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crs_RL30470

crs_RL30470_0

Introduction This report discusses current constitutional and statutory requirements related to affirmative action in employment. Seeds of the legal controversy regarding affirmative action may be traced to the early 1960s as first the Warren and then the Burger Court grappled with the seemingly intractable problem of racial segregation in the nation's public schools. Judicial rulings from this period recognized an "affirmative duty," cast upon local school boards by the Equal Protection Clause, to desegregate formerly "dual school" systems and to eliminate "root and branch" the last "vestiges" of state-enforced segregation. In the employment context, the Court has similarly upheld the constitutionality of affirmative action plans adopted by or imposed upon governmental entities with a history of past discrimination. Meanwhile, Congress and the Executive followed the Court's lead by approving a panoply of laws and regulations which authorize, either directly or by judicial or administrative interpretation, "race-conscious" strategies to promote minority opportunity in jobs, education, and governmental contracting. The basic statutory framework for affirmative action in employment derives from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, or sex. The Title VII remedial scheme rests largely on judicial power to order monetary damages and injunctive relief, including "such affirmative action as may be appropriate," to make discrimination victims whole. Except as may be imposed by order of a court to remedy "egregious" violations of law, however, or by consent decree to settle pending claims, there is no general statutory obligation on employers to adopt affirmative action plans. However, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has issued guidelines to protect employers and unions from charges of "reverse discrimination" when they voluntarily take actions to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. In addition, federal departments and agencies are required to periodically formulate affirmative action plans for their employees and a "minority recruitment program" to correct minority "underrepresentation" in specific federal job categories. The historical model for federal laws and regulations establishing minority participation "goals" may be found in Executive Orders which since the early 1960s have imposed affirmative minority hiring and employment requirements on federally financed construction projects and in connection with other large federal contracts. Executive Order 11246, as currently administered by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, requires that all employers with 50 or more employees and federal contracts in excess of $50,000 file written affirmative action plans with the government. These must include minority and female hiring goals and timetables to which the contractor must commit its "good faith" efforts.

This report discusses current constitutional and statutory requirements related to affirmative action in employment. Seeds of the legal controversy regarding affirmative action may be traced to the early 1960s as the Supreme Court grappled with the seemingly intractable problem of racial segregation in the nation's public schools. Judicial rulings from this period recognized an "affirmative duty," cast upon local school boards by the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, to desegregate formerly "dual school" systems and to eliminate "root and branch" the last "vestiges" of state-enforced segregation. In the employment context, the Court has similarly upheld the constitutionality of affirmative action plans adopted by or imposed upon governmental entities with a history of past discrimination. Meanwhile, Congress and the Executive have followed the Court's lead by approving a panoply of laws and regulations that authorize, either directly or by judicial or administrative interpretation, "race-conscious" strategies to promote minority opportunity in jobs, education, and governmental contracting. The basic statutory framework for affirmative action in employment derives from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex. The Title VII remedial scheme rests largely on judicial power to order monetary damages and injunctive relief, including "such affirmative action as may be appropriate," to make discrimination victims whole. Except as may be imposed by order of a court to remedy "egregious" violations of law, however, or by consent decree to settle pending claims, there is no general statutory obligation on employers to adopt affirmative action plans. However, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has issued guidelines to protect employers and unions from charges of "reverse discrimination" when they voluntarily take actions to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. In addition, federal departments and agencies are required to periodically formulate affirmative action plans for their employees and a "minority recruitment program" to correct minority "underrepresentation" in specific federal job categories. The historical model for federal laws and regulations establishing minority participation "goals" may be found in Executive Orders which since the early 1960s have imposed affirmative minority hiring and employment requirements on federally financed construction projects and in connection with other large federal contracts. Executive Order 11246, as presently administered by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, requires that all employers with 50 or more employees and federal contracts in excess of $50,000 file written affirmative action plans with the government. These must include minority and female hiring goals and timetables to which the contractor must commit its "good faith" efforts.

crs_R41161

crs_R41161_0

Most Recent Developments On February 11, 2011, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 ( H.R. 1 ) was introduced in the House. The bill passed the House on February 19, 2011. The House-passed version of H.R. 1 would have provided a total of $60.065 billion agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS). This included $7.38 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.123 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.697 billion for the Science Agencies, and $864.8 million for the related agencies. On April 15, 2011, President Obama signed into law the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 ( P.L. The act provides a total of $61.202 billion for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS. The $61.202 provided by the act includes $7.581 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.389 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.314 billion for the Science Agencies, and $917.9 million for the related agencies. FY2010 and FY2011 Appropriations This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress to provide FY2011 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies. It also provides an overview of FY2010 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. Of the $68.835 billion appropriated for FY2010, $14.164 billion was for the Department of Commerce, $28.078 billion was for the Department of Justice, $25.658 billion was for the Science Agencies, and $934.8 million was for the related agencies. For FY2011, the Administration requested a total of $66.109 billion for CJS, an approximately 4.0% decrease in budget authority compared with FY2010 appropriations. The FY2011 request included $8.968 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.737 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.431 billion for the Science Agencies, and $973.4 million for the related agencies. 112-10 provides a total of $6.860 billion for NSF.

This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress to provide FY2011 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS). It also provides an overview of FY2010 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117), included a total of $68.705 billion in new budget authority for CJS. Of the $68.705 billion appropriated for FY2010, $14.035 billion was for the Department of Commerce, $28.078 billion was for the Department of Justice, $25.658 billion was for the Science Agencies, and $934.8 million was for the related agencies. For FY2011, the Administration requested a total of $66.109 billion for CJS, a 4.0% decrease in budget authority compared with FY2010 appropriations. The FY2011 request included $8.968 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.737 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.431 billion for the Science Agencies, and $973.4 million for the related agencies. On February 11, 2011, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1) was introduced in the House. The bill passed the House on February 19, 2011. The House-passed version of H.R. 1 would have provided a total of $60.065 billion for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS. This included $7.38 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.123 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.697 billion for the Science Agencies, and $864.8 million for the related agencies. On April 15, 2011, President Obama signed into law the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10). The act provides a total of $61.202 billion for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS. The $61.202 provided by the act includes $7.581 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.389 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.314 billion for the Science Agencies, and $917.9 million for the related agencies.

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T he Economic Development Administration (EDA) was created pursuant to the enactment of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, with the objective of fostering growth in economically distressed areas characterized by high levels of unemployment and low per-capita income levels. On December 18, 2015, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, P.L. 114-113 , which appropriated $261 million in total funding for EDA, including $222 million for EDA programs and activities and $39 million for salaries and expenses. Total funding for FY2016 was 4.4% ($1.1 million) higher than the amount appropriated for FY2015. FY2016 appropriations included a significant increase ($5 million) in the amount of funds targeted to assist coal mining communities and a modest increase ($2 million) in funding for Planning Assistance. The increased funding for coal-impacted communities and planning assistance was offset by a reduction ($10 million) in the amount appropriated for Economic Adjustment Assistance and the zeroing out of funding for activities supporting innovative manufacturing. Administration's Request The Obama Administration's FY2016 budget request, which was released on February 2, 2015, proposed an increase in total EDA funding from $250 million in FY2015 to $273 million in FY2016, a 9.2% increase. A significant increase, 23%, in funding for salaries and expenses. 2578 , the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill for FY2016 (CJS). On June 3, 2015, the House passed H.R. The bill, as passed by the House, would have frozen EDA appropriations at their FY2015 levels, rejecting the Administration's request for an increase in overall funding and a shift in funding priorities. The bill proposed increasing funding for assistance to coal communities by $5 million and would have established assistance to these communities as a stand-alone program rather than a set-aside under the Economic Adjustment Assistance program while eliminating $4 million in funding for Innovative Manufacturing grants. 2578 On June 16, 2015, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of H.R. 2578 , the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill for FY2016. The Senate Appropriations Committee rejected the Administration's proposed increase in funding for EDA programs and recommended freezing total funding at the FY2015 total of $250 million, including $213 million for EDA programs and $37 million for salaries and expenses. Instead, the bill recommended a $3 million increase in funding for Economic Adjustment Assistance grants. The increased funding for coal-impacted communities and planning assistance was offset by a $10 million reduction in the amount appropriated for Economic Adjustment Assistance and the zeroing out of appropriations for activities supporting innovative manufacturing.

The Economic Development Administration was created pursuant to the enactment of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, with the objective of fostering growth in economically distressed areas characterized by high levels of unemployment and low per-capita income levels. EDA, an agency within the Department of Commerce, is the primary federal agency charged with implementing and coordinating federal economic development policy. For FY2016, the Obama Administration requested significant increases in funding for EDA activities and salaries and expenses. Under the Administration's proposal, EDA funding would have increased by 9.2%, from $250 million to $273 million over the last fiscal year, including significant increases in funding for the following: salaries and expenses, from $37 million to $45.5 million; regional Innovation Program grants, from $10 million to $25 million; economic Adjustment Assistance, from $45 million to $53 million; and Planning Grants, from $30 million to $39.5 million. On June 3, 2015, the House approved its version of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) Appropriations Act for FY2016, H.R. 2578. The bill rejected the Administration's proposed funding increases. Instead, the bill recommended freezing total EDA funding at the FY2015 level of $250 million. The bill also recommended a $5 million increase in funding for coal mining communities (above the amount set aside under the Economic Adjustment Assistance) while recommending eliminating $4 million in funding for Innovative Manufacturing. On June 16, 2015, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of H.R. 2578. This bill also rejected the Administration's proposed increases in funding and, like its House counterpart, would have frozen total funding for EDA at the FY2015 level of $250 million. The bill would have shifted funding priorities, eliminating $4 million in funding for Innovative Manufacturing, transferring $10 million in Assistance to Coal Mining Communities from a set-aside under the Economic Adjustment Assistance program to a stand-alone program, and increasing funding for Economic Adjustment Assistance by $3 million, from $45 million in FY2015 to $48 million for FY2016. Unable to reach agreement on a final appropriations for FY2016 for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) Appropriations Act for FY2016, Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions providing funding for government operations through December 22, 2015. On December 18, 2015, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, P.L. 114-113, which appropriated $261 million in total funding for EDA, including $222 million for EDA programs and activities and $39 million for salaries and expenses. Total funding for FY2016 was 4.4% ($141 million) higher than the amount appropriated for FY2015, including a $5 million increase in the amount of funds targeted to assist coal mining communities and a $2 million increase in funding for Planning Assistance. The increased funding for coal-impacted communities and planning assistance was offset by a $10 million reduction in the amount appropriated for Economic Adjustment Assistance and the elimination of $4 million funding for activities supporting innovative manufacturing.

crs_R41611

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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter, the "Dodd-Frank Act," P.L. 111-203 , July 21, 2010) is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified 330 provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act that require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation. The Unified Agenda One way for Congress to identify upcoming Dodd-Frank Act rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (hereafter, "Unified Agenda"), which is published twice each year (spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration, for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date (sometimes just the projected month and year) for the next regulatory action. Each entry also contains an element indicating the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act). This Report The December 20, 2010, edition of the Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan is the first edition that RISC has compiled and issued after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. This report examines the December 20, 2010, edition of the Unified Agenda and identifies upcoming proposed and final rules that are expected to be issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, as well as long-term actions. The results of the searches for proposed and final rules are provided in the Appendix to this report.

Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agencies for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203, July 21, 2010, hereafter the "Dodd-Frank Act") is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified more than 300 provisions in the act that require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation. One way for Congress to identify upcoming Dodd-Frank Act rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, which is published twice each year (spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration, for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The Unified Agenda lists upcoming activities, by agency, in five separate categories or stages of the rulemaking process: the prerule stage, the proposed rule stage, the final rule stage, long-term actions, and completed actions. All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date for the next regulatory action. Each entry also contains an element indicating the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act). This report examines the most recent edition of the Unified Agenda, published on December 20, 2010 (the first edition that RISC compiled and issued after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act). The report identifies upcoming proposed and final rules listed in the Unified Agenda that are expected to be issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act. The Appendix lists these upcoming proposed and final rules in a table. The report also briefly discusses the long-term actions listed in the Unified Agenda, as well as some options for congressional oversight over the Dodd-Frank Act rules.

crs_R45420

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Introduction Overview The United States is the world's biggest economy (in nominal dollars), leading trading nation (goods and services), and largest source of and destination for foreign direct investment. The U.S. output of goods and services, or gross domestic product (GDP), totaled $19.5 trillion in 2017. That is almost the combined GDP of the next three largest economies. All told, the United States, with close to 5% of the world's population, accounted for almost 25% of the world's output and more than 16% of its growth in 2017. While the United States is the world's largest exporter (goods and services combined), U.S. exports are overshadowed by the large U.S. demand for imported products. However, the level of both U.S. exports and imports of goods and services depends on many interrelated domestic and international factors, including the value of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies, global demand for other dollar-denominated assets—including U.S. Treasury securities, and the relative strength of the U.S. and world economies. While the United States is still by far the dominant economy in the world, its relative position has shifted in the past two decades. In addition, questions affecting U.S. trade trends could also arise as the Trump Administration renegotiates FTAs and pursues new ones, and Congress debates and potentially ratifies them. Recent Developments in International Trade International trade is an important engine not only of the U.S. economy, but of the global economy. In 2017, the United States exported $2.4 trillion in goods and services and imported $2.9 trillion. Since 2009, when trade flows declined sharply in the midst of the international financial and economic crisis, U.S. exports grew 48.5%, while U.S. imports grew 47.6% in nominal terms. While most of the United States' largest trading partners remain advanced economies, U.S. trade with emerging market and developing economies—although comparatively low—accounts for a growing share of total U.S. trade ( Figure 2 and Figure 3 ). — with growth rising from 4.39% in 2016 to 4.72% in 2017, partly due to the moderate slowdown in China's economic growth over the past few years (from 10.60% in 2010 to 6.86% in 2017). In 2017, the United States accounted for 24.5% of world GDP (down from 30.6% in 2000), China for 14.7% (up from 3.6% in 2000), Japan for 6.5% (down from 14.6% in 2000, but up from 5.9% in 2016), and Germany for 4.6% (down from 5.8% in 2000) ( Figure 5 ). Value In nominal terms, world merchandise exports expanded 10.56% in 2017, after two years of declines, reaching $17,478.8 billion ( Figure 7 ). World merchandise imports also grew considerably in 2017, up 11.25%, after declining 3.23% in 2016. World exports and imports of services also increased in value considerably in 2017, up 7.74% and 6.93%, respectively. U.S. Trade in Goods U.S merchandise exports totaled $1.55 trillion in 2017, a 6.62% ($96.4 billion) increase from the 2016 level ( Figure 11 and Table 3 ). The value of U.S. merchandise imports was $2.36 trillion over the same period, up 6.92% ($152.9 billion) from 2016. U.S. imports increased more than U.S. exports, leading to a $56.4 billion (7.52%) increase in the U.S. merchandise trade deficit to $807.5 billion in 2017. U.S. merchandise imports from all six top trading partners also increased in 2017. Trade in Goods with Free Trade Agreement Partners26 U.S. two-way (exports plus imports) merchandise trade between the United States and its 20 FTA partners was $1,517.2 billion in 2017 countries. It accounted for 38.76% of total U.S. merchandise trade with the world. U.S. two-way (exports and imports) trade in services grew 5.63% between 2016 and 2017 ( Figure 18 ). During that period, U.S. exports of services increased 5.11% ($38 billion), from $758.9 billion to $797.7 billion, while U.S. services imports grew 6.40% ($32.6 billion), from $509.8 billion to $542.5 billion ( Table 8 ). The U.S. surplus in services trade increased 2.45% ($6.1 billion) to $255.2 billion. Trade in Services with Leading Partners In 2017, the EU—as a single entity—was the United States' top trading partner in terms of two-way (exports plus imports) services trade, while the largest single-country trading partners were the UK, Canada, Japan, China, and Germany ( Table 11 ). In 2017, the United States maintained a services trade surplus with every major services trading partner except with Hong Kong ($4.4 billion deficit), India ($3.1 billion deficit), and France ($2.7 billion deficit). In 2017, exports of goods and services totaled $2,351.1 billion and imports totaled $2,903.3 billion, resulting in a deficit of $552.3 billion, up slightly from 2016 but down from the all-time high level registered in 2006 ($761.7 billion) ( Table 12 ). Issues for Congress Congress plays a major role in shaping U.S. trade policy through its legislative and oversight authority. The Trump Administration's trade policy, which it characterizes as "Putting America First," has placed questions regarding the role of trade in the U.S. economy, the future of U.S. trade policy, and the U.S. role in the global economy at the forefront of the congressional policy debate. Other potential issues for Congress raised by changes in U.S. trade patterns and the global landscape include: (1) the future direction of the global trading system, as well as specific policies and issues raised by global economic developments; (2) the impact of the changing dynamics and composition of U.S. trade on the U.S. economy and U.S. relations with trading partners; (3) how to take full advantage of growing markets for U.S. manufacturers, service providers, agricultural producers, and their workers, including preparing for increased competition; and (4) how to assess the quality of data on trade and what, if any, additional resources should be devoted to collecting trade data and analyzing the role of trade in the U.S. economy.

Summary The United States is the world's biggest economy (in nominal dollars), leading trading nation (goods and services), and largest source of and destination for foreign direct investment. The U.S. output of goods and services, or gross domestic product (GDP), totaled $19.5 trillion in 2017. That is almost the combined GDP in nominal dollars of the next three largest economies. All told, the United States, with close to 5% of the world's population, accounted for almost 25% of the world's output and more than 16% of its growth in 2017. While the United States is the world's largest exporter (goods and services combined), U.S. exports are overshadowed by the large U.S. demand for imported products. However, the level of both U.S. exports and imports of goods and services depends on many interrelated domestic and international macroeconomic factors, including the value of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies, global demand for other dollar-denominated assets—including U.S. Treasury securities, and the relative strength of the U.S. and world economies. While the United States is still by far the dominant economy in the world, its relative position has shifted in the past two decades. The changing dynamics and composition of U.S. trade have been important to Congress because they can affect the overall health of the U.S. economy and specific industries, the success of U.S. businesses and workers, and the U.S. standard of living. They also have implications for U.S. geopolitical interests. Conversely, geopolitical tensions, risks, and opportunities can have major impacts on U.S. trade flows. These issues are complex and at times controversial, and developments in the global economy often make policymaking more challenging, as it involves balancing many competing interests. Congress is in a unique position to address these and other issues, particularly given its constitutional authority for legislating and overseeing international trade and financial policy. Key Trade and Economic Developments in 2017 World Economic Developments. World economic growth rose from 3.3% in 2016 to 3.7% in 2017. Advanced economies grew 2.3%, while emerging market and developing economies grew 4.7%—partly due to the moderate slowdown in China's GDP growth over the past few years (from 10.6% in 2010 to 6.7% in 2017). In 2017, the United States accounted for 24.5% of global GDP (down from 30.6% in 2000), China for 14.7% (up from 3.6% in 2000), Japan for 6.5% (down from 14.6% in 2000), and Germany for 4.6% (down from 5.8% in 2000). In addition, world merchandise trade recorded its largest increase since 2011. In nominal terms, world merchandise exports expanded 10.6% in 2017, after two years of declines, reaching $17.5 trillion. World merchandise imports also grew considerably in 2017, up 11.3%, after declining 3.2% in 2016. In addition, world exports and imports of services increased in value considerably in 2017, up 7.7% and 6.9%, respectively. U.S. Goods Trade. U.S. merchandise exports totaled $1.6 trillion in 2017, a 6.6% increase from the 2016 level. The value of U.S. merchandise imports was $2.4 trillion over the same period, up 6.9% from the 2016 level. U.S. imports increased more than U.S. exports, leading to a $56.4 billion (7.5%) increase in the U.S. merchandise trade deficit, which reached $807.5 billion in 2017. In 2017, the European Union (EU) was the United States' top trading partner in terms of two-way (exports plus imports) merchandise trade (accounting for 22.5% of total U.S. merchandise trade), while China was the largest single-country trading partner (accounting for 16.3% of total U.S. merchandise trade). U.S. Services Trade. U.S. two-way (exports and imports) trade in services grew 5.6% between 2016 and 2017. During that period, U.S. exports of services increased 5.1%, from $758.9 billion to $797.7 billion, while U.S. services imports grew 6.4%, from $509.8 billion to $542.5 billion. The United States maintained a services trade surplus with every major services trading partner except Hong Kong, India, and France in 2017. The overall services trade surplus increased 2.5% ($6.1 billion) to $255.2 billion. The EU was the United States' top trading partner in terms of two-way (exports plus imports) services trade in 2017, while the largest single-country trading partners were the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, China, and Germany. U.S. Total Trade. In 2017, U.S. exports of goods and services totaled $2.4 trillion, while U.S. imports totaled $2.9 trillion, resulting in a deficit of $552.3 billion, up slightly from 2016, but down from the all-time high level registered in 2006 ($761.7 billion). Issues for Congress International trade is one of several important drivers of economic growth. A number of questions regarding recent and future trends in U.S exports and imports could arise as the Trump Administration renegotiates U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) and pursues news ones, and takes a more forceful stance to reduce U.S. bilateral trade deficits, enforce U.S. trade laws and agreements, and promote what it considers to be "free," "fair," and "reciprocal" trade. One question pertains to the impact of renegotiating or pursuing new FTAs on the U.S. economy. As with any trade liberalizing measure, an FTA can have net positive overall effects on some sectors and adverse effects on others. An FTA may create export and import opportunities in one sector of the U.S. economy but divert trade away from others. Members of Congress weigh these effects on various industries and on their constituencies, while also considering the overall impact on the United States and other trading partners. Because trade relations can differ significantly from one trade partner to another, the evaluation will likely differ in each case. Furthermore, Members may take into account not only the immediate static effects of greater global economic integration efforts, but also the long-term, dynamic effects, which could play an important role in evaluating their contribution to the U.S. economy. Finally, other issues for Congress raised by the changing patterns in U.S. trade and the global landscape could include contemplating the future direction of the global trading system, as well as assessing the quality and availability of data on trade and what, if any, additional resources should be devoted to collecting trade data and analyzing the role of trade in the U.S. economy.

crs_R43728

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Frequently Asked Questions This report addresses frequently asked questions related to the Common Core State Standards and federal involvement with the standards. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, please see CRS Report R43711, Common Core State Standards and Assessments: Background and Issues , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. What NCLB requirements apply to academic standards and assessments? The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) required states participating in ESEA Title I-A to: develop and adopt content and performance standards and aligned assessments in the subjects of mathematics and reading in each of grades 3-8 and for at least one grade in grades 10-12 by the end of the 2005-2006 school year, assuming certain minimum levels of annual federal funding were provided for state assessment grants; adopt content and performance standards in science (at three grade levels—grades 3-5, 6-9, and 10-12) by the end of the 2005-2006 school year; and adopt assessments in science (at three grade levels) by the end of the 2007-2008 school year. What are the Common Core State Standards? However, according to CCSSI, a state is considered to have adopted the Common Core State Standards only if (1) a state adopts 100% of the standards in ELA and in mathematics (word for word), "with the option of adding up to 15% of standards on top of the core" standards, and (2) the body authorizing standards in the state has taken formal action to adopt and implement the standards. How many states have adopted the Common Core State Standards? As of August 2014, 43 states, the District of Columbia, 4 outlying areas, and the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) had adopted the Common Core State Standards. This total does not include Indiana and Oklahoma who recently became the first states to adopt and subsequently discontinue use of the Common Core State Standards. What role has the federal government played in the development, adoption, and implementation of the Common Core State Standards? While the federal government did not have a role in developing the Common Core State Standards, the Obama Administration has taken three major steps to incentivize the adoption and implementation of the standards: (1) Race to the Top (RTT) State Grants, (2) RTT Assessment Grants, and (3) ESEA flexibility package. Under the program, over $4 billion in competitive grants were awarded to 18 states and the District of Columbia. Do states have to adopt and implement the Common Core State Standards? What is the difference between standards and curriculum? Will the Common Core State Standards lead to national standards, national assessments, or a national curriculum? How do the Common Core State Standards relate to teacher evaluation? Are there legislative decisions approaching that are potentially relevant to the Common Core State Standards?

Over the last two decades, there has been interest in developing federal policies that focus on student outcomes in elementary and secondary education. Perhaps most prominently, the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110), which amended and reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), marked a dramatic expansion of the federal government's role in supporting standards-based instruction and test-based accountability, thereby increasing the federal government's involvement in decisions that directly affect teaching and learning. Under the ESEA, states are required to have standards in reading and mathematics for specified grade levels in order to receive funding under Title I-A of the ESEA. In response to this requirement, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have adopted and implemented standards that meet the requirements of the ESEA. Since the ESEA was last comprehensively reauthorized by NCLB, recent developments have taken place that have possibly played a role in the selection of reading and mathematics standards by states: (1) the development and release of the Common Core State Standards; (2) the Race to the Top (RTT) State Grant competition and RTT Assessment Grants competition; and (3) the ESEA flexibility package provided by the Department of Education (ED) to states with approved applications. As of June 2014, 43 states, the District of Columbia, 4 outlying areas, and the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) had at some point adopted the Common Core State Standards. Indiana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina recently became the first states to adopt and subsequently discontinue use of the Common Core State Standards. These three changes have substantially changed the elementary and secondary education federal policy landscape. This short report answers common questions related to K-12 accountability provisions under the ESEA, Common Core State Standards, RTT, and the ESEA flexibility package, including: What NCLB requirements apply to academic standards and assessments? What are the Common Core State Standards? How many states have adopted the Common Core State Standards? What role has the federal government played in the development, adoption, and implementation of the Common Core State Standards? Do states have to adopt and implement the Common Core State Standards? What is the difference between standards and curriculum? Will the Common Core State Standards lead to national standards, national assessments, or a national curriculum? How do the Common Core State Standards relate to teacher evaluation? Are there legislative decisions approaching that are potentially relevant to the Common Core State Standards? A more detailed discussion of the Common Core State Standards and their relationship to RTT grants and the ESEA flexibility package is available in CRS Report R43711, Common Core State Standards and Assessments: Background and Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

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Introduction The Obama Administration requested $94.5 billion for the Department of Transportation (DOT) for FY2017, $19.5 billion (26%) more than DOT received in FY2016. The Obama Administration proposal included significant increases in funding for highway, transit, and intercity passenger rail programs. The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended a total of $76.9 billion in new budget authority for DOT for FY2017 ($74.7 billion after scorekeeping adjustments); this is $1.8 billion (2.5%) above the comparable FY2016 amount. On May 12, 2016, the full Senate began consideration of FY2017 appropriations for Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies. By custom, appropriations bills originate in the House of Representatives. On May 24, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations reported out H.R. 5394 . The scale of the funding coming from these funds is not entirely obvious in DOT budget tables, because most of the funding from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund is in the form of discretionary budget authority and so is combined with the discretionary budget authority provided from the general fund. Selected Issues Overall, the Obama Administration's FY2017 budget request totaled $96.9 billion in new budget resources for DOT. The requested funding is $21.9 billion more than that enacted for FY2016. The Obama Administration request called for significant increases over the authorized amounts for highways, transit, and intercity rail. According to press reports, the Trump Administration has requested $1 billion in reductions from FY2016 levels, zeroing out the Essential Air Services program (-$150 million) and the TIGER (National Infrastructure Investment) grant program (-$500 million) and reducing funding for the transit New Starts program (-$400 million). Highway Trust Fund Solvency Virtually all federal highway funding and most federal transit funding come from the Highway Trust Fund, whose revenues comes largely from the federal motor fuels excise tax ("gas tax"). Congress has continued to support the TIGER program through annual DOT appropriations. The $85 million in the Senate bill, and $50 million recommended in the House bill, for intercity passenger rail grants in FY2017 in addition to the grants to Amtrak would be the first funding provided for intercity passenger rail (other than grants for positive train control implementation) since the 111 th Congress (2009-2010), which provided $10.5 billion for DOT's high-speed and intercity passenger rail grant program. The Senate bill would have provided $2.338 billion, the authorized level, which is 7% ($161 million) above the FY2016 level. That provision was not included in the Senate bill. For FY2017, the Senate bill would have provided $150 million for WMATA, while expressing frustration at the lack of progress the agency has made in improving safety with the additional funding it has been receiving.

In February 2016, the Obama Administration proposed a $96.9 billion budget for the Department of Transportation (DOT) for FY2017. That is approximately $22 billion more than was provided for FY2016. The budget request reflected the Administration's call for significant increases in funding for highway, transit, and rail programs. The DOT appropriations bill funds federal programs covering aviation, highways and highway safety, public transit, intercity rail, maritime safety, pipelines, and related activities. Federal highway, transit, and rail programs were reauthorized in the fall of 2015, and their future funding authorizations were somewhat increased. There is general agreement that more funding is needed for transportation infrastructure, but Congress has not been able to agree on a source that could provide the additional funding. The federal excise tax on motor fuel, which is the primary funding source for federal highway and transit programs, has not been increased in over 20 years, and does not raise enough revenue to support even the current level of spending. To address this shortfall, Congress periodically transfers money from the general fund to keep the programs going. The annual appropriations for DOT are combined with those for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations bill. In the 114th Congress, the Senate passed H.R. 2577, in which Division A was FY2017 appropriations for THUD. The bill would have provided $76.9 billion in new budget authority for DOT, $1.8 billion more than the comparable figure in FY2016 but roughly $20 billion less than the Administration request. The increase in spending over FY2016 was not obvious in budget tables due to a proposed rescission of $2.2 billion of contract authority, which made the net FY2017 amount $344 million less than the comparable FY2016 appropriation. The House Committee on Appropriations reported out H.R. 5394, which would have provided $76.9 billion in new budget authority for DOT. The major changes from FY2016 levels in these bills were more funding for highways, transit, and intercity passenger rail. FY2017 funding is being provided by a continuing resolution (CR) at roughly FY2016 levels. The current CR ends on April 28, 2017. According to press reports, the Trump Administration has requested a $1 billion reduction in DOT funding from FY2016 levels, with cuts to the Essential Air Service, TIGER (National Infrastructure Investment), and transit New Starts grant programs.

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Thailand is an important trade and investment partner for the United States, and U.S. access to Thai military facilities and sustained military-to-military cooperation make Thailand an important element of the U.S. strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Bangkok's political turmoil over the past decade has harmed the bilateral relationship. With Bangkok consumed with its own political crises, analysts believe Thailand's ability to help with regional initiatives, including those supported by the United States, is severely limited. If Thailand is under a military government for an extended period, what are the implications for U.S. relations with one of its Asian treaty allies and for U.S. policy in the region? Two days later, the military ousted the civilian government, and Army Commander Prayuth Chan-ocha seized power. Former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was placed under house arrest (she was later released). Response to the Coup In response to the 2014 coup, the United States immediately suspended $4.7 million in foreign assistance to Thailand, cancelled a series of military exercises and Thai military officers' visits, and urged a quick return to civilian rule and early elections. The 2006 coup was the first in 15 years. Thaksin's 2001-2006 tenure as Prime Minister was marked by an unprecedented centralization of power in the Prime Minister's office, as well as the implementation of populist economic policies such as the public subsidy of health care. When demonstrations have occurred, they have usually been between two main groups: the "yellow shirts" (with sub-groups such as the People's Alliance for Democracy and the People's Democratic Reform Committee) and the "red shirts" (sometimes known as the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship).The yellow shirts are a mix of the military, royalists, the bureaucracy, and largely urban and middle class citizens. Role of the Palace The ailing King Bhumiphol Adulyadej has remained largely disengaged from the ongoing political crisis. There is no other arbiter of the King's status—pointing to the weakness of Thailand's other political institutions—and the succession process is unclear. U.S.-Thailand Security Relations In many ways, the military-to-military connection has been the strongest pillar of the U.S.-Thai relationship. The United States has a statutory obligation to withhold aid to militaries involved in coups against democratically elected governments and, after the 2014 coup, the United States suspended military assistance and training exercises with Thailand, chilling relations. Thailand's education system is consistently ranked below some other Southeast Asian nations. His sister, Yingluck, also implemented populist policies. They worry that China is gaining more leverage in Thailand—particularly given the chill in U.S.-Thai relations. Without a strong U.S.-Thai relationship, analysts warn that it will be increasingly difficult to strengthen treaty alliances and regional multilateral organizations such as ASEAN. Thailand-Burma Ties Historically, Thailand has had an uneasy, albeit peaceful, relationship with Burma—both in the past when Burma was controlled by the military and currently with the military ceding some control to the country's civilian politicians. Relations with Malaysia have been complicated by the insurgency in Thailand's majority-Muslim southern provinces, which border Malaysia (see next section). Also, the Thai government has a poor record on combating human trafficking, and its security forces have been accused of human rights violations in the southern provinces throughout the country's various administrations. For decades, many observers have been concerned about Thailand's democracy. However, after the 2006 coup, a new constitution was drafted. In 2014, UNHCR estimated that around 120,000 Burmese refugees lived in nine camps along the Thai-Burmese border.

Thailand is a long-time military ally and a significant trade and economic partner for the United States. For many years, Thailand was seen as a model democracy in Southeast Asia, although this image, along with U.S.-Thai relations, has been complicated by deep political and economic instability in the wake of two military coups in the past nine years. The first, in 2006, displaced Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a popular but polarizing figure who is currently living in exile. The second, in 2014, deposed an acting prime minister after Thaksin's sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was ousted from the premiership by a Constitutional Court decision that many saw as politically motivated. After the 2014 coup, the military installed General Army Commander Prayuth Chan-ocha as Prime Minister. He remains head of the Thai government. The junta is drafting a new constitution, and elections are unlikely before 2017. Thailand's political instability stems primarily from the rivalry between Thaksin's supporters (loosely known as "red shirts") and his opponents ("yellow shirts"—largely urban elites, the military, and those loyal to Thailand's King). Parties loyal to Thaksin have won the last six nationwide elections, including several that took place after the 2006 coup, but a series of prime ministers have been removed, either via coup or court action. Following the 2014 coup, Thailand faces numerous risks to internal stability. Thaksin's supporters, analysts warn, feel increasingly disenfranchised, and they may resort to violence to express their political grievances in the future. Concerns also surround the health of Thailand's widely revered King Bhumiphol Adulyadej and uncertainty about the royal succession process. The royal palace is one of Thailand's most powerful institutions, and in the past, the King has intervened in periods of internal conflict. Thailand's government also must contend with a low-level insurgency in the country's southern, Muslim-majority provinces, where around 6,000 have been killed since 2004. Some analysts see U.S.-Thailand relations at an important crossroad. For decades, bilateral military-to-military cooperation has been robust in terms of security assistance, training, and military exercises. After the 2014 coup, the United States suspended security assistance funds to Thailand, and the rationale for an ongoing military relationship is challenged, given that the Thai military has overthrown several democratically elected governments. Nevertheless, some analysts contend that maintaining the U.S.-Thai relationship is vital, warning that, without it, the United States may lose access to Thailand's strategically located military facilities and that China may become even more influential in the region. Dozens of other U.S. agencies also base their regional headquarters in Thailand, and some officials worry that political tension with Bangkok could threaten those operations as well. U.S. interests may also be affected by Thailand's political instability, which limits Bangkok's ability to pursue an active foreign policy. Thailand has historically been a leader of the regional Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and it maintains relatively close relations with both China and neighboring Myanmar. Some believe that having a U.S. ally focused deeply on domestic instability could limit opportunities to pursue broader regional initiatives. The United States and the international community have raised other concerns about Thailand, mainly having to do with human trafficking, the large refugee population living within the country's borders, and human rights and democracy conditions. This report will be updated periodically.

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This report provides a brief overview of the major tax and spending policy changes set to take effect under current law at the end of 2012 or early in 2013. Collectively, these policies have been referred to by some as the "fiscal cliff." Major Fiscal Policy Changes A variety of revenue and spending provisions are set to expire around the end of calendar year 2012, including the Bush tax cuts and other related tax provisions, extended emergency unemployment benefits, the Social Security payroll tax reduction, the "doc fix," and other tax extenders. If Congress and the President allow all of these measures to expire as scheduled under current law and let the spending cuts under the Budget Control Act (BCA) take effect (see discussion below), the budget deficits beginning in FY2013 will gradually fall as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and are projected to remain at sustainable levels through FY2022. Under current law, the budget deficit is estimated to fall $502 billion between FY2012 and FY2013 (see Table 1 ) as a result of fiscal policy changes set to take place at the end of 2012 and early in 2013. This estimated deficit reduction assumes that current law will be implemented as scheduled. If, however, Congress changes the trajectory of these policies by increasing spending (i.e., by eliminating the BCA automatic spending cuts) or decreasing revenue (i.e., by extending a portion of the Bush tax cuts), these policies would increase the deficit relative to the baseline. Also included in the Bush tax cuts were provisions that reduced tax rates on long-term capital gains and dividends; reduced and ultimately repealed limitations for personal exemptions (PEP) and itemized deductions (Pease); and expanded certain tax credits, including the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), child tax credit, adoption tax credit, and dependent care tax credit. The Bush tax cuts also contained provisions to reduce the marriage tax penalty, as well as modified various education-related tax incentives. Extending current estate tax provisions would increase the budget deficit, relative to current law. CBO estimates that allowing the two-percentage-point payroll tax reduction to expire would reduce the budget deficit by $95 billion between FY2012 and FY2013 (see Table 1 ). Tax Extenders A number of temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2011, and more are scheduled to expire at the end of 2012. 112-25 ). P.L. Allowing for a reduction in Medicare payment rates for physicians would reduce the budget deficit by $11 billion between FY2012 and FY2013. However, making significant changes to spending or revenue policies at this time may be harmful to the ongoing economic recovery. There are also timing issues associated with various tax and spending policies scheduled to take effect under current law that have potential implications on the economy. Thus, the timing associated with various tax and spending policies scheduled to change under current law at the end of 2012 or early in 2013 has important consequences for the expected economic effects of individual policy choices. He stated that the spending and tax policies set to take effect in 2013 could endanger the recovery and recommended that Congress work to implement a credible medium-term plan for deficit reduction.

This report provides a brief overview of the major tax and spending policy changes set to take effect under current law at the end of 2012 or early in 2013. Collectively, these policies have been referred to by some as the "fiscal cliff." Extending current revenue policies (e.g., extending the Bush tax cuts) and changing current spending policies (e.g., not allowing the BCA sequester to take effect) would increase the projected budget deficit relative to current law. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that if current law remains in place, the budget deficit will fall by $502 billion between FY2012 and FY2013. Revenue provisions that are set to expire at the end of 2012 include the "Bush tax cuts," as well as provisions related to the estate tax and the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). Collectively, the Bush tax cuts reduced income taxes by reducing tax rates, reduced the marriage penalty, repealed limitations on personal exemptions and itemized deductions (PEP and Pease, respectively), expanded refundable credits, and modified education tax incentives. The Bush tax cuts also reduced estate tax liabilities by increasing the amount of an estate exempt from taxation and by lowering the tax rate. The two-percentage-point reduction in the Social Security payroll tax is also set to expire at the end of 2012 and a number of temporary tax provisions (also known as "tax extenders") expired at the end of 2011 with more scheduled to expire at the end of 2012. Under current law, these provisions are collectively estimated to reduce the budget deficit by nearly $400 billion between FY2012 and FY2013. There are a variety of spending policies set to change at the end of 2012 or early in 2013. These include the federal share of extended benefit payments for unemployment and the authorization for temporary emergency unemployment benefits. Payments to physicians under Medicare are scheduled to be reduced by 27% in 2013 under the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) system. Automatic spending cuts enacted as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) are scheduled to reduce spending beginning in FY2013. Under current law, these policy changes are collectively estimated to reduce the budget deficit by over $100 billion between FY2012 and FY2013. In making fiscal policy choices, Congress will have to weigh the benefits of deficit reduction against the potential implications of fiscal policy choices for the ongoing economic recovery. Maintaining current revenue and spending policies will add to the deficit, while increasing revenues and reducing spending, as under current law, could slow economic growth. Thus, deficit reduction measures must be balanced against concerns that spending cuts or tax increases could dampen an already weak economic recovery. CBO has concluded that allowing current law fiscal policies to take effect will dampen short-term economic growth, but accelerate long-term economic growth. Conversely, CBO has concluded that postponing the fiscal restraint would accelerate short-term economic growth, but dampen long-term economic growth. In that context, several policy observers have recommended implementing a credible medium-term plan that balances economic considerations with deficit reduction.

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Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 , ACA, as amended), a number of provisions directly affect access to health insurance coverage. This report provides a description of two of the provisions in ACA that are targeted toward younger individuals, for plan years beginning on or after s ix months from the date of enactment (i.e., the plan year beginning on or after September 23, 2010). ACA prohibits coverage exclusions for children with preexisting health conditions who are under age 19, and the law also requires plans to continue to make dependent coverage available to children under age 26.

Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, ACA, as amended), a number of provisions directly affect access to health insurance coverage. This report provides a description of two of the provisions in ACA that are targeted toward younger individuals, for plan years beginning on or after six months from the date of enactment (i.e., the plan year beginning on or after September 23, 2010). ACA prohibits coverage exclusions for children with preexisting health conditions who are under age 19, and the law also requires plans to continue to make dependent coverage available to children under age 26.

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Congressional action on the FY2018 NDAA reflected a running debate about the size of the defense budget given the strategic environment and budgetary issues facing the United States. Annual limits on discretionary spending set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ) remain in place through FY2021 and fundamentally shape congressional actions related to all federal spending, including defense funding. One exception to that rule is that the Administration's November 2017 amendment to its FY2018 budget request reflected its revision of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan: The additional $5.9 billion requested included $1.2 billion to support the President's decision to deploy in Afghanistan about 3,500 more U.S. personnel than the May 2017 budget request had assumed. The BCA established separate limits (commonly referred to as caps ) on defense and nondefense discretionary budget authority that are enforced by a mechanism called sequestration . The defense limit applies to the national defense budget (function 050), but does not restrict amounts designated by the President and Congress as funding for emergencies or for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The Trump Administration proposed $603 billion for base budget national defense discretionary spending in FY2018—$54 billion more than the BCA cap. 2810 ) authorized defense appropriations at levels which, if enacted, would have exceeded the cap then in force, thus triggering sequestration. After the FY2018 NDAA was enacted, but before final action on any FY2018 appropriations, the caps on discretionary spending for defense and nondefense programs in FY2018 and FY2019 were increased as part of P.L. 115-123 , which included the fifth continuing appropriations resolution for FY2018. The revised cap on base budget, discretionary defense appropriations for FY2018 is $629 billion, which would accommodate appropriations to the level authorized by the enacted version of the FY2018 NDAA. The Trump Administration's initial FY2018 budget request, released on May 23, 2017, included a total of $677.1 billion for national defense-related activities of the federal government (budget function 050). Of the initial, $677.1 billion request, $612.5 billion was for the base budget , that is, for funds intended to pay for those activities the DOD and other national defense-related agencies would pursue even if U.S. forces were not engaged in contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. The remainder of the FY2018 request—originally amounting to $64.6 billion—is designated as funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). House and Senate Action on FY2018 NDAA Of the $667.6 billion in national defense discretionary funding initially requested by the President for FY2018, $659.8 billion fell within the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and was subject to authorization by the annual National Defense Authorization Act. On July 14, 2017, the House passed H.R. 2810 , the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018, by a vote of 344-81. On September 18, 2017, the Senate passed its version of that bill by a vote of 89-8 after having replaced the text of the House bill with an amended version of S. 1519 , the version of the bill that had been reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee. FY2018 DOD Budget Amendment (November 2017) In November 2017—after the House and Senate had passed their respective versions of the FY2018 NDAA but before House and Senate conferees had completed work on a compromise version of the bill ( H.R. The requested increase included $4.01 billion to expand and upgrade missile defense programs intended to counter threats from North Korea; $674 million to repair USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald , destroyers equipped for antimissile defense that were damaged in separate collisions in the Western Pacific; and $1.18 billion to cover costs associated with the deployment in and around Afghanistan of 3,500 more U.S. troops than had been assumed in the FY2018 budget request. Conferees on the FY2018 NDAA authorized the additional funds requested by the budget amendment. The President and Congress designated as emergency funds the $4.7 billion requested for missile defense and ship repair while designating as OCO the funds requested for an enlarged U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The House agreed to the conference report on November 14, 2017, by a vote of 356-70. The Senate agreed to it on November 16, 2017, by voice vote and the President signed the bill into law ( P.L. 115-91 ) on December 12, 2017. A slightly modified version of that requirement is included in Section 1641 of the final version of the NDAA. That amount is authorized by the final version of H.R. 2810 . 2810 . The Senate bill would have approved the request while the House bill would approve a total of $3.74 billion on grounds that the remainder of the funds requested would not be needed during FY2018. The final version of H.R. The final version of H.R.

The Trump Administration's initial FY2018 budget request, released on May 23, 2017, included a total of $677.1 billion for the national defense budget function (Budget Function 050), which encompasses all defense-related activities of the federal government. Of that amount, $659.8 billion was for appropriation accounts for which authorization is provided in the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The remainder of the request was either for mandatory funds not requiring annual authorization or for discretionary funds outside the scope of the NDAA. That initial Administration request included $595.3 billion in discretionary funding for the so-called base budget, that is, funds intended to pay for activities that the Department of Defense (DOD) and other national defense-related agencies would pursue even if U.S. forces were not engaged in contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. The remaining $64.6 billion of the request, formally designated as funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), would fund the incremental cost of those ongoing operations as well as any other DOD costs that Congress and the President agree to so designate. On July 14, 2017, the House passed by a vote of 344-81 H.R. 2810, the version of the FY2018 NDAA that had been reported by the House Armed Services Committee. That bill would have authorized $613.8 billion for the base budget—$18.5 billion more than the Administration's initial request—and $74.6 billion designated as OCO funding, which is $10 billion more than the Administration's OCO request. The Senate passed its version of H.R. 2810 on September 18, 2017, by a vote of 89-8, after first replacing the House-passed text of that bill with the text of S. 1519, the version of the FY2018 NDAA that had been reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee. This Senate-passed version of the bill would have authorized $631.9 billion for the base budget—exceeding the base budget request by nearly $37 billion—and $60.0 billion for OCO-designated funding. In November 2017—after the House and Senate had passed their respective versions of the FY2018 NDAA but before conferees had completed negotiations to produce a compromise version of the bill—the Trump Administration amended its FY2018 DOD budget request, asking for an additional $5.9 billion. The additional funds included $4.0 billion for missile defense-related programs the Administration described as being in response to recent missile tests and other activities by North Korea. The budget amendment also included $674 million to repair two Navy destroyers damaged in collisions and $1.2 billion to support the President's decision to increase by approximately 3,500 the number of U.S. military personnel in and around Afghanistan. The $1.2 billion associated with the Afghanistan troop levels was designated as OCO while the remaining $4.7 billion of the increase was included in the base budget. The final version of H.R. 2810 authorized $626.4 billion for base budget activities and $65.7 billion for OCO-designated funding. The House agreed to this final version of the bill on November 14, 2017, by a vote of 356-70. The Senate agreed to it on November 16, 2017, by voice vote. President Trump signed the bill into law (P.L. 115-91) on December 12, 2017. Congressional action on FY2018 defense funding reflected a running debate about the size of the defense budget given the strategic environment and budgetary issues facing the United States. Annual limits (often referred to as caps) on discretionary spending for defense and for nondefense federal activities, set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), remain in place through FY2021. If the amount appropriated for either category were to exceed the relevant cap, it would trigger near-across-the-board reductions to a level allowed by the cap—a process called sequestration. Appropriations designated by Congress and the President as funding for OCO or for emergencies are exempt from these caps. For the period during which Congress was considering the FY2018 NDAA, the BCA limit on discretionary defense spending was $549 billion. The caps apply to appropriations, not authorization legislation. However, if Congress had appropriated for national defense programs the amounts requested by the Administration or the amounts authorized by any of the versions of H.R. 2810 passed by House or Senate, those appropriations would have triggered sequestration. Before Congress enacted any FY2018 appropriations bills, it raised the FY2018 and FY2019 discretionary spending caps on defense and nondefense spending as part of P.L. 115-123, which included the fifth continuing appropriations resolution for FY2018. The revised cap on base budget, discretionary defense appropriations for FY2018 is $629 billion, which would accommodate appropriations to the level authorized by the enacted version of H.R. 2810.

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Introduction The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced a new initiative in July 2012, under which it would be willing to waive certain federal work participation standards under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant to permit states to experiment with "alternative and innovative strategies, policies, and procedures that are designed to improve employment outcomes for needy families." The work participation standards are numerical performance standards that each state must meet or risk being penalized through a reduction in its block grant. These are standards that apply to the states, not directly to individuals, though they influence how states design their welfare-to-work programs and apply requirements to individual recipients. Such waivers will be the first "new" waivers to test welfare-to-work strategies in more than 15 years, since the enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law that created TANF. Some in Congress have opposed the Administration's waiver initiative. The House has twice (once in the 113 th Congress; once in the 112 th Congress) passed measures to bar HHS from moving forward with granting waivers of the TANF work participation standards. Opponents of the waiver initiative question both its legality and the process used in forwarding the initiative, and claim that granting waivers of the participation standards would weaken the work requirements. The standards are performance measures computed in the aggregate for each state, which require that a specified percentage of families be considered engaged in specified activities for a minimum number of hours. The TANF statute provides that 50% of all families and 90% of two-parent families included in the participation rate are required to be engaged in work. However, few states have ever faced this standard because the percentage is reduced for caseload reduction or state spending in excess of what is required under the TANF MOE. However, there are limits on the ability of states to count participation in pre-employment activities such as education, rehabilitative activities, and job search toward the work standards: For work-eligible individuals age 20 and older, participation in a GED program counts only if the recipient also participates in activities more closely related to work for at least 20 hours per week. Application and Approval Process In order for TANF work standards to be waived, states would have to apply for a waiver and have that waiver approved by HHS and OMB. As of June 3, 2013, no state had requested a waiver. Testing Alternative Welfare-to-Work Strategies TANF was enacted during a period of experimentation of welfare-to-work strategies. President Obama's waiver initiative essentially would permit states to negotiate an alternative to the work participation rate as the way to measure the performance of their welfare-to-work program. Presumably, states would focus on achieving a better score on the outcome being measured: increasing the number of recipients who move from welfare to work. It could be argued that the old dichotomy between "work-first" and education-focused strategies is outdated, given new types of programs such as career pathways that combine work-focused education and training with work. These programs are available to low-income persons generally, but have yet to be tested and evaluated in a welfare-to-work setting.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced a new initiative in July 2012, under which it would be willing to waive certain federal work participation standards under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant to permit states to experiment with "alternative and innovative strategies, policies, and procedures that are designed to improve employment outcomes for needy families." Some in Congress have opposed the Administration's waiver initiative. The House has twice (once in the 113th Congress; once in the 112th Congress) passed measures to bar HHS from moving forward with granting waivers of the TANF work participation standards. Opponents of the waiver initiative question its legality and the process used in forwarding the initiative, and they claim that granting waivers of the participation standards would weaken the work requirements. The major provision that HHS would waive is the numerical performance standards that states must meet or risk being penalized through a reduction in their TANF block grant. The TANF statute provides that 50% of all families and 90% of two-parent families included in a participation rate are required to be engaged in work, though few states have ever faced the full standard because this percentage is reduced for certain credits. To be considered engaged in work under the TANF standard, a family must either be working or in specified welfare-to-work activities for a minimum number of hours per week. Pre-employment activities such as job search, rehabilitative activities, and education count for a limited period of time or under limited circumstances. Though these counting rules apply to states, and not directly to individual recipients, they may influence the requirements that states place on recipients. The new waivers would permit states to have welfare-to-work initiatives assessed using different measures than the TANF work participation rate. Thus, states could test alternative welfare-to-work approaches by engaging recipients in activities currently not countable without risk of losing block grant funds. States would have to apply for waivers, which must be approved by HHS and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). States would also be required to monitor performance measures and evaluate the alternative welfare-to-work program. HHS also indicated it might waive some requirements that apply to states for verifying work activities. As of June 3, 2013, no state had requested a waiver. The new initiative would allow the first new waivers to test welfare-to-work strategies in more than 15 years, although waivers were used extensively in the years immediately preceding the 1996 welfare reform legislation. The pre-welfare reform research found that "work-first," education-focused, and certain "mixed strategy" programs all moved recipients from welfare to work. However, the education-focused programs did not outperform the "work-first" programs even over a five-year timeframe. This lent support to TANF's focus on rapid job attachment and limits on counting education and training toward the participation standards. This research is now 15 to 20 years old, and certain newer workforce strategies (e.g., "career pathways") have yet to be tested in a welfare-to-work setting. The waiver initiative would also allow states to evaluate their welfare-to-work programs by focusing on outcomes, such as the rate at which recipients leave welfare for work, rather than participation. This might focus state behavior on increasing such outcomes. However, it could also alter state behavior in ways not anticipated or desired by policymakers.

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Introduction A presidential transition—the period from campaigning through placement of new administration personnel—is a unique time in American politics and holds the promise of opportunity as well as a real or perceived vulnerability to our nation's security interests. Presidential transitions during times of U.S. involvement in military operations and national security-related activities are not unique to the 2008-2009 presidential transition period (see Appendix A ). How the newly elected president recognizes and responds to these challenges will "depend heavily upon the planning and learning that takes place during the transition from one Administration to another." Other activities that the current and incoming administrations and Congress may wish to consider undertaking during the presidential transition period include undertaking public outreach efforts to discuss possible risks to the nation, involving the national security representatives of presidential hopefuls in all transition-related discussions, establishing joint advisory councils responsible for addressing all transition-related risks, requiring the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to undertake efforts to support the nation's awareness of risks, reflecting the national security priorities of the new Administration in the 2009 budget, passing the FY2009 appropriations without undue delay; quickly assigning newly elected and existing Members of Congress to committees focused on national security, holding hearings comprised of national security experts to gather ideas on prospective U.S. national security policies and goals, and holding hearings soon after the inauguration of the new President to determine the Administration's national security-related priorities. However, actions can be taken by the outgoing President and President-elect to ameliorate any suspected appearance of presidential decision-making ambiguity. Conclusion While the first presidential transition in the post 9/11 era is of concern to many national security observers, risks during the transition period may be minimized with proactive executive branch and congressional actions. Whether the enemies of the United States choose to undertake action counter to the nation's security interests or the new President experiences a relatively peaceful period during the transition, the new Administration's recognition and response to these challenges will depend heavily on the preparation and education activities that have occurred prior to the inauguration. The transition-related actions or inactions of the outgoing and incoming Administration may have a long-lasting affect on new President's ability to effectively safeguard United State's interests and may also effect the legacy of the outgoing President.

