface fire ecosystems are ecosystems where fires burn relatively frequently (typically 5- to 35-year intervals), with the fires consuming leaves or needles, grasses, twigs and small branches, and sometimes small trees, but generally leaving moderate and large trees unharmed by the fire. Stand-Replacement Fire/Crown Fire Ecosystems
Stand-replacement fire ecosystems are those where crown fires are normal, natural, periodic events to which the ecosystem has adapted. Depending on how it is accomplished, mechanical thinning may add to surface fuels (and increase surface fire intensity) unless the fine fuels that result from the thinning are removed from the stand or otherwise treated....
Thinning and prescribed fires can modify understory microclimate that was previously buffered by overstory vegetation.... Thinned stands (open tree canopies) allow solar radiation to penetrate to the forest floor, which then increases surface temperatures, decreases fire fuel moisture, and decreases relative humidity compared to unthinned stands—conditions that can increase surface fire intensity.... An increase in surface fire intensity may increase the likelihood that overstory tree crowns ignite. However, others caution that expedited review or limits on ESA consultation and on public oversight of proposed fuel treatments may allow treatments to include commercial timber harvests or other actions that provide little wildfire protection and exacerbate fuel accumulations in the short run, while causing other environmental damages. Conclusions
As more acres and more homes have burned in the past few years, and more people are at risk from wildfires, Congress has faced increasing pressures to protect structures and resources. To protect homes, Congress could create new programs and expand existing ones for installing non-flammable roofing, removing burnable materials adjacent to structures, and creating a defensible space of at least 30 feet around the building. Existing programs for federal lands authorize prescribed burning (intentional fires under prescribed conditions) and mechanical treatments (cutting and removing some trees), the principal means of reducing fuel levels. However, prescribed fires are risky and mechanical treatments can cause other ecological damages, and both are expensive. Proponents of more fuel treatment advocate accelerated processes for environmental analysis and public review to reduce costs and expedite action. Others caution that inadequate analysis and review can allow projects with unintended damages and few fire protection benefits. Such activities:
a. Shall be limited to areas:
(1) In the wildland-urban interface; or
(2) Condition Classes 2 or 3 [moderate or high risk of ecological damage] in Fire Regimes I, II, or III [surface fire, stand-replacement fire at 35 years or less, and mixed-intensity fire], outside the wildland-urban interface;
b. Shall be identified through a collaborative framework as described in "A Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities and Environment 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy Implementation Plan";
c. Shall be conducted consistent with agency and Departmental procedures and applicable land and resource management plans;
d. Shall not be conducted in wilderness areas or impair the suitability of wilderness study areas for preservation as wilderness; and
e. Shall not include the use of herbicides or pesticides or the construction of new permanent roads or other new permanent infrastructure; and may include the sale of vegetative material if the primary purpose of the activity is hazardous fuel reduction. | Wildfires are getting more severe, with more acres and houses burned and more people at risk. This results from excess biomass in the forests, due to past logging and grazing and a century of fire suppression, combined with an expanding wildland-urban interface—more people and houses in and near the forests—and climate change, exacerbating drought and insect and disease problems. Some assert that current efforts to protect houses and to reduce biomass (through fuel treatments, such as thinning) are inadequate, and that public objections to some of these activities on federal lands raise costs and delay action. Others counter that proposals for federal lands allow timber harvesting with substantial environmental damage and little fire protection. Congress is addressing these issues through various legislative proposals and through funding for protection programs.
Wildfires are inevitable—biomass, dry conditions, and lightning create fires. Some are surface fires, which burn needles, grasses, and other fine fuels and leave most trees alive. Others are crown fires, which are typically driven by high winds and burn biomass at all levels from the ground through the tree tops. Many wildfires contain areas of both surface and crown fires. Surface fires are relatively easy to control, but crown fires are difficult, if not impossible, to stop; often, crown fires burn until they run out of fuel or the weather changes.
Homes can be ignited by direct contact with fire, by radiative heating, and by firebrands (burning materials lifted by the wind or the fire's own convection column). Protection of homes must address all three. Research has identified the keys to protecting structures: having a non-flammable roof; clearing burnable materials that abut the house (e.g., plants, flammable mulch, woodpiles, wooden decks); and landscaping to create a defensible space around the structure.
Wildland and resource damages from fire vary widely, depending on the nature of the ecosystem as well as on site-specific conditions. Surface fire ecosystems, which burn on 5- to 35-year cycles, can be damaged by crown fires due to unnatural fuel accumulations and fuel ladders (small trees and dense undergrowth); fuel treatments probably prevent some crown fires in such ecosystems. Stand-replacement fire ecosystems are those where crown fires are natural and the species are adapted to periodic crown fires; fuel treatments are unlikely to alter the historic fire regime of such ecosystems. In mixed-intensity fire ecosystems, where a mix of surface and crown fires is historically normal, it is unclear whether fuel treatments would alter wildfire patterns.
Prescribed burning (intentional fires) and mechanical treatments (cutting and removing some trees) can reduce resource damages caused by wildfires in some ecosystems. However, prescribed fires are risky, mechanical treatments can cause other ecological damages, and both are expensive. Proponents of more treatment advocate expedited processes for environmental and public review of projects to hasten action and cut costs, but others caution that inadequate review can allow unintended damages with few fire protection benefits. |
crs_R44120 | crs_R44120_0 | In the typical course of enacting an annual defense authorization, congressional staffs receive many requests for information on provisions contained in these bills. This report summarizes selected highlights of S. 1356 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (FY2016 NDAA), which was passed by the House of Representatives on November 5, 2015, passed by the Senate on November 10, 2015, and signed by the President on November 25, 2015 ( P.L. 114-92 ), and an initial bill, H.R. 1735 , that was passed by both the House and the Senate. The President had vetoed H.R. 1735 , an earlier version of the FY2016 NDAA, on October 22, 2015. In his veto message, the President objected that the bill would have provided more funding for defense-related activities than would be allowed under spending caps that then were in effect, which initially had been imposed by P.L. 112-25 , the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). The President objected to legislation that would, in effect, allow defense-related spending for FY2016 to exceed the BCA defense spending cap without allowing similar budgetary leeway for nondefense related spending, which was subject to a similar BCA spending cap. Subsequently, the President signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-74 ) which raised the FY2016 spending caps for both defense and nondefense spending. The text of the initial bill ( H.R. 1735 ) then was modified to comply with the revised spending caps while retaining intact the final military personnel provisions discussed in this report. For procedural reasons, the text of that revised NDAA then was substituted for the original text of S. 1356 , an unrelated bill previously passed by the Senate. The amended version of S. 1356 (i.e., the revised FY2016 NDAA) then was passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President. Some issues discussed in this report previously were addressed in the Carl Levin and Howard P. 'Buck' McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 ( P.L. Those issues that were considered previously are designated with an asterisk in the relevant section titles of this report. Additionally, it would have allowed the Service Secretaries to decrease the number of personnel in an active component and in the Selected Reserve of a reserve component under their jurisdiction by up to 2% below the authorized end-strength. Section 402 of the final bill ( P.L. Reference(s): Previously discussed in CRS Report R43647, FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], and similar reports from earlier years. Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) adjustments first enacted by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 ( P.L. The final version of the bill contained numerous provisions regarding the legal procedures, policies and programs, and data collection and reporting for military sexual assaults. The initial House-passed bill (H.R. 114-92, S. 1356) include provisions similar to the initial Senate-passed version of H.R. 1735. 114-92 , S. 1356 ) requires that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate no later than March 1, 2016, with a plan to obtain budget-neutrality for the DeCA and the military exchange system. 1735 . 114-92, S. 1356) provides for smaller pharmacy copayment increases than would have been provided under the initial Senate-passed bill (H.R. 1735). Reference(s) : Previously discussed in CRS Report R43647, FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues , and CRS Report R43184, FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues . Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in the implementation of that follow-up plan. By not including the provisions of the initial Senate Section 711, the provisions of the enacted bill (P.L. Discussion : Both the initial House and Senate-passed versions of the bill (H.R. | Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the regular use of the reserve component personnel for operational missions, further heighten interest in a wide range of military personnel policies and issues.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has selected a number of the military personnel issues considered in deliberations on H.R. 1735 as passed by the House and by the Senate and the final bill, S. 1356, as enacted (P.L. 114-92). This report provides a brief synopsis of sections in each bill that pertain to selected personnel policy. These include major military retirement reforms, end strengths, compensation, health care, and sexual assault, as well as less prominent issues that nonetheless generate significant public interest.
This report focuses exclusively on the annual defense authorization process. It does not include language concerning appropriations, or tax implications of policy choices, topics which are addressed in other CRS products. Some issues were addressed previously in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report R43647, FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. Such issues are designated with an asterisk in the relevant section titles of this report.
This report summarizes selected highlights of S. 1356, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (FY2016 NDAA), which was passed by the House of Representatives on November 5, 2015, passed by the Senate on November 10, 2015, and signed by the President on November 25, 2015 (P.L. 114-92), and an initial bill, H.R. 1735, that was passed by both the House and the Senate.
The President had vetoed H.R. 1735, an earlier version of the FY2016 NDAA, on October 22, 2015. In his veto message, the President objected that the bill would have provided more funding for defense-related activities than would be allowed under spending caps that then were in effect, which initially had been imposed by P.L. 112-25, the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). The President objected to legislation that would, in effect, allow defense-related spending for FY2016 to exceed the BCA defense spending cap without allowing similar budgetary leeway for nondefense related spending, which was subject to a similar BCA spending cap.
Subsequently, the President signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74) which raised the FY2016 spending caps for both defense and nondefense spending. The text of the initial bill (H.R. 1735) then was modified to comply with the revised spending caps while retaining intact the final military personnel provisions discussed in this report. For procedural reasons, the text of that revised NDAA then was substituted for the original text of S. 1356, an unrelated bill previously passed by the Senate. The amended version of S. 1356 (i.e., the revised FY2016 NDAA) then was passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President.
This report summarizes selected highlights of S. 1356, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (FY2016 NDAA), which was passed by the House of Representatives on November 5, 2015, passed by the Senate on November 10, 2015, and signed by the President on November 25, 2015 (P.L. 114-92), and an initial bill, H.R. 1735, that was passed by both the House and the Senate.
The President had vetoed H.R. 1735, an earlier version of the FY2016 NDAA, on October 22, 2015. In his veto message, the President objected that the bill would have provided more funding for defense-related activities than would be allowed under spending caps that then were in effect, which initially had been imposed by P.L. 112-25, the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). The President objected to legislation that would, in effect, allow defense-related spending for FY2016 to exceed the BCA defense spending cap without allowing similar budgetary leeway for nondefense related spending, which was subject to a similar BCA spending cap.
Subsequently, the President signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74) which raised the FY2016 spending caps for both defense and nondefense spending. The text of the initial bill (H.R. 1735) then was modified to comply with the revised spending caps while retaining intact the final military personnel provisions discussed in this report. For procedural reasons, the text of that revised NDAA then was substituted for the original text of S. 1356, an unrelated bill previously passed by the Senate. The amended version of S. 1356 (i.e., the revised FY2016 NDAA) then was passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President. |
crs_R41473 | crs_R41473_0 | Overview
In 1998, Al Qaeda (AQ) conducted its first U.S.-documented terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, killing 224 people, including 12 Americans, and injuring over 4,500 in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. According to the U.S. State Department, the continued presence of Al Qaeda operatives in the region and Islamist militants in Somalia poses the greatest threat to U.S. and allied government interests in the region, where porous borders remain vulnerable to the movement of terrorists and illicit materials. The reported recruitment efforts of Al Shabaab in the United States have also raised concern regarding threats to the homeland and the involvement of U.S. citizens in terrorism activities overseas. The United States implements a range of overt, covert, and clandestine programs to counter the transnational terrorist threat in this region. This report explores U.S. measures to prevent, deter, and preempt terrorism in East Africa, focusing on the response to threats posed by violent Islamist extremist groups such as Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab. The report describes both regional and bilateral programs designed to counter the influence and activities of violent extremist organizations. Which agencies currently implement counterterrorism programs? He introduced S.Res. Several bills were introduced in the aftermath of the 2010 Kampala bombings: H.Con.Res. Related legislation, H.Res. The committee has also sought to expand or enhance several counterterrorism authorities, including the "Section 1208" program, which allows DOD to provide assistance to foreign forces facilitating U.S. Special Operations Forces operations to counter terrorism; various counter-ideology initiatives, including efforts to facilitate DOD understanding of the cultural and ideological contexts of radicalization; and the "Section 1206" train and equip program, which has been used to build capabilities in East Africa. The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee has investigated the activities of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and its sub-regional presence in Djibouti, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). The region's porous borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial institutions, pervasive corruption, and, in some cases, state complicity in terrorist activities, combined with the almost 20-year absence of central authority in Somalia, have provided an enabling environment for Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups. The U.S. According to the State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism , the threat these groups pose remains largely focused on targets in the region:
Al-Shabaab's leadership was supportive of al-Qa'ida (AQ), and both groups continued to present a serious terrorist threat to American and allied interests throughout the Horn of Africa…. The United States does not provide direct funding support to the African Union for AMISOM. A brief overview of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region by country is provided in Appendix A . Select Oversight Issues for Congress
Policy and Program Coordination of Regional Counterterrorism Programs
Strategic guidance for U.S. counterterrorism and counter-extremism efforts in East Africa is provided by multiple government agencies, and the extent to which there is a comprehensive and integrated interagency plan for countering the threat regionally is unclear. U.S. efforts to strengthen the capacity of Somali intelligence services in the past decade have reportedly led to some notable successes, including the disruption of terrorist operations in the planning stages, and such efforts have reportedly assisted the capture of several AQ operatives in Somalia. Reported U.S. assistance to Somali "security forces" in the past has been controversial. The State Department reports that the country remains vulnerable to international terrorism. House Homeland Security Committee, "The Evolving Nature of Terrorism," September 15, 2010. Hearings on political instability and terrorist activities in Somalia:
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, "The Horn of Africa: Current Conditions and U.S. Policy," June 17, 2010; and "Somalia: Prospects for a Lasting Peace and a Unified Response to Extremism and Terrorism," June 25, 2009
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Developing a Coordinated and Sustainable Strategy for Somalia," May 20, 2009
Hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee, "U.S. Policy Toward Yemen and Somalia," April 29, 2010. | The United States government has implemented a range of programs to counter violent extremist threats in East Africa in response to Al Qaeda's bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and subsequent transnational terrorist activity in the region. These programs include regional and bilateral efforts, both military and civilian. The programs seek to build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation, port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies. Current U.S.-led regional counterterrorism efforts include the State Department's East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) and the U.S. military's Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), part of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). The United States has also provided significant assistance in support of the African Union's (AU) peace operations in Somalia, where the country's nascent security forces and AU peacekeepers face a complex insurgency waged by, among others, Al Shabaab, a local group linked to Al Qaeda that often resorts to terrorist tactics. The State Department reports that both Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab pose serious terrorist threats to the United States and U.S. interests in the region. Evidence of linkages between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, highlight another regional dimension of the threat posed by violent extremists in the area.
Congress has appropriated increasing counterterrorism assistance for Africa over the past decade, and has demonstrated continued interest in both the nature of the terrorist threat and efforts to counter it through hearings, investigations, and legislation. Questions have been raised regarding
the level of U.S. funding and personnel dedicated to these efforts; the underlying assumptions on which these programs have been developed; cooperation between implementing agencies; and the extent to which U.S. programs actually prevent or mitigate radicalization, recruitment, and support for violent extremist organizations.
This report provides an overview of current U.S. counterterrorism assistance programs and influence operations in East Africa and explores some of the strategies underpinning them. It also provides a brief description of the evolving terrorist threat in the region. The security cooperation and civil affairs activities of the U.S. military in the region have grown substantially in the past decade, primarily in response to these threats, and the report explores the various roles of the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, among other agencies, in implementing counterterrorism and counter-extremism programs in the region. The report does not address covert or clandestine operations to collect intelligence or capture or eliminate terrorist targets in the region.
Related legislation includes several bills introduced in the aftermath of the July 2010 Kampala bombings: H.Con.Res. 303, H.Res. 1538, and H.Res. 1596, as well as S.Res. 573, on Somalia; S. 3757, on Ethiopia; and H.Res. 1708, on Eritrea. For further information, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins; CRS Report RL33911, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch. |
crs_R40461 | crs_R40461_0 | For some historians, efforts by countries to improve their own trade position and help domestic industries at the expense of others by imposing measures that artificially increase exports or limit imports describe protectionism. Each scenario reflects a different dimension of the relationship between the economic downturn and protectionism. The scenarios are not predictions, but descriptions of how and why protectionist pressures could be manifested and transmitted under very different situations and policy responses. Under a low impact s cenario existing WTO rules and obligations, bolstered by a high level of global interdependence, keep pressures for protection under control. Proposals for protection, if implemented, have a modest impact on global trade flows. Under a medium impact scenario WTO rules prove inadequate or are disregarded due to the exigencies of the economic crisis. As a result, trade and investment flows over time could be diverted or fall outside WTO surveillance, thereby weakening the world trading system. High Impact Scenario: WTO Rules Are Violated, Major Trade Conflicts Occur, And Trading System Is Undermined
Under this scenario, WTO rules are violated or ignored and major trade conflicts occur. This threat arises from the longstanding presence of highly skewed trade balances driven by distorted global consumption and savings patterns—patterns that were an underlying cause of the global economic downturn. Given the prominent role that China and the United States play in the global imbalances, two flashpoints for any outbreak of protectionism can be identified. The first involves the possibility that some countries could be perceived as "free riders" in the international effort to increase global aggregate demand. Assuming the transition to domestic-led growth by China takes years to accomplish, a major concern is that the current account surplus countries could try to avoid massive factory closings by resorting to tariff and trade policies designed to export their overcapacity to the rest of the world. Policy Challenges for Congress
The global economic downturn is deep and broad. In this context, three broad policy challenges can be derived from the analysis presented in this report. The first deals with international coordination and surveillance of fiscal stimulus programs. The second relates to multilateral surveillance of trade pressures and barriers adopted during this crisis. The third pertains to the management of U.S. trade relations, particularly as it relates to trade with China and other current account surplus countries. This is true on a range of issues, including constituent requests for protection, facilitating the adjustment of current account surplus countries, and formulating trade liberalization priorities. | In today's severe global economic downturn, concerns are being raised that countries may try to improve their own trade positions in order to help domestic industries at the expense of others by imposing measures that artificially increase their exports or restrict imports. Such efforts are considered by some to be a form of "protectionism" and are often referred to as beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
This report develops three scenarios to approximate different dimensions of the relationship between the global economic downturn and protectionism. The scenarios are not predictions, but descriptions of how and why pressures for protection could be manifested and transmitted under different circumstances and assumptions.
Under a low impact scenario, existing World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and obligations, bolstered by a high level of global interdependence, discourage trade restrictions and trade diverting measures from being proposed. If implemented, the measures conform to WTO rules and/or have a limited impact on trade flows. Recent reports issued by the WTO and World Bank provide preliminary support for this scenario.
Under a medium impact scenario, WTO rules are violated or are disregarded due to the exigencies of the economic crisis and demands to provide financial rescue plans for the banking and auto sectors. As a result, trade and investment flows over time could be diverted or fall outside WTO surveillance, thereby weakening the global trading system.
Under a high impact scenario, WTO rules are violated, major trade conflict occurs, and the world trading system is undermined. This threat arises from the longstanding presence of large trade imbalances driven by distorted global consumption and savings patterns—patterns that were an underlying cause of the global economic downturn. Given the prominent role that China and the United States play in the global imbalances, two flashpoints for any outbreak of protectionism can be identified. The first could stem from U.S. public concerns that other countries are gaining a "free ride" in terms of international efforts to increase aggregate spending and get the world economy growing again. The second could arise if China and other surplus countries try to avoid massive factory closings and layoffs by exporting their overcapacity to the United States and Europe with trade policy measures such as export subsidies and currency depreciation.
Three broad policy challenges for Congress are derived from the analysis. The first deals with international surveillance of fiscal stimulus programs. The second relates to multilateral surveillance of trade pressures and barriers proposed and adopted during the economic crisis. The third pertains to the joint management of U.S. trade relations by Congress and the administration, particularly as it bears on responding to constituent requests for protection, facilitating the adjustment of current account surplus countries, and formulating trade liberalization priorities. |
crs_RL32176 | crs_RL32176_0 | Because regulation of the insurance market was left to the states in the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, however, the legislature in question is most often a state legislature. In 1981, Congress authorized the creation of alternative market entities known as risk retention groups and risk purchasing groups (RRGs and RPGs). Their purpose was to expand insurance supply by simplifying state insurance regulation. In the 1981 act, subsequently amended in 1986 and known now as the Liability Risk Retention Act (LRRA), Congress crafted a narrow exception to the usual state insurance regulations for these groups in largely exempting the groups from multiple state regulation. Over the past few years, interest in risk retention and purchasing groups has increased as access to affordable insurance has become a challenge for some businesses. Legislation was introduced in both the 110 th and 111 th Congresses to expand the LRRA to commercial property insurance, but no action was take on these bills. Recent Legislation
112th Congress
Risk Retention Modernization Act of 2011 (H.R. 2126 was introduced by Representatives John Campbell, along with Representative Peter Welch, on June 3, 2011. In addition, the director is to study and issue reports to Congress on the states' regulation of RRGs and RPGs and the compliance with the LRRA. Risk Retention and Purchasing Group Structure and Regulation
Risk retention groups are required by current federal law to be state-chartered insurance companies; they are allowed to insure commercial liability risks, such as the risk that a physician will be found liable for medical malpractice, but not other property/casualty risks, such as the risk that a physician's office might burn down. The exact corporate structure of a risk retention group can vary. RRGs and RPGs Since 1986
Growth in the Risk Retention Market17
Market reaction to the expansion of the law was relatively swift. The relative calm in the marketplace that prevailed through the 1990s ended quickly with the hardening of the insurance market in 2001. The liability insurance market generally has softened since 2005 or so. As was noted above, the number of insured declined from 2001 to 2004. Doubts about such an expansion, however, have also been raised. Stripping away jargon, this question can be phrased as an issue of availability vs. reliability. Arguments in support of expansion often focus on a failure of the current insurance market, and the current regulatory system, to make a sufficient supply of insurance available so that consumers who need insurance can find it at a reasonable price. The question posed is essentially: "What happens to a community when a business, a school, or a doctor cannot find or afford insurance?" Arguments opposing expansion often focus on the dangers in allowing insurance to be sold that is not subject to same regulatory standards as "normal" insurance. The question posed is essentially: "What happens to a community if the insurer from which this business, school, or doctor purchases insurance ends up bankrupt or if the policy does not cover what needs to be covered?" | Risk retention groups (RRGs) and risk purchasing groups (RPGs) are alternative insurance entities authorized by Congress to expand insurance supply through a simplification of insurance regulation. The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 generally leaves the regulation and taxation of the business of insurance to the individual states. In 1981 and 1986, however, Congress crafted a narrow exception to the usual state insurance regulations for these groups, generally exempting them from multiple state oversight. Membership in risk retention and purchasing groups is limited to commercial enterprises and governmental bodies, and the risks insured by these groups are limited to liability risks.
Over the past two decades, interest—both in Congress and in the market—in RRGs and RPGs has varied largely with the vagaries of the regular insurance market. From 2001 to 2004, the insurance market was in one of its periodic "hard" markets, and regular insurance became increasingly expensive and sometimes unavailable. Since 2001, the numbers of risk retention groups rose dramatically and calls have been heard to expand the scope of insurance that they are allowed to offer. At the same time, some problems occurred in individual risk retention groups, and cautionary voices have also been raised. Although the liability insurance market has softened somewhat in the past few years, with policies becoming more available and relatively less expensive, risk retention groups have continued to form in significant numbers.
The fundamental question surrounding expansion of the Liability Risk Retention Act (LRRA) can be posed as an issue of availability vs. reliability. Those who would support expansion often emphasize a failure of the current insurance market and the current regulatory system to make a sufficient supply of insurance available so that consumers who need insurance can find it at a reasonable price. The question they pose is essentially: "What happens to a community when a business, a school, or a doctor can not afford or find liability insurance?" Those who would oppose expansion often emphasize the dangers in allowing insurance to be sold that is not subject to same regulatory standards as "normal" insurance. The question this group poses is essentially: "What happens to a community if the insurer from which this business, school, or doctor purchases insurance ends up insolvent or if the policy does not cover what needs to be covered?"
In the 112th Congress, H.R. 2126, the Risk Retention Modernization Act of 2011, would extend the LRRA to commercial property insurance, authorize the Federal Insurance Office to determine the states' compliance with the act and impose corporate governance standards on RRGs and RPGs. Representative John Campbell introduced the bill on June 3, 2011. A similar bill was introduced in the 111th Congress by Representative Dennis Moore, with Representative Campbell as a cosponsor.
This report outlines the current regulatory structures affecting risk retention and risk purchasing groups as well as the legislative and market history of these groups. It also discusses the debate regarding possible expansion of these groups into areas beyond commercial liability insurance. This report will be updated as significant legislative events occur. |
crs_R44063 | crs_R44063_0 | Introduction
The Obama Administration released its FY2016 budget request on February 2, 2015. It requested $93.7 billion for the Department of Transportation (DOT), $22 billion (31%) more than DOT received in FY2015. DOT's discretionary budget allocation is shared with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, as the allocation is given to the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations bill. With other changes in offsets recommended by the House Appropriations Committee, the net increase in discretionary funding is $25 million, and the committee recommended a $25 million reduction in mandatory funding, so there is no net change in actual funding in the committee-recommended House THUD bill from FY2015. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P.L. And while the House and Senate are currently negotiating the differences between their versions of surface transportation authorization legislation ( H.R. 22 ), the FY2016 funding levels provided in both the House and Senate bills are not significantly higher than the FY2015 levels. The scale of DOT's annual funding coming from these funds is not entirely obvious in DOT budget tables; for while virtually all of the funding from the Highway Trust Fund is in the form of contract authority (which is a form of mandatory budget authority), most of the funding from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund is in the form of discretionary budget authority and so is mingled with the discretionary budget authority provided from the general fund of the Treasury. DOT FY2016 Appropriations
Recent Events
On November 10, 2015, the House and Senate went to conference to resolve their differences on H.R. 114-74 ) on October 30, 2015, which increased the amount of budget authority available for nondefense accounts for FY2016 by $24.6 billion. The requested funding is $22 billion more than that enacted for FY2015. The Administration request reflected its surface transportation reauthorization proposal, which called for significant increases in funding for highways, transit, and intercity rail. One reason for the shortfall in the fund is that the federal gas tax has not been raised since 1993. Congress has continued to support the TIGER program through annual DOT appropriations. After the restructuring of DOT programs in the 2012 surface transportation reauthorization, the TIGER program is virtually the only remaining discretionary grant program for surface transportation other than the Federal Transit Administration's Capital Investment Grant program (popularly referred to as New Starts), discussed below. The Senate-reported bill would provide a total of $283 million, the requested amount. The Administration's FY2016 budget request included $875 million for the cost of positive train control implementation on commuter railroad routes; neither the House-passed nor Senate-reported bill included funding specifically for this purpose, though the Senate-reported bill recommends $50 million for rail safety grant programs. H.Rept. Intercity Passenger Rail Development
Reflecting the Administration's surface transportation reauthorization proposal, the budget proposed a total of $4.8 billion for a new National High Performance Rail System program within FRA, consisting of two grant programs: $2.45 billion for a Current Passenger Rail Service grant program (which would primarily fund maintenance and improvement of existing intercity passenger rail service, i.e., Amtrak) and $2.325 billion for a Rail Service Improvement grant program (which would fund new intercity passenger rail projects as well as some improvements to freight rail). Funding provided in H.R. Amtrak
The Administration proposal for a new Current Passenger Rail Service account would almost double the amount Congress provided Amtrak in FY2015. The House-passed bill would provide $1.148 billion for Amtrak for FY2016, 17% below the FY2015 amount. For FY2016, the Administration requested $3.25 billion for the program, $1.13 billion (53%) more than the $2.12 billion provided in FY2015. The House-passed bill would provide $1.92 billion, roughly $200 million (9%) less than the FY2015 level. The Senate-reported bill recommends $1.585 billion, 25% ($535 million) below the FY2015 level. The federal share for New Starts projects, by statute, can be up to 80%. For FY2016, the House-passed H.R. 2577 would provide $100 million, $50 million less than in previous years. The House Committee on Appropriations had initially recommended $75 million, and in the committee report accompanying H.R. During committee markup, an amendment was approved adding $25 million to the WMATA funding. | On February 2, 2015, the Obama Administration proposed a $93.7 billion budget for the Department of Transportation (DOT) for FY2016. That is about $22 billion (31%) more than was provided in FY2015. The budget request for DOT reflected the Administration's call for significant increases in funding for highway, transit, and rail programs. Neither the surface transportation reauthorization legislation (H.R. 22) that the House and Senate are currently negotiating nor the DOT appropriations bill as passed by the House or reported out by the Senate Committee on Appropriations (H.R. 2577) would increase transportation funding on the scale requested by the Administration.
The annual appropriations for DOT are combined with those for the Department of Housing and Urban Development in the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations bill. The House has passed H.R. 2577, which would provide FY2016 appropriations for THUD. The House-passed version of H.R. 2577 would provide $70.6 billion for DOT, $1 billion less than DOT received in FY2015 (after rescissions are subtracted from the FY2015 total, the difference is reduced to $646 million) and $23 billion less than the Administration request.
The House-passed bill cuts funding for Amtrak by $242 million (17%) from its FY2015 level, to $1.148 billion, less than half the amount requested by the Administration. The House Appropriations Committee marked up the bill one day after an Amtrak passenger train derailed in Philadelphia, which raised the profile of the cuts to Amtrak funding. The House-passed bill also includes significant cuts to the TIGER discretionary grant program and the transit New Starts program. For TIGER, the bill would provide $100 million, an 80% reduction from the $500 million provided in FY2015 and $1.15 billion below the Administration request. For New Starts, it would provide $1.9 billion, a 9% reduction from the $2.1 billion provided in FY2015 and $1.3 billion below the Administration request. These three programs account for most of the bill's cut in transportation funding from the FY2015 level.
The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a version of H.R. 2577 providing $71.3 billion for DOT, a reduction of $368 million from the FY2015 level (after rescissions are subtracted from the FY2015 total, the difference is reduced to $17 million) and $22 billion less than the Administration request. The committee recommended funding the TIGER grant program and Amtrak at their FY2015 levels. It recommended a 25% ($535 million) cut to the New Starts transit grant program, the major change in the recommended FY2016 levels from FY2015 levels.
On November 18, 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations released a substitute amendment to H.R. 2577 that would increase DOT discretionary funding by $690 million, reflecting the Balanced Budget Act of 2015 (which increased the amount of budget authority for FY2016). Specifically, the substitute amendment would change the following accounts:
Under the Office of the Secretary, the National Infrastructure Investment (TIGER) grant account would change from $500 million to $600 million. The Federal Aviation Administration Facilities & Equipment account would change from $2.6 billion to $2.855 billion. The Federal Transit Administration Capital Investment grant (New Starts) account would change from $1.585 billion to $1.896 billion. The Maritime Administration account would change from $373 million to $397 million.
The remainder of this report has not been updated to reflect the substitute amendment. |
crs_RL33384 | crs_RL33384_0 | The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. This act eliminated most cable television rate regulations beyond the basic tier as of March 31, 1999 . In most cases, rates for a basic tier of services (defined as the tier that includes "over the air" broadcast stations) continues to be regulated either by local franchising authorities (LFAs) or state authorities. Most small cable operators (those serving less than 1% of all cable subscribers and having no affiliation with any company whose gross annual revenues exceed $250 million) were freed from rate regulation immediately. The Current Cable Market
According to the FCC's Twelfth Annual Report on Competition in Video Markets , released in March 2006, approximately 65.4 million homes in the United States, or 69.4% of all Multichannel Video Program Distributor (MVPD) television homes, subscribed to cable television as of June 2004. Such entities include cable operators, direct broadcast satellite (DBS) services, and—in much smaller numbers—subscribers to five other technologies that deliver programming. As of June 2005, DBS subscribers numbered more than 26.1 million, or 27.7% of all MVPD subscribers. This extensive fact sheet presents background information on the history and evolution of the cable industry in the United States, including the evolution of parts of the Communications Act of 1934 that affect cable television, discussion of issues such as must-carry regulations, and information on the regulation of cable television by state and local authorities, including local franchising authority agreements and customer service guidelines. Consumer Alert. This two-page notice details the end of federal regulation of expanded basic cable rates as of March 31, 1999, which was mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, P.L. 104-104 . | Cable television is one of the oldest and most popular distribution technologies used to deliver video programming to consumers. It uses fixed coaxial or fiber-optic cables to accomplish delivery. Of the various other methods used to deliver video, only direct broadcast satellite (DBS) successfully competes with cable. It uses communications satellites to deliver signals to individual consumers. In 2005, cable television was received by 65.4 million homes, or approximately 69% of all pay television subscribers. In comparison, DBS was received by 26.1 million homes, or approximately 27.7% of all television subscribers. This report presents information on the history of federal regulation of the cable television industry and background information on cable rates and other cable industry issues. The DBS industry, cable's main competitor, is not addressed extensively in this report. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, P.L. 104-104, eliminated most cable rate regulation beyond the basic tier of services as of March 31, 1999. Some small cable operators were freed from regulation upon the enactment of the law, but in most cases, rates for a basic tier of services continue to be regulated. The Telecommunications Act also opened up new areas of competition between telephone companies and cable companies. This report will be updated as legislation or news events warrant. |
crs_R44431 | crs_R44431_0 | Introduction
Each Congress, hundreds of measures are introduced to recognize, support, honor, or acknowledge individuals, groups, and events with a national day, week, or month of recognition. This type of legislation can be divided into three categories: federal holidays; patriotic and national observances; and recognition of a specific day, week, or month to commemorate a specific individual, group, or event. To create a new federal holiday, a law is required. Recognition or Support of a Commemorative Day, Week, or Month
In addition to statutory federal holidays and patriotic and national observances, Congress has historically considered legislation that recognizes, supports, honors, or acknowledges certain days, weeks, and months. House
In the 104 th Congress (1995-1996), the House adopted a new standing rule to reduce the number of commemorative bills and resolutions introduced and considered by the chamber. By using a simple resolution to designate a commemorative day, week, or month, only one chamber—either the House or Senate—can agree to the measure. and one bill (S.) were agreed to by the Senate. Introduction of House Resolutions
Though House Rule XII, clause 5, prohibits the introduction or consideration of date-specific commemorative legislation, hundreds of commemorative resolutions that would honor a day, week, or month are introduced each Congress. | Typically, each Congress, hundreds of legislative measures are introduced to recognize, support, honor, or acknowledge certain days, weeks, and months. Some scholars have observed that commemorative legislation has universal and patriotic appeal and also provides an opportunity to connect directly with constituents, which can help fulfill representational responsibilities to Members' districts or states.
Often used to commemorate an individual, group, or event, these measures can be divided into three categories: (1) federal holidays; (2) patriotic and national observances; and (3) recognition of a specific day, week, or month that commemorates a specific individual, group, or event. To create either a federal holiday or a patriotic or national observance, a law is required. Action to recognize, support, honor, or acknowledge certain days, weeks, and months, however, requires only a simple resolution agreed to by the House or Senate, or a concurrent resolution agreed to by both chambers.
While historically common for Congress to recognize a day, week, or month, this practice has become rarer since the adoption of House Rule XII, clause 5, in the 104th Congress (1995-1996). Since that time, the number of commemorative resolutions introduced and considered in the House has declined. This rule, however, does not apply to the Senate, where date-specific commemorative legislation is still introduced and considered. |
crs_R43435 | crs_R43435_0 | In addition to facing the prospect of a federal criminal prosecution, those who violate the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) may suffer a number of additional adverse consequences under federal law. Nevertheless, without federal statutory sanction, more than 20 states have established medical marijuana regulatory regimes. Four have gone further and "legalized" marijuana under state recreational marijuana laws. Because controlled substances classified as Schedule I drugs have "a high potential for abuse" with "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States" and lack "accepted safety for use of the drug [] under medical supervisions," they may not be dispensed under a prescription, and such substances may be used only for bona fide, federal government-approved research studies. Medical Marijuana Laws
State medical marijuana laws follow a general pattern, although most have some individual characteristics and the manner in which they are enforced can differ considerably. In addition, the laws afford registered patients, care givers, cultivators, and distributors immunity from the consequences of state criminal laws. Retail Marijuana
Four states, Washington, Colorado, Oregon, and Alaska, have established retail marijuana regimes. The memorandum instructs federal prosecutors to prioritize their "limited investigative and prosecutorial resources to address the most significant [marijuana-related] threats" and identified the following eight activities as those that the federal government wants most to prevent: (1) distributing marijuana to children; (2) revenue from the sale of marijuana going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; (3) diverting marijuana from states that have legalized its possession to other states that prohibit it; (4) using state-authorized marijuana activity as a pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs; (5) using firearms or violent behavior in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; (6) exacerbating adverse public health and safety consequences due to marijuana use, including driving while under the influence of marijuana; (7) growing marijuana on the nation's public lands; and (8) possessing or using marijuana on federal property. The preemption doctrine stands at the threshold of the federal-state marijuana debate. The Supremacy Clause, therefore, "elevates" the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, federal regulations, and treaties above the laws of the states. The MMMA escaped obstacle preemption because it merely conveyed immunity from the consequences of state law: "the MMMA's limited state-law immunity for [medical marijuana] use does not frustrate the CSA's operation nor refuse its provisions their natural effect, such that its purpose cannot otherwise be accomplished.... [T]his immunity does not purport to alter the CSA's federal criminalization of marijuana, or to interfere with or undermine federal enforcement of that prohibition." FinCEN's guidance specifically addresses the obligations to file suspicious activity reports (SARs). FinCEN began its guidance by emphasizing the point made in the accompanying 2014 Cole Memorandum, that the Justice Department's investigation and prosecution of financial crimes would be focused on activities that conflict with any of several federal priorities:
preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states; preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; preventing violence and the use of firearms in cultivation and distribution of marijuana; preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use; preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property. The offender and any accomplices face an additional five-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for possession of a firearm; a seven-year mandatory term if he brandishes the firearm; and a 10-year mandatory term if discharges it. The question of whether marijuana users may be excluded from federally assisted housing is not the same as whether applicants for such housing may be required to undergo drug testing. Lawyers may advise their clients about the features of the state medical marijuana statute, but they may not assist clients in a violation of the CSA. Enacted Marijuana-Related Measures
P.L. However, there is some uncertainty regarding the legal effect of the provision. Legislative Proposals in the 114th Congress
P.L. | The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) outlaws the possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana except for authorized research. More than 20 states have regulatory schemes that allow possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana for medicinal purposes. Four have revenue regimes that allow possession, cultivation, and sale generally. The U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause preempts any state law that conflicts with federal law. Although there is some division, the majority of state courts have concluded that the federal-state marijuana law conflict does not require preemption of state medical marijuana laws. The legal consequences of a CSA violation, however, remain in place. Nevertheless, current federal criminal enforcement guidelines counsel confining investigations and prosecutions to the most egregious affront to federal interests.
Legal and ethical considerations limit the extent to which an attorney may advise and assist a client intent on participating in his or her state's medical or recreational marijuana system. Bar associations differ on the precise boundaries of those limitations.
State medical marijuana laws grant registered patients, their doctors, and providers immunity from the consequences of state law. The Washington, Colorado, Oregon, and Alaska retail marijuana regimes authorize the commercial exploitation of the marijuana market in small taxable doses.
The present and potential consequences of a CSA violation can be substantial. Cultivation or sale of marijuana on all but the smallest scale invites a five-year mandatory minimum prison term. Revenues and the property used to generate them may merely be awaiting federal collection under federal forfeiture laws. Federal tax laws deny marijuana entrepreneurs the benefits available to other businesses. Banks may afford marijuana merchants financial services only if the bank files a suspicious activity report (SAR) for every marijuana-related transaction that exceeds certain monetary thresholds, and only if it conducts a level of due diligence into its customers' activities sufficient to unearth any affront to federal interests.
Marijuana users may not possess a firearm or ammunition. They may not hold federal security clearances. They may not operate commercial trucks, buses, trains, or planes. Federal contractors and private employers may be free to refuse to hire them and to fire them. If fired, they may be ineligible for unemployment compensation. They may be denied federally assisted housing.
At the heart of the federal-state conflict lies a disagreement over dangers and benefits inherent in marijuana use. The CSA authorizes research on controlled substances, including those in Schedule I such as marijuana, that may address those questions. Members have introduced a number of bills in the 114th Congress that speak to the conflict. Additionally, a few marijuana-related provisions were enacted into law late in the 113th Congress.
This report is available in an abridged form, without footnotes or citations to authority, as CRS Report R43437, Marijuana: Medical and Retail—An Abbreviated View of Selected Legal Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Portions of this report have been borrowed from CRS Report R43034, State Legalization of Recreational Marijuana: Selected Legal Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42014 | crs_R42014_0 | Introduction
P.L. 112-29 , the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, or "AIA," arguably made the most significant changes to the patent statute since the 19 th century. Among other provisions, the statute introduced into U.S. law a first-inventor-to-file priority rule, an infringement defense based upon prior commercial use, and assignee filing. The legislation prevented patents from claiming or encompassing human organisms, limited the availability of patents claiming tax strategies, and restricted the best mode requirement. The AIA also made notable reforms to administrative patent challenge proceedings at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and to the law of patent marking. Passage of the AIA was preceded by several years of legislative debate about the current workings and future direction of the U.S. patent system. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
First Inventor to File
The AIA shifted the U.S. patent priority rule from the previous "first-to-invent" principle to the global norm of the "first-inventor-to-file" principle. Conditions for patentability; novelty
(a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART.—A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; ....
(b) EXCEPTIONS.—
(1) DISCLOSURES MADE 1 YEAR OR LESS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE FILING DATE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION.—A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(1) if—
(A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or
(B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor....
An example may clarify the operation of the grace period post-AIA. The Patent Act also addressed the issue of "false marking." The AIA also allowed for "virtual marking." This circumstance is termed "willful infringement." In particular, the AIA (1) replaced the previous inter partes reexamination system with inter partes review proceedings; (2) introduced a new proceeding titled "post-grant review"; (3) established a new supplemental examination procedure; and (4) created a new transitional post-grant review proceeding for the review of the validity of certain business method patents. The ability of members of the public to cite to the USPTO information that may be pertinent to the validity of a granted patent has been augmented under the provisions of the AIA. Following the 1999 legislation, the USPTO began to publish many pending patent applications. The AIA additionally stipulated fees for patent services provided by the USPTO. For example, the fees for filing a patent application and for the issuance of an approved application were $300 and $1,400 respectively; the new fees are $330 and $1,510. However, violation of the best mode requirement no longer forms the basis for an accused infringer's defense to a charge of patent infringement during enforcement litigation or post-grant review proceedings. The approach embodied in the AIA keeps USPTO use of fees within the appropriations process, but mandates that any excess fees be used only to fund USPTO activities. | Following several years of legislative discussion concerning patent reform, the Congress enacted P.L. 112-29, signed into law on September 16, 2011. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, or "AIA," made significant changes to the patent system, including:
First-Inventor-to-File Priority System. The AIA shifted the U.S. patent priority rule from a "first-to-invent" system to the "first-inventor-to-file principle" while allowing for a one-year grace period. Prior User Rights. The legislation established an infringement defense based upon an accused infringer's prior commercial use of an invention patented by another. Assignee Filing. Under the AIA, a patent application may be filed by the inventor's employer or other entity to which rights in the invention are assigned. Post-Grant Review Proceedings. The AIA changed the current system of administrative patent challenges at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) by establishing post-grant review, inter partes review, and a transitional program for business method patents. Public Participation in USPTO Procedures. The legislation allowed members of the public to submit pertinent information to the USPTO concerning particular applications both before and after patent issuance. USPTO Fees. The AIA stipulated fees for USPTO patent services and allows the agency to adjust the fees in order to cover its costs. It also required that fees collected above the amount provided for in the appropriations process be used only for the USPTO. Patent Marking. The AIA limited lawsuits challenging patent owners with false patent marking and allowed for virtual, Internet-based marking. Patentable Subject Matter. The AIA prevented patents claiming or encompassing human organisms and limited the availability of patents claiming tax strategies. Best Mode. The statute maintained the requirement that patents describe the best mode, or superior way for practicing the claimed invention, but eliminated failures to do so as a basis for invalidating the patent.
The AIA introduced a number of additional changes to the patent law, including changes to the venue and joinder statutes, the introduction of supplemental examination, and a clarification of the law of willful infringement.
Although the AIA arguably made the most significant changes to the U.S. patent statute since the 19th century, the legislation did not reflect all of the issues that were the subject of congressional discussion including the assessment of damages during infringement litigation and the publication of all pending patent applications prior to grant. |
crs_RL33325 | crs_RL33325_0 | Introduction
Farmers and ranchers have had to adjust to significant changes in the structure and business methods of the livestock and meat sectors in recent decades. These groups believe that federal officials have not enforced existing laws designed to prevent anti-competitive behavior, and that the laws themselves should be strengthened to better address today's market realities. Others assert that present competition and antitrust policies remain adequate and effective. They believe that the sector's structural changes are a desirable outgrowth of other factors such as technological and managerial improvements, changing consumer demand, and more international competition. The 2008 omnibus farm bill (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 ) contains a number of animal-related provisions as part of its new Livestock title (Title XI) that may affect how USDA is to regulate livestock and poultry markets. These include provisions that change Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA ) definitions of associations and handlers and require USDA to issue rules and specify requirements regarding breach of contract and the venue for any litigation. The 2008 farm bill, however, did not include other provisions that were part of the Senate-passed version of the farm bill, such as provisions prohibiting ownership among large meat packers, provisions strengthening enforcement authorities over live poultry dealers, and certain changes to the Mandatory Livestock Price Reporting Program. Continued consolidation and recent mergers could raise these concentration ratios even more, particularly in the beef sector. Concentration in meatpacking has increased: In 1985, the then-top four firms claimed 50% of all steer/heifer slaughter and 39% of all cattle slaughter; by 2007, four firms slaughtered 84% of all young cattle (steers and heifers), and 72% of U.S. cattle of all types. Pork Production
Hog production has experienced perhaps the most sweeping changes over the past 25 years. The number of U.S. farms with hogs declined from 667,000 in 1980 to 67,000 in 2005; those remaining have become much larger and less diversified. In hog packing in 2007, four firms slaughtered 64% of all U.S. hogs, compared with 32% in 1985 ( Table 2 ). In the turkey meat sector, a few of the larger companies also account for a large share of the industry. Now typical are contract production arrangements with large integrators who may provide the genetics, pigs and other inputs, and a contracting producer (farmer) who provides facilities and labor. Relevant Authorities and Agencies
Historical Context
Concerns about the growing market power of large corporations in general, and of meat packers in particular, were widespread by the late 1800s and culminated, by the early 1900s, with the passage of several major antitrust laws, including the Sherman and Clayton Acts (see below). Selected Issues and Legislation
Research on Competition and Price Impacts
Have increased market concentration and vertical integration, including production contracts, made livestock markets less competitive and depressed farm prices? The farm bill also requires USDA to issue an annual report detailing investigations into possible violations under the Packers and Stockyards (P&S) Act. These types of competition and marketing issues could continue to be of interest to some Members of Congress, and may likely resurface during the 111 th Congress. This report will be updated as warranted. The enacted 2008 farm bill amends the P&S Act as follows. | Changes in the structure and business methods of livestock and meat production and marketing—sometimes referred to as consolidation, concentration and/or vertical integration—have long generated interest and controversy in Congress. The top four firms slaughtered 69% of all U.S. cattle in 2006. In 1985, the then-top four packers accounted for 39% of all cattle slaughter, according to industry and USDA statistics. Since 2007, however, some approved and planned acquisitions in the beef packing sector could further alter these statistics. In the beef sector, one company now accounts for a large and growing share of the market and may push the four-firm concentration ratio in this sector to as much as 75%. Live hog production has seen sweeping changes over the past 25 years. Four firms slaughtered 64% of all U.S. hogs in 2006, compared with 32% in 1985. The number of U.S. farms with hogs has declined sharply, and those remaining have become much larger and less diversified. Many hogs today are sold through production contracts, where a pork processor might provide the pigs and other inputs, and a contracting producer (farmer) provides facilities and labor.
Debate has revolved around the impacts of such changes on farm prices, consumers, global competitiveness, and the traditional U.S. system of independent farms and ranches. Inherent in these questions is the role government should play in monitoring and regulating agricultural markets. Some groups believe that federal officials have not enforced existing laws designed to prevent anti-competitive behavior, and/or that the laws themselves should be strengthened to better address today's market realities. Others assert that present competition and antitrust policies remain adequate and effective. They believe that the sector's structural changes are a desirable outgrowth of other factors such as technological and managerial improvements, changing consumer demand, and more international competition.
Concerns about the growing market power of large corporations in general, and of meat packers in particular, date back to the late 1800s and culminated, by the early 1900s, in the passage of several major antitrust laws, including the Sherman and Clayton Acts and other general antitrust laws. Laws such as the Packers and Stockyards (P&S) Act of 1921 were enacted specifically to address concerns in the livestock and poultry sectors. Other laws, such as the 1967 Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA), were enacted to provide protection to producers from buyers of their products. Congress has also continued to introduce legislation intended to address various perceived problems in livestock markets, which sponsors often broadly refer to as "competition issues."
The 2008 omnibus farm bill (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246) contains a number of animal-related provisions as part of its new Livestock title (Title XI) that may affect how USDA is to regulate livestock and poultry markets. These include provisions that change AFPA definitions of associations and handlers and require USDA to issue rules and specify requirements regarding breach of contract and the venue for any litigation. The farm bill also requires USDA to issue an annual report detailing investigations into possible violations under the P&S Act. The 2008 farm bill, however, did not include other provisions that were part of the Senate-passed version of the farm bill, such as provisions prohibiting ownership among large meat packers, provisions strengthening enforcement authorities over live poultry dealers, and certain changes to the Mandatory Livestock Price Reporting Program. These types of competition and marketing issues could continue to be of interest to some Members of Congress, and may likely resurface during the 111th Congress. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL32645 | crs_RL32645_0 | Background and Overview of the Framework Agreement
The Framework Agreement is the latest achievement in the Doha Development Agenda(DDA) round of trade negotiations at the WTO. This round of trade negotiations was launched atthe 4th Ministerial of the WTO at Doha, Qatar in November 2001. At Doha, negotiators agreed to resolve issues related totheir implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements, to negotiate special and differentialtreatment for developing countries in the new round, and to provide technical assistance in thenegotiations and implementation of the agreements. The agreement also abandons the January 1, 2005 deadline for thenegotiations, but instead sets December 2005 as the date for the 6th Ministerial to be held in HongKong. Priorities. The Framework Agreement addresses the three "pillars" of agricultural trade liberalization identifiedin the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration: substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support;the phase-out, with a view to total elimination, of all export subsidies; and substantial improvementsin market access. Key provisions in the agriculture framework address trade-distorting domestic support,export competition, market access, cotton subsidies, and other issues. Non-Agricultural Market Access(13)
Non-agricultural market access (NAMA) received less scrutiny than agriculture innegotiations for the Framework Agreement. These include the modalityfor reducing tariffs, the binding of developing country tariffs, the issue of sectoral tariff elimination,and special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries. The Framework itselfmentions services only briefly because they were not the focus of the negotiations over theframework and the parameters of the negotiations had already been established as part of the "built-inagenda" and in the Doha Ministerial Declaration that launched the new round. The Frameworkreaffirms the commitments made in the Doha Ministerial Declaration and charges the negotiatorsto complete and submit their initial offers as soon as possible, to submit revised offers by May 2005and to ensure that the offers are of high quality. The Framework also charges the negotiators to bearin mind when making their offers the sectors and modes of supply that are of interest to developingcountries. The WTO negotiating Frameworksets forth modalities for negotiations on trade facilitation. U.S. Looking Ahead
The Framework Agreement resolved several contentious issues regarding the negotiation ofa future agriculture agreement. Much work remains to be done to flesh out the Framework to an actual agreement ontrade liberalization. In turn, the manner by which these issues are resolved may influence the level ofCongressional support for any resulting agreement. Services. Trade Facilitation. In establishing talks on trade facilitation, membercountries may first reach an agreement on whether to negotiate new rules, or merely guidelines, fortrade facilitation. | On July 31, 2004, the 147 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) reached aFramework Agreement for conducting future Doha Round trade negotiations. The FrameworkAgreement is the latest step in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round of trade negotiationsat the WTO, which was launched at the 4th Ministerial of the WTO at Doha, Qatar in November2001. This report provides analysis of the framework agreement and its significant results(agriculture, industrial market access, services, and trade facilitation) in the context of U.S.objectives.
The Framework addresses the three "pillars" of agricultural trade liberalization identified inthe 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration: substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support;the phase-out, with a view to total elimination, of all export subsidies; and substantial improvementsin market access. A crucial trade-off for the negotiations is the extent to which developed countriesreduce their trade-distorting domestic support in return for additional market access from largedeveloping countries.
Non-agricultural market access (NAMA) received less scrutiny. The agreement providesgeneral guidance for future negotiations on the modality for reducing tariffs, the binding ofdeveloping country tariffs, sectoral tariff elimination, and special and differential treatment (SDT)for developing countries. The NAMA talks may benefit from the new impetus in the agriculturalnegotiations.
The parameters of the services negotiations were established as part of the pre-Doha "built-inagenda" and in the Doha Ministerial Declaration that launched the new round. The frameworkreaffirms the commitments made at Doha and charges the negotiators to complete and submit theirinitial offers as soon as possible, to submit revised offers by May 2005, and to ensure that the offersare in sectors and modes of supply that are of interest to developing countries. Services involvingthe temporary movement of natural persons will remain contentious for both developed anddeveloping countries.
The Framework sets forth modalities for negotiations on trade facilitation, includingassessing the needs and priorities of member countries; providing technical assistance to developingcountries; and addressing trade facilitation language in the GATT agreement. An early matter forclarification is whether the negotiations will yield enforceable rules, or merely guidelines, for tradefacilitation.
While the Framework Agreement resolved several contentious issues regarding thenegotiation of a future agriculture agreement, other issues were addressed in a cursory fashion, ifat all. Much work remains to be done to flesh out the Framework to achieve an actual agreement ontrade liberalization. The manner in which these issues are resolved may influence the level ofCongressional support for any resulting agreement. The agreement also abandons the January 1,2005, deadline for the negotiations, but instead sets December 2005 as the date for the 6th Ministerialto be held in Hong Kong. This report will be updated as appropriate. |
crs_RS22879 | crs_RS22879_0 | In June 2008, the House and Senate passed the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( H.R. 6124 / P.L. 110-246 ), the Farm Bill. Title XV includes the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act of 2008, which gives trade preferences to U.S. imports of Haitian apparel. On May 16, 2008, USAID announced that it would provide $20 million worth of emergency food aid to Haiti, and on May 23, 2008, USAID pledged an additional $25 million to support the WFP's programs in Haiti. Congressional Emergency Food Aid Response
In late June 2008, Congress appropriated $1.2 billion in FY2008 and FY2009 supplemental assistance for P.L. 480 food aid in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 ( P.L. 110-252 ). | Haiti faces several interrelated challenges, the most immediate being a lingering food crisis that in April 2008 led to deadly protests and the ouster of Haiti's prime minister. Haiti also suffers from a legacy of poverty, unemployment, and under-development that is compounding security problems for its new and fragile democracy. On May 23, 2008, the Bush Administration announced that it would send an additional $25 million in emergency food aid to Haiti, bringing its total emergency contribution to $45 million. In late June 2008, Congress appropriated $1.2 billion in FY2008 and FY2009 supplemental assistance for P.L. 480 food aid in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 ( P.L. 110-252 ). Haiti is one of ten priority countries likely to receive a portion of that assistance. In June 2008, the House and Senate also passed the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( H.R. 6124 / P.L. 110-246 ), the Farm Bill. Title XV includes the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act of 2008, which provides tariff preferences for U.S. imports of Haitian apparel, its largest export sector. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44488 | crs_R44488_0 | Introduction
A commercial or depository bank is typically a corporation that obtains either a federal or state charter to accept federally insured deposits and pay interest to depositors. Commercial banks also make residential and commercial mortgage loans, consumer loans, provide check cashing and clearing services, and may underwrite securities, including U.S. Treasuries, municipal bonds, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issuances, and commercial paper (unsecured short-term loans to cover short-term liquid ity needs). The permissible activities of depository banks are defined by statute, namely the Glass-Steagall Act. By contrast, investment banks (or brokerage firms) are not allowed to accept federally insured deposits, and they do not make loans (i.e., a debt obligation owed to a single lending source). Congressional interest in the financial conditions of depository banks, also referred to as the commercial banking system, has increased following challenging economic conditions and changes in the regulatory environment. Both large and small banking institutions experienced losses related to the declining asset values (of mortgage-related assets), resulting in a substantial increase in bank failures. Hence, the challenge for the banking industry is to determine the sustainable amount of financial (lending) risk-taking while simultaneously facing higher costs associated with greater financial risk-taking (i.e., compliance with prudential regulations designed to minimize the severity of financial distress under deteriorating macroeconomic conditions). This report begins with a general overview of the banking industry. Next, this report summarizes profitability and lending activity levels in the banking industry. At the other extreme are the large financial institutions that have $10 billion or more in assets. For several decades, bank assets have increased while the number of banking institutions has decreased. The smallest of the community banks, those with less than $100 million in assets, have accounted for most of the industry consolidation even prior to the 2007-2009 recession. An Overview of Capital (Equity) Regulation
Banking regulators (i.e., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and state banking regulators) require U.S. banking institutions that accept federally insured deposits to comply with safety and soundness regulations, which are designed to monitor and buffer against the types of financial intermediation risks that can result in financial distress for banks and the broader economy. Return on assets (RoA) and return on equity (RoE) are commonly used metrics to gauge bank profitability. The negative returns coincided with the wave of loan defaults that also occurred during the recession, which led to the deterioration of capital, increases in the number of banks on the FDIC's problem list, and increases in bank failures. Capital requirements pertaining to the maintenance of equity shareholder levels are designed to buffer against unanticipated losses and generally do not vary. Since the recession, regulators have required banks to increase loan-loss provisioning (as well as other components of regulatory capital) levels to better match the levels of problem loans. For example, suppose a bank originates a consumer loan that is expected to be repaid in full over two years. Conclusion
Since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the banking industry has exhibited profitability. The industry is still accumulating sufficient reserves to cover noncurrent assets. Hence, profitability trends may differ for banks by size. | A commercial bank is an institution that obtains either a federal or state charter that allows it to accept federally insured deposits and pay interest to depositors. In addition, the charter allows banks to make residential and commercial mortgage loans; to provide check cashing and clearing services; to underwrite securities that include U.S. Treasuries, municipal bonds, commercial paper, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issuances; and to conduct other activities as defined by statute, namely the National Banking Act. Commercial banks are limited in what they can do. For example, the Glass-Steagall Act separates commercial banking (i.e., activities that are permissible for depository institutions with a bank charter) from investment banking (i.e., activities that are permissible for brokerage firms, which do not include taking deposits or providing loans).
Congressional interest in the financial conditions of depository banks, or the commercial banking industry, has increased in light of the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2009, which resulted in a large increase in the number of distressed institutions. Providing credit during the financial crisis was difficult for the banking system. Thus, an analysis of post-financial crisis trends that pertain to lending activity may provide some useful insights about recovery of the banking system. The financial condition of the banking industry can be examined in terms of profitability, lending activity, and capitalization levels (to buffer against the financial risks). This report focuses primarily on profitability and lending activity levels. Issues related to higher bank capitalization requirements are discussed in CRS Report R42744, U.S. Implementation of the Basel Capital Regulatory Framework, by [author name scrubbed].
The banking system generally has substantially more small banks (i.e., those with $1 billion or less in assets) relative to larger size banks. For several decades, bank assets have increased while the number of banking institutions has decreased. The banking industry continues consolidating, with more of the industry's assets held by a smaller number of institutions.
Generally speaking, by most measures, the health of the banking system has improved since 2009. There are fewer problem banks since the peak in 2011, as well as fewer bank failures in comparison to the peak amount of failures in 2010. The return on assets (RoA) and return on equity (RoE) for the banking industry, expressed as percentages, have rebounded since the financial crisis. Although RoA and RoE have not returned to pre-recessionary levels, the range of percentages that should be associated with optimal performance of the banking system is subjective.
The banking system currently has increased its capital reserves that have been designated to buffer against unforeseen macroeconomic and financial shocks. The banking system also has loan-loss reserves to sufficiently cover losses expected to be uncollectible. For loans that are noncurrent (delinquent) but have not yet gone into default, however, the banking system still needs to rebuild this loan-loss capacity if such loans do become uncollectible. Hence, news of industry profitability should be tempered by the news that aggregate loan-loss provisions still must increase to sufficiently buffer against noncurrent loans. |
crs_RS21659 | crs_RS21659_0 | The Kosovo action exposed a great disparity in defense capabilities between the United States and its allies. The other significant change occurred at NATO's Washington, D.C. summit in April 1999, when the alliance launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The 2002 Prague Summit: Enter PCC
NATO sought to address the perceived problems of DCI at its November 2002 meeting in Prague by approving the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). Istanbul, Riga, and Bucharest
Unlike Washington and Prague, subsequent NATO summits in Istanbul (2004), Riga (2006), and Bucharest (2008) did not result in new initiatives setting out extensive programmatic objectives for enhancing the alliance's capabilities. The 2008 Bucharest summit declaration did not mention PCC, but referred instead to the more general Comprehensive Political Guidance, agreed to at Riga. In light of NATO missions, particularly in Afghanistan, the Bucharest declaration also stressed the urgency of acquiring specific capabilities such as strategic and intra-theater airlift and communications, and pointed toward a possible future NATO missile defense system. Defense Spending and Progress Reports
To meet the goals of PCC, the European allies need to restructure and modernize their militaries and address deficiencies in equipment procurement and in R&D programs. It has also been suggested that the capabilities requirements effectively raise the bar for new members of the alliance. | With the end of the Cold War, NATO began to reassess its collective defense strategy and to anticipate possible new missions. The conflicts in the Balkans highlighted the need for more mobile forces, for greater technological equality between the United States and its allies, and for interoperability. In 1999, NATO launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), an effort to enable the alliance to deploy troops quickly to crisis regions, to supply and protect those forces, and to equip them to engage an adversary effectively. At its 2002 summit, NATO approved a new initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), touted as a slimmed-down, more focused DCI, with quantifiable goals. Analysts cautioned that the success of PCC would hinge upon increased spending and changed procurement priorities, particularly by the European allies. At NATO's 2004 Istanbul summit and its 2006 Riga summit, the alliance reaffirmed the goals of PCC. The 2008 Bucharest summit declaration did not mention PCC, but, in light of NATO missions, particularly in Afghanistan, stressed the urgency of acquiring specific capabilities such as airlift and communications. Congress may review the alliance's progress in boosting NATO capabilities. This report will not be updated. See also CRS Report RS22529, The NATO Summit at Riga, 2006, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42957 | crs_R42957_0 | Introduction
At the outset of the 113 th Congress, there has been renewed congressional interest in gun control legislation. Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced S. 150 , the Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, which would prohibit, subject to certain exceptions, the sale, transfer, possession, manufacturing, and importation of specifically named firearms and other firearms that have certain features, as well as the transfer and possession of large capacity ammunition feeding devices. Representative Carolyn McCarthy introduced a companion measure, H.R. 437 , in the House of Representatives. S. 150 is similar to the Assault Weapons Ban of 1994 that was in effect through September 13, 2004. Commerce Clause
The 1994 Assault Weapons Ban was challenged on the basis that it violated the Commerce Clause. Second Amendment Consideration
If enacted, an assault weapons ban could also be challenged on Second Amendment grounds in light of the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller . | In the 113th Congress, there has been renewed congressional interest in gun control legislation. On January 16, 2013, President Obama announced his support for legislation on gun control, including a ban on certain semiautomatic assault firearms and large capacity ammunition feeding devices. Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced S. 150, the Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, which would prohibit, subject to certain exceptions, the sale, transfer, possession, manufacturing, and importation of specifically named firearms and other firearms that have certain features, as well as the transfer and possession of large capacity ammunition feeding devices. Representative Carolyn McCarthy introduced a companion measure, H.R. 437, in the House of Representatives. S. 150 is similar to the Assault Weapons Ban of 1994 (P.L. 103-322) that was in effect through September 13, 2004.
The Assault Weapons Ban of 1994 was challenged in the courts for violating, among other things, the Equal Protection Clause and the Commerce Clause. This report reviews the disposition of these challenges. It also discusses Second Amendment jurisprudence in light of the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller and how lower courts have evaluated state and local assault weapons bans post-Heller. |
crs_RL30566 | crs_RL30566_0 | Overview of U.S.-South Korean Economic Relations
Relative Economic Importance
Since 2000, South Korea has been the United States' seventh-largest trading partner, ahead of Western European countries like France and Italy. Trade flows in 2006 exceeded $75 billion, an all-time high for U.S.-Korea bilateral trade; South Korea was the United States' seventh largest export market and its seventh largest source of imports. In 2006, the United States was Korea's third-largest trading partner, second-largest export market, third-largest source of imports, and its second-largest supplier of foreign direct investment. Diminishing Friction over Trade Disputes
The bilateral economic relationship has been accompanied by numerous disagreements over trade policies. The intensity of the disputes has diminished considerably since the late 1980s and early 1990s, in large measure because South Korea has enacted a set of sweeping market-oriented reforms as a quid pro quo for receiving a $58 billion package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following the near collapse of the South Korean economy in 1997. The United States and South Korea appear to have become more adept at managing their trade disputes, so that they tend to be less acrimonious than they were in the 1980s and 1990s. This may be partly due to the quarterly, working-level "trade action agenda" trade meetings that were initiated in early 2001. The KORUS FTA Negotiations2
U.S.-ROK economic relations advanced to the point that the two sides on February 2, 2006, announced their intent to launch negotiations to form a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). If an agreement is reached, it would be the United States' largest FTA since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). To go into effect, FTAs must be approved by Congress. South Korea's Increased Economic Integration with China
As mentioned earlier, in 2003 China surpassed the United States as South Korea's number one trading partner (see Figure 3 ). Many South Korean exports to China are intermediate goods used in the production of finished goods that ultimately are exported from China to other countries, including the United States. In broad terms, the Bush Administration has stated that it supports South Korea's economic engagement with North Korea, including the Kaesong industrial zone. One element of the U.S. strategy toward Korea appears to be attempting to raise the pressure on these ministries by pushing for the Korean Cabinet to focus on the issue. In cases where an issue is a significant subject of the KORUS FTA talks, that fact is mentioned, but more detailed discussion is left to CRS Report RL33435, The Proposed South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement . Korea's Complaints Against U.S. | South Korea is a major economic partner for the United States. In 2006, trade between the two countries surpassed $75 billion, making South Korea the United States' seventh-largest trading partner—ahead of France and Italy—and its seventh-largest export market. In 2006, the U.S. was Korea's third-largest trading partner, second-largest export market, and its second-largest supplier of foreign direct investment (FDI).
Bilateral economic relations have advanced to the point that the two sides in February 2006 announced their intention to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA), which they hope to complete in 2007. If an agreement is reached, it would be the United States' largest FTA since the completion of the North American Free Trade Agreement. To go into effect, FTAs must be approved by Congress and the Korean National Assembly. The FTA negotiation and ratification processes are likely to politicize bilateral trade disputes and produce spillovers between the economic and strategic aspects of the relationship, particularly if there are dramatic developments in the crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
Increased U.S.-South Korean economic interaction has been accompanied by numerous disagreements over trade and economic policies. The intensity of the disputes has diminished considerably since the late 1980s and early 1990s, in part because South Korea has enacted a set of sweeping market-oriented reforms as a quid pro quo for receiving a $58 billion package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following the near collapse of the South Korean economy in 1997. In recent years, the United States and South Korea appear to have become more adept at managing their trade disputes, so that they tend to be less acrimonious than they were in the 1980s and 1990s. This is due in part to the quarterly, working-level bilateral trade meetings that have been held since early 2001. Strategic factors, including South Korea's increased economic integration with North Korea, have become issues on the bilateral U.S.-South Korea economic front. In the FTA talks, South Korean officials are attempting to secure preferential tariff treatment for goods made by South Korean firms in the Kaesong industrial zone, located inside North Korea. In 2003, China surpassed the United States as South Korea's largest trading partner. Many South Korean exports to China are believed to be intermediate goods that are incorporated into products sent to the United States.
This report summarizes the main issues in U.S.-South Korean economic relations, including South Korea's economic prospects and economic reforms, and major bilateral economic disputes. Details of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) talks are left to CRS Report RL33435, The Proposed South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), by William Cooper and Mark Manyin.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R42590 | crs_R42590_0 | The 112 th Congress is considering additional major postal reforms, including reductions in service, expansion of the USPS's authority to provide products and services, and alterations to the postal employees pension and healthcare plans. Were it not for congressional action to reduce a statutorily required payment to the USPS's Retirees Health Benefits Fund (RHBF), the USPS would have lost an additional $9.5 billion. As the USPS's finances have deteriorated, its ability to absorb operating losses has been diminished. Since FY2005, the USPS's debt has risen to $13 billion from $0, $2 billion below its maximum statutory borrowing authority (39 U.S.C. These deficits are particularly problematic because Congress designed the USPS to be self-supporting (P.L. The USPS's Efforts to Improve Its Financial Condition
To help stem its losses, the USPS has taken a number of steps. Foremost, the Postal Service has downsized its workforce through attrition. Since FY2006, the number of career postal workers has shrunk 21.9%, to about 544,000 from 696,138. Postal Reform Legislation in the 112th Congress
Numerous postal reform bills have been introduced in the 112 th Congress. 2309 and S. 1789 have progressed the furthest toward enactment. 2309 , the Postal Reform Act of 2011, on June 23, 2011. 2309 with amendments on January 17, 2012 ( H.Rept. The House Rules Committee reported H.R. 2309 on March 29, 2012 ( H.Rept. The Senate passed S. 1789 amended by a vote of 62-37 on April 25, 2012. H.R. The authority also could authorize the Postmaster General to consult with postal employee unions to revise its workers compensation program to move injured employees of retirement age onto retirement benefits (Section 311); immediately transfer to the USPS the $11 billion FERS overpayment (Section 306); control the long-term growth of the USPS's employee compensation costs by (1) lowering the USPS's FEHB and Federal Employee Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) contributions and (2) changing collective bargaining by requiring arbitrators to consider the USPS's financial condition, defining USPS employee compensation to include all benefits, abolishing the requirement that USPS maintain employee fringe benefits not less than those provided in 1970, and requiring the USPS and unions to adopt reductions-in-force (RIF) procedures (Sections 301-305); gradually increase the postage rates for some mail classes that the USPS carries at a loss (Sections 401-403); end all annual appropriations to the USPS (Section 409); and reduce the USPS's FY2011 RHBF payment (due in August 2012) from $5.5 billion to $1.0 billion, and increase the USPS's FY2015 and FY2016 RHBF payments by $2.25 billion each year (Section 410). At the time of writing this report, both the House and Senate FY2013 Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) bills and reports contain postal policy provisions. The agency has asked Congress to enact a variety of reforms to improve the USPS's financial condition. At present, the USPS appears to be suffering from both a short-term liquidity crisis (i.e., dwindling cash and borrowing authority) and a long-term structural deficit (i.e., stagnating revenues and rising overhead costs). Assuming Congress wants to maintain the present USPS model —addressing these financial challenges will require (1) improving the USPS's liquidity immediately; (2) fortifying USPS's long-term revenues; and (3) controlling the growth of USPS's long-term costs, all while (4) having USPS continue to provide universal postal service to the public. 2309 and S. 1789 . As Table 3 indicates, both H.R. 2309 and S. 1789 contain provisions intended to make progress toward each of these four goals. However, H.R. And it would appear that H.R. | Since FY2007, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has lost more than $25 billion. Were it not for congressional action to reduce and defer statutorily required retiree health benefits, the USPS would have lost an additional $9.5 billion. As the USPS's finances have deteriorated, its ability to absorb operating losses has been diminished. The USPS's current debt is $13 billion, $2 billion below its maximum statutory borrowing authority. The agency owes $11.1 billion in payments to the Retiree Health Benefits Fund by September 20, 2012, and it currently has less than $1 billion in cash. These deficits are particularly problematic since Congress designed the Postal Service to be self-supporting in 1970 and enacted significant postal reforms in 2006.
To help stem its losses, the USPS has taken a number of steps. Foremost, the Postal Service has downsized its workforce through attrition. Since FY2006, the number of career postal workers has shrunk 21.9%, to about 544,000 from 696,138. However, the USPS has said it is unable to return to solvency through its own actions, and it has asked Congress to enact major reforms.
Numerous postal reform bills have been introduced in the 112th Congress; House and Senate appropriators and President Barack H. Obama also have advanced postal proposals. Among postal authorizing legislation, H.R. 2309 and S. 1789 have progressed the furthest toward enactment. The Senate passed S. 1789, the 21st Century Postal Service Act, on April 27, 2012. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform reported H.R. 2309, the Postal Reform Act of 2011, on January 17, 2012, and the House Rules Committee reported H.R. 2309 on March 29, 2012. Both bills include major reforms, such as reductions in service, expansion of the USPS's authority to provide products and services, and alterations to the postal employees pension and healthcare plans.
At present, the USPS appears to be suffering from both a short-term liquidity crisis (i.e., dwindling cash and borrowing authority) and a long-term structural deficit (i.e., stagnating revenues and rising overhead costs). To address both of these financial challenges, the USPS would have to (1) improve its liquidity immediately; (2) fortify its long-term revenues; and (3) control the growth of its long-term costs, all while (4) continuing to provide universal postal service to the public.
Both H.R. 2309 and S. 1789 contain provisions to make progress toward achieving each of these goals, albeit in different ways and to different degrees. H.R. 2309 would aim to reduce the USPS's costs through reducing the number of delivery and postal facilities and enacting a variety of USPS compensation reforms. S. 1789 would largely preserve present-day postal services and enact a number of incremental cost-cutting policies, such as reducing the USPS workers' compensation outlays.
This report will be updated after any further legislative action. |
crs_RS21592 | crs_RS21592_0 | The pilot-scale plant (PFEP) started up in June 2003 only to shut down after Iran suspended enrichment activities in December 2003. Negotiating with Iran
Since 2003, negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program have proceeded on two levels—with IAEA inspectors and at the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna, and with the European Union foreign ministers (known as the EU-3) of Germany, the UK, and France. Summit, the IAEA Board voted on resolution GOV/2005/77, which found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. The U.N. Security Council issued a presidential statement on March 29, 2006 calling upon Iran to reinstate its suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol and implement transparency measures. Since June 2006, the Security Council has demanded Iranian compliance and transparency, and Iran has failed to respond. UNSCR 1737 gave Iran another 60 days to comply, which expired on February 21, 2007. The Security Council continues to discuss further sanctions on Iran. | International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend sensitive activities in negotiations with Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3), which broke down in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement and reported Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. The Security Council called upon Iran to resuspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued its enrichment activities, failing to meet deadline after deadline. On December 23, 2006, the Security Council adopted limited sanctions under UNSCR 1737 and gave Iran another 60 days. However, the February 21, 2007, deadline has passed with little progress, and further sanctions may be under consideration. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL33950 | crs_RL33950_0 | Within the past year increased discussion has occurred about rates and patterns of land conversion in the Northern Plains, particularly conversion from native grass or rangeland into crop production. This discussion is driven by two concerns: (1) that this type of land conversion is becoming more widespread in the Dakotas and in the Northern Plains generally, and (2) that land conversion is reducing the amount of land available for both wildlife habitat and grazing. These concerns are expressed most strongly by advocates of wildlife protection and enhancement. Those concerned fear that landowners in the region will continue to convert grasslands to crop production, especially to corn production, as long as commodity market prices remain high. Many forces that may be encouraging the conversion of land in the Northern Plains have intensified recently. The recent push for renewable energy from biofuels and rising market prices for corn since August 2006, as a growing portion of this crop is used as a bioenergy feedstock, appear to be providing economic incentives to convert land. Data are limited, mainly because not enough time has passed to document these very recent trends in periodic surveys. However, anecdotal evidence from numerous sources suggests grassland conversion to cropland is being observed more frequently in the Northern Plains than in previous years. Each offers varying vantage points on this topic from different time frames, locations, and data collection and compilation techniques. FSA administers the federal farm commodity support programs. Neither view can be substantiated with the current data limitations. The high number of CRP acres scheduled to expire in the next four years in South Dakota, North Dakota, and Montana heightens concerns about potential conversions. Some are concerned about the future pattern of land conversion in this region, what environmental impact these changes will have, and what changes in public policy might slow, halt, or reverse this process. General Conversion Questions: What types of land are being converted to cropland? | Land is being converted from native grass or rangeland into crop production in the Northern Plains region, especially in South Dakota, North Dakota, and Montana. Advocates of wildlife protection and enhancement, and grazing interests, are concerned that landowners in this region will continue to convert grasslands to crop production, especially to corn production, as long as market prices remain high. As the rate of land conversion accelerates, those concerned suspect it will have significant environmental impacts and reduce the amount of land available for both wildlife habitat and grazing. They are seeking changes in public policy that might slow, halt, or reverse this process.
The availability of reliable and timely data to examine these concerns is limited. Though not enough time has passed to document current trends in periodic surveys, anecdotal evidence from numerous sources suggests that grassland conversion to cropland is being observed more frequently in the Northern Plains than in years past. Identified data sets—each offering different time frames, collection techniques, and insights on this topic—indicate a shift in land use in the region. Questions concerning exactly how much land is being converted to cropland, where this land is located, and what forces are driving the change can be only partially examined with the limited data currently available.
While the forces encouraging the conversion of land are not discussed in depth in this report, it is widely thought that the recent push for renewable energy from biofuels, rising market prices for corn, and advances in biotechnology are intensifying the conversion rate. Some of the possible conversion forces, such as expiring Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) contract acres, commodity support program policy, and existing conservation compliance policy, might be reviewed by Congress in the context of the upcoming farm bill. Discussion on topics such as current policy, technological advances in crop production, changes in wildlife habitat and population, regional economics, and environmental sustainability could assist anticipated farm bill discussions. |
crs_R42948 | crs_R42948_0 | U.S.-India engagement on shared security interests is a topic of interest to the U.S. Congress, where there is considerable support for a deepened U.S. partnership with the world's largest democracy. This report includes a brief outline of American security interests in relation to India, followed by an in-depth discussion of India's strategic interests and defense posture. These sections provide context for a review of the variously convergent and divergent strategic interests of both countries. It concludes with a brief discussion of the outlook for future security bilateral cooperation. A companion piece to this report—CRS Report R42823, India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]—discusses the details of current U.S.-India security engagement. Review of US-India Security Relations, 1947-2005
In the early decades following Indian independence, the potential for positive security relations between Washington and New Delhi was hindered by three largely intertwined disagreements: The first was rooted in the all-consuming Cold War calculus and ostensibly nonaligned India's Soviet tilt (the latter being a function of India's strongly-held anti-colonialist sentiments following nearly a century under London's direct rule as the "crown jewel" of the British Empire). As the largest, most populous and most economically successful country in the region, India is an avid champion of counterterrorism efforts in the region. The Defense Department's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that as India's "military capabilities grow, [the country] will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond." In June 2012, the two countries upgraded their ties to a strategic and cooperative partnership. Areas of Divergent Perspectives and Other Obstacles
Differing geopolitical, historic and economic experiences of the United States and India constitute the basis for considerable friction on a number of foreign policies and perspectives. India is also reported to be wary of intelligence and military contacts between the United States and its South Asian neighbors, particularly Pakistan. This success speaks to the broad consensus in both political establishments on the importance of the bilateral strategic partnership. The changes also served to open doors to both broader and smoother engagements in bilateral security cooperation and defense trade. Confusion arises from short-term versus long-term analyses of U.S.-India security relations. The Obama Administration—along with numerous pro-India analysts in Washington—has tended to emphasize the anticipated benefits of long-term engagement as opposed to a short-term approach that seeks gains derived through more narrow transactions. This latter tack can have the effect of raising and then thwarting expectations in Washington, as was the case with the ultimate failure of U.S. defense firms to secure the multi-billion-dollar contracts to supply new jets fighters to India. At the same time, growing U.S. frustrations have arisen from the sense that India's enthusiasm for further deepening bilateral security cooperation is limited, and that New Delhi has been insufficiently reciprocating in its approach. Looking ahead, there is widespread concurrence among many officials and analysts, alike, that the security relationship would benefit by undergirding ambitious rhetoric with more concrete action in areas of mutual agreement. In their view, defining which such actions would provide meaningful gains, even on a modest scale, appears to be the central task facing U.S. and Indian policy makers in coming years. Congress can guide the course and pace of this process with legislative consideration and through its oversight of U.S. foreign relations in Asia. | In today's fluid geopolitical environment, the relationship between the United States, the world's oldest democracy and an established global power, and India, its most populous democracy and an aspiring global power, is seen as a key variable in the unfolding international dynamics of the 21st century. As U.S. foreign policy attention shifts toward the Asia-Pacific (or Indo-Pacific) region, and as India's economic and military capabilities grow, Washington's pursuit of a strategic partnership with New Delhi demonstrates that the mutual wariness of the Cold War era has rapidly faded. A vital and in some ways leading aspect of this partnership has been security relations, and today the two countries are engaging in unprecedented levels of military-to-military ties, defense trade, and counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation. Still, although considerable enthusiasm for deepened security engagement is found in both capitals—and not least in the U.S. Congress—there is also a persistent sense that this aspect of the bilateral relationship lacks purpose and focus. Some observers argue that the potential of the relationship has been oversold, and that the benefits either hoped for or expected may not materialize in the near future. While Obama Administration officials variously contend that India is now or will be a net provider of security in its region, many independent analysts are skeptical that this aspiration can be realized, at least in the near-term.
Nongovernmental analyses of the course and pace of U.S.-India security relations are oftentimes incompatible or even conflicting in their assumptions and recommendations. Such incompatibility is frequently the result of the differing conclusions rooted in short-term versus long-term perspectives. The Obama Administration—along with numerous pro-India analysts in Washington—has tended to emphasize the anticipated benefits of long-term engagement as opposed to a short-term approach that seeks gains derived through more narrow transactions. This latter tack can have the effect of raising and then thwarting expectations in Washington, as was the case with the ultimate failure of U.S. defense firms to secure the multi-billion-dollar contracts to supply new combat aircraft to India. At the same time, frustrations among many in the United States have arisen from the sense that India's enthusiasm for further deepening bilateral security cooperation is limited, and that New Delhi's reciprocity has been insufficient.
Looking ahead, there is widespread concurrence among many officials and analysts that the security relationship would benefit from undergirding ambitious rhetoric with more concrete action in areas of mutual agreement. In their view, defining which actions will provide meaningful gains, even on a modest scale, appears to be the central task facing U.S. and Indian policy makers in coming years.
To assist Members of Congress and their staffs in clarifying the status of and outlook for bilateral security cooperation, this report—a companion to CRS Report R42823, India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]—takes a systematic approach to the major strategic perspectives held by policy makers in both countries and the ways in which these perspectives are variously harmonious, discordant, or, in some cases, both. The report opens with a brief review of the pre-2005 history of U.S.-India security relations. This is followed by discussion of key U.S. security interests related to India. Next is a focus on India's defense posture writ large. With this context set, the report reviews key areas of convergent and divergent security interests and perspectives. A brief discussion of the outlook for future security cooperation closes. For information on U.S.-India relations more broadly, see CRS Report RL33529, India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40976 | crs_R40976_0 | Introduction
During 2007, both the House and the Senate established new earmark transparency procedures for their respective chambers. They provide for public disclosure of approved earmarks and the identification of their congressional sponsors, among other requirements. These procedures currently are contained in House Rule XXI, clause 9, and Senate Rule XLIV. Under both chambers' rules, an earmark is a provision in legislation or report language that meets certain criteria. First, it is included primarily at the request of a Member. Second, it provides, authorizes, or recommends a specific amount of discretionary budget authority, credit authority, or other spending authority (1) to an entity, or (2) to a specific state, locality, or congressional district. This report provides information on the earmarks disclosed by the House and Senate for the 12 regular, annual appropriations bills for each of FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010. For these bills, a list of earmarks was typically included in the explanatory statement accompanying the final version of the bill, under the heading "Disclosure of Earmarks and Congressionally Directed Spending Items." This report analyzes the data in the lists directly, without additions or deletions, as explained below. The disclosures typically identify the federal agency, project name, amount, and requester. In some cases, other information also has been included, such as an account within an agency, or the recipient, purpose, or location of the earmark. For example, it does not pertain to any earmarks disclosed for supplemental appropriations bills or for authorizing legislation. Data on Congressional Disclosure of Earmarks
Distribution of Earmarks in FY2010
In FY2010, Congress identified 11,320 earmarks worth $32.0 billion. Some appropriations bills account for more earmarks than others. The Energy-Water bill contains the greatest number of FY2010 earmarks (2,293, about 20% of all earmarks; Figure 1 ). The distribution of the value of earmarks is more concentrated, with about $27.5 billion, or 86%, of the value of earmarks in four of the appropriations bills (Military Construction-VA, Energy-Water, Defense, and Transportation-HUD). The Military Construction-VA bill contains the greatest value of FY2010 earmarks ($14.5 billion, about 45% of the combined value of earmarks; Figure 2 ). Some appropriations bills account for fewer earmarks but have a greater share of the value, or vice versa. Congressionally Disclosed Earmarks Requested by the President
House and Senate rules do not require congressional disclosure of presidentially requested earmarks. Table 3 presents the number and value of FY2010 earmarks in the disclosure lists that were requested by the President. The total across all appropriations bills in FY2010 is 2,039 earmarks worth $21.8 billion (18% of the total number and 68% of the total value). The 12-bill total is 1,265 earmarks worth $9.5 billion (11% of the 11,320 total number and 30% of the $32.0 billion total value). The total across all appropriations bills in FY2010 is 9,281 earmarks worth $10.2 billion (82% of the 11,320 total number and 32% of the $32.0 billion total value; Table 3 ). Thus, the percentage of the appropriations that was earmarked decreased in FY2010: 1.5% of the total appropriation (down from 1.8% in both FY2008 and FY2009) and 2.4% of the non-mandatory appropriation (down from 2.9% in both FY2008 and FY2009, Table 5 ). Over all 12 appropriations bills, the percentage of non-mandatory appropriations that was earmarked fell from 2.9% in FY2008 to 2.4% in FY2010 ( Table 5 ). Conversely, the number and value of earmarks requested solely by Members have decreased, by 17% and 19% respectively, from 11,117 earmarks worth $12.5 billion in FY2008 to 9,281 earmarks worth $10.2 billion in FY2010. This 17% decrease in the number of Member-only earmarks is a larger decrease than the 12% overall decrease in the number of earmarks from FY2008 to FY2010 ( Table 4 ). | In 2007, both the House and the Senate established new earmark transparency procedures. They provide for public disclosure of approved earmarks and the identification of their congressional sponsors. These procedures currently are contained in House Rule XXI, clause 9, and Senate Rule XLIV. Under both chambers' rules, an earmark is a provision in legislation or report language that is included primarily at the request of a Member, and provides, authorizes, or recommends a specific amount to an entity or to a specific state, locality, or congressional district.
This report summarizes the earmarks disclosed for the 12 regular, annual appropriations bills for each of FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010. For these bills, a list of earmarks was typically included in the explanatory statement accompanying the final version of the bill under the heading "Disclosure of Earmarks and Congressionally Directed Spending Items." This report does not pertain to any earmarks disclosed in supplemental appropriations or authorizing legislation.
This report directly analyzes the data in the earmark disclosure lists, without additions or deletions. For individual earmarks, the disclosures typically identify the federal agency, project name, amount, and requester. In some cases, other information also has been included, such as an account within an agency, or the purpose or location of the earmark.
In FY2010, Congress identified 11,320 earmarks with a total value of $32.0 billion. Some appropriations bills account for more earmarks than others (Table 2). For instance, about four-fifths of the 11,320 earmarks in FY2010 are in five of the 12 appropriations bills. The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies appropriations bill contains the greatest number of FY2010 earmarks—2,293, about 20% of the total number of earmarks.
The distribution of the value of earmarks is more concentrated, with about $27.5 billion, or 86%, of the value of earmarks in four of the appropriations bills. The Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies appropriations bill contains the greatest value of FY2010 earmarks—$14.5 billion, about 45% of the total value. Some appropriations bills account for fewer earmarks but have a greater share of the value, or vice versa.
House and Senate rules do not require congressional disclosure of presidentially requested earmarks. However, nine appropriations bills in FY2010 list the President as a requester, either solely or with a Member of Congress, for 2,039 earmarks worth $21.8 billion (18% of the total number and 68% of the total value of earmarks in the disclosure lists). It is possible that there are more presidential earmarks than those disclosed by Congress. There were 9,281 Member-only earmarks worth $10.2 billion (82% of the total number and 32% of the total value, Table 3).
From FY2008 to FY2010, the total number of appropriations earmarks in all 12 bills decreased 12%, from 12,810 to 11,320. However, the total value of earmarks increased 11%, from $28.9 billion to $32.0 billion (Table 5). The percentage of the total appropriation that was earmarked decreased from 1.8% in FY2008 to 1.5% in FY2010. Excluding mandatory spending, the percentage of non-mandatory appropriations that were earmarked fell from 2.9% to 2.4%. Both the number and value of President-only earmarks increased since FY2008 (from 819 earmarks worth $4.2 billion in FY2008, to 1,265 earmarks worth $9.5 billion in FY2010; up 54% by number and 126% by value). Conversely, the number and value of Member-only earmarks decreased since FY2008, from 11,117 earmarks worth $12.5 billion in FY2008, to 9,281 earmarks worth $10.2 billion in FY2010, down 17% by number and 19% by value (Table 6). |
crs_RS20550 | crs_RS20550_0 | DLA Troop Support's Clothing and Textile Directorate (C&T) supplies more than 8,000 different items ranging from uniforms and body armor to tents and canteens. Military uniforms are generally procured through competitive contracts. According to a GAO report on DOD's ground combat uniforms, DLA managed eight uniforms for the military services as of 2010. Legislative Initiatives Passed that Affect Military Uniform Procurement
Section 352 of P.L. 113-66, the NDAA for FY2014
Section 352 of 113-66, the NDAA for FY2014, requires all military services to adopt and field a joint combat camouflage uniform by October 1, 2018. (2) CONTENT- At a minimum, the guidance required by paragraph (1) shall require the Secretary of each of the military departments—
(A) in cooperation with the commanders of the combatant commands, including the unified combatant command for special operations forces, to establish, by not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, joint criteria for combat and camouflage utility uniforms and families of uniforms, which shall be included in all new requirements documents for such uniforms;
(B) to continually work together to assess and develop new technologies that could be incorporated into future combat and camouflage utility uniforms and families of uniforms to improve war fighter survivability;
(C) to ensure that new combat and camouflage utility uniforms and families of uniforms meet the geographic and operational requirements of the commanders of the combatant commands; and
(D) to ensure that all new combat and camouflage utility uniforms and families of uniforms achieve interoperability with all components of individual war fighter systems, including body armor, organizational clothing and individual equipment, and other individual protective systems. Section 352 of P.L. 111-84, the NDAA for FY2010
Section 352 of P.L. 111-84 , the NDAA for FY2010, contained several provisions of importance to the procurement of military uniforms. Legislative Initiatives Proposed on Military Uniform Procurement
Section 839 of H.R. Section 839 of P.L. 113-66 would have required that the initial military footwear issued to enlisted military personnel be procured in accordance with the provisions of the Berry Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 2533a. | Military uniforms are procured through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), an agency of the Department of Defense (DOD). DLA is DOD's largest combat support agency, providing worldwide logistics support for the United States military services, civilian agencies, and foreign countries. With headquarters in Fort Belvoir, VA, DLA operates three supply centers: DLA Aviation, DLA Land and Maritime, and DLA Troop Support. Military uniforms are procured through DLA Troop Support in Philadelphia, PA.
DLA Troop Support is responsible for procuring nearly all of the food, clothing, and medical supplies used by the military, including about 90% of the construction material used by troops in the field, and repair parts for aircraft, combat vehicles, and other weapons system platforms. According to DLA Troop Support's website, "Each year, DLA Troop Support supplies and manages over $13.4 billion worth of food, clothing and textiles, pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and construction and equipment supplies in support of America's warfighters worldwide and their eligible dependents." Within DLA Troop Support, the Clothing and Textile (C&T) Directorate supplies more than 8,000 different items ranging from uniforms to footwear and equipment. According to DLA Troop Support, in FY2012, C&T sales of clothing, textiles, and equipment to military personnel worldwide surpassed $1.9 billion.
Legislative initiatives that affect the procurement of military uniforms were enacted in several bills, among them: Section 822 of P.L. 112-81, the NDAA for FY2012; Section 821 of P.L. 111-383, the Ike Skelton NDAA for FY2011; and Section 352 of P.L. 111-84, the NDAA for FY2010.
Section 352 of P.L. 113-66 requires all military services to use a joint combat camouflage uniform, while Section 839 of H.R. 1960, the proposed House-version of the NDAA for FY2014, would have, if enacted, required that the initial military footwear issued to enlisted military personnel conform to the provisions of the Berry Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 2533a. |
crs_R41379 | crs_R41379_0 | Introduction
On June 1, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided unanimously in Samantar v. Yousef that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which governs the immunity of foreign states in U.S. courts, does not apply in suits against foreign officials. Samanta r's particular facts involved the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), but the ruling applies to all causes of action against foreign officials. The holding clarifies that no foreign government officials, neither present nor former, are entitled to invoke the FSIA as a defense, unless the foreign state is the real party in interest in the case. The ruling leaves open the possibility that foreign officials have recourse to other sources of immunity or other defenses to jurisdiction or the merits of a lawsuit. Officials may assert immunity under the common law (unwritten law that has been developed by courts), for example, perhaps aided by State Department suggestions of immunity. This report provides an overview of the FSIA, followed by a consideration of the FSIA's possible application in the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling and the remaining options for foreign officials who seek immunity from lawsuits, as well as some of the questions that may emerge from each option. The report also addresses relevant legislation. Justice Stevens also left open the possibility that Samantar may be entitled to head of state immunity under the common law. To the extent the FSIA codifies common law foreign sovereign immunity, as in the case of lawsuits based on commercial activity under the restrictive theory, the recognition of a separate theory of immunity for foreign officials may not yield results significantly different from those cases in which courts applied the FSIA directly. The same common law considerations some courts previously applied to determine whether a foreign official is an "agency or instrumentality" under the FSIA would likely lead to similar results where the common law is applied directly. However, where Congress enacts exceptions to the FSIA that depart from the common law, outcomes may vary from cases decided under the pre-Samantar approach. | On June 1, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided unanimously in Samantar v. Yousef that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which governs the immunity of foreign states in U.S. courts, does not apply in suits against foreign officials. The ruling clarifies that officials of foreign governments, whether present or former, are not entitled to invoke the FSIA as a shield, unless the foreign state is the real party in interest in the case. Samantar's particular facts involve the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), but the ruling applies to all causes of action against foreign officials. The ruling leaves open the possibility that foreign officials have recourse to other sources of immunity or other defenses to jurisdiction or the merits of a lawsuit. Officials may assert immunity under the common law, for example, perhaps aided by State Department suggestions of immunity. The Court also left open the possibility that Congress could enact new provisions to address the immunity of foreign officials.
Prior to the Samantar decision, most federal judicial circuits interpreted the FSIA to cover foreign officials as "agencies or instrumentalities" of the foreign state based on their interpretation that Congress had intended to fully codify the common law of foreign sovereign immunity. To the extent the FSIA exceptions codify sovereign immunity of states under the common law, as in the case of lawsuits based on commercial activity under the restrictive theory, the recognition of a separate theory of immunity for foreign officials may not yield results significantly different from those cases in which courts applied the FSIA. The same common law considerations some courts previously applied to determine whether a foreign official is an "agency or instrumentality" under the FSIA would likely lead to similar results where the common law is applied directly. However, where Congress enacts exceptions to the FSIA that depart from the common law, outcomes may vary from cases decided under the pre-Samantar approach.