A presidential transition is a unique time in America and holds the promise of opportunity, as well as a possible risk to the nation's security interests. The 2008-2009 election marks the first presidential transition in the post-9/11 era, and is of concern to many national security observers. While changes in administration during U.S. involvement in national security related activities are not unique to the 2008-2009 election, many observers suggest that the current security climate and recent acts of terrorism by individuals wishing to influence national elections and change foreign policies portend a time of increased risk to the current presidential transition period. Whether the enemies of the United States choose to undertake action that may harm the nation's security interests during the 2008-2009 election, or the new President experiences a relatively peaceful period during the transition, many foreign and domestic policy and security challenges will await the new Administration. How the new President recognizes and responds to these challenges will depend heavily on the planning and learning that occurs prior to the inauguration. Actions can be taken by the outgoing President and President-elect that may ameliorate decision-making activities in the new administration. Whether an incident of national security significance occurs just before or soon after the presidential transition, the actions or inactions of the outgoing Administration may have a long-lasting effect on the new President's ability to effectively safeguard U.S. interests and may affect the legacy of the outgoing President. This report discusses historical national-security related presidential transition activities, provides a representative sampling of national security issues the next administration may encounter, and offers considerations and options relevant to each of the five phases of the presidential transition period. Each phase has distinct challenges and opportunities for the incoming administration, the outgoing administration, and Congress. This report will be updated as needed.

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Introduction On July 22, 2009, in Phuket, Thailand, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and representatives from the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) signed the Instrument of Extension and the Instrument of Accession to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The move came less than six months after she had announced, during a visit to Jakarta, that the Obama Administration would launch its formal interagency process to pursue accession. One of ASEAN's pillars, the TAC was first negotiated in 1976 and subsequently amended to allow non-regional countries to accede. The Administration's move is designed to symbolically boost the United States' standing in Southeast Asia by expanding the multilateral component of U.S. policy in the region. Following consultations with selective offices in the Senate, the Administration decided that accession would take the form of an executive agreement, which does not require Senate approval. Interests in the TAC, ASEAN, and Southeast Asia Motivations for and Reservations Against Acceding to the TAC The Obama Administration's primary motivation for acceding to the TAC appears to have been to send a signal that the United States seeks to upgrade its presence in Southeast Asia. Accession to the TAC by non-members often is seen as a symbol of their commitment to engagement in Southeast Asia and the organization's emphasis on multilateral processes. Objections to joining the TAC included arguments that the TAC's emphasis on non-interference in domestic affairs (particularly in Articles 2, 10, and 13) would constrain U.S. freedom of action, particularly its ability to penalize Burma; a concern that the treaty would undermine U.S. security agreements with Asian allies, notably Japan, South Korea, and Australia; a belief that acceding would accord greater legitimacy to the ruling Burmese junta; a view that ASEAN is insufficiently "action-oriented"; and a belief that the TAC is an ineffectual, largely symbolic agreement. Interests in Southeast Asia One of the world's largest regional groupings, ASEAN is Southeast Asia's primary multilateral organization. Its 10 member-nations include over 500 million people. Geographically, Southeast Asia includes some of the world's most critical sea lanes, including the Straits of Malacca, through which pass a large percentage of the world's trade. Indeed, one factor motivating the United States' increased engagement with ASEAN in the 2000s has been the desire to support Southeast Asia's political stature as China expands its influence in the region. U.S.-ASEAN Economic Relations Collectively, ASEAN is a major U.S. trading partner. Over the same period, ASEAN has been the source for about 5%-6% of total U.S. imports. Arguably, U.S. accession to the TAC could have taken the form of a treaty, with accession being subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, or an executive agreement. Some States that have acceded to the TAC, including the United States, negotiated side letters that address the issues discussed in the following sections.

On July 22, 2009, during Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's visit to Southeast Asia, the United States acceded to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), one of the 10-nation organization's core documents, as had been amended by the 1987 and 1998 TAC Protocols. The move came less than six months after Secretary of State Clinton announced in Jakarta that the Obama Administration would launch its formal interagency process to pursue accession. This report analyzes the legal and diplomatic issues involved with accession to the TAC. ASEAN is Southeast Asia's primary multilateral organization. Its 10 member-nations include over 500 million people. Collectively, ASEAN is one of the United States' largest trading partners, constituting about 5%-6% of total U.S. trade. Geographically, Southeast Asia includes some of the world's most critical sea lanes, including the Straits of Malacca, through which pass a large percentage of the world's trade. The TAC was first negotiated in 1976 and subsequently amended to allow non-regional countries to accede. Fifteen countries have done so, including U.S. allies Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as China, Russia, and India. Within ASEAN, accession to the TAC by non-members often is seen as a symbol of commitment to engagement in Southeast Asia, and to the organization's emphasis on multilateral processes. The United States is the last major Pacific power to have acceded. The fact that the United States was not a party to the TAC had been one of many pieces of evidence that Southeast Asian leaders cited in arguing that the United States neglected Southeast Asia generally, and ASEAN specifically. Southeast Asian leaders generally have welcomed the Obama Administration's move, which seems to be designed to boost the United States' standing in Southeast Asia by expanding the multilateral component of U.S. policy in the region. Some U.S. and Southeast Asian officials and analysts say that expanding U.S. engagement with ASEAN will help boost Southeast Asia's political stature, particularly as China seeks to continue expanding its influence in the region. The major concern with accession is whether the TAC's emphasis on non-interference in other countries' domestic affairs will constrain U.S. freedom of action, particularly its ability to maintain or expand sanctions on Burma. Proponents of accession often note that Australia has imposed and expanded financial and travel restrictions on Burma since it acceded in 2005. Canberra's restrictions are far less extensive than the sanctions the United States maintains on Burma. The Administration and ASEAN negotiated and exchanged side letters designed to alleviate these concerns. Other objections to accession included arguments that it will accord greater legitimacy to the ruling Burmese junta; a view that ASEAN is insufficiently "action-oriented"; and a belief that the TAC is an untested, arguably ineffectual agreement. One issue for U.S. policymakers was whether accession to the TAC should take the form of a treaty, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, or whether the President already has sufficient authority to enter the TAC without further legislative action being necessary. Ultimately, after consulting with selective offices in the Senate, the Administration decided that accession would take the form of an executive agreement, which does not require Senate approval.

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Introduction Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in late August 2005, causing extensive wind damageand catastrophic flooding, and leading to Presidential disaster declarations for Alabama, Florida,Louisiana and Mississippi. The storm was one of the worst natural disasters in the nation's history. Hurricane Rita, which made landfall along the Gulf Coast in late September 2005, was somewhatless severe than Katrina when it hit. Government officials and citizens shaken by the devastation of the earlierstorm mounted aggressive preparedness efforts in anticipation of Hurricane Rita, drawing on lessonslearned from Katrina just weeks earlier. Hurricane Katrina is estimated to have killed more than 1,200 people, and displaced about2 million. The FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) recently increased its estimate of the number of personsdisplaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to about 2 million. Over the past decade, in response to the Oklahoma City bombing, the terror attacks of 2001and several serious natural disasters, Congress and the Administration created new authorities,structures and plans to assure that government at all levels can respond well to disasters likeHurricane Katrina. This report will discuss relevant authorities and response plans that guided the public healthand medical response to the 2005 hurricanes. This report will be updated as circumstanceswarrant. The National Response Plan The National Response Plan (NRP) is the framework under which federal and voluntaryagencies are instructed to operate when a disaster occurs. (5) The NRP was released by DHS in December 2004, replacing theprevious Federal Response Plan. According to the NRP, which is under the overall coordination of the Secretary of HomelandSecurity, the Secretary of HHS is tasked with Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8, thecoordination of public health and medical services, as laid out in the plan's ESF#8 annex. (6) HHS is responsible forcoordinating the following activities under ESF#8, and may request assistance from 14 designatedsupport agencies and the American Red Cross as needed: Assessment of public health and medical needs; Health surveillance; Medical care personnel; Health and medical equipment and supplies; Patient evacuation; Patient care; Safety and security of human drugs, biologics, and medical devices, veterinarydrugs, and other HHS-regulated products; Blood and blood products; Food safety and security; Agriculture safety and security (principally with regard to food-producinganimals and animal feeds and drugs); Worker health and safety; All-hazard public health and medical consultation, technical assistance andsupport; Behavioral health care; Public health and medical information; Vector control (e.g., control of disease-carrying insects androdents); Potable water, wastewater and solid waste disposal; Victim identification and mortuary services; and Protection of animal health (principally with regard to HHS-regulated animalfeeds and drugs). Mass care is the responsibility of DHS and is carried out by FEMA and theAmerican Red Cross according to ESF#6. This system of continuous communication andcoordination is an example of the changes that have been made in national public health responsecapability in the aftermath of the September 11 and anthrax attacks of 2001, though there is stillwork to be done in assuring that all relevant state agencies have continuous EOC communicationwith those at the federal level. As discussed earlier, federal leadership for medical emergency response is based in HHS perits coordinating responsibility under NRP ESF#8. Morgues were setup in Louisiana and Mississippi to house and identify the dead. HRSA undertook a number of response efforts following Hurricane Katrina, including staffdeployments. Department of Homeland Security National Disaster Medical System. (45) NDMS is administered by FEMA and is a partnership of HHS,DHS, the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs, state and local governments, and the privatesector. These after-action reports are expected to be prepared andsubmitted to a variety of agencies involved in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Disaster Planning in Healthcare Overview. (77) Options for Congress. The program is in its early stages, with pilots beginning in several states,and was not ready for use in response to Hurricane Katrina.

Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in late August 2005, causing catastrophic winddamage and flooding in several states, and a massive dislocation of victims across the country. Thestorm was one of the worst natural disasters in the nation's history. Estimates are that more than1,200 people were killed and about 2 million displaced. Hurricane Rita, which made landfall alongthe Gulf Coast in late September 2005, was ultimately less lethal than Katrina, but promptedaggressive preparedness efforts by governments and citizens shaken by the devastation of the earlierstorm. In response to a series of disasters and terrorist attacks over the past decade, in particular theterror attacks of 2001, Congress, the Administration, state and local governments and the privatesector have made investments to improve disaster preparedness and response. New federalauthorities and programs to strengthen the nation's public health system were introduced incomprehensive legislation in 2002. Congress also created the Department of Homeland Security(DHS) in 2002 to provide national leadership for coordinated preparedness and response planning. A new National Response Plan (NRP), launched by DHS in December 2004, met its first major testin the response to Hurricane Katrina. According to the NRP, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is tasked withcoordinating the response of the public health and medical sectors following a disaster. HHS workswith several other agencies to accomplish this mission, which includes assuring the safety of food,water and environments, treating the ranks of the ill and injured, and identifying the dead. HHSactivities are coordinated with those of other lead agencies under the overall leadership of DHS. Congress and others will review the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita with an eyetoward assessing how well the NRP worked as an instrument for coordinated national response, andhow well various agencies at the federal, state and local levels carried out their missions under theplan. Hurricane Katrina dealt some familiar blows in emergency response. The failure ofcommunication systems, and subsequent difficulties in coordination, challenged response efforts inthis disaster as with others before it. Hurricane Katrina also pushed some response elements, suchas surge capacity in the healthcare workforce, to their limits. The response to Hurricane Katrina hasalso called attention to the matter of disaster planning in healthcare facilities, and the potential roleof health information technology in expediting the care of displaced persons. Policymakers will nodoubt study these elements of the Katrina response and seek options for continued improvement innational disaster preparedness and response. This report discusses the NRP and its components for public health and medical response,provides information on key response activities carried out by agencies in HHS and DHS, anddiscusses certain issues in public health and medical preparedness that have been raised by theresponse to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

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To enter into force, the agreement mustbe approved by the enactment of a joint resolution of Congress. Implementing Procedure The statutory requirements and legislative procedure leading to the enactment and entry into force of a trade agreement with a nonmarket economy (NME)country, including Vietnam, are set out in detail in Sections 151, 404, 405, and 407 of the Trade Act of 1974 ( P.L.93-618 ), as amended. Functionally, the consideration and enactment of the approval resolution and the implementation of the agreement follow a specific expedited ("fast-track")procedure explained below. A notice of the effective date of the agreement is published by the U.S. Trade Representativein the Federal Register .

The procedure leading to the entry into force of the U.S. trade agreement with Vietnam, including a reciprocalextension of nondiscriminatory treatment. calls for its approval by the enactment of a joint resolution of Congress,considered under a specific fast-track procedurewith deadlines for its various stages, with mandatory language and no amendments. After favorable reports on thelegislation in both houses, H.J.Res. 51,approving the nondiscriminatory treatment, was enacted on October 16, 2001; the agreement also was ratified byVietnam on December 4, 2001, and entered intoforce by exchange of notices of acceptance between the two parties on December 10, 2001. The functional sequenceof the legislative and executive steps involvedin the implementation of the agreement is described in this report.

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Forests are major carbon sinks—repositories of vast amounts of carbon. This report describes current markets for forest carbon sequestration, the potential for using forests to offset other sources of GHG emissions, and the concerns and drawbacks related to forest carbon sequestration efforts. Projects that sequester GHGs or reduce GHG emissions from unregulated economic sectors, such as forestry, can generate offsets, or credits, to sell to regulated entities or to those who wish to reduce their carbon footprints. In either case—for regulated entities or for voluntary reductions—forestry activities (e.g., afforestation, reforestation, and avoided deforestation) typically present opportunities to offset GHG emissions. One concern for offset markets, in addition to the drawbacks discussed below, is the potential for double-counting the offsets—that is, that sellers might try to sell the same offset to multiple buyers. For forestry projects, the CDM includes only afforestation (planting trees where none were previously growing) and reforestation (replanting trees on recently cleared forest sites). Regional Initiatives in the United States Even though the United States is not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, many states are participating in regional initiatives for mandatory reduction of GHG emissions. These technical guidelines could provide a consistent basis for carbon reporting and for offset projects in both voluntary and compliance markets. Forestry Projects for Offsets Several types of forestry projects might qualify as offsets for compliance or voluntary carbon markets. This is particularly significant for forestry, since tropical deforestation and forest degradation have been estimated to cause as much as 17% of anthropogenic carbon emissions. (See " Avoided Deforestation ," below.) Long-Term Wood Products Some have suggested that harvesting timber for long-term wood products should be included as possible carbon offsets. Sawmill wastes are almost entirely used for paper or energy (burned as a substitute for fossil fuels). Paper products have a relatively brief duration, often releasing their carbon in less than a year, but paper is commonly recycled, reducing the carbon release as well as reducing the demand for wood from the forest. Some argue that harvesting increases carbon sequestration by storing carbon in long-term products and sequestering large amounts of carbon in reforestation. However, avoiding deforestation is particularly prone to leakage—deforestation of another site to provide the desired products or outcomes. Potential Drawbacks of Forestry-Related Projects Although forestry-related projects may offer considerable opportunities to mitigate climate change, several issues with offsets generally and with forestry projects in particular have generated controversy. Additionality means that the offset project is an activity beyond what would have occurred under a business-as-usual scenario. For instance, does the activity represent a common practice or conform to an industry standard? Is the forestry project required under other federal, state, or local laws? For some markets and practices, assurance of sustainable forest management can be obtained through forest certification. Product Leakage Forest products face another type of leakage: product leakage. Forest offset projects are typically expected to generate offsets (via sequestration) for decades. Some are concerned that the emission offsets will be subsequently negated by human activity (e.g., change in land use) or a natural occurrence (e.g., forest fire, disease, or pestilence). An analysis of four particular carbon offset market standards found that one required a 10% buffer (i.e., only 90% of the estimated carbon offset could be sold); another required a 30% buffer, while the other two used variable buffers (from 5% to 60%) depending on an assessment of the risk of the project. This relies on accurate measurement and monitoring to assure that payments are for net carbon sequestration. Forward Crediting Many biological sequestration projects, such as afforestation or reforestation, present a unique challenge because of the significant time gap between the initial project activity (e.g., planting trees) and the actual carbon sequestration.

Forests are major carbon sinks (storehouses), and activities that alter forests can release or sequester carbon dioxide (CO2), the most common greenhouse gas (GHG). Some carbon markets have been formed under mandatory GHG reduction regimes, such as the Kyoto Protocol and various regional and state initiatives in the United States. Other markets have formed for voluntary efforts to reduce GHG emissions. Offsets, or credits for sequestering carbon or reducing emissions in unregulated sectors, are typically allowed in both mandatory and voluntary markets. Forestry activities are among the largest-volume and lowest-cost opportunities for generating offsets. Various forestry activities may be feasible for carbon offsets. Afforestation (planting trees on open sites) and reforestation (planting trees on recently cleared sites) are the activities most commonly included for offsets. Some propose that the carbon stored in long-term wood products, such as lumber and plywood, could be credited as carbon offsets, and mill wastes often substitute for fossil fuels to produce energy; however, short-term products (e.g., paper) and the biomass left in the woods after timber harvesting release carbon, making the net carbon effects uncertain. Some forest management practices also might qualify for carbon offsets; certified sustainable forest practices provide a system of assured, long-term forests, while activities to increase tree growth face many of the same concerns as long-term wood products. Finally, deforestation is a major source of GHG emissions, accounting for as much as 17% of anthropogenic emissions. Thus, avoided deforestation, especially in the tropics, potentially provides an enormous opportunity to reduce GHG emissions. However, avoided deforestation is particularly prone to leakage (see below), as well as many of the concerns about forest carbon offsets generally. Forestry projects may offer considerable market opportunities for carbon offsets, but several issues have generated concerns and controversy. One concern, especially for compliance markets, is whether projects are additional to business as usual. An activity that is common practice or industry standard, or a project that is required under current federal, state, or local laws, cannot be used as an offset. Functional carbon markets also require cost-effective practices to verify carbon sequestration. Current measurement and monitoring practices are costly and have several implementation challenges. Another concern is that, compared to other types of offsets, forestry projects present substantial risk of leakage. Emission leakage can occur if carbon sequestered in one location (e.g., by avoided deforestation) leads to carbon release (e.g., from increased harvesting) in another location. Product leakage could occur if forest carbon sequestration induces use of more carbon-intensive substitutes (e.g., cement or steel). Forest carbon projects are expected to generate offsets for decades. Some are concerned that the sequestration will be negated subsequently by human activity (e.g., change in land use) or a natural occurrence (e.g., forest fire or disease). Although there are legal and accounting mechanisms that can address this concern, implementing these options may present challenges, particularly for projects in developing nations. Finally, forward crediting to allow early credits for expected sequestration faces many of the same concerns about not fulfilling expectations.

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These issues often arise at the regional level but have a federal connection. For example, Congress may be faced with responding to various water-related crises, such as extreme drought or flooding issues (e.g., California drought in 2014 and coastal flooding issues associated with Hurricane Sandy or other storms). This report first discusses recent congressional activity and possible topics for the 114 th Congress. Next, it provides an overview of the federal role in water resources development, management, and protection, including a discussion of the two major federal water resources agencies—the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation)—and related legislation. Recent Congressional Activity and Looking Forward The water resource issues of the 114 th Congress are shaped in part by the actions of past Congresses. Legislation Enacted in the 113th Congress The 113 th Congress enacted an omnibus Corps authorization bill, the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA 2014, P.L. 113-121 ). Energy and environmental policy affect water resources management and development. 113-23 ). The 113 th Congress also enacted a farm bill ( P.L. Legislation Considered, but Not Enacted, During the 113th Congress The 113 th Congress considered but did not enact legislation to augment developed water supplies (e.g., water storage, water reuse), settle Indian water rights claims, lift restrictions on firearms at Army Corps projects, and provide direction for individual water projects and facilities. Because of recent water conditions (e.g., drought in portions of the West and Southwest), disasters, or legal or agency developments, certain basin issues are likely to receive congressional attention. Common themes in regional restoration efforts include demand for new project services (e.g., improved or new flood control, water supply, and navigation facilities), protection of threatened and endangered species, drought and flood management, and water quality concerns. However, the remainder of this report focuses on the projects, programs, and policies of the Corps and Reclamation. The most recent WRDAs were enacted in 2000, 2007, and 2014. Examples of Reclamation-related water project and management issues that may be considered during the 114 th Congress include the following: response to drought, and operations of federal reservoirs and water delivery; regulatory impediments to new water storage projects; status of Reclamation's Safety of Dams program; authorization, appropriations, and reporting to address aging infrastructure; Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley water reliability and species concerns (e.g., Bay-Delta Conservation Plan, CALFED reauthorization, and proposals to address Central Valley Project water supplies); miscellaneous project adjustments; Klamath River Basin restoration and Klamath project management; Colorado River water management; San Joaquin River restoration settlement funding and oversight. Overarching Policy Issues In addition to issues related to federal projects, the 114 th Congress faces a number of overarching water resources issues, including flood and drought management and response; project funding and authorization priorities; and aquatic ecosystem restoration. In addition to NIDIS reauthorization ( P.L. Funding and Authorization Priorities Aging Infrastructure U.S. water infrastructure is aging; the majority of the nation's dams, locks, and levees are more than 50 years old.

The 114th Congress faces many water resource development, management, and protection issues. Congressional actions shape reinvestment in aging federal infrastructure (e.g., dams, locks, and levees) and federal and nonfederal investment in new infrastructure, such as water supply augmentation, hydropower projects, navigation improvements, and efforts to restore aquatic ecosystems. These issues often arise at the regional or local levels but frequently have a federal connection. Ongoing issues include competition over water, drought and flood responses and policies, competitiveness and efficiency of U.S. harbors and waterways, and innovative and alternative financing approaches. The 114th Congress also may continue oversight of operations of federal infrastructure during drought and low-flow conditions, past large-scale flooding issues (e.g., Hurricane Sandy, Hurricane Katrina, Missouri and Mississippi River floods), and balancing hydropower generation, recreational use, and protection of threatened and endangered species. In addition to oversight, each Congress also provides appropriations for major federal water resource agencies, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation). The issues before the 114th Congress are shaped in part by what earlier Congresses chose to enact and consider. Measures considered but not enacted by the 113th Congress include California drought legislation, various drought policy and water efficiency and conservation measures, regional restoration legislation (e.g., Klamath Basin, Great Lakes, Chesapeake Bay), actions to expedite water storage projects and permits, settlement of Indian water rights claims, and a lifting of restrictions on firearms at Army Corps projects. Because of recent water conditions, disasters, or legal or agency developments, certain river basin issues are particularly likely to receive congressional attention during the 114th Congress. The Columbia River, Missouri River, and Sacramento and San Joaquin River (Central Valley Project) basins fall into this category. Other potential topics of congressional interest include emergency drought or flood legislation, private and public hydropower, water research and science investment and coordination, aging infrastructure, and environmental policy. The 113th Congress enacted an omnibus Corps authorization bill, the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA 2014, P.L. 113-121). In addition to authorizing new programs (e.g., Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act) and Corps construction projects, the legislation also established new processes that may shape how subsequent Corps project authorizations are identified. A Corps authorization bill often is considered by each Congress; enactment, however, has been less regular, with the most recent bills enacted in 2014, 2007, and 2000. The 113th Congress also enacted legislation to facilitate small conduit hydropower development (P.L. 113-23 and P.L. 113-24). This report discusses recent congressional activity and possible topics for the 114th Congress. It provides an overview of the federal role in water resources development, management, and protection, with a focus on projects of the two major federal water resources agencies—Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps—and related legislation. It also discusses overarching policy issues, such as drought and flood management and response, project funding and authorization priorities, and aquatic ecosystem restoration.

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About This Report This report provides background information and a summary of federal programs related to behavioral health among the American Indian and Alaska Native (AI/AN) population. Congressional hearings have focused on behavioral health problems such as alcohol use disorders, drug use disorders, and youth suicide in the AI/AN population. Federal Agencies Included in This Report Designing and implementing programs to improve AI/AN behavioral health is a challenging task that requires collaboration among federal agencies, tribal governments, other organizations, communities, and individuals. This report, however, focuses on the activities of two agencies within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): the Indian Health Service (IHS) and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). IHS is the lead federal agency on health care (including behavioral health care) among the AI/AN population. SAMHSA is the lead federal agency on behavioral health care among the general population (including the AI/AN population). Other programs may finance behavioral health services for the AI/AN population. IHS and SAMHSA Programs Included in This Report This report includes IHS and SAMHSA programs that specifically target behavioral health in the AI/AN population; it does not include every IHS or SAMHSA program that may be used to support behavioral health in the AI/AN population. Background on AI/AN Behavioral Health Research on AI/AN behavioral health demonstrates three key points: The AI/AN population has (1) a high prevalence of risk factors for behavioral health problems, (2) a high prevalence of behavioral health problems, and (3) limited access to care for behavioral health problems. IHS programs within ASAP's scope include Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders (FASD), Integrated Substance Abuse Treatment in Primary Care, Methamphetamine and Suicide Prevention Initiative (MSPI), and Youth Regional Treatment Centers (YRTCs). IHS programs within MM/SS's scope are Behavioral Health Integration with Primary Care, Telebehavioral Health and Workforce Development, and Zero Suicide Initiative. GLS Youth Suicide Prevention—State/Tribal The GLS Youth Suicide Prevention—State/Tribal program aims to improve the suicide prevention efforts of states, U.S. territories, ITs, and TOs.

Behavioral health problems (e.g., mental disorders, substance use disorders, and suicide) among the American Indian and Alaska Native (AI/AN) population have been the subject of multiple congressional hearings, introduced bills, and Administration initiatives in recent years. Research on AI/AN behavioral health demonstrates three key points: Relative to the general U.S. population, the AI/AN population has (1) a high prevalence of risk factors for behavioral health problems, (2) a high prevalence of behavioral health problems, and (3) limited access to care for behavioral health problems. Improving behavioral health among the AI/AN population is a challenging task that requires collaboration among federal agencies, tribal governments, other organizations, communities, and individuals, especially in a resource constrained budget environment. Within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), two key agencies conduct activities designed to improve AI/AN behavioral health: the Indian Health Service (IHS) and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). IHS is the lead federal agency on health care (including behavioral health care) among the AI/AN population. SAMHSA is the lead federal agency on behavioral health care among the general population (including the AI/AN population). This report describes IHS and SAMHSA programs (listed below) that specifically target behavioral health in the AI/AN population; it does not include every IHS or SAMHSA program available to support behavioral health in the AI/AN population. IHS Programs Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders Integrated Substance Abuse Treatment in Primary Care Methamphetamine and Suicide Prevention Initiative Youth Regional Treatment Centers Behavioral Health Integration with Primary Care Telebehavioral Health and Workforce Development Zero Suicide Initiative SAMHSA Programs Systems of Care Circles of Care Garrett Lee Smith (GLS) Youth Suicide Prevention—Campus GLS Youth Suicide Prevention—State/Tribal Native Connections Project LAUNCH Strategic Prevention Framework–Partnerships for Success Drug Courts Understanding the relationship between AI/AN behavioral health problems and related federal programs may help policymakers consider policy options affecting the AI/AN population. Policymakers could amend, eliminate, or create programs; require different types of coordination or information; and/or provide additional oversight.

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Major Developments Defense Logistics Agency Issues Formal Notice for American-made Shoes On January 31, 2014, DOD issued a solicitation designed to conduct market research to assess the availability of American-made shoes fully compliant with the Berry Amendment. According to one press report, DLA has announced that four companies have reported being capable of producing 100% domestic, U.S.-made, athletic footwear for military personnel. 113-66 , the NDAA for FY2014 ( H.R. 3304 ) was signed into law on December 26, 2013. Some of the Berry Amendment-related provisions proposed in H.R. 1960 and S. 1197 were not incorporated into the enacted bill. A discussion was provided in the joint explanation statement which accompanied the bill. 3304 . 1960, the House-proposed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 H.R. 1960 was introduced in the House on May 14, passed the House in a recorded vote (315-108) on June 14, and was referred to the Senate on July 8, 2013. The bill contained several provisions which would, if enacted into law, impact domestic source restrictions. The report would include a list of the components in the DOD supply chain for which one supplier controls over 50% of the global market, a list of supply chain parts where there is inadequate information to determine whether there is a single source for components, as well as the Secretary of Defense's recommendations on which single source suppliers create vulnerabilities and recommendations on how to reduce them; Section 839would have required DOD to meet domestic sourcing requirements for footwear issued to enlisted members, provided that DOD can certify that there are at least two domestic manufacturers of footwear that can meet the requirements of the Berry Amendment; Section 1601 would have required the DOD Inspector General to conduct periodic audits of contracting practices and policies related to the Berry Amendment. S. 1197, the Senate-proposed National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014 S. 1197 was introduced on June 20, 2013, and referred to the Armed Services Committee. S.Rept. 113-44 , which accompanied S. 1197 , directed both DOD and the Army to study the status of domestic sourcing for athletic footwear for enlisted members, as discussed here. As such, the committee directs DOD to submit a publicly releasable report to the congressional defense committees that includes, but not be limited to, any audits or auditing policy, investigations and enforcement, incentives, procurement officer training, and regulatory interpretation guidelines relating to the Department's contracting for textiles and clothing contained in Federal Supply Codes 83 and 84, and athletic footwear listed in Federal Supply Class 8430 and 8435. 1. From what sources does DOD procure American flags? 2533a shall apply. Background The Berry Amendment contains a number of domestic source restrictions that prohibit DOD from acquiring food, clothing, fabrics (including ballistic fibers), specialty metals, stainless steel, and hand or measuring tools that are not grown or produced in the United States. Some policy makers believe that the Berry Amendment's restrictions (like the specialty metal clause) contradict free trade policies, and that the presence and degree of such competition is the most effective tool for promoting efficiencies and improving quality. Others believe that U.S.-based companies need the protections afforded by the Berry Amendment. Several issues were raised during the debate. Charles R. Henry, testified that the Berry Amendment was critical to the maintenance of a "warm" U.S. industrial base during periods of adversity and war. Congress may choose to examine the domestic source restrictions under the Berry Amendment and other procurement provisions and to determine whether they help or hurt the defense industrial base, including relationships with foreign trading partners. Option 7: Audit and Investigate Berry Amendment Contracts Congress could investigate all military procurement contracts for compliance with the Berry Amendment. This provision would amend Title 10 U.S.C. P.L. 110th Congress Legislation Proposed H.R.

This report examines the original intent and purpose of the Berry Amendment and legislative proposals to amend the application of domestic source restrictions, as well as potential options for Congress. In order to protect the U.S. industrial base during periods of adversity and war, Congress passed domestic source restrictions as part of the 1941 Fifth Supplemental Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriations Act. These provisions later became known as the Berry Amendment. The Berry Amendment (Title 10 United States Code [U.S.C.] §2533a, Requirement to Buy Certain Articles from American Sources; Exceptions) contains a number of domestic source restrictions that prohibit DOD from acquiring food, clothing (including military uniforms), fabrics (including ballistic fibers), stainless steel, and hand or measuring tools that are not grown or produced in the United States. The Berry Amendment applies to DOD purchases only. On January 31, 2014, DOD issued a solicitation designed to conduct market research to assess the marketplace for the availability of American-made shoes fully compliant with the Berry Amendment. According to one February 2014 press report, four firms have told the Defense Logistics Agency that they could produce U.S.-made athletic footwear for military personnel. H.R. 1960, the House-proposed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2014, was introduced in the House on May 14, passed the House in a recorded vote (315-108) on June 14, and was referred to the Senate on July 8, 2013. The bill contained several provisions which would, if enacted into law, impact domestic source restrictions under the Berry Amendment, including the procurement of American flags, footwear for enlisted service members, contracts for textiles and clothing, and periodic audits by the Inspector General on contracts for goods and services. S. 1197, the Senate-proposed NDAA for FY2014, was introduced on June 20, 2013, and referred to the Armed Services Committee. Senate Report (S. Rept.) 113-44, which accompanied S. 1197, directed both DOD and the Army to study the status of domestic sourcing for athletic footwear for enlisted members, and to determine if there were sufficient quantities and with the appropriate qualities to meet the needs and requirement of DOD. The committee also directed DOD to submit a report to Congress including any audits or auditing policy, investigations and enforcement, and other requirements relating to DOD's contracting for textiles, clothing, and athletic footwear. P.L. 113-66, the NDAA for FY2014 (H.R. 3304) was signed into law on December 26, 2013. The Berry Amendment-related provisions proposed in H.R. 1960 and S. 1197 were not entirely incorporated into the enacted bill. A discussion was provided in the legislative text and joint explanation statement which accompanied H.R. 3304. Some policy makers believe that policies like the Berry Amendment contradict free trade policies, and that the presence and degree of such competition is the most effective tool for promoting efficiencies and improving quality. On the other hand, some other policy makers believe that key domestic sectors (like manufacturing) need the protections afforded by the Berry Amendment. The debate over the Berry Amendment raises several questions, among them (1) If the United States does not produce a solely domestic item, or if U.S. manufacturers are at maximum production capability, should DOD restrict procurement from foreign sources; and (2) to what extent do U.S. national security interests and industrial base concerns justify waiver of the Berry Amendment?

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A "pit" is the core of the primary stage of a thermonuclear weapon. Its key ingredient is weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu), which is composed mainly of the fissile isotope plutonium-239 (Pu-239) along with small quantities of other plutonium isotopes. Detonating the pit provides the energy to detonate a weapon's secondary stage. During the Cold War, the Rocky Flats Plant (CO) made up to 2,000 "war reserve" pits per year (ppy). Since then, the United States has made 29 war reserve pits total for replacement in W88 submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads between 2007 and 2011. Yet as discussed in " Install Equipment with a Single-Shift Capacity of 50 ppy ," the Department of Defense (DOD) stated it needed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA, the separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE) in charge of maintaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile) to have the capacity to produce 50 to 80 ppy. Pits are to be made at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL, NM) in the PF-4 (Plutonium Facility 4) building, potentially in proposed smaller structures called modules that would be connected to PF-4 by tunnels, or in both. Production at that rate requires enough "Material At Risk" (MAR) and space. To measure "enough," this report uses the concept of margin, which is space available for pit production and supporting tasks minus space required for them to be able to produce at a specified rate, and MAR available for pit production and supporting tasks minus MAR required for them to do so. A CRS report provides a detailed breakout of PF-4's space and MAR usage. However, while figures for space and MAR available for pit production exist, though they may need updating, figures for space and MAR required to produce 80 ppy do not exist because they have never been calculated rigorously. Accordingly, this report cannot find that one or more options would provide enough margin for producing 80 ppy or supporting AC. While the options seek to increase the feasibility of producing 80 ppy by 2027, the report cannot address whether they could meet that date because time to implement them cannot be determined. A combination of these and other options may be needed to meet the congressional requirement. These include: reducing cost; accelerating schedule (i.e., making capacity available sooner); increasing throughput, the rate at which pits are made or processes completed; improving worker safety, which includes reducing the risk of injury from building collapse, fire, industrial accidents, and radiation exposure; reducing the risk to the public from radiation exposure if PF-4 were to release a large quantity of plutonium as a result of an earthquake or major accident; and reducing radioactive waste. Relocate a Trailer Park at Los Alamos This option holds the potential to increase MAR permitted in PF-4 faster and at lower cost than new construction. Improve Modeling of Atmospheric Dispersion of Plutonium Compared to the current calculation, using a different computer model and different assumptions on plutonium dispersion reduces calculated dose by up to orders of magnitude. NNSA calculates dose to an MEOI from an accident at PF-4 using computer models. Increase Material-At-Risk Ceilings by Using Conservative Rather Than Very Conservative Assumptions This option holds the potential to increase permitted MAR in PF-4 by several orders of magnitude by using different assumptions in a calculation. Dose is calculated for a MAR value using a ten-factor equation that includes the amount of damage the building sustains, the fraction of plutonium that is released into the atmosphere by the event, an individual's breathing rate, and others. Yet an increase in the MAR ceiling in PF-4 by a factor of less than ten, and perhaps less than two—especially when combined with other MAR reduction measures described in this report—would probably provide enough MAR to permit production of 80 pits per year in PF-4. (Rem is a measure of radiation dose.) Pu-238 is 277 times more radioactive than Pu-239, so while PF-4 housed less than 2 kg of Pu-238 in February 2013, it contributed about a quarter of PF-4's MAR. That would permit either a reduction in the space and MAR needed for these processes, though offset somewhat by added space and MAR needed for packaging the drums, or would permit existing equipment to process more plutonium in order to support a higher rate of pit production. Hydrochloric acid processing for recovering plutonium produces a substantial waste stream that requires further treatment. Since Pu-241 decay is the only source of Am-241, after passing aged plutonium through a final run of metal chlorination to remove Am-241, so little Pu-241 would remain that even if all of it decayed to Am-241, the latter would never reach the level found in 30-year-old WGPu, and the weapons laboratories have certified weapons with pits that old (and older) as acceptable for use in the stockpile. Pu-241 has the shortest half-life of the plutonium isotopes in WGPu. Options Involving Structural Modifications to PF-4 Augment Seismic Resilience of PF-4 This option would increase permitted MAR, worker safety, and public safety. For example, it removed about 20 tons of combustible material from PF-4, mostly from the laboratory floor.

A pit is the plutonium core of a thermonuclear weapon. Imploding it with conventional explosives provides the energy to detonate the rest of the weapon. The Rocky Flats Plant made up to 2,000 pits per year (ppy) through 1989; since then, the United States has made 29 pits for the stockpile. Yet the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act requires the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which manages the nuclear weapons program, to produce at a rate of 80 ppy for 90 days in 2027. How can that requirement be met? Pits are to be made at Los Alamos National Laboratory's main plutonium facility, PF-4. To manufacture pits, a facility must have enough laboratory floor space and a high enough limit for Material At Risk (MAR), the amount of radioactive material a worst-case accident could release. Producing 80 ppy requires enough "margin," the space or MAR available to produce pits minus space or MAR required for that production rate. While space and MAR available have been calculated, amounts required to produce 80 ppy have never been calculated rigorously, leaving space and MAR needs undefined. Further, the report cannot address whether certain options could meet the 2027 date because time to implement them cannot be determined. Accordingly, this report presents 16 options that seek to increase the feasibility of producing 80 ppy by 2027, including: The radiation dose an individual would receive from a worst-case accident determines MAR permitted in PF-4. A ten-factor equation calculates dose as a function of MAR. NNSA uses worst-case values in this equation, yet median values may provide sufficient conservatism. Median values reduce calculated dose by orders of magnitude, permitting a large increase in PF-4 MAR. Yet merely doubling permitted MAR might suffice for producing 80 ppy. Providing this increase through construction at PF-4 could be costly and take years. In determining MAR for PF-4, the closest offsite individual is at a nearby trailer park. Relocating it would place the next closest individual farther away. The added distance would reduce dose, permitting increased MAR in PF-4. Using a different meteorological model and different assumptions would greatly reduce the currently calculated dose, perhaps permitting doubling PF-4 MAR. Plutonium decays radioactively, creating elements that various processes remove to purify plutonium. One process generates byproducts; plutonium is recovered from them with processes that take space and MAR. Since the United States has tons of plutonium surplus to defense needs, byproducts could be dispositioned as waste. Pits use weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu). U.S. WGPu is about 50 years old. About nine-tenths of plutonium-241, a WGPu isotope, decays to americium-241 in that time. Since plutonium-241 is the source of americium-241 in WGPu, removing the current americium-241 would prevent WGPu from ever reaching its americium-241 limit, permitting reduction in equipment for that process and reducing worker radiation exposure. A plutonium isotope used in space probes, plutonium-238, is extremely radioactive. It accounts for a small quantity of PF-4 plutonium but a quarter of PF-4's MAR. Building a "module" near PF-4 for plutonium-238 work would free MAR and space in PF-4, so one module might suffice instead of two or three. To reduce risk of collapse, loss of life, and radiation release from an earthquake, NNSA increased the seismic resilience of PF-4. More steps are planned; more could be taken. Achieving the congressionally mandated capacity will probably require choosing among options to create a package. MAR margin could be increased by relocating a trailer park, using a new meteorological model, installing rugged containers in the PF-4 production line, increasing PF-4's seismic resilience, and using less conservative assumptions in the MAR-to-dose equation. Similar choices exist for other options. At issue for Congress: What are the risks, costs, and benefits of the options? What is the optimum combination of options? CRS Report R44047, In Brief: Options to Help Meet a Congressional Requirement for Nuclear Weapon "Pit" Production, by [author name scrubbed], is a condensed version of this report.

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This report compares selected House and Senate rules of procedure for various stages of the legislative process: referral of legislation to committees; scheduling and calling up measures; and floor consideration. In general multiple referrals are more common in the House than in the Senate. The Senate Majority Leader has the authority to raise measures for Senate floor consideration. Special rules must be agreed to by a majority vote of the House. The agreements are negotiated by the Majority Leader, in consultation with the Minority Leader, committee chairmen, and interested Senators. Complex unanimous consent agreements are printed in the Senate's daily "Calendar of Business," and in the Congressional Record . It is easier to circumvent committees in the Senate than in the House, primarily because Senators generally have the right to offer non-germane amendments (commonly known as "riders") to measures being considered on the floor. Floor Consideration Presiding Officer and Recognition Practices The Speaker of the House is both the leader of the majority party and the chamber's presiding officer. In this dual position, the Speaker uses his parliamentary and political powers to govern House floor proceedings. In the Senate, individual Senators have the right to unlimited debate. Amending Measures The House typically meets in the Committee of the Whole to consider legislation that will be amended. Such amendment[s] must then be approved by the full House. The Senate (the chamber does not have a Committee of the Whole) considers and amends legislation in a less structured manner than the House. Germaneness of amendments is not required in the Senate, except in four specific instances: 1) if a unanimous consent agreement so requires; 2) in the post-cloture period (see previous section); 3) if a rule-making provision in a statute so requires (e.g., provisions of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 governing consideration of budget resolutions and reconciliation bills); and 4) if the underlying measure is a general appropriations bill. Senate quorum calls are in order at almost any time. Voting Procedures The House and Senate each have three main types of votes: voice , division , and record . Adjournment and Legislative Days The House routinely adjourns at the end of a day's proceedings. This means that a legislative day in the Senate can continue for many calendar days.

More differences than similarities emerge when comparing selected House and Senate rules of procedure for referring legislation to committees, and for scheduling, raising and considering measures on the floor. While the House uses four calendars (Union, House, Private, Discharge), the Senate only employs two calendars (Legislative and Executive). The House's system of special days for considering certain types of measures (e.g., "District Days") has no equivalent in the Senate. In making scheduling decisions, the Speaker typically consults only with majority party leaders and selected Representatives whereas the Senate Majority Leader confers broadly with minority party leaders and interested Senators. The Speaker's dual position as leader of the majority party and the House's presiding officer gives him more authority to govern floor proceedings than the Senate's presiding officer. While debate time is always restricted in the House, individual Senators generally have the right to unlimited debate. Most noncontroversial measures are approved by "suspension of the rules" in the House, and by unanimous consent in the Senate. Floor consideration of major bills is generally governed by "special rules" in the House, and by "complex unanimous consent agreements" in the Senate. The House typically meets in the Committee of the Whole to consider major legislation; no such committee exists in the Senate. The House considers and amends legislation in a more structured manner (e.g., by section or title) than the Senate. In addition, while germaneness of amendments is required in the House, it is mandated only in four instances in the Senate. Rollcall votes can be requested at almost any time in the Senate, but only after completing a voice or division vote in the House. Because the Senate often recesses instead of adjourning at the end of the day, Senate legislative days can continue for several calendar days. By contrast, the House routinely adjourns at the end of each legislative day.

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Introduction The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Comstock held that Congress possessed the legislative authority under the Constitution's necessary and proper clause to enact 18 U.S.C. Legislative Authority The Constitution vests federal legislative powers in Congress. Those legislative powers which it does not mention are reserved to the states and the people. When it framed the issue, however, it eluded the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause: "The question presented in this case is whether the power vested in Congress by Article I, §8, of the Constitution, '[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' its authority to 'regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States.'" "Pursuant to its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has carried into execution various of its enumerated powers—... U.S. Const. Section 4248, it contended, "is a rational incident to Congress' Article I powers to enact criminal laws, provide for the operation of a penal system, and assume for the United States custodial responsibilities for its prisoners." United States v. Comstock The Court in United States v. Comstock adopted the Justice Department's sequential or stepping stone argument, up to a point. The Court agreed that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to create federal criminal laws to ensure compliance with legislation enacted pursuant to one of its enumerated powers. 158 (1855); "(3) the sound reasons for the statute's enactment in light of the Government's custodial interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody" should they be released when other grounds for federal detention ceased to exist; "(4) the statute's accommodation of state interests" by affording states the option of assuming treatment responsibility for those of its citizens civilly committed under Section 4248; "and (5) the statute's narrow scope," that is, civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals otherwise scheduled for release from federal custody. Had the views of Justices Thomas and Scalia prevailed, there might have been some question of the continued validity of federal statutes which permit civil commitment on other mental grounds of federal prisoners scheduled for release or of other statutes which permit imposition of a term of supervised release to be served after federal inmates are released from prison. Five members of the Court, however, obviously found more appropriate a more nuanced description of the scope of the Clause—sometimes, the Necessary and Proper Clause will support legislation to help carry into execution a power which itself is no more than necessary and proper. The extent to which the Court's five considerations will be found to limit the stepping stone reach of the Clause in the future remains to be seen.

The Adam Walsh Act created 18 U.S.C. 4248, which authorizes civil commitment as sexually dangerous those otherwise about to be released from federal custody. In United States v. Comstock, the United States Supreme Court rejected a suggestion that enactment of Section 4248 lay outside the scope of Congress's legislative powers. It did so without considering whether the section might be vulnerable to constitutional attack on other grounds. The Constitution reserves to the states and the people those powers that it does not vest in the federal government. It vests in Congress the authority to enact laws necessary and proper to carrying into execution the powers it bestows on the federal government. The Justice Department contended that Congress has authority under the Constitution to enact those criminal laws which it finds necessary and proper to carry into execution various of its other powers such as the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce and legislation for the District of Columbia and federal enclaves. It argued further that incident to the power to enact criminal laws is the power to enact laws for the operation of a federal penal system and for responsibility for those assigned to that system, even after the expiration of the initial authority to imprison them. Comstock argued that Congress has no such incidental power. He contended that Congress's constitutional authority to enact legislation with respect to those imprisoned for violation of federal criminal laws ends with their terms of imprisonment. Subject to certain conditions that might lead to a different result under other circumstances, the Court agreed with the Justice Department, up to a point. Had Comstock prevailed, there might have been some question of the continued validity of federal statutes which permit civil commitment on other grounds of federal prisoners scheduled for release or of those statutes which permit imposition of a term of supervised release to be served after federal inmates are released from prison. As is, the opinion appears to support a more expansive view of Congress's legislative authority than was previously the case—sometimes, the Necessary and Proper Clause will support legislation to help carry into execution a power which itself is no more than necessary and proper. The Court's conclusion in Comstock was predicated upon "(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause ... , (2) the long history of federal involvement in this area, (3) the sound reasons for the statute's enactment in light of the Government's custodial interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute's accommodation of state interests, and (5) the statute's narrow scope," 130 S.Ct. at 1965. The extent to which absence of such factors will be found to limit the reach of the Clause in the future remains to be seen.

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With the financial turmoil and the volatile stock market, many have proposed increasing the limit on capital losses that can be deducted against ordinary income (the loss limit). An individual who is actually earning money on his portfolio can achieve tax benefits by realizing losses and not gains (and can hold assets with gains until death when no tax will ever be paid). The assets in these plans are not affected by the net loss restrictions. Symmetrical treatment of long-term gains and losses, however, would allow only 50% of a net long-term loss to be deducted against net short-term gains ($100 of net long-term loss could only offset $50 of net short-term gain). It established the current law treatment of gains by lowering the maximum tax rate on long-term capital gains income to 20% (and creating a 10% maximum capital gains tax rate for individuals in the 15% tax bracket). Under current law, asymmetries between the tax treatment of capital gains and losses remain. When capital gains income is taxed more lightly than other types of income, allowing capital losses to offset other income without limit increases a taxpayer's ability to minimize income taxes by altering the timing of the realization of gains and losses. In most cases, the current system, even without indexing the $3,000 loss for inflation, is more generous than the system that existed in 1978. In general, most of the capital losses are realized on assets that are predominantly owned by higher income taxpayers. Taxpayers with net capital losses can deduct up to $3,000 against ordinary income, but about 60% are subject to the loss limit and have to carryover the excess losses to subsequent years. One argument that might be made for providing capital gains tax relief is that it would increase the value of the stock market and thus investor confidence. Such a link is weaker and more uncertain than a direct stimulus to the economy via spending increases or cuts in taxes aimed at lower income individuals. Policy Options Several reasons have been advanced to increase the net capital loss limit against ordinary income: as part of an economic stimulus plan, as a means of restoring confidence in the stock market, and to restore the value of the loss limitation to its 1978 level. In the short run, an increase in the loss limitation could produce an incentive to sell stock, which could depress stock prices and erode confidence even further. Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that the tax benefits of an increase in the net capital loss limitation would be received by a relatively small number of higher income individuals. Second, while correcting the $3,000 loss limit to reflect price changes since 1978 would increase its value to about $10,000 in 2010 dollars, net long-term capital losses are generally treated more preferentially than they were prior to 1978 because of the asymmetry between loss and gain, which was never addressed during recent tax changes. Restoration of historical treatment would also require an adjustment for asymmetry. Raising the limit on losses without addressing asymmetry will expand opportunities to game the system. If net short-term losses are less than the loss limitation, then $2 of net long-term loss can be used to offset each $1 remaining in the net loss limitation.

Several reasons have been advanced for increasing the net capital loss limit against ordinary income: as part of an economic stimulus plan, as a means of restoring confidence in the stock market, and to restore the value of the loss limitation to its 1978 level. Under current law, long-term and short-term losses are netted against their respective gains and then against each other, but if any net loss remains it can offset up to $3,000 of ordinary income each year. Capital loss limits are imposed because individuals who own stock directly decide when to realize gains and losses. The limit constrains individuals from reducing their taxes by realizing losses while holding assets with gains until death when taxes are avoided completely. Current treatment of gains and losses exhibits an asymmetry because long-term gains are taxed at lower rates, but net long-term losses can offset income taxed at full rates. Individuals can game the system and minimize taxes by selectively realizing gains and losses, and for that reason the historical development of capital gains rules contains numerous instances of tax revisions directed at addressing asymmetry. The current asymmetry has grown as successive tax changes introduced increasingly favorable treatment of gains. Expansion of the loss limit would increase "gaming" opportunities. In most cases, this asymmetry makes current treatment more generous than it was in the past, although the capital loss limit has not increased since 1978. Capital loss limit expansions, like capital gains tax benefits, would primarily favor higher income individuals who are more likely to hold stock. Most stock shares held by moderate income individuals are in retirement savings plans (such as pensions and individual retirement accounts) that are not affected by the loss limit. Statistics also suggest that only a tiny fraction of individuals in most income classes experience a loss and that the loss can usually be deducted relatively quickly. One reason for proposing an increase in the loss limit is to stimulate the economy, by increasing the value of the stock market and investor confidence. Economic theory, however, suggests that the most certain method of stimulus is to increase spending directly or cut taxes of those with the highest marginal propensity to consume, generally lower income individuals. Expanding the capital loss limit is an indirect method, and is uncertain as well. Increased capital loss limits could reduce stock market values in the short run by encouraging individuals to sell. Adjusting the limit to reflect inflation since 1978 would result in an increase in the dollar limit to about $10,000. However, most people are better off now than they would be if the $3,000 had been indexed for inflation if capital losses were excludable to the same extent as long-term capital gains were taxable. For higher income individuals, restoring symmetry would require using about $2 in long-term loss to offset each dollar of ordinary income. Fully symmetric treatment would also require the same adjustment when offsetting short-term gains with long-term losses. This report will be updated to reflect legislative developments.

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One amendment sponsored by Representative Dan Benisheck and Representative Kyrsten Sinema would require the VA Inspector General (IG) to submit a copy of an IG report relating to employee misconduct to the House and Senate Committees on Veterans Affairs when submitting it to the Secretary; explain in that copy changes that the Secretary recommended to the report while it was being prepared; require the IG to identify managers responsible for correcting problems; and deny bonuses to managers who fail to rectify them. 1994 as amended by the House Committee on Veterans Affairs. It then describes sections of the VA Accountability of Act of 2015 as passed by the House on July 29, 2015. Section-by-Section Descriptions Section 1. Short Title This act may be cited as the VA Accountability Act of 2015. Section 3. The provision would provide that the appointment of an individual appointed (1) to a permanent position in the competitive service or (2) as a career appointee in the Senior Executive Service (SES) in the department would become final only after the employee served an 18-month probationary period. Current law, at 5 U.S.C. Section 4. Performance Appraisal System for Senior Executives at VA35 Section 5 of H.R. Mobility Requirement for Senior Executives Section 5(a) would require the Secretary to reassign every senior executive at least once every five years to a position at a different location with different personnel and program supervision responsibilities. Section 6. 1994 , as reported, would provide authority to change the crediting of federal service under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) for certain SES employees who were removed from service at the VA due to performance or misconduct, and were convicted of a felony that influenced performance in that position; and certain retirees who separated from SES employment at the VA before a final decision was issued with respect to a removal action, and were convicted of a felony that influenced performance in that position. Section 7. The provision would provide that the Secretary could not place an employee of the department—(1) who is subject to an investigation for purposes of determining whether he or she should be subject to any disciplinary action under Title 38 or Title 5, or (2) against whom any disciplinary action is proposed or initiated under Title 38 or Title 5—on administrative leave, or any other type of paid non-duty status without charge to leave, for more than 14 days during any 365-day period. Section 8. The provision would provide that an employee of the department is performing official duty during the period in which he or she is testifying in an official capacity before the House of Representatives or the Senate, a House or Senate committee, or a joint or select committee of Congress. Section 9. The provisions would require the Secretary to ensure that the aggregate amount of awards and bonuses paid in a fiscal year under 5 U.S.C. Chapter 45 or 5 U.S.C. Chapter 53, or any other awards or bonuses authorized under 38 U.S.C. do not exceed $300 million in each of the fiscal years FY2015 through FY2018, or $360 million in each of the fiscal years FY2019 through FY2024. Section 10. 1994 would require the Comptroller General of the United States (the Government Accountability Office, GAO) to conduct a study on the amount of time department employees spent in carrying out organizing activities related to labor organizations and the amount of space in department facilities used for such activities. Section 11. The Secretary must ensure that any responsible manager's performance review includes an evaluation regarding whether that manager took appropriate actions to resolve identified issues.