This report provides an overview of the FSIA, followed by a consideration of the remaining options for foreign officials who seek immunity from lawsuits, as well as some of the questions that may emerge from each option. The report also discusses legislation addressing the immunity of foreign officials (the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, H.R. 3143 and S. 1535). |
crs_R40174 | crs_R40174_0 | However, opponents of the treaty respond that it is not necessary, noting that the development of the broadcasting industry in the United States has not been hurt by the fact that it is not even a party to the Rome Convention. History of Negotiations
At its first session in November 1998, the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR) of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) decided to pursue in earnest discussions and submissions concerning the text of a new broadcasting treaty. At its fall 2006 meeting, the WIPO General Assembly tentatively agreed to convene a diplomatic conference in November/December 2007 to conclude a treaty for the protection of only traditional broadcasting organizations and cablecasting organizations, contingent on the SCCR's successfully tabling a consensus proposed text. There appears to be uncertainty and disagreement among the negotiating parties as to precisely what a "signal-based" approach means for the narrowed focus of a new treaty. Although further discussions occurred during the November 2008 SCCR meetings, no decisions were made, and the proposed treaty remains an active item on the SCCR agenda. [Longstanding negotiations do not] justify the creation of rights that would be exceedingly novel in U.S. law and that are likely to harm consumers' existing rights, and stifle technology innovation." Assuming that the treaty is eventually successfully concluded and that the United States is a signatory, any such treaty would not take effect for the United States unless and until the treaty was ratified by the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate, and Congress enacted implementing legislation. Additionally, webcasting/netcasting and simulcasting may be included in a separate agreement or as a protocol to a new broadcasting treaty, unless they are reconsidered for inclusion in the new broadcast treaty itself. | Existing international agreements relevant to broadcasting protections do not cover advancements in broadcasting technology that were not envisioned when they were concluded. Therefore, in 1998 the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR) of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) decided to negotiate and draft a new treaty that would extend protection to new methods of broadcasting. The SCCR has not yet achieved consensus on a text.
In recent years, a growing signal piracy problem has increased the urgency of concluding a new treaty, resulting in a decision by the WIPO General Assembly to restrict the focus of the treaty to signal-based protections for traditional broadcasting organizations and cablecasting. Consideration of controversial issues of webcasting (advocated by the United States) and simulcasting protections have been postponed. However, much work remains to achieve a final proposed text as the basis for formal negotiations to conclude a treaty. Despite a concerted effort to conclude a treaty in 2007, in June 2007 the SCCR decided that more time and work were needed. Further discussions occurred during SCCR meetings in 2008, but no decisions were made. The treaty remains an active item on the SCCR agenda.
A concluded treaty would not take effect for the United States unless Congress were to enact implementing legislation and the United States were to ratify the treaty with the advice and consent of the Senate. Noting that the United States is not a party to the existing 1961 Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, various U.S. stakeholders have argued that a new broadcasting treaty is not needed, that any new treaty should not inhibit technological innovation or consumer use, and that Congress should exercise greater oversight over U.S. participation in the negotiations. |
crs_RL33493 | crs_RL33493_0 | Most Recent Developments
President Bush announced on June 18, 2008, that he would like to open areas of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) for oil and gas development currently under presidential and congressional moratoria (discussed in more detail below). But, on July 14, 2008, President Bush reversed his position and lifted the executive ban on the OCS imposed in 1990 by President George H.W. Bush. Congressional action approving the Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2009 ( P.L. 110 - 329 , enacted September 30, 2008), continued the funding of government activities through March 6, 2009, or until a regular appropriations bill is enacted, omitted language that provided for the congressional OCS moratoria along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. 111-8 ) does not contain the OCS moratoria. Those areas may now be made available for preleasing, leasing, and related activity that could lead to oil and gas development. The moratorium, however, is still in place for most of the Eastern Gulf of Mexico which was placed off-limits statutorily until 2022 under the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA) ( P.L. There are some indications in the 111 th Congress that a total OCS ban is unlikely, but the question may be, how much of the OCS remains open and available for oil and gas drilling. Separate legislation ( H.R. 1696 ) has been introduced to place MMS planning areas in the North Atlantic and Mid-Atlantic permanently off-limits to oil and gas leasing and development. Further, the Administration began planning its next five-year leasing program in August 2008 that would, if approved, be implemented as early as 2010 - two years ahead of schedule. The proposed new five-year program, introduced in January 2009, would supersede the current five-year leasing program from 2007-2012. A new five-year lease program, beginning in 2010, would allow the newly opened OCS areas to be offered in a lease sale sooner than if they remained on their current schedule. The Obama Administration extended the comment period on the proposed five-year leasing program 180 days beyond its required 60 days to assess the information they have on the OCS for energy development, including renewable energy development. In 1998, President Clinton extended the offshore leasing prohibition until 2012. Proponents of the moratoria contend that offshore drilling would pose unacceptable environmental risks and threaten coastal tourism industries, whereas supporters of expanded offshore leasing counter that more domestic oil and gas production is vital for the nation's energy security. Congress enacted the moratoria for each of fiscal years 1982-2008 through the annual Interior Appropriations bill. The permanent appropriations law ( P.L. Thus, when President Bush lifted the executive ban, it did not include the EGoM. Congressional debate over royalty relief for OCS oil and gas producers has been ongoing. Kerr McGee Oil and Gas Corp. (acquired by Anadarko Petroleum Corp. in August 2006) challenged MMS's assertion in a lawsuit that it had authority to place price thresholds in the DWRRA leases (1996-2000). A recent U.S. District Court decision , however, which was upheld by a 3-member panel in the U.S. Court of Appeals, ruled that the Secretary of the Interior had no authority to impose price thresholds for oil and gas leases held under the DWRRA.. Based on the court ruling, the lessees, therefore, should have the right to produce up to the specified volume of oil and gas in the lease, regardless of the price. In the inventory, the DOI provided mean estimates of 8.5 billion barrels of known oil reserves and 29.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas; 82% of the oil and 95% of the gas is in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). 109 - 432 ). | Oil and gas leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) has been an important issue in the debate over energy security and domestic energy resources. The Department of the Interior (DOI) released a comprehensive inventory of OCS resources in February 2006 that estimated reserves of 8.5 billion barrels of oil and 29.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. Another 86 billion barrels of oil and 420 tcf of natural gas are classified as undiscovered resources. Congress had imposed moratoria on much of the OCS since 1982 through the annual Interior appropriation bills. A Presidential Directive issued by President George H.W. Bush in 1990 (and extended by President Clinton until 2012) also banned offshore oil and gas development in much of the OCS. Proponents of the moratoria contend that offshore drilling would pose unacceptable environmental risks and threaten coastal tourism industries. However, on June 18, 2008, President Bush announced his support for lifting the moratoria on offshore oil and gas development. However, President Bush said that he would not lift the executive ban until Congress acted to lift its ban first. But, on July 14, 2008, President Bush reversed his position and lifted the executive ban on the OCS before Congress acted.
Congressional action approving the Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329, enacted September 30, 2008), continued the funding of government activities through March 6, 2009, or until a regular appropriations bill is enacted, omitted language that provided for the congressional OCS moratoria along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The permanent appropriations law (P.L. 111-8) does not contain the OCS moratoria. Those areas may now be made available for preleasing, leasing, and related activity that could lead to oil and gas development. The moratorium, however, is still in place for most of the Eastern Gulf of Mexico which was placed off-limits statutorily until 2022 under the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA) (P.L. 109-432). There are some indications in the 111th Congress that a total OCS ban is unlikely, but the question may be, how much of the OCS remains open and available for oil and gas drilling. Separate legislation (H.R. 1696) has been introduced to place MMS planning areas in the North Atlantic and Mid-Atlantic permanently off-limits to oil and gas leasing and development.
Further, the Administration began planning its next five-year leasing program in August 2008 that would, if approved, be implemented as early as 2010 - two years ahead of schedule. The proposed new five-year program, introduced in January 2009, would supersede the current five-year leasing program from 2007-2012. A new five-year lease program, beginning in 2010, would allow the newly opened OCS areas to be offered in a lease sale sooner than if the MMS remained on their current schedule. The Obama Administration extended the comment period on the proposed five-year leasing program 180 days beyond its required 60 days to assess the information they have on the OCS for energy development, including renewable energy development.
Royalty relief, particularly for deep-water projects, has come under closer scrutiny since it was revealed in a February 2006 New York Times article that leases issued during 1998 and 1999 did not contain price thresholds for royalty relief (above which royalties apply) as part of the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA) of 1995 (leases issued between 1996-2000). However, Kerr McGee Oil and Gas Corp. (now Anadarko Petroleum Corp.) filed a lawsuit challenging the Minerals Management Service's (MMS) authority to impose price thresholds in the DWRRA leases. A recent U.S. District Court decision, which was upheld by a 3-member panel in the U.S. Court of Appeals, ruled that the Secretary of the Interior had no authority to impose price thresholds for oil and gas leases held under the DWRRA . |
crs_R41142 | crs_R41142_0 | The federal government provides both indirect support for school construction (mainly by exempting from federal income taxation the interest on state and local government bonds used to finance school construction and renovation) and direct support via grants and loans for unique schools and populations. This report examines estimates of school infrastructure needs and discusses the federal role in financing both K-12 public school infrastructure and public and private higher education facilities. General U.S. Department of Education administered-facilities grant programs were authorized beginning in 1963. Federal Programs that Provide Funding for Educational Facilities
Federal support for school construction and renovation is provided through various allowances and programs. The programs described below, although not an exhaustive list of all programs that may support construction or renovation of educational facilities, are organized by federal agency. Department of Education
Alaska Native K-12 and Community Education
The Alaska Native Educational Equity, Support, and Assistance Act (Title VII-C of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended) provides competitive grants to Alaska Native and other organizations to meet the unique educational needs of Alaska Natives and to support supplemental education programs to benefit Alaska Natives. Funds are allocated to the State Charter Schools Facilities Incentive Grants program and the Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities program from the Charter Schools program according to appropriations acts. Low-Income and Minority-Serving Institutions of Higher Education
Several programs authorized under Title III-A, Title III-B, Title III-F, Title V, Title VII-A-4, and Title VIII-AA of HEA provide grants to certain eligible public and private nonprofit institutions of higher education (IHEs) for activities such as the purchase of equipment, faculty development, curriculum development, tutoring, endowment development, and administrative improvements. To varying extents, the nine programs allow construction, maintenance, renovation, improvement of instructional facilities, or the acquisition of land on which to construct instructional or campus facilities. The appropriations acts of FY2012-FY2015 contained provisions allowing a portion of the appropriation to be used for elementary and secondary school construction, renovation, and modernization of a facility run by the Department of Education of the State of Hawaii that served a predominantly Native Hawaiian student body. provides general support for the institutions. §54D) may be used to reduce energy consumption at least 20% in publicly owned buildings, including K-12 schools and IHEs, or to support research in specific areas through expenditures on research facilities and research grants. Six of the programs for land-grant colleges allow construction or renovation of facilities at the institutions. University Research Facilities
The federal government appropriates funds for the construction and improvement of buildings and facilities occupied or used by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (15 U.S.C. Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA)
The Department of Defense operates schools for the children of military members stationed in the United States and abroad. | By some measures, the United States spent over $50 billion on new construction, additions, and alterations in public elementary and secondary schools and public and private postsecondary institutions in 2012. Although state and local governments are traditionally responsible for the majority of facilities in public K-12 schools and postsecondary institutions, the federal government also provides some direct and indirect support for school infrastructure. Facilities at private institutions are funded primarily by donations, tuition, private foundations, endowments, and governments. The largest federal contributions are indirect—the forgone revenue attributable to the exemption of interest on state and local governmental bonds used for school construction, modernization, renovation, and repair; and other tax credits.
Federal direct support for school infrastructure is provided through loans and grants to K-12 schools serving certain populations or K-12 schools with specific needs. For example, there are grant programs for schools with a high population of students who are Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, Indians, children of military parents, individuals with disabilities, or deaf. Funding is also available to schools affected by natural disasters or located in rural areas. And there are programs to encourage the development of charter schools. Although the Department of Education administers several of the grant programs funding facilities at elementary and secondary schools, other agencies, such as the Department of the Interior and the Department of Defense, also administer programs.
At the postsecondary level, there are several programs to support institutions of higher education that serve large low-income or minority populations and to support research facilities. The allowable uses of funds in the programs authorized primarily by Titles III and V of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, and administered by the U.S. Department of Education variously include construction, maintenance, renovation, and improvement of instructional facilities and acquisition of land on which to construct instructional facilities. In addition, there are programs administered by other agencies, such as the National Endowment for the Humanities and the U.S. Department of Commerce, that support postsecondary research facilities, facility renovations at minority-serving postsecondary institutions, telecommunications, disaster relief at postsecondary institutions, and other uses.
This report provides a short description of federal allowances and programs that provide support for the construction or renovation of educational facilities. The allowances and programs are organized by the agency that administers or regulates the program. Appropriations and budget authorities are included for FY2014 and FY2015 or the most recent year available. These programs exist in various forms and responsibility for their administration is spread across many agencies; thus, the list of programs presented should not be considered a fully exhaustive list of all federally funded programs that support school facilities and infrastructure at least in part. |
crs_RS21605 | crs_RS21605_0 | Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program
The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) is a block grant program under which the federal government gives annual grants to states, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories and commonwealths, and Indian tribal organizations to operate multi-component home energy assistance programs for needy households. The allotment method may change depending on the amount of funds appropriated by Congress. For more information about how the LIHEAP formula distributes funds, see CRS Report RL33275, The LIHEAP Formula: Legislative History and Current Law , by [author name scrubbed]. Column (b) of Table 1 shows the amounts allocated to the states in FY2007. Following Table 1 , Table 2 shows estimated allocations to the states at various hypothetical appropriations levels. | The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) is a block grant program under which the federal government gives annual grants to states, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories and commonwealths, and Indian tribal organizations to operate multi-component home energy assistance programs for needy households. This report contains two tables that show estimated LIHEAP allocations to the states. Table 1 shows state allocations at various levels: (1) the amount appropriated for FY2006, (2) the amount appropriated for FY2007, (3) the amount appropriated in FY2008, and (4) estimated state allocations based on the amount requested by the President for FY2009. Table 2 shows estimated state allocations at other hypothetical appropriations increments. For detailed information on how the LIHEAP formula allocates funds to the states, see CRS Report RL33275, The LIHEAP Formula: Legislative History and Current Law, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated when proposed funding levels change. |
crs_R40797 | crs_R40797_0 | Introduction
Purpose and Organization
Unlike natural gas or fuel oil, electricity cannot be easily stored. However, interest in electric power storage (EPS) has been growing with technological advancements that can make storage a more practical means of integrating renewable power into the electricity grid and achieving other operating benefits. This report summarizes the technical, regulatory, and policy issues that surround implementation of EPS. This section of the report discusses the storage technologies and their applications. Residential electricity storage. Integrated Solutions . Industry and Regulator Acceptance of Storage
Electricity storage is one of several technologies and methods of meeting power demand that are of current congressional interest (including distributed generation, renewable power, and demand response ) which do not fit the traditional power industry paradigm. That paradigm involves reliance on large-scale central power plants and long-distance transmission lines to meet demand. As noted above, this raises the question of how quickly and effectively the power industry and its federal and state regulators will be willing to pursue and deploy new approaches that are cost-effective. Current Legislation and Incentives
This section of the report reviews the treatment of electric power storage in three current legislative proposals:
S. 1091 , the Storage Technology of Renewable and Green Energy Act of 2009 (STORAGE Act). H.R. 2454 , the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES). S. 1462 , the American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009 (ACELA). 111-5 ). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. | Unlike natural gas or fuel oil, electricity cannot be easily stored. However, interest in electric power storage (EPS) has been growing with technological advancements that can make storage a more practical means of integrating renewable power into the electricity grid and achieving other operating benefits.
This report summarizes the technical, regulatory, and policy issues that surround implementation of EPS. Electricity storage is one of several non-traditional technologies and methods of meeting power demand that are of current congressional interest (others include distributed generation, renewable power, and demand response). EPS and these other alternatives do not fit the traditional power industry paradigm, which involves reliance on large-scale central power plants and long-distance transmission lines to meet demand. This raises the question of how quickly and effectively the power industry and its regulators will be willing to pursue and deploy new approaches. Electricity storage is also currently a relatively high-cost technology, another factor that could delay its deployment.
The report identifies several areas for possible congressional oversight, including:
Power industry and state regulator acceptance of storage technologies. Integration of storage into transmission system planning, including integration of renewable power into the electricity grid. Federal executive agency focus on EPS as a solution to power system needs. The application of incentives for electric power storage development included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5).
The report discusses how the provisions of several pending bills relate to the development of electric power storage, including S. 1091, the Storage Technology of Renewable and Green Energy Act of 2009 (STORAGE Act); H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES); and S. 1462, the American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009 (ACELA).
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R40844 | crs_R40844_0 | §2451, a trade remedy statute aimed at import surges from China. Further, while President Obama was authorized to review the tariffs after six months and to modify, reduce, or terminate them, he allowed the tariffs to remain in place as originally imposed. Section 421, which was enacted as one element of an October 2000 statute addressing various issues involving the accession of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO), authorizes the President to impose safeguards—that is, temporary measures such as import surcharges or quotas—on Chinese products in the event that the ITC finds that these imports have resulted in market disruption in the United States. Market disruption occurs under Section 421 if an import surge of a Chinese product is a significant cause of material injury or threat of material injury to the domestic industry producing the like or directly competitive product. This provision is separate from XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, which allow WTO members to respond to injurious import surges generally but on a stricter basis than provided for under China's Accession Protocol. China requested consultations with the United States under the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes on September 14, 2009, and requested a panel on December 21, 2009, claiming that the additional tariffs are inconsistent with U.S. GATT obligations to accord Chinese tires MFN tariff treatment and not to exceed negotiated tariff rates, that the United States imposed tariffs under the special safeguard mechanism in China's WTO Accession Protocol without first attempting to justify them under general GATT and WTO safeguard provisions, and that Section 421 and its application in this case are inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Protocol. In a report circulated September 5, 2011, the WTO Appellate Body upheld the challenged panel determinations and thus U.S. actions under the Protocol. The safeguard may be applied only to goods of Chinese origin, a significant difference from the WTO Safeguards Agreement, which requires that a safeguard be imposed on the subject product regardless of its source. The statute, which also permitted the President to grant most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment to Chinese goods upon China's accession to the WTO, was enacted in October 2000, a little more than a year before China became a WTO member. Section 406 in turn was adapted from Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. Section 421 Investigation: Chinese Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from China (2009)
On April 20, 2009, the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union filed a petition with the U.S. International Trade Commission requesting that it institute a Section 421 investigation involving certain passenger vehicle and light truck tires from China. The ITC instituted the investigation (TA-421-7) on April 24, 2009. As a result of its investigation, the ITC in June 2009 voted 4-2 that imports of the subject tires were causing market disruption to domestic producers and recommended that the President impose an addition duty on the imported tires for three years, beginning with an additional 55% ad valorem duty in the first year, 45% ad valorem in the second year, and 35% ad valorem in the third year. The ITC also recommended expedited consideration of trade adjustment assistance if applications for such assistance were filed by affected firms or workers. The President subsequently decided to provide import relief regarding the subject tires and on September 11, 2009, proclaimed increased tariffs for three years, albeit at lower rates than those recommended by the ITC, effective September 26, 2009. The President also directed the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce to expedite applications for trade adjustment assistance and to provide other available economic assistance to affected workers, firms, and communities. No formal requests have been made under section 421(o) for the ITC to investigate whether it is necessary to extend the tariffs, which are scheduled to expire on September 25, 2012. Before proceeding with its analysis, the panel set out context for the case, including that the case raised questions that had not yet been dealt with in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding, such as the relationship of the China-specific safeguard to the WTO global safeguard mechanisms; that the U.S. International Trade Commission causation determination was not unanimous, warranting "very careful consideration" by the panel of this aspect of the determination; that the unanimous ITC material injury finding was not before the panel, thus making causation a crucial issue, though complicated by the fact that the ITC's period of investigation had "involved in part a period of massive global economic downturn or recession"; that the Section 421 petition had been filed by a labor union concerned with job losses and not by the domestic tire industry, which had reduced investment in the United States and increased investment in China, arguably precipitating the increase in Chinese tire imports that resulted in the safeguard; and that the domestic industry indicated that it would not make adjustments even though a safeguard was put in place. Panel and Appellate Body Reports Adopted
The panel and Appellate Body reports were adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on October 5, 2011. | On April 20, 2009, the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union filed a petition with the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) requesting an investigation under Section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §2451, a trade remedy statute addressing import surges from China, to examine whether Chinese passenger vehicle and light truck tires were causing market disruption to U.S. tire producers. Market disruption will be found to occur under Section 421 whenever imports of a Chinese product that is "like or directly competitive with" a domestic product "are increasing rapidly ... so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or threat of material injury, to the domestic industry." The ITC initiated the investigation (TA-421-7) on April 24, 2009.
As a result of its investigation, the ITC in June 2009 voted 4-2 that Chinese tire imports were causing domestic market disruption and recommended that the President impose an added duty on these items for three years at an annually declining rate. The ITC also recommended expedited consideration of trade adjustment assistance (TAA) applications filed by affected firms or workers. On September 11, 2009, President Obama proclaimed increased tariffs on Chinese tires for three years effective September 26, 2009, albeit at lower rates than recommended by the ITC. The proclaimed increase was 35% ad valorem in the first year, 30% in the second, and 25% in the third year. The President also directed the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce to expedite TAA applications and to provide other assistance to affected workers, firms, and communities. While the President was authorized to review the tariffs after six months and to modify, reduce, or terminate them, he did not take any of these actions. No formal requests have been made to extend the tire tariffs, which are scheduled to expire on September 25, 2012. Six petitions had been previously filed under Section 421, with the ITC finding market disruption in four out of six of its investigations. President Bush decided not to provide import relief in these earlier cases.
Section 421 was enacted as part of an October 2000 statute that also permitted the President to grant most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment to Chinese products upon China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Section 421 authorizes the President to impose safeguards—that is, temporary measures such as import surcharges or quotas—on Chinese goods if domestic market disruption is found. The statute implements a China-specific safeguard mechanism in China's WTO Accession Protocol that may be utilized by WTO members through December 2013. The provision is separate from Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, which allow WTO members to respond to injurious import surges but on a stricter basis than under the Protocol. A major difference is that the Protocol allows a safeguard to be applied only to Chinese products while the Safeguards Agreement requires that any safeguard be applied to a product regardless of its source.
China filed a WTO complaint against the United States in September 2009, claiming that the Section 421 tariffs violate U.S. GATT obligations to accord Chinese tires MFN tariff treatment and not to exceed negotiated tariff rates, that the United States imposed tariffs under the safeguard mechanism in China's Accession Protocol without first attempting to justify them under GATT and WTO safeguard provisions, and that Section 421 and its application in this case violate U.S. obligations under the Protocol. In a December 2010 report, the WTO panel rejected all of China's claims. China later appealed panel findings related to the Accession Protocol. The WTO Appellate Body upheld the panel, and thus U.S. actions under the Protocol, in a September 2011 report. The panel and Appellate Body reports were adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on October 5, 2011, ending the WTO dispute. |
crs_RL32229 | crs_RL32229_0 | Frequently Asked Questions
Contracting Authority and Eligibility
What Are the Statutory, Regulatory, and Other ControllingAuthorities for How Federal Government Contracts Are Awarded? In general, theauthority for awarding federal government contracts can be found in the United States Code (U.S.C. Primary authority for the awarding andadministration of Iraq reconstruction contracts has been transferred to the U.S.-led CoalitionProvisional Authority (CPA) http://www.cpa-iraq.org/ . It is anticipated that USAIDand the other federal agencies involved with Iraq's reconstruction will continue their roles in thecontracting process as a complement to CPA's efforts. For additional information on federal agencysolicitations, application procedures, and contact information, see CRS Report RS21546, IraqReconstruction Resources: Fact Sheet. The solicitation (Solicitation DACA63-03-R-0021, for theRepair and Continuity Operations of Iraq Oil Infrastructure) called for a total of two (2) contractsto be awarded, and that work under each of these two contracts could range from a minimum amountof $500,000 to not more than $500,000,000, during the life of the contracts. (30) The company confirmed this. Businesses Get Federal Government Contracts for Work in Iraq? Iraq reconstruction prime contractors areresponsible for choosing their own subcontractors. Both S. 2400 , the proposedDepartment of Defense FY2005 Authorization Bill for Military Construction and the Departmentof Energy, and S. 2401 , the proposed Department of Defense FY2005 AuthorizationBill, would require the Secretary of Defense to (1) submit to Congress a report detailing amanagement and oversight plan covering contractor personnel who are managed by federalgovernment personnel; and (2) submit to the House and Senate defense committees a report thatoutlines the rationale for and nature of the security, intelligence, law enforcement, and criminaljustice activities performed by contractors in Iraq. Themeasure was referred to the House Rules Committee. CRS Report RS21489 . CRS Report RL32079 . CRS Report RL31024 . | This report provides answers to frequently asked questions about contracts for thereconstruction and recovery in Iraq after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and questions aboutcontracts for providing support services to the U.S. military during and after OIF. The reportdescribes the governing authorities for federal government contracting policy in general, and Iraqicontracting policy in particular; the contracting process, issues, and challenges; the authority ofindividual federal agencies; contract awards and the identity of major prime contractors; the businessprocurement process, congressional oversight, and resources for additional information.
Due to the transfer of sovereignty on June 30, 2004, this report will not be updated again. For a more comprehensive discussion of Iraq, activities since the transfer of sovereignty, and overallIraqi reconstruction issues, see CRS Report RL31339 , Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts andPost-Saddam Governance , and CRS Report RL31833 , Iraq: Recent Developments in ReconstructionAssistance. For a fact sheet on the application of federal procurement statutes to contracts for thereconstruction of Iraq, refer to CRS Report RS21546, Iraq Reconstruction Resources: Fact Sheet. For a detailed discussion on the application of federal procurement statutes to reconstructioncontracts in Iraq, refer to CRS Report RS21555 , Iraq Reconstruction: Frequently Asked QuestionsConcerning the Application of Federal Procurement Statutes.
Key Policy Staff
Abbreviations:
FDT = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
KSG = Knowledge Services Group |
crs_RL33311 | crs_RL33311_0 | Current federal tax law allows self-employed individuals to deduct the entire amount they spend on health insurance for themselves and their spouses and dependents. This treatment is similar to the tax exclusion for employer contributions to the health plans of wage earners, with one noteworthy exception: employer contributions are exempt from payroll taxes (e.g., Medicare and Social Security taxes), but health insurance expenditures by the self-employed are not deemed a deductible business expense and thus are subject to the self-employment payroll tax. Several bills in the 111 th Congress would enable self-employed taxpayers to exclude those expenditures from the income base for the tax. This report examines the current tax treatment of these expenditures, the legislative history of the deduction, its effectiveness as a policy tool for improving access to health care for the self-employed, proposals in the 111 th Congress to alter the deduction, and the implications of the leading health care reform proposals in Congress for health insurance coverage among the self-employed. Current Law
Under Section 162(l) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), self-employed individuals are allowed to deduct the entire amount of their spending on health insurance for themselves and their immediate family members. Use of the deduction is subject to several limitations. First, the deduction may not exceed a self-employed taxpayer's net earned income from the trade or business in which the health plan was purchased, less the deductions for 50% of the self-employment tax and contributions to certain pension plans (e.g., Keogh plans or simplified employee pension plans for the self-employed). Second, the deduction may not be claimed for any month when a self-employed individual is eligible to participate in a health plan offered by an employer or a spouse's employer. Third, the expenditures used to compute the deduction may not also be included in the medical expenses eligible for the itemized deduction under IRC Section 213—though health insurance expenditures that cannot be deducted under IRC Section 162(l) may be included in these medical expenses. Finally, health insurance spending by self-employed individuals is not deemed an ordinary and necessary business expense, which means those expenditures must be added to the income base for the self-employment tax of 15.3%. On the other hand, the expenditures eligible for the deduction are subject to the self-employment tax, whereas employer contributions to employee health plans are exempt from payroll taxes. Legislation in the 111th Congress That Could Affect Health Insurance Coverage for the Self-Employed
Numerous bills to create new tax subsidies for the purchase of health insurance have been introduced in the 111 th Congress. At least five bills in the current Congress would modify the deduction to equalize the tax treatment of health insurance purchased by the self-employed and the tax treatment of health benefits obtained by wage earners through their employers. But the same provision in H.R. 533 , H.R. 1470 , H.R. 1763 , H.R. 3067 , and S. 725 would exempt these expenditures from the self-employment tax by allowing the self-employed to treat them as a deductible business expense. More specifically, it would make the following notable changes in the current health care system:
require all individuals to have health insurance or pay a penalty, create a health insurance exchange where individuals and smaller companies can purchase health insurance, provide subsidies for the purchase of health insurance for individuals and families with incomes at or below 400% of the federal poverty level, require employers to provide health insurance to all employees or pay into a health insurance exchange trust fund, offer exceptions to the employer mandate to certain small firms and provide a tax credit to small employers that do provide coverage, impose new regulations on health plans participating in the health insurance exchange and in the small-group health insurance market aimed at improving access to affordable health insurance, and expand Medicaid coverage to eligible households with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level. Policy Issues Related to the Deduction
The tax deduction for health insurance expenditures by the self-employed has several advantages. It is relatively simple for the IRS to administer and for self-employed individuals to claim. The deduction also establishes a substantial degree of parity between the tax treatment of health insurance purchased by the self-employed and the taxation of health benefits employees receive from their employers. | Federal tax law allows self-employed individuals to deduct from their gross income the entire amount they spend on health insurance for themselves and their spouses and dependents.
This report explains how these expenditures are treated under the federal tax code, reviews the legislative history of the deduction, assesses its effectiveness as a policy tool for expanding access to health care for the self-employed, describes proposals in the 111th Congress to modify the deduction, and discusses the implications of leading health care reform proposals in Congress for health insurance coverage among the self-employed.
Under Section 162(l) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), qualified self-employed individuals may deduct the entire amount of their payments for health insurance for themselves and immediate family members. Use of the deduction is governed by several rules. First, it may not exceed an eligible taxpayer's net earned income from the trade or business in which the health plan was established, less the deductions for 50% of the self-employment tax and contributions to certain pension plans. Second, the deduction may not be claimed for any period when a qualified individual is eligible to participate in a health plan offered by an employer or by a spouse's employer. Third, the expenditures used to claim the deduction cannot be included in the medical expenses eligible for the itemized deduction under IRC Section 213. Finally, health insurance expenditures by self-employed individuals are subject to the self-employment tax.
The tax deduction for health insurance expenditures by the self-employed has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it is relatively easy for the IRS to administer and for self-employed taxpayers to claim, and the deduction comes close to establishing parity between the tax treatment of health insurance for the self-employed and the taxation of employer contributions to employee health plans. On the other hand, the deduction delivers the largest tax benefit for the same insurance policy to those who arguably need it the least: self-employed individuals in the highest tax bracket. It also is uncapped, thus encouraging the purchase of generous plans.
Several bills in the 111th Congress (H.R. 533, H.R. 1470, H.R. 1763, H.R. 3067, and S. 275) would eliminate the final remaining obstacle to achieving equal tax treatment for the health insurance purchased by the self-employed and the health benefits employees receive through their employers. The obstacle lies in the difference between the income base for the payroll taxes paid by wage earners and the self-employment taxes paid by the self-employed: health insurance expenditures by the self-employed are subject to the self-employment tax, whereas employer contributions to employee health plans are not subject to the payroll tax. Each bill would allow the self-employed to deduct these expenditures as an ordinary and necessary business expense, thereby removing them from the income base for the self-employment tax.
Some of the health care reform legislation being considered in the House and Senate could affect health insurance coverage for the self-employed. Though it remains unclear whether either chamber will pass such a bill in the current Congress—and if so, what tax provisions it might contain—enough is known about the key issues in the congressional debate to sketch their implications for the self-employed. Proposals that would expand private health insurance coverage or simultaneously expand public and private coverage options (e.g., H.R. 3200) could lead to greater coverage among the self-employed through income-based tax subsidies for the purchase of insurance and an individual mandate. |
crs_R44849 | crs_R44849_0 | These workers are sometimes referred to as guest workers. The H-2A and H-2B programs are administered by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the Department of Labor (DOL). After receiving labor certification, a prospective H-2A or H-2B employer can submit an application, known as a petition, to DHS to bring in foreign workers. If the application is approved, foreign workers who are abroad can then go to a U.S. embassy or consulate to apply for an H-2A or H-2B nonimmigrant visa from the Department of State (DOS). If the visa application is approved, the worker is issued a visa that he or she can use to apply for admission to the United States at a port of entry. INA provisions on the admission of H-2A workers state that an H-2A petition cannot be approved unless the petitioner has applied to DOL for certification that
(1) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and who will be available at the time and at place needed, to perform the labor or services involved in the petition and
(2) the employment of the alien in such labor or services will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed. H-2B Nonagricultural Worker Visa
The H-2B visa provides for the temporary admission of foreign workers to the United States to perform temporary nonagricultural service or labor, if unemployed U.S. workers cannot be found. For FY2017, language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ) provides for the issuance of H-2B visas beyond the statutory cap under certain conditions (see " Legislative Activity "). Major guest worker reform legislation was last considered in the 113 th Congress. More recent guest worker bills have proposed changes to the existing H-2A and H-2B visas. Legislative action on guest worker programs in recent years has focused on the H-2B visa, specifically on the statutory cap and H-2B regulatory provisions. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ) included an H-2B returning worker provision, providing that a returning H-2B worker who had been counted against the 66,000 cap in FY2013, FY2014, or FY2015 would not be counted again in FY2016. Policy Considerations
Guest worker programs generally try to achieve two goals simultaneously: to be responsive to legitimate employer needs for temporary labor and to provide adequate protections for U.S. and foreign temporary workers. The balancing of broad guest worker program goals is reflected, in practice, in the particular provisions that H-2A and H-2B proposals include on a range of component policy considerations, such as program administration, the labor market test, and wages, among others. The H-2A visa is not numerically limited. More direct questions about legalization of unauthorized workers in the United States also arise in connection with guest worker programs. | Under current law, certain foreign workers, sometimes referred to as guest workers, may be admitted to the United States to perform temporary service or labor under two temporary worker visas: the H-2A visa for agricultural workers and the H-2B visa for nonagricultural workers. Both programs are administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Labor (DOL).
The H-2A and H-2B programs—and guest worker programs broadly—strive both to be responsive to legitimate employer needs for temporary labor and to provide adequate protections for U.S. and foreign temporary workers. There is much debate, however, about how to strike the appropriate balance between these goals.
Bringing workers into the United States under either the H-2A or H-2B program is a multiagency process involving DOL, DHS, and the Department of State (DOS). As an initial step in the process, a prospective H-2A or H-2B employer must apply for DOL labor certification to ensure that U.S. workers are not available for the jobs in question and that the hiring of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. After receiving labor certification, the employer can submit an application, known as a petition, to DHS to bring in foreign workers. If the application is approved, a foreign worker who is abroad can then go to a U.S. embassy or consulate to apply for an H-2A or H-2B nonimmigrant visa from DOS. If the visa application is approved, the worker is issued a visa that he or she can use to apply for admission to the United States at a port of entry.
Major guest worker reform legislation was last considered in the 113th Congress. Since then, guest worker bills typically have proposed to change particular aspects of the existing H-2A and H-2B visas.
Legislative action in recent years has focused on the H-2B visa, specifically the statutory numerical limitation on the visa and H-2B regulatory provisions. Regarding the H-2B numerical limitation, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) provided that a returning H-2B worker who had been counted against the statutory cap in FY2013, FY2014, or FY2015 would not be counted again in FY2016. This provision expired at the end of FY2016. For FY2017, related language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) provides for the issuance of H-2B visas beyond the statutory limit under certain conditions.
Guest worker proposals may contain provisions on a range of component policy issues. Key policy considerations for Congress include the labor market test to determine whether U.S. workers are available for the positions, required wages, and enforcement. The issue of unauthorized workers also arises in connection with guest worker programs. |
crs_R42070 | crs_R42070_0 | Introduction
The largest sources of federal funding for elementary and secondary education are the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB; P.L. 107-110 ), and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA; P.L. 108-446 ). Approximately 6 million students with disabilities receive special education under Part B of the IDEA. Both the ESEA and the IDEA affect the education of students with disabilities and aim to improve educational outcomes for these students. When the underlying concepts or legislative language of the ESEA and IDEA are not clearly aligned, it can be difficult for educators to plan and execute an appropriate education for students with disabilities. The purpose of this report is to highlight issues of alignment and possible misalignment between the two laws, to describe how statutory and regulatory language has sought to clarify these issues, and to draw attention to issues that Congress may want to clarify. This report is organized around four broad education policy issues that are relevant to both the ESEA and IDEA: standards, assessments, accountability, and teachers. Academic goals often focus on the content areas of reading and mathematics. Table 1 provides a comparison of select statutory and regulatory provisions of the ESEA and IDEA discussed above:
Alignment Issues
The education of students with disabilities is affected by both the academic content and achievement standards in the ESEA and individualized IEP goals in the IDEA. Under the ESEA, students with disabilities are required to participate in state assessments used within the federal accountability system. The IDEA, however, requires various assessments for students with disabilities that are not included in the ESEA. This issue may receive attention from Congress during the reauthorization of the ESEA. The IDEA "monitoring and enforcement" system was designed to assess whether states are meeting a series of academic and compliance indicators to determine whether the law is being implemented as intended. The subgroups are specified in statute as economically disadvantaged students, students with limited English proficiency (LEP), students with disabilities, and students in major racial and ethnic subgroups. Background
The ESEA includes a definition of "highly qualified" teacher as the term relates to teachers of elementary and secondary education. The IDEA also includes a definition of "highly qualified" teacher as the term relates to special education teachers of elementary and secondary education. Teachers who teach core academic subjects exclusively to students with the most significant cognitive disabilities, whether new or not new to the profession, have several options for meeting the "highly qualified" definition: (1) teachers may meet the "highly qualified" definition of the ESEA for any elementary, middle, or secondary teacher; (2) elementary teachers may meet the requirements by demonstrating competence on HOUSSE; and (3) middle and secondary school teachers may meet the requirements by demonstrating "subject matter knowledge appropriate to the level of instruction being provided, as determined by the State, needed to effectively teach to those standards" (i.e., alternate achievement standards). Because many students with disabilities spend the majority of their time in the regular education classroom, the ability of a regular education teacher to address the needs of students with disabilities may directly impact the learning of students with disabilities and their performance on state assessments. | The largest sources of federal funding for elementary and secondary education are the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB; P.L. 107-110), and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA; P.L. 108-446). The ESEA provides funding and services for a broad population of students, including disadvantaged students, migrant students, neglected and delinquent students, and students with limited English proficiency. Approximately 6 million students with disabilities ages 6 through 21 attend elementary and secondary schools; however, they are not afforded special services under the ESEA due to their disability status. The IDEA provides funding and services specifically for those students with disabilities. Both the ESEA and IDEA aim to improve the educational outcomes for students with disabilities. The ways in which they do this sometimes differ, and when the laws are not fully or clearly aligned it can be difficult for educators to plan and execute an appropriate education for students with disabilities.
In the 113th Congress, legislators have actively considered reauthorization of the ESEA. This report focuses on four broad policy issues within both the ESEA and IDEA, which potentially create differing expectations or requirements for schools and teachers educating students with disabilities:
Standards. Under the ESEA, students with disabilities are taught to state academic content standards that apply to all children in the state. Under the IDEA, academic goals are established for each child in an individualized education program (IEP). Assessments. Under the ESEA, students with disabilities participate in annual assessments that determine adequate yearly progress toward meeting expectations associated with state academic content and achievement standards. Under the IDEA, students with disabilities are assessed for identification purposes and for monitoring progress toward meeting goals articulated in their IEPs. Accountability. The ESEA accountability system primarily measures whether schools and local education agencies are making adequate yearly progress in reading and mathematics achievement. The "students with disabilities" subgroup is expected to make adequate yearly progress. The IDEA monitoring system measures whether states are meeting certain compliance and performance indicators to determine whether the law is being implemented as intended. Teachers. Both the ESEA and IDEA have requirements regarding "highly qualified" teachers. The ESEA includes a definition of "highly qualified" teacher as the term relates to teachers of elementary and secondary education. The IDEA also includes a definition of "highly qualified" teacher as the term relates to special education teachers of elementary and secondary education. Because students with disabilities spend the majority of time in the general education classroom, they are affected by both definitions.
This report highlights issues pertaining to alignment and misalignment among ESEA and IDEA provisions within these areas, describes how statutory and regulatory language has sought to clarify these issues, and discusses specific issues that Congress may consider during deliberations on the reauthorization of ESEA. |
crs_RL34276 | crs_RL34276_0 | On December 26, 2007, the President signed into law the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. 2764 / P.L. The measure also included $2.385 billion in emergency international affairs spending in addition to emergency funds for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Background
H.R. 2764 , the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Act for FY2008, was the vehicle used for the omnibus bill because it had been previously approved by both the House and Senate. The House passed the amended version on December 17, 2007. For more information on all the provisions of the Act, see CRS Report RL34278, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations for Global War on Terror Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes. Congressional leaders have stated that an additional supplemental measure could be considered in the spring of 2008. International Affairs Emergency Supplemental Request
On February 6, 2007, the Administration sent to Congress its regular FY2008 budget that included $35.1 billion for international affairs. At the same time, the President sent Congress an FY2008 emergency supplemental request of $3.301 billion for international affairs. On October 22, 2007, the Administration amended its supplemental request with $3.596 billion in additional spending. The total FY2008 emergency supplemental request for international affairs spending amounts to $6.897 billion. While the largest portion of the total request is for State Department operations and foreign assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan, it also includes sizeable requests for programs in Mexico, the West Bank and Gaza, North Korea, Sudan, and Pakistan. The Bush Administration has increasingly requested emergency supplemental funds for international affairs budgets. Some budget experts and others have criticized the Administration for relying too heavily on supplementals, and that some items, particularly relating to Iraq and Afghanistan, have become routine and should be incorporated into the regular appropriations cycle. The Administration counters that given the nature of rapidly changing overseas events and unforeseen emergencies, it is necessary to make emergency supplemental requests for what it claims are unexpected and non-recurring expenses. 110 - 161 ). Foreign Operations3
The Foreign Operations portion, totaling $3.678 billion, of the supplemental request was sent to Congress in two tranches. 480 food aid, was sent to Congress on October 22 nd . Supplemental funds approved by Congress include
$115 million for Global Health & Child Survival (no CSH funds were requested); $110 million for International Disaster Assistance ($80 million had been requested for activities in Iraq); $20.8 million for USAID Operating Expenses ($61.8 million was requested for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan); $542.6 million for Economic Support Fund ($2.2 billion had been requested for Iraq Afghanistan, the West Bank and Gaza, Pakistan, North Korea, and Sudan); $200 million for Migration and Refugee Assistance for Iraqi refugees and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and the West Bank and Gaza ($230 million was requested); $100 million for Foreign Military Financing (no FMF funds were requested); and $35 million for Peacekeeping Operations (no PKO funds were requested). Congress did not include this request in the FY2008 omnibus act. | Congress approved an FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764) during the week of December 17, 2007, that included some emergency supplemental funding for international affairs requested by the White House. The President signed the spending measure on December 26 (P.L. 110-161). The White House had submitted emergency supplemental requests to Congress for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and international affairs programs totaling $196.5 billion. The request was made in two installments—an estimate of additional expenses was sent to Congress with the FY2008 regular budget request in February 2007, and a second amended request was made on October 22, 2007. Of the total, $6.897 billion consisted of international affairs spending, relating to State Department operations and foreign assistance programs, and included $350 million in Agriculture Department food aid appropriations. This report analyzes the international affairs portion of the request and tracks related legislative activity.
On February 6, 2007, the Administration sent to Congress its regular FY2008 budget that included $35.1 billion for international affairs. At the same time, the President sent Congress a separate FY2008 emergency supplemental request of $3.301 billion for international affairs. On October 22, 2007, the Administration amended its supplemental request with $3.596 billion in additional spending. While the largest portion of the total request was for State Department operations and foreign assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan, it also included sizeable requests for programs in Mexico, the West Bank and Gaza, North Korea, Sudan, and Pakistan.
The Bush Administration has increasingly requested supplemental funds for international affairs budgets. Some budget experts and others have criticized the Administration for relying too heavily on supplementals, saying that many items have become routine, particularly relating to Iraq and Afghanistan, and should be incorporated into the regular appropriations cycle. The Administration counters that given the nature of rapidly changing overseas events and unforeseen emergencies, it is necessary to make supplemental requests for what it asserts are unexpected and non-recurring expenses.
Some congressional leaders have said that an additional supplemental bill may be considered later in 2008. In the meantime, nearly $2.4 billion in international affairs funding requested in the supplemental was included in an omnibus FY2008 appropriations bill. H.R. 2764, the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriation bill, was the vehicle used to accommodate 11 outstanding appropriations measures for both regular FY2008 and supplemental funding. The omnibus also included supplemental funding for military operations. For further information, see CRS Report RL34278, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations for Global War on Terror Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32473 | crs_RL32473_0 | Introduction
Omnibus appropriations acts have become a significant feature of the legislative process in recent years as Congress and the President have resorted more frequently to their use to bring action on the regular appropriations cycle to a close. Following a discussion of pertinent background information, this report reviews the recent use of such measures and briefly addresses several issues that their use raises. For nearly two centuries, regular appropriations bills were considered by the House and Senate as individual measures and enacted by the President as standalone laws. In 1950, the House and Senate undertook a one-time experiment in improving legislative efficiency by considering all of the regular appropriations acts for FY1951 in a single bill, the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950 (81 st Congress, P.L. The following year, the House and Senate returned to the practice of considering the regular appropriations acts individually. Omnibus Appropriations Acts: FY1986-FY2016
During the 31-year period covering FY1986-FY2016, 22 different omnibus measures were enacted for 19 different fiscal years. (Two separate omnibus appropriations acts were enacted for FY2001, FY2009, and FY2012. ) Each of the omnibus acts funded between two and 13 regular appropriations acts, on average funding almost eight (7.7) of them. Eighteen of the omnibus measures were bills or joint resolutions carrying the designation "omnibus," "consolidated," or "omnibus consolidated" appropriations in the title; seven were titled as continuing appropriations acts (FY1986, FY1987, FY1988, the first ones for FY2009 and FY2012, FY2013; and FY2015); and one was the VA-HUD Appropriations Act for FY2001, which also included the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for FY2001 (see Table 1 , and, at the end of the report, Table 3 ). During this period, a total of 390 regular appropriations acts were enacted or covered by full-year continuing appropriations. Of these, 191 (48.9%) were enacted as standalone measures, 158 (43.6%) were enacted in omnibus measures, and 29 (6.9%) were enacted in other forms (largely full-year continuing appropriations acts). Each year, a median of six regular appropriations acts were enacted as standalone measures, and 5.5 were enacted in omnibus measures. Prior Passage of Regular Appropriations Bills
One of the chief concerns regarding the use of omnibus appropriations acts is that it reduces the opportunities for Members to debate and amend the regular appropriations acts that are incorporated therein. | Omnibus appropriations acts have become a significant feature of the legislative process in recent years as Congress and the President have used them more frequently to bring action on the regular appropriations cycle to a close. Following a discussion of pertinent background information, this report reviews the recent enactment of such measures and briefly addresses several issues raised by their use.
For nearly two centuries, regular appropriations acts were considered by the House and Senate as individual measures and enacted as standalone laws. In 1950, the House and Senate undertook a one-time experiment in improving legislative efficiency by considering all of the regular appropriations acts for FY1951 in a single bill, the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950. The following year, the House and Senate returned to the practice of considering the regular appropriations acts individually.