This report describes H.R. 1994, 114th Congress, 1st Session, the VA Accountability Act of 2015, as passed by the House on July 29, 2015, and compares its sections to current law where appropriate. Sections 1 through 10 were reported by the Committee on Veterans Affairs. Section 11 was added as a floor amendment. Section 1 is the short title, "VA Accountability Act of 2015." Section 2 would authorize the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to expedite removing or demoting most employees for misconduct. Section 3 would require an individual appointed to a permanent position in the competitive service or as a career appointee in the Senior Executive Service (SES) to serve an 18-month probationary period before the appointment would become final. Section 4 would establish a process for handling whistleblower complaints. Section 5 would establish specific requirements for VA's senior executive performance appraisal system and would require the Secretary of the VA to reassign senior executives to a new position at least every five years. It would also require a review of, and a plan for improvements to, the current management training program for senior executives. Section 6 would provide authority to reduce retirement benefits under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) for certain former SES employees at the VA who were removed from service (or separated from SES employment before a final removal decision was issued) and convicted of a felony that influenced performance in that position. Section 7 would provide that an employee of the department (1) who is subject to an investigation for purposes of determining whether he or she should be subject to any disciplinary action under Title 38 or Title 5 of the U.S.C., or (2) against whom any disciplinary action is proposed or initiated under Title 38 or Title 5 could not be placed on administrative leave, or any other type of paid non-duty status without charge to leave, for more than 14 days during any 365-day period. Section 8 would provide that an employee, who is testifying in an official capacity before the House of Representatives or the Senate, a House or Senate committee, or a joint or select committee of Congress, is performing official duty when engaged in such activity. Section 9 would limit the aggregate amount of awards and bonuses that could be paid to employees under 5 U.S.C. Chapter 45 or 5 U.S.C. Chapter 53, or any other awards or bonuses authorized under 38 U.S.C., to $300 million in each of the fiscal years FY2015 through FY2018, and $360 million in each of the fiscal years FY2019 through FY2024. Section 10 would require the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study on the amount of time department employees spent in carrying out organizing activities related to labor organizations and the amount of space in department facilities used for such activities. Section 11 would direct the VA Inspector General to submit a report that addresses a public health or safety issue relating to employee misconduct to the House and Senate Committees on Veterans Affairs when submitting it to the VA Secretary. It would require the Secretary to direct a responsible manager to resolve the issue; include in a manager's performance review an evaluation regarding whether the manager took appropriate actions to resolve it; and deny any bonus to a manager if the issue is not resolved.

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Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2010 included a compromise version of the House- and Senate-passed versions of Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 2010 (MILCON-VA Appropriations Act of 2010). The Consolidated Appropriations Act was singed into law on December 16, 2009 ( P.L. The MILCON-VA Appropriations Act, 2010, provides a total of approximately $45.1 billion for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). This is a 7.4% increase over the FY2009 enacted amount and the same as the Administration's budget request for VHA (see Table 1 ). 111-117 ) also provides approximately $48.2 billion in advance appropriations for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts to be available in FY2011. The Veterans Health Care System The VHA operates the nation's largest integrated direct health care delivery system. Furthermore, P.L. Veteran's Status Eligibility for VA health care is based primarily on "veteran's status" resulting from military service. 99-272 ), enacted into law in 1986, gave the VHA the authority to bill some veterans and most health care insurers for nonservice-connected care provided to veterans enrolled in the VA health care system, to help defray the cost of delivering medical services to veterans. Including total available resources (including medical collections) the Administration's budget would have provided $41.1 billion for VHA. FY2010 VHA Budget President's Request On February 26, 2009, President Barack Obama released an initial budget outline for FY2010. On May 7, the Administration released the full VHA budget proposal for FY2010. The President requested a total of $45.1 billion for VHA (excluding collections). The House agreed upon version of the budget resolution affirmed that "VA should not be authorized to bill private insurance companies for treatment of health conditions that are related to veterans' military service." 13 After negotiations between the two chambers, the House and Senate agreed to the conference report to accompany the FY2010 budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. 13 , H.Rept. 111-89 ) on April 29. The conference agreement provides $53.4 billion in discretionary budget authority and $53.1 billion in mandatory budget authority for VA programs. Sections 402 and 424 of the conference agreement included language exempting the following VA accounts from a point of order against advance appropriations: medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities. 3082 , H.Rept. 111-188 ). H.R. The House Appropriations Committee also provided advance appropriations totaling $48.2 billion for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts, an 8.3 % increase over the FY2010 House-passed funding level. On July 10, the House passed H.R. On November 17, the Senate passed H.R. 3082 as amended. H.R. 3082 as amended by the Senate provided a total of $45.2 billion for VHA, a $160.0 million increase over the House-passed amount, and $157.6 million over the President's request. 111-117 ). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 provides a total of $45.1 billion for VHA without medical care collections, same as the Administration's request for FY2010. 111-117 ( H.Rept. 1016 ) was signed into law ( P.L.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). This report focuses on the VHA. The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health care system. Veterans generally must enroll in the VA health care system to receive medical care. Eligibility for enrollment is based primarily on previous military service, disability, and income. VA provides free inpatient and outpatient medical care to veterans for service-connected conditions and to low-income veterans for nonservice-connected conditions. On February 26, 2009, the President submitted a preliminary budget outline for FY2010, and submitted his full FY2010 budget proposal to Congress on May 7. The Administration requested a total of $45.1 billion for VHA (excluding collections). This is a 7.5% increase over the FY2009 enacted level. Including total available resources (including medical care collections), the President's budget would provide approximately $48 billion for VHA. Based on the President's preliminary budget outline, on April 29, 2009, the House and Senate agreed to the conference report to accompany the FY2010 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13, H.Rept. 111-89). The conference agreement provides $53.4 billion in discretionary budget authority and $53.1 billion in mandatory budget authority for VA programs. Sections 402 and 424 of the conference agreement included language exempting the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts from a point of order against advance appropriations. Furthermore, the conference agreement states that VHA is not and should not be authorized to bill private insurance companies for treatment of health conditions that are related to veterans' service-connected disabilities. On July 10, the House passed its version of the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3082, H.Rept. 111-188). The House-passed bill provided a total of $45.1 billion for VHA. H.R. 3082 also provided $48.2 billion in advance appropriations for VHA to be available in FY2011. On November 17, the Senate passed H.R. 3082 as amended. H.R. 3082 as amended by the Senate provided a total of $45.2 billion for VHA, a $160.0 million increase over the House-passed amount, and $157.6 million over the President's request. The Consolidated Appropriations Act was signed into law on December 16, 2009 (P.L. 111-117, H.Rept. 111-366). Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2010 included a compromised version of the House and Senate passed versions of Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010. The Consolidated Appropriations Act provides a total of $45.1 billion for VHA, same as the Administration's request for FY2010, and 7.4% over the FY2009 enacted amount. P.L. 111-117 includes an advance appropriation of $48.2 billion for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts to be available in FY2011. With the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117), the FY2010 appropriations process for VHA was completed by Congress. This report will not be updated.

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In the Supreme Court's 2008-2009 term, which likely will conclude in late June, 2009, the Court has accepted for argument five environmental cases—an unusually large number out of the roughly 85 cases accepted for argument. This report reviews the cases, decided and undecided, and then briefly comments. At this writing, one of the five cases has been decided. These exercises involve the use of "mid-frequency active sonar" to detect enemy submarines. On remand from the Ninth Circuit, the district court modified the preliminary injunction to allow the Navy to use the sonar if it used mitigation measures. The Court did not address the merits of the lawsuit—that is, whether the Navy exercises violated NEPA or the other federal environmental laws claimed to be violated. Whether Cost-benefit Analysis May Be Used to Determine "Best Technology Available" Under the Clean Water Act: Entergy Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency Facts and litigation history: "Power plants and other industrial operations withdraw billions of gallons of water from the nation's waterways each day to cool their facilities. The rule permitted EPA to conduct cost-benefit analysis in determining BTA. Second, however, EPA has a new source performance standard promulgated under CWA section 306 that specifically prohibits discharges from Coeur Alaska's type of ore processing ("a froth flotation mill") into waters of the United States. EPA and the state then sued to recover their cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA; popularly "Superfund Act"), which attaches liability for such government cleanup costs to past and present owners and operators of a contaminated site, those who transported the hazardous substance to the site, and those who arranged for the disposal of the hazardous substance at the site ("arranger liability"). In United States v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co ., 520 F.3d 918 (9 th Cir. One element of that expansive liability, legislative history shows, is that parties made liable under the act are jointly and severally liable (each is potentially liable for the entire cleanup) unless there is some reasonable basis for apportioning liability. Industry views these five cases with optimism; the environmental community with apprehension. For one thing, the environmental side won in the decision below in all five cases. Assuming the conventional wisdom that the Supreme Court does not take cases merely to affirm the decision below, the environmental sweep in the appellate courts suggests decisions going the other way in the Supreme Court (the one decision so far, in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council , follows that prediction). As for the principal NEPA case, Summers v. Earth Island Institute , it has been noted that the Supreme Court has voted against the environmental position in each of its 15 NEPA decisions.

In the Supreme Court's 2008-2009 term, which likely will conclude in late June, 2009, the Court has accepted for argument five environmental cases—an unusually large number out of the roughly 85 cases accepted for argument. This report reviews the cases, decided and undecided, and then briefly comments. The one case of the five that is already decided is Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, holding that the national security interest in the Navy's being able to conduct exercises using "mid-frequency active sonar" clearly outweighs the danger to whales from use of such sonar. In so deciding, the Court also invalidated the Ninth Circuit's lax standard for the issuance of preliminary injunctions. The four cases remaining to be decided are, first, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, raising the question whether a court's awarding nationwide relief from the application of a rule is proper in the context of a site-specific challenge to the rule. Second, the case of Entergy Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency addresses the Clean Water Act's demand that EPA require the "best technology available" to minimize fish mortality from cooling water intake structures; the issue is whether that demand allows EPA to do cost-benefit analysis in deciding what technology to approve. Third, the case of Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Alaska Conservation Group poses the issue whether a discharge prohibited by a Clean Water Act new source performance standard can still be allowed pursuant to a "fill" permit under the act. And fourth, the case of Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States takes on two questions at the heart of the Superfund Act's liability scheme: when is there a reasonable basis for apportioning liability for hazardous-substance cleanup costs among responsible parties, in lieu of the joint and several liability that would otherwise apply, and when is a manufacturer liable for having arranged for the disposal of a hazardous substance even though disposal was not the primary purpose of the arrangement. Each of these cases has important implications for the particular program involved, and a few reach well beyond. Industry views these five cases with optimism; the environmental community with apprehension. A principal reason is that in all five cases, the environmental side won in the decision below. Assuming the conventional wisdom that the Supreme Court does not take cases merely to affirm the decision below, the environmental sweep in the lower appellate courts suggests decisions going the other way in the Supreme Court. The one decision so far, in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, follows that prediction.

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A policymaker deciding whether to support a new action; a legislator deciding whether to vote for a new program; a regulator deciding whether to impose a stringent standard: each decisionmaker faces the question, What will be foregone if I decide to commit the resources for this activity? These constraints that arise from institutional contexts in which legislators and other policymakers address tradeoffs both limit alternatives that can usefully be considered, and tend to push decisionmakers to make up-or-down, case-by-case decisions rather than choosing among tradeoffs. While the President, Congress as a whole, each Chamber, and the full Committees on Budget and on Appropriations have the ability to view comprehensively funding priorities and consider tradeoffs, only in exceptional cases can those with comprehensive authority devote attention to the level of detail at which most environmental, health, and safety tradeoffs occur. The competition among alternatives is not just on the basis of relative costs and benefits: there is also political reality. For environmental, health, and safety statutes, tradeoffs are largely determined by the statutes/programs of the subcommittee/committee of jurisdiction. One result is that each act containing regulatory programs has its own criteria for decisions on setting standards, cleanup, etc. What seems clear is that even if state and local, corporate, or private investments in alternatives to pollution control mandates would contribute equally—or even more—to net national welfare, there is little reason to assume the alternatives would be selected from more cost-effective environmental, health, or safety programs such as immunization, education, or care for poor pregnant women. Weighing Tradeoffs: Where Does It Lead? In reality, the actual tradeoff faced by a policymaker at a particular time and place—subcommittee, committee, or the floor of Congress; or Commission or Agency—is effectively limited by institutional structures and rules and by the incommensurable criteria brought by different decisionmakers who would ultimately decide on the actual alternatives for spending any dollars the tradeoffs make available. There may be definite options, as when an appropriations subcommittee allocates dollars among programs in its jurisdiction; but in other cases the tradeoff may be between an intended outcome and the nebulous consequence of not opting for that outcome. The problem is depicted in Figure 1 : Putative tradeoffs among environmental, health, and safety expenditures presume that all programs are on the table , as shown in Figure 1 -A , each with a specified dollar amount per unit that gives one measure of potential cost-effectiveness; but the voting legislator typically has only a single program on the table at a time, the result of a deliberate, formal process of agenda setting, as shown in Figure 1 -B ; and the administrator(s) of diverse programs generally finds each program on a separate table , with the boundaries of each defined by a separate statute that gives little or no authority to an administrator to compare and reallocate resources across them, as illustrated in Figure 1 -C . In the end, the underlying issue of environmental, health, and safety cost-effectiveness is how to foster decision processes and structures that enable tradeoffs that reflect the informed preferences of the citizenry. Evidence indicates that programs vary in cost-effectiveness.

A policymaker making a decision on approving a program may face the questions, What are the tradeoffs? What alternatives are foregone by committing resources to that program? This issue has been sharpened in environmental, health, and safety policy because studies indicate that some programs are more cost-effective than others, suggesting that redirecting resources from less efficient to more effective programs would increase overall national economic welfare. Actually making implied tradeoffs has proved difficult, however. One reason is continuing controversy over methods for evaluating the risks, costs, and benefits of alternative programs—leaving uncertainty about exactly what would be gained and lost in a tradeoff. Other constraints affecting tradeoffs include variations in regulatory standards among environmental, health, and safety statutes and political responses to nonquantifiable values such as equity. Legislative efforts to revise the statutes or to establish more comprehensive reviews of tradeoffs have moved slowly. Two further factors constrain the ability to make a tradeoff at a particular time and in a particular institutional context. One consists of institutional structures and procedures that impose limits on possible ranges of decisions within the legislative and executive branches. For example, an appropriations subcommittee typically weighs spending tradeoffs only among programs within its jurisdiction, but not tradeoffs with programs in the jurisdiction of other subcommittees even if the programs are related. Similarly, statutes authorizing environmental, health, and safety regulations may be written by separate committees, leading to variations in cost-effectiveness standards for protecting the public health and environment. A second complicating factor occurs when a program's alternative(s) would require a shift in who can decide on the use of the resources involved, as when a regulatory program is considered in lieu of a tax-supported program. Deciding to regulate industrial air pollutants mandates spending by industry and consumers; choosing not to regulate leaves those monies available to the industry's executives and consumers, who can invest/spend them according to their own preferences. Having little control over alternative expenditures, a decisionmaker tends to focus on each program as self-contained, not to compare options. The actual tradeoff faced by a legislator or policymaker at a particular time and place is constrained by institutional structure and rules, and by the fact that most decisions are up-or-down, not between program options. Many putative tradeoffs exist only in a theoretical sense: they are tradeoffs not then and there available to that policymaker. Making environmental, health, and safety tradeoffs on the basis of cost-benefit analyses implies restructuring decisionmaking processes, but such restructuring is very difficult in itself, and it is unclear whether the results would more accurately reflect the informed preferences of Congress—or the citizenry.

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So vast is this "bioinvasion" (as some have termed it) that only rough estimates can be made of the numbers of non-native species now in North America, much less the rest of the world. In consequence, agencies whose mission it is to address those risks also are better developed. Some focus on narrowly drawn problems. Threat of Invasive Species Various abundant invasive species have had severe economic impacts on U.S. industries and the natural environment. Seaports, where many ships exchange ballast water, are at severe risk of invasions: even if only a tiny proportion of newly arriving non-native species survive in busy ports like San Francisco Bay or Chesapeake Bay, the actual number of successful invasive species may be large. In the 19 th century, the railroads over which cattle were transported were a major path for the establishment of new plants. In the 20 th century, zebra mussels quickly escaped the drainage of the Great Lakes (probably via the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal) and began an invasion into the Mississippi River drainage, and Asian carp are repeating the process in the opposite direction. The mission of the National Institute of Invasive Species Science is to work with others to coordinate data and research from many sources to predict and reduce the effects of harmful non-native plants, animals, and diseases in natural areas and throughout the United States. What characteristics of seed dispersal, nesting, food and host preferences, etc., are most likely to lead to exuberant proliferation and result in economic and ecological harm? This evidence may be based on experience with the species domestically or in other countries. (For many species, the economic impacts are simply unknown.) These non-native crops and their benefits are not the focus of this report but should not be forgotten in discussions of those imported species that cause serious harm. Quarantines operate basically on either of two strategies: investing in strict control at points of entry to prevent organisms from leaving the quarantine area (with the risk that it could be too late to prevent escape) or attempting to control before the organisms arrive in the country (i.e., trying to act on the source or point of export or regulating the pathway of import). Basic Methods of Invasive Species Control If inspections and quarantines fail to keep an invasive plant or animal out of a region and a species becomes established, the problem shifts to control of the species, which includes preventing its spread between local areas and beyond any established perimeter. Prevention practices vary depending on the species and surrounding environment, and they may include more than one of the methods described below. Biopesticides can be divided into three major classes: biochemical pesticides are naturally occurring substances (e.g., pheromones) that control pests by nontoxic mechanisms (e.g., interfering with finding mates); microbial pesticides contain a microorganism (e.g., a bacterium, fungus, virus, or protozoan) as the active ingredient, such as various types of the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) used to control certain insects harmful to cabbages, potatoes, and other crops; and plant-incorporated protectants are pesticides that plants produce from genetic material that has been added to the plant, as when the gene for the Bt pesticidal protein is introduced into a plant's own genetic material, causing the plant to manufacture the substance that destroys pests. Issues for Congress: Actions and Approaches Current federal laws concerning invasive species form a patchwork, stronger in certain areas, such as agriculture and ballast water, and weaker or absent in other areas. Congress could choose to address these gaps either by explicitly delegating such authority to the President or by crafting legislation. Specifically, it does not regulate the release of a species into the wild once they have been admitted, unless that species is already designated a noxious weed or disease carrier. Approaches to Regulation: Species-by-Species vs. Pathways Legislation to address invasive species could take a species-by-species approach, a pathway approach, or a combination of the two. Review of industries dependent on importing and transferring non-native species . While the current 16 teams work primarily on NPS lands, they also may work with adjoining landowners.

For the first few centuries after the arrival of Europeans in North America, plants and animals of many species were sent between the two land masses. The transfer of non-natives consisted not only of intentional westbound species ranging from pigs to dandelions but also of intentional eastbound species such as grey squirrels and tomatoes. And for those centuries, the remaining non-native species crossing the Atlantic, uninvited and often unwelcome, were ignored if they were noticed at all. They were joined by various species arriving deliberately or accidentally from Asia and Africa. The national focus on invasive species arose in the 19th century, primarily owing to losses in agriculture (due to weeds or plant diseases), the leading industry of the time. A few recently arrived invasive species, and estimates of adverse economic impacts exceeding $100 billion annually have sharpened that focus. Very broadly, the unanswered question regarding invasive species concerns whose responsibility it is to ensure economic integrity and ecological stability in response to the actual or potential impacts of invasive species, and at what cost. As this report shows, the current answer is not simple. It may depend on answers to many other questions: Is the introduction deliberate or accidental? Does it affect agriculture? By what pathway does the new species arrive? Is the potential harm from the species already known? Is the species already established in one area of the country? Finally, if the answers to any of these questions are unsatisfactory, what changes should be made? The specific issue before Congress is whether new legislative authorities and funding are needed to address issues of invasive species and their increasing economic and ecological impacts on such disparate matters as power-plant operations, grazing lands, and coral fishes. Such legislation could affect domestic and international trade, tourism, industries dependent on importing non-native species, those dependent on keeping them out, and finally, the variety of natural resources that have little direct economic value and yet affect the lives of a broad segment of the public. In the century or so of congressional responses to invasive species, the usual approach has been an ad hoc attack on the particular problem, from impure seed stocks to Asian carp in the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal. A few notable attempts have begun to address specific pathways by which invasives arrive (e.g., ship ballast water), but no current law addresses the broad, general concern over non-native species and the variety of paths by which they enter this country. A 1998 executive order took a step in bringing together some of the current authorities and resources to address a problem that has expanded with both increasing world trade and travel and decreasing transit time for humans and cargo. Multiple bills have been introduced on this subject in recent Congresses. There are two basic approaches to limiting the spread of invasive species: a species-by-species assessment of the risks or benefits of admitting or excluding species, and a policy based on controlling pathways of entry in which vigilance is maintained on incoming ballast tanks, cargo holds, packing materials, and similar vehicles for unwanted organisms. These two approaches may complement each other. Policymakers also may emphasize prevention over post hoc control or vice-versa, or they may adopt a combination of the two approaches.

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This report explains the Clean Air Act requirement that federal departments and agencies demonstrate that their activities—including projects that they fund—"conform" to state plans for achieving air quality standards. The report explains the statutory requirements, reviews the recent history of their implementation, and examines how conformity requirements might affect areas designated "nonattainment" for a revised ozone air quality standard. Conformity: The Basics Transportation conformity, which is required by Section 176(c) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), was established by Congress as a means of insuring that federal actions, including the provision of federal funds for transportation projects, not undermine air quality in areas that have not attained national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) and in areas that were nonattainment, but have been redesignated as maintenance areas under CAA Section 175A. Under Section 176(c), departments and agencies of the federal government are prohibited from engaging in, supporting or providing financial assistance for, licensing, permitting, or approving any activity that does not conform to a State Implementation Plan (SIP) after such a plan has been submitted and approved. Under the act, depending on the NAAQS and the classification of the nonattainment area, states are required to develop SIPs within 18 months to four years of EPA's designation of an area as nonattainment. In general, in areas that have not attained one or more of the six NAAQS established by EPA (currently more than 100 areas with a combined population of 143 million ) the state must develop a SIP providing for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the NAAQS. Transportation Conformity Although a wide range of federal funding and programs is subject to conformity, it is transportation planning (and ultimately highway funding) that is most commonly affected. Before a new transportation plan or transportation improvement program (TIP) can be approved by the Federal Highway Administration or Federal Transit Administration or a new non-exempt project can receive federal funding, a regional emissions analysis must generally demonstrate that the emissions of these pollutants or their precursors projected from the entire transportation system, including the new projects, are consistent with the emissions ceilings established in the SIP. Determining Conformity in a Rural Area In general, the statute and regulations assume that projects requiring a conformity determination will be located in urban or suburban areas, because most nonattainment areas have an urban or suburban core. These areas would only need to demonstrate conformity if they had a non-exempt project that required federal funding or approval—a rare occurrence. Grace Periods In the 2005 surface transportation law, Congress amended Section 176(c) of the Clean Air Act to provide that areas that do not make a conformity determination for a transportation plan or TIP by the applicable deadline are given a 12-month grace period to demonstrate compliance before conformity will lapse. From 1997 to 2003, 63 areas in 29 states and Puerto Rico had experienced a lapse, according to EPA. Vehicle emissions were, therefore, major contributors to the area's ozone nonattainment. The new program de-emphasized new highway capacity. And third, the implementation of more stringent air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter (PM) in 2004 would mean that additional areas would be subject to conformity, many for the first time. In areas that will be formally designated nonattainment, the emission standards cited above will facilitate the demonstration of conformity. EPA's analysis projects the effects of these standards on ozone nonattainment areas.

Under the Clean Air Act, areas that have not attained one or more of the six National Ambient Air Quality Standards (currently more than 100 areas with a combined population of 143 million) must develop State Implementation Plans (SIPs) providing for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the NAAQS. The act requires that, in these areas, federal agencies not engage in, approve, permit, or provide financial support for activities that do not "conform" to the area's SIP. Although a wide range of federal funding and programs is subject to conformity, it is transportation planning (and ultimately highway funding) that is most commonly affected. Before a new transportation plan or transportation improvement program (TIP) can be approved by the Federal Highway Administration or Federal Transit Administration or a new non-exempt project can receive federal funding in a nonattainment area, a regional emissions analysis must generally demonstrate that the projected emissions from the entire transportation system, including the new projects, are consistent with the emissions ceilings established in the SIP. While some express concern at the potential impact of these conformity determinations in delaying or altering new highway projects, others note that the process simply obligates the federal government to support rather than undermine the legally adopted state plans for achieving air quality. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there were numerous lapses of conformity: 63 areas, in 29 states and Puerto Rico, had lapses between 1997 and 2003. In 2005, however, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to provide a 12-month grace period to demonstrate compliance following an area's designation as nonattainment before conformity will lapse. Since 2007, only seven areas have experienced a conformity lapse, despite the imposition of more stringent ambient air quality standards for both ozone and particulate matter. All but one of the lapses since 2007 were resolved within a year. As Congress considers reauthorization of surface transportation programs this year, questions have again been raised regarding the impact of conformity requirements, and whether the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) current proposal to strengthen the ambient air quality standard for ozone will affect the number of areas required to make conformity determinations. Particular concern has been expressed for rural areas that may never have been classified nonattainment for an air quality standard before. The number of areas ultimately affected will depend on numerous factors, including the level at which EPA sets the final ozone standard and trends in emissions and weather in the period before EPA designates any new nonattainment areas. Although these factors introduce elements of uncertainty in future projections, most rural areas are unlikely to be designated nonattainment for the ozone standard, because they do not have ozone monitors in place. In the few rural areas that have been designated nonattainment, conformity needs only to be determined if there is a non-exempt transportation project that depends on federal funding or approval—a rare occurrence. In addition, EPA's conformity regulations provide exceptions for areas with insignificant motor vehicle emissions, which may facilitate the demonstration of conformity in any rural areas that will be designated nonattainment. This report explains the statutory conformity requirements, reviews the recent history of their implementation, and examines how conformity requirements might affect areas designated nonattainment for a revised ozone air quality standard.

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The term "tax-exempt organization" generally refers to an organization that is exempt from federal income taxes under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Although the IRC describes more than 30 types of organizations that qualify for exemption, the type that people often mean when using the term "tax-exempt organization" is found in Section 501(c)(3). What is a nonprofit (not-for-profit) organization? This can be misleading depending on the context. What is a private foundation? Can tax-exempt organizations participate in election activities? Whether or not the organization incorporates, it may need to file for recognition of tax-exempt status from the IRS depending on its tax status. If the organization will be a Section 501(c)(3) organization, it is generally required to file an application for tax-exempt status with the IRS. It asks for the organization's basic contact information and must be filed electronically. Certain information does not have to be disclosed. What resources provide information on general issues involving tax-exempt organizations? The following organizations provide further information on general topics related to tax-exempt organizations, including management, accountability, and fund-raising practices. The group also provides information on public policy issues of interest to nonprofit organizations and conducts and publishes research on various aspects of charitable giving and volunteering in the United States.

This report answers frequently asked questions about tax-exempt organizations. It provides basic answers and refers to sources of additional information that might be useful. The report focuses on the types of organizations described in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 501(c), with the main emphasis on Section 501(c)(3) charitable organizations. One set of questions addresses some of the primary characteristics of tax-exempt organizations, including whether they may participate in lobbying and election-related activities, and defines the terms "tax-exempt," "nonprofit (not-for-profit)," and "private foundation." Another group of questions provides general information on how to form a tax-exempt organization, what information must be disclosed to the IRS and the public, and how an organization might lose its tax-exempt status. The report ends with questions intended to help the reader find resources that provide information on specific organizations and additional information on tax-exempt organizations in general. This report summarizes information with respect to tax-exempt organizations. It should not be relied on for specific tax advice. Such advice should be sought directly from the IRS or qualified tax professionals.

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For recent official citations, see CRS Report RL30011, Medal of Honor Recipients: 1979-2014 , by [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report R43939, Medal of Honor Recipients in the 113th Congress: A Fact Sheet , by [author name scrubbed]. Although not the first military award, the medal became one of the most popular and prestigious awards. As of this printing, 3,512 Medals of Honor have been awarded to 3,493 recipients. For this reason it is sometimes called the Congressional Medal of Honor. In 1918, during U.S. participation in World War I, Congress decided to clear away any inconsistencies of the legislation which had grown around the Army medal and make a set of rules for its award.... [T]he provisions of existing law relating to the award of the Medals of Honor ... are amended so that the President is authorized to present, in the name of Congress, a Medal of Honor only to each person who, while an officer or enlisted man of the Army, shall hereafter, in action involving actual conflict with an enemy, distinguish himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. Since the rescissions during World War I, no other MoH awards have been rescinded. In certain cases, Congress has held hearings concerning the award. Nevertheless, on numerous occasions, legislation has been introduced seeking to have the MoH awarded. In recent times, there have been a number of specific instances in which the MoH was awarded or reinstated outside of the statutory time limits. In one case, the award was renounced by a recipient. It is noteworthy that two MoH awards have gone "unclaimed." As a result of the review, 24 recipients were honored in 2014. On June 2, 2015, at a White House ceremony, President Obama presented Medals of Honor posthumously to Army Sergeant William Shemin and Army Private Henry Lincoln Johnson following the upgrade of their Distinguished Service Crosses to Medals of Honor.

The Medal of Honor is the nation's highest military award for bravery. It is awarded by the President in the name of Congress. For this reason, it is often referred to as the Congressional Medal of Honor. Since it was first presented in 1863, the medal has been awarded 3,512 times to 3,493 recipients. Nineteen individuals have been double recipients of the award. Recipients of the Medal of Honor are afforded a number of benefits as a result of this award. Since the award's inception, the laws and regulations that apply to it have changed. In certain cases, the award has been rescinded. Six rescinded awards have been reinstated. On a number of occasions, legislation has been offered to waive certain restrictions and to encourage the President to award the Medal of Honor to particular individuals. Generally speaking, this type of legislation is rarely enacted. In a very limited number of cases, the medal has been awarded outside the legal restrictions concerning time limits. These cases are often based on technical errors, lost documents or eyewitness accounts, or other factors that justify reconsideration. These cases, however, represent the exception and not the rule. The two most recent recipients from World War I, Army Private Henry Johnson and Army Sergeant William Shemin, were awarded Medals of Honor posthumously by President Obama on June 2, 2015. For information on recent recipients, see CRS Report RL30011, Medal of Honor Recipients: 1979-2014, and CRS Report R43939, Medal of Honor Recipients in the 113th Congress: A Fact Sheet.

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Introduction This report provides policy and historical background about Puerto Rico's political status —referring to the relationship between the federal government and a territorial one. After the U.S. Department of Justice declined to certify the release of federal funds to support the plebiscite, Puerto Rico amended its plebiscite law to add a status-quo option on the ballot. Some political parties and other groups on the island encouraged their supporters to boycott the plebiscite. On June 11, 23.0% of voters turned out for the plebiscite, where 97.2% selected statehood; 1.5% selected free association/independence; and 1.3% chose the "current territorial status." If Congress chose to alter Puerto Rico's political status, it could do so through statute regardless of whether a plebiscite were held or what sentiment such a vote revealed. The report also is not intended to be an analysis of the various legal, economic, or social issues that might arise in considering Puerto Rico's political status or a change in its relationship with the United States. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 1 , the island is geographically isolated from the mainland United States; it lies approximately 1,500 miles from Washington and 1,000 miles from Miami. Perhaps because that debate remains unsettled, status is an undercurrent in virtually every policy matter on the island. Federal policy debates generally are less affected by status, but here, too, status often arises at least tangentially. In the foreseeable future, oversight of Puerto Rico is likely to be relevant for Congress as the House and Senate monitor the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) enacted during the 114 th Congress (discussed elsewhere in this report and in other CRS products) in response to the island's financial crisis. Brief Political Status and Policy History Puerto Rico is a U.S. territory subject to congressional authority derived from the Territory Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Most recently, in 2012, voters were asked to answer two questions: (1) whether they wished to maintain Puerto Rico's current political status; and (2) regardless of the choice in the first question, whether they preferred statehood, independence, or to be a "sovereign free associated state." Both free association and independence would entail Puerto Rico becoming an independent country. 2017 Plebiscite Results On June 11, 2017, voters in Puerto Rico chose among the three options on the revised plebiscite ballot. Status Legislation Introduced in the 115th Congress Two status bills have been introduced in the 115 th Congress. H.R. Specifically, H.R. 900 , introduced by Representative Gutiérrez, proposes a popular vote between independence and free association. 260 , H.R. 727 (Pierluisi) would have authorized the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission to "provide for a vote" in the territory on admitting Puerto Rico as a state. The bill did not advance beyond introduction.

Puerto Rico lies approximately 1,000 miles southeast of Miami and 1,500 miles from Washington, DC. Despite being far outside the continental United States, the island has played a significant role in American politics and policy since the United States acquired Puerto Rico from Spain in 1898. Puerto Rico's political status—referring to the relationship between the federal government and a territorial one—is an undercurrent in virtually every policy matter on the island. In a June 11, 2017, plebiscite (popular vote), 97.2% of voters chose statehood when presented with three options on the ballot. Turnout for the plebiscite was 23.0% of eligible voters. Some parties and other groups opposing the plebiscite had urged their bases to boycott the vote. (These data are based on 99.5% of precincts reporting results.) After initially including only statehood and free association/independence options, an amended territorial law ultimately permitted three options on the plebiscite ballot: statehood, free association/independence, or current territorial status. Before the latest plebiscite, Puerto Ricans most recently reconsidered their status through a 2012 plebiscite. On that occasion, voters were asked two questions: whether to maintain the status quo, and if a change were selected, whether to pursue statehood, independence, or status as a "sovereign free associated state." Majorities chose a change in the status quo in answering the first question, and statehood in answering the second. The results have been controversial. If Congress chose to alter Puerto Rico's political status, it could do so through statute. Ultimately, the Territory Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress broad discretion over Puerto Rico and other territories. Congress has not enacted any recent legislation devoted specifically to status. Two bills have been introduced during the 115th Congress. H.R. 260 proposes to admit Puerto Rico as a state if residents choose statehood in a plebiscite. H.R. 900 proposes a popular vote between independence and free association (which entails an ongoing relationship between independent countries). In the 114th Congress, H.R. 727, which did not advance beyond introduction, would have authorized a plebiscite on statehood. Even in seemingly unrelated federal policy debates, Puerto Rico status often arises at least tangentially. In the foreseeable future, oversight of Puerto Rico is likely to be relevant for Congress as the House and Senate monitor the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; P.L. 114-187; 48 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.) enacted during the 114th Congress. Status also shaped the policy context surrounding the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the 2016 Sanchez Valle case. This report does not provide an economic or legal analysis of these topics; instead, it provides policy and historical background for understanding status and its current relevance for Congress. This report will be updated in the event of significant legislative or status developments.

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This report surveys the legal theories that may be invoked by aggrieved contract parties to obtain redress in these situations—that is, when new federal statutes interfere with contracts entered into pre-enactment. For public contracts, the usual legal challenge is via a breach of contract claim, though claims that contract rights have been "taken," requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, are often joined. For private contracts, the breach theory is not available since by definition the United States is not a party to the contract. The Competing Interests in Protecting Contract Rights Protection of settled expectations is essential to ordered society, certainly to the conduct of business. At the same time, government must have latitude to address new problems, even if that means interfering with settled expectations in existing contracts. Thus, contracts generally are said to confer no immunity against future legislation. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity and Vesting of Jurisdiction To sue the United States for congressional interference with a contract right (public or private), the United States must have waived its sovereign immunity: the United States is immune from suit except as it consents to be sued. Breach of contract is the main theory on which challenges to congressional interference with pre-existing public contracts are litigated. As earlier noted, the United States is as bound by its contracts as are individuals, save for the special "sovereign defenses" discussed below. That is, the same breach rules apply to the United States as a contract party as to a nonfederal party. Special Cases There are several breach of public contract situations worth special mention: Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing In a set of related cases, the United States was found liable for contract breach even though the congressional enactment did not run afoul of any express term in the affected contracts. Additional Requirements The Supreme Court has held that Congress's imposition of additional requirements on an entity that has previously contracted with the United States may be regarded as tantamount to a breach. The sovereign act d efense holds that the United States is not contractually liable for its "public and general" acts as sovereign. Thus, a federal agency "cannot contract away Congress' sovereign power to regulate unless Congress has clearly and unmistakably empowered the agency to do so." Breach claims based on contract termination by the United States are precluded, on the ground that the government's contracts are "entered into subject to the power of Congress to enact legislation authorizing the government to … cancel them …." Being inherent in federal sovereignty, this defense is not dependent on being expressly stated in government contracts. A breach by the United States, therefore, can be argued to constitute a taking of one's property in a contract right. Judicial Preference for Breach of Contract Claims While breach of contract and takings claims against the United States are often brought in the same action, the Court of Federal Claims and Federal Circuit display a marked preference for litigating such actions under a breach theory—often ignoring the taking claim entirely. Takings Congressional interference with existing private contracts raises takings issues for the same reason that such interference with existing public contracts does: contract rights generally are deemed property under the Takings Clause. The Court held that government actions that only incidentally interfere with performance of private contracts—rather than targeting them directly—constitute but a "frustration," not a taking, of those contract rights. Omnia Limits At least three limits to the Omnia rule exist.

Laws enacted by Congress on occasion interfere with contracts entered into before enactment, prompting suits against the United States by disappointed contract parties. In a few of them, courts have awarded billions of dollars to the United States' contracting partners. This report surveys the legal theories invoked in such suits. Note that litigation on the grounds covered herein can be avoided entirely if the congressional enactment is construed to apply only to future contracts. Two competing interests underlie this report's topic. On the one hand, protection of settled expectations, at least to some degree, is essential to ordered society. Contract law has this goal for expectations embodied in contracts. On the other hand, government needs latitude to address new problems, so contracts generally are said to confer no immunity against future legislation. The balance struck by the case law is that while Congress legitimately can thwart performance under existing contracts, the United States may in some instances have to pay compensation. The United States cannot be sued unless it waives sovereign immunity and vests jurisdiction to hear claims against it in a court. This the United States has done with regard to the legal theories at issue here. Once past these procedural thresholds, courts accord different treatment to legislative interference with existing contracts depending on whether the interference is with a "public contract," defined as one where the United States is a party, or with a private contract, defined as one between two non-federal parties. Broadly speaking, challenges to the former are more likely to win. For public contracts, breach of contract is the main theory on which challenges to congressional interference with existing contracts are litigated. The United States is as bound by its contracts as are individuals, so the same breach rules apply. Some special situations that have occupied the courts in recent years have been (1) breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) the addition by Congress of new hurdles for the private party to a contract with the United States; and (3) breach by congressional inaction. In addition to sovereign immunity, which as noted has been waived, there are other "sovereign defenses" that the United States can invoke when sued for breach. One is the sovereign acts doctrine, which holds that the United States is not liable for its "public and general" acts as sovereign. This defense seeks to ensure that the United States is no worse off than a private contracting party when acts of the United States as sovereign impede contract performance. Another sovereign defense flows from the unmistakability doctrine, which states that a federal agency may not contract away Congress's sovereign power to regulate unless Congress has unmistakably empowered the agency to do so. For private contracts, the main legal theory is the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. Plaintiffs argue that since contract rights generally are deemed "property" under the Takings Clause, a congressional enactment that thwarts performance under a contract in essence takes property, requiring compensation. The government's defense is often the Omnia rule, a Supreme Court holding under which government actions that only incidentally interfere with performance of private contracts are deemed to constitute but a frustration, not a taking, of contract rights. Per this definition, the Omnia rule does not apply when the congressional action expressly "targets" an existing contract right, though even here the taking claim usually is rejected.

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111-148 , PPACA) and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-152 ). On January 19, 2011, the House passed H.R. 2 , which would repeal PPACA. Nonetheless, it is possible that the 112 th Congress will examine other legislation to amend parts of PPACA. During any debate to amend PPACA, one issue that may arise is the eligibility of aliens (noncitizens) for some of the key provisions of the act. Treatment of Noncitizens in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) The following section discusses alien eligibility for the following provisions under PPACA: high-risk pools, the heath insurance mandate, the exchanges, and premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies. All foreign nationals working in the United States are subject to U.S. tax laws. Interaction Between Alien Eligibility for Credits and Medicaid Eligibility Some have raised concerns that PPACA created an inequality between U.S. citizens and some noncitizens with incomes at or below 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) with respect to eligibility to participate in an exchange and receive premium credits or cost-sharing subsidies. In general, all U.S. citizens and Medicaid-eligible noncitizens with incomes at or below 133% of the FPL will be eligible for Medicaid, while similarly situated Medicaid-ineligible lawfully present noncitizens will be eligible to participate in an exchange and possibly to receive the credits or subsidies. Verification of Alien Status Under PPACA To enforce the alien eligibility requirements under the act, § 1411 of PPACA requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish a program to determine whether an individual who is to be covered through an exchange plan, or who is claiming a premium tax credit or reduced cost-sharing, is a citizen or national of the United States or an alien lawfully present in the United States. Summary of Eligibility of Unauthorized Aliens under PPACA As previously discussed, PPACA expressly exempts unauthorized (illegal) aliens from the mandate to have health coverage and bars them from a health insurance exchange. Unauthorized aliens are not eligible for the federal premium credits or cost-sharing subsidies. Unauthorized aliens are also barred from participating in the temporary high-risk pools.

The 111th Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, PPACA), and amended it a week later by passing the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152). (PPACA refers to P.L. 111-148 as amended by P.L. 111-152.) On January 19, 2011, the House passed H.R. 2, which would repeal PPACA. It is possible that the 112th Congress will examine other legislation to amend parts of PPACA. One issue that may arise during any debate to amend provisions in PPACA is the eligibility of aliens (noncitizens) for some of the key provisions of the act. Aliens who are "lawfully present in the United States" are subject to the heath insurance mandate and are eligible, if otherwise qualified, to participate in the high-risk pools and the exchanges, and they are eligible for premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies. PPACA expressly exempts unauthorized (illegal) aliens from the mandate to have health coverage and bars them from a health insurance exchange. Unauthorized aliens are not eligible for the federal premium credits or cost-sharing subsidies. Unauthorized aliens are also barred from participating in the temporary high-risk pools. To enforce the alien eligibility requirements under PPACA, the act requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a program to determine whether an individual who is to be covered in the individual market by a qualified health plan offered through an exchange, or who is claiming a premium tax credit or reduced cost-sharing, is a citizen or national of the United States or an alien lawfully present in the United States. Some have raised concerns that PPACA created an inequality between U.S. citizens and some noncitizens with incomes at or below 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) with respect to eligibility to participate in an exchange and receive premium credits or cost-sharing subsidies. In general, all U.S. citizens and Medicaid-eligible noncitizens with incomes at or below 133% of FPL will be eligible for Medicaid, while similarly situated Medicaid-ineligible lawfully present noncitizens will be eligible to participate in an exchange and possibly to receive the credits or subsidies. This report will be updated if warranted by legislative events.

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However, many 911 centers (also known as Public Safety Answering Points or PSAPs) continue to use legacy telephone technologies that can receive 911 voice calls, but cannot accept data (e.g., text, photos). Next Generation 911 (NG911) technologies offer callers the ability to either call 911 or send data (e.g., text, photos, or video) to PSAPs. NG911 technologies offer PSAPs the ability to accept data, share data with first responders, provide accurate location information, interconnect with other centers, and re-route calls during emergencies. There is general consensus that PSAPs should migrate to NG911; however, the migration will be costly and complex, and will require coordination between state and local 911 agencies and telecommunication providers. NG911 technologies are expected to change the way 911 systems operate and interoperate. Fire safety organizations argued that a single nationwide number for people to call during fires would reduce response times and save lives. Since then, 911 services have expanded to nearly every jurisdiction in the nation, covering most of the United States. While 911 is the nationwide number to call for emergencies, there is not one nationwide 911 network; the nation's 911 network includes 5,783 separate state and local PSAPs, each of which is operated by a different entity and serves a specific area, typically a county. When a person dials 911, a telecommunications provider (e.g., telephone company, wireless provider) routes the call over a dedicated line to the appropriate PSAP; the PSAP receives calls through its phone systems, and uses computer software to manage 911 caller information (e.g., phone number, location) and to dispatch public safety (e.g., police, fire) to the scene; public safety agencies receive information from the PSAP through computer-aided dispatch systems. Progress has been made; however, there are disparities in services across jurisdictions. No 911 Services In some areas of the nation, people do not have access to traditional 911 services. Basic 911 Services Some localities are limited to Basic 911 services. In these jurisdictions, the call is connected to a PSAP, but the call-taker may not receive the phone number or location of the caller; the call-taker may need to ask the caller for their exact location, delaying the response. Most PSAPs can receive location information for both landline and wireless callers. Next Generation 911 Services (NG911) Some areas have begun to implement NG911. NG911 systems use Internet Protocol (IP) based technologies to deliver and process calls. NG911 systems include Emergency Services Internet Protocol network (ESInet), IP-based software services and applications, databases, and data management processes that interconnect to PSAP equipment. There is consensus that upgrades to 911 systems are needed to ensure 911 systems are compatible with modern devices. However, the adoption of NG911 may change the structure of the nation's 911 system from a system of individual PSAPs to one of interconnected PSAPs, and drive the need for national policies to ensure 911 systems are compatible, interoperable, and secure. A key issue for Congress may be determining the level of federal involvement in the deployment of the NG911 and the development of policies (governance, funding, and technology policies) that support the deployment without infringing on state and local authorities over 911 services. While the FCC has been able to drive improvements to private telecommunication network through its rulemaking authority, the ICO has relied on grants to drive improvements to state and local 911 systems. In most states, 911 fees are used to support current 911 operations; some states have diverted a portion of their 911 fees for other purposes. Interoperability The adoption of NG911 technologies will enable PSAPs to interconnect, changing the structure of the nation's 911 system from a set of disconnected state and local PSAPs to a nationwide system of connected PSAPs. For example, to achieve the benefits of an interconnected system, PSAPs will need to use standards-based technology that will ensure interoperability.

In 2018, Congress and 911 advocates celebrated the 50th anniversary of the first 911 call. Over the past 50 years, states and localities have adopted 911 as the number to call during emergencies, established 911 centers (also known as Public Safety Answering Points or PSAPs) to receive and manage 911 calls, managed and funded their local PSAPs, and educated the public on 911 use. Today, 911 services are available in most jurisdictions in the United States, people know 911 is the number to call in emergencies, and 911 systems have helped to save lives. However, there are challenges. In some areas of the nation, people do not have access to traditional 911 services. In other areas, PSAPs use different technologies and cannot interconnect. Additionally, PSAPs are at various stages of upgrade; as a result, 911 services may vary from one jurisdiction to the next. For example, some PSAPs can receive text messages, while others cannot. The variation in service may confuse callers who expect 911 services to be consistent across jurisdictions, and may delay the response. Further, most PSAPs rely on legacy telephone technologies, adopted decades ago to receive voice calls from landline phones, and the home address associated with the phone number. With 80% of 911 calls now coming from mobile devices (e.g., cell phones), 911 systems have had to be adjusted to accommodate wireless calls and their location information. Telecommunication providers that serve 911 centers have had to configure their systems to route wireless 911 calls to the appropriate PSAP and to transmit the caller's number and location information which, for mobile callers, is a complex task. Similarly, PSAPs have had to adjust their systems to accept 911 calls and location information for wireless callers. While PSAPs can now accept calls from wireless devices, and some location information for wireless callers, most cannot accommodate text messages, photos, or videos—communications that are commonly used by consumers today. Since 2008, Congress has urged the adoption of Internet Protocol (IP) based systems to improve 911 services. IP-based systems can: accept data communications (e.g., text, photos, videos) to allow those in danger to text 911 when they cannot call; leverage computer-based geolocation applications to accurately locate callers; enable interconnections between PSAPs, allowing PSAPs to re-route calls during emergencies, building redundancies into the nation's 911 system; and interconnect with other public safety systems to enable information-sharing during response. Some states have begun implementing next generation of 911 (NG911) technologies (e.g., installing a basic IP network or Emergency Services Internet Protocol Network (ESInet)); however, funding has been a challenge, and progress has been relatively slow. There is general consensus that upgrades to 911 systems are needed, and that adoption of NG911 technologies will improve 911 services. However, the implementation is expected to be costly and complex. Both private telecommunication networks and 911 systems will need to be upgraded to achieve the full benefits of NG911 technologies. Further, adoption of NG911 will change the way PSAPs operate and interoperate. PSAPs will be able to accept different types of data, and will need to establish policies and procedures for handling this new information. NG911 will also enable PSAPs to interconnect to form regional 911 systems, and for regional systems to connect to form a single nationwide 911 network. The formation of a single nationwide network may drive the need for new policies related to the governance, funding, interoperability, and security of the nation's 911 centers. An issue for Congress is determining the appropriate level of federal involvement in the implementation and oversight of a nationwide NG911 system that will support the deployment, while still respecting state and local authorities over 911 services.

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Most Recent Developments President Obama's FY2013 budget request for Energy and Water Development was released in February 2012. On April 25, 2012, the House Appropriations Committee reported out H.R. 5325 ( H.Rept. 112-462 ), with a total of $32.2 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out S. 2465 ( S.Rept. 112-164 ) on April 26, funding Energy and Water Development programs at $33.4 billion. The House passed H.R. 5325 with some amendments on June 6. 112-175 ), signed into law September 28, continues appropriations until March 27, 2013, for Energy and Water Development programs at 0.612% above the FY2012-enacted levels, with two exceptions: DOE's Nuclear Weapons Activities program is funded at an annual rate of $7.577 billion, the amount requested for FY2013, instead of the FY2012 rate of $7.214 billion, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation program was increased by $100 million over the FY2012 level of $2.296 billion to fund domestic uranium enrichment R&D. On March 6, 2013, the House passed H.R. 933 , the FY2013 Defense and Military Construction/VA, Full Year Continuing Resolution. The bill was signed into law on March 26, 2013 ( P.L. The act funds Energy and Water Development accounts at the FY2012 enacted level for the rest of FY2013, with some exceptions, and subject to the sequestration requirements of the Budget Control Act which went into effect March 1, 2013. Overview The Energy and Water Development bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). The Budget Control Act and Energy and Water Development Appropriations FY2013 discretionary appropriations were considered in the context of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25 ), which established discretionary spending limits for FY2012-FY2021. 113-6 continues funding for Energy and Water Development programs at the FY2012 level (minus sequestrations) for all accounts except the following: In Title I, the Corps of Engineers Construction budget is reduced by $20 million from the FY2012 level of $1.617 billion In Title II, the Central Utah Project funding is set at $21.0 million instead of the FY2012 level of $28.7 million In Title III, the Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy budget is $1.814 billion, rather than the FY2012 level of $1.810 billion In Title III, the Nuclear Energy budget is $759.0 million, rather than $765.4 million In Title III, the Science budget is $4.8760 billion, compared to the FY2012 level of $4.8736 billion In Title III, Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy funding is $265 million, rather than the FY2012 level of $275 million In Title III, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Weapons program is funded at $7.5573 billion, rather than the FY2012 level of $7.2141 billion In Title III, the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program is increased by $110 million over the FY2012 level of $2.2959 billion, to fund domestic uranium enrichment R&D. The Senate Appropriations Committee agreed with the Administration's request. For FY2013 the Administration requested $17 million for Natural Gas Technologies. The House Appropriations Committee sharply criticized the Administration's nuclear waste policy and provided $25 million for FY2013 to resume work on the Yucca Mountain repository. The Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013 ( P.L.

The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), for the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the Department of Energy (DOE), and for a number of independent agencies. President Obama's FY2013 budget request for Energy and Water Development was released in February 2012. For FY2013 the level of overall spending has been a major issue. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25) contained an overall discretionary spending cap for FY2013 of $1.047 trillion. On March 29, 2012, the House passed a budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 112) that caps spending at a lower level, $1.028 trillion. The Senate has not passed a budget resolution, but on April 19, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee allotted subcommittee funding levels that totaled the $1.047 trillion cap in the BCA. The difference between overall spending caps is reflected in differences in spending proposals for Energy and Water Development programs. The Administration's request for FY2013 was $33.684 billion. On April 25, the House Appropriations Committee reported out H.R. 5325 (H.Rept. 112-462), with a total of $32.156 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out S. 2465 (S.Rept. 112-164) on April 26, funding Energy and Water Development programs at $33.432 billion. On June 6 the House passed H.R. 5325 by a vote of 255-165, with some amendments. On September 28, 2012, President Obama signed into law the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013 (P.L. 112-175). The act continues appropriations until March 27, 2013, for Energy and Water Development programs at 0.612% above the FY2012-enacted levels, with several exceptions. On March 26, 2013, the President signed H.R. 933, the FY2013 Defense and Military Construction/VA, Full Year Continuing Resolution (P.L. 113-6). The act funds Energy and Water Development accounts at the FY2012 enacted level for the rest of FY2013, with some exceptions, and subject to the sequestration requirements of the Budget Control Act which went into effect March 1, 2013. In addition, issues specific to Energy and Water Development programs included the distribution of appropriations for Corps (Title I) and Reclamation (Title II) projects that have historically received congressional appropriations above Administration requests; alternatives to the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, which the Administration has abandoned (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal); and proposed FY2013 spending levels for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs (Title III) that are 25% higher in the Administration's request than the amount appropriated for FY2012.

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The U.S. Constitution empowers the President to nominate candidates for Article III judgeships, but also vests the Senate with the role of providing "advice" and affording or withholding "consent" with respect to the President's nominees. To carry out this "advice and consent" role, the Senate typically holds a hearing at which Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee question the nominee. After conducting this hearing, the Senate generally either "consents" to the nomination by voting in favor of the nominee's confirmation or instead rejects the nominee. Such questions frequently include inquiries "about specific cases, judicial philosophy, and attitudes on issues that are likely to come before the Court." However, judicial nominees have often refused to answer certain questions at their confirmation hearings—or have volunteered only perfunctory responses—claiming that fully answering certain questions could violate various ethical norms governing judges and judicial candidates or impair the independence or fairness of the federal judiciary. In response to concerns regarding the proper conduct of judges and judicial candidates, judges and bar associations have promulgated a variety of "canons" of judicial ethics—that is, self-enforcing, aspirational norms intended to promote the independence and integrity of the judiciary. Beyond the canons of judicial ethics, historical practice reveals the constitutional norms that have influenced what questions a federal judicial nominee should or must refuse to answer. Here, too, however, different nominees have reached different conclusions regarding which types of responses are improper. While it is fairly clear that a sitting federal judge who has been nominated for elevation to a higher federal court should generally refrain from directly commenting about the merits of a pending case —especially a case arising from the nominee's own court —it is less clear whether (or to what extent) Canon 3(A)(6) discourages judicial nominees from answering more general questions about their jurisprudential views, controversial legal issues, and the soundness of judicial precedents that litigants may challenge in the future. Thus, while it is clear that the Code of Conduct may constrain judicial nominees from answering certain questions during the confirmation process, nominees and commentators have not reached a consensus regarding the scope of those constraints. General Trends in Questions and Answers Supreme Court nominees have generally declined to stake out positions on issues or factual circumstances that are likely to come before the Court in future cases, resulting in a practice referred to by some as the Ginsburg Rule. Nominees' willingness to respond to these types of questions varies widely. Ultimately, however, there are few available remedies when a nominee refuses to answer a particular question. Although a Senator may vote against a nominee who is not sufficiently forthcoming, as a matter of historical practice the Senate has rarely viewed lack of candor during confirmation hearings as disqualifying, and it does not appear that the Senate has ever rejected a Supreme Court nominee solely on the basis of evasiveness.

The U.S. Constitution vests the Senate with the role of providing "advice" and affording or withholding "consent" when a President nominates a candidate to be an Article III judge—that is, a federal judge entitled to life tenure, such as a Supreme Court Justice. To carry out this "advice and consent" role, the Senate typically holds a hearing at which Members question the nominee. After conducting this hearing, the Senate generally either "consents" to the nomination by voting to confirm the nominee or instead rejects the nominee. Notably, many prior judicial nominees have refrained from answering certain questions during their confirmation hearings on the ground that responding to those questions would contravene norms of judicial ethics or the Constitution. Various "canons" of judicial conduct—that is, self-enforcing aspirational norms intended to promote the independence and integrity of the judiciary—may potentially discourage nominees from fully answering certain questions that Senators may pose to them in the confirmation context. However, although these canons squarely prohibit some forms of conduct during the judicial confirmation process—such as pledging to reach specified results in future cases if confirmed—it is less clear whether or to what extent the canons constrain judges from providing Senators with more general information regarding their jurisprudential views. As a result, disagreement exists regarding the extent to which applicable ethical rules prohibit nominees from answering certain questions. Beyond the judicial ethics rules, broader constitutional values, such as due process and the separation of powers, have informed the Senate's questioning of judicial nominees. As a result, historical practice can help illuminate which questions a judicial nominee may or should refuse to answer during his or her confirmation. Recent Supreme Court nominees, for instance, have invoked the so-called "Ginsburg Rule" to decline to discuss any cases that are currently pending before the Court or any issues that are likely to come before the Court. Senators and nominees have disagreed about whether any given response would improperly prejudge an issue that is likely to be contested at the Supreme Court. Although nominees have reached varied conclusions regarding which responses are permissible or impermissible, nominees have commonly answered general questions regarding their judicial philosophy, their prior statements, and judicial procedure. Nominees have been more hesitant, however, to answer specific questions about prior Supreme Court precedent, especially cases presenting issues that are likely to recur in the future. Ultimately, however, there are few available remedies when a nominee refuses to answer a particular question. Although a Senator may vote against a nominee who is not sufficiently forthcoming, as a matter of historical practice the Senate has rarely viewed lack of candor during confirmation hearings as disqualifying, and it does not appear that the Senate has ever rejected a Supreme Court nominee solely on the basis of evasiveness.

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Introduction Since 1997, education tax benefits have become an increasingly important component of federal higher education policy. For the 2017 tax year, 14 tax benefits are available for college students and their parents to help pay for higher education (see Table 1 ). In 2018, this number falls to 11, as the personal exemption for dependents (including college-age dependents) and deduction for work-related business education expenses are temporarily suspended (through the end of 2025), and the tuition and fees deduction will have expired. The available tax benefits are a mixture of credits, deductions, exclusions, and other incentives. The benefits can be placed into one of three general categories: incentives for current year expenses, preferential tax treatment of student loans, and incentives for saving for college. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates the cost to the federal government of education tax benefits—the revenue foregone from offering these benefits—to be $168.5 billion over the 2016-2020 window. This report provides a brief overview of the higher education tax benefits that are currently available to students and their families. Tax Benefits Versus Traditional Student Aid The federal government provides individuals with financial assistance for higher education expenses in two ways: tax benefits and traditional student aid (loans, grants, and work-study assistance). Between 1954 and 1996, eight tax benefits for education were enacted: 1. an exclusion for scholarships, fellowships, and tuition reductions; 2. a parental exemption for students ages 19 to 23 who were enrolled in college; 3. a business expense deduction for work-related education; 4. an exclusion for employer-provided education assistance; 5. an exclusion for the interest earned on educational savings bonds; 6. an exclusion of qualifying cancelled student loans from taxable income; 7. an unlimited gift tax exclusion for amounts paid by a donor directly to an educational institution for tuition payments on behalf of the donee; and 8. an exclusion of the earnings from qualified tuition programs (QTPs), also known as Section 529 Plans. The tuition and fees deduction was scheduled to expire at the end of 2005. The benefits can be divided into three groups: incentives for current year higher education expenses, incentives that provide preferential tax treatment of student loan expenses, and incentives for saving for college.

The federal government provides financial assistance to individuals for higher education expenses in two major ways: tax benefits and traditional student aid (loans, grants, and work-study assistance). Since 1997, education tax benefits have become an increasingly important component of federal higher education policy. In 2017, 14 tax benefits are available for college students and their parents to help pay for higher education. The available tax benefits are a mixture of credits, deductions, exclusions, and other incentives. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates the cost to the federal government of education tax benefits—the revenue foregone from offering these benefits—to be $142 billion between 2017 and 2021. This report provides a brief overview of the higher education tax benefits that are currently available to students and their families. These tax benefits can be divided into three groups: 1. incentives for current year expenses, 2. incentives for preferential tax treatment of student loan expenses, and 3. incentives for saving for college. In 2017, incentives for current expenses include two tax credits: the American Opportunity and Lifetime Learning tax credits; two deductions: an above-the-line deduction for tuition and fees and a deduction for work-related education expenses; two exclusions: an exclusion for scholarships, fellowship income, and tuition reductions, and an exclusion for employer-provided education benefits; and a personal exemption for student dependents aged 19 to 23. Under current law the tuition and fees deduction expired at the end of 2017 and the personal exemption (including for student dependents aged 19 to 23) is temporarily suspended from 2018 through the end of 2025. Tax benefits for student loan expenses include a deduction for interest paid on student loans and an exclusion from income for the amount of forgiven student loans. College saving tax incentives include Qualified Tuition Plans (529 plans); Coverdell education savings accounts (ESAs); an education savings bond program; withdrawals from individual retirement accounts (IRAs) to pay for college expenses without penalty; and the allowance of uniform transfers to minors. (Both Coverdells and 529s can also be used for certain K-12 education expenses, subject to limitations.)

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What Is the Reed Act? Unemployment Compensation (UC) is a joint federal-state program and is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes. 83-567. The amendments to Title IX, among other things, provided for the transfer of excess funds in the federal portion of the UTF to the individual state accounts under certain conditions. The second type, special Reed Act distributions, distributes some of the federal UTF funds to the states where these special distributions may follow some but not all of the conditions set by the Reed Act. Under FUTA, the federal tax on employers finances the states' administrative costs of UC and loans to states with insolvent UC programs. The extended benefits program is funded 50% by the federal government and 50% by the states, but the 2009 stimulus package ( P.L. 111-5 §2005) as amended temporarily provides for 100% federal funding of this program through March 7, 2012. These distributions are called Reed Act distributions. The most recent Reed Act distribution that was a regular and not a special Reed Act distribution was $15.9 million and occurred in 1998. The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, P.L. 105-33 , limited the Reed Act distributions for the 1999 to 2001 period to special distributions of $100 million each year. In March 2002, the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, P.L. 107-147 , provided for a one-time special Reed Act distribution of up to $8 billion to state accounts in the UTF, where the funds were distributed based upon the formula used for regular Reed Act distributions, using calendar year 2000 state information. There was no Reed Act distribution in 2003, and no regular Reed Act distribution is projected through FY2021. According to the Department of Labor, there is no projected distribution through FY2021 on account outstanding loans owed to the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. Transfers to States in the 2009 Stimulus Package The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P.L. 111-5 §2003) provided for a special UTF distribution. The law provided a special transfer of UTF funds from FUA of up to a total of $7 billion to the state accounts within the UTF as "incentive payments" for changing certain state UC laws. In addition, the act transferred a total of $500 million from the federal ESAA to the state's accounts in the UTF.

Under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA; P.L. 76-379), the federal unemployment tax on employers finances the states' administrative costs of Unemployment Compensation (UC) and loans to states with insolvent UC programs. The extended benefits program is funded 50% by the federal government and 50% by the states, but the 2009 stimulus package (P.L. 111-5 §2005) as amended temporarily provides for 100% federal funding of this program through December 31, 2012. FUTA tax revenues are placed into the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) that—among its many accounts—contains three federal accounts and 53 individual state accounts from the states' unemployment taxes. Under certain financial conditions, excess federal tax funds in the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) are transferred to the individual state accounts within the UTF. The transferred funds are referred to as Reed Act distributions. The Reed Act, P.L. 83-567, set ceilings in the federal UTF accounts that trigger funds to be distributed to state accounts; Congress has changed these ceilings several times (P.L. 105-33, P.L. 102-318, and P.L. 100-203). There are other transfers in the UTF that are labeled by legislation as special Reed Act distributions. These are distributed in a manner similar to the Reed Act but do not follow all of the Reed Act provisions. The most recent regular Reed Act distribution was $15.9 million and occurred in 1998. The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, P.L. 105-33, limited Reed Act distributions for the 1999 to 2001 period to special Reed Act distributions of $100 million each year. In March 2002, the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, P.L. 107-147, provided for a one-time special Reed Act distribution of up to $8 billion to state accounts. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5 §2003) provided for a special UTF distribution that has some properties similar to a Reed Act distribution. The law distributes up to a total of $7.5 billion to the states through a special transfer of funds from the federal accounts within the UTF to the state accounts, using the methodology required by the Reed Act to determine the maximum state allotments. Up to $7 billion was distributed to states as incentive payments for changing certain state UC laws. Administrative funds totaling $500 million was distributed among the state accounts, regardless of whether states changed their UC laws. According to the Department of Labor, there is no projected regular Reed Act distribution through FY2021 on account outstanding loans in the UTF owed to the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. This report will be updated if legislative activity affects Reed Act distributions.

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Since the beginning of 2008, employment has fallen again and the unemployment rate has risen. Job loss—declines in employment—is one of the most important macroeconomic problems facing policymakers, both in terms of its economic cost and the social toll it takes on our society. But what is often missing from the policy debate is a distinction between net job loss and gross job loss. Gross job loss is the total number of jobs eliminated by all contracting firms in a given period, whereas net job loss is the result of greater gross job loss than gross job gains in a given period. Economists view net job loss as a detrimental phenomenon and most recommend that policy be used to mitigate it. However, they view gross job loss, as long as it is offset by gross job gains, as a healthy and normal part of a functioning market economy, although it may have social costs. As can be seen in Figure 1 , gross job loss and job gains are each, on average, around 20 times higher than net job loss (or gains) in any given quarter. This is true in both expansions and recessions. Clearly, gross job loss is not incompatible with a healthy labor market: during an expansion in which the unemployment rate was lower than it had been in three decades, gross job losses steadily increased as the expansion progressed. And even during the 2001 recession and subsequent "jobless recovery," gross job gains continued to average about 8 million per quarter; but gross job gains in this period were more than offset by gross job losses. In the current expansion, job gains and losses have been modestly lower than in the second half of the 1990s. What Causes Gross Job Loss and Net Job Loss? These gross job gains may not occur instantaneously—so there could be transitional net job loss—but when they do occur, they will offset the gross job loss caused by higher imports so that the trade deficit causes no net job loss. Policies that impede gross job loss (e.g., regulatory restrictions on dismissal or layoffs) may seem to be a desirable way to limit net job loss at first blush. However, such policies could have the unintended effect of making firms reluctant to take on new workers, because a firm would not be able to subsequently reduce its workforce easily if the need for the new workers proved to be only temporary. As a result, gross job gains could decline; if gross job gains declined by more than gross job loss declined, net job creation would decline. International comparison confirms this view. Net job loss is a serious economic problem that fiscal and monetary policy can be used to mitigate. Trade, trade deficits, offshore outsourcing, overseas investment, and economic restructuring all cause gross job loss. As the buggy example suggests, policies that impede gross job loss can have high efficiency costs. The difference in the unemployment experience of countries with high barriers to job loss, such as the high unemployment countries of Western Europe, and countries with low barriers, such as the United States, offers some evidence that barriers to gross job loss can lead to lower gross job gains, making such barriers ultimately self-defeating.

Total nonfarm private employment has fallen since the beginning of 2008. Job loss is one of the most important macroeconomic problems facing policymakers, both in terms of its economic and social cost. But what is often missing from the policy debate is a distinction between net job loss and gross job loss. Gross job loss is the total number of jobs eliminated by all contracting firms in a given period, whereas net job loss is the result of greater gross job loss than gross job gains in a given period. Economists view net job loss as a detrimental phenomenon, and most recommend that fiscal and monetary policy be used to mitigate it. However, they view gross job loss, as long as it is offset by gross job gains, as a healthy and normal part of a functioning market economy, although it may have social costs and will not affect all regions or industries equally. Data reveal that gross job loss and job gains are each, on average, 20 times higher than net job loss (or gains) in any given quarter. This is true in both expansions and recessions. Clearly, gross job loss is not incompatible with a healthy labor market: during the 1990s expansion in which the unemployment rate was lower than it had been in three decades, gross job losses steadily increased as the expansion progressed. Even during the 2001 recession and subsequent "jobless recovery," gross job gains continued to average about 8 million per quarter; but these gross job gains were more than offset by gross job losses. In the subsequent expansion, gross job gains stayed relatively constant, but gross job losses fell. Small businesses have both higher gross job gains and losses than large firms, and have tended to contribute modestly more net job creation. Many causes of job loss have been offered, including imports, trade deficits, offshore outsourcing, direct investment abroad, and restructuring. But economic theory suggests that all of these cause gross job loss, not net job loss. Historical experience is supportive: neither imports, the trade deficit, nor the implementation of trade liberalization agreements are correlated with net job loss. Theory suggests, and empirical evidence has confirmed, that only recessions cause net job loss. Policies that impede gross job loss may seem to be a desirable way to limit net job loss at first blush. However, such policies could make firms reluctant to hire new workers, because a firm would not be able to subsequently reduce its workforce easily if the need for the new workers proved to be only temporary. As a result, gross job gains could decline; if gross job gains declined by more than gross job loss declined, net job creation would decline. International comparison confirms this view: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain all had high barriers to job loss and unemployment rates that were typically twice as high in the 1990s as low barrier countries like the United States. Although attempts to impede gross job loss may reduce economic efficiency, policy can (and does) assist some of those affected by gross job loss through unemployment insurance and other parts of the social safety net. Whether the existing social safety net is adequate as gross job loss increases is the subject of policy debate. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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This is an overview of federal law relating to the statutes of limitation in criminal cases, including those changes produced by the act. "The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Therefore, in most instances, prosecutions are barred if the defendant can show that there was no indictment or other formal charge filed within the time period dictated by the statute of limitations. The common law recognized no period of limitation. Federal statutes of limitation are as old as federal crimes. Others suspend or extend the applicable period under certain circumstances such as the flight of the accused, or during time of war. Limits by Crime Although the majority of federal crimes are governed by the general five-year statute of limitations, Congress has chosen longer periods for specific types of crimes—20 years for the theft of art work; 10 years for arson, for certain crimes against financial institutions, and for immigration offenses; and 8 years for the nonviolent terrorist offenses that may be prosecuted at any time if committed under violent circumstances. For example, an otherwise applicable limitation period may be suspended or extended in cases involving child abuse, the concealment of the assets of an estate in bankruptcy, wartime fraud against the government, dismissal of original charges, fugitives, foreign evidence, or DNA evidence. That is no longer the case. Conspiracies and Continuing Offenses Statutes of limitation "normally begin to run when the crime is complete, " which occurs when the last element of the crime has been satisfied. The rule for conspiracy is a bit different. Thus, the statute of limitations for such conspiracies begins to run not with the first overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy but with the last. The applicable statute of limitations for these continuing crimes is delayed if either "the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one." Constitutional Considerations Ex post Facto : Historically, constitutional challenges to the application of various statutes of limitation have arisen most often under the ex post facto or due process clauses. Due Process : Retroactivity aside, the due process clauses may be implicated when a crime has no statute of limitations or when the period of limitation has not run.

A statute of limitations dictates the time period within which a legal proceeding must begin. The purpose of a statute of limitations in a criminal case is to ensure the prompt prosecution of criminal charges and thereby spare the accused of the burden of having to defend against stale charges after memories may have faded or evidence is lost. There is no statute of limitations for federal crimes punishable by death, nor for certain federal crimes of terrorism, nor for certain federal sex offenses. Prosecution for most other federal crimes must begin within five years of the commitment of the offense. There are exceptions. Some types of crimes are subject to a longer period of limitation; some circumstances suspend or extend the otherwise applicable period of limitation. Arson, art theft, certain crimes against financial institutions, and various immigration offenses all carry statutes of limitation longer than the five-year standard. Regardless of the applicable statute of limitations, the period may be extended or the running of the period suspended or tolled under a number of circumstances, such as when the accused is a fugitive or when the case involves charges of child abuse, bankruptcy, wartime fraud against the government, or DNA evidence. Ordinarily, the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the crime has been completed. Although the federal crime of conspiracy is complete when one of the plotters commits an affirmative act in its name, the period for conspiracies begins with the last affirmative act committed in furtherance of the scheme. Other so-called continuing offenses include various possession crimes and some that impose continuing obligations to register or report. Limitation-related constitutional challenges arise most often under the Constitution's ex post facto and due process clauses. The federal courts have long held that a statute of limitations may be enlarged retroactively as long as the previously applicable period of limitation has not expired. The Supreme Court recently confirmed that view; the ex post facto proscription precludes legislative revival of an expired period of limitation. Due process condemns pre-indictment delays even when permitted by the statute of limitations if the prosecution wrongfully caused the delay and the accused's defense suffered actual, substantial harm as a consequence. This report is an abbreviated form as CRS Report RL31253, Statute of Limitation in Federal Criminal Cases: An Overview, without the attachments, footnotes, or attributions to authority found in the parent report.

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Congress created the Smithsonian Institution (SI) in 1846, 10 years after it agreed to accept the bequest of James Smithson, an English scientist who lived much of his life in continental Europe. Smithson, who died in 1829, left the bulk of his estate to the United States of America to found at Washington the establishment that bears his name. Today, SI is a complex of museum, education, research, and revenue-generating entities primarily located in the Washington, DC, region, with additional facilities and activities across the United States and world that reportedly employs 6,500 staff, supplemented by 6,300 volunteers. In fiscal year (FY) 2015, SI's museums and zoo, which are open to the public largely without admission fee, were visited 29.3 million times, while its websites were accessed 134 million times. Governmental, but organizationally separate and distinct from the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the national government, SI is overseen by a board composed of representatives of each branch. SI is overseen by a Board of Regents (Regents), who are authorized by Congress to carry out a number of activities and oversee certain entities authorized by Congress. In addition to carrying out those authorities, it appears that SI acts pursuant to its role as trustee of the Smithson and other bequests and gifts to create additional entities to further SI missions. SI Leadership The activities of SI are overseen by the Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. Legislation, 114th Congress (2015-2016) H.R.

The Smithsonian Institution (SI) is a complex of museum, education, research, and revenue-generating entities primarily located in the Washington, DC, region, with additional facilities and activities across the United States and world, that reportedly employs 6,500 staff, supplemented by 6,300 volunteers. In fiscal year (FY) 2016, SI's museums and zoo, which are open to the public largely without admission fee, were visited 29.3 million times, while its websites were accessed 134 million times. Congress created SI in 1846, after it agreed to accept the bequest of James Smithson, an English scientist who left the bulk of his estate to the United States of America to found at Washington an establishment bearing his name. Governmental but organizationally separate and distinct from the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the U.S. government, SI is overseen by a Board of Regents (Regents), composed of the Chief Justice, Vice President, Members of the House and Senate, and private citizens. The Regents are authorized by Congress to carry out a number of activities, and oversee certain SI entities established or authorized by Congress. Congress provides to SI an annual appropriation—in FY2016, this was approximately $696 million—and provides oversight of SI activities. In addition to carrying out authorities granted by Congress, it appears that SI acts pursuant to its role as trustee of the Smithson and other bequests and gifts to create additional entities to further SI missions. This report provides an overview of SI organization and leadership roles, and entities created by Congress as well as those created by SI. It also provides background information on consideration of an SI museum collaboration in London, and Smithsonian related legislation introduced in the 114th Congress (2015-2016).

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Introduction The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan brought renewed attention to the needs of veterans, including the needs of homeless veterans. In response to the issue of homelessness among veterans, Congress has created numerous programs to fund services, transitional housing, and permanent housing specifically for homeless veterans. Several issues regarding homelessness among veterans have become prominent since the beginning of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Third is the concern that adequate services might not exist to serve the needs of women veterans. Table 1 , below, contains estimates of homeless veterans from 2009 through 2015. See Table 2 . In each of the studies, both male and female veterans were more likely to be homeless than their nonveteran counterparts. (See Table 3 .) Overrepresentation of Female Veterans As with male veterans, research has shown that women veterans are more likely to be homeless than women who are not veterans. In addition, the Department of Labor (DOL) is responsible for programs that provide employment services for homeless veterans while the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) collaborates with the VA on two additional programs. The Department of Veterans Affairs The majority of programs that serve homeless veterans are part of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), one of the three major organizations within the VA (the other two are the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) and the National Cemetery Administration). Health Care for Homeless Veterans The first federal program to specifically address the needs of homeless veterans, Health Care for Homeless Veterans (HCHV), was initially called the Homeless Chronically Mentally Ill veterans program. Congress has appropriated funds for the DCHV program since its inception. Veterans are eligible if they are receiving care in the Domiciliary Care for Homeless Veterans program, the Compensated Work Therapy Transitional Housing program, in Community Residential Care Facilities, or in a Grant and Per Diem program. VA and HUD Collaborations HUD-VASH Early Years of HUD-VASH The HUD-VA Supported Housing (HUD-VASH) program began in 1992 as a collaboration between the VA and HUD whereby HUD provided housing to homeless veterans through a set-aside of tenant-based Section 8 vouchers and the VA provided supportive services. The contract between the VA and the outside service provider may occur in circumstances where (1) there is a shortage of affordable rental housing and a veteran needs more assistance than the VA can provide, (2) a veteran does not live near a local VA facility and it is impractical for the VA to provide assistance, or (3) veterans in the area have lower than average success in obtaining housing when compared to veterans participating in HUD-VASH overall. For the number of new vouchers funded in each fiscal year, see Table 5 . Issues Regarding Veterans and Homelessness The VA Plan to End Veteran Homelessness On November 3, 2009, the VA announced a plan to end homelessness among veterans within five years. Congress has appropriated $575 million for the program, an amount sufficient to fund 79,000 vouchers for one year. The additional Section 8 vouchers, as well as increased funding through VA program interventions (see Table 4 ), could be making a difference in the number of veterans experiencing homelessness. In addition to funding increases, the numbers of veterans served in VA homeless programs have increased in the years since the plan was announced, as shown in Table 6 . A number of studies have examined the mental health status of troops returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. Women veterans face challenges that could contribute to their risks of homelessness. As a result, programs serving homeless veterans may not have adequate facilities for female veterans at risk of homelessness, particularly transitional housing for women and women with children.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan brought renewed attention to the needs of veterans, including the needs of homeless veterans. Researchers have found both male and female veterans to be overrepresented in the homeless population, and, as the number of veterans increased due to these conflicts, there was concern that the number of homeless veterans could rise commensurately. The 2007-2009 recession and the subsequent slow economic recovery also raised concerns that homelessness could increase among all groups, including veterans. Congress has created numerous programs that serve homeless veterans specifically, almost all of which are funded through the Veterans Health Administration of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). These programs provide health care and rehabilitation services for homeless veterans (the Health Care for Homeless Veterans and Domiciliary Care for Homeless Veterans programs), employment assistance (Homeless Veterans Reintegration Program—a Department of Labor program—and Compensated Work Therapy program), and transitional housing (Grant and Per Diem program) as well as supportive services (the Supportive Services for Veteran Families program). The VA also works with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to provide permanent supportive housing to homeless veterans through the HUD-VA Supported Housing Program (HUD-VASH). In the HUD-VASH program, HUD funds rental assistance through Section 8 vouchers while the VA provides supportive services. In addition, the VA and HUD have collaborated on a homelessness prevention demonstration program. Several issues regarding veterans and homelessness have become prominent, in part because of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. One issue is ending homelessness among veterans. In November 2009, the VA announced a plan to end homelessness within five years. Both the VA and HUD have taken steps to increase housing and services for homeless veterans. Funding for VA programs has increased in recent years (see Table 4), Congress has appropriated funds to increase available units of permanent supportive housing through the HUD-VASH program (see Table 5), and the number of veterans served in many programs has increased (see Table 6). Congress has appropriated a total of $575 million to support initial funding of HUD-VASH vouchers in each year from FY2008 through FY2015, enough to fund approximately 79,000 vouchers. Since the VA announced its plan, the HUD and VA point-in-time estimates of the number of veterans experiencing homelessness has fallen from 73,367 in 2009 to 47,725 in 2015 (see Table 1). Another issue is the concern that veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who are at risk of homelessness may not receive the services they need. In addition, concerns have arisen about the needs of female veterans, whose numbers are increasing. Women veterans face challenges that could contribute to their risks of homelessness. They are more likely to have experienced sexual trauma than women in the general population and are more likely than male veterans to be single parents. Historically, few homeless programs for veterans have had the facilities to provide separate accommodations for women and women with children. In recent years, Congress and the VA have made changes to some programs in an attempt to address the needs of female veterans, including funding set-asides and efforts to expand services.

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T he information technology (IT) industry has evolved greatly over the last half century. This technology is ubiquitous and increasingly integral to almost every facet of modern society. ICT devices and components are generally interdependent, and disruption of one may affect many others. The Concept of Cybersecurity Over the past several years, experts and policymakers have expressed increasing concerns about protecting ICT systems from cyberattacks —deliberate attempts by unauthorized persons to access ICT systems, usually with the goal of theft, disruption, damage, or other unlawful actions. Many experts expect the number and severity of cyberattacks to increase over the next several years. The act of protecting ICT systems and their contents has come to be known as cybersecurity . A broad and arguably somewhat fuzzy concept, cybersecurity can be a useful term but tends to defy precise definition. Cybersecurity is also sometimes conflated inappropriately in public discussion with other concepts such as privacy, information sharing, intelligence gathering, and surveillance. Management of Cybersecurity Risks The risks associated with any attack depend on three factors: threats (who is attacking), vulnerabilities (the weaknesses they are attacking), and impacts (what the attack does). The management of risk to information systems is considered fundamental to effective cybersecurity. Most cyberattacks have limited impacts, but a successful attack on some components of critical infrastructure (CI)—most of which is held by the private sector—could have significant effects on national security, the economy, and the livelihood and safety of individual citizens. Federal Role The federal role in cybersecurity involves both securing federal systems and assisting in protecting nonfederal systems. Under current law, all federal agencies have cybersecurity responsibilities relating to their own systems, and many have sector-specific responsibilities for CI. More than 50 statutes address various aspects of cybersecurity. Workforce —improving the size, skills, and preparation of the federal and private sector cybersecurity workforce. Information Sharing P.L. Executive Branch Actions Some notable actions have been taken by the Obama Administration during the 114 th Congress. Initiatives in the plan include a proposed revolving fund for modernizing federal IT (see H.R. 5792 ) and the appointment of a federal chief information security officer, among other actions. Presidential Policy Directive 41 describes how the federal government will respond to cybersecurity incidents affecting government and private-sector entities, including principles, kinds of response, a framework of roles and responsibilities, and coordination. Long-Term Challenges The legislative and executive-branch actions discussed above are largely designed to address several well-established near-term needs in cybersecurity: preventing cyber-based disasters and espionage, reducing impacts of successful attacks, improving inter- and intrasector collaboration, clarifying federal agency roles and responsibilities, and fighting cybercrime. However, those needs exist in the context of more difficult long-term challenges relating to design, incentives, consensus, and environment (DICE): Design: Experts often say that effective security needs to be an integral part of ICT design. Legislation and executive actions in the 114 th and future Congresses could have significant impacts on those challenges.

The information and communications technology (ICT) industry has evolved greatly over the last half century. The technology is ubiquitous and increasingly integral to almost every facet of modern society. ICT devices and components are generally interdependent, and disruption of one may affect many others. Over the past several years, experts and policymakers have expressed increasing concerns about protecting ICT systems from cyberattacks, which many experts expect to increase in frequency and severity over the next several years. The act of protecting ICT systems and their contents has come to be known as cybersecurity. A broad and arguably somewhat fuzzy concept, cybersecurity can be a useful term but tends to defy precise definition. It is also sometimes inappropriately conflated with other concepts such as privacy, information sharing, intelligence gathering, and surveillance. However, cybersecurity can be an important tool in protecting privacy and preventing unauthorized surveillance, and information sharing and intelligence gathering can be useful tools for effecting cybersecurity. The management of risk to information systems is considered fundamental to effective cybersecurity. The risks associated with any attack depend on three factors: threats (who is attacking), vulnerabilities (the weaknesses they are attacking), and impacts (what the attack does). Most cyberattacks have limited impacts, but a successful attack on some components of critical infrastructure (CI)—most of which is held by the private sector—could have significant effects on national security, the economy, and the livelihood and safety of individual citizens. Reducing such risks usually involves removing threat sources, addressing vulnerabilities, and lessening impacts. The federal role in cybersecurity involves both securing federal systems and assisting in protecting nonfederal systems. Under current law, all federal agencies have cybersecurity responsibilities relating to their own systems, and many have sector-specific responsibilities for CI. On average, federal agencies spend more than 10% of their annual ICT budgets on cybersecurity. More than 50 statutes address various aspects of cybersecurity. Five bills enacted in the 113th Congress and another in the 114th address the security of federal ICT and U.S. CI, the federal cybersecurity workforce, cybersecurity research and development, information sharing in both the public and private sectors, and international aspects of cybersecurity. Other bills considered by Congress have addressed a range of additional issues, including data breach prevention and response, cybercrime and law enforcement, and the Internet of Things, among others. Among actions taken by the Obama Administration during the 114th Congress are promotion and expansion of nonfederal information sharing and analysis organizations; announcement of an action plan to improve cybersecurity nationwide; proposed increases in cybersecurity funding for federal agencies of more than 30%, including establishment of a revolving fund for modernizing federal ICT; and a directive laying out how the federal government will respond to both government and private-sector cybersecurity incidents. Those recent legislative and executive-branch actions are largely designed to address several well-established needs in cybersecurity. However, those needs exist in the context of difficult long-term challenges relating to design, incentives, consensus, and environment. Legislation and executive actions in the 114th and future Congresses could have significant impacts on those challenges.

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This report offers a preliminary analysis of major policy issues and potential implications that appear to be most relevant as the House and Senate assess the ruling and consider whether or how to respond. This report will be updated to reflect major developments and as policy implications become clearer. McCutcheon v. FEC involves a challenge to the aggregate amount (discussed below) that an individual can contribute to federal candidates, political parties, and political action committees (PACs). During the 2012 election cycle, Alabama donor Shaun McCutcheon wished to contribute more than the existing aggregate limits to candidates and the Republican National Committee (RNC). On April 2, 2014, the Court issued a plurality opinion striking down the aggregate limits on constitutional grounds. The decision does not affect base limits (discussed below) that individuals may contribute to particular candidates or parties. Instead, McCutcheon permits individuals to give limited contributions to an unlimited number of candidates, political parties, and political action committees. Before the decision, the aggregate limits would have functionally capped the number of candidates, parties, or PACs a contributor could support. Second, FECA limits the aggregate amount an individual can contribute to all candidates, parties, or PACs. The same contributor might also be able to contribute to political party committees, PACs, or both. It is unclear how many donors the decision might affect.

Recently invalidated aggregate limits on federal campaign contributions capped the total amount that one can give to all candidates, parties, or political action committees (PACs). For the 2014 election cycle, the aggregate limit for individual contributions was $123,200.The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the aggregate limits on April 2, 2014. Alabama contributor Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee (RNC) brought the case, McCutcheon v. FEC, after the aggregate limits prevented McCutcheon from contributing as desired to federal candidates and parties during the 2012 election cycle. The decision does not affect "base limits" that individuals may contribute to particular candidates or parties. Instead, McCutcheon permits individuals to give limited contributions to an unlimited number of candidates, political parties, and political action committees. This report offers a preliminary analysis of major policy issues and potential implications that appear to be most relevant as the House and Senate decide whether or how to respond to McCutcheon. With the aggregate limits relaxed, additional funds might flow to candidate committees, party committees, or PACs. Joint fundraising committees and leadership PACs might expand as tools to funnel large contributions to multiple candidate committees, parties, or PACs. Disclosure of contributors who exceed the current aggregate limits might also be a policy concern. It is important to note that whether these possibilities will occur is unclear at this time. This report will be updated to reflect major developments. This version of the report supersedes previous versions.

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Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agencies for a variety of reasons, and in a variety of ways. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148 ) is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified more than 40 provisions in PPACA that require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation. The Unified Agenda A potentially better way for Congress to identify upcoming PPACA rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (hereafter, Unified Agenda), which is published twice each year (spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration, for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date (sometimes just the projected month and year) for the next regulatory action. Each entry also contains an element indicating the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act). This Report The December 20, 2010, edition of the Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan is the first edition that RISC has compiled and issued after the enactment of PPACA. This report examines the December 20, 2010, edition of the Unified Agenda and identifies upcoming proposed and final rules and long-term actions that are expected to be issued pursuant to PPACA.

Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agencies for a variety of reasons, and in a variety of ways. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148) is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified more than 40 provisions in PPACA that require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation. One way for Congress to identify upcoming PPACA rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, which is published twice each year (spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration, for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The Unified Agenda lists upcoming activities, by agency, in five separate categories or stages of the rulemaking process: the prerule stage, the proposed rule stage, the final rule stage, long-term actions, and completed actions. All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date for the next regulatory action. Each entry also contains an element indicating the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act). This report examines the most recent edition of the Unified Agenda, published on December 20, 2010 (the first edition that RISC compiled and issued after the enactment of PPACA). The report identifies upcoming proposed and final rules listed in the Unified Agenda that are expected to be issued pursuant to PPACA. The Appendix lists these upcoming proposed and final rules in a table. The report also briefly discusses the long-term actions listed in the Unified Agenda, as well as some options for congressional oversight over the PPACA rules.

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Importance of U.S. Meat Exports to Russia In December 2008, the United States and Russia signed a protocol aimed at resolving various emerging trade issues between the two countries in order to continue U.S. livestock and poultry exports to Russia through the end of 2009. These actions, in part, followed on Russia's threats throughout 2008 and 2009 regarding its concerns about antimicrobial use in U.S. meat production. In 2008, Russia was the single largest export market for U.S. poultry products, with exports valued at more than $820 million (about 18% of total U.S. poultry exports). Russia was also among the leading export markets for U.S. pork and beef products, valued at $330 million and nearly $70 million, respectively. Each of these export categories had also experienced strong growth in the Russian market ( Table 1 ). In December 2009, media reports first indicated that Russia has reduced its 2010 global import quotas for pork and poultry below 2009 quota levels. U.S. quota allocations reportedly are to be reduced even further in both 2011 and 2012. With regard to agriculture, the U.S.-Russia 2006 bilateral market access agreement, or side letters, committed Russia to: permitting the immediate resumption of imports of de-boned beef, bone-in beef, and beef by-products from cattle younger than 30 months and allowing imports of beef and beef by-products from cattle of all ages, once the United States received a positive evaluation as a beef producer from the World Organization for Animal Health; accepting safety certifications by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) of pork and poultry slaughter, processing, and cold storage facilities to export products to Russia, along with procedures to expedite the certification process; accepting U.S. freezing treatments as an adequate measure to prevent trichinae infestation in pork to be sold for retail sale as well as for further processing (Russia previously had only allowed frozen pork to be imported for further processing); and continuing to apply until 2009 the provisions of the 2005 U.S.-Russia bilateral agreement on meat that established tariff-rate quotas, including in- and over-quota tariff rates, and to conduct bilateral negotiations on the treatment of meat imports after the agreement expires. Russian officials also signaled that they might reduce U.S. permits to import poultry and pork under that country's quota system. By December 2009, Russia had escalated these trade issues in a series of actions that threatened to effectively shut out U.S. livestock and poultry exports to Russia. Russia continued to cite food safety concerns, including but not limited to its findings of antimicrobial residues (legal in the United States) and the use of chlorine rinses on U.S. meat exports. Pork Products During this time Russia identified several U.S. pork processing companies as ineligible to export products to Russia. Throughout 2008 and 2009, Russia has refused imports of meat products from several European countries and from several U.S. plants—including plants owned by Tyson Foods Inc. and a unit of Smithfield Foods—because trace amounts of tetracycline and oxytetracycline were found in some of the pork tested. Some further point out that Russia's perceived "zero tolerance" regarding antimicrobial use is the most restrictive among all U.S. trading partners. In addition, for most of 2009, Russia was among other U.S. trading partner countries that initiated H1N1-related import restrictions on U.S. pork or pork products, following initial reports about influenza virus in April 2009. Russia's ban went into effect on January 1, 2010, banning poultry imports treated with chlorine washes from all exporting countries, including the United States. As noted above, since pathogen reduction rinses are commonplace in U.S. poultry production, this action was expected to effectively ban all U.S. poultry exports to Russia. Considerations for Congress Members of Congress with important poultry and meat industry constituents have been closely monitoring events and ongoing negotiations between the United States and Russia to resolve these trade disputes.

In December 2008, the United States and Russia signed a protocol aimed at resolving various emerging trade issues between the two countries in order to continue U.S. livestock and poultry exports to Russia through the end of 2009. By December 2009, however, Russia had escalated these trade issues in a series of actions that threatened to shut out U.S. livestock and poultry exports. These actions, in part, followed on Russia's statements throughout 2008 and 2009 regarding its concerns about antimicrobial use in U.S. meat production. Russia has continued to cite various food safety concerns, including concerns about antimicrobial residues and the use of chlorine rinses on U.S. meat exports, and identified several U.S. poultry and meat processing companies as ineligible to export meat to Russia. In 2008 and again in 2009, Russia announced that it was banning poultry imports from several U.S. establishments due to safety concerns. In addition, throughout 2008 and 2009, Russia refused imports of pork products from several U.S. plants because trace amounts of antibiotics were found in some of the meat tested. As part of these actions, Russian officials signaled that U.S. permits to import poultry and pork under that country's quota system might be restricted. (Russia also banned pork products for most of 2009 from several countries, including the United States, following reports about the H1N1 influenza virus in April 2009.) In December 2009, Russia announced that it would implement its previously proposed ban on poultry imports treated with chlorine washes from all exporting countries, effective January 1, 2010. This action was expected to effectively ban all U.S. poultry exports to Russia, since pathogen reduction rinses are commonplace in U.S. poultry production. (A similar European Union (EU) prohibition has kept U.S. chicken out of the EU since 1997.) By late March 2010, trade reports were indicating that a potential resolution of the poultry dispute might be close. The delistings, as of late 2009, of virtually all U.S. pork plants that exported to Russia (purported to be mainly due to concerns about findings of trace amounts of antimicrobials on pork) was reportedly resolved earlier in March. Also in December 2009, reports emerged that Russia would reduce its 2010 import quotas for U.S. pork and poultry below 2009 quota levels. Russia's import quotas for U.S. beef, however, would be increased above 2009 levels. Quota allocations for U.S. pork and poultry are expected to be reduced even further in both 2011 and 2012. Many U.S. producers believe that Russia's food safety restrictions, including those regarding antimicrobial use, are not science-based, but are instead intended to protect and promote Russia's own growing domestic pork and poultry production. Some further point out that Russia's perceived "zero tolerance" regarding antimicrobial use is the most restrictive among all U.S. trading partners. For U.S. poultry and meat producers, the economic stakes of Russian import actions are significant. In 2008, Russia was the single largest export market for U.S. poultry products, with exports valued at more than $820 million (about 18% of total U.S. poultry exports). Russia was also among the leading export markets for U.S. pork and beef products, valued at $330 million and nearly $70 million, respectively. All these export products had also experienced strong growth in the Russian market. Members of Congress with important poultry and meat industry constituents have been monitoring events and ongoing negotiations between the United States and Russia to resolve these disputes.

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Introduction The distribution of income in the United States features heavily in congressional discussions about the middle class, program funding and effectiveness, new and existing target groups, government tax revenue, and social mobility, among other topics. Recently, the level and distribution of U.S. income have also been raised in the context of broader macroeconomic issues, such as economic growth. This report responds to that interest by providing a guide to various measures, indicators, and graphics commonly used to describe the U.S. income distribution. This report provides descriptive analysis of the U.S. income distribution to illustrate various concepts. This analysis reveals broad trends, but does not provide an exhaustive study of the distribution of income in the United States. Importantly, the report does not explore potential drivers and impacts of changes to the shape and span of the distribution. This report is organized as follows: first, it examines the complexities of income measurement and important definitional and data considerations to bear in mind when using and interpreting income statistics. An appendix presents information on the set of summary indicators of income dispersion reported annually by the U.S. Census Bureau. In practice, however, empirical analysis of the income distribution involves several choices about how income is defined and the level at which income data are examined. Income can be constructed narrowly (e.g., earnings only) or broadly (e.g., as the sum of earnings, capital gains, government transfers, and other sources). It can be presented in pre-tax status or reflect the taxes paid and tax credits received. For these reasons, disagreement over the interpretation of income levels and trends frequently centers on how income is defined. Level of Analysis Income can be presented at the individual level or represent pooled resources among families, households, or tax units. Figure 3 shows the distribution of U.S. household income in 2013. In 2013, median household income was $51,939 and average household income was $72,641. Figure 4 shows the trend in median household income between 1993 and 2013. Median household income in 2013 was slightly higher than median household income in 1995 ($51,719 in 2013 dollars). Figure 9 compares quintile income shares across 1993, 2003, and 2013, and reveals growing concentration of U.S. household income at the top of the distribution over the past 20 years. The share of income among the top 20% of the distribution grew from 48.9% in 1993 to 49.8% in 2003 and to 51% in 2013. Gini Index The Gini index is a popular summary measure of income dispersion that describes the relationship between the cumulative distribution of income and the cumulative distribution of the population, a relationship depicted by the Lorenz curve. It was 0.476 in 2013. CBO data indicate a wide range of incomes at the top of the income spectrum. These indicators differ from the measures described in the main body of this report in that they do not convey descriptive details on the experience of the typical household, the range of incomes, or the shape of the distribution, but instead use information on the full distribution to characterize overall income dispersion (i.e., they are relative measures used to assess departure from a perfectly equal distribution of income).

The distribution of income in the United States features heavily in congressional discussions about the middle class, program funding and effectiveness, new and existing target groups, government tax revenue, and social mobility, among other topics. Recently, the level and distribution of U.S. income have also been raised in the context of broader macroeconomic issues, such as economic growth. Accordingly, Congress has sought information on the absolute and relative experience of U.S. households, the range of incomes, and their dispersion. Describing the income distribution involves several important choices about the definition of income and the level at which income data are examined. Income can be constructed narrowly (e.g., earnings only) or broadly (e.g., as the sum of earnings, capital gains, government transfers, and other sources); it can be presented in pre-tax status or reflect taxes paid and tax credits received. Income can be presented at the individual level or represent pooled resources among households, families, or tax units. These choices about how to define income affect the magnitude of income indicators and the shape and range of the U.S. income distribution. For this reason, disagreement over the interpretation of income levels and trends frequently centers on how income is defined. This report is a guide to various measures, indicators, and graphics commonly used to describe the U.S. income distribution. It examines the complexities of income measurement, outlines important definitional and data considerations to bear in mind when using and interpreting income statistics, and reviews descriptive statistics commonly used in analysis. It also discusses the Gini index, a popular summary measure of income dispersion and an appendix presents information on additional summary indicators of income dispersion reported annually by the U.S. Census Bureau. The report provides descriptive analysis of the U.S. income distribution to illustrate various concepts and data presentation strategies. This analysis reveals broad trends, but does not provide an exhaustive study of the distribution of income in the United States. Importantly, the report does not explore potential drivers and impacts of changes to the shape and span of the distribution. Census data show a gap in income between households at the top of the distribution and those in the middle and bottom of the distribution. In 2013, household income at the 90th percentile was $150,000, whereas household income at the 10th percentile was $12,401. Said another way, household income at the 90th percentile was 12.1 times the level of household income at the 10th percentile. Median household income in 2013 was $51,939, up from $49,594 in 1993 (in 2013 dollars). Census data reveal growing concentration of income at the top of the distribution between 1993 and 2013. Households in the top 20% of the distribution earned 51% of total household income in 2013, compared to 48.9% in 1993 (an increase of 4.3%). The share of total income among the bottom 20% of households was 3.2% in 2013 and 3.6% in 1993 (a decrease of 11.1%). In addition, Census calculations indicate that the Gini index increased from 0.454 in 1993 to 0.476 in 2013, indicating increased dispersion of household income.

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The newest GI Bill was enacted on June 30, 2008, as the Post-9/11 Veterans' Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill), Title V of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-252 ). Although the VA still provides benefits under several older GI Bills, participation and spending for the Post-9/11 GI Bill has represented approximately 80% or more of total GI Bill participation and spending in each year since FY2013. In FY2018, the program is estimated to benefit almost 800,000 individuals and expend over $12 billion. The benefits were designed to meet four main objectives: 1. provide reservists benefits equivalent to members of the regular Armed Forces for equivalent, though often not continuous, active duty service; 2. ensure comprehensive educational benefits; 3. meet military recruiting goals; and 4. improve military retention through transferability of benefits. The Post-9/11 GI Bill provides aid payments to or on behalf of participants pursuing approved programs of education for tuition and fees, housing, books and supplies, and other education-related expenditures. The program became effective August 1, 2009. Individuals must serve an aggregate minimum of 90 days on active duty after September 10, 2001, be discharged or released for a service-connected disability after serving a minimum of 30 continuous days on active duty after September 10, 2001, or be awarded the Purple Heart for service occurring after September 10, 2001. Irrevocable Election Many Post-9/11 GI Bill-eligible individuals are also eligible for another veterans' educational assistance program or the Post-9/11 GI Bill through a different mechanism. Individuals with a single qualifying active duty service period must make an irrevocable election to give up benefits under one other program to receive benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. There are limitations on when family members may begin using their benefits. In addition, covered participants attending public IHLs are qualifying individuals who were discharged or released from an active duty service period of not fewer than 90 days within three years of the date of enrollment; individuals using Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits transferred from an individual described above; Marine Gunnery Sergeant John David Fry Scholarship recipients; and individuals using Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits transferred from a member of the uniformed services who is serving on active duty. The housing allowance is based on the DOD-determined monthly basic allowance for housing (BAH) for a member of the Armed Forces with dependents in pay grade E-5 (hereinafter referred to as the "E-5 with dependents BAH"). Housing Allowance . The benefit amount is at a public IHL, the "actual net cost for in-state tuition and fees" for the program of education, reduced according to the length of time served on active duty ( Table 2 ) and less certain waivers, reductions, scholarships, and assistance; at a private or foreign IHL, the lesser of the private school maximum ( Table 1 ), reduced according to the length of time served on active duty ( Table 2 ), or the "actual net cost for tuition and fees" for the program of education, reduced according to the length of time served on active duty ( Table 2 ) and less certain waivers, reductions, scholarships, and assistance; or the amount allowable under the Tuition Assistance "Top-Up" Program (see " Tuition Assistance "Top-Up" Program "). Individuals who have served in the Armed Forces and who are or were the dependents of servicemembers who were disabled, delayed, or died as a result of military service may be eligible for the Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance program (DEA; 38 U.S.C., Chapter 35). Individuals eligible for the Post-9/11 GI Bill based on their service and eligible for transferred Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits are not subject to the 48-month limit. Individuals may not establish Post-9/11 GI Bill and UCX eligibility based on the same period of service.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers several educational assistance programs (GI Bills®) that provide funds to or on behalf of veterans and servicemembers and their family members to facilitate their enrollment in and pursuit of approved programs of education. Participation and spending for the Post-9/11 GI Bill has represented approximately 80% or more of total GI Bill participation and spending in each year since FY2013. In FY2018, the program is estimated to benefit almost 800,000 individuals and expend over $12 billion. For a description of the other GI Bills, see CRS Report R42785, GI Bills Enacted Prior to 2008 and Related Veterans' Educational Assistance Programs: A Primer. The Post-9/11 Veterans' Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill)—enacted as Title V of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252) on June 30, 2008—is the newest GI Bill and went into effect on August 1, 2009. There were four main drivers for the Post-9/11 GI Bill: (1) providing parity of benefits for reservists and members of the regular Armed Forces, (2) ensuring comprehensive educational benefits, (3) meeting military recruiting goals, and (4) improving military retention through transferability of benefits. The Post-9/11 GI Bill provides benefits to veterans and servicemembers and their family members. Veterans and servicemembers who serve an aggregate minimum of 90 days on active duty after September 10, 2001, and continue serving or are discharged honorably may be eligible. In addition, individuals who have been discharged or released for a service-connected disability after serving a minimum of 30 continuous days on active duty after September 10, 2001, may be eligible. There are two mechanisms by which dependents of individuals with military service may be eligible for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. Transferred Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits may be available to the dependents of servicemembers who serve for at least 10 years. Also, the Post-9/11 GI Bill Marine Gunnery Sergeant John David Fry Scholarship Program may be available to the spouse and children of servicemembers who die while serving on active duty in the line of duty. Participants may be eligible for payments to cover tuition and fees, housing, books and supplies, tutorial and relocation assistance, and testing and certification fees. Individuals who serve on active duty for 36 months after September 10, 2001, may receive a tuition and fees benefit of up to the amount of in-state tuition and fees charged when enrolled in public institutions of higher learning (IHLs), or up to $22,805.34 when enrolled in private IHLs in academic year 2017-2018. In general, the monthly housing allowance is based on the Department of Defense (DOD)-determined monthly basic allowance for housing (BAH) for a member of the Armed Forces with dependents in pay grade E-5 and varies depending on location. Benefit payments vary depending on the participant's active duty status, length of qualifying active duty, rate of pursuit, and program of education. For example, participants on active duty are not eligible for a Post-9/11 GI Bill housing allowance. Many Post-9/11 GI Bill-eligible individuals are eligible for another GI Bill or other veterans program that could support educational achievement such as Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX). Individuals with a single qualifying active duty service period must make an irrevocable election to give up benefits under one other GI Bill program to receive benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Similarly, individuals may not establish Post-9/11 GI Bill and UCX eligibility based on the same period of service.

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In that case, a physician may ask FDA for permission to get the investigational new drug for the patient outside of the clinical trial. This report discusses the underlying philosophy behind how FDA, concerned with safety and effectiveness, weighs risks and benefits when deciding whether to allow access to a medical product, either through normal approval channels or outside them; FDA policies on compassionate use and emergency use authority; obstacles—perceived as the result of FDA or manufacturer decisions—to individuals' expanded access to investigational drugs, and some possible remedies; and how expanded access to compassionate use and emergency use authority might form part of a broader approach to ensuring safe, effective, and available drugs. That application (a new drug application [NDA] or a biologics license application [BLA]) includes data from clinical trials as evidence of the product's safety and effectiveness for its stated purpose(s). Through FDA's expanded access procedure, a person, acting through a licensed physician, may request access to an investigational drug—through either a new IND or a revised protocol to an existing IND—if a licensed physician determines the patient has "no comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy available to diagnose, monitor, or treat" the serious disease or condition; and "the probable risk to the person from the investigational drug or investigational device is not greater than the probable risk from the disease or condition"; and the Secretary determines "that there is sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness to support the use of the investigational drug" for this person; and "that provision of the investigational drug … will not interfere with the initiation, conduct, or completion of clinical investigations to support marketing approval"; and "the sponsor, or clinical investigator, of the investigational drug ... submits" "to the Secretary a clinical protocol consistent with the provisions of" FFDCA Section 505(i) and related regulations. The widespread use of expanded access is limited by an important factor: whether the manufacturer agrees to provide the drug, which—because it is not FDA-approved—cannot be obtained otherwise. The FDA does not have the authority to compel a manufacturer to participate. Since 2004, and with the most recent amended reauthorization in 2013, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs (FDA commissioner), as delegated by the HHS Secretary, may issue an emergency use authorization (EUA) to allow temporary use of medical products that FDA has not approved or licensed, or unapproved uses for approved or licensed products. Such a decision varies, depending on many factors: an individual's prognosis, threat to the community, alternative available treatments, and informed consent, among others. It may, however, be relevant to a public health decision. These laws, which many states have passed in the absence of federal legislation, are intended to allow a manufacturer to provide an investigational drug to a terminally ill patient if certain conditions are met: the drug has completed Phase I testing and is in a continuing FDA-approved clinical trial; all FDA-approved treatments have been considered; a physician recommends the use of the investigational drug; and the patient provides written informed consent. However, the FDA may permit the use of an unapproved drug in certain circumstances—a process referred to as compassionate use . Available supply. Liability . Limited staff and facility resources. Data for assessing safety and effectiveness . Although FDA reports the number of requests it receives, manufacturers do not. Expanded Access as Part of Broader Approach Those who set national policy seek to balance (1) protecting the public by trying to ensure that the drugs people take are safe and effective and (2) protecting the public by getting new products to the market quickly. Incentives to Development . Expediting Development and Review . Limiting Access . Regulatory Science .