During the 31-fiscal year period covering FY1986-FY2016, a total of 390 regular appropriations acts were enacted or covered by full-year continuing appropriations. Of these, 191 (48.9%) were enacted as standalone measures, 170 (43.6%) were enacted in omnibus measures, and 29 (6.9%) were enacted in other forms (largely full-year continuing appropriations acts). Each year, a median of six regular appropriations acts were enacted as standalone measures, and 5.5 were enacted in omnibus measures.
During this period, 22 different omnibus measures were enacted for 19 different fiscal years. (Two separate omnibus appropriations acts were enacted for FY2001, FY2009, and FY2012.) Each of the omnibus acts funded between two and 13 regular appropriations acts (7.5 median).
Eighteen of the omnibus measures were bills or joint resolutions carrying the designation "omnibus," "consolidated," or "omnibus consolidated" appropriations in the title; seven were titled as continuing appropriations acts (FY1986, FY1987, FY1988, FY2009, the first for FY2012, FY2013; and FY2015); and one was the VA-HUD Appropriations Act for FY2001, which also included the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for FY2001.
In addition to the customary concern—of sacrificing the opportunity for debate and amendment for greater legislative efficiency—that arises whenever complex legislation is considered under time constraints, the use of omnibus appropriations acts has generated controversy for other reasons. These include whether adequate consideration was given to regular appropriations acts prior to their incorporation into omnibus appropriations legislation, the use of across-the-board rescissions, and the inclusion of significant legislative (rather than funding) provisions.
This report will be updated at the conclusion of the annual appropriations process. |
crs_RS22635 | crs_RS22635_0 | Background
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a single-employer defined benefit pension plan may be terminated at the employer's discretion. However, the implementation of the decision to terminate a plan is a decision that implicates a fiduciary responsibility to the plan participants and beneficiaries. There are two basic issues in Beck regarding whether the defendant employer breached ERISA's fiduciary duty requirements. No section in ERISA explicitly provides that a standard termination may occur by merging the terminating plan with a multiemployer plan. They alleged that Crown had violated its fiduciary duty under ERISA by failing to adequately consider the merger proposal. Instead, the Supreme Court found that Crown did not breach its fiduciary duty in failing to consider PACE's merger proposal, because merger is not a permissible form of plan termination under ERISA. | The Beck v. PACE International Union case concerned the decision by an employer in bankruptcy proceedings to terminate its pension plans. The employer, which was both plan sponsor and administrator, had the option of terminating the plans by buying annuities for plan participants and beneficiaries or by merging the plans with a multiemployer plan. It chose the annuity option. At issue in Beck was whether the employer breached the fiduciary duty owed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to plan participants and beneficiaries by failing to adequately consider the merger proposal. The Supreme Court found that the employer did not breach its fiduciary duty in failing to consider PACE's merger proposal, because merger is not a permissible form of plan termination under ERISA. This report discusses the Beck case and will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL30352 | crs_RL30352_0 | Introduction1
Eight times since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution in 1973, Members of Congress have filed suit to force various Presidents to comply with its requirements or otherwise to recognize Congress's war powers under the Constitution. In each instance where a ruling was delivered, the reviewing court refused to render a decision on the merits. Most recently, 10 Members of Congress filed suit to enjoin U.S. military operations against Libya in the absence of a declaration of war, but the reviewing federal district court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds due to lack of standing. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution confers on Congress the power to "declare War," and Congress has enacted declarations eleven times in American history. Nonetheless, concern that Congress had allowed its war power to atrophy in the contexts of the Cold War and the wars in Korea and Vietnam led to the enactment in 1973, over President Nixon's veto, of the War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148 ). Accordingly, the WPR requires the President to consult with Congress "in every possible instance" prior to introducing U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities and to report to Congress within 48 hours when, absent a declaration of war, U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into "hostilities or ... situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." After this report is submitted (or after such date that it was required to be submitted), the WPR requires that U.S. troops be withdrawn at the end of 60 days (90 days in certain circumstances), unless Congress authorizes continued involvement by passing a declaration of war or some other specific authorization for continued U.S. involvement in hostilities. Several Presidents have viewed aspects of the War Powers Resolution as unconstitutionally trenching upon their constitutional authorities in matters of war and foreign relations. This report summarizes the eight suits that have been brought by Members of Congress since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution which have alleged presidential noncompliance with the Resolution or the requirements of the Constitution with respect to the involvement of U.S. Armed Forces in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Grenada; U.S. escort operations in the Persian Gulf; Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; NATO's actions against Yugoslavia, Iraq's noncompliance with its obligation to disarm; and U.S. military operations against Libya. He had not yet, however, sought or obtained congressional authorization for the use of force. NATO's Air War in Kosovo and Yugoslavia
In 1999, 26 Members of the House initiated a suit in the case of Campbell v. Clinton , asking for a declaratory judgment that U.S. participation in NATO's military actions against Yugoslavia in the Kosovo situation violated Congress's constitutional power to declare war or otherwise authorize military action and that the War Powers Resolution required the termination of U.S. participation "no later than sixty calendar days after March 24, 1999" (the date NATO began bombing Yugoslavia), unless Congress authorized continued U.S. involvement. The appellate court did, however, reach the merits of the issue on the plaintiffs' other claim; namely, that the discretionary authority to use force conferred on the President by the October authorization unconstitutionally delegated Congress's power to declare war. These circumstances, the court concluded, did not warrant judicial intervention. Thus, the case continues not to be fit for judicial review." The plaintiffs also requested the issuance of a judicial order enjoining further military operations against Libya absent a declaration of war. The courts have variously relied on the political question doctrine, the equitable/remedial discretion doctrine, ripeness, mootness, and congressional standing. | Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution confers on Congress the power to "declare War." Modern Presidents, however, have contended that, notwithstanding this clause, they do not need congressional authorization to use force. Partly in response to that contention, and because of widespread concern that Congress had allowed its war power to atrophy in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, Congress in 1973 enacted the War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148). Among other things, the WPR generally requires the President to report to Congress within 48 hours when, absent a declaration of war, U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into "hostilities or ... situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." After a report is submitted or required to be submitted, the WPR requires that the forces be withdrawn within 60 days (90 days in specified circumstances) unless Congress declares war or otherwise authorizes their continued involvement.
Nonetheless, subsequent Presidents have continued to maintain that they have sufficient authority independent of Congress to initiate the use of military force, and several Presidents have viewed aspects of the WPR as unconstitutionally infringing upon their Commander-in-Chief authority. Congress has on four occasions enacted authorizations specifically waiving the 60-90 day limitation on the use of force otherwise imposed by the WPR. But on eight occasions Members of Congress have filed suit to force various Presidents to comply with WPR requirements or otherwise to recognize Congress's war powers under the Constitution. In seven of the eight cases where final rulings were issued, the courts have found reasons not to render a decision on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. In one case, involving the President's authority to pursue military action against Iraq following congressional authorization, the court ruled on the merits of the plaintiffs' claim concerning the constitutionality of this authorization, but dismissed all other claims on jurisdictional grounds. The courts have variously found the political question doctrine, the equitable/remedial discretion doctrine, the issue of ripeness, and the question of congressional standing to preclude judicial resolution of the matter. Although the courts have not ruled out the possibility that a conflict over the use of force between Congress and the President could require a judicial resolution, they have thus far deemed the matter to be one for the political branches to resolve.
On June 15, 2011, 10 Members of Congress brought suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. military operations against Libya violated Congress's constitutional power to declare war, and also requested a judicial order enjoining further operations against Libya absent a declaration of war. The reviewing federal district court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds due to lack of standing.
This report summarizes the eight cases initiated by Members of Congress in which final rulings were reached, which concerned U.S. military activities in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Grenada; military action taken during the Persian Gulf conflict between Iraq and Iran; U.S. activities in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (prior to the congressional authorization); U.S. participation in NATO's action in Kosovo and Yugoslavia; and U.S. military action in Libya. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R41404 | crs_R41404_0 | R ecent unauthorized disclosures to the press concerning activities in the White House, and the publication of large quantities of classified information by WikiLeaks and other organizations and news outlets, has prompted congressional interest in criminal prohibitions on disclosure of classified information. While President Trump and certain media outlets have described certain White House leaks as "criminal" and "illegal , " there is no single statute that criminalizes any unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Instead, criminal prohibitions on unauthorized disclosure of classified information are based on a complex and often overlapping set of statutes with provisions that differ depending on, among other factors, what material was leaked, to whom it was given, and the intent of the discloser. Historically, the criminal statutes prohibiting the disclosure of protected information have been used almost exclusively to prosecute (1) individuals with access to classified information (and a corresponding obligation to protect it) who make it available to foreign agents and (2) foreign agents who obtain classified information unlawfully while present in the United States. These prosecutions and the related proceedings that have been filed against members of the press who receive leaked information implicate unique constitutional considerations concerning the scope of First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. And the term "classified information" is limited to information that was classified "for reasons of national security[.]" Other Relevant Statutes
In addition to the Espionage Act and its UCMJ counterparts, other criminal prohibitions in the U.S. Code have been or potentially could be utilized to prosecute the disclosure of classified information. Legal Proceedings Involving the Press or Other Recipients of Unlawful Disclosures
While courts have held that the Espionage Act and other relevant statutes allow for convictions for leaks to the press, the government has never prosecuted a traditional news organization for its receipt of classified or other protected information. | Recent unauthorized disclosures of information concerning activities in the White House, and the publication of large quantities of classified information by WikiLeaks and other organizations and news outlets, have prompted congressional interest in criminal prohibitions on disclosure of classified information. While some have described recent leaks of classified information as "illegal" and "criminal," there is no single statute that criminalizes any unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Instead, the legal framework is based on a complex and often overlapping set of statutes with provisions that differ depending on, among other factors, what information was disclosed, to whom it was given, and the intentions of the discloser. This report identifies statutory prohibitions that may be implicated by the unauthorized release of classified information, and it examines the elements necessary to secure a conviction under the Espionage Act and applicable statutes.
Historically, the Espionage Act and other relevant statutes have been used almost exclusively to prosecute (1) individuals with access to classified information (and a corresponding obligation to protect it) who make it available to foreign agents, and (2) foreign agents who obtain classified information unlawfully while present in the United States. While prosecutions appear to be on the rise, disclosures of classified information to the press have been punished as crimes less frequently, and the government has never prosecuted a traditional news organization for publishing classified information that it received as a result of a leak.
This report examines prosecutions of individuals who leak information to the press or policy organizations, such as lobbying groups and think tanks, as well as civil and criminal actions that have been brought against the recipients of leaked information—often the press. Because these cases implicate unique First Amendment concerns regarding freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the constitutional framework relevant to prosecutions and other legal proceedings filed as a result of leaked classified information is also analyzed in this report.
Lastly, this report provides a summary of previous legislative efforts to criminalize the unauthorized disclosure of classified information and to address potential gaps or ambiguities in current statutes. |
crs_RL32701 | crs_RL32701_0 | The United States, the third-largest population globally, accounts for about 4.5% of the world's population. The U.S. populationâestimated in the 2010 Census at 308.7 million persons âhas more than doubled from its 1950 level of 152.3 million. More than just being double in size, the U.S. population has become qualitatively different from what it was in 1950. As noted by the Population Reference Bureau, "The U.S. is getting bigger, older, and more diverse." The objective of this report is to highlight some of the demographic changes that have already occurred since 1950 and to illustrate how these and future trends will reshape the nation in the decades to come. While this report will not discuss policy options, it is important to recognize that the inexorable demographic momentum will produce an increasingly older population in the United States. There is ample reason to believe that the United States will be able to cope with the current and projected changes if policymakers address and adapt to the changing demographic profile as it relates to a number of essential domains such as work, retirement, and pensions, private wealth and income security, transfer systems, and the health and well-being of the aging population. These topics are discussed briefly in the final section of this report. Net Immigration
Immigration has been an important component of population growth in the United States. The Changing Age ProfileâThe United States Is Getting Older
Aside from its total size, one of the most important demographic characteristics of a population for public policy is its age and sex structure. Since 1950, the United States has been in the midst of a profound demographic change: rapid population aging, a phenomenon that is replacing the earlier "young" age-sex structure with that of an older population. Race and EthnicityâThe United States Is Becoming More Diverse
The U.S. population is becoming more racially and ethnically diverse. First , immigration has been a major influence on both the size and the age structure of the U.S. population. Changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the population will also have profound effects on the health and healthcare needs of the population. | The United States, the third most populous country globally, accounts for about 4.5% of the world's population. The U.S. populationâcurrently estimated at 308.7 million personsâhas more than doubled since its 1950 level of 152.3 million. More than just being double in size, the population has become qualitatively different from what it was in 1950. As noted by the Population Reference Bureau, "The U.S. is getting bigger, older, and more diverse." The objective of this report is to highlight some of the demographic changes that have already occurred since 1950 and to illustrate how these and future trends will reshape the nation in the decades to come (through 2050).
The United States Is Getting Bigger. U.S. population growth is due to the trends over time in the interplay of increased births, decreased deaths, and increased net immigration.
The United States Is Getting Older. Aside from the total size, one of the most important demographic characteristics of a population for public policy is its age and sex structure. This report illustrates how the United States has been in the midst of a profound demographic change: the rapid aging of its population, as reflected by an increasing proportion of persons aged 65 and older, and an increasing median age in the population.
The United States Is Becoming More Racially and Ethnically Diverse , reflecting the major influence that immigration has had on both the size and the age structure of the U.S. population. This section considers the changing profile of the five major racial groups in the United States. In addition, trends in the changing ethnic composition of the Hispanic or Latino Origin population are discussed.
Although this report will not specifically discuss policy options to address the changing demographic profile, it is important to recognize that the inexorable demographic momentum will have important implications for the economic and social forces that will shape future societal well-being. There is ample reason to believe that the United States will be able to cope with the current and projected demographic changes if policymakers accelerate efforts to address and adapt to the changing population profile as it relates to a number of essential domains, such as work, retirement, and pensions; private wealth and income security; the federal budget and inter-generational equity; health, healthcare, and health spending; and the health and well-being of the aging population. These topics, among others, are discussed briefly in the final section of this report. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R43637 | crs_R43637_0 | Introduction
Following the death of a worker beneficiary or other insured worker, Social Security makes a lump-sum death benefit payment of $255 to the eligible surviving spouse or, if there is no spouse, to eligible surviving dependent children. In 2016, such payments were made for about 782,300 deaths, for a total of about $204 million in benefit payments. 74-271), but the program did include a lump-sum benefit that would be paid if a worker died before the retirement age of 65. When made, the payment equaled six times the primary insurance amount (PIA). The benefit was therefore paid in nearly every death of a Social Security-insured worker. 83-761) kept the formula of three times the PIA but capped the benefit at $255, which was approximately three times the maximum PIA payable under Social Security in 1952. Current Eligibility Rules
If a surviving spouse is living with the worker at the time of death, the benefit is paid to the spouse. If the worker and the spouse were living apart, the spouse could still receive the lump-sum death payment if the spouse was already receiving benefits based on the worker's record or became eligible for survivors benefits upon the worker's death. The real value of the lump-sum death benefit has declined significantly since it was introduced. The share of the total lump-sum death benefit to total Social Security benefits (indexed to wages) have declined faster than the real value of the lump-sum death benefit (indexed to prices), mainly because Social Security benefits are linked to national wage levels, which are increasing faster than price levels. Proposals to Change or Eliminate the Lump-Sum Death Benefit
Over the years, various proposals would have changed or eliminated the death benefit. Some proposals would have increased the benefit. None of these proposals have been enacted into law. | When a Social Security-insured worker dies, the surviving spouse who was living with the deceased is entitled to a one-time lump-sum death benefit of $255. If they were living apart, the surviving spouse can still receive the lump sum under certain conditions. If there is no such spouse, the payment can be made to a child who meets certain requirements. In the majority of deaths, however, no payment is made.
The lump-sum death benefit was once an important part of Social Security benefits to survivors. Between 1937 and 1939, the lump-sum was the only benefit available to survivors of insured workers who died before 65 years old, and before 1952, the $255 amount was greater than three times the maximum monthly benefits payable under Social Security. However, because the lump-sum death benefit has been capped at $255 for the past eight decades, inflation has eroded its value. At the same time, the real value of other Social Security benefits has increased. The total payment on lump-sum death benefits in 2016 was about $204 million, less than 0.03% of total Social Security (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance) benefit payments.
The erosion of the value of the lump-sum death benefit has brought about various proposals to change it, including some recent congressional proposals that would have increased the benefit amount. Several presidential budget proposals have also proposed changes, ranging from eliminating the provision to changing eligibility rules. None of these proposals were enacted into law. |
crs_RL31305 | crs_RL31305_0 | 4546 ), and the Presidentsigned the bill into law on December 2 ( P.L. 107-314 ). Earlier, on October 10, the House, and onOctober 16, the Senate, approved a conference agreement on the FY2003 defense appropriationsbill ( H.R. 5010 ), and the President signed it into law on October 23 ( P.L. The most contentious issue was whether to permitconcurrent receipt of military retired pay and veterans disability benefits. The Houseauthorization bill included a provision to phase in partial concurrent receipt. The White House Statement of Administration Policy on theSenate bill threatened to veto any bill that includes either partial or full concurrentreceipt. The conference agreement on the defense authorization bill provides abenefit payment only to military retirees with a disability determined to be caused bya combat or combat-related injury. Theconference report on the defense appropriations bill does not provide any of themoney, and the appropriations committees did not take up separate legislation toprovide additional funding for the war on terrorism. A number of significant personnel related issues emerged, however. The dispute over concurrent receipt held up a conference agreement on the defense authorization bill until after the November elections. On November 12,during the 107th Congress's lame duck session, authorizers announced a compromiseon the issue that provides a new benefit for retirees who are determined to have adisability caused by a combat or combat-related injury. Subsequent to House and Senate action on the defense authorization bill, however, the issue was resolved in a fashion acceptable to the Administration. The conference agreement on H.R. 4775 , providing supplemental appropriations for FY2002, includes legislative language directing the Army to enterinto a follow-on contract immediately to develop and field a next generation non-lineof sight cannon artillery system by 2008. Other Army Weapons Programs. Thecommittee distributed the savings to a number of other missile defense programs. The authorization conference report also prohibits the use of FY2003 funds for development of a nuclear-armed interceptor for missile defense - the Senate versionof the bill had flatly prohibited development. The authorization conference report includes a revised version of the House provision regarding the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Defense Appropriations
P.L. 107-248 , H.R. P.L. 107-249 , H.R. 107-206 , H.R. Five other appropriations bills also provide fundsfor national defense activities of DOD and other agencies including:
the military construction appropriations bill, which finances construction of military facilities and construction and operation of military familyhousing, all administered by DOD;
the energy and water development appropriations bill, which funds atomic energy defense activities administered by the Department ofEnergy;
the VA-HUD-independent agencies appropriations bill, which finances civil defense activities administered by the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency, activities of the Selective Service System, and DOD support for NationalScience Foundation Antarctic research;
the Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill, which funds national security-related activities of the FBI, the Department of Justice, and someother agencies; and
the transportation appropriations bill, which funds some defense-related activities of the Coast Guard. The Administration requested the $10 billion asan unallocated contingency fund for costs of counter-terrorism operations in FY2003,but several members of the Armed Services Committees both in the House and in theSenate have said they would prefer using that money to increase spending on majorweapons programs, especially shipbuilding. | Congress has completed action on the FY2003 defense authorization ( H.R. 4546 ) and defense appropriations ( H.R. 5010 ) bills. The President signed the FY2003 defenseappropriations act into law on October 23 ( P.L. 107-248 ), and he signed the FY2003 defenseauthorization act into law on December 2 ( P.L. 107-314 ). In addition, Congress has approved, andthe President has signed, the military construction appropriations bill ( H.R. 5011 , P.L.107-249 ). The House and Senate Appropriations Committees did not, however, take up bills toprovide $10 billion that the Administration requested as a contingency fund for costs ofcounter-terrorism operations in FY2003.
The conference agreement on the defense appropriations bill establishes final funding levels for key defense programs, and it resolves a number of matters that were at issue during the year. Asthe Administration requested, the bill eliminates funds for development of the Crusader artillerysystem and instead provides increased funding for other Army indirect fire programs. Confereesadded funds to develop an alternative tube artillery system to be deployed by 2008. Earlier, theconference report on the FY2002 supplemental appropriations bill ( H.R. 4775 , P.L.107-206 ) directed the Army to enter into a follow-on contract to use Crusader technology indeveloping such a system.
Conferees on the defense authorization bill reached agreement on several contentious issues, though some may recur next year. The key issue, which held up the conference agreement until afterthe mid-term elections, was whether to permit concurrent receipt of military retired pay and veteran'sdisability benefits. The Senate authorization bill included a provision to allow immediate, fullconcurrent receipt, while the House bill phased in a program to allow concurrent receipt for thosewith 60% or greater disabilities. The White House threatened to veto a bill that included eitherprovision. The conference agreement provides a new benefit, paid by the Defense Department, tomilitary retirees who have a disability determined to be caused by a combat or combat-related injury.
The conference agreement on the defense authorization also resolved a number of other issues. The agreement includes amended versions of Senate provisions tightening oversight of missiledefense programs; it drops a House provision concerning application of the Endangered Species Actto defense facilities, but includes a provision concerning the Migratory Bird Treaty Act; it prohibitsFY2003 funds from being used to develop nuclear armed interceptors for missile defense; it providesfunds for developing a nuclear-earth penetrator warhead, but only after the Defense Departmentsubmits a report on the project that includes a review of non-nuclear alternatives; and it drops aSenate provision permitting service members to have access to abortions at military facilitiesoverseas.
Key Policy Staff |
crs_R43388 | crs_R43388_0 | Introduction
The Buy America Act is the popular name for a group of domestic content restrictions that have been attached to funds administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT). These funds are used to make grants to states, localities, and other non-federal government entities for various transportation projects. The Buy American Act, another statute requiring domestic content preferences in federal government procurement, does not apply to these funds because, while the source of the money is federal, purchases are not made directly by the federal government. Generally, these statutes require applicable agency grant programs and spending to be used to fund projects that only include steel, iron, and/or manufactured products produced in the United States. Each provision includes a series of circumstances under which the agency may issue a nationwide or project-specific waiver to these domestic content requirements. Such exemptions could be based upon a finding that application of the domestic content requirement is not in the public interest, the needed materials are not produced in sufficient quantity and/or quality in the United States, or the cost of using domestic materials is unreasonable, among others. | The Buy America Act is the popular name for a group of domestic content restrictions that have been attached to funds administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT). These funds are used to make grants to states, localities, and other non-federal government entities for various transportation projects. Specific sources of funding administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) are covered under various Buy America provisions. Generally, these statutes require applicable agency grant programs and spending to be used to fund projects that only include steel, iron, and/or manufactured products produced in the United States. Each provision includes a series of circumstances under which the agency may issue a nationwide or project-specific waiver to these domestic content requirements. Such exemptions may be based upon a finding that application of the domestic content requirement is not in the public interest, the needed materials are not produced in sufficient quantity and/or quality in the United States, or the cost of using domestic materials is unreasonable, among others.
The Buy American Act, another statute requiring domestic content preferences in federal government procurement, does not apply to DOT-administered grant funds because, while the source of the money is federal, purchases are not made directly by the federal government. For more information on the Buy American Act and other domestic preference requirements, see CRS Report R43354, Domestic Content Restrictions: The Buy American Act and Complementary Provisions of Federal Law, by [author name scrubbed] et al. |
crs_RL31336 | crs_RL31336_0 | Introduction
The Older Americans Act (OAA) is the major vehicle for the delivery of social and nutrition services for older persons. Originally enacted in 1965, the act supports a wide range of social services and programs for older persons. 109-365 reauthorized all programs under the act through FY2011. Table 3 shows the appropriations history for the act's programs for FY1999-FY2006. In addition, the law added a requirement that the Assistant Secretary award funds for competitive grants to states for development and implementation of elder justice activities. Among these are demonstration model projects to help older people "age in place," including in Naturally Occurring Retirement Communities (NORCs); and to develop systems for the delivery of mental health screening and treatment services for older people who lack access to such services. 109-365 revised the Title V community service employment program to place more emphasis on training eligible older individuals; however, it maintained the program focus on employing older people in community service jobs. The law also required the Secretary of Labor to conduct a national competition for Title V funds every four years. P.L. (The law also authorized a new grant program as part of Title VII of the act, discussed below.) 109-365 explicitly expanded AoA's role in promoting home and community-based long-term care services. Under the provision in P.L. Title III. Grants for State and Community Programs on Aging
Title III authorizes grants to state and area agencies on aging to act as advocates on behalf of, and to coordinate programs for, older persons. It accounted for 70% of total OAA funds in FY2006 ($1.24 billion out of $1.78 billion). States receive separate allotments of funds for supportive services and centers, family caregiver support, congregate nutrition services, home-delivered nutrition services, nutrition services incentive grants, and disease prevention and health promotion services. The law added requirements that states and area agencies target services and programs on older people at risk for institutional care and older people with limited English proficiency. The assessment may include:
an analysis of how demographic changes may affect older individuals, including those with low incomes, those with greatest economic need, minority older individuals, those residing in rural areas, and those with limited English proficiency; an analysis of how the programs, policies, and services provided by states and area agencies can be improved, and how resource levels can be adjusted to meet the needs of the changing population of older individuals in the state; and an analysis of how the change in the number of persons age 85 years and older is expected to affect the need for supportive services. Thus, the law now requires that states (1) receive funds based on their relative share of the U.S. population age 60 and over; (2) receive no less than one-half of 1% of the total appropriation; and (3) receive no less than the amount they received for FY2006 (the FY2006 "hold harmless") plus a phased-out guaranteed growth factor—that is, for FY2007, 20% of the percentage increase in appropriation amounts for the respective programs over the FY2006 amounts; for FY2008, 15%; for FY2009, 10%, and for FY2010, 5%. 109-365 added authority for the Assistant Secretary on Aging to conduct several new demonstration programs under Title IV. It is the only Older Americans Act program that focuses solely on the needs of institutionalized persons. 109-365 Amendments to Title VII
Elder Justice Grants
P.L. Appropriations amounts for previous years are available in CRS Report RL32437, Older Americans Act: History of Appropriations, FY1966-FY2004 , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). For information on FY2007 appropriations, see CRS Report RL33880, Older Americans Act (OAA) Funding , by [author name scrubbed]. Figure 1 shows the distribution of FY2006 funding by program. | The Older Americans Act (OAA) is the major vehicle for the delivery of social and nutrition services for older persons. Originally enacted in 1965, the act supports a wide range of social services and programs for older persons. Authorization of appropriations expired at the end of FY2005. The Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006 (P.L. 109-365) reauthorized all programs under the act through FY2011.
The major program under the act, Title III—Grants for State and Community Programs on Aging—authorizes grants to 56 state and 655 area agencies on aging to act as advocates on behalf of, and to coordinate programs for, older persons. Title III accounted for 70% of the act's total FY2006 appropriations ($1.24 billion out of $1.78 billion). States receive separate allotments of funds for supportive services and centers, family caregiver support, congregate and home-delivered nutrition services, the nutrition services incentive grant program, and disease prevention and health promotion services. Title V—Community Service Senior Opportunities Act—is the only federally subsidized employment program for low-income older persons. It represented almost one-quarter of the act's total funding in FY2006 ($432.3 million).
P.L. 109-365 added requirements that state and area agencies on aging focus programs and services on specific groups of older people, including those at risk for institutional care and those with limited English proficiency. The law also added requirements that the Administration on Aging (AoA) and state and area agencies focus efforts on the promotion of home and community-based long-term care services for older people to prevent or delay the need for institutional care. The law also revised the formula for distribution of Title III grants to require that states receive at least as much as they received in FY2006 (a 2006 "hold harmless" level), and to gradually eliminate a "guaranteed growth" provision.
The new law added responsibility for AoA to develop and implement systems for elder justice and to conduct an elder abuse national incidence study. It also added authority for competitive grants to states for elder justice activities under Title VII. In addition, the law authorized the Assistant Secretary on Aging to conduct several new research and demonstration programs, including model projects to assist older people "age in place"(including in Naturally Occurring Retirement Communities, or NORCs); and to develop systems for mental health screening and treatment for older people. P.L. 109-365 maintained the Title V program focus on employing older people in community service jobs, but it also revised the program to place more emphasis on training eligible older individuals. The new law required the Secretary of Labor to conduct a national competition for Title V funds every four years.
For FY2006, the act's programs received $1.78 billion, a 2% decrease from the FY2005 level. Figure 1 shows the distribution of FY2006 funding by program. Table 3 shows the appropriations history for OAA programs for FY1999-FY2006. For appropriations amounts for FY1966-FY2004, see CRS Report RL32437, Older Americans Act: History of Appropriations, FY1966-FY2004, by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). For FY2007 appropriations and the FY2008 budget request, see CRS Report RL33880, Older Americans Act (OAA) Funding, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45067 | crs_R45067_0 | T he Children's Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) program provides direct financial support to children's hospitals—those that treat primarily patients below the age of 18—to train medical residents and fellows. The program is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and is authorized in Section 340E of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). CHGME receives annual discretionary appropriations, which are authorized through FY2023. Because the Medicare program is used primarily by people who are over the age of 65, and children's hospitals treat primarily people below the age of 18, children's hospitals have low Medicare patient volume and receive few Medicare GME payments. Prior to the program's inception, advocates argued that the lack of direct federal support for GME in children's hospitals impeded the development of the pediatric workforce because children's hospitals, rather than general hospitals, are more likely to have the patient volume necessary to train pediatric subspecialists. Since the CHGME program began, the size of the pediatric subspecialty workforce has increased. HRSA data show that the program provided financial support to more than 7,100 medical residents and fellows in the 2015-2016 academic year (the last year of final data available). Finally, the program was most recently reauthorized from FY2019 through FY2023 in 2018 in the Dr. Benjy Frances Brooks Children's Hospital GME Support Reauthorization Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-241 ), which increased the amount of funding authorized and extended the period of the program's authorization of appropriations to FY2023. The law reauthorizes the program appropriations through FY2023 and increases the amount authorized to $325 million, allocating $105 million for Direct Graduate Medical Education Payments (DGME) and $220 million for Indirect Graduate Medical Education Payments (IME). In FY2017, the most recent year of final data available, the program supported training at 58 free-standing children's hospitals located in 29 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Other Sources of GME Funding for Children's Hospitals
CHGME funds are one source of medical residency training support at children's hospitals. Concluding Observations
Appropriations for the CHGME program were reauthorized in 2018 through the end of FY2023. Though the reauthorization did not include substantive changes, policy changes to the program have been included in various policy proposals that would consolidate GME support (e.g., " FY2019 President's Budget Request "). | The Children's Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) program provides direct financial support to children's hospitals to train medical residents and fellows. The program is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and is authorized in Section 340E of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). CHGME receives annual discretionary appropriations, and its funding has increased in recent years. The program was funded at $315 million in FY2018 and will receive $325 million in FY2019.
Hospitals typically receive support for graduate medical education (GME) through Medicare, and those payments are provided to hospitals based on their Medicare patient volume. Because the Medicare program is used primarily by people who are over the age of 65, and children's hospitals treat primarily people below the age of 18, children's hospitals have low Medicare patient volume and receive few Medicare GME payments.
Prior to the CHGME program, advocates argued that the lack of direct federal support for GME in children's hospitals impeded the development of the pediatric workforce. Program proponents argued that children's hospitals, rather than general hospitals, are more likely to have the patient volume necessary to train pediatric subspecialists. Since the program was created in 1999, the size of the pediatric subspecialty workforce has increased. The CHGME program supports the training of nearly half of general pediatricians and more than half of all pediatric subspecialists. In the most recent year for which final training data are available (academic year 2016-2017), the program provided financial support to more than 7,100 medical residents and fellows. In FY2017, the program supported training at 58 free-standing children's hospitals located in 29 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
The program's appropriations were reauthorized in 2018 by P.L. 115-241, the Dr. Benjy Frances Brooks Children's Hospital GME Support Reauthorization Act of 2018, which extended the program's authorizations of appropriations until FY2023 and increased the amount authorized to $325 million. Under prior law, the program's authorization had been set to expire at the end of FY2018 and the amount authorized had been $300 million. The reauthorization did not include substantive changes to the program. The President's budget for FY2019 proposed to eliminate funding for this program; instead, it proposed that CHGME funds be combined with other sources of GME support, which would require new legislation. |
crs_R44720 | crs_R44720_0 | Introduction
The 21st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ) was signed into law on December 13, 2016, by President Barack Obama. On November 30, 2016, the House passed the House amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 34 , the 21st Century Cures Act, on a vote of 392 to 26. The bill was then sent to the Senate where it was considered and passed, with only minor technical modification, on December 7, 2016, on a vote of 94 to 5. The law consists of three divisions:
Division A—21st Century Cures Act; Division B—Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis; and Division C—Increasing Choice, Access, and Quality in Health Care for Americans. CRS has published a series of reports on this law, one on each Division. This is the report for Division A of the law. Division A of the law provides funding for biomedical research—including the Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI) and the Cancer Moonshot Initiative—and for the opioid crisis response; modifies Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pathways for the approval of regulated medical products; and makes a number of reforms to the National Institutes of Health (NIH). As noted, both the House and the Senate considered previous legislation to support medical innovation, primarily through reforms to the NIH and changes to the drug, biologic and device approval pathways at the FDA. This report provides a brief summary of each provision of the 21 st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255 ), by title, subtitle, and section. The Division includes five titles, as follows: (1) Innovation projects and state responses to opioid abuse; (2) Discovery; (3) Development; (4) Delivery; and (5) Savings. Subtitle E- Advancement of the National Institutes of Health Research and Data Access
Sections 2051. Title III-Development47
Subtitle A-Patient Focused Drug Development
The Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA; P.L. However, the FDA's authority to require postmarket studies of medical devices is limited. Title IV- Delivery
Sections 4001 through 4008 of Title IV address the federal policies to promote the adoption and use of EHR technology. In addition, MACs develop and implement local coverage determinations (LCD) for their jurisdictions. Title V-Savings
Section 5001. Amendment to the Prevention and Public Health Fund
Section 4002 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. | The 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255) was signed into law on December 13, 2016, by President Barack Obama. On November 30, 2016, the House passed the House amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 34, the 21st Century Cures Act, on a vote of 392 to 26. The bill was then sent to the Senate where it was considered and passed, with only minor technical modification, on December 7, 2016, on a vote of 94 to 5.
The law consists of three divisions:
Division A—21st Century Cures Act; Division B—Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis; and Division C—Increasing Choice, Access, and Quality in Health Care for Americans.
CRS has published a series of reports on this law, one on each Division. This is the report for Division A of the law.
This report provides a brief summary of each provision of the 21st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255), by title, subtitle, and section. The Division includes five titles, as follows: (1) Innovation projects and state responses to opioid abuse; (2) Discovery; (3) Development; (4) Delivery; and (5) Savings.
Title I provides funding for biomedical research, including the Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI) and the Cancer Moonshot Initiative, for the opioid crisis response, and for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to support certain new activities authorized by the law.
Title II, consisting of seven subtitles, requires or authorizes a number of activities to support biomedical research, including the reauthorization of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the reform of that agency through numerous administrative, reporting, and data access provisions. The Title includes provisions that support young investigators funded by NIH; pediatric research; collaborative research such as research on neurological disease; and precision medicine efforts, and specifically the PMI.
Title III, consisting of ten subtitles, focuses on modifying the drug and device approval pathways at the FDA to support innovation, and specifically includes provisions that support patient-focused drug development and streamlined and clarified pathways to approval for drugs, combination products, antimicrobials, Orphan drugs, drugs for rare disease, and regenerative therapies. This Title also contains provisions making modifications to the medical device approval pathway and reforms to the FDA's hiring process. Finally, it addresses FDA's regulation of medical countermeasure and vaccine development.
Title IV focuses on health care delivery, and includes provisions that together address the federal policies to promote the adoption and use of electronic health record (EHR) technology, as well as a handful of Medicare delivery provisions addressing telehealth services in Medicare, site-of-service price transparency for certain Medicare services, Local Coverage Determinations (LCDs) under Medicare, and a technology and pharmaceutical ombudsman for Medicare.
Title V provides savings for the Division, and includes Medicare and Medicaid savings; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) savings, including Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF) and territory funding; and savings from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) drawdown. |
crs_RL31501 | crs_RL31501_0 | The history of child labor in the American workplace can be divided, roughly, into four periods. The regulation of child labor generally began at the state level. Although the measure was in reality child labor legislation, it was hoped that it might secure Court approval. Child Labor Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
The FLSA, as amended, protects children by setting conditions under which they may be employed and, in certain types of work, prohibiting their employment altogether. The law and regulations include differences with respect to age and the types of work that children and teenagers may perform. Re-emergence of the Child Labor Issue (1982-2000)
By the late 1940s, exploitation and endangerment of young children in the world-of-work was popularly believed to have been resolved through legislation (the FLSA) and through the administrative discretion of the Secretary of Labor in implementing the FLSA. 2342 would raise the minimum age to be employed in agricultural occupations to 16, the same as in nonagricultural occupations. "In the case of a minor who is between the ages of 16 and 18 years, the employment is not in an occupation that is particularly hazardous for the employment of children between those ages or detrimental to their health or well-being.... " "The minor is employed in accordance with this Act and in accordance with any other Federal, State, or local law that provides greater protection to minors." —The Secretary of Labor will prescribe a unified model for such work permits that will contain information concerning the identity of the child worker and his/her parent (or a similar person where appropriate), contact information and parental consent for the child to work, school status, identification of employer, type of work to be engaged in, name and contact information of the designated state agency, summary of age limitations and other legal requirements for employment of minors, among other information. Further legislation was not then proposed. A Question of Public Policy
Work in or around sawmills and wood-working machinery has been deemed by DOL as especially hazardous for persons under 18 years of age. Taking the Issue to Congress
At least since the 105 th Congress, legislation to amend federal child labor law on behalf of the Amish has been repeatedly introduced, both in the House and in the Senate. | The history of child labor in America is long and, in some cases, unsavory. It dates back to the founding of the United States. Historically, except for the privileged few, most children worked—either for their parents or for an outside employer. Through the years, however, child labor practices have changed. So have the benefits and risks associated with employment of children. In some respects, altered workplace technology has served to make work easier and less hazardous. At the same time, some processes and equipment have rendered the workplace more advanced and dangerous, especially for children and youth.
Child labor first became a federal legislative issue at least as far back as 1906 with the introduction of the Beveridge proposal for regulation of the types of work in which children might be engaged. Although the 1906 legislation was not adopted, it led to extended study of the conditions under which children were employed or allowed to work and to a series of legislative proposals—some approved, others defeated or overturned by the courts—culminating in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938. The latter statute, amended periodically, remains the primary federal law dealing with the employment of children.
Generally speaking, work by young persons (under 18 years of age) in mines and factories is not allowed. The types of nonfarm work that may be suitable (or especially hazardous) for persons under 18 years of age has been left mainly to the discretion of the Secretary of Labor. Some types of work—for example, some newspaper sales and delivery, theatrical (and related) employment—are exempt from the FLSA child labor requirements. Finally, a distinction has been made between employment in nonagricultural occupations and in agricultural occupations and, in the latter case, between work for a parent and commercial employment.
This report examines the historical issue of child labor in America and summarizes legislation that has been introduced from the 108th Congress to the 113th Congress. |
crs_RL34088 | crs_RL34088_0 | In addition to their jobs, workers have obligations—civic, familial, and personal—to fulfill that sometimes require them to be absent from the workplace (e.g., to serve on a jury, retrieve a sick child from day care, or attend a funeral). The U.S. government generally has allowed individual businesses to decide whether to accommodate the nonwork activities of employees by granting them leave (with or without pay) rather than firing them. In other countries, national governments or the international organizations to which they belong more often have developed social policies that entitle individuals to take time off from the workplace for a variety of reasons. Policies specifically intended to reconcile the work and family lives of individuals—which include leave benefits, child-care subsidies, and flexible work arrangements—have garnered increased attention in the 30-member Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In the United States, which is an OECD member, congressional interest has coalesced around family-friendly paid leave proposals. They would entitle individuals to time off with pay to accomplish parental and caregiving obligations (e.g., bonding with a newborn or newly placed adopted child or assisting a seriously ill spouse). Women are regarded as the chief beneficiaries of these proposals because
women are the typical informal (unpaid) caregivers to family and friends, and a majority of women are in the workforce, with both husbands and wives employed in about one-half of married-couple families. One is an employer mandate (e.g., H.R. 2460 / S. 1152 ); the other, a temporary disability insurance program (e.g., H.R. 1723 ). In addition, the Obama Administration's FY2011 budget for the Labor Department includes a request for $50 million to help states plan and set up paid family leave programs. This report begins by reviewing U.S. government regulation of time off from work for any purpose. It then examines the incidence of paid leave benefits voluntarily provided by U.S. firms. Access to paid leave by various employee and employer characteristics also is analyzed. Estimates from a government survey of the direct cost to U.S. businesses of the different types of leave offered are presented as well. Indirect employer costs that might arise in connection with some types of leave more than others, such as the greater likelihood of hiring and training temporary replacements for employees absent because of maternity versus bereavement reasons, are not included. Neither are estimates of potential gains to companies (e.g., a more stable and experienced workforce, and increased productivity due to greater worker morale) and society (e.g., improved public health, lower formal caregiving costs, and broader participation in civic affairs). They also do not require employers to offer employees time off to care for sick family members. According to the latest data available from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), benefits account for 30% of the total compensation (wages and benefits) of employees in the civilian economy. Incidence by Employee and Employer Characteristics
In the Private Sector
More than three-fourths of employees at firms in the private sector are provided paid vacations and holidays, making these the most widely available leave benefits. | In addition to their jobs, workers have obligations—civic, familial, and personal—to fulfill that sometimes require them to be absent from the workplace (e.g., to serve on a jury, retrieve a sick child from day care, or attend a funeral). The U.S. government generally has allowed individual employers to decide whether to accommodate the nonwork activities of employees by granting them leave, with or without pay, rather than firing them. In other countries, national governments or the international organizations to which they belong more often have developed social policies that entitle individuals to time off from the workplace (oftentimes paid) for a variety of reasons (e.g., maternity and vacations).
Public policies specifically intended to reconcile the work and family lives of individuals—which include leave benefits, child-care subsidies, and flexible work arrangements—have garnered increased attention among countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In the United States, which is an OECD member, congressional interest has coalesced around family-friendly paid leave proposals (e.g., H.R. 2460/S. 1152 and H.R. 1723). Typically, they would entitle workers to time off with pay to accomplish parental and caregiving obligations to help women in particular balance work and family responsibilities because they are the typical unpaid family caregiver and most women work for pay, with both spouses employed in about one-half of married-couple families.
Currently, there are few federal statutes that pertain directly or indirectly to employer provision of leave benefits for any purpose. This report begins by reviewing those policies, including the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programs, which five states have established to compensate for lost wages while workers are recovering from nonoccupational illnesses and injuries, are discussed as well. So too are the California and New Jersey family leave insurance programs, which essentially extend the TDI programs of the two states to employees caring for family members. The Obama Administration has requested $50 million as part of the Labor Department's FY2011 budget for grants to states to help them plan and set up paid family leave programs.
The report then examines the incidence of different types of paid leave that U.S. employers voluntarily provide as part of an employee's total compensation. For example, vacations and holidays are the most commonly offered leave benefits: more than three-fourths of employees in the private sector receive paid time off for these reasons. Access to leave by various employee and employer characteristics also is analyzed. Particular attention is focused on paid sick leave, which was offered to 61% of private sector employees in June 2009, according to the latest data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The report closes with results from a federal government survey of the average direct cost to businesses of different types of leave. Indirect employer costs that might arise in connection with some types of leave more than others (e.g., the greater likelihood of hiring and training temporary replacements for employees absent because of maternity versus bereavement reasons) are not included. Neither are estimates of potential gains to employers (e.g., a more stable, experienced workforce) and society (e.g., improved public health and broader participation in civic affairs). |
crs_R44909 | crs_R44909_0 | Introduction
The federal bureaucracy of the present day is the product of more than two centuries of legislative and administrative actions by successive generations of elected and appointed officials. As such, the diverse organizations and processes of the federal government are a consequence of the influence and decisions of thousands of officials with differing viewpoints about the role of government and diverse policy preferences. The federal bureaucracy's organizational arrangements are also reflective of ongoing competition between Congress and the President to influence the behavior of agencies. With its size, complexity, and idiosyncratic history, the federal bureaucracy is sometimes perceived as immutable. Notwithstanding this perception, federal organizational structures and processes are under continual congressional and administrative study and alteration in response to changing contexts and priorities. It involves more than just structural rearrangement of organizational units and personnel, and it can occur within agencies as well as among two or more agencies. Government reorganizations can also entail changes in interagency processes or the distribution of resources and functions among agencies. The government organizations that are the focus of this report are those that exercise significant federal legal authority. Primary constitutional responsibility for the structural organization of the executive branch of the federal government, as well as the creation of the principal components of that branch, rests with Congress. Moreover, Congress has long sought to promote efficiency, transparency, accountability, public participation, and economy in the operations of the executive departments, agencies, and other governmental entities through specifications of both government-wide and agency-specific processes. Key tools that Congress uses to shape the contours of the federal government include authorizing legislation, appropriations legislation, and oversight. The President has often played a leadership role in reorganization of the executive branch by transmitting proposals and advocating legislative action in public statements and private negotiations. Presidents and their appointed agency heads also have a variety of administrative tools at their disposal for making smaller-scale structural and procedural organizational changes. This report begins with discussions of some tools available to Congress, the President, and agency leaders for initiation and implementation of executive branch reorganization. It then discusses interagency coordinative mechanisms that are sometimes used by each of these actors to bridge interorganizational gaps. The report concludes with general observations regarding federal reorganization efforts. This provision states,
The President of the United States is authorized to designate and empower the head of any department or agency in the executive branch, or any official thereof who is required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform without approval, ratification, or other action by the President (1) any function which is vested in the President by law, or (2) any function which such officer is required or authorized by law to perform only with or subject to the approval, ratification, or other action of the President: Provided, That nothing contained herein shall relieve the President of his responsibility in office for the acts of any such head or other official designated by him to perform such functions. Each of the three major governing actors discussed in this report—Congress, the President, and agency heads—has tried to bridge the interagency (and, sometimes, intra-agency) divide by establishing interagency coordinative mechanisms of one kind or another. Interagency coordinative mechanisms are often used in an effort to establish cooperation among agencies with shared missions, similar functions, or overlapping jurisdiction. Some arrangements provide for collaboration among equals, while others designate a lead agency with authority to direct activities. | The federal bureaucracy of the present day is the product of more than two centuries of legislative and administrative actions by successive generations of elected and appointed officials. As such, the diverse organizations and processes of the federal government are a consequence of the influence and decisions of thousands of officials with differing viewpoints about the role of government and diverse policy preferences. The federal bureaucracy's organizational arrangements are also reflective of ongoing competition between Congress and the President to influence the behavior of agencies. With its size, complexity, and idiosyncratic history, the federal bureaucracy is sometimes perceived as immutable. Notwithstanding this perception, federal organizational structures and processes are under continual congressional and administrative study and alteration in response to changing contexts and priorities.
The term reorganization may be defined to encompass the intended alterations in the purpose, functions, procedures, assignments, and relationships within and among organizations. It involves more than just structural rearrangement of organizational units and personnel, and it can occur within agencies as well as among two or more agencies. Government reorganizations can also entail changes in interagency processes or the distribution of resources and functions among agencies. The government organizations that are the focus of this report are those that exercise significant federal legal authority.
Primary constitutional responsibility for the structural organization of the executive branch of the federal government, as well as the creation of the principal components of that branch, rests with Congress. Congress also has delimited the operations of the executive departments, agencies, and other governmental entities through specifications of both government-wide and agency-specific processes. Key tools that Congress uses to shape the contours of the federal government include authorizing legislation, appropriations legislation, and oversight.
The President has often played a leadership role in reorganization of the executive branch by transmitting proposals and advocating legislative action in public statements and private negotiations. Presidents and their appointed agency heads also have a variety of administrative tools at their disposal for making structural and procedural organizational changes that are not in conflict with statutes.