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the U.S. sale of drugs and biological products, basing approval or licensure on evidence of the safety and effectiveness for a product's intended uses. Without that approval or licensure, a manufacturer may not distribute the product except for use in the clinical trials that will provide evidence to determine that product's safety and effectiveness. Under certain circumstances, however, FDA may permit the sponsor to provide an unapproved or unlicensed product to patients outside that standard regulatory framework. Two such mechanisms are expanded access to investigational drugs, commonly referred to as compassionate use, and emergency use authorization. If excluded from a clinical trial because of its enrollment limitations, a person, acting through a physician, may request access to an investigational new drug outside of the trial. FDA may grant expanded access to a patient with a serious disease or condition for which there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy, if, among other requirements, probable risk to the patient from the drug is less than the probable risk from the disease; there is sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness to support the drug's use for this person; and providing access "will not interfere with the ... clinical investigations to support marketing approval." The widespread use of expanded access is limited by an important factor: whether the manufacturer agrees to provide the drug, which—because it is not FDA-approved—cannot be obtained otherwise. The FDA does not have the authority to compel a manufacturer to participate. Manufacturers consider several factors in deciding whether to provide an investigational drug, such as available supply, perceived liability risk, limited staff and facility resources, and need for data to assess safety and effectiveness. Although FDA reports the number of requests it receives, manufacturers do not. In the case of determination of a military, domestic, or public health emergency, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs may issue an emergency use authorization (EUA) to allow temporary use of medical products that FDA has not approved or licensed, or unapproved uses for approved or licensed products. FDA's assessment of the balance of a drug's potential risks and benefits—whether for overall market approval or for an individual with a serious disease or a public faced with an unusual and dangerous threat—may vary with the circumstance, such as an individual's prognosis, threat to the community, alternative available treatments, extent of knowledge of safety and effectiveness in the anticipated use, and informed consent. Although FDA granted over 99% of the expanded access requests it has received since 2010, patients and others point to what they see as FDA-created obstacles to access. In February 2015, FDA released draft guidance and a new form that, when finalized, would reduce the amount of information required from the physician. Since 2014, 20 states have passed so-called right to try laws to bypass FDA permission for access to an investigational drug. Congress and FDA seek to protect the public by balancing ensuring that drugs are safe and effective with getting new products to the market quickly. Complementing expanded access programs in achieving those goals are broader tools including incentives to development, expediting development and review, limited access, and regulatory science.

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Introduction Foreign outsourcing—the importing of some intermediate product (i.e., a portion of a final product or some good or service needed to produce a final product) that was once produced domestically—is not a new phenomenon, nor is it one that is economically distinct from other types of imports in terms of its basic economic impact. A steadily rising level of trade in intermediate products is one of the salient characteristics of U.S. trade and world trade for the last 30 years. It has been estimated that as much as a third of the growth of world trade since 1970 has been the result of such outsourcing worldwide. Outsourcing may seem different from traditional notions of trade in that it involves exchange of a productive resource (capital or labor) rather than an exchange of a final good and service, but it can be analyzed within the same framework as increased importing of a final product or increased trade in general. This intertwining of economic efficiency and distributional equity will mean that policymakers may find it difficult to take advantage of the increase in economic efficiency that foreign outsourcing affords without also establishing policies to assure equitable treatment of those whose jobs are lost and whose lives are disrupted by this market churning force. Jobs are created and destroyed. Foreign outsourcing and increased imports can contribute to that "churning," and in doing that can be expected to change the composition of total output and the composition of total employment, but they do not necessarily permanently reduce the level of either. There are two complementary reasons for the relative steadiness of total employment and output in the face of foreign outsourcing and other disruptive market forces. First, the Federal Reserve, using monetary policy, can set the overall level of spending in the economy to a level consistent with full employment. But with adequate economy-wide spending, it was possible to create job gains that more than offset job losses. Second, against the economic backdrop of adequate aggregate spending, any increase in the purchase of imports will tend to generate an equal increase in the sale of the country's exports of goods or assets . The positive stimulus of the increased export of goods is direct. The stimulus from an increased export of assets is indirect. From 1994 to 2001, MNC employment rose in both the parents and the foreign affiliates. The evidence in this regard points to a pattern of balance, not a net diversion to foreign locations. A Rising Level of Trade and Economic Well-Being For the economist, the central economic question to be answered in regard to foreign outsourcing, or increased international trade in general, is not its particular impacts on employment or wages. Output and employment along with wages and profits in the affected industry will likely fall. Therefore the full cost of protection is thought by economists to likely be significantly higher than that estimate. As jobs are destroyed by foreign outsourcing in one part of the economy, it is hoped that the boost to the idea production process would improve the attractiveness of U.S. exports on the world market, leading to an acceleration of the flow of exports and foreign outsourcing into the United States, and boosting the rate of creation of better jobs in other parts of the economy.

Foreign outsourcing—the importing of some intermediate product (i.e., a portion of a final product or some good or service needed to produce a final product) that was once produced domestically—is not a new phenomenon, nor is it one that is economically distinct from other types of imports in terms of its basic economic consequences. A steadily rising level of trade in intermediate products is one of the salient characteristics of U.S. trade and world trade for the last 30 years. It has been estimated that as much as a third of the growth of world trade since 1970 has been the result of such outsourcing worldwide. While foreign outsourcing may seem different from traditional notions of trade in that it involves exchange of a productive resource (capital or labor) rather than an exchange of a final good and service, the ultimate economic outcome is exactly the same: a net increase in economic efficiency through the elimination of economic inefficiencies that occur when countries use only the productive resources found within their borders. This gain is not likely to be achieved, however, without causing costly disruptions for the particular workers and sectors tied to the now-imported good. Foreign outsourcing, trade in general, and trade deficits tend to change the composition of total output and the composition of total employment, but it is unlikely that economy-wide they lead to any change in the overall level of either. In some areas of the economy output falls and jobs are destroyed, but in other areas output is increased and jobs are created. There are two complementary reasons for this. First, the Federal Reserve using monetary policy can set the overall level of spending in the economy to a level consistent with full employment. With aggregate spending at the right level, full employment is possible with or without outsourcing, trade deficits, or trade in general. Second, according to basic economic principles any increase in the demand for an import will also lead to adjustments in the foreign exchange market that will induce an equal increase in the demand for the country's exports of goods or assets. The positive stimulus to employment of the increased export of goods is direct, that of the increased export of assets is indirect, but both tend to create jobs in other parts of the economy. Indirect evidence of this inherent "two-way" nature of trade and that increased outsourcing over the last 30 years has not likely led to a significant net diversion of employment or output abroad is found in the relatively stable patterns of employment and output between the domestic parent and foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational corporations. In addition, there is evidence of sizable foreign outsourcing to and job creation in the United States. The destructive aspects of foreign outsourcing are costly and distressing to those whose jobs are lost to increased imports. Therefore, matters of efficiency and equity are intertwined and one of the principal challenges for policymakers in the face of foreign outsourcing (and trade in general) is to find ways to ameliorate the associated harm, without sacrificing the economy-wide gains that such trade generates. Compensation for loss and adjustment assistance is thought by economists to offer the best chance for securing higher economic efficiency along with distributional equity. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Background The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has monitored numerous recalls of meat and poultry products sold in the United States. The recalls have involved beef products possibly contaminated with E. coli O157:H7, beef and poultry products possibly contaminated with Salmonella , and canned meat products possibly contaminated by botulism. A recall is "a firm's voluntary removal of distributed meat or poultry products from commerce when there is reason to believe that such products are adulterated or misbranded...." Recalls received heightened attention in February 2008, when USDA announced the largest-ever recall—143.4 million pounds of fresh and frozen beef products from a California slaughterer-processor. The Class II recall was in response to evidence that nonambulatory ("downer") cattle had been mistreated and periodically slaughtered for food, in violation of a federal humane slaughter law and of meat safety regulations, respectively. Recalls raise issues of consumer confidence in the meat industry and questions of the adequacy of the USDA oversight. This report provides an overview of USDA's statutory authority to regulate meat, poultry, and their products. Specifically, the report discusses the requirements of USDA relating to inspections and import regulations, as well as USDA's role in product recalls, including its power to seize and detain products in commerce. Information about recent recalls and analysis of recall data can be found in the Appendix of the report. Current Statutory Authority to Regulate Meat and Poultry Products USDA does not currently have statutory authority to issue mandatory recalls of contaminated products. Rather, recalls of meat and poultry products are voluntary actions taken by food companies. If an establishment conducts the recall, FSIS provides assistance and monitors the recall. FSIS oversight begins when it learns of a potential recall. The Recall Committee makes a preliminary evaluation to determine whether to recommend a recall of the product. The press release and a photo of the product are posted on FSIS' website, and the information is disseminated to stakeholders (including Congress), news media, and public health officials. Recall notification reports are issued for all classes of recalls and are also posted on the FSIS website. FSIS issues a recall termination report after it completes effectiveness checks and determines that all reasonable efforts have been made to recall the product.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has monitored numerous recalls of meat and poultry products sold in the United States. The recalls have involved beef products possibly contaminated with E. coli O157:H7, beef and poultry products possibly contaminated with Salmonella, and canned meat products possibly contaminated by botulism. These recalls raise issues of consumer confidence in the meat industry and questions about the adequacy of the USDA oversight of these products. In February 2008, USDA announced the largest-ever recall, of 143.4 million pounds of fresh and frozen beef products from a California slaughterer-processor. The Class II recall (meaning only a remote possibility of adverse health effects) was in response to evidence that nonambulatory ("downer") cattle had been mistreated and periodically slaughtered for food, in violation of a federal humane slaughter law and of meat safety regulations, respectively. Following these recalls, Congress included in the 2008 farm law (P.L. 110-246) new requirements for establishments to promptly notify USDA about potentially adulterated or mislabeled meat and poultry products and also to develop and maintain plans for conducting a recall. Other recall-related issues for Congress include whether USDA should be given mandatory recall authority; whether notification and/or recall planning rules should be more prescriptive; and whether new recordkeeping and product traceability requirements are needed. Currently, USDA does not have authority to mandate a recall of meat and poultry products. Rather, USDA, through FSIS, monitors food companies' recalls. When FSIS learns of a potential recall, it convenes a recall committee, which makes recommendations based on information such as any pertinent production and distribution data provided by the company. Once the company initiates a recall, FSIS immediately issues a press release to notify the public, posts it on its website, and provides information directly to stakeholders—including Congress, the media, federal, state, and local officials, and constituents—via e-mail and faxes. At the conclusion of the recall, FSIS conducts an effectiveness check to determine whether all appropriate parties were properly notified and all reasonable efforts were made to retrieve, destroy, or return the recalled product to the firm. This report provides an overview of USDA's authority to regulate meat, poultry, and their products. Specifically, it discusses the requirements of USDA inspections and import regulations, as well as USDA's role in product recalls. This report also addresses some of the issues that arise when considering possible changes to recall authority that may be of interest as the 112th Congress may consider related food safety issues. The Appendix of this report provides information regarding recent recalls and the significance of the recall data.

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Introduction On June 2, 2014, the United States Supreme Court overturned Carol Bond's conviction under the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act as a matter of congressional intent rather than Congress's constitutional authority. The Court concluded that Congress could not have intended the Act to reach "run of the mill" local crimes like Mrs. It had been anticipated that the Court might take the opportunity to clarify the scope of Congress's legislative authority under the treaty power. Background On numerous occasions, Carol Bond, a microbiologist, coated the car door handles and mailbox of her husband's paramour with a mixture of toxic chemicals. Bond was eventually implicated and indicted in federal court for possession and use of a chemical weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Reserving the right to appeal, she pled guilty and was sentenced to imprisonment for six years. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit initially ruled that she lacked standing to raise the constitutional issue, since the Tenth Amendment exists for the protection of state, not individual, rights. Moreover, "with practically no qualifying language in Holland to turn to, [appellate courts] are bound to take at face value the Supreme Court's statement that 'if the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute ... as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government,'" federalism concerns notwithstanding. A concurring member of the panel, however, expressed the hope that the Supreme Court would "flesh out the most important sentence in the most important case about the constitutional law of foreign affairs, and in doing so, clarify (indeed curtail) the contours of federal power to enact laws that intrude on matters so local that no drafter of the Convention contemplated their inclusion in it." Bond's Application Challenge Mrs. Bond contended that the focus of the Chemical Weapons Convention and its implementing legislation are so distinct that Congress could not have intended them to apply to her conduct. Before considering Mrs. "In sum," said the Court, "the global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon. Bond's conduct. But insofar as the Convention may be read to obligate the United States to enact domestic legislation criminalizing conduct of the sort at issue in this case, which typically is the sort of conduct regulated by the States, the Convention exceeds the scope of the treaty power."

The Chemical Weapons Convention obligates the United States to outlaw the use, production, and retention of weapons consisting of toxic chemicals. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act outlaws the possession or use of toxic chemicals, except for peaceful purposes. In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had not intended the Act to reach a "run of the mill" assault case using a skin irritating chemical. Carol Anne Bond, upon discovering that her husband had impregnated another woman, repeatedly dusted the woman's mail box, front door knob, and car door handles with a toxic chemical. Mrs. Bond was indicted in federal court and pled guilty to possessing a chemical weapon in violation of Section 229 of the Act, but reserved the right to appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected her constitutional challenge. A concurring member of the panel, however, urged the Supreme Court to clarify the nearly century-old pronouncement in Missouri v. Holland, "if the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute ... as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government." The concurring judge observed that, "since Holland, Congress has largely resisted testing the outer bounds of its treaty-implementing authority. But if ever there was a statute that did test those limits, it would be Section 229. With its shockingly broad definitions, Section 229 federalizes purely local, run-of-the mill criminal conduct.... Sweeping statutes like Section 229 are in deep tension with an important structural feature of our Government: The States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law." The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide the treaty power issue. Instead, it ruled Congress did not intend the Act to apply to Mrs. Bond's conduct. The Convention did not require a criminal statute sweeping enough to encompass Mrs. Bond's conduct. If Congress intended to reach that deeply into an area within the primacy of the state authority, the Court said, its intention would have to more apparent. Three concurring members of the Court would have held that the federal government lacked the constitutional authority under the treaty power to punish Mrs. Bond. The question of whether application of the statute might be sustained under the Commerce Clause was not before the Court.

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Background During the Obama Administration, the United States considered two mega-regional free trade agreements that its participants argued were comprehensive and high-standard: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among the United States and 11 other countries, and the U.S.-European Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). The 12 TPP countries signed the agreement in February 2016, but the agreement required ratification by each country before it could enter into force. In the United States, this required implementing legislation by Congress. Upon taking office, however, President Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP and halted further negotiations on the T-TIP. The remaining 11 partners to the TPP concluded, without U.S. participation, a revised TPP, now identified as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The Trump Administration is also attempting to revise the two largest existing U.S. FTAs, through the ongoing renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and modification talks regarding the U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) FTA. President Trump has addressed trade broadly and trade agreements more directly through an assertive trade enforcement agenda and vocal skepticism of past U.S. trade agreements and the potential benefits of trade. The Trump Administration also has characterized U.S. trade agreements as unfair and detrimental to the economy, a viewpoint that is not shared by U.S. trading partners, established economic analysis, and various business and consumer groups. For some observers, the growing globalization of the economy raises concerns that the cost of U.S. leadership in the global arena is outstripping the benefits of U.S. global engagement. Others argue that the United States needs to renegotiate its role and require others to share more of the costs. At times, data on U.S. trade with FTA partner countries are provided by various groups in different formats, which present various conclusions about U.S. trade balances with FTA partners. Bilateral Trade Balances In most cases, economists question the usefulness of using bilateral trade balances as indicators of trade relations, of the effectiveness of a trade agreement, or of the costs and benefits of a trade agreement. Issues for Congress In discussing proposed FTAs, both advocates and opponents of such agreements often focus on the U.S. merchandise trade balance with existing FTA partners as one way of measuring the success of such agreements. Economists generally argue, however, that due to the nature of recent FTAs, bilateral trade balances serve as incomplete measures of the comprehensive nature of the trade and economic relationships that often exist between the United States and its FTA partners. For instance, recent trade agreements include trade in services, provisions for investment, and trade facilitation, among other areas that are not reflected in bilateral merchandise trade balances.

During the Obama Administration, the United States negotiated two mega-regional free trade agreements that its participants argued were comprehensive and high-standard: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among the United States and 11 other countries, and the U.S.-European Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). The 12 TPP countries signed the agreement in February 2016, but the agreement required ratification by each country before it could enter into force. In the United States, this required implementing legislation by Congress. Upon taking office, President Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP and halted further negotiations on the T-TIP, but may reengage in the TPP under different terms. The remaining 11 partners to the TPP concluded, without U.S. participation, a revised TPP, now identified as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The Trump Administration is also attempting to revise the two largest existing U.S. FTAs, through the ongoing renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and modification talks regarding the U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) FTA. President Trump has addressed trade broadly and trade agreements more directly through an assertive trade enforcement agenda and vocal skepticism of past U.S. trade agreements and the potential benefits of trade. The Trump Administration has characterized U.S. trade agreements as unfair and detrimental to the economy, a viewpoint that is not shared by U.S. trading partners, established economic analysis, and various business and consumer groups. For some observers, the growing globalization of the economy raises concerns that the cost of U.S. leadership in the global arena is outstripping the benefits of U.S. global engagement. Others argue that the United States needs to renegotiate its role and require others to share more of the costs. The Trump Administration's approach does not rule out the possibility that some countries are not fully abiding by international trade agreements and rules. Such actions may distort market performance and erode public support for the international trade system. Discussions of FTAs often focus on trade balances, particularly U.S. bilateral merchandise trade balances with its FTA partner countries, as one way of measuring the success of the agreements. Although bilateral merchandise trade balances can provide a quick snapshot of the U.S. trade relationship with a particular country, most economists argue that such balances serve as incomplete measures of the comprehensive nature of the trade and economic relationship between the United States and its FTA partners. Indeed, current trade agreements include trade in services, provisions for investment, and trade facilitation, among others that are not reflected in bilateral merchandise trade balances. This report presents data on U.S. merchandise (goods) trade with its Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partner countries. The data are presented to show bilateral trade balances for individual FTA partners and groups of countries representing such major agreements as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central American Free Trade Agreement and Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) relative to total U.S. trade balances. This report also discusses the issues involved in using bilateral merchandise trade balances as a standard for measuring the economic effects of a particular FTA.

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Between 1990 and 2014 an average of 594,600 inmates were released annually from state and federal prisons. Many studies have indicated that reentry initiatives that combine work training and placement with counseling and housing assistance can reduce recidivism rates. Offender reentry includes all the activities and programming conducted to prepare ex-convicts to return safely to the community and to live as law-abiding citizens. Reentry programs are typically divided into three phases: programs that prepare offenders to reenter society while they are in prison, programs that connect ex-offenders with services immediately after they are released from prison, and programs that provide long-term support and supervision for ex-offenders as they settle into communities permanently. Offender reentry programs vary widely in range, scope, and methodology. The increase in the number of people incarcerated in prisons was offset by a decrease in the number of people incarcerated in jails. Should recidivism statistics include any contact with the criminal justice system by an ex-offender? This more narrow definition is often stated in two parts: correctional programs that focus on the transition to the community (such as prerelease, work release, halfway houses, or other programs specifically aiming at reentry) and programs that have initiated some form of treatment (such as substance abuse, life skills, education, or mental health) in prison that is linked to community programs that will continue the treatment once the prisoner has been released. Program Effectiveness: The "What Works" Literature Compared with other social science fields, there has been a relative lack of rigorously designed studies on the issue of offender reentry. Research on the effectiveness of prison-based mental health treatment suggests that these programs can help reduce recidivism. Offender Reentry Programs at the Department of Justice (DOJ) The Department of Justice (DOJ) offers grants for a variety of offender reentry-related programs. Most of these grants were authorized by the Second Chance Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-199 ). For example, the most recent major national-level study showed that within five years of their release three-quarters of ex-offenders came into contact with the legal system and about half were back in prison for either a new conviction or a violation of the terms of their release. However, only a quarter of the ex-offenders ended up in prison for having committed new crimes. The reportedly most successful programs focus on high-risk offenders, are intensive in nature, begin during institutional placement, and take place mostly in the community. As Congress considers this issue, a number of policy issues may be assessed, including whether the current federal grant programs are adequate or whether new programs should be created, whether there is a need for more regular national-level recidivism data (there were almost 20 years between the BJS's two reports on recidivism), whether enough coordination of the many programs that may be used to help ex-offenders is occurring within the federal government, whether more evaluations of offender reentry programs are needed, and whether funding will be appropriated for the programs and activities that were authorized by the Second Chance Act.

The number of people incarcerated in the United States grew steadily for nearly 30 years. That number has been slowly decreasing since 2008, but as of 2014 there were still over 2 million people incarcerated in prisons and jails across the country. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) reports that between 1990 and 2014 an average of 594,600 inmates have been released annually from state and federal prisons and almost 5 million ex-offenders are under some form of community-based supervision. Nearly all prisoners will return to their communities as some point. Offender reentry can include all the activities and programming conducted to prepare prisoners to return safely to the community and to live as law-abiding citizens. Some ex-offenders, however, eventually end up back in prison. The BJS's most recent study on recidivism showed that within five years of release nearly three-quarters of ex-offenders released in 2005 came back into contact with the criminal justice system, and more than half returned to prison after either being convicted for a new crime or for violating the conditions of their release. Compared with the average American, ex-offenders are less educated, less likely to be gainfully employed, and more likely to have a history of mental illness or substance abuse—all of which have been shown to be risk factors for recidivism. Three phases are associated with offender reentry programs: programs that take place during incarceration, which aim to prepare offenders for their eventual release; programs that take place during offenders' release period, which seek to connect ex-offenders with the various services they may require; and long-term programs that take place as ex-offenders permanently reintegrate into their communities, which attempt to provide offenders with support and supervision. There is a wide array of offender reentry program designs, and these programs can differ significantly in range, scope, and methodology. Researchers in the offender reentry field have suggested that the best programs begin during incarceration and extend throughout the release and reintegration process. Despite the relative lack of highly rigorous research on the effectiveness of some reentry programs, an emerging "what works" literature suggests that programs focusing on work training and placement, drug and mental health treatment, and housing assistance have proven to be effective. The federal government's involvement in offender reentry programs typically occurs through grant funding, which is available through a wide array of federal programs at the Departments of Justice, Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services. However, only a handful of grant programs in the federal government are designed explicitly for offender reentry purposes. Most of these offender reentry-specific programs were authorized by the Second Chance Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-199). Congress has continued to fund grant programs authorized under the Second Chance Act even though the authorization of appropriations expired in FY2010.

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The shortage of flu vaccine in the fall of 2004 renewed discussion of the fragility of thenation's system for providing this potentially life-saving product. Some have expressed concern thatthis situation bodes ill for national preparedness for an influenza pandemic or a large-scalebioterrorism event. This report will describe the current system of flu vaccine production anddelivery, the causes of supply problems, and options for improvement. Flu Vaccine Shortage in the 2004-2005 Season Government and Corporate Actions On October 5, 2004, Chiron (pronounced Kī́-ron), a California-based biotechnologycompany, notified U.S. health officials that British regulatory authorities had suspended productionof influenza ("flu") vaccine in its plant in Liverpool, England, due to vaccine safety concerns. Theplant was slated to provide between 46 million and 48 million doses of injectable flu vaccine(Fluvirin®) for the U.S. market for the imminent 2004-2005 flu season, almost half the plannednationwide supply of 100 million doses. The announcement of Chiron's suspension prompted CDC and its Advisory Committee onImmunization Practices (ACIP) to re-define the groups most at risk (enumerated in Table 2 ), to begiven priority for the available vaccine doses. CDC also activated its Emergency Operations Centerto coordinate nationwide tracking of available vaccine doses, high-priority individuals who mightneed them, and infections signaling the beginning of the winter flu season. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sent a team to the Liverpool plant to determineif any of the affected Chiron vaccine lots could be salvaged, but announced on October 15, 2004 thatnone of the vaccine was safe for use. The FDA also sought to identify additional sources of vaccinefrom other manufacturers, domestically and abroad. States responded to the shortage by launching plans to locate and re-distribute or ration dosesof vaccine, and by pursuing widespread reports of price-gouging. a. Some in Congress,concerned that states may not always be able to respond effectively, have asked aboutrelevant federal authorities. Since the shortage was announced, several vaccinemanufacturers expressed interest in entering the flu vaccine market. Congress added flu vaccine to the VICP list in October 2004, inthe American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ( P.L.108-357 ). The response of the public to government recommendations during the 2004shortage is illustrative. Actually, theshortage of flu vaccine illustrates two serious challenges that the federal governmentfaces in a public health emergency. Law and tradition place much of theresponsibility for preventing or managing the shortage either with the states, or withthe private sector, and the threshold over which the federal government would wrestcontrol from either appears high. A number of bills were introduced before the 2004-2005 shortage was announced, some in response to flu vaccine problems during the2003-2004 season. Senate Special Aging Committee, hearing on Influenza and the Elderly , September 28, 2004. Sloan et al., "The Fragility of the U.S.

On October 5, 2004, Chiron (pronounced Kī́-ron), a California-based biotechnologycompany, notified U.S. health officials that British regulatory authorities had suspended productionof influenza ("flu") vaccine in its plant in Liverpool, England, due to vaccine safety concerns. Theplant was slated to provide between 46 million and 48 million doses of flu vaccine for the U.S.market for the imminent 2004-2005 flu season, almost half the expected nationwide supply. The announcement of Chiron's suspension prompted the Centers for Disease Control andPrevention (CDC) and its Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) to re-define thegroups most at risk, to be given priority for the available vaccine doses. CDC coordinatednationwide tracking of available vaccine, high-priority individuals who might need it, and infectionssignaling the start of the winter flu season. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sent a teamto the Liverpool plant to determine whether any of the Chiron vaccine lots could be salvaged (theylater determined that they could not) and sought additional sources of vaccine from othermanufacturers, domestically and abroad. States launched plans to locate and re-distribute or rationvaccine, and responded to reports of price-gouging. The response of local, state, and federalagencies was limited because most of the U.S. flu vaccine market is in private hands. Several bills were introduced in response to the shortage, and proposals introduced earlierin the 108th Congress, in response to flu vaccine supply problems during the 2003-2004 season,received renewed attention. Two hearings on influenza vaccine were held immediately prior toannouncement of the shortage, indicating Congress's ongoing interest in this issue. Additionalhearings were held after the shortage was announced. Congress also passed (in P.L. 108-357 , theAmerican Jobs Creation Act of 2004) a provision adding flu vaccine to the National Vaccine InjuryCompensation Program (VICP), and provided $100 million in FY2005 funding for influenzapreparedness, which could be used to purchase flu vaccine. The shortage illustrates the challenges that the federal government faces in responding topublic health threats. Much of the responsibility for preventing or managing the shortage rests withthe states or with the private sector, and the threshold over which the federal government wouldwrest control from either appears high. As a result, the federal government may appear disorganizedor unresponsive. The shortage also raises questions about the role and effectiveness of governmentin rationing a scarce health resource. As communities across the country saw long lines of sick and elderly citizens waiting in vainfor flu vaccine, and concerns about the supply for the 2005-2006 season emerged as well,policymakers asked why the system to provide this potentially life-saving product was so unreliable,and what could be done about it. Some have expressed concern that this situation bodes ill forpreparedness for an influenza pandemic or a large-scale bioterrorism event. This report will describethe system of flu vaccine production and delivery, the causes of supply problems, and options forimprovement. It will be updated as circumstances warrant.

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It is also interesting to note that American real estate was quite popular with foreign investors. Throughout the nation's history, there has been criticism of foreign investment in the United States. Nevertheless, by the early 1970s foreign investment in the United States began to rise dramatically, and since then there has been frequent congressional debate as to whether there should be more restriction on investment by foreign citizens in American businesses. Constitutional Justifications and Limitations Federal constitutional provisions may be interpreted as legal validation of federal statutes restricting investments by foreigners; other constitutional provisions have to be adhered to by the states in imposing additional restrictions on foreign investment. If it is determined that foreign investments impair national preparedness in the event of an emergency, it appears that prohibition of foreign investments could on this basis be construed as constitutional. Present Federal Restrictions on Foreign Investment Four major federal statutes which have an impact upon foreign investment in the United States are information-gathering and disclosure statutes, instead of actual restriction statutes. Amendments to the act in 1990 direct the President to publish for the use of the general public and federal agencies periodic information concerning foreign investment, including information on ownership by foreign governments of United States affiliates of business enterprises the ownership or control of which by foreign persons is more than 50% of the voting securities or other evidence of ownership of these enterprises, as well as business enterprises the ownership or control of which by foreign persons is 50% or less of the voting securities or other evidence of ownership of these enterprises. Aircraft Industry Statutory restrictions bar a considerable amount of foreign investment in the aircraft industry. An aircraft is eligible for registration only if it is: (1) not registered under the laws of a foreign country and is owned by a citizen of the United States, a citizen of a foreign country lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, or a corporation not a citizen of the United States when the corporation is organized and doing business under the laws of the United States or a state and the aircraft is based and primarily used in the United States; or (2) an aircraft of the United States Government or a state, the District of Columbia, a territory or possession, or a political subdivision of a state, territory, or possession.

Foreign investment in the United States is a matter of congressional concern. It is believed by some that the United States has an unusually liberal policy which allows foreigners to invest in virtually all American businesses and real estate and that these foreign investments undermine the American economy by making it vulnerable to foreign influence and domination. These critics argue that there is even foreign domination of some key defense-related industries and that the ability of the country to protect itself in a time of national emergency could greatly suffer. These critics further argue that extensive foreign investment in this country drives up prices which Americans have to pay for investments and, even more importantly, for houses and farmland in areas where there is a significant amount of foreign ownership. However, others argue that the United States should welcome foreign investment because the influx of foreign money contributes to the creation of jobs in this country. Some also believe that the United States should be a kind of sanctuary for foreign money because of the political and economic instability which characterizes much of the rest of the world. It is also argued that, in this age of globalization of the world's economy, United States restrictions on foreign investment will only impair this nation's economy and cause us to appear isolationist. This report takes a look at some of the major federal statutes which presently restrict investment by foreigners. The report first gives a brief history of foreign investment in the United States. It then reviews constitutional justifications and constitutional limitations which exist concerning federal statutory restrictions on foreign ownership of property. After that follows a discussion of some of the major federal statutes which limit foreign investment in the United States. Some of these statutes will be looked at in detail, but a detailed treatment of such other laws as the tax laws, the antitrust laws, and the immigration laws is beyond the scope of this report. The report will be updated as needed.

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Introduction In recent years, there has been significant congressional interest in compensation of the federal workforce. The increased interest has been driven at least in part by the federal fiscal situation and in part by the state of the economy since the recession began in 2007. Issues related to the compensation of federal employees often center on the pay differential between federal workers and their private sector counterparts. For years, the annual President's Pay Agent (PPA) study, which is covered in greater detail later in this report, has shown a large wage penalty for federal workers compared to private sector workers in similar occupations. A spate of recent studies, which use a different analytical approach and data sources, has partially contradicted the findings of the PPA study by concluding that at least some federal workers enjoy a wage premium over comparable private sector workers. These studies and accompanying reporting on the comparison of compensation of federal workers to private sector workers provide an indication of the disparate findings, which makes it difficult to determine how compensation of federal employees actually compares to that of workers in the private sector. In evaluating claims about federal pay, there appear to be two basic approaches to comparing compensation in the federal and private-sector workforces—the human capital approach and the jobs analysis approach. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive but may be difficult to combine given data limitations. Each approach is outlined below, followed by an examination of a few recent studies comparing federal and private sector compensation. The studies reviewed were chosen because they are official government studies (President's Pay Agent, Congressional Budget Office) or have received significant attention in policy debates. The Human Capital Approach The "human capital" approach attempts to account for (control) as many observable characteristics of individual workers as possible that are known to affect individual compensation. In this approach, an attempt is made to match comparable jobs in different sectors rather than comparable workers in those sectors. Of the five studies under review, one reports an overall average wage penalty for federal workers (PPA), one reports neither an overall average wage premium nor a penalty for federal workers (CBO), and three (Heritage, AEI, and Cato) find overall average wage premia for federal workers compared to private sector workers. Only two of the studies—CBO and AEI—report earnings differentials by level of educational attainment, however. While the AEI report shows a clear wage premium across levels of educational attainment, the more methodologically rigorous CBO study finds a more nuanced outcome. That is, federal workers with less than a bachelor's degree have on average a wage premium compared to private sector counterparts, while federal workers with post-graduate educational attainment experience a wage penalty relative to private sector counterparts. Results from these studies provide useful information. The range of worker and job characteristics is sufficiently broad across sectors that claims about "average" workers generally conceal much of the variation driving differences in compensation. For purposes of policy, the most informative studies show variation in compensation differentials by some control variables, particularly by some measure of human capital (e.g., education) or detailed occupation.

Recently there has been significant congressional interest in compensation of the federal civilian workforce. The increased interest has been driven at least in part by budgetary pressure and in part by the state of the economy since the recession began in 2007. Issues related to the compensation of federal employees often center on the pay differential between federal workers and their private sector counterparts. For several years, the annual President's Pay Agent (PPA) study has shown a large wage penalty for federal workers compared to private sector workers in similar occupations. A few recent studies, however, which use a different analytical approach and data sources, have partially contradicted the findings of the PPA study by concluding that at least some federal workers enjoy a wage premium over comparable private sector workers. These disparate findings make it difficult to determine how compensation of federal employees compares to workers in the private sector. In evaluating claims about federal pay, there appear to be two basic approaches to comparing compensation in the federal and private-sector workforces—the human capital approach and the jobs analysis approach. The human capital approach attempts to account for as many observable characteristics of individual workers as possible (e.g., education, experience) that are known to affect individual compensation. The jobs analysis approach, on the other hand, focuses on matching comparable jobs in different sectors rather than workers with similar demographic characteristics in those sectors. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive but may be difficult to combine given data limitations. Each approach is outlined in this report, followed by an examination of a few recent studies comparing federal and private sector compensation. The studies reviewed were chosen because they are official government studies (President's Pay Agent, Congressional Budget Office) or have received significant attention in policy debates. Results from these studies, which at times arrive at vastly different conclusions, provide some useful information about evaluating competing claims related to the compensation of the federal workforce. In general, the more methodologically rigorous "human capital" studies show a pay premium for federal workers with lower levels of educational attainment and a pay penalty for federal workers with higher levels of educational attainment. The range of worker and job characteristics is sufficiently broad across sectors that claims about "average" workers conceal much of the variation driving differences in compensation. For purposes of policy, the most informative studies show variation in compensation differentials by some control variables. Of the five studies under review, one reports an overall average wage penalty for federal workers (PPA), one reports neither an overall average wage premium nor a penalty for federal workers, and three find overall average wage premia for federal workers compared to private sector workers. Only two of the studies—CBO and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)—report earnings differentials by level of educational attainment, however. While the AEI report shows a clear wage premium across levels of educational attainment, the more methodologically rigorous CBO study finds a more nuanced outcome. That is, federal workers with less than a bachelor's degree have on average a wage premium compared to private sector counterparts, while federal workers with post-graduate educational attainment on average experience a wage penalty relative to private sector counterparts.

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I n January 2017, the House and Senate adopted a budget resolution for FY2017 ( S.Con.Res. 3 ), which reflects an agreement between the chambers on the FY2017 budget and sets forth budgetary levels for FY2018-FY2026. S.Con.Res. 3 also includes reconciliation instructions directing specific committees to develop and report legislation that would change laws within their respective jurisdictions to reduce the deficit. These instructions trigger the budget reconciliation process, which may allow certain legislation to be considered under expedited procedures. The reconciliation instructions included in S.Con.Res. 3 direct two committees in each chamber to report legislation within their jurisdictions that would reduce the deficit by $1 billion over the period FY2017-FY2026. In the House, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Energy and Commerce Committee are directed to report. In the Senate, the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions are directed to report. 1628 , American Health Care Act (AHCA) of 2017. 228 and H.Res. The AHCA would repeal or modify several requirements for private health insurance plans established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended). The bill would repeal the ACA's cost-sharing subsidies for lower-income individuals who purchase health insurance through the exchanges, and it would substitute the ACA's premium tax credit for a tax credit with different eligibility rules and calculation requirements. For example, the bill would establish a late-enrollment penalty for certain individuals who do not maintain health insurance coverage, and it would create a new fund to provide funding to states for specified activities intended to improve access to health insurance and health care in the state. The AHCA also includes a number of changes to the Medicaid program. The bill would repeal some parts of the ACA related to Medicaid, such as the changes the ACA made to presumptive eligibility and the state option to provide Medicaid coverage to non-elderly individuals with income above 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL). The most significant new provision would convert Medicaid financing to a per capita cap model (i.e., per enrollee limits on federal payments to states) starting in FY2020. Also, states would have the option to receive block grant funding (i.e., a predetermined fixed amount of federal funding) instead of per capita cap funding for non-elderly, nondisabled, non-expansion adults and children starting in FY2020. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) issued a cost estimate for the AHCA, as passed by the House on May 4, 2017. According to the estimate, the AHCA would reduce federal deficits by $119 billion over the period FY2017-FY2026. With respect to effects on health insurance coverage, CBO and JCT project that, in CY2018, 14 million more people would be uninsured under the AHCA than under current law, and in CY2026, 23 million more people would be uninsured than under current law. This report contains three tables that, together, provide an overview of the AHCA provisions, as amended by the five manager's amendments and the amendment referenced in H.Res. Table 1 includes provisions that apply to the private health insurance market, Table 2 includes provisions that affect the Medicaid program, and Table 3 includes provisions related to public health and taxes. Each table contains a column identifying whether the AHCA provision is related to an ACA provision (e.g., whether the AHCA provision repeals an ACA-related provision). In addition to the three tables, the report includes more detailed summaries of each AHCA provision and two graphics showing the effective dates of AHCA provisions. Figure 1 covers AHCA provisions related to the private health insurance market, public health, and taxes. Figure 2 covers AHCA provisions related to the Medicaid program. Per Section 2202(a) of the new title, states may use payments allocated from the Patient and State Stability Fund for any of the following activities: a new or existing mechanism that provides financial assistance to certain high-risk individuals who do not have access to employer-sponsored insurance to enroll in the individual market; providing incentives to entities to enter into arrangements with the state for the purpose of stabilizing premiums in the individual market; reducing health insurance costs in the individual and small-group markets for individuals who have or are projected to have high health care utilization (as measured by cost) and individuals who face high costs of health insurance coverage due to low population density in the state; promoting health insurance issuer participation and increasing insurance options in the individual and small-group markets; promoting access to preventive, dental, or vision services, or any combination of such services; maternity coverage and newborn care; prevention, treatment, or recovery services for individuals with mental or substance abuse disorders that focus on inpatient or outpatient clinical care of treatment of addiction and mental illness and early identification and intervention for children and young adults with mental illness; providing payments, directly or indirectly, to health care providers for the provision of services specified by the CMS Administrator; and providing assistance to reduce out-of-pocket costs (including premiums) for individuals with health insurance coverage in the state.

In January 2017, the House and Senate adopted a budget resolution for FY2017 (S.Con.Res. 3), which reflects an agreement between the chambers on the budget for FY2017 and sets forth budgetary levels for FY2018-FY2026. S.Con.Res. 3 also includes reconciliation instructions directing specific committees to develop and report legislation that would change laws within their respective jurisdictions to reduce the deficit. These instructions trigger the budget reconciliation process, which may allow certain legislation to be considered under expedited procedures. The reconciliation instructions included in S.Con.Res. 3 direct two committees in each chamber to report legislation within their jurisdictions that would reduce the deficit by $1 billion over the period FY2017-FY2026. In the House, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Energy and Commerce Committee are directed to report. In the Senate, the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions are directed to report. In response to the reconciliation instructions, there was activity in four different House committees—Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Budget, and Rules—during the first quarter of 2017. The result of this activity was H.R. 1628, the American Health Care Act (AHCA) of 2017. The version of the AHCA as passed by the House on May 4, 2017 (which incorporated eight amendments referenced in H.Res. 228 and H.Res. 308), is the topic of this report. The bill includes a number of provisions that would repeal or modify parts of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended). For example, the bill would repeal the ACA's cost-sharing subsidies for lower-income individuals who purchase health insurance through the exchanges, and it would substitute the ACA's premium tax credit for a tax credit with different eligibility rules and calculation requirements. The bill also would repeal some of the ACA's Medicaid provisions, such as the changes the ACA made to presumptive eligibility and the state option to provide Medicaid coverage to non-elderly individuals with income above 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL). The AHCA also includes a number of provisions that do not specifically relate to aspects of the ACA. For example, the bill would establish a late-enrollment penalty for certain individuals who do not maintain health insurance coverage, and it would create a new fund to provide funding to states for specified activities intended to improve access to health insurance and health care in the state. The bill would convert Medicaid financing to a per capita cap model (i.e., per enrollee limits on federal payments to states) starting in FY2020, and states would have the option to receive block grant funding (i.e., a predetermined fixed amount of federal funding) instead of per capita cap funding for non-elderly, nondisabled, non-expansion adults and children starting in FY2020. This report contains three tables that, together, provide an overview of all the AHCA provisions. Table 1 includes provisions that apply to the private health insurance market, Table 2 includes provisions that affect the Medicaid program, and Table 3 includes provisions related to public health and taxes. Each table contains a column identifying whether the AHCA provision is related to an ACA provision (e.g., whether the AHCA provision repeals an ACA-related provision). In addition to the three tables, the report includes more detailed summaries of each AHCA provision and two graphics showing the effective dates of AHCA provisions. Figure 1 covers AHCA provisions related to the private health insurance market, public health, and taxes. Figure 2 covers AHCA provisions related to the Medicaid program. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) issued a cost estimate for the AHCA, as passed by the House on May 4, 2017. According to the estimate, the AHCA would reduce federal deficits by $119 billion over the period FY2017-FY2026. With respect to effects on health insurance coverage, CBO and JCT project that, in CY2018, 14 million more people would be uninsured under the AHCA than under current law, and in CY2026, 23 million more people would be uninsured than under current law.

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Overview In spite of ongoing international efforts to combat Afghanistan's narcotics trade, U.N. officials estimate that Afghanistan supplies over 90% of the world's illicit opium. Afghanistan's Opium Economy Opium production has become an entrenched negative element of Afghanistan's fragile political and economic order over the last 30 years in spite of ongoing local, regional, and international efforts to reverse its growth. United Nations and Afghan government officials announced that further reductions in national cultivation and output statistics were recorded for the 2008-2009 season, due in part to bad weather, interdiction efforts, market prices, and improved agricultural assistance in some key poppy growing areas. Estimates for 2010, suggest that production will remain relatively static, with crop disease and poor weather conditions exerting downward pressure on output. Parallel debates focus on the advisability and targeting of interdiction and eradication and the relative importance of and appropriate methods for sustainably replacing poppy cultivation and opium industry labor as income sources for Afghan households. In the most volatile areas of the country, insecurity and corruption create a climate in which poppy cultivators and drug-trafficking groups remain largely free to operate. Recent UNODC/MCN reports attribute sustainable declines in poppy cultivation to political stability, economic integration, alternative livelihood assistance, and effective law enforcement. Survey information from early 2010 suggests this price relationship may be shifting, as wheat prices begin to decline at a faster rate than opium prices. Obama Administration Policy and Funding Requests The Obama Administration is implementing new counternarcotics policies in conjunction with its strategic reviews of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. SIGAR also reported that Congress had appropriated approximately $3 billion for counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan from 2001 through 2008. Issues for Congress Experts and government officials have warned that narcotics trafficking jeopardizes international efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan. Striking such a balance may continue to create challenges for the United States and its allies. Defining the Role of the U.S. Military and ISAF Debate over the role of the U.S. military and coalition forces in the International Security Assistance Force has shifted as the roles and missions of those forces have changed. According to the April 2010 report to Congress on current U.S. strategy and operations in Afghanistan, "The Government of Afghanistan has the lead in all CN operations and partners with ANSF, U.S., and international forces to target narcotics traffickers and facilities known to support the insurgency." In areas that have reduced poppy cultivation in the north, east, and west of the country, USAID and its contracting partners are seeking to provide broad-based agricultural development assistance designed to consolidate positive changes in poppy cultivation patterns. In southern and eastern areas of the country where counterinsurgency operations are ongoing amid continued poppy cultivation and drug production, USAID and its contracting partners plan to provide more targeted, quick-impact agricultural and development assistance as a means of reinforcing efforts to secure newly cleared areas. Accounts suggest that the Obama Administration's decision to "phase out" U.S. support to eradication efforts has not eliminated the Afghan government's commitment to continue to support eradication efforts by Afghan governors. Although poppy cultivation and drug trafficking were widespread prior to the fall of the Taliban regime, U.S. counternarcotics programs in the region were limited, and focused on eliminating poppy cultivation and supporting interdiction activities in neighboring countries.

Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have eroded Afghanistan's fragile political and economic order over the last 30 years. In spite of ongoing counternarcotics efforts by the Afghan government, the United States, and their partners, Afghanistan remains the source of over 90% of the world's illicit opium. Since 2001, efforts to provide viable economic alternatives to poppy cultivation and to disrupt drug trafficking and related corruption have succeeded in some areas. However, insecurity, particularly in the southern province of Helmand, and widespread corruption fueled a surge in cultivation in 2006 and 2007, pushing opium output to all-time highs. In 2008 and 2009, poppy cultivation decreased in north-central and eastern Afghanistan, while drug activity became more concentrated in the south and west. National poppy cultivation and opium production totals dropped in 2009 for the second straight season, as pressure from provincial officials, higher wheat prices, drought, and lower opium prices altered the cultivation decisions of some Afghan poppy farmers. Preliminary estimates for the 2010 season suggest that poor weather conditions, disease, and military operations in key poppy growing areas will limit production to 2009 levels, in spite of backsliding in some areas. Some experts continue to question the sustainability of rapid changes in cultivation patterns and recommend reinforcing recent reductions to replace poppy cultivation in local economies over time. Across Afghanistan, insurgents, criminal organizations, and corrupt officials exploit narcotics as a reliable source of revenue and patronage, which has perpetuated the threat these groups pose to the country's fragile internal security and the legitimacy of its elected government. The trafficking of Afghan drugs appears to provide financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continue to operate in and around Afghanistan. Although coalition forces may be less frequently relying on figures involved with narcotics for intelligence and security support, many observers have warned that drug-related corruption among appointed and elected Afghan officials creates political obstacles to progress. As of April 2010, Congress had appropriated approximately $4.2 billion in regular and supplemental foreign assistance and defense funding for counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan from FY2001 through FY2010. The Obama Administration is pursuing a two-pronged interdiction and development policy in support of the government of Afghanistan's implementation of its National Drug Control Strategy. At present, U.S. military and law enforcement personnel are assisting Afghan forces and judicial authorities in targeting drug trafficking organizations while State Department, USAID, and USDA personnel are implementing expanded agricultural development assistance programs. The Administration ended U.S. support for eradication after deciding previous efforts were inefficient and potentially counterproductive. Afghan authorities continue to implement targeted eradication efforts. This report provides current statistical information, profiles the narcotics trade's participants, explores linkages between narcotics, insecurity, and corruption, and reviews U.S. and international policy responses since late 2001. The report also considers ongoing policy debates regarding the counternarcotics role of coalition military forces, poppy eradication, alternative livelihoods, and funding issues for Congress. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report R40699, Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

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In the last few years, the United States has considered bilateral and regional free trade areas (FTAs) with a number of trading partners. Such arrangements are not new in U.S. trade policy. The United States has had a free trade arrangement with Israel since 1985 and with Canada since 1989. The latter was suspended when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that included the United States, Canada, and Mexico went into effect in January 1994. U.S. interest in bilateral and regional free trade arrangements surged, and the Bush Administration accelerated the pace of negotiations after the enactment of the Trade Promotion Authority in August 2002. U.S. participation in free trade agreements can occur only with the concurrence of Congress. In addition, FTAs affect the U.S. economy, with the impact varying across sectors. The 112 th Congress and the Obama Administration faced the question of whether and when to act on three pending FTAs—with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. Although the Bush Administration signed these agreements, it and the leaders of the 110 th Congress could not reach agreement on proceeding to enact them. No action was taken during the 111 th Congress either. After discussion with congressional leaders and negotiations with the governments of Colombia, Panama, and South Korea to assuage congressional concerns regarding treatment of union officials (Colombia), taxation regimes (Panama), and trade in autos (South Korea), President Obama submitted draft implementing legislation to Congress on October 3, 2011. In the meantime, on November 14, 2009, President Obama committed to work with the current and prospective partners to form the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. Furthermore, the United States is negotiating with the European Union to form the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). FTAs raise some important policy issues: Do FTAs serve or impede U.S. long-term national interests and trade policy objectives? Which type of an FTA arrangement meets U.S. national interests? What should U.S. criteria be in choosing FTA partners? Are FTAs a substitute for or a complement to U.S. commitments and interests in promoting a multilateral trading system via the World Trade Organization (WTO)? What effect will the expiration of TPA have on the future of FTAs as a trade policy strategy? Preferential trade arrangements include the following: free trade areas (FTAs), under which member countries agree to eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers on trade in goods within the FTA, but each country maintains its own trade policies, including tariffs on trade outside the region; customs unions , in which members conduct free trade among themselves and maintain common tariffs and other trade policies outside the arrangement; common markets , in which member countries go beyond a customs union by eliminating barriers to labor and capital flows across national borders within the market; and economic unions , where members merge their economies even further by establishing a common currency, and therefore a unified monetary policy, along with other common economic institutions. The 112 th Congress approved each of the bills in successive votes on October 12, along with legislation to renew an aspect of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, and the President signed them into law on October 21, 2012. The TPP is a free trade agreement that includes nations on both sides of the Pacific. Negotiations on the TPP, which grew out of an FTA among four countries—Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore—now include, besides the United States, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam.

Free trade areas (FTAs) are arrangements among two or more countries under which they agree to eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers on trade in goods among themselves. However, each country maintains its own policies, including tariffs, on trade outside the region. In the last few years, the United States has engaged or has proposed to engage in negotiations to establish bilateral and regional free trade arrangements with a number of trading partners. Such arrangements are not new in U.S. trade policy. The United States has had a free trade arrangement with Israel since 1985 and with Canada since 1989, which was expanded to include Mexico and became the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) effective in January 1994. U.S. interest in bilateral and regional free trade arrangements surged, and the Bush Administration accelerated the pace of negotiations after the enactment of the Trade Promotion Authority in August 2002. U.S. participation in free trade agreements can occur only with the concurrence of Congress. In addition, FTAs affect the U.S. economy, with the impact varying across sectors. The 112th Congress and the Obama Administration faced the question of whether and when to act on three FTAs pending from the Bush Administration—with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. Although the Bush Administration signed these agreements, it and the leaders of the 110th Congress could not reach agreement on proceeding to enact them. No action was taken during the 111th Congress either. After discussion with congressional leaders and negotiations with the governments of Colombia, Panama, and South Korea to assuage congressional concerns regarding treatment of union officials (Colombia), taxation regimes (Panama), and trade in autos (South Korea), President Obama submitted draft implementing legislation to Congress on October 3, 2011. The 112th Congress approved each of the bills in successive votes on October 12, along with legislation to renew an aspect of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. President Obama signed the bills into law on October 21, 2011. In the meantime, on November 14, 2009, President Obama committed to work with the current and prospective partners in the negotiations to form a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. The TPP is a free trade agreement that includes nations on both sides of the Pacific. The TPP negotiations emerged from an FTA that included Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore and that entered into force in 2006. Besides the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam have joined the negotiations. Furthermore, the United States has been negotiating with the 28-member European Union to form the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). FTAs raise some important policy issues: Do FTAs serve or impede U.S. long-term national interests and trade policy objectives? Which type of an FTA arrangement meets U.S. national interests? What should U.S. criteria be in choosing FTA partners? Are FTAs a substitute for or a complement to U.S. commitments and interests in promoting a multilateral trading system via the World Trade Organization (WTO)? What effect will the expiration of TPA have on the future of FTAs as a trade policy strategy?

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The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-246 ), the 2008 farm bill, reauthorizes almost all existing conservation programs, modifies several programs, and creates various new conservation programs. These changes address eligibility requirements, program definitions, enrollment and payment limits, contract terms, evaluation and application ranking criteria, among other administrative issues. In general, the conservation title includes specific changes that expand eligibility and delivery of technical assistance under most programs to cover more broadly, for example, forested and managed lands, pollinator habitat and protection, and identified natural resource areas, among other expansions. Producer coverage across most programs is also expanded to include beginning, limited resource, and socially disadvantaged producers; speciality crop producers; and producers transitioning to organic production. Estimated new spending on the 2008 farm bill's conservation title—not including estimated conservation-related revenue and cost-offset provisions in the bill—is projected to increase by $2.7 billion over 5 years and $4.0 billion over 10 years. Total mandatory spending for the title is projected at $24.3 billion over 5 years (FY2008-FY2012) and $55.2 billion over 10 years (FY2008-FY2017). Program Changes in the Enacted 2008 Farm Bill (P.L. The bill also requires a report on the new Agricultural Water Enhancement Program (Sec. New Conservation Programs In addition to the changes made to existing agricultural conservation programs, the enacted 2008 farm bill also expands the range of USDA conservation activities by creating several new programs, including a program expanding conservation activities in the Chesapeake Bay region, a new state grants program, a provision to limit production on native sod, and a provision promoting market-based approaches to conservation. Chesapeake Bay Watershed Program This program (Sec. The bill provides $50 million in mandatory funds (FY2009-FY2012) for the program. Appendix. 110-246) Compared with Previous Law and the House- and Senate-Passed Bills (H.R.

The 2008 enacted farm bill (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246) reauthorizes almost all existing conservation programs, modifies several programs, and creates various new conservation programs. A new Conservation Stewardship program replaces the existing Conservation Security Program and a new Agricultural Water Enhancement Program under the Environmental Quality Incentives Program is also authorized with mandatory funding. Other new programs include the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Program and a "Sodsaver" provision to help preserve native sod, including virgin prairie in the Prairie Pothole National Priority Area. Significant modifications to existing programs include a reduction of the maximum enrolled acreage under the Conservation Reserve Program to 32 million acres and an increase in the cap for the Wetlands Reserve Program to over 3 million acres. Other changes in the enacted bill include modifications to address eligibility requirements, program definitions, enrollment and payment limits, contract terms, evaluation and application ranking criteria, among other administrative issues. Eligibility is expanded for many programs and technical assistance under most programs is broadened to cover forested and managed lands, pollinator habitat and protection, and identified natural resource areas. Beginning, limited resource, and socially disadvantaged producers, specialty crop producers, and producers transitioning to organic production are also targeted for special consideration in many existing programs. Estimated new spending on the conservation title—not including estimated conservation-related revenue and cost-offset provisions in the bill—is projected to increase by $2.7 billion over 5 years and $4.0 billion over 10 years. Total mandatory spending for the conservation title is projected at $24.3 billion over 5 years (FY2008-FY2012) and $55.2 billion over 10 years (FY2008-FY2017). A comparison of conservation provisions in the enacted 2008 farm bill with existing law and the House and Senate farm bills is provided in the Appendix. This report will not be updated.

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Background The United States maintains a range of economic sanctions on the Government of Sudan. The United States generally restricts foreign aid because Sudan has been found, by the Secretary of State, to be a supporter of acts of international terrorism, is operating under a military dictatorship, and has fallen into arrears in its debt repayment. The United States has also suspended bilateral preferential trade treatment, restricted commercial exports and imports, denied the export of defense articles and defense services, and refused to support requests from Sudan for funding or program support in the international financial institutions for reasons related to terrorism, regional stability, and human rights—including religious freedom, worker rights, and trafficking in persons. On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Powell testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations to report his assessment of the current crisis in Darfur, in Sudan's western region bordering Chad. Exceptions to Sanctions In fine-tuning the imposition of economic sanctions on Sudan, Congress made an effort to distinguish between the Government of Sudan, the people of Sudan, and areas of the country outside of control of the government, to make aid and commerce available to the general population, with enactment of the following in the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act: Sec. 501. (a) Additional Authorities.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to undertake appropriate programs using Federal agencies, contractual arrangements, or direct support of indigenous groups, agencies, or organizations in areas outside of control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to provide emergency relief, promote economic self-sufficiency, build civil authority, provide education, enhance rule of law and the development of judicial and legal frameworks, support people-to-people reconciliation efforts, or implement any program in support of any viable peace agreement at the local, regional, or national level in Sudan. The Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 also continues restrictions imposed on foreign aid in the foreign assistance appropriations Act, 2004, unless the President finds that the following conditions, stated in the Sudan Peace Act, as amended, are met, namely: that the Government of Sudan has taken demonstrable steps to— (A) ensure that the armed forces of Sudan and any associated militias are not committing atrocities or obstructing human rights monitors or the provision of humanitarian assistance; (B) demobilize and disarm militias supported or created by the Government of Sudan; (C) allow full and unfettered humanitarian assistance to all regions of Sudan, including the Darfur region; (D) allow an international commission of inquiry to conduct an investigation of atrocities in the Darfur region, in a manner consistent with United National Security Council Resolution 1564 (September 18, 2004), to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in the Darfur region by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable; (E) cooperate fully with the African Union, the United Nations, and all other observer, monitoring, and protection missions mandated to operate in Sudan; (F) permit the safe and voluntary return of displaced persons and refugees to their homes and rebuild the communities destroyed in the violence; and (G) implement the final agreements reached in the Naivasha peace process and install a new coalition government based on the Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan signed on June 5, 2004.

The United States maintains a range of economic sanctions on the Government of Sudan. The United States generally restricts foreign aid because Sudan has been found, by the Secretary of State, to be a supporter of acts of international terrorism, is operating under a military dictatorship, and has fallen into arrears in its debt repayment. The United States has also suspended bilateral preferential trade treatment, restricted commercial exports and imports, denied the export of defense articles and defense services, and refused to support requests from Sudan for funding or program support in the international financial institutions for reasons related to terrorism, regional stability, and human rights—including religious freedom, worker rights, and trafficking in persons. Notwithstanding the restrictions, the Congress has made an effort to hone the economic sanctions imposed against Sudan to distinguish between the Government of Sudan and the people of the country, to relieve the latter from sanctions' sting. In 2000, legislation was enacted to allow foreign aid to Sudan if it would be applied to nongovernmental efforts "to provide emergency relief, promote economic self-sufficiency, build civil authority, provide education, enhance rule of law and the development of judicial and legal frameworks, support people-to-people reconciliation efforts, or implement any program in support of any viable peace agreement...." [§ 501 of the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act]. With Secretary of State Powell's assessment that genocide has been committed in the Darfur region of west Sudan, stated before the Committee on Foreign Relations on September 9, 2004, and with continuing reports of extreme violence committed against the civilian population of Darfur, and against those who have fled that region to take up shelter in refugee camps along the Sudan/Chad border, the United States must consider its relationship with Sudan, the effectiveness and impact of economic assistance to Sudan, the appropriateness and impact of economic sanctions, and the nexus of the two. Especially as it states the case of genocide before the United Nations, which has not found the condition of "genocidal intent" among the perpetrators of the violence, a new assessment of the use of economic sanctions might be timely. This report describes U.N. actions and U.S. economic sanctions currently in place on Sudan, and the exceptions to those sanctions. It will be updated as events warrant.

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Introduction Membership in the United Nations (U.N.) has been an issue of ongoing interest for Congress. Currently, the United Nations has 193 members. The organization also has two non-member observer states, the Holy See (Vatican) and "Palestine," which have standing invitations to participate as observers in the sessions and work of the U.N. General Assembly. Examples of specialized agencies include the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), U.N. Educational Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and World Health Organization (WHO). As a member of the P-5, the United States plays a key role in determining U.N. membership. Background The criteria and process for admitting new U.N. members were established in 1945 by the 51 original members of the United Nations in Article 4 of the U.N. Charter. Membership is open to all "peace-loving states" that accept the obligations contained in the Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out such obligations. Many experts contend that the imprecise nature of these criteria has allowed member states to broadly interpret the conditions for membership, in some cases causing political considerations to have significant weight on membership decisions. Paths to U.N. Decisions on membership applications may be vetoed by any of the P-5. Membership in U.N. Specialized Agencies The process and criteria for membership in U.N. specialized agencies vary depending on the organization. Each of these entities is a legally independent intergovernmental organization with its own constitution, rules, membership, organs, and financial resources. In 11 specialized agencies, membership in the United Nations gives a state access to membership in the agency without having to have its admission approved by the membership of the agency (ICAO, IFAD, ILO, IMO, ITU, UNIDO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, and UNESCO). Of these 11 agencies, three also provide membership, without a vote, to member nations of any specialized agency (IFAD, UNIDO, and WIPO). Application for U.N. Although Palestine has the term "state" in its current designation, it is not a U.N. member. U.S. Policy As one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the United States can play a key role in determining membership in the United Nations. It has a more limited role in determining membership in U.N. specialized agencies. A decision to admit a new member in these bodies is generally made by the entire membership, where each member—including the United States—has one vote. The decision to vote for or against membership in both the United Nations and its specialized agencies lies primarily with the executive branch of the U.S. government, which represents the United States in the United Nations and related agencies. Some Members of Congress, however, have sought to influence U.S. policy on the issue by proposing legislation advocating or opposing the membership of various countries and entities—including Israel, Montenegro, Kosovo, South Africa, China/Taiwan, and the PLO. 103-236 ) states that the United States shall not make contributions to "any affiliated organization of the United Nations which grants full membership as a state to any organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood"; and S ection 414 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 ( P.L. The United States currently withholds its voluntary and assessed contributions to UNESCO in response to the 2011 decision by UNESCO members to admit Palestine as a member. Impact on Membership in Other U.N. Entities U.S. decisions on membership in one U.N. entity can potentially affect membership in related U.N. entities. Contributions to U.N. System Entities Based on existing restrictions in U.S. law, Palestinian membership in U.N. bodies could have implications for U.S. contributions to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. When Palestine was admitted to UNESCO in October 2011, for example, it also became eligible for membership, without a vote, in IFAD, UNIDO, and WIPO. Role of Politics in Membership Criteria and Process Experts and observers generally agree that individual U.N. members' response to the criteria for U.N. membership and decision to admit a state are inherently political. The extent to which the criteria have been applied to various membership applications has depended on the applicant country or entity, geopolitical issues at the time, and individual member states' national interests and views on the role and nature of the United Nations. Looking Ahead: Key Questions In light of the aforementioned issues, Members of Congress may face several questions related to U.N. and specialized agency membership, including whether to support or oppose the efforts of various entities to pursue membership in the United Nations or its specialized agencies; what specific steps Members might take to support or oppose the membership of various entities, including, but not limited to, those that represent the Palestinians; and how, if at all, to address the Obama Administration's continued requests to support legislation that would provide authority to waive the legislative restrictions that prohibit U.S. funding for UNESCO.

Since the United Nations (U.N.) was established in 1945, the U.S. government, including many Members of Congress, has maintained an ongoing interest in the criteria and process for membership in the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The United Nations currently has 193 member states and two observer non-member states—the Holy See (Vatican) and "Palestine." Criteria and Process The decision to admit a state into the United Nations is made by the U.N. General Assembly on the recommendation of the U.N. Security Council, including all five permanent members (P-5): the United States, China, France, United Kingdom, and Russia. Membership is open to all "peace-loving states" that accept the obligations contained in the U.N. Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out such obligations. Given the imprecise nature of such criteria, many member states have broadly interpreted the conditions for U.N. membership. Consequently, global and domestic politics play a primary role in many membership decisions. Each of the United Nations' 16 specialized agencies has its own constitution, rules, membership, governance, and financial resources. As such, the process and criteria for admitting new members vary depending on the organization. In 11 specialized agencies, U.N. membership gives a state access to membership in the agency without requiring its admission to be approved by the current membership. Of these 11 agencies, 3 also provide membership, without a vote, to any member of any other specialized agency. Two other specialized agencies require a separate voting process to admit new members. U.S. Role and Policy Decisions on U.N. membership are subject to veto by any of the P-5; thus, the United States plays a significant role in determining U.N. membership. The United States has a more limited role in U.N. specialized agencies because decisions to admit new members to these bodies are generally made by the entire membership and each member has one vote. U.S. membership decisions in both the United Nations and its specialized agencies lie primarily with the executive branch, which represents the United States in U.N. and other multilateral fora. Although Congress often does not play a large role in determining U.N. membership, Members have sought to influence U.S. policy on the issue through legislation advocating or opposing the membership of various countries and entities—including Israel, Montenegro, Kosovo, South Africa, China/Taiwan, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Notably, in the mid-1990s, Congress enacted two separate laws that prohibit funding to U.N. entities that (1) admit the PLO as a member, and (2) grant full membership as a state to any organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood (see Section 410 of P.L. 103-236 and Section 414 of P.L. 101-246). The United States currently withholds its assessed and voluntary contributions to the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which admitted Palestine as a member in 2011. Key Issues Members of Congress may consider the following issues related to U.N. membership: Impact on other U.N. entities and international organizations. Membership in one U.N. organization can potentially affect membership in other U.N. entities. Some experts also suggest that U.N. membership could affect membership in other international organizations, such as the International Criminal Court. U.S. contributions to U.N. entities. Based on restrictions in U.S. law, Palestinian membership in U.N. bodies could have implications for U.S. funding of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. For example, when Palestine was admitted to UNESCO, it became eligible for membership, without a vote, in three specialized agencies—the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). To date, Palestine has not joined any of these specialized agencies. The United States is a member of IFAD and WIPO, but not UNIDO. Political considerations in membership criteria and process. Many experts agree that each U.N. member state's decision to admit a new state is largely political. The extent to which the criteria outlined in the U.N. Charter has been applied to membership applications has often depended on geopolitical issues at the time, and member states' national self-interests and views on the role and nature of the United Nations. This report may be updated as events warrant.

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Introduction About 8.3 million children under age 19 in the United States, or 10.4% of children in this age group, had no health insurance for at least some of 2009. (Similarly, about 10.3% of children in this age group had no health insurance for at least some of 2008.) Uninsured children are, on average, less likely than insured children to have the recommended number of well-baby and well-child medical visits and less likely to receive standard immunizations. The Data This report uses 2009 data collected in the 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the Census Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the CPS collects information on individual health insurance status, income, and poverty. This report, therefore, uses the term "uninsured" to mean uninsured at a point in 2009, not necessarily uninsured over the entire year. Of those children under age 6, 39.9% had public insurance, while 26.9% of children between 13 and 18 years old had public insurance in 2009. On the other hand, only 31.4% of children who were not citizens had employer-sponsored insurance. As family income increased, children were more likely to have employer-sponsored coverage and less likely to have public coverage. Employment Characteristics of the Parents for Children Who Live with at Least One Parent As shown in Table 3 , among children under age 19 who live with at least one parent, there is a relationship between the insurance status of the child and the employment characteristics of the parent(s). Figure 1 looks at the total number of uninsured children and displays the percentage of uninsured children living with at least one parent by family structure. Even though Figure 1 shows that those living in two-parent households are the largest group of uninsured children, Figure 2 demonstrate that children living in two-parent families are less likely to be uninsured than children living with only one parent. These differences raise important issues for policy makers considering policy options to reduce the number of uninsured. For example, proposals that may affect the greatest number of children in two-parent families (which comprise almost 59% of the uninsured children) may not affect the greatest number of children living in single-father families (of whom 16% are uninsured). When looking simply at the uninsurance rate, the effects of the economy on the children's uninsurance rate do not seem especially meaningful. In any case, between 1999 and 2009, the offsetting downward trend in children covered by employer-sponsored health insurance and upward trend in children covered by public health insurance attenuated variations in the percentage of uninsured children.

About 8.3 million children under age 19 in the United States, or 10.4% of children in this age group, had no health insurance for at least some of 2009. (Similarly, about 10.3% of children in this age group had no health insurance for at least some of 2008.) Children living in families below the poverty threshold, children not living with at least one parent, Hispanic children, and children whose parents did not have health insurance were especially likely to be uninsured. On the other hand, children whose parents had employer-sponsored coverage were themselves likely to have employer-sponsored coverage. An extensive body of research suggests that children without health insurance are, on average, less likely than insured children to have the recommended number of well-baby and well-child medical visits and less likely to receive standard immunizations. This report examines the characteristics of insured and uninsured children in 2009 (the latest year for which data are available) using data from the (March) Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS). The first part of the report compares broad groups of children. Those particularly likely to be uninsured in 2009 included the groups mentioned above, as well as children between ages 13 and 18, children living in the South, and children who are not U.S citizens. Groups particularly likely to receive publicly funded insurance included children of single mothers, black children, and children in families with incomes lower than the federal poverty threshold. The second section of the report compares two methods of measuring uninsured children. Using family structure as an example, the report analyzes uninsurance both in terms of the percentage of each family status in the total pool of uninsured children (e.g., 58.9% of the pool of uninsured children were in two-parent families) and in terms of the percentage of each family status who were uninsured (e.g., 8.3% of those in two-parent families were uninsured). This difference may be important for policy makers considering policy options to reduce the number of uninsured children. The final part of the report examines the rate of uninsured children under 18 over the past 10 years (the years for which comparable data are available). The uninsurance rate has been relatively flat over this period. This relative constancy in the children's uninsurance rate, however, masks a decline in children covered by employer-sponsored insurance and a concurrent increase in children covered by public insurance.

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Under the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act ( P.L. 105-270 ), agencies are required to submit inventories of their commercial activities to OMB by June 30 of each year. The federal government's written policy of relying on the private sector for the provision of goods and services has its origins in three Bureau of the Budget bulletins issued in the 1950s. Two similar bills introduced during the 112 th Congress, H.R. 1474 and S. 785 , appear to reflect this perspective. In recognition of this principle, it has been and continues to be the general policy of the Federal Government—(1) to rely on commercial sources to supply the products and services the Government needs; (2) to refrain from providing a product or service if the product or service can be procured more economically from a commercial sources; and (3) to utilize Federal employees to perform inherently governmental functions…. Recent Developments in the History of Sourcing Policy Competitive Sourcing The historically predominant strain of sourcing policy—which focuses on governmental reliance on the private sector, Circular A-76, and public-private competitions —was designated one of the components of President George W. Bush's President's Management Agenda (PMA), and, as such, was named competitive sourcing. Some commentators might suggest that the Bush Administration did not support the possibility that work performed by a contractor could be subjected to public-private competition. The Panel believes that federal sourcing policy should: 1. OMB Memorandum on Multi-Sector Workforce Management With the release of an OMB memorandum, in July 2009, regarding the multi-sector workforce, the Obama Administration initiated a systematic effort to develop policy and guidance for managing a workforce that consists of both federal employees and government contractors. Office of Federal Procurement Policy's Policy Letter 11-01 Another document that may aid agencies in managing their multi-sector workforces is OFPP's policy letter on inherently governmental and critical functions, which was published in the Federal Register on September 12, 2011. The policy letter [ c]larifies what functions are inherently governmental and must always be performed by Federal employees … [e]xplains what agencies must do when work is "closely associated" with inherently governmental functions … [r]equi res agencies to ident ify their 'critical functions' in order to ensure they have sufficient internal capability to maintain control over functions that are core to the agency's mission and operations … [and] [o]utlines a series of agency management responsibilities to strengthen accountability for the effective implementation of these policies. "Overreliance on contractors" has been identified by the Obama Administration as an issue that warrants attention. (This section contains a definition of inherently governmental .)

Dating back to the 1950s, federal sourcing policy generally has focused on the premise that the government should rely on the private sector for the provision of certain goods and services. Additionally, it has centered around guidance for conducting public-private competitions to determine whether federal employees, or contractor employees, should be selected to perform certain agency functions. The Administration of President George W. Bush, in particular, emphasized subjecting eligible agency functions to public-private competitions. Branding this policy, and related guidance, as competitive sourcing, the Bush Administration included it as one component of the President's Management Agenda. During the Administration of President Barack Obama, another strain, or facet, of sourcing policy surfaced. Labeled multi-sector workforce management by the Administration, it posits that federal agencies might be susceptible to overreliance on contractors, which could affect the ability of agencies to maintain control over their missions and operations. OMB's July 2009 memorandum provides guidance to agencies on how to manage their multi-sector workforces. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy's Policy Letter 11-01—by providing a single, consistent definition of inherently governmental and guidance for identifying and managing inherently governmental functions, functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions, and critical functions—complements the Administration's multi-sector workforce management policy. This letter was issued in September 2011. Congressional interest in sourcing policy, generally, has been evident for some time. For example, in 1998, the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act (P.L. 105-270) was signed into law. It requires certain federal agencies to compile, and submit annually to OMB, inventories of their commercial activities, which are activities that may be performed by federal employees or a government contractor. Recent signs of interest in sourcing policy include two substantively similar but identically titled bills that were introduced during the 112th Congress. H.R. 1474 and S. 785, the Freedom From Government Competition Act, contain provisions that would expand upon existing policies designed to encourage federal government reliance on the private sector for the provision of both goods and services. This report provides an overview of the evolution of federal sourcing policy to date and identifies the major policy issues before Congress. It is not a legislation tracking report. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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FY2007 Appropriations Bill Enacted On February 15, 2007, President Bush signed a revised yearlong continuing resolution into law ( P.L. 110-5 ). Those exceptions include funding a number of HUD programs at levels higher than those enacted in FY2006: Tenant Based Rental Assistance: $15,920 million Project-Based Rental Assistance: $5,976 million Public Housing Operating Fund: $3,864 million Indian Housing Loan Guarantee: $6 million Homeless Assistance Grants: $1,442 million Salaries and Expenses: the FY2006 levels, plus such sums as necessary to meet 50% of the need for cost-of-living increases for federal employees The act funds three HUD accounts below their FY2006 level: Self Help Homeownership: $49 million Research and Technology: $50 million Community Development Fund: $3,772 million The decrease in funding for the Community Development Fund does not decrease funding for the primary program funded by the account, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. House Passage On June 14, 2006, the House passed its version of the FY2007 Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia and Independent Agencies Appropriations bill ( H.R. President's Budget Submitted The President submitted his FY2007 budget to the Congress on February 6, 2006, requesting $34.1 billion for HUD. Congress also rejected major cuts requested by the President for the Section 811 Housing for the Disabled program and the HOPE VI program. HUD's FY2007 budget summary states that the budget intends to use "taxpayer money more wisely," and "reform programs in need of repair." Tenant-Based Rental Assistance (Section 8 Vouchers) The tenant-based rental assistance account funds the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program. Budgets would have then been prorated to fit within the amount appropriated. Agencies would have continued to be prohibited from overleasing. The FY2007 supplemental funding bill ( H.R. The House-passed and Senate committee-passed bills would have funded the President's request for contract administrators, and the CR funds contract administrators at the FY2006 level, which is the same as the President's request. Capital Fund The President's FY2007 budget proposed an 11% reduction for the public housing Capital Fund. The President's budget for FY2007 proposed to increase funding for HOPWA to just over $300 million. Congress rejected the proposal and appropriated $4.2 billion for the seven HUD programs that would have been eliminated, including $3.7 billion in CDBG funding. 5576 . On July 26, 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of H.R. This is just under $6 million more than appropriated in FY2006 or recommended by the House, and would have been used to fund several initiatives proposed for elimination in the President's budget and the House bill. However, while the Administration's budget proposal contained funding for two new programs—the Samaritan Initiative and the Prisoner Re-Entry Initiative—the House version of the HUD funding bill did not contain funding for these two programs. Housing Programs for the Elderly and the Disabled Formerly known together as Housing for Special Populations, the Section 202 housing for the elderly program and the Section 811 housing for the disabled program provide capital grants and ongoing project rental assistance contracts (PRAC) to developers of new subsidized housing for these populations. In FY2007, for the second year in a row, the Administration's budget proposed to cut in half funding for the Section 811 program, to $119 million from $237 million in FY2006. 5576 would have slightly increased funding over the House-passed version, and would have provided $5 million for new vouchers. It was not enacted before the end of the 109 th Congress. FHAP provides grants to state and local agencies to enforce laws that are substantially equivalent to the federal Fair Housing Act.

On February 6, 2006, the President submitted his FY2007 budget to the Congress. It proposed funding the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) at $34.1 billion, just over the FY2006 level (not including FY2006 supplementals related to Hurricane Katrina). HUD's FY2007 budget summary stated that the budget intended to use "taxpayer money more wisely" and "reform programs in need of repair." The President's budget would have increased funding for the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program from $15.4 billion in FY2006 to $15.9 billion in FY2007. It proposed to reduce funding to the Public Housing Capital Fund to $2.2 billion from the $2.4 billion that was appropriated for FY2006. The proposed budget also would have eliminated funding for public housing's HOPE VI program, which replaces distressed public housing units with new or rehabilitated mixed-income developments. Within the community development programs, the President's FY2007 budget proposed cutting funding to the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program by nearly 20% from the FY2006 level. CDBG provides grants to states and localities to use for housing and community development projects. The FY2007 budget proposal would have increased funding for the Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) program from $286 million to $300 million and the HOME program from $1.7 billion to $1.9 billion. Additionally, it would have increased funding for the four Homeless Assistance Grants by $209 million, and provided funding for two new initiatives: the Samaritan Initiative for the chronically homeless and the Prisoner Re-entry Initiative. The President's budget proposed to cut in half funding for the Section 811 Housing for the Disabled program, as proposed in FY2006. The FY2007 budget would have provided $119 million for Section 811, down from $237 million in FY2006. Funding for the Section 202 Housing for the Elderly program would have been reduced from just under $735 million to $546 million, a drop of 25.7%. The House passed its version of the HUD funding bill on June 14, 2006 (H.R. 5576). It funded most programs at or near the President's requested level, although it increased funding for the Section 8 voucher program, CDBG, and the Section 202 Housing for the Elderly and Section 811 Housing for the Disabled programs. The Senate Appropriations Committee passed its version of H.R. 5576 on July 20, 2006. It would have provided over $2 billion more for HUD than the President's request and the House bill, increased funding for Public Housing and restored funding for programs slated for elimination, including HOPE VI. Since the majority of the FY2007 appropriations bills were not approved before the end of FY2006, Congress enacted a series of stop-gap funding measures, or continuing resolutions, to maintain government operations. On February 15, 2007, Congress approved a revised yearlong continuing resolution, funding most accounts at their FY2006 level (P.L. 110-5). Congress is also considering FY2007 supplemental appropriations that may make changes to HUD funding (H.R. 1591). This report will be updated to reflect legislative activity.

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Introduction The U.S. Constitution provides Congress with powers over the Armed Forces, including the power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Congressional efforts to address military sexual assault intensified in 2004 in response to rising public concern about the rate and number of assaults and perceptions of an inadequate response by the military to support the victims and to hold perpetrators accountable. Since 2004, Congress has enacted over 100 provisions intended to address various aspects of the problem as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Sexual violence is not a problem confined to the military. Some national surveys suggest that up to 19.3% of women and 1.7% of men in the United States have been victims of sexual assault at some point in their lives. There is a continued national dialogue with regard to sexual violence at universities, and other government and private organizations. Sexual assault can have both deleterious physical and psychological effects on the victim. When an assault occurs in or around the workplace it can negatively affect the working environment and organizational functioning. In the military context, when the ability of a unit to work together effectively is impaired, it can ultimately impact mission success. This framework may help congressional staff understand the legislative and policy landscape, link proposed policy solutions with potential impact metrics, and identify possible gaps that remain unaddressed. Congressional oversight and action on military sexual assault can be organized into four main categories. Victim protection and support. DOD management and accountability pertains to organization, monitoring, and evaluation of DOD's efforts in sexual assault prevention and response. Victim protection and support focuses on DOD's response once an alleged assault has occurred, including actions to protect and support the victim. Finally, m ilitary justice and investigations addresses holding perpetrators accountable through military investigative and judicial processes. Operating under the oversight of an Advisory Working Group the statutory duties of the SAPRO Director are to (1) oversee implementation of the comprehensive policy for the Department of Defense sexual assault prevention and response program; (2) serve as the single point of authority, accountability, and oversight for the sexual assault prevention and response program; and (3) provide oversight to ensure that the military departments comply with the sexual assault prevention and response program. Congress and DOD have taken actions to improve monitoring of sexual harassment. Another provision in the FY2014 NDAA expressed a sense of Congress that (1) commanding officers in the Armed Forces are responsible for establishing a command climate in which sexual assault allegations are properly managed and fairly evaluated and in which a victim can report criminal activity, including sexual assault, without fear of retaliation, including ostracism and group pressure from other members of the command; (2) the failure of commanding officers to maintain such a command climate is an appropriate basis for relief from their command positions; and (3) senior officers should evaluate subordinate commanding officers on their performance in establishing a command climate as described in paragraph (1) during the regular periodic counseling and performance appraisal process prescribed by the Armed Force concerned for inclusion in the systems of records maintained and used for assignment and promotion selection boards. The military justice system is embodied in a code of military criminal laws called the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) which the President implements through the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to raise and support armies; provide and maintain a navy and make rules for the governance of those forces. Under this authority, Congress determines military criminal law applicable to members of the Armed Forces. Congress has determined that sexual assault is a criminal act under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). As such, Congress has an interest in overseeing the implementation and enforcement of these laws in order to provide for the health, welfare, and good order of the Armed Forces. Prevention and response to sexual violence in the military is not a new concern, nor is sexual violence a problem confined to the military. While prevalence is difficult to estimate, some surveys suggest that up to 19.3% of women and 1.7% of men in the United States have been a victim of sexual assault at some point in their lives. There is a continued national dialogue with regard to sexual violence at universities and other government and private organizations. Sexual assault can have both deleterious physical and psychological effects on the victim and, when an assault occurs in or around the workplace, it can harm the working environment and function of the organization. In the military context, when an assault occurs it impairs the unit's ability to work effectively; it can have an impact on cohesion, stability, and ultimately, mission success. Thus, concern about sexual assault in the military stems from complementary imperatives: protecting the individual health and welfare of military servicemembers, and ensuring preparedness and effectiveness of military units. Congressional efforts to address military sexual assault, pursuant to its Constitutional authority, have intensified over the past two decades in response to rising public concern about incident rates and perceptions of a lack of adequate response by the military to support the victims and hold perpetrators accountable. Since 2004, Congress has enacted over 100 provisions intended to address some aspect of the problem as part of the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In addition, DOD has devoted significant resources to the issue in terms of funds, personnel, and training time. Given the scope and complexity of this issue, it is helpful to apply a framework for analysis and oversight. This report provides such a framework to help congressional staff understand the legislative and policy landscape, link proposed policy solutions with potential impact metrics, and identify possible gaps that remain unaddressed. Congressional oversight and action on military sexual assault can be organized into four main categories: (1) Department of Defense (DOD) management and accountability, (2) prevention, (3) victim protection and support, and (4) military justice and investigations. The first category deals with actions to improve management, monitoring, and evaluation of DOD's efforts in sexual assault prevention and response. The second category includes efforts to reduce the number of sexual assaults through screening, training, and organizational culture. The third category focuses on DOD's response once an alleged assault has occurred, including actions to protect and support the victim. Finally, the last category addresses bringing perpetrators to justice through military investigative and judicial processes.

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Nevertheless, due to a broad policy consensus among the elites and in society at large, Latvia has followed a consistent general course—building democratic institutions, strengthening the rule of law, establishing a free-market economy, and integrating into NATO and the European Union (EU). Latvia's Foreign Policy and Relations with the United States After reestablishing its independence in 1991, Latvia's key foreign policy goals were to join NATO and the European Union. It joined both of them in 2004. Relations with Russia Latvia and Russia have had sometimes difficult relations. The two countries have cooperated in Iraq and Afghanistan.

After restoration of its independence in 1991 following decades of Soviet rule, Latvia made rapid strides toward establishing a democratic political system and a dynamic, free market economy. It achieved two key foreign policy goals when it joined NATO and the European Union in 2004. However, relations with Russia remain strained over such issues as the country's Russian-speaking minority and energy relations. Latvia and the United States have excellent relations. Latvia has deployed troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and plays a significant role in efforts to encourage democracy and a pro-Western orientation among post-Soviet countries. This report will be updated as needed.

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T hree agencies in the Department of the Interior (DOI) share responsibility for managing the nation's ocean energy resources, which cover approximately 1.7 billion acres on the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS). The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) administers offshore energy leasing; the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) oversees offshore operational safety and environmental responsibility; and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) manages public revenues from federally regulated offshore and onshore energy projects. BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR receive appropriations in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. This report discusses FY2017 appropriations for the three agencies, including the Obama Administration's funding request for each agency and subsequent congressional action. The 115 th Congress is faced with addressing the ocean energy agencies' appropriations for the remainder of FY2017. BOEM's operations are funded both by discretionary appropriations under the agency's Ocean Energy Management account and by the authority to expend offsetting collections derived from a portion of OCS rental receipts and cost recovery fees. The initial discretionary appropriation for each fiscal year is reduced by the amount of eligible receipts and fees that are collected, so that the final amount appropriated to BOEM is the net of those collections. For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested total appropriations of $175.1 million for BOEM, of which $94.9 million would be derived from offsetting collections, for a net appropriation of $80.2 million ( Table 1 ). This reflects an increase of $6.0 million (+8.0%) in BOEM's net requested appropriation from Congress, along with BOEM's estimate of fewer offsetting collections than in FY2016 (1.7% less in offsetting collections). On July 14, 2016, the House passed its Interior appropriations bill, H.R. 5538 , with total appropriations of $169.3 million for BOEM, offset by the rental receipt and fee collections described above, for a net appropriation of $74.4 million. On June 16, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its Interior appropriations bill, S. 3068 . The Senate committee bill contained total appropriations of $169.6 million for BOEM, offset by the rental receipt and fee collections described above, for a net appropriation of $74.6 million. 114-254 ). For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested total appropriations of $204.9 million for BSEE, of which $108.5 million would be derived from offsetting collections of OCS rental receipts, cost recovery fees, and inspection fees, for a net appropriation of $96.3 million (see Table 2 ). 5538 , contained total appropriations of $204.9 million for BSEE, offset by rental receipt and fee collections of $96.5 million. The bill also included a rescission of $20.0 million in unobligated balances, which functions as an offset to the total, yielding a net appropriation of $88.3 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee's Interior appropriations bill, S. 3068 , contained total appropriations of $204.7 million for BSEE, offset by rental receipt and fee collections of $96.5 million, as well as a $25 million rescission of unobligated balances, for a net appropriation of $83.1 million. The 114 th Congress did not enact full-year Interior appropriations for FY2017, and continuing funds were provided through April 28, 2017, under the CRs ( P.L. 114-223 and P.L. There are no offsetting collections proposed for ONRR as there are for BOEM and BSEE. The CRs generally provide funding at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of less than 1%. General Provisions H.R.

This report discusses FY2017 appropriations for the Department of the Interior's (DOI's) Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR). The three agencies collectively administer federal ocean energy resources covering more than 1.7 billion acres on the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS). BOEM administers offshore energy leasing, BSEE oversees offshore operational safety and environmental responsibility, and ONRR manages public revenues from federally regulated offshore and onshore energy projects. BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR receive appropriations in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. The 114th Congress did not enact full-year Interior appropriations for FY2017. Continuing funds for the ocean energy agencies were provided through April 28, 2017, by two continuing resolutions (CRs; P.L. 114-223 and P.L. 114-254). The CRs generally provide funding at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of less than 1%. The 115th Congress is faced with addressing these agencies' appropriations for the remainder of FY2017. BOEM's and BSEE's operations are funded both by discretionary appropriations from general funds of the Treasury and by the authority to expend offsetting collections derived from a portion of OCS rental receipts and cost recovery fees (and, for BSEE, inspection fees). The initial discretionary appropriation for each fiscal year to each agency is reduced by the amount of eligible receipts and fees that are collected, so that the final amount appropriated to BOEM and BSEE is the net of those collections. ONRR does not receive funding through offsetting collections. For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested total appropriations of $175.1 million for BOEM, $204.9 million for BSEE, and $129.3 million for ONRR. The BOEM total included an estimated $94.9 million in offsetting collections, for a net appropriation of $80.2 million. The BSEE total included an estimated $108.5 million in offsetting collections, for a net appropriation of $96.3 million. The requests for all three agencies represented increases from enacted FY2016 appropriations—a requested increase of 8.0% for BOEM (for the net appropriation after offsets), 8.9% for BSEE (for the net appropriation after offsets), and 3.0% for ONRR. On July 14, 2016, the House passed H.R. 5538, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill for FY2017. On June 16, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the bill, S. 3068. Neither bill was enacted. For BOEM, H.R. 5538 recommended total appropriations of $169.3 million, with $94.9 million derived from offsetting collections, for a net appropriation of $74.4 million. S. 3068 recommended total appropriations of $169.6 million for BOEM, with $94.9 million derived from offsetting collections, for a net appropriation of $74.6 million. For BSEE, H.R. 5538 recommended total appropriations of $204.9 million, with $96.5 million derived from offsetting collections, along with a rescission of $20.0 million—resulting in a net appropriation for BSEE of $88.3 million. S. 3068 recommended total appropriations of $204.7 million for BSEE, with $96.5 million derived from offsetting collections and a rescission of $25.0 million, for a net appropriation of $83.1 million. For ONRR, H.R. 5538 contained appropriations of $126.5 million and S. 3068 contained appropriations of $121.8 million.

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O n October 2, 2017, the Supreme Court is to begin its new term. While the Court issued a number of notable decisions during its last full term, Court watchers have largely agreed that, at least compared to recent terms, the Court's October 2016 term was diminished both with regard to volume and content. With the Court already accepting over 30 cases, many of which raise difficult questions in various areas of law, the October 2017 has the potential to be one of the most consequential in years. A full discussion of these cases and others that the Supreme Court will hear during its upcoming term is beyond the scope of this report (indeed, the Court has to grant certiorari to the majority of cases that will likely make up its docket for the upcoming year). But Table 1 provides brief summaries of the cases the Court has already agreed to hear during the October 2017 term, and many of the cases on the Court's docket are discussed in existing or forthcoming CRS products. The majority of this report highlights four of the notable cases of the new term that could impact the work of Congress: (1)  Carpenter v. United States , which examines the limits the Fourth Amendment imposes on the warrantless collection of the historical cell phone location records of a criminal suspect; (2)  Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) , a case exploring whether Congress, by prohibiting a state from partially repealing a state law, impermissibly commandeers the powers of the state; (3)  Gill v. Whitford , which considers when a state's redistricting plan amounts to impermissible partisan gerrymandering; and (4) Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission , which asks whether a baker has a First Amendment right to decline to make cakes for same-sex weddings. Each case is addressed in a separate section below that (1) provides background information on the case; (2) summarizes the arguments that were or are likely to be presented to the Court in each case; and (3) examines the implications that the Court's ruling could have for Congress, including broader ramifications for the jurisprudence in a given area of law. The case could decide whether cell phone users have a protected Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the trove of location data held by their wireless carriers. Federalism: Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association In Christie v. NCAA , the Supreme Court is asked to consider whether a federal statute understood to bar the partial repeal of New Jersey's sports gambling prohibition runs afoul of the Tenth Amendment. Redistricting: Gill v. Whitford On October 3, 2017, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Gill v. Whitford , a case that could significantly impact how congressional and state legislative redistricting maps are drawn. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear one of these cases next term in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission .

On October 2, 2017, the Supreme Court is to begin its new term. While the Court issued a number of notable decisions during its last full term, Court watchers have largely agreed that, at least compared to recent terms, the Court's October 2016 term was diminished both with regard to volume and content. With the Court already accepting over 30 cases for its next term, many of which raise deep and difficult questions in various areas of law, the October 2017 Supreme Court term could be considerably different. The next Court term has the potential to be one of the most consequential in years. A full discussion of every case that the Court will hear during the October 2017 term is beyond the scope of this report (indeed, the Court has to grant certiorari to the majority of cases that will likely make up its docket for the upcoming year). But Table 1 provides brief summaries of the cases the Court has already agreed to hear during the October 2017 term, and many of the cases on the Court's docket are discussed in existing or forthcoming CRS products. The majority of this report highlights four notable cases of the new term that could impact the work of Congress: (1) Carpenter v. United States; (2) Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA); (3) Gill v. Whitford; and (4) Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. In a case that could decide whether cell phone users have a protected privacy interest in the trove of location data held by their wireless carriers, the Court in Carpenter v. United States will examine whether the government's warrantless collection of historical cell phone location data is constrained by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. In Christie v. NCAA, the Court will consider whether a federal statute understood to bar the partial repeal of New Jersey's sports gambling prohibition runs afoul of the Tenth Amendment's anti-commandeering principle. In a case that could significantly impact how congressional and state legislative redistricting maps are drawn, Gill v. Whitford will examine whether a state's redistricting map constitutes an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Finally, in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Court will examine a dispute that weighs states' interests in enforcing their civil rights laws against the interests of those who object to same-sex marriage on religious grounds. The discussion that follows of each of these cases (1) provides background information; (2) summarizes the arguments that were or are likely to be presented to the Court; and (3) examines the implications that the Court's ruling could have for Congress, including broader ramifications for the jurisprudence in a given area of law.

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Businesses leaders have been urging a movement toward a territorial tax, which would generally eliminate U.S. income taxes on active foreign source income. Such a proposal (presumably based on one developed by Grubert and Mutti) was included in the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform in 2005, more recently in a draft proposal by Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp, and in a bill, S. 2091 , introduced by Senator Enzi. The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (referred to as the Fiscal Commission) also proposed a territorial tax in general terms. Deferral Deferral allows a firm to delay taxation of its earnings in foreign subsidiaries until the income is paid as a dividend to the U.S. parent company. Although a territorial tax is often focused on exempting foreign source income that under current law is taxed when repatriated, there are four basic categories of foreign source income, three of which are not eligible for deferral. This foreign tax credit is designed to prevent double taxation of income earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations from facing a combined U.S. and foreign tax in excess of the U.S. tax due if the income was earned in the United States. If applied overall or in a way that can combine income subject to high taxes with income subject to low taxes, unused credits in high-tax countries (or associated with highly taxed income) can be used to offset U.S. tax due in low-tax countries or income subject to low taxes. They may have also been delaying repatriations in anticipation of another holiday. Aside from the issue of the effect of a territorial tax (and of its particular design features) on profit shifting, other reforms might be considered that might address profit shifting either in the current system or in a system revised in ways other than moving to a territorial tax. Transition An important issue in moving to a territorial tax is how to treat accumulated unrepatriated earnings, which were generated under a worldwide system. As will be discussed subsequently, the proposals have included a variety of approaches. Hybrid approaches such as taxing a share of income currently would also eliminate the scope for tax planning around repatriation. Revenue Issues A shift to a territorial system could potentially gain revenue, in part because relatively little tax is collected on foreign operations. Because transitional gains are temporary, this approach results in a long-run revenue loss. The Grubert Mutti Proposal This proposal has been circulating for some time as a general proto-type of a move to a territorial tax, and has been estimated to raise revenue, primarily due to increased taxes on royalties and allocation of parent company expenses between taxable and exempt income. The proposal does not address the treatment of existing accumulated earnings abroad or profit shifting via intangible assets, although one of the proposal's authors has indicated that their plan should probably include a tax on accumulated earnings, but at a lower rate. No actual repatriation is necessary. Some elements that increase the tax burden on foreign source income (offsetting the loss from exempting dividends and in some cases branch income) are the allocation of deductions and taxation of royalties in the Grubert-Mutti proposal and the 5% inclusion of dividends in the other two proposals. The Ways and Means Discussion Draft indicates that these issues will be considered separately and S. 2091 would make the look-through rules (as well as the exclusion of active financing income), currently part of extenders and having expired after 2011, permanent One comment suggested that tax reform should address the leakage in Subpart F including check-the-box and the look-through rules At the same time, one of the concerns about check the box and look through rules is that the result would not be greater U.S. tax collections but an increase in taxes paid to other countries. This change would, however, permit the elimination of Subpart F. Ending Deferral and Ending Cross-Crediting Via a Per Country Limit A greater level of taxation and a more effective provision to discourage artificial profit shifting, which would also eliminate disincentives to repatriate, is to combine ending deferral with a per country limit on foreign tax credits, preventing tax haven income from being shielded by foreign tax credits. Measures to Modify the Current System: the President's Proposals The President has made several proposals that address international tax issues. A minimum tax that could be imposed in the framework of an effective territorial system is discussed below.

Among potential tax reforms under discussion by Congress is revising the tax treatment of foreign source income of U.S. multinational corporations. Some business leaders have been urging a movement toward a territorial tax, which would eliminate some U.S. income taxes on active foreign source income. Under a territorial tax, only the country where the income is earned imposes a tax. Territorial proposals include the Grubert-Mutti proposal (included in President Bush's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform proposal in 2005) and, more recently, a draft Ways and Means Committee proposal and a Senate bill, S. 2091. The Fiscal Commission also proposed a territorial tax. Proposals have, however, also been made to increase the taxation of foreign source income, including S. 727, and proposals by President Obama. Although the United States has a worldwide system that includes foreign earnings in U.S. taxable income, two provisions cause the current system to resemble a territorial tax in that very little tax is collected. Deferral delays paying taxes until income is repatriated (paid as a dividend by the foreign subsidiary to its U.S. parent). When income is repatriated, credits for foreign taxes paid offset the U.S. tax due. Under cross-crediting, unused foreign tax credits from high tax countries or on highly taxed income can be used to offset U.S. tax on income in low tax countries. Some proponents of a territorial tax urge such a system on the grounds that the current system discourages repatriations. Economic evidence suggests that effect is small, in part because in normal circumstances a large share of income is retained for permanent reinvestment. Amounts held abroad may have increased, however, as firms lobbied for another repatriation holiday (similar to that adopted in 2004) that allowed firms to exempt most dividends from income on a one-time basis. Opponents are concerned about encouraging investment abroad. A territorial tax is generally not viewed as efficient because it favors foreign investment, but that increased outflow of investment is likely to have a small effect relative to the U.S. economy. Artificial shifting of profits into tax havens or low tax countries is a current problem that could be worsened under some territorial tax designs, and proposals have included measures to address this problem. Proposals also address the transitional issue of the treatment of the existing stock of unrepatriated earnings. The Ways and Means proposal would tax this stock of earnings, but at a lower rate, and use the revenues to offset losses from other parts of the plan, which would lead to a long-run revenue loss. S. 2091 has a similar approach. The Grubert-Mutti proposal does not have a specific transitional tax, but would raise revenue largely due to its disallowance of parent overhead expenses aimed at reducing profit shifting. The other two proposals also contain provisions to address profit shifting. In addition there are complicated issues in the design of a territorial tax, such as how to treat branches and dividends of firms in which the corporation is only partially owned. A number of issues arise from the ending of foreign tax credits, with perhaps the most significant one being the increased tax on royalties, which are currently subject to tax, have low or no foreign taxes, and would lose the shield of excess credits. The final section of the report briefly discusses some alternative options, including those in S. 727 and in the Administration proposals. It also discusses hybrid approaches that combine territorial and worldwide systems in a more efficient way, including eliminating the disincentive to repatriate. One such approach is a minimum tax on foreign source income, which is proposed by the President in the context of current rules, but could be combined with a territorial system.

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Why a U.S.-Thailand FTA? The Bush Administration notified Congress on February 12, 2004, that it intends to begin free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations with Thailand. This notification, which follows an October 19, 2003 announcement by President Bush and former Thai Prime Minister Thaskin of their agreement to launch negotiations, allows for talks to begin within 90 days or by mid-May 2004, after required consultations with Congress. Two negotiating sessions took place in 2004, and a third was held April 4-8, 2005, in Thailand. In the notification letter sent to the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader, then-U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick put forth an array of potential commercial and foreign policy gains that could be derived from the agreement. At the same time, Mr. Zoellick alluded to sensitive issues that require attention: trade in automobiles, protection of intellectual property rights, and labor and environmental standards. Zoellick's letter states that an FTA would be particularly beneficial to U.S. agricultural producers who have urged the administration to move forward, as well as to U.S. companies exporting industrial goods and services. For agricultural producers, by eliminating or reducing Thailand's high tariffs and other barriers, the FTA offers the opportunity to significantly increase export sales to Thailand. By eliminating U.S. tariff and non-tariff barriers to Thai exports, an FTA could help increase the competitiveness and market share of Thai products in the U.S. market. Still, a number of contentious issues persist. While the United States has not filed any cases against Thailand in the WTO, it has pressed Thailand to liberalize its trade and investment regimes and to improve protection of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR). Issues in the FTA Negotiations Countries that form FTAs agree at a minimum to phase out tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on mutual trade in goods in order to enhance market access between trading partners. As a result, the negotiation is covering trade in goods and services, agriculture, investment, and intellectual property rights, as well as other issues such as government procurement, competition policy, and customs procedures. Similar large increases in Thai agricultural exports to the United States can be expected if substantial liberalization occurs. While Thailand has committed to open up telecommunications services to direct foreign competition by early 2006, the reform process has lagged. Liberalization of other services such as legal, construction, architecture, engineering, and accounting are also U.S. negotiating objectives. Status of FTA Negotiations The two sides completed their sixth round of FTA negotiations in Chiang Mai, Thailand on January 10-13, 2006. Congress and the U.S.-Thailand FTA The U.S.-Thailand FTA negotiations are of interest to Congress because (1) an agreement would require passage of implementing legislation to become operational; (2) an agreement could increase U.S. exports of goods, services, and investment; (3) an agreement could increase competition for U.S. import-competing industries such as textiles and apparel and pick-up trucks; and (4) if an agreement is implemented, Thailand would become the second Asian FTA partner (the first was Singapore) for the United States.

President Bush and former Thai Prime Minister Thaskin on October 19, 2003, agreed to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). Six negotiating rounds took place, the most recent January 10-13, 2006 in Thailand. U.S. trade officials had hoped to conclude the negotiations by early 2006, but the negotiations were suspended by Thailand in February 2006 due to Bangkok's political crisis. After 18 months of negotiations the two sides were wide apart on a number of issues, such as financial services liberalization and a number of other sensitive issues. Combined with considerable public opposition to the FTA in Thailand, the Bush Administration may be hard pressed to complete the negotiation before trade promotion authority expires in mid-2007. While the Thai government appointed by the military after Thailand's September 2006 coup remains committed to concluding an FTA with the United States, it also plans to submit any agreement to the 242 National Legislative Assembly (NLA) for approval—a step that deposed Prime Minister Thaskin maintained was not required. At this date, however, there are no plans (date or venue) to resume the negotiations. In the notification letter sent to the congressional leadership, then-U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick put forth an array of commercial and foreign policy gains that could be derived from the agreement. The letter stated that an FTA would be particularly beneficial to U.S. agricultural producers, as well as to U.S. companies exporting goods and services to Thailand and investing there. Mr. Zoellick also alluded to sensitive issues that would need to be addressed: trade in automobiles, protection of intellectual property rights, and labor and environmental standards. Thailand has been viewed as a strong candidate for an FTA with the United States. Its economy has shown relatively healthy growth in recent years, rising by 6.2% in 2004 and 4.5% in 2005. Yet, Thailand maintains relatively high tariff and non-tariff barriers on a number of products and services. Secondly, an FTA with Thailand would allow U.S. exporters to gain access to Thai markets similar to that obtained by other countries through bilateral and plurilateral agreements with Thailand. Third, a U.S.-Thailand FTA would likely induce other countries to seek a trade liberalization agreement with the United States. Countries that form FTAs agree at a minimum to phase out or reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on mutual trade in order to enhance market access between the trading partners. The U.S.-Thailand FTA is expected to be comprehensive, seeking to liberalize trade in goods, agriculture, services, and investment, as well as intellectual property rights. Other issues such as government procurement, competition policy, environment and labor standards, and customs procedures are also on the negotiating table. The U.S.-Thailand FTA negotiations are of interest to Congress because (1) an agreement would require passage of implementing legislation to go into effect; (2) an agreement could increase U.S. exports of goods, services, and investment, with particular benefits for agricultural exports; and (3) an agreement could increase competition for U.S. import-competing industries such as textiles and apparel and light trucks, thereby raising the issue of job losses. This report will be updated if negotiations are resumed.

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Introduction The welfare reform law of 1996 ( P.L. 104-193 ) provided an increase in federal child carefunding for low-income families, with the expectation that newly implemented work requirementsfor welfare recipients (many being single mothers) would create a greater demand for child careservices. This additional funding was accompanied by the creation of a unified and expanded ChildCare and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) program, with the aim of serving low-incomefamilies, regardless of welfare status. These two funding streams are commonly referred to incombination as the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). (As will be discussed later, a portion of federal mandatory funding to statesis contingent on states spending some of their own state funds on child care.) Authorization for thediscretionary portion of the CCDF and appropriations for both the CCDF mandatory funds, as wellas the TANF block grant, are due to expire at the end of FY2002. Recent TANF expenditure data show that states are spending increasingamounts of TANF funds for child care services within the TANF program ($2.2 billion in FY2000);however, the extent to which this will continue during an economic downturn is an unansweredquestion for TANF and child care state administrators alike. Three were associated with the cash welfare system. In addition to creating the new block of mandatory child care funding, the 1996 welfare law reauthorized and amended the CCDBG. This combination of new mandatory funding and expanded CCDBG discretionary funding is commonly referred to as the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and makes up the largestsource of federal program funding ($4.8 billion in FY2002) appropriated solely for child caresubsidies and child care activities for low-income families. In order for a state to be eligible for its share of the remaining funds (also known as "matching funds" ), that state must first meet a "maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement." In other words, the amount transferred from TANF to CCDF in FY2000 ($2.4 billion)exceeds the amount that was appropriated directly in discretionary CCDF funds for FY2002 ($2.1billion), or any single fiscal year so far. Transferring funds to the CCDF is not the only channel through which states may use TANF funding to support child care services for low-income families. In FY2000,states reported spending a total of $2.2 billion of federal TANF and related state funds on child care. SSBG. The most recent available data indicate that in FY2000, combined child care expenditures made fromthese two programs totaled over $9 billion - more than double the level of expenditures made forchild care via these same two programs in FY1997. No match applies to the discretionary fund. Furthermore, mandatory fundsbring with them state matching requirements (for the non-"guaranteed" portion). Discretionary and mandatory CCDF funds also carry with them different time limits for states to obligate and spend the money.

The welfare reform law of 1996 ( P.L. 104-193 ) sharply increased federal child care funding for low-income families, with the expectation that new work requirements for welfare parents (most ofwhom were single mothers) would increase demand for child care services. This additional fundingwas accompanied by the creation of a unified and expanded Child Care and Development BlockGrant (CCDBG) program, with the aim of serving low-income families, regardless of welfare status. The expanded program is financed through two funding streams commonly referred to incombination as the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). CCDF appropriations in FY2002 from the two funding streams total $4.8 billion: $2.7 billion in mandatory funding and $2.2 billion in discretionary funds ( Figure 1 ). The two funding streamsfall under separate committee jurisdictions, and carry with them different rules regarding allocation,state matching requirements, and time limits for obligating and spending money. A portion of themandatory funding is "guaranteed" to states and is based on states' spending on child care prior tothe 1996 welfare law. In order for a state to be eligible for its share of the remaining mandatoryfunds, which require state matching, the state must first spend a designated amount (also based onhistorical spending) of its own state funds. Discretionary CCDF funding is 100% federal (i.e.,requires no state match) and is allocated according to a different formula than either portion ofmandatory funds. Both the mandatory and the discretionary funding streams expire at theend ofFY2002 and are due to be reauthorized this year, the mandatory funding as part of welfare (TANF)reauthorization. Although the CCDF is the only federal grant program dedicated solely for the purpose of providing child care subsidies and activities for low-income families, states also are using two otherfederal block grants for this purpose: TANF and the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG). Stateshave increasingly used TANF dollars for child care services within their TANF programs ($2.2billion in FY2000) in addition to transferring TANF funds to the CCDF. The TANF transfers toCCDF in FY2000 ($2.4 billion) exceeded the discretionary funds appropriated for any single yearso far. Overall, expenditure data show that in FY2000, states spent more than $9 billion in federaland state funds associated with the CCDF and TANF - more than double the amount spent on childcare via these programs in FY1997. SSBG expenditure data are not available for FY2000, but statesare reported to have spent almost $400 million in SSBG funds in FY1999 to support child careservices. As Congress decides how much funding to make available for child care, it will need to consider multiple programs, and the various funding streams within them. It is unclear whether thecurrent level of child care funding via TANF and SSBG will be sustained if the recent economicdownturn gives rise to needs perceived to be more pressing.