In addition to the tools just mentioned, each of the three major governing actors discussed in this report—Congress, the President, and agency heads—has tried to address the challenge of coordination across organizational boundaries by establishing interagency coordinative mechanisms of one kind or another. These are often used in an effort to establish cooperation among agencies with shared missions, similar functions, or overlapping jurisdiction. Some arrangements provide for collaboration among equals, while others designate a lead agency with authority to direct activities.
This report discusses some tools available to Congress, the President, and agency leaders, respectively, for initiation and implementation of executive branch reorganization. It also discusses the interagency coordinative mechanisms that are sometimes used by each of these actors to bridge interorganizational gaps. The report concludes with general observations regarding federal reorganization efforts. |
crs_R41958 | crs_R41958_0 | The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter, the "Dodd-Frank Act," P.L. 111-203 , July 21, 2010) is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified 330 provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act that require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation. The Unified Agenda
One way for Congress to identify upcoming Dodd-Frank Act rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (hereafter, Unified Agenda), which is published twice each year (usually in the spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration, for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date (sometimes just the projected month and year) for the next regulatory action. Each entry also contains an element indicating the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act). This Report
The July 7, 2011, edition of the Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan is the second edition that RISC has compiled and issued after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. This report examines the July 7, 2011, edition of the Unified Agenda and identifies upcoming proposed and final rules that agencies expect to issue pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act in the next 12 months, as well as long-term actions. The results of the searches for proposed and final rules are provided in the Appendix to this report. None of the 72 rules that were listed in the "final rule" section of the Unified Agenda were included in the regulatory plan. | Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agencies for a variety of reasons, and in a variety of ways. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203, July 21, 2010; hereafter the "Dodd-Frank Act") is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified more than 300 provisions in the act that require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation.
One way for Congress to identify upcoming Dodd-Frank Act rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, which is published twice each year (usually in the spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The Unified Agenda lists upcoming activities, by agency, in five separate categories or stages of the rulemaking process: the prerule stage, the proposed rule stage, the final rule stage, long-term actions, and completed actions. All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date for the next regulatory action. Each entry also contains an element indicating the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act).
This report examines the most recent edition of the Unified Agenda, which was published on July 7, 2011 (the second edition that RISC compiled and issued since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act). This report identifies upcoming proposed and final rules listed in the July 7, 2011, edition of the Unified Agenda that agencies expect to issue pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act. (A previous CRS report identified the rulemaking actions that were listed in the December 2010 version of the Unified Agenda.) The Appendix lists these upcoming proposed and final rules in a table. The report also briefly discusses the long-term actions listed in the Unified Agenda, as well as some options for congressional oversight over the Dodd-Frank Act rules. |
crs_R41491 | crs_R41491_0 | The "internal procedure" problems that GMAC Mortgage referenced have become popularly characterized as "robo-signing"—the practice of having a small number of individuals sign a large number of affidavits and other legal documents submitted to courts and other public authorities by mortgage companies to execute foreclosures. Several employees and individuals with power-of-attorney signing authority for major servicers, including GMAC Mortgage, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo, have been deposed as part of foreclosure contests. Some of these depositions raised concerns as to whether individuals who claimed in sworn affidavits to have personal knowledge of facts necessary to legally foreclose on a property actually had that knowledge; assignments and sales of interests in mortgages were properly executed; legal documents were properly notarized in accordance with state law; and, as a result, mortgage companies had met the necessary requisites to foreclose on certain properties. In other words, they do not believe anyone has been wrongfully foreclosed upon or evicted, but that some of the paperwork that must be filed to complete a foreclosure in certain states may not have been properly reviewed or notarized by their employees. In actuality, these procedural defects have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the foreclosure process in both judicial and nonjudicial states and create a cloud over the legal title of homes and, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, could result in judicial sanctions, civil penalties, and even criminal prosecutions. It is unclear whether or not the procedural problems masked substantive problems, such as a failure to transfer interests in a mortgage properly, thus calling into question true ownership of mortgages, in certain instances. Even if substantive problems do exist, it may be possible to rectify deficiencies in many, if not the vast majority, of cases to allow for the completion of a foreclosure. Correcting these problems would come at a cost by potentially causing significant delays in the completion of the foreclosure process, even for properties in which foreclosure is inevitable. This report seeks to shed light on some of these uncertainties by explaining the mortgage market process and some of the legal agreements entered into between market participants; explaining the legal procedures of typical judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure statutes; explaining some of the procedural problems that have surfaced during the implementation of foreclosure proceedings that drove some mortgage servicers to pause foreclosure sales and evictions; analyzing how the increasing complexity of the secondary mortgage market over the last 10 to 15 years may have led to or exacerbated these procedural problems; and addressing some of the potential substantive errors that could have been hidden by the procedural problems and the legal effect these problems could have on homeowners, lenders, and other mortgage market participants. | During the summer of 2010, several employees and individuals with power-of-attorney signing authority for major servicers, including GMAC Mortgage, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo, were deposed as part of foreclosure contests. These depositions raised concerns about what has been characterized as "robo-signing"—the practice of having a small number of individuals sign a large number of affidavits and other legal documents submitted to courts and other public authorities by mortgage companies to execute foreclosures. As a result of these depositions, many have questioned whether individuals who claimed in sworn affidavits to have personal knowledge of facts necessary to legally foreclose on a property actually had that knowledge; whether assignments and sales of interests in mortgages were properly executed; whether legal documents were properly notarized in accordance with state law; and, as a result, whether mortgage companies had met the necessary requisites to legally foreclose on certain properties. In response, several major mortgage servicers temporarily halted foreclosure sales to review their internal foreclosure procedures.
These procedural defects have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the foreclosure process and could result in judicial sanctions, civil penalties, and even criminal prosecutions. The servicers in question do not believe they have wrongfully foreclosed upon or evicted anyone, but that some of the paperwork that must be filed to complete a foreclosure in certain states may not have been properly reviewed or notarized by their employees. Whether or not homes have been wrongfully foreclosed upon is unknown at this time. It also is unclear whether or not the procedural problems masked substantive problems, such as a failure to properly transfer interests in a mortgage, thus calling into question true ownership of mortgages, in certain instances. Even if substantive problems do exist, it may be possible to rectify deficiencies in many, if not the vast majority, of cases to allow for the completion of a foreclosure. Correcting these problems would come at a cost by potentially causing significant delays in the completion of the foreclosure process.
This report seeks to shed light on some of these issues by explaining the mortgage market process and some of the legal agreements entered into between market participants; explaining the legal procedures of typical judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure statutes; explaining some of the procedural problems that have surfaced during the implementation of foreclosure proceedings that drove some mortgage servicers to briefly halt foreclosure sales and evictions; analyzing how the increasing complexity of the secondary mortgage market over the last 10 to 15 years may have led to or exacerbated these procedural problems; and addressing some of the potential substantive errors that could have been hidden by the procedural problems and the legal effect these problems could have on homeowners, lenders, and other mortgage market participants. |
crs_RL33292 | crs_RL33292_0 | Introduction
On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a jointstatement that announced the creation of a "global partnership," which would include "full" civilnuclear cooperation between the United States and India. This is at odds with nearly three decadesof U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice. President Bush committed to persuading Congress toamend the pertinent laws to approve the agreement, as well as persuading U.S. allies to create anexception to multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines for India to allow for nuclearcooperation. India committed to separating its civilian from its military nuclear facilities, declaringcivilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEAsafeguards, and signing an Additional Protocol, which provides enhanced access and informationfor IAEA inspectors. P.L. 109-401 , the law that provides the executive branch withauthority to waive restrictions under the Atomic Energy Act with respect to India, requires thePresident to determine that the following actions had occurred:
India has provided the United States and the IAEA with a credible plan toseparate civil and military facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration regardingits civil facilities with the IAEA;
India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required prior to signatureby the parties of an agreement requiring the application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordancewith IAEA standards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors DocumentGOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials and programs as declared in the plan,including materials used in or produced through the use of India's civil nuclearfacilities;
India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward concluding anAdditional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that would apply toIndia's civil nuclear program;
India is working actively with the United States for the early conclusion of amultilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile materials for use in nuclearweapons;
India is working with and supporting U.S. and international efforts to preventthe spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology to any state that does not already possessfull-scale functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants;
India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear and other sensitivematerials and technology through the application of comprehensive export control legislation andregulations, and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines; and
the NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear itemscovered by the guidelines of the NSG. (12)
This report provides background on India's nuclear fuel cycle, a discussion of various issuesinvolved in separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and potential concerns for Congress asit considers whether the United States has adequate assurances that its nuclear cooperation does notassist, encourage, or induce India's nuclear weapons development, production, or proliferation. Two pressurized water reactors under construction by the Russians atKudankulam will be under IAEA safeguards also. Spent Fuel Reprocessing. Heavy Water Production. (41)
The Separation Plan
On March 2, 2006, during President Bush's visit to India, U.S. and Indianofficials agreed upon a final separation plan. (49)
The Administration has defended the separation plan most recently ascredible and defensible in this way:
For [the separation plan] to be credibleand defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint, it had to capture more than justa token number of Indian nuclear facilities, which it did by encompassing nearlytwo-thirds of India's current and planned thermal power reactors as well as all futurecivil thermal and breeder reactors. Other Facilities. Issues for Congress
U.S. officials acknowledge the importance of a credible Indian separationplan for ensuring that the United States complies with its Article I obligations underthe Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) -- to not in any way assist a nuclearweapons program in a non-nuclear weapon state. For almost thirty years, the U.S.legal standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activities in a stateprovides adequate assurances. The Administration has sought, and Congress hasprovided, backing for a lower level of assurance by proposing that the separation plantake the place of comprehensive safeguards. | On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announcedthe creation of a "global partnership," which would include "full" civil nuclear cooperation betweenthe United States and India. This is at odds with nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policyand practice. President Bush promised India he would persuade Congress to amend the pertinentlaws to approve the agreement, as well as persuade U.S. allies to create an exception to multilateralNuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines for India. India committed to, among other things,separating its civilian nuclear facilities from its military nuclear facilities, declaring civilian facilitiesto the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards, andsigning an Additional Protocol. See CRS Report RL33016 , U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India:Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed], for further details on the agreement.
The separation plan announced by Prime Minister Singh and President Bush on March 2,2006, and further elaborated on May 11, 2006, would place 8 power reactors under inspection,bringing the total up to 14 out of a possible 22 under inspection. Several fuel fabrication and spentfuel storage facilities were declared, as well as 3 heavy water plants that were described as"safeguards-irrelevant." The plan excludes from international inspection 8 indigenous powerreactors, enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except as currently safeguarded), militaryproduction reactors and other military nuclear plants and 3 heavy water plants. Administrationofficials have defended the separation plan as credible and defensible because it covers more thanjust a token number of Indian facilities, provides for safeguards in perpetuity, and includes upstreamand downstream facilities.
U.S. officials acknowledge the importance of a credible separation plan to ensuring that theUnited States complies with its Article I obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT) -- to not in any way assist a nuclear weapons program in a non-nuclear weapon state. Foralmost 30 years, the U.S. legal standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activitiesin a state provides adequate assurances. The Administration is apparently asking Congress to backa lower level of assurance by proposing that the separation plan take the place of comprehensivesafeguards.
Congress is likely to consider this issue as well as others when the Administration eventuallysubmits its cooperation agreement with India for approval by both chambers. P.L. 109-401 , signedon December 18, 2006, provides waivers for a nuclear cooperation agreement with India fromrelevant Atomic Energy Act provisions, and requires detailed information on the separation plan andresultant safeguards. This report, which will be updated as necessary, provides background onIndia's nuclear fuel cycle, a discussion of various issues involved in separating civilian and militarynuclear facilities and potential concerns for Congress as it considers whether the United States hasadequate assurances that its nuclear cooperation does not assist, encourage, or induce India's nuclearweapons development, production, or proliferation. |
crs_R41285 | crs_R41285_0 | In 1891, Congress authorized the President to reserve existing public forestlands to protect and preserve the lands and resources. Acceptable levels and locations of various uses are determined with public involvement in a land management planning process. Congress has also designated specific national forest areas to emphasize particular resources or values. Congress continues to consider legislation to designate specific national forest areas for particular purposes. For example, the Omnibus Public Lands Management Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-11 ) designated 20 new national forest wilderness areas, added lands to 20 existing national forest wilderness areas, designated at least nine wild and scenic rivers through national forests, designated two new national scenic areas and one new national recreation area in national forests, and designated seven other areas in national forests with special management provisions. Congress expanded theses goals in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA). As part of its special area designations for some NFS lands, Congress has established two systems of special management areas, with general guidance that applies to all such designated areas: the National Wilderness Preservation System and the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System. Specifically, the act states:
Except as specifically provided for in this Act, and subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this Act and, except as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of this Act (including measures required in emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the area), there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no structure or installation within any such area. These areas differ from the two standardized systems (wilderness and wild and scenic river corridors) in having neither general authorizing legislation for the type of designation nor general management direction for all such areas. The common provisions can be grouped into administrative provisions and resource management provisions. Findings. Purpose. Management Plan. Many SMA statutes provide for an advisory committee or group for the designated area. Withdrawal. Many of the statutes also explicitly allow hunting and fishing, and sometimes trapping, consistent with state law. Inholder Access. Authorization of Appropriations. Less Common Resource Management Provisions
In addition to administrative provisions, several of the statutes designating SMAs have included additional provisions governing natural resource management within the SMA. Motorized Access. Wildfire, Insect, and Disease Control. Some SMA statutes explicitly allow activities to control fires, insects, and diseases. Livestock Grazing. Military Overflights. Water Use/Water Rights. Individual Congressionally Designated Areas in the National Forest System
This appendix lists the 97 specially designated individual areas, grouped into six major types of designations: national monuments; recreation areas; scenic areas; game refuges; protection areas; and other. §505(b)—has no effect on state responsibility and authority for fish and wildlife. §10—authorizes appropriations. §6—authorizes land acquisition. §7—directs management "in accordance with the laws, rules, and regulations applicable to the national forests, for public outdoor recreation in a manner compatible with the following objectives": "(1) the maintenance and protection of the free-flowing nature of the rivers"; "(2) conservation of the scenic, wilderness, cultural, scientific, and other values contributing to the public benefit"; "(3) preservation ... of all features and peculiarities believed to be biologically unique including, but not limited to, rare and endemic plant species, rare combinations of aquatic, terrestrial, and atmospheric habitats, and the rare combinations of outstanding and diverse ecosystems and parts of ecosystems associated therewith"; "(4) protection and maintenance of fish and wildlife habitat"; "(5) protection of archeological and paleontological sites and interpretation of these sites for the public benefit and knowledge insofar as it is compatible with protection"; "(6) preservation and restoration of historic sites associated with and typifying the economic and social history of the region and the American West; and" "(7) such management, utilization, and disposal of natural resources ... including, but not limited to, timber harvesting by selective cutting, mining, and grazing and the continuation of such existing uses and developments as are compatible with the provisions of this Act." §4(c)—requires "an overall management plan," in consultation with state and local governments and interested persons. 11. 26. (c)—prohibits buffer zones. (5)—withdraws the areas from public land, mining, and mineral leasing laws, subject to valid existing rights. 37 . Has no effect on state jurisdiction or responsibilities. | In 1891, Congress authorized the President to reserve public forests to protect the lands and resources. The many presidential proclamations and subsequent land purchases have led to the current National Forest System. These lands are managed to balance the many purposes and values through an interdisciplinary planning process, with public involvement, under the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 and the National Forest Management Act of 1976.
Congress has also designated many specific national forest areas to emphasize particular values or resources, and continues to consider legislation to designate additional specially managed areas within the national forests. Congress has established two land management systems for which statutory guidelines generally apply to all areas in the system. The National Wilderness Preservation System has many units, with general management guidelines: no permanent roads or structures; no commercial enterprises; and no motorized or mechanical access. However, the 1964 Wilderness Act that created the Wilderness System and many subsequent wilderness statutes have also included numerous exceptions to these standards for specific areas. The other system is the Wild and Scenic Rivers System, with general management direction for the corridors identified along designated rivers.
In addition, Congress has designated at least 96 individual areas within the National Forest System, and continues to consider more such designations. The Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, for example, designated 10 individual special areas among its many provisions. While many of the designations are unique, the areas can generally be grouped into six categories: national monuments (5, plus one administrative designation); recreation areas (26); scenic areas (11); game refuges (6); protection areas (37); and other (11).
While the statutes designating these 96 areas differ, many provisions are found in multiple statutes. Common administrative provisions include findings of the importance and uniqueness of the area; purposes for administration of the area; designation of the area, often with references to maps and boundaries; applicable law, with most making the provisions supplemental to the management guidance for national forests generally; a management plan for the area; an advisory committee for the area or the plan; authorization of land acquisition; and withdrawal of the area from the public land laws. Less common administrative provisions include requiring regulations for the area; explicitly allowing inholder access; prohibiting buffer zones around the area; retaining most state and local governance provisions; and authorizing appropriations.
There are also three common resource management provisions in the many statutes designating special areas: withdrawal of the area from mining and mineral leasing laws, subject to valid existing rights; timber harvesting restrictions, often with exemptions for fire, insect, or disease control; and fish and wildlife management, generally preserving state responsibilities and jurisdiction, allowing fishing and hunting, and authorizing area or period closures for various purposes, in consultation with state officials. Less common resource management provisions include limitations on motorized access; authority for fire, insect, and disease control actions; permission to continue livestock grazing; authority for low-level military overflights; and directions on water use and water rights. |
crs_R40096 | crs_R40096_0 | On October 17, 2006, EPA published its revisions to the NAAQS for particulate matter (PM) to provide protection against potential health effects associated with short- and long-term exposure to particulates (including chronic respiratory disease and premature mortality). The standard for slightly larger, but still inhalable, particles less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM 10 ) established in 1987 was not similarly changed. Promulgation of NAAQS sets in motion a process under which the states and EPA first identify geographic nonattainment areas, those areas failing to meet the NAAQS based on monitoring and analysis of relevant air quality data. States then have three years from the date of EPA's final designations to submit nonattainment area State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which identify specific regulations and emission control requirements that will bring an area into compliance. The publication of final designations—and thus the effective date of the final designations—had been delayed since January 2009 pending review by the incoming Administration. The January 2013 revisions changed the existing (2006) annual health-based ("primary") standard for "fine" particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter (or PM 2.5 ), lowering the allowable average concentration of PM 2.5 in the air from the current level of 15 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m 3 ) to a limit of 12 µg/m 3 . EPA did not require new nonattainment designations for PM 10 based on the 2006 revisions to the standard. EPA's November 2009 final designations, which were based on air quality monitoring data for calendar years 2006 through 2008, do not include counties violating the annual standard, as the level is unchanged from the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. Comparing the 2006 and 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS Designations
EPA's final designations for nonattainment of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS (those areas with or contributing to air quality levels exceeding the annual and 24-hour standards or both) included all or part of 204 counties in 20 states and the District of Columbia. Based on the final designations for the 2006 24-hour PM 2.5 NAAQS, 38 counties would be designated nonattainment for PM 2.5 for the first time but the majority of the counties identified overlap with EPA's final nonattainment designations for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. Most of the 1997 PM 2.5 nonattainment areas were only exceeding the annual standard; only 12 counties were exceeding both the 24-hour and the annual standards. Thus, tightening the 24-hour standard resulted in an increased number of areas (82 counties) being designated nonattainment based on exceedances of both the 24-hour and the annual standard. Conclusions
The designation of geographical areas unable to meet the NAAQS is a critical step in NAAQS implementation, and historically has been an issue of concern and debate among EPA, states and tribes, various stakeholders, and some Members of Congress. Although EPA and states continue the implementation of the 2006 revised PM 2.5 standards, the EPA recently completed the next round of periodic review of the particulates NAAQS, and on January 15, 2013, EPA published a final rule further revising the PM 2.5 standards. Comparison of EPA's Final and Interim Nonattainment Designation Areas for the 2006 24-Hour PM 2.5 NAAQS and the Final Nonattainment Designation Areas for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS
Appendix C. Tribal Lands: U.S. EPA Designations for the 2006 PM 2.5 NAAQS 24-Hour Standard
Appendix D. Map Depicting Counties in Nonattainment for the 2006 24-Hour PM 2.5 NAAQS: EPA's Designation as of December 22, 2008
On December 22, 2008, EPA had identified 58 areas in 25 states, comprising 211 counties (154 counties and portions of 57 additional counties) for designation as nonattainment for the revised 2006 24-hour PM 2.5 standard. | The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published revisions to the Clean Air Act (CAA) National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for particulate matter (particulates, or PM) on October 17, 2006. EPA's actions leading up to and following promulgation of the 2006 standard have been the subject of considerable congressional oversight. EPA and states' ongoing implementation of the standard, beginning with the designation of those geographical areas not in compliance, likewise has been an area of concern and debate among some Members of Congress, states, and other stakeholders for some time. EPA's most recent round of periodic review of the particulates NAAQS and final rule revising the PM NAAQS, published January 15, 2013, prompted further scrutiny of the ongoing implementation of the standards.
Promulgation of NAAQS sets in motion a process under which the states and EPA identify areas that exceed the national standard ("nonattainment areas") using multi-year air quality monitoring data and other criteria, requiring states to take steps to reduce pollutant concentrations in order to achieve it. The publication of the final designations for the 2006 NAAQS—and thus the effective date of the final designations—had initially been delayed pending review by the current Administration. On November 13, 2009, EPA published its final designations for the 2006 PM NAAQS that included 120 counties and portions of counties in 18 states as nonattainment areas based on 2006 through 2008 air quality monitoring data. The final designations, which include tribal land of 22 tribes, were effective as of December 14, 2009. States have three years from the effective date to submit nonattainment area State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which identify specific regulations and emission control requirements that would bring a nonattainment area into compliance.
The 2006 NAAQS strengthened the pre-existing (1997) standard for "fine" particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter (PM2.5) by lowering the allowable daily concentration of PM2.5 in the air. The daily standard averaged over 24-hour periods was reduced from 65 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) to 35 µg/m3. However, the annual PM2.5 standard, which addresses human health effects from chronic exposures to the pollutants, was unchanged from the 1997 standard of 15 µg/m3. The 2006 NAAQS did not substantially modify the daily standard for slightly larger, but still inhalable, particles less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM10), retaining the 24-hour standard but revoking the annual standard for PM10.
EPA's final nonattainment designations are only for the revised 2006 24-hour PM2.5 standard. EPA did not require new nonattainment designations for the PM2.5 annual standard and for PM10. The final designations for the 2006 PM2.5 NAAQS included a few areas designated nonattainment for PM2.5 for the first time, but, as expected, the majority of the counties identified overlapped with EPA's final nonattainment designations for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS. EPA's designations for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS included all or part of 204 counties in 20 states and the District of Columbia. Most of them were only exceeding the annual standard; only 12 counties were exceeding both the 24-hour and the annual standards. Thus, the 2006 tightening of the 24-hour standard resulted in an increased number of areas being designated nonattainment based on exceedances of both the 24-hour and the annual standards. |
crs_RL34200 | crs_RL34200_0 | Cross Burning
Legislatures in almost half of the states have enacted statutes that explicitly outlaw cross burning in one form or another. Without more, these proscriptions do not ordinarily reach beyond burning crosses to hangman's nooses or other such harbingers of violence. On the other hand, in those states where the terroristic threats statute proscribes threats of death, serious injury or property destruction, particularly where the statute has a hate crime element, the circumstances surrounding a cross burning or similar display may present all the elements for a prosecution. Civil Rights
Most jurisdictions have hate crime sentencing statutes that enhance the penalties imposed for commission of other criminal offense when the defendant was motivated by racial, religious or some other discriminatory animus. However, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the First Amendment does not afford all forms of expression absolute protection, and the government constitutionally may prohibit the forms of expression that fall outside of the First Amendment's protections. See Watts v. United States , [394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)] ("political hyperbole" is not a true threat); R.A.V. In this case, Virginia did not single out cross-burning with the intent to intimidate for certain reasons, such as cross-burning with the intent to intimidate due to racial prejudice, but rather banned all cross burning done with the intent to intimidate regardless of the underlying animus. As a result, Justice Thomas saw no reason to analyze the statute under the First Amendment. Whether it may proscribe only those true threats that also include a hate crime element of the type found in the ordinance in R.A.V. Overbreadth and Vagueness
Overbreadth
Lower court cases decided after Black continue to address overbreadth and vagueness challenges to threat, harassment and intimidation statutes. This category of unprotected speech is of somewhat uncertain dimensions. The Court found that the statute failed to distinguish between advocacy, which is protected by the First Amendment, and incitements to "imminent lawless action," which are not protected. | Almost half of the states outlaw cross burning with the intent to threaten as such. A few of these statutes cover the display of hangman's nooses and other symbols of intimidation as well. Moreover, the same misconduct also frequently falls under more general state prohibitions on coercion, terroristic threats, harassment, or hate crimes. Some of these laws feature a hate crime element without which conviction is not possible; others do not. In either case, there are obvious first amendment implications.
The Supreme Court has explained that not all speech, particular expressive conduct, is protected by the First Amendment. However, in R.A.V. v. St. Paul , it held cross burning with the intent to annoy was protected and did not come within the "fighting words" category of unprotected speech. Shortly thereafter, in Black v. Virginia , the Court held that cross burning with the intent to convey a true threat was not protected. Some of the Justices noted another difference between the two cases: the ordinance in R.A.V. had a hate crime elementâthe offense had to be motivated by racial or some other discriminatory animus; the statute in Black had no such element.
In years since Black was announced, the lower courts have continued to recognize true threats as unprotected, but have also continued to analyze challenges to threat statutes under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine and the vagueness doctrine of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process clauses. These laws have generally survived such challenges, although an imprecisely worded statute has fallen victim to a vagueness attack upon occasion. |
crs_RS21586 | crs_RS21586_0 | Office of Technology Assessment
Congress established OTA in 1972 with passage of P.L. 92-484. Legislation to Create An OTA-like Organization for Congress
Since 2001 proposals have been made to create an OTA-like office in the legislative branch to provide technology assessment-related support. FY2006
In July 2006, the House Science Committee held background hearings on the issue of providing scientific and technical advice to Congress. Policy Issues
The following issues could be considered when evaluating alternative technology assessment proposals: (1) analysis of the need for more technology assessment information and advice; (2) evidence of political support for enhancing legislative capabilities for technology assessment; (3) with respect to augmenting GAO's "core capability" to conduct technology assessment, the availability of funds, the timing, and the utility of GAO's technology assessments for congressional decisionmaking, and the pros and cons of locating a large assessment center within GAO, including its impact on other GAO functions, including auditing and evaluation activities; and (4) the potential benefits and costs of establishing a more independent legislative technology assessment function, such as in a separate OTA-like support activity or in an existing congressional support agency. | Congress created the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1972, P.L. 92-484, and terminated its funding in 1995. The pros and cons of reviving OTA or re-creating a similar body have been examined. Since 2002, at congressional direction, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted several pilot technology assessments. Legislation was proposed during the 108th Congress to restore OTA's funding; to create an entity to conduct assessments for Congress; to conduct technology assessments in GAO; and to create a technology assessment capability in GAO or under its direction. In 2006, the House Science Committee held hearings on the issue of providing science and technology advice to Congress. Policy issues under discussion include the need for assessments, funding, the utility of GAO's technology assessment work, and options for design of an advisory body. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R43018 | crs_R43018_0 | Introduction
Communication between Members of Congress and their constituents has changed with the development of new online social networking services. Many Members now use e-mail, official websites, blogs, YouTube channels, Twitter, and Facebook pages to communicate with their constituents—technologies that were either non-existent or not widely available 20 years ago. These technologies have arguably served to enhance the ability of Members of Congress to fulfill their representational duties by providing greater opportunities for communication between the Member and individual constituents, supporting the fundamental democratic role of sharing information about public policy and government operations. This report examines Member use of two electronic communication mediums: Twitter and Facebook. After providing an overview and background of each medium, the report analyzes patterns of Member use of Twitter and Facebook during a two-month period in 2011. This report is inherently a snapshot of a dynamic process. Thus, the conclusions drawn from these data cannot be easily generalized nor can these results be used to predict future behavior. In addition, electronic technology has reduced the marginal cost of constituent communications; unlike postal letters, Members can reach large numbers of constituents for a fixed cost. Data Analysis
This report analyzes the following questions related to Member use of Twitter and Facebook:
What proportion of Members use Twitter and Facebook? How often do Members use Twitter and Facebook? What are Members Tweeting and posting about? Methodology
For two consecutive months—August 25 to October 24, 2011—the Tweets and Facebook posts of Representatives and Senators who were registered to use Twitter and Facebook were collected. As with any new technology, the number of Members using Twitter and the patterns of use may change rapidly in short periods of time. Who Is Using Twitter and Facebook? Earlier studies of social media adoption showed that House Republicans were the most likely adopters of Twitter. During the two-month study, the observed Members sent a total of 30,765 Tweets and posted 16,239 times on Facebook, for an average of over 504 Member Tweets and 266 Member Facebook posts per day. House Republicans Tweeted a plurality of Tweets (48%) and a majority of Facebook posts (54%) over the study period. This was followed by House Democrats, who accounted for 29% of Tweets and 27% of Facebook posts. To assess the content of Member Tweets and Facebook posts, seven major message categories were created following an examination of Tweets and Facebook posts sent by Members during the study: position taking, district or state, official congressional action, policy statement, media, personal, and other. The next most common category was district or state Tweets and posts. These were followed by official action (17% of Tweets and 21% of Facebook posts), and policy statements (16% of Tweets and 16% of Facebook posts). | Communication between Members of Congress and their constituents has changed with the development of new online social networking services. Many Members now use e-mail, official websites, blogs, YouTube channels, Twitter, and Facebook pages to communicate with their constituents—technologies that were either non-existent or not widely available 20 years ago.
Social networking services have arguably served to enhance the ability of Members of Congress to fulfill their representational duties by providing greater opportunities for communication between the Member and individual constituents. In addition, electronic communication technology has reduced the marginal cost of constituent communications; unlike postal letters, Members can reach large numbers of constituents for a fixed cost.
This report examines Member adoption and use of two social networking services: Twitter and Facebook. The report analyzes data on Member use of Twitter and Facebook collected by an academic institution in collaboration with the Congressional Research Service during a two-month period between August and October 2011 and the adoption of both platforms as of January 2012. This report analyzes the following questions related to Member use of Twitter and Facebook:
What proportion of Members use Twitter and Facebook? How often are Members using Twitter and Facebook? How widely are Member Tweets and posts being followed? What are Members Tweeting and posting about?
This report provides a snapshot of a dynamic process. As with any new technology, the number of Members using Twitter and Facebook, and the patterns of use, may change rapidly in short periods of time. As a result, the conclusions drawn from these data cannot be easily generalized or used to predict future behavior.
The data show that, at the time of the study, 451 (of 541) Representatives (including Delegates and the Resident Commissioner) and Senators were registered with Twitter (83.4%) and 487 (of 541) Representatives and Senators were registered with Facebook (90%). During the study period—August to October 2011—a total of 30,765 "Tweets" were sent and 16,261 Facebook posts were made. The data show that
overall, registered Members sent an average of 1.24 Tweets and 0.63 Facebook posts per day; Senate Republicans sent the most Tweets per day (1.53 on average), followed by Senate Democrats (1.49), House Republicans (1.23), and House Democrats (1.09); for Facebook, Senate Republicans posted the most (0.84 on average), followed by House Republicans (0.71), Senate Democrats (0.53), and House Democrats (0.48); and the data also suggest that the top 20% of Twitter and Facebook users account for over 50% of the Tweets and posts during this study.
Use of Twitter and Facebook was analyzed by coding Tweets and posts into seven categories: position taking, district or state, official congressional action, policy statement, media, personal, and other. The data suggest position taking is the most frequent type of Tweet (41%) and Facebook post (39%). This is followed by district or state (26% of Tweets and 32% of Facebook posts); official action (17% of Tweets and 21% of Facebook posts); and policy statements (16% of Tweets and 16% of Facebook posts). |
crs_R43149 | crs_R43149_0 | Introduction
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA; 42 U.S.C. This regulatory program is sometimes referred to as "cradle-to-grave" management. That year, there were 589 coal-fired power plants in the United States. With some exceptions, regulatory determinations were made for each waste between 1988 and 2002. The report discusses specific Bevill or Bentsen waste only as necessary to provide examples of recent issues that have called attention to the waste, particularly issues that may lead EPA to determine that new federal waste management requirements should be established for any one or more of the currently excluded wastes. Regulations established under Subtitle C apply only to the management of solid waste identified as hazardous. If regulated or explicitly not regulated under Subtitle C, those concerns included the potential cost to industry, given uncertainties of risks associated with such wastes; conflicts with other federal law, such as wastewater treatment requirements being implemented under the Clean Water Act (CWA); and precedent that would be set by giving preferential treatment to certain industries to be exempt from strict Subtitle C requirements. Ultimately, the Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980 ( P.L. More specifically, the Bentsen amendment added Subsection 3001(b)(2), which excludes "drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, and production of crude oil or natural gas or geothermal energy" from Subtitle C requirements. The Bevill amendment added Subsection 3001(b)(3) to exclude the following from Subtitle C:
fly ash waste, bottom ash waste, slag waste, and flue gas emission control waste generated from the combustion of coal or other fossil fuels; solid waste from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing of ores and minerals, including phosphate rock and overburden from the mining of uranium ore; and cement kiln dust. Each determination to exempt the waste from the federal hazardous waste management program was not equivalent to determining each waste is nonhazardous or poses no potential hazard. For example, CWA requires that discharges of pollutants to surface waters (e.g., wastewater discharges to a river, bay, or ocean) must be authorized by a permit issued under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program. (A discussion of state and federal requirements potentially applicable to the management of Bevill-Bentsen waste is beyond the scope of this report. Recent Attention on Bevill-Bentsen Waste
Since EPA determined that regulation under Subtitle C was not warranted, various stakeholders representing environmental, public health, and industry groups have disagreed over whether the exclusion results in risks to human health and the environment. Those stakeholders, as well as EPA and state regulatory agencies, have disagreed on a wide range of issues, including the level of risk posed by the waste; whether or not existing state or other federal requirements are adequate to address risks associated with the waste; the degree to which there are gaps in local or state regulation of the waste; and whether regulation under Subtitle C is an appropriate mechanism to manage the waste. EPA Authorities to Regulate Bevill-Bentsen Waste
EPA's existing authority to subject Bevill-Bentsen waste to any new federal waste management requirements under RCRA is established under Subtitle C, subject to limitations specified in the Bevill and Bentsen amendments. EPA efforts to regulate CCW provide evidence of the challenges posed to regulating an excluded waste under Subtitle C. In 2000 and 2009, EPA submitted draft regulatory determinations for review to the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recommending that risks associated with the improper management of CCW warrant its regulation according to national standards established under Subtitle C. In both instances, after OMB review, those draft recommendations were revised—in 2000 to keep the Bevill exclusion in place, and in 2010 to include a Subtitle D option to regulate the waste. EPA Authority Under RCRA Subtitle D
Solid waste that does not meet the regulatory definition of a hazardous waste, including solid waste that is explicitly deemed not a hazardous waste (e.g., Bevill-Bentsen waste), is regulated under RCRA Subtitle D. In contrast to Subtitle C requirements, Subtitle D regulates only the disposal of solid waste. EPA could potentially draw from its Subtitle D authorities to establish requirements applicable to solid waste disposal facilities that receive a particular Bevill-Bentsen waste. If improperly managed, it may pose some threat to human health and the environment. | The federal program to manage hazardous waste was established in 1976 by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Under RCRA Subtitle C, Congress directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate standards applicable to persons who generate, transport, treat, store, or dispose of such waste. Under the program, federal waste handling requirements govern every phase of waste management, from its generation to its final disposition and beyond ("cradle to grave").
The stringent Subtitle C standards apply only to waste identified as "hazardous" according to regulatory criteria established by EPA. This report discusses waste excluded from the regulatory definition of hazardous waste pursuant to amendments to Subtitle C in the Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980. Sometimes referred to by the names of their sponsors, Representative Thomas Bevill and Senator Lloyd Bentsen, the amendments exclude specific large-volume industrial solid waste from Subtitle C, as follows:
The Bevill Amendment—fly ash waste, bottom ash waste, slag waste, and flue gas emission control waste generated primarily from the combustion of coal or other fossil fuels; solid waste from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing of ores and minerals, including phosphate rock and overburden from the mining of uranium ore; and cement kiln dust (42 U.S.C. §6921(b)(3)(A)(i)-(iii)). The Bentsen Amendment—drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, and production of crude oil or natural gas or geothermal energy (42 U.S.C. §6921(b)(2)(A)).
The exclusions were temporary, pending EPA study of each waste, followed by reports to Congress and regulatory determinations explaining whether or not regulation under Subtitle C was warranted.
Regulatory Determinations for Bevill-Bentsen Waste
EPA issued regulatory determinations for each type of waste between 1988 and 2002. With limited exceptions, the agency determined that regulation under Subtitle C was not warranted. EPA noted that the exclusion is not equivalent to determining the waste is nonhazardous. EPA identified conditions under which management of each waste poses some threat to human health and the environment. The exemption meant that Subtitle C's strict cradle-to-grave management may not be practical for the waste, but that other potentially applicable state or federal requirements could be adequate to address waste-specific risks. For example, wastewater excluded from Subtitle C may be subject to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitting requirements established under the Clean Water Act (CWA) if its disposal involves discharge to surface water or processing at a municipal wastewater treatment facility.
Existing EPA Authority to Regulate Bevill-Bentsen Waste
Two categories of Bevill-Bentsen wastes that have recently drawn national attention include wastewater generated from natural gas production that involves hydraulic fracturing and coal combustion waste (CCW) generated at coal-fired power plants (e.g., "coal ash"). That attention has been due, in part, to changes in the volume or nature of the waste or as a result of risks to human health and the environment associated with improper management of the waste.
The potential for EPA to regulate spent fracking fluid, CCW, or any other Bevill-Bentsen wastes has drawn the attention of some Members of Congress, generally for two opposing reasons: (1) given its current authority under RCRA, EPA may not be able to regulate the waste adequately to address risks associated with its disposal; or (2) given existing state and other federal requirements applicable to the management of the waste, EPA will subject the waste to unnecessary requirements that are costly and burdensome to states and to industry.
This report discusses EPA's existing authorities under RCRA Subtitle C (with regard to hazardous waste management) or Subtitle D (solid waste management) from which the agency could draw to establish new requirements applicable to Bevill or Bentsen wastes, including any limitations on its Subtitle C authorities established under the Bevill-Bentsen amendments. The report does not attempt to identify or discuss issues specific to each Bevill-Bentsen waste, such as risks associated with improper management, or what EPA has identified as improper management. |
crs_98-594 | crs_98-594_0 | Background
Tajikistan is a significant country in Central Asia by virtue of its geographic location bordering China and Afghanistan and its ample water resources, but it faces ethnic and clan schisms, deep poverty, poor governance, and other severe challenges. Tajikistan was one of the poorest of the new states that gained independence at the end of 1991 after the break-up of the former Soviet Union. The new country was soon plunged into a devastating civil conflict between competing regional and other interests. The civil war further set back economic development in the country. The economy recovered to its Soviet-era level by the early 2000s, and GDP expanded several times by the late 2000s, despite setbacks associated with the global economic downturn. Poverty remains widespread, however, and the infrastructure for healthcare, education, transportation, and energy faces steep developmental needs, according to some observers (see also below, " Economic Issues "). The country continues to face problems of political integration, perhaps evidenced in part by violence in central and eastern Tajikstan (see below, " The 2010 Attacks " and " The 2012 Instability in Mountainous Badakhshan "). Tajikistan also faces substantial threats from terrorism and narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan. Over the period FY1992-FY2010, the United States budgeted $988.57 million of aid for Tajikistan (FREEDOM Support Act and agency budgets), mainly for food and other humanitarian needs. Budgeted assistance for FY2011 was $44.48 million and for FY2012 was $45.1 million, and the Administration requested $36.4 million in foreign assistance for Tajikistan in FY2014. Country data for FY2013 are not yet available. Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Narcotics
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, Tajikistan seemed to be willing to cooperate with the United States, but hesitated to do so without permission from Moscow. However, Tajikistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance's combat against the Taliban, so it was predisposed to welcome U.S.-led backing for the Northern Alliance. Perhaps after gauging Russia's views, the Tajik Defense Ministry on September 25, 2001, offered use of Tajik airspace to U.S. forces, and some coalition forces began to transit through Tajik airspace and airfields, including U.S. troops entering and leaving Afghanistan via the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan. During a January 2009 visit, the then-Commander of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), General David Petraeus, reached agreement with President Rahmon on the land transit of goods such as construction materials to support military operations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. While most land transport along this Northern Distribution Network (NDN) traverses Uzbekistan to final destinations in Afghanistan, Tajikistan serves as an alternative route for a small percentage of supplies. | Tajikistan is a significant country in Central Asia by virtue of its geographic location bordering China and Afghanistan and its ample water and other resources, but it faces ethnic and clan schisms, deep poverty, poor governance, and other severe challenges. Tajikistan was one of the poorest of the new states that gained independence at the end of 1991 after the break-up of the former Soviet Union. The new country was soon plunged into a devastating civil conflict between competing regional and other interests that lasted until a peace settlement in 1997. Former state farm chairman Imomaliy Rahmon rose to power during this period and was reelected president after the peace settlement as part of a power-sharing arrangement. He was reelected in 2006. His rule has been increasingly authoritarian and has been marked by ongoing human rights abuses, according to many observers.
The civil war had further set back economic development in the country. The economy recovered to its Soviet-era level by the early 2000s, and GDP had expanded several times by the late 2000s, despite setbacks associated with the global economic downturn. Poverty remains widespread, however, and the infrastructure for healthcare, education, transportation, and energy faces steep developmental needs, according to many observers. The country continues to face problems of political integration, perhaps evidenced in part by recent violence in eastern Tajikistan. The country also faces substantial threats from terrorism and narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan.
The United States has been Tajikistan's largest bilateral donor, budgeting $988.57 million of aid for Tajikistan (FREEDOM Support Act and agency budgets) over the period from FY1992 through FY2010, mainly for food and other humanitarian needs. Budgeted foreign assistance for FY2012 was $45.1 million, and the Administration requested $36.4 million for FY2014 (these FY2012 and FY2014 figures exclude most Defense and Energy Department programs; data for FY2013 are not yet available).
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, Tajikistan seemed to be willing to cooperate with the United States, but hesitated to do so without permission from Moscow. However, Tajikistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance's combat against the Taliban. Perhaps after gauging Russia's views, Tajikistan soon offered use of Tajik airspace to U.S. forces, and some coalition forces began to transit through Tajik airspace and airfields. During a January 2009 visit, the then-Commander of the U.S. Central Command reached agreement with President Rahmon on the land transit of goods such as construction materials to support military operations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. While most land transport along this Northern Distribution Network traverses Uzbekistan to final destinations in Afghanistan, Tajikistan serves as an alternative route for a small percentage of supplies. In March 2012, the land transit of some ISAF material out of Afghanistan through Tajikistan began. |
crs_RL34401 | crs_RL34401_0 | From FY2001 through FY2015, Congress appropriated approximately $20.9 billion for nanotechnology research and development (R&D). Overview
The economic and societal promise of nanotechnology has led to involvement and investments by governments and companies around the world. Since then, the United States has emerged as a global leader in nanotechnology. However, the competition for global leadership is intensifying as foreign investments in nanoscale science, engineering, and technology increase. President Obama has requested $1.5 billion in NNI funding for FY2016. Proponents of the NNI assert that nanotechnology is one of the most important emerging and enabling technologies and that U.S. competitiveness, technological leadership, national security, and societal interests require an aggressive approach to the development and commercialization of nanotechnology. Critics of the NNI hold a variety of competing views, asserting that government is not doing enough, is doing too much, or is moving too quickly. While many provisions of this act have no sunset provision, FY2008 was the last year of agency authorizations included in the act. Bills to amend and reauthorize the act were introduced in the 114 th , 113 th , 111 th , and 110 th Congresses. No comprehensive reauthorization legislation was introduced in 112 th Congress. In the 114 th Congress, as of the date of this report, one bill has been introduced that seeks to amend the 21 st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act. Incorporated as Subtitle B of Title 1 of the America Competes Reauthorization Act of 2015 ( H.R. No further action had been taken as of the date of this report. 108-153 ). U.S. However, these assessments have recognized that the NNI faces a variety of challenges in ensuring that the full promise of nanotechnology is realized and that the United States remains the global leader in nanoscale science, engineering, and technology. 1898, the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2015, was introduced on April 21, 2015, and referred to the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology and the House Committee on Education and the Workforce. In August 2015, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology referred the bill to the Subcommittee on Research and Technology. S. 3187 / P.L. 554 (111 th Congress) —National Nanotechnology Initiative Amendments Act of 2009 " below). Authorizes appropriations to (1) NIST for the development of nanotechnology standards; and (2) NSF, for use by the NNCO, to develop and maintain a public information database of NNP projects in EHS; education; public outreach; ethical, legal, and other societal issues; and of nanotechnology facilities accessible for use by individuals from academia and industry;ma de the National Nanotechnology Advisory Panel (NNAP) a distinct entity, and requires the NNAP to establish a subpanel to enable it to assess whether societal, ethical, legal, environmental, and workforce concerns are adequately addressed by the NNP ; r evise d provisions for triennial external review of the NNP ; required the designation of a "coordinator for societal dimensions of nanotechnology," within OSTP, to convene a panel to develop a research plan, and requires the coordinator to enter into an arrangement with the National Science Board to create a report that identifies the broad goals and needs of EHS researchers;d irected the NSTC to establish an interagency Education Working Group to coordinate, prioritize, and plan formal and informal educational activities supported under the NNP , including activities to help participants understand the EHS implications of nanotechnology ;provide d for one or more grants to establish Nanotechnology Education Partnerships to recruit and help prepare secondary school students to pursue postsecondary l evel courses in nanotechnology;r equire d agencies supporting nanotechnology research facilities to provide access to representatives from industry and other stakeholders for the transfer of research results or assist in developing proof-of-concept prototypes of nanoscale p roducts, devices, or processes;directed NIST, in its Technology Innovation Program, and all agencies with Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs, to encourage the submission of nanotechnology related grant proposals; set, for the NNP, the objective of establishing industry liaison group s for all industry sectors that would benefit from nanotechnology applications;r equire d coordination and leveraging of federal investments with nanotechnology research, development, and tec hnology transition initiatives supported by state governments;required the NNP to support nanotechnology R&D in areas of national importance (e.g., economic competitiveness, energy production, water purification , agriculture, and health care; in environment al , health, and safety research on the risks of nanoparticles ) and in ethical, legal, and societal is sues related to nanotechnology;required the NNP to support a wide array of research in support of nanomanufacturing ;required the director of the NNCO to review and report on nanomanufacturing research and research facilities;required an NNAP review of the nanomanufacturing program com ponent area and the capabilities of nanotechnology research facilities supported by the NNP;set forth provisions regarding NNP nanoscale characterization and metrology research; andr equire d deliberative public input in the decision making processes affecting policies for the research, develop ment, and use of nanotechnology, and authorizes $2.0 million for the NNCO to carry out this responsibility. | Nanotechnology—a term encompassing the science, engineering, and applications of submicron materials—involves the harnessing of unique physical, chemical, and biological properties of nanoscale substances in fundamentally new and useful ways. The economic and societal promise of nanotechnology has led to investments by governments and companies around the world. In 2000, the United States launched the world's first national nanotechnology program. From FY2001 through FY2015, the federal government invested approximately $20.9 billion in nanoscale science, engineering, and technology through the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). President Obama has requested $1.5 billion in NNI funding for FY2016. U.S. companies and state governments have invested billions more. The United States has, in the view of many experts, emerged as a global leader in nanotechnology, though the competition for global leadership is intensifying as countries and companies around the world increase their investments.
Nanotechnology's complexity and intricacies, early stage of development (with commercial pay-off possibly years away for many potential applications), and broad scope of potential applications engender a wide range of public policy issues. Maintaining U.S. technological and commercial leadership in nanotechnology poses a variety of technical and policy challenges, including development of technologies that will enable commercial scale manufacturing of nanotechnology materials and products, as well as environmental, health, and safety concerns.
Congress established programs, assigned responsibilities, and initiated research and development related to these issues in the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-153). Although many provisions of this act have no sunset provision, FY2008 was the last year of agency authorizations included in the act. Bills to amend and reauthorize the act were introduced in the 110th, 111th, and 113th Congresses but were not enacted. No comprehensive reauthorization bill was introduced in the 112th Congress. In the 114th Congress, as of the date of this report, one bill has been introduced that seeks to amend the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act. The National Nanotechnology Initiative Amendments Act of 2015 is incorporated as Subtitle B of Title 1 of the America Competes Reauthorization Act of 2015 (H.R. 1898). The bill was introduced April 21, 2015, and referred to the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology and the House Committee on Education and the Workforce. In August 2015, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology referred the bill to the Subcommittee on Research and Technology. No further action had been taken as of the date of this report.
Proponents of the NNI assert that nanotechnology is one of the most important emerging and enabling technologies and that U.S. competitiveness, technological leadership, national security, and societal interests require an aggressive approach to its development and commercialization. Critics of the NNI voice concerns that reflect disparate underlying beliefs. Some critics assert that the government is not doing enough to move technology from the laboratory into the marketplace. Others argue that the magnitude of the public investment may skew what should be market-based decisions in research, development, and commercialization. Still other critics say that the inherent risks of nanotechnology are not being addressed in a timely or effective manner. |
crs_RL34075 | crs_RL34075_0 | It also reflects on Pakistan's evolving relationships with the United States and with neighboring countries. The chief justice was suspended and charged with misconduct and misuse of authority by Pakistani President Musharraf on March 9, 2007. Also, India's Border Security Force killed six people trying to cross the Line of Control (LOC) from Pakistan into India. 04/12/07 —Four members of an Iranian criminal gang and a Pakistani border security official were killed during a raid on a hideout along the border of Pakistan and Iran. On the same day, Pakistani President Musharraf reportedly announced that tribal fighters in South Waziristan had killed up to 300 foreign militants in a month of fighting. The editorial further said that while the government and population of Pakistan appreciate the assistance received from the United States, "the pundits in the U.S. who believe that they can use the leverage of U.S. official aid to paralyse Pakistan's economy are sadly mistaken as they have an exaggerated sense of the importance of these official flows." 05/02/07 —According to the Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, the political alliance between Pakistani President Musharraf's government and "militant religious parties" has strengthened the militants and given them "influence in the country's affairs disproportionate to their support among the Pakistani people," leaving the government ineffectual in responding to chronic "sectarian and religiously motivated violence" against minorities. On the same day, explosions in tribal areas destroyed or damaged 20 music shops after business hours. A relative was killed with him. Opposition parties, lawyers' groups, and human rights organizations condemned the federal government, the Sindh provincial government, and the pro-government MQM political party for causing the violence in Karachi. The journalists had gathered to protest the government's tightened restrictions on the media. He reportedly claimed that Pakistan will have enough power to meet demand by 2010. Additional groups will be returned in August and October. | Many see Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf as currently facing the most serious challenges to his authority since he wrested control of Pakistan's government in a 1999 coup. Set off by the March 9, 2007 suspension of the chief justice, Pakistan's citizenry has grown vocal in its objections to Musharraf. Subsequent restrictions on the media increased the outrage, and journalists have joined thousands of lawyers and social activists in the streets to demonstrate against the president and demand his resignation. Pro-government groups have countered, resulting in factional fighting and bloodshed. In addition, long hours without electricity and safe water, historically high temperatures, and natural disasters, have much of Pakistan's population of 165 million on edge.
On top of this, "Talibanization" has spread throughout the tribal areas and into major cities. Militant mosques make demands on the government, while village groups blow up shops that sell such agents of Westernization as music CDs and movie videos. Many reporters and analysts believe the federal government has lost its command of much of the country and speculate on a post-Musharraf government.
Conflicts with neighboring countries include cross-border fighting, infiltration by militants, and territorial disputes. Gunfights with foreign militants and border patrols plague Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. Spring thaws have heightened tensions with India along the Line of Control.
For additional analysis, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41835 | crs_R41835_0 | Introduction
State revenues declined during the recent economic recession (December 2007 through June 2009) and have not fully recovered. At the same time, the recession increased the number of individuals meeting Medicaid's income eligibility standards. This state fiscal condition is a reason the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. As a condition of the receipt of the federal Medicaid matching funds made available under the ARRA FMAP provision, states were required to maintain their Medicaid programs with the same eligibility standards, methodologies, or procedures for Medicaid through June 30, 2011 (i.e., the end of the ARRA temporary FMAP adjustment period). This provision is referred to as the Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirement. With the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as modified by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as modified by P.L. 111-152 ), the ARRA MOE provisions were extended and expanded. ACA's MOE provisions were designed to ensure that individuals eligible for Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) did not lose coverage in the period between the date of enactment of ACA (March 23, 2010) and the implementation of the state health insurance exchanges (expected in 2014). Because states are prohibited from curbing the cost of Medicaid through restricting eligibility standards due to the MOE requirements included in ARRA and ACA, over the past few years, states have focused cost containment strategies on reducing provider rates, making changes to their benefit packages, or implementing limitations on the use of benefits. States want greater flexibility to restrain their Medicaid expenditures through eligibility restrictions. This report summarizes the MOE requirements enacted under ARRA and ACA and what these requirements have meant for states in terms of their actions to restrict Medicaid and/or State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) eligibility. It also summarizes recent legislative activity to repeal the MOE requirements. 111-226 . Under P.L. | State revenues declined during the recent economic recession (December 2007 through June 2009) and have not fully recovered. At the same time, the recession increased the number of individuals meeting Medicaid's income eligibility standards. States are faced with tough decisions about where to direct their increasingly limited funds.
This state fiscal condition is a reason the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5; and subsequently extended in P.L. 111-226) included a temporary increase to Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) rates. As a condition of the receipt of the federal Medicaid matching funds made available under ARRA, states were required to maintain their Medicaid programs with the same eligibility standards, methodologies, or procedures for Medicaid through June 30, 2011. This provision is referred to as the ARRA Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirement.
The ARRA MOE provisions were extended and expanded in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as modified by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as modified by P.L. 111-152). ACA's MOE provisions were designed to ensure that individuals eligible for Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) did not lose coverage in the period between the date of enactment of ACA (March 23, 2010) and the implementation of the state health insurance exchanges (expected in 2014).
Because states are prohibited from curbing the cost of Medicaid through restricting eligibility standards due to the MOE requirements included in ARRA and ACA, states have focused cost containment strategies on reducing provider rates, making changes to their benefit packages, or implementing limitations on the use of benefits. However, states want greater flexibility to restrain their Medicaid expenditures through eligibility restrictions.
This report summarizes the MOE requirements enacted under ARRA and ACA and what these requirements have meant for states in terms of their actions to restrict Medicaid and/or CHIP eligibility. It also summarizes recent legislative activity to repeal the MOE requirements. |
crs_R41921 | crs_R41921_0 | Introduction
The mental health of veterans—and particularly veterans of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) —has been a topic of ongoing concern to Members of Congress and their constituents, as evidenced by hearings and legislation. Knowing the number of veterans affected by various mental disorders and actions the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is taking to address mental disorders can help Congress determine where to focus attention and resources. Using data from the VA, this brief report addresses the number of veterans with (1) depression or bipolar disorder , (2) posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (3) substance use disorders; Appendix A discusses important data limitations. For each topic, this report also briefly describes what the VA is doing in terms of screening and treatment; Appendix B lists reports evaluating the VA's efforts. From FY2002 through FY2012, 1.6 million OEF/OIF veterans (including members of the Reserve and National Guard) left active duty and became eligible for VA health care; by the end of FY2012, 56% of them had enrolled and obtained VA health care. The VA publishes the cumulative prevalence of selected mental disorders among OEF/OIF veterans using VA health care, based on information in the VA's electronic health records. Systematic information regarding veterans who do not use VA health care is not available. Data about OEF/OIF veterans using VA health care should not be extrapolated to the rest of the OEF/OIF veteran population, or to the broader veteran population. Several reports that have evaluated the VA's PTSD screening and treatment efforts and offered recommendations are listed in Appendix B . | The mental health of veterans—and particularly veterans of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF)—has been a topic of ongoing concern to Members of Congress and their constituents, as evidenced by hearings and legislation. Knowing the number of veterans affected by various mental disorders and actions the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is taking to address mental disorders can help Congress determine where to focus attention and resources.
Using data from the VA, this brief report addresses the number of veterans with (1) depression or bipolar disorder, (2) posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (3) substance use disorders. For each topic, this report also briefly describes what the VA is doing in terms of screening and treatment.
From FY2002 through FY2012, 1.6 million OEF/OIF veterans (including members of the Reserve and National Guard) left active duty and became eligible for VA health care; by the end of FY2012, 56% of them had enrolled and obtained VA health care. The VA publishes the cumulative prevalence of selected mental disorders among OEF/OIF veterans using VA health care, based on information in the VA's electronic health records.
Systematic information regarding veterans who do not use VA health care is not available. Data about OEF/OIF veterans using VA health care should not be extrapolated to the rest of the OEF/OIF veteran population, or to the broader veteran population. Limitations of the VA's data are discussed in Appendix A.
Reports that have evaluated VA's efforts and offered recommendations are listed in Appendix B. |
crs_R41616 | crs_R41616_0 | Introduction
During the first session of the 111 th Congress, the economy officially exited its recent recession. However, the economy and housing markets across the country continued to feel the effects of an economic downturn that featured the largest decline in output, consumption, and investment and the largest increase in unemployment of any post-World War II recession. The downturn was, in part, both a cause and a result of issues in the housing finance system and troubles in housing markets. 110-289 ), which included the authority for the federal government to place the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, into conservatorship (authority that the government promptly exercised). At the same time, the 111 th Congress faced perennial questions about how best to meet the affordable housing needs of low-income and vulnerable populations and whether to make changes to the programs that comprise today's federal affordable housing system, particularly in light of rising budget deficits. This report provides a brief summary of major housing issues that were considered in the 111 th Congress. The housing GSEs have played a major role in U.S. housing markets. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act, P.L. The 111 th Congress enacted a number of laws that included provisions related to foreclosure mitigation. The 111 th Congress also enacted a number of foreclosure-related provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act ( P.L. The 111 th Congress also provided additional funding for two other programs that had been established during the 110 th Congress: the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program (NFMCP), which received appropriations in both the FY2009 and FY2010 Housing and Urban Development (HUD) appropriations acts, and the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), which received additional funding in both the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. The 111 th Congress included a number of changes to mortgage origination standards and practices in its comprehensive financial reform legislation, the Dodd-Frank Act ( P.L. 111-203 ). However, the 111 th Congress did not enact legislation addressing these potential risks. Housing for Low-Income Individuals and Families
Appropriations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development
The majority of housing assistance programs for low-income individuals and families are funded through discretionary appropriations provided to HUD's budget in the annual appropriations process. 111-5 ), aimed at stimulating the economy. Homelessness Assistance and Prevention
Government assistance for housing for homeless individuals and families is provided primarily through the HUD Homeless Assistance Grants. In addition to P.L. 111-374 instituted are converting the source of funding for Section 811 tenant-based rental assistance to the Section 8 program; allowing Section 811 rental assistance to be used in conjunction with sources of financing other than Section 811 capital grants, including funds through the LIHTC and HOME program; decreasing the concentration of housing units for persons with disabilities by limiting the units in multifamily housing dedicated to persons with disabilities to 25% of the total (due to the need to finance the remaining 75% of units, this limitation could also encourage developers to use other funding sources to supplement the Section 811 funding); and delegating the processing of mixed finance developments to state housing finance agencies. 2847 ) were passed by the House. 4868 was not enacted before the end of the 111 th Congress. Housing Legislation in the 111th Congress
The following list presents legislation relating to housing and community development considered by the 111 th Congress. Legislation focuses primarily on the programs of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Rural Housing Service of the Department of Agriculture, and issues relating to housing finance and tax. | Housing issues related to the recent turmoil in U.S. housing markets, as well as perennial issues related to the housing needs of low-income individuals and families, were prominent in the 111th Congress. The recent recession that was, in part, both a cause and a result of issues in the housing finance system put legislation designed to address current foreclosures and prevent a future crisis on the congressional agenda. At the same time, the 111th Congress faced questions about how best to meet the affordable housing needs of low-income and vulnerable populations, particularly as unemployment climbed and the economy worsened. While the recession officially ended during the first session of the 111th Congress, housing markets in many parts of the country continued to experience the effects of an economic downturn. The 111th Congress considered a number of measures to shore up housing markets and to address issues related to both housing finance and housing assistance for low-income populations. While a number of measures were enacted, other issues were left unresolved at the end of the 111th Congress.
This report summarizes housing issues that were considered in the 111th Congress. The report divides issues into three main sections: "Housing Finance and Homeownership," "Housing for Low-Income Individuals and Families," and "Other Issues."
Within the realm of housing finance and homeownership, the 111th Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act, P.L. 111-203). While not exclusively focused on housing, the Dodd-Frank Act did include foreclosure prevention-related provisions and changes to mortgage origination standards and practices. Notably absent from the Dodd-Frank Act were changes to the way in which the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—are structured and their role in the mortgage market, although the 111th Congress did feature discussions regarding reform of the GSEs. The 111th Congress also enacted tax provisions meant to bolster housing markets by providing a tax credit for first-time homebuyers. Foreclosure issues and FHA reform were other issues considered by the 111th Congress.
Congress also enacted laws that made changes to existing programs that provide housing assistance to low-income individuals and families. The Homeless Assistance Grants, administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) were amended to give communities greater flexibility in providing housing and services to homeless individuals (P.L. 111-22). The programs that fund housing for low-income seniors and individuals with disabilities (Section 202 and Section 811, respectively) also were changed to allow greater integration of funding from non-HUD sources in housing developments (P.L. 111-372 and P.L. 111-374). The 111th Congress also considered legislation related to housing assistance programs that was not ultimately enacted, including reform to HUD's largest assistance programs: public housing and the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program.
In addition to these activities, the 111th Congress enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5). This legislation, aimed at stimulating the economy, provided additional appropriations to several HUD programs. |
crs_RL33760 | crs_RL33760_0 | After Iraq, other high priorities will be the continuing fight against terrorism and efforts to dissuade or restrain Iran and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons programs. A key corollary question for Congress is what its role should be in redirecting policy. Among the central recommendations of the ISG are to make training of Iraqi security forces the primary U.S. military mission and to aim to withdraw all U.S. combat brigades not necessary for force protection by the first quarter of 2008. Congress faces an evaluation of these recommendations and a decision as to what, if any, legislative measures might be helpful to promote these or other policies. Trade issues have become increasingly controversial in Congress during the last few years. That debate could be launched early in the 110 th Congress with the scheduled expiration on July 1, 2007, of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). TPA is the authority that the Congress has delegated to the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements that receive expedited Congressional consideration (limited debate and no amendments). Congress's decision could have major implications for pending FTA negotiations, such as those with Malaysia, South Korea, and Panama, and for U.S. participation in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). for Iraq, Afghanistan, or other counter-terror operations. Many of these programs address U.S. concerns about the proliferation of weapons or materials from specific countries. Afghanistan and Iraq . The long-term trends and situations in Asia that warrant attention include (1) the rise of China and Beijing's increasing economic clout both in the region and in trade with the United States; (2) a military buildup both of nuclear and conventional weapons along with channels for nuclear proliferation; (3) a serious decline in favorable attitudes toward the United States, particularly among Asian nations with large Muslim populations and in South Korea; (4) rising nationalism and forces for self-determination, ethnic conflicts, or terrorist incidents in several Asian nations; (5) a growing U.S. strategic relationship with India; (6) cooperation with Pakistan in countering al Qaeda and potential instability and anti-democratic forces within that country; (7) the need for the United States to realign its military forces combined with a decline in the degree to which South Koreans and Japanese feel the need for those forces to protect them; (8) a scramble for natural resources, particularly petroleum but also water and coal; (9) globalization and trade, along with capital flows, that not only have generated a $356 billion U.S. trade deficit with nations of the Asia Pacific but have led to the outsourcing of jobs to Asian nations; (10) expanding industrial production networks that have created heavy interdependency among economies, including between Taiwan and mainland China; and (11) a developing network of regional free trade and security arrangements that could create an East Asian trading bloc or a security mechanism with diminished U.S. influence. The allies consider the stabilization of Afghanistan their most important mission. Trade issues will also continue to be a concern. Defense Budget Trends and Issues for Congress
[[author name scrubbed], Specialist in National Defense ([phone number scrubbed])]
Defense spending, and particularly spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, will be one of the first major issues on the agenda in the opening weeks of the 110 th Congress, and may be among the most difficult. One major remaining issue is the reserve retirement age. This is likely to continue to be the case during the 110 th Congress as many Members grapple with the real and perceived effects of globalization and how to balance the benefits and costs of trade liberalization. Many Members of Congress have raised concerns over lost jobs and lower wages, over the growing income gap in the United States, and over the burgeoning U.S. trade deficits with trading partners, especially China. | The 110th Congress will face a number of pressing foreign affairs, defense, and trade issues in the opening days of its tenure. This report identifies major issues most likely to be on the legislative agenda, discusses critical policy choices at stake, and summarizes some of the major alternatives that Congress may consider. The report lists Congressional Research Service reports that address these issues, and it identifies key analysts and their areas of responsibility.
A major issue confronting the new Congress is what to do in Iraq. The Baker/Hamilton-led Iraq Study Group recommended pursuing a new diplomatic initiative, including negotiations with Iran and Syria; and making the training of Iraqi security forces the primary U.S. military mission. The commission concluded that the United States "could" aim to withdraw all U.S. combat brigades not necessary for force protection by the first quarter of 2008. Congress faces an evaluation of these recommendations and a decision as to what its role should be in implementing these or other new policies. Supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan may be the initial vehicle for debate over a new course in Iraq.
U.S. and allied progress in Afghanistan may also be among the key issues in the 110th Congress along with international counter-terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional geopolitical dynamics, and trade developments. China's rise is reshaping global economic relations and is affecting security dynamics in Asia and around the globe. The ongoing fight against terrorism, particularly in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, and efforts to dissuade or restrain Iran and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons programs are key issues for consideration, as is the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
Defense spending, and particularly budgeting for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, will also be one of the major issues facing the 110th Congress. Congress may be asked to consider large increases in funding for the Army, and it faces a potentially difficult tradeoff between increases in the size of the Army and funding for major weapons programs. Other defense issues include the implementation of recent base closure plans, the status of intelligence reform, pay and benefits of military personnel, and the role and structure of National Guard and Reserve forces.
Trade issues have become increasingly controversial in recent years, and may well remain so as many Members grapple with the real and perceived effects of globalization. Many Members have concerns about instances of lost jobs and lower wages, the growing income gap in the United States, and about burgeoning U.S. trade deficits. Debate over trade policy could be launched with the scheduled expiration on July 1, 2007, of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). TPA is the authority that Congress has delegated to the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements that receive expedited congressional consideration. Congress's decision on TPA will have major implications for pending negotiations, and for U.S. participation in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). |
crs_R42460 | crs_R42460_0 | In response to the 1973 oil embargo, Congress created a Strategic Petroleum Reserve of up to 1 billion barrels in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975. In May 1978, Congress authorized expansion of the SPR's physical capacity to 750 million barrels, and in 2005 directed further expansion to the authorized size of 1 billion barrels. Congress intended the SPR to help prevent a repetition of the economic disruption that the 1973 Arab oil embargo had caused. IEA member countries, including the United States, are committed to maintaining oil stocks (inventories) equivalent to 90 days of their prior year's net imports, developing programs for demand restraint in the event of emergencies, and agreeing to participate in allocation of oil deliveries to balance a shortage among IEA members. Severe Energy Supply Interruption Emergencies
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA, P.L. 94-163 ) authorized drawdown of the Reserve upon a finding by the President that there is a "severe energy supply interruption." Severe Domestic Energy Supply Interruption
Congress enacted additional drawdown authority in the 1990 Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments ( P.L. This provision authorized the President to use the SPR for domestic energy supply shortages without having to declare a "severe energy supply interruption" or the need to meet obligations of the United States under the international energy program. This authority limits SPR sales to no more than 30 million barrels over a maximum 60-day period only when the SPR inventory is above 500 million barrels. SPR Sites
The SPR physically comprises four sites, two in Texas and two in Louisiana ( Figure 1 ). The sites offer access to both marine terminals and pipeline systems needed for moving crude oil to and from the SPR. Each site consists of an underground salt dome (a naturally occurring geologic structure), solution-mined to create storage caverns. The SPR's storage capacity had expanded to 727 million barrels, and its inventory had reached nearly 700 million barrels before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. The SPR currently holds the equivalent of 139 days of import protection (based on 2016 import data of 4.871 million barrels per day of net petroleum imports). As an alternative to appropriated funds, DOE proposed accepting transfer of a discrete portion of the royalties payments collected by the Department of the Interior (DOI) for Gulf of Mexico oil leases in the form of royalty-in-kind (RIK) oil rather than as revenues. 2014 Test Sale
The Secretary of Energy, under Section 161(g) of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, authorized a test sale of 5 MMb to test drawdown and sales procedures at the TEXOMA facilities. Based on a 2005 SPR crude oil compatibility study, DOE agreed that the SPR could store a small percentage of heavy crude to satisfy the short-term needs of a few refineries in the event of a supply disruption. Crude oil prices also responded immediately to the release of oil from the SPR. In 2011, the price increases were thought to be largely attributable to the loss of Libyan production during the revolution in that country. The Future of U.S. Imports of Crude Oil
The ability of the SPR to supplement the domestic U.S. supply of crude oil and effectively replace imports depends on the size of the reserve as well as its drawdown capabilities. | Congress authorized the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975 to help prevent a repetition of the economic disruption caused by the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo. EPCA specifically authorizes the President to draw down the SPR upon a finding that there is a "severe energy supply interruption." The meaning of a "severe energy supply interruption" has, over time, been controversial. The authors of EPCA intended the SPR only to ameliorate discernible physical shortages of crude oil. Historically, increasing crude oil prices typically signal market concerns for supply availability. However, Congress deliberately kept price trigger considerations out of the President's SPR drawdown authority because of the question about what price level should trigger a drawdown, and the concern that a price threshold could influence market behavior and industry inventory practices. As a member of the International Energy Agency—a coalition of 28 countries—the United States agrees to support energy supply security through energy policy cooperation, commit to maintaining emergency reserves equal to 90 days of net petroleum oil imports, develop programs for demand restraint in the event of emergencies, and participate in allocation of oil deliveries among the signatory nations to balance a shortage.
The Department of Energy (DOE) manages the SPR, which is comprised of 62 underground storage caverns that were solution-mined from naturally occurring salt domes located at four sites in Texas and Louisiana. The 2005 Energy Policy Act directed SPR expansion to its authorized capacity of 1 billion barrels, but the SPR's physical expansion has not proceeded beyond 727 million barrels. The SPR's maximum drawdown capability is 4.4 million barrels per day, based on the capacity of the pipelines and marine terminals that serve it. Legislation restricts SPR sales to no more than 30 million barrels over a 60-day period for anything less than a severe energy supply interruption.
Congress initially appropriated funds to fill the SPR through crude oil purchases, but ended that practice in 1994. In 2000, the Department of Energy began acquiring oil to fill the SPR through the royalty-in-kind (RIK) program. In lieu of paying cash royalties on Gulf of Mexico leases, producers diverted a portion of their production volume to the SPR. The Secretary of the Interior administratively terminated the RIK program in 2009.
The DOE has conducted sales and loans of crude oil from the SPR for several different reasons. The 1990 Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments expanded SPR drawdown authority to include responding to short-term supply interruptions stemming from situations internal to the United States. U.S. Presidents have authorized emergency sales of SPR crude to meet IEA obligations during the 1990 Persian Gulf War, in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, and after a prolonged disruption of Libyan crude in 2011. In addition to these emergency sales, the Department of Energy has released oil, from time-to-time, to test the SPR system and make loans to help refiners bridge temporary supply disruptions, and has sold oil at the direction of Congress to generate revenue for budget deficit reduction.
The 30.64 million barrel SPR sale in 2011 reduced the SPR's inventory from 726.6 million barrels to 695.9 million barrels. The SPR currently holds the equivalent of 139 days of import protection (based on 2016 data of 4.871 million barrels per day of net petroleum imports). |
crs_RS21127 | crs_RS21127_0 | Introduction
Insider trading in securities may occur when a person in possession of material nonpublic information about a company trades in the company's securities and makes a profit or avoids a loss. Federal statutes have provisions that either specifically forbid insider trading or have been interpreted by courts to prohibit insider trading. Some exemptions from these reporting requirements are provided. Section 16 of the 1934 Act places sanctions on insiders who use inside information in making short-swing profits. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
After a number of hearings and considerable debate in the 100 th Congress, President Reagan signed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012
The STOCK Act, signed into law on April 4, 2012, affirms that insider trading prohibitions apply to Members of Congress, congressional staff, and other federal officials. Selected Regulations
As stated above, SEC Rule 10b-5, which implements Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, is apparently the most frequently used SEC rule in lawsuits that charge violations of insider trading prohibitions. However, other SEC rules, some of which specifically target insider trading, are also important. Selected Decisions Illustrating the Use of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to Prosecute Insider Trading Violations
There are numerous cases and administrative proceedings in which Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have been used to prosecute insider trading violations. On December 6, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court in Salman v. United States sided with the Ninth Circuit, unanimously upholding the conviction of Bassam Yacoub Salman for insider trading on tips that he had received from his brother-in-law. The Court agreed with federal prosecutors that a trader can be guilty of violating insider trading prohibitions even if the insider did not receive a tangible benefit, such as money or property, for passing the tip so long as the trader and insider are friends or relatives. Congressional Interest in Insider Trading
No bills concerning insider trading appear to have been introduced, to date, in the 115 th Congress. However, before the Supreme Court's Salman decision, at least three bills were introduced in the 114 th Congress in an attempt to prevent the type of securities trading that would appear to have been allowed under the Newman decision. H.R. H.R. However, the Salman decision does not appear to go as far as the bills in prohibiting the act of trading in securities with inside information and disclosing inside information. | Insider trading in securities may occur when a person in possession of material nonpublic information about a company trades in the company's securities and makes a profit or avoids a loss. Certain federal statutes have provisions that have been used to prosecute insider trading violations. For example, Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the disgorgement of short-swing profits by named insiders—directors, officers, and 10% shareholders. The 1934 Act's general antifraud provision, Section 10(b), is frequently used in the prosecution of insider traders. Although the statute does not specifically mention insider trading but, instead, forbids the use of "manipulative or deceptive" means in buying or selling securities, case law has clarified that insider trading is the type of fraud that is prohibited by Section 10(b). Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules issued to implement Section 10(b), particularly Rule 10b-5, have also been frequently invoked in insider trading prosecutions. With the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Congress enacted legislation that imposed up to treble damages (and in some cases the greater of $1 million or up to treble damages) on persons found guilty of insider trading. More recently, the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-105) explicitly stated that there is no exemption from the insider trading prohibitions for Members of Congress, congressional employees, or any federal officials. As noted above, SEC Rule 10b-5 is the most frequently used SEC rule in lawsuits that charge violations of insider trading prohibitions. However, other SEC rules, some of which specifically target insider trading, are also important.
There are numerous cases in which Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have been used to prosecute insider trading violations. The most recent case of note is the Supreme Court's decision in Salman v. United States. On December 6, 2016, the Court unanimously upheld the conviction of Bassam Yacoub Salman for insider trading on tips that he had received from his brother-in-law. The Court agreed with federal prosecutors that a trader can be guilty of violating insider trading prohibitions even if the insider did not receive a tangible benefit, such as money or property, for passing the tip so long as the trader and insider are friends or relatives.
No bill concerning insider trading appears to have been introduced in the 115th Congress to date. However, several bills, including H.R. 1173, H.R. 1625, and S. 702, were introduced in the 114th Congress before the Supreme Court's Salman decision. The Salman decision appears not to go as far as these bills would have in prohibiting the acts of trading in securities with inside information and disclosing inside information. |
crs_R44837 | crs_R44837_0 | This report discusses major benefits that are provided to individual service-disabled veterans by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment benefits typically support service-disabled veterans in obtaining and maintaining suitable employment. Housing grants and benefits can assist veterans in modifying their homes to accommodate a service-connected disability. Programs Not Included in This Report
In addition to the programs described in this report, service-disabled veterans also are typically eligible for programs that are available to the broader veteran population. This report does not discuss benefits that are available to both service-disabled and non-service disabled veterans, such as health benefits. A service-connected disability is a physical or mental injury or condition that was "incurred or aggravated" in the line of military duty and that results in a disability. Veterans Disability Compensation8
Veterans Disability Compensation (VDC) is a monthly cash payment to a veteran with a service-connected disability. A veteran with a disability rating of 20% or more is entitled to VR&E benefits if the VRC determines the veteran has an employment handicap. The Veterans Health Administration administers the Home Improvements and Structural Alterations grant to assist veterans who have both service- and non-service-connected disabilities in making their homes accessible. The grant limits for the first category of adapted housing are higher than for the second, and both types of adapted housing are available to veterans and servicemembers with severe burn injuries. Special Housing Adaptation Grants
SHA grants are available to veterans who may need to modify their homes, but perhaps not to the degree required for veterans eligible for SAH grants. Other Grants and Benefits
Automobile and Special Adaptive Equipment Grants35
Veterans with certain service-connected disabilities are eligible for one-time grants toward the purchase of an automobile or for financial assistance to purchase adaptive equipment for an existing automobile to make it safe or legal for the veteran's use. Clothing Allowance Grant39
Eligibility
A veteran with a service-connected disability is eligible for an annual clothing allowance if because of the disability he or she
wears or uses a prosthetic or orthopedic appliance, including a wheelchair, which the VA determines is likely to damage the veteran's clothing; or uses a prescription skin medication that the VA determines causes irreparable damage to the veteran's outergarments. Service-Disabled Veterans Insurance42
Eligibility
A veteran with a service-connected disability, even if rated at 0%, who is in good health may apply for Service-Disabled Veterans Insurance (S-DVI) life insurance within two years of receiving a disability rating from the VA. Good health is defined by regulation as being free from any medical condition that would likely weaken the person's normal physical or mental functions or shorten his or her life. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers programs to qualified former U.S. servicemembers (veterans). This report describes programs that provide benefits to veterans with service-connected disabilities (service-disabled veterans). These benefits can compensate a veteran for an injury or provide assistance to enable a veteran to have a higher quality of life.
To qualify for the benefits discussed in this report, a veteran must have a physical or mental condition that was "incurred or aggravated" in the line of military duty and that results in a disability. Service-connected disabilities are rated on a scale from 0% to 100% using a VA rating schedule. Disability ratings are used to determine eligibility for various types of benefits and the amount of Veterans Disability Compensation benefits. This report describes major VA benefit programs that are limited to veterans with service-connected disabilities.
Veterans Disability Compensation is a monthly cash payment to a veteran with a service-connected disability. Veterans with higher disability ratings are entitled to higher payments. Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment supports services for a veteran with an employment handicap to assist the veteran in obtaining and retaining suitable employment. Housing Grants and Benefits: Specially Adapted Housing Grants support the construction or acquisition of a new home or the remodeling of an existing home to help the veteran live independently in a barrier-free environment. Special Housing Adaptation Grants support modifications to a veteran's home to accommodate a disability but support less-intensive modifications than Specially Adapted Housing Grants. Home Improvements and Structural Alterations Grants can be used to improve a veteran's access to his or her home or to facilitate continuation of treatment for the veteran's disability. Other Grants and Benefits: Automobile and Special Adaptive Equipment Grants can be used to purchase an automobile or to purchase adaptive equipment for an existing automobile to make it safe or legal for the veteran to use that vehicle. Clothing Allowance Grants are for veterans who utilize medical devices or medications that are likely to damage the veteran's clothing. Service-Disabled Veterans Insurance is life insurance for service-disabled veterans.
This report does not discuss health care services provided by the Veterans' Health Administration and other benefits that are available to veterans who may or may not have service-connected disabilities. |
crs_R41721 | crs_R41721_0 | Most Recent Developments
On November 18, 2011, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-55 ), which includes the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 (Division B). The act includes $60.91 billion for CJS, of which $7.808 billion is for the Department of Commerce, $27.408 billion is for the Department of Justice, $24.838 billion is for the science agencies, and $856.6 million is for the related agencies. FY2012 Appropriations
This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress to provide FY2012 appropriations for CJS accounts. The source for the FY2011-enacted amounts, the FY2012-requested amounts, and the House Committee on Appropriations-recommended amounts is H.Rept. 112-169 . The Senate-passed amounts were taken from H.R. 2112 , as passed by the Senate. FY2012-enacted amounts were taken from H.Rept. 112-284 . The Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 includes a total of $60.91 billion for the bureaus and agencies funded as a part of the act. The Senate amended the House-passed version of H.R. The bill included $8.192 billion for the Department of Commerce, $26.925 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.643 billion for the science agencies, and $903.9 million for the related agencies. H.R. 2596 would have provided a total of $57.949 billion for CJS. The bill included $7.161 billion for the Department of Commerce, $26.323 billion for the Department of Justice, $23.649 billion for the science agencies, and $814.8 million for the related agencies. For FY2012, the Administration requested a total of $64.93 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual CJS appropriations bill. The Administration's FY2012 request included $8.761 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.68 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.498 billion for the science agencies, and $991.4 million for the related agencies. The Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 ( P.L. 112-10 ) provided a total of $61.092 billion for CJS, which includes $7.578 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.281 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.315 billion for the science agencies, and $917.9 million for the related agencies. Survey of Selected Issues
Department of Commerce
Congress considered the following issues as part of the Department of Commerce FY2012 appropriations process:
whether to fund the Obama Administration's proposed 17.2% increase in funding for the International Trade Administration for FY2012 as part of the Administration's goal of doubling exports over the next five years through the National Export Initiative; oversight of the President's Export Control Reform Initiative—under the Bureau of Industry and Security—the end goal of which is to create a single licensing authority for both dual-use and munitions exports; whether to approve, as a cost-control measure, the Administration's proposed termination of two Census Bureau programs: (1) the Statistical Abstract Program, which would eliminate both the print and online versions of Statistical Abstract , as well as the County and City Data Book , State and Metropolitan Area Data Book , and USA Counties Web database; and (2) the Federal Financial Statistics Program, which would terminate the Consolidated Federal Funds Report ; whether to provide the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office with the authority to use all the fees it collects in a fiscal year; whether to continue and expand support for the extramural programs of the National Institute of Standards and Technology aimed at the development of "pre-competitive" generic technologies; whether to approve the proposed establishment of a Climate Service line office and the related changes to the administrative structure of NOAA; whether to accept the Administration's proposal to transfer funds from public works to economic adjustment assistance under the Economic Development Administration to help distressed areas affected by unemployment as a result of the recession; funding levels and oversight of the new inter-agency Regional Innovation Program, a proposal for a new national competition to identify 20 growth zones across the country; whether to increase funding for the activities and outreach of the Minority Business Development Agency's (MBDA's) Office of Native American Business Development to support research on Native American trade promotion and economic disparities, and whether to increase funding for MBDA to monitor and provide technical assistance for minority businesses seeking federal contracts; and whether to accept the Administration's proposal to omit expenditures for Public Telecommunications Facilities, Planning and Construction from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration budget. 2112 as originally passed by the Senate, 7.2% above H.R. The House Committee on Appropriations recommended $16.793 billion. The Senate bill would have provided $501 million. | This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress to provide FY2012 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts.
On November 18, 2011, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-55), which includes the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 (Division B). The act includes $60.91 billion for CJS, of which $7.808 billion is for the Department of Commerce, $27.408 billion is for the Department of Justice, $24.838 billion is for the science agencies, and $856.6 million is for the related agencies.
On November 1, 2011, the Senate passed an amended version of H.R. 2112, which included the Senate's proposed funding for the agencies and bureaus funded as part of the annual CJS appropriations bill. H.R. 2112, as passed by the Senate, would have provided $60.664 billion for CJS. This included $8.192 billion for the Department of Commerce, $26.925 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.643 billion for the science agencies, and $903.9 million for the related agencies.
On July 20, 2011, the House Committee on Appropriations reported the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.R. 2596). The bill would have provided a total of $57.949 billion for CJS. The bill included $7.161 billion for the Department of Commerce, $26.323 billion for the Department of Justice, $23.649 billion for the science agencies, and $814.8 million for the related agencies.
For FY2012, the Administration requested a total of $64.93 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded as part of the annual CJS appropriations bill. The Administration's FY2012 request included $8.761 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.68 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.498 billion for the science agencies, and $991.4 million for the related agencies.
On April 15, 2011, President Obama signed into law the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10). The act provided a total of $61.092 billion for agencies and bureaus funded as part of the annual appropriations for CJS for FY2011. The $61.092 billion provided by the act includes $7.578 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.281 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.315 billion for the science agencies, and $917.9 million for the related agencies.
The source for the FY2011-enacted amounts, the FY2012-requested amounts, and the House Committee on Appropriations-recommended amounts is H.Rept. 112-169. The Senate-passed amounts were taken from H.R. 2112, as passed by the Senate. FY2012-enacted amounts were taken from H.Rept. 112-284. |
crs_RL30886 | crs_RL30886_0 | (2)
Estimates of Mexico's Share of Drug Trafficking Activity
According to estimates by the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law EnforcementAffairs,Mexico is the primary transit point for cocaine entering the United States from South America, and is a majorsourcecountry for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine. Table 1. Data on ephedrine seizures were provided by the Embassy of Mexico for thereporting period December 1, 1999 to November 30, 2000. (7)
Seizures of cocaine, which many consider to be the key test, were down to 23.2 metric tons in 2000, a 31% decline from theseizures in 1999, and a 12% decline from the average seizures in the previous six years (1994-1999), but roughlyequal tothe performance in recent years except for 1997 and 1999. Seizures of heroin were up to 0.302 metric tons in 2000, a 17% increasefrom 1999, a 31% increase over the 1994-1999 average, and the highest rate in the last seven years except for 1996. Among the key arrests in 2000 were the apprehensions of five members of the Arellano Feliz or Tijuana cartel, with themost important being Ismael "El Mayel" Higuera Guerrero (chief operations officer) and Jesus "Chuy" Labra Aviles(financial manager), and lesser collaborators being Enrique Harari Garduno, Carlos Ariel Charry Guzman, andIsmaelHiguera Avila. Critics argue that Mexican authorities have failed to weed out corruption, to arrest major drug traffickers, to extraditeMexican citizens to the United States on drug-related charges, and to enforce the country's anti-money-launderinglegislation (9) . Following the meeting of Presidents Bush and Fox in Mexicoinmid-February 2001, officials are working to implement this temporary surrender protocol. The U.S. estimate of effective eradication of opium poppy cultivation in 2000 of 7,600 hectares was 4% lower than in1999, and 6% lower than the average effective eradication in the 1994-1999 period. This produced a potential yieldin2000 of only 24 metric tons of opium gum, a 55% decline from 1999, and a new record low. Mexico's Counter-Narcotics Cooperation with the United States
U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics cooperation increased substantially during the Administration of PresidentZedillo(1994-2000), with the full range of law enforcement, military, and border and drug control agencies being involved. Thepresidentssigned agreements on law enforcement cooperation and implementation of performance measures of effectivenessfor thejoint strategy when President Clinton visited Mexico in mid-February 1999, and the two governments decided inNovember1999 to establish a new interdiction working group under the High Level Contact Group. Officials of Mexico and the United States have also cooperated extensively on United Nations (U.N.) and Organization ofAmerican States (OAS) anti-drug activities in recent years. They worked together with other governments on theagreement of the Inter-American Drug Control Commission (CICAD) in October 1999 to adopt a multilateralevaluationmechanism (MEM) to assess all member countries' counter-narcotics performance, and they participated in the firsttest ofthis system in 2000. | This report provides information on Mexico's counter-narcotics efforts during the six year presidency of Ernesto Zedillo(December 1, 1994 to December 1, 2000) and a short period of the presidency of Vicente Fox (December 1, 2000,to March1, 2001), with special emphasis on calendar year 2000, covered by the State Department's report on internationalnarcoticscontrol.
Share of Traffic. Mexico continued to be the transit point for about 50-65% of the cocaine entering the United Statesfrom South America in 2000, with the uncertain and varying estimates being similar to estimates in recent years. Mexicoalso continued to be a major source country for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine, and a major center formoneylaundering activities.
Control Efforts. Seizures of cocaine by Mexico in 2000 were down 31% from 1999, and down 12% from the 1994-1999average, which might be viewed as lagging performance. Seizures of opium were down from unusually high levelsin1999, but represented a 32% increase over the 1994-1999 average. Seizures of heroin were up slightly, whileseizures ofmarijuana, methamphetamine, and drug labs were up significantly. Arrests were up slightly in2000, to reach the highestlevels in the last seven years except for 1996, but numerous instances of apparent corruption persist. Severalimportantdrug traffickers were arrested in 2000, including key members of the Arellano Feliz or Tijuana cartel, Ismael "ElMayel"Higuera Guerrero (chief operations officer) and Jesus "Chuy" Labra Aviles (financial manager). While only oneMexicannational was extradited to the United States in 2000 on drug-related charges, a January 2001 ruling by the MexicanSupreme Court, and Mexican Senate approval of the temporary surrender protocol are promising developments. Eradication of opium and marijuana declined somewhat in 2000, but with fewer hectares ofcultivation, the potential yieldof opium declined markedly to a new record low, and the potential yield of marijuana was lower than four of theprevioussix years.
Cooperative Efforts. U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics cooperation continued at unprecedented levels during the final yearsof the presidencies of Zedillo and Clinton, with the full range of law enforcement, military, border, and drug controlagencies being involved. In the last two years the countries agreed on measures to gauge the effectiveness of thejointanti-drug strategy, they established a new interdiction working group that led to significantly increased maritimeinterdiction cooperation, and they took various cooperative steps to control money laundering activities. They alsocooperated on U.N. and OAS anti-drug activities, including the development and first application of the multilateralevaluation mechanism (MEM) of the Inter-American Drug Control Commission (CICAD) to assess thecounter-narcoticsperformance of all member countries. Following elections in both countries, Presidents Fox and Bush met inMexico inmid-February 2001, and agreed to strengthen law enforcement and counter-narcotics cooperation between thecountries. |
crs_RS22670 | crs_RS22670_0 | Background
In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp . that, under the Patent Act as it was written at that time, it was not an act of patent infringement to manufacture the components of a patented invention in the United States and then ship them abroad for assembly into an end product. In response to this loophole in the patent law that would have allowed potential infringers to avoid liability, Congress added subsection (f) to § 271 of the Patent Act. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. The patent at issue in Microsoft v. AT&T concerned AT&T's patent on a speech coder-decoder (a codec). Microsoft exports overseas a limited number of U.S.-made "golden master disks" containing the machine-readable software code of its Windows operating system; foreign computer manufacturers may use these disks to replicate the master disk in generating multiple copies of Windows for installation on foreign-assembled computers that are then sold to foreign customers. In a 7-1 decision issued in late April 2007, the Court reversed the Federal Circuit's judgment, holding that Microsoft was not liable for patent infringement under § 271(f), as the statute is currently written, when foreign-manufactured computers are loaded with Windows software that has been copied abroad from a master disk or an electronic transmission sent by Microsoft from the United States. | Generally speaking, United States patent law does not have extraterritorial effect. The exception, however, is § 271(f) of the Patent Act, which makes it an act of patent infringement to manufacture within the United States the components of a patented invention and then export those disassembled parts for combination abroad into an end product. However, in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp . (550 U.S. ___ , No. 05-1056, decided April 30, 2007), the U.S. Supreme Court held that software companies are not liable for patent infringement under § 271(f) when they export software that has been embodied in machine-readable, physical form (a CD-ROM, for example), with the intent that such software be copied abroad for installation onto foreign-manufactured computers. In this case, AT&T holds a patent on a speech software program upon which Microsoft's Windows operating system infringes. Microsoft ships abroad a "master version" of Windows, either on a disk or via encrypted electronic transmission, which foreign computer manufacturers use to generate copies. Thus, the actual copies of the Windows software that are installed onto the foreign-made computers are made abroad. Consequently, according to the Supreme Court, liability for such unauthorized replication, if any, would have to arise under the patent laws of those foreign countries, not the U.S. Patent Act. |
crs_RL32869 | crs_RL32869_0 | It contained a reallocation of $29 billion in Hurricane Katrina recovery funds,as well as a 1% across-the-board rescission for all domestic discretionary programs. 3058 , the FY2006Treasury, Transportation, Judiciary, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), District of Columbia,and Related Agencies (TTHUD) funding bill. It was signed into law on November 30, 2005, as P.L.109-115 . For most accounts, the final agreement splits thedifference between the House- and Senate- approved levels, and it rejects the Administration'sStrengthening America's Communities Initiative (SACI), which would have eliminated theCommunity Development Block Grant (CDBG) program and replaced it with a new program withinthe Department of Commerce. Rescission and Reallocation Package Submitted. Like the Houseversion, the Senate bill rejected the President's SACI proposal. On June 21,2005, the House Appropriations Committee approved, with minor changes, an FY2006 TTHUDfunding bill that was approved by the Subcommittee on June 15, 2005. 3058 provided an overall increase in funding for HUD of more than $4 billion above the President'srequest. President's Budget Submitted. The Presidentsubmitted his FY2006 budget to the Congress on February 7, 2005, requesting $29.1 billion forHUD, a cut of $2.8 billion, or 9%, from FY2005 appropriations of $31.9 billion. The mostcontroversial aspect of the budget was the proposed elimination of the CDBG and related programsat HUD, and their replacement with a new program at the Department of Commerce. 109-148 . HOPE VI. The bill adopted the President's request that the Indian Economic Block Grant program, whichwas funded within the Community Development Fund, be funded as a set-aside in this account; H.R.3058 would set aside $45 million for this purpose, which is a 35% reduction in fundingfrom FY2005 and a 22% reduction in funding from the President's request. Housing for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA). On October 20, 2005, the full Senate approved its version of H.R. The Senate bill would have appropriated $32.4 million infunding for college and university programs and retain the programs under the CDF account, whilethe House bill called for transferring the activity to a new Self Help and Assisted Homeownershipaccount; it would appropriate $40 million for the Neighborhood Initiative Program, a program thatwas not included in the President's request or the House version of the bill; and it would haveappropriated $30 million for capacity building grants under the National Community DevelopmentInitiative program, which is $2 million less than the amount recommended by the House. Both the House and Senate-passed versions of the FY2006 HUD bill would have provided$1.9 billion for the HOME program in FY2006, less than the President requested, but slightly morethan was provided in FY2005. Like the House and Senate versions, the final version includes funds for capitalgrants, but does not transfer Section 811 vouchers to the Section 8 tenant-based rental account, asthe Senate version proposed. 3058 increased funding for fair housing activitiesabove the President's requested level, but provided less than was appropriated in FY2005 and whatwas recommended by the House. | In February 2005, a House Appropriations Committee reorganization plan abolished theVeterans Affairs, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and IndependentAgencies Subcommittee, sending HUD to a new Treasury, Transportation, Judiciary, Housing andUrban Development, District of Columbia and Related Agencies Subcommittee. A similar but notidentical change was made in the Senate, creating the Transportation, Treasury, HUD Subcommittee.
On February 7, 2005, the Administration submitted a $29.1 billion FY2006 budget requestfor HUD, which is 9% less than was provided in FY2005. The most controversial part of the budgetproposal would have eliminated the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program inHUD and transferred its purposes to the Department of Commerce, combining it with 17 otherprograms (that had approximately $5.6 billion of appropriations in FY2005) into a new $3.7 billionStrengthening America's Communities Initiative (SACI) grant program. The President's budgetproposal also included increased funding for Section 8 tenant-based rental vouchers, HomelessAssistance Grants, and the HOME program; decreased funding for Housing for the Disabled (Section811), Housing for Persons with AIDS, and Fair Housing programs; and elimination of funding forthe HOPE VI program.
On June 30, 2005, the House approved an FY2006 HUD appropriations bill, H.R. 3058 , funding HUD at more than $4 billion above the President's requested level. The bill, which rejected the President's SACI initiative, would fund CDBG at HUD and increasefunding above the President's request for several HUD programs.
On October 20, 2005, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 3058 , providing forHUD more than $5 billion above what the President requested and more than $1 billion above whatthe House version allocated. Like the House bill, the Senate version rejected the President's SACIinitiative and proposed to fund CDBG and related programs within the HUD budget, and increasefunding above the President's request and the House-approved level for several HUD programs,including HOPE VI and Section 811.
On October 28, 2005, the President submitted to Congress a rescission and reallocationpackage that would rescind $124 million in HUD funding and transfer $2.2 billion to HUD fromFEMA's disaster relief fund. A modified version was attached to the FY2006 DefenseAppropriations law ( P.L. 109-148 ), providing $11.9 billion for HUD. That bill also contained a 1%across-the-board rescission that applies to all of HUD's discretionary programs.
On November 18, 2005, the House and Senate approved a final version of the FY2006 HUDappropriations bill. It does not adopt the CDBG transfer, and funds most programs between theHouse- and Senate-approved levels.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: ALD -- American Law; DSP -- Domestic Social Policy; G&F --Government and Finance |
crs_R42997 | crs_R42997_0 | Recent years have witnessed a growing interest, in Congress, in the executive branch, and in the broader policy community, in re-examining how well the U.S. government conducts the business of national security—from decision-making, to strategy-making, to budgeting, to planning and execution, to accountability and oversight. Within the context of these debates, a number of practitioners and observers have called for the adoption of "unified"—or "consolidated" or "integrated"—approaches to national security budgeting. The primary concern of this unified national security budgeting school, loosely defined, is not to improve U.S. budgeting practices per se , but rather to use budgetary mechanisms to drive changes in the priorities and practice of national security. Members of the school broadly share the view that some U.S. national security concerns, such as counter-terrorism, or stabilization and reconstruction, are inherently cross-cutting: that is, they require the participation of multiple agencies, and their associated responsibilities could conceivably be divided up any number of ways among various agencies. Such changes, they add, could improve effectiveness and save money. Various proponents have put forward quite different proposed remedies and are—apparently—aiming to solve quite different underlying problems. For Congress, constitutionally mandated to control the power of the purse, fundamental issues at stake include both oversight of the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. government national security activities, and the integrity of the overall federal system of budgeting. Of particular interest may be the extent to which, if any, efforts to optimize the overall system, and efforts to optimize its national security "sub-system," constitute competing imperatives. How the Current System Addresses National Security
The current system does not budget for national security in an explicit and bounded way. Third, skeptics might observe that "national security" is but one subset of overall U.S. concerns, and that optimizing for national security might well mean sub-optimizing in other arenas and at the level of U.S. government responsibilities. A Single National Security Budget
Perhaps the most ambitious approach to unified budgeting for national security would feature a single, shared pool of funding for all national security activities, with systemic-level decision-making and accountability from the White House, and with holistic congressional oversight of the entire pool. In turn, different levels of adjudication might introduce different kinds of potential costs. Of those, "crosscut displays" may be the most common. Strategically driven budgeting carries a number of potential costs in the sense of additional requirements. For any given unified budgeting proposal, what problem is it designed to solve—for example, are current U.S. national security efforts perceived to be too expensive, too ineffective, or imbalanced in the distribution of labor across the executive branch? For any unified budgeting proposal, how would the impact of its use on both effectiveness and efficiency be determined? | In recent years a number of observers and practitioners have identified various facets of U.S. government national security practice—decision-making, strategy-making, budgeting, planning and execution, and congressional oversight—as inherently "cross-cutting." They have in mind arenas—such as counterterrorism, and stabilization and reconstruction—that by definition involve multiple agencies, or for which responsibilities could be divided up in any number of ways among various agencies. For such facets of national security, they argue, the U.S. government is seldom able to conduct genuinely holistic consideration. The cost, they add, is a loss of effectiveness, or efficiency, or both.
In order to encourage holistic consideration of national security issues, some members of this inchoate school have called for the use of "unified national security budgeting" (UNSB). To be clear, their goal is not to refine the U.S. federal system of budgeting, but rather to use budgetary mechanisms to drive changes in U.S. national security practices. Within this broad school of thought, various proponents call for the adoption of a number of different approaches, from a single shared funding pool for all national security activities, to mission-specific funding pools, to crosscut displays, to more strategically driven budgeting. In turn, various proponents apparently aim to achieve quite different kinds of change with their proposed remedies—from rebalancing the distribution of roles and responsibilities among executive branch agencies, to saving money, to revisiting fundamental understandings about how U.S. national security is best protected.
For Congress, constitutionally mandated to control the power of the purse, the most fundamental issue at stake may be ensuring the integrity of the overall federal budgeting system—there may be no single best answer regarding how it should function, but that it function would seem to be of paramount importance. At the same time, while the current system does not adjudicate "national security" in an explicit, bounded way, and while no single, generally agreed definition of the boundaries of "national security" exists, Congress has oversight responsibility for any number of activities and executive branch agencies that could reasonably be considered to contribute to national security, and thus vested interests in both the effectiveness and the efficiency of U.S. national security practices. A basic challenge for Congress may be fundamental tensions between optimizing the overall federal budgeting system, and optimizing for its national security sub-system.
For any set of "unified budgeting" proposals, it may be helpful to Congress to consider what problems the proposals are designed to address; the potential costs and benefits that implementing the proposals might introduce; the risks the proposals might pose to the functioning of the current overall U.S. federal budgeting system; and how the impact of the implementation of the proposals would best be gauged. |
crs_R43430 | crs_R43430_0 | Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR), and why has it required repeated congressional attention? 105-33 ), the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) is the statutory method for determining the annual updates to the Medicare physician fee schedule (MPFS). The lack of a viable alternative payment model has hampered attempts to repeal and replace the SGR system. Each of the three committees of jurisdiction passed bills in 2013 that would repeal the SGR system for determining Medicare physician payment updates. When does the current doc fix patch expire? | This report responds to frequently asked questions about the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) system for updating Medicare physician fee schedule payments (MPFS) and the recent legislative efforts to repeal and replace the SGR. Frequently asked questions address the background of the SGR, the need for congressional overrides (also referred to as "doc fixes"), and current legislative activity.
For additional information, see CRS Report R40907, Medicare Physician Payment Updates and the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) System , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL30811 | crs_RL30811_0 | Coinciding with the slowdown in inter-Korean dialogue since the spring of 2001, there have been a growing number ofnaval and border clashes between the two Koreas and between North Korea and Japan. Thisis amarked contrast to earlier thaws (in 1972, 1985, and the early 1990s) in which the governments monopolizedcross-borderactivity. (8)
Criticism of the Sunshine Policy in South Korea. (10) President Kim'sdomestic support has been further weakened by the widespread perception that he is a "lame duck." Chronology
2000
3/9/00 - Kim Dae Jung's "Berlin Declaration." 12/12-16/00 - 4th round inter-ministerial talks , in Pyongyang. Thenew Defense Minister, Kim Dong-shin, has conservative ties. TheROKalso announces there will not be a joint North-South celebration of the first anniversary of the June 2000 summit. The U.S. will offer theDPRK a further lifting of U.S. sanctions, assistance to the North Korean people (presumably food aid), and "otherpoliticalsteps" if the North agrees to 1) start to take serious, verifiable steps to reduce the conventional weapons threat tothe South,2) "improved implementation" of the '94 Framework, and 3) verifiable "constraints" on North Korea's missileexports. | This report chronicles major developments in the thaw between North and South Korea that has followed the historicinter-Korean summit meeting in June 2000. In the months immediately following the summit, the two Koreasdeveloped anew dialogue, which included several inter-ministerial talks, a meeting of defense ministers, talks on economiccooperation, and family reunions. The sheer breadth and depth of the dialogue indicated to many analysts that SeoulandPyongyang were trying in earnest to regularize and institutionalize the rapprochement, in contrast to previouslyephemeralthaws in 1972, 1985 and the early 1990s. There have been several setbacks, however, leading many critics towonderwhether North Korea's diplomatic outreach is merely a tactic to obtain economic assistance and reduce the U.S.trooppresence in South Korea. Since February 2001, inter-Korean diplomacy has effectively been frozen. With SouthKoreanPresident Kim Dae Jung being openly labeled a "lame duck," many have wondered whether his sunshine policy ofengaging North Korea has run out of steam.
Due to the growing length of the chronology, this report will not be updated. Instead, a new North-South timeline will bestarted each calendar year, beginning with events on January 1 of that year. |
crs_RL33851 | crs_RL33851_0 | Overview1
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has helped over 3.69 million Afghan refugees return to Afghanistan since March of 2002, marking the largest assisted return operation in UNHCR's history. In addition, more than a million refugees have returned to Afghanistan without availing themselves of UNHCR's assistance (also known as "spontaneous returns") bringing the total number of returnees to 4.8 million or more. The working assumption at the time was that there were approximately 2 million refugees in Pakistan and 1.5 million in Iran. Almost everyone was caught off-guard, when subsequently 2.15 million Afghans returned in 2002, and yet most of the camps in Pakistan (and to some extent the cities in Iran) continued to house large numbers of Afghan refugees. Although the numbers of returns declined in subsequent years, it can be seen from Table 1 that through 2005 the pace remained very strong. Profile of Remaining Refugees
UNHCR estimates that, as of December 2006, perhaps 2.46 million registered and unregistered Afghans are currently living in Pakistan and more than 900,000 in Iran. Still, perhaps as many as 3.5 million registered and unregistered Afghans still live in exile. The GoP appears to have both economic and security concerns about the Afghan population in Pakistan. Economic worries about the Afghan population have become more persistent in recent years, as the overall level of international funding for refugees in Pakistan has decreased. According to some reports, this resulted in many Afghans crossing the border into Afghanistan without the desire to do so and without adequate preparation, support, or security on either side of the border. Future Prospects
With each passing year, however, it may become more difficult to encourage refugees to return voluntarily to Afghanistan. Those who remain, by contrast, may find it especially difficult to return to a country to which they have, relatively speaking, few ties. Remittances from Afghans working in Iran bring a good deal of revenue to their families in Afghanistan, and Afghans continue to be an important source of labor in Iran, where they are particularly prevalent in construction and agriculture. Nevertheless, Iran's position, like that of Pakistan, has generally been that it is time for Afghans to return home, and these efforts are part of an explicit effort to encourage Afghans to return to Afghanistan. U.S. Assistance for Afghan Refugees
The United States government (USG) has provided humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees since the early 1980s. Almost all assistance has been provided through the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account, and has been programmed by the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). This funding is used not only for the protection and care of refugees in countries of asylum, but also for the reintegration of Afghan returnees in Afghanistan. Thus, as funding is declining, its importance may be increasing. Both the GoI and the GoP, indicate some possible flexibility on the future of Afghan migration, but have nevertheless made clear that they believe the refugee crisis in Afghanistan is over, and that there is no excuse for Afghans to remain in their countries on humanitarian grounds. It remains to be seen what effect the Pakistani government's recently announced plans for controlling and securing the Afghan border, through the construction of fences and planting of landmines, will have on refugee movements. New research indicates that Afghan labor migration may prove beneficial to both Afghanistan—in the form of remittances—and to countries of asylum—in the form of labor. Maintaining security along the border with Afghanistan is also a concern. | The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has helped 3.69 million Afghan refugees return to Afghanistan since March 2002, marking the largest assisted return operation in its history. In addition, more than 1.11 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan without availing themselves of UNHCR's assistance, bringing the total number of returnees to at least 4.8 million. Despite the massive returns, possibly 3.5 million registered and unregistered Afghans still remain in these two countries of asylum—up to 2.46 million in Pakistan and more than 900,000 in Iran—making Afghans the second-largest refugee population in the world. These numbers are far greater than the initial working assumption in 2002 of 3.5 million refugees; in fact, the total is believed to be more than 8 million. The United States spent approximately $332.37 million between FY 2002 and FY 2005 on humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees and returnees through the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). It continues to provide support to refugees and returnees.
The 110th Congress faces several relevant challenges. The safe and voluntary return of refugees to Afghanistan is not only a major part of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, but also an important indicator of its success. To the extent that refugees continue to return, it can be seen that Afghans are taking part in the future of their country. It is becoming more difficult, however, to encourage refugees to return. Those who were most capable of returning did so in the early years; those who remain have progressively less to return to—houses, livelihoods, family—in Afghanistan. Furthermore, maintaining the high pace of returns will require greater levels of reintegration assistance to anchor returnees in their homes and help them reestablish their lives in Afghanistan. Security will also be a major factor in population displacement within and across borders.
The status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran has also been somewhat controversial in recent years as these governments want all Afghan refugees to return to Afghanistan. Officials in Pakistan have become concerned that the concentrations of Afghans in the country pose a security and crime risk, as individuals and goods are smuggled across the border. At the same time, however, many observers argue that Afghan labor migration may be beneficial to both Iran and Pakistan—which take advantage of cheap and effective immigrant labor—as well as Afghanistan, whose citizens benefit heavily from remittances sent in from abroad. To cut off this source of income for many poor Afghans could have disastrous consequences—not only humanitarian, but in the security sphere as well, as more than a million Afghans along the Afghan-Pakistan border are deprived of livelihoods and resort to other means to feed their families. Reportedly, many Afghans cross the border regularly, without documentation, and Islamabad does not appear to have the resources to control this flow. A future challenge will thus be to balance reasonable concerns about security with the importance of Afghanistan's labor plans in the regional economies and the forces that drive its migration patterns. It remains to be seen what effect the Pakistani government's recently announced plans for controlling and securing the Afghan border, through the construction of fences and planting of landmines, will have on refugee movements. This report will be updated. |
crs_RL33163 | crs_RL33163_0 | Background
The United States has provided support to drug crop eradication programs in the Andes sincethe 1980s and for alternative development (AD) since at least the 1970s. Since 2000, the centerpieceof the U.S. counternarcotics policy has been the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), withColombia the major recipient. ACI supports anumber of missions, including interdiction of drug trafficking, illicit crop eradication, alternativedevelopment, and rule of law and democracy promotion in the Andes. The three main producers of cocaine -- Colombia, Bolivia and Peru -- collectively producenearly the entire global supply. In addition, Colombia has become a producer of high quality heroin,most of it destined for the United States. From FY2000 through FY2005, the United States has provided a total of about $4.3 billion from theAndean Counterdrug Initiative account. FMF assistance to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia has the objectiveof establishing and strengthening national authority in remote areas that are prone to drug trafficking,and related activities of illegally armed groups. Drug crops can also be manually eradicated, often with the agreement of the grower, but also withouthis consent. (7)
Reductions in coca and opium poppy cultivation began to be seen by 2003. While once the largest producer of cocaine in the Andes, it is now second toColombia. Alternative Development Programs
Providing alternatives to drug crop cultivation is believed to be a crucial component toachieve effective eradication. U.S. alternative development programs are managed by the U.S.Agency for International Development, and often include technical support for farmers agreeing togive up their drug crops, marketing assistance, and the strengthening of transportation infrastructurein order to get crops to market. (14)
Issues for Congress
Congress has expressed a number of concerns with regard to eradication, including thefollowing: the health and environmental effects of aerial spraying; the reliability of drug cropestimates; and the effectiveness and sustainability of eradication. With regard to alternativedevelopment, Congress has expressed interest in its effectiveness; its relationship with eradication;and the long-term sustainability of programs. (21) The State Department has certified four times since 2002 thatthe herbicide mixture poses no unreasonable risk to health or the environment, and that usage inColombia is consistent with applications in the United States and with label recommendations. According to the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy, the eradication program in Colombia has resulted in potential cocaineproduction decreasing by 7% in 2004 to 430 metric tons of pure cocaine. This is down from its peakof 700 metric tons in 2001. (65)
Linking Eradication and AD. Appendix A. Map of the Andean Region | The United States has supported drug crop eradication and alternative development programsin the Andes for decades. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru collectively produce nearly the entire globalsupply of cocaine. In addition, Colombia has become a producer of high quality heroin, most of itdestined for the United States and Europe. The United States provides counternarcotics assistancethrough the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). The program supports a number of missions,including interdiction of drug trafficking, illicit crop eradication, alternative development, and ruleof law and democracy promotion. From FY2000 through FY2005, the United States has provideda total of about $4.3 billion in ACI funds.
Since 2001, coca cultivation in the Andes has been reduced by 22%, with the largest decreaseoccurring in Colombia, according to the State Department. Opium poppy crops, grown mainly inColombia and from which heroin is made, have been reduced by 67%. However, the region wasstill capable of producing 640 metric tons of cocaine, and 3.8 metric tons of heroin in 2004,according to the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Congress has expressed a number of concerns with regard to eradication, especially the healthand environmental effects of aerial spraying, its sustainability and social consequences, and thereliability of drug crop estimates. With regard to alternative development, Congress has expressedinterest in its effectiveness, its relationship to eradication, and the long-term sustainability ofprograms once they are started.
Drug crops are eradicated either manually or by aerial spraying of a herbicide mixture, themain ingredient being glyphosate, used commercially in the United States under the brand name ofRoundup®. Eradication can be conducted with the voluntary agreement of growers, or involuntarily. Peru and Bolivia do not allow aerial eradication, which has proven to be controversial. Criticsbelieve it poses risks to the environment and the health of inhabitants living in sprayed regions. Proponents believe it is the most effective and safe means to defoliate large areas being used for drugcrop cultivation, thereby removing a lucrative source of income from the illegally armed Colombiangroups.
Providing alternatives to drug crops is believed to be crucial to achieve effective eradication. This often includes technical support for farmers, marketing assistance, and strengthening thetransportation infrastructure in order to get crops to market. The U.S. approach to alternativedevelopment (AD) is to link it to eradication. Growers who agree to eradicate are eligible forassistance.
This report will not be updated. For more information on the Andean Counterdrug Initiative,see CRS Report RL32337 , Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs:FY2005 Assistance ; and CRS Report RL32774 , Plan Colombia: A Progress Report , both by ConnieVeillette. |
crs_R41036 | crs_R41036_0 | On January 12, 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti. As of January 25, 2010, the death toll was estimated to exceed 150,000. The earthquake and resulting aftershocks affected approximately 3 million people and caused significant damage to buildings and infrastructure. The earthquake has left an estimated 1 million Haitians homeless. On January 22, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Haiti Assistance Income Tax Incentive Act (HAITI Act; P.L. 111-126 ). Specifically, the legislation allows taxpayers making charitable contributions of cash made to organizations providing aid to earthquake victims after January 11, 2010, and before March 1, 2010, to take the associated charitable deduction on their 2009 income tax returns. The HAITI Act ( H.R. 4462 ) was introduced in the House on January 19, 2010, and passed by a voice vote on January 20, 2010. The Senate had introduced companion legislation ( S. 2936 ) on January 20, 2010, but passed the identical House legislation H.R. 4462 on January 21, 2010. Provisions in the HAITI Act are similar to those adopted under P.L. 109-1 following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that the HAITI Act would result in revenue losses of approximately $2 million over the 10-year budget window spanning FY2010 through FY2019. Current Law
Under current law, charitable contributions from individuals, corporations, and estates and trusts are tax deductible in the year they are made. Individuals may claim deductions up to 50% of their adjusted gross income for qualified contributions to 501(c)(3) charitable organizations. Corporations can deduct up to 10% of their taxable income for qualified charitable donations. Corporations can also carry forward unused charitable deductions for up to five years. Total charitable giving in 2008 was $307.65 billion. Natural Disasters and Charitable Contributions
The Indian Ocean Tsunami
Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, changes in the laws governing charitable giving were made in the act to accelerate the income tax benefits for charitable cash contributions for the relief of victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami ( P.L. Hence, the taxpayer saved $17 by claiming the charitable deduction on their 2004 tax return. Under KETRA, individual and corporate giving limits were temporarily suspended. Assessment of the HAITI Act
The accelerated deduction provision of the HAITI Act, like deductions for charitable contributions generally, reduces the net cost of contributing, and is intended to encourage donations to disaster relief agencies that provide assistance to victims of the earthquake in Haiti. The inframarginal impact of a tax subsidy is the benefits given to individuals whose behavior is unchanged by the policy. Efficient tax incentives are ones where the marginal impact is large relative to the inframarginal impact. In general, theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest that tax benefits for charitable giving do not appear to significantly increase donations. Second, deductions violate vertical equity principles, as greater benefits accrue to higher income individuals. | On January 12, 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti. As of January 25, 2010, the death toll was estimated to exceed 150,000. The earthquake and resulting aftershocks affected approximately 3 million people and caused significant damage to buildings and infrastructure. The earthquake has left an estimated 1 million Haitians homeless.
On January 22, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Haiti Assistance Income Tax Incentive Act (HAITI Act; P.L. 111-126). This legislation accelerates income tax benefits for charitable cash contributions for the relief of earthquake victims. Specifically, the legislation allows taxpayers making charitable contributions of cash made to organizations providing aid to earthquake victims after January 11, 2010, and before March 1, 2010, to take the associated charitable deduction on their 2009 income tax returns. The HAITI Act (H.R. 4462) was introduced in the House on January 19, 2010, and passed by a voice vote on January 20, 2010. The Senate had introduced companion legislation (S. 2936) on January 20, 2010, but passed the identical House legislation H.R. 4462 on January 21, 2010. Provisions in the HAITI Act are similar to those adopted under P.L. 109-1 following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that the HAITI Act would result in revenue losses of approximately $2 million over the 10-year budget window spanning FY2010 through FY2019.
Under current law, charitable contributions to 501(c)(3) charitable organizations from individuals, corporations, and estates and trusts are tax deductible in the year they are made. Individuals can deduct up to 50% of their adjusted gross income (AGI), phased-out for higher income individuals. Corporations can deduct up to 10% of their taxable income. Individuals and corporations can carry forward any unclaimed charitable deductions for up to five years. Total charitable giving in 2008 was $307.65 billion.
In the past, Congress has passed legislation to encourage charitable giving following natural disasters. Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, legislation was passed that allowed taxpayers making charitable contributions to aid tsunami victims in January 2005 to take the charitable deduction on their 2004 tax return. This provision is similar to the one enacted under the HAITI Act. In September 2005, following Hurricane Katrina, individual and corporate giving limits were suspended. The rules surrounding charitable contributions of food inventory and books were also relaxed to encourage in-kind giving.
The HAITI Act, like other tax policies, can be evaluated along the dimensions of efficiency and equity. Efficiency is greatest when the policy's marginal impact, the giving induced by the program, is large relative to the policy's inframarginal impact, the benefits given to those whose behavior was not directly caused by the tax policy. Using this framework, the HAITI Act is unlikely to be economically efficient. In general, tax benefits for charitable giving do not appear to significantly increase donations. Furthermore, tax deductions violate principles of vertical equity in that the benefits of tax deductions accrue disproportionately to higher income groups and provide larger benefits to those with a greater ability to pay. |
crs_R45326 | crs_R45326_0 | T he U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is an agency within the Department of Defense with both military and civil works responsibilities. Congress directs USACE's civil works activities through authorizations legislation, annual and supplemental appropriations, and oversight activities. As part of USACE's civil works activities, Congress has authorized and appropriated funds for the agency to perform the following:
water resource projects for maintaining navigable channels, reducing flood and storm damage, and restoring aquatic ecosystems, among other purposes; regulation of activities affecting certain waters and wetlands activities; and remediation of sites involved in the development of U.S. nuclear weapons from the 1940s through the 1960s, administered under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). In February 2018, Congress also provided more than $17.40 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. USACE Projects
USACE water resource projects attract congressional attention because these projects can have significant local and regional economic benefits and environmental effects. Instead, USACE generally has been directly engaged in the planning and construction of projects; the majority of its appropriations are used to perform work on geographically specific studies and projects authorized by Congress. An estimated $96 billion in authorized USACE construction projects and dam safety work is eligible for USACE construction appropriations; discretionary appropriations for the USACE Construction account in annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bills have averaged $2 billion in recent years. At times, including in BBA 2018, Congress also has funded construction of new flood control projects in areas affected by recent flood disasters. Enacted appropriations bills since FY2014 have allowed the agency to initiate a specified number of USACE new start studies and construction projects. USACE Supplemental Appropriations
USACE also undertakes flood fighting activities and other natural disaster response and recovery activities. From FY1990 through FY2018, Congress in total provided USACE accounts with almost $50.63 billion in supplemental appropriations, more than $49.20 billion of which was provided from FY2005 through FY2018. The following sections discuss three current policy topics related to USACE supplemental appropriations in more detail:
transparency on the use of USACE supplemental appropriations; funding nonfederal interests to study and construct federal flood control projects; and the level of supplemental appropriations for construction activities. Although some of the funding has provided for (or is expected to provide for) the completion of ongoing construction projects in flood-affected areas, a significant portion of the funding has been allocated to construction projects that were not funded for construction prior to the flood event or the enactment of the supplemental appropriations law. Also supplemental bills often alter or waive various requirements that otherwise are standard for USACE activities, such as cost shares, project cost increase limitations, and congressional limits on new studies and new construction starts. In FY2012 and FY2019, Congress provided $0.5 billion and $2.2 billion, respectively, in additional funding to USACE through the annual appropriations process. Examples of these policy questions include the following:
How has Congress's role shifted vis-à-vis USACE and the agency's appropriations, and does that shift affect the type of information and engagement that Congress may pursue in the future regarding USACE's use of appropriations? How do these trends affect the effective, efficient, and accountable use of federal funding provided to USACE? What do these trends portend for USACE's long-term planning, budgeting, and duties? 115-123 ), Congress has provided $17.398 billion in supplemental appropriations to the following U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) accounts:
$135 million for Investigations for flood risk reduction studies; $15,055 million for Construction (of which $15,000 million is specifically for construction of flood risk reduction projects and $55 million is for short-term repairs to damaged construction projects); $770 million for Mississippi River and Tributaries; $608 million for Operations and Maintenance; $810 million for Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies; and $20 million for Expenses. $4.575 billion is to be used for USACE flood and storm damage reduction construction activities in any state or territory with more than one flood-related major disaster declaration in calendar year (CY) 2014, CY2015, CY2016, or CY2017. Seventeen states (e.g., North Carolina, which was affected by Hurricane Matthew in 2016 and Hurricane Florence in 2018) do not qualify for USACE supplemental construction appropriations provided by the BBA 2018. | The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is an agency within the Department of Defense with both military and civil works responsibilities. The agency's civil works activities consist largely of the planning, construction, and operation of water resource projects to maintain navigable channels, reduce flood and storm damage, and restore aquatic ecosystems. Congress directs USACE's civil works activities through authorization legislation, annual and supplemental appropriations, and oversight. For Congress, the issue is not only the level of USACE appropriations but also how efficiently the agency is delivering flood control, navigation, and ecosystem restoration projects. These projects can have significant local as well as national economic and environmental benefits.
Annual and Supplemental Appropriations
USACE discretionary appropriations, which typically are provided through annual Energy and Water Development appropriations acts, have ranged from $4.7 billion to $7.0 billion during the decade from FY2009 to FY2019 and have been increasing since FY2013. In recent years, Congress has directed that more than 50% of the enacted appropriations be used for operation and maintenance of USACE's aging infrastructure.
USACE also has a prominent role in responding to natural disasters, especially floods, in U.S. states and territories. Congress increasingly is using supplemental appropriations not only to perform emergency response and repair for damaged flood control works and USACE projects but also to study and construct new projects that reduce flood risks in areas recently affected by hurricanes and floods. From FY2005 through FY2018, Congress enacted 13 supplemental bills related to flooding and natural disasters, providing a total of almost $45 billion to USACE; for the same period, annual discretionary appropriations for USACE's flood-related projects and activities totaled $23 billion. Supplemental appropriations bills often alter or waive various requirements for USACE activities, such as cost shares and project cost limitations, and establish project selection and reporting requirements that differ from requirements for USACE activities funded through annual discretionary appropriations.
Issues for Congress
Issues for Congress include the significant role of supplemental appropriations in advancing studies and construction of flood control projects since FY2005 and the agency's backlog of authorized but unconstructed projects. The agency has reported a $96 billion backlog of authorized construction projects; for context, annual appropriations for the USACE Construction account (which funds most USACE construction projects) in FY2018 and FY2019 are $2.1 billion and $2.2 billion, respectively. Congress also has limited the number of new studies and construction projects initiated with annual discretionary appropriations (e.g., a limit of five new construction starts using FY2019 appropriations). Given that only a few construction projects typically are started each fiscal year, numerous projects authorized for construction by previous Congresses remain unfunded.
USACE may fund some of the authorized flood control projects in its backlog with the more than $17 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations provided to USACE accounts in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123). Although no numerical limits on starting new studies or construction projects are associated with these funds, the study and construction funds have some geographic limitations that tie their use to areas affected by flooding by the hurricanes in 2017 or by more than one flood in calendar years 2014 through 2017. As a result of this limitation, seventeen states (including North Carolina, which was affected by Hurricane Matthew in 2016 and Hurricane Florence in 2018) did not qualify for USACE supplemental construction appropriations provided through the BBA 2018.
Related policy questions for Congress and other decisionmakers include the following:
How have the roles of Congress and the Administration shifted vis-à-vis USACE and its appropriations, and does that shift affect the type of information and engagement that Congress may pursue in the future regarding USACE's use of appropriations? How do trends in annual and supplemental appropriations amounts, processes, and requirements influence the effective, efficient, and accountable use of federal funding provided to USACE? What do these trends portend for USACE's long-term planning, budgeting, and duties? |
crs_R42851 | crs_R42851_0 | Introduction
The Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act) requires remote retailers of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco—that is, retailers who sell cigarettes and smokeless tobacco without a face-to-face transaction with the buyer—to pay all state and local taxes before delivering the purchased goods. In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota , the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax and that the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing State." In Red Earth LLC v. United States and Gordon v. Holder , the federal district courts for the Western District of New York and the District of Columbia, respectively, granted preliminary injunctions concluding, among other things, that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail in demonstrating that the PACT Act's requirement that remote retailers pay the state and local taxes of the jurisdictions to which they send cigarettes and smokeless tobacco violates due process because it does not require minimum contacts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction in Red Earth , and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. In Musser's Inc. v. United States , the federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the due process argument because, it concluded, the PACT Act is merely a federal statute that requires compliance with state and local laws and does not implicate due process. The PACT Act, the court determined, is no different in principle from other federal statutes that incorporate state law. Moreover, the court determined, the plaintiff had minimum contacts with the jurisdictions into which it shipped tobacco products because it transacted business through its interactive website. The Supreme Court stated in Quill : "While Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the states and may thus authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce, it does not similarly have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause." The remote retailers have challenged the PACT Act under the Due Process Clause. In Quill , the Court considered whether the State of North Dakota could require an out-of-state mail order retailer to collect a use tax on merchandise sold in the state. The plaintiffs claimed that the PACT Act violates the Due Process Clause because "it subjects them to the taxing jurisdiction of state and local governments without regard to whether they have sufficient minimum contacts with those taxing jurisdictions." It would appear that the PACT Act seeks to legislate the due process requirement out of the equation. The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Circuit). However, if the PACT Act subjects out-of-state businesses to the taxing authority of states with which they do not have minimum contacts, it appears that its provisions may not comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted in reviewing the preliminary injunction in Red Earth , whether one sale into a jurisdiction satisfies the due process requirements for minimum contacts is a "close question." | The Jenkins Act requires out-of-state sellers of cigarettes to register and file a report with the states in which they sell cigarettes listing the name, address, and quantity of cigarettes sold to state residents. In the past, the states would use this information to collect taxes from the buyers directly. However, with the rise of Internet sales of cigarettes, compliance with the Jenkins Act was very low, and it was estimated that billions of dollars of state and local taxes went unpaid. In 2010, Congress passed the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act), which amends the Jenkins Act, to address this problem. The PACT Act requires remote retailers of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco—that is, retailers who sell without an in-person transaction with the buyer—to pay the state and local taxes of the jurisdiction in which the buyer receives the goods.
Three remote retailers have challenged the PACT Act in federal courts seeking to enjoin enforcement of the act, claiming that forcing remote sellers to pay state and local taxes violates due process. The Supreme Court held in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax and that the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing State." In Red Earth LLC v. United States and Gordon v. Holder, the federal district courts for the Western District of New York and the District of Columbia, respectively, issued preliminary injunctions, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in demonstrating that the PACT Act violates due process because it subjects the retailers to the taxing authority of foreign states regardless of whether they have the required minimum contacts with the taxing jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the Red Earth preliminary injunction, and the United States has appealed the preliminary injunction issued in Gordon to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In Musser's Inc. v. United States, the federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the due process argument, concluding that because the PACT Act is federal legislation, the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to states, do not apply. The PACT Act, the Musser's court determined, is not different in principle from other federal statutes that incorporate state laws. In any event, the court determined, because the plaintiff took orders over the Internet, it had minimum contacts in the jurisdictions into which it shipped tobacco products.
The Supreme Court stated in Quill: "While Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the states and may thus authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce, it does not similarly have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause." In Gordon, the district court for the District of Columbia characterized the issue as whether one sale into a taxing jurisdiction satisfied the due process requirement for minimum contacts, and concluded it did not. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in upholding the preliminary injunction in Red Earth, described the issue as a "close question." |
crs_R42084 | crs_R42084_0 | From FY2005 through 2011, the U.S. government obligated over $50 billion for contracts performed primarily in Afghanistan. Because the primary goal of defense contracting in Afghanistan is to support the overall mission, which in turn is intended to promote U.S. interests abroad, it is deemed essential that contracting is not only thought of as a response to immediate practical needs but also as part of the larger strategy. Wartime Contracting Versus Peacetime Contracting
U.S. government contracting in Afghanistan and other wartime environments is different than contracting in peacetime. In peacetime, the goal of contracting is generally to obtain the good or service that is required. The measurements of success are generally getting the right good or service, on schedule and at a fair price. In wartime, however—and particularly in a counterinsurgency environment—cost, schedule, and performance are often secondary to the larger strategic goals of promoting security and denying popular support for the insurgency. Some of the weaknesses of the current federal government acquisition process can be exacerbated by and exploited in a wartime environment, making it more difficult to adhere to best practices. These weaknesses include inadequate acquisition planning, poorly written requirements, and an insufficient number of qualified and capable acquisition and contract oversight personnel. For example, in a wartime environment, it is more difficult to write a good contract that incorporates the sometimes competing goals of counterinsurgency (COIN) contracting, more difficult to research and evaluate companies bidding on a contract, and more difficult to conduct oversight of projects being built in dangerous locations. This effort, which is being spearheaded at the general officer level, seeks to take a strategic approach to contracting by (1) articulating the role of contracting in current operations; (2) identifying specific acquisition weaknesses and creating the infrastructure to address them; and (3) using more reliable data to make better acquisitions decisions. The two major efforts in this area are Task Force 2010 and the Vendor Vetting Cell. DOD established Task Force 2010 in July 2010 to help commanders and acquisition personnel better understand with whom they are doing business, to conduct investigations to gain visibility into the flow of money at the subcontractor levels, and to promote and distribute best contracting practices. Task Force 2010 also supports efforts to track and recover goods that are stolen while in the possession of contractors providing logistics support to the U.S. government. According to government officials, as of October 2, 2011, Task Force 2010 had assisted in the recovery of over 180,000 pieces of equipment worth over $170 million and successfully suspended or debarred over 120 companies or individuals. The Afghanistan Vendor Vetting Cell was established to ensure that government contracts are not awarded to companies with ties to insurgents, warlords, or criminal networks. The cell was set up in the fall of 2010 and is based in CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, FL. In June 2011, the vendor vetting cell consisted of 14 analysts capable of vetting approximately 15 companies a week. The cell is expected to have 63 analysts by December 2011. Issues for Congress
The allocation of billions of contracting dollars to support military operations and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan raises a number of potential questions for Congress that may have significant policy implications for current and future overseas operations. To what extent are U.S. government development and CERP contracts contributing to the overall mission in Afghanistan? How will contract oversight be impacted by the drawdown in Afghanistan? To what extent is DOD preparing for the role of contractors in future military operations? | Government contracting in Afghanistan and other wartime environments is different than contracting in peacetime. In peacetime, the goal of contracting is generally to obtain the good or service that is required. The measurements of success are generally getting the right good or service, on schedule, and at a fair price. In wartime, however—and particularly in a counterinsurgency environment—cost, schedule, and performance are often secondary to larger strategic goals of promoting security and denying popular support for the insurgency.
From FY2005 through 2011, the U.S. government obligated more than $50 billion for contracts performed primarily in Afghanistan. Because a primary goal of defense contracting in Afghanistan is to support the overall mission, it is deemed essential that contracting is not only thought of as a response to immediate needs but also as part of the larger strategy. As General Allen, Commander, International Security Assistance Force, recently wrote, "We must improve our contracting practices to ensure they fully support our mission."
Many of the weaknesses of the current government acquisition process can be exacerbated and exploited in a wartime environment, making it more difficult to adhere to best practices. These weaknesses include inadequate acquisition planning, poorly written requirements, and an insufficient number of capable acquisition and contract oversight personnel. For example, in a wartime environment, it is more difficult to research and evaluate companies bidding on a contract and more difficult to conduct oversight of projects built in dangerous locations.
In Afghanistan, an effort is currently underway to improve contracting. This effort, led by senior military officers, seeks to take a strategic approach to contracting by (1) articulating the role of contracting in current operations; (2) identifying specific acquisition weaknesses and creating the infrastructure to address them; and (3) using reliable data to make better acquisitions decisions.
Two of the major initiatives to improve contracting in Afghanistan that are well underway are Task Force 2010 and the Vendor Vetting Cell. Task Force 2010 was established in 2010 to help DOD commanders and acquisition personnel better understand with whom they are doing business, to conduct investigations to gain visibility into the flow of money at the subcontractor level, and to promote best contracting practices. The task force also supports efforts to track and recover goods stolen while in the possession of contractors providing logistics support. As of October 2, 2011, Task Force 2010 assisted in recovering over 180,000 pieces of equipment worth over $170 million and successfully suspended or debarred over 120 companies or individuals.
The Afghanistan Vendor Vetting Cell was established to ensure that government contracts are not awarded to companies with ties to insurgents, warlords, or criminal networks. The cell was set up in the fall of 2010 and is based in CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, FL. In June 2011, the vendor vetting cell consisted of 14 analysts capable of vetting approximately 15 companies a week. The cell is expected to have 63 analysts by December 2011.
The billions of contracting dollars spent to support military operations and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan raise a number of potential questions for Congress that may have significant policy implications for current and future overseas operations. These questions include (1) to what extent are U.S. government development and CERP contracts contributing to the overall mission in Afghanistan; (2) how will contract oversight be impacted by a troop drawdown; and (3) to what extent is DOD preparing for the role of contractors in future military operations? |
crs_R41686 | crs_R41686_0 | Introduction: U.S. Tsunami Warning Centers
The United States has two centers that monitor, detect, and issue warnings for tsunamis. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) National Weather Service (NWS) manages both centers. The NWS operates the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) at Ford Island, Hawaii, and the National Tsunami Warning Center (NTWC) at Palmer, Alaska. Detecting Tsunamis and Issuing Warnings
The tsunami warning centers monitor and evaluate data from seismic networks and determine if a tsunami is likely based on the location, magnitude, and depth of an earthquake. The centers monitor coastal water-level data, typically with tide-level gauges, and data from NOAA's network of Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) detection buoys to confirm that a tsunami has been generated or, if one has not been generated, to cancel any warnings. P.L. As of November 18, 2015, 4 of the 39 U.S. buoys (10%) were not operational. This represents an improvement over the course of the year; in March 2015, 9 of the buoys were not operational (23%). The inoperable stations likely would not prevent the issuance of tsunami warnings, which are primarily a function of seismic data from an earthquake or landslide, combined with location information about the event. The National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
According to NOAA, the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) was formed in response to the recognition of a tsunami threat to Oregon, Washington State, and Northern California from a large earthquake on the Cascadia subduction zone, which lies off the northwest coast of the United States and is capable of generating earthquakes as large as magnitude 9 or greater. Among other activities, the NTHMP assists states in emergency planning and in developing maps of potential coastal inundation for a tsunami of a given intensity. The NTHMP also operates tsunami disaster outreach and education programs in support of NOAA's TsunamiReady program. Issues for Congress
Maintenance and availability of the DART buoy network have been key issues for Congress. 109-424 , Congress stated that "maintaining operational tsunami detection equipment is the highest priority within the program carried out under this Act." 34 , the Tsunami Warning, Education, and Research Act of 2015, on January 7, 2015, by unanimous consent. The Senate passed its version of the legislation, as an amendment in the nature of a substitute for H.R. 34 , on October 6, 2015, by unanimous consent. Reauthorization of the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program: Legislation in the 114th Congress
Both versions of the legislation would amend the Tsunami Warning and Education Act and authorize appropriations for the NTHMP through FY2017 ( H.R. 34 ) or through FY2021 ( S. 533 ). Authorization for the program's appropriations in P.L. 109-424 expired in FY2012. Both bills apparently would not make fundamental changes to the NTHMP but would broaden the program to include an additional focus on tsunami research and outreach, among other alterations. In subsection (b), the Senate-passed version would require that 80% of the DART buoys be maintained at operational capacity. During FY2015, NOAA reorganized portions of its budget and aligned costs for the tsunami activities into two accounts: DART buoys are funded out of Observations Programs, Projects, and Activities (PPA), and all other tsunami activities are funded out of Analyze, Forecast, and Support PPA. For tsunami activities in FY2015, NOAA allocated $12.2 million under Observations PPA and $19.2 million under Analyze, Forecast, and Support PPA, for a total of $31.4 million. The FY2016 budget request was $6 million less than the FY2015 enacted amount (representing a $6 million reduction in the NTHMP grant funds, similar to the Administration's FY2015 request). | The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) National Weather Service (NWS) manages two tsunami warning centers that monitor, detect, and issue warnings for tsunamis. The NWS operates the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) at Ford Island, Hawaii, and the National Tsunami Warning Center (NTWC) at Palmer, Alaska.
The tsunami warning centers monitor and evaluate data from seismic networks and determine if a tsunami is likely based on the location, magnitude, and depth of an earthquake. The centers monitor relevant water-level data, typically with tide-level gauges, and data from NOAA's network of Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) detection buoys to confirm that a tsunami has been generated or to cancel any warnings if no tsunami is detected. As of November 18, 2015, 4 of the United States' 39 DART buoys (10%) were not operational. This figure represents an improvement over the course of the year; in March 2015, 9 of the buoys were not operational (23%). The inoperable stations likely would not prevent the issuance of tsunami warnings, which are primarily a function of seismic data from an earthquake or landslide, combined with location information about the event.
On January 7, 2015, the House passed by unanimous consent H.R. 34, the Tsunami Warning, Education, and Research Act of 2015. The bill would amend the Tsunami Warning and Education Act (P.L. 109-424) and authorize appropriations for the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) through FY2017. Authorization for NTHMP appropriations expired in FY2012. On February 23, 2015, the Senate introduced its version of the bill, S. 533, which would authorize appropriations for six years through FY2021. On October 6, 2015, the Senate passed its legislation as an amendment in the nature of a substitute for H.R. 34 by unanimous consent. Neither bill would make fundamental changes to the NTHMP, but both would broaden the program to include an increased focus on tsunami research and outreach, among other alterations.
The NTHMP assists states in emergency planning and in developing maps of potential coastal inundation for a tsunami of a given intensity. A goal of the program is to ensure adequate advance warning of tsunamis along all U.S. coastal areas and appropriate community response to a tsunami event. The NTHMP formed in 1995 in response to the recognition of a tsunami threat to Oregon, Washington, and Northern California from a large earthquake on the Cascadia subduction zone, which lies off the northwest coast of the United States and is capable of generating earthquakes as large as magnitude 9 or greater. The NTHMP also operates tsunami disaster outreach and education programs that support NOAA's TsunamiReady program.
During FY2015, NOAA reorganized portions of its budget and aligned costs for tsunami activities into two accounts. For FY2015, $12.2 million was allocated under Observations Programs, Projects, and Activities (PPA), and $19.2 million was allocated under Analyze, Forecast, and Support PPA, for a total of $31.4 million. The FY2016 budget request is $6 million less than the FY2015 enacted amount.
Key issues for Congress include maintenance and availability of the DART buoy network. P.L. 109-424 states that "maintaining operational tsunami detection equipment is the highest priority within the program carried out under this Act." The House-passed bill would require that "the Administration's operational tsunami detection equipment is properly maintained," but the Senate-passed version would be more specific and require, "to the degree practicable, [the maintenance of] not less than 80 percent of the [DART] buoy array at operational capacity." |
crs_R42543 | crs_R42543_0 | FirstNet was created by Congress with provisions in Title VI (Spectrum Act) of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ) to ensure the deployment and operation of a nationwide, broadband network for public safety communications. In addition to establishing the structure and goals for FirstNet, Congress provided $7 billion for costs related to planning and deploying the broadband network, and a $135 million grant program to assist states with plans to connect to FirstNet's broadband network. To attract private sector partners, FirstNet can offer access to its assets, including radio frequency spectrum capacity, in return for financial payment or other support. The total cost to build out the network is estimated by most experts to be in excess of $30 billion over 10 years. On November 21, 2016, Rivada Mercury filed a lawsuit against the U.S. government in the U.S. Court of Appeals of Federal Claims over what Rivada says is the illegal and wrongful exclusion of the consortium from the FirstNet procurement process. The lawsuit is expected to delay the contract award until March 1, 2017, at the earliest, although further delays are possible depending on the resolution of the lawsuit. State Public Safety Radio Networks
Since September 11, 2001, state and local agencies—aided by federal grant programs—have invested in improving the reliability and interoperability of mission critical voice communications over Land Mobile Radio (LMR) networks. Each state and other participants have appointed a coordinator to work directly with FirstNet. The state has 90 days to agree to participate or to notify FirstNet, the NTIA, and the FCC of its intent to deploy its own part of the Radio Access Network, and an additional 180 days to provide its plan to the FCC. These costs include the continued operation and possible expansion of state and local LMR voice networks; the cost of integration of LMR and broadband infrastructure; the costs of forfeiting to FirstNet the potential economies of scale in network construction and operation; and the cost of lost opportunities for competition and innovation in wireless services at the state and local level. Network Construction Fund
The Spectrum Act requires that $7 billion, reduced by the amount needed to establish FirstNet, be available for a Network Construction Fund established in the Treasury to be used by FirstNet for costs associated with building the nationwide network and for grants to states that qualify to build their own networks. The act effectively creates three types of expenditures from the Network Construction Fund but does not specify how funds would be allocated for (1) expenditures by FirstNet on construction, maintenance, and related expenses to build the nationwide network required in the act; (2) by the NTIA to make payments to states that are participating in FirstNet; and (3) by the NTIA for grants to those states that qualify to build their own Radio Access Networks. Among federal agencies designated by the act to provide consultation and support are the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC). As required by the act, the initial, 10-year license to use these frequencies was assigned by the FCC to FirstNet. A total of 34 MHz of spectrum capacity will therefore be available for public safety networks within the 700 MHz band: the 22 MHz designated for broadband, and 12 MHz allocated for narrowband communications, primarily voice. Public Safety Trust Fund
The law provides for transfers from a Public Safety Trust Fund, which is established in the Treasury by the act, to receive revenues from designated auctions of spectrum licenses. These partnerships may be formed between FirstNet and a secondary user for the purpose of constructing, managing, and operating the network. As an independent entity, FirstNet—the First Responder Network Authority—has been given both goals and time frames. | Congress included provisions in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96) for planning, building, and managing a new, nationwide, broadband network for public safety communications, by creating the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet). The act allocated 10 MHz of additional radio frequency spectrum to accommodate the new network and required that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) assign a license to FirstNet, comprising the newly designated frequencies plus 10 MHz previously assigned to states by the FCC for public safety use. In addition, the act designated federal appropriations of over $7 billion for the network and other public safety needs. These funds are provided through new revenue from the auction of licenses to the commercial sector in other spectrum bands.
The establishment of FirstNet is an important step toward reaching what has been a national goal since September 11, 2001: the provision of interoperable communications for first responders. The immediate goal for FirstNet is to provide a broadband network nationwide to carry data, although it will provide an option for voice communications as well. The cost of constructing and maintaining a nationwide network is estimated by many experts to be in the tens of billions of dollars over the long term. The law anticipates that most of these costs will be covered by partnerships between FirstNet and the private sector in return for commercial access to FirstNet's spectrum.
In order to maintain control over the quality and nature of communications, many states are likely to continue to invest in and maintain their own Land Mobile Radio (LMR) networks that operate on narrowband frequencies under the jurisdiction of state and local public safety agencies. Information available to the public indicates that FirstNet intends to discourage states from building and operating their own networks within FirstNet, in part by limiting the amount of spectrum available for this purpose. FirstNet has taken the position that state autonomy in network design decisions and management will jeopardize FirstNet's ability to provide a network that meets its coverage and service goals.
P.L. 112-96 was signed into law on February 22, 2012, setting in motion the process of setting up FirstNet as an "independent authority within the National Telecommunications and Information Administration," as required by the act; laying out the parameters for partnerships and state, tribal, and federal participation; and meeting requirements either statutory or practical. After extensive consultation with stakeholders and potential partners in preparing proposals for partnering with FirstNet, the initial phases of organization culminated with the deadline for submitting proposals to build and operate the nationwide network, on May 31, 2016.
On November 21, 2016, one of the FirstNet bidders eliminated from consideration, Rivada Mercury, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. Court of Appeals of Federal Claims over what Rivada says is the illegal and wrongful exclusion of the consortium from the FirstNet procurement process. The lawsuit is expected to delay the contract award until March 1, 2017, at the earliest, although further delays are possible depending on the resolution of the lawsuit.
Once the contract is awarded, the contractor will have up to 180 days to deliver detailed deployment plans to each state and territory. Governors will then have 90 days to decide whether to opt in to FirstNet or to opt out and build their own Radio Access Network which must be interoperable with FirstNet. As FirstNet becomes operational, the potential level of public safety agency participation should be better understood, providing opportunities to evaluate the success of FirstNet in meeting the goals Congress set for it in 2012. The 115th Congress will likely continue monitoring the development and deployment of FirstNet through periodic hearings in both the House and Senate. |
crs_R44485 | crs_R44485_0 | Introduction
Originally enacted in 1965, the Older Americans Act (OAA) supports a wide range of social services and programs for individuals aged 60 years or older. These services and programs include supportive services, congregate nutrition services (i.e., meals served at group sites such as senior centers, community centers, schools, churches, or senior housing complexes), home-delivered nutrition services, family caregiver support, community service employment, the Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program, and services to prevent the abuse, neglect, and exploitation of older persons. Except for Title V, Community Service Employment for Older Americans (CSEOA), all programs are administered by the Administration on Aging (AOA) in the Administration for Community Living (ACL) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Title V is administered by the Department of Labor's (DOL's) Employment and Training Administration. The OAA has been reauthorized and amended numerous times since it was first enacted in 1965. On April 19, 2016, President Barack Obama signed P.L. 114-144 , the Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016. This report provides information on bipartisan efforts to reauthorize the OAA, including a discussion of key issues, followed by a brief summary of that act's historical development. The Older Americans Act Reauthorization of 2016
The following provides a section-by-section summary of key provisions in The Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016 ( P.L. Prior to the 2016 reauthorization, the last OAA reauthorization occurred in 2006, when the Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006 ( P.L. 109-365 ) was enacted, which extended the act's authorizations of appropriations through FY2011 (authorizations of appropriations for most OAA programs expired on September 30, 2011). OAA-authorized activities have continued to receive funding for FY2012 through FY2016. In the 114 th Congress, both the House and the Senate have considered bipartisan legislation to reauthorize the OAA. The bill would also make various amendments to existing OAA authorities, including changes to the statutory funding formula for certain programs under Title III of the act. The House took up S. 192 and passed the bill with an amendment on March 21, 2016. The Senate passed S. 192 , as amended by the House on April 7, 2016. Older Americans Act: Historical Development
First enacted in 1965, the Older Americans Act (OAA) was created in response to concern by policymakers about a lack of community social services for older individuals. | First enacted in 1965, the Older Americans Act (OAA) was created in response to concern by policymakers about a lack of community social services for older individuals. Since then, the OAA has been reauthorized and amended numerous times. The last OAA reauthorization occurred in 2006, when the Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006 (P.L. 109-365) was enacted, which extended the act's authorizations of appropriations through FY2011 (authorizations of appropriations for most OAA programs expired on September 30, 2011). OAA-authorized activities have continued to receive funding for FY2012 through FY2016.
Today the OAA supports a wide range of social services and programs for individuals aged 60 years or older. These services and programs include supportive services, congregate nutrition services (i.e., meals served at group sites such as senior centers, community centers, schools, churches, or senior housing complexes), home-delivered nutrition services, family caregiver support, community service employment, the Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program, and services to prevent the abuse, neglect, and exploitation of older persons. Except for Title V, Community Service Employment for Older Americans (CSEOA), all programs are administered by the Administration on Aging (AOA) in the Administration for Community Living (ACL) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Title V is administered by the Department of Labor's (DOL's) Employment and Training Administration.
In the 114th Congress, both the House and the Senate have considered bipartisan legislation to reauthorize the OAA. On July 16, 2015, the Senate passed S. 192, the Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2015. The House took up S. 192 and passed the bill with an amendment on March 21, 2016. The Senate passed S. 192, as amended by the House on April 7, 2016. On April 19, 2016, President Barack Obama signed P.L. 114-144, the Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016. Key reauthorization issues for policymakers and stakeholders included changes to the Title III statutory funding formula for certain programs, statutory language for discretionary authorizations of appropriations, and constraints on discretionary appropriations in the current budgetary climate that have curbed interest in amending the act to establish new programs or activities.
This report provides information on the status of bipartisan legislation to reauthorize the OAA and key issues, followed by a brief summary of that act's historical development. Next, it provides a section-by-section summary of P.L. 114-144, the Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016. |
crs_R41651 | crs_R41651_0 | Introduction
The Congressional Review Act (CRA, 5 U.S.C. REINS Act
Under the CRA, an agency regulation takes effect as provided by law unless Congress disapproves the rule with a CRA joint resolution of disapproval. In contrast, the Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act ( H.R. 10 and S. 299 , 112 th Congress) would (if enacted) generally require the enactment of a joint resolution of approval before any "major rule" could take effect. The REINS Act was reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary on November 10, 2011, and by the Committee on Rules on November 18, 2011. Methodology Used in This Report
This report provides information on the types of "major rules" that may be subject to the REINS Act, if it is enacted. Specifically, the report identifies how many major rules have been issued in recent years, and which agencies have issued them. It also attempts to identify why OIRA considered certain rules published during calendar year 2010 to be major rules under the CRA. The agencies issued 76 major rules in 1998 and 77 major rules in 2000. In calendar year 2009, the first calendar year of the Obama Administration, federal agencies issued 84 major final rules. However, 11 of those 84 rules were actually issued in early January 2009, during the final days of the Bush Administration. In contrast, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued 627 final rules from 2004 through 2010, of which 144 (23%) were considered major rules. Table 3 below takes the 100 major rules that were published during calendar year 2010 and, using information in GAO's reports on the major rules and information in the preambles to the rules themselves, illustrates which of the various definitions of a "major rule" appear to be applicable to them (i.e., why the rules were considered "major"). As the figure shows, 37 of the rules appeared to be "major" only because they were expected to produce $100 million in costs, $100 million in benefits, or both; 34 of the rules appeared to only involve some type of transfer (23 were increased transfers, 7 were decreased transfers, and 4 were non-federal transfers); 16 rules appeared to be major only because they were expected to result in increased costs or prices (but not at or above the $100 million threshold); 6 rules appeared to only involve "consumer surplus" issues; 4 rules appeared to only involve changes to fee structures; and 3 rules appeared to be major for multiple reasons. Transfer Rules
For example, 37 of the 100 rules appeared to be "major" at least in part because they involved transfers of funds from one party to another party, most commonly the transfer of federal funds to the recipients of those funds (e.g., grants, food stamps, Medicare or Medicaid funds, special pay for members of the military, and crop payments). In 20 of the 39 rules, estimated costs and benefits were both expected to exceed $100 million. Net Benefits
In 14 of the 20 rules with estimated annual regulatory costs and benefits of at least $100 million, the agencies' lowest estimates of regulatory benefits were larger than the highest estimated compliance costs. However, GAO's federal rules database indicates that the number of major final rules has been at or above 50 in every full calendar year since the CRA was enacted in March 1996, and the number of major rules first exceeded 80 during the last calendar year of the George W. Bush Administration, when federal agencies issued 95 major rules. In 2010, federal agencies published 100 major rules. H.R. The bill would create a Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis (CORA), transferring to the director of that office the Comptroller General's responsibilities under the CRA. | Under the Congressional Review Act (CRA, 5 U.S.C. §§801-808), a covered agency regulation takes effect as provided by law unless Congress disapproves the rule with a joint resolution of disapproval. In contrast, the Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act (H.R. 10 and S. 299, 112th Congress) would (if enacted) generally require the enactment of a joint resolution of approval before any "major rule" could take effect (e.g., rules that are expected to have a $100 million annual impact on the economy). The REINS Act was reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary on November 10, 2011, and by the Committee on Rules on November 18, 2011.
This report provides information on the types of "major rules" that may be covered by the REINS Act, if enacted. Specifically, it identifies how many major rules have been issued in recent years, and which agencies have issued them. It also attempts to identify why certain rules published during calendar year 2010 were considered to be major rules under the CRA.
According to a database maintained by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in 9 of the 14 full calendar years since the CRA was enacted, federal agencies published between 50 and 70 major rules. The agencies published 76 major rules in 1998, and 77 major rules in 2000. The number of major rules issued in a single calendar year first exceeded 80 in 2008 (the last full year of the George W. Bush Administration), when 95 major rules were published. In calendar year 2009, the first year of the Barack Obama Administration, federal agencies published 84 major final rules. However, 11 of those 84 rules were actually issued in early January 2009, during the final days of the Bush Administration. During calendar year 2010, federal agencies published 100 major final rules. The entities that issued the largest number of major rules from 2004 through 2010 were the Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
CRS examined the 100 major rules published in 2010 and concluded that they appeared to be "major" for a variety of reasons. Thirty-seven of the rules appeared to be major because they involved transfers of funds from one party to another party, most commonly the transfer of federal funds to the recipients of those funds (e.g., grants, food stamps, Medicare or Medicaid funds, special pay for members of the military, and crop payments). Ten other rules appeared to be major because they were expected to prompt consumer spending, or because they were establishing fees for the reimbursement of particular federal functions (e.g., issuance of passports and oversight of the nuclear power industry). Thirty-nine rules appeared to be major because they were expected to result in at least $100 million in annual compliance costs, regulatory benefits, or both. In 20 of those 39 rules, estimated costs and benefits were both expected to exceed $100 million. In 14 of these rules, the agencies' lowest estimates of regulatory benefits were larger than the highest estimated compliance costs. In only one rule were the lowest costs greater than the highest benefits, and the agency indicated that this result was caused by the lack of discretion provided in the underlying statute. These variations in the type of major rules do not bring into question the appropriateness of congressional oversight. However, Congress may need different types of expertise to oversee different types of major rules. H.R. 214 (112th Congress), which would create a Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis, may provide access to that expertise.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33765 | crs_RL33765_0 | Financial systems are vital to the effective management and oversight of public funds, because the information they provide is used by government officials to make decisions about agency programs and operations. In order to improve the quality of financial data available to government officials, Congress has funded a number of financial management improvement initiatives. One recent effort to improve agency financial systems, the Financial Management Line of Business (FMLOB) initiative, was launched by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 2004. While the objective of moving to a shared services environment is widely supported in principle, a range of public and private sector observers has expressed concern that the initiative is moving too fast. Critics say that the capabilities of some SSPs have not been adequately demonstrated, that internal control problems should be addressed prior to migrating core financial systems, and agencies need time to prepare their personnel and build internal support for the initiative. Implementation should be delayed, critics argue, until these and other risk factors have been mitigated. Large-scale financial modernization efforts have the potential to generate more timely and accurate financial data, which are needed for effective oversight of agency programs and operations. The House Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance, and Accountability, has held several hearings on the initiative, although no bills have been introduced. This report provides background information on the FMLOB's origins and goals, and presents the arguments of supporters and critics of the initiative. Finally, it discusses the project's implementation status. The financial management task force determined that "significant savings" over a 10-year period were possible if the government consolidated agency financial systems and standardized the related business processes. According to the business case, transferring agency financial management functions to SSPs would enable to government to:
improve its leverage in negotiations with suppliers; reduce future agency development, modernization, and enhancement expenditures; reduce future agency operation and maintenance expenditures; retire agency "stovepiped" core financial systems; re-deploy current agency financial management personnel; improve agency program decision making due to enhanced financial reporting; and leverage best practices for investment management, procurement, budgeting, and real estate management. Goals
The stated objective of the FMLOB is to improve the cost, quality, and performance of government financial management systems by utilizing shared service providers and implementing other government-wide reforms. Timing
With "limited exception," the guidance requires that when an agency identifies a need to upgrade or modernize its core financial system, it must, at that time, either select an SSP or become designated as a federal SSP itself. FFMIA Compliance
OMB also argues that the FMLOB will increase the number of agencies in compliance with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996. In the report, which was prepared at the request of the House Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance, and Accountability, NAPA stated that the move to a shared services environment "makes a great deal of sense," citing its potential to reduce operating costs and free agency CFOs and their staff to focus on core program activities. | Federal financial management systems generate the information that is used by government officials to manage and oversee agency programs and operations. Concerns about the quality of agency financial information, and about the costs of operating and modernizing the systems that produce it, have prompted a number of systems improvement initiatives in recent years. One such effort, the Financial Management Line of Business (FMLOB), seeks to improve the cost, quality, and performance of government financial systems by consolidating agency core systems functions at a limited number of third-party shared service providers (SSPs), and by standardizing the related business processes government-wide.
As part of the initiative, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 2006 directed all federal agencies needing to upgrade or modernize their financial management systems either to transfer their core financial functions to an SSP, seek designation as an SSP, or to prove that they can operate their in-house systems with less risk and at a lower cost than an SSP. Agencies that undergo migration must, in most cases, select their SSPs through competitions between public and private organizations. OMB's guidance also requires all agencies eventually to adopt government-wide business and accounting practices, which are under development in FMLOB workgroups.
It is widely acknowledged that consolidation and standardization might improve the cost and quality of agency financial data. Proponents suggest that the sooner agencies move to SSPs, the sooner the government might enhance its efficiency and capacity for oversight. Concerns have been expressed, however, by both public and private sector observers, that the initiative is moving too fast, and that important issues surrounding the transition to shared service providers have not been adequately addressed. Critics argue that migration should be delayed until agencies have strengthened their internal controls, fully evaluated the qualifications of potential SSPs, and educated their personnel about the initiative. Evidence from previous systems modernization efforts suggests that these issues might put the FMLOB at increased risk for cost overruns, schedule delays, and problems with the accuracy of the data after implementation.
Effective congressional oversight of agency programs and operations is dependent, in part, on the availability of timely and accurate financial data. Congress has invested billions of dollars in systems modernization projects in recent years, but these efforts have not consistently yielded significant improvements in the information they produce. The House Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance, and Accountability has held several hearings on the initiative, although no bills have been introduced.
This report examines the origins and objectives of the FMLOB, outlines the arguments of the initiative's supporters and critics, and discusses the project's status. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R45299 | crs_R45299_0 | Introduction
The movement of air pollutants across state lines, known as interstate transport, has posed a decades-long challenge to air quality protection. Interstate transport has made it difficult for some downwind states to attain federal standards for ozone and fine particulate matter (PM 2.5 ). The CAA's "Good Neighbor" provision recognizes such interstate issues and requires states to prohibit emissions that significantly contribute to air quality problems in another state (Section 110(a)(2)(D)). It requires each state's implementation plan—a collection of air quality regulations and documents—to include adequate provisions to prohibit emissions that either "contribute significantly" to nonattainment or "interfere with maintenance" of federal air quality standards in another state. Since the 1990s, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states have implemented various regional programs to address interstate air transport. Members of Congress representing both downwind and upwind states may have an interest in how EPA and states implement the CAA's Good Neighbor provision, particularly as states begin to develop plans for nonattainment areas to come into compliance with the 2015 ozone standards. Section 126(b) Petitions
Under CAA Section 126(b), any state or political subdivision can petition EPA to issue a "finding that any major source or group of stationary sources emits or would emit any air pollutant in violation" of the Good Neighbor provision. Results of Regional SO2 and NOx Trading Programs
Power sector SO 2 and NO x emissions have declined since 2005. In addition, emissions in 2016 were below the total emission budgets for each CSAPR trading program (see Figure 4 ). EIA's national-scale analysis also points to a combination of broader market and regulatory factors contributing to emission reductions, in particular for SO 2 . Going forward, it is not clear whether emissions will remain well below CSAPR budgets given recent low allowance prices for ozone season NO x and the supply of banked allowances that can be used in future years. The agency has, therefore, not yet determined whether and how it will update the CSAPR budgets with respect to the 2015 ozone standard. For example, some stakeholders have expressed concern about transport of ozone and ozone precursor emissions to downwind states—and the health impacts associated with ozone exposure—and stated that some coal-fired power plants do not make full use of "already-installed pollution controls" to reduce ozone precursor emissions. On the other hand, emissions are below CSAPR budgets, and other stakeholders have questioned the feasibility of additional reductions in ozone precursors. These stakeholders have raised concerns about the extent to which international or natural sources contribute to ambient ozone concentrations. The following issues may inform deliberations about interstate air transport, particularly as EPA continues its assessment of Good Neighbor obligations with respect to the 2015 ozone standard. EPA noted that nonpower-sector sources may be "well-positioned to cost-effectively reduce NO x " emissions compared to the power sector, but the agency also concluded that it has less certainty about nonpower-sector NO x control strategies. The extent to which the current collection of federal and state programs—such as CSAPR and EPA mobile source programs that set tailpipe emission standards—improve air quality in areas not meeting the 2015 ozone standard is to be determined. While EPA has set state-specific emission budgets for CSAPR states intended to address interstate ozone transport with respect to the 2008 ozone standard, it is not clear whether these budgets will be sufficient to address Good Neighbor obligations under the more stringent 2015 ozone standard. In light of this trend in NO x allowance prices, some have questioned whether additional regulatory incentives may be necessary for states to fulfill Good Neighbor obligations. Related EPA Air Quality Initiatives
Current Trump Administration air quality initiatives may indirectly affect consideration of states' Good Neighbor obligations. Specifically, EPA's memorandum sought comment on "potential flexibilities" for developing the Good Neighbor SIPs, describing considerations for each step of the transport framework, including assessment of international ozone transport. | Notwithstanding air quality progress since 1970, challenges remain to reduce pollution in areas exceeding federal standards and to ensure continued compliance elsewhere. The movement of air pollutants across state lines, known as interstate transport, has made it difficult for some downwind states to attain federal ozone and fine particulate matter (PM2.5) standards, partly because states lack authority to limit emissions from other states.
The Clean Air Act's "Good Neighbor" provision (Section 110(a)(2)(D)) seeks to address this issue and requires states to prohibit emissions that significantly contribute to another state's air quality problems. It requires each state's implementation plan (SIP)—a collection of air quality regulations and documents—to prohibit emissions that either "significantly contribute" to nonattainment or "interfere with maintenance" of federal air quality standards in another state. The act also authorizes states to petition EPA to issue a finding that emissions from "any major source or group of stationary sources" violate the Good Neighbor provision (Section 126(b)).
EPA and the states have implemented regional programs to address interstate ozone and PM2.5 transport and comply with the Good Neighbor provision. These programs set emission "budgets" for ozone and PM2.5 precursor emissions—specifically, sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) as PM2.5 precursors and seasonal NOx emissions as an ozone precursor. The current program—the Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR)—focuses on limiting interstate transport of power sector SO2 and NOx emissions to eastern states.
Power sector emissions in CSAPR states are below emission budgets as a result of regulatory and market factors (see figure). Annual SO2, annual NOx, and ozone season NOx emissions from CSAPR sources decreased 77%, 41%, and 15%, respectively, between 2009 and 2016.
EPA has concluded that regional SO2 and NOx programs have reduced interstate transport of PM2.5 and ozone. The Energy Information Administration's national-scale analysis identifies market and regulatory factors contributing to emission reductions. It is unclear whether emissions will remain well below budgets, given recent prices of ozone season NOx allowances (i.e., authorization for each ton emitted) and the supply of banked allowances for future use in lieu of emission reductions.
Research indicates that ozone transport harms air quality in downwind states. However, stakeholder views vary regarding the extent to which interstate transport impacts air quality. Some note that some coal-fired power plants do not fully use already-installed pollution controls. Several states have sought additional upwind reductions in ozone precursors through Section 126(b) petitions. Others have questioned the feasibility of achieving additional reductions in ozone precursors, raising concerns about emissions from international or natural sources.
EPA recently proposed to determine that CSAPR fully addresses Good Neighbor obligations for the 2008 ozone standard but has not yet made a "Good Neighbor" determination for the more stringent 2015 ozone standard. The agency has therefore not yet determined whether and how it will update the CSAPR budgets with respect to the 2015 ozone standard.
Members of Congress may have an interest in better understanding how EPA and states implement the Clean Air Act's Good Neighbor provision, particularly as EPA continues its assessment of Good Neighbor obligations under the 2015 ozone standard.
The following issues, among others, may inform deliberations about interstate air transport. First, the extent to which existing programs will improve air quality in areas not meeting the 2015 ozone standard is to be determined. CSAPR has not addressed NOx emissions from nonpower sector sources, such as large industrial boilers. EPA concluded that industrial sources have potential to cost-effectively reduce NOx emissions but is less certain about the structure of potential NOx control strategies. Second, some have questioned whether additional regulatory incentives are necessary to fulfill Good Neighbor obligations, particularly given current NOx allowance prices. These prices are below the marginal abatement cost, which may result in higher emissions. Third, EPA's current air quality initiatives may indirectly affect its Good Neighbor assessments. EPA recently sought comment on potential flexibilities for the development of Good Neighbor SIPs. |
crs_R45312 | crs_R45312_0 | Introduction
Electricity generation is vital to the commerce and daily functioning of the United States. The electric power grid in the United States comprises all of the power plants generating electricity, together with the transmission and distribution lines and systems which bring power to end-use customers. The U.S. electric grid has historically operated with a high level of reliability; however, the various parts of the electric power system are all vulnerable to failure due to natural, operational, or manmade events. Some recent reports about foreign hackers targeting the U.S. electric power system and other critical infrastructure are summarized below. While these intrusions have not been reported as having resulted in significant disruptions, concerns have increased over the potential for these intrusions to result in damaging cyber attacks in the future. Electric Grid Reliability
Congress gave the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority to oversee the reliability of the bulk-power system under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ; EPACT05). FERC can approve or remand back reliability standards proposed by the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) , which bulk-power system owners and operators must follow to help ensure the reliable operation of the grid. Currently, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) serves as the ERO. 13800 on "Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure" because the risks of cyber threats to critical infrastructure are perceived as a national security imperative. 13800 called for an assessment of a prolonged electric power outage resulting from a cyber attack, and an evaluation of the "readiness and gaps in the United States' ability to manage and mitigate consequences of a cyber incident against the electric subsector." The cyber supply chain and public-private cybersecurity information sharing were listed among a number of major cybersecurity potential vulnerabilities. Cyber Threats to the Grid
The bulk power system faces new and evolving cybersecurity threats on a daily basis. Cyber risks can come from direct attacks aimed at the electric grid or other critical infrastructure which could impact the operations or security of the grid. Some Recent Malware Threats
Cyber intrusions on the electric grid have resulted in the deposits of malware on grid ICS networks with the capability of causing damage or taking over certain aspects of system control or functionality. IoT devices have been increasingly targeted by botnet malware (whereby the hacker takes over the operation of a large number of infected devices) to launch denial-of-service or other cyber attacks. If such IoT cyber attacks were able to access electric utility operational or industrial control systems, they could potentially impair these systems or cause electric power networks to operate based on manipulated conditions or false information. Given that the grid relies on several of the other sectors (for example, for water and fuel transportation), the question of whether these other sectors should also have similar, mandatory standards focused on support of the electric power sector may be an issue for Congress to consider. The electric power system in the United States is evolving, but not consistently across sectors and regions of the country. While some may say such inconsistencies may add a level of complexity that may make a nationwide cyber event more unlikely, the consistent development of a modern electric power system would likely add to the prospects of U.S. economic health and competitiveness. Policy options designed to ensure that the developing electric power system is as secure as possible will likely be a major consideration for Congress. | Electricity generation is vital to the commerce and daily functioning of the United States. The U.S. electric power grid comprises all of the power plants generating electricity, together with the transmission and distribution lines and systems that bring power to end-use customers. The U.S. electric grid has operated historically with a high level of reliability; however, the various parts of the electric power system are all vulnerable to failure due to natural, operational, or manmade events.
The bulk power system faces new and evolving cybersecurity threats. Cyber threats can come from direct attacks aimed at electric grid or other critical infrastructure that could impact the operations or security of the grid. Arguably, the greatest cyber threats to the grid have been intrusions focused on manipulating industrial control system (ICS) networks. Cyber intrusions on the electric grid have resulted in malware on ICS networks with the capability of causing damage or taking over certain aspects of system control or functionality. Recent concerns have extended to Internet of Things (IoT) devices connected to networks. IoT devices have been increasingly targeted by botnet malware (whereby the hacker takes over the operation of a large number of infected devices) to launch denial-of-service or other cyber attacks. If such IoT cyber attacks were able to access electric utility ICS networks, they could potentially impair these systems or cause electric power networks to operate based on manipulated conditions or false information.
Congress gave the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority to oversee the reliability of the bulk power system under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58; EPACT05). FERC can approve or remand back reliability standards proposed by the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), which bulk-power system owners and operators must follow to help ensure the reliable operation of the grid. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation serves currently as the ERO, and proposes mandatory and enforceable reliability standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection (which include physical and cybersecurity).
There have been increasing reports about foreign hackers targeting the U.S. electric power system and other critical infrastructure. While these intrusions have not been reported as having resulted in significant disruptions, concerns have increased over the potential of the intrusions for potentially damaging cyber attacks. In 2017, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13800 on "Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure" because the risks of cyber threats to critical infrastructure are perceived as a national security imperative. EO 13800 called for an assessment of a prolonged electric power outage resulting from a cyber attack, and an evaluation of the "readiness and gaps in the United States' ability to manage and mitigate consequences of a cyber incident against the electricity subsector." The cyber supply chain and public-private cybersecurity information sharing were listed among a number of major cybersecurity concerns.
Electricity is a subsector of the energy critical infrastructure (CI) sector. Given that the grid relies on several of the other CI sectors (for example, water and fuel transportation), the question of whether these other sectors should also have similar mandatory standards focused on support of the electric power sector may be an issue for Congress to consider.
The electric power system in the United States is evolving, but not consistently across sectors and regions of the country. While some may say such inconsistencies may add a level of complexity that may make a nationwide cyber event more unlikely, the consistent development of a modern electric power system would likely add to the prospects of U.S. economic health and competitiveness. Policy options designed to ensure that the developing electric power system is as secure as possible, will likely be a major consideration for Congress. |
crs_RS22615 | crs_RS22615_0 | Background
Due to the repressive regime of Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco, Spain was isolated from key developments elsewhere in Europe after World War II, such as the success of democracy, free market economics, and the establishment of the European Union and NATO. Economic reforms begun in the late Franco period were expanded and rapid economic growth ensued. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the United States and Spain have generally maintained good relations in the post-Franco period, whether under Socialist or right-of-center governments. Current Political and Economic Situation
The Socialist Party (PSOE), led by Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, has governed Spain since 2004. Public debate over the war, and the misdeeds of Franco's dictatorship, had been muted for more than three decades in order to permit Spain to consolidate its democracy. Zapatero has said that he views military force as a "last resort" in the war on terrorism. Spain has also been eager to highlight its cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism. | In the more than three decades since the death of Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco, Spain has become a mature democracy and has experienced rapid economic growth. It has also become an increasingly important player internationally, including in NATO and the European Union. The United States and Spain have generally enjoyed good relations. However, problems have arisen in recent years over such issues as the war in Iraq, promoting democracy in Latin America, and the tactics to be used in fighting the war on terrorism. This report provides information on Spain's current political and economic situation, its struggle against Islamist terrorism, and its relations with the United States. It will be updated as needed. |
crs_RS21339 | crs_RS21339_0 | Early organization and orientation have provided Members a "leg up" in addressing pressing needs. Educational Sessions
The educational sessions available range from legislative procedures, both in committee and on the floor, to how to hire a staff, and how to construct an office budget. Accordingly, before the end of the year, class officers are elected, party leaders selected, and chamber officers, such as the chaplain, chosen. Regional representatives to steering and policy committees, designees to the committees on committees, and other party officials are named. Each of these actions is then subject only to official ratification at the start of the Congress. | Since the mid-1970s, the House and Senate have convened early organization meetings in November or December of even-numbered years to prepare for the start of the new Congress in January.
The purposes of these meetings are both educational and organizational. Educational sessions range from legislative procedures and staff hiring to current issues. Organizational sessions elect class officers, party leaders, and chamber officers; name committee representatives and other party officials; and select committee chairmen and often committee members. Such actions are officially ratified at the start of the new Congress. |
crs_R41988 | crs_R41988_0 | The deduction was also designed to support the domestic manufacturing sector and reduce effective corporate tax rates. This incentive distorts the allocation of capital. A number of policy options related to the Section 199 deduction conclude this report. Legislative History and Background
The Section 199 domestic production activities deduction was added to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA; P.L. The Deduction: Applying the Deduction to Qualified Activities
The production activities deduction allows taxpayers a deduction based on the lesser of taxable income derived from qualified production activities (qualified production activity income; QPAI) or taxable income. Eligible income includes that derived from production property that was manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted within the United States. Electricity, natural gas, and potable water production is also eligible. Construction performed within the United States may also qualify for the deduction, as can engineering and architectural services associated with domestic construction projects. In 2012, more than one-third of corporate taxable income was eligible for the Section 199 deduction. These revenues could be used to offset the cost of a tax rate reduction. Eliminating the deduction for all businesses would generate enough additional revenue to offset the cost of approximately a 1.4 percentage point reduction in the corporate tax rate. Alternatively, tax policy can also reduce economic efficiency. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of Section 199 claims made by corporations across industrial sectors, relative to the distribution of total corporate assets, total corporate business receipts, and total corporate profits (net income less deficit) for 2013. , As noted above, in 2013, 66% of corporate claims of the Section 199 deduction were made by firms in the manufacturing sector. Corporate claims of the Section 199 deduction were also small for the education services, health care, and social assistance sectors. In 2016, an estimated 73% of the revenue loss associated with the production activities deduction was attributable to the corporate sector, with the remainder claimed by pass-through businesses on individual income tax returns ( Table 1 above). For example, if the Section 199 deduction is repealed in exchange for a revenue-neutral lower corporate tax rate, the construction sector stands to potentially lose relative to other sectors. Broadening the tax base by repealing the Section 199 deduction, using the revenue generated to reduce tax rates, would remove an existing distortion in the tax system and could enhance economic efficiency. The Tax Reform Act of 2014 ( H.R. The House Republican 2016 "Better Way" Tax Reform Blueprint also proposed to repeal Section 199 as part of a comprehensive tax reform that would repeal tax expenditures and lower tax rates. In isolation, repealing the Section 199 deduction and providing a revenue-neutral reduction in tax rates could increase the effective tax rates of taxpayers previously qualifying for the deduction. In addition, if the deduction is repealed for all businesses, but the revenues are used only to reduce corporate tax rates, the effective tax rate on pass-through entities could increase. 6 ) did not include a repeal of the Section 199 deduction for oil and gas. | In 2004, Congress added the Section 199 domestic production activities deduction to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The deduction was intended to achieve a number of policy goals, including compensating for repeal of the extraterritorial income (ETI) export-subsidy provisions, supporting the domestic manufacturing sector, and reducing effective corporate tax rates.
Under current law, qualified activities are eligible for a deduction equal to 9% of the lesser of taxable income derived from qualified production activities, or taxable income. Eligible income includes that derived from the production of property that was manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted within the United States. Electricity, natural gas, and potable water production is also eligible, as is film production. Domestic construction projects, as well as engineering and architectural services associated with such projects, also qualify. Certain oil- and gas-related activities also qualify for the deduction, but at a reduced rate of 6%. Overall, more than one-third of corporate taxable income qualifies for the deduction.
In 2013, 66% of corporate claims of the Section 199 deduction were attributable to the manufacturing sector. Another 16% of the value of corporate claims came from the information sector, while 3% were attributable to the mining sector. Other large sectors of the economy, such as finance and insurance, as well as wholesale and retail trade, had few Section 199 claims, relative to their contributions toward economic activity.
In practice, the Section 199 deduction reduces corporate tax rates for certain selected industries. Providing a tax break for certain industries can distort the allocation of capital in the economy, reducing economic efficiency and total economic output. Economic efficiency may be enhanced by repealing the Section 199 deduction and using the additional revenues to offset the cost of reducing corporate tax rates. Repealing the Section 199 deduction could allow for a revenue-neutral corporate tax rate reduction of an estimated 1.4 percentage points.
For companies currently claiming the Section 199 deduction, repeal of the deduction in exchange for a reduced corporate tax rate could lead to increased effective tax rates. Under current law, activities eligible for the deduction receive a tax break equal to 3.15 percentage points. Further, the deduction can currently be claimed by pass-through entities, including S corporations and partnerships. If the Section 199 deduction were repealed for all businesses, but rate cuts were confined to the corporate sector, the result could be higher effective tax rates on pass-through entities. Repealing the Section 199 deduction only for the corporate tax could allow for a revenue-neutral corporate tax rate reduction of an estimated 1.0 percentage points.
Recent tax reform proposals include repeal of the Section 199 deduction as part of base broadening, providing additional revenue to offset the revenue loss associated with rate reduction. Specifically, both the Tax Reform Act of 2014 (H.R. 1) in the 113th Congress and the House Republican "Better Way" tax reform blueprint from 2016 include repeal of the Section 199 deduction. |
crs_R42325 | crs_R42325_0 | Functions that federal law and policy require to be performed by government personnel, not contractor employees, are known as "inherently governmental functions." Such functions have been a topic of interest in recent Congresses, in part, because of questions about sourcing policy (i.e., whether specific functions should be performed by government personnel or contractor employees). There have also been questions about the various definitions of inherently governmental function given in federal law and policy and, particularly, whether the existence of multiple definitions of this term may have resulted in contractor employees performing functions that should be performed by government personnel. Previously, the 110 th Congress had tasked the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with
reviewing existing definitions of inherently governmental function to determine whether such definitions are "sufficiently focused" to ensure that only government personnel perform inherently governmental functions or "other critical functions necessary for the mission of a Federal department or agency"; developing a "single consistent definition" of inherently governmental function that would address any deficiencies in the existing definitions, reasonably apply to all agencies, and ensure that agency personnel can identify positions that perform inherently governmental functions; developing criteria for identifying "critical functions" that should be performed by government personnel; and developing criteria for identifying positions that government personnel should perform in order to ensure that agencies develop and maintain "sufficient organic expertise and technical capacity" to perform their missions and oversee contractors' work. Partly in response to this charge, OMB, through the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), issued Policy Letter 11-01 on September 12, 2011. As explained below, Policy Letter 11-01 adopts the definition of inherently governmental function given in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998, rather than creating a new definition. However, Policy Letter 11-01 does establish two tests for identifying inherently governmental functions, as well as defines a critical function as one "that is necessary to the agency being able to effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations." Its primary focus is upon government-wide statutes, regulations, and policy documents, not agency-specific ones. Some of these definitions mirror the definitions of the FAIR Act or Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, discussed below, while others incorporate the definitions of the FAIR Act or OMB Circular A-76 by reference. Policy-Based Definitions and Declarations
OMB Circular A-76 provides the other main definition of inherently governmental functions used in federal law and policy. Policy Letter 11-01 adopts the FAIR Act's definition of inherently governmental function , as well as the listings of inherently governmental functions and functions closely associated with the performance of inherently governmental functions given in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The current version of OMB Circular A-76 says only that "[a]n inherently governmental activity is an activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel." There are no exemptions. For example, rather than giving its own definition of "inherently governmental function," it adopts the FAIR Act's definition of an inherently governmental function as "one that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees." This definition is a policy determination, not a legal determination. However, a judicial declaration that a function is inherently governmental under a constitutional test would not necessarily preclude the executive branch from contracting out this function under the FAIR Act, OMB Circular A-76, the FAR, or OFPP Policy Letter 11-01. | Functions that federal law and policy require to be performed by government personnel, not contractor employees, are known as "inherently governmental functions." Such functions have been a topic of interest in recent Congresses, in part, because of questions about sourcing policy (i.e., whether specific functions should be performed by government personnel or contractor employees). There have also been questions about the various definitions of inherently governmental function given in federal law and policy and, particularly, whether the existence of multiple definitions of this term may have resulted in contractor employees performing functions that should be performed by government personnel.
Two primary definitions of inherently governmental function currently exist in federal law and policy. One is a statutory definition, enacted as part of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998. This definition states that an inherently governmental function is "a function so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees." The other is a policy-oriented definition contained in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. This definition states that an inherently governmental activity is "an activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel." These two definitions arguably do not differ significantly in and of themselves. However, both the FAIR Act and OMB Circular A-76 include further elaboration and expansion upon the meaning of inherently governmental function that differ in certain ways.
Other statutes, regulations, and guidance documents that define inherently governmental function do so either by reproducing the language of the FAIR Act or OMB Circular A-76, or by incorporating their definitions by reference. Most notably, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) incorporates by reference or otherwise adopts the definition of OMB Circular A-76, while Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, discussed below, adopts the FAIR Act's definition. However, like the FAIR Act and OMB Circular A-76, both the FAR and Policy Letter 11-01 also include some unique elaboration and expansion upon the term.
In addition to these definitions, there are numerous statutory, regulatory, and policy provisions designating specific functions as inherently governmental or, alternatively, commercial. (A commercial function is one that could be performed by contractor employees, although there is generally no requirement that contractor employees perform commercial functions.) Such designations also help establish the meaning of inherently governmental function by specifying what is—and is not—included within this category. Similarly, while not offering their own definitions of inherently governmental function, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the federal courts have developed tests that they use in identifying specific functions as inherently governmental or commercial. However, a judicial declaration that a particular function is inherently governmental under a constitutional test would not necessarily preclude the executive branch from contracting out this function.
The 110th Congress tasked OMB with reviewing existing definitions of inherently governmental function and developing a "single consistent definition" of this term. Partly in response to this charge, OMB, though the OFPP, issued Policy Letter 11-01. Policy Letter 11-01 adopts the FAIR Act's definition of inherently governmental function, rather than establishing a new definition. However, Policy Letter 11-01 does establish two tests for identifying inherently governmental functions, as well as defines a critical function as one "that is necessary to the agency being able to effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations." |
crs_RL33730 | crs_RL33730_0 | Introduction and Background
The 108 th Congress established a new recreation fee program for the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the four major federal land management agencies—the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture (USDA). The agencies can spend the revenue collected without further appropriation, with most of the money retained at the collection site, and the collections can be used for specified purposes. The extent to which fees should be charged for recreation has been controversial for decades, and the Fee Demo program had both supporters and critics. The agencies anticipate collecting about $265 million in fees in FY2011, with NPS collections accounting for about two-thirds of the total. Congress had considered whether to let the Fee Demo program expire, extend it, or make it permanent, and how to structure any extended or permanent program. They involve the use of advisory committees to provide input on fees, the establishment of the national recreation pass, the extent of agency participation in the recreation fee program, and the collection and use of fee receipts. Another objective of the law is to enhance public involvement in determining fee sites and setting fees. Recreation Passes
The law authorizes the establishment of a national pass for recreation at a variety of sites managed by different agencies. Support and Opposition
Many assert that the recreation fee program improves recreation and visitor services, and is needed to supplement appropriations. They believe that the program retains the benefits of the former Fee Demo program, such as keeping most fees on-site to provide improvements desired by visitors. They also contend that the current program improves upon the former one, for example, by seeking to establish fair and similar fees among agencies. The criteria in the FLREA for determining fees are intended to ensure that they are charged in appropriate circumstances, namely, where infrastructure and services directly benefit the public. However, some concerns with recreation fees continue to be expressed. Other concerns are that federal lands will be overdeveloped to attract fee-paying tourists, and that one national pass is difficult to implement given differences in agency lands and complex issues regarding pricing and sharing revenues. The standard version of the pass became available to the general public in January 2007 for a cost of $80. Fee Sites
The agencies conducted a detailed analysis of the extent to which sites charging recreation fees under the former Fee Demo Program met the criteria and prohibitions of the FLREA for charging entry, standard amenity, and expanded amenity fees. The NPS and FWS made little change, as both agencies were authorized under Fee Demo to charge entrance fees and continue to have authority to charge entrance fees under FLREA. These agencies also charge amenity fees at some sites. The FS made the most changes as a result of the FLREA. Recreation Fee Receipts
In FY2009, the five agencies collected a total of $258.4 million in recreation receipts under the FLREA. Fees collected during a fiscal year, and carried over from previous years, are available for obligation by the agencies. The agencies report having obligated FY2009 funds for a variety of purposes, including operation, maintenance, and capital improvement projects. For the four agencies, a total of $574.4 million in recreation fees was available for obligation in FY2009. For the first time in FY2009, NPS obligated more than half of the monies available for obligation (50.5%). | The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (FLREA in P.L. 108-447) established a new recreation fee program for five federal agencies—the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture (USDA). The law authorizes these agencies to charge fees at recreation sites through December 8, 2014. It provides for different kinds of fees, criteria for charging fees, public participation in determining fees, and the establishment of a national recreation pass. The agencies can use the collections without further appropriation. Most of the money is for improvements at the collecting site, such as operation, maintenance, and capital improvement projects. This program supersedes, and seeks to improve upon, the Recreational Fee Demonstration Program.
The extent of participation in the current fee program varies considerably among the agencies, ranging from fee collection at only one Reclamation site to 4,185 FS sites. The agencies conducted analyses of the extent to which sites charging fees under the former fee program meet the criteria and prohibitions of the FLREA for charging entry, standard amenity, and expanded amenity fees. The NPS and FWS made little change in fees and fee sites as a result of the new law. The BLM made some adjustments, while the FS made the most changes, initially dropping fees at 437 sites. The agencies are determining fee sites and setting fees with public input, with the BLM and the FS using Recreation Resource Advisory Committees for this purpose.
A new national recreation pass became available in January 2007. There are different versions of the pass for seniors, disabled persons, volunteers at recreation sites, and the general public.
In FY2009, the agencies collected a total of $258.4 million in recreation receipts under the FLREA, with the NPS collecting about two-thirds of the revenue. Together with fees carried over from previous years, $574.4 million was available for obligation in FY2009. For the first time since the collection of recreation fees under the former fee program, more than 50% of available funding was obligated in FY2009.
Recreation fees have been controversial for decades, and there continues to be a difference of opinion as to the need for recreation fees and how fee programs should operate. The current program has supporters and critics. Many assert that the program improves recreation and visitor services, keeping most fees on-site for improvements that visitors desire. Supporters contend that the current program improves upon the former one, in allowing fees to be charged only in appropriate circumstances, setting fair and similar fees among agencies, providing for public involvement in setting fees, and establishing a single national pass. Some critics continue to oppose recreation fees in general, or believe that they are appropriate for fewer agencies or types of lands. Others find fault with the current program, for instance, for not simplifying fees enough, ensuring that most fees are used to reduce the maintenance backlogs of agencies, or obligating funds more quickly. Still others contend that it is difficult to implement one national pass, given differences in agency lands and issues regarding pricing and sharing of revenues.
Congress continues to oversee agency efforts to establish, collect, and spend recreation fees under the FLREA. Issues regarding the structure of the program—whether to let the program expire in 2014, or whether to extend it or make it permanent—will likely be addressed in congressional deliberations. |
crs_R43212 | crs_R43212_0 | Introduction
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. The Widget Effect
Teacher evaluation is largely the responsibility of local school administrators working within broad rules set by state law and collective bargaining agreements. These rules generally identify the procedures and circumstances under which a teacher may be dismissed for poor performance and have little to do with conducting teacher evaluation. Until recently, only a handful of states had implemented statewide teacher evaluation policies. A Growing Federal Role
Until recently, federal policy had been silent on the issue of teacher effectiveness (i.e., evaluating their performance in the classroom). The federal government's first foray into teacher effectiveness policy can be traced to enactment of the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) in 2006. ARRA's Race to the Top (RTT) authority outlines five major elements of an approved teacher evaluation system. In 2009, 15 states required that student achievement be factored into teacher performance and 30 states required classroom observation be included in teacher evaluation compared to 30 and 39 states, respectively, in 2012. In the 113 th Congress, both committees again reported ESEA reauthorization bills containing provisions on teacher evaluation. This time, the House bill ( H.R. 5 , the Student Success Act) would make teacher evaluation reforms optional and the Senate bill ( S. 1094 , the Strengthening America's Schools Act) would make teacher evaluation reforms mandatory. These reforms may (in the case of H.R. 5 ) or must (in the case of S. 1094 ) meet guidelines similar to the five requirements for teacher evaluation in current federal policy (discussed above). On July 19, 2013, the House passed H.R. 5 and referred the measure to the Senate. S. 1094 has not received floor debate. Policy Issues
Although there is general congressional interest in teacher evaluation reform, strong disagreement exists over whether these changes should be mandated or simply supported by the federal government. Moreover, some argue that no federal role is appropriate in this matter. Among those who think there is some appropriate federal role, there remain several areas of dispute. How much weight should student learning have in teacher evaluation? Which staffing decisions should be tied to teacher evaluation outcomes? Should evaluation reform include school leadership? Should federal funds be provided to support the development of evaluation systems and evaluator training? What, if any, role should teacher evaluation systems play in the accountability of teacher preparation programs? Should current federal requirements for the equitable distribution of teacher quality include an effectiveness component? | Teacher evaluation has historically been largely the responsibility of local school administrators working within broad rules set by state law and collective bargaining agreements. These rules generally identify the procedures and circumstances under which a teacher may be dismissed for poor performance and have little to do with conducting teacher evaluation. Until recently, only a handful of states had implemented statewide teacher evaluation policies and federal policy had been silent on the issue of evaluating teacher effectiveness.
In 2006, Congress authorized the Teacher Incentive Fund to support pay-for-performance programs that provide incentive pay to effective teachers. Regulatory guidance for this program (which was later enacted in statute) marked the federal government's first foray into teacher evaluation policy. The federal role in this area was further expanded through passage of the Race to the Top program in 2009, which required states to implement specific education reforms such as including student achievement in teacher evaluation systems. This action brought about a "sea change" in state-level policymaking. For example, between 2009 and 2012, the number of states requiring that student achievement be factored into teacher evaluation doubled from 15 to 30.
Congressional interest in teacher evaluation policy has continued through efforts to reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), last authorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-110). In the 113th Congress, committees of jurisdiction in both chambers reported ESEA reauthorization bills containing provisions on teacher evaluation. The House bill (H.R. 5, the Student Success Act) would make teacher evaluation reforms optional, and the Senate bill (S. 1094, the Strengthening America's Schools Act) would make teacher evaluation reforms mandatory. These reforms may (in the case of H.R. 5) or must (in the case of S. 1094) meet guidelines similar to the requirements for teacher evaluation in current federal policy. On July 19, 2013, the House passed H.R. 5 and referred the measure to the Senate. S. 1094 has not received floor debate.
Although there is general congressional interest in teacher evaluation reform, strong disagreement exists over whether these changes should be mandated or simply supported by the federal government. Moreover, some argue that no federal role is appropriate in this matter. Among those who think there is some appropriate federal role, there remain several areas of dispute, including the following: How much weight should student learning have in teacher evaluation? Which staffing decisions should be tied to teacher evaluation outcomes? Should evaluation reform include school leadership? Should federal funds be provided to support the development of evaluation systems and evaluator training? What role, if any, should teacher evaluation systems play in the accountability of teacher preparation programs? Should current federal requirements for the equitable distribution of teacher quality include an effectiveness component? |