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Pipelines and their routes also can be controversial locally, regionally, or nationally. Congress has a long-standing interest in pipeline development and the regulation of pipelines because of the critical role of pipelines in the domestic energy markets. This report discusses how the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) administers its responsibilities related to certain pipeline segments that require Corps authorizations. The role of the Corps in authorizing oil and natural gas pipelines is limited to (1) the agency's regulatory authorities for authorizing activities affecting regulated water bodies and wetlands and activities that alter or obstruct navigable waters and (2) its civil works authorities, including allowing a pipeline to cross a Corps water resource project and related lands. After an overview of the Corps and the broader federal role in approving private oil and natural gas pipelines, the remainder of the report discusses how the Corps' regulatory responsibilities apply where pipelines cross water bodies and wetlands (i.e., Corps regulatory program); how the Corps' civil works authorities may apply if a pipeline may alter or affect a Corps water resource project or may cross Corps-managed land (i.e., Corps civil works program); how the Corps complies with various federal statutes as it arrives at pipeline-related decisions, including the environmental documentation requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the historic preservation requirements of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA); and how the agency's role in pipelines raises or illustrates various policy issues for decisionmakers. Under the agency's regulatory program, the Corps is responsible for authorizing activities that could affect federally regulated waters and wetlands. Under its civil works program, the agency is responsible for approving activities that cross or affect Corps lands and projects. Regulatory Role A pipeline developer must have authorization from the Corps regulatory program (sometimes referred to as its permit program) for any pipeline segment affecting or crossing Corps jurisdictional water, in accordance with Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, under which the Corps regulates the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States, including wetlands; and Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, under which the Corps regulates structures and/or work in or affecting the course, condition, or capacity of navigable waters. General permits essentially preauthorize a group of similar activities on a programmatic level. Pipeline activities that require Corps authorization and that are similar in nature with minimal environmental impacts (e.g., minor stream crossings) may qualify for a general permit. Nationwide Permit 12: Utility-Line Activities One of the nationwide permits—NWP 12—is used to authorize utility-line activities, including the construction, maintenance, or repair of utility lines in waters of the United States. For requests to have pipelines cross below, on, or above Corps land and non-Corps land with a Corps real estate interest, the Corps generally will decide on whether or not to grant both a permission to alter a Corps civil works project and an easement to cross Corps land or a consent to cross non-Corps land with a Corps real estate interest. Policy Issues Raised by Corps' Pipeline Roles and Decisions Growth in North American crude oil and natural gas production has led to efforts to expand the domestic oil and natural gas pipeline network. The Corps is authorized as part of its regulatory program to regulate certain pipeline activities that may affect certain waters and wetlands; it also is authorized to grant permissions, easements, and consents for pipeline segments that cross Corps water resources projects and associated lands. How does the Corps evaluate cumulative impacts? When a pipeline is largely a nonfederal undertaking and the federal role is limited to discrete segments, to what extent should the federal government shape siting and other aspects of the pipeline? How does the use of general permits (rather than individual permits) for Corps-regulated pipeline segments affect the agency's review of proposed water crossings, the information available to stakeholders and the public, and compliance with the requirements of NHPA? As Congress considers the Corps' current and future roles and the federal role in pipelines more broadly, these questions reflect some of the basic debates about federal actions associated with private infrastructure.

Growth in North American crude oil and natural gas production has led to efforts to expand the domestic oil and natural gas pipeline network. Pipeline developers are required to obtain authorizations from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) before constructing certain pipeline segments. Under the agency's regulatory program, the Corps is responsible for authorizing activities that may affect federally regulated waters and wetlands. Under its civil works program, the agency is responsible for approving activities that cross or may affect Corps-managed lands and Corps water resource projects. The agency's role with respect to pipelines can be controversial and may raise policy issues for Congress. Congress has a long-standing interest in pipeline development and the regulation of pipelines because of the role of pipelines in the domestic energy markets. Corps Regulation of Water Crossings. The Corps has regulatory responsibilities pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §1344), under which the Corps authorizes activities that may discharge dredge or fill material into waters of the United States, including wetlands. The agency also has regulatory responsibilities pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. §403), under which the Corps authorizes structures and work in or affecting the course, condition, or capacity of navigable waters. Because most pipelines cross or potentially affect U.S. waters and wetlands somewhere along their routes, pipeline developers routinely are required to obtain Corps authorization for some pipeline segments. The Corps authorizes most pipeline water crossings using a general permit—Nationwide Permit 12—for utility-line activities in waters of the United States. A nationwide permit essentially preauthorizes a group of activities similar in nature that are likely to have a minor effect on waters and wetlands both individually and cumulatively. Approvals Related to Corps Land and Corps Projects. A pipeline developer may need permissions from the agency's civil works program if a pipeline segment may affect or cross a Corps water resource project and Corps-managed land. That is, the Corps would need to grant (1) an easement, typically for a right-of-way, to cross federal land managed by the Corps or (2) a consent to cross non-Corps land with a Corps real estate interest (typically a federal flood easement over nonfederal land). Prior to the granting of the easement or consent, the Corps generally must provide permission for the pipeline to alter the associated Corps water resource project. The easement at a Corps project for the Dakota Access Pipeline to cross under the Missouri River in North Dakota was particularly controversial. Corps Actions Must Comply with Federal Statutes. In carrying out its regulatory and civil works authorities, the Corps complies with applicable federal requirements. For example, the Corps identifies and considers the environmental impacts of the agency's proposed action (e.g., Corps permit of an activity affecting a wetland) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.) and considers impacts on historic properties pursuant to the National Historical Preservation Act (NHPA; 54 U.S.C. §306108). Policy Issues. Various questions arise in policy debates on Corps' actions related to pipelines: How does the Corps determine the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of its decisions to authorize activities in regulated waters or Corps-managed lands? When the federal role in a pipeline is limited to approving activities at discrete segments, to what extent should federal agencies influence siting and other aspects of a pipeline? How does the use of Corps general permits affect the agency's review, information available to stakeholders and the public, and compliance with NHPA? These questions reflect some of the basic debates and challenges that Congress and other policymakers face regarding federal approvals associated with private infrastructure.

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In the past half-century, in government and beyond, information creation, distribution, retention, and preservation activities have transitioned from a tangible, paper-based process to digital processes managed through computerized information technologies. Information, whether a newspaper, government communication, or congressional bill, is created as a word processing document, spreadsheet, database, or other digital object which then may be rendered as a text, image, or video file. Those files are then distributed through a myriad of outlets ranging from particular software applications and websites to social media platforms. The material may be produced in tangible, printed form, but typically remains in digital formats. ), specify the production, dissemination, retention, and availability of government information by or through the Government Publishing Office (GPO). GPO is a legislative branch agency that serves all three branches of the federal government as a centralized resource for gathering, cataloging, producing, providing, authenticating, and preserving published information. In 1962, Congress created the Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) within GPO to provide permanent public access to published federal government information. GPO continues to operate on the basis of a number of statutory authorities first granted in the 19 th and 20 th centuries that presume the existence of government information in an ink-on-paper format, because no other format existed when those authorities were enacted. Others have raised broader questions about the capacity of Title 44 and other information dissemination authorities to enable the provision of government information in an effective and efficient manner. In light of the technological changes of the past four decades, a relevant question for Congress might arise: To what extent can these 19 th century authorities and work patterns meet the challenges of ubiquitous digital creation of government information? This question is further complicated by the lack of a stable, robust set of digital information resources and management practices like those that were in place when Congress last considered current government information policies. This report examines three areas related to the production, distribution, retention, and management of government information in a primarily digital environment. These areas include the Joint Committee on Printing; the Federal Depository Library Program; and government information management in the future, Joint Committee on Printing JCP was established by Congress in 1846 to oversee the management of private printers who competed to provide printing and publishing services to the government. The emergence of a predominantly digital FDLP may raise questions about the capacity of GPO to manage the program given its existing statutory authorities. The 1895 printing act was arguably an expression of the state-of-the-art standard of printing technology and provided a foundation which supported government information distribution for more than a century. By contrast, in the fourth or fifth decade of transitioning from the tangible written word to ubiquitous digital creation and distribution, the way ahead is not as clear.

In the past half-century, in government and beyond, information creation, distribution, retention, and preservation activities have transitioned from a tangible, paper-based process to digital processes managed through computerized information technologies. Information is created as a digital object which then may be rendered as a text, image, or video file. Those files are then distributed through a myriad of outlets ranging from particular software applications and websites to social media platforms. The material may be produced in tangible, printed form, but typically remains in digital formats. The Government Publishing Office (GPO) is a legislative branch agency that serves all three branches of the national government as a centralized resource for gathering, cataloging, producing, providing, authenticating, and preserving published information. The agency is overseen by the Joint Committee on Printing (JCP), which in 1895 was charged with overseeing and regulating U.S. government printing. GPO operates on the basis of a number of statutory authorities first granted in the 19th and 20th centuries that presume the existence of government information in an ink-on-paper format, because no other format existed when those authorities were enacted. GPO's activities include the Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP), which provides permanent public access to published federal government information, and which last received legislative consideration in 1962. In light of the governance and technological changes of the past four decades, a relevant question for Congress might arise: To what extent can decades-old authorities and work patterns meet the challenges of digital government information? For example, the widespread availability of government information in digital form has led some to question whether paper versions of some publications might be eliminated in favor of digital versions, but others note that paper versions are still required for a variety of reasons. Another area of concern focuses on questions about the capacity of current information dissemination authorities to enable the provision of digital government information in an effective and efficient manner. With regard to information retention, the emergence of a predominantly digital FDLP may raise questions about the capacity of GPO to manage the program given its existing statutory authorities. These questions are further complicated by the lack of a stable, robust set of digital information resources and management practices like those that were in place when Congress last considered current government information policies. The 1895 printing act was arguably an expression of the state-of-the-art standard of printing technology and provided a foundation which supported government information distribution for more than a century. By contrast, in the fourth or fifth decade of transitioning from the tangible written word to ubiquitous digital creation and distribution, the way ahead is not as clear, due in part to a lack of widely understood and accepted standards for managing digital information. This report examines three areas related to the production, distribution, retention, and management of government information in a primarily digital environment. These areas include the Joint Committee on Printing; the Federal Depository Library Program; and government information management in the future.

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On July 19, 2011, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 2584 ( H.Rept. 112-151 ) which included $27.52 billion in appropriations for FY2012 for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. 2584 as reported would provide a total of $7.15 billion for the EPA, $1.82 billion (20%) less than the President's FY2012 request of $8.97 billion submitted to Congress on February 14, 2011, and $1.53 billion (18%) less than the FY2011 enacted appropriation of $8.68 billion. H.R. Concerns regarding these EPA actions continued to be raised during House floor debate and were among roughly 250 amendments considered and pending prior to suspension of floor debate on July 28, 2011. No bill to fund Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2012 has been formally introduced in the Senate. However, on October 14, 2011, the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft bill for FY2012 to serve as a starting point of discussions for markup. The Senate subcommittee draft recommended a total appropriation of $29.55 billion for FY2012 for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies, including $8.62 billion for EPA under Title II of the draft. The Senate subcommittee draft did not include provisions similar to the House committee-reported bill that would restrict or preclude EPA from using FY2012 funds for implementing or proceeding with a number of regulatory actions. At the time this report was updated, EPA and other departments and agencies funded within the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill were operating under a third continuing resolution, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-55 ), which provides funding through December 16, 2011. If the House committee bill were enacted as reported, the provisions and amendments in Title IV would impact ongoing and anticipated EPA activities including those addressing greenhouse gas emissions, hazardous air pollutants, particulate matter emissions, permitting of new source air emissions, water quality impacts of mountaintop mining operations, management of coal ash, lead-based paint removal, environmental impacts associated with livestock operations, financial responsibility with respect to Superfund cleanup, and stormwater discharge. Further, Title V of the committee-reported bill, the Reducing Regulatory Burdens Act of 2011, included amendments to the Clean Water Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in response to EPA's consideration of requiring permits under the Clean Water Act for point source discharges of pesticides in or near U.S. waters. Only those provisions affecting EPA programs that are clearly identifiable by specific language or references in the House committee-reported bill are included in this report. 2584 as reported for selected EPA programs and activities that have received prominent attention during deliberations on the FY2012 appropriations. Amendments that were agreed to or failed during floor debate, as well as proposed amendments pending actions, are not included in the tables, as House floor debate was not completed. House committee-reported H.R. 2584 as reported by the House Appropriations Committee. The more controversial provisions regarding several EPA programs and regulations were contained in the "General Provisions" in Title IV of H.R. 2584 . The Senate subcommittee draft did not include those provisions that would restrict or preclude the use of FY2012 funds for certain EPA actions, as were contained in Title IV and Title V of House committee-reported H.R. 2584 . The provisions included in H.R. H.R.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal departments and agencies funded within the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill are currently operating under a continuing resolution (P.L. 112-55), which runs through December 16, 2011, while the debate over FY2012 appropriations continues. In July 2011, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 2584 (H.Rept. 112-151) with $27.52 billion in appropriations for FY2012 for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. Title II of H.R. 2584, as reported, would provide a total of $7.15 billion for EPA, $1.82 billion (20%) less than the President's FY2012 request of $8.97 billion, and $1.53 billion (18%) less than the FY2011 enacted appropriation of $8.68 billion. In addition to funding levels for the various EPA programs and activities, H.R. 2584 as reported included more than 25 provisions that would restrict or preclude the use of FY2012 funds by EPA for implementing or proceeding with a number of recent and pending EPA regulatory actions. Nearly 250 amendments, including several regarding EPA, were under consideration during floor debate which was suspended on July 28, 2011. No companion bill for FY2012 appropriations has been formally introduced in the Senate. However, on October 14, 2011, the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft bill for FY2012 to serve as a starting point of discussions for markup. The Senate subcommittee draft, which recommended $8.62 billion for EPA, did not include those provisions that would restrict or preclude the use of FY2012 funds for certain EPA actions, as were contained in the House committee-reported H.R. 2584. Several EPA regulatory actions have received considerable attention during House and Senate oversight committee hearings, appropriations committee hearings, and House floor debate on the FY2012 appropriations. The provisions included in H.R. 2584 as reported, and many of the House floor amendments (considered and pending), cut across the various environmental pollution control statutes' programs and initiatives, such as those that address greenhouse gas emissions, hazardous air pollutants, particulate matter emissions, permitting of new source air emissions, water quality impacts of mountaintop mining operations, management of coal ash, lead-based paint removal, environmental impacts associated with livestock operations, financial responsibility with respect to Superfund cleanup, and stormwater discharge. Further, Title V of the House committee-reported bill, the Reducing Regulatory Burdens Act of 2011, included significant amendments to the Clean Water Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in response to EPA's consideration of requiring permits under the Clean Water Act for point source discharges of pesticides in or near U.S. waters. To date, House floor debate on H.R. 2584 has not been completed. This report summarizes funding levels for EPA accounts and certain program activities as proposed in H.R. 2584 as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, and in the Senate subcommittee draft. Selected provisions regarding EPA program activities extracted from the House committee-reported bill are also presented. Only those provisions that are clearly identifiable by specific language or references contained in the bill are included. No comparable provisions were identified for the Senate subcommittee draft. Amendments that were voted on and pending during initial House floor debate at the end of July 2011 are not included.

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Background On July 13, 2000, after nearly five years of bargaining, the U.S. and Vietnam announced theyhad signed a bilateral trade agreement (BTA). It entered into force on December10, 2001 when the two countries formally exchanged notices of acceptance. The BTA is a major step toward fully normalizing U.S.-Vietnam commercial relations, as it restores reciprocal most-favored-nation (MFN, also known as normal trade relations [NTR])treatment between the two countries, and commits Vietnam to undertake a wide range ofmarket-oriented economic reforms. tariffs on most imports from Vietnam. Restoration of Temporary MFN Status to Vietnam. Under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, MFN treatmentmay be restored to NME countries after two requirements have been met: a) The President issues a determination that the country is not in violation of the freedom-of-emigration requirements of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. (7) Such anagreement requires approval by the Congress(and by the Vietnamese National Assembly). The approval of the BTA allows thePresident to extend temporary MFN tariff treatment to Vietnam. Additionally, each extension will require a presidential determination that Vietnam is satisfactorilyextending reciprocal MFN treatment to U.S. exports. Vietnam and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Vietnam's Path to Commercial Normalization with the United States U.S. and Vietnamese Interests in a Bilateral Trade Agreement U.S. Moresectors will be open to U.S. multinationals. The World Bank has estimated that Vietnam's exports to the U.S. will rise to $1.3 billion- more than 60% over 2000 levels - in the first year of MFN status, as U.S. tariff rates onVietnamese exports would fall from their non-MFN average of 40% to less than 3%. In particular, Vietnam's clothing exports are expected to increase dramatically. Banking Services. Telecommunications. 4) Investment Regarding investment , the U.S.-Vietnam trade agreement includes guarantees of MFN treatment, national treatment, transparency, and protection against expropriation. Comparison with the 1999 "Agreement in Principle" In July 1999 the U.S. and Vietnam announced an "agreement in principle" on a BTA, but for nearly a year Vietnam delayed finalizing the deal because of intense divisions among the VietnameseCommunist Party (VCP) leadership (see the following section for an analysis of the reasons forVietnam's hesitation). The U.S. agreed to this concession, but in exchange received significantlyshorter phase-in periods. (27) Vietnam's Ambivalence toward Economic Integration Though the U.S. and Vietnam reached an agreement in principle on the BTA in July 1999, fornearly a year Vietnam delayed signing the deal.

On July 13, 2000, U.S. and Vietnamese negotiators signed a sweeping bilateral trade agreement (BTA). Following affirmative votes in Congress and the Vietnamese National Assembly, the BTAentered in into force on December 10, 2001, when the two countries formally exchanged lettersimplementing the agreement. Under the deal, the U.S. will extend temporary most-favored nation(MFN, also known as normal trade relations [NTR] status) status to Vietnam, a step that willsignificantly reduce U.S. tariffs on most imports from Vietnam. The World Bank has estimated thatVietnam's exports to the U.S. will rise to $1.3 billion - 60% higher than 2000 levels - in the firstyear of MFN status, as U.S. tariff rates on Vietnamese exports will fall from their non-MFN averageof 40% to less than 3%. In particular, Vietnamese garment exports are expected to record a tenfoldincrease in the first year after receiving MFN treatment. In return, Hanoi agreed to undertake a wide range of market-liberalization measures, including extending MFN treatment to U.S. exports, reducing tariffs on goods, easing barriers to U.S. services(such as banking and telecommunications), committing to protect certain intellectual property rights,and providing additional inducements and protections for inward foreign direct investment. Vietnamis the world's 13th most populous country, with 78 million inhabitants, roughly equal to thepopulation of Germany. The U.S. and Vietnam reached an agreement in principle in July 1999, butfor nearly a year Vietnam delayed finalizing the deal because of intense divisions among theVietnamese Communist Party (VCP) leadership. Under the requirements of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 - Section 402 of which is commonly referred to as the "Jackson-Vanik amendment" - signing a bilateral trade agreement isa necessary step for the U.S. to restore MFN treatment to certain socialist countries, includingVietnam. Congressional approval of the BTA will allow the President to extend MFN treatment toVietnam. Such MFN status will be conditional because - as with all Title IV BTAs - it will requireannual Presidential extensions, which Congress could disapprove. This report outlines the terms of the BTA, identifies U.S. and Vietnamese motivations for entering into the deal, analyzes the reasons for Vietnam's delay in signing the agreement, andexplains Congress' role in the process of restoring normal trade relations treatment to Vietnam. This report will be updated periodically. Further information on U.S.-Vietnam relations is available inCRS Issue Brief IB98033, Vietnam-U.S. Relations . Further information on the legislative and legalprocedures for handling the BTA is available in CRS Report RS20717 , Vietnam Trade Agreement:Approval and Implementing Procedure .

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The disclosure reports for other government employees who are required to file public reports will remain publicly available at the employee's agency. Public Disclosure Reports Who Is Required to File The law requiring public disclosure of personal financial information applies to the President, the Vice President, all Members of Congress (as well as candidates for President, Vice President, and Congress), federal judges and justices, and to high-level staff in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government. In a somewhat similar manner in the judicial and legislative branches, employees are generally covered if they earn a salary greater than 120% of the base salary of a GS-15 (regardless of whether they are on the General Schedule or not) and if they work at that rate of pay on more than 60 days in a calendar year. Information on mortgages on personal residences must be disclosed by the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, and nominees and incumbents in most presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed positions Transactions—financial transactions, including purchases, sales, or exchanges exceeding $1,000 in value, of income-producing property, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, exchange traded funds, or other securities Outside Positions—positions held in outside businesses and organizations Agreements—agreements for future employment or leaves of absence with private entities, continuing payments from or participation in benefit plans of former employers Blind Trusts—the cash value of the interests in any blind trusts Information in the reports concerning the finances of the spouse and dependent children of covered federal officials is to include particular disclosures with regard to the income, gifts, assets, liabilities, and financial transactions of such individuals. These more frequent, periodic transaction reports must be filed within 30 days after the official is notified of a covered transaction in stocks, bonds, or other such securities (but no later than 45 days after the date of the transaction). Availability to the Public The public financial disclosure reports required to be made by officers and employees of the federal government under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 have always been available to the public and the press for copy or inspection from the official's agency (the designated ethics office) within 30 days after the May 15 filing deadline. Under more recent legislation known as the STOCK Act, reports for the highest-level officials in the government, including the President, Vice President, Members of and candidates to Congress, and executive officials compensated at level I of the Executive Schedule (Cabinet officials), and level II of the Executive Schedule (which includes Deputy Secretaries of the departments as well as the heads of many executive and independent agencies) are now also required to be posted on the Internet by their respective agencies.

High-level officials in all three branches of the federal government are required to publicly disclose detailed information concerning their financial holdings and transactions in income-producing property and assets, such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and real property, as well as information on income, gifts, and reimbursements from private non-governmental sources. Covered federal officials must disclose this information not only for themselves, but also must disclose much of the same required financial information with regard to their spouses and dependent children. Public financial disclosure and reporting requirements, originally adopted in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, apply to the President, Vice President, all Members of Congress (as well as to candidates for President, Vice President, or Congress), federal judges and justices, and to employees in all three branches of the federal government who are compensated at a rate of pay over a particular amount (generally, 120% of the base salary of a GS-15) for more than 60 days in a calendar year. Covered officers and employees of the federal government must file detailed financial reports on an annual basis by May 15, setting out information for the previous year on income, gifts, reimbursements, financial holdings and assets, financial transactions, outside positions held, and any agreements or understandings for future private employment. In addition to the annual May 15 reports, all covered public filers must file more frequent public reports throughout the year concerning financial transactions of over $1,000 in assets such as stocks or bonds. Such periodic reports on financial transactions must be filed within 30 days of the receipt of notice of any such covered purchase or sale (but not later than 45 days of the actual transaction). For the highest-level officials in the executive and legislative branches of government—the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, and executive officials compensated on Level I of the Executive Schedule (Cabinet officials) and Level II of the Executive Schedule (including sub-Cabinet officials and heads of executive branch and independent agencies)—all of the public reports required to be filed, including the annual report and the periodic transaction reports, are to be posted on the Internet for public availability, searching, and downloading. For all other covered employees in the federal government, the financial disclosure reports remain publicly available to individuals and the press at the employee's agency.

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The Coast Guard's FY2012 budget appeared to request $975.5 million in acquisition funding for these programs, including $289.9 million for aircraft, $512.0 million for surface ships and boats, and $173.6 million for other items. FY2012 Budget Proposed Dropping Use of Term "Deepwater" Reflecting the 2007 change to a collection of separate acquisition programs, the Coast Guard's proposed FY2012 budget submission proposed to eliminate the use of "Deepwater" as a term for grouping or referring collectively to these acquisition programs. Consistent with the dissolution of Integrated CG Systems and the disaggregation of the Deepwater Acquisition into asset-based Acquisition Program Baselines, the proposed changes align projects that were formerly grouped under Integrated Deepwater Systems (IDS) with the existing authorized structure for Vessels, Aviation, Shore, Other Equipment, and Personnel and Management. House and Senate committees held several oversight hearings on the program, at which non-Coast Guard, non-ICGS witnesses, and several Members of Congress strongly criticized the management and execution of the program. Coast Guard Reform Actions in 2007 In 2007, as the Coast Guard's management and execution of the then-integrated Deepwater program was being strongly criticized by various observers, the Coast Guard announced a number of reform actions that significantly altered the service's approach to Deepwater acquisition (and to Coast Guard acquisition in general). Among these was the change from a single, integrated Deepwater acquisition program to a collection of separate Deepwater acquisition programs. Oversight Issues for Congress These acquisition programs have been a focus of congressional oversight for several years. Potential Options for Congress In addition to approving or modifying the Coast Guard's requests for acquisition funding these acquisition programs, potential options for Congress regarding these programs include but are not limited to the following: continue to track the Coast Guard's management and execution of these acquisition programs, including implementation of reform actions announced by the Coast Guard itself or recommended by GAO; modify reporting requirements for these acquisition programs; prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funding for these acquisition programs until the Coast Guard or DHS takes certain actions or makes certain certifications; and pass legislation to codify acquisition reforms for these programs that the Coast Guard has already announced, or to change acquisition policies and practices for Deepwater acquisition programs in other ways. In response to criticisms of the management and execution of the Deepwater program, Coast Guard and industry officials acknowledged certain problems in the program's management and execution and defended the program's management execution in other respects.

The term Deepwater referred to more than a dozen separate Coast Guard acquisition programs for replacing and modernizing the service's aging fleet of deepwater-capable ships and aircraft. Until April 2007, the Coast Guard pursued these programs as a single, integrated acquisition program that was known as the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) program or Deepwater program for short. Since April 2007, the Coast Guard has pursued them as separate acquisition programs. These acquisition programs include plans for, among other things, 91 new cutters, 124 new small boats, and 247 new or modernized airplanes, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Coast Guard's proposed FY2012 budget submission proposed to eliminate the use of "Deepwater" as a term for grouping or referring collectively to these acquisition programs. The budget submission stated that "Consistent with the dissolution of Integrated CG Systems and the disaggregation of the Deepwater Acquisition into asset-based Acquisition Program Baselines, the proposed changes align projects that were formerly grouped under Integrated Deepwater Systems (IDS) with the existing authorized structure for Vessels, Aviation, Shore, Other Equipment, and Personnel and Management." The year 2007 was a watershed year for these acquisition programs. The management and execution of what was then the single, integrated Deepwater program was strongly criticized by various observers. House and Senate committees held several oversight hearings on the program. Bills were introduced to restructure or reform the program in various ways. Coast Guard and industry officials acknowledged certain problems in the program's management and execution and defended the program's management and execution in other respects. The Coast Guard announced a number of reform actions that significantly altered the service's approach to Deepwater acquisition (and to Coast Guard acquisition in general). Among these was the change from a single, integrated Deepwater acquisition program to a collection of separate acquisition programs. The Coast Guard's management of these acquisition programs, including implementation of recommendations made by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), has been a topic of continuing congressional oversight. Additional oversight issues have included reporting of information to Congress on these programs; cost growth in, and budget planning for, these acquisition programs; a Coast Guard fleet mix analysis that could lead to changes in planned asset quantities; and execution of individual acquisition programs. The Coast Guard's FY2012 budget appeared to request $975.5 million in acquisition funding for these programs, including $289.9 million for aircraft, $512.0 million for surface ships and boats, and $173.6 million for other items.

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USDA's 2018 Farm Income Forecast According to ERS, U.S. net farm income is forecast at $66.3 billion in 2018, down 12% from last year ( Table A-1 ). This forecast includes the first round of payments under the trade aid package announced by USDA in July 2018. The forecast decline in 2018 net farm income represents continued agriculture-sector economic weakness since 2013's record high of $123.8 billion. Selected Highlights The net farm income forecast for 2018 is substantially below the 10-year average of $86.9 billion ( Figure 1 ). Net cash income is also projected lower in 2018 at $93.4 billion (-8%). Since the record highs of 2012 and 2013, net cash income and net farm income have fallen by 31% and 46%, respectively ( Figure 1 ), thus continuing a general downward trend in farm income since 2013—primarily the result of a significant decline in most farm commodity prices since the 2013-2014. Ad hoc disaster assistance and crop insurance indemnity payments were also larger in 2018. Cash receipts from crop and livestock production are up slightly (+0.7%) at $374.9 billion ( Table A-1 ). Crop Receipts Total crop sales peaked in 2012 at $231.6 billion when a nationwide drought pushed commodity prices to record or near-record levels. Government Payments Government payments in 2018 are projected up 17.9% from 2017 at $13.6 billion—the highest total since 2006 and due largely to payments under the market facilitation program (MFP) by USDA of approximately $4.6 billion in response to the U.S.-China trade dispute. In contrast, government payments are expected to represent 21% of the projected net farm income of $66.3 billion. Production Expenses Total production expenses for 2018 for the U.S. agricultural sector are projected to be up (+4.2%) from 2017 in nominal dollars at $369.1 billion ( Figure 16 ). Agricultural Trade Outlook U.S. agricultural exports have been a major contributor to farm income, especially since 2005. However, USDA forecasts China's imports of U.S. agricultural products to decline to $20.5 billion in FY2018 and to $13.6 billion in FY2019 as a result of the U.S.-China trade dispute. ROW is expected to account for 41% of U.S. agricultural exports in FY2019. U.S. Farm and Manufactured Agricultural Product Export Shares The share of agricultural production (based on value) sold outside the country indicates the level of U.S. agriculture's dependence on foreign markets, as well as the overall market for U.S. agricultural products. Farm Asset Values and Debt The U.S. farm income and asset-value situation and outlook suggest a relatively stable financial position heading into 2018 for the agriculture sector as a whole—but with considerable uncertainty regarding the downward outlook for prices and market conditions for the sector and an increasing dependency on international markets to absorb domestic surpluses: Farm asset values—which reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments—are projected to be up 1.4% in 2018 to a nominal $3 trillion ( Table A-3 ). On-Farm vs. Off-Farm Income Shares Average farm household income (sum of on- and off-farm income) is projected at $111,321 in 2018 ( Table A-2 ), down 1.9% from 2017 and well below the record of $134,164 in 2014. U.S. Total vs. Farm Household Average Income Since the late 1990s, farm household incomes have surged ahead of average U.S. household incomes ( Figure 28 and Figure 29 ). In 2017 (the last year for which comparable data were available), the average farm household income of $113,495 was about 27% higher than the average U.S. household income of $89,632 ( Table A-2 ).

According to USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS), national net farm income—a key indicator of U.S. farm well-being—is forecast at $66.3 billion in 2018, down over $9 billion (-12%) from last year. The forecast decline in 2018 net farm income is the result of a small increase in gross returns (up $5.8 billion or +1.3%)—including the initial tranche of payments under the trade aid package announced by USDA in July 2018—offset by higher production expenses (up $14.9 billion or +4.2%). Net farm income is calculated on an accrual basis. Net cash income (calculated on a cash-flow basis) is also projected lower in 2018 (-8%) to $93.4 billion. The 2018 net farm income forecast is substantially below the 10-year average of $86.9 billion (in nominal dollars)—primarily the result of the outlook for continued weak prices for most major crops. Commodity prices are under pressure from a record soybean and near-record corn harvest and from diminished export prospects due to an ongoing trade dispute with China. U.S. farm income experienced a golden period during 2011 through 2014 due to strong commodity prices and robust agricultural exports. Most crops and livestock product prices remain significantly below the average for 2011-2014, when prices for many major commodities attained record or near-record highs. Net farm income is projected down 46% since its record high of $123.7 billion in 2013. Net cash income is projected down 31% from its 2013 high of $135.6 billion. Farm-sector production expenses have risen 2.5% over that same period, thus contributing to lower aggregate income totals. Government payments are projected up nearly 18% from 2017 at $13.6 billion—the highest total since 2006 and due largely to market facilitation payments by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) of approximately $4.6 billion in response to the U.S.-China trade dispute. Ad hoc disaster assistance and crop insurance indemnity payments were also larger in 2018. Since 2008, U.S. agricultural exports have accounted for a 20% share of U.S. farm and manufactured or processed agricultural sales. In 2018 total agricultural exports are forecast up 2% at $143.4 billion. However, abundant supplies in international markets, strong competition from major foreign competitors, and the ongoing U.S.-China trade dispute are expected to shift trade patterns and diminish U.S. export prospects in 2019. In spite of the lower farm income outlook, farm wealth is projected up 1.4% from 2017 to $3.0 trillion. Farm asset values reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments. Farmland values are projected up 1.9% in 2018 following a 2.3% rise in 2017. Because they comprise such a significant portion of the U.S. farm sector's asset base (81%), change in farmland values is a critical barometer of the farm sector's financial performance. At the farm household level, average farm household incomes have been well above average U.S. household incomes since the late 1990s. However, that advantage has narrowed in recent years. In 2014, the average farm household income (including off-farm income sources) was about 77% higher than the average U.S. household income. In 2017 (the last year with comparable data), that advantage is expected to decline to 27%. The outlook for lower net farm income and relatively weak prices for most major program crops signals the likelihood of continued relatively lean times ahead. The U.S. agricultural sector's well-being remains dependent on continued growth in domestic and foreign demand to sustain prices at current modest levels. In addition to commodity prices, the financial picture for the agricultural sector as a whole heading into 2019 will hinge on both domestic and international macroeconomic factors, including interest rates, economic growth, and consumer demand. This report incorporates USDA's November 30, 2018, farm income projections and its November 29, 2018, U.S. agricultural trade outlook update.

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Introduction The term STEM education refers to teaching and learning in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. It typically includes educational activities across all grade levels—from pre-school to post-doctorate—in both formal (e.g., classrooms) and informal (e.g., afterschool programs) settings. Federal policymakers have an active and enduring interest in STEM education, and the topic is frequently raised in federal science, education, workforce, national security, defense, and immigration policy debates. The second component of the federal effort in STEM education consists of programs whose main stated goal is to improve STEM education outcomes in the United States, whether by supporting students in STEM fields directly, improving STEM teacher preparation, improving the quality of STEM programs at the K-12 and postsecondary educational levels, providing better access to STEM majors for traditionally underrepresented minorities, or through some other means. Key Agencies and Historical Trends According to the NSTC-11 program inventory and subsequent annual updates carried out by the OSTP, funding for the federal STEM education effort ranged from $2.8 billion to $3.4 billion in nominal dollars annually between the FY2010 baseline year and FY2016. Of the 14 federal agencies that have reported funding for STEM education programs during the period between FY2010 and FY2016, funding increased at four—the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS), the Department of Defense (DOD), HHS, and NSF—and remained constant at one (Department of Agriculture). In recent years, there has been a push at the federal level to streamline the federal STEM education effort. Among these concerns are persistent achievement gaps between various demographic groups across both secondary and postsecondary education levels, U.S. K-12 student performance on international mathematics and science tests, U.S. K-12 STEM teacher quality, and the U.S. Those with concerns about STEM education cite a variety of data and trends as alarming. Among these are persistent achievement gaps between various demographic groups, concerns about adequate preparation of U.S. Other issues that garner attention include the proportion of foreign student enrollments in STEM programs in U.S. institutions of higher education, global STEM education attainment as it pertains to the U.S. position as a global leader in STEM education, and the availability of S&E graduates of sufficient quality and quantity to satisfy the demands of the U.S. STEM labor market. Differences in Postsecondary Education Degree Attainment In addition to achievement gaps at the K-12 educational level, another central topic of discussion in conversations about STEM education policy is the underrepresentation of women and certain ethnic and racial groups in bachelor and doctoral degree attainment in science and engineering. For example, in the decade between 2000 and 2010, overall graduate enrollments in S&E fields grew by 35%. The following section discusses selected historical federal STEM education measures, as well as legislative efforts in the 114 th and 115 th Congresses that are relevant to STEM education policy. Data Sources and Major Publications A number of sources and major publications provide data about the federal STEM education effort and the condition of STEM education in the United States and around the globe. It is published every two years.

The term STEM education refers to teaching and learning in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. It typically includes educational activities across all grade levels—from pre-school to post-doctorate—in both formal (e.g., classrooms) and informal (e.g., afterschool programs) settings. Federal policymakers have an active and enduring interest in STEM education, and the topic is frequently raised in federal science, education, workforce, national security, and immigration policy debates. Various attempts to assess the federal STEM education effort have produced different estimates of its scope and scale. These efforts have identified between 105 and 254 STEM education programs and activities at 13 to 15 federal agencies. Annual federal appropriations for STEM education are typically in the range of $2.8 billion to $3.4 billion. All published inventories identify the Department of Education, National Science Foundation, and the Department of Health and Human Services as key agencies in the federal effort. Over half of federal STEM education funding is intended to serve the needs of postsecondary schools and students; the remainder goes to efforts at the K-12 educational level. Much of the funding for postsecondary students is in the form of financial aid, including fellowships and grants. It is often suggested that the United States performs poorly in STEM education, but the data paint a complex picture. By some measures, U.S. students appear to be doing quite well. For example, overall graduate student enrollments in science and engineering (S&E) grew 15% over the last decade. Further, S&E degree attainment for groups traditionally underrepresented in STEM majors—such as Hispanic/Latino, African American, and female students—grew by 122%, 35%, and 37%, respectively. On the other hand, concerns remain about persistent academic achievement gaps between various demographic groups, STEM teacher quality, the rankings of U.S. students on international STEM assessments, foreign student enrollments and increased educational attainment in other countries, and the ability of the U.S. STEM education system to meet domestic demand for STEM labor. Federal STEM education policy concerns center on broad issues—such as governance of the federal effort and broadening participation of underrepresented populations—as well as those that are specific to STEM education at the elementary, secondary, and postsecondary levels. Governance concerns focus on perceived duplication and lack of coordination in the federal effort; broadening participation concerns tend to highlight achievement and participation gaps between various demographic groups. A variety of policy options have garnered attention in recent years, relating to elementary, secondary, and postsecondary STEM education. At the K-12 level, these include proposals to address educational accountability, standards, and teacher quality. At the postsecondary level, proposals center on efforts to remediate and retain students in STEM majors. This report is intended to serve as a primer on existing STEM education policy issues and programs. It covers the federal STEM education effort and the condition of STEM education in the United States, and examines selected policy issues central to the contemporary federal conversation about STEM education. It also provides a history of major federal legislative efforts impacting STEM education.

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In recent years, parts of the West have been subject to prolonged drought conditions, including a severe drought in California that lasted from 2012 to 2016. Although by most metrics the drought in California has ended, debate regarding the possible detrimental effects of certain federal water supply-related authorities, as well as the federal role in water resources development more broadly, continues. Although some argue that a rollback of existing environmental protections should be only a temporary measure taken during times of drought (if at all), others contend that the drought in California magnified an issue that needs to be addressed, regardless of hydrological conditions. The 114 th Congress saw significant drought-related legislation enacted in the form of Subtitle J of the Water Resources Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322 ). The WIIN Act included a number of provisions generally related to Reclamation, as well as several provisions specifically focusing on the operations of the CVP. Some, but not all, of those provision are scheduled to sunset after five years. In the 115 th Congress, multiple proposals (including those that were previously proposed but were not enacted in the WIIN Act) have been consolidated in H.R. 23 , the Gaining Responsibility on Water Act of 2017 (GROW Act). The House Rules Committee version of H.R. 23 included seven titles. Titles I-IV are for the most part specific to California. They include directives for the operation of the CVP and amendments to the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA; Title XXXIV of P.L. 102-575 ) and the San Joaquin River Restoration Act (Title X of P.L. 111-11 , the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009), among other things. Titles V-VII would be West-wide in their application and would include changes related to water supply development on federal lands and Reclamation's project development process. These titles also would include restrictions on the federal government's abilities to exercise reserved water rights. Supporters of the bill argue that these changes would provide more water to users from existing and new sources while safeguarding existing state water rights. Opponents believe that the bill goes too far in rolling back environmental protections, which, along with the effects of other parts of the legislation (e.g., potential new storage projects), could be detrimental to species and their habitats. Several of the bill's titles have been considered and/or passed by the House in the 115 th or prior congresses. Other titles are new or altered compared to language that has been considered previously. Based on past congressional debates, some provisions (in particular those that would preempt state law and make major changes to CVP operations and the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement) may be controversial. In considering these provisions, Congress may consider the trade-offs involved in proposed changes. The remainder of this report focuses on the most prominent provisions of H.R. It is not an exhaustive summary of the bill, but it provides relevant context and background for individual titles and sections. The report also provides a broad discussion of potential issues for Congress in considering this legislation. 23 would establish a new framework for implementation, including priority listing of restoration projects and other conditions and requirements; allow for the release of flows under the SJRRS only if mitigation actions, including actions to mitigate the effects of the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement on landowners, have been implemented; direct that the settlement may not result in material adverse impacts to third parties, including groundwater seepage or groundwater rising above a threshold of 10 feet below the surface; require that costs for any fish barriers that need to be installed pursuant to ESA will be paid by DOI; forbid the acquisition of land to implement the SJRRS through eminent domain; declare that Sections 5930-5948 of the California Fish and Game Code and other applicable federal laws and the settlement agreement are met through compliance with the bill's provisions; and declare that under conditions in which flows beyond Exhibit B of the SJRRS are recommended, then the authority to implement the settlement would terminate.

In recent years, parts of the American West (i.e., the 17 states west of the Mississippi River) have been subject to prolonged drought conditions, including a severe drought in California that lasted from 2012 to 2016. Dating to the 112th Congress, several bills were proposed to address these conditions. The 114th Congress saw significant drought-related legislation enacted in the form of Subtitle J of the Water Resources Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322). The WIIN Act included a number of provisions generally related to the Bureau of Reclamation (or Reclamation, a bureau within the Department of the Interior), as well as several provisions specifically focusing on the operations of the Central Valley Project (CVP), a large federal water project in California. Some, but not all, of those provisions are scheduled to sunset after five years. Although by most metrics the drought in California has ended, debate continues regarding the possible detrimental effects of certain federal water supply-related authorities and the federal role in water resources development more broadly. Although some argue that rollback of existing environmental protections should be only a temporary measure taken during times of drought (if at all), others contend that the drought in California magnified an issue that needs to be addressed, regardless of hydrological conditions. In the 115th Congress, multiple proposals (including those that were previously proposed but were not enacted in the WIIN Act) have been consolidated in H.R. 23, the Gaining Responsibility on Water Act of 2017 (GROW Act). The House Rules Committee version of H.R. 23 included seven titles. Titles I-IV of the bill are for the most part specific to California and include directives for the operation of the CVP and amendments to the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA; Title XXIV of P.L. 102-575) and the San Joaquin River Restoration Act (Title X of P.L. 111-11, the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009), among other things. Titles V-VII would be West-wide in their application and would include changes related to water supply development on federal lands and Reclamation's project-development process. These titles also would include restrictions on the federal government's abilities to exercise reserved water rights. Supporters of the bill argue that these changes would provide more water to users from existing and new sources while safeguarding existing state water rights. Opponents believe that the bill goes too far in rolling back environmental protections, which, along with the effects of other parts of the legislation (e.g., potential new storage projects), could be detrimental to species and their habitat. Several of the bill's titles have been considered and/or passed by the House in the 115th or prior congresses. Other titles are new or altered compared to language that has been considered previously. Based on past congressional debates, some provisions (in particular those that would make major changes to CVP operations and the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement) may be controversial. In considering these provisions, Congress may consider the trade-offs involved in proposed changes. This report focuses on the most prominent provisions of H.R. 23. It provides relevant context and background for individual titles and sections, as well as a broad discussion of potential issues for Congress in considering this legislation.

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Head Start Program Overview Head Start is a federal program that has provided comprehensive early childhood development services to low-income children and their families since 1965. Most children served in Head Start programs are three- and four-year olds, but in 1994 legislation expanded Head Start to include an Early Head Start program, which serves children from birth to three years of age. Except as noted, the term Head Start in this report typically refers to both of these programs. Head Start is administered by the Office of Head Start (OHS) within the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which provides grants directly from the federal government to local entities (as opposed to providing funding through the state). The Head Start program is currently due for reauthorization. The Head Start Act was last reauthorized in December 2007, with the enactment of the Improving Head Start for School Readiness Act of 2007 ( P.L. In addition, when Head Start was reauthorized in 2007, programs were given the authority to fill up to 35% of their slots with children from families with income between 100% and 130% of the poverty line, provided that these children are not given higher priority than children who are homeless or living below poverty. FY2014 Funding Status and Issues Funding Gap and Continuing Resolution Congress did not enact FY2014 appropriations prior to the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013. This resulted in a funding gap and partial government shutdown that lasted until a short-term continuing resolution (CR) was signed into law on October 17, 2013. That CR ( P.L. 113-46 ) funds Head Start at its annualized FY2013 post-sequester levels through January 15, 2014. Preliminary Congressional Action On July 11, 2013, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved an FY2014 appropriations bill ( S. 1284 , S.Rept. The House Appropriations Committee has not taken action on an FY2014 L-HHS-ED appropriations bill. This amount is roughly $2 billion (+27%) more than the program's post-sequester FY2013 funding level of $7.573 billion. The President's request included $1.4 billion for a newly proposed Early Head Start-Child Care Partnership Program, $25 million for certain implementation costs related to the Head Start Designation Renewal System, and a 1.9% cost-of-living adjustment for existing grantees. This amount is $395 million (-5%) less than Head Start's FY2012 funding level of $7.969 billion. This FY2013 funding level reflects amounts provided in the final FY2013 appropriations law ( P.L. 113-6 ), an across-the-board rescission of 0.2% required by Section 3004 of the final FY2013 appropriations law (as interpreted by the Office of Management and Budget), reductions required by the sequestration ordered on March 1, and any potential transfers or reprogramming of funds pursuant to the authority of the Secretary. "Sequestration" is an automatic across-the-board spending reduction process under which budgetary resources are permanently canceled to enforce budget policy goals. Under the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. According to HHS, roughly 57,000 children were cut from Head Start programs in FY2013 as a result of the sequester. 113-2 ), in response to Hurricane Sandy. Prior to the enactment of P.L. 112-6 , P.L. Allocation Formula Unlike some other federal social service programs that are funded through the states, HHS awards Head Start funds directly to local public and private nonprofit and for-profit grantees. Under the President's proposal, interested states would have submitted a plan for the approval of both HHS and the Department of Education, in which they would outline state preschool goals and activities; a state accountability program; an explanation of how the current level of enrollment of Head Start-eligible three- and four-year-olds would be maintained (if not exceeded); information regarding the most recent year's spending on Head Start and state preschool programs, and assurances that this level would be at a minimum maintained; plans for assuring professional development for staff; and the plans for coordination of programs and funding (state and federal) for the purpose of promoting school readiness. degree relating to early childhood by the end of FY2011. 110-134 .

Head Start is a federal program that has provided comprehensive early childhood development services to low-income children since 1965. The program seeks to promote school readiness by enhancing the social and cognitive development of children through the provision of educational, health, nutritional, social, and other services. Head Start is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Federal Head Start funds are provided directly to local grantees rather than through states. Programs are locally designed and are administered by a network of roughly 1,600 public and private nonprofit and for-profit agencies. Most children served in Head Start programs are three- and four-year olds, but in 1994 Head Start was expanded to include an Early Head Start program, which serves children from birth to three years of age. Except as noted, the term Head Start in this report typically refers to both of these programs. The FY2013 operating level for Head Start was $7.573 billion. This amount is $395 million (-5%) less than Head Start's FY2012 funding level of $7.969 billion. The FY2013 operating level includes amounts provided in the final FY2013 appropriations law (P.L. 113-6), an across-the-board rescission of 0.2% (per Section 3004 of P.L. 113-6), and reductions required by the sequester ordered on March 1, 2013. Sequestration is an automatic spending reduction process in which budgetary resources are canceled to enforce budget policy goals. The FY2013 sequester was ordered by the President as a result of provisions in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), as amended. According to HHS, roughly 57,000 children were cut from Head Start programs as a result of this sequester. In FY2013, Head Start also received roughly $95 million (post-sequester) from P.L. 113-2 for disaster relief costs related to Hurricane Sandy. These funds were appropriated in addition to funds provided in the final FY2013 appropriations law. Congress did not enact FY2014 appropriations prior to the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013. This resulted in a funding gap and partial government shutdown that lasted until a short-term continuing resolution (CR) was signed into law on October 17, 2013. That CR (P.L. 113-46) funds Head Start at its annualized FY2013 post-sequester levels through January 15, 2014. Prior to the start of the fiscal year, in July 2013, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved an appropriations bill (S. 1284, S.Rept. 113-71) that would have provided Head Start with $9.621 billion in FY2014. This is the full amount requested in the FY2014 President's Budget and is roughly $2 billion (+27%) more than the program's post-sequester FY2013 operating level. The President's request included $1.4 billion for a newly proposed Early Head Start-Child Care Partnership Program. The House Appropriations Committee has not taken action on this bill. The Head Start Act was most recently reauthorized with the signing of the Improving Head Start for School Readiness Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-134) on December 12, 2007. This law authorized the program through the end of FY2012, meaning that Head Start is currently due for reauthorization. The 2007 reauthorization law included provisions to increase the program's authorized funding levels; revise the allocation formula; limit grantee designation periods to five years (at which point the grant may be re-competed); expand eligibility to allow grantees to fill up to 35% of their slots with children from families with income between 100% and 130% of the poverty line (in certain circumstances); increase qualifications and training requirements for Head Start staff; delineate roles and responsibilities of a grantee's governing body and policy council; and terminate the National Reporting System. The law also contained provisions aimed at promoting coordination among Head Start grantees and other state and local early childhood programs.

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Title I-A is the largest program in the ESEA, funded at $14.4 billion for FY2015. Title I-A is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The ESEA was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ) on December 10, 2015. This report provides final FY2015 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest total Title I-A grant amount ($1.7 billion) and, as a result, the largest percentage share (11.81%) of Title I-A grants. Wyoming received the smallest total Title I-A grant amount ($33.1 million) and, as a result, the smallest percentage share (0.23%) of Title I-A grants.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95) on December 10, 2015. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and is funded at $14.4 billion for FY2015. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others. This report provides final FY2015 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest FY2015 Title I-A grant amount ($1.7 billion or 11.81% of total Title I-A grants). Wyoming received the smallest FY2015 Title I-A grant amount ($33.1 million or 0.23% of total Title I-A grants).

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U.S. employers in various industries argue that they need to hire foreign workers to perform low-skilled jobs. A threshold question about importing temporary lower-skilled workers, sometimes referred to as guest workers, is whether U.S. employers need foreign workers for lower-skilled positions, or whether there is a sufficient number of available U.S. workers who could fill these jobs. The H-2A and H-2B programs are administered by the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the Department of Labor (DOL) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While there are many differences between the H-2A agricultural worker program and the H-2B nonagricultural worker program, the process of importing workers under either program entails the same steps. INA provisions on the admission of H-2A workers state that an H-2A petition cannot be approved unless the petitioner has applied to DOL for certification that (1) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified … and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (2) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed. The Obama Administration initially retained both the 2008 DHS and DOL final rules on the H-2B visa. As noted above, this rule is not currently in effect. The J-1 visa is for individuals participating in work- and study-based exchange visitor programs and encompasses a variety of work-related programs. Among the positions they hold are H-2B-like seasonal jobs at resorts and amusement parks. In May 2012, DOS published a second interim final rule on the SWT program, most of which became effective that month. Labor advocates argue that the program provides too few protections for workers. Some bills would amend INA provisions on the H-2A visa, while others would establish new temporary agricultural worker programs as alternatives to the H-2A program. Still other proposals would couple a legalization program for agricultural workers either with H-2A reform, as in the traditional AgJOBS formulation, or with other changes to current law on agricultural labor. Policy Considerations Generally speaking, as discussed above, guest worker programs try to achieve two goals simultaneously: to be responsive to legitimate employer needs for labor and to provide adequate protections for U.S. and foreign temporary workers. Intended to protect job opportunities for U.S. workers, labor certification entails a determination by DOL of whether qualified U.S. workers are available to perform the needed work and whether the hiring of foreign workers will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. A main difference between the DOL H-2A and H-2B rules issued by the George W. Bush Administration in 2008 and the rules issued by the Obama Administration in 2010 and 2012 concerns implementation of the labor market test. Legislative guest worker proposals in recent Congresses have also incorporated various forms of labor attestation. The 2011 DOL rule on H-2B wage rates has been highly controversial, with some critics arguing that the new wage requirements will make the H-2B program prohibitively expensive. Like the H-2B program, other capped temporary worker programs in current law have fixed statutory numerical limits. Adjustment of Status of Guest Workers The issue of adjustment of status, or the change of immigration status to legal permanent resident (LPR) status in the United States, arises in connection with guest worker programs. Appendix C. H-2A and H-2B Visa Issuances Appendix D. DHS and DOL Regulations on H-2A and H-2B Nonimmigrants and their Employment in the United States H-2A Regulations: DHS The 2008 DHS final rule on the H-2A visa made various changes to prior regulations.

U.S. employers in various industries argue that they need to hire foreign workers to perform lower-skilled jobs, while others maintain that many of these positions could be filled by U.S. workers. Under current law, certain lower-skilled foreign workers, sometimes referred to as guest workers, may be admitted to the United States to perform temporary service or labor under two temporary worker visas: the H-2A visa for agricultural workers and the H-2B visa for nonagricultural workers. Both programs are administered by the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS/USCIS) and the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Administration (DOL/ETA). The H-2A and H-2B programs—and guest worker programs broadly—strive both to be responsive to legitimate employer needs for labor and to provide adequate protections for U.S. and foreign temporary workers. There is much debate, however, about how to strike the appropriate balance between these twin goals. Under the George W. Bush Administration, both DHS and DOL issued regulations to streamline the H-2A and H-2B programs. The Obama Administration retained the DHS rules, but rewrote the DOL rules. Arguing that the latter provided inadequate protections for workers, it issued a new DOL final rule on H-2A employment, which became effective in March 2010. The Obama Administration also issued a new DOL final rule on H-2B employment in 2012 and a DOL final rule on H-2B wage rates in 2011, but neither of these rules is currently in effect. Bringing workers into the United States under either the H-2A program or H-2B program is a multi-agency process involving DOL, DHS, and the Department of State. As an initial step in the process, employers must apply for DOL labor certification to ensure that U.S. workers are not available for the jobs in question and that the hiring of foreign workers will not adversely affect U.S. workers. The labor certification process has long been criticized as ineffective, with employers complaining that it is burdensome and unresponsive to their labor needs and labor advocates arguing that it provides too few protections for workers. The H-2A program and foreign agricultural workers in general have been a focus of congressional attention in recent Congresses. Proposals have been introduced as recently as in the 112th Congress that would have amended current law on the H-2A visa, while others would have established new temporary agricultural worker programs as alternatives to the H-2A program. Still other proposals would have coupled a legalization program for agricultural workers with either H-2A or other agricultural labor-related reform. DOL's recent rules on H-2B employment and wages also have been subjects of congressional interest. Guest worker proposals may contain provisions on a range of component policy issues. Key policy considerations include the labor market test to determine whether U.S. workers are available for the positions, wages, and enforcement. The issue of adjustment of status, which means the change to legal permanent resident (LPR) status in the United States, may also arise in connection with guest worker programs. While the discussion of current guest worker programs in this report focuses on the H-2A and H-2B visas, it also covers the Summer Work Travel (SWT) program, the largest of several programs under the J-1 visa for participants in work- and study-based exchange visitor programs. The SWT program is particularly relevant because participants work largely in unskilled jobs, including H-2B-like seasonal jobs at resorts and amusement parks.

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A company's ability to produce crude oil depends on access to oil deposits, but it also depends on access to modern technology. The effects of rising world demand and higher prices since 2003 can be seen in the increased output of most of the companies on the list. Objectives Privately held companies have the goal of maximizing shareholder value. The national oil companies of more developed nations, Statoil in Norway, and Petronas in Malaysia, for example, tend to follow a more commercially oriented strategy than the Nigerian National Petroleum Co. and Petroleos de Venezuela, where government objectives largely supplant commercial objectives, and the companies are under pressure to maximize the flow of funds to the national treasuries. However, in some cases technological factors make this strategy difficult. For some countries and their national oil companies, oil supply security means the ownership, or exclusive rights to, desired supplies of oil. Characteristics of National Oil Companies Because national oil companies may be motivated by different objectives than private oil companies, their performance characteristics are also likely to be different. However, those firms, the international oil companies, hold a shrinking fraction of the world's reserve base. In the longer term, damage to the world oil market could be enhanced by the dominant position the national oil companies have in terms of potential reserve access. If the national oil companies do not undertake investment on this scale, and if they and their governments exclude the international oil companies from developing reserves in their countries, the world oil market could be supply-constrained in the future, and prices might be higher than if higher investment took place. The international oil companies may not have access to what they consider to be favorable prospects. For example, while an oil-producing nation's government might be willing to try to coerce private oil companies, they might be less willing to do so to a company directly tied to the U.S. government. If the national oil companies hold the title to ever greater portions of actual and potential oil reserves, production, and exploration and development activities, and if they are relatively less capable of utilizing those resources, oil supplies are likely to be relatively constrained in the future. The private international oil companies are unlikely to be able to counter national oil companies to preserve their own profit-seeking interests as well as those of the U.S. market, which requires adequate physical supply at moderate prices. Adnoc is the state-owned company of the United Arab Emigrates CNOOC is a 71% state-owned company of China INOC is the state-owned company of Iraq KPC is the state-owned company of Kuwait Libya NOC is the state-owned company of Libya NIOC is the state-owned company of Iran NNPC is the state-owned company of Nigeria ONGC is the 71.4% state-owned company of India PDVSA is the state-owned company of Venezuela Pemex is the state-owned company of Mexico Pertamina is the state-owned company of Indonesia PetroChina is the 90% state-owned company of China Petronas is the state-owned company of Malaysia QP is the state-owned company of Qatar Rosneft is the 75.16% state-owned company of Russia Saudi Aramco is the state-owned company of Saudi Arabia Sonatrach is the state-owned company of Algeria Statoil is the 70.9% state oil company of Norway

In the United States, the term "big oil companies" is likely to be taken to mean the major private international oil companies, largely based in Europe or America. However, while some of those companies are indeed among the largest in the world, by many important measures, a majority of the largest oil companies are state-owned, national oil companies. By conventional definitions, national oil companies hold the majority of petroleum reserves and produce the majority of the world's supply of crude oil. Since national oil companies generally hold exclusive rights to exploration and development of petroleum resources within the home country, they also can decide on the degree to which they require participation by private companies in those activities. The national oil companies typically do not operate strictly on the basis of market principles. Because of their close ties to the national government, in many cases their objectives might include wealth re-distribution, jobs creation, general economic development, economic and energy security, and vertical integration. Although these objectives might be desirable from the point of view of the nation's government, they are unlikely to be equivalent to the maximization of shareholder value, the stated objective of the private international oil companies. Differing objectives might be considered to be important only if they lead to different characteristics and outcomes, which is the case for the national oil companies. Many of these companies have been found to be inefficient, with relatively low investment rates. They tend to exploit oil reserves for short-term gain, possibly damaging oil fields, reducing the longer term production potential. Some also have limited access to international capital markets because of poor business practices and a lack of transparency in their business deals. High oil prices since late 2003 have masked the effect of some of these characteristics in the flow of oil revenues. However, if the price of oil moderates, the potential supply constraint related to the inefficient operations of the national oil companies may be a destabilizing factor in the world oil market. A wide variety of policy directions can be taken to mitigate the potential challenge posed by the dominance of national oil companies. Demand management policy can reduce the U.S. dependence on imports. The U.S. government can use its political influence to try to encourage nations not to use national oil companies to forward the aims of the government, but to follow commercial practices to maximize revenue flows. An expanded supply of oil could be encouraged as a condition for trade and aid agreements in some cases. Finally, promoting international trade and recognized commercial practices could be encouraged.

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111-148 , as amended) generally incentivize large employers to offer adequate and affordable health insurance coverage to their full-time employees and their full-time employees' dependents. If an applicable large employer fails to offer health insurance or offers substandard coverage to its employees, that employer may be subject to a penalty. As shown in Figure 1 , all common-law employers, including government entities (such as federal, state, local, or Indian tribal government entities), are responsible for annually determining whether they are considered an applicable large employer (ALE). An ALE is generally an employer that has at least 50 full-time employees (including full-time equivalent employees , which are a representation of non-full-time employees as full-time employees). If an employer qualifies as an ALE in a given year, then it will be subject to the ESRP in the subsequent year. If an employer does not offer such coverage, the employer risks being subject to a penalty if at least one full-time employee receives a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy through a health insurance exchange (exchange). If an employer does not qualify as an ALE, then it will not be subject to the ESRP, nor will it be at risk of a penalty for failing to offer health insurance coverage to its full-time employees. If an employer does not qualify as an ALE, then it will not be subject to the ESRP, nor will it be at risk of a penalty for failing to offer appropriate health insurance coverage to its full-time employees. Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Once an employer is determined to be an ALE, the employer must either satisfy the ESRP by offering affordable and adequate health insurance coverage to its full-time employees (and their dependents) or risk being subject to a penalty payment if at least one full-time employee receives a premium tax credit through an exchange. Penalty for Applicable Large Employers Offering Health Insurance Coverage to at Least 95% of Full-Time Employees If, for 2018, an ALE was subject to an ESRP penalty and offered health insurance to more than 95% of its full-time employees (and their dependents), the monthly penalty amount is the lesser of the following: the number of full-time employees who received a premium credit multiplied by one-twelfth of $3,480 for any applicable month, or the total number of the firm's full-time employees minus 30, multiplied by one-twelfth of $2,320 for any applicable month.

The employer shared responsibility provisions (ESRP), which often are referred to as the employer mandate, generally incentivize large employers to offer adequate and affordable health insurance coverage to their full-time employees and full-time employees' dependents. If an applicable large employer fails to offer health insurance or offers substandard coverage to its employees, the employer may be subject to a penalty (i.e., assessment payment). All common-law employers, including government entities (such as federal, state, local, or Indian tribal government entities), are responsible for annually determining whether they are considered an applicable large employer (ALE), which is generally an employer that has at least 50 full-time employees (including full-time equivalent employees, which are a representation of non-full-time employees as full-time employees). If an employer qualifies as an ALE in a given year, then it will be subject to the ESRP in the subsequent year, meaning it will have to offer adequate, affordable health insurance coverage to generally all of its full-time employees (and their dependents) or it will risk being subject to one of two penalties. Regardless of penalty type, a penalty will be triggered only if at least one full-time employee receives financial assistance through an exchange. These types of financial assistance generally are not available to employees who were offered affordable and adequate coverage by their employer. If an employer does not qualify as an ALE, then it will not be subject to the ESRP and will not face a penalty for failing to offer health insurance coverage to its full-time employees. Which potential ESRP penalty an ALE may be subject to is contingent upon whether an ALE offered appropriate health insurance to enough of its full-time employees (and their dependents). If an ALE offered appropriate health insurance to 95% or more of its full-time employees (and their dependents) and at least one employee received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy through a health insurance exchange, then the employer may be subject a penalty that is the lesser of (1) an amount based on the number of people who received financial assistance through an exchange or (2) an amount based on the number of the firm's full-time employees. If an ALE did not offer appropriate health insurance coverage to its full-time employees (or offered appropriate coverage to less than 95% of its full-time employees and their dependents) and at least one employee received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy through a health insurance exchange, then the employer may be subject to a penalty based on the number of the firm's full-time employees.

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Introduction The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) Act of 1965 was enacted to help preserve, develop, and ensure access to outdoor recreation resources. The law created the Land and Water Conservation Fund in the Treasury as a funding source to implement its outdoor recreation goals. The fund accumulates the majority of its revenues from oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). These mandatory appropriations had been relatively small through FY2017, but are estimated to have increased substantially in FY2018 and to remain relatively high at least over the next decade. Of current debate is whether to reauthorize provisions of the LWCF Act beyond September 30, 2018, and alter the operation of the fund. Alterations under discussion include whether to permanently reauthorize the LWCF Act, make all or a portion of the appropriations under that law mandatory (rather than discretionary), direct monies to be used for particular purposes provided for in the LWCF Act, or amend the law to authorize the fund to be used for different purposes. Perennial congressional issues include (1) deciding the total appropriation for federal land acquisition, determining the level of acquisition funds for each of the four agencies, and identifying which lands should be acquired; (2) deciding the level of funding for the state grant program; and (3) determining what, if any, other purposes should be funded through LWCF and at what level. From FY1965 through FY2018, about $40.0 billion has been credited to the LWCF under both the LWCF Act and GOMESA. Purposes of LWCF Appropriations Appropriations from LWCF have been made for three general purposes: (1) federal acquisition of land and waters and interests therein; (2) the stateside grants for recreational planning; acquiring recreational lands, waters, or related interests; and developing outdoor recreational facilities; and (3) related purposes. Federal Land Acquisition The LWCF is the principal source of funds for federal acquisition of lands. Most federal lands are acquired (and managed) by four agencies—the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture, and the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in DOI. Under the competitive grant program, begun in FY2014, the NPS awards discretionary grants to urbanized areas meeting certain criteria. In addition, mandatory appropriations are provided for the traditional state grants only. Specifically, under GOMESA, 12.5% of the revenues from certain OCS leasing in the Gulf of Mexico is directed to the stateside program to be used in accordance with the terms of the LWCF Act. The states award their grant money through a competitive, open project selection process based on their recreation plans and their own priorities and selection criteria. Congress has continued to fund a competitive program each year, with funding increasing from $3.0 million in FY2014 to $20.0 million in FY2018. Since FY1998, the LWCF has been used for an array of other purposes related to lands and resources, such as maintenance of agency facilities (including deferred maintenance), the Historic Preservation Fund, the Payments in Lieu of Taxes program, the FS Forest Legacy program, FWS State and Tribal Wildlife grants, and FWS Cooperative Endangered Species grants. Since FY2008, however, funds have been appropriated annually for grants under two programs: Forest Legacy, and the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund. Funding History Overview of Total Appropriations, FY1965-FY2018 Nearly all of the $18.4 billion appropriated throughout the history of the LWCF was discretionary funding. The $18.4 billion appropriated through FY2018 has been unevenly allocated among federal land acquisition, the stateside program, and other purposes, as shown in Figure 2 . Overview of Discretionary Appropriations, FY1965-FY2018 Annual discretionary appropriations from the LWCF have fluctuated widely since the origin of the program more than 50 years ago. Reauthorization of LWCF Act Provisions Under the LWCF Act, the authority for the LWCF to receive $900 million in revenues annually is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2018. Under the traditional state grant program, a portion of the appropriation is to be distributed equally among the states, with the percentage varying depending on the total amount of appropriations.

The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) Act of 1965 was enacted to help preserve, develop, and ensure access to outdoor recreation facilities to strengthen the health of U.S. citizens. The law created the Land and Water Conservation Fund in the U.S. Treasury as a funding source to implement its outdoor recreation goals. The LWCF has been used for three general purposes. First, it has been the principal source of monies for land acquisition for outdoor recreation by four federal agencies—the National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Forest Service. Second, the LWCF also funds a matching grant program to assist states in recreational planning, acquiring recreational lands and waters, and developing outdoor recreational facilities. There are two aspects to this "stateside" program: the traditional state grants and the more recent competitive state grants. Under the traditional state grant program, a portion of the appropriation is divided equally among the states, with the remainder apportioned based on need. Each state awards its grant money based on its own outdoor recreation plan and priorities. The competitive state grant program, begun in FY2014, funds recreation projects in urbanized areas meeting certain criteria. Third, beginning in FY1998, LWCF has been used to fund other federal programs with related purposes, such as the Forest Legacy program of the Forest Service and grants under the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund of the Fish and Wildlife Service. Under the LWCF Act, the fund is authorized through September 30, 2018, to accrue $900 million annually from multiple sources. However, nearly all of the revenue is derived from oil and gas leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The LWCF receives additional money under more recent legislation (P.L. 109-432, "GOMESA"). Throughout the history of the LWCF, $40.0 billion in revenues have accrued under both the LWCF Act and GOMESA. Congress determines the level of funding for the three LWCF purposes through the annual appropriations process. These discretionary appropriations have fluctuated widely since the origin of the program. In addition, any funds deposited under GOMESA are mandatory appropriations for the state grant program. Mandatory appropriations were relatively small from FY2009-FY2017. They increased substantially in FY2018, and are expected to remain relatively high at least over the next decade, due to additional revenues from leasing in the Gulf of Mexico. Less than half of the $40.0 billion in total revenues that have accrued in the LWCF have been appropriated ($18.4 billion). FY2001 marked the highest funding ever, with appropriations exceeding the authorized level by reaching nearly $1 billion. For FY2018, the most recent fiscal year, the total appropriation was $487.6 million (with $425.0 million in discretionary funds and $62.6 million in mandatory funds). The $18.4 billion appropriated through the history of the program has been allocated unevenly among federal land acquisition (61%), the state grant program (25%), and other purposes (14%). Similarly, federal land acquisition funds have been allocated unevenly among the four agencies. A variety of issues pertaining to the LWCF are the subject of legislation, hearings, and other debate. Some of them are being considered as part of deliberations over whether to reauthorize the LWCF beyond September 30, 2018. Issues include the optimal level of funding for LWCF overall and its individual components, whether to reauthorize provisions of the LWCF, and whether to retain discretionary appropriations or provide additional mandatory appropriations. Other issues involve whether LWCF funds should be used for additional purposes, such as maintenance, or set aside for particular priorities, such as securing additional access to federal lands for recreation. The priority of the state grant program vis-à-vis federal acquisition is being debated, as is the extent to which the fund should be used for other programs benefitting states.

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Introduction This report provides an assessment of current and emerging water procurement and management technologies and practices related to shale energy development in the United States. Water resource management issues associated with shale energy development are of concern to policy makers because shale energy represents an opportunity as well as a challenge. Shale oil and natural gas present significant new energy resources, but their development also may pose risks to water quality and other water uses. The intersection of evolving technology, environmental protection, hydrocarbon energy demand, and national and geopolitical energy and trade interests provide the context for this study. Shale gas and shale oil (collectively referred to as shale energy ), which were long considered "unconventional" hydrocarbon resources, are now experiencing significant development in the United States. Economical extraction relies on directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing ("fracking"). This report discusses the water inputs to shale energy development, wastewater management related to shale energy development (including some related topics such as induced seismicity), and emerging water technologies for both the production of shale energy and the disposal of wastewaters. Primer on Shale Energy Resources Development The extraction of shale energy has the potential to affect U.S. energy security by reducing quantities of crude oil and refined petroleum products purchased in global markets. The typical sources of water for well development have been surface or groundwater. Water quality also must be considered for compatibility with hydraulic fracturing. This is a potential disincentive for oil and gas operators to tap AMD from abandoned mines. The produced formation water can be highly saline, and often is referred to as produced brines. Proper storage and management of these fluids can prevent the potential contamination of groundwater and surface water that would occur if released into the environment. Many factors can influence the volume and management of shale gas produced fluids. Emerging Water Technologies for Shale Energy Development The pace of technological change in water sourcing and water management for shale energy development is rapid, but uneven. Trends in water management have generally been influenced by local disposal costs, regulations, and geologic conditions, rather than by water scarcity alone. These include nontoxic or "green" fracturing fluid additives , driven in part by concerns over the composition of fracturing fluids and increasing requirements of disclosure of fracturing fluid composition; alternatives to freshwater in the fracturing process , including recycled flowback fluids (mixed at various proportions with freshwater), carbon dioxide, nitrogen, hydrocarbon gases (such as ethane and propane), industrial waters, and (in the Appalachian region) potentially acid mine discharge waters; innovative well and well-pad configurations such as multilateral wells, which, in some cases, reduce the total volume of fluids required, but are more likely to have economic advantages in reducing labor, trucking, and other water handling costs; and closed-loop or reduced emission ( "green" ) well completions for handling flowback fluids and minimizing the venting of methane to the atmosphere. Widespread adoption of fracturing practices that minimize the use of freshwater (groundwater, surface waters, or municipally sourced waters) may reduce pressures from the shale energy sector on scarce water supplies in more arid areas such as Texas and the Rocky Mountain states. Water management issues are relevant to the entire life cycle of shale energy development, because fluids will continue to be produced even after a well is drilled, fractured, and producing oil and/or natural gas. Therefore, research that views shale energy production in a life-cycle and materials-flow context may facilitate the identification of technologies and processes that can mitigate potential impacts along different stages of the shale energy development life cycle.

Shale oil and gas (collectively referred to as shale energy), long considered "unconventional" hydrocarbon resources, are now being developed rapidly. Economic extraction of shale energy resources typically relies on the use of hydraulic fracturing. This technique often requires significant amounts of freshwater, and fracturing flowback and related wastewaters must be recycled or disposed of after a well is completed. While shale energy presents a significant energy resource, its development has the potential to pose risks to water availability and water quality. This report provides a technological assessment of existing and emerging water procurement and management practices in shale energy-producing regions of the United States. The intersection of evolving technology, growing environmental concerns, demand for new sources of hydrocarbon energy, and the potential national interests in developing shale oil and gas resources provides the context for this study. Congressional attention has been focused on two key aspects of the issue: shale energy as a growing U.S. energy source, and environmental concerns associated with the development of these resources. Water for shale energy projects is used most intensely in the fracturing portion of a well's life cycle. Under current practices, fracturing typically is a water-dependent activity, often requiring between a few million and 10 million gallons of water per fractured horizontal well. This water demand often is concentrated geographically and temporally during the development of a particular shale formation. Production activities and management and treatment of the wastewater produced during shale energy production (including flowback from fracturing and water produced from source formations) have raised concerns over the potential contamination of groundwater and surface water and induced seismicity associated with wastewater injection wells. Water resource issues may pose constraints on the future development of domestic shale oil and gas. Potential negative effects from shale energy extraction—particularly effects associated with hydraulic fracturing and wastewater management—have prompted state and regional regulatory actions to protect water supplies. Future congressional and executive branch actions may influence development of shale oil and shale gas on federal lands and elsewhere through additional regulatory oversight or other policy actions. At the same time, advances in shale energy extraction and wastewater management techniques may reduce some development impacts. The pace of technological change in water sourcing and water management in the shale energy sector is rapid, but uneven. Trends in water management have generally been influenced by local disposal costs, regulations, and geologic conditions rather than by water scarcity alone. Emerging technologies and practices in water resources management can be divided into those that seek to reduce the amount of consumptive freshwater utilization in the drilling and completion process, and those that seek to lower the costs and/or minimize the potential for negative environmental impacts associated with wastewater management. Water management issues are relevant to the entire life cycle of shale energy development, because fluids will continue to be produced even after a well is drilled, fractured, and producing oil and/or natural gas. Research that views the shale energy production process in a life-cycle and materials-flow context may facilitate the identification of technologies and processes that can mitigate potential impacts along different stages of shale energy development.

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Introduction On August 24, 2006, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced the approval of an application to switch Plan B, an emergency contraceptive, from a prescription-only drug to an over-the-counter (OTC) drug for women 18 years of age and older. Plan B will only be sold OTC in pharmacies or healthcare clinics. It will continue to be dispensed as a prescription drug for women 17 years old and younger. Approval of the switch to OTC for Plan B has been controversial. Conservative religious and pro-life groups believe that readily available Plan B may increase the occurrence of unsafe sexual activity and that such a drug should be used only under the supervision of a healthcare professional. Their primary concern with Plan B, however, is that it might prevent the implantation of the embryo in the uterus, which, for those who believe human life begins at conception, would constitute an abortion. However, the medical community does not consider prevention of implantation to be an abortion, and FDA does not classify Plan B as an abortion drug. In addition, the report discusses the Department of Justice guidelines for the treatment of sexual assault victims, which have been criticized by numerous organizations because they do not mention offering emergency contraception to female rape victims. Plan B is used before a pregnancy can be diagnosed. for more detailed information about sexual assault and pregnancy. On January 13, 2005, a letter signed by 97 Members of Congress was sent to the Director of the Office on Violence Against Women expressing concern over the failure to mention emergency contraception and urging that the Protocol be changed to include such information. H.R. 464 is similar to H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. Individuals who criticize the delayed FDA decision believe that Bush Administration policy and FDA actions were based on political and ideological considerations rather than on sound science. FDA does not classify Plan B as an abortion drug. Research has found that the use of emergency contraception rises when it is made available without a prescription. This same conclusion was reached in a separate review of the medical literature published in April 2007. The authors of this second study found that "advance provision of emergency contraception did not reduce pregnancy rates when compared to conventional provision.... The interventions tested thus far have not reduced overall pregnancy rates in the populations studied." Pro-choice groups believe OTC status for Plan B will reduce the number of unintended pregnancies and reduce the number of abortions performed in the United States. According to Barr Pharmaceuticals, sales of Plan B in the United States have doubled since August 2006, "rising from about $40 million a year to what will probably be close to $80 million for 2007."

On August 24, 2006, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced the approval of an application to switch Plan B, an emergency contraceptive, from a prescription-only drug to an over-the-counter (OTC) drug for women 18 years of age and older. Plan B will only be sold in pharmacies or healthcare clinics. It will continue to be dispensed as a prescription drug for women 17 years old and younger. Plan B is a brand of post-coital contraceptive that is administered within a few hours or days of unprotected intercourse. Emergency contraception prevents pregnancy; it does not disrupt an established pregnancy. Approval of the switch to OTC status for Plan B has been controversial. Some Members of Congress urged the FDA to deny OTC status for Plan B. Individuals who criticize the three-year delay in deciding to switch to OTC believe that Bush Administration policy and FDA actions were based on political and ideological considerations rather than on sound science. Conservative religious and pro-life groups believe Plan B may increase unsafe sexual activity and should be used only under the supervision of a healthcare professional and, therefore, should not be available OTC. Their major concern with Plan B, however, is that it might prevent the implantation of an embryo in the uterus, which to pro-life groups constitutes abortion. However, the medical community does not consider prevention of implantation to be an abortion, and FDA does not classify Plan B as an abortion drug. Emergency contraceptives are currently available without a prescription in more than 40 countries. According to Barr Pharmaceuticals, sales of Plan B in the United States have doubled since August 2006, "rising from about $40 million a year to what will probably be close to $80 million for 2007." Women's health advocates claim that OTC status will improve access to the drug, thereby reducing the number of unintended pregnancies and reducing the number of abortions. However, a medical literature review, published in April 2007, found that "advance provision of emergency contraception did not reduce pregnancy rates when compared to conventional provision.... The interventions tested thus far have not reduced overall pregnancy rates in the populations studied." The Office of Violence Against Women within the Department of Justice (DOJ) has developed guidelines for the treatment of sexual assault victims. The guidelines, released in September 2004, have been criticized by numerous organizations because they do not mention offering emergency contraception to female rape victims. In January 2005, a letter signed by 97 Members of Congress was sent to the Director of the Office on Violence Against Women expressing concern over the failure to mention emergency contraception and urging that the guidelines be changed to include such information. Legislation introduced in the 110th Congress (S. 21/H.R. 819, H.R. 464, S. 1240, H.R. 2064/S. 1800, H.R. 2503, H.R. 2596/S. 1555) aims to ensure that Plan B is made available to women in general and sexual assault victims in particular or encourage education and provide information about Plan B. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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This report analyzes the factors that determine the cost of electricity from new power plants. These factors—including construction costs, fuel expense, environmental regulations, and financing costs—can all be affected by government energy and economic policies. Government decisions to influence, or not influence, these factors can largely determine the kind of power plants that are built in the future. For example, government policies aimed at reducing the cost of constructing power plants could especially benefit nuclear plants, which are costly to build. Policies that reduce the cost of fossil fuels could benefit natural gas plants, which are inexpensive to build but rely on an expensive fuel. The report provides projections of the possible cost of power for new fossil, nuclear, and renewable plants built in 2015. The projections illustrate how different assumptions, such as for the availability of federal incentives, change the cost rankings of the technologies. Key observations include the following: Government incentives can change the relative costs of the generating technologies. For example, federal loan guarantees can turn nuclear power from a high cost technology to a relatively low cost option. The natural gas-fired combined cycle power plant, the most commonly built type of large natural gas plant, is a competitive generating technology under a wide variety of assumptions for fuel price, construction cost, government incentives, and carbon controls. This raises the possibility that power plant developers will continue to follow the pattern of the 1990s and rely heavily on natural gas plants to meet the need for new power generation. With current technology, coal-fired power plants using carbon capture equipment are an expensive source of electricity in a carbon control case. Other power sources, such as wind, nuclear, geothermal, and the natural gas combined cycle plant without capture technology, currently appear to be more economical. None of the projections is intended to be a "most likely" case. Future uncertainties preclude firm forecasts. The value of this discussion is not as a source of point estimates of future power costs, but as a source of insight into the factors that can determine future outcomes, including factors that can be influenced by the Congress. The rankings of the technologies by cost are therefore also an approximation and should not be viewed as definitive estimates of the relative cost-competitiveness of each option. As shown below in Table 15 : A 12% increase in the price of gas would equalize the cost of electricity from the combined cycle plant without carbon capture with wind power (column 3); A 20% increase would equalize the power cost of the combined cycle plant and the nuclear plant; The price of natural gas would have to more than double for the power cost of the gas-fired combined cycle plant to equal the cost of coal power with carbon controls, or increase by 75% to match the cost of solar thermal power.

This report analyzes the factors that determine the cost of electricity from new power plants. These factors—including construction costs, fuel expense, environmental regulations, and financing costs—can all be affected by government energy, environmental, and economic policies. Government decisions to influence, or not influence, these factors can largely determine the kind of power plants that are built in the future. For example, government policies aimed at reducing the cost of constructing power plants could especially benefit nuclear plants, which are costly to build. Policies that reduce the cost of fossil fuels could benefit natural gas plants, which are inexpensive to build but rely on an expensive fuel. The report provides projections of the possible cost of power from new fossil, nuclear, and renewable plants built in 2015, illustrating how different assumptions, such as for the availability of federal incentives, change the cost rankings of the technologies. None of the projections is intended to be a "most likely" case. Future uncertainties preclude firm forecasts. The rankings of the technologies by cost are therefore also an approximation and should not be viewed as definitive estimates of the relative cost-competitiveness of each option. The value of the discussion is not as a source of point estimates of future power costs, but as a source of insight into the factors that can determine future outcomes, including factors that can be influenced by the Congress. Key observations include the following: Government incentives can change the relative costs of the generating technologies. For example, federal loan guarantees can turn nuclear power from a high cost technology to a relatively low cost option. The natural gas-fired combined cycle power plant, the most commonly built type of large natural gas plant, is a competitive generating technology under a wide variety of assumptions for fuel price, construction cost, government incentives, and carbon controls. This raises the possibility that power plant developers will continue to follow the pattern of the 1990s and rely heavily on natural gas plants to meet the need for new generating capacity. With current technology, coal-fired power plants using carbon capture equipment are an expensive source of electricity in a carbon control case. Other power sources, such as wind, nuclear, geothermal, and the natural gas combined cycle without capture technology currently appear to be more economical.

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Background Veterans' employment outcomes in the civilian sector are an issue of ongoing congressional interest. These services are divided into (1) general programs that are broadly available to veterans, (2) programs that target veterans with service-connected disabilities, and (3) competitive grant programs that provide additional employment-related services to veterans but may not be available to all veterans. As the table shows, the unemployment rate for GWII veterans is higher than the unemployment rates of both veterans from other service periods and nonveterans. Comparable data on employment outcomes for nonveterans with disabilities were not available. The unemployment rate for GWII veterans is more dynamic than the unemployment rate for other populations . The similarity of these trends underscores the influence of the broader labor market on veterans' employment outcomes. The veteran-targeted programs in this report are presented in Table 2 . Transition Assistance Program (TAP) TAP provides pre-separation services and counseling on a number of transition-related topics to separating members of the Armed Forces. In addition to guidance on broader transition issues such as financial management and health care, TAP includes information on the following employment issues as they relate to veterans: the correlation between military skills and civilian occupations; professional certifications, including licensing and apprenticeships; public and community service opportunities, including federal employment opportunities and veterans' hiring preferences (described in a subsequent section of this report); self-employment and entrepreneurship, including veterans' small business and entrepreneurship programs; and education and training assistance, including use of veterans' educational benefits and other job training opportunities. The Post-9/11 GI Bill provides separate payments for tuition and fees, supplies, housing, and other costs. In 2011, DOL further operationalized veterans' priority of service in the AJC system by launching a Gold Card initiative directed at post-9/11 veterans. Jobs for Veterans State Grants The Jobs for Veterans State Grants (JVSG) program provides formula grants to states to fund two types of personnel positions that work in conjunction within the AJC system to assist veterans. Federal Employment38 There are several programs and policies that provide a preference for veterans in obtaining employment in the federal government. These policies and programs can either give veterans an advantage in the competitive hiring process or, in some cases, allow a veteran to be appointed without going through the competitive process. Small Business Administration Programs44 The Small Business Administration (SBA) has a variety of programs to assist veterans with developing and managing a small business, financing a small business, and acquiring federal contracts. The Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E) program provides comprehensive services for veterans with a service-connected disability and does not have an analogue among general veterans' programs. Disabled Veterans Outreach Program (DVOP) Employment Services59 DVOP provides formula grants to states to hire staff to provide a range of intensive services to veterans with service-connected disabilities as well as other veterans with multiple barriers to employment. DVOP is part of DOL's JVSG program, which also funds the previously discussed LVER program. Federal Employment. Homeless Veterans Reintegration Program (HVRP)63 HVRP is a competitive grant program administered by DOL.

Veterans' employment outcomes in the civilian labor market are an issue of ongoing congressional interest. This report offers introductory data on veterans' performance in the civilian labor market as well as a discussion of veteran-targeted federal programs that provide employment-related benefits and services. According to federal data, the unemployment rate for veterans who served after September 2001 is higher than the unemployment rate for nonveterans. Conversely, the unemployment rate for veterans from prior service periods (a much larger population than post-9/11 veterans) is lower than the nonveteran unemployment rate. The varied demographic factors of each of these populations likely contribute to variations in employment outcomes, though their degree of influence is unclear. There are a number of federal programs to assist veterans in developing job skills and securing civilian employment. Broadly speaking, these programs can be divided into (1) general veterans' programs, (2) programs that target veterans with service-connected disabilities, and (3) competitive grant programs that offer supplemental services but may not be available to veterans in all areas. General veterans' programs begin with transition programs that are provided to exiting members of the Armed Forces. These transition programs cover a variety of topics, including information on identifying occupations that align with military skills and specializations, conducting job searches, applying for employment, and navigating veterans' benefits. One of the most common veterans' benefits is educational funding through the GI Bill. The GI Bill programs typically provide funding for tuition, fees, books, housing, and other educational costs while the veteran is enrolled. Veterans who are seeking employment without obtaining additional education receive priority of service at local federally funded American Job Center (AJC) locations and may receive assistance from dedicated state personnel. Veterans who wish to pursue employment in the federal government are assisted by several policies that give them preference in the competitive hiring process or, in some cases, allow them to forgo the competitive process and be appointed directly. Veterans who wish to start a small business may receive loans and technical assistance from the Small Business Administration (SBA). Veterans with service-connected disabilities who have obstacles to employment may be assisted by the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E) program. This program provides assistance in identifying an occupation that is consistent with the veteran's skills and interests and providing services (including educational services) to achieve that outcome. Disabled veterans and other veterans with substantial barriers to employment can receive assistance from the Disabled Veterans Outreach Program (DVOP), which funds personnel positions that provide assistance in local labor markets as part of the AJC network. In addition to these nationwide programs, the federal government also funds competitive grant programs for state, local, and private entities to provide employment-oriented services to veterans. These include the Homeless Veterans Reintegration Program, which provides employment services in conjunction with other supportive services.

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Introduction Housing and residential mortgage markets in the United States are continuing to recover from several years of turmoil that began with the bursting of a housing "bubble" that peaked in the mid-2000s and burst in 2007-2008. In addition, housing affordability continues to be an issue for many households in general, and for low-income renter households in particular. The 114 th Congress considered a number of housing-related issues against this backdrop. Congress also considered certain changes related to two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as other housing finance-related issues. These issues included appropriations for housing programs in a limited funding environment, certain reforms to some HUD-assisted housing programs, the reauthorization of the main program of housing assistance for Native American tribes, and debate about GSE contributions to two affordable housing funds that were created in 2008 but received GSE funding for the first time beginning in 2016. Additional issues of active interest to Congress included oversight of HUD on the occasion of the department's 50 th anniversary, issues related to enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, and the status of certain housing-related tax provisions. Home Foreclosures Partly because of rising house prices and decreasing negative equity, mortgage foreclosure rates have also been consistently declining. Both have been increasing somewhat in recent years, though new home sales in particular remain relatively low. Nevertheless, as housing markets have started to stabilize, there have been signs that housing starts are also beginning to increase. Interest Rates Relatively low numbers of mortgage originations have persisted despite continued low mortgage interest rates. Furthermore, a mortgage might be insured by a federal government agency, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Although the supply of rental housing has also increased, both through new construction and as some formerly owner-occupied homes are converted to rentals, in many markets the rise in the number of renters has increased competition for rental housing and pushed up rents. Rising rents can contribute to housing affordability problems, particularly for households with lower incomes. Given these concerns, some Members of Congress have sought to stop Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from funding the Housing Trust Fund and/or the Capital Magnet Fund. As discussed earlier in the " Overview of Housing and Mortgage Market Conditions " section, mortgage originations and home sales are at relatively low levels and mortgage credit is relatively tight compared to the early 2000s, and some argue that the new regulations have contributed to the slow recovery. The Supreme Court's holding in Inclusive Communities that "disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the [FHA]" mirrors previous interpretations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and all 11 federal courts of appeals that had ruled on the issue. HUD's Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) Rule The Fair Housing Act also requires HUD to administer its programs in a way that affirmatively furthers fair housing. This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income. With regard to the first justification, it is not clear that the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums has an effect on the homeownership rate.

Housing and residential mortgage markets in the United States are continuing to recover from several years of turmoil that began in 2007-2008, though the recovery has been uneven across the country. Nationally, home prices have been consistently increasing since 2012. Negative equity and mortgage foreclosure rates have been steadily decreasing, though both remain elevated. Home sales have begun to increase, with sales of existing homes approaching levels that were common in the early 2000s, though sales of new homes and housing starts remain relatively low. Mortgage originations have also remained relatively low despite ongoing low interest rates, leading many to argue that it is too difficult for prospective homebuyers to qualify for a mortgage. Some believe that this is because mortgage regulations put in place in recent years are restricting access to mortgages for creditworthy homebuyers, while others hold that these rules provide important consumer protections and suggest that other factors are limiting mortgage access. About two-thirds of new mortgages continue to be backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac or insured by a government agency such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), with the remaining mortgages mostly being held on bank balance sheets. In the rental housing market, vacancy rates have continued to decline and rents have continued to increase as more households become renters. Although the supply of rental housing has also increased, it has generally not kept pace with the increasing demand. Rising rents have contributed to housing affordability problems, which are especially pronounced for low-income renters. The 114th Congress considered a number of housing-related issues against this backdrop. Some of these issues were related to housing for low-income individuals and families, including appropriations for housing programs in a limited funding environment, proposed reforms to certain rental assistance programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), debate over funding for two affordable housing funds (the Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund), and the possible reauthorization of the main program that provides housing assistance to Native Americans. Congress also took the occasion of HUD's 50th anniversary to reflect on the department's role through hearings and other actions. Congress also deliberated on certain housing finance-related issues, including possible targeted changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, oversight of mortgage-related rulemakings, and issues related to the future and financial health of FHA. Two fair housing issues were also active in the 114th Congress. HUD recently released a new rule updating certain HUD grantees' responsibilities to "affirmatively further" fair housing. Separately, the Supreme Court issued a decision affirming that disparate impact claims are allowable under the Fair Housing Act. Congress expressed interest in both of these developments. As in recent years, the 114th Congress considered several housing-related tax provisions as part of a broader tax extenders bill. These housing-related provisions included extensions of the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, and provisions related to the low-income housing tax credit.

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Most Recent Developments On September 29, 1999, the President signed a $2.457 billion FY2000 legislative branchappropriations bill into Public Law 106-57 (113 Stat. 1905, which passed on June 10 (214-197), contained $1.862 billion, excluding funds for Senate internal activities and Senate activities of the architect of the Capitol.This appropriation was a $54.8 million decrease from the appropriation reported earlier by theHouse Appropriations Committee. The reduction was contained in an amendment agreed to by theHouse. The total legislative appropriation passed by the House was a reduction of $190 million,or 9.3%, from the FY1999 funding level of $2.052 billion, also excluding Senate items. The Senate-passed bill, S. 1206, contained $1.679 billion, excluding funds for House internal activities and House activities of the architect of the Capitol. This was a reduction of $114 million,or 6.4%, from the FY1999 appropriation of $1.793 billion, also excluding funds for House items. Subsequently, the FY2000 legislative budget was rescinded by 0.38% in H.R. 3194, the FY2000 Consolidated Appropriations Act, signed into Public Law 106-113 on November 29, 1999. An FY1999 supplemental appropriation of $5.6 million was made available to the architect of the Capitol in P.L. 106-31 , which was signed on May 21, 1999. The total FY2000 budget represented a decrease of $135.2 million, or6.6%, from the FY1999 level of $2.052, also excluding Senate activities. The Committee's press releaseissued on May 21 noted that the bill reduced the number of FTE staff positions by 98,making a cumulative FTE reduction of 4,412, or 16%, since 1994. On August 4, 1999, confereesapproved a $2.457 billion for the legislative branch budget, a reduction of 4.8%, or$124.1 million, from the FY1999 budget of $2.581 billion. The act- rescinded $3.5 million in FY1999 appropriations of the House of Representatives under the account salaries and expenses, within the headingsalaries, officers and employees, and made available the same amount of $3.5 millionfor the House chief administrative officer to replace the House payrollsystem; made available $3.8 million to the architect of the Capitol for necessary expenses of a House page dormitory; (8) made available $1.8 million to the architect of the Capitol for necessary expenses for life safety renovations to the O'Neill House OfficeBuilding; authorized adjustments in certain leadership allowances (effective in FY2000); authorized each office under the heading House leadership offices to transfer any amounts appropriated for the office among the categories ofallowances and expenses for the office, excluding funds appropriated for officialexpenses (applicable in FY1999); and, established a pilot Russian leadership program in FY1999 under the "leadership of the Librarian of Congress to bring up to 3,000 emergingRussian political leaders to the United States...to give Russian leaders from all levelsof government first hand exposure to the American free market economic system andoperation of American democratic institutions." What additional funds might be needed for securityenhancement for the Capitol, other congressional buildings, and adjacent grounds? How much should be appropriated for the Office of theArchitect's request to undertake capital improvements? Technology Issues House and Senate Legislative Information Systems. (35) As reported by the House Appropriations Committee, H.R.

On September 29, 1999, the President signed a $2.457 billion FY2000 legislative branch appropriations bill into P.L. 106-57 (113 Stat. 408). This represented a reduction of 4.8%, or $124.1million, from the FY1999 budget of $2.581 billion. The House bill, H.R. 1905, contained $1.862 billion, excluding funds for Senate activities and Senate activities of the architect of the Capitol. This appropriation was a $54.8 million decrease fromthat reported by the House Appropriations Committee. The reduction was contained in anamendment agreed to by the House. The total legislative appropriation passed by the House was areduction of $190 million, or 9.3%, from the FY1999 funding level of $2.052 billion, also excludingSenate items. As reported to the House, H.R. 1905 contained $1.917 billion, excluding funds for Senate items. This was a reduction of $135.2 million, or 6.6%, from the FY1999 level of $2.052 billion, also excluding Senate items . The bill reduced FTE staff positions by 98, making a cumulativereduction of 4,412, or 16%, since 1994. The Senate-passed bill, S.1206, contained $1.679 billion, excluding funds for House internal activities and House activities of the architect of the Capitol. This was a reduction of $114 million,or 6.4%, from the FY1999 appropriation of $1.793 billion, also excluding funds for House items . Subsequently, the FY2000 legislative budget was rescinded by 0.38% in P.L. 106-113 , Consolidated Appropriations Act, signed on November 29, 1999. An FY1999 supplemental appropriation of $5.6 million was made available to the architect ofthe Capitol in P.L. 106-31 , which was signed on May 21, 1999. The act contained $3.8 million forthe "necessary expenses of a House page dormitory" and $1.8 million for life safety renovations tothe O'Neill House Office Building. Among issues under consideration were: What additional staff and funds might be necessary to ensure that Congress's computers are Year-2000 compliant? What funds are needed for technology development, including electronicdocument printing and development of a legislative information system? What attention should be given to the support agencies' staff recruitment toreplace employees who are eligible for retirement in the immediate future? How much should funding be increased for security enhancement for theCapitol, other congressional buildings, and adjacent grounds? How much should be appropriated for the Office of the Architect of theCapitol's request to undertake capital improvements? At an appropriation level of $2.457 billion for FY2000, the legislative budget comprises 0.15% of the total federal budget. Key Policy Staff Division abbreviations: GOV/FIN = Government and Finance

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The check would be returned unpaid to the merchant or other third party. Financial institutions have offered overdraft lines of credit for protection against account overdrafts. Participating institutions offer this type of overdraft protection as a feature of their accounts, and customers do not have to apply and qualify for the service. Legislation and Ongoing Concerns Bounced-Check/Overdraft Protection Legislation Currently, three bills address overdraft protection programs in the 111 th Congress: H.R. The bills would enhance consumer protection by increasing consumer knowledge and awareness of overdraft programs and facilitating the ability of consumers to accept or decline overdraft services. Fees associated with these programs would be considered finance charges. H.R. This legislation would require financial institutions offering overdraft protection services for ATM, point-of-sale, online, telephone initiated, and in person transactions to provide a warning notification when an overdraft fee will be imposed and to include the amount of the fee. Consumer Advocate Issues Consumer advocates have been supportive of overdraft protection legislation. Guidance Issued by Federal Regulators In February 2005, federal regulators issued guidance addressing the risks presented by bounced-check or courtesy overdraft protection services. Both documents stated that clear disclosures and explanations to consumers of the operation, costs, and limitations of an institution's overdraft program are essential. On May 19, 2005, the Federal Reserve issued a final rule amending its Regulation DD to provide consumers with uniform and adequate disclosure information concerning bounced-check or courtesy overdraft protection services. Communications that are defined as advertisements, as well as those that are excluded from the definition, are described in detail. 2008 Amendments to Regulation DD On December 18, 2008, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System adopted additional amendments to Regulation DD due to continued concerns with overdraft services despite the issuance of the 2005 guidance and Regulation DD amendments. The intent of these provisions is to ensure that consumers are provided with an accurate idea of their account balance. On November 12, 2009, the Board of Governors issued final rules under Regulation E. These rules require financial institutions to provide consumers the choice of opting in or affirmatively consenting to the institution's overdraft program for ATM and one-time debit card transactions.

Overdraft protection programs are an optional service offered by financial institutions to consumers. These programs are often referred to as "bounced-check protection" or "courtesy overdraft protection" to distinguish them from the more traditional overdraft lines of credit. Participating institutions cover checks drawn on accounts with insufficient funds and charge a fee. Financial institution representatives state that these programs offer a beneficial service to their customers by covering checks that would otherwise be returned unpaid. Consumer advocates argue that these programs are high-cost credit products that are marketed to vulnerable consumers, and that their main purpose is to increase fee income for banks. Federal regulators have monitored the development of overdraft protection programs to ensure that adequate consumer disclosure is being provided and to measure the risk exposure for financial institutions. Several actions have been taken. In February 2005, federal regulators of the banking industry issued guidance concerning bounced-check/overdraft protection services offered by insured depository institutions. The Federal Reserve amended its Regulation DD (Truth in Savings) in May 2005 to address concerns about the adequacy and uniformity of consumer disclosures relating to overdraft services offered by depository institutions, including the advertising of these services. On December 18, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced additional amendments to Regulation DD. The changes aim to facilitate consumer understanding of how overdraft services operate and the costs associated with these programs. On November 12, 2009, the Federal Reserve announced amendments to Regulation E (Electronic Fund Transfers) that provide consumers a choice regarding their institution's payment of overdrafts for automated teller machines (ATMs) and one-time debit transactions. Such payments would be prohibited unless the consumer affirmatively "opts in" or agrees to this type of overdraft protection. Legislation in the 111th Congress (H.R. 1487, H.R. 3904, and S. 1799) would provide enhanced consumer protections for overdraft protection programs. This report will be updated as events and legislation warrant.

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The National Security Council Staff . NSPM-4: What's Changed? On April 4, 2017, the Trump Administration issued National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) - 4: Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees . NSPM-4 details how the executive branch intends to manage and coordinate national and homeland security issues among relevant departments and agencies. This NSPM augments an earlier articulation from the Trump Administration regarding the management of national security matters, as expressed in NSPM-2, which was issued on January 28, 2017. Table A-2 depicts the membership of the PC, from the George H.W.

On April 4, 2017, the Trump Administration issued National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-4: Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees. NSPM-4 details how the executive branch intends to manage and coordinate national and homeland security issues among relevant departments and agencies. This NSPM augments an earlier articulation from the Trump Administration regarding the management of national security matters, as expressed in NSPM-2, which was issued on January 28, 2017. This report offers a brief historical overview of the formation of the National Security Council (NSC), clarifies the terms and structures associated with it, and provides an overview of what changed with the issuance of NSPM-4 on April 4, 2017. In addition, it compares NSC structures for each President going back to the George H.W. Bush Administration.

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A lthough it has national impact, the presidential election is, in essence, 50 state and District of Columbia elections for presidential electors held on the same day throughout the country. The state rules and procedures for filing election contests generally, and with respect to the selection of presidential electors specifically, may vary greatly from state to state. The electoral count law provides that if a contest or challenge in a state to the election or appointment of presidential electors is resolved in that state by an established procedure before the sixth day prior to the meeting of the electors, that such determination shall be "conclusive" and shall "govern" when Congress counts the electoral votes as directed in the Twelfth Amendment. Contests in the State Under the U.S. Constitution, the states are delegated the initial and principal authority for the administration of elections within their jurisdictions, including elections to federal office. A candidate and/or electors who seek to challenge the results of an election of presidential electors within a state must, therefore, follow those state statutes, procedures, and deadlines for filing such challenges and contests. The complaint must allege one of the four statutory grounds for overturning the results of the election (misconduct, fraud, or corruption of an election official; ineligibility of the successful candidate; receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of lawful votes "sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election"; or proof of bribery of voters or election officials). Challenges to Electoral Count in Congress The Twelfth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall meet in joint session to count and certify the electoral votes for President. When Congress meets to count the electoral votes in January following the meeting of the presidential electors in December, objections may be made to the counting of electoral votes from a particular state. Any such objection must be presented in writing and must be signed by at least one Senator and one Representative. For an objection to be sustained, it must be agreed to by each house of Congress meeting separately. By way of example, due to alleged voting irregularities in the state, an objection was made to the Ohio electoral votes during the January 2005 joint session . In accordance with federal law, the chambers withdrew from the joint session to consider the objection, but neither the House nor Senate agreed to accept the objection. Regarding their own congressional elections, the House of Representatives and the Senate have adopted a "but for" test, requiring the contestant to prove that "but for" the alleged fraud or irregularity the result of the election would have b een different.

Questions occasionally surface regarding potential voting fraud or election irregularities in presidential elections. (See, for example, Sean Sullivan and Philip Rucker, "Trump's Claim of 'Rigged' Vote Stirs Fears of Trouble," Washington Post, October 18, 2016, p. A1; Edward-Isaac Dovere, "Fears Mount on Trump's 'Rigged Election' Rhetoric," Politico, October 16, 2016; Daniel Kurtzleben, "5 Reasons (And Then Some) Not to Worry About A 'Rigged' Election," NPR, October 18, 2016). If legitimate and verifiable allegations of voting fraud, or indications of misconduct by election officials on election day are presented, what legal recourses are available to complainants to litigate and potentially to remedy such wrongs and to contest the result of a presidential election? Presidential elections are conducted in each state and the District of Columbia to select "electors" from that state who will meet and formally vote for a candidate for President on the first Monday following the second Wednesday in December. Under the U.S. Constitution, these elections for presidential electors are administered and regulated in the first instance by the states, and state laws have established the procedures for ballot security, tallying the votes, challenging the vote count, recounts, and election contests within their respective jurisdictions. A candidate or voters challenging the results of a presidential election in a particular state would thus initially seek to contest the results of that election in the state according to the procedures and deadlines set out in the laws of that specific state. After the results of an election for presidential electors are officially certified by the state, the selected presidential electors meet and cast their votes for President in December. The certificates indicating the votes of the electors are then sent to the federal government, and those certificates are opened and the electoral votes formally announced during the first week in January in a joint session of the U.S. Congress, under the directions of the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution. The counting and the official tabulation of the electoral votes from the states within Congress provides a further opportunity to challenge and protest electoral votes from a state. Under federal law and congressional precedents, an objection may be made to the counting of electoral votes from a state by a formal objection made in writing by at least one Member of the House of Representatives and one Senator. Once made, each house of Congress separately debates and votes on the objection. If both houses of Congress sustain the objection, the electoral votes objected to are not counted; but if only one house, or neither the House nor the Senate, votes to sustain the objection, then the electoral votes from that state are counted.

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Introduction Bid protests of federal government contracts filed with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have received congressional scrutiny due to high-profile protests of awards, including protests filed against a $1.6 billion Department of Defense (DOD) contract for cloud services (protested by Amazon, Citrix Systems, and other companies); a contract to provide security background checks for the Department of Homeland Security (protested by US Investigations Services), and a NASA contract to develop crew space transportation capability (protested by Sierra Nevada Corp.). The increasing number of protests and the impact protests can have in delaying contract award or performance have raised concerns regarding the impact of protests on agency operations, especially in DOD. Both the House- and Senate- passed versions of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act seek to require a report on the GAO bid protest process. In addition to GAO sustaining a protest, protesters can also obtain relief when a contracting agency voluntarily acts to correct the allegation charged in the protest. The percentage of protesters obtaining relief—either through a protest being sustained or voluntary action taken by an agency—is called the effectiveness rate. Over the last five fiscal years the effectiveness rate has remained relatively stable, averaging 42%. Some observers believe that the increase in the effectiveness rate is a result of the predictable nature of GAO opinions. If GAO decisions are sufficiently predictable to allow agencies to determine how GAO will rule in a given situation, agencies may be more likely to voluntarily take corrective action than wait for GAO to sustain a protest. Under this theory, the effectiveness rate is a rough measure of the number of protests that have actual or potential merit. Others believe that corrective action often reflects agencies' risk-averse efforts to avoid even the potential of a protest being sustained. These observers could argue that the high likelihood of protests being resolved through voluntary agency corrective actions encourages companies to file protests. This trend reversed itself in FY2008: from FY2008-FY2014 total government spending, adjusted for inflation, decreased 25% while total protests increased 45%. This data indicates that, when compared to the rate of government spending, bid protests decreased from FY2001-FY2008, and increased from FY2008-FY2014. The rate at which GAO sustains protests has also seen a significant shift in recent years. From FY2001-FY2008 GAO sustained protests in 22% of their opinions; from FY2009-FY2014 that number dropped to 17% (see Figure 7 ). This data seems to indicate that while companies are more likely to file a bid protest, they are somewhat less likely to win a bid protest. When agencies do not adequately debrief losing bidders, the losing companies may file a protest to determine why they lost the competition. To the extent that poor communication between government and agencies result in bid protests, improving agency communication, clarity, and debriefs could result in fewer protests. The specter of a company filing a bid protest appears to influence agency behavior—sometimes positively and sometimes negatively. Fear of protests may motivate agency officials to conduct more rigorous market research, hold a competition instead of awarding a sole-source contract, or conduct a more thorough and fair competition. Fear of a protest could also prompt officials to try to structure a contract in a manner they deem less likely to be protested, such as using lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) as an award criteria instead of a best-value competition (when best value may be more appropriate). Protests against civilian agencies are also growing at a faster rate than protests against DOD.

Bid protests on federal government contracts filed with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have received congressional scrutiny due to protests of high-profile awards and reports that the number of protests is increasing. Concerns over delays in contract award or performance triggered by a GAO protest, coupled with the increasing number of GAO protests, have prompted concerns about the potential impact of protests upon government agency operations, especially in the Department of Defense (DOD). Both the House- and Senate- passed versions of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act call for a report on the bid protest process. There has been a significant shift in bid protest trends over the last six years. When compared to the rate of government spending, bid protests decreased from FY2001-FY2008, and increased from FY2008-FY2014. From FY2008-FY2014, total government spending, adjusted for inflation, decreased 25% while total protests increased 45%. The rate at which GAO sustains protests has also seen a significant shift in recent years. From FY2001-FY2008 GAO sustained protests in 22% of their opinions; from FY2009-FY2014 that number dropped to 17%. These numbers suggest that while companies are more likely to file a bid protest, they are somewhat less likely to win a bid protest. In addition to GAO sustaining a protest, contracting agencies may voluntarily act to correct the allegation charged in the protest. The percentage of protesters obtaining relief—either through a protest being sustained or voluntary action taken by an agency—is called the effectiveness rate. Over the last five fiscal years the effectiveness rate has remained relatively stable, averaging 42%. Some observers believe that the increase in the effectiveness rate is a result of the predictable nature of GAO opinions. When agencies can determine how GAO will rule in a given situation, they are more likely to voluntarily take corrective action. Under this theory, the effectiveness rate is a rough measure of the number of protests that have merit. Others believe that voluntary action by agencies is often a result of a risk-averse culture that seeks to avoid even the potential of a protest being sustained. These observers could argue that the high likelihood of protests being resolved through voluntary agency action encourages companies to file protests. Analysts believe that protests are sometimes the result of poor communication between government and industry, poorly written requirements, and agencies not adequately debriefing losing bidders after an award. When agencies do not adequately debrief bidders, companies may file a protest to determine why they lost a competition. If poor communication results in bid protests, improving agency communication, clarity, and debriefs could result in fewer protests. The specter of a company filing a protest can influence agency behavior—sometimes positively and sometimes negatively. Fear of a protest may motivate agency officials to conduct more rigorous market research, hold a competition instead of using sole-source awards, or conduct a more thorough and fair competition. Fear of a protest could also prompt officials to try to structure a contract in a manner they deem less likely to be protested, such as using lowest price technically acceptable as an award criteria instead of a best-value competition (when best value may be more appropriate). DOD contracts are less likely to be protested, and when protested, less likely to be sustained than civilian agency contracts. Protests against civilian agencies are also growing at a faster rate than protests against DOD